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Chapter I:

Prior to 1941 there were no specialized. flexible gunnery schools. Such rudiments of that type of training am were given were made possible through some of the six Air Corps schools that existed during the 1920's and 1930's.1 The military appropriations act of 1939 provided for the expansion of the old fields and the creation of new ones.2 The first active stops in the direction of specialized flexible gunnery schools tiers taken in 1940 and 1941. In September 1940 the Chief of the Air Corps in Washington revealed to the newly activated Southeast Air Corps Training Center at Maxwell Field, Ala., plans for the establishment of two aerial gunnery schools and asked for recommendations which would further that end. The Southeast Training Center Headquarters responded. with a proposed program of instruction in October 1940 which, after several revisions, was adopted officially by the Chief of the Air Corps on 4 March 1941. A five-week course was contemplated in which emphasis the first week would be on orientation.


the second, on sighting and lectures on such matters as range estimates, repairing of guns and aircraft recognition; the third, on ground range exercises; the fourth, on preliminary air exercises; and the fifth, on air range instruction.3

To facilitate the establishment of schools and the working out of an efficient training program, officers were seat to England in the summer of 1941 to study the RAF gunnery system.4 In October one of them, Maj. M. L. Kennedy, who was attached to the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC), made a report which was something of a land mark because of the basic information it contained, serving to clarify the subject then being so much discussed, Some of his suggestions were as follows: (1) As many officers as possible should go to England, get first-band information on training requirements for actual combat flying, and return after six months to study changes in the course. Gunners should practice actual aerial firing at a target. Synthetic devices were valuable in preparing the gunner for air-to-air practice but should not be a substitute for air firing, (3) There should be assigned to flexible gunnery schools "fighter type aircraft for monitoring attacks against cinema guns and for teaching proper methods of gunnery control and tactics," (4) Well-trained instructors "should be considered the backbone of the gunnery schools," They should have a good understanding of armament an& classroom technique. (5) A distinctive badge or emblem should be authorized for the uniform of graduate air gunners. (6) A percentage of gunners in tactical units should


be commissioned.5

In the meantime definite steps had been taken to organize at Las Vegas, Nev., the first flexible gunnery school. Military authorities, inspecting the site near that town during the late months of 1940 and the early months of 1941, were impressed with its possibilities as the location of a gunnery school. Its strategic advantages were excellent, the flying weather there was good, and more than 90 per cent of the area contemplated. was uninhabited public wasteland. Despite unsatisfactory moral conditions in Las Vegas, there was a feeling that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages, Final arrangements between the city and the Army in the form of a lease were completed 25 January Tromps to staff and man the post arrived from Brooks Field on 17 June 1941, though there was no actual firing training before 7 December 1941. By that time three classes of instructors, totaling slightly more than 100 men, had graduated, and on 9 December 1941 the Chief of the Air Corps ordered immediate aerial training for gunners.6 Before the end of 1941 the West Coast Training Center had asked approve of a plan to enlarge the Las Vegas School so that it might have 320 students enter each week.7 Some idea of the expansion of this first flexible gunnery school may be gained by comparing the number of students connected with it in 1942 and 1943. In the former year 10,562 enrolled and 9,117 graduated; in the latter, 18,974 enrolled and 18,071



Harlingen, Tex., also offered advantages for gunnery training. The winters were mild, the hot summers were tempered by constant Gulf winds, and the railroads were near enough to offer good transportation facilities. One disadvantage which led to hesitations in choosing the site was its proximity to the Mexican border, a factor which restricted flying to the south, However, this objection was overcome, and the War Department announced on 6 May 1941 its approval of the location; though come of the personnel to operate the school arrived by 1 September 1941, training activities did not begin before Pearl Harbor, and the first class did. not graduate until January 1942.9 Harlingen was originally constructed to handle a student load of 600, which meant a graduating class of 120 each week, In July 1942 the quota was increased to 940, and in October of that year to 1,320. In April 1943, when the course was expanded to six weeks, the quota was 1,920. Later the requirements were in terms of graduates each week. A total of 360 was required. in August 1943, and 475 in November of that year. The latter figure may be compared with the original weekly quota of 120 in This school had 4,953 graduates in 1942, 15,682 in 1943, and 4,009 during the first two months of 1944.10 The fact that there were slightly more than 80 per cent as many graduates during the first two months of 1944 as during all of 1942 is suggestive of the rapid expansion


of the school.

Tyndall Field as a site for a flexible gunnery school was agreed Upon by Army authorities and representatives of the chamber of commerce of Panama City, Fla., as early as September 1940. Authorization for the school was given on 15 April 1941, and though 2,000 troops had arrived there from Eglin Field by 7 December 1941, classes did not begin for students until 23 February 1942. A significant factor In its choice was that the Gulf of Mexico afforded large over-water areas which could be used, for aerial gunnery ranges.11 There were strong indications by the end of 1941 that Tyndall Field could not handle the volume of air traffic necessitated by the expanding gunnery program; hence, steps were taken which resulted in the activation of a sub-base at Apalachicola, Fla., on 10 July 1942.12 The school had 2,091 graduates in 1942, a figure which may be compared with a total of 39,452 by the end of August 1944.13

An instructors school for flexible gunnery was activated at Fort Myers, Fla., on 5 July 1942, the first class started 7 September, and more than 3,000 men had been graduated by the end of the year.14

More than a year elapsed from the time that the West Coast Training Center investigated the site near Kingman, Ariz. until it was approved on 27 May 1942 as the location for a flexible gunnery school. As far as climatic conditions, transportation facilities, and lands suitable for


air-to-air firing ranges were concerned, Kingman had decided advantages. There was a water supply problem, however, which was not solved until engineers found supplies of water not at first thought available, The school was activated 4 August 1942, though training did not begin until the middle of January 1943. The late start made it possible to fashion a program which would reflect the sound experiences and avoid the mistakes of the earlier schools.15 Kingman graduates numbered 10,861 in 1943.16

In a climate mild in winter and hot in summer, but usually tempered by southeast breezes, and in a location once a wasteland, from which on a clear day can be seen the mountains of Mexico 85 miles distant, is the Laredo Army Air Field. The gunnery school there was activated 12 August 1942, and the first aerial gunnery class started 30 November of the same rear and was graduated the first week of January 1943.17

Yuma Army Air Field was at first an advanced pilot training school, but was officially changed to a radio flexible gunnery school on 11 November 1943. For approximately one month the gunnery program paralleled the pilot training one, after which the latter was abandoned. Though there were only 113 graduates by the end of 1943, there were at that time 1,655 students enrolled.18


The following are the numbers graduating from the several flexible gunnery schools during the period from activation until 31 August 1944:

Las Vegas 44,246
Harlingen 36,494
Tyndall Field 39,452
Fort Myers 33,118
Laredo 27,077
Kingman 24,008
Yuma 10,431
Grand Total 214,826

The weekly output of graduates at the end of August 1944 for all flexible gunnery schools was 3,500, a figure which represents an annual production rate of 182,000.19 There were 3,209 graduates for the week ending 16 June 1944, while the total for the four previous weeks was 12,618.20 In July 1943 AAF Headquarters devised plans which it felt would, result in an annual production rate of 180,000 gunners by March 1944.21 The relative success of its plan is indicated by the weekly ratios given above.

The creation and expansion of flexible gunnery schools was, of course, linked with the problem of securing an adequate number of students who could meet the requirements of the gunnery program,. The problem was not solely one of determining physical, mental, and technical qualifications, but also of creating psychological condition which would be most conducive to satisfactory results. In an immediate action letter sent 10 August 1942 to all who had high official connection with the AAF training program, Headquarters laid down a detailed program of entrance requirements


for attendance at flexible gunnery schools, and described the status of those who graduated from such schools. Those who entered did so voluntarily, They must be between the ages of 18 and 30 inclusive, 5 feet, 10 inches or less in height, and 170 pounds or less in weight, They were required to pass the Army General Classification Test with a score of at leant 100 and make a satisfactory score on the Mechanical Aptitude Test. Nonspecialists or specialists such as airplane mechanics, radio or radar operators, and aircraft armorers were eligible for admission, provided they were below the grade of staff sergeant. Upon graduation all enlisted men below the third enlisted grade who had graduated from an AAF school of any of the three specialist types indicated above would be immediately appointed to the grade of staff sergeant, and all other graduates below the fourth enlisted grade would be immediately appointed to the grade of sergeant. All graduates were authorized to wear a combat crew badge.22

As far as physical and mental requirements were concerned, the tendency after the summer of 1942 was to lower them. During the fall months the requirements for passing the Mechanical Aptitude Test were lowered from 100 to 85 and subsequently to 80,23 and for the General Classification Test from 100 to 85.24 Even these steps did not suffice to fill the quotas, as indicated by the complaint of the Flying Training Command that men who did not meet the above requirements were being assigned to


flexible gunnery schools.25 By July 1943 the physical requirements for trainees also had been modified. The age limits were then 18-35, requirements as to height, minimum 60 and maximum 72 inches, and as to weight, not less than 100 nor more than 180 pounds.26

The crews of bombardment airplanes differed as to personnel included in the respective types of planes. lien the flexible gunnery program was in the early stages, the Chief of the Air Corps issued a directive in which provision was made for a crew of eight on heavy bombardment planes and of three on all light bombardment types. The only difference in the requirements for B-25 and. B-26 planes from those for B-17 and B-24 was one gunner instead of two.27 After the gunnery program was more fully developed, however, there was an expansion in the heavy bombardment crew with the addition of more enlisted specialists.28

Of the various aircrew members, only the pilots were exempted from flexible gunnery training. Such a requirement varied, however, in its application to navigators and bombardiers. In July 1942, when advanced bombardier schools were unable to absorb the flow of trainees assigned from preflight schools, it was decided. to send. men assigned to bombardier training to flexible gunnery before they entered the preflight course. The same procedure was followed in the case of navigators. Limited


capacity combined, with priority given to career gunners made it impossible for flexible gunnery schools to accommodate all who were scheduled to take the training given after the policy was changed in December 1942, and only preflight graduates might go to gunnery schools, the existing situation was not altered to the extent that all bombardiers and navigators received flexible gunnery instruction.29 In 1944 there was considerable discussion of the wisdom of requiring gunnery training for these two groups, So many bombardiers and. navigators were required that it was not considered feasible to give all of them instruction beyond their special duties, It was pointed out also that the establishment of a B-29 Flexible Gunnery School and the increasing emphasis upon more gunners made it impossible for the existing schools to carry out the accelerated program if navigators and bombardiers were routed through the gunnery course. A navigator's gunnery duties were not important, it was contended, because he had no primary gun position on a B-24 and fired only the side nose guns on a B-17. In April 1944 bombardier and navigator officers and cadets were no longer required to take gunnery training, but soon afterward Headquarters AAF requested that those groups be given as much of such training as possible.30


During 1942 and, the early part of 1943 AAF authorities became convinced of the need of special mechanical training for those who expected to take flexible gunnery training. The development of mechanical aptitudes gave one an initial advantage over the nonspecialist in understanding flexible gunnery techniques. After the volunteer system was abandoned, it was found that "persuasion and salesmanship" in securing acquiescence in the compulsory gunnery program were easier "when the students were graduates of technical schools giving them an introductory knowledge of some of the basic skills involved in flexible gunnery." Thus the abandonment of the voluntary system early in 1943 gave momentum to the move for restricting training to specialists only.31 Most elaborate plans were worked out for obtaining from factory schools students to be trained as aerial engineers and likewise as gunners.32 In December 1942 the Chief of the Air Staff declared that flexible gunnery was "primarily for enlisted specialists" who were "qualified as airplane mechanics, radio operators or armorers." Nonspecialists, he claimed, in many eases could not qualify for training and had to be eliminated. The results were unfilled quotas and unnecessary expense.33 The order, however, which directed that basic soldiers were no longer to be trained in flexible gunnery but only in mechanics, did not come until 27 April 1943.34 This policy continued for approximately three months, after which nonspecialists were again placed on a par with specialists. The


reason was the expansion of the program, which was designed to produce as soon as possible 140,000 gunners a year. In the words of General Arnold, flexible gunnery training in the Training Command and the training air forces was to be given "a priority on personnel, base facilities, and. equipment, including combat type airplanes, ahead of all other training activities in the United States."35 At the same time that General Arnold was writing these words designed to bolster the program, Brig, Gen. R. W. Harper was indicating its breakdown into the following groupings;36

Bombardiers and Navigators 40,000
Radio Operator Mechanics 16,667
Armorers 16,667
Airplane Mechanics 16,667
Non-specialist career gunners 50,000

Officers as well as enlisted men were trained at flexible gunnery schools. In answer to a request from the Technical Training Command for information as to officer training, Headquarters AAF referred to a memorandum of 9 September 1942 in which it was stated that bombardier, navigator, observer and radar officers were eligible for the gunnery courses.37 Some of the officers became instructors and some performed administrative and supervisory duties.

Moral of flexible gunnery students was affected by numerous factors. Graduate gunners became either staff sergeants or sergeants. There were complaints from the training air forces that these grades were too high, with the result that the Military Personnel Division of the Air Staff


made a rule late in 1943 to the effect that specialist gunners might not be ranked higher than sergeants or other enlisted men higher than corporals. AAF Headquarters, however, felt that the application of such a principle had the effect of lowering morale because it forced some to reduce their rank in order to become gunners. Under existing tables of organization, radio operator mechanics, airplane mechanics, and armorers might train in grade up to and including technical sergeant, and other personnel sent to gunnery schools to train as career gunners could not be above the grade of sergeant. In March 1944 it was decreed that specialists and. career gunners might train in grades up to and including technical sergeant and sergeant, respectively, so that they would be assured. of no reduction in rank.38

Until 16 January 1943 flexible gunnery training was on a volunteer basis. The theory was that greater enthusiasm would prevail, morale would be higher, and efficiency greater than if the compulsory principle were applied. To a great degree, however, these expectations were not met. Some of the men sent to gunnery schools were averse to training after they discovered what their duties were. In September 1942, at a time when there was much demand for specialists elsewhere, the Flying Training Command restricted flexible gunnery volunteers to nonspecialists and eliminated aviation cadets. The personnel of the schools at that time was therefore of inferior quality. Before the end of the year it


became apparent that specialists were highly desirable as gunnery material and also that the numbers contemplated in flexible gunnery plans for 1943 could very probably not be met under the volunteer system. All these factors resulted in the abandonment of that system.39

Whether more good or evil would result from the change was one of the most significant questions concerning the flexible gunnery program during 1943. Just before the compulsory policy was put into effect, the Flying Training Command protested against it. After intimating that numerical needs had not been met because the command had no jurisdiction over the procurement of students, that Headquarters predicted that compulsory service would cause the elimination rate to rise to approximately 35 per cent of the total number enrolled. Assuming that students were not supposed to be made to fly, it felt that this high rate of elimination would be due largely to candidates who, seeking a transfer from Replacement Centers, will not make the statement they do not desire to fly, before being ordered to the Flexible Gunnery Schools and beginning training.40

There is evidence that the initial results of the compulsory system were not good. The Southeast Training Center had its director of altitude training units make an inspection of Tyndall Field early in February 1943, and. the result was a rather startling retort as to the reaction to required training. Many were afraid of flying and were using altitude chamber tests as a means of securing disqualification. Some who did not


express fear complained that they had never volunteered for aerial gunnery, The director felt that a bad mental situation was thus being created, and he recommended the voluntary system.41 This report led the Southeast Training Center to direct the commanding officer at Tyndall Field to make an investigation of the conditions alleged to exist. The investigation among the students showed dissatisfaction with aerial gunnery to such an extent that it caused "the flight surgeon deep concern."Many did not know at the classification centers that flexible gunnery training was required, and, upon hearing that an expressed fear of flying was a cause of elimination, "flocked" to the hospital to express the fear end avoid the training. This situation, however, was viewed as a natural result of the transition from a voluntary to a compulsory basis. /t was recommended that requirements be made clear at the classification centers, so that elimination could take place there.42

Thus, as General Harper stated it, the problem that arose was whether a good enough educational and sales job could be done on prospective students to keep the gunnery program, from a practical standpoint, on a voluntary basis. By the end of June he expressed the view to the Commending General of the Flying Training Command that "The splendid job of publicity designed to accomplish this and which is now being conducted by your Public Relations Office has come to the attention of this Headquarters. The results of their efforts are already evidenced by the


improved attitude of students arriving at gunnery schools."43

The elimination rate of 35 per cent predicted by the Flying Training Command, did not materialize. In a report on the flexible gunnery programs elimination policy in October 1943, Headquarters of the Central Flexible Gunnery Instructors School indicated that 10 per cent of the students failed to continue the gunnery course. A final examination, on which the passing grade was 70, cut off 2 per cent. Ground range deficiency and air range deficiency were responsible for the other 8 per cent.44 One year before this time, when the training was voluntary, the elimination rate in the four flexible gunnery schools then in existence was as follows:

Las Vegas
Fort Myers
Tyndall Field

Lack of standardization of instruction and differences in facilities were reasons assigned for differences in the rate in the respective schools. The mean average for the four is strikingly similar to the 1943 figure.45 Fear of flying continued to be a valid reason for elimination. "In no case," stated a flying Training Command Memorandum of 5 May 1944, "should a trainee be ordered to fly or threatened with disciplinary action if he refused."46


Though prior to 1941 there were no specialized flexible gunnery schools, six were established before the end of 1942 and one in 1943. The following is the chronological order in which they came into existence: Las Vegas, Tyndall, Harlingen, Fort Myers (instructors), Kingman, Laredo, and Yuma. By 1 September 1944, 214,826 gunners had graduated from the seven schools, while the weekly production at that time was 3,500. In securing students, physical and mental requirements were sometimes conditioned by unfilled quotas. The shift from voluntary to compulsory training, determined largely by the needs of an expanding program, gave rise to a morale problem, which seems to have been satisfactorily adjusted after an educational campaign had sold flexible gunnery program. A bombardment crew included pilots, radio operators, bombardiers, navigators, photographers, and observers. With the exception that bombardiers and navigators were exempted during a brief period in 1944, only pilots were not required to take gunnery training.

Eliminations because of training deficiencies and fear of flying amounted to approximately 10 per cent of those trained.


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Notes to Chapter I:

1. These six were the Air Corps Primary Flying School, Brooks Field, San Antonio, Tex.; Air Corps Advanced Flying School, Kelly Field, San Antonio, Tax.; Air Corps Balloon and Airship School, Scott Field., Belleville, Ill., which was inactivated during the 1930's; Air Corps Tactical School, Langley Field, Hampton, Va.; Air Corps Engineering School, McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio; Air Corps Technical School, Chanute Field, Rantoul, Ill. Before 1938 the Primary School had been removed to Randolph Field and the Tactical School to Harwell Field. Annual Report of the Chief of the Air Corps (1926 ), 129; ibid., (1936), 28-30; ibid. (1938), Chart opposite 29.

2. ibid., (1939), 1-3.

3. History of Buckingham Army Air Field, Installment I, II, 11-13.

4. Ibid.,14-15.

5. Maj, W. L. Kennedy to C/AC (through Chief, T&O Div.), 8 Oct. 1941, in AAG 353.9C1, Training, General.

6. History of Las Vegas FGS, 1 Jan. 1939-7 Dec. 1941, 1-3, 5, 33, 84-86; ibid. 8 Dec. 1941-1 Jan. 1943, 1.

7. Hq. WCACTC to C/AC, 20 Dec. 1941, in 353.9C2, Training, General.

8. Ibid,. 8 Dec. 1941-1Jan. 1943, 86; ibid., 1 Jan. 1943-31 Dec. 1943, 81.

9. History of Harlingen Army Air Field, 1 May 1941-1 March 1944, I, 1-7, 20-22; II,1.

10. Ibid., V, 45-55.

11. History of Tyndall Field FGS, 1 Jan. 1939-7 Dec. 1941, 4, 6; ibid., 7 Dec. 1941-31 Dec. 1942, 1, 9.

12. Ibid., 7 Dec, 1941-31 Dec. 1942, 34-36.

13. For 1942 figures see AFFTC Consolidated Flying Training Report, Dec. 1942, The total figures were given the writer in interview with Lt. Col, Robert A. Gardner, Chief, Flexible Gunnery Div., 11 Sep. 1944.

14. History of Buckingham Army Air Field, Installment 1, II, 33-35, 150. There will be a discussion in a later chapter of the activities of this school.

15. History of Kingman Army Air Field, Installment 1, 1-5, 15.

16. ibid., Installment 2, 250.

17. History of Laredo Army Air Field, May 1942 to January 1943, 1-3, 9.

18. History of Yuma Army Air Field, Installment 3, 15, 182, 189.

19. The above figures were supplied the writer by Lt. Col .Robert A. Gardner, 11 Sep. 1944. Figures given by AFTRC, Statistical Control Unit, for the total number of graduates through 31 Aug, 1944, are 215, 404.

20. Daily Diary, AFTRC, 21 June 1944.

21. AC/AS, Plans to AC/AS, Training, 11 July 1943, in AAG 353E Training.

22. Hq. AAF to CG's, all air forces and commands and CO's, all AAF stations and activities in Continental U, S., 10 Aug. 1942, in AFACT 353, Gunnery, General.

23. History of Harlingen Army Air Field, 1 May 1941-1 March 1944, II, 8.

24. History of Buckingham Army Air Field, installment 1, II, 42.

25. HQ AFFTC to CG AAF 28 Jan. 1943, in AAG 353, Gunnery Training.

26. AC/AS, Personnel to Maj. John W. Stanley, 27 July 1943, in ibid.

27. C/AC to CG's WCACTC, GCACTC, SEACTC, ACTTC, 9 Jan. 1941, in AAG 353.9B2, Training, General.

28. Information on crew members of types of bombardment planes was obtained from a chart made accessible by Lt. Col, W. L. Clark, Flexible Gunnery Div., 9 Jan. 1945.

29. Memo for General Perrin by Brig, Gen, R. V. Harper, 3 Sep, 1943, in AAG 353, Gunnery Training; AAF Historical Studies: No. 5, Individual Training of Bombardiers, 16, 42.

30. For discussion and decisions see R&P., AC/AS, Training to AC/AS, OC&R, 18 March 1944; R&R, AC/AS, OC&R to AC/AS, Training, 21 March 1944, in AAG 353, Gunnery Training; AFTRC Monthly Progress Report, March, 1944; Maj, Gen, R. W. Harper to CG 4th AF, 11 May 1944, in AAG 353 Gunnery Training; memo for General Perrin by Brig. Gen. R. W. Harper, 3 Sep. 1943, in ibid.

31. History of Harlingen Army Air Field, 1 May 1941-1 March 1944, II, 8.

32. Hq AAF to CG 2d AF, 7 Sep. 1942, inclosing directive of 5 Sep. 1942 to AFTTC; AFRIT to CG AFTTC, 5 Sep, 1942, in AAG 353.9F, Training, General.

33. C/AS to CG's, all AF's, commands, etc. 1 Dec. 1942, in AAG 353, Gunnery Training.

34. Brig. Gen. R. W. Harper to CG AFFTC, 27 April 1943, in ibid.

35. R&R, CG AAF to AC/AS, Training, 3 Aug. 1943, in AAG 353A, Gunnery Training; 1st ind., (Hq WDC and 4th Army to CG AAF 25 July 1943) AC/AS, Personnel to CG WDC & 4th Army, 2 Aug. 1943, in AAG 353A, Gunnery Training.

36. Brig. Gen. R. W. Harper to CG AFTRC, 3 Aug. 1943, in AAG 353A, Gunnery Training.

37. Hq Technical School, AFTTC, Boca Raton, Fla.; to CG AFTTC, 9 Jan. 1943, and 2d ind., AFRIT to CG AFTTC, 27 Jan. 1943, in AAG 353, Gunnery Training.

38. These policies and changes are discussed in Brig, Gen, R. W. Harper to AFPMP, 28 Feb. 1944; R&R, AFPMP to AC/AS, Training, 6 March 1944; 3rd ind. (Hq AFTRC to CG AAF, 19 Feb. 1944), Hq, AAF to CG AFTRC, 9 March 1944, all in ibid.

39. History of Eastern Flying Training Command, Installment 2, II, 968-69, 972-74; History of Central Flying Training Command, Installment 3, 661-62, 665; History of Buckingham Army Air Field, Installment 1, II, 38-41.

40. Hq AFFTC/AFRIT, 10 Jan. 1943, in AFACT 353, Gunnery, General.

41. Office of the Surgeon, Hq SEAFTC to C/S SEAFTC, 5 Feb. 1943, in AAG 353, Gunnery Training.

42. Hq SEAFTC to CO Tyndall Field, 15 Feb, 1943, and 1st ind., CO Tyndall Field FGS to CG SEAFTC, 23 Feb. 1943, in ibid.

43. Brig. Gen, R. W. Harper to CG AFTTC, 30 June 1943, in ibid.

44. Hq. CFGIS to AC/AS, Training, 20 Oct. 1943, in ibid.

45. 3d ind. (AFRIT to CG AFFTC, 30 Oct.1942) Hq, AFFTC to CG AAF, 21 Nov. 1942, in AFACT 353, Gunnery General.

46. AFTRC Monthly Progress Report, May 1944, 16, 17.

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