Footnotes

1. Clause 11 of the Constitution stated that "The Emperor is the Supreme Commander of the Army and Navy."

2. Although there was no official title as a body for the Ministers, Chiefs of the General Staffs and Inspectorate General, they were commonly known as the "Central Authorities."

3. Clause 5 of the Constitution stated: The following subjects must be referred to and approved by the Cabinet Council: legislative bills, budgets, and statement of accounts; foreign treaties and important international stipulations; Imperial ordnances concerning the enactment of government organizations, rules and laws; supervision of disputes between the ministries; petitions granted by the Emperor or transferred from the Diet; extra expenditures; assignment and resignation of the prefectural governors and officials directly appointed by the Emperor, and important administrative affairs of high policy which are handled by the heads of each ministry.

4. The divisions were the 1st, the 8th through 12th, the 14th, the 23d through 25th and the 28th and 29th Divisions.

5. For details of conference see Japanese Monograph No. 150, Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part IV.

6. Ibid, Appendix 2.

7. For details of these orders see Appendix No. 1: Army Department Orders Nos. 569 through 574 (both inclusive).

8. After the Imperial Sanction of 2 December, the Chiefs of the General Staffs notified the Army and Navy Commanders in Chief that X-Day would be 8 December. The code names were to be: Army--HINODE WA YAMAGATA TO SU (1400, 2 Dec) and the Navy--NIITAKAYAMA NOBORE 1208 (1730, 2 Dec). The same day (2 Dec) the Chief of the Naval General Staff issued Navy Order No. 12 to the CinC of the Combined Fleet, announcing 8 December as the day on which to start operations. No Army order announcing the date was issued.

9. For details of the treaty see Japanese Monograph No. 177, Thailand Operations Record.

10. This force sailed from Samah, Hainan Island on 4 December 1941. (Japanese Monograph No. 107, Malay Invasion Naval Operations (Revised Edition).)

11. Ibid.

12. Details of the Java Sea Battle are given in Japanese Monograph No. 101, Netherlands East Indies Naval Invasion Operations, Jan - Mar 42.

13. Details of the Java Operation are given in Japanese Monograph No. 66, The Invasion of the Netherlands East Indies (16th Army).

14. Japanese Monograph No. 24, History of the Southern Army, 1941 - 1945, Table No. 2.

15. Japanese Monograph No. 143, Southeast Area Operations Record, (Revised Edition) South Seas Detachment Operations.

16. For details of organization see Japanese Monograph No. 77, Japanese Preparations for Operations in Manchuria (Prior to 1943), Chart No. 6.

17. None of the participating forces were adequately prepared for another large-scale operation. Since the outbreak of the war they had participated in all major naval engagements and what time they had when not committed to combat operations was fully occupied in repairing and maintaining warships and aircraft. In consequence, there was little time for training or a thorough study of Imperial General Headquarters' plans.

18. For details of the Battle of Midway see Japanese Monograph No. 93, Midway Operation, Apr 42 - Jun 42. This monograph, however, states that only 42 planes were lost. Subsequent research by the Foreign Histories Division, supported by the fact that four carriers were sunk (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu), brings this number to 261.

19. It is interesting to note that within Japan stringent security measures were taken to keep the Midway defeat from the people. So great was the shock of this defeat that the naval losses were concealed from even Navy personnel and the survivors of the sunken warships were kept isolated for some time. Outside high Navy circles, the truth was revealed only to Imperial General Headquarters Army Section chiefs at bureau level or higher.

20. Japanese Monograph No. 56, Southwest Area Air Operations Record, Phase 2.

21. For details of the Chekiang-Kiangsi Operation see Japanese Monograph No. 71, Army Operations in China, Dec 41 - Dec 43, Chapter 3.

22. Japanese Monograph No. 37, 18th Army Operations, Vol 1, Chapter 1.

23. Although Col. T. Hattori, then Chief of Operations Section, Army General Staff had no knowledge of the Navy's occupation of Guadalcanal and Tulagi, Army headquarters at Rabaul had informed Col. Imoto, the officer in Tokyo responsible for the Southeast Pacific Area, Army General Staff Operations Section. (Statement by Col. Hattori in Tokyo, 20 June 1958)

24. This engagement was known as the "Battle of Savo Island."

25. The U.S. Navy officially reported its losses as four cruisers (Vincennes, Quincy, Canberra and Astoria) sunk, one cruiser (Chicago) and one destroyer (Ralph Talbot) damaged.

26. Had it attacked the weakly defended transports in Sealark Channel it could have effectively halted Allied operations in the south Pacific and completely cut off the 1st Marine Division from reinforcements and supplies as all the transports and cargo ships of the South Pacific Force were present in the Channel.

27. The United States Navy published their loss as one large aircraft carrier (Enterprise) seriously damaged.

28. Japanese Monograph No. 37, 18th Army Operations, Vol I.

29. The U.S. Navy officially reported its losses as three cruisers and seven destroyers sunk and one battleship, two cruisers and four destroyers damaged.

30. In 1942 shipping was needed to carry bauxite, tungsten, tin, copper, iron ore, manganese, etc from Malaya; oil from Sumatra; soyabean and soyabean oil as well as coal from Manchuria, coal from China and French Indo-China and iron ore from Hainan Island; in addition to transporting machinery and industrial products from Japan to Asia.

31. Japanese Monograph No. 25, French Indo-China Area Operations Record.

32. Japanese Monograph No. 71, Army Operations in China, Dec 1941 - Dec 1943.

33. Japanese Monograph No. 177, Thailand Operations Record.

34. For details see Japanese Monograph No. 37, 18th Army Operations, Vol I.

35. Ibid.

36. For details see Japanese Monograph No. 71, Army Operations in China, Dec 194l - Dec 1943.

37. The Free India Provisional Government was established with the idea of furthering the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Chandra Bose, leader in the India Independence Movement, came to Tokyo from Berlin in May 1943. He earnestly requested the Japanese Government to support his independence movement and his plan to establish a Provisional Government for Free India. Upon being promised the support of the Japanese Government, he flew to Malaya and established his government there on 21 October 1943. This was recognized by the Japanese Government two days later. The purpose of his government was to encourage anti-British movements in India and to establish an independent India. As a result of the Japanese support of his end objectives, his forces cooperated with the Japanese forces in the Burma-Malaya theater. His influence with the Indians and the India National Army greatly assisted Japanese operations in that area.

38. The Philippines were actually the responsibility of the 14th Army but Imperial General Headquarters felt at first it was the most convenient place from which the Second Area Army could control its area. Later, the Second Area Army headquarters was transferred to the North of Australia Area.

39. In April 1944, the 33d Army Headquarters was activated in Burma. The 18th and 56th Divisions were transferred from the command of the 15th Army to the command of the newly established 33d Army and the 53d Division on arrival from Japan was also placed under its command. This reduced the strength of the 15th Army to three divisions (15th, 31st and 33d).

40. Both the 32d and 35th Divisions were transferred to the Southern Area from the 12th Army in north China in February 1944.

41. This report proved to be false.

42. For Army Department Order No. 1081, 24 July 1944, see Appendix No. 1.

43. The strength for the decisive battle on the Homeland was to be under the direct command of the Imperial General Headquarters.

44. On 22 September 1944 the Formosa Army was redesignated the Tenth Area Army.

45. The advance echelon of the 23d Division, including the headquarters, was attacked at sea and suffered many casualties, including its chief of staff and many staff officers. The remaining units arrived in increments until 23 December. As General Yamashita considered Leyte already lost, the Division remained on Luzon to reinforce the units there. The 10th and 19th Divisions arrived on Luzon during the second half of December.

46. Iwo Jima is approximately 1200 kilometers from both Tokyo and Saipan and forms the center of the Ogasawara Islands. There were two airfields, one in the central and one in the southern part of the island. Iwo Jima, therefore, served as the only strategic base between Tokyo and the Marianas, now that the Marianas were in enemy hands.

47. See Army Department Order No. 1245, 6 February 1945 - Appendix No. 1. It is interesting to note that prior to 6 February 1945, the Commander of the General Defense Command had been referred to as "Boeisoshireikan" whereas after this date he was referred to as "Naichiboeigunshireikan." The former term signified that he had command of forces outside as well as within the confines of Japan, whereas the latter that his command was limited to forces in the Homeland.

48. For details of these operations see Japanese Monograph No. 72, Army Operations in China, Jan 1944 - Aug 1945.

49. The Army-Navy Central Agreement Regarding Air Operations, published on 6 February, was a tentative agreement; the final agreement was not concluded until 1 March. This was caused by the Navy being unable in early February to state the air strength it would have available for these operations.

50. See page 248.

51. See pages 248-9.

52. See Appendix No. 1.

53. "TEN-GO" Operation, although stressing that strength be conserved as much as possible, called for attacks against enemy task forces accompanied by landing forces.

54. According to United States information (obtained after the war) 1457 ships (including 430 transports) participated in the Okinawa Campaign. The total number of Marines and Army troops landed reached 183,000.

55. The divisions withdrawn from the Kwantung Army were the 1st, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 23d, 24th, 28th, 29th and 71st Divisions and 2d Tank Division.

56. The "Outline of the Operational Plan Against the Soviet Union in Manchuria and Korea" published by Imperial General Headquarters on 30 May 1945 was for the overall holding operations to be conducted in the area extending from south Manchuria to north Korea. The necessary modifications had been made to the "Outline of the Imperial Army's Plan of Operations against the Soviet Union" issued in September 1944 in view of the change in strength available for the operations against the Soviet Union and the progress of the operational preparations being made in Manchuria and Korea. The operational objective emphasised in the new operations plan was to "destroy the enemy infiltrating into Manchuria and hold strategic sectors south of the Hsinking-Tumen railway and east of the Dairen-Hsinking railway, thus facilitating the execution of the overall operation."

57. The 55th Army Headquarters was organized on 8 April (during the Second Stage Mobilization).



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