Sir John Shore, a distinguished member of the Company’s civil service, and the author of the revenue settlement of 1793, succeeded to the government, on the departure of Lord Cornwallis, who, in a letter to Mr. Dundas on the choice of his successor, had given it as his opinion, that “nobody but a person who had never been in the service, and who was essentially unconnected with its members, who was of a rank far surpassing his associates in the government, and who had the full support of the Ministry at home, was competent for the office of Governor-General.”
Subsequently to the date of this letter, Sir John, then Mr. Shore, had visited England, and on his return, Lord Cornwallis wrote again to Mr. Dundas, that “seeing how greatly Mr. Shore’s Lind had been enlarged and improved by the visit, he desired to make an exception in his favour.” Mr. Pitt, who had taken great interest in the question of the revenue settlement, had been much struck with the industry, candour and talent exhibited by Sir John Shore, and, believing him to be well suited to carry out the views of Lord Cornwallis, mentioned his name to the King as his successor. The King replied, that “No one could have been so properly thought of as Mr. Shore, unless a very proper man of distinction could be found to be Governor General at Bengal.” Sir John Shore, therefore, received the appointment, and entered on the duties of his office on the 28th of October, 1793.
The first question of importance which came up to test his powers, was connected with the politics of the Deccan. The treaty of alliance concluded with the Nizam and the Mahrattas by Lord Cornwallis in 1790, stipulated, that “if after the conclusion of the peace with Tippoo, he should attack or molest either of the contracting parties, the others shall join to punish him, the mode or conditions of effecting which shall be hereafter settled by the contracting parties.” To avoid future complications, Lord Cornwallis was anxious, after the termination of the war, that the grounds on which the allied powers could demand mutual support, should be distinctly defined. He accordingly sent the draft of a “treaty of guarantee,” to Poona and Hyderabad, in which he proposed that if any difference should arise between any of the confederates and Tippoo, the nature and circumstances should be communicated to the others, and that they should not be bound to take up arms till they were convinced that he had justice on his side, and that every effort for conciliation had been exhausted. The proposal was highly acceptable to the Nizam. The Mahrattas had a long account against him, and their envoys were pressing the
settlement of it at Hyderabad, at the time when his army was employed conjointly with theirs against Tippoo. The Nizam brought forward a counter-claim of larger amount, under thirty-four heads, for contributions unjustly exacted, and revenue unjustly withheld. But he proposed to postpone the adjustment of these accounts till the war had terminated, hoping thereby to obtain the friendly interposition of the English government. He therefore welcomed the treaty of guarantee with much avidity, under the impression that it would serve to strengthen his influence with Lord Cornwallis, and counteract the hostility of the Poona durbar, who were already preparing to invade his territories.
The Mahrattas, on the other hand, declined any engagements which might in any measure interfere with their designs on the Nizam. Mahdajee Sindia was then at Poona, exercising a powerful influence in the councils of the state, and he did not conceal his opinion that the Company had become too powerful, and that Tippoo ought to be supported as a counterpoise to them. He denounced the proposed treaty as an arrogant assumption of authority. Nana Furnuvese, however, was anxious to cultivate a good understanding with the English government, as a check on the ambitious projects of Sindia, and prolonged the negotiations for several months. He then drew up the outline of another treaty, including in it the demand of arrears of chout from Tippoo, which he was well aware Lord Cornwallis would never sanction. After a twelvemonth vainly spent in these wearisome discussions, the Governor-General was obliged to abandon all hope of obtaining the concurrence of the Mahrattas in any arrangement, and to remain content with a vague and verbal assurance, that they would abide by their engagements.
At the beginning of 1794, the death of Mahdajee Sindia, the chief opponent of the Guarantee treaty, and the succession of his grand-nephew Dowlut Rao, a youth of thirteen, to his power and resources, appeared to present a favourable opportunity for the energetic
interposition of British influence to preserve the peace of India. But Sir John Shore determined to remain quiescent. The Mahrattas, who expected some decisive movement on this occasion, were not slow to perceive that the sceptre of the British power had fallen into feeble hands; and as soon as they discovered that Lord Cornwallis’s successor was resolved to limit his interference to “good offices,” they hastened their preparations for war with the Nizam. Tippoo likewise announced his intention of joining them to crush the Nizam, who immediately claimed from the Government of Calcutta the fulfilment of the 10th article of the treaty of 1790, which bound the contracting parties to unite in repelling his aggressions. There can be little doubt that if Lord Cornwallis had been in India at this time, his manly representations, backed by the assembly of an army on the frontier, would have been sufficient to maintain peace between the parties. But Sir John Shore lacked his spirit and resolution; he had a morbid dread of giving offence to the Mahrattas, which might end in a war, and drain the treasury, then full to the brim; and he was above all anxious to exhibit a most exemplary obedience to the Act of Parliament which discountenanced native alliances. The question which he put to himself was “whether we were bound by treaty to defend the Nizam, if Tippoo should attack him while engaged in hostilities with the Mahrattas, either as their ally or independently of them.” Strange to say, his opinion was in the negative. The Nizam pleaded that in becoming a party to the treaty of 1790, he had trusted to the good faith of the English Government, not to the treachery of the Mahrattas. But Sir John Shore persuaded himself that the defection of one of the parties from a tripartite alliance, offensive and defensive, and his union with the power against whom the treaty was made, cancelled the obligation of the remaining party. It is, however due to his memory to state that his judgment was evidently influenced, to a considerable extent, by the incompetence of his Commander-in-chief to take charge of a war with Tippoo and the Mahrattas. He resolved,
therefore, to remain neuter, and leave the Nizam to his fate. And thus the high reputation which the British Government had acquired throughout India by the prompt succour of the raja of Travancore when attacked by the armies of Tippoo, was sacrificed by his successor, from motives of expedience and economy, and too obsequious a submission to an Act of Parliament through which Lord Cornwallis had boldly driven his coach, and had, nevertheless, received the thanks of both Houses.
To assemble a Mahratta army when there was a prospect of plunder had never presented any difficulty. On the present occasion the young Peshwa resolved to accompany the expedition, and summoned all the feudatories into the field; and it proved to be the last time they were mustered under the national standard. Dowlut Rao Sindia brought up a force of 25,000, of whom 10,000 consisted of De Boigne’s regular infantry. The Raja of Berar contributed 15,000 horse and foot. Holkar’s contingent was only 10,000, but of these 2,000 were disciplined by European officers, and he had, moreover, a following of 10,000 Pindarees. Govind Rao Guickwar likewise sent a detachment of troops, and all the southern Jageerdars furnished their quota. The whole army mustered 130,000 horse and foot, and 150 pieces of cannon. The Nizam, abandoned by his English allies, threw himself into the hands of their European rivals, with whom they were then at war. A French officer of the name of Raymond, who had come out to India with Lally, twenty-five years before, and fully shared his animosity towards the English, had entered the service of the Nizam, and organised two battalions, which did good service in the Mysore war. When the struggle with the Mahrattas appeared inevitable, he was directed to increase his force to the fullest possible extent. The procrastination of the Mahrattas, arising from the dissensions created by the death of Mahdajee Sindia, enabled Raymond to raise this body of troops to 18,000, all of whom were trained and commanded by European officers.
The war with the Mahrattas, while at a distance, was popular with the Hyderabad army. The disorderly soldiers indulged in the wildest gasconade, threatening to plunder and burn Poona; the dancing girls moved through the camp chanting the triumphs the army was about to achieve, and even the chief minister, forgetting his own dignity, boasted that the Peshwa should be banished to Benares, with a cloth about his loins and a water-pot in his hand, to mutter incantations on the banks of the sacred stream.
The Nizam was the first in the field, and advanced from Beder, where he had established his camp, towards the Mahratta frontier. The Peshwa quitted Poona in January, and the two armies approached each other on the 10th of March. On that evening the Nizam sat in durbar, and received congratulations for the victory of the morrow. The forces joined issue on the 11th, a little in advance of the village of Kurdla, which has given its name to the battle. The Nizam’s. Patan cavalry drove the centre division of the Mahratta army, commanded by Pureshram Bhao, from the field, and a large portion of his army was seized with a panic and fled. By this time the regular battalions on both sides approached within musket shot of each other, and the Nizam’s cavalry were advancing steadily to the support of their infantry, when Rughoojee Bhonslay assailed them with a shower of rockets, and Perron, who commanded Sindia’s disciplined troops, poured in a destructive fire from thirty-five pieces of cannon he had judiciously planted on an eminence. The cavalry was put to the route, but Raymond’s infantry stood their ground, and had even obtained some advantage over Perron’s battalions, when he was obliged, in consequence of repeated and pressing orders, to follow the Nizam, who had retraced his steps, to Kurdla. The Nizam was accompanied on this expedition by his zenana, and the favourite Sultana, terrified by the roar of the artillery, insisted on his retiring beyond the reach of it, and threatened, if he refused, to disgrace him by exposing herself to public gaze. The dotard
yielded to her importunities, and the whole army retreated in wild confusion. The greater portion of the troops fled from the field, after having plundered the baggage of their own army, but the Pindarees pursued them, and stripped them of everything they possessed. The next morning the Mahrattas advanced over the field, and found it strewed with guns, stores, baggage, and all the equipments of the army. Only a tenth of the Nizam’s force remained about Kurdla, in which he had taken refuge, and where, after sustaining the cannonade of the Mahrattas for two days, he solicited a cessation of arms. The Mahrattas demanded territorial cessions of the value of thirty-five lacs of rupees a-year, together with an indemnity of three crores of rupees, one-third to be paid down immediately, as well as the surrender of Musheer-ool-moolk, his chief minister, and the ablest man at his court, on the pretext that amends must be made for some insulting language he was reported to have used in reference to Nana Furnuvese. With these hard conditions the Nizam was constrained to comply, and he affixed his signature to the humiliating treaty on the 13th of March, 1795.
During these transactions the British ministers at the court of the Nizam and the Peshwa removed from their camps, and remained in the neighbourhood, mere spectators of the event. Neither were the two English battalions in the pay of the Nizam allowed to take any part in the war, notwithstanding his earnest entreaty. He returned to his capital highly incensed at this neutrality, and immediately dismissed the battalions, while Raymond was directed to increase his force with all diligence. He and his officers lost no opportunity of manifesting their hatred of the English; they carried the colours of the French republic, then at war with England, and wore the cap of liberty on their buttons. Raymond made the greatest and most successful exertions to improve the discipline and efficiency of his corps, and the power and resources of the Hyderabad state, which Lord Cornwallis had endeavoured to
secure for the interests of the British nation, were thus transferred to its enemies. The Nizam, following the example of Sindia, determined to assign districts for the support of this foreign force, and Raymond made his selection of Kurpa, because it lay on the confines of the Company’s territories, and was comparatively adjacent to the coast, from which he would be enabled to receive recruits, and possibly co-operate with a regiment then expected from France. But even the pacific Shore could not brook the presumption of the Nizam in planting a hostile force in the immediate neighbourhood of the British territories. He peremptorily insisted on their removal, and threatened to enforce the demand by a military demonstration. Just at this juncture an unexpected event – the rebellion of the Nizam’s son, Ali Jah – served in some measure to restore a good understanding between him and the government of Calcutta. On the night of the 28th of June that prince abruptly quitted Hyderabad, and proceeded to Beder, where he raised the standard of revolt. The Nizam was thrown into a fever of alarm, and recalled the English battalions in all haste, and offered immediately to remove the French force from the frontier. The battalions were directed to march against the prince with the utmost expedition; but before they could reach Beder, Raymond’s corps had extinguished the revolt.
The battle of Kurdla completely prostrated the Nizam, and left him at the mercy of the Mahrattas, who would doubtless have returned to complete his humiliation after the division of the spoil, had not the sudden death of the Peshwa given a new direction to the current of events, and restored to him much of his previous consequence. By the success of the recent campaign Nana Furnuvese had gained the summit of his wishes. He had restored the Mahratta supremacy in the Deccan, and gratified the Mahratta chiefs with plunder. Dowlut Rao Sindia manifested the greatest deference to him; the raja of Berar and the great brahmin feudatories were entirely
subservient to him. He was without a rival in the Mahratta commonwealth; but his love of power, and his anxiety to monopolise it, produced an event which brought him to the grave in misery and disgrace. During the minority of the Peshwa, Madhoo Rao, the second, Nana had for twenty years enjoyed, with occasional interruptions, the chief control of Mahratta affairs at the capital. But though the Peshwa was now of age he was still kept by the minister in a state of the most stringent and galling tutelage, and in a fit of impatience threw himself from a terrace of the palace on the 22nd of October, 1795. He died two days after, bequeathing his throne to his cousin Bajee Rao, the son of the luckless Raghoba, and the last of the Peshwas. Bajee Rao was a prince of many accomplishments, mental and bodily, graceful in person, mild in his demeanour, and of the most insinuating address, but distinguished above every prince of the age by his profound dissimulation, and his utter unscrupulousness. As he grew up Nana Furnuvese had watched his movements with great jealousy, and had for some time detained him a close prisoner. The unexpected death of the Peshwa confounded all the plans of Nana, and gave rise to a series of complications unmatched even in Mahratta history, of which, however, we can find room for only a brief outline.
Immediately after the catastrophe Nana assembled the Mahratta chiefs, carefully suppressed the dying bequest of the late Peshwa in favour of Bajee Rao, and proposed that his widow should be required to adopt Chimnajee, the younger brother of Bajee Rao, in whose name he himself intended to continue to administer the government. Bajee Rao, on receiving intimation of this plot, which, if successful, would have deprived him of all his rights, opened a secret correspondence with young Sindia and his minister, Balloba Tantia, and offered them jageers of the value of four lacs of rupees a year if they would support his claim to the succession. Nana Furnuvese discovered this negotiation. and resolved to circumvent Sindia by releasing Bajee Rao of
his own accord, and placing him on the vacant throne. That prince was accordingly conducted to Poona, and reconciled to Nana, whom he engaged to maintain as his minister. Meanwhile Balloba, Sindia’s chief adviser, who resented this proceeding, resolved to counteract the designs of Nana, and directed the army, then encamped on the banks of the Godavery, to march up to Poona. Nana, who was as remarkable for political talent as for personal cowardice, immediately fled to Poorander. Balloba, now master of the situation, proposed to Pureshram Bhao, the commander-in-chief, that Bajee Rao should be set aside, and placed in confinement, that the widow of the late Peshwa should adopt Chimnajee, and that Pureshram himself should be the chief minister. He sought advice of Nana in his retreat, and that wily statesman not only gave his approval of the adoption, but proceeded in person to Satara to procure the investiture from the descendant of Sevajee. Bajee Rao, ignorant of these machinations, repaired to Sindia’s camp, where he was detained as a prisoner, while Chimnajee, greatly against his own will, was installed as Peshwa on the 26th of May, 1796.
Pureshram Bhao, now at the head of the government, immediately released the minister of the Nizam, who had been held as a hostage for fourteen months since the battle of Kurdla. The great object of all the parties in power at Poona at this time was to obtain possession of the person of Nana, who was obliged to fly for security to the fortress of Mhar. His fortunes now seemed to be at the lowest ebb, but they were restored by his extraordinary tact. “The vigour of his judgment,” as the historian of the Mahrattas observes, “the fertility of his resources, the extent of his influence, and the combination of instruments he called into action, surprised all India.” He renewed his communications with Bajee Rao. He entered into an engagement with the Nizam, which is generally known as the treaty of Mhar, and was dated the 8th of October, 1796, in which it was provided
that a body of 15,000 Hyderabad troops and a train of artillery should be sent to assist in establishing Bajee Rao as Peshwa, and Nana as minister, and that, in return for this assistance, the territory the Nizam had been constrained to cede to the Mahrattas should be restored, and the balance of the indemnity remitted. Balloba, the inveterate foe of Nana, having received some intimation of these schemes, determined to frustrate them by sending Bajee Rao as a prisoner into Hindostan. He was sent under the charge of Sirjee Rao Ghatkay, and on the route succeeded in corrupting him, by promising his master, Sindia, a donative of two crores if he obtained his liberty and his crown; he was liberated accordingly. The schemes of Nana were now matured. He had secured the co-operation of Rughoojee Bhonslay, and Holkar. He had gained over Sindia by the promise of Pureshram’s jageers, worth ten lacs of rupees a year, and on the 27th of October, 1796, that chief commenced the revolution by seizing his own minister Balloba. Pureshram took to flight; Nana marched in triumph to Poona, and on the 4th of December placed Bajee Rao on the throne of his ancestors, and cancelled the adoption of Chimnajee.
Bajee Rao, whose nature was to trust no one and to deceive all, was no sooner in possession of power than he began to plot the destruction of the two men who had been the chief instruments of his elevation. The agency of Sindia was employed against Nana, who was induced by the representations of the infamous Sirjee Rao to pay his master a visit of ceremony, when he was seized and confined in the fort of Ahmednugur. His escort, consisting of a thousand persons, was stripped, maimed, killed, or dispersed. Troops were sent to pillage his adherents, and the capital presented a scene of confusion and bloodshed. Having thus disposed, as he thought, of Nana, Bajee Rao began to devise means of ridding himself of Sindia. who had recently espoused the beautiful daughter of Sirjee Rao Ghatkay. The wedding was celebrated with extraordinary
display and expense. The monthly cost of his army at Poona, moreover, did not fall short of twenty lacs of rupees. He began to be straitened for money, and was constrained to press Bajee Rao for the two crores which had been agreed on as the price of his release and elevation. Bajee Rao pleaded the emptiness of his treasury, but advised him to constitute Ghatkay his chief minister, and instruct him to levy this sum from the wealthy inhabitants of Poona. The advice was taken; the ruffian was let loose on the capital, and, as long as it exists, his name will be remembered with horror and execration. He proceeded in the first instance to the Peshwa’s palace, where he seized the ex-ministers of the party of Nana, and scourged them until they gave up their property. The rich bankers and merchants, and all who were suspected of the possession of wealth, were tortured till it was surrendered. For many days the city of Poona was given up to plunder and violence. Amrit Rao, the illegitimate son of Raghoba, who had been placed in the office of minister on the imprisonment of Nana, not knowing that the infamous Ghatkay had been set on these atrocious proceedings by the advice of his own brother, Bajee Rao, attributed them to the malevolence of Sindia, and proposed to assassinate him. Bajee Rao readily entered into a project so entirely in accordance with his own wishes, and one Abba Bally was selected to despatch him, at a public interview, in the Peshwa’s palace. Sindia was summoned to the audience chamber, and Bajee Rao upbraided him with the arrogance and cruelty which he and his servants exhibited, and declared that he would no longer endure the contempt shown to his authority, ordering him at the same time peremptorily to depart from the capital. Sindia replied, with the greatest modesty, that he was anxious to obey, but could not remove his camp for want of funds, and solicited payment of the large sum which had been expended in seating Bajee Rao on the throne. At this moment Amrit Rao inquired whether he should give the signal to the executioner, but Bajee Rao’s courage failed him, and
Sindia was allowed to depart in peace. This was the first occasion on which the Peshwa manifested that irresolution of purpose which marked his character through life, and rendered him an object of general contempt. It was in the midst of this scene of intrigue and confusion that Lord Wellesley assumed the office of Governor-General, and speedily convinced the native princes of India that the energy of Hastings and Cornwallis was restored to the British Government.
One of the two points on which Lord Cornwallis had received specific instructions before he embarked for India, had reference to the amalgamation of the King’s and the Company’s army. Mr. Dundas considered that India could be retained only by a large European force; and as the number of European soldiers in India, in 1788, was only 12,000, to about 58,000 native sepoys, he deemed it necessary, in order to create a feeling of perfect security, to augment it to about 17,000, so as to establish the proportion of one to three. He considered it important that the whole of this force should be under the Crown, and “act in concert with the general strength of the empire.” Lord Cornwallis, during his residence in India, collected a mass of information on the subject, which he embodied in an elaborate minute on his return to England. He proposed that the whole army, European and native, should be transferred to the Crown; but he considered it indispensable that the European officers of the native army should remain an essentially distinct body; that they should go out to India early in life, and devote themselves entirely to the Indian service, in which a perfect knowledge of the language, and attention to the customs and religious prejudices of the sepoys, was absolutely necessary. This plan of amalgamation, which appears to have been drawn up in November, 1794, was rejected by the Court of Directors, who were not disposed to transfer their entire military establishment to the Crown; and it did not receive the full concurrence of the Board of Control.
Before this plan was ready for consideration, the officers of the Bengal army were in a state of open mutiny. Lord Cornwallis had been employed during his administration in abolishing sinecure offices, and lessening the sources of illegitimate gain, both in the civil and military branches of the service. The civilians had been compensated for these reductions by increased salaries, but it was impossible to adopt the same rule with regard to a body of officers counted by thousands. The command of a regiment was still worth 80,000 rupees a year, but the general disproportion in the remuneration of the two services, was a source of constant envy and discontent to the military branch. This feeling was inflamed by the superior advantages of rank enjoyed by the King’s officers. Sir John Shore, on assuming the government, found that he had to deal, not with the discontent, but with the actual insubordination of the Bengal army, and, in a country in which he felt that “the civil authority was at the mercy of the military.” This spirit of mutiny continued to increase throughout the year 1794; but the officers refrained from any overt act of rebellion, while they waited to ascertain how far the new regulations which Mr. Dundas was drawing up in lieu of Lord Cornwallis’s amalgamation scheme, proved agreeable to their wishes. The regulations, however, were delayed so long, that the patience of the officers was exhausted, and on Christmas-day, 1795, Sir John Shore convened the Council, and laid before them the alarming intelligence he had just received. Delegates had been elected from each regiment to form an executive board, and the whole army was bound by the most solemn obligations to protect their persons, and make good their losses by a general subscription. This board was authorized to treat with government on these terms: – that the Company’s regiments should not be reduced; that the King’s troops should be limited by law to a small number; that promotion should invariably go by seniority; and that all allowances which had at any time been granted to the army, including double batta,
should be restored. If these conditions were not accepted. they were prepared to seize the Governor-General and the Commander-in-chief, and take possession of the government.
The Council was thunderstruck at this state of affairs. It was a crisis of the same magnitude as that which Clive had quelled thirty years before by his undaunted bearing; but there was no Clive at Calcutta. The Governor-General instantly dispatched orders for troops to the Cape and Madras, and directed the Admiral to bring up his whole squadron to Calcutta without delay; he likewise accepted an offer from De Boigne, of the services of a corps of Sindia’s cavalry, commanded by European officers. The Commander-in-chief, Sir Robert Abercromby, proceeded to Cawnpore. Though he was not the man for the emergency, his official character and his courteous manner effected some good; but it was the firmness of the artillery in Calcutta, and the manly resistance of several officers at Cawnpore, that stemmed the tide of mutiny for the time. The long-expected regulations arrived at length, in May, 1796, and disgusted all parties. Sir John Shore described them as a mass of confusion, calculated neither to gratify the officers, nor to improve the discipline of the army. The spirit of revolt blazed forth afresh. Remonstrances poured in upon the bewildered government from every quarter, and on the 30th of June, Sir John Shore wrote to his superiors at home stating, that the pressure on him had been so great, as to oblige him to give way, partly, and to modify the regulations. In a minute which he promulgated in India, he expressed a hope that the general code which he had drawn up would be acceptable to the officers. The regulations were so modified, that there was little of them left. The concessions went even beyond the expectations of the army. Arrears of batta to the extent of seven lacs of rupees, were granted unasked; the arrears of brevet rank were gratuitously bestowed, and such an addition made to the allowances of the officers of all grades, as to entail a permanent
addition of seven lacs of annual expenditure. The weakness of government had, in fact, surrendered everything up to a factious army. In a letter to Lord Cornwallis, immediately after this transaction, Sir John Shore admitted that he was little qualified by habit or experience, to contend with a discontented army, and the responsibility of these wretched measures, must, therefore, rest chiefly with the Commander-in-chief.
The intelligence of these concessions, which reached England in December, 1796, filled the Ministry with alarm, and they determined immediately to supersede Sir John Shore. Lord Cornwallis was importuned to proceed forthwith to India, and he was assured by Mr. Dundas, that if he could bring himself to forego his comforts at home for only a twelvemonth, and spend three months at Calcutta, and three months at Madras, he would do the greatest service to his country that ever any man had it in his power to do. So urgent did the necessity of the case appear, that Mr. Dundas offered his own services, in case of Lord Cornwallis’s refusal, and stated his readiness to go out to Bengal as Governor-General; but Mr. Pitt refused to part with his colleague, and Lord Cornwallis determined “to sacrifice all personal consideration of comfort and happiness, to the service of the public.” He was sworn in as Governor-General on the 1st of February, 1797, and the appointment was immediately announced to all the Presidencies in India. On the first intelligence of this spirit of insubordination, Mr. Dundas declared himself averse to all concessions, and resolved to put it down with a high hand. But he met with serious obstructions in various quarters, and was obliged, at length, to succumb to circumstances. There was a regularly organised committee of Bengal officers then sitting in London, as the representatives of the mutineers in India, and the Court of Directors and Mr. Dundas, strange to say, entered into negotiations with them, and passed, what Lord Cornwallis designated, a “milk-and-water order,” with which they desired him to,
embark for India and assume the government, which he refused to do. They proceeded further to make concession after concession to the London committee, and even promoted one of the ringleaders to a confidential post at the India House. Lord Cornwallis therefore resigned the office of Governor-General in disgust, on the 2nd of August.
The most memorable event of Sir John Shore’s administration was the change which he made in the Oude succession. Hyder Beg Khan, the chief minister, was a native statesman of vast energy and singular ability, and sustained the sinking fortunes of the state with great vigour. His death in 1795, and the appointment of a successor totally devoid of principle, put an end to all hope of reform in the government. By nature, the Vizier was a man of good disposition, but spoiled by the enjoyment of absolute power, and by the fools, knaves, and sycophants, who composed his court. During the seventeen years of his reign he had lived only for one object – the gratification of his personal appetites. Some English adventurer who visited his court introduced to his notice the diversion of a race by old women in sacks. The Vizier was enchanted with this new pleasure, and exclaimed, that though he had expended a crore of rupees in procuring amusement, he had never found anything so much to his taste. The government was completely effete, and, but for the protection of the English battalions, the country would long since have been absorbed by Sindia. Sir John Shore, before he resigned the government, paid a visit to the Nabob at Lucknow, and prevailed on him to appoint Tufuzzil Hussein, his minister. He had been his master’s representative in Calcutta, and had obtained the entire confidence of Sir John Shore by the simplicity of his character, his unblemished integrity, and his great abilities. In his various interviews with the Vizier, Sir John endeavoured to inculcate on him the necessity of endeavouring to promote the prosperity of the country and the happiness of his people; but he found that such questions had never come within the
scope of his imagination. Whatever favourable impression the Governor-General might produce in the morning, was completely effaced in the evening, when the Vizier was again closeted with his buffoons and parasites, or stupefied with opium. After a residence of six weeks at Lucknow, Sir John returned to Calcutta, and the Nabob, worn out with excesses, died in the course of the year.
The succession of his reputed son, Vizier Ali, was ratified by Sir John Shore on the ground that the old Nabob had acknowledged his title, that the Nabob’s mother had given it her sanction, and that it was generally acquiesced in by the people. But he subsequently received information of his spurious birth and violent character, and, from that feeling of conscientiousness which had always guided his conduct, proceeded to Lucknow to investigate the case. Before he reached it, he was met by the minister, Tufuzzil Hussein, who assured him that Vizier All was not even the illegitimate son of the late Vizier, but the offspring of a man of the lowest caste; that his elevation had created astonishment and disgust, and that the succession belonged of right to Sadut Ali, the brother of the late prince. The province of Oude was considered by the people of Hindostan to stand in a position altogether different from that of any other principality in India. In 1764 it had been conquered by the British arms, and forfeited by the laws of eastern warfare. It was afterwards voluntarily restored to the family of the Vizier by Lord Clive, and was ever after considered a dependency of the British Government, and the appointment of its Nabobs was held to rest on the will of the Governor-General. Sir John felt the full responsibility of his situation, and was most anxious to do justice. He consulted all those who were likely to give impartial testimony, and he found the statement of the minister regarding the ignoble birth of Vizier Ali fully confirmed. He learned, likewise, that since his elevation he had exhibited great violence and unsteadiness of character, and the most hostile designs towards the English
Government. Sir John, therefore, came to the conclusion that it would be injurious to the country, and disgraceful to the British name to support him, and that, as all the children of the late Nabob were illegitimate, the throne ought to descend to his brother.
That prince was at the time residing at Benares, and Sir John Shore deputed Mr. Cherry, the Resident, to announce the intentions of the British Government to him. He was likewise presented with the draft of a treaty, which, with some subsequent modifications, embraced the following provisions: that the defence of the Oude dominions should remain exclusively with the British Government; that the number of British troops stationed in Oude should consist of 10,000; and that the annual payment for them should be seventy-six lacs of rupees, which was to vary according to the increase or diminution of the force; that the fortress of Allahabad, the key of the province which the English were to defend, should be made over to them, that the Nabob should not maintain more than 35,000 troops, and should enter into no negotiation with any foreign power, without the consent of the British Government. The treaty made such arrangements as a superior would dictate to a subordinate, and fully bore out the impression that Oude was subject to the Company. During this negotiation, Sir John was encamped in the immediate neighbourhood of Lucknow, and exposed to no little peril from Vizier Ali, who was surrounded by bands of desperate men, who openly talked of his assassination. The city was then supposed to contain 800,000 inhabitants; the streets were narrow lanes and intricate passages, capable of being strongly defended, and every house was filled with armed men. Ibrahim Beg, a bold and reckless adventurer, commanded the troops of Vizier Ali, and had 300 pieces of ordnance, of which 30 were so posted that they could not be seized without great danger. Sir John Shore was strongly advised by the minister and the nobles to anticipate the designs of Vizier Ali, and seize
him in the city, but he felt that the firing of a single shot might lead to the massacre of thousands. In the midst of these dangers, his escape from which was pronounced by his successor in the government to be miraculous, he maintained the utmost calmness and composure, and his conduct throughout this transaction exhibited a pattern of courage and resolution.
Sadut All at length reached Cawnpore, and was escorted from thence to Lucknow, a distance of 50 miles, by a large British force, and all the embarrassments of Sir John Shore at once terminated. Vizier Ali was deserted by his servants and followers as Sadut Ali approached the city, in which he was proclaimed Nabob Vizier on the 21st of January, 1798. Vizier Ali was removed to Benares, where he resided some time on his pension of a lac and a half of rupees a year, cherishing the most inveterate feelings towards the English Government. The revolution was hailed by Europeans and natives as an act of justice, and the general feeling in Oude was that “the right had come to the rightful.” The Court of Directors recorded that “in circumstances of great delicacy and embarrassment, Sir John Shore had conducted himself with great temper, ability, and firmness.” Dr. Lawrence, a friend of Mr. Burke’s and one of the managers of the impeachment of Hastings, threatened Sir John with an indictment for his proceedings in Oude, but it was never carried into execution; and the impartial voice of posterity has paid homage to the honesty, the wisdom, and the vigour manifested by him on this occasion. Immediately after Saadut All had been placed on the throne, Sir John Shore, who had been created Lord Teignmouth, returned to Calcutta, and embarked for England on the 25th of March, 1798.
This collection transcribed by Chris Gage