I want to agree with you that there is something more to the self other than
language for Percy, but, im a little unclear about you answer and the use of
Lost in the Cosmos.
This work is the one that gives me the most trouble, especially the parts
about the unformulability of the self, and it being something that floats
around on a sliding scale from - infinity to + infinity. Now what im puzzuled
over in your responces is the word "essence," maybe this is very minor and
unimportant quibble here, but this notion of "essence" as I generally
understand the word seems to be what Percy's self does not have. How do I
understand this word, well I generally find the old distiction between "what
a thing is", and "that a thing is" helpful; with "essence" then being a
things "whatness," and existence being "that a thing is"
for example, a human"s "essence" has often been said to be a
"rational-animal" (*note how Percy defines man in various ways as a
"language-animal" making language are essential diferentia).
It is in this sense of essence then that I find Percy problematic. It seems
to me that he clearly thinks That a self, exists, but What a self is, its
essence, seems up to the self's own making through language. Maybe this will
help some in seeing why im a bit hesitent to say there is an essential self
(a way a self should be), for Percy, that we each must try to actualize to be
fully human.
anyways, my question is this, and its still quite unthought through and maybe
there is nothing here...
when working through Aquinas' position on some of these very things, many
hold that Thomas made a REAL distinction between being (esse, or existence)
and essence. By real, i mean metaphysically real, not a "formal" distinction
which is one of solely of reason. It is this distinction that some thinkers,
esp. those following E. Gilson, use to work out Aquinas as an existentialist
of sorts, for he doesnt forget being.
Now, its a guess here, but I would think Percy would buy into Aquinas on this
distinction but i'm not sure. What interests me however, is whether or not
Peirce would, and what the ramifications of this would be for his notion of
individuals. The reason why this popped into mind, is that I know Peirce
often followed Scotus, who did not make this Thomistic distinction. Anyone
have any ideas on this one? All of this may amount to a bunch of Medieval
nothing, but im curious...
ken Mitchell