ADDRESS REPLY TO:
CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS
WASHINGTON
June 26, 1939
SUBJECT: Report on Fleet Problem XX
TO: Commandant, Air Corps Tactical School,
Maxwell Field,
Montgomery, Ala.
There is enclosed herewith for your information and such comment as you may wish to submit, a copy of subject report.
C. E. Duncan, Major, Air Corps, Executive
1 Incl. - Rep.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I |
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PAGES |
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SECTION I |
Introduction |
1 - 2 |
SECTION II |
Standard Symbols, U. S. Navy |
3 |
SECTION III |
General Organization, U. S. Fleet |
4 |
SECTION IV |
Organization, Aircraft, Battle Force, U. S. Fleet |
5 - 7 |
SECTION V |
Organization, Aircraft, Scouting Force. |
8 - 10 |
SECTION VI |
Operation of Aircraft Carriers. |
11 - 15 |
SECTION VII |
Aircraft Operation, Aircraft, Battle Force |
16 - 24 |
SECTION VIII |
Supply & Logistics, Aircraft, Battle Force |
25 - 27 |
SECTION IX |
Tactical Operation of Patrol Planes. |
28 - 31 |
SECTION X |
Supply & Logistics of Patrol Plane Operation |
32 - 34 |
CHAPTER II |
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FLEET PROBLEM XX |
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SECTION XI |
Basis of Problem |
35 |
SECTION XII |
Strength of Opposing Forces |
36 - 45 |
SECTION XIII |
Summary of Situation. |
44 |
SECTION XIV |
Mission and Decisions of Black and White Commanders. |
45 - 47 |
SECTION XV |
Narrative of Operations of White First Fleet. |
48 - 54 |
SECTION XVI |
Narrative of Operations of Black Aircraft. |
55 - 61 |
CHAPTER III |
|
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS |
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SECTION XVII |
Necessity for a Clearly Defined Policy of National Defense. |
62 - 63 |
SECTION XVIII |
Principal Effects Aircraft May Cause in the Field of Navy Strategy. |
64 |
SECTION XIX |
Principal Effects Aircraft May Cause in Naval Tactics. |
65 |
SECTION XX |
Comparison of Characteristics and Performance of Naval Patrol Planes with Army Multi-motored Bombers. |
66 - 67 |
SECTION XXI |
Comparison of Characteristics and Performance of Carrier Based Aircraft with Land Based Aircraft. |
67 - 68 |
SECTION XXII |
Night Operations |
68 |
SECTION XXIII |
Defense of Aircraft Carriers Against Aerial Attack. |
69 |
SECTION XXIV |
Communications |
70 |
SECTION XXV |
Will Aircraft Carriers Survive |
71 - 72 |
CHAPTER - I
SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
1. a. This report is confined principally to:
(1) Organization. Aircraft, Battle Force, and Aircraft, Scouting Force.
(2) Operation of Aircraft Carriers.
(3) Operations, and Supply and Logistics of Aircraft, Battle Force, and Aircraft, Scouting Force.
(4) Fleet Problem XX.
(a) A brief discussion of opposing forces, indicating their mission, strength, disposition and movement.
(b) Operations, and supply and logistics of Aircraft, Battle Force, and Aircraft, Scouting Force during Fleet Problem XX.
b. I am not interested in discussing in
this report such questions as to whether or not the airplane will destroy the
value of the battleships or any other class of naval vessel. The battleship
undoubtedly is a major unit in any fleet. In the large scale naval engagement
of the past the number of gun such a ship carried, its superior range, and
thickness of its protective armor have constituted an invaluable asset.
The development of air power has produced some controversy in and outside the
Navy, over the continuance of its value, but the weight of authoritative
opinion in the Navy seems to be that the bomber has not as yet destroyed the
usefulness of the battleship. The crisis in Europe in the Fall of 1938 brought
forcibly to worldwide attention the overshadowing influence of air power in
international affairs. The realization that airplanes had been built in great
numbers and developed to a point where they are capable of operating at high
speeds over long distance with large bomb loads, thrust upon the world a new
concept of National Defense. Our President and Congress have seen the necessity
of building and maintaining a strong, powerful, a well balanced Navy capable of
meeting and defeating an enemy far from our shores, and of enlarging our Air
Force in order to provide aircraft in sufficient numbers, modernity, and
effectiveness to propel (sic) invasion and increase our offensive power at sea.
Our President and Congress recognized the airplane
--1--
is a great, strategtical and tactical
weapon. In the preparation of this report, I have made a careful study of Fleet
dispositions, tactical and strategical doctrine of
Aircraft, Battle Force, and of Aircraft, Scouting Force. I have had tours of
duty with the various types of tactical squadrons of the Aircraft, Battle
Force, and Aircraft, Scouting Force, and Fleet Marine Aviation. I participated
in Minor Fleet Problem in the Pacific during November, 1938, Fleet Problem XX,
and the Minor Joint Army-Navy Exercise of the New England Coast in April. I
have flown on practically all type missions with which Aircraft, Battle Force,
and Aircraft, Scouting Force are concerned. Therefore, Conclusions drawn and
incorporated in the report have been made only after a careful study and
consideration of the important factors and in most cases after personal
observation.
--2—
2. Symbols denoting types of Aircraft
VPB: |
Patrol - Bombers |
VSB: |
Scout - Bombers |
VTB: |
Torpedo - Bombers |
VF: |
Fighters |
VJ: |
Utility Planes |
VJR: |
Utility Transport |
VSO: |
Scout Observation |
VB: |
Bombing |
VM: |
Miscellaneous |
VSR: |
Scouting and Transport |
3.
Symbols denoting types of Surface Ships
BB: |
Battleship |
CA: |
Heavy Cruiser |
CL: |
Light Cruiser |
CV: |
Aircraft Carrier |
DD: |
Destroyer |
AD: |
Aircraft Tender |
SS: |
Submarine |
AVP: |
Patrol Plane Tender (Small) |
A[G]: |
Auxiliary (Miscellaneous) |
AM: |
Mine Sweeps (Auxiliary) |
AV: |
Heavier-than-air Aircraft Tender |
AO: |
Tanker |
OSS: |
Old Submarine |
--3—
SECTION
III
4. General Organization, U.
S. Fleet.
--4--
SECTION
IV
5. Organization, Aircraft, Battle Force, U. S. Fleet.
NOTE: The Aircraft Carrier RANGER has been
assigned the Atlantic Squadron and will be based on the East Coast.
--5--
Group
Organization, Aircraft, Battle Force
(CV3) YORKTOWN … Flagship |
|||
4 VM Planes – Flag Unit |
|||
Carrier
Division One |
|||
(CV3) SARATOGA |
|||
(CV2) LEXINGTON |
|||
(CV4) RANGER |
|||
SARATOGA AIR GROUP |
LEXINGTON AIR GROUP |
||
(VB3) Bombing Squadron Three |
(VB2) Bombing Squadron Two |
||
(VF3) Fighting Squadron Three |
(VF2) Fighting Squadron Two |
||
(VS3) Scouting Squadron Three |
(VS2) Scouting Squadron Two |
||
(VT3) Torpedo Squadron Three |
(VT2) Torpedo Squadron Two |
||
RANGER AIR GROUP (GREEN, Solid). |
|
||
(VB4) Bombing Squadron Four (18 VB planes) |
|||
(VF4) Fighting Squadron Four (18 VF planes plus 1 VSB) |
|||
(VS41) Scouting Squadron Forty-two (18 VSB planes) |
|||
(VS42) Scouting Squadron Forty-two (18 VSB planes) |
|||
--6--
Carrier
Division Two |
|
YORKTOWN (F) |
|
YORKTOWN AIR GROUP |
ENTERPRISE AIR GROUP |
(VB5) Bombing Squadron Five |
(VB6) Bombing Squadron Five |
(VF5) Fighting Squadron Five |
(VF6) Fighting Squadron Five |
(VS5) Scouting Squadron Five |
(VS6) Scouting Squadron Five |
(VT5) Torpedo Squadron Five |
(VT6) Torpedo Squadron Five |
3 VSO, 2 VJ planes based in SARATOGA
3 VSO, 2 VJ planes based in LEXINGTON
3 VSO, 2 VJ planes based in RANGER
3 VSO, 2 VJ planes based in YORKTOWN
3 VSO, 2 VJ planes based in ENTERPRISE
Present plans contemplate basing the Aircraft, Battle Force, except the RANGER, in San Diego - San Pedro area.
The carriers LEXINGTON and SARATOGA are based at San Pedro because they are unable to operate out of San Diego Harbor. The Air Group of the above carriers base at San Diego.
One or more groups will base at San Francisco when the base
there is completed.
--7--
SECTION V
6. Organization of Aircraft, Scouting
Force.
Patrol Wing One | ||||
(AV1) WRIGHT... Flagship | ||||
Squadrons |
||||
(VP-7) |
Patrol Squadron Seven |
BLUE |
(Double Stripe) |
(12 VPB) |
(VP-9) |
Patrol Squadron Nine |
RED |
(Double Stripe) |
(12 VPB) |
(VP-11) |
Patrol Squadron Eleven |
GREEN |
(Double Stripe) |
(12 VPB) |
(VP-12) |
Patrol Squadron Twelve |
YELLOW |
(Double Stripe) |
(12 VPB) |
Tenders | ||||
(AV1) WRIGHT |
1 VSO, 1 VJ plane - Ship unit |
Tender |
||
(AV3) LANGLEY |
1 VSO, 1 VJ plane - Ship unit |
Tender |
||
(AVP1) LAPWING |
Tender |
|||
(AVP9) SANDPIPER |
Tender |
(VP-1) |
Patrol Squadron One |
RED |
(Solid) |
(12 VPB) |
(VP-4) |
Patrol Squadron Four |
YELLOW |
(Solid) |
(12 VPB) |
(VP-6) |
Patrol Squadron Six |
BLUE |
(Solid) |
(12 VPB) |
(VP-8) |
Patrol Squadron Eight |
ALUMINUM |
(Solid) |
(12 VPB) |
(VP-10) |
Patrol Squadron Ten |
BLACK |
(Solid) |
(12 VPB) |
(VP-18) |
Patrol Squadron Eighteen |
GREEN |
(Solid) |
(12 VPB) |
(AVP4) |
AVOCET |
Tender |
(AVP6) |
PELICAN |
Tender |
(AVP7) |
SWAN |
Tender |
Patrol Wing
Three
(AVP8)
GANNET... Flagship
Squadrons
(VP-2) |
Patrol Squadron Two |
GREEN |
(Single Stripe) |
(12 VPB) |
(VP-3) |
Patrol Squadron Three |
RED |
(Single Stripe) |
(12 VPB) |
(VP-5) |
Patrol Squadron Five |
BLACK |
(Single Stripe) |
(12 VPB) |
Tenders
(AVP-3) |
THRUSH |
Tender |
(AVP8) |
GANNET |
Tender |
Fleet Air Base, Coco
Solo
Utility Unit – 2 VF, 2 VSO, 2 VJR, 3 VJ
--9--
Patrol Wing
Four
Naval Air Station, Seattle, Washington
(AVP5)
TEAL... Flagship
Squadrons
(VP-16) |
Patrol Squadron Sixteen |
BLUE |
(Checker) (6 VPB) |
(VP-17) |
Patrol Squadron Seventeen |
RED |
(Checker) (6 VPB) |
(VP-19) |
Patrol Squadron Nineteen |
YELLOW |
(Checker) (6 VPB) |
(VP-20) |
Patrol Squadron Twenty |
BLACK |
(Checker) (6 VPB) |
(VP-21) |
Patrol Squadron Twenty-one |
GREEN |
(Checker) (6 VPB) |
Tender
(AVP5) TEAL... Seattle Tender
Fleet Air Base, Sitka, Alaska
Utility Unit... 1 VJ
NOTE: One squadron under Patrol Wing FOUR is based at Sitka. Squadrons are alternated at Sitka every three months.
Patrol Wing
Five
(AM2) OWL... Flagship
(VP-14) |
Patrol Squadron Fourteen |
YELLOW |
(Solid) |
(9 VPB) |
(VP-15) |
Patrol Squadron Fifteen |
RED |
(Solid) |
(9 VPB) |
Tender
NOTES: VP-1 at San Diego, receiving new PBY-4 airplanes for ferrying to Pearl Harbor during Third Quarter.
VP-18 [illegible]
B. Four-motored Patrol Bombers.
1. Contract has been let for 6 four-motored
patrol bombers.
--10--
SECTION
VI.
OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT
CARRIERS
7. Aircraft Carrier Operations.
a. Fleet Dispositions.
Due to the great secrecy of Fleet Dispositions, Standard and Special, they are included in this report. I believe it most essential that Army Air Corps officers be familiar with Fleet Dispositio0ns. By a careful study of Fleet Dispositions that might be expected under various conditions deductions can can easily be made as to the most likely position of various types of ships of the enemy. In making assignment of units to the various dispositions, due regard is mad for facility of maneuver from one disposition to another. Station unit commanders dispose their forces within assigned areas in a manner best to meet existing or anticipated situations.
b. Carrier Dispositions.
Carriers take position within assigned areas to effect prompt launching or recovery of aircraft and hold to a minimum the distance they are required to run outside their area incident to launching or recovery. If, during launching or recovery, carriers get outside the Fleet Dispositions, they will be accompanied by part of the heavy cruisers. Cruisers would seldom be assigned such a mission when a major engagement is imminent.
During the launching and recovery of aircraft, one or two destroyers normally act as plane guards for each carrier. Except during the launching and recovery of aircraft, plane guard destroyers form the inner anti-submarine screen for carriers and during daylight normally take screening stations.
One of the major problems confronting the Commander of Aircraft Battle Force, is the proper disposition of aircraft carriers within the various Fleet Dispositions. It requires a large area, even in clear weather, for the safe and efficient launching and recovery of aircraft. During periods of low visibility, this area is greatly increased. New Doctrine, employing the sector method, is being tried out. The operation of seven carriers, the number that will soon be a part of the Fleet, each carrier operation approximately 74 airplanes, required careful planning, efficient and prompt maneuvering. The Navy, unlike the Army, holds out no reserve in battle. Of course, certain situations might necessitate staggering the operations of aircraft carrier groups.
During the launching and recovery of aircraft, carriers maintain a minimum speed of 20 knots and a maximum speed of 30 knots over the flying deck. The most desirable speed is approximately 27 knots. During the launching and recovery of aircraft, the carrier course is always in the direction from which the wind is blowing. This complicates carrier operations. Should the wind be blowing 180 degrees opposite the Fleet course, the carriers will be forced to
--11--
operate outside the Fleet Disposition and consequently will receive little protection against attack by aircraft or surface vessels. This was the case the day of the big battle, Fleet Problem XX; and at other times, during periods of heavy aircraft operations, I have seen the carriers, at the end of the day's operation, approximately 50 miles from the Fleet guide. The normal position of the carriers is from 1000 yards to 5 miles in the rear of the Fleet guide.
c. Factors that limit Carrier Operations.
(1) Weather conditions.
(a) Fog and storms in the area of carrier operations hamper and in the majority of cases, prevent flying. In many instances, and particularly when radio silence is being maintained, conditions may be such that the carriers will be in a storm area or fog area but near a clear areas and not be aware of it.
(b) Cold weather and Icing Conditions.
Effective operations of carriers in the North Atlantic and in other areas with weather conditions similar to those conditions found in the North Atlantic, would be greatly limited during winter months. Icing of the flight deck and of planes on the flight deck, would be very difficult to combat. Covers for the entire plane and a positive means of starting planes in zero weather would be essential. The hangars of the carriers are large enough to accommodate only from one-third to one-half the planes, and even should the hangar be able to accommodate all the planes, the necessity of having the planes on deck for prompt launching would prevent their being stored in the hangar.
(2) Rough seas.
Extremely rough seas, particularly seas with large swells, slow up and often prevent carrier operations. It is possible, but not safe, to operate when surface wind is as strong as 33 knots. Delay in take-off and landing under such conditions will vary from 20 to 50 percent. Signal men, on the take-off, might have to hold the plane until the carrier righted itself to a proper and safe condition for take-off; upon landing, a large number of planes would have to be waved off due to unsafe position of the ship a t the time plane arrived at carrier deck for cut (land) signal, and delay caused by heavy seas in parking of planes.
One of the most dangerous operating conditions
is when there are cross swells with moderate winds which produce a great rocking
motion of the carriers. Following an operation on 5 January, with conditions
similar to that described above, one squadron of the LEXINGTON Air Group had to
change 14 times and another squadron 17 times. The thought occurred to me that
an attempt to conduct carrier operations under such conditions would completely
put the operating units out of action.
--12--
8. Defense of Aircraft Carriers against Light Forces.
IF night attack upon the Fleet, while in cruising disposition, is anticipated, the action taken by the O. T. C. may include the following:
a. Attempt evasion through a wide detour to avoid contact.
b. Attempt evasion after contact is made by directing a course change by station units away from attack.
c. Repel the attacks with destroyers and cruisers on the engaged flank while maneuvering remainder of disposition away from direction of attack.
d. Depend upon own light forces, supported by battle line to drive off attacking units.
When attack or trailing by enemy light forces during the night is probable, the O. T. C. may direct the air force to establish an outer air patrol to give timely warning of approach of enemy forces. The prevailing opinion is that except during periods of clear weather, and on moonlight nights, operations of carrier base aircraft under such a condition are very ineffective. Also, it requires lights aboard the carrier for safe conduct of latching and recovery of aircraft during night operations. This gives away the carrier dispositions and might enable the enemy to make an effective attack with light surface vessels and submarines.
9. Defense of Aircraft Carriers against Air Attack.
When enemy air attack is probable, the O. T. C. may establish any of the following air patrols to assist in the antiaircraft defense:
a. Outer Air Patrol.
The outer air patrol, if established, will, unless otherwise directed, be formed on the arc of a circle twenty-five miles beyond the outer screen in the direction from which the attack is expected.
b. Aerial Pickets.
Aerial pickets have as their mission the sighting, reporting, and tracking of high altitude attacks. They will operate singly outside the outer screen and surface pickets, being disposed laterally, radially, and vertically, according to the conditions existing and number available.
c. Combat Air Patrols.
Combat air patrols are established over and above unit to which assigned for purpose of denying enemy observation or enemy air attack. Their primary mission is destruction of enemy aircraft.
d. disposition and Maneuvering of Carriers when warned of impending Air Attack.
If a bombing attack is expected, units should be placed in such a line of bearing as will allow bringing maximum antiaircraft to bear on attacks from the direction of the sun in the shortest time.
When an air attack threatens, radical irregular maneuvers should be made with changes of speed where such action can be taken without danger of collision with other units. Carriers, if given warning of impending attack, will be so maneuvered as to come closely under the protection of the antiaircraft batteries of the battle line. Such a disposition not only hampers maneuvering of carriers but also hampers maneuvering of battleships. At times during day of big battle, Fleet Problem XX, the carriers of the WHITE Fleet, except during launching and recover of aircraft, operated between the battleship divisions. The carriers were under stray enemy shell fire a great deal of the time and in my opinion, at times, could have been the target of well directed enemy gun fire.
e. Antiaircraft Defense of Aircraft Carriers.
Whenever possible, carriers are so disposed as to receive maximum protection from other components of the Fleet. The following is a brief description of material characteristics and antiaircraft defense of carriers now in operation.
(1) LEXINGTON and SARATOGA.
The LEXINGTON and SARATOGA are sister ships and are the largest man-of-war in existence. They have a speed of 33 knots. They each carry eight 8" guns, twelve 5" antiaircraft guns, 12 machines guns, and have 7" side armor.
The YORKTOWN and ENTERPRISE, the two newest carriers in operation, are identical in performance, construction, and armament. They have a speed of 32 knots. They each carry eight 5" guns, sixteen 1. 1" and twelve machine guns for protection against aircraft.
(3) RANGER.
The RANGER is the smallest carrier. It is more modern than the LEXINGTON and SARATOGA, but not as modern s the YORKTOWN and ENTERPRISE. In the opinion of the majority of Naval officers, it is too small and is underpowered. It has a speed of 29 knots and no armor. It carries eight 5" antiaircraft guns and 16 machine guns for protection against attacking aircraft.
--14--
All the carriers base the same number of airplanes and their flight decks are equally vulnerable. The LEXINGTON and SARATOGA each carry approximately twice as much aviation gasoline as the other carriers. I question the ability of antiaircraft to defend carriers against a well directed and determined attack by airplanes. In the majority of instances, there is no intelligence net to warn the carriers of approaching attacking aircraft. High altitude bombers near the bomb-release line prior to coming under antiaircraft fire, unless the carriers is disposed within the Fleet disposition. However, this is seldom the case during the launching and recovery of aircraft. Many times I have seen high altitude bombers and even dive bombers and torpedo planes complete their attack prior to being opposed by antiaircraft.
10. Responsibility of Commanding Officers, Aircraft Carriers.
The commanding officers of carriers are responsible for:
a. The preparation of aircraft units for their mission, including the dissemination of necessary information and orders, their servicing and arming, their state of readiness, and the spotting of the flight deck.
b. The launching and recovery of aircraft.
c. Maintaining communications with aircraft in the air.
d. Issuing orders as to time of return of units to carrier.
e. Maintaining records of positions of aircraft in air; of informing them of change in rendezvous conditions; and for the operation of measures designed to safeguard their flight.
f. Defense of carrier group through maneuver and gunfire.
AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS:
AIRCRAFT BATTLE FORCE
11. Definitions:
a. Section.
The section is the basic tactical unit of the aircraft division. It consists, normally, of three planes.
b. Division.
Division is an organization consisting of two or more sections of the same type. Six or nine planes compose a division.
c. Squadron.
An organization consisting of two or more divisions of aircraft.
d. Group
An aircraft group is an organization consisting of two or more squadrons of aircraft.
e. Wing
An aircraft wing is an organization consisting of two or more groups.
The present organization of the Aircraft, Battle Force, consists of five groups, each group four squadrons, each squadron two divisions, and each division nine planes. During operations, the group commander normally commands the group from the air and is followed by an accompanying plane. When aboard ship, the Captain of the ship commands all units. He issues orders to the group through the air officer.
12. Squadron Maneuvers.
a. Squadron Departures.
(1) Normal Departure.
Scouts depart by sections, as formed, without waiting to accomplish squadron rendezvous. Other types effect squadron rendezvous before proceeding on assigned mission.
--16--
(2) Urgent Departure.
All types depart by sections as soon as formed after section rendezvous, squadron affecting assembly on way to objective.
(3) Deferred Departure.
Squadron and group rendezvous are affected prior to departure.
13. Navigational Responsibility.
Each plane at all times responsible fro its own navigation and will continually fix its position as accurately as its facilities permit. Even when flying in formation, each plane must, to the best of its ability, record its successive positions in order that it may be able at any time to operate independently.
14. Scouting Line.
Whenever a flight of aircraft is seeking contact with a surface unit, in the absence of positive information as to the relative location thereof, aircraft shall employ the scouting line to reduce the chance of missing the contact. The primary application of this principle is during the interception of the carrier or parent vessel upon return from a protracted flight. Illustration - The LEXINGTON Air Group was forced to employ the scouting line when it became lost on return flight during Fleet Problem XX, and was finally forced to resort to lost plane procedure.
15. Attack Doctrine, Aircraft Battle Force.
a. Mission of Aircraft.
Aircraft may be employed to perform the following attack missions:
(1) To destroy enemy surface craft.
(a) Capital Ships - by bombs or torpedoes.
(b) Light forces - By bombs or machine guns.
(2) To reduce battle efficiency of enemy surface craft.
(a) Capital Ships - by bombs and torpedoes.
(b) Light Forces - by bombs or machine guns.
--17—
(a) All types - by bombs, machine guns, and use of smoke.
(40 To force enemy to maneuver, to join or break off
engagement, or otherwise to confirm to our will.
(5) To deny enemy use of the air.
(a) By destruction of enemy carriers or bases.
(b) By destruction of enemy aircraft.
16. Approach Formation.
a. Dive Bombers.
For dive bombers an ABC, or open echelon formation,
with distance
between planes of from 10 to 20 times the wing spa, approaching at maximum speed
from the highest practicable altitude, with minimum change of course or
maneuvering, until brought under enemy gun fire, is desirable.
b. Horizontal Bombers.
For horizontal bombers, an approximation of the attack
formation to be employed, with the planes separated by from eight to ten times
the wing span, is preferable. This formation will usually be some form of Vee because such a formation affords
better protection against hostile fighters.
17. The Attack.
a. Dive Bombers.
For dive bombers the attack must be delivered at maximum
speed, directly from the approach formation, without maneuvering, and preferably
on the approach course.
b. Horizontal Bombers.
For horizontal bombers, the attack must be made with
minimum change of formation or course after coming in contact with enemy.
--18--
18. The Retirement.
The retirement must be made at maximum speed, on zigzag courses and with rapid change of altitude. Formations will be opened to reduce effectiveness of enemy antiaircraft fire or closed for defense against fighters in accordance with the actual opposition encountered.
19. Attack Against Submarines.
Owing to the probable absence of effective antiaircraft fire from submarines, attacks on them may be made from comparatively low altitude and at close range.
20. Strafing of Surface Targets.
The general principles of strafing surface targets are:
a. Against capital ships, battleships, and heavy cruisers, strafing should be employed only during the dive and before bombs are released.
b. Against aircraft carriers, with planes on deck, repeated strafing attacks should be made following the bombing dive.
c. Against light cruisers, light forces and submarines, fifty caliber gun fire may be expected to do considerable damage.
21. Smoke Screens.
a. Smoke screens, while often of great tactical value may work to the detriment of our own forces in a rapidly changing situations. For this reason, smoke must not be laid except on orders from the O. T. C., or in accordance with approved operations orders. Wind has such a marked influence on the success of smoke laying operations that it must always be given major consideration.
b. Types of Smoke Screens:
(1) To cover employment of our main body;
(2) To cover maneuvers of our own battle line;
(3) To break off engagement:
(4) To interfere with enemy gun fire observation;
(5) To force a change of the enemy battle line.
In my personal observations, when conditions are favorable, smoke is invaluable for a torpedo attack by airplanes.
--19--
22. Practical Instructions and Doctrine for Type Squadrons.
a. Fighting Squadrons.
(1) Mission.
The primary mission of fighting squadrons is the destruction of enemy aircraft.
(2) Attack against surface craft.
In attack against surface craft, fighters employ dive bombing.
(3) Basic principles of aerial engagement.
The basic principles of aerial engagement for Army pursuit and Navy fighters are essentially the same, therefore will not be discussed.
(4) Ability of fighter squadrons to repel attacks.
In my opinion, and in the opinion of the majority of Navy officers, the percentage of fighter to other types of aircraft is too small to repel or even weaken a greatly determined aerial attack. Som officers are of the opinion that the percent of fighter squadrons to that of the observation, bombing, and torpedo squadrons should be increased. Others are of the opinion that space aboard carriers is too precious to be consumed by fighting squadrons which have so little striking power compared to the other squadrons. The percentage of fighter is so small that their effort, during a major engagement, is confined chiefly to protection of the carriers. In my opinion, it would not be sound policy to increase the strength of the fighting squadrons at the expense of the bombing or torpedo squadrons, of which the latter can be used for both torpedo and bombing.
b. Torpedo Squadrons.
(1) Mission
The VTB type is the heaviest striking arm with which a carriers is equipped. When used as a heavy bomber or torpedo plane, it constitutes a major serial threat and is capable of inflicting decisive damage. While its primary purpose is to destroy enemy vessels, it may be used, should the general tactical situation requires, to impose desired maneuvers upon the enemy.
(2) Targets.
The usual objective for a VTB Squadron is a formation of Capital Ships or vessels of the train. An aircraft carrier, in the event of surprise, is an ideal target [illegible] The attack can be consummated prior the launching of [illegible]
--20--
(a) Mission.
The purpose of an aircraft torpedo attack is two-fold. The first and obvious purpose is to destroy enemy vessels; the second is to cause confusion or reduction in speed of one or more vessels in the formation and to force the enemy to maneuver into an unfavorable position during a main management.
(b) General Types of Attack.
Attack on one flank only of an enemy formation with full squadron strength. This attack is ordinarily employed against the enemy battle line in action and is usually used in conjunction with a destroyer attack.
2. Wave attack.
It is usually employed against a column of insufficient length on which to use a concentrated attack.
3. Divided attack.
Attack in two divisions on both bows of enemy formation. This form of attack is very effective on account of the cross fire obtained.
The TBD-1 airplane has a crew of three (pilot, bomber, and gunner & radio man). It is capable of carrying one 1000-lb bomb, or three 500-lb. bomb, or one 1000-lb torpedo.
The bombing altitude depends to a considerable extent upon visibility. With unlimited visibility, bombing should be done from maximum altitude to avoid detection and effective antiaircraft fire.
(e) Composite Bombing.
The practicability of using heavy dive bombers as horizontal bombers by flying as wing planes in a plane of the VTB type has been demonstrated. The problem resolves itself into one of proper rendezvous of the composite group. At the present time, all of the standard type bombing
planes, SB2U type, are restricted to horizontal bombing. This plane, built by Chance-Voight, was designed primarily for dive bombing, and was supposed to carry a maximum load of 1000 pounds of bombs. After the plane had been in the service for some time and had been subjected to carrier landings and to considerable dive bombing operations, crimps of a dangerous nature developed in the wing and center section. It is very evident that a steep dive for an appreciable distance with a full load of bombs might result in disintegration of the plane. This structural weakness necessitates placing the SB2U planes in TBD-1 horizontal bombing formation. The bombs are dropped on signal from the TBD planes. This curtails and slows up operations, and in cases of low visibility, would prevent the effective use of the SB2U planes. The SB2U in the fastest plane in the Navy, having a top speed of about 268 miles per hour at its critical altitude. To be forced to operate it in TBD formations that are about 70 miles per hour slower certainly minimum its usefulness.
9. Aircraft Bombing Doctrine. (Horizontal Bombing)
(1) Bombing Formations
The bombing formation used should be such to obtain a reasonably high probability of hitting without reducing too much the percentages of hits. For general use against a maneuvering target, a six-plane Vee with planes 90 feet apart in considered most satisfactory. A larger formation only slightly increases this probability and is difficult to maneuver. However, with increased altitudes and consequently larger linear mil values, larger formations may become necessary in order to get the desired pattern size and still maintain the same density. For use against a stationary target or against one which is maintaining a steady course and speed, a three-plane or four-plane closed Vee with 100 feet between planes is best. For approach from ahead or astern, the formation should be in deflection than in range, and for in range, and for approaches from the beam, larger in range than in deflection. In all bombing formations, all planes of a group should fly at the level of or slightly below the level of the leader.
(2) Bombing Attack Factors.
The following are factors which are helpful during daylight in making an effective bombing approach and attack:
(a) Target not protected by aircraft;
(b) Target under effective fire from surface vessels;
(c) Bombers supported by light bombers;
(d) Attack from the sun;
--22--
(e) Attack from ahead or astern;
(f) Low broken clouds not exceeding six on the scale of zero to 10;
(g) Attack at dusk or dawn from the large semi-circle.
d. Aircraft Tactical Instruction for Carrier VS Type Squadrons. (1) Tactical Organization.
The carrier scouting squadron has the same tactical organization as do other carrier squadrons. The three-plane section is the normal peace time scouting unit. In war this might be reduced.
(2) Mission.
(a) Primary mission is scouting.
(b) Secondary mission is dive bombing.
(c) Other missions which this type of squadron may be called upon to perform are:
2. Patrol;
3. Smoke laying. e. Aircraft Tactical Instructions for VB Type Sqauadrons. (1) Mission.
(a) The Primary Mission of a heavy dive bombing squadron in the rapid and effective delivery of heavy bombs on enemy objectives.
(b) The Secondary Mission of a heavy dive bombing squadron include search, patrol, strafing and smoking. (2) Offensive Power.
Carrier based aircraft are essentially
offensive weapons. Their major offensive power is heavy bomb. All other missions
are secondary to deliver of heavy bombing attacks.
--23--
( 3) Control of the Air
The surest and quickest means of gaining control of the air is the destruction of enemy carriers, tenders, and bases by bombing attacks.
(4) Guiding Principles of Bombing Attacks.
The guiding principles of attack on surface vessels are:
(a) Concentration of sufficient strength to sink or completely disable individual vessels rather than dispersal of attacks so as to inflict less damage on a greater number.
(b) Delivery of attack in such a way as to reduce the effectiveness of antiaircraft fire.
(c) Delivery of attack when conditions are such that the target may find it difficult to maneuver at high speed.
NOTE: Since Army planes are not designed for dive bombing, detailed information concerning dive bombing is not considered essential.
The principle involved in conducting wing tactics is to so coordinate the movements of the individual groups that maximum effectiveness is gained in conducting attack. Upon arriving within striking distance, each group attacks in succession. A simultaneous attack may be possible should objectives be sufficiently separated that no interference results.
--24--
SECTION VIII
SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS, AIRCRAFT, BATTLE
FORCE
When units are based ashore, supply, repair and overhaul
are effected ashore. When units are based aboard carriers, supply and repair are
effected aboard carriers. No major overhaul is done on carriers.
24. Duties of Organization, Naval Air Station.
Provide operating facilities, barracks, etcetera, for flee
air detachments; major overhaul and repair of aircraft, Battle Force; supply of
units based at station; flight training as may be assigned; development of
carrier facilities and operating methods.
25. Facilities, Naval Air Station.
The Naval Air Station, San Diego, provides facilities as
follows:
a. Assembly major repairs, major overhaul, and rebuilding of fleet
aircraft and equipment.
b. Storage for fleet aircraft material, in excess of storage
capacity of carriers or supply vessels; storage of fleet aircraft material
pending opportunity for deliver to fleet aircraft squadrons, vessels or
temporary bases.
c. Hangar facilities for assembly, operations, overhaul, and
housing of fleet aircraft.
d. Mooring facilities for fleet seaplanes.
e. Land flying field, suitable for tactical exercises of
fleet land airplanes. Several outlying fields are made available.
f. Berthing places at wharves for fleet aircraft squadrons
surface craft.
g. Torpedo range; machine gun, pistol, and rifle range; and
suitable target practice and bombing areas.
h. Quarters, berthing, messing and office facilities for
fleet aircraft squadrons personnel temporarily at the base for overhaul, repair,
or mobilization of aircraft for tactical exercises and training.
--25--
26. Fleet Aircraft Squadrons, Primarily an Operating Force.
The fleet aircraft squadrons are primarily operating units. Commissioned and enlisted personnel shall be adequate for operation, maintenance and minor repairs only. For major repairs and overhaul the fleet aircraft squadrons depend upon the fleet aircraft bases or naval aircraft stations whose paramount duty is to serve the fleet aircraft. From personal observation, I am of the opinion that the operating squadrons in the Navy do a great deal of the repair, commonly termed second echelon maintenance, ordinarily done by our engineering departments of the air bases.
27. Ordnance Service.
Storage facilities for bombs, small arms ammunition, and pyrotechnics are provided by the Naval Base or Fleet Air Stations. It is the function of the gunnery department of the squadron to get the bombs and small arms ammunition to the airplane. It is the duty of Ordnance personnel to arm the bombs. When operating aboard carriers the squadron crews combing with the ship's crew in getting the bombs to the planes. The plane crews load the bombs on the plane.
28. Refueling of Airplanes.
Refueling of airplanes ashore is similar to methods employed by the Army. Refueling aboard carriers is very fast and efficient. The gasoline hose lines extend along outside of carrier for safety purposes. Gasoline is stored in tanks well below the water line. The aqua system is employed throughout all carriers. Oil is carried either in drums or small containers. The LEXINGTON and SARATOGA each carry approximately 140, 00 gallons of aviation gasoline. [Added in margin: (14 to 20 tank cars)? ]
29. Airplane Spares and Replacement.
When operating at sea for extended periods,
each carrier carries 3 airplanes as spares for each of the four squadrons
aboard. Spare parts of all kinds and in quantities sufficient for required
operations are carried by the carriers. During the period 3 January to 1 March,
the four carriers that participated in Fleet Problem XX averaged 9 planes per
carrier that were either completely demolished or required major overhaul.
--26--
The cost of operating and maintaining an
aircraft carrier is tremendous. When the aircraft carrier LEXINGTON departed
from San Diego. 3 January for Fleet Problem XX, there were 2205 officers and men
aboard. Of this, number, approximately 100 officers and cadets and 625 men
belonged to the operating units of the LEXINGTON Air Group, approximately 20
officers and 50 men belonged to Headquarters, Aircraft Battle Force, and
approximately 80 officers and 1330 men belonged to the ship's crew. When a
carrier is operating with the fleet, it requires from one to two destroyers to
act as plane guards. True these destroyers form some protection to the fleet.
However, were the carriers not present, these destroyers would be disposed in
the destroyer divisions unless assigned a special mission. When a carrier or
group of carriers are detached from the fleet on a special mission, they require
approximately two heavy cruisers and eight to twelve destroyers for protection.
All of the operations described above weaken the fleet. The aircraft carriers
LEXINGTON and SARATOGA carry approximately 2,500,000 gallons of fuel oil; the
carriers RANGER, YORKTOWN, and ENTERPRISE carry about two-thirds of the above
amount. During Fleet Problem XX, the LEXINGTON used from 50, 00 to 70, 000
gallons of fuel oil daily; the amount consumed being dependent upon the speed of
the Fleet, wind direction and velocity, and amount of aircraft operations. The
question arises "Does the usefulness of the carrier outweigh its cost of
construction and operation? " Airplane carriers are the most
vulnerable type of warship known. Is it not possible that carriers are being
eclipsed by gigantic bombing planes. It is possible that nations may have to
discard carriers and rely upon monster planes of great speed flown, not from
carriers, but from well located land or sea bases. There are a large number of
Naval aviators who are the above opinion.
--27--
31. Mission of Patrol-Bombing Planes.
The primary mission of patrol planes is scouting, and their secondary mission is bombing.
32. Characteristics and Performance of Present Type Patrol Planes.
Characteristics, weights, and performance of present type patrol planes have been the subject matter of previous reports. The following data are include in this report in order to give an idea of speed, range and fuel capacity of patrol planes when employed on patrol or bombing missions.
a. Four Engine Patrol Planes.
Service ceiling - 22, 000 feet
Maximum speed at critical altitude - 236 MPH
Fuel capacity as patrol plane - 2, 790 gallons
Fuel capacity as bomber with four 1000-lb bombs - 1, 864
Fuel capacity as torpedo plane with two 1933-lb torpedoes - 1, 863
b. PBY-4 (twin engine) Patrol Plane.
Service ceiling - 25, 800 feet
Maximum speed at critical altitude - 195 MPH
Overload of fuel as patrol plane - 1570 gals.
With a maximum economical range of 3810 miles.
Range with normal load of fuel - 2180 miles.
When carrying two 1000-lb. bombs and overload of fuel of 1000 gallons, maximum economical range 2360 miles.
When carrying two 1000-lb. bombs with normal load of fuel, range 1300 miles
Plane is equipped for both bombing and torpedoes.
33. Requirements of Bases for Patrol Plane Operations.
a. Nearness to scene of operation;
b. Sufficient room for heavy take-off, landings and mooring.
c. Minimum of obstructions for night operations.
--28--
d. Accessibility of tanker and tenders.
e. Facilities for hauling planes out of water.
f. Easy to defend against attack by submarines or destroyers.
g. Well land-locked so as to be free, under normal conditions, from ground swells.
34. Defense of Patrol Plane Bases.
a. Means of defense of patrol plane bases are:
(1) Antiaircraft guns (seldom would protection by antiaircraft guns, except from those on ships that might be in the bases, be possible.
(2) Machine guns (particularly those on the planes).
(3) Batteries of tenders.
(4) Mines.
(5) Aircraft (Land based and normally operated by Marines). Also Army aircraft can be used very effectively against raiding forces until main forces of enemy arrive within their operating range.
b. Dispersion of aircraft as a means of protection.
Patrol planes, while in their bases, will be dispersed as an added protection against airplane attack.
c. Raids on bases.
Raids by aircraft, submarines, and surface craft on advanced, and in many cases, on permanent bases are likely to occur.
35. Tactical Operation of Patrol Planes.
Patrol planes, depending upon the situation, may be employed on the following missions:
a. Scouting an
patrol.
--29--
b. To cover the advance and attack zones in anti-submarine screening operations.
c. To track at night a designated force in order to give timely information to O. T. C. in order to facilitate night or dawn attack by air, surface and/or by submarine forces.
d. To bomb enemy ships or bases.
e. To lay smoke screens.
f. To deliver torpedo attacks.
36. Operation of Patrol Planes in Heavy Seas.
Twin-engine and four-engine patrol planes can take off with a moderate load in a moderate sea. Even moderate loads cannot be taken off in heavy seas. The worst possible conditions for take-off are caused by ground swells. It is impossible to take off when there are large ground swells. With moderate loads, take-off is dangerous but possible in small ground swells.
37. Operation of Patrol Planes in Cold Weather Areas.
a. Patrol planes have little trouble with surface ice in their bases. One squadron of patrol planes is kept in Sitka, Alaska. The weather is not extremely cold there. Seldom is there ice in a salt water base from which patrol planes normally operate.
b. Icing conditions of patrol planes and land operated bombers while in the air are practically identical. Patrol planes operating in Alaskan Territory are equipped with de-icers. However, only a very small percent of the total number of patrol planes are equipped or can be equipped with de-icers. This would be prevent effective, continuous operations in the North Atlantic area, on inareas with weather conditions similar to those encountered in the North Atlantic area, a large portion of the time. In cold weather patrol planes, when anchored in the water, often collect a tremendous amount of frost of ice on the wings and fuselage. This is particularly true of operations in the Alaskan waters. This condition would also be encountered during winter months in the New England area. Icing conditions slow up and hamper operations tremendously.
--30—
38. Operation of Patrol Planes in Tropical
Seas.
In most tropical waters, patrol planes collect so many
barnacles that they have to be hauled out of the water every third day and
washed off with fresh water. When they stay in the water four or more days, they
have to be hauled out of the water and have their hulls scraped. This requires
beaching facilities of a permanent nature. Operation of four-motored planes in
the Caribbean area, except at Guantanamo, would be exceedingly difficult if not
entirely impossible with present facilities.
--31—
SECTION X
SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS OF
PATROL PLANE OPERATION
39. Shore Establishment of Permanent Bases.
Description of:
"Duties of Organization, Naval Air Station"; "Facilities, Naval Air Station"; "Fleet Aircraft, Squadrons, Primarily an Operating Unit", found in Paragraphs 24, 25, and 26, above are applicable to Aircraft, Scouting Force as well as to Aircraft, Battle Force.
40. Ordnance Service.
It is the function of the gunnery department of the tactical squadrons to get the bombs and small arms ammunition to the planes. It is the duty of ordnance personnel to load and arm the bombs. Plane crews load the bombs on the planes by operation of windlasses on top of planes. Ordnance personnel secure and arm the bombs. When planes, in the water, are loaded with bombs, the bombs are brought in small boats to the planes. Fuzes are not carried to the planes in the same boat with the bombs. The planes carry the bombs underneath the wings.
41. Refueling of Airplanes.
a. Gasoline.
Airplanes are refueled from either tenders or
gasoline trucks when operating from permanent bases. When operating from
advanced bases, planes are refueled from tenders or small Bowser boats. The
aircraft tender LANGLEY carries approximately 100,000 gallons of aviation
gasoline. The tender WRIGHT carries 70,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, and the
"bird" type tenders of the SANDPIPER type carry about 20,000 gallons. A survey
of the facilities for supply of aviation gasoline indicates that they are
entirely inadequate for extensive aircraft operations. There is a great
necessity for underground storage of aviation gasoline at the important bases in
the possible and contemplate theatre of operations. Under the present method of
supply, should the tenders be destroyed or forced into the yards for overhaul,
practically the entire Aircraft Scouting Force would be immobilized.
--32—
b. Aviation Oil.
Aviation oil is carried in 10 gallon containers by the tenders. The supply of aviation oil is not a difficult problem.
c. Refueling and Re-arming at Sea.
It is possible, but dangerous, to service and re-arm patrol planes in extremely moderate seas. However, it is possible to refuel planes in a sea that is too rough for take-off or landing operations. As a general policy no servicing operations at sea will be undertaken. Sea conditions, such as ground swells and roughness of water, cannot be predicted. The danger of losing planes and crews in sea operations (landings, take-offs, servicing, and re-arming) is too great to warrant it as standard practice.
d. Length of Time it takes to Service and Re-arm Patrol Plane Units in Permanent Bases and in Advanced Bases lacking Norman Beaching Facilities.
(1) Permanent Bases.
When operating from permanent bases in protected waters the chief and practically only difference between the time it takes to re-service and re-arm patrol planes and land planes, is the time it takes to haul the patrol planes out of the water onto the ramp, plus the time of launching planes from the ramp into the water. Under war conditions, the necessity of dispersion while in the base, for protective purposes, might necessitate re-servicing and re-arming at anchor some, if not all, the planes. In such a case, where two or three ramps are available, the time of re-arming and re-servicing is greater than the time it takes to haul planes out of the water onto the ramp, re-service, re-arm, and launch back into the water. Under normal conditions, it takes from 35 minutes to one hour to haul a squadron of 12 patrol planes out of the water onto a ramp and from 15 to 25 minutes to launch same. It takes from one to three hours to get a four-motored patrol plane out of the water onto a ramp and 45 minutes to launch same. For this reason alone. I do not believe the Navy will purchase a large number of four-motor patrol planes.
--33--
(2) Advanced Bases.
When operating in advanced bases patrol planes
re-service and re-arm from tenders. The planes are either taxied near the
tenders, tied up, res-serviced, and re-armed, or else are res-serviced and
re-armed by small Bower boats. The former method is the fastest; the latter
method the safest. Under normal conditions, a wing consisting of 48 planes can
re-service and re-arm with one 1000-lb. bomb in from six to eight hours. It
takes approximately two and one-half hours longer to re-arm with two 1000-lb.
bombs. Strong tides crossing the direction of the wind greatly hamper
re-servicing and re-arming, and make taxiing very difficult.
42. Airplane Supplies and Spare parts.
The tactical squadrons keep on hand only a
small, limited amount of supplies and spare parts. When operating from permanent
bases, supplies and spares are stored in the material store rooms. When
operating from advanced bases, supplies and spare are carried on tenders.
43. Airplanes Repair and Overhaul.
Minor repairs are made within the squadrons.
Major repairs and overhaul are made by the Naval Air Stations and Naval Air
Bases. When operating from advanced bases, major repairs are made by aircraft
tenders. "Bird" type tenders are not capable of conducting airplane repair.
Tactical squadrons of the Navy do practically all repair work classed by the
Army as first and second echelon maintenance.
--34--
CHAPTER
II
SECTION
XI
BASIS OF
PROBLEM
43. Fleet Problem XX was based upon defense of the Monroe Doctrine. BLACK, the United States, was defending against WHITE, a strong European Power, that was attempting to further its interest in GREEN, an ally of BLACK, and to establish Naval bases in the Caribbean Area.
--35--
SECTION
XII
44. Survey of Opposing Strength.
a. Character of Theater of Operations.
(1) The territory of BLACK comprised the United States proper, the Canal Zone, and all other islands and possessions, not specified as GREEN, actually under the sovereignty of the United States.
(2) The territory of GREEN was bounded by the actual coast line from Cape San Roque westward; thence by the chain of the lesser Antilles, Virgin Islands, Culebra, Puerto Rico, and Hispaniola. The Island of Cuba as far west as the 77th Meridian was GREEN territory.
(3) WHITE had no Naval bases or harbors, other than Port Sail, a constructive port 2115 nautical miles generally east of San Juan.
(4) Brief description of Anchorage in GREEN Territory:
The GREEN coast from Port of Spain to Guadeloupe and from Guadeloupe to Mona Passage is fringed with islands. South of Guadeloupe. the sea area contains no suitable anchorage for a large fleet. North and west of Guadeloupe, the enclosed area is large, passages into the area are numerous, and it contains the Puerto Rico - Culebra - Virgin Islands area. BLACK accepted the anchorage and shore facilities of the Puerto Rico - Culebra - Virgin Islands area, which have been developed by GREEN, and established advanced bases therein. It was in this are that Commander, White Fleet, was directed to deny advanced bases to BLACK.
b. Political Factors.
(1) Internal conditions.
The revolution in GREEN, particularly at Port William, instigated by WHITE for the purpose of furthering WHITE'S interest was the apparent cause of the situation.
(2) External Relations.
WHITE desired to restrict hostilities to BLACK and to the GREEN government and therefore had to act with considerable circumspection to avoid difficulties with neutral states.
(3) Alliances.
The GREEN Insurgent Forces held only Port William in strength. All GREEN ports and harbors are available to BLACK. If WHITE expected to occupy any of GREEN'S harbors, organized resistance could be expected.
--36--
(4) Economic Factors.
It is probable that trade advantages have been the underlying cause of the situation. No economic factors had any immediate effect upon the solution of the problem.
(5) Psychological Factors.
The training and morale of the WHITE and BLACK Fleet were practically the same.
The theater of operations lay in the southern part of the trade wind belt. February and March are the dry season. The weather was generally fair with scattered to broken cumulus clouds during daylight. Part of the time there were light showers, and occassionally heavy showers, both day and night. The trade winds normally blew from northeast to east with a velocity of from 15 to 25 knots from 10:00 to sunset. No severe storms were encountered. Visibility during daylight was generally greater than 20,000 yards and normally was very high. Generally, excellent flying conditions were encountered, except that practically throughout the entire problem, seaplanes were unable to operate on account of the large swells and roughness of the sea that made recovery dangerous to both material and personnel.
(7) Communications Facilities.
(a) Communications facilities available to both forces.
1. Radio Washington low frequency. Fox method for delivery of noon Problem traffic.
2. All radio weather information, including special facilities, provided by station ships MEDUSA, HOLLAND, WHITNEY, and MELVILLE.
No friendly communications facilities outside of own forces and (a) above were available to WHITE.
(c) BLACK.
1. U.S. Naval
shore communication facilities, located in the United States proper, in the
Canal Zone and all other island possessions under BLACK sovereignty and those
assigned to GREEN. This [illegible] direction finding facilities.
--37--
2. Merchant ships operating in the Problem Area.
3. Commercial communication facilities as arranged with the Federal Communications Commission.
4. An analysis of above communication facilities indicates that BLACK, working along interior lines, had a decided advantage over WHITE. However, for purposes of gaining information of WHITE'S disposition and movements, little of the above communication facilities were of any use to BLACK; and since the actual combat between the two opposing forces took place far out in the South Atlantic, neither force had any particular advantage over the other in the matter of communication facilities.
(g) Logistic Support.
(a) BLACK.
BLACK had two oilers available that accompanied his Fleet. Adequate fuel oil was available. Except for the carrier and cruisers sent to Trinidad to intercept and destroy the UTAHS that were attempting to support the insurrectionists, at Port William, fuel oil expenditures were not large. Capaqcities for gasoline for BLACK Patrol Planes were as follows:
LANGLEY |
100,00 gallons |
WRIGHT |
70,000 " |
2 AVP (DD's) |
60,000 " |
5 AVP (AM's) |
50,000 " |
2 AO's |
200,000 " |
VP's |
60,000 " |
TOTAL |
540,000 " |
Bomb capacities were as follows:
2 AVS |
250,000 Pounds |
2 AVP (DD) |
40,000 " |
5 AVP (AM) |
20,000 " |
There was approximately 50 percent excess accommodations for personnel but no complete relief plane crews.
Limitations imposed:
1. Planes could not operate over 100 hours without complete check.
--38--
2. Planes were limited to 500 miles distance to sea from base actually occupied. Flights by squadrons or selected units were extended to 100 miles when specifically authorized by BLACK. Night searching operations were not permitted. Patrol planes were permitted 500 miles from bases at sunset in good weather but at sunset had to commence returning home. Under good conditions, they were permitted to take off prior to daylight.
(b) WHITE.
1. WHITE Fleet was not refueled upon departure from Port Sail. The cruising radius of the carriers and battleships was sufficient to refuel destroyers at sea. I observed refueling of destroyers from both carriers and battleships and it did not appear to be exceptionally difficult. Aviation gasoline was sufficient for operation of carrier-based aircraft.
2. Second Fleet.
The WHITE Second Fleet was not expected to arrive Port Sail until 1 March with troops, fuel, supplies and patrol planes.
3. Limitations imposed:
Operations until after 1 March had to conform to the logistical situation.
--39--
BLACK |
WHITE | ||||
(a) RANGER (Carrier) |
LEXINGTON | ||||
Squadrons |
Planes |
Armament |
Squadrons |
Planes |
Armament |
VB-4 |
18 BC |
1 - 1000 |
VB-2 |
18 SBT-24 |
1 - 1000 |
VF-4 |
18 F3F |
2 - 100 |
VF-3 |
18 F2F |
2 - 100 |
VS-41 |
18 SBU-1 |
1 - 500 |
VS-3 |
18 SB-4 |
1 - 500 |
VS-42 |
18 SBU-1 |
1 - 500 |
VT-2 |
1 TBD |
1 - 1000, or
|
(b) MARINES |
YORKTOWN | ||||
Squadrons |
Planes |
Armament |
Squadrons |
Planes |
Armament |
VMS-3 |
9 SU |
1 - 500 |
VB-5 |
18 BT |
1 – 1000 |
VMB-1 |
12 BG |
1 - 1000 |
VF-5 |
18 F2F |
2 – 100 |
VMF-1 |
18 F3F |
2 - 100 |
VS-5 |
18 SBC |
1 – 500 |
VMS-1 |
12 O3U-6 |
1 - 500 |
VT-5 |
1 TBD |
1 - 1000, or
|
VMS-1 |
11 (Utility) |
||||
? |
|||||
(c) PATROL UNITS |
ENTERPRISE | ||||
Squadrons |
Planes |
Planes |
Squadrons |
Planes |
Armament |
VP - 7 |
12 P BY |
2 - 1000, or
|
VB-6 |
18 BT |
1 - 1000 |
VF-6 |
18 F3F |
2 - 100 | |||
VS-6 |
18 SBC |
1 - 500 | |||
VP-9 |
12 P BY |
2 - 1000, or 4-500 |
VT-6 |
18 TBD |
1 - 1000, or
|
VP-11 |
12 P BY | ||||
VP-12 |
12 P BY | ||||
VP-2 |
12 P BY |
||||
VP-3 |
12 P BY | ||||
VP-5 |
12 P BY | ||||
VP-14 |
12 P BY | ||||
VP-15 |
12 P BY |
Recapitulation of Aircraft.
BLACK |
WHITE | ||
Type |
Armament |
Type |
Armament |
30 Bombers |
30-1000 |
54 Bombers |
54-1000 |
57 Scount |
57-500 |
54 Scouts |
54-500 |
36 Fighters |
72-100 |
54 Fighters |
108-100, or |
102 Patrol |
204-1000, or
|
162-500, or
| |
1 Squadron only: |
12 Torpedoes |
54 Torpedoes |
--40--
(10) Summary of Opposing Armed Forces.
BLACK |
Type |
WHITE |
Radius |
6 |
BB |
6 |
10,00 - 18,000 |
5 |
CA |
5 |
4,000 - 15,000 |
3 |
CA |
1 |
2,000 - 8,200 |
4 |
CL (10,000) |
1 |
4,000 - 15,000 |
2 |
CL |
5 |
2,000 - 6,800 |
1 |
CV |
3 |
6,600 - 16,000 |
4 |
DD (1850) |
6 |
1,530 - 7,000 |
13 |
DD (1500) |
21 |
1,500 - 7,000 |
15 |
DD (1200) |
4 |
1,400 - 4,000 |
4 (with VP Squad.) |
AG |
- |
1,400 - 4,000 |
2 " " " |
AVP |
- |
1,400 - 4,000 |
2 " " " |
AV |
- |
8,000 - 11,000 |
5" " " |
AVP |
- |
5,000 - 6,500 |
- |
OSS |
5 |
9,600 - 12,000 |
- |
SS |
8 |
7,800 - 15,000 |
2 |
AO |
- |
7,800 - 15,000 |
- |
XAP (UTAHS) |
3 |
8 |
--41--
(11) Summary of Opposing Strength Factors.
(a) Strength Factors (General and Implied):
BLACK |
WHITE |
Support of GREEN Government |
Instability of GREEN government. |
(b) Strategical and Tactical:
Interior lines initially, but somewhat modified by constructive land. |
Initial concentration. |
The Initiative. | |
Shore based aircraft to assist in protecting bases. |
Submarines as a means of providing early information. |
Shore communications facilities. |
Direction of trade winds favored operation of WHITE Fleet. |
Proximity of bases. |
|
Good weather for Patrol Plane Scouting. |
(c) Ships and Weapons:
Superiority in CA's (8 to 6) |
Initial superiority in BB's (6 to 3) |
Superiority in ten 10,000 ton CL's (4 to 1) |
and superiority in BB endurance strength. |
Superiority in destroyer torpedoes (364 to 316) |
Superiority in CCL (6 to 4) |
Possession of light mine layers. |
Superiority in new DD (21 to 13) |
Superiority of old destroyers. (15 to 14) |
Greater antiaircraft strength of DD's. |
Greater aircraft bomb-carrying capacity. (267,000 to 145,000 lbs.) |
Overwhelming superiority in carrier aircraft based aircraft (216 to 72). |
Superiority in aircraft torpedoes. | |
Superiority in aircraft carriers (3 to 1) | |
Superiority in submarines in (13 to 0) |
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(12) Summary of Weakness Factors.
BLACK |
WHITE |
a. General and Implied. | |
Situation in Pacific prevented use of full Naval strength. |
Distance of theater of operation from WHITE homeland. |
Weakness of GREEN government. |
|
b. Strategical and Tactical. | |
Initial separation of forces and difficulty of concentrating them. |
Lack of long range scouts and bombers. |
Lack of bases in theater of operation. | |
Necessity of intercepting UTAHS at great distance from WHITE MAIN body. |
Necessity of protecting transports. |
Meager intelligence of WHITE Movements. |
Necessity of coming within range of Patrol Planes, in order to bring BLACK to battle. |
Uncertainty as to location of WHITE's main effort. |
Lack of mine sweepers. |
Inadequate patrol plane tenders. |
Cruiser inferiority (12 to 14) |
Inferiority in airplane carriers. |
|
Difficulty of including shore based and sea based aircraft in same engagement. |
(13) Most Significant Difference in Strength of Opposing Forces.
BLACK's principal superiority lay in his large number of parol planes and the numerous anchorages from which they could operate. The employment of these planes for scouting could possibly disclose to BLACK of WHITE's movement and prevent any surprise operations except possibly with submarines.
WHITE's most significant items of superiority
were his submarines and his carriers.
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SECTION XIII
SUMMARY OF SITUATION
45. WHITE was particularly active with regard to the revolution in GREEN. The situation in GREEN had been rapidly reaching a crisis. BLACK considered that the attitude of WHITE seriously threatened one its traditional doctrines, but representations to WHITE have been ineffective. the WHITE First Fleet was assembled at Port Sail 10 February and three merchantmen (UTAHS) were loaded with military supplies, aircraft, artillery, tanks and volunteers for support of insurgents at Port William. Should such supplies reach Port William, headquarters of the insurgents, at the critical time, the GREEN government would be overthrown, and WHITE political and economic control thereof would be secured. The GREEN Government appealed to WHITE for assistance. On 18 February the main portion of BLACK'S Fleet was in or near Culebra; while cruiser Division Four and Eight were at Trinidad and Patrol Plane Units were at various harbors from Key West to Trinidad. In addition, the Navy Department advised that Battle Division Five and Destroyer Division Ten would depart Hampton Roads 21 February and would be within 350 miles of Culebra by 06:00 24 February. No other forces were available to BLACK.
BLACK, failing to obtain satisfactory assurances as to WHITE's intentions regarding GREEN, announced a state of war to exist with WHITE as of 06:00 20 February. GREEN made a similar announcement and aligned itself with BLACK. While WHITE at the same time recognized the insurgents as belligerents and announced a state of war with BLACK and GREEN.
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SECTION
XIV
MISSION AND DECISION
OF BLACK AND WHITE COMMANDERS.
On 18 February BLACK received an order from the Navy Department to seize or destroy the UTAHS.
After fully analyzing the situation, Commander BLACK decide upon the following specific tasks, given in their order of relative importance.
(l) To destroy WHITE First Fleet before it can be reinforced by the Second Fleet.
(2) To seize or destroy the UTAHS before their arrival within 300 miles of Port William.
(3) To establish an advanced fleet base in the Puerto Rico - Virgin Islands area.
Should all of the foregoing objectives be attained, the resultant would be "command of the sea". BLACK's purpose of the operations undertaken to accomplish the three tanks considered as a whole, was to gain and exercise command of the vital sea areas of the GREEN Coast. BLACK Commander therefore decided his mission was:
To Destroy the WHITE First Fleet, seizing or destroying the WHITE UTAHS, and establishing an advanced base in the Puerto Rico - Culebra - Virgin Islands area.
b. Subsidiary Decisions as to Employment of Forces.
(1) To dispatch Cruiser Division Four and Eight from Trinidad at 04:00, 19 February to destroy the UTAHS;
(2) To dispatch RANGER, 1 CA and CL AT 06:00, 20 February from Culebra areas to support (1);
(3) To have these units rejoin after accomplishment of their tasks;
(4) If it becomes evident that Group (2) will not be required to have it rejoin Main Body;
(5) If UTAH escort be found to be so markedly superior to (a) and (b) groups combined as not to justify attack, the task will be abandoned and the units involved concentrated with main body.
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(6) To scout with patrol planes from 06:00, 20 February;
(7) To maintain striking groups of tender based and shore based planes in readiness to reduce WHITE strength by attrition attacks from 06:00, 20 Februayr;
(8) To disperse patrol plane tenders and oilers within easy supporting distance of each other in the Samana - St. Thomas zone, to mine approaches to their anchorages and to use DD's or DM's as further protection against submarines;
(9) To commence movement of patrol planes and tenders from Florida and Cuba to Samana and St. Thomas zone on 20 February;
(10) To move patrol planes and tender from Trinidad to Northern Zone as soon as development warrant;
(11) To employ Marine planes to protect bases and to support and augment patrol plane attacks;
(12) To utilize the 320 mines available in light mine layers to mine against submarines as a protection for tenders;
(13) To bomb exposed WHITE units, preferable about sundown;
(14) Main Body.
(a) to move Main Body to sea at 06:00, 20 February, after sweeping channel for mines;
(b) To operate Main Body within easy supporting distance of shore based planes at San Juan, St. Thomas, etc., pending arrival of Hampton Roads Force; maintaining adequate security measures;
(c) From such central location, Main Body will be employed to take such advantage of eventualities as circumstances warrant;
(d) To effect junction between Main Body and Hampton Roads Force in late afternoon, 23 February;
(e) After concentration of battleships to seek engagement during daylight within support of shore based planes;
(f) During general engagement to make enemy battleships the primary objective of bombing planes;
(g) To seek favorable battle ranges.
--46--
a. Instructions from WHITE Navy Department to WHITE's First Fleet.
The WHITE Navy Department by letter assigned the following tasks to the WHITE First Fleet:
(1) To gain command of the vital sea areas of the GREEN coast.
(2) To deny to BLACK an advanced Fleet base in the Puerto Rico - Culebra - Virgin Island area.
(3) To Insure the safe arrival of the UTAHS (XAP's) at Port William.
After a careful analysis of the instruction from the Navy Department, WHITE decided his mission:
"To destroy the BLACK Fleet and to insure the safe arrival of the UTAHS at Port William in order to gain command of the vital seaareas off the GREEN cost, and to advance WHITE's interest in GREEN. "
c. Plan of employment of Forces.
(1) To escort the UTAHS to Port William with a detachment of the Main Body.
(2) To destroy BLACK patrol plane tenders, fuel ships, and shore facilities in the BLACK base area.
(5) To avoid damage to the WHITE Main Body by BLACK Patrol Planes by remaining outside their radius until an effort has been made to destroy their tenders and fuel ships and to then proceed towards Culebra.
(4) To reduce BLACK's battleship strength by submarine attack prior to a main engagement.
(5) To engage the BLACK Main Body in a day engagement.
--47--
SECTION
XV
NARRATIVE OF
OPERATIONS OF WHITE FIRST FLEET
Narrative of operations of WHITE First Fleet is confined principally to aircraft carrier operations. Full account of operations and details are not included.
48. A brief history of Operations, situations and orders issued during period 16 - 27 February (inclusive).
a. 16 February.
Submarine Squadron Three, in accordance with the plans and orders of Commander WHITE, departed for observation in the vicinity of Anegada Passage.
b. 18 February.
The UTAHS escorted by a detachment from the Main Body departed Port Sail at 06:00 on a direct course for Port William at 15 knots. The WHITE Fleet departed from Port Sail immediately thereafter and took the same course as the UTAHS at a Fleet Speed of 145 knots.
c. 06:00, 20 February.
(1) BLACK announced a state of war to exist effective at this time. GREEN associated itself with BLACK. WHITE assumed that a state of war exists and recognized the insurgent de facto government at Port William as belligerents. GREEN Insurgents at Port William cannot hold out longer than 23 February unless UTAHS arrive by 12:00 that date.
(2) Carrier operations.
Operations in accordance with original directive "Screen main body against surface and air attacks." The LEXINGTON Air Group maintained a combat air patrol of 6 VF and an outer air patrol of one full squadron of either VS, VB, or VTB from start of the problem at 06:00 until sunset.
d. 21 February.
Operations under original directive. At 04:59 ENTERPRISE completed launching combat air patrol of 6 VF and outer patrol of 18 VB.
At 05:50 ENTERPRISE reported two heavy cruisers in latitude 11°- 59' north, longitude 44° - 32' west: course 200°: speed 15.
From 06:30 to 15:30, numerous reports were made of enemy cruisers. A study of all contact reports indicated the presence of 3 light and 3 heavy cruisers.
Commander, Aircraft Battle Force, ordered ENTERPRISE to attack at 06:45.
--48--
At 07:20, O.T.C. ordered Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force, to support the escort detachment at his own discretion. As soon as practicable thereafter LEXINGTON launched attack of 42 aircraft. Attacks by LEXINGTON and Carrier Division Two were repeated as fast as refueling and rearming would permit.
At about noon, three WHITE cruisers engaged three enemy cruisers.
At 20:30, Commander, Carrier Unit, reported to O.T.C. that he estimated that Carrier Groups had dropped sufficient bombs to destroy 2 cruisers and that LEXINGTON had lost 28 planes for which she had 6 spares available.
Final result of engagement as decided by Chief Umpire: UTAHS escaped serious damage and were able to proceed to Port William. Two enemy cruisers were destroyed and one disabled to such an extent as to require major overhaul. WHITE lost one cruiser and one cruiser was slightly damaged.
During night, opposing forces withdrew.
e. 22 February.
No change in mission. At 16:24, O.T.C. advised that he contemplated placing prearranged raiding plan in effect afternoon 23 February, and that if attacks on patrol plane bases were considered justifiable, they should be delivered not later than 25 February with not more than one carrier, 2 plane guard destroyers and one destroyer division.
Composition of Raiding Force:
Commander, Vice Admiral King, with LEXINGTON as his Flagship
Aircraft Carriers LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE
Two heavy cruisers
Eleven destroyers.
During day, aircraft operations consisted in maintaining combat and outer air patrols around Fleet dispositions. No enemy contacts were made.
At 13:44 Fleet course was changed to 290 true. Weather conditions were average to undesirable. Numerous and frequent rain squalls were encountered. LEXINGTON Air Group failed to get information as to change of Fleet Course prior to take-off on afternoon mission. As a result it became lost upon return flight to carrier, and had to break radio silence in order to locate it.
Information from Task Forces Two and Four indicated heavy concentration of BLACK aircraft and tenders at San Juan and Culebra.
At 09:30 Commander Raiding Force issued following Operations Order No. 6:
"Summary of information majority of BLACK patrol planes San Juan which consider likely to change. Also believe Samana useful base. This force gains position favorable attack BLACK patrol plane bases then attack them if situation warrants. Attack destroyers, desdivision four drive home attack same objectives Friday night. Both units then seek own safety. Be ready join Com WHITE whom keep informed of movements. Support Group Cruiser Division Five
--49--
carrier plane guards Desdiv Two leave attack group when ordered about sunset Friday. Rejoin main body during daylight Saturday. Par. X-ray Keep ready to repel plane attacks including radical maneuvers. Intend attacking carrier be one with most striking power."
f. 23 February.
(1) 06:00 Commander, Raiding Force, issued information summary and directive to raiding force as follows.
"Information summary heavy patrol plane concentration at San Juan WRIGHT (tender) there but LANGLEY and both tankers not yet located. Destroyer Division Three has two ships out of action, other two damaged. At this time consider objectives first San Juan, second Samana, third Culebra including Great Harbor, fourth St. Thomas Harbor, Cricorie Channel, Air Station."
(2) Attack on Raiding Force.
(a) Raiding Force attacked by VP (patrol planes) as follows:
AT 14:10 attacked by 5 VP's from direction of sun, altitude 10,000.
15:45 attacked by 3 VP's, altitude 10,000.
16:59 attacked by 22 VP's, altitude 14,000, from 90? true, three division of 10, 6 and 6 planes spaced at intervals of about 2 minutes.
17:22 attacked by 8 VP's, altitude 10,000. Planes turned away after drop on ENTERPRISE.
(b) Summary.
Attacks by the last 30 planes were presaged by voice radio between the attacking planes as to time, direction, and altitude of attacks. LEXINGTON intercepted messages and consequently knew all the above prior to sighting the planes. The attack of the first three planes was unopposed and in my opinion was a complete surprise. Attached is a chart showing disposition of ships forming the antiaircraft screen. Maneuver of force was 60? and 45? simultaneous turns of entire force. As a result of the attack Chief Umpire advised that LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE were each assessed 15% damage. Each ship lost 11 bombers and after arresting gear inoperative until one hour after daylight the following day.
g. 24 February.
AT 10:18 Commander Carriers advised O.T.C. that Carrier ENTERPRISE was out of action having been attacked by RANGER aircraft. Planes of the ENTERPRISE had departed on mission prior to the attack.
--50--
At 11:25 O.T.C. directed that Commander Carrier Unit maintain inner and outer patrols.
At 12:18 raiding force, less ENTERPRISE and attached ships, joined main body.
h. 25 February.
No carrier aircraft operations.
i. 26 February.
06:52 O.T.C. informed main body as follows:
AT 02:30, 25 February, CUSHING entered San Juan unsuspected and shelled Cruiser MEMPHIS, WRIGHT (tender), anchored patrol planes, and air field. ENTERPRISE aircraft attacked bases at San Juan and Samana. RANGER air group attacked ENTERPRISE and ENTERPRISE thrown out of action. ENTERPRISE plane guard fired torpedoes at 2 BLACK heavy cruisers. WHITE submarines are assembling north of Virgin Islands to intercept main body.
11:05 O.T.C. informed carrier unit Commander that a patrol plane was observing the Fleet from cover of cumulus clouds.
17:10 ENTERPRISE rejoined carrier group.
19:20 Commander Carrier Unit advised O.T.C. as follows:
Scouting Squadron Three attacked San Juan with 17 one thousand pound bombs at 07:30. WRIGHT with NECHES were alongside. Scouting Squadron Six attacked San Juan, shortly after Squadron Three, with 16 one thousand pound bombs. Above attacks unopposed.
Bombing Squadron Six attacked Tanker and LANGLEY (tender) in Samana Bay. Attack unopposed.
21:00 Commander Carrier Unit issued following order for operations:
27 February (Day of main engagement between BLACK and WHITE Fleets).
"00:26 enemy main body expected approach between bearing 195? and 256?.
YORKTOWN launch squadrons zero six hours group less fighters conduct search attack normal procedure in sector named radius 120 miles. Scouts locate enemy main body contact section track same others continue locate carrier which other squadrons attack after which refuel, rears, and attack Battle Line. space ENTERPRISE launch squadrons when ordered about seven hours attack Carrier first, Cruisers second, after which same as YORKTOWN space LEXINGTON launch squadrons when ordered about eight hours Scout Squadron with full fuel scout tactically for O.T.C. then spot for battle line as ordered space all fighting squadrons combat air patrol for own carriers space arm with bombs use no smoke space conserve fuel especially Fighter and Tactical Scouts space YORKTOWN operate right flank LEXINGTON center, ENTERPRISE left flank of battle line 21:00."
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j. 27 February.
Main Engagement, which was witnessed by the President.
At 06:00 true wind was 077 degrees, 22 knots. Seas were quite rough. No seaplanes from battleships or cruisers were launched due to the extreme danger of recovery. Carrier squadrons had to scout and spot for the Fleet.
06:10 YORKTOWN launched Air Group of 74 planes for combat air patrol, locate main body, locate and attack BLACK carrier.
07:09 Scouting Squadrons located main body and reported strength, disposition and movements from then until end of battle.
07:15 ENTERPRISE launched Air Group consisting of 69 planes for combat air patrol and attack of BLACK carrier and cruisers.
07:29 YORKTOWN Air Group Commander reported that YORKTOWN Air Group had completed attack on RANGER from 6,000 feet, unopposed, planes on deck,
NOTE: Instructions from C & C were issued that no attack were to be made prior to 10:00. BLACK received these instruction but they did not reach WHITE Carrier Unit Command. Had Carrier Unit Commander received these instruction, he would still have been able to attack the carrier RANGER but planes of RANGER could have been launched prior to attack and plan of operations of Commander WHITE Carrier Unit would have been materially changed.
08:30 LEXINGTON launched air group of 74 planes for combat air patrol, tactical scouting, spotting, and attack cruisers or van of BLACK battle line when ordered.
09:40 Commander Carrier Unit directed YORKTOWN arm torpedo squadron Five with torpedoes.
10:20 ENTERPRISE commenced launching air group, this group having failed to locate and attack enemy objectives on first mission. Reference failure of above attack, commander WHITE carrier unit made following comments:
"The failure of the ENTERPRISE group to locate the enemy appears inexcusable. The reason advance by the ENTERPRISE was that the contact report sent in by the YORKTOWN qt 07:09 was in error. This does not appear to be the case since Scouting Squadron Three had no trouble locating the enemy from the same information. It appear that a large errot in the original contact reports might have been overcome by the ENTERPRISE Group Command disposing his Air Group on a Scouting line his outbound course."
COMMENT: ENTERPRISE missed objective by over 100 miles.
10:42 YORKTOWN began launching Air Group of 71 planes.
11:12 Commander Fighting Squadron Three reported large group of patrol planes approaching WHITE fleet from the sun, altitude 13,500 feet.
11:33 Attack by LEXINGTON Air Group completed.
11:45 YORKTOWN Air Group second attack completed.
11:46 ENTERPRISE direct not to launch attack.
--52--
12:08 LEXINGTON began landing aircraft.
12:35 Signal received to cease present exercise.
Comment by Carrier Unit Commander:
"The manner of working carriers in proximity to the main body prior to and during the main engagement is worthy of note. At 06:00 the carrier unit occupied station between the battleship divisions with the Fleet Guide bearing 45? relative distance 2300 yards from Carrier Unit Guide. This placed the carrier column midway between the two battleship columns. Tasks were assigned each carrier which permitted staggering launching and recovery operations in order that two of the three carrier groups would be in the air the maximum time until the termination of the engagement .When the YORKTOWN left the formation to work planes the ENTERPRISE took station on the left flank of the battleships, the LEXINGTON remaining in the center, the right flank station having been assigned to the YORKTOWN Except when working planes carriers remained close to the battleships for AA protection. After completing launching and recovery operations each carrier rejoined at flank (greater than maximum) speed. The wind and course of the main body being in opposite directions necessitated considerable separation from main body when engaged in working planes even though minimum speed consistent with safety was employed in these operations."
Opposed to the plan of operating carriers under protection of the van of the Battle Line is the method of operation employed by BLACK who operated his carrier well from his main body and on the unexposed flank of his main body. I was flying with the LEXINGTON Air Group from 08:15 to 12:40 and observed the approach formation of and battle formation of the opposing Fleets and the attack by aircraft of opposing forces. In my opinion, the carriers of the WHITE force, disposed as they were in between the two battleship divisions, came under enemy shell fire and could easily have been the target of well directed gun fire. I do not believe that commander could operate carriers under close protection of battleships in a main engagement. Such a plan of operation limits the maneuvering of both battleships and the carriers, and exposes the carriers to gun fire. Does the added value of AA protection overbalance the above? In my opinion it does not.
--53--
49. Communications.
During the period 3 January - 17 February, the Aircraft, Battle Force, conducted extensive and intensive training in all available means of communication. Efficient operation of aircraft at sea requires perfection of all concerned. In my opinion, the officers and men of the Aircraft Carrier Groups are highly efficient in Communications. Communication between planes must be simple and fast. Communication between planes and carriers must not be complicated and must be able to get thru even under the worst possible interference. The following comments are submitted on subjects that, to me, appear deserving of considerable thought:
a. Operation of Communication Intelligence.
Aircraft Carrier RANGER, Patrol Planes, and BLACK high frequency series circuits were located and intercepted by aircraft carrier LEXINGTON. By noting activity, counting calls, etc., their search operations could more or less be visualized. Warning of VP attacks was obtained by intercepting their MO's and voice transmission. RANGER voice transmission was intercepted from 400 to 800 miles giving notice of the activity of her scouts and in one instance her position.
b. Cryptographic Aids.
An airplane pilot as to be familiar with and use the following codes:
Aircraft Signal Book
Aircraft Contact Pad
Sector Method, semi-plain language
Latitude and longitude method, plain language.
c. Voice Communication.
Excessive use of plain voice gives much valuable information to an alert enemy. In the opinion of Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force - "The use of confidential calls on voice circuits should always be required during Fleet Problems and Exercises. A suitable voice code is urgently needed." LEXINGTON Air Group employed Confidential Calls and a Chartboard Voice Code throughout exercise. This code appeared to be entirely practicable for aircraft use.
d. Interference and Deception Methods.
Patrol plane voice frequency was interfered with during VP attacks on Raiding Force 24 February. Results were that VP voice transmission, when close aboard interfered with to a certain extent. On the other hand, interception of these transmissions, prior to the time interference was started, gave valuable information as to time, direction and altitude of attacks.
--54--
SECTION
XVI
NARRATIVE OF
OPERATIONS OF BLACK AIRCRAFT
Operations of BLACK surface ships were no as extensive as WHITE. I gathered from the critique that all operations, except possibly the conduct of operations against the UTAHS and their supporting force, were worthy of praise.
50. Carrier Operations.
Since BLACK had only one carrier it was necessary to save it for operations in support of the Fleet at such time and place as to gain the maximum effectiveness. He sent it out in support of the raiding force operations against the UTAHS, but recalled it prior to its employment in the attack and prior to its discovery by WHITE aircraft. Prior to 27 February RANGER aircraft was employed principally in protection of BLACK Main Body and in close in patrol. It delivered a decisive attack against the Carrier ENTERPRISE 24 February while ENTERPRISE was on a raiding mission. On 27 February it was employed in support of WHITE Fleet and in attacking WHITE carriers.
51. Aircraft One, Fleet Marine Force.
Aircraft One, Fleet Marine Force, prior to 27 February, was employed chiefly-
a. In protection of patrol plane bases against raids by surface ships, submarines and aircraft;
b. Close in patrol to the limit of its operating range;
c. Attack against submarines and surface vessels scouting or attempting raids on BLACK bases. On 27 February it supported the BLACK Fleet and delivered an attack against cruisers of WHITE Fleet.
52. Task Force Four.
a. Organization.
The set-up of Fleet Problem XX placed all available patrol planes with the BLACK Fleet. Task Force Four consisted of:
--55--
Patrol Wings One, Two, Three, and Five with a total of 102 patrol planes;
Aircraft One, Fleet Marine Forces, with 64 planes;
Two large aircraft tenders;
Two destroyer type tenders;
Two oilers (KANAWHA and NECHES) gasoline only;
Four destroyers and Desdiv Twenty-one;
Light mine layers and an off-shore patrol of the bases.
b. Location of Task Force Four at opening of Problem:
MEMPHIS, Force Flag, at Trinidad.
Patrol Wing One. three squadrons, plus WILLIAMSON and one motor div at Trinidad. Two squadrons and two small tenders at Culebra.
Patrol Wing Three. two squadrons, plus WILLIAMSON and one motor div at Trinidad. Two squadrons and two small tenders at Guantanamo.
Patrol Wing Five. two squadrons, plus CHILDS and OWL at Key West.
Aircraft One. Fleet Marine Force at San Juan and St. Thomas.
Destroyers of Desdiv 21 distributed between Samana, San Juan and Culebra.
Destroyers of Desdiv 21 distributed between Samana, San Juan and Culebra.
Destroyers of Motor Div One assigned to the bases including Trinidad.
LANGLEY and KANAWHA at Samana.
The units to operate as a task group from Samana were LANGLEY, Wing Three, Wing Five, the small tender and one oiler. Thus at the opening of the Problem, it was necessary to effect a new organization and being operations. This worked out satisfactorily but, initially, gave Commander Task Force Four considerable concern.
Requirement of bases for patrol plane operation have been previously discussed Commander, Task Force Four, considered only three available locations as fulfilling the requirements. These were Samana Bay, San Juan and Trinidad. There are few locations in the world more satisfactory for a Fleet Base than Samana Bay, and with a reasonable amount of work, it could be made into a first class patrol plane base. It is well surveyed, has ample depth, and could be developed into a very strong Fleet Base. In opinion of Commander, Task Group Four, the United States should gain control of it. San Juan proved very satisfactory but space was restricted due to dredging operations and shallow water. Trinidad proved
--56--
very satisfactory. Experience revealed that at San Juan and Trinidad the planes fouled excessively, while at Samana and Culebra, there was little evidence of fouling. This fouling is apparently caused by the shallow, stagnant water at San Juan and Trinidad. San Juan is easily the best area in the Puerto Rico - Virgin Island Group.
In Puerto Rico and St. Croix there are several areas that could be developed into excellent landing fields.
Culebra can be used as condition of wind and sea permit, only as an advanced base. It is exposed greatly and when I was there patrol plane operation would have been dangerous if not impossible.
d. Defense of Bases.
Defense of bases has been previously discussed. The raids on the patrol plane bases showed the necessity of supporting defenses. Both Samana and San Juan could be defended against surface vessels by mines. In this problem, mines, aircraft, machine guns of the planes, and guns of the ships present in the bases, furnished the only protection. Dispersion of aircraft in a base is limited and occupation of many bases and rapid change of bases is next to impossible. The abandonment of a major base in the face of an aid raid in war would be next to impossible unless operations are cancelled for a considerable period. The planes might take the air but tenders and assisting vessels cannot go to sea, because the personnel and planes must be proved for. Main bases must be protected to such an extent as to make raids extremely dangerous. The prevention of such raids through early detection and destruction of the raiding vessels is the best solution. This proves most difficult on occasions as evinced by raiding vessels rendering an attack prior to being detected. The security of gasoline supply is vital. The detail of a few destroyers would have prevented the major portion of the losses sustained during raids.
e. Submarines.
A large number of submarine contracts were made by aircraft but many were duplications. Patrol planes reported they could follow their shape below periscopes depth and in one instance noted a change of course but could not get the image on the bomb sight. The development of a delayed action bomb in the nature of a depth charge is considered a necessary and valuable weapon for aircraft. In conference with Commanding Officer, Patrol Wing One, he said submarines submerge as soon as they hear a plane and in most cases would be difficult to bomb when submerged due to difficulty in detecting sufficiently well for effective bombing. However, submarines cannot stay submerged a great length of time and bombing when they return to surface is feasible when coordinated properly.
--57--
f. Aircraft Attack on LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE 24 February.
There were two patrol plane attacks on the carriers LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE which were part of the Raiding Force previously described. The following account of the attack was given by Commander, Task Four:
"On 24 February there were two patrol plane attacks on enemy carriers. Patrol Squadron Three evacuating Trinidad that date was ordered to make a wide sweep while enroute to San Juan. About 11:40 an enemy force of 2 CV, 3 CA, and 10 DD was sighted. Commander of Patrol Squadron Three was able to rendezvous a division of his planes and at 14:07 from 13,500 feet made an attack out of the sun at 140 knots on the LEXINGTON, dropping 24 500-pound bombs. It was reported that this attack was a surprise and unopposed. AT 13:00 the same date, a group of 30 planes departed San Juan and proceeded to the contact point sent out by a scouting plane. Radio bearing on the trailing plane guided the striking group and the enemy force was picked up about 16:20. The striking group remained about 25 miles from the enemy, cruising about until the clouds drifted over between the patrol planes and the enemy force. About 16:50 the striking group started its bombing approach at 15,000 feet with the sun behind them and clouds blanketing the enemy vision. At 16:50 the striking group cleared the clouds, found the enemy carriers with planes on deck and immediately attacked the leading squadrons on the LEXINGTON and the following squadron on the ENTERPRISE. Except for an indication of the enemy aircraft fire from the leading carrier, LEXINGTON, for about 45 seconds prior to the time the bombs were dropped, there was no counter activity noted. The ENTERPRISE and cruisers gave no indication at any time that they saw the bombing planes pass over. It is believed that this attack was unexpected as no provision to counter the attack was made. The ships were not zig-zagging. No protective air patrol was encountered. Total bombs dropped were:
On LEXINGTON 64 500-pound.
On ENTERPRISE 52 500-pound.
It is estimated that each of these vessels were at various times during the day the target for the following number of bombs from patrol planes:
LEXINGTON - 120
ENTERPRISE - 72
Approximately one half these bombs were dropped on the LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE by Patrol Wing One in the one attack. As a matter of information with refererence to the relative hits that might have been expected under actual conditions from an attack of this nature, there has been transformed on scale targets of the LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE the results obtained by the actual planes involved in their live bombing practice off San Juan 3 February. This transportation indicates 28 500-pound bomb hits on the LEXINGTON deck and 20 500-pound bomb hits on the ENTERPRISE type deck for this one attack by Patrol Wing One.
Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force, was greatly pleased at this attack until he learned later that voice radio was used by the attacking group and that the enemy vessels were listening and knew the plane of the attack group commander."
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g. Main Engagement, 27 February.
(1) Commander BLACK ordered Commander Task Force Four, to support the Main Body in the general engagement and when the general engagement appeared imminent to have all his aircraft take station within the shortest striking distance of the probable battle areas. Attack groups were to be organized so that objectives assigned were appropriate to the capabilities of the various types. There were considered:
(a) Patrol planes with bombs or bombing planes:
Cruisers or battleships.
(b) Patrol planes with torpedoes:
1. Battleships
2. Cruisers
(c) Fighting planes:
1. Aircraft
2. Strafing heavy ships
3. Destroyers
(a) Other ship and land based airplanes:
1. Destroyers
2. Cruisers.
(2) Carrier Planes.
The same general doctrine was prescribed for carrier planes as for those of Task Force Four. Insofar as practicable, they were to coordinate their attack with Task Force Four.
(3) Air Attack, Main Engagement.
For the main engagement, 27 February, the Attack Group consisting of Patrol Wing One, Three, and Marine Aircraft, assembled at the Fleet rendezvous at 09:30. Patrol Wing Five being slower, failed to join up in time but did attack later. The striking group, consisting of 70 VP's as bombers, 12 VP's as torpedo planes, and 36 Marine planes as escort and strafing, remained at an altitude of 12,500 feet, proceeded to contact own, BLACK, Fleet, and then took position about 20 miles from the enemy fleet awaiting orders to attack. The torpedo squadron was with the attack group when the attack was ordered, but then lost altitude rapidly had proceeded to attack the disengaged bow of the enemy van. This attack was seriously cut up by the fire of three enemy cruisers on enemy's disengaged bow. The main bombing attack, which was never below 12,500 feet, was directed at the three leading battleships. Just at the time of the attack, 9 enemy fighters delivered an attack at the rear of the leading squadron. Their attack was considered too late and too weak to be effective. Upon the bombing flight's approach, the third battleship, the CALIFORNIA, flasher her searchlights. There was other indication of enemy firing on the planes until after they had turned away, at which time several cruisers were observed to have opened fire.
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53. Supply and Logistics.
a. Aviation Gasoline.
The security of gasoline supply for Task Four was vital.
The Aircraft, Scouting Force, is woefully lacking in suitable tenders. However, gasoline stored in tankers and tenders will always be a vulnerable target. If necessary, Commander, Task Four, planned to use the CHILDS as a high speed transport in order to maintain operations in case of gasoline shortage at other bases. Such use of high speed transport might be of great value in emergency. No tenders can carry an adequate Wing supply of gasoline and oilers, if used, should be fitted for fueling planes direct. Well dispersed underground storage is essential at regularly established bases.
b. Aviation Oil.
Aviation oil was carried in containers and presented no particular problem. The amount carried by tenders was greatly in excess of the requirements for aviation gasoline on hand or available.
c. Bombs.
The directive of the problem indicated that bombs might be supplied BLACK patrol planes as long as gasoline was available. The Commander, Task Group Four, interpreted this to mean that all types of bombs in any quantity required for operations at hand were available. Actually, there were on hand in the tenders indicated below the following live bombs:
Tender |
1000-lb. |
500-lb. |
100-lb. |
Torpedoes |
WRIGHT |
61 |
81 |
514 |
0 |
LANGLEY |
96 |
192 |
192 |
0 |
CHILDS |
0 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
WILLIAMSONN |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
In view of the theoretical bombs expended during Fleet Problem XX, Task Four would, had it been obliged to depend upon the bomb supply actually carried on the tenders, have over-expended 15 1000-pound bombs and would have had only 5 500-pound bombs left. No 100-pound bombs were used by patrol planes during the exercise.
The bird class tenders have no allowance on bombs and no room for their storage. Any bombs to be provided by these tenders would have to be carried as a deck load in lieu of other essential spares. In this connection they would also be limited by weight factors inasmuch as they are already overloaded.
d. Reservicing and Rearming.
Reservicing and rearming of patrol planes present a tremendous problem. High winds, rough seas augment greatly difficulties encountered. The result of the aircraft rearming drill held by Patrol Wing One in connection with their live bombing practice fired on 3 February, 1939, indicated that the time required to rearm one Wing (48 planes) with 4 500-pound bombs each would consume, with facilities available, from 6 to 8 hours. Methods of reservicing have been discussed previously.
e. Airplane Maintenance.
Patrol planes cannot operate a great length of time without being hauled out of the water and gone over thoroughly. In San Juan the planes collected so many barnacles they had to be hauled out of the water every third day. Should the planes stay in the water four days, their hulls would require scraping. Without the facilities afforded at San Juan by Pan American, operations would have been greatly hampered, and in some cases planes would have been forced to take off with reduced loads.
54. Communications.
Communications in Task Four were excellent. The radio sets carried in each patrol plane are very powerful and both voice and short wave can be heard for several hundred miles. Where planes are operating away from their base from 12 to 24 hours, position reports, in peacetime, are necessary for safety purposes. This, of course, might give information to the enemy of area in which searching operations are being conducted. It is not believed patrol planes can operate effectively without use of radio. However, code should be employed when giving orders for an attack.
CHAPTER
III
Necessity for a Clearly Defined Policy of National Defense
55. Fleet Problem XX demonstrated thoroughly to me that a well defined policy of national defense is essential to intelligent arming. The three most possible policies are:
(a) Defense of continental United States, including Hawaii and the Canal Zone.
(b) Defense of the Americas and Hawaii as essential to the long run defense of the United States.
(c) A world policy backed by sufficient power to make a great bloc with such military and naval strength that no combination of restless powers would dare start a war with us.
Since our government has always supported the first policy I shall not discuss it further.
Our present program of defense is in support of the second policy. In arming for defense of this announced policy the following essentials are worthy of considerations
(a) As a link in the defense of the Panama Canal, more and better equipped airplane bases, available to the military forces of the U.S., in Brazil and certain other south and Central American countries are necessary. Our commercial interests in foreign countries must be protected. Therefore, certain American Airlines of recognised strength and who have demonstrated their ability to cope adequately with Foreign airlines operating in these countries should be encouraged to construct, and if necessary given financial aid in the construction thereof, adequate air bases.
(b) Fleet bases, seaplane bases adequately equipped for operation of large patrol-bombers, and air-land bases, adequate for the operation of large, long range four motored bombers, should be maintained in the Caribbean area. Strategic objectives are most likely to involve the seizure or important outlying territory or a reduction in strength of the enemy through strangulation of his commerce. Naval and air forces based in the Caribbean area can support the defense of both Americas. A sound employment of aircraft in the Caribbean area might possibly have the strategic effect of enabling our fleet to employ its principal strength in some other area.
The program of arming to take an active hand in European affairs is extremely expensive and is apparently against the better judgment of our government. Justice Cordess of the Supreme Court wrote a few years ago "We live in a world of change. If a body of law were in existence, adequate for the civilization of today it could not meet the demands of tomorrow. Society is inconsistent. So long as it is inconsistent there can be no constancy in law." The
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announced policy of England in 1934 was to never again fight on European soil. She reversed this policy in 1936. We might possibly again be drawn into a conflict against our will. Our government should recognize this possibility even though she might not arm for it, and should plan accordingly.
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SECTION
XVIII
PRINCIPAL EFFECTS
AIRCRAFT MAY CAUSE IN THE FIELD OF NAVAL STRATEGY.
56. Aircraft will cause an increase in the employment of attrition as a means of inflicting damage. With the availability of fast, long range bombers, capable of carrying tremendous bomb loads, we may expect the employment of attrition to a greater extent than ever before. Destruction of advanced bases, supply vessels, and aircraft carriers will probably be among the early targets for attack. If possible the enemy fleet should be drawn into an area for the general engagement where land based aircraft can support our own Fleet operations. The strength of two hostile air contingents will have great strategic importance. If one power is able to destroy all opposing air forces and still retain a large portion of its own it will have the advantage of being able to conceal the movements of its own fleet and yet know what the enemy is doing. Such a fleet would have a power out of proportion to its material strength and in case of a general engagement their air power might be the decisive factor for victory.
57. Land based aircraft and patrol-bombers (seaplanes) have greatly augmented the defensive and offensive power of our Navy and have increased the effective control of the sea. The advent of the long range land bombers and patrol-planes have greatly increased the strategic importance of outlying territory.
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SECTION
XIX
PRINCIPLE EFFECTS
AIRCRAFT MAY CAUSE ON NAVAL TACTICS.
58. The principal effects aircraft may cause in Naval Tactics are:
(a) The enlargement of the area of tactical contact and command.
(b) A great and important increase in the tactical means of information and security.
(c) Effectiveness, to a greater or less extent, of carrier based aircraft against all types of ships.
(d) A reduction of the importance of the submarine and destroyer as a means of gaining information and inflicting attrition.
(e) An increase in the importance of preliminary and final phases of Naval Warfare.
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SECTION
XX
COMPARISON OF
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF NAVAL PATROL PLANES WITH ARMY MULTI-MOTORED
BOMBERS
59. Speed.
The Army bombers are from 50 to 75 miles faster than the Navy Patrol Planes.
The operating range of army bombers and patrol planes is practically the same.
61. Bomb Load.
Navy patrol planes can carry a slightly larger load of bombs, whan operating at the same range, than twin motored army bombers, but not as heavy a load of bombs as the army four motored bombers.
62. Security.
(a) Protection against attacking aircraft.
Patrol planes have less protection against attacking aircraft than Army bombers. The necessity of a hull strong enough to stand a beating in heavy seas and in take-off's and landings apparently prevents the installment of modern gun nacelles on patrol planes. This greatly decreases the effectiveness of the fire of the gunners, particularly of the gunners on the port and starboard side of the plane who have to operate their guns in the open and in the face of a terrific wind blast.
Neither patrol planes or Army bombers can depend upon maneuverability for protection. However, the additional speed the bomber has over the patrol plane greatly enhances its ability to evade attack.
(b) Dispersion of Aircraft.
Patrol planes cannot be dispersed too greatly in their operating bases. Too much dispersion slows up servicing and reaming because small boats for servicing the planes are allow and few. Also patrol plane units cannot be widely dispersed on numerous bases. It is necessary to have the service of the tenders and anchors for the planes. It takes the tenders some time to go from one base to another, and it normally takes 6 hours or more for one tender to put out sufficient anchors for one Patrol Wing. Dispersion or units of army bombers depends upon the number and adequate of available bases. Dispersion of planes on a modern land base does not allow up appreciably operations and re-servicing and re-arming.
(e) Security of Bases.
(a) Patrol Plane Bases.
(1) Anti-aircraft guns.
(2) Machine guns.
(3) Batteries of tenders
(4) Mines.
(5) Aircraft.
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62. (c) Security of Bases.
(b) Land Bases.
(1) Anti-aircraft weapons.
(2) Aircraft.
63. Reliability of Operation.
Except for the following conditions which hamper and in some cases prevent operation patrol planes and land bombers possess practically the same degree reliability of operation.
(a) Icing Conditions.
When anchored in cold water bases patrol planes collect a tremendous amount of ice and frost on the wings and fuselage.
(b) Rough Sea.
Patrol planes can take-off or land a moderate load in choppy waters. However, take-offs and landings with even a moderate load when there are ground swells are very dangerous and is undertaken only in emergency. Inability to foresee ground swells has forced the Navy to abandon the idea of operations in the open sea.
The danger in landing, take-off, re-servicing and re-arming at sea is too great to warrant it as standard practices.
(c) Tropical Bases.
In the majority of bases in the Caribbean Sea area patrol planes have to be hauled out of the water every third day and have their hulls washed off. Four days in the water meant scraping the hull.
64. Adaptability for Scouting and Bombing.
Due to the possibility of patrol planes being able to land in emergency, at sea I believe they are far better for scouting purpose than long-range Army reconnaissance planes. Due to the additional speed the Army bomber has over the patrol plane, and its ability to operate under adverse conditions I believe it superior to the patrol plane as a bomber.
SECTION
XXI
COMPARISON OF
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT WITH LAND BASED
AIRCRAFT.
65. Aircraft based on shore as compared to carrier based aircraft must be considered as possessing a strength much greater than can be indicated by any evaluation by any evaluation of numbers and types alone. Carrier based aircraft is limited as to size, speed, weight carrying characteristics and operating range. The operating range of land operated bombers is so greatly in excess of carrier based aircraft as to not warrant a true comparison.
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65. Army pursuit and fighters have a much greater speed and fire power than Navy fighters. The great advantages land planes have over carrier based aircraft makes highly desirable to seek a general fleet engagement within the operating range of land based aircraft.
SECTION
XXII
66. I am not in a position to render many conclusions concerning night attack because there were no night operations of aircraft during Fleet Problem XX. The following conclusions have been drawn after a study of reports, witnessing of night attacks by destroyers and conferences with high ranking officers of the Navy.
(a) There never has, and probably never will be, a major fleet engagement at night.
(b) Destroyers and submarines are extremely useful in delivering surprise attacks at night against aircraft carriers.
(e) It is impossible to operate carrier based aircraft at night without the use of lights on the ship. Aircraft or carriers can not operate in large numbers without the use of lights. The danger of giving away the carrier position does not warrant night operation.
(d) Use of Flares.
Flares are of little use in general search, but once the target has been located they can illuminate the ships sufficiently to permit effective bombing. Flares also minimize the effectiveness of anti-aircraft gun fire and are of great value in tailing ships on dark nights.
(e) Aircraft Operation on Moon Light Nights.
Low flying planes can locate surface vessels, particularly aircraft carriers, on bright moon light nights and can maintain contact with only a fair amount of moon light.
(f) Anti-aircraft Fire.
Anti-aircraft gun fire from ships will be ineffective at night unless searchlights are employed. There is much controversy in the Navy as to which will be the best policy to pursue. Risk attack of the airplanes without opposition or attack aircraft with aid of searchlights, which give the bombers a splendid aiming point and which will disclose the strength and movements of the Fleet. The existing tactical or strategical situation will probably be the determining factor.
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SECTION
XXIII
DEFENSE OF AIRCRAFT
CARRIERS AGAINST AERIAL ATTACK
67. Aircraft carriers depend upon fighters, maneuverability, and anti-aircraft for protection against attacking aircraft. Arrangement of ships having heavy anti-aircraft batteries in such a manner that hostile bombers must fly over several lines of gun fire before reaching the carrier contributes greatly to its gun fire defence. Fighters are inadequate in number and have insufficient fire power and speed to ward off a determined attack of fast, high flying bombers. Torpedo planes have little to fear from fighters. Maneuvering of the carrier when operating under protection of the Fleet is limited to the maneuvering of other ships of the Fleet. Seldom will maneuvering of the carrier hamper seriously bombing operations. Anti-aircraft has not proven its effectiveness against fast high flying bombers. The Commander Aircraft, SCOUTING FORCE said "The hits from bombs dropped at great heights can be accurately determined, but anti-aircraft hits on planes at 15,000 feet have not been demonstrated". Prior to and immediately following Fleet Problem XX certain capital ships of our Fleet conducted anti-aircraft firing against "drones" (radio controlled aircraft). In one firing practice by a ship the drone flew by four times at an altitude between 8,000 and 10,000 foot and was fired upon by numerous batteries. The drone was not shot down, but was finally lost in the haze. In another practice in the Caribbean Sea a "drone" was shot at several times at altitudes varying from 8,000 to 10,000 foot by numerous batteries. The plane was landed back at the airport at Guantanamo, Cuba, with only one hit which was on a strut. On another occasion a drone was shot down in flames by anti-aircraft of a carrier. However, the plane made several runs prior to being shot down.
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SECTION
XXIV
COMMUNICATIONS
68. Excessive use of plain voice transmission gives much valuable information to an alert enemy. A suitable voices code is urgently needed. Use of confidential calls on voice circuits should always be required on Fleet Problems and joint Army-Navy exercises.
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SECTION
XXV
WILL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
SURVIVE
69. Aircraft carriers of today are the most vulnerable type of warship known. There is a strong opinion in the Navy that aircraft carriers will not be able to survive a protracted war between major powers. The prime purpose of carrier based aircraft is protection of the Fleet through scouting, spotting of gunfire, defense against air attack, and bombing of enemy ships. Nations of the world are building carriers with a speed of 35 knots, length of over 800 feet and a beam of between 80 and 100 feet. The wing span of the largest plane operated from one of our own Navy carriers is approximately 50 feet. We have army bombers and Navy Patrol planes with a wing span of over 100 feet and land planes are being built twice this size and with an operating range of between 3,000 and 7,000 miles. The protective armor of a carrier will not stand a bombing attack of a 500 pound bomb. Each carrier carries approximately 90 airplanes, over two thirds of which are kept on the carrier deck. A successful bombing attack by even one plane is sufficient to immobilize or destroy a carrier with all its airplanes. It is horrible to think of the results of a determined bombing attack against a carrier with its 140,000 gallons or more of aviation gasoline and 1,500,000 gallons of fuel oil.
70. The authoritative opinion in the Navy seems to be that carriers might be the deciding factor in a Naval engagement. We have not as yet built planes of sufficient size and operating range to furnish adequate protection to the Fleet in sea areas far from the operating bases of Army bombers and Navy patrol planes.
71. Rear Admiral Yates Sterling, former Chief of Staff of the U. S. Navy, wrote "Shall we be discovering soon that the carrier is being eclipsed by the new gigantic bombing planes? Is it not possible that all nations soon may have to discard carriers and, for their own security, rely upon a large number of monster planes of great speed, flown, not from carriers but from well-located land bases. No mention is heard of carriers for these monsters. With the coming of these giants can we not begin to doubt the future effectiveness of small carrier planes. If they are provided with numerous airplane land bases and flying fields, their long flying range and mobility will enable them to run down any fleet of surface warships, even if carriers accompany them. Possibly it is a daring thought as yet to give up aircraft carriers. But their vulnerability cannot be denied, and their necessarily small planes are becoming less formidable and less formidable and less immune from destruction by giant planes of tomorrow.
When the time comes, the answer will not be a larger carrier but the scrapping of carriers for self-contained, fast, long-flying, heavily gunned, bomb-supplied leviathans of the upper air".
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78.In my opinion the usefulness of the carrier has not as yet been outgrown by the advent of giant bombers. If possible carriers should be operated in such a manner as to evade attrition attacks that will most assuredly be delivered prior to a major naval engagement. Aircraft for scouting and for the offensive is indispensable in naval battle and as yet it is still possible that carrier based aircraft might be the only aircraft available in certain sea areas far from bases in our possession. Modern aircraft carriers built in the United States cost approximately $70,000,000 and their accompanying aircraft $5,000,000. A fleet of giant bombers can be built for what it costs to build one carrier. Carrier based aircraft also requires land bases for training purposes. These bases are just as expensive to construct and maintain as bases for land-operated bombers. If a decision should be necessary as to choice between construction of a carrier and long range, speedy bombers I believe it would be extremely sound to choose the long range bombers, for I agree with Admiral Sterling that the usefulness of carriers will eventually be eclipsed by long range, speedy bombers of the giant type.
Raiding Force Antiaircraft Disposition At Time Of Attack By Patrol Planes.