We left Major Eyre enjoying, on the early morn of the 3rd of August, the triumph of his decisive victory. It is difficult even to imagine a position more gratifying to a high-minded soldier than that which he then occupied. Of the dangers he had incurred in attempting the relief of Arah that to his life had been the least. He had risked his reputation as a soldier, his very commission as an officer; for he had turned aside without authority from his course. And, now, he could scarcely exaggerate to himself the importance of the results of his daring. To have saved his fellow-countrymen was a great thing; but, for the interests of India, it was greater still to have dealt a staggering blow at victorious rebellion, to have saved all Bihar from the fate which, but for him, would have overtaken Arah.
But even in that hour of triumph Eyre must have felt, and Eyre did feel, that his task was but half accomplished. A “staggering blow” may baffle a murderous onslaught, but unless the recipient of it be thoroughly disabled a renewal of the attack is always possible. So reasoned Eyre. The rebels whom he had baulked of their prey were still strong enough to return.
His very departure would invite them. He felt, then, that he must follow up his victory and pursue the Sipahis to the stronghold of the great landowner whom they had recognised as their leader.
The task was not easy. The roads were reported to be almost impassable; the country surrounding the stronghold of Kunwar Singh was described as inaccessible. But the events of the previous eight-and-forty hours had told their tale. The mental courage which had dared, the skill and gallantry which had carried to success, the march on Arah, had been marked and appreciated by the Englishmen who had followed Eyre.
No men are more quick to discern noble qualities in a leader than the private soldier. It was a striking testimony to the hold which Eyre’s conduct and character had taken on the minds of the men of the 5th Fusiliers, that, when they heard that he was about to lead them across those impassable roads to an inaccessible stronghold, they were loud in their expressions of the confidence with which they would hail the order to move forward36.
But before setting out on this expedition something yet remained to be done at Arah. The townspeople had unmistakably sympathised with the revolted Sipahis. Not a single voice had warned Captain Dunbar of the ambush into which he was leading his detachment. Some of the more prominent men of the city had even taken an active part against our countrymen. As a preliminary measure, then, Eyre disarmed the population. Men whose active aid on behalf of the rebels was indisputable were brought to trial. Throughout the district order was restored. At the same time Eyre communicated his intentions to the military authorities at Danapur, and solicited reinforcements of at least two hundred more European troops and a supply of ammunition. He took advantage, likewise, of the number of volunteers flocking to his camp, to organise a corps of European volunteer cavalry, the command of which he conferred upon Captain Jackson, of the Stud Department. His wounded he sent in to Danapur.
On the 8th of August Eyre was joined by two hundred men of the 10th Foot and five officers. Three days later a hundred of Rattray’s Sikhs joined him. His total augmented force then consisted of three hundred and thirty European Infantry, thirty-six European Cavalry, one hundred and forty Sikhs, forty of whom were the Arah garrison commanded by Herwald Wake, and sixteen Volunteer Cavalry.
With this force Eyre set out on the afternoon of the 11th, in the direction of Jagdispur, the hereditary stronghold of Kunwar Singh.
Meanwhile the troops under the orders of Kunwar Singh had to a great extent recovered heart. The halt of eight days’ duration made by Major Eyre at Arah had inspired them with the belief that no further advance was intended by the English, and that they would be left unmolested in their stronghold. Impressed with this idea, Kunwar Singh detached small parties in the direction of Baksar, to feel their way and to intercept any small bodies of Europeans whom they might meet. In this they were partially successful, and this success would probably have incited their leader, had he been left alone, to make, a little later, a movement in force in the same direction. But Kunwar Singh was well served by the country-people. He was informed, almost as soon as they arrived, of the reinforcements which reached Eyre. He felt certain, then, as to the next move of the British force, and he resolved, with the energy which formed so strong a feature of his character, to meet it with his remaining available strength.
Calling in, then, all his detachments within reach, he occupied, in considerable force, the village of Dilawar, about a mile and a half in advance of Jagdispur, and covered by a river. This village he caused to be intrenched. It was connected with Jagdispur by a very thick jungle, with the intricacies of which, however, his men were well acquainted.
Not content with occupying a position presenting difficulties to an assailant, and capable of being in a great measure masked, Kunwar Singh was so ill-advised as to send a strong body of cavalry and infantry across the river to occupy a village, Tola Narainpur, on its left bank. It was this cardinal error which rendered his defeat certain. He had in the field altogether about five thousand two hundred men, of whom twelve hundred were Sipahis.
Eyre had advanced towards Jagdispur the afternoon of the 11th. He marched eight miles, passing over en route his late battle-field, and encamped for the night on the banks of the Ghagar rivulet.
Resuming his march with the early dawn, be halted at 9 o’clock to refresh his men. At 10 o’clock he again advanced, and in half-an-hour detected the presence of the enemy in Tola Narainpur. He at once sent forward his skirmishers, supported by a fire of grape. This fire forced the enemy in and
about the village to discover themselves. Eyre then sent at them with the bayonet the detachment of the 10th, eager to avenge their comrades. The main body of the enemy stood their ground with great obstinacy, but were in the end driven across the river. Meanwhile the 5th Fusiliers, assisted by a field howitzer, had held in check the enemy’s left, consisting of irregulars, horse and foot. These now simultaneously gave way. The river was crossed by our men, and an impetuous attack on the intrenchments of Dilawar placed that village almost immediately in their power.
Still there lay a mile and a half of thick jungle to be traversed. Eyre gave the enemy no time to recover themselves; but, sending on his infantry in skirmishing order, forced his way through the thicket, driving the Sipahis before him. In their retreat the enemy left behind them two of their guns. Completely disheartened by the continuous advance of our men, they scarcely attempted to defend their leader’s stronghold, but fled, taking Kunwar Singh with them, in the direction of Sasaram. The battle had begun at half-past 10 o’clock. At 1 o’clock Eyre and his force were in possession of Jagdispur. The enemy lost three hundred men. The loss of the British amounted to six wounded.
On the morning of the 14th Eyre detached a force to Jataura, about eight miles from Jagdispur, to beat up the quarters of Kunwar Singh, – but the wily chieftain had had good information, and had retired early. The house he had occupied there was, however, destroyed. A similar fate befell the palace and other buildings, notably the property of rebels, at Jagdispur and in its vicinity.
The campaign terminated with the victory at Jagdispur.
Two days after it had been achieved, the Assistant Adjutant-General of the Danapur division wrote to inform Eyre that Havelock, then attempting to relieve Lakhnao, had compelled to fall back; that the cry at Kanhpur was still for troops; and that he and those under his command were required to join a force then being collected at Allahabad.
Eyre had accomplished his mission. His work was done. The mutineers had been driven from Bihar. He and his gallant comrades were then not at all unwilling to proceed to the part of India for which they had originally been destined, and where they might hope to render fresh services to their
country.
Eyre, therefore, bade adieu to Arah on the 20th, and on the following day set out for Baksar en route for Allahabad.
Meanwhile events had been occurring in Calcutta calculated greatly to increase the means at the disposal of the Government for the suppression of the revolt.
On the 1st of August, Major-General Sir James Outram landed in Calcutta. The varied services of this distinguished officer at once marked him out for high command. The name of Outram had for years been a household word in India. A keen and successful sportsman, a quick-witted and energetic political officer, a hater and exposer of corruption, Outram had but recently figured as Commander-in-chief of the expedition despatched in 1856 to the Persian Gulf. His success there had been prompt and complete. When, on the conclusion of peace with Persia, the regiments which had composed his expeditionary force had been detached rapidly to India, Sir James Outran had followed to Bombay. It would seem to have been the original intention of the Governor-General to re-employ him in the political post which had been bestowed upon him before the mutiny, that of Agent to the Governor-General of Rajputana. The mutinies at Indur, at Nasirabad, at Nimach, and the outbreaks in other parts of Central India had thrown that part of the country into disorder, and Lord Canning felt that a strong hand controlling a strong force would be required to re-establish authority. The state of the country, however, rendered it impossible for Sir James Outran to proceed alone from Bombay to his post in Rajputana; and he felt, moreover, that in the actual state of affairs his presence might be more useful t, the Government in some other part of India. On arriving at Bombay, then, he at once telegraphed to the Governor-General for orders. Receiving no reply – for Lord Canning could not at the moment make up his mind – Outram cut the Gordian knot by steaming round to Calcutta. He arrived there, as already stated, on the 1st of August.
Meanwhile, Lord Canning had, on the 15th of July, determined to employ Sir James Outram in the command of an expeditionary force in Central India, and he telegraphed to Bombay to that effect. But again he changed his views, and resolved to use his services to restore order in the country between Patna and Kanhpur. Sir James Outram’s arrival in Calcutta on the
1st of August coincided then with the latest wishes of the Governor-General.
The reader must remember that, on the 1st day of August, the only information possessed by the Government regarding Bihar was that Captain Dunbar’s detachment had been beaten, that Arah was besieged, that the grand trunk road was unsafe, and that the entire province might at any moment be lost to them. From Kanhpur they had information that Havelock was about to cross the Ganges with his small force, and to march on Lakhnao. Having regard to the fact that an entire province was arrayed in arms against him, his attempt did not seem promising. Altogether the look-out on the 1st of August was gloomy in Calcutta.
No sooner, then, had Sir James Outram landed, than Lord Canning felt that the man for the occasion had arrived. Four days later he appointed him to command the united Danapur and Kanhpur divisions of the army, thus placing him in supreme military command of the country between the first of those stations and Lakhnao. Outram eagerly clutched at the offer. Like every true soldier, he was of opinion that “action, not counsel,” was required. He set out to assume his command the very day after he had been nominated to it, taking with him a mountain train of artillery, but no gunners to work it, these not being, at the moment, available.
The day prior to Sir James Outram’s nomination, Lord Canning, feeling the extreme inconvenience of leaving the civil divisions of Banaras, Allahabad, Kanhpur, and other outlying districts, without a supreme administrative officer to control them – the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces being at the time shut up in Agra – had given effect to a resolution at which he had arrived, to detach one of his councillors to Banaras to take up the lapsed authority in that part of India. His selection had fallen upon Mr. J. P. Grant. I have already alluded to this gentleman as the ablest member of the Council of the Governor-General. Mr. Grant was, indeed, a man of very remarkable ability. He had a clear and sound understanding, a quick and subtle brain, great independence, and great decision of character. If he had a fault, it may have been that he did not always make sufficient allowance for men whose intellect was less vast, and whose views were less sound than his own.
He failed thus to rate at their full influence on the multitude opinions firmly advocated by others, but which he knew to be untenable. His prescience came thus to be mistaken for dogmatic assertion, his keen insight for conceit. But this slight defect, arising from want of European training, was overborne by the powerful intellect, the high and lofty ideas of one of the greatest members of the Indian Civil Service.
The despatch of an administrative officer of the first order to the civil districts north of Bengal had been further rendered advisable by the action of the Government of India at the very end of July. On the 31st of that month there appeared in the Official Gazette a resolution of the Governor-General in Council directing the course to be pursued in Resolution in dealing with mutineers who might be captured or who might surrender to the authorities. This resolution was much criticised at the time, and in England as well as in India it was very generally condemned. After a lapse of thirty years it is, perhaps, possible to bring to its consideration a calm and unbiassed judgment.
The avowed object of the resolution was to prevent the civil officers of the country from hastily resorting to and carrying too far measures of severity against the revolted Sipahis, some of whom might, possibly, have been unable to withstand the influence of their comrades; some might have endeavoured to protect their officers; some might have merely revolted without murdering their officers; and some might have simply taken their way to their homes on the general revolt of their regiment.
To carry out this object, it was ruled in the resolution, first, that no native officer or soldier belonging to a regiment which had not mutinied should be punished, even as a deserter, unless he were found with arms in his hand. Such men, it was directed, should be made over to the military authorities, or, when such a step were impossible, should be kept in prison pending the orders of Government.
The second section provided for the treatment of native officers and soldiers, being mutineers or deserters, belonging to regiments which had mutinied, but the European officers of which had not been murdered. Such native officers and soldiers, when apprehended without arms in their possession, were to be sent to a certain fixed place, to be dealt with by the military authorities.
The third section dealt with mutineers or deserters who belonged
to regiments which had killed a European officer, or who had committed some sanguinary outrage. Such offenders were to be judged by the civil power. In the event, however, of extenuating circumstances transpiring, the case was to be reported to the Government before the carrying out of the sentence.
These were the three principal provisions of the resolution. In the remaining portion of it Lord Canning dwelt very much upon the evil certain to arise by continuing to inflict indiscriminate punishment, after a district or division should have been brought into order, and after a sufficient impression should have been made upon the rebellious and the disorderly.
It was objected to this resolution that it was ill-timed; that, issued when the struggle was still undecided, when the enemy still held Dehli. when our countrymen were besieged in Lakhnao, on the morrow, as it were, of the massacres of Fathgarh and Kanhpur, and whilst the fate of Bihar was trembling in the balance, it was calculated to encourage the rebels, to show them that, through fear of them, we were anxious to entice them back to their allegiance. It is possible that the strong dislike with which the resolution was regarded at the time was in a great measure attributable to the want of confidence felt in the Government. Certainly, the provisions I have quoted were not only not objectionable, but the spirit in which they were conceived was worthy of the highest praise.
They are not fairly liable to the condemnation that was passed upon them at the time. They do not condone mutiny or desertion. But – the public had no confidence in the Government. The order that, in certain circumstances, an appeal lay from the civil magistrate to the highest authority roused suspicion. It was considered, moreover, that the very publication of such a resolution was a tacit rebuke to those who had carried out severe measures of retribution.
Examining the order after a lapse of thirty years, all the objections to it made at the time fade away. The provisions it contained are wise and statesmanlike. Another measure contemplated by Lord Canning about this time filled to overflowing the measure of his unpopularity. The danger arising from allowing an entire population to carry arms had not been unremarked by the citizens of Calcutta. It was a danger obvious, and in many cases most pressing. On the 13th of July, then, the
Grand Jury in their presentment suggested the disarming of the native population of Calcutta and its suburbs as a measure required for the preservation of peace and the prevention of crime. A disarming bill had for some time been under the consideration of the Government. The presentment of the Grand Jury stimulated their action regarding it. But the indignation of the Calcutta public was intense when it was found that the measure of the Government applied the order to disarm to Europeans as well as to natives.
It was in vain that it was pointed out that the act of the Government contained a proviso under which it was possible for any man to apply for a licence to carry arms, and that it was not to be credited that such permission would be refused to an European. So profound was the mistrust of the Government that all argument was wasted. Again I have to record my conviction that the measure of the Government, accompanied by the proviso referred to, was a statesmanlike measure. Any other, partial or one-sided in its limitations, would have been wrong in principle and might have been mischievous in action.
Whilst in these terrible months of June and July the Government of India had had to encounter dangers at a distance from their own door, they were being preserved by the commanding officer of a native infantry regiment from a peril close at hand, and which, but for him, might have been serious indeed. The station of Jalpaigori, on the Tista, a hundred and seventy-three miles from the capital, and in the direct route to the station of Darjiling, was garrisoned by the 73rd Regiment Native Infantry. The commanding officer was Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Sherer. This officer had passed nearly the whole of his Indian career in the Stud Department. His knowledge of horses was profound. In managing the quadruped he had learned, too, how to deal with his master. Transferred, according to the orders then in force, on his promotion to a Lieutenant-Colonelcy, from the superintendence of the stud at Baksar to the command of a native infantry regiment, having in the intervening period of thirty years forgotten all his drill, he very soon showed his officers that great natural ability is universal in its practical application, and that, whatever be the sphere assigned to a really capable man wherein to labour, he will always come to the front.
Colonel Sherer had not been long in command of his regiment
when the mutiny broke out. His position was full of peril. His men were, so to speak, masters of the situation. There were no Europeans within easy reach of them. There were, too, traitors in their ranks. But there were also men who still trusted to the fortune of the British. It must be remembered, moreover, that to this regiment the new cartridge, regarded by others as the symbol of the proselytising intentions of the Government, had not been served out. The station, likewise, was far from the high road. Still, rumours, detailed reports, letters, emissaries, found their way from time to time into the regimental lines. Alarm succeeded alarm. But Sherer and his officers were calm. They maintained a careful watch over the movements of their companies. At last there could be no doubt but that mischief was intended. Four of the most influential men in the regiment were indicated to Sherer as the heads of a conspiracy which would inevitably break out that or the following night. Sherer had them seized and tried. Their guilt was clearly proved, and they were condemned to death. The sentence, however, required the confirmation of the Major- General commanding the Presidency Division. It reached him when all was couleur de rose at Barrackpur and at Calcutta. The hearts of the Major-General and of the Commander-in-Chief were inclined to mercy. It was considered that dismissal from the service was a sufficient punishment for mutiny with intent to murder. Au order then was transmitted to Sherer to “dismiss the offenders from the service.” Before this order could reach Sherer the horizon had darkened. The Sipahis at Danapur had revolted; the Arah catastrophe had occurred. To temporise at such a crisis would be fatal. But Sherer had the order. He obeyed it – after his fashion.
Commanding a parade for the following morning, he brought out the condemned Sipahis and had them blown away from guns. The same day he wrote officially to the Major-General commanding the Presidency Division to inform him that, in obedience to his orders to dismiss the four condemned Sipahis from the service, he had that morning dismissed them – from the muzzles of four loaded guns37.
This act of vigour had its effect. The rising was postponed. Two days later Eyre’s victory deprived the disaffected of all
hope of success, and Sherer, continuing a combined policy of watchfulness, conciliation, and firmness, brought his regiment safely through the crisis, their arms retained, and their reputation unstained38.
Very shortly after this episode, Lord Elgin, then the British Plenipotentiary to China, arrived in Calcutta (8th of August). He was conveyed by H.M.’s ship Shannon. Captain William Peel, having on board three hundred marines and one hundred of H.M.’s 90th Regiment.
Three days later, the consort of the Shannon, the Pearl, Captain Sotheby, brought, besides her crew, two hundred more men of the 90th. From that moment the arrival of reinforcements was continuous, and the country south of Allahabad was for ever out of danger.
But the arrival of the Shannon and the Pearl had a result more practical than the mere announcement that they had brought to Calcutta Lord Elgin and some three or four hundred soldiers would seem to imply. In the month of July, Major-General Thomas Ashburnham, who commanded the China expedition, and who had proceeded by way of Calcutta on his way to his destination, had written thence to Lord Canning to express his great desire to send him a naval brigade to keep open under all circumstances his communications with Allahabad.
In the same letter General Ashburnham had likewise expressed his conviction that Captain Peel would be a most admirable coadjutor in carrying to perfection a scheme of that nature. Lord Canning clutched at the idea thus propounded; Lord Elgin assented to it, and, as we have seen, he arrived at Calcutta on the 8th of August, prepared not only to give moral aid to the Government, but “to place Her Majesty’s ships Shannon and Pearl, with their respective crews,” at the disposal of the Governor-General.
Lord Canning, as I have said, clutched at the offer. On the 10th the two vessels were officially placed. at his disposal. On the 18th Captain William Peel started for Allahabad with a naval brigade composed of four hundred men, six 65-cwt. 8-inch hollow shot or shell guns, two 24-pound howitzers, and two field pieces.
I must chronicle one more important event, and then quit
Calcutta for the scenes of turmoil and action. In the last week of July the new Commander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, arrived in Calcutta. Lord Canning had recommended that the post he came to fill should be bestowed upon Sir Patrick Grant. But the Prime Minister of the day, Lord Palmerston, strongly held the opinion enunciated by Sir James Outram, that to suppress the Indian Mutiny action rather than counsel was required in a General. He, therefore, selected a plain, blunt soldier, and sent him to Calcutta to assume the supreme direction of military affairs in India. The selection was extremely popular with the army, for Sir Colin had served on the North-West frontier, and had won the confidence and affection of officers and men.
Calcutta may now safely be quitted. Numerous reinforcements had made her secure. The crisis which had menaced Mr. Beadon’s line of six hundred miles had been successfully surmounted. Many dangers miles had been overcome. Banaras had been threatened and restored to order; Allahabad had been snatched from destruction; Patna, Danapur, and Bihar after a terrible trial, had been brought again under the aegis of British protection. Who had saved that line? Not the Supreme Government, for the action of the Government in refusing to disarm the native troops had increased, if it had not actually caused, the disorder. Not the Local Governments – the one shut up in Agra, the other hair-splitting and venting its personal spite in Calcutta. No, – four names indicate the men who saved that line to the British. North of Bihar, Mr. Frederic Gubbins, of the Civil Service, the judge who virtually administered the great Hindu city, and Colonel Neill, whose prompt and resolute action stamped out rebellion whenever and wherever it raised its head. South of Banaras, Mr. William Tayler and Major Eyre. These are names to be honoured, – these are the subordinates who won the battle; the untitled upholders of the honour, the glory, and the fair name of England. They were alike the heads that devised, the hands that executed. Associated for ever with theirs, too, in their undying glory, as supports who maintained the over-burdened structure, will be the names of those whose sphere of action, though confined, was of vital importance, – the names of the members of that Arab garrison, most fitly represented by their three leaders, by Herwald Wake, by Vicars Boyle, and by Colvin.
36. In his report to Army Head-quarters, Captain L’Estrange, commanding the detachment of the 5th Fusiliers, after describing the reported difficulties of the march, added “Under all the circumstances, a feeling of doubt, if not of apprehension, as to the success of our expedition might easily have pervaded troops less confident than ours were in the judgment, talent, and courage of our leader.”
37. I not only received these details from Sir George Sherer himself, but I have read the proceedings of the Court Martial and the entire correspondence.
38. Colonel Sherer was rewarded by receiving the order of a Knight Commander of the Star of India.
This collection transcribed by Chris Gage