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Korea: Liberation and Self-Determination

Crisis Watch Commentary

By John Feffer

 

 

 

Fifty-six years ago, Korea was liberated from Japan. Note the passive construction. Koreans did not, by and large, liberate themselves at the end of World War II. The United States liberated the South; the Soviet army liberated the North. The division of the peninsula continues to this day. It remains the chief obstacle to Korean self-determination. And self-determination is a key organizing principle for Koreans on both halves of the peninsula.

After flirting with both Soviet and Chinese styles of communism, North Korea built a new system around Juche or self-determination. The principle of Juche encompasses political independence from other countries, economic self-sufficiency, and self-defense (the mellifluous Korean triplet of chaju, charip, chawi). This independent, nonaligned vision proved quite compelling for several third world countries during the cold war. True, at the height of its powers, North Korea depended on other countries (Chinese energy supplies, Russian armaments, European technology). But relatively speaking, North Korea was a passionately independent country that determined its own course in the world. Relative to South Korea, that is.

South Korea has remained, even after the democratization struggles of the 1980s and 1990s, dependent on the U.S. military.

There are 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. The U.S. supplies South Korea with over 70% of its armaments. The U.S. also sets the parameters within which South Korea makes its defense policy. There is a considerable civic movement in South Korea that opposes U.S. bases as well as larger U.S. strategic initiatives (including missile defense). Korean nationalism "the right of Koreans to determine their own national priorities" animates this movement.

Self-determination is not, of course, simply a matter of government prerogative. Since the 1980s, Korean civic movements have been expanding the space for citizens to participate in public policy. For instance, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, civic movements have campaigned against "fire sales" and foreign control of domestic financial institutions, trying to preserve the economic self-determination that produced the "miracle on the Han." Even though South Korea's national sovereignty remains constrained by U.S. military and economic influence, South Korean civil society is one of the most vibrant in the world.

This transformation in popular sovereignty, perhaps more so than the relative differences in the two governments' ideologies, marks the divergence in North and South Korean realities. Twenty-five years ago, the two Koreas were structurally similar, if ideologically different. In neither country did ordinary citizens exercise popular sovereignty (in the formal democratic sense of the word). At that time, unification as a fusion of two vertically structured societies seemed easier to imagine.

Today, with the citizens of North and South operating according to entirely different conceptions of what it means to be a citizen, unification seems a

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more difficult undertaking.

Still, overcoming the division of the Korean peninsula remains the national aspiration of the Korean people (which may differ from what any given Korean individual might want: many South Korean twenty-somethings, for instance, could care less about unification). There is no doubt that diluting U.S. power over South Korea is a necessary precondition. Such a dilution would include the transformation of U.S. troops into a transitional peacekeeping role, a compromise that North Korea has indicated, sotto voce, that it would accept, largely because it prefers U.S. troops to revived Japanese militarism. It would also require the U.S. to step back from its theater missile defense plans, which threaten to further divide North from South (the North vigorously opposes the plan; the South is under pressure from the U.S. to support the plan).

Several presidents have supported reducing the U.S. "footprint" in Korea (Nixon, Carter, Bush Sr.). In the 1990s, however, the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea has attained the status of a sacred cow, with several top officials insisting that U.S. troops will remain on the peninsula even after unification (i.e.: after the disappearance of any North Korean "threat"). And the Bush Jr. administration has aggressively pushed missile defense rather than seriously pursuing the threat reduction package that the Clinton administration was on the verge of negotiating with North Korea.

Korean unification, a difficult task even at the best of times, is not made any easier by the forces of globalization and U.S. military policy. To help create an atmosphere in which Koreans can determine the fate of the peninsula largely by themselves, the U.S. government should stop thinking of its own short-term interests and consider the long-term interests of the region.

(John Feffer <Johnfeffer@aol.com> writes frequently about East Asia. He is a member of FPIF's Advisory Committee.)

 

Sources for More Information

Roy Richard Grinker, Korea and Its Futures (1998).

Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (2000).

Samuel Kim, ed., Korea's Globalization (2000).

Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas (2000).

People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)

(South Korean civic movement pushing for greater popular sovereignty) 3F Anguk Bldg 175-3 Anguk-Dong Chongno-Gu Seoul 110-240, Korea Tel: 82-2-723-4250

Fax: 82-2-723-5055 Email: pspdint@pspd.org Web: http://www.pspd.org/

 

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What is SOFA?

United States-U.S. Military Bases- ROK-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

 

 

Currently there are 37,000 U.S. servicemen stationed in 96 different places in the Republic of Korea (ROK or Korea in short). Since the U.S. Army landed in Inchon Port in Sept. 9, 1945, the U.S. Armed Forces have never left ROK and have had great influence over it. In short Korea is a  heaven  for the U.S. Armed Forces. There are several countries occupied by the U.S. Armed Forces in the world, but none enjoy such privileges with absolute strategic command as in Korea.

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is an agreement that determines the lawful status of the U.S. Armed Forces in ROK. According to international law, foreign armed forces generally abide by the law of the stationed country. An exception is made when the foreign armed forces have to perform a special duty in a country under a mutual agreement between two countries within the law. However, SOFA between ROK and U.S. goes far beyond making simple accommodations to the U.S. Army - it is practically forfeiture of the sovereignty of Korea.

During the period of the U.S. military government, ROK had no sovereignty. After an establishment of an independent administration, the new administration and the U.S. agreed upon the status of the U.S. Armed Forces. The content of the agreement consisted of surrendering all rights on the part of ROK and allowing the U.S. Armed Forces' exclusive rights to the military bases and facilities with one condition that the U.S. Army withdraw in 1949. Because of a request made by the U.S. Army during the turmoil of the Korean War in June, 1950, however, the U.S. Army took away all the jurisdiction of the Korean government. It took thirteen years to go from a complete surrender of jurisdiction to an establishment of SOFA between ROK and the U.S. in 1967, which is considered a most unequal law by international legal standards.

The U.S. administration further demanded a humiliating agreement between Korea and Japan and a dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam. Even after partial revisions were made to SOFA in 1991, most items limiting the rights of ROK remain unchanged. In exchange for the revisions, the U.S. demanded that ROK pay an enormous share of the cost of stationing US troops there. Agreeing to make further revisions of ROK-US SOFA in November 1995, the Korean administration promised to raise their share of the defense fund. (The share of ROK in 1995 was $ 30 million, which amounts to 78% of the stationing expenses, with an annual increase of 10 %) Due to a unilateral announcement of a negotiation rupture  by the U.S., however, the agreement has been deferred until now. Only when local civil organizations launched strong campaign against it, the U.S. Pentagon - being concerned about anti-U.S. sentiment - made an announcement last November that it will hold working-level meetings within this year.

However, what will the U.S. request and Korea surrender in exchange this year? Will ROK purchase a massive amount of the U.S. made weapons? Or will the U.S. demand a further increase of the financial contribution by ROK?

 

Unfair ROK-U.S. SOFA

 

Because of SOFA:

 

·         ROK is permanently leasing U.S. military bases for free.

·         The criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. servicemen committing crimes against Koreans falls under the U.S. armed forces.

·         In reality it is difficult to compensate for civilians' damages inflicted by the U.S. troops.

·         Korean laborers working in U.S. military bases do not have the protection of the major labor rights protected under Korean law.

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·         Korean custom-clearance officers do not have an access to U.S. military goods.

·         ROK cannot place a restriction on environmental problems in the U.S. military bases.

·         ROK cannot protect an invasion of private property that is occupied by U.S. military.

·         ROK does not have an access to information regarding weapons brought in by the U.S. Army to Korea.

·         Other issues include women living in military camp-side towns and noise disturbance resulting from military planes.

 

As can be seen from the above problems, SOFA supports indulgences of all crimes committed by the U.S. servicemen.

SOFA, Encouraging Crimes Committed by the U.S. Servicemen

The U.S. government and its military do not acknowledge the criminal jurisdiction of the Korean Administration of Justice; and precisely because of that, the crimes committed by the U.S. soldiers, averaging 2,000 cases a year, are not punished properly. The Korean government is supposed to hand its jurisdiction over the U.S. servicemen and their families to the U.S. Army if the U.S. requests. Since the establishment of SOFA in 1967, the cases in which ROK claimed jurisdiction over the U.S. servicemen remain only 2%. Although the U.S. soldiers commit hideous crimes including murder, robbery, and rape, Koreans cannot even arrest them for investigation unless the crime is a flagrant offense. Crimes committed by the U.S. servicemen are increasing in number, and they are getting crueler.

 

The U.S. uses any land in Korea for free.

The land can be used indefinitely; a lease period is not specified. Considering that most countries establish a lease contract with a lease period, which are often extended through an agreement, the rent-free usage of the U.S. military bases in Korea is unreasonable. Because Item 6, ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, which is the basis of SOFA, states that this treaty is valid indefinitely, it is as if the ownership of the U.S. military bases belongs to the U.S. When leasing a base, one needs to inspect and monitor if the property is being used according to its original purpose. As such, the Korean administration needs to have the right to govern what is going on in the U.S. military bases, but that is not the case. Furthermore, the purpose of facilities and military zones may not necessarily be related to the security of the Korean peninsula since the purpose of the U.S. military occupancy is not stated at all. Given that the military strategic command belongs to the U.S. Armed Forces, this can be very dangerous.

 

Irreclaimable Environmental and Noise Pollution

Environmental pollution produced by the U.S. military bases is very serious. The U.S. military bases are discharging polluted water and oil into rivers and ocean illegally. The environmental damages include soil pollution by heavy metals such as PCB, lead, and cadmium; and hearing damage, insomnia, the birth of deformed infants and animals as well as miscarriages because of shooting, bombing, and landing and taking-off of fighter jets. Item 1, Article 4, of SOFA states that the U.S. Armed Forces do not have an obligation to restore the base and facilities formerly used by the U.S. army back to the original state. This lack of obligation creates an ironical situation in which an army dispatched to defend a country destroys its very territory. The case of the Philippines has proven that the U.S. Army destroys the occupied land for good after its withdrawal. Providing the land for free and indefinitely, however, we are not even given a right to conduct surveillance.

 

An institutionalized system known as SOFA legalizes inequality between countries.

ROK-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement must be completely revised!

 

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All agreed upon articles in ROK-US SOFA must be corrected:

·         Complete guaranteeing of Korean government's jurisdiction and rights to criminal investigation and to carrying out sentences.

·         Establishing claim for damage incurred by the U.S. servicemen.

·         Contracting a lease between ROK and the U.S. and collecting fees for using military bases.

·         Establishing human rights and labor rights of Korean laborers working in the U.S. military bases.

·         Providing preventive measures against smuggling and illegal outflow of the U.S. military post exchange (or PX).

 

A revised law must include other measures abolishing special privileges of the U.S. Armed Forces. These are the minimal needs  and  demands for  reclaiming our nation's sovereignty.

In the 50 years of the U.S. occupancy in Korea, the U.S. has seriously violated Korea's sovereignty and human rights. The U.S. supported military dictators' regimes and have oppressed Korean Minjung (an indigenous Korean word referring to people resisting oppression) trying to change an unfair ROK-US relationship. The U.S government has also dismissed the demands of Koreans calling for an equal relationship between the two countries. Despite opposition expressed by Northeast Asian  Minjung, the U.S. forced unfair agreements and treaties upon Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, and so on in order to hold strong military hegemony over Northeast Asia.

Foreign military forces must withdraw from every country. The U.S. Armed Forces Korea are no exception. We do not know of any foreign army altruistically sacrificing their lives and bearing all costs, except in a very few and temporary cases perhaps. We only know of inequality and looting committed by foreign forces. Therefore, the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Korea must withdraw from this land unless they agree to revise SOFA completely.

 

 

Solidarity in South Korean Civil Movement against the U.S. Forces:

The case of the death of two schoolgirls in June 2002

 

Naoko Murakami (Summer Internship Student)

August 22, 2002

 

1. Introduction

 

The civil movement against the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) has brought about two revisions of the Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between South Korea and the U.S.  Despite the revisions, however, the persistency of USFK legal treachery and the intrinsically unjust nature of SOFA was yet again exposed in the recent case of the negligent homicide of two middle school girls by US servicemen in Yangju, Kyonggi Province.  The resulting civil protest exerted a significant influence on the legal resolution of the incident, and demonstrated strong solidarity among citizens in South Korea. 

This paper is specifically concerned with the civil movement against the USFK and its handling of the Yangju incident. The paper follows the civil movement up until the USFK announcement of its decision not to waive criminal jurisdiction over the incident. This paper also visits, through footnote, a crime committed in 2001 by a U.S. soldier in Okinawa, Japan. Because the fight for criminal jurisdiction is at the heart of both cases, comparison of the two help the understanding of civil movements in each respective country.  It will be helpful for readers to understand the characteristics of Korean civil movements against U.S. crimes, and further the study of civil movements against U.S. armed forces across the world.

 

2. The Incident and its development

On 13 June 2002, in Yangju, Kyonggi Province, two middle school girls walking to a friend’s birthday party were killed by a U.S. armored truck, which was participating in a field exercise called

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ATT Training.  About 10 tanks participated in the training of that day, and they were heading to a training area at regular intervals.  A 54-ton truck in the third line hit the two girls when it turned aside to clear the way for the tank approaching from the opposite direction.  The driver and the track commander, Sgt. Mark Walker and Fernando Nino from the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, were handed over to U.S. military police for investigation.  Immediately, the USFK expressed regret over the incident through a statement issued in the name of the commander of the Eighth U.S. Army, Lt. Gen Daniel R. Zanini.  It also clarified the USFK’s intention to thoroughly carry out a South Korea-U.S. joint investigation.  Thomas A. Hubbard, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, also expressed his condolences over the deaths of the two girls later in the afternoon.  The next day, the assistant chief of the Second U.S. Army, the assistant chief of civil affairs, and the assistant chief judicial affairs visited the mortuary and gave 1,000,000-Won consolation money to the parents. This was an exceptionally quick and sympathetic response by the USFK. 

Other actions taken by the USFK, however, were predictably in favor of hindering rather that helping justice.  South Korean police, who arrived at the accident scene, were not permitted to do anything more than basic investigation, such as collection of evidential sources, because the USFK had already finished arranging the scene.  The Korean police were not even permitted to interview the soldiers and witnesses.

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which is based on the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty in July 1966, defines the legal status of the U.S. Forces in Korea. Under the terms of the third paragraph of Article 22 of SOFA, it is the U.S. who has the first criminal jurisdiction over the crimes that are committed by U.S. servicemen while on duty.  South Korea does not have a right to get involved from investigation to trial. Unlike the Status of Forces Agreement between Japan and U.S., SOFA between South Korea and U.S. provides the U.S. a conclusive right to decide whether the incident occurred while on duty or not. All that the South Korean government can do is to request that the U.S. waive its jurisdiction.  According to the statistics of the Justice Ministry, the National Campaign for Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea, South Korean courts passed judgment only in 23 cases (7.3%) out of 311 crimes involving U.S. soldiers in 2000 and 26 cases (6.9%) out of 376 crimes in 2002.

South Korea is able to request that the U.S. waive its jurisdiction on the crimes committed by U.S. soldiers in liberty.  After the first revision of SOFA in 1991, the items that the U.S. gives “sympathetic consideration” to South Korea’s request was added.  However, South Korea still did not, and still does not, have a legal right to obtain jurisdiction, because the U.S. could reject South Korea’s request.

Regarding the death of the two school girls in Yangju, the Ministry of Justice filed an official request with USFK, on July 10, to give up its primary criminal jurisdiction.  This was the first time the South Korean government exercised its right to request the U.S to waive jurisdiction over a crime committed by U.S. soldiers.  Under the terms of Article 4 of the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the Ministry of Justice has to file an official request with the USFK to waive primary criminal jurisdiction within 21 days after an incident.  Therefore, the Ministry of Justice had to file an official request with the USFK before July 5.  But because the USFK’s consignment of the warrants for the incident was unpunctual, this deadline was extended to July 11. 

The reasons for the Ministry of Justice’s unprecedented decision to request U.S. waiver of jurisdiction are as follows: the South Korean prosecutor could not interview the two U.S. soldiers until July 9, the death of the two junior high school students was serious affair, the victims did not have any fault, and they were considering the feelings of the bereaved family. In response to a Korean request of waiver, the U.S. must, under the terms of SOFA, reply within 28 days. 

Shortly after the Ministry of Justice’s request, it was speculated that the U.S. was unlikely to waive jurisdiction because it had never previously waived jurisdiction over crimes committed by servicemen while on the duty. On the day after the Ministry of Justice’s request, Culture Daily reported that the USFK was unwilling to create a precedent where a crime committed while on duty was prosecuted in a South Korean court. The USFK’s lack of a quick response to the Culture Daily report led civic groups and citizens to actually infer this statement as true.

The bereaved families and civic groups sued the six U.S. commanders under suspicion of negligent homicide and requested to have them prevented from leaving South Korea.  One of them, the 2nd division commander, who promised the bereaved families to build a memorial monument for two girls, finished his term and departed from South Korea. Based on independent investigation implemented in July, the Korean prosecutor announced that they could not find negligence for criminal liability among the commanders who were sued, except for the drivers and truck commander.  Although South Korean prosecutors also summoned the suspects, they reportedly refused to answer specific questions about the incident. According to the Ministry of Justice, on August 7, the USFK submitted an official document stating that the USFK would not waive jurisdiction because there hadn’t been any precedent in which the USFK waived its jurisdiction over an incident committed while on duty, and furthermore, that the persons concerned had already been prosecuted under their jurisdiction.

 

3. South Korean Civil Movement against the USFK

 

3.1 History of civil movements against the USFK, and SOFA

The two revisions of SOFA were the direct results of civil movements against the SOFA and the USFK. The existence of U.S. forces in Korea was of course a result of Cold War doctrine.  Protest against the USFK was forbidden under former authoritarian regimes and the National Security Law. A rationale was created and propagandized to justify the continued presence of USFK; the notion that the prevention of a North Korean attack was only possible through the continued existence of USFK was fixed indelibly within the psyche of a generation of South Koreans. Thus, although U.S. soldiers committed a great number of crimes in the era passed, the victims and their bereaved families were compelled to accept them. Protest against the USFK was recognized as an act serving the interests of the enemy. 

Today, crimes of U.S. soldiers against prostitutes around the military bases tend not to be brought to light.  It is not only because the victims are unwilling to come forth, but also because the South Korean people pay little attention to them.  There is deeply rooted prejudice against prostitutes serving U.S. soldiers.  Calling them by the demeaning term, “Yangsaeksi [prostitution for the U.S. soldiers, (literal translation: Western hostess)],” South Korean people want to deny even their existence. South Korean people did not recognize the crimes by the U.S. soldiers against prostitutes as problems for the whole of South Korean society.  They believed that the USFK was only an issue for “non-nationalistic” people, or for prostitutes.  Accordingly, numerous criminal cases, not to mention crimes that went unreported, were covered up without attracting anyone’s attention.

However, as anti-Americanism spread in the 1980s among the civics in the wake of the Kwangju Incident, the crimes of U.S. soldiers became a concern for South Korean citizens.  At the same time, increasing momentum toward democratization brought active discussion over a revision of SOFA.  SOFA was revised for the first time in 25 years on February 1991.  Yet, the revised version of SOFA still maintained unequal clauses.  Although the clauses stating South Korea’s automatic waiver of criminal jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers was deleted and the scope of crimes over which South Korea can exercise first jurisdiction was

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expanded, some clauses are still effective enough to impose restrictions on South Korea’s exercise of jurisdiction.

The second revision was also the result of a public outcry against crimes involving U.S. soldiers.  Crimes committed by U.S. servicemen, such as the bizarre murder of Yun Gumi in 1992 again gave rise to much controversy over the overall revision of SOFA.  Particularly, the case of Yun Gumi brought the crimes of the U.S. army into public debate. Consequently, the first civic group that specializes in crimes involving the USFK, the National Campaign for Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea, was established.  Negotiations with the U.S. for the revision of SOFA started in 1995. However, these negotiations were suspended due to disagreements on criminal jurisdiction.  The U.S. then unilaterally broke off the negotiations in 1997.  As crimes involving the USFK became infamies, (crimes including murder, damage to the quality of life of residents in the vicinity of target practice areas, and unsanctioned discharge of toxic substances into the Han River), protests against the USFK rose sharply in 1999 and could not be ignored.  As a result, the negotiations between South Korea and the U.S. resumed.  127 civil groups for the revision of SOFA merged in solidarity to become the People’s Action for Reform of Unjust ROK US SOFA Agreement.  Monthly rallies in front of the U.S. embassy also began, and still continue to take place after 35 rallies. In January 2001, through 11 negotiations, a proposal for the revision of SOFA was concluded. During the process of its ratification in South Korea, civics and civil groups sharply reacted against ratification because it was a change for the worse in actuality. The public debate regarding SOFA among the South Korean citizenry has directly aided the movement for democratization and development of civil society in South Korea.

 

3.2 The Civil Movement regarding the death of the two schoolgirls

The civil movement against the USFK’s indifferent response to the death of the two girls did not immediately gain momentum. The FIFA World Cup, which South Korea was hosting at the time, was drawing much of the public’s attention away from the incident.  As major media did not report the incident, many citizens were even unaware of the incident. However, as noted above, it was unusual for the USFK to express regret over the incident so quickly.  The public did not forget the incident.  After the World Cup, South Korean citizens’ concern about the incident grew because of movements by civic groups, including reports on Internet web sites and street demonstrations.  One month later, rallies were simultaneously held in big cities throughout the country.

What the civil movement required of the USFK was mainly divided into four items: waiver of jurisdiction over the incident, President Bush’s apology, prompt payment of compensation, and the revision of SOFA.  The call for criminal jurisdiction over the incident came as the result of the USFK’s inability to give a convincing explanation on the cause of the incident.  The public was growing suspicious, but as long as the USFK had jurisdiction, South Korean prosecutors could not even interview the soldiers responsible for the

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deaths.  It is highly likely that the U.S. conceals the truth to avoid liability. The request for President Bush’s apology results from a precedent set by former president Bill Clinton while visiting Okinawa for a summit in 2000, when he officially apologized for an incident committed by a U.S. soldier there. This incident demonstrates the inherently biased nature of SOFA between Korea and the US, with regards to such issues as the jurisdiction over crimes committed by a U.S. soldier while on the duty.

However, citizens also recognize that the South Korean government is also at fault in its handling of the Yangju incident.  Although the national coalition worked on the government again and again, the reaction of the government was languid.  It was at the last possible moment when the Ministry of Justice unwillingly filed an official request with the U.S. for waiver of jurisdiction. The government seemed only concerned with its relationship with the United States.  On July 22, the Defense Ministry spokesman doubted that the U.S. military would give up jurisdiction over the soldiers.  This definitively inflamed the citizens’ discontent with the government because the government seemed on the side of the United States. The reason the Defense Ministry cited is the same reason that the USFK had raised from the beginning and that the USFK consequently raised when it announced its decision not to waive jurisdiction on August 7, 2002.  To make matters worse, the Defense Ministry retracted its proposal to have an interview with the national coalition group.  Two days after the announcement, the national coalition held a press conference in front of the building of the Defense Ministry and denounced the Defense Ministry by using such words as “betrayal,” “humiliating,” and “thoughtless”.

Moreover, when the people heard that the Kyonggi Province office was to honor a commander of the Second U.S. Army for his achievements, in light of the upcoming departure from his post, citizens reacted sharply against it.  They argued that this would show the Kyonggi government as being ignorant of the current citizen’s movement against the USFK and unpatriotic.

Kim P’ant’ae, director of the People’s Action for Reform of Unjust ROK US SOFA Agreement, insisted that though the South Korean government had been pushed to request the waiver of jurisdiction to the U.S., it did not seem to have strong will to pursue a thorough investigation. Mun Jonghyon, regular representative of the national coalition, also argued that one of the obstacles preventing the demise of the USFK was none other than the South Korean government and what was required was an active involvement of the South Korean government towards the resolution of the incident, as the Okinawa administration and Japanese government had done.  Through the incident, the South Korean citizens learned that an active civil movement enables them to steer the government, which did little for the people’s rights by itself.

The current upsurge of the protests against the USFK reminded citizens of other incidents involving the USFK.  The incident of the two school girls came a week after a 52-year-old worker, Chon Dongrok, died following his electrocution by power lines set up by a U.S. military base near the inter-Korean border.  In rallies for the two girls, there were pictures of Chon Dongrok and boards, which accused the USFK of his death.  In the 5th national coalition rally for a full accounting of the death of the two schoolgirls and punishment of those responsible for it, a regular representative of a national coalition mentioned the incident of Chon Dongrok when he called for closing of the military unit responsible for the incident.  Also, the unsolved homicide committed by a U.S. serviceman in March 2000 received a great deal of public attention and roused the movement for its reinvestigation, although when it happened, it was ignored because the victim was an aged prostitute for U.S. soldiers.  The National Campaign for Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea explains that the case of the schoolgirls exposed the USFK’s uncooperative and unreasonable stance on crimes committed by its soldiers.

 

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SOFA and Sovereignty Over Korea

By Ahn Sung-Ho

 

Two Korean middle school girls were run over and killed by a U.S. armored vehicle at around 10:45, June 13, in Yangju, Kyonggi Province, 30 km north of Seoul. The girls were identified as Shin Hyo-soon and Shim Mi-sun on their way to a friend's birthday party. On the other hand, the two soldiers who operated the 54-ton armored bridge carrier were identified as Sgt. Fernando Nino and Sgt. Mark Walker from the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division. They were immediately handed over to U.S. military police for investigation by local law enforcement officials in conformity to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The investigation was done virtually by the U.S. military army alone and was alleged to reveal that it was an accident.  The families and friends of the girls and NGOs have been demanding that the investigation be re-done systematically by the Korean police, and that the United States Forces Korea (or USFK) give up its rights to try the soldiers in a U.S. court. On July 10, the Ministry of Justice of Korea filed an official request for the United States Forces Korea to waive its primary criminal jurisdiction over the alleged accident that crushed the two students to death. Further, the major political parties, the Grand National Party and the Millennium Democratic Party, also supported the Korean Government's action.

This means that the ROK as a nation has requested the U.S. for jurisdiction over the incident. The USFK, however, declined the ROK request. One argument is that there is no precedent of U.S. soldiers being tried in Korean courts concerning on-duty crimes. The National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops, a local civic NGO however, has rebutted this argument saying that although not in Korea the U.S. did waive its jurisdiction once: in June 1957 the U.S. government declared it would give up its primary criminal jurisdiction over the death of a 46-year-old Japanese woman. This precedent virtually nullifies the power of the first argument.

There is no reason why it cannot occur in Korea if one occurred in another country. The other argument is that the two U.S. soldiers already face a court-martial for negligent homicide. This isn't persuasive because the court process can always be stopped.

These are not isolated incidents, but just a tip of the iceberg. The National Campaign reports the Korean government's official statistics that 56,904 U.S. soldiers and civilian employees were involved in 50,082 criminal acts between the years of 1967 and 1998. And less than 5% of the criminals involved were taken to Korean courts.

On the basis of the statistics, experts estimate that more than 100,000 crimes were committed since U.S. troops began to station in this nation on September 8, 1945. Right now, we have 37,000 U.S. troops in 96 bases in the territory of the Republic of Korea. They have been killing our women, they have been raping or sexually abusing our children, they have been despising and beating our brothers, but rarely being reasonably punished. What do they sound like? Do they sound like troops of one of our allies? No, they sound more like those of a conqueror. They are arrogant, don't care about the safety and security of our people.

They are just concerned about themselves, their regulations, their customs, and their ideas. We know that U.S. troops have good-natured soldiers. But as a system, they are evil. Where do those absurdities come from? First, people almost unanimously blame them on the SOFA between the Republic of Korea and the United States.

This Agreement, which was drafted when Korea was so poor and desperate, confers such a ridiculously exceptional status to American soldiers and their families and their relatives and their visitors. We know the Agreement was signed by the Korean government and was ratified by the National

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Assembly, and so that it has a great binding force. Since it damnifies the sovereignty of this nation and constantly threatens the safety and security of the citizens, however, the SOFA must be interpreted and applied to the restoration of Korea's sovereignty.

For the specific case in question, the U.S. government must re-consider their decline to the Korean government and waive the jurisdiction in question. They must recall that Korean citizens also have rights to life, happiness, and safety if U.S. citizens do. The SOFA must be revised and the evil unfairness of the ROK-U.S. relationship must be fixed immediately.  Second, the Korean government and law enforcement officers should be reminded that their duty is to protect or care for their own people. A brief review of the USFK-involved crimes shows that Korean police are not aggressive enough in protecting the safety, life, property, and human rights of Koreans. If our guards and officers do not care, who would care? Most of all, lastly, all the people must realize the seriousness of the unfairness in the SOFA and deploy a new millennium movement of independence from the USFK. We must spend more money on our national defense. We cannot live in this state of indigence drunk with some physical comfort when in a shadowy corner of this land our brothers, sisters, and children are despised, abused, and killed away. This absurdity cannot be ignored any more.

The Hanyang Journal

All Rights Reserved

 

 

Students holding ceremony in memory of Hyo-Soon and Mi-Sun

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                     One of the victim’s mother in grief