No Higher Law
No Higher Law
American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776

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No Higher Law
We can not fail, under the favor of a gracious Providence, to attain the high destiny which seems to await us.
—James Monroe, Inaugural Address, 1817

The same force that had once guided Pilgrim sails to Plymouth Rock had impressed our ships at Manila and our army at Santiago. Upon us rested the duty of extending Christian civilization, of crushing despotism, of uplifting humanity and making the rights of man prevail. Providence has put it upon us.
—Senator Orville Platt (R.-Conn.), 1898

A gray ship flying the American flag in every corner of the world is a statement about who we are, what we are interested in, and how we assure and deter in the far reaches of the earth.
—Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, 2007
Introduction

Writing history is almost always an effort to make the past speak to the present. I have written No Higher Law in that spirit. My research has been guided by concerns about America and the world in the first decades of the twenty-first century, even as I write about the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the campaign against pirates of the Caribbean in the 1820s, America’s first treaty protectorate regime in Colombia in 1846, and Senate debates on treaties from 1794 to the end of World War II. Asking the past to speak to the present is not the same as seeing and describing the past strictly through modern perspectives, ideas, or morality. Rather, such a historical inquiry reconsiders the past both to better understand it on its own terms and to reframe our understanding of the present.

As I wrote this book, the United States was engaged in a Global War on Terror. Unilateral, preemptive, and even preventive military intervention was official American policy. President George W. Bush proclaimed this policy with less stealth than Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, but with hardly more imperiousness than James Polk, more swagger than Theodore Roosevelt, or more cynicism than Richard Nixon. President Bush’s predecessor, William Clinton, had declared: “When our national security interests are threatened, we will, as America always has, use diplomacy when we can, but force if we must. We will act with others when we can, but alone when we must.” And George W. Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, had told the Chicago Council of Global Affairs on April 23, 2007: “No president should ever hesitate to use force—unilaterally if necessary—to protect ourselves and our vital interests when we are attacked or imminently threatened.”

U.S. presidents since the Republic’s first decades had announced their willingness to use force unilaterally to protect U.S. citizens and the country’s security interests, a disposition consistent with conventional notions of the right of sovereign nation-states to act in self-defense to preserve their independent
existence and vital interests. Likewise, American policymakers resorted to preemptive use of military force and justified policies toward Spain, England, and France in the Western Hemisphere as anticipatory self-defense from the 1790s.

In more modern times, preemptive war in self-defense is recognized in customary international law and under the United Nations Charter. Preemptive war is much more controversial but, on balance, plausibly justified in the name of self-defense (if intelligence on enemy intentions and capabilities indicates that the risks of inaction are too great to tolerate). U.S. support for “regime change,” that is, overt or clandestine operations to overthrow the governments of sovereign nations, may be more controversial but is also without historical novelty. Indeed, American-sponsored regime change preceded annexation of West Florida in 1810, Texas in 1845, California in 1850, and Hawaii in 1898.

To make sense of policies that took U.S. armed forces to Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 and engaged them around the world in hundreds of more or less clandestine operations before and after September 11, 2001, we need to look to the evolution of America’s foreign policy from the beginnings of the Republic. We need to ask how American policies were shaped in response to changes in the international system and how they were influenced by domestic politics and by underlying American religious and cultural premises. No Higher Law is such a historical inquiry. It seeks to uncover the sources of present American foreign policy by taking a long view of ideological, institutional, and political development within a dynamic international system.

No Higher Law reveals a continuity in certain beliefs, institutions, policies, and practices in the American experience as part of the country’s evolving grand strategy. These continuities persisted despite ongoing changes in the international system and dramatic augmentation in American economic power and military capabilities since the late nineteenth century. No Higher Law demonstrates not only that American foreign policy was rarely inspired by benevolence—not a surprise, since consistent saintly behavior is too much to expect of any nation-state in a dangerous international system—but that to achieve its foreign policy objectives the United States engaged in aggressive diplomacy, often deployed military force into foreign territory, and orchestrated regime change to overthrow the governments of sovereign nations judged inimical to U.S. interests.

In these respects the United States behaved much like other powers in the international system, within constraints imposed by geography, technology, economic resources, and military capabilities. However, unlike the great powers of Europe, which relied on shifting alliances and balance of power.
Chapter One

The Isolationist Myth

We are met together at a most interesting period. The situation of the principal powers of Europe are singular and portentous. Connected with some by treaties and with all by commerce, no important event there can be indifferent to us.—John Adams, First Message to Congress, 1797

Making sense of U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first century requires rethinking America's historical role in the community of nations. It also requires understanding the connection between partisan and sectional politics and the foreign policy challenges confronted by the new nation in the first half century after independence.

The American colonies' war for independence from Britain was part of a major conflict among European powers that stretched from India and the Mediterranean into the West Indies and North America. French and Spanish arms, supplies, money, naval assets, and troops deployed against the British made possible American independence.¹ In the decades after its independence, America's leaders devised policies for inserting the country into an international system dominated by the European powers. Although never entirely consensual, the emerging policies were rooted in concerns for the new nation's security, ambitious commercial and territorial aspirations, and an assertive nationalism. In its first half century, American foreign policy was expansionist, self-congratulatory, far reaching, aggressive, and sometimes idealistic—but never isolationist.

There is abundant scholarship debunking the myth of U.S. foreign policy isolationism after independence.² Yet there persists among many Americans the idea that until 1898 U.S. foreign policy conformed to an isolationist vision bequeathed by George Washington's Farewell Address in 1796 or Thomas Jefferson's admonition against “entangling alliances” in 1801.³ But Washington
and Jefferson were not isolationists. They did not promote American disen-
gagement and separation from international politics, international diplomacy,
or international commerce or even from meddling in European politics and
influencing the balance of power in European affairs. Neither did their suc-
cessors in America’s first half century. As Alexander H. Everett, America’s
minister to Spain.

Beginnings

No constitutional authority existed for Madison’s proclamation. He explained
this operation to Congress in early December, appealing to international
law, “necessity,” and the immediate economic and security threats posed by
the uncertain situation of the Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere.
(Napoleon had usurped the Spanish throne in 1808, ensconcing his brother
Joseph as ruler of Spain.) Madison’s West Florida initiative combined prag-
matism, opportunism, and “soft power” (appeals to international norms, even
if the particular terms of the Louisiana Purchase had been contested by the
Bourbon Monarchy before Napoleon’s invasion of Spain in 1808). Madison
justified his West Florida operation to Congress in December 1810:

Among the events growing out of the state of the Spanish monarchy,
our attention was imperiously attracted to the change developing itself
in that portion of West Florida which, though of right appertaining to
the United States, had remained in the possession of Spain, awaiting
the result of negotiations for its actual delivery to them. The Span-
ish authority was subverted, and a situation produced exposing the
country to ulterior events which might essentially affect the rights and
welfare of the Union. In such a conjuncture I did not delay the inter-
position required for the occupancy of the territory west of the river
Perdido, to which the title of the United States extends, and to which
the laws provided for the territory of Orleans are applicable. . . . The
legality and necessity of the course pursued, assure me of the favorable
light in which it will present itself to the legislature, and of the prompt-
tude with which they will supply whatever provisions may be due to
the essential rights and equitable interests of the people thus brought
into the bosom of the American family.

Madison presented Congress with a fait accompli: West Florida was now
declared to be part of the Union. As had Adams and Jefferson before him,
Madison wished to ensure that the annexation “was [plausibly] compatible
with the law of nations and would eventually be accepted as such by settlers
on the Gulf Coast and by governments in London, Madrid and Paris. Madison understood the intricate links between American domestic politics and the country’s position in the international system.

Just prior to the 1812 war with the United Kingdom, Congress had reached out to Spain’s colonies, inviting them to gain their independence, but without risking direct confrontation with Spain and its British ally:

Be it,

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That they behold, with friendly interest, the establishment of independent sovereignties by the Spanish provinces in America, consequent upon the actual state of the monarchy to which they belonged; that, as neighbors and inhabitants of the same hemisphere, the United States feel great solicitude for their welfare; and that, when those provinces shall have attained the condition of nations, by the just exercise of their rights, the Senate and House of Representatives will unite with the Executive in establishing with them, as sovereign and independent States, such amicable relations and commercial intercourse as may require their Legislative authority.

This backhanded encouragement for independence movements throughout Spanish America only made sense in the context of the global moment: the United States faced war with England, and Madison plotted the invasion of

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<td>Quasi-War</td>
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<td>Barbary Coast War</td>
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<td>Creek War</td>
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THE ISOLATIONIST MYTH
East Florida. Congress would pass the No Transfer Resolution in January 1811, aimed at deterring possible British intervention in Cuba or Florida. Felix Grundy (R.-Tenn.) told his colleagues:

Grundy not only imagined an American empire; he also assessed the impact of war on relations with France and other European powers. His appeal to domestic economic interests and patriotism and to the defense of women and children against “savages” sounds as modern as effective rallying-round-the-flag coalition-building. His global framework sharpens the significance of the 1811 resolution declaring that the United States would “behold, with friendly interest, the establishment of independent sovereignties by the Spanish provinces in America.” Isolationism was not Grundy’s plate of choice.

Viewed by the British in 1814, the fates of Texas, Oregon, Canada, and the Spanish northern territories, including California, the West Indies, and the Central American isthmus, were hardly sealed with the stamp of the Eagle. Spain had reconquered some of its Western Hemisphere possessions with counterrevolutionary military campaigns; Mexico and Peru, the centers of the colonial empire, and Cuba, its most important military base in the Caribbean, had remained under Spanish control. What in retrospect seems “inevitable”—Latin American independence, American acquisition of Texas and the Oregon Territory, and incorporation of California into the Union—was not deemed so by policymakers in 1815. The British, French, Portuguese, Dutch, and Russians had not yet given up on the Western Hemisphere. To create a secure bastion in the hemisphere, American foreign policy would, of necessity, contest the ambitions of the major European powers for the foreseeable future. In the meantime, the Spanish-American wars of independence engaged the United States in messy diplomacy with Spain and other European powers, as well as clandestine military and commercial operations into the early 1820s.
Chapter Two

The Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny

We cannot obscure ourselves, if we would; a part we must take, honorable or dishonorable, in all that is done in the civilized world. —Congressman Daniel Webster, 1823

From the 1780s into the 1820s, Americans constructed an emergent nationalism based partly on their cultural, religious, and political traditions, partly through engagement and war with Native peoples and the European powers, and partly through the creation of new national myths. America’s exceptionalism, its example to all the world, its rightful role as protector of the Western Hemisphere, and its Providential destiny became the stuff of national identity and popular culture, which informed U.S. policy. Such notions also became stock rhetoric in the halls of Congress as Americans came to see themselves and their unique political experiment in contradistinction to the tyranny of European monarchies and in contraposition to negative images of Catholic Spain and Spanish America. Spain, its culture, institutions, and religion was “what the United States should not become”—a decadent empire, the antithesis of the American beacon of freedom and liberty. And, as intellectual historian Iván Jaksic discovered, “Latin America did not fare any better. All the negative characteristics ascribed to Spain were simply transferred across the Atlantic [by American writers], where the element of race added ever darker overtones.”

Like foreign policy more generally, American policy toward the Western Hemisphere was shaped by domestic politics as well as international circumstances. In the years following the War of 1812, the interplay between foreign policy and domestic politics vectored America toward ascendancy in the Western Hemisphere. President Madison’s (1809–17) incursions into the Floridas and his invasion of Canada during the War of 1812, followed by President James Monroe’s renewed aggression against East Florida (1817–19), set
<table>
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<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rush-Bagot Agreement</td>
<td>1817</td>
<td>Demilitarizes the boundary with Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andrew Jackson attacks Seminoles/ Spanish</td>
<td>1817–18</td>
<td>Jackson defeats Seminoles and escaped slaves; destroys Spanish forts, British plantations; seizes Spanish territory; proclaims provisional military government at Pensacola; operation divides Republican Party among anti-Jackson faction and pro-Jackson faction, headed by Adams</td>
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<td>Anglo-American Convention</td>
<td>1818</td>
<td>Provides for joint Anglo-American occupation of the Oregon Territory; United States requests return of slaves (&quot;property&quot;) in British territory or on British ships when the Treaty of Ghent (1814) was signed</td>
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<td>Adams-Onis Treaty</td>
<td>1819</td>
<td>Acquisition of East Florida from Spain and demarcation of the U.S. boundary with Spanish territory across the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean</td>
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<td>Missouri Compromise</td>
<td>1820</td>
<td>Establishes north/south boundary for expansion of slavery in territory of the Louisiana Purchase at latitude 36°30′; maintains balance of slave and free states in the Senate</td>
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<td>Diplomatic Recognition</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td>United States recognizes independence of five Spanish American republics: Gran Colombia (Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela after 1830); Mexico, Chile, Peru, La Plata (Buenos Ayres)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creation of the West Indian Squadron</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td>War on pirates in the Caribbean; conflict with Spanish authorities in Cuba and Puerto Rico</td>
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<td>Monroe Doctrine</td>
<td>1823</td>
<td>Announced in December message to Congress</td>
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<td>Russo-American treaty</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td>Limits Russian expansion south on the Pacific Coast</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anglo-American treaty</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td>Suppression of slave trade through naval interdiction by American and British ships (not ratified by Britain)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gran Colombia</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td>First American trade and navigation treaty with a Spanish American republic; incorporates principle of &quot;free ships make free goods&quot;</td>
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the United States against Spain and England. Calls from American legislators to support Spain's rebellious colonies, beginning in 1811, provoked Spanish, French, and even Russian anger. As wars raged across the Spanish American empire (1810–26), American merchants, mercenaries, and emissaries undermined Spanish rule. In 1822, the United States became the first nation to recognize the independence of several Spanish American republics—a unilateral and revolutionary initiative challenging the European monarchies and the rules of "legitimacy" in the existing international system.3

For years, the European powers and the Spanish Americans would take little practical notice of Monroe's claim to an American protectorate over the hemisphere. If Americans gradually came to believe that the Monroe Doctrine established principles or even rights in international law, Europeans thought less of it. As the British and the Americans contested commercial privileges and political influence during the next half century, British diplomatic correspondence repeatedly revealed the low opinion held for America's unilaterality and the challenges it raised for international law and to European
possessions in the region—but also the extent to which the Monroe Doctrine became patriotic pulp for domestic politics in the United States. In private correspondence to Lord Clarendon in 1853 regarding American regional policy and tolerance for filibustering operations in Cuba, England’s chief diplomat in Washington, D.C., wrote:

By eternal repetition this so-called doctrine is gradually becoming, in the minds of the Democracy here, one of those habitual maxims which are no longer reasoned upon but felt, and any imagined “violation of the Monroe Doctrine” is now vehemently taken up as a just reason for peremptory demand for satisfaction from any Foreign Power who may have committed it.

Now altho’ I know that a great deal of this language is held for home political purposes, each party out-bidding the other in its offer of “Americanism,” still it cannot be denied that a very dangerous effect is produced upon the Masses by such doctrines, and it becomes a very grave question what position Foreign Powers ought to adopt in regard to them. It seems to me quite clear that if carried out to their full effect, we should be forced to resist them somewhere, and the question remains as to the point at which it would be advisable to make a stand.\footnote{52}

By the 1840s, an expanded Monroe Doctrine had become a foundation of American foreign policy but also a bipartisan pillar of jingoism in American politics. As a unilateral doctrine aimed at European powers, its meaning, the circumstances when it would be applied, and its reach were strictly matters for U.S. policymakers to decide as they sought for America.

Appendix: Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–1846\footnote{52}

1798–1800—Undeclared Naval War with France.

1801–5—Tripoli. The First Barbary War included the USS George Washington and USS Philadelphia affairs and the Eaton expedition, during which a few marines landed with Agent William Eaton to raise a force against Tripoli in an effort to free the crew of the Philadelphia. Tripoli declared war, but the United States did not.

1806—Mexico (Spanish territory). Captain Zebulon M. Pike, with a platoon of troops, invaded Spanish territory at the headwaters of the Rio Grande on orders from General James Wilkinson.

Chapter Three

Providential Nursery?

What has miserable, inefficient Mexico—with her superstition, her burlesque upon freedom, her actual tyranny by the few over the many—what has she to do with the great mission of peopling the new world with a noble race? Be it ours, to achieve that mission!

—Walt Whitman, Editorial, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1846

Between 1800 and 1867 the United States more than tripled in size. But American territorial aggrandizement did not happen Providentially. American diplomats successfully negotiated treaties with European powers transferring territory to the United States. American policymakers also made war on European nations, Native Americans, and Mexico. They gradually subverted foreign claims over vast territories across North America. War, annexation proclamations, covert operations, filibusters, skillful diplomatic negotiations, land purchases, westward migration, immigration, and technological innovation all combined to transform a fragile, militarily weak federal republic into an increasingly potent nation-state.

European wars spilled over into the Western Hemisphere, engaging the United States alternately against British, French, and Spanish forces from the Floridas to Canada. War proffered both danger and opportunity. Each conflict spawned internal dissent along partisan and sectional lines, which threatened the country with disunion but also provided the chance to expand the nation’s territorial domain and increase its weight in the international system. The European wars, and especially the Napoleonic wars, also revolutionized the Western Hemisphere by undermining the Spanish colonial empire.

After Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808, independence movements erupted in parts of Spanish America (1810–14). The Spanish American insurgencies challenged American policymakers and merchants to balance the country’s territorial ambitions (especially in the Floridas) and its economic interests
between Spanish claims and the affection for the United States of the insurgents from Mexico to southern South America. American government agents went to Buenos Aires, Chile, and Venezuela (1811–12), then throughout South America. Although the United States reaffirmed its policy of neutrality in 1818, mercenaries, merchants, and political missionaries with copies of the American Declaration of Independence weighed in on the side of the insurgents. American ports were opened to Spanish American rebels—Monroe made this official policy in messages to Congress in 1817 and 1818. With final ratification of the Adams-Onís Treaty in 1821, Monroe finally sent a message to Congress on March 8, 1822, urging recognition of the Spanish American republics and requesting appropriations for “such missions to the independent nations on the American continent as the President of the United States may deem proper.”

Less than two months before Mexican independence, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams delivered a Fourth of July speech in 1821 which would become a classic referent in the mythology of American foreign policy. He told the House of Representatives that America has “in the lapse of nearly half a century, without a single exception, respected the independence of other nations while asserting and maintaining her own. She has abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when conflict has been for principles to which she clings, as to the last vital drop that visits the heart. . . . she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all.”

By the time John Quincy Adams delivered this speech, American foreign policy had departed markedly from the claims of his myth-in-the-making moment. Although perhaps good advice, especially the trope on avoiding quests for monsters to destroy, Adams’s assertion that “she [the United States] has abstained from interference in the concerns of others” rang hollow to Native peoples, European powers, North African potentates, and even the Spanish Americans. Efforts to open markets, acquire territory, civilize and Christianize “savage” and “inferior” peoples, and influence foreign governments contradicted almost all of Adams’s claims. As conservative historian Max Boot put it: “The U.S. has been involved in other countries’ internal affairs since at least 1805, when, during the Tripolitan War, William Eaton tried to topple the Pasha of Tripoli and replace him with his pro-American brother.”

Two years after Adams’s July 4th foreign policy address, President James Monroe, with Adams’s assistance, concocted the Monroe Doctrine under circumstances detailed in chapter 2. Monroe announced American intentions to oversee the New World and warned Europe to discard any thought of renewed colonization or political influence in the Western Hemisphere.
Monroe shared his generation’s vision of an American dominion stretching between the seas, “under the favor of a gracious Providence, to attain the high destiny which seems to await us.”

From Monroe to Polk

American political development and foreign relations in the first half of the nineteenth century depended greatly on the use of military force or the threat of force. Native peoples resisted as the army and settlers appropriated their lands and destroyed their way of life. The Spanish sought to defend the Floridas from U.S. advances and small-scale filibusters. In the course of losing their Western Hemisphere colonies, they could no longer resist U.S. pressures and ceded Florida in the 1819 Adams-Onís Treaty. Monroe’s successors, John Quincy Adams (1825–29) and Andrew Jackson (1829–37), added no European-held or Mexican territory to the United States, but both supported acquisition of Texas from Mexico. Then, in 1836, Mexico lost Texas in a U.S.-supported rebellion. Texas became an independent republic, achieving recognition by several continental European powers, England, and the United States despite Mexican opposition. Before leaving office in 1837, Andrew Jackson threatened Mexico with use of force if it refused to resolve certain outstanding claims of U.S. citizens. The language in Jackson's message was menacing; it called upon Congress to authorize the president to use the navy to “take reprisals” against Mexico if it should fail to satisfy American demands. Jackson then urged Congress to recognize the independence of the Republic of Texas with appointment of a chargé d’affaires.

Eight years later, in late February 1845, ignoring Mexican admonitions that annexation of Texas would be considered the equivalent of a declaration of war, Congress voted in a joint resolution to do just that. The question of Texas annexation had been an important issue in the presidential campaign of 1844. Factionalism within the Democratic Party and partisanship between Democrats and Whigs in the Senate had cost President John Tyler his party’s nomination and led to the election of Democrat James K. Polk. Lame-duck president Tyler could not obtain the necessary two-thirds vote in the senate for approval of a treaty between Texas and the United States for Texas’s annexation. The votes of twenty-five Whigs against the treaty made annexation by joint resolution Tyler’s only viable option.

Congress's joint resolution was aimed partly at countering British and French policies intended to persuade Mexico to recognize Texas’s independence so long as it did not accede to annexation by the United States. In January 1845 British foreign secretary Lord Aberdeen had written: “Her Majesty's
Government are of opinion that the continuance of Texas as Independent Power, under its own Laws and institutions, must conduce to a more permanent balance of interests in the North American continent, and that its interposition between the United States and Mexico offers the best chance of a preservation of friendly relations between those two Governments.”

France also favored an independent Texas, as made clear by Foreign Minister François Guizot in June 1845: “There are in America [the Western Hemisphere] three powers, the United States, England, and the states of Spanish origin. . . . What is the interest of France? It is that the independent states remain independent, that the balance of forces between the great masses which divide America continue, that no one of them become exclusively preponderant.”

Contemporary diplomatic correspondence thus makes clear that, notwithstanding the Monroe Doctrine, for the European powers the Western Hemisphere remained part of the global chessboard.
Chapter Four

The Good Neighbor

When we wanted this country we came and took it. If we want Central America, the cheapest, easiest and quickest way to get it is to go and take it, and if France and England interfere, read the Monroe doctrine to them.—Senator Albert Gallatin Brown (D.-Miss.), September 11, 1858

Looking backward from 1860, many Latin American leaders and intellectuals had come to distrust and fear the United States. Beyond the anger, it was difficult for Latin Americans—as well as for historians to the present—to make sense of how U.S. partisan and sectional politics influenced American policy in the hemisphere. Such an understanding requires reconsideration of the relationship between American political and economic development and the country's international relations.

Until the Civil War, America had lived off slavery. Slaves produced most of America's important cash crops such as cotton, tobacco, rice, indigo, and sugarcane. With Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton gin in 1793, southern agriculture became gradually less diversified; cotton was king and the perpetuation of slavery was assured. The American South grew 60 percent of the world's cotton and provided some 70 percent of the cotton in the British textile industry in 1840. Thus, slavery paid for a substantial share of the capital, iron, and manufactured goods that fueled American economic growth. Duties on those imports financed the federal government, whose main source of revenue was land sales and customs duties. In 1850, almost 2 million slaves worked on cotton plantations, and cotton accounted for more than half of the value of exports—ten times more than its nearest competitor, the wheat and wheat flour of the North. By 1860, slaves represented almost 15 percent of the American population, and this figure reached over 45 percent in states such as Georgia and Alabama. In South Carolina, slaves outnumbered free persons.
Embedded in global commercial and financial networks, the cotton plantations linked America to all continents, to manufacturing workers in England and Europe, to labor markets in Africa and Asia, and to the world’s financial centers. British capital financed southern banks, which extended credit to planters to open up new lands for cotton cultivation. New England shipping and finance supported and was supported by the slave economy. In 1860, U.S. cotton manufacturing still generated more income than the iron industry; it too relied indirectly on slavery. As settlers moved west, western farmers sold corn, wheat, and livestock products to the southern plantations. Slaves served as collateral for loans, were themselves commodities, and, through taxes on their sale and value, funded local and state governments. In short, slavery was a bedrock of American economic and political development.

Colombian poet José María Torres Caicedo, living in Paris, responded to the Walker episode and American filibustering in Cuba and Central America with *Las dos Americas* (The Two Americas), a bitter denunciation of the betrayal by the United States of its own revolutionary past and its aggression against the poet’s *América Latina*:

> The Latin American race  
> is confronted by the Saxon Race  
> Mortal enemy who now threatens  
> To destroy its liberty and its banner.

The Walker intervention, along with other filibuster expeditions and repeated American and European interventions in the region, are seen by one school of Latin American scholars as the origin of popularization of the term *América Latina* (Latin America) and for a growing sense of Pan-Latinism (*Latinidad*) in reaction to Anglo-American presumptions of political hegemony and cultural superiority. President Pierce’s recognition of the Walker government made the filibuster much more than the story of a “loose cannon.” Central American and Mexican nationalism would have anti-Americanism as a basic ingredient in the future.
Chapter Five

The New Manifest Destiny

The Civil War bloodied the United States and threatened it with dissolution. It had not, however, cured the country of an inveterate belief in its special Providence and manifest destiny. Notwithstanding the postwar tribulations of Reconstruction, racial strife, cyclic economic crises, and labor conflict, the country’s leaders recast and expanded America’s regional and global mission while maintaining unilateralism as its basic foreign policy principle.1

On Abraham Lincoln’s assassination in April 1865, Vice President Andrew Johnson (1865–69) assumed the presidency. Johnson had never been a Republican but rather a “Unionist,” and he was the only southerner not to leave the Senate at the outset of the Civil War. In his first annual message to Congress, he reaffirmed his faith in America’s Providential origin and destiny: “To form a more perfect Union, by an ordinance of the people of the United States, is the declared purpose of the Constitution. The hand of Divine Providence was never more plainly visible in the affairs of men than in the framing and adopting of that instrument. It is, beyond comparison, the greatest event in American history; and indeed, is it not, of all the events in modern times, the most pregnant with consequences for every people of the earth?”

Johnson’s message dwelt primarily on the task of reconstruction at home, but he also included glowing reports on American commercial relations as well as technological and scientific cooperation with the emperors of China, Russia, and Brazil. He ended his message with a remarkable celebration of American exceptionalism, especially coming only seven months after General Robert E. Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Courthouse on April 9, 1865.
## Table 5.1. American Delegates to the First International Conference of American States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delegate</th>
<th>Biography</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Carnegie</td>
<td>Carnegie Steel, largest producer of steel, pig iron, and rails in the world and supplier of armor plate for the New Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornelius N. Bliss</td>
<td>Textile magnate; chair of New York Republican state committee (1887–88); founder of American Protective Tariff League; treasurer of the Republican National Committee (1892); secretary of the interior under McKinley (1897–99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Jefferson Coolidge</td>
<td>Boston financier and banker; directorships of Merchants National Bank of Boston and the New England Trust Company; management of various railroads; U.S. minister to France, 1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clement Studebaker</td>
<td>World’s largest manufacturer of carriages and wagons; since the late 1850s, the family company had sold wagons to the U.S. Army; after 1897, gradually entered automobile manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles R. Flint</td>
<td>Ship owner, exporter, arms merchant, speculator, only member of the delegation with long-standing interest in Latin America; major exporter to Brazil; business associate of Brazilian minister Salvador de Mendoça (Brazilian delegate to the conference); Chilean consul at New York City, a post he filled from 1876 to 1879, at which time he became consul general to the United States for Nicaragua and Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Gassaway Davis</td>
<td>Former U.S. senator (D.-W.Va., 1871–83); lumber, coal, and railroad magnate; by 1892, Davis Coal &amp; Coke was among the largest in the world; also represented the United States at the 1901 Pan American Conference; unsuccessful vice-presidential candidate in 1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John F. Hanson</td>
<td>Bibb Manufacturing Company, a Georgia textile manufacturer; by 1900, the company owned the largest cotton mill in the country; newspaper owner; a founder of Georgia Tech University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris M. Estee</td>
<td>California fruit grower and lawyer; secretary of the state Republican Central Committee (1871–75); state assemblyman representing Sacramento; established vineyards in Napa, California; delegate to the 1888 Republican National Convention; in 1890, appointed to the U.S. District Court in Hawaii; interested in Nicaraguan canal project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John B. Henderson</td>
<td>Former U.S. senator from Missouri; coauthor of Thirteenth Amendment; Washington lawyer; presided over Republican National Convention (1884)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William H. Trescot</td>
<td>Diplomat; counsel for the United States before the Halifax Fishery Commission (1877); commissioner for the revision of the treaty with China (1880); minister to Chile (1881–82); in 1882, with General U.S. Grant, negotiated a commercial treaty with Mexico</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Six

The New Navy

Our interest and our dignity require that our rights should depend upon the will of no other state, but upon our own power to enforce them.—CAPTAIN ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, 1898

In the year of the First International Conference of American States, President Harrison appointed Benjamin F. Tracy as secretary of the navy. Tracy, influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan, who was working at the newly created (1884) Naval War College, recommended construction of two fleets of battleships, twelve ships for the Atlantic, eight for the Pacific, all of them equal to the best in the world in regard to armor, armaments, structural strength, and speed. He also proposed adding sixty fast cruisers for commercial raiding and coastal defense.1

In 1890, Mahan published The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660–1783. This book became an intellectual foundation for a massive naval modernization program and for American imperial expansion. According to Mahan, economic prosperity and national security could not be separated. The key to both was a powerful navy deployed to every region of the planet. Since military and economic power were interdependent, some sort of imperialism, however euphemized, could not be avoided if American destiny “in the broadest sense” was to be fulfilled. Mahan argued that “when a question arises of control over distant regions . . . whether they be crumbling empires, anarchical republics, colonies, isolated military posts, or [small] islands, it must ultimately be decided by naval power.” Mahan saw potential threats to America almost everywhere and warned that action must be taken to deter or destroy them. European and Asian rivals would not be constrained by international law—only by American military power. Most notably, Mahan sought to instill fear of potential enemies and their capabilities, or even their potential capabilities, into public and congressional debates on naval budgets and doctrine.2
Theodore Roosevelt, then assistant secretary of the navy, had neatly summarized this global vision in a letter to Alfred Thayer Mahan, just before the Spanish-American War:

**THIS LETTER MUST,** of course, be considered as entirely confidential, because in my position I am merely carrying out the policy of the secretary and the President. I suppose I need not tell you that as regards Hawaii I take your views absolutely, as indeed I do on foreign policy generally. If I had my way we would annex those islands tomorrow. If that is impossible I would establish a protectorate over them.

I believe we should build the Nicaraguan canal at once, and, in the meantime, that we should build a dozen new battleships, half of them on the Pacific Coast; and these battleships should have large coal capacity and a consequent increased radius of action.

I am fully alive to the danger from Japan, and I know that it is idle to rely on any sentimental goodwill toward us.

... There are big problems in the West Indies also. Until we definitely turn Spain out of those islands (and if I had my way that would be done tomorrow), we will always be menaced by trouble there. We should acquire the Danish Islands and, by turning Spain out, should serve notice that no strong European power, and especially not Germany, should be allowed to gain a foothold by supplanting some weak European power. I do not fear England—Canada is a hostage for her good behavior but I do fear some of the other powers.62

Underlying agreement existed among the imperialists and the navalists on the need to defend the Caribbean and expand the New Navy, but differences of opinion existed on strategy and tactics. Mahan, for example, hesitated on annexation of the Philippines. Once taken, the islands would have to be defended, placing a severe burden on the navy if challenged by Japan or Germany. Some of the navalists favored annexation of Cuba; others preferred a protectorate over a nominally independent republic. On the Central American isthmus, some believed that the 1846 treaty with Colombia could be used, along with cash, to control a Panamanian canal. Others, like Roosevelt, had no patience for the Colombians’ insistence on treatment as a sovereign country. In any case, for the moment, they preferred a Nicaraguan canal. But Roosevelt did not favor annexation of Nicaragua, Panama, or the Dominican Republic. He shared doubts about their peoples’ suitability as citizens and preferred stable protectorate regimes to their acquisition by the United States.63
Chapter Seven

Protective Imperialism

[God] has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns. . . . He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission of America.

—Senator Albert J. Beveridge, Washington, D.C., 1900

President Theodore Roosevelt’s recovery of the No Transfer Principle and his expansive interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine inaugurated a decade of American military intervention and colonialism. American policymakers intended not only to consolidate hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and enhance the country’s global power; they also sought to remake the political and social systems of their new possessions. As General Leonard Wood, military governor of Cuba (1899–1902) and then commander of the Philippines Division and commander of the Department of the East (1902–3), put it, the United States “became responsible for the welfare of the people, politically, mentally, and morally.” The new possessions were populated by colonial subjects, like the Indian Nations within the United States, defined by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1831 as “domestic dependent nations [that] occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will. . . . Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”

By 1885, the U.S. Supreme Court had transformed the Indians into “local dependent communities” rather than dependent nations and had decided that Indians born on reservations were “nationals,” owing allegiance to the United States without the privileges of citizenship. For the expansionists and imperialists after 1898, policy toward the Caribbean and Pacific protectorates had much to emulate from the country’s subjugation of the Indian peoples. In his acceptance speech for the Republican vice presidential nomination in 1900, Theodore Roosevelt made clear the connection between Indian policy and
colonial policy: “[On Indian reservations,] the army officers and the civilian agents still exercise authority without asking the ‘consent of the governed.’ We must proceed in the Philippines with the same wise caution.”

For some Latin Americans, the United States seemed much more fearsome than any European power that might want to collect debts or extend its influence in the Western Hemisphere. For Colombian author and journalist José María Vargas Vila, the United States had become the principal enemy of the Latin American people. In *Ante los Bárbaros* (Facing the Barbarians), first published in 1900 and then reprinted and “updated” on the anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine in 1923, Vargas Vila was less than subtle: “*El Yanki; He ahí el Enemigo*” (The Yanki, Here We Have the Enemy). Latin American intellectuals from Mexico to South America responded eloquently to America’s imperial pretensions. Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío wrote in his *To Roosevelt* (1904):

You are the United States,  
you are the future invader  
of the naive America that has Indian blood,  
that still prays to Jesus Christ and still speaks Spanish.  
. . . Catholic America, Spanish America,  
the America in which noble Cuauhtemoc said:  
“I’m not in a bed of roses”; that America  
that trembles in hurricanes and lives on love,  
it lives, you men of Saxon eyes and barbarous soul.  
And it dreams. And it loves, and it vibrates, and it is the daughter of the Sun.  
Be careful. Viva Spanish America!  
There are a thousand cubs loosed from the Spanish lion.  
Roosevelt, one would have to be, through God himself,  
the terrible Rifleman and strong Hunter,  
to manage to grab us in your iron claws.  

Latin American nationalists and Hispanists urged solidarity against U.S. aggression and neocolonial imposition of its “superior culture” and institutions. These themes, dating as we have seen from Simón Bolívar’s distrust of American leaders and the warnings to his people by the first Mexican ambassador to the United States, would remain central to Latin American opposition to American policies in the hemisphere into the twenty-first century.
Chapter Eight

Return to Normalcy

When Europe turns to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of peace, there will be a struggle for commercial and industrial supremacy such as the world has never witnessed. And if this land of ours desires to maintain its eminence, it must be prepared for that struggle.
—Warren Harding, Speech to the National Association of Manufacturers, New York, 1915

Following American foreign policy tradition since the time of George Washington, in August 1914 President Woodrow Wilson declared U.S. neutrality in the conflict that became World War I. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan called on the belligerents to accept the Declaration of London as the definition of neutral rights. Britain illegally mined the North Sea and extended a blockade of Germany to foodstuffs and other noncontraband (non–war-making) items. In February 1915, Germany announced that British attempts to starve Germans with an illegal blockade required exceptional countermeasures. The waters around the British Isles would be considered a war zone. Enemy merchant ships found in the zone would be destroyed without provision for the safety of passengers or crew. Neutral ships should avoid the zone, lest they be mistaken for British ships and sunk inadvertently.

In response to the German decision, President Wilson issued his “strict accountability” message: “The government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property, and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas.” He added: “It is stated for the information of the Imperial Government that representations have been made to his Britannic Majesty’s Government in respect to the unwarranted use of the American flag for the protection of British ships.” In March 1915, Britain declared a blockade of all German ports and
warned that merchant ships bound to or from such ports would be subject to seizure and confiscation. The British interdicted American shipping, seizing some vessels, and impeded American trade with Germany.

During February and March of 1917, German submarines sank several American merchant ships. Americans continued to insist, unsuccessfully, as they had during the Napoleonic wars, on respect for neutral shipping. The powder keg only needed a spark to set it off. The idea that Germany intended to create a North American front in the war, should the United States respond forcefully when submarine warfare renewed, eliminated any doubt in American public opinion regarding “Hun treachery.” With the Zimmermann note, released to the American press on March 1, 1917, the Kaiser’s government lit the ready fuse. The note, intercepted by British intelligence, proposed an alliance with Mexico and recovery of lost territory from the Mexican War of 1846–48 upon German victory:

Berlin, January 19, 1917

We intend to begin unrestricted submarine warfare on the first of February. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: Make war together, make peace together, generous financial support, and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you.

You will inform the President [of Mexico] of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States is certain and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves.

Please call the President’s attention to the fact that the unrestricted employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England to make peace within a few months.

[Signed,] Zimmermann.

The idea of a German alliance with Mexico and restoration of the Southwest and Texas to Mexico after German victory not only defied the Monroe Doctrine and threatened U.S. with their national security but brought the monster of European intrusion into the Western Hemisphere back out of the historical closet.
Chapter Nine

Independent Internationalism

America seeks no earthly empire built on blood and force. No ambition, no temptation, lures her to thought of foreign dominions. The legions which she sends forth are armed, not with the sword, but with the cross. The higher state to which she seeks the allegiance of all mankind is not of human, but of divine origin.—Calvin Coolidge, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1925

Republican presidents Warren Harding (1921–23) and Calvin Coolidge (1923–29) presided over a dramatic increase in American political influence and weight in the world economy. Massive augmentations of foreign investment, trade, lending, and octopus-like extension of financial networks made the United States the world's leading economic power. Americans increasingly controlled natural resources and communication, transportation, and energy networks around the world. This pattern was especially notable in Latin America.

In 1914, no U.S. bank operated in South America, and no American steamship line served the region. By 1921, over fifty U.S. banks had established branches in addition to expanded operations in the Caribbean and Central America.\(^1\) Latin American economic policy was part of the global effort by the State Department and other American agencies to champion the “imperative demands of American business” and to coordinate “the work of all departments bearing upon the same great object of American prosperity.”\(^2\) Of 10 billion dollars invested abroad by U.S. firms and individuals, 40 percent (4 billion dollars) corresponded to Latin America. Accompanying these trends came fierce competition to place loans, bribe government officials, and employ U.S. experts, such as Edwin W. Kemmerer (the “money doctor”) to supervise Latin American governments’ fiscal and monetary policies.\(^3\)
A less noticeable penetration of Latin America—one that would become much more important after World War II—came with U.S. government subsidies for a nascent Pan American Federation of Labor, using the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and Samuel Gompers as instruments. At first intended to influence Mexican labor organizations and the policies of the government of Venustiano Carranza, the Pan American Federation of Labor was, according to Santiago Iglesias Pantín (a Puerto Rican labor leader and pro-statehood senator), “the instrumentality through which the influence of radical labor unions in Latin America, inspired by the example of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia would be checked.” This initiative was the AFL corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, seeking to limit the reach of “extra-hemispheric” labor ideologies into the Western Hemisphere.

The foreign ministers agreed unanimously to the following resolution:

The Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics

Declares:

That any attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against the states which sign this declaration.

In case acts of aggression are committed or should there be reason to believe that an act of aggression is being prepared by a non-American nation against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American nation, the nations signatory to the present declaration will consult among themselves in order to agree upon the measure it may be advisable to take.

All the signatory nations, or two or more of them, according to circumstances, shall proceed to negotiate the necessary complementary agreements so as to organize cooperation for defense and the assistance that they shall lend each other in the event of aggressions such as those referred to in this declaration.

In principle, the new-and-improved No Transfer Principle could be invoked by “two or more” of the signatory Pan American states in the event of aggression or if there be “reason to believe that an act of aggression is being prepared.” For the United States, this provided cover for preemptive or reactive military measures against extra-hemispheric powers by agreement with a single Latin American nation.
Chapter Ten

Not-So-Cold War, I

We should cease to talk about vague and... unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. ... We are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.
—George Kennan, director of Policy Planning, U.S. State Department 1948

Conventional periodization calls the years from shortly after World War II until 1990 the “Cold War.” For much of the world, including most of Latin America, this description is a terrible misnomer. The two global superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—never directly warred against each other.¹ Yet their surrogate wars around the world left millions of casualties in the names of “Democracy” and “Communism.” U.S.-Soviet contestation transformed decolonization movements, civil wars, and even reformist politics into surrogate battles between the two superpowers.

Major hot wars in China (1946–50), Korea (1950–53), and Southeast Asia (1954–75) left several hundred thousand U.S. and allied military casualties. In the Chinese civil war, estimates for dead and wounded range from 2 to 4 million.² In Korea from 1950 to 1953, military and civilian casualties, including Chinese and Koreans, are estimated at around 4 million. The end result was a fortified border at the 38th parallel, about where it had been when the war started, thus “containment” had occurred. In the Vietnam War, unlike the Korean conflict, the United States failed to prevent unification, leading to the creation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. American dead and wounded numbered close to 300,000; total casualties, civilian and military, in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia likely numbered more than 6 million.³

The battle between the Soviets and the Americans sometimes resembled a religious war. The discourse of American policymakers conflated American national interests and the defense of “Western Civilization” fighting against
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Troops deployed in northern province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946–49</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Major U.S. army presence of about 100,000 troops, fighting, training, and advising local combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947–49</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>U.S. forces wage a three-year counterinsurgency campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Heavy CIA involvement in national elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948–54</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Commando operations, “secret” CIA war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950–53</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Major forces engaged in war on Korean peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950–55</td>
<td>Formosa (Taiwan)</td>
<td>In June 1950, at the beginning of the Korean War, President Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent Chinese attacks upon Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>CIA overthrows government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Financial, matériel, and air support for colonial French military operations, which leads eventually to direct U.S. military involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>CIA overthrows the government of President Jacobo Arbenz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954–55</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Naval units evacuate U.S. civilians from the Tachen Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>A marine battalion evacuates U.S. civilians from Alexandria during the Suez Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Special operations and counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Failed covert operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>U.S. marines and army units totaling 14,000 land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Clashes between U.S. forces and local citizens in Canal Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>Covert operations against People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Policy Forum, "US Military and Clandestine Operations in Foreign Countries."
"Godless Communism." Future secretary of state John Foster Dulles wrote in 1949: “Terrorism, which breaks men’s spirit, is, to Communists, a normal way to make their creed prevail, and to them it seems legitimate because they do not think of human beings as being brothers through the Fatherhood of God.” For its part, the Soviet Union fused Soviet grand strategy and Russian nationalism with “liberation movements” in the battle against “capitalist wage slavery.” No matter that Third World and European peoples had their own agendas and internal conflicts. American and Soviet leaders subsumed such struggles under their own interpretations and sought to use them for their own ends in the global superpower contest.
In 1954, Eisenhower created the Planning Coordination Group (Special Group) within the NSC framework, with secret directive NSC-5412/2. This directive provided broad, vague, and menacing “authority” (seemingly beyond the president's constitutional authority, if subjected to congressional or judicial test—which it was not). The NSC determined that the United States should make covert war on the Soviet Union, its allies, its potential allies, and even its sympathizers—all without explicit congressional approval or oversight. It made the decision that covert operations should, among other activities:

- Create and exploit troublesome problems for International Communism, impair relations between the USSR and Communist China and between them and their satellites, complicate control within the USSR, Communist China and their satellites, and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc.
- Discredit the prestige and ideology of International Communism and reduce the strength of its parties and other elements.
- Counter any threat of a party or individuals directly or indirectly responsive to Communist control to achieve dominant power in a free world country.
- Reduce International Communist control over any areas of the world.\(^{47}\)

This vision of foreign policy and covert operations—a death struggle between two incompatible ways of life—left no room for concerns such as international law, sovereignty, or the UN Charter. Nor could policymakers take seriously America’s repeatedly proclaimed commitment to democracy and self-determination. Such discourse was largely marketing slogans for managing American public opinion and ideological propaganda for competing with Soviet communism.

One month after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the CIA executed Operation PBSUCCESS in Guatemala. American covert operations to contain or “rollback” communism had come to Central America.\(^{74}\) Guatemala became a target for the frustration of early Cold War setbacks in Europe and Asia and of frenzied domestic anticommunism in the United States. Arbenz’s nationalist rhetoric, collaboration with the local Communist Party in an agrarian reform program affecting the holdings of the United Fruit Company, and labor reforms all pushed too hard on the U.S. anticommunist button. U.S. policymakers were also concerned about the possible “demonstration effect” of agrarian reform and nationalization for U.S. interests elsewhere in the hemisphere. Moreover, some Guatemalan elites and military officers looked favorably on any rationale that would suppress social reform, organization of peasant unions, and disruption of the old order.
To prepare cover for the covert operation, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles cajoled, threatened, squeezed, and coerced the governments of the region to take a strong anticommunist stand at the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas (March 1–28, 1954). Governed by dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez, whose secret police notoriously persecuted and tortured regime opponents, Venezuela seemed a less-than-ideal location for sermons on democracy in the hemisphere. The congresses of Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia objected to holding the conference in Caracas; officials from Ecuador, Panama, Mexico, and even Colombia expressed reservations. In the end, only Costa Rica refused to send a delegation.\textsuperscript{75}

Over the objections of Guatemala and without the votes of Mexico and Argentina, the conference adopted a resolution that melded and updated the No Transfer Principle and the Monroe Doctrine to the Cold War by applying selectively the terms of the Rio Treaty, the OAS Charter, and the Bogotá

\begin{table}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points \\
1 Abolition of secret treaties \\
2 Freedom of navigation of the seas \\
3 Equality of trade and removal, so far as possible, of economic barriers \\
4 Reduction of armaments to the extent compatible with security \\
5 Adjustment of colonial claims (decolonization, self-determination) \\
6 Russia to be assured independent development and international withdrawal from occupied Russian territory \\
7 Restoration of Belgium to antebellum national status \\
8 France evacuated; Alsace-Lorraine to be returned to France from Germany \\
9 Italian borders redrawn on lines of nationality \\
10 Autonomous development for peoples of Austria-Hungary as the Austro-Hungarian Empire is dissolved \\
11 Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and other Balkan states to be granted integrity and have their territories evacuated, and Serbia to be given access to the Adriatic Sea \\
12 Sovereignty for Turkey, but autonomous development for other nationalities within the former empire; free passage through Dardanelles for ships and commerce of all nations \\
13 Establishment of an independent Poland with access to the sea \\
14 General association of the nations to enforce the peace (a multilateral international association of nations to enforce the peace) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}
Declaration. The Caracas Declaration provided plausible collective security rationale for combating “international communism” everywhere or anywhere in the hemisphere, despite a sop to sovereignty and nonintervention in the last section of the document.

The Tenth Inter-American Conference

DECLARES:

... That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement extending to this Hemisphere the political system of an extra continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America. . . .

RECOMMENDS:

That without prejudice to such other measures as they may consider desirable, special attention be given by each of the American governments to the following steps for the purpose of counteracting the subversive activities of the international communist movement within their respective jurisdictions:

1. Measures to require disclosure of the identity, activities, and sources of funds, of those who are spreading propaganda of the international communist movement or who travel in the interests of that movement, and of those who act as its agents or in its behalf;

and

2. The exchange of information among governments to assist in fulfilling the purpose of the resolutions adopted by the Inter-American Conferences and Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs regarding international communism. 76

In some sense, this resolution merely reaffirmed the commitment to regional counterintelligence and anticommunism spelled out at Bogotá in 1948. Given the immediate political context, however, it provided symbolic support for U.S. claims that Guatemala's government represented a grave threat, the camel's nose of communism slipping into the hemispheric tent. By this interpretation, even Latin American governments that failed to repress communists might be so much a threat to the hemisphere as to require invocation of the updated Monroe Doctrine and the right of collective or unilateral self-defense against “communist penetration of the hemisphere.”
Chapter Eleven

Not-So-Cold War, II

We are engaged in a mortal struggle to determine the shape of the future world. Latin America is a key area in the struggle. . . . We must ensure that it is neither turned against us nor taken over by those who threaten our vital national interests.—GENERAL VERNON WALTERS, U.S. military attaché in Paris, November 3, 1970

Fidel Castro took power in Cuba after two years of insurgency against Fulgencio Batista’s dictatorship. The United States had pushed Batista in 1956 to create a more effective anticommunist intelligence apparatus (the BRAC [Buró de Represión de las Actividades Comunistas]). When CIA inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick returned to Havana in 1957, he found “evidence that BRAC might be too enthusiastic in some of its interrogations.” By March 1958, the U.S. government cut off military assistance (but not CIA intelligence liaison) to the Batista regime.

On January 1, 1959, Batista fled the island. Six days later, Washington recognized the new government. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent a memo to President Eisenhower stating: “The Provisional Government appears free from Communist taint and there are indications that it intends to pursue friendly relations with the United States.” But by mid-1959, U.S. policymakers had decided otherwise. In November, Undersecretary of State Christian Herter told Eisenhower: “All actions of the United States Government should be designed to encourage within Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America opposition to the extremist, anti-American course of the Castro regime.”

J. C. King, head of the CIA’s Western Division, wrote a memorandum on December 11, 1959, for Richard Bissell, CIA director of plans, and CIA director Allen Dulles. The memo stated that Castro had established a far-left dictatorship. King concluded that “violent action” was the only means of breaking Castro’s grip on power. He recommended that “thorough consideration be
given to the elimination of Fidel Castro,” apparently the first time that the idea of assassinating Castro was committed to paper. According to Kirkpatrick, “By 1960 Cuba was in all respects a Communist country.” President Eisenhower directed U.S. oil companies not to refine oil coming to Cuba from the Soviet Union, embargoed Cuban sugar imports, and cut off all military and economic aid. By year’s end, the United States had imposed an embargo on exports to Cuba, excepting only food and medicine. American efforts to isolate and punish the Cuban regime would endure through the first decade of the twenty-first century—long after the Cold War ended.

The Kennedy administration (1961–63) picked up where Eisenhower’s team left off. Kennedy authorized, then took full responsibility for, an invasion by CIA-supported Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. The invasion failed miserably. But the Bay of Pigs fiasco did not stop clandestine operations against Cuba. Between April 1961 and October 1962, Soviet and U.S. miscalculations made Cuba the focus of one of the Cold War’s most dramatic and nearly cataclysmic confrontations.

The Soviet Union sent military assistance, trainers, and troops to Cuba. It also installed intermediate range missile launchers and provided nuclear warheads for the missiles—though the U.S. government apparently did not know that the warheads had already reached Cuba in October 1962. For two weeks, the people of the world held their collective breath as the United States and the Soviets (largely ignoring Castro and the Cubans, let alone NATO and Warsaw Pact allies) fortuitously negotiated a settlement to the crisis, and the Soviets removed their missiles.

Note: The 1961 coup in El Salvador was against a reformist military junta; all the others ousted civilian governments.
Chapter Twelve

American Crusade

We cannot escape our destiny, nor should we try to do so. The leadership of the free world was thrust upon us two centuries ago in that little hall of Philadelphia.

—Ronald Reagan, 1974

Ronald Reagan campaigned aggressively against policies of the Carter administration. His acceptance speech at the Republican convention in Detroit was a brilliant piece of rhetoric and touched virtually every thematic element in the cantata of American patriotic discourse. He began with the pilgrims and the New World myth: “Three hundred and sixty years ago, in 1620, a group of families dared to cross a mighty ocean to build a future for themselves in a new world.” He moved to the heroes of the War of Independence and then, as Jefferson had after the 1800 election, called for unity “to overcome the injuries that have been done to America these past three and a half years [by the Carter administration]”: “More than anything else, I want my candidacy to unify our country; to renew the American spirit and sense of purpose.” Like Jefferson, Reagan declaimed against “big government,” modernizing this motif as an assault on the New Deal and Great Society social programs that had become “givens” in American politics. Then he attacked the dismal economic policies of the incumbent administration as “a new and altogether indigestible economic stew, one part inflation, one part high unemployment, one part recession, one part runaway taxes, one part deficit spending and seasoned by an energy crisis. It's an economic stew that has turned the national stomach.”

Reagan promised to cut back the federal government, reduce taxes, and put Americans back to work. He reminded Americans that they lived in the greatest country in the world, though under Carter it had suffered setbacks, and proclaimed that “for those who have abandoned hope, we’ll restore hope and we’ll welcome them into a great national crusade to make America.
Table 12.1. Foreign Policies and Doctrines, 1947–1989

**Truman Doctrine, 1947 (Greece and Turkey).** I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. . . . The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration.

**Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957 (Middle East).** The action which I propose would have the following features. It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid.

It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.

**Kennedy, 1963 (Latin America).** [It is necessary] to come to the aid of any government requesting aid to prevent a takeover aligned to the policies of foreign communism. . . . Every resource at our command [must be used] to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere.

**Johnson, 1964 (Latin America).** We must protect the Alliance against the efforts of communism to tear down all that we are building. . . . I now, today, assure you that the full power of the United States is ready to assist any country whose freedom is threatened by forces dictated from beyond the shores of this continent.

**Nixon Doctrine, 1969 (Persian Gulf, Middle East, Vietnam).** First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

**Carter Doctrine, 1980 (Persian Gulf, Afghanistan).** Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

**Reagan Doctrine, 1985 (Afghanistan, Nicaragua, global).** We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth. Support for freedom fighters is self-defense.
Chapter Thirteen

Not the End of History

A total dismantling of socialism as a world phenomenon has been taking place. This may be inevitable and good. For this is a reunification of mankind on the basis of common sense. And a common fellow from Stavropol [Gorbachev] set this process in motion.

—Anatoly Chernaev, October 5, 1989

With the end of the Cold War, a resurgent messianism (mis)informed American foreign policy. In the words of historian and international expert on insurgency and terrorism Walter Laqueur, “When the Cold War came to an end in 1989 with the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, when the countries of Eastern Europe regained independence, and when finally the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was widespread feeling throughout the world that at long last universal peace had descended on Earth.”

American philosopher and political economist Francis Fukuyama captured the essence of this euphoric pretension that the Soviet implosion meant that liberal democracy and capitalism would spread their blessings around the world. Fukuyama claimed: “The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. . . . What we may be witnessing is . . . the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”

Rather than the “end of history,” universal peace, and the global victory of liberal democracy predicted by Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War bequeathed the United States “a jungle full of poisonous snakes.” The end of bipolarity as the frame for world politics made more visible the underlying conditions suppressed by the Cold War, such as ethnic strife, cultural and religious conflict, secessionist movements, civil wars, and pervasive poverty in much of the world. The dangers posed by rogue states, failing states, and
failed states became painfully evident as UN membership increased from 159 in 1990 to 185 in 1994. And, although some ex-Soviet republics transformed themselves into nations that favored Western-style party politics, in much of the world, governments and peoples rejected liberal, secular, “market democracy.” They also resisted American pretensions of global primacy.

A first hint of what would follow came with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, two months after East Germany began dismantling the Berlin Wall. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein sought control of Kuwait’s oil, but also harked back to Great Britain’s creation of Kuwait in 1961 (the same year construction began on the Berlin Wall). Hussein claimed that Kuwaiti oil wells were sucking oil across the Iraqi frontier and that, in any case, Kuwait was part of Iraq.
Chapter Fourteen

The New Normalcy?

The way I think about it, it's a new normalcy. . . . [The war] may never end [.at] least, not in our lifetime.—VICE PRESIDENT RICHARD CHENEY, 2001

Nine days after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, President George W. Bush declared a Global War on Terror. As in America’s war on the pirates of the Caribbean in the 1820s, there would be no sanctuaries in the Global War on Terror. Those who harbored the terrorists would also face America’s wrath: “We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. . . . From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” Bush added: “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”1

Responding to the attacks on the United States, the NATO Council invoked article 5 of the treaty regime for the first time—the attack on the United States represented an attack on all members of NATO. The alliance created in 1949 to contain the Soviet Union would now go on the offensive against militant Islamists in Afghanistan.2 On October 7, 2001, Bush announced that the United States and its allies had begun strikes on al Qaeda camps and the military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.3 America and its allies quickly ousted the country’s Taliban government but failed to capture or kill al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

A year later, the White House released the 2002 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” The document began by acclaiming the Cold War victory and, seemingly, accepting Professor Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis: “The great struggles of the twentieth century between
liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. . . . We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants.”

As in the time of Woodrow Wilson’s democratic crusade almost a century earlier, as America fought international terrorism it would also “use this moment of opportunity to . . . bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”

Missed in this litany was the fact that al Qaeda had not attacked the United States to oppose democracy in America, free markets, or free trade. Nor were the Taliban in Afghanistan or millions of Muslims around the world, nor millions of people of diverse faiths and ethnicities particularly attracted by the cultural and religious gifts offered by the most recent American civilizing mission. More broadly, much of the world and many of its sovereign governments, including China, Russia, and most of South Asia, did not share American enthusiasm for liberalism or “market democracy,” whether in its conservative or liberal versions. As historian and cofounder of the Project for a New American Century Robert Kagan put it: “To non-liberals, the international liberal order is not progress. It is oppression.”
Notes

Abbreviations
NATO           North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC           National Security Council
NSC-PD        Presidential Directive/National Security Council
PPS           Policy and Planning Staff

Introduction
1 As I was finishing this book, newly elected president Barack Obama moved toward renaming the war. Instead of a “war on terror,” it would be a war against terrorist organizations.
3 The essentials of the Bush Doctrine were put forth in George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” on September 17, 2002. Its basic components are unilaterism, when necessary (alliances if possible and convenient); preemptive strikes (or preventive strikes) against existing or potential threats; and regime change, where necessary to “extend the benefits of freedom across the globe.”
4 Article 51 of the UN Charter reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” However, the legality of preemptive war is controversial. Preemptive war doctrine builds upon the seventeenth-century formulation of the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius (“The Law of War and Peace,” 1625), who argued that “self-defense” may be permitted “not only after an attack has already been suffered, but also in advance, where the deed may be anticipated.” Later, in The Law of Nations (1758), Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel affirmed:
"A nation has the right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force and every other just means of resistance against the aggressor." Under this broader, and perhaps more controversial, interpretation of self-defense, Article 51 of the UN Charter would not override the customary right of anticipatory self-defense or even preemptive attack. Interestingly enough, the works of Grotius and Vattel were favorite readings of Thomas Jefferson, who relied very heavily upon them for crafting the Declaration of Independence.

Gray, "Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrine."

The West Florida Republic lasted three months; today its territory forms part of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. The Texas Republic existed from 1836 to 1845. The California “Bear Flag” Republic lasted less than a month (1846). The Republic of Hawaii, created with the intervention of the American minister to Hawaii and the U.S. Navy, lasted from 1894 to 1898, before annexation by joint resolution of the U.S. Congress.

The most widely used textbook on U.S.–Latin American relations (Peter Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 7–8) focuses especially on the character and transformation of the international system that “guided the management of inter-American relations,” with special attention to “the ultimate content of policy, rather than with struggles over its formation.” This book also enters this terrain, but much more attention is given here to domestic politics and to the shaping, directly and indirectly, of foreign policy and relations with Latin America by partisan, sectional, racial, and even personal conflicts within the United States.

I use the term “grand strategy” in this book in the broad sense of the effort to define a state’s strategic interests and to focus and coordinate diplomatic, economic, cultural, and military assets of its government and peoples to achieve its self-defined national objectives. Such objectives always include security (survival), but the definition of interests and other objectives may change over time, requiring reformulation of grand strategy in relation to changing international, regional, and domestic contingencies. Other authors limit “grand strategy” to “the means by which a state plans to use force or the threat of force to achieve political ends” (see Desch, When the Third World Matters, 1). There is no single correct definition for “grand strategy.” I simply alert the reader at the outset to the usage I have adopted in this volume.

For a very different opinion, see Schweikart and Allen, A Patriot’s History.

Thus McDougal (Promised Land, 11) refers to a “bible of [American] foreign affairs,” replete with conflicting and overlapping precepts that make American policy analogous to the Sergio Leone spaghetti western The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: As America gained weight in international affairs, “predictably, the Good the United States did magnified enormously, but so too did the Bad and the Ugly.”

This premise implies that histories of the foreign policies of other nations would also include reference to national myths, political culture, territorial ambitions, domestic politics, perceptions of threats by adversaries, geopolitics, security doctrine, and so on. Those histories, whether of Great Britain, Spain, or France in the nineteenth century or of Germany, Russia, Japan, or China in the twentieth century, among many more, are for others to write. In this spirit, I share the observations of historian William Appleman Williams (“Confessions,” 339): “I do not approve of imperial actions by Russia or by Israel, and I do not approve of repression in Brazil.

NOTES TO PAGES 000–000
Select Bibliography

In writing this book, I have relied on the work of generations of historians, social scientists, journalists, political analysts, literary scholars, and travel accounts. I have also drawn on forty years of reading and research, including immersion in congressional debates, contemporary newspapers, memoirs, letters, and other traditional historical source materials. For purposes of publication, I have limited the references here to works cited in the text, to books and articles that have so influenced my interpretations and conclusions that it would be improper not to mention them, and to important reference and bibliographical sources. A more comprehensive bibliography of works consulted is available at the website dedicated to this book at <http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/dept/polsciwb/brianl/book18.html>.

For selected government documents and publications, I have used citations that most easily connect a reader to the document as mentioned in the text or notes. For some government publications, for example, the U.S. State Department series *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, I have relied on digital versions, but most of the time I have also verified content with printed sources. For presidential messages to Congress, speeches, proclamations, and related materials, I have often relied on the Avalon Project at Yale University (<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/>), the American Presidency Project at the University of California, Santa Barbara (<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>), and the Office of the Public Register, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/>). For the period since the Truman administration, the U.S. State Department offers online access to much material, along with a useful “search” function, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/>, and also a list of all volumes (since 1861), with a chronological indication of content for each volume. Likewise, the Library of Congress website “A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774–1875,” <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.html>, provides access to many of the debates and documents mentioned in the text, including references to *U.S. Statutes at Large (Stat.)*, congressional debates, and House and Senate journals. For diplomatic correspondence in the first half of the nineteenth century, the compilations of William R. Manning, listed below, are invaluable. I have also relied on the National Security Archive at George Washington University and its internet site, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>, for declassified materials and for its valuable electronic briefing books.
The selective bibliography is divided into four sections. The first, Official Publications and Collections of Official Documents, includes government publications and nongovernmental collections of documents cited in the text or relied on for documentation. The second section, Selected Official and Nongovernmental Documents, includes individual documents, such as presidential directives, commission reports, State Department memoranda (for example, the Clark Memorandum of 1928, brief reports by the Congressional Research Service, or short policy statements by the Department of Defense). The third section, Books, Monographs, and Theses, includes full citations for publications cited in the notes or upon which I have significantly relied in my research but that are not directly cited in the notes. This includes bibliographic works and historiography on American politics and foreign relations. The last section, Articles, Book Chapters, and Papers, includes full citations of miscellaneous policy papers, reports, briefings, and other materials cited in the notes.

Official Publications and Collections of Official Documents


Avalon Project (Yale University, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/>). A large collection of digital documents and supporting materials on Law, History, Economics, Politics, Diplomacy, and Government and including internal links to American Diplomacy; Major Treaties; Inter-American System: Agreements, Conventions, and Other Documents; Cold War Diplomacy; Defense Treaties of the United States; and Selected Treaties between the United States and Native Americans.
