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figs., notes, bibl., index
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A Devil of a
Whipping
The Battle of
Cowpens
by Lawrence
E. Babits
Copyright (c) 2001 by the University of North Carolina Press. All
rights reserved.
Introduction.
I was desirous to have a stroke at Tarlton . . . & I have Given him a
devil of a whiping [sic].--Daniel Morgan to William Snickers, 26
January 1781
American drummers beating a staccato long roll called infantry into
formation in the raw predawn hours of 17 January 1781.[1] The drummers
signaled a climax to events that began nine months earlier when the
British captured Charleston, South Carolina. Less than an hour away from
the wet fields in front of the American camp, Banastre Tarleton's feared
British Legion and other battalions were closing in on Daniel Morgan's
Americans. An uncertain situation would be resolved within two hours on
the gentle slopes of a South Carolina crossroads called the Cowpens. The
battle marked a turning point in American fortunes. The road through the
American position led symbolically, if not quite literally, to Yorktown
and British surrender on 19 October 1781.
Three years earlier, in 1778, the Revolutionary War in the North was at a
stalemate. The British were unable to destroy General George Washington's
army, isolate New England, or convince the rebels to quit fighting. They
lost one army at Saratoga and evacuated Philadelphia. Content to hold
their base at New York, the British shifted their emphasis southward.
The British effort was directed at the southern colonies for a number of
reasons. Repeated calls for help came from southern Loyalists and British
policy was to aid their subjects. The 1778 Carlisle Commission, which
attempted, unsuccessfully, to reach a negotiated settlement with the
Americans, reported Loyalist support in America. However militant they
seemed, northern Loyalists usually turned out only when the British army
could support them and then in small numbers.
The southern colonies appeared to be different. For one thing, the British
had a base in Florida from which Loyalists raided Georgia. Earlier
Loyalist uprisings in the South failed because they lacked British
military support. Southern Loyalists in England made their feelings known
to Lord George Germain, the secretary of state for the American
Department. Reports written by former colonial governors of Georgia and
South Carolina asked for a military expedition to retake those colonies.
Despite lukewarm northern Loyalists, Germain opted to support the
southerners. Germain's internal political problems threatened the
government, and France entered the war. He could point to the Howes's
failure. They were mild Whigs relieved of command for inadequately
prosecuting the war in the North.[2]
In New York, the commander in chief of the American theater, Sir Henry
Clinton, was in a defensive position due to the French entry into the war
and his declining military strength. Clinton's forces were depleted by
reinforcements sent to Florida, the West Indies, and Canada. Concerned
about Washington's army in front of New York, French sea power, and
British strategic plans, Clinton issued vague orders to Lieutenant Colonel
Archibald Campbell about reinforcing the garrison in Saint Augustine,
Florida.
Instead of sailing directly for Florida, Campbell landed in Georgia where
his "reinforcements" easily captured Savannah in December 1778. They
expanded their hold on Georgia by taking Augusta and Sunbury. After an
aborted attack on Charleston, South Carolina, the British bloodily
repulsed a French-American attempt to recapture Savannah in October
1779.[3]
The next spring, Clinton directed a major effort against Charleston, which
capitulated in May 1780. The British moved quickly to solidify control
over South Carolina. While two columns moved into South Carolina's
interior, Major General Charles, the Earl Cornwallis, commanded a third
force moving toward North Carolina. He sent Lieutenant Colonel Banastre
Tarleton, a ruthless cavalry leader, after the last Continentals who were
already retreating. Tarleton's rapid movements enabled him to catch the
Americans at Waxhaws, just below the North Carolina border. After a brief
call for surrender, Tarleton's dragoons attacked, broke American
resistance, and then engaged in what infuriated Americans termed a
massacre. Waxhaws set the stage for many similar bloody encounters over
the next eighteen months. Tarleton's reputation for brutality was
established, and his name became a byword for terror and no quarter
throughout the South.[4]
While the British successfully waged conventional war against the
Continentals and embodied militia, American partisans proved impossible to
suppress. After Charleston fell, the British tried to govern South
Carolina as a royal colony and reinstituted a Loyalist militia to protect
the frontier and maintain order.[5] Even with garrisons across the
backcountry, the British colonial government and military could not halt
the internecine warfare. British pacification efforts were thwarted by
shifting policies, ferocity against rebellious Americans, and Loyalist
desires to retaliate against their Whig oppressors. The military's
inability to protect paroled Americans and their property alienated
inactive Whigs and drove them back into rebellion.[6]
The backcountry erupted after Tory raids, the most notorious led by a New
York Loyalist ironically named Christian Huck. Outraged at the murders of
neighbors, Whigs wiped out Huck's party in July 1780. In short order,
attacks came against British outposts at Hanging Rock, Musgrove's Mill,
Rocky Mount, and small foraging parties. The raids served to create
further animosity.[7]
In August 1780, an American army under Major General Horatio Gates moved
into South Carolina. On 16 August, the Americans were defeated outside
Camden. Even though shattered American forces began regrouping in
Hillsborough, North Carolina, the British had no regular opposition for
the next two months. They also achieved some success against Whig
partisans such as General Thomas Sumter.
General Cornwallis was one of the best British field commanders in North
America when he succeeded Henry Clinton in command of the southern British
forces. He served in America from 1776 until 1778, when he returned to
England because his wife was ill. After her death, he returned to America
and served until his surrender at Yorktown in 1781. His long experience in
America with key roles during the 1776 New York campaign, Brandywine,
Monmouth, and Camden demonstrated his abilities. Short and stout,
Cornwallis was not a commanding figure, but subordinates respected him. He
was fearless in battle, and at a time when other British generals were
inclined to be somewhat indecisive and conservative, Cornwallis was a
forceful leader.[8]
Cornwallis seized an opportunity presented by the lack of opposition,
invaded North Carolina, and occupied Charlotte. He intended to advance
against Salisbury, but American resistance stiffened, and militia units
attacked British foraging parties. Then a force, composed largely of
Tories sent into western North Carolina under Lieutenant Colonel Patrick
Ferguson, encountered trouble. Responding to a threat to "lay waste their
country," "overmountain" frontiersmen gathered to oppose Ferguson's
advance and then moved rapidly against him. Faced with opposition,
Ferguson withdrew to Kings Mountain, where he was killed, and his men
captured. The Kings Mountain debacle ruined Cornwallis's plans for a
further advance because his left-flank screening force was wiped out and
Tory support was badly eroded. Cornwallis withdrew from Charlotte and went
to Winnsboro, South Carolina, to refit his men.[9]
The Kings Mountain victory secondary impacts on the war in the South were
that the overmountain men's performance reinforced southern attitudes that
militia could win the war, as well as diverting British attention from a
"serious deterioration" of control around their bases at Augusta, Ninety
Six, and Camden. The British commander at Ninety Six, Colonel John Harris
Cruger, failed to win Andrew Pickens to the British side after Loyalist
depredations against his family and property, even though Pickens acted as
a commissioner to look into treatment of his Tory neighbors captured at
Kings Mountain.[10]
For Cornwallis and his troops in South Carolina, the strategic situation
in late December 1780 was complex. His men were scattered in a wide arc
running across South Carolina from Georgetown, through Camden and
Winnsboro to Ninety Six. South of Ninety Six, the line continued to
Augusta, Georgia, and a series of small outposts downriver to Savannah.
Inside this arc, British or Tory detachments were stationed at Fort Granby
(modern Columbia), Fort Watson, Orangeburg, Monck's Corner, and other
small posts. The British created these posts to reestablish a Loyalist
government, but the small garrisons were vulnerable if a sizable American
force moved against them. British troops were stationed between some
posts, including Banastre Tarleton's detachment on the Broad River west of
Winnsboro.[11]
Cornwallis positioned the main British force in upcountry South Carolina
at Winnsboro. Equidistant between Cheraws and Ninety Six, he was about 30
miles from both Friday's Ferry (at Columbia) and Camden. The road net
connecting these towns to Winnsboro also fanned north, providing
Cornwallis with several options for moving his army. It was an ideal
situation to control the upcountry and threaten North Carolina.
The American situation was exceedingly bleak in December 1780. The
southern army was located in Charlotte with a detachment at New
Providence. At Charlotte, approximately 950 American Continentals and some
1,500 militia were erecting huts for a winter camp. Adding to shortages of
food, forage, and other supplies, smallpox broke out in town.[12]
Demoralized American forces received their most important reinforcement
when Major General Nathanael Greene rode into Charlotte on 2 December
1780. Greene was a remarkable man. Raised a Quaker, he ran the family
ironworks in Coventry, Rhode Island. Excluded from the Quakers when he
volunteered for the militia in 1774, he led Rhode Island troops sent to
Boston in 1775, and in 1776 was placed in charge of the Long Island, New
York, defenses. Appointed quartermaster general of Washington's army in
1778, he performed admirably and organized the department's affairs to
ensure a regular supply system. His combat role included participation in
every major battle under Washington between 1776 and 1779.
The business skills acquired as an ironworks manager and administrative
experience as quartermaster general under Washington prepared Greene for
the complex task of keeping the southern army supplied. During his
southern campaign of 1780 and 1781, he won no victories but drove the
British into a small enclave between Charleston and Savannah. His major
accomplishment was keeping his army in the field. As long as it existed,
the army posed a threat to the British and became rallying point for
Whigs. In the meantime, small detachments wiped out isolated British
garrisons.
Salisbury, forty-two miles north of Charlotte, was a major transhipment
point for supplies collected from the North Carolina piedmont and sent
from states farther north. The garrison included craftsmen who
manufactured a variety of needed items. Greene instituted clothing
production by paying for work with salt. Finally, the town included a jail
which held some remaining Kings Mountain prisoners.[13] Hillsborough
functioned as the state capital. The North Carolina Board of War resided
there, and numerous Continental officers were in town, expediting supply
convoys and forwarding troops southward. Supplies gathered from the
surrounding area were stockpiled here until wagons were available to
transport them to the army.[14]
Greene's conclusions regarding the situation were grim. There were few
supplies in Charlotte. Supplies the British did not capture in 1780, the
militia plundered or consumed before they could be distributed to the
army. Disruptions caused by the war and failed harvests compounded the
situation. The Continentals were in a state of poor discipline because
they lacked adequate clothing, food, and shelter. Smallpox posed a real
problem to the militia but not the Continentals, who had been inoculated.
Finally, the British garrison at Winnsboro was a distinct threat, both
because of its proximity to Charlotte and the numbers of its reasonably
mobile garrison.[15]
When Greene took over the American army, he did not operate in a vacuum.
He sent officers to explore river systems north of Charlotte as far as
Virginia. Officers were sent south to find a suitable winter campsite. By
the time Greene left Charlotte, he had a solid grasp of the strategic
potential of the countryside and had reorganized the supply system.[16]
When Greene arrived, a scouting detachment composed of Continental light
infantry and militia was at New Providence, fifteen miles below Charlotte.
From here they raided south, gathered supplies, encouraged Whigs, and
intimidated Loyalists. Just before Greene's arrival, a raiding party from
New Providence under William Washington captured the garrison at Rugeley's
Mill using a log on wheels to intimidate the Tories.[17]
Faced with a deteriorating situation, Greene had little choice. To
alleviate supply problems, he reduced the men he had to feed in one place.
The main army moved back into South Carolina. Morgan's light infantry were
increased and sent into the South Carolina backcountry. In mid-December
1780, Greene issued the orders that set in motion maneuvers culminating in
the American victory at Yorktown nine months later.[18]
There were several aspects to Greene's plan. First, moving to Hick's
Creek, South Carolina, enabled him to supply his main force while
threatening British garrisons in eastern South Carolina. By sending Morgan
west, British posts in the Carolina backcountry were threatened, and
Morgan's detachment could obtain food. American militia operated as a
screen in front of both American camps and between British posts, cutting
off supplies, foragers, messengers, and small patrols.
Most important, American actions prompted a British reaction. Cornwallis
responded by dispatching Tarleton to protect Ninety Six, where he also
would be in a position to move against Morgan. Greene divided his army by
moving his main force to Hick's Creek (Cheraws), South Carolina. His move
back into South Carolina demonstrated that the entire state was not under
British control as 1780 ended. Greene wrote both Samuel Huntington,
president of the Continental Congress, and George Washington on 28
December 1780 and explained what he had done.[19]
Greene had first-hand knowledge of problems inherent in dividing a force
since he had studied tactics and participated in the 1776 New York
campaign.[20] Greene weighed economy of force against mass with his own
strategic situation in mind.[21] The Americans were not strong enough to
fight the British, nor did available food and forage permit an American
concentration in sufficient strength. The political situation demanded
that Greene exploit momentum acquired by the Kings Mountain victory and
keep South Carolina within the revolutionary fold.[22]
Green marched his army from Charlotte on 20 December 1780. They reached
the South Carolina campsite on 25 December. Greene partially solved supply
problems by shipping food down the Peedee River, but, as he said, Hicks
Creek was "no Eden." The men had wornout uniforms and suffered from the
weather.[23] The Americans were now positioned far enough to each side of
Winnsboro so they could not be surprised by a sudden British movement.
Reduced numbers at two locations meant they could better obtain adequate
subsistence.
Morgan left Charlotte on 21 December and camped at Grindal Shoals on the
Pacolet River.[24] Two separated American units were not the only British
problem. Swarms of militia operating over most of the territory Cornwallis
nominally controlled terrorized supporters of both sides. One American
veteran recalled the time as "almost Fire & Faggot Between Whig & Tory,
who were contending for the ascendancy."[25]
The worsening backcountry situation is a difficult aspect of the southern
campaign to understand. British plans to maintain royal control behind a
military screen were thwarted by Loyalists wanting to settle old scores
and men calling themselves militia simply to plunder.[26] Taking advantage
of the unrest, Morgan and Greene authorized forays that did little to ease
Cornwallis's mind. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee and Colonel Francis Marion
attacked Georgetown, South Carolina, on 25 January 1781.[27] In the west,
Lieutenant Colonel William Washington's Continental dragoons and militia
first destroyed a Tory force at Hammond's Store in late December, then
moved farther south and burned a fortification a short distance from
Ninety Six.[28]
Cornwallis knew of Greene's activity. Spies and scouting parties around
Charlotte reported departures with fairly accurate estimates of American
numbers.[29] Cornwallis was perplexed because Greene violated a principle
dictating consolidation of inferior forces in the face of a superior
enemy. Cornwallis felt Morgan could threaten Ninety Six while Greene might
move against Camden, Georgetown, or other eastern British posts.
Cornwallis was in difficult straits because the region north of Winnsboro
had been subjected to intense foraging by both sides and was virtually
stripped of resources. Cornwallis located here partly because the town
commanded a backcountry road network and because potentially adequate
supplies were available just south of Winnsboro.[30] Greene placed
Americans upstream across the rivers most important for supplying British
forces at Camden, Georgetown, Fort Granby, and other interior posts,
including Winnsboro. While supplies could be floated downstream to
American camps, resources the British could not obtain from the interior
came from the coast, upstream, or over difficult roads where they were
vulnerable to partisan raiders. This crucial logistical aspect of the
southern campaign would, in the long run, help ruin Cornwallis and the
British southern army.
Greene's innovative response to superior British numbers compounded
Cornwallis's dilemma because he wanted to invade North Carolina and march
through Charlotte against the American bases at Salisbury and
Hillsborough. While Cornwallis gathered supplies, recruited his forces,
and made dispositions to defend his rear, he had to deal with Morgan and
Ninety Six.[31]
Morgan's threat against Ninety Six so concerned Cornwallis that he wrote
Tarleton, "I sent Haldane to you last night, to desire you would pass
Broad river, with the legion and the first battalion of the 71st, as soon
as possible. If Morgan is still at Williams', or any where within your
reach, I should wish you to push him to the utmost: I have not heard,
except from M'Arthur, of his having cannon; nor would I believe it, unless
he has it from very good authority: It is, however, possible, and Ninety
Six is of so much consequence, that no time is to be lost."[32]
Tarleton moved westward and placed his force between Morgan and Ninety
Six. Privy to Cornwallis's plans for an invasion of North Carolina,
Tarleton was aware what Cornwallis wanted. When he learned Ninety Six was
not in danger, Tarleton reorganized to "push [Morgan] to the utmost." In
addition to acquiring supplies by foraging and impressment, he requested
wagons and additional troops because he needed more men to destroy Morgan,
and then explained how his movements fit into Cornwallis's plans.[33]
Letters between Cornwallis and Tarleton explain the British response to
Morgan. Tarleton would protect Ninety Six, then deal with Morgan. To
accomplish the latter, he requested a reinforcement of light troops.
Knowing he would move rapidly, he ordered that no women accompany his
baggage. If Tarleton pursued Morgan, Ninety Six would be reinforced by the
7th Regiment. At the same time, Cornwallis would invade North Carolina,
and by advancing slightly northwest, cut off Morgan. Tarleton clearly saw
an opportunity in Greene's division of the Americans. His letter confirmed
an understanding of Cornwallis's basic plan and proposed action to destroy
a wing of the American forces.[34]
Once it was clear Morgan did not threaten Ninety Six, Cornwallis
authorized Tarleton to employ the 7th Regiment and its cannon in the
effort to destroy Morgan. Tarleton had about 1,100 men, including local
Tories who served as guides. He was now free to drive Morgan out of South
Carolina. By advancing, Tarleton's detachment would screen Cornwallis's
left flank and protect it from overmountain militia who destroyed
Ferguson. British officers with Tarleton later said the force was
"designed to penetrate into North Carolina."[35]
Unfortunately for the British, weather interfered with their planned
movements. Rains delayed reinforcements marching from the coast under
Major General Alexander Leslie, and Cornwallis waited. The rain delayed
Tarleton but did not stop his movement against Morgan. While Tarleton had
problems gathering basic food to feed his men, his wagons carried some
luxurious condiments for the officers.[36]
Aware of coordinated movements against him, Morgan was concerned with
feeding his troops.[37] The Flying Army rarely bivouacked together because
scattered detachments were positioned where they could obtain food more
easily. Given Tory/Patriot animosities, American forces unsurprisingly
supplied themselves at Tory expense because they were not required to
issue them receipts.[38]
Despite supply problems and the coming and going of militia who claimed
enlistments were expiring, Morgan accomplished Greene's strategic aims. He
posed a threat to the Carolina backcountry that Cornwallis could not
ignore; moreover, he raised American spirits. When Tarleton came after
him, however, Morgan withdrew. Over the next week, both commanders
prepared for a fight as they moved north. On 17 January 1781, when
Tarleton's advance patrol came out of the pine forests and deployed south
of the American battle lines, the Americans were ready. Knowing an
engagement with Tarleton was inevitable, Morgan chose the ground and his
men were rested, ready, and waiting.
What happened was standardized over the years. British infantry drove in
Morgan's skirmishers before advancing against American militia. The South
Carolinians stood their ground. Every battalion fired at least one
close-range volley before retreating around the American left flank with
Tarleton's dragoons howling in pursuit. Tarleton's infantry advanced again
and engaged the Continentals and Virginia militia in a firefight.
When Tarleton moved to break the main-line deadlock, the American right
withdrew. In the crisis, Morgan selected a point where the Continentals
would halt, turn, and fire. When they did so, the British infantry
collapsed in shock and began a panic-stricken withdrawal. The British
fled, and although Tarleton and most of his dragoons eluded pursuit and
rejoined Cornwallis, few infantrymen escaped the Americans.
This summation is drawn from popular traditional accounts. Official
accounts and later historians related only part of the battle.
Participants from the lower ranks provide additional details for
incorporation into the battle's history. Morgan, as he described in a
letter to his friend William Snickers, had given Tarleton "a devil
of a whiping [sic]."[39] Later, almost nine months to the day,
British survivors of Cowpens and ensuing campaigns surrendered at
Yorktown, Virginia. How Morgan managed to win with minimal support and a
potentially disastrous mix of Continentals, state troops, and militia from
six states is the tactical story of Cowpens. How Morgan took a disparate
group of men and welded them into a force capable of using traditional
European tactics in a new American fashion is the real story of Cowpens,
which emerges from new study of published materials and the pension
documents.
1. The long roll is one of the rudiments, or basic drum beatings, of
eighteenth-century music. In the military, the long roll was a call to
bring men immediately into ranks, preparatory to fighting. Moon,
Instructor for the Drum, 22.
2. The issues involved and the British interpretation of American
sentiments are covered by Pancake, This Destructive War, 25-30.
3. Campbell, Expedition against the Rebels of Georgia; Lawrence,
Storm over Savannah.
4. Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1, 60-115;
Pancake, This Destructive War, 60-71; Tarleton, Campaigns of
1780-81, 9-32; Uhlendorf, Siege of Charleston.
5. Pancake, This Destructive War, 67-72, contains a good summation
of British efforts and their problems. Lambert's South Carolina
Loyalists, 93-125, provides greater detail and examines Loyalist
motivation.
6. Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 120-21; Pancake, This
Destructive War, 81-82. One example is Tarleton burning Thomas
Sumter's plantation on 28 May 1780. Tarleton later wrote "without any
thing material happening on the route." Tarleton, Campaigns of
1780-81, 27. Another is the burning of Andrew Pickens's farm in
December 1780; Pancake, This Destructive War, 85.
7. Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 84-85; Pancake, War,
128.
8. Wickwire and Wickwire, Cornwallis; Lamb, Original and
Authentic Journal, 362; Pancake, This Destructive War, 57-59;
Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780-81, 85.
9. Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War, 208-10; Pancake, This
Destructive War, 120-21; Stedman, American War, 217-18;
Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780-81, 165-69.
10. Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 59-60, 143-44; Henry Lee,
Memoirs of the War, 209. Rankin, North Carolina
Continentals, 266, briefly indicates southern ideas about militia.
11. Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War, 215-16; Pancake, This
Destructive War, 123-27; Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780-81,
168-70, 182-83.
12. Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, 6 Dec. 1780, Greene to Abner
Nash, 6 Dec. 1780, Greene to George Washington, 7 Dec. 1780, Greene to
Henry Knox, 7 Dec. 1780, Showman, Greene Papers, 6:530-31, 533,
542-45, 547; Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War, 233-34; Seymour,
Journal of the Southern Expedition.
13. Greene to John Butler, 13 Dec. 1780, Greene to Joseph Marbury, 4 Dec.
1780, Showman, Greene Papers, 6:516, 566, 521-22.
14. Baron Von Steuben to Greene, 24 Nov. 1780, John Gunby to Greene, 13
Dec. 1780, Showman, Greene Papers, 6:503, 567.
15. Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War, 244-45; Greene to Jefferson, 6
Dec. 1780, Greene to Abner Nash, 6 Dec. 1780, Greene to Nicholas Long, 6
Dec. 1780, Greene to North Carolina Board of War, 7 Dec. 1780, Greene to
George Washington, 7 Dec. 1780, Showman, Greene Papers, 6:530-31,
532, 533-34, 541, 542-45.
16. Conrad, "Nathanael Greene and the Southern Campaigns," 70; Henry Lee,
Memoirs of the War, 244-45, 247; Rankin, North Carolina
Continentals, 261; Showman, Greene Papers, 6:xvi-xix.
17. Seymour, Journal of the Southern Expedition, 10; William
Smallwood to Nathanael Greene, 6 Dec. 1780, Showman, Greene Papers,
6:538-39. Many Virginians mentioned this episode in their pension
applications: Samuel Brown, pension, 1 June 1835, M804, Roll 377; James
Emmons, pension, 2 Oct. 1832, M804, Roll 927; Lawrence Everheart, pension,
7 Apr. 1834, M804, Roll 944.
18. Greene to Daniel Morgan, 16 Dec. 1780, Showman, Greene Papers,
6:589-90.
19. Greene to Samuel Huntington, 7 Dec. 1780, Greene to George Washington,
7 Dec. 1780, Showman, Greene Papers, 7:7-11.
20. Conrad, "Nathanael Greene and the Southern Campaigns," 71; Tarleton,
Campaigns of 1780-81, 208. Had Greene known British reinforcements
were nearing Charleston, he might not have chosen to divide his forces.
21. Economy of force and mass are modern principles of war used to guide
analysts in evaluating combat. Economy of force means having enough
resources to complete the mission. Mass means having superior force at the
critical place and time. For additional discussion, see Matlof,
American Military History, 6-7.
22. Conrad, "Nathanael Greene and the Southern Campaigns," 76; Nathanael
Greene to Alexander Hamilton, 10 Jan. 1781, Showman, Greene Papers,
7:87-91.
23. Greene to Hamilton, 10 Jan. 1781, Showman, Greene Papers,
7:87-91; William Johnson, Sketches of Nathanael Greene, 1:362;
Rankin, North Carolina Continentals, 265; O. H. Williams to Elie
Williams, 14 Jan. 1781, Merritt, Calendar, 35.
24. Greene to Lafayette, 29 Dec. 1780, Showman, Greene Papers,
7:18-19; William Johnson, Sketches of Nathanael Greene, 1:362;
Seymour, Journal of the Southern Expedition, 11-12.
25. James Collins, pension, 8 Apr. 1834, M804, Roll 613; Aaron Guyton,
pension, 1 Oct. 1833, M804, Roll 1149; Robert Long, pension, supplementary
statement, 7 Oct. 1835, M804, Roll 1581; Henry Lee, Memoirs of the
War, 248-51; Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780-81, 183-84. Wider
views of backcountry unrest can be found in Crow and Tise, Southern
Experience, and Hoffman et al., Uncivil War.
26. Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 104-36; Pancake, This
Destructive War, 73-90.
27. Henry Lee to Nathanael Greene, 25 Jan. 1781, Showman, Greene
Papers, 7:197-98. Other attacks were planned but put off after
Greene's withdrawal to Virginia in February. See Francis Marion to Greene,
27 Jan. 1781, ibid., 7:207.
28. Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War, 223-25; Daniel Morgan to Greene,
31 Dec. 1780, 4 Jan. 1781, Showman, Greene Papers, 7:30-31, 50-51.
29. MacKenzie, Strictures on Lt. Col. Tarleton's History, 95-96.
30. Conrad, "Nathanael Greene and the Southern Campaigns," 69; Tarleton,
Campaigns of 1780-81, 169.
31. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780-81, 182-83.
32. Lord Cornwallis to Banastre Tarleton, 2 Jan. 1781, Tarleton,
Campaigns of 1780-81, 244-45.
33. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780-81, 211-12, 245-46.
34. Lord Cornwallis to Banastre Tarleton, 5 Jan. 1781, Cornwallis to Henry
Clinton, 18 Jan. 1781, ibid., 246-47, 249-50.
35. Samuel Shaw, "Revolutionary War Letter to Captain Winthrop Sargent";
Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780-81, 249.
36. James Simons to William Washington, 3 Nov. 1803, Balch, Papers,
45-47: Joseph Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences, 303; Tarleton,
Campaigns of 1780-81, 214.
37. Daniel Morgan to Nathanael Greene, 15 Jan. 1781, Showman, Greene
Papers, 7:127-28; Seymour, Journal of the Southern Expedition,
11.
38. Greene to Morgan, 16 Dec. 1780, 6:589-90; E. Alfred Jones, Journal
of Alexander Chesney, 126-30.
39. Morgan to William Snickers, 19 Jan. 1781, Horatio Gates Papers.
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