

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# FUEHRER CONFERENCES

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authority of: undated ltr.  
George S. Smith, Colonel GSC  
Chief, Intelligence Group G.S.  
337170  
*[Signature]*

ON MATTERS  
DEALING WITH  
THE

## GERMAN NAVY

### 1942

Germany. Kriegsmarine. Oberkommando.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

Foreword

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken the translation of important documents concerning World War II which were found in the German Naval Archives captured at Tambach.

2. The present volume entitled Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1942 is the second of a series to appear, the 1943 conferences having been published previously. When the series is completed, all important conferences between the Fuehrer and Commander in Chief, Navy occurring during the war years 1939-1945 for which records have been found will be available in English. The documents translated in this volume are the result of notes taken for the Commander in Chief, Navy during his conferences with the Fuehrer. After these notes were subsequently typed, they were signed by the Commander in Chief, Navy, in this case Grand Admiral Raeder.

3. The over-all purpose of these translations is to provide materials which may be used as a basis for the study of naval problems arising from total war.

4. In the publication Fuehrer Conferences, 1943 the Secretary of the Navy invited attention to the following items of particular interest, which are also applicable to this volume:

- a. The function of a joint command.
- b. The role of air power in naval warfare.
- c. The result of domination of the Navy by military men unfamiliar with the rudiments of sea power.

*Thor. B. Inglis*

Washington, D. C.  
1946



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High Command, Navy

Naval Staff

Memorandum concerning the Report the Commander in Chief, Navy made to the Fuehrer 12 January 1942 on the Planned Passage of the Brest Group through the Channel.

I. Present:

1. Armed Forces High Command:

Field Marshal Keitel  
Lt. General Jodl  
Colonel Scherf, attached to the General Staff  
Captain (Navy) von Puttkamer  
Commander Junge  
Major Christian  
Major Below, present part of the time

2. Navy:

Commander in Chief, Navy  
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff  
Commanding Admiral of Battleships  
Commanding Admiral of Defenses, West  
Operations Officer to the Commanding Admiral of Battleships

3. Air Force:

Lt. General Jeschonnek  
Colonel Galland

II. Minutes of the Conference:

1. The Commander in Chief, Navy opened the session with something like the following remarks:

"The question of the passage of the Brest Group through the Channel has been examined by all agencies concerned. In the light of the Fuehrer's opinion, the German Fleet's primary task is to defend the Norwegian coast and ports and, in so doing, it should use its might unsparingly.

All parties concerned therefore have approached this study with an open mind. Even though, on the basis of this study, I do not believe that I should take the initiative in advocating such a breakthrough operation, plans have been worked out that ought to be followed, should the break through the Channel be decided upon.

Since you, my Fuehrer, informed me that you insist upon the return of the heavy units to their home bases, I suggest that Vice Admiral Ciliax report on the details of how this operation is to be prepared and carried out, and that Commodore Ruge subsequently

report on the necessary security measures, minesweeping measures, etc., to enable you, my Fuehrer, to make the final decision afterwards."

2. Following these introductory remarks, the Fuehrer expressed himself as follows:

The Naval Force (Geschwader) at Brest has, above all, the welcome effect of tying up enemy air forces and diverting them from making attacks upon the German Homeland. This advantage will last exactly as long as the enemy considers himself compelled to attack because the ships are undamaged. With our ships at Brest, enemy sea forces are tied up to no greater extent than would be the case if the ships were stationed in Norway. If he - the Fuehrer - could see any chance that the ships might remain undamaged for four or five months and, thereafter, be employed in operations in the Atlantic, in consequence of a changed over-all situation, he might be more inclined to consider leaving them at Brest. Since in the opinion of the Fuehrer such a development is not to be expected however, he is determined to withdraw the ships from Brest, to avoid exposing them to chance hits day after day.

On the basis of incoming reports and in view of the increasingly unfriendly attitude of Sweden, the Fuehrer, furthermore, fears that there will be a large-scale Norwegian-Russian offensive in Norway. He thinks that if a strong task force of battleships and cruisers, practically the entire German Fleet, were stationed along the Norwegian coast, it could, in conjunction with the German Air Force, make a decisive contribution toward the defense of the area of Norway. He therefore is determined to have the main strength of the German naval forces shifted to that area.

3. Subsequent to these fundamental observations of the Fuehrer, the Commanding Admiral of Battleships reports on necessary preparations and planning. The following points are given special emphasis in this report:

a. The demand for a minimum of ship movements prior to the operation. The Fuehrer expresses agreement with the opinions presented by the Commanding Admiral of Battleships.

b. The necessity of leaving Brest under cover of darkness, taking maximum advantage of the element of surprise, and of passing through the Straits of Dover in the daytime, thus making the most effective use of the means of defense at our disposal. The Fuehrer likewise expresses approval, emphasizing particularly the surprise to be achieved by having the ships leave after dark.

c. It is stressed very emphatically that a very strong pursuit and fighter cover should be provided on the day of the breakthrough itself from the beginning of dawn to the end of dusk. The demand of the Commanding Admiral of Battleships is for at least ten airplanes for low-level defense and ten airplanes for high-altitude defense; other strong pursuit forces should be held in constant readiness.

The Fuehrer is aware of the decisive role to be played by the Air Force in this enterprise. Lt. General Jeschonnek does not be-



lieve that he will be able to provide constant unfailling protection for the ships with the available two hundred and fifty pursuit planes, which cannot possibly be reinforced. He then promises to draw on the existing night fighter formations for long-range fighter planes, with which to provide dawn fighter protection.

4. Subsequent to this report of the Commanding Admiral of Battleships, the Fuehrer asks for opinions as to the feasibility of using the northern route. He makes it clear that he does not care which route is selected by the Navy, if only it is successful in getting those ships transferred to Norwegian waters.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, and the Commanding Admiral of Battleships explain that the northern route is not suitable for several reasons. First of all, due to the training situation at Brest, it has been impossible to train crews for full scale battle maneuvers. The present disposition of enemy forces also is against such a move; there are two or three battleships and two aircraft carriers in the Home Fleet. And lastly, the German air forces would not be able to provide the necessary air cover.

5. Commodore Ruge then reports on defense problems and the mine situation, coming to the conclusion that, while the deep-water channel cannot be called absolutely safe from mines, a relative measure of safety nonetheless does exist.

6. The Fuehrer subsequently points out once more that the success or failure of this undertaking will depend on how well the secret of it is kept. He ponders on methods of deceiving the enemy but changes the subject when warned by the Commanding Admiral of Battleships and the representatives of the Naval Staff against any signs of unusual activity. It is pointed out that, by needlessly arousing the enemy's curiosity, we would jeopardize the very departure of our ships from Brest and add to the danger of their being discovered.

7. The Commander in Chief, Navy again emphasizes the demands to be made on the Air Force, for:

a. a very strong fighter cover

b. attacks on airfields serving enemy torpedo planes in the early morning of the day of the breakthrough, and possibly a few days earlier.

Lt. General Jeschonnek replies to this as follows:

In view of the over-all war situation, reinforcement of our air forces in the West is impossible; however, in compliance with the Fuehrer's orders, the question will be examined once again.

The constant air cover, as demanded by the Commanding Admiral of Battleships, will call for sixty of the two hundred and fifty available pursuit planes, assuming that there are going to be three relays. In the opinion of Lt. General Jeschonnek and also of Colonel Galland, the one hundred and ninety remaining pursuits will

hardly be sufficient for the heavy air battles that are sure to develop on the day of the breakthrough. We may expect our fighter force to become very inferior in strength, at least during the afternoon. The short distances from the enemy air bases to the target objects will enable the enemy to carry out surprise attacks, while we will not always be able to have additional fighters of our own, over and above the constant air umbrella, ready at the time and place of attack. With at least three hundred enemy fighters in Southeast England, which will accompany the waves of attacking planes, this constant air umbrella of our own, will, moreover, be quite inferior in strength. All of it will become entangled in fights with the enemy fighters, so that in this case the enemy attack planes would hardly be disturbed.

Lt. General Jeschonnek also calls attention to the fact that, in the afternoon, our own anti-aircraft personnel is susceptible to fatigue, as experience has shown.

8. The Fuehrer sums up once more:

a. The ships must not leave port in the daytime because we are dependent on the element of surprise.

b. This necessarily means that they will have to pass through the Dover Straits in the daytime.

c. In view of past experience the Fuehrer does not believe the British capable of making and carrying out lightning decisions. This is why he does not believe that they will be as swift as was assumed by the Naval Staff and the Commanding Admiral of Battleships in shifting their bomber and pursuit forces to the southeastern part of England, for an attack on our ships in the Dover Straits. The Fuehrer illustrates his argument by picturing what would happen if the situation were reversed, i.e. if a surprise report came in that British battleships have appeared in the Thames estuary and are heading for the Straits of Dover. In his opinion even we would hardly be able to bring up air pursuit forces and bomber forces swiftly and methodically.

He compares the situation of the Brest Group with that of a patient having cancer, who is surely doomed unless he submits to an operation. An operation, on the other hand, even though it may have to be a drastic one, will offer at least some hope that the patient's life may yet be saved. Passage of our ships through the Channel would be such an operation. It must therefore be attempted.

9. The question of how to divert British air forces by the means of other operations is briefly touched upon, and it is felt that the "Tirpitz" Operation and the stationing of the TIRPITZ at Trondheim would offer certain opportunities in that direction.

10. Colonel Galland then sets forth his views on the tactics of the German Air Force and, unlike Lt. General Jeschonnek, stresses the need for offensive tactics, that means rolling attacks by fighter bombers on air bases in the eastern part of England.



Colonel Galland, too, is of the opinion that the strong Spitfire forces, at the disposal of the British will render things difficult for the long-range fighters which we are going to employ.

11. In closing, the Commander in Chief, Navy again points out emphatically that success or failure of the enterprise will hinge upon the way in which our air forces are used. He once more asks the Fuehrer for a directive to the Air Force to do everything in its power that might further the security of the ships.

The Fuehrer directs Lt. General Jeschonnek to do so. The latter, however, emphasizes again that unfailing protection cannot be guaranteed because of the lack of needed reinforcements.

12. Tide and daylight will determine the timing of the operation. That is the reason why the date of the operation cannot be changed. The Commander in Chief, Navy then asks what should be done in case one or several ships are unable to move on the date set.

It is decided that, if two battleships are in a position to move, they are to undertake the operation, if necessary without the cruiser. If only one battleship and the cruiser can move, they are to do likewise. But in no case should the PRINZ EUGEN do so alone.

13. Finally the question of transferring the TIRPITZ is raised by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, and the Fuehrer decides that the TIRPITZ is to be transferred at once.

14. Finally the Fuehrer emphasizes once more that nothing can be gained by leaving the ships at Brest. Should the Brest Group manage to escape through the Channel, however, there is a chance that it might be employed to good advantage at a later date.

If, on the other hand, the ships remain at Brest, their "flypaper effect", i.e. their ability to tie up enemy air forces, may not continue for long. As long as the ships remain in battleworthy condition they will constitute worthwhile targets, which the enemy will feel obliged to attack. But the moment they are seriously damaged - and this may happen any day - the enemy will discontinue his attacks. Such a development will nullify the one and only advantage derived from leaving the ships at Brest.

In view of all this the Fuehrer, in accordance with the suggestions of the Commander in Chief, Navy, finally decides that the operation is to be prepared for as proposed.

signed: Raeder

countersigned: Lt. Comdr. Assmann

Preliminary Report by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff (Vice Admiral Fricke) on the Conference with the Fuehrer on 22 January 1942.

I. Norway:

1. Latest reports have thoroughly convinced the Fuehrer that Britain and the United States intend to make every effort to influence the course of the war by an attack on northern Norway. Several places along the coast from Trondheim to Kirkenes will probably be occupied shortly. Sweden's support in a spring offensive is expected, for which she would receive Narvik and ore deposits near Petsamo. Finland would be guaranteed her independence within the old borders.

The Fuehrer has proof of Sweden's willingness to participate and therefore plans the following:

a. To expose the intentions of Britain and the United States as well as Sweden's attitude in the world press.

b. To appoint Field Marshal von Kesselring as Commander of the Armed Forces in Norway.

Anglo-Saxon domination of the Swedish area will gradually eliminate all freedom of action in the Baltic Sea. Should German naval units still be in the Baltic under such circumstances, we should immediately disarm them completely. The only ships from which we could salvage any appreciable amount of nickel would be the battleships.

The Fuehrer is convinced that Norway is the "zone of destiny" in this war. Therefore he demands unconditional obedience to all his commands and wishes concerning the defense of this area.

2. The Fuehrer ordered a considerable reinforcement of Army personnel and materiel in Norway. The Commander in Chief, Air was instructed to strengthen his forces. The latter anticipates certain difficulties: he is short of planes; reconnaissance and fighting are limited in bad weather; besides, the Norwegian air fields are inconveniently located and are all too few.

The Fuehrer desires that the Navy must also do everything in its power to head off the British offensive at the very start. The Navy must take over adequate reconnaissance in weather not fit for flying. It must defend the sea lanes to Norway, and must dislodge with all available forces any enemy troops which have landed, entirely foregoing all other warfare "except for the Mediterranean operations".

3. The Fuehrer demands that all measures be instituted at once since the danger is imminent. He agrees, however, to let Brest Group complete its mission, using all light defense forces. The PT boats are to remain in the Channel. On completion of the mission the Fuehrer would like to have all vessels in Norway.

The Fuehrer requires that PT boats operate in the Norwegian area. He agrees with the proposal to transfer a PT flotilla to Norway



by about the second half of February. The PT boats in the Black Sea will remain. He demands transfer of all submarines to Norway for reconnaissance against the approaching enemy. This order can be revised to correspond with the scarcity of available bases. If we transfer submarine training bases, which will probably be necessary in any case on account of ice conditions, it would relieve the operational submarines. The Fuehrer is very happy about the fact that submarines are already operating between Iceland and Scotland. Those positions would therefore have to remain occupied and it would be necessary to co-ordinate them more closely with the Norway problem.

The Fuehrer demands that every available vessel be employed in Norway. He endorses our plans to use battleships, pocket battleships, heavy cruisers, light naval forces and PT boats; increases his demand for submarines; is of the same opinion as the Naval Staff concerning the improbability of a landing in western France.

The Fuehrer demands investigation of the possibility of using light cruisers, auxiliary cruisers and an increased number of auxiliary vessels fit for reconnaissance in Norwegian waters.

4. The Fuehrer orders even more of the heaviest artillery pieces to be mounted in Norway. He demands that all heavy caliber guns available be tested and made ready (reserve barrels of the old battleships, captured French barrels, 25 to 30.5 barrels in Swinemuende, etc.).

5. It will be necessary to investigate further the possibility of bringing in supplies by submarine.

6. The Fuehrer emphasized several times that the greatest speed and efficiency are vitally important. He is deeply concerned about the grave consequences which unfavorable developments in the North Norwegian area could have on the entire course of the war.

II. The Fuehrer had no comments to make on the oil problem which I presented as being very serious, especially in view of the planned operations.

III. The Terboven affair is settled in our favor. A corresponding decision in written form will be forwarded to the Naval Staff and to the Reich Commissioner.

signed: Fricke

The Commander in Chief of the Navy  
and the Chief of the Naval Staff

Report to the Fuehrer, made by the Commander in  
Chief, Navy the afternoon of 13 February 1942.  
(The Staff of the Armed Forces High Command was  
not present.)

1. Norway:

The reinforcement of our position in Norway makes the utmost demands on our escort forces. Delays in shipping supplies are unavoidable at present, in view of the limited number of convoys. The situation cannot be expected to improve until after operation "Cerberus" has been completed. The critical oil situation in Norway is being relieved by oil imports. Numerous escort vessels have been lost through enemy action and the wear and tear of heavy duty.

The naval and coastal defenses of Norway are still very weak at present. We have increased the protection of our sea lanes in the northern area by laying flanking mine fields in the waters between Harstad and Kirkenes. Additional mine fields are being laid.

The following measures are now in preparation:

a. The PRINZ EUGEN and the SCHEER are to be transferred at the earliest possible moment, the battleships as soon as repairs, now being made at increased speed, are completed. Furthermore, all destroyers and torpedo boats ready for combat duty are being assigned to Norway, to be based at Trondheim and Narvik.

b. Provisions have been made to reinforce our patrol forces in the Norwegian area, particularly with vessels withdrawn from the western area.

c. Preparations are in progress to transfer another PT flotilla after operation "Cerberus" is completed.

d. Commanding Admiral, Norway will continue to expand the coastal mine fields.

e. It is planned to increase mine operations in the Skagerrak, in the northern part of the North Sea, and the Arctic Ocean; completion expected at the end of February or at the beginning of March.

f. Supply shipments for the operational activities of our combat forces are to be increased.

2. Russia:

The following points are of decisive importance for the renewal of naval warfare in the Gulf of Finland and for the final expulsion of the Russians from the Baltic:



a. Continuous attacks on Russian naval forces in Leningrad and Kronstadt by Army artillery and the Air Force.

b. Conquest of the islands in the Gulf of Finland in order to get operational bases for a tight blockade of Kronstadt Bay. An agreement was reached with the Army, whereby Army troops are to seize the islands. The Navy will then take over and be responsible for holding them.

3. Black Sea:

The main problem in the Black Sea concerns transportation of supplies for the Army. The Naval Staff is fully aware of the complications involved. Difficulties are due to the lack of sufficient shipping space and the absence of escort and combat forces. Measures are being taken to improve our position in the Black Sea. PT boats, Italian anti-submarine vessels, small submarines, landing craft (MFP), etc. are being added to our forces; mine fields are being laid. Orders have been issued to speed up all measures and to make every effort to support the Army by bringing up supplies. Russian naval forces in the Black Sea must be attacked and destroyed. The degree of success obtained will determine the outcome of the war in the Black Sea area. Attention is called to the fact that eventually it will become necessary to occupy all Russian Black Sea bases and ports.

The Fuehrer concurs in this opinion.

See Annex 1 on Transportation of PT boats.

4. Western Area:

Due to lack of strength, our naval and air forces are, at present, largely limited to defensive operations on the Atlantic coast and in the Channel. The enemy is hampering our transport operations by the increased use of mines, by air raids and PT boat attacks. This forces us to confine convoy movements as well as patrolling and minesweeping activities to the hours of night.

Steps are being taken to provide more effective patrol of coastal waters by increasing the patrol forces. Likewise, our locating facilities must be improved and our coast artillery reinforced. The offensive operations of our PT boats and aircraft against the very extensive enemy convoy traffic along the English coast are of particular importance in the face of our otherwise purely defensive situation. We must try with all our might to intensify these operations as much as possible. Unfortunately the weather greatly hampers PT boat operations during the winter months. The Naval Staff considers it urgently necessary to leave at least two PT boat flotillas stationed in the Channel area. Otherwise even our defensive operations are jeopardized. Aerial mines must be used more extensively in large-scale attacks.

5. Atlantic:

Submarine warfare in the Atlantic produces good results at the present time. (See Annex 2.) In the war against enemy shipping everything depends on the number of submarines available. Time and again Churchill speaks of shipping tonnage as his greatest

worry. Britain and the U. S. are building 7,000,000 BRT in 1942, which means that Germany and Japan will have to sink a monthly total of 600,000 BRT to offset this increase. This will become possible once the Japanese war against enemy shipping in the Indian Ocean gets under way. If the number of workmen had remained the same after production was adjusted to the cut in the raw material allotment and after manpower had been redistributed between repair work and new construction, our monthly output of submarines would have dropped to about 19 or 20. Since, however, many workmen are still being drafted into the Armed Forces, this figure will drop to 16 or 17 in the course of the year. This is entirely inadequate. No improvement can be expected at this time.

6. Mediterranean:

The most significant factor at this time is that not a single heavy British ship in the Mediterranean is fully seaworthy. The Axis rules both the sea and the air in the Central Mediterranean.

However, enemy submarines still menace our shipping, there still is a shortage of transport vessels and escort forces, and the oil situation continues to be critical.

The Mediterranean situation is definitely favorable at the moment. In conjunction with events in East Asia, it gives us some indication of the possibilities if we were to launch an attack on Egypt and the Suez Canal just as quickly as possible. Except for Singapore, the British position is at present weakest in the North Africa-Suez area. Attention is called to the change of Government in Egypt. The British position in Egypt is precarious because Britain has to depend on the 40,000 Egyptian troops to safeguard her rear communications.

a. Mediterranean Shipping: An agreement was reached with Italy concerning transport vessels for the Mediterranean whereby we will get ten transports to begin with. The Italian Minister of Transportation is still objecting to the transfer of another ten; he claims the need of this tonnage for his own war construction program. According to the findings of our representative, Dr. Scholz, Director of the German Shipyard Company (Deutsche Werft), however, this tonnage could easily be made available. Likewise difficulties are being encountered concerning the chartering of Italian vessels for war purposes, since the Duce has to be consulted in every instance.

The Commander in Chief, Navy requests that these points be mentioned, should the Fuehrer decide to write to the Duce. He will submit a draft, if desired.

The Fuehrer agrees.

7. East Asia:

Rangoon, Singapore, and, most likely, also Port Darwin will be in Japanese hands within a few weeks. Only weak resistance is expected on Sumatra, while Java will be able to hold out longer. Japan plans to protect this front in the Indian Ocean by capturing the key position of Ceylon, and she also plans to gain control of the sea in that area by means of superior naval forces.



Fifteen Japanese submarines are at the moment operating in the Bay of Bengal, in the waters off Ceylon, and in the straits on both sides of Sumatra and Java.

With Rangoon, Sumatra, and Java gone, the last oil wells between Bahrein and the American continent will be lost. Oil supplies for Australia and New Zealand will have to come from either the Persian Gulf or from America. Once Japanese battleships, aircraft carriers, submarines, and the Japanese naval air force are based on Ceylon, Britain will be forced to resort to heavily escorted convoys, if she desires to maintain communications with India and the Near East. Only Alexandria, Durban, and Simonstown will be available as repair bases for large British naval vessels in that part of the world.

The Suez and Basra positions are the western pillars of the British position in the Indian area. Should these positions collapse under the weight of concerted Axis pressure, the consequences for the British Empire would be disastrous. An early German-Italian attack on the British key position of Suez would therefore be of utmost strategic importance. Such an undertaking, if successful, would completely solve all our Mediterranean problems; it would have far-reaching effects on such matters as the Mosul oil fields (!!), the attitude of Turkey, the Near East, the Arabian and Indian nationalist movements, the Eastern Front, and the Caucasus. According to reports available, the British themselves are fully aware of the great danger which is threatening them in Egypt. They fear that the German-Italian forces might establish contact with the Japanese. The Japanese, on their part, are making an honest effort to establish contact with Germany by sea and by air since they realize the decisive significance this would have on the outcome of the war.

8. Request for Cancellation of Operation "Seeloewe".

A decision is requested to what extent the commitments of personnel and materiel for operation "Seeloewe", which are still very considerable, have to remain in force. Since the operation cannot possibly be carried out in 1942 it is proposed that all commitments be cancelled if at all permissible from a military point of view. Thus urgently needed personnel and ships such as landing craft (MFP), tug boats, etc., can be used in areas of strategic importance at the present time, for example in Norway, and in the Baltic, Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Seas. The Commander in Chief, Navy requests that the period of time required for the preparations of operation "Seeloewe" be lengthened from eight months to twelve months.

The Fuehrer gives his consent.

9. Repair of Cruiser LEIPZIG.

See Annex 3.

signed: Raeder

countersigned: Lt. Comdr. Assmann

Annex 1

The Naval Construction Division submits the following considerations concerning the transportation of PT boats to the Black Sea and the possibility of PT boat construction in the Linz Shipyards: (K III M 410/42 gKdos)

Preparations are made for the transfer of six PT boats to the Black Sea via the super highways (Reichsautobahn) and the Danube. The boats are to be dispatched as soon as ice conditions on the Elbe River permit - about the middle of March. Unless adverse weather conditions delay the transfer, it is expected that the six PT boats will reach the Black Sea ninety days after leaving Kiel, i.e. by the middle of June.

The shipyards at Linz have no facilities for building PT boats. It would take at least three months of preparations before construction of the first boat could begin.

There are no workmen in Linz with experience in building PT boats. Such workmen would have to be withdrawn from the two North German PT boat yards.

The construction of a PT boat, from the time the keel is laid until commissioning, takes six and a half months in a shipyard where production is in full swing. In Linz, construction of the first boats would require approximately eight months. This means that the first PT boat would not be ready for commissioning until the middle of January 1943 at the earliest, provided all necessary preparations were begun at once. Therefore mass production in the North German shipyards is preferable. If necessary, additional PT boats can be transferred to the Black Sea this summer.

The Fuehrer agrees.



Submarine Situation on 11 February 1942.

I. For location of the submarines see annexed chart. (Not incl.)

II. Number of operational submarines . . . . . 106

These are distributed as follows:

1. In ports . . . . . 32
  - a. In western France . . . . . 29
  - b. In Kiel . . . . . 3
2. In the Mediterranean . . . . . 21
  - a. In the zone of operations . . 5  
(Cyrenaica Coast)
  - b. Returning from the  
zone of operations. . . . . 4
  - c. In Italian ports. . . . . 12
3. In the Norwegian and Scotland-  
Iceland areas . . . . . 18
  - a. In the Arctic Ocean . . . . . 6
  - b. In Trondheim. . . . . 1
  - c. Northern Scotland and  
Iceland . . . . . 7
  - d. In the northern North Sea  
en route to zone of oper-  
ations, later to be put  
into action off North Amer-  
ica . . . . . 4
4. American Coast . . . . . 35
  - a. In the zone of operations . . 9
  - b. Returning from zone of  
operations. . . . . 14
  - c. En route to the zone of  
operations (5 of these to  
the West Indies). . . . . 12

III. Losses:

Total. . . . . 73  
(Losses in January: 5, 4 of them in the Mediterranean)

Monthly average now 2.5

IV. Further Plans:

1. By the end of February the number of submarines  
will be as follows:

a.	In the Norwegian area . . . .	12
b.	In the Scotland-Iceland area. . . . .	<u>8</u>
	Total . . . . .	20

2. The large and medium submarines now being completed in western France, as well as the large submarines becoming available at home, will operate along the American coast. The medium submarines will be assigned to the northern zone, i.e. South of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, while the large submarines will operate along the coast of the U. S. A. between the Florida Strait and New York, as well as in the vicinity of the more important shipping centers in the West Indies. The first three submarines are expected to make their appearance near Curacao and Aruba about 16 February. The shelling of Aruba is planned.



Repairs to Restore the Speed of the Cruiser LEIPZIG

At the present time the cruiser LEIPZIG has only two boilers functioning instead of the usual six. The four missing boilers still have to be installed. This will take seven months.

Furthermore, of the 135 kilometers of cable which were damaged some time ago and which affected primarily the operation of anti-aircraft artillery and the torpedo weapons, only 30 kilometers have so far been re-installed. The re-installation of all the cable will require twelve months, in addition to a preliminary period of four months needed for procuring the switchboards and other electrical equipment. Installation of the cable necessitates the services of one hundred and seventy electricians for a period of twelve months.

Since the boilers cannot be placed prior to the laying of the cables, the period required for the over-all job will be determined by the time it takes to complete the electrical installations. It is roughly estimated that an additional month will be needed for miscellaneous repairs.

At present the ship has a maximum speed of 21 knots when both boilers and the cruising engine are used simultaneously.

The Commander in Chief, Navy requests that the idea of completely renovating the LEIPZIG be dropped. The cruiser is urgently needed as an artillery and torpedo training vessel, for which a speed of 21 knots is sufficient; it would therefore hardly be worthwhile to use up raw materials as well as shipyard facilities and workmen for one year.

The Fuehrer agrees.

Berlin 14 March 1942

Commander in Chief of the Navy  
and Chief of the Naval Staff

Report by the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer at Headquarters "Wolfsschanze" the evening of 12 March 1942.

1. Submarine Warfare.

We must carry on submarine warfare to the utmost, in order to take advantage of the unpreparedness of the United States, for we can most effectively fight England by reducing available cargo space. Losses of submarines, 2.4 per month.

2. The War in the North.

A. The TIRPITZ made a sortie into the Arctic Ocean when planes reported a fifteen ship enemy convoy near Jan Mayen, headed for Russia. The Naval Staff is of the opinion that in such cases all forces available must be used unconditionally for the important task of disrupting the shipment of supplies to Russia or preventing enemy landings. The TIRPITZ was unable to intercept the convoy. The latter evidently changed its course when the enemy realized that they had been sighted by German planes. A strong enemy task force including an aircraft carrier was sent out in pursuit of the TIRPITZ. In spite of daring attacks by torpedo planes, the enemy was unsuccessful. Skillful defense maneuvers, coupled with good luck, were responsible for the TIRPITZ' escape.

Conclusions drawn from this operation: This operation reveals the weakness of our own naval forces in the northern area. The enemy responds to every German sortie by sending out strong task forces, particularly aircraft carriers, which are the greatest menace to our heavy ships. The extreme weakness of our defenses is evidenced by the fact that the enemy dares to advance into the coastal waters of the northern area without being smashed by the German Air Force. Our own defensive forces (destroyers and torpedo boats) are so few in number that our ships are always extremely hard pressed whenever they come in contact with the enemy.

The following inferences can be drawn from this:

a. Strong support from our own air units in the Norwegian area is, in the absence of aircraft carriers, an absolute prerequisite to successful operation in the Arctic Ocean. (Air reconnaissance is needed, even if it should be at the expense of the Atlantic Air Forces. Torpedo planes must be thrown into the fight.)

b. In view of the enemy's determined stand, every operation in the Arctic Ocean involves the use of all our naval forces.



This will be particularly necessary as long as there are enemy carriers.

c. Therefore our own naval forces should be held back at first, in order to ensure their availability for repulsing enemy landing attempts. They should be committed only after the enemy's exact position and strength has been accurately and unequivocally ascertained by air reconnaissance, and when there is sufficient support by the Air Force.

d. The Air Force must be ordered to wage relentless warfare against the enemy carriers. It must be the prime aim of naval air operations in the northern area to annihilate these carriers at sea and at their bases. Elimination of the aircraft carriers would basically improve our own chances.

e. Work on our aircraft carrier must be accelerated. In this connection sufficient numbers of carrier planes must be provided. See Annex 2 for the attitude of the Fuehrer.

Everything must be done toward the early formation of a German task force composed of the TIRPITZ, the SCHARNHORST, one aircraft carrier, two heavy cruisers and twelve to fourteen destroyers. It would be a serious threat to the enemy in the northern area and could be used very effectively.

B. The role assigned to the Navy in the event of an enemy landing is dealt with in Annex 1.

The Commander in Chief, Navy requests that the Commander in Chief, Air receive instructions to reinforce the Air Force in Norway. At the same time he should be informed of the purpose and the aims of aerial activity in that area.

The Fuehrer approves.

C. Available ships. The HIPPER is ready to sail for Norway beginning 14 March. The stern of the PRINZ EUGEN is being rebuilt in Germany. The jury rudder will be completed in Trondheim in about six weeks. At that time the Baltic Sea will be sufficiently free of ice to permit the crossing. The SCHARNHORST will be ready in Kiel at the end of May. Three proposals are offered pertaining to the GNEISENAU. See Annex 3.

The LUETZOW will be ready to sail in April. The KOELN and NUERNBERG need a thorough overhauling as the result of extremely hard and long service.

D. The POTSDAM and GNEISENAU will be ready about 10 April. It takes about two to three weeks for the installation of the de-gaussing gear.

### 3. The War in the West. Blockade runners.

The ELSA ESSBERGER made port in France. For her cargo see Annex 4. Five ships homeward bound are: OSORNO, expected the middle of March; RIO GRANDE, beginning of April; FUSIJAMA, end of April; PORTLAND and MUENSTERLAND, middle of May. All are carrying rubber.

Departures: The TANNENFELS is about to depart. Later it will be possible to send ships to the Dutch East Indies for oil and tin.

4. The Mediterranean.

A memorandum by the Naval Staff analyzes the situation in the Mediterranean. It urges that for strategic reasons the drive for the Suez Canal, if at all feasible, should be carried out this year, because of its far-reaching consequences. The favorable situation in the Mediterranean, so pronounced at the present time, will probably never occur again. The problem of shipping space for an attack on the Suez Canal can be solved. The Naval Staff is now attending to the details. The Navy cannot judge whether the Army has the necessary number of troops in readiness. The Naval Staff, however, thinks it desirable on the part of the Fuehrer to issue orders that preparations for an offensive against the Suez Canal be begun. Above all, transports should be prepared.

In this connection the Commander in Chief, Navy raises the question of the Italian transport submarines. See Annex 5.

The need for the occupation of Malta is pointed out. Advantage should be taken of the present state of its defenses, greatly weakened by German attacks. If Axis troops do not occupy Malta, it is imperative that the German Air Force continues its attacks on the island to the same extent as heretofore. Such attacks alone will prevent the enemy from rebuilding Malta's offensive and defensive capacities. If our attacks are not continued, the enemy will immediately and hurriedly begin to rebuild Malta. This would complicate the transportation of supplies to northern Africa.

What is the Fuehrer's opinion on:

- a. The part Italy will play in the taking of Malta?
- b. The possibility of support by the German Air Force and Army?

The Fuehrer knows the Duce's intention. He is afraid that the operation, evidently scheduled for July, will again be postponed. The German Air Force must give support.

The Fuehrer is inclined to undertake an offensive against the Suez Canal if the Air Force can remain intact in the Mediterranean. If it is used elsewhere, the offensive cannot be carried out. If Malta falls soon, it will greatly facilitate a Suez offensive.

The Fuehrer will discuss these questions with the Duce at their next meeting.

4a. Japanese bases on Madagascar.

The Japanese have recognized the great strategic importance of Madagascar for naval warfare. According to reports submitted, they are planning to establish bases on Madagascar in addition to Ceylon, in order to be able to cripple sea traffic in the Indian



Ocean and the Arabian Sea. From there they could likewise successfully attack shipping around the Cape. Before establishing these bases, Japan will have to get German consent. For military reasons such consent ought to be granted. Attention is called to the fact, however, that this is a matter of great political significance, since it touches on the basic question of France's relation to the Tri-Partite Powers on the one hand, and the Anglo-Saxons on the other. Such action on the part of the Japanese may have repercussions in the French homeland, the African colonies, as well as in Portuguese East Africa.

It is important that Japanese officers report unofficially that Madagascar will be used only as bases for submarines and not for light or heavy naval forces.

The Fuehrer is of the opinion that France will not give her consent.

#### 5. The Black Sea.

Beginning May, the following ships will be in the Black Sea:

3 German submarines, 250 tons each, assembled in Linz.  
6 PT boats  
8 large motor minesweepers  
4 small motor minesweepers  
14 armed trawlers

#### Italian ships:

4 medium PT boats, 18 tons each, to be ready by the middle of March; they have a range of 350 miles at 42 knots, 850 miles at 8.5 knots.

Each is equipped with two torpedo tubes and one 2 cm gun. They are to be transported by rail as far as Vienna, and from there by water. An alternate route would be via the Rhone, Rhine, Danube.

In April and May, the following ships will be sent to the Black Sea:

4 small motor boats, 3 tons each, with a range of 34 miles at 70 knots. Each carries a small torpedo and has a crew of two. They are to be transported by truck.  
6 small submarines, 34.5 tons each, with two 200 kg torpedoes. They have a surface speed of 7.5 knots. A submerged speed of 7 knots. They have a range of 600 miles at 7.7 knots, 1,400 miles at 5 knots. Their underwater range is 60 miles at 3 knots. Their endurance is from four to five days. They have a crew of four.

These small submarines are to be shipped partly by rail in special cars, partly by water via Save-Danube.

Rumanian submarines: The DELFINUL is ready for action. During the summer two more submarines will be added. These will be taken

over and tested by German personnel. Later they will be operated by combined German-Rumanian crews.

6. Raw Materials.

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports on developments pertaining to naval construction etc. on the basis of Annex 6, and Supplements 1 to 4. Only a few of the particulars are stressed.

It appears that in 1944 only 15 (possibly only 12 to 13) submarines, one PT boat and two motor minesweepers will be under construction. The Commander in Chief, Navy points out that Minister Speer told him more cubic space is being allotted for commercial use than for military use, and that some of these contingents are assigned on the basis of former allocations without specifying for what purpose.

The Fuehrer absolutely refuses to consider raising the contingents. He repeats again and again that it is impossible to allocate more space than there is. Available space inadequately utilized by certain agencies must be reallocated.

The Commander in Chief, Navy suggests that he might re-examine the details with General Thomas, but the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command explains that this can be done only together with him. He states that the allocations of 5 March are only temporary.

The Commander in Chief, Navy brings up the question of handing over fifty 2 cm guns to the Rumanians as mentioned in Document Skl. Q.A.I. flak 3781 Gkdos of 9 March, issued by Quartermaster Division, Fleet Section of the Naval Staff. He asks that the Armed Forces High Command grant the Navy's requests as set forth in this document, since it appears that the Army and Air Force have more facilities and raw materials at their disposal than they need. The Navy, on the other hand, inadequately provided for, has difficulty fulfilling the tasks assigned to it.

7. Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

The Commander in Chief, Navy cites urgent reasons against the appointment of a Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

The Fuehrer is in agreement. He says that the four-year plan is a monstrosity and states that he is definitely opposed to appointing a Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

8. In private conference, the Commander in Chief, Navy reports on the results of experiments with air compartments of underwater weapons.

Raeder



The Role of the Navy in Repulsing Enemy Landing Attempts in Norway.

1. As soon as it becomes evident that the enemy is getting ready to attempt landing operations on a larger scale, all naval forces stationed in Norway will put to sea for the purpose of attacking the invasion fleet and annihilating it before a landing is attempted. If the invasion fleet cannot be completely destroyed, the damage inflicted should at least be so severe that the enemy has to turn back.

The success of this plan depends on how soon the invasion attempt is discovered and on the strength of the enemy. We must make no mistake about the fact that the enemy may use forces outnumbering ours by far. If however our reconnaissance is able to sight the invasion fleet en route, our naval forces have a good chance of being successful in spite of the enemy's superior numbers. Our torpedo boats and PT boats during the night preceding the landing could be particularly effective. In view of the participation of enemy aircraft carriers, our own naval forces need strong support from our Air Force.

2. If our Navy and Air Force do not succeed in preventing an enemy landing and the establishment of a beachhead, the Navy will use all available forces to strike against the enemy supply lines in order to prevent the enemy from bringing up and landing reinforcements. Such an attack against the supply lines should at least slow up matters sufficiently to give the Army the time needed to destroy the enemy forces on land. It is altogether feasible that the German naval forces assembled in Norway (including submarines), can accomplish this in cooperation with bomber and pursuit units of the Air Force, even if the enemy should be very strong.

3. The prospects of success will depend a great deal on where the enemy will attempt to force a landing. Our naval forces will have a good chance of being successful in repulsing the enemy if he attempts landings in areas where we can concentrate the submarines and light surface torpedo carriers, (torpedo and PT boats) beforehand. Our own heavy ships, i.e. battleships and cruisers, will remain in areas in which the enemy is less likely to land, and will thus be safe from early elimination or blockade. Hence they will not be restricted in their actions against the enemy's invasion and supply forces and can attack from the outside.

It is impossible at this time to consolidate our light forces in areas that seem particularly endangered. As yet we have no definite information whatsoever indicating that the enemy has decided on one specific spot for an invasion. We may well expect that he will feign landings in several spots in order to confuse us and to split our defense forces. For the time being therefore our naval forces are distributed according to the importance of the respective areas. Two submarines each are assigned to Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik; there are six submarines in the Arctic re-

gion. These are to be reinforced by an additional four. Trondheim was chosen as the focal point for the surface forces. With the exclusion of Bergen, Trondheim is not only the strongest base but from the naval point of view also holds the key to the entire North Norwegian area. At present the TIRPITZ and the SCHEER are stationed there with five destroyers and two torpedo boats. After the arrival of the HIPPER, two more destroyers and five more torpedo boats in Trondheim, the SCHEER together with several torpedo boats is to be transferred to Narvik. Thus the strong and well balanced task force composed of the TIRPITZ and HIPPER with their own destroyers will remain in Trondheim. The SCHEER, which can put to sea on very short notice due to the special make of her engines, will protect the important Lofoten Islands from Narvik. The Narvik area will be further reinforced by a PT boat flotilla to be based at Svolvor. (The transfer of these boats has been delayed by ice conditions, but it is expected that six out of ten PT boats and an escort vessel will soon be able to set out for Svolvor.) PT boats are stationed in the Arctic region and along the West coast of Norway. To be more specific, four PT boats are stationed in the Arctic region, and three older PT boats in Bergen. The latter will be replaced by four newer and more effective PT boats as soon as ice conditions in our home waters permit.

4. According to the Naval Staff our naval forces stationed throughout the Norwegian area already have considerable defense value. Their mere presence makes large scale enemy invasion attempts a somewhat risky undertaking. At any rate the enemy will now have to use considerable forces in such an operation.

5. The numerous mine fields which were laid during the past weeks along all approaches to the Norwegian coastal inter-island route, undoubtedly have defense value. The enemy knows with certainty of the existence of these mine fields either through the establishment of danger zones or through his intelligence service. (So far approximately 1,650 mines have been laid. Work to complete and perfect these mine fields is in progress.)

The Fuehrer is extremely worried that a surprise landing might be made in bad weather in the absence of air reconnaissance, and asks what the Navy could do under such circumstances. The Commander in Chief, Navy replies that the Navy would likewise be unable to detect the approaching fleet in time because of the enormous sea expanses to be patrolled and the fact that our few ships cannot be at sea continuously in bad weather. In this connection the fuel shortage is another important factor. Furthermore, if we were to split our naval forces for the purpose of reconnaissance, they would readily be annihilated. Occasional reconnaissance operations by small naval forces off the heavily threatened northern coast could be considered.



Planes for Aircraft Carriers

To provide the carrier with planes for experimental and training purposes, the Air Force makes an initial assignment of the following types:

	50	BF	. 109T	pursuit planes
	4	Junker	87c	dive bombers
	13	Fieseler	167	multiple purpose planes
Total:	67	planes		

This number of carrier planes will at best be sufficient for preliminary tryouts. It is not enough, however, to warrant the Navy's efforts toward the completion of the aircraft carrier. In all probability no more planes will be available once the carrier, after its trial-runs, is put into service as part of the fleet. The Air Force believes, however, that it is impossible to continue building the above named types of planes.

Since the carrier is of decisive importance for the operation of our heavy ships, the suggestion is made that the Commander in Chief, Air should once more investigate whether it might not be feasible to convert current models into carrier planes or to order the development of new carrier planes.

The Commander in Chief, Navy asks the Fuehrer to instruct the Commander in Chief, Air to attend to the development and construction of carrier planes in sufficiently large numbers.

The Fuehrer believes that the aircraft carrier is urgently needed and will direct the Commander in Chief, Air accordingly.

Refitting the Battleship GNEISENAU

Investigation has revealed that the GNEISENAU could be refitted according to one of the following plans:

1a. Refit with only two 28 cm turrets and repair of the bow in its present form is possible by. . . . . 1 January 1943, the work to be done in the Deutsche Werke at Kiel.

1b. Refit with only two 28 cm turrets and repair of the bow in its present form is possible by. . . . . 1 April 1943, the work to be done in Gdynia.

2. Refit with three 28 cm turrets with simultaneous rebuilding, i.e. lengthening of the bow, is possible by. . . 15 November 1943, the rebuilding to be done in Gdynia. The repair and the installation of turret A determines the length of time required.

3. Change of armament to three 38 cm turrets and simultaneously rebuilding i.e. lengthening of the bow by. . . . 1 February 1944, the work to be done in Gdynia.

The Fuehrer approves the third plan. He orders that the two 28 cm turrets which are intact be used for coastal defense immediately.



Cargo of the ELSA ESSBERGER in Tons.

1.	Rubber . . . . .	4,059
2.	Dammar . . . . .	52
3.	Tires. . . . .	266.4
4.	Tin. . . . .	55.6
5.	Tin ore. . . . .	30.2
6.	Tungsten ore . . . . .	48.2
7.	Wood oil . . . . .	17.0
8.	Coconut oil. . . . .	334.6
9.	Walnut oil . . . . .	57.0
10.	Shelled peanuts. . . . .	990.0
11.	Leather goods. . . . .	85.9
12.	Sole leather . . . . .	57.7
13.	Buffalo hides. . . . .	27.1
14.	Hemp . . . . .	189.7
15.	Gut. . . . .	14.0
16.	Animal tallow. . . . .	169.0
17.	Coffee . . . . .	23.9
18.	Tea. . . . .	106.7
19.	Dried egg yolk . . . . .	65.0
20.	Nutmeg . . . . .	7.5
21.	Miscellaneous (gallnuts, duck feathers, black bristles, ka- pok, etc.) . . . . .	<u>110.9</u>
	Total. . . . .	6,767.4 tons

Italian Transport Submarines

All endeavors of the Naval Staff to get larger numbers of submarines for transport purposes have failed. The Italian attitude is as follows:

- a. Only two more submarines are to be converted for transport purposes in addition to the two now in operation.
- b. No Italian submarines are to be withdrawn from the Atlantic.
- c. Very little would be gained by using submarines for transport purposes.

The Naval Staff, on the contrary, is convinced that the use of numerous submarines for the purpose of carrying supplies to the very front lines, already of great importance now, will be particularly decisive in the event of a German offensive. Conversion of fourteen larger submarines now in the Mediterranean is possible at present. According to the computations of the Naval Staff, the Italians could raise the amount of supplies transported by submarines to at least 2,000 tons per month in the case of harbors right behind the front.

The request is made that the Fuehrer broach the subject at the next meeting with the Duce.

The Fuehrer consents to do this. He states that he had the Reichsmarschall call the Duce's attention to this urgent matter.



The construction program of the Navy determines the distribution of raw materials. After setting aside the raw materials needed for the maintenance, i.e. the repair of the ships in service, the surplus is used for the construction of new ships and for all other demands of the Navy. The ship construction program possible during the next few years is shown by supplements 1 and 2 entitled respectively "Ships to be Completed during 1942 and 1943" and "Construction of Major War Vessels in accordance with Fuehrer's Orders." Column a shows the original plans drawn up on the basis of the tasks assigned to the Navy. Column b contains the changes necessitated by the cut in raw materials ordered last December. The construction plan extends over a period of years in order to make the most of the raw materials allotted. It is based on the supposition that the allotments for the next quarter periods will approximately equal the allotment announced in December for the first quarter of the year. Even though the number of new ships to be constructed had to be cut down below the strategic requirements, on the whole the Navy would still be able to carry out its major tasks, unless losses should be heavy. Under the circumstances however, there are no reserves for unforeseen happenings. Since the December order went into effect, the following has become apparent after careful study of the situation.

1. It is possible to carry out the planned ship construction program with minor curtailments. These will amount to one or two submarines per month, since the nonferrous metals required to build them are needed in other places where the quantity allotted has proven absolutely inadequate.

2. The needs of other departments of the Navy are met as follows:

- a. Artillery. It is barely possible to produce the planned amount of weapons, equipment and ammunition. The output of some types of ammunition will fall slightly short of the minimum required. The output for the second quarter will be more nearly adequate, since lack of coal and electricity slowed down production during the first quarter. If this output, which represents the minimum needed, is to be maintained, the allotment of nonferrous metals must be increased slightly at the beginning of the third quarter.

- b. Torpedoes. In view of the smaller number of submarines, the December allotment is sufficient to permit the production of the necessary number of torpedo tubes and torpedo setting equipment, as well as of 500 G7e and 400 G7a torpedoes. In this connection it must be noted that the production of 500 G7e torpedoes is assured only because of a cut in production during the first quarter. If the allotment of raw materials remains the same, the production of G7e torpedoes would by necessity drop down too low at the beginning of the third quarter.

- c. Mines. If the most urgent strategic demands for

anti-mine equipment are met fully, the assigned amount of raw materials will be sufficient only to produce half of the mines needed, i.e. approximately 1,000 mines. In view of this limited output, our supply of mines will be exhausted soon if mines are used to any great extent. Here likewise the strategic needs of the future can be met only to a limited extent, unless the allotment of raw materials is increased.

d. Navigation equipment. The raw materials set aside for this purpose, particularly copper, proved insufficient. The allotment for the second quarter had to be drawn upon during the first quarter in order to produce the needed number of gyro compasses. If all new ships are to be equipped with the most essential navigation apparatuses, the copper allotment must be nearly doubled.

e. Construction of fortifications. The available raw materials are sufficient to take care of the construction necessary in 1942. No provision at all has been made however for the coastal and anti-aircraft batteries to be built in 1943. Unless provisions are made this year, these batteries will not be ready in time next year. Additional allotments of raw materials for coastal defenses are required to permit compliance with the Fuehrer's orders.

f. Living quarters, food, personal equipment. It is just about possible to produce equipment, temporary buildings, tin cans etc. in sufficient quantities. Because of insufficient copper and aluminum allotments, half of the buildings are without electricity and cooking facilities. Consequently they are not usable for the time being.

g. Special-purpose motor vehicles, maintenance units, and similar equipment for temporary bases, submarine bases, etc. The quantity of raw materials allotted must be practically doubled, since the present quota is not nearly sufficient to fill the demand created by the transfer of equipment to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

h. Medical service. The available raw materials for the first quarter are just about sufficient. It must be kept in mind however that during this time it was still possible to draw on existing supplies. If the Navy is maintained at its present strength, there has to be an increase in the allotment of copper and aluminum during the second quarter, in order to be able to provide the medical service with sufficient equipment.

This over-all survey reveals that copper and aluminum must be diverted to certain fields not directly connected with ship building, if our present Navy is to be kept in condition for carrying on effective warfare. As mentioned above, this can be done only at the expense of new ships, unless the allotments of these materials are higher for the second quarter than they were for the first.

3. On 5 March the Armed Forces High Command, War Economy and Armaments Division announced the quantities of raw materials the Navy will probably receive for the second quarter. It is much



less than the allotment for the first quarter. This reduction will have the following results: New ships: supplements 1 and 2, column c show that the number of ships and boats that can still be built is reduced to the point of military ineffectiveness. The number of submarines completed each month will be too small to replace even our losses resulting from the expected increase of anti-submarine warfare by the enemy. Thus the number of submarines at our disposal will gradually decrease. Attention is called to the fact that the figure fifteen is based on the supposition that only submarines of series VIIc and IXc are being built. Since, however, other boats, such as submarine tankers and long range U-boats, are likewise needed which require considerably greater amounts of raw material, the actual figure will drop to as low as 12 to 13 per month. As for surface vessels, only those can be completed which are in an advanced state of construction and for which the raw materials were previously allocated. By the end of 1943 the construction of all surface vessels must be stopped with the exception of one PT boat and two motor minesweepers per month. Even now the number of existing destroyers, torpedo boats and minesweepers (M-boats), etc. has proved inadequate. Thus, the construction of new ships will soon come to a complete stop if allotments of raw materials remain on the present level, and, taking into account the losses of the future, the time will come when we will no longer have the necessary ships for convoy and escort duty. As the result, submarine warfare and the shipment of supplies will suffer. Due to the fact that the size of the allotment of raw materials undergoes abrupt change every three months, part of these materials are tied up in ships which cannot be finished and have to be dismantled. For all practical purposes these materials are misapplied.

Supplement 3 gives a survey of the ships which can still be completed during 1942 and 1943, those on which work must be stopped because of lack of materials, and those which must be dismantled or on which work cannot even be begun. It is impossible to build any more new surface vessels during the next few years, for even if only fifteen submarines are built per month, these and the maintenance of the existing ships will use up all available raw materials.

The shortage of raw materials would affect other fields as follows:

a. Artillery. The reduction of the monthly allotment from 700 to 210 tons was counteracted by careful utilization of other raw materials. Thanks to this, the strategic needs can just about be met during the first quarter. Any further cut, however, would be catastrophic. For example, in regard to ammunition, the greatest amount of copper goes into time fuses. Production of these would be reduced from 45,000 to 30,000. Therefore most of the ammunition needed would not be available. That is an impossible situation. We cannot permit the copper allotment to be cut.

b. Torpedoes. Production of G7a torpedoes would drop from 480 to 200, and at the beginning of the third quarter the production of the G7e would also decline. Already the lack of the necessary number of G7a torpedoes jeopardizes the target practice program of the submarines. This is absolutely nonpermissible.

c. Mines. The allotted raw materials can be used either to make influence sweep gear only, or a small number of mines and depth charges. Either mine or anti-mine warfare would soon come to an end.

d. Navigation equipment. Already previous allotments are entirely inadequate.

e. Construction of fortifications. Only fifteen of the anti-aircraft batteries planned for 1942 can be equipped. The fifteen naval coast artillery batteries built cannot be completed.

f. Living quarters, food and personal equipment. In addition to serious curtailments of food and living quarters, there would be a shortage of equipment for 78,000 men. Since this is the question of steel only, the problem could be handled by the Navy alone. Due to the shortage of nonferrous metals, a portion of the steel assigned for ship building purposes cannot be used.

g. and h. Special-purpose motor vehicles, etc., and medical service. Previous allotments already proved insufficient. The copper and aluminum quotas would have to be increased at the expense of submarine construction.

4. In conclusion, the following is apparent:

a. The allotments for the first quarter were not quite sufficient to fill the minimum military needs. If it is impossible to increase the quotas, raw materials intended for construction of submarines must be used for maintenance of the existing ships. As a result one or two submarines less will be produced per month.

b. If the allotment for the second quarter is 10% less than that of the first, the military needs can be filled only with definite limitations. It is doubtful whether the ships in service together with the few new additions can keep up submarine warfare and escort duty for any length of time.

c. If the allotment is cut as indicated in the message of 5 March, it will be impossible for the Navy to carry out the tasks assigned. The present effectiveness of the Navy will be jeopardized; a gradual deterioration will take place during the next few years. Submarine warfare will gradually come to an end.



## Supplement 1 to Annex 6

SHIPS TO BE COMPLETED DURING 1942 AND 1943.

		1942				1943				No Time Limit	Total	Cut
		I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV			
Sub- ma- rines	a	58	61	68	76	66	72	61	65		527	154
	b	53	57	61	62	62	58	50	49		452	
	c	53	50	45	45	45	45	45	45		373	
DD	a	2	4	3	3	1	1	1	1		16	9
	b	-	3	2	2	1	1	2	1		12	
	c	-	3	2	2	-	-	-	-		7	
Torp. Boats	a	3	3	2	1	4	6	5	3		27	16
	b	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1		12	
	c	1	3	2	1	2	2	-	-		11	
PT Boats	a	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	4		68	34
	b	8	13	8	7	6	9	8	3	8	70	
	c	8	10	3	3	3	3	3	3		36	
Mine- Swprs.	a	48	42	14	6	8	2	6	6		132	36
	b	9	42	23	31	7	9	7	5		132	
	c	9	41	23	23	-	-	-	-		96	
Motor Mine- Swprs.	a	14	16	14	6	1	-	-			51	33
	b	15	16	13	14	15	13	7			93	
	c	15	15	6	6	6	6	6			60	
Torp. Recov. Craft	a	3	2	2	5	5	4				21	10
	b	3	2	-	3	5	-			24	37	
	c	3	2	-	3	3	-				11	

- a. Original plan, needed for strategic reasons.  
b. Curtailed plan.  
c. Plan in view of the announced cut in raw materials.

Difference between number of ships to be built under original plan and of ships which can be built if raw materials are cut.

## Supplement 2 to Annex 6

CONSTRUCTION OF MAJOR WAR VESSELS IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
FUEHRER'S ORDERS.

Type of Vessel	Original plans for constructing ships needed annually to carry out tasks assigned by order of the Fuehrer.		Plans for ship construction after the December cut in raw materials. Effective the first quarter of 1942. (Barely permits carrying out tasks assigned each year.)		Plans conforming to the cut in raw materials announced 5 March. (They do not permit carrying out the tasks assigned.)					
					1942		1943		1944	
	per mo.	per yr.	per mo.	per yr.	per mo.	per yr.	per mo.	per yr.	per mo.	per yr.
Large Subs.	6	72	5	60	3	36	3	36	3	36
Medium Subs.	19	228	15	180	12	144	12	144	<u>12</u>	144
DD	1/2	6	1/3	4	1/3	4	1/4	3	-	-
Torp. Boats	1	12	1/2	6	1/2	6	1/3	4	-	-
Mine-Swprs.	9	108	8	96	8	96	-	-	-	-
PT Boats	4	48	3	36	1 1/2	18	1	12	1	12
Motor Mine-Swprs.	6	72	3	60	2 1/3	28	2	24	2	24
Torp. Recov. Craft	-	31	-	<u>31</u>	-	<u>11</u>	-	-	-	-



SHIPS TO BE BUILT 1942 AND 1943.

Type	To be Completed	Material lacking; work to be stop- ped.	To be dismantled; or work is not to be started.
Cruisers	-	SEYDLITZ 2 Dutch	-
Aircraft Carriers	-	GRAF ZEPPELIN	-
Scout Cruisers	-	3	3
Destroyers	7 1 Dutch	2 2 Norwegian	9
Torpedo Boats	10 (1-37, 9-39) 1 French	6 (39)	24 (40) 6 (41) 8 (French, Dutch)
Torpedo Re- cov. Craft	11	8	12
Submarines	408	-	260
PT Boats	30	-	49
Mineswprs.	96	20	28
Escort Vessels	-	-	30
Motor Mine- swprs.	52	-	49
Coast De- fense Boats	33	-	-
Sub. Chasers	4	4	17
Other ships, including new ones to be built	To Be Cancelled Completely.		

These ships will be completed during 1942 and 1943. Material for

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additional ships will not become available until the beginning of 1944. Since construction of submarines is to be continued (15 per month) and the remaining material is barely sufficient to keep the existing ships in repair, no materials will be available for building new surface vessels or completing those on which work had to be stopped.



## Supplement 4 to Annex 6

Schedule of Principal Metal Allotments

Stated in tons per month

	Steel, exclusive of structural steel	copper	aluminum
Allotments received 1941*			
second quarter	176,000	5,667	4,150
third quarter	190,000	5,750	3,624
fourth quarter	185,000	4,950	3,000
Basic allotment for planning purposes, 1942*	170,000	3,300	3,000
Allotment assigned, first quarter, 1942	153,000	2,950	2,140
Cut allotment, first quar- ter, 1942	153,000	2,650	1,840
Basic allotment for second quarter, 1942	153,000	2,650	1,840
Assigned 5 March for second quarter, 1942	150,000	1,600	1,600
Amount needed for construc- tion for the second quarter in accordance with the Fueh- rer's order	172,000	3,100	2,300

\* inclusive of communications gear.

Berlin 16 April 1942

Naval Staff

Report by the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer at Wolfsschanze, 13 April 1942, in the evening.

In the presence of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command; during the discussion of points IX and X, Lt. General Jodl, Vice Admiral Krancke and Captain von Puttkamer were also present.

I. Attack on St. Nazaire. (Annex 1)

The Situation in the Western Area Since Summer 1941:

Enemy strength is increasing. Army and Air Force are weaker due to the situation in the East. Nearly all naval forces have been transferred to Norway. We have no means of repulsing an enemy landing attempt.

The situation provokes enemy operations like the one of 28 March 1942. The following statements are taken from a British operations order:

- Mission: 1. Destroy the floodgates of the large dock that can accommodate the TIRPITZ.
2. Destroy small locks and all submarines and other craft in the vicinity.

The enemy knew exactly the strength of our naval forces (5 torpedo boats) and could adjust his own strength accordingly. The attack was timed according to moon and tide (28 March to 31 March). The route from Falmouth to the objective took 35 hours at a speed of 12 knots. They flew the German flag and used German recognition signals. (Comment in longhand: "Air Force recognition signals").

One submarine was used as marker boat. The air attack was coordinated with the naval attack.

Mission of the Destroyer CAMPBELTOWN:

Force a lane through the torpedo net and ram the outer floodgate so that the forecastle extends over the floodgate. Land the troops, then sink the CAMPBELTOWN. Remove the crew in motorboats. CAMPBELTOWN was loaded with demolition charge with a two hour time fuse.

Advantages for the Enemy:

- A. Poor, changing visibility, 200 m - 4,000 m.



B. At high water the sand bars are flooded, making it possible for the enemy to evade mines and other obstacles.

C. Good reconnaissance through air attacks, which probably had the additional purpose of distracting our attention and drowning out engine noises of the PT boats. Nevertheless shore batteries and anti-aircraft batteries observed the enemy boats as soon as they came into view. A short delay was due to exchange of recognition signals. The artillery fire was very effective.

The Fuehrer criticizes the exchange of recognition signals under such circumstances and also the delay (6-1/2 minutes) before the alarm order was given.

(Comment added in longhand: New regulation: shore station demands recognition signal. If naval forces do not answer immediately with naval recognition signal, open fire. New, uniform alarm signal for the Navy has been ordered.)

The Commander in Chief, Navy states that, considering the available means, the defense had been handled correctly in all essentials. However, it should be impossible for a destroyer to reach the floodgate; besides, due to inexperience, the search for the demolition charge and its subsequent removal were not carried out correctly. In other cases demolition charges in locks, etc., were expertly located and removed at great risk.

Possible Countermeasures Necessary to Prevent Similar Raids:

A. Aerial reconnaissance is a prime requisite for prompt recognition. The British were at sea for 35 hours; they approached during daylight. Even during the World War evening reconnaissance was carried out to protect the coast whenever the weather permitted. It is possible that some airfields at high altitudes (as in Norway) have different visibility conditions than prevail at sea. In such cases sea planes operating from the harbors must do the reconnoitering, since they can see as long as visibility allows enemy naval forces to enter coastal waters.

Fuehrer: Sea planes are too greatly endangered.

Commander in Chief, Navy: No more than patrol boats without proper rear protection. All ship-based planes are sea planes. Furthermore, to assure the necessary protection, some bombers will have to be used for reconnaissance along the entire West Coast. The Naval Air Force is of great importance.

B. Flotillas for patrolling and for protecting the harbors have been established as far as possible and additional ones are being built. There are not nearly enough of them to protect the bases and the long coast. The Commander in Chief, Navy states the number and distribution of the present flotillas. He compares these to the minimum number necessary and states the number of vessels under construction. (See Annex 2.)

Almost all of the new vessels, however, will have to be used to replace inferior units; the total number of vessels would hardly

be increased in 1942. The Commander in Chief, Navy, using a chart prepared by the War Economy Section of the Naval Ordnance Division, demonstrates on the one hand the repeated efforts of the High Command, Navy to obtain the workers and raw materials necessary for reinforcing escort and patrol flotillas; on the other hand he shows how naval requirements continually had to yield to those of the Air Force and of the Army. If the Reichsmarschall is perhaps able to build more planes it proves that he has manpower and raw materials at his disposal which, by rights, should belong to the Navy. It is certainly not the fault of the High Command, Navy that there are so few vessels. The cause lies in the distribution of men and raw materials no doubt always made in view of the particular war situation -- in spite of continual requests made by the High Command, Navy, to the Fuehrer, to Dr. Todt, and to the Armed Forces High Command.

The Commander in Chief, Navy also points out that patrol boats in coastal areas which do not have a rear protection of light naval forces are gravely endangered. It is not difficult for a few destroyers to sink them, once they have been located by enemy reconnaissance.

Even then one or another of the boats would be able to report.

C. Mine fields: French anti-submarine mine fields near the mouth of the Loire are seven to nine meters below the lowest water level. This is no obstacle for surface forces. They are a great danger for our own incoming submarines, since the strong current tears them loose. The river plus the tide cause a current of about five knots. Moored mines are therefore quite unsuitable. This was learned in the First World War at the Jade and the Elbe, where mine fields were promptly removed as a danger for our own forces because they would tear loose and drift. Besides this, at high tide the water rises four or five meters, and destroyers can go right over the mine fields.

New experiments are planned as follows:

1. Heavy ground mines are to be buried in the sand bars to prevent passage at such places.

2. A field of ground mines is to be laid which will be electrically detonated from the shore. Their success depends largely on a foolproof detonator cable.

D. Harbor booms have been placed wherever harbor and current conditions permit, for example Boulogne, Brest, Dunkirk. They have not been approved for St. Nazaire, since neither buoys nor dolphins can be used there. The former cannot hold the booms in place due to the swift current, and the latter cannot be driven into the rocky bottom near the mouth of the harbor. Trelis masts on concrete blocks will be tried out if they prove workable. Experiments will be made with a new type of obstacle consisting of a series of barges connected by iron chains.

E. Location finding devices: The number on the West Coast



will be increased as more devices become available (two, possibly up to four a month).

F. Alarm signal in case of invasion: The Navy has such a signal, but all parts of the Armed Forces should know it and use it. All posts which see the signal must repeat it continuously until certain that it has been received everywhere.

The Fuehrer asks whether it would be possible to illuminate the coastal area with parachute flares.

Commander in Chief, Navy: The coastal artillery has star shells which illuminate the coastal area widely. The searchlights used in conjunction with artillery fire have the advantage of blinding the enemy.

Summary by the Commander in Chief, Navy:

Experiences gained as the result of this attack are being utilized to the utmost. Nevertheless we have to consider the possibility of similar raids whenever the enemy is favored by good visibility. The danger is particularly great as long as there is neither an effective naval defense nor an adequate air reconnaissance. In the absence of almost all naval forces as well as the Air Force from the home waters, due to the changed war situation, even raids in the German Bight do not appear impossible. Entrances to the German Bight, like Borkum and Wangeroog, greatly exposed by removal of guns to the occupied territories, must be better fortified again (e.g., by placing the GNEISENAU's 15 cm battery on Wangeroog).

The Fuehrer stresses the fact that he must demand that at least the most important naval bases, like submarine bases, be so well protected that successful raids would be impossible. In his opinion this was not the case at St. Nazaire.

The Commander in Chief, Navy mentions experiences with British explosives which should not only be brought to the attention of the entire Armed Forces but also of the civilian population in order to prevent sabotage. He hands a large number of photographs to the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command.

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports that the population of St. Nazaire and its vicinity strongly favors De Gaulle. Two days before the attack a successful police raid was staged.

II. Naval Situation in March 1942.

Home Waters and the German Sphere of Influence.

A. Norway. The cruiser ADMIRAL HIPPER was transferred to Trondheim as planned. LUETZOW will presumably follow in mid-May. PRINZ EUGEN will probably return for repairs at the end of April. Since there are very few destroyers in the Arctic Sea future operations of surface forces must depend on the possibility of effective air reconnaissance, so far as fuel permits.

The twenty submarines assigned to the protection of the northern area have the following missions:

1. To paralyze enemy convoy traffic in the Arctic Sea and near the ports.
2. To recognize and thwart promptly any enemy plans to land in the Norwegian area.

Extensive plans for further mine fields to protect our own transports were carried out (e.g., near Bantos and Stadtlandet). Deep-sea mine fields were laid near the North Cape as protection against enemy submarines. It is believed that three enemy submarines have been sunk there already. A mine field in the Porsanger Fjord protects the Banak airport against naval bombardment.

B. The attempt made by Norwegian merchant ships to break out of Swedish harbors, which we have been expecting since the beginning of January, was completely unsuccessful. Reports have furnished us with the details.

C. Traffic of merchant ships during March: Traffic between German and German occupied harbors consisted of 1,274 merchant vessels of 2,566,017 BRT. Of these, 1,011 ships of 2,177,136 BRT were convoyed!! They were distributed as follows:

Norway	405 ships totaling 1,062,666 BRT
North Sea	519 ships totaling 1,145,351 BRT
Western Area	330 ships totaling 358,000 BRT

No traffic in the Baltic due to ice.

Foreign Waters:

A. Cruiser warfare: Ship "10" operated without success in the Antarctic. However, in the South Atlantic five enemy steamers were captured without firing a shot. These were PAGASITIKOS, WELLPARK, WELLESSEN, AUST, and one other. Ship "10" will be supplied by REGENSBURG and proceed to the western part of the Indian Ocean as planned.

An agreement was reached with the Japanese Navy reserving the area West of 80° East longitude and South of 10° South latitude for ship "10", and possibly permitting Japanese submarines to operate in an area 300 miles wide along the eastern coast of Africa. We recommended to the Japanese the use of submarines near the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

Ship "28" is en route in the South Atlantic. DOGGERBANK successfully fulfilled her mine-laying mission off Capetown. She received new orders to lay mines near Cape Agulhas with the coming new moon. Meanwhile she is waiting in the South Atlantic.

B. Blockade runners: Supply ship REGENSBURG in the Indian Ocean and TANNENFELS in the South Atlantic are both en route to Japan. The tanker CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN is in the waiting zone in the Southwest part of the South Atlantic.



Of the five blockade runners returning home, two have already arrived in Bordeaux: the OSORNO and the RIO GRANDE, the latter with 3,700 tons of rubber and 3,800 tons of whale oil. The FUSIYAMA is in the South Atlantic, and the PORTLAND and the MUENSTER are still West of Cape Horn.

The Mediterranean and the Black Sea: the VALIANT left Alexandria after three and a half months of repairs. The QUEEN ELIZABETH docked there. Since no sign of the VALIANT has been found in the Mediterranean for several days, it is assumed that she left by way of the Red Sea. It is not known whether she is ready for action. The MALAYA sailed Westward from Gibraltar. Attacks made by German and Italian submarine and planes have seriously weakened light enemy forces. In short, the situation in the Mediterranean is extremely favorable right now. (See Annex 3 in this connection.)

Therefore the 5th and 6th Transport Squadrons were sent to Tripoli as planned.

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla is to be used to lay mines off Malta in connection with the current major operation against that island.

The 6th Motor Minesweeping Flotilla is to be transferred to Tripoli for escort duty.

Four more PT boats, now at Cologne, are being assigned to the Mediterranean. These could ultimately be sent to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles.

The Fuehrer permits that they attempt passage through the Dardanelles camouflaged as merchant vessels without previous political negotiations.

In the Black Sea new mine fields are being laid off the Rumanian and Bulgarian Coast.

The plan to mine the Crimean Coast had to be dropped temporarily because the necessary Rumanian naval forces were refused.

The Fuehrer orders that none of the German batteries be given to either Bulgaria or Rumania.

C. Submarine warfare: We have 288 submarines as of 1 April 1942 of which 122 are operational units. Location of the 125 boats in operation areas on 9 April is as follows:

- |                   |           |  |
|-------------------|-----------|--|
| a. Arctic Ocean:  | Total 19; | 5 are at Kirkenes, Narvik and Trondheim, and <u>14 at sea.</u>   |
| b. Atlantic:      | Total 81; | 45 in North Atlantic and U. S. Coast; 2 in South Atlantic; 34 in bases on the western coast of France. |
| c. Mediterranean: | Total 20; | 7 at sea.  |
| d. Home ports:    | Total 5;  | 3 overdue.   |

Submarines sank these vessels in March (confirmed):

German submarines:	89 vessels totaling 524,286 BRT
Italian submarines:	19 vessels totaling 82,000 BRT
Japanese submarines:	19 vessels totaling 101,098 BRT

Total enemy losses for March 1942 in ships sunk or captured (Great Britain, U.S.A., Russia, and the Netherlands):

Ships destroyed by submarines:	707,384 BRT
Ships destroyed by surface forces:	64,202 BRT (of these Japan sank 53,200 BRT)
Ships destroyed by mines:	15,955 BRT
Ships destroyed by the Air Force:	77,564 BRT
Ships captured or confiscated:	212,462 BRT (Japan is responsible for 140 vessels of 196,000 BRT)
Other losses (collisions, shipwrecks, etc.):	17,826 BRT

Total losses for March 1942: 362 vessels of 1,095,393 BRT

The Fuehrer agrees with the Commander in Chief, Navy that victory depends on destroying the greatest amount of Allied tonnage possible. Thus all offensive operations of the enemy can be slowed down or even stopped entirely. The Fuehrer believes that attacks on the Murmansk convoys are most important at the moment.

The Commander in Chief, Navy states that construction of submarines should be stepped up to the very limit. He requests permission to get copper on the black market in France and Belgium.

The Fuehrer wants confirmation whether this is still actually possible. (For submarine production see Annex 4)

III. Support of the German offensive in the East by Japanese naval warfare in the Indian Ocean. (See Annex 5)

It is of decisive importance that Japanese forces attack British supply lines to the Red Sea and Persia in the northern part of the Indian Ocean. The purpose would be to disrupt Russian supplies and thus aid our eastern offensive. The Armed Forces High Command must therefore point out to the Japanese Liaison Staff that a strong Japanese attack on British supply lines would support German operations most effectively.

The Fuehrer has already given Ambassador Oshima some general indications of the spring offensive.

IV. Germany's relations with France.

The Fuehrer is asked for his opinion in regard to further developments.

The Fuehrer believes that Marshal Petain plays a very insignificant role being very old and easily influenced. He thinks it



likely that Laval will replace Petain, but he does not consider the French capable of energetic action of any kind at present. Their whole attitude is weak (witness the Riom trial). According to Ambassador Abetz 5% of the population is for collaboration and 5% for de Gaulle; the rest are watching and waiting. The Fuehrer believes that the French will try to repulse attacks on West Africa.

V. U. S. bases and the development of U. S. policy pertaining to them. (See Annex 6)

VI. The fuel oil situation in 1942.

The Commander in Chief, Navy refers to the report made to the Fuehrer. (Annex 7)

VII. Completion of the aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN.

A. It will take at least until summer 1943 to complete the hull and install the engines. These are the essential factors:

1. Delivery of auxiliary engines which either are missing entirely or have been removed and installed elsewhere.

2. Installation of a bulge as a counterbalance in case the ship lists after being damaged.

3. Increasing the fuel capacity, thus improving the cruising range by 25% at a speed of 19 knots.

B. The total time necessary to complete the carrier does not depend on completing the hull and engines but on changing the flight installations for the use of planes adapted from the Ju 87 D and BF 109 F.

About two years are required to develop, construct and test the catapults necessary for these planes. If it is possible to convert the existing catapults the time limit will be reduced by six months. New winches for the arresting gear are needed. The company producing these winches has not yet announced when they can be delivered.

The carrier cannot therefore be completed before the winter of 1943.

The Fuehrer points out that in general the Armed Forces set their requirements too high.

C. Amounts of iron, steel and scarce raw materials necessary for completion: fifteen tons of copper from the naval allotment pledged already. Other raw materials are not essential.

D. Required manpower. If conversion takes twelve months:

Shipbuilders, etc., for twelve months	590
Machinists, electricians, etc., for eight months	300
For testing during the following four months	600

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Shipbuilders, etc., for twelve months	590
Machinists, electricians, etc., for eight months	300
For testing during the following four months	600



Labor needed during the installation of the bulges which will take an additional five months:

Shipbuilders, etc.:	220
Machinists, etc.:	40

E. Planes for the carrier. (Result of a previous conference between the High Command, Navy and Commander in Chief, Air.)

1. Only a small number of the planes designed originally for this carrier is still available. They are sufficient only for test runs of the carrier, not for combat.

The Air Force claims more of this type cannot be constructed.

2. If a new, special carrier plane is developed, mass production cannot start until 1946..

3. Thus the only types of carrier planes which the Air Force can deliver at present are converted combat models. The following two types are proposed for conversion:

BF 109 F, a pursuit plane.  
Ju 87 D, a dive bomber and reconnaissance plane.

The use of the above mentioned adaptations has serious disadvantages:

a. In addition to a minimum of ten pursuit planes there are only 21 to 23 Ju 87 D; six of these are not ready for immediate use. (Original plans call for thirty three bombers.)

There are no torpedo planes.

b. It will be necessary to design and construct new winches for the arresting gear. The flight deck and the hangar deck as well as the elevators will have to be reinforced because of the increased weight of the planes.

There are also technical difficulties in taking off and landing: a catapult will have to be used for all take-offs except with a few Ju 87 D's used for reconnaissance. They can leave from the deck when there are favorable headwinds due to the speed of the ship. The high landing speed of the BF 109 F is another complication. The Air Force will have to decide most of these questions. Both plane types are heavier and the Ju 87 D is unwieldy in addition. It will take longer to transfer the planes from one deck to another; the whole rhythm of movement on the carrier will be slowed down, and the planes will be delayed in getting into action.

Summary:

1. Earliest date by which work on the hull and installation of the engines can be completed is summer 1943 provided that construction in the harbors of Kiel and Wilhelmshaven is not interrupted by air raids.

2. Date of final completion of the entire carrier including changes in the flight installations for the planes: winter of 1943/44.

3. Aircraft: Only ten converted pursuit planes and twenty two converted bombers (including reconnaissance planes) will be available. There are no torpedo planes. If a new type of special carrier plane is developed, mass production cannot be attained until 1946!!

Before all technical and tactical difficulties mentioned above can be solved and a final decision in regard to the types of planes in question can be made, further discussions between the Air Force and the Navy are necessary.

The Naval Staff maintains that the results of our efforts so far do not justify continuing work on the carrier. While the technical problems concerning ship construction and plane conversion can evidently be solved, the disadvantages which still remain reduce the carrier's tactical value to a critical point. We must expect heavy losses which we cannot afford due to these causes: Take-off without catapult is possible only under favorable conditions; most of the planes depend completely on catapults; there is no smoke-laying equipment for aircraft available; the planes are too heavy and cumbersome; the landing of the planes presents a difficult technical problem. The attempt to use converted aircraft should therefore be discouraged. If the Air Force is not in a position to reconsider the construction of the originally planned carrier plane, the request for the development of a new plane especially adapted for aircraft carriers must be maintained.

The Commander in Chief, Navy will approach the Fuehrer again, if the discussions with the Commander in Chief, Air in regard to carrier planes do not have satisfactory results.

The Fuehrer believes that torpedo planes are necessary in any case; it is furthermore important that our own types of aircraft are a match for those of the enemy.

#### VIII. Miscellaneous

A. The steamer SCHARNHORST is in Japan and can be sold to the Japanese.

B. Distribution of the GNEISENAU's guns: Three guns 280 mm from turret A were installed on coast defense gun mounts near the Hook of Holland. Turrets B and C were mounted whole in Norway (by blasting into solid rock).

#### IX. Admiral Krancke reports on manpower of the Navy.

Upon information about the composition of the First Naval Brigade, the Fuehrer admits that the Navy is very short of officers (only 15,000 officers for 500,000 men). On the other hand it is not advisable to use Army divisions which can be employed in com-



bat for occupation of the French islands, for if they should be needed in the East they would then not be available. The division on the Channel Islands, for instance, is practically lost to the Army. The protection of the coastal islands is a part of the Navy's coastal defense assignment, and as such is particularly a naval responsibility. Since the Army is in urgent need of additional forces, he must give this task to the Navy in spite of the shortage of naval officers. It is not important whether properly organized brigades are set up; the island defense forces should be formed to fit local needs. Besides local defense strong points, mining, etc., depending on the terrain and landing possibilities, there must also be one mobile shocktroop unit for each island to annihilate any airborne troops or other forces landing there. The primary duty of these troops is to keep the enemy from getting a foothold on the island. At the same time, however, they are really an advance guard, and as such they must be integrated with the entire coastal defense system, including their radar stations, etc. Thus, as the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division observes, the Navy will not set up brigades, but will receive orders to take over the defense of this or that island. The necessary officers must be trained, possibly from the ranks of non-commissioned officers. The Army has had tremendous losses among its officers; it can transfer officers temporarily, but cannot dispense with them permanently. The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division proposes that the Navy be given until October to complete this task. The Fuehrer considered October too late. The Navy will have to get additional men from the reserves, for it does not have sufficient personnel. The Fuehrer admitted that the staffs of the Navy are very small and says the Army should take this as an example. He is also aware of the fact that the Navy needs many rear-echelon units since they have a very complicated technical organization.

Additional remarks.

On 14 April 1942 the following telegram was sent confirming the results of the above conference:

To the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, personal; copy to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff.

"Request confirmation of yesterday's conference on naval brigades: Navy entirely responsible for defense of islands in Western Area to be designated by Armed Forces High Command. Necessary personnel and materiel to be determined in collaboration with Commanding General, West and to be installed as soon as possible. Troops to be trained on the islands. Army ordered to furnish necessary officers temporarily until Navy can train its own. Army to assist likewise in training of new naval artillery officers. Army and Air Force to provide arms and equipment which Navy lacks. This method of taking over naval defense of the islands seems quicker and more economical than adhering rigidly to previous orders."

Grand Admiral Raeder

X. Definition of authority in the Netherlands among the Commanding General, West; the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands; and the Commanding Admiral, North Sea Station.

Vice Admiral Krancke reports on organization:

According to the Fuehrer's order No. 40, the Commanding General, West is responsible for the conduct of the war along the coast in the French, Belgian, and entire Dutch area, without referring to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands. In Holland, therefore, he is responsible not only for the area of the Commanding Admiral, Netherlands, but also for that part of the Dutch area commanded by the Admiral, Coastal Defenses, German Bight. The Commanding General, West is responsible not only for coastal warfare, but also for its preparation as regards tactics, organization, personnel, and materiel.

The Netherlands belongs to the North Sea area as far as naval organization is concerned (ship traffic, coastal and anti-aircraft defense, widespread dock and supply systems, and replacement units). The Commanding Admiral, Netherlands is subordinate to the Admiral, North Sea Station.

This means that both the Commanding Admiral, North Sea Station and the Commanding General, West are in charge of the same coastal defense. Their orders overlap. The authority of the Commanding General, West has to deal continuously with matters coming under the jurisdiction of the Commanding Admiral, North Sea Station. The organization must therefore be changed. The Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff is asked to investigate this question and to define clearly the respective spheres of command.

The Fuehrer will make the decision.

XI. The question of a naval representative at the Fuehrer Headquarters. (See Annex 8)

In a private conference the Commander in Chief, Navy explains why it is necessary to have a permanent representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters. He compares the Navy with other branches of the Armed Forces. The Fuehrer approves a permanent representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters. He will be a flag officer authorized to move freely between the Naval Staff and the Headquarters; he has the right to report to the Fuehrer on all matters pertaining to the Navy, and to be present at all conferences dealing with the general conduct of the war.

signed: Raeder

countersigned: Assmann



Conclusions to be drawn from British Offensive Operations against the French Coast.

I. General Conclusions:

British operations against the Norwegian and French coasts show that the British, taking advantage of the fact that the German Army and Air Force are heavily engaged in the East, are determined and able to attack the extensive German Coast more frequently and on a larger scale than we have thus far expected.

The following principal changes have occurred since the summer of 1941:

a. On the side of the enemy: The British Isles are adequately protected against insignificant dangers existing at present. There is no danger of a German invasion. Powerful air, ground, and naval forces are now available to the British. They possess both air and naval superiority. As a result they are increasing their preparations for offensive action against our coasts. Starting with small surprise raids against weakly defended points on the Norwegian Coast, they are building up additional reinforcements of materiel and men in the meantime in order to be strong enough to attack the French Coast. Russia exerts strong pressure on Britain to relieve the Russian Front by attacks in the West. On the other hand, the increasing loss in tonnage resulting from the submarine war gives cause for anxiety, forcing the British to try to eliminate the submarines in the French bases. Agents in the French area co-operate in every way possible to keep the British fully informed in regard to German strength, distribution of our forces, harbor defenses, etc. In contrast to past practice the enemy now prepares operations with meticulous care and employs sufficient forces in carrying them out. He is prepared to take great risks and shows remarkable courage and initiative.

b. On the side of Germany: The main part of our Army and Air Force is tied down in the East at the expense of the West (e. g. early in April the Commander, Air, Atlantic Coast had for reconnaissance purposes only four Heinkel 111 planes ready for action). Our heavy naval forces were transferred from Brest either to Germany or to Norway. All patrol boats, destroyers, torpedo boats, minesweepers, and PT boats that could possibly be spared were sent to Norway as ordered to aid in the defense of the endangered northern area. The center of our defense was shifted to Norway (mines, nets, coastal batteries, and anti-aircraft defenses). As a result of these measures our own coast is becoming more and more vulnerable.

In spite of this the preparedness for defense at home was strengthened as far as possible by suitable measures in regard to organization, personnel, and materiel, so that we can expect the defense to be successful.

Summary: The enemy's offensive strength is increasing, while we are weakened because our forces are tied down in the East and in Norway.

II. Remarks on countermeasures to the enemy's operation against St. Nazaire.

In a concentrated surprise attack, and with severe losses, the enemy was able to gain a partial success against the outer Normandy locks, the pumps and the machine installations. The operation was painstakingly planned; the enemy utilized weather conditions; he was very accurately informed about the German situation on land and sea. He did not succeed in doing any essential damage to the German base, and submarine operations were not even disturbed.

Considering the very weak forces available, the success of our defense is particularly praiseworthy. Preparedness, deportment of the troops, and the entire land defense deserve full recognition.

In spite of this, our preventive measures and our means of defense were not sufficient to prevent the enemy from approaching and from penetrating into the Loire estuary, the harbor channel, and into the harbor itself. For this reason a careful check and analysis of the experiences gained was made to determine the following:

a. What measures could have prevented the enemy's approach and his penetration into the harbor?

b. What should be done to exhaust every possibility for strengthening, perfecting, and improving coastal defense in the future?

Analysis of question "a" with reference to St. Nazaire:

1. It can be stated once and for all that the planes available cannot carry out the necessary daily sea reconnaissance. This is absolutely indispensable to any coastal defense, however, not only in the evening but also at night. (The enemy air force can do this.) It cannot be said whether in the case of St. Nazaire, in view of the bad weather conditions, air reconnaissance would have changed the outcome.

2. Prompt discovery of the enemy's approach was made difficult by the bad weather, by the diversion caused by a simultaneous air raid, and by the course the enemy took. In that kind of weather we will have to expect successful surprise attacks in the future too. It was not the case that harbor defense boats and coastal patrol boats lying in the outer roadstead were negligent in the performance of their duties. The enemy was favored by very limited visibility. It is absolutely necessary to considerably augment our patrol vessels. Defense forces in addition to those in action were not available and will not be available within a reasonable space of time, considering the general appreciable shortage of naval forces which is well known.



We do not have sufficient radar equipment for locating the enemy at sea. There is a deficiency at St. Nazaire, but the present capacity of industry and the raw material situation do not permit filling even the most urgent demands.

3. The enemy came in with the tide, thus clearing both the anti-submarine mine obstacles and the sand bars - a new experience - and approached St. Nazaire not using the channel. In the kind of weather which prevailed, prompt discovery would have been possible only with a large number of patrol boats, which were not present or obtainable. Only strong mine barriers were there to prevent the enemy's approach. The value of such barriers is considered very questionable: there is the possibility of clearing them at high tide; the mines are damaged or lost due to lack of protection in unprotected bays; and they present a great hazard to our own shipping, as experience has shown. They endanger our own submarines particularly! (In the First World War as well as in the present war we often had to remove our own mines for this reason.) The use of nets, booms and cables was under careful consideration, but was rejected in the case of St. Nazaire. Our experience has been that the obstacles are exposed to such wear and tear in unprotected roadsteads that they are often torn loose, start to drift, and greatly endanger our own shipping. Where conditions permit, e.g., at Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Brest, Lorient, booms were installed and are in use.

Anti-submarine nets are present in the Loire estuary. They are no protection against surface forces. Surface craft running full speed against the nets can overcome such obstacles.

Summary: On the basis of previous experience and in view of the men and materiel available, the defense measures taken by the responsible commander were adequate to meet the requirements considered necessary up to that time. No enemy motor boat succeeded in making a landing. All landing boats were destroyed or damaged and forced back. It must be stated, nevertheless, that an enemy destroyer should never have been allowed to break through to the floodgate under any circumstances, and similar occurrences must be prevented in the future. An enemy destroyer attacking full force which clears anti-submarine mine obstructions, sand banks, and nets is something new. The following necessary measures are being taken: ground mines are being buried in sand banks exposed at low tide; construction in the harbor is being undertaken to protect booms; depth charge throwers are being placed in front of the entrance and the locks.

In view of the shortages everywhere and the necessity of using numerous makeshift defense measures, experience will show that there will constantly be new shortcomings in our defenses and new demands made upon them.

(Note for the Commander in Chief, Navy: Other branches of the services had similar experiences. Note the drive for collecting furs and winter clothing, the inadequacies in the anti-aircraft protection of numerous German cities, and the ammunition situation in the Army which is in part alarming!)

Even if more careful preparations at St. Nazaire had been made and additional measures for protection had been taken, they would not have succeeded in warding off a determined enemy who had exact knowledge of all German defensive weapons, especially when the enemy utilized bad weather for a surprise attack and used German recognition signals. The only thing which could have prevented the enemy from approaching and penetrating as far as St. Nazaire would have been strong naval forces and sufficient planes for reconnaissance.

### III. Experiences in using naval forces.

Sufficient naval forces as well as planes are necessary in coastal defense for adequate reconnaissance and for repulsing enemy attempts at landing. There must be constant naval patrol activity in the vicinity of all points suitable for enemy landings, and the patrol units must be backed by stronger ships, such as destroyers and torpedo boats, held in constant readiness.

With the forces available at present patrol duty is possible only to a very limited extent, since nearly all patrol, minesweeping, and escort craft are engaged in minesweeping and convoy duty and are fully occupied with these tasks. Combat units to support the patrol boats are not available except at very few points, such as in Norway at the moment.

A study of possible enemy landings (see Appendix to Annex 1) shows that in order to fulfill the most urgent tasks we must demand, in addition to the present forces as they are now distributed, at least the following naval forces for the endangered area from Kirkenes to Bayonne:

7 destroyer flotillas (6 destroyers each)....	42 destroyers
11 torpedo boat flotillas (6 boats each)...	66 torpedo boats
50 patrol flotillas (12 boats each).....	600 patrol boats
5 motor-minesweeper flotillas	
(12 boats each).....	60 motor-minesweepers

The need is calculated on the following basis: Half of the destroyers and torpedo boats are always ready for action. One third of the patrol and motor-minesweeper flotillas is in dock for repair; one third is off duty; one third is stationed at sea.

Even with these reinforcements, the various regions would not gain very much. For example:

a. The entire French west coast receives only nine patrol flotillas, one destroyer flotilla, and two torpedo boat flotillas. Of these Brest, Lorient, and St. Nazaire would receive two patrol flotillas each, and all three ports together would receive one destroyer flotilla and one torpedo boat flotilla.

b. The French channel coast and the Belgian and Dutch coasts receive only six patrol flotillas, five motor-minesweeper flotillas, two destroyer flotillas, and three torpedo boat flotillas. Of these only five motor-minesweeper flotillas, one destroyer flotilla, and two torpedo boat flotillas would go to the Boulogne-Ijmuiden sector.



c. Norway is given 30 patrol flotillas, four destroyer flotillas, and four torpedo boat flotillas.

Considering our pressing requirements these demands are extremely modest. In view of our limited resources and potentialities, however, even they cannot be satisfied.

These statements concerning the real requirements necessary to carry out the tasks in coastal defense which fall to the Navy show that the available forces are completely inadequate everywhere. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that every opportunity to increase and strengthen our existing forces should be utilized to the fullest. On the other hand there exist these unfortunate conditions: a completely insufficient allocation of raw materials; loss of urgently needed labor and naval personnel; and an entirely inadequate distribution of oil. (In Norway, for example, more than 20 urgently needed patrol vessels had to be kept idle at certain times because of lack of oil; at present, all operations of light and heavy units using fuel oil have been suspended except for the most urgent defensive operations.)

It can be stated that if strong German naval forces were present there would be no danger whatever for the extensive German coastline. With the present shortages, however, every shift of forces opens new gaps at other points. If we assigned more light naval forces to the Western Area it would weaken our position in Norway to a degree intolerable at the present time. Reduction of the instructional staff at home has a very damaging effect upon submarine training and upon the availability of submarine crews.

IV. Tactical lessons, derived from previous enemy landing operations, which were ordered put into practice at once:

- a. Important command posts are to be shifted from the endangered coast into the interior.
- b. Patrol and harbor defense craft at sea are to be reinforced to the greatest extent possible.
- c. The supply of arms and ammunition is to be checked everywhere. Defense and security of all headquarters are to be checked anew.
- d. Coastal defenses must remain fully alerted even during air raids. All guard posts and observation posts facing the sea must be constantly manned.
- e. Emergency structures to protect all locks against ramming or blasting are to be built at once in so far as local conditions permit the use of makeshift measures.
- f. Particular attention is to be given to the guarding, arming, and fortification of isolated installations and equipment such as radio stations. As far as possible these are to be moved to strong points.

g. All communications equipment and all lines of communication are to be checked constantly.

h. The last reserves are to be drawn out of all offices, coastal and anti-aircraft batteries, naval units not ready for action, schools, etc. They are to be used for coastal defense. All employees and workers are to be utilized as far as possible for guard duties; they are to receive accelerated training and be assigned by the Army.

i. Guarding of the docks is to be improved on the basis of past experience.

j. A motor brigade is to be formed from existing automobile stocks for emergency use. Reserve units must be set up.

k. Regular Army companies ready for action, being the backbone of defense, must be placed in all submarine bases.

l. French civilians are to be completely evacuated from coastal and port areas vital to the defense.

V. Other experiences and lessons for the future.

1. It is vitally necessary to reinforce our light naval patrol forces. Great difficulties will have to be overcome in regard to raw materials, dockyard capacity, labor and oil shortages.

2. Aerial reconnaissance forces must be increased. Timely defensive measures are impossible without adequate aerial reconnaissance along coasts where enemy raids or large-scale operations may be expected at any time. We absolutely must insist upon evening reconnaissance to a distance of 150 nautical miles from our coast at the very least.

3. Our coastal artillery defenses should be reinforced by additional batteries as soon as possible. The location of existing batteries should be checked in the light of the latest experiences for more efficient distribution. Possibly a number of batteries could be shifted from the coastal sector of Operation "Seelowe" to other locations.

4. Increased attention must be given to patrol activities. Patrol forces and harbor defense forces must be reinforced as much as our resources will possibly permit. Perhaps reductions in convoy services will be unavoidable. All patrol and harbor defense vessels should be equipped with radio, and in some cases with radar. Equipment, raw materials, and industrial capacity are all problems! Harbor defenses facing the sea should be strengthened as much as the shortage of vessels permits.

5. The use of mines in coastal defense should be increased as far as it can possibly be done. Careful planning is necessary because of the limited number of mines and mine-laying vessels available. Experiments can be made in using ground mines



in sand banks and in shallow waters off our own bases outside our navigational channels.

6. All opportunities for constructing nets, booms, and cables should be taken advantage of as far as the material is available, in order to prevent surprise attacks. Every kind of improvised device should be utilized.

7. Construction in harbors should be undertaken to prevent blasting of locks and entrance channels. All locks should be protected against attempts at ramming.

8. Additional torpedo batteries and depth charge throwers should be installed for defense against enemy action, as far as existing equipment permits.

9. Large-scale improvements should be undertaken to make radar equipment more effective against targets at sea. Production is sharply limited by industrial capacity and raw material allocation.

10. It should never be forgotten that new enemy surprises are possible at any moment. Defense measures should be checked everywhere for their effectiveness against new enemy devices and tactics contrived to fit local conditions.

11. We can expect to reinforce and improve coastal defense only to a very small extent with additional forces, arms, and equipment, since all these things are being used to capacity already. Therefore it is necessary to distribute and utilize everything to the very last reserves in the most effective way possible.

The grave lack of forces in all branches of the Navy is a decisive factor in any evaluation of our defensive measures. The only relief can come from a fundamental improvement in the naval situation in regard to armaments, raw materials, and labor, something which the Naval Staff has been continually requesting for years! Besides this it remains to be said that the absence of a strong naval air force is not only an immense disadvantage in all offensive operations of naval forces, but it is also a very great handicap in protecting the waters near the coast and the coast itself.

Possible Enemy Landings

Other landing operations on a limited scale are likely to occur in the future. According to the variety of devices and tactics used in the past, we can expect further surprises of all kinds in the future. A large-scale invasion in the Western Area is improbable at present, but it would be possible in northern Norway and in the Arctic Area. Sooner or later, however, the enemy will be strong enough to launch large-scale operations in the Western Area too.

The most important military objectives in the Western Area are the submarine bases at Lorient, St. Nazaire, and Brest, as well as the shipyard and dock installations at Brest. Next are the port facilities at La Pallice, La Rochelle, Royan, Le Verdon, Bayonne, St. Jean de Luz. In addition there are those in the Gironde estuary, which is a center for blockade-runners and for ore traffic, and the location of an Italian submarine base. The ports in the Loire and the Gironde estuaries would make good bridgeheads for larger invasion attempts.

The most important objectives on the Channel coast are the PT boat bases at Boulogne, Ostende, and IJmuiden. Next to these are all the other ports, such as Flushing, Dunkirk, Calais, Cherbourg, Le Havre, the Scheldt River estuary, and Hook of Holland, which are important for our escort and patrol services. Other likely objectives are coastal batteries of strategic importance, radar installations, and airfields. The area between the Seine and the Somme and also the "Fortress Holland", as at Scheveningen and Hook of Holland, are likely theaters for a large-scale invasion.

The most important objectives in Norway are coastal batteries and other installations of importance to the war effort. Bases for both surface vessels and submarines are significant, particularly those at Trondheim and Bergen. Transit and reloading ports serving our supply lines and our escort and patrol activities are likewise important, especially Kirkenes, Petsamo, Kristiansand, Tromsø, Stavanger, etc. Large-scale landing operations may occur in the Kirkenes-Petsamo area and in the vicinity of the Lofoten Islands.

In the Skagerrak, Kattegat, and the German Bight regions landings are less likely, although worthwhile objectives do exist there, such as coastal batteries, ships, and patrol units.



Number and distribution of the indicated types of flotillas in the Northern Area, including the North Sea - Skagerrak, and the Western Area, including the Channel (without the Baltic, Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas).

	Norway	North Sea, Skagerrak, Kattegat.	Channel, Dutch-Coast, Western Area.	Total:	Approx. No. of Vessels
Minesweeper Flotillas	9	7	15	31	387
Sub. Chaser Flotillas	2	1	1	4	45
Patrol Flotillas	6	4	9	19	220
Mot. Mineswpr. Flotillas	2	1	4	7	80
PT Boat Flotillas	2	-	2	4	34
Harbor Def. Flotillas	9	11	12	32	540

Additions to the Navy up to 1 April 1943.

5 Destroyers. . . . . Existing flotillas brought up to strength. At present seventeen destroyers are available.

7 Torpedo boats . . . . . Existing flotillas brought up to strength. At present twenty one vessels are available (five are out of commission).

17 PT boats. . . . . Existing flotillas brought up to strength. One PT flotilla added.

82 Minesweepers. . . . . Existing flotillas brought up to strength. Seven converted minesweepers replaced by new minesweepers.

22 Motor minesweepers. . . . . Two new motor minesweeper flotillas.

2 Minelayers. . . . . New.

12 Mine clearance vessels. . . Existing flotillas brought up to strength. Replacements for losses.

8 Submarine chasers . . . . . Existing flotillas brought up to strength.

83 Patrol vessels. . . . . Seventy old minesweepers and thirteen new fishing trawlers. Vessels unfit for sea duty are replaced by armed fishing trawlers.

11 Torpedo recovery vessels. . Replacements for submarine training divisions.



Available Strength in Patrol Flotillas, Destroyer Flotillas, Torpedo Boat Flotillas, and their Computed Additional Requirements.

Available		Additional Requirements			
<u>West Coast of France</u>					
Brest	}	2 patrol flotillas	}	1 destroyer flotilla	
Lorient		4 patrol flotillas			2 patrol flotillas
St. Nazaire		- destroyer flotillas	2 patrol flotillas	}	1 torpedo boat flotilla
La Pallice/ La Rochelle		1 torpedo boat flotilla	1 patrol flotilla		
Royan/ Le Verdon		5 harbor defense flotillas	1 patrol flotilla		
Bayonne/St. Jean de Luz			1 patrol flotilla		
Total:		4 patrol flotillas	9 patrol flotillas	1 destroyer flotilla	
		1 torpedo boat flotilla		2 torpedo boat flotillas	
		5 harbor defense flotillas			

Available Strength in Patrol Flotillas, Destroyer Flotillas, Torpedo Boat Flotillas, and their Computed Additional Requirements.		
Available		Additional requirements
<u>French Channel Coast and Belgian-Dutch Coast</u>		
Northern Coast of Brittany		1 patrol flotilla
Channel Islands/St. Malo	5 patrol flotillas	2 patrol flotillas
Cherbourg	- destroyer flotillas	2 patrol flotillas
Le Havre	- torpedo boat flotillas	1 patrol flotilla
Boulogne/Ijmuiden	7 harbor defense flotillas	5 flotillas of large motor minesweepers 1 destroyer flotilla 2 torpedo boat flotillas
Total:	5 patrol flotillas 7 harbor defense flotillas	6 patrol flotillas 5 flotillas of large motor minesweepers 2 destroyer flotillas 3 torpedo boat flotillas



Available Strength in Patrol Flotillas, Destroyer Flotillas, Torpedo Boat Flotillas, and their Computed Additional Requirements.

Available		Additional requirements	
<u>Norway</u>			
Polar Region	3 patrol flotillas	1 destroyer flotilla	} Altogether at least 30 patrol flotillas which means 120 vessels in this area.
Lofoten	2/2 destroyer flotillas	1 destroyer flotilla & 1 torpedo boat flotilla	
Trondheim	2/2 torpedo boat flotillas 5 harbor defense flotillas	1 destroyer flotilla & 1 torpedo boat flotilla	
Bergen	3 patrol flotillas - destroyer flotillas	1 destroyer flotilla 1 torpedo boat flotilla	
Stavanger/South Coast	- torpedo boat flotillas 4 harbor defense flotillas	1 torpedo boat flotilla	
Total:	6 patrol flotillas 2/2 destroyer flotillas 2/2 torpedo boat flotillas 9 harbor defense flotillas	4 destroyer flotillas 4 torpedo boat flotillas	At least 30 patrol flotillas

Available Strength in Patrol Flotillas, Destroyer Flotillas, Torpedo Boat Flotillas, and their Computed Additional Requirements.		
Available		Additional Requirements
<u>Skagerrak-Kattegat-North Sea</u>		
Skagerrak Kattegat	4 patrol flotillas	2 patrol flotillas 1 torpedo boat flotilla
North Sea/ German Bight	- destroyer flotillas - torpedo boat flotillas 11 harbor defense flotillas	3 patrol flotillas 1 torpedo boat flotilla  Total: 5 patrol flotillas 2 torpedo boat flotillas
<u>Total Available in the entire area (Norway/Skagerrak, North Sea/Channel Coast, Western Coast of France):</u>	2/2 destroyer flotillas 1 torpedo boat flotilla 2/2 torpedo boat flotillas 19 patrol flotillas 32 harbor defense flotillas	<u>Total Additional Requirements for entire area:</u>  7 destroyer flotillas 11 torpedo boat flotillas 50 patrol flotillas 5 flotillas of large motor minesweepers Several harbor defense flo- tillas



The Mediterranean Situation

In order to maintain our position in North Africa, to accumulate adequate reinforcements and materiel, and later to carry out an offensive against Egypt, our air and naval forces must dominate the Central Mediterranean and secure our supply lines. To accomplish this, the following are prerequisite:

- A. The solution of the oil problem.
- B. The provision of adequate cargo space.
- C. The elimination of the threat of Malta.
- D. The establishment of sufficient port facilities in North Africa.
- E. The effective blocking of the Straits of Sicily.

We can only dominate both sea and air in the Central Mediterranean by continuing the present hard fighting. An essential prerequisite is that the German Air Force in the Mediterranean be strongly reinforced.

A copy of discussion topics for the Duce-Fuehrer conference has been submitted to the Armed Forces High Command.

It is particularly important that the question of oil and cargo space be solved. According to our information there are sufficient Italian vessels available to fill our needs. However, the Italian Ministry of Transport is making difficulties. The Duce has to exert strong pressure! The present situation forces us to reduce merchant shipping temporarily. It enables us to send supplies to Africa without constant escorts, as there is little risk for vessels sailing alone.

Other discussion points for the Duce conference:

- A. The question of using more transport submarines. With 10 to 14 medium sized boats in the Mediterranean we could send supplies amounting to 2,000 tons per month right to the front lines.
- B. The necessity of bringing North African harbors back to full capacity.
- C. The importance of closing the Straits of Sicily.
- D. The importance of occupying Malta very soon. Italy should be urged to do so as soon as possible, since Malta will never again be as weak as it is right now. Its defenses will be rebuilt immediately if we let up on the present strong attacks.

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On the basis of numerous reports, the Naval Staff must stress once more how extremely weak Britain's position in the Eastern Mediterranean is at the present time. That has never been the case before. An early attack against Suez (this year) would have excellent chances of success. It could very well decide the war. We could get enough cargo ships. All reports confirm the fact that the enemy is making tremendous efforts to pour all available reinforcements into Egypt and the Near East and to establish a huge supply base in the Red Sea area. If the Suez offensive is delayed until 1943 it might easily fail.

It is therefore imperative to take Malta as soon as possible and to launch an offensive against the Suez Canal not later than 1942.



Increase in the Production of Submarines

As we announced in the last reports, the number of new submarines which was originally set at 24-25 per month as an urgent naval requirement has sunk to eighteen boats for the present on account of the reduced raw material quotas. In all probability we must count on a gradual reduction to fifteen boats. In order to postpone a further decrease below eighteen boats as long as possible, the Commander in Chief of the Navy was forced to limit new construction of other types of vessels, particularly destroyers and torpedo boats, to the greatest possible extent. A further reduction, especially of light naval vessels, is absolutely impossible. On the contrary, we must try in every way to increase the number of patrol units and light vessels needed for coastal and offshore protection, as the experiences in the recent British landing actions have demonstrated. Under no circumstances can additional decreases be made in favor of submarine construction.

On the other hand, enemy reports and our own calculations based on the recent heavy sinkings have confirmed the Naval Staff in its opinion that submarine warfare is of really decisive importance for the outcome of the war. We consider it our duty therefore again to request most urgently an allotment of raw materials above the existing quota in order to make possible an increase in submarine construction up to the 25 boats originally planned. No change in the other allotments would be involved, since this increase would be used solely to augment submarine construction.

The Naval Staff considers it possible to obtain the additional amount of copper required for the special purpose of increasing submarine construction by means of buying on the black market in unoccupied France, collecting scrap metal, salvaging copper from the Maginot Line, melting church bells, running the blockade, etc.

To increase the number of submarines to twenty five, an additional allotment of 250 tons of copper per month is necessary and is herewith applied for.

The question of increased construction at a later date should also be considered from this angle: after construction has been reduced to eighteen and later to fifteen submarines a month, it will be extremely difficult to increase the number within a reasonable length of time if the situation should improve. The stepping up of submarine construction is substantially more difficult and protracted than for instance the same process in munitions manufacture.

Support of the German Land Offensive (see Directive 41)\*  
by Japanese Naval Operations in the Indian Ocean.

The following should be particularly noted in connection with the German summer offensive in the East:

In their endeavor to support Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United States will make every effort during the coming weeks and months to increase shipment of equipment, materiel, and troops to Russia as much as possible. In particular the supplies reaching Russia on the Basra-Iran route will go to the Russian Caucasus and southern fronts. All British or American war materiel which reaches Russia by way of the Near East and the Caucasus is extremely disadvantageous to our land offensive. Every ton of supplies which the enemy manages to get through to the Near East means a continuous reinforcement of the enemy war potential, makes our own operations in the Caucasus more difficult, and strengthens the British position in the Near East and Egypt.

The German High Command is, therefore, intensely interested in having these British and American supply shipments in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea attacked and disrupted as soon and as effectively as possible. As matters stand, only the Japanese are in a position to do this.

Strong Japanese attacks on the enemy's supply lines in the Indian Ocean could have a decisive effect on our land offensives both in Africa and in Russia. Considering the long period of time necessary before such measures against shipping on the part of the Japanese can be started and can begin to be effective, we must use every means to persuade them to begin operations in the Indian Ocean at the earliest possible date.

In the current conferences with the Japanese Liaison Staff about the situation of naval warfare, the Naval Staff has reminded Admiral Nomura constantly how necessary it is that the Japanese Navy operate soon and decisively in the northern part of the Indian Ocean. The Japanese indicated time and again in the conferences that Japan is willing to harass supply lines to India in her own interest, and that she also intends to operate in the western part of the Indian Ocean with several submarines and two auxiliary cruisers, possibly in May, but that Japan's decisions are greatly handicapped by uncertainty about German plans for future operations. Japan feels that strong attacks against the British supply lines to the Arabian Sea are justified only if Germany really has the intention of advancing against the British position in the Near East and the Middle East. The Japanese representatives speak of the necessity for an offensive by Germany and Italy against the Caucasus-Suez area simultaneous with Japanese operations in the western Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized, however, that vigorous Japanese activity against the British supply routes to Iran and the Red Sea undertaken as soon as possible would be of immeasur-

\* not included



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able assistance to our offensive in southern Russia. The Japanese Navy will shift its activities to the western part of the Indian Ocean when it is aware of the great value this move would have for the German operations.

For this reason the Fuehrer is urgently requested to have the Armed Forces High Command officially inform the Japanese High Command through the Japanese Liaison Staff that strong attacks by the Japanese Navy and Naval Air Force against British supply lines in the western part of the Indian Ocean would give decisive support to the German operations intended for early summer of this year.

Bases of the United States of America as of 15 March 1942.

## A. 1 - 33. Bases within its own possessions:

1. Boston
2. Newport
3. New York
4. Washington
5. Norfolk
6. Charleston
7. Pensacola
8. New Orleans
9. Corpus Christi
10. Tampa
11. Key West
12. Guantanamo
13. Puerto Rico: San Juan, Culebra, Vieques
14. St. Thomas
15. Cocosolo
16. Balboa
17. San Diego
18. San Pedro
19. San Francisco
20. Puget Sound
21. Sitka
22. Juneau
23. Seward
24. Kodiak
25. Nome
26. Dutch Harbor
27. Kiska
28. Pearl Harbor
29. Midway
30. Johnston
31. Palmyra
32. Canton, Enderbury
33. Samoa: Pagopago, Rose Island.

## B. 34 - 36 Bases which have been lost to date:

34. Wake
35. Guam
36. Cavite, Olangapo.

## C. 37 - 44 Bases leased from Great Britain:

37. Newfoundland
38. Bermuda
39. Mariguana
40. Portland Bay, Jamaica
41. Antigua
42. Santa Lucia
43. Trinidad
44. Georgetown



D. 45 - 60 Bases in the Western Hemisphere which belong to other nations but are being used by the United States:

45. Macapa
46. Para (Belem)
47. Sao Luiz
48. Fortaleza
49. Natal
50. Pernambuco
51. Quintero Bay
52. Chimbote
53. Gulf of Nicoya
54. Culebra Bay
55. Gulf of Fonseca
56. Livingston
57. Progreso
58. Vera Cruz
59. Acapulco
60. Magdalena Bay.

E. 61 - 68 Bases taken over from other nations:

61. Northern Ireland
62. Iceland
63. Eastern coast of Greenland; exact location unknown
64. Julianehaab
65. Paramaribo
66. Aruba
67. Guayaquil
68. Galapagos.

F. 69 - 79 Advanced supply bases:

69. Bathurst
70. Freetown
71. Monrovia
72. Cape Palmas
73. Takoradi
74. Lagos
75. Massawa
  - a. Assab
  - b. Asmara
  - c. Akaba
76. Napier
77. Wellington
78. Auckland
79. Port Darwin.

G. 80 - 84 Further connections:

80. Capetown
81. Durban
82. Basra
83. Calcutta
84. Chungking

The Fuel Oil Situation in the German and Italian Navies  
at the beginning of April 1942.

1. At the beginning of April the fuel oil (Heizöl) situation unexpectedly grew worse; the Rumanian commitment for April was reduced from 46,000 tons to 8,000 tons. According to the Armed Forces High Command, War Economy and Armaments Division, this unusual decrease is due to the fact that the Rumanian Minister of Economics, contrary to agreement, granted a subsequent increase in internal oil consumption for April.

2. On the basis of the original promise of the Armed Forces High Command, War Economy and Armaments Division, all the fuel oil from Rumania for April was offered to the Italian Navy, namely:

	46,000 tons, and in addition
	6,000 tons from reserves of the German Navy
total:	52,000 tons

This quantity had to be recognized as the very minimum to meet Italian requirements.

3. The quota for April for the German Navy on the basis of the original promise of the Armed Forces High Command was to have been 50,000 tons of fuel oil. Of this about 30,000 tons were allotted for coastal defense, convoy duty, and submarine training, and 20,000 tons were meant for the nucleus fleet. Even with this distribution, operations of heavy vessels, including cruisers, burning fuel oil, would no longer be possible, and destroyers and torpedo boats could operate only to a limited degree. The use of pocket battleships and PT boats is still unlimited, because they use Diesel oil (Treiböl).

4. According to the original allocations for the two navies, the oil supply available to the German Navy was 110,000 tons. Taking into consideration the widely scattered bases, this amount represents the absolute minimum requirement, which must be maintained if the German Navy is to remain capable of limited action in cases of emergency.

5. On the basis of the original commitments, the amount of fuel oil to be delivered to the Italian and German Navies in April totalled 97,000 tons. On account of the drastic reduction in shipments from Rumania, the Armed Forces High Command, War Economy and Armaments Division was forced to lower the allotments for both navies at the beginning of the month to 61,000 tons.

6. The recent greatly reduced fuel oil shipments for both navies made it necessary to redistribute the oil for April on a much smaller scale. In view of the great significance of the shipment of supplies to Africa and the importance of our own tasks, we had to allocate to the Italian Navy 30,000 tons, and to



the German Navy 35,000 tons, totalling 65,000 tons. In spite of grave misgivings, we will have to cover the 4,000 tons above the total imports for April out of our fuel oil reserves, which will thereby be diminished to about 106,000 tons.

7. The consequence of the greatly reduced allotment to both navies is that both the German and the Italian Navies must completely abandon any operations whatsoever of heavy units using fuel oil. The present fuel oil allotments permit in the current month nothing but the coastal patrol and escort services, submarine training, and only two convoys to Africa, the latter with torpedo boats and destroyers. There are no restrictions for light vessels using Diesel oil or for operational submarines. Destroyers ready for action in the Arctic Ocean could in each separate case be granted permission for action, subject to recall, when there are unmistakable reports about the enemy.

In the event that enemy attacks make operation of German light and heavy forces necessary, instructions were given to fall back on the last reserves of fuel oil. It is impossible to repeat such emergency operations several times.

8. Through the unexpected development of the Rumanian oil economy, the fuel oil situation, contrary to advance calculations, has reached a state which is bound to have a disastrous effect on the further course of the war. Even if the monthly imports are sufficient, the slightest interruption in transportation will necessarily affect the effective functioning even of those German and Italian naval units which are indispensable for maintaining the coastal patrol and convoy services.

Note for the Commander in Chief, Navy

The Question of Naval Representation at the Fuehrer's Headquarters.

The way in which Armed Forces leadership has developed makes a change in the method of liaison between the Navy and the Armed Forces High Command increasingly urgent. A continuation of the present conditions would certainly cause grave injury to the interests of the Navy and would be extremely detrimental to the whole war effort.

The following facts illustrate the importance of this question:

1. Due to lack of recognition and understanding with regard to the Navy and due to obvious misinterpretation of actual occurrences, the consequences of the St. Nazaire incident have led the Armed Forces High Command to issue orders which ruthlessly by-pass the Naval Staff and Naval Headquarters. In addition these orders show that in the case of the Navy, the High Command does not intend to limit itself to general instructions, but rather intends to give orders that go into the smallest tactical and technical details.

2. The Fuehrer Directive No. 40 relating to jurisdiction over coastal areas was drawn up without any decisive naval participation, in spite of the fact that his directive touches on the basic principles of the Navy. It has given cause for grave concern in various respects.

3. The Armed Forces High Command has made most important decisions on over-all strategic and operational planning for the future conduct of the war without consulting the Navy. Frequently only the Chief of the General Staff, Army and the Chief of the General Staff, Air are present at the Fuehrer conferences which deal with fundamental questions relating to the conduct of the war.

4. The consequences that can and must arise from having no one in the Fuehrer Headquarters who can judge matters of naval warfare competently and independently are illustrated by the entirely unnecessary and harmful nervous tension and uncertainty, which was created at Fuehrer Headquarters as the result of the reports from St. Nazaire on 28 March.

5. A change in organization, with the aim of naval representation in the Armed Forces High Command, seems to be necessary. It is contradictory to the demands of war strategy today that there is no high-ranking naval officer in the Armed Forces High Command or in the vicinity of the Fuehrer; one who, as a responsible adviser to the Fuehrer, occupies a leading position in the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. While the



Fuehrer is intimately associated with the General Staffs of the Army and the Air Force every day, making a continuous exchange of ideas possible, he has no adequate close contact with the problems of naval warfare.

A comparison with the other branches of the Armed Forces shows that the Navy is much too inadequately represented at the Fuehrer Headquarters as regards both rank and influence. The representation of the Air Force in particular is excellently organized in the circle closest to the Fuehrer, and they are consequently in a position to keep the Fuehrer exceedingly well informed as to their own interests. The different branches of the Armed Forces are represented as follows at the Fuehrer's Headquarters:

Army:

a. Permanent representatives:

1. Lt. General Schmundt, Chief of the Army Adjutant General's Office.
2. Lt. General Jodl.
3. One General Staff officer.
4. One aide.

b. Occasional representatives:

The Chief of the Army General Staff, who reports daily on the war situation to the Fuehrer.

Air Force:

a. Permanent representatives:

1. Lt. General Bodenschatz, liaison officer plenipotentiary for the Reichsmarschall at the Fuehrer Headquarters.
2. Major Below, Air Force Adjutant.
3. Major Christian, on General Jodl's staff, confidential aide to the Chief of the General Staff.

b. Occasional representatives:

The Chief of the General Staff and/or the Chief of the Operations Division, present at the daily reports on the war situation.

Navy:

a. Permanent representative:

Captain von Puttkamer, Naval Aide.

b. Occasional representatives:

None.

6. Even if the Naval Staff cannot be in the direct vicinity of the Fuehrer, like the General Staffs of the other branches of the Armed Forces, then the permanent influence which is indispensable can be attained only by means of an experienced, authoritative naval personality in the confidence of the Chief of the Naval Staff, who can keep the Fuehrer and the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff constantly informed on naval affairs. As far as we can see, it is only by detailing such a personality to the Fuehrer Headquarters that we would have the possibility of changing the conditions which are going from bad to worse and of representing the requirements of naval warfare with the necessary emphasis.

In regard to the person to be sent, it seems suitable to delegate someone with the rank of a flag officer. He must be a man who can be depended upon to keep the Fuehrer constantly informed about the fundamental problems of naval warfare as they appear to the Naval Staff; he must likewise be able to interpret properly all operational and tactical questions of naval warfare; he must be able to prevail over the Fuehrer and the generals in matters of naval interest. There is no doubt that it would be of the greatest advantage to the whole war effort if a capable admiral suited to this task were sent to the Fuehrer Headquarters.



Berlin 16 May 1942

Commander in Chief of the Navy

Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy with the Fuehrer at the Fuehrer's Headquarters, Wolfsschanze, on 13 and 14 May 1942.

A. Conference on the afternoon of 13 May 1942.

Present: Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command  
Minister Speer  
Dorpmueller  
Reichsstatthalter Kaufmann  
Reich Commissioner Terboven  
Staatsrat Blohm  
Ministerialdirektor Waldeck  
Vice Admiral Krancke

1. The question of increasing ship traffic to Norway is discussed. The proposals of the Commander in Chief, Navy are found in Annex 1.

The Fuehrer agrees in principle with the general outline. He will determine the organization and appoint the necessary personnel from among the representatives of the shipping firms themselves.

There is general agreement that the shipping firms can work only in closest co-operation with the Navy. Such questions as the utilization of harbors, unloading, etc., can be decided upon only in consultation with the proper naval authorities.

Ship repairs: The available facilities must be increased if at all possible. Perhaps certain shipyards should be set aside for this purpose (Blohm, Speer).

Construction of new ships: A standard type of about 2,000-3,000 tons with a speed of about nine knots and simple engines is to be built. Staatsrat Blohm submits a design. Motor ships under construction which are not needed by the Navy as blockade-runners and mine-exploding vessels (Sperrbrecher) are to be equipped with generators and used for merchant shipping.

Field railways are to be used for clearing the docks quickly, and the goods should be stored near the harbors in case they cannot be completely removed at once.

2. Special conference.

Present: Commander in Chief, Navy  
Minister Speer  
Vice Admiral Krancke  
Rear Admiral Kleikamp

Discussion concerning the continuation of destroyer construction.

The Fuehrer considers it hazardous to discontinue construction of destroyers.

Minister Speer holds out the prospect of an additional monthly supply of 1,000 tons of copper which can be obtained from middle and low tension wires if the Armed Forces will extract the copper themselves and provide the necessary iron at the rate of six to one.

The Commander in Chief, Navy considers it justified under these circumstances to start work again on all vessels up to the size of destroyers on which construction was stopped.

The Fuehrer agrees.

3. The Fuehrer decides that a dock is to be built in Trondheim in the Gallosen Fjord even if it will take ten months longer to construct it there.

4. In a subsequent conference with Minister Speer, Vice Admiral Krancke, Rear Admiral Kleikamp, the Fuehrer decides that the EUROPA, the POTSDAM, and the GNEISENAU be converted into auxiliary aircraft carriers. The Military Problems and Shipyards Branch, Naval Construction Division expects to have the plans ready in three months and the converted ships should be completed about twelve months from the time the necessary material is available. The Fuehrer considers it entirely out of the question for larger surface forces to operate without airplane protection.

B. The afternoon of 14 May 1942.

Present: Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command  
Lt. General Jodl  
Commanding Admiral, Submarines  
Vice Admiral Krancke  
Commander von Puttkamer

1. Report of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines on all matters pertaining to submarine warfare (see page 82).

2. The Spitsbergen question.

The Fuehrer again suggests establishing a base and mining coal at Spitsbergen. The Commander in Chief, Navy proposes that the Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, who supposedly called attention to Spitsbergen's importance, be asked to send a commission including a naval officer and coal mining experts in order to investigate on the spot the possibility of establishing a base and the prospects for mining and transporting the coal. The Armed Forces High Command points out the difficulties of supplying a base of any size.



3. Decision of the Fuehrer concerning the release of a special weapon for submarines.

Present: Commander in Chief, Navy  
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command

The Armed Forces High Command will give instructions in writing.

4. Present: Only the Commander in Chief, Navy.

The Commander in Chief, Navy points out once more the need for closest co-operation of the representative of the shipping firms with the Navy. The Commander in Chief, Navy recommends an order which will authorize the Shipping and Transport Branch of the Naval High Command to make all decisions concerning the use of the merchant marine, since the Maritime Shipping Department of the Ministry of Transportation has proved itself unfit for the task.

5. The Commander in Chief, Navy thanks the Fuehrer for his instructions concerning auxiliary aircraft carriers but requests confirmation that the priority ratings of the following will not be affected: submarines and everything pertaining to them (inclusive of torpedo recovery vessels), as well as escort and patrol forces from destroyers on down. He requests further that the Fuehrer put pressure on the Air Force in the matter of carrier planes.

The Fuehrer confirms this. He expresses his opinion that the problem of mass production of suitable types of carrier planes can be solved more easily if there are four carriers than if there is only one.

6. The Commander in Chief, Navy believes that before final decisions can be made about the types of ships to be built for the post-war Navy, we must be clear about whether Britain has to be taken into account or whether our efforts need to be directed only against the United States. In the former case it would again be mainly a war against merchant shipping, and the emphasis would be on auxiliary cruisers equipped with planes, and on submarines; in the latter case, battleships and aircraft carriers would be of primary importance.

The Commander in Chief, Navy is preparing plans for auxiliary cruisers and aircraft carriers, which will be submitted in the near future. In battleship design we are working on these problems: double-bottom construction, protection for propellers and rudder so that they cannot be destroyed simultaneously, and the arrangement of the armored decks.

The Fuehrer declares that a final decision as to types can be made only after it has become clear how the war will end; preparation must be made for both eventualities. Superstructure on warships must be limited as much as possible. Everything above the upper deck must be heavily armored as far as it is practicable, in order to prevent destruction by 2,000 kg bombs. The effect of such bombs is lessened by using curved armor.

7. In answer to the letter of the Commander in Chief, Navy the Fuehrer expresses his belief that it is impossible to build up a naval air force during this war. He realizes the necessity, however, of accelerating construction of airplane carriers even at this late date.

The Commander in Chief, Navy points out that a naval air force with excellent personnel and planes existed at the time the Air Ministry was established.

8. With reference to the letter concerning Midshipman Sommer of the Naval Medical Branch, the Commander in Chief, Navy says that he will settle the matter; he disapproves strongly of the letter of Lieutenant Bauer of the Naval Medical Branch.

signed: Raeder



Organization of Shipping.I. Present Organization

The Navy requisitions whatever it needs from the available total tonnage of merchantmen for naval warfare proper (auxiliary warships and other auxiliary vessels) and for transporting troops. The rest is at the disposal of the Ministry of Transportation, Maritime Shipping Department for transporting equipment and supplies for the Armed Forces and for shipping commercial goods.

The number of ships requisitioned and operated by the Navy is always kept at an absolutely necessary minimum. The percentage of auxiliary warships and other auxiliary vessels used is rather stable. But even here the Navy has always exercised great restraint for the benefit of merchant shipping and is doing this even more so in the face of the growing shortage in cargo space. The layman cannot possibly realize what a great number of merchantmen is required, since he is not in a position to comprehend either the size of the tasks in the coastal zones or the purpose of this type of naval warfare. He does not know what a large number of forces it takes simply to provide adequate protection for those who travel the sea lanes - primarily the merchantmen. Similarly he does not understand that these tasks of naval warfare cover extraordinarily large areas and that we have at our disposal only a quite insignificant force of warships for defense purposes as well as for offensive naval warfare.

The need for tonnage to transport supplies to the Armed Forces fluctuates more than that for auxiliary warships and other auxiliary vessels. It is obvious that the tonnage required is dictated strictly by the number of troops involved and by the construction that is carried on for defense and offense. Every additional soldier or workman in a place that must be supplied by sea, means an increase in the tonnage needed. Here too the Navy has always tried - and we think successfully - to get along with a minimum of cargo space by planning its use carefully and by cutting down on tonnage needs in every way possible. An essential prerequisite was and is the work of the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas, a unit of the Armed Forces High Command which collects and classifies according to urgency all the demands for transportation made by individual units on the supply system of the Armed Forces. For the past four weeks the Ministry of Transportation has furnished the necessary tonnage for the shipment of military supplies (not troops) at the request of the Naval Staff. However, the constantly growing demands for military and commercial sea transportation have in general led to difficulties.

The cargo space at the disposal of the Ministry of Transportation, Maritime Shipping Department for transporting commercial goods is allocated on the basis of economic considerations. The allocation of cargo space is made by the Ministry of Transportation in co-

operation with the Association of German Shipowners. The shrinkage in the total tonnage at Germany's disposal and the unavoidable increase in the needs of the Armed Forces have made it more and more difficult for the Ministry of Transportation to distribute properly the available tonnage. So far, an adjustment was possible only by direct negotiation with the parties concerned.

It can be said that utilization of cargo space has been carefully planned, but there is simply not enough tonnage available any more to meet the demands. Isolated mistakes must be expected in any enterprise; but it surely reveals a lack of deeper insight into the military aspect of all transportation by sea in wartime, if certain personalities interpret such isolated cases as symptoms of inefficiency in the management of merchant shipping.

The management of merchant shipping during wartime, regardless of whether it is used for commercial purposes or for the Armed Forces, is subject to the laws of naval warfare. Shipping depends above all on the strategic situation. For instance, the military supply situation may occasionally require disregarding a 100% utilization of cargo space. Sometimes it is better to forego return freight if, in so doing, supplies can be speeded up. Such emergency cases tend, of course, to provoke all too easily the criticism of the person thinking purely along commercial lines and in terms of the shipping concerns.

## II. Change in organization

If in spite of what has been said above, it is believed that the growing difficulties which are to be expected as a result of the shrinkage of total cargo space can be mastered only by using dictatorial powers over merchant shipping, then it would be well to consider the following:

1. The problem is to distribute the total available tonnage so that it will meet the requirements of (a) naval warfare (auxiliary warships and other auxiliary vessels), (b) transportation of supplies for the Armed Forces, and (c) merchant shipping. The requirements of cargo space for (a) and (b) depend entirely on the tasks confronting the Navy or the Armed Forces - in other words, they are determined purely by naval and military considerations. Only the requirements for (c) can be determined by the economic situation. Although it lies in the interest of the total conduct of the war to satisfy the requirements for (c) as far as possible, still it is hardly necessary to stress the fact that the needs of naval warfare and transportation of supplies for the Armed Forces must dominate, since their fulfillment or nonfulfillment has an immediate effect on the conduct of the war. Only one authority must deal with all these requirements, however, as they are all phases of one and the same problem, cargo space.

2. The best possible use of cargo space can be assured only if cargo allotments are very well organized. This organization is of especial importance when the need for cargo space and



the available tonnage are out of balance. There must be an authority which can give priority to the more important cargo. As far as the transportation of supplies for the Armed Forces is concerned, the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas performs this function. Here the decision rests with the Armed Forces High Command. For commercial shipping there is still no such office with powers of decision. Such an office should act in the interest of the total war economy.

It is not possible to combine these two offices because they have to make their decisions on entirely different bases. The amount of shipping for the Armed Forces is dictated solely by military tasks assigned by the highest authority, while merchant shipping is guided by the requirements of the war economy.

3. The utilization of the available tonnage depends also very largely on the operational execution of maritime transportation. It is the task of the naval command to create the proper conditions for the fastest possible flow of maritime transportation.

4. From the above (1-3) it is clear that the conduct of merchant shipping must be dictated neither by the merchant nor by the shipowner, but solely by someone directly connected with the conduct of the war. It must be someone within the naval command who has access to the following information on which he can base his decisions:

a. Information about the tasks of naval warfare (requirements for auxiliary warships and other auxiliary vessels).

b. Information about the state of the naval war. He must have the possibility of judging and when necessary of influencing operational execution of maritime transportation in order to assure a smooth flow.

c. Knowledge of the turnover which is needed in military and commercial goods, and the requirements for troop transports.

It follows that the decisions about merchant shipping must be dictated from within the Armed Forces, to be specific, by the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, on the basis of the requirements of the Armed Forces and of the economic situation. The central offices, one for the Armed Forces and one for commercial shipping, are responsible for the priority ratings and sequence of demands for cargo space. If the demands for cargo space cannot be entirely satisfied, each has the authority for his own sphere to make a corresponding adjustment of the amount of cargo to the tonnage available.

The Naval Staff, Shipping and Transport Branch, divides the total cargo space by order of the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff on a basis of equality among all shippers concerned (Naval Staff, military supplies, commerce). A "Shipping and Transport Branch" - perhaps a better designation can be found - is to be created to work out these decisions for the Naval Staff. It will

be subordinate to the Quartermaster Division of the Naval Staff and will be directed by a naval officer. The staff of this office will take over those sections of the Maritime Shipping Department of the Ministry of Transportation which are necessary for accomplishing the above tasks. In addition, outstanding personalities of the shipping industry will be included.

5. The construction of new merchantmen for relieving shortages in cargo space and the acceleration of repairs on such ships are closely connected with the problem of utilization of cargo space. Therefore these tasks must likewise be directed by the same office which dictates the disposition of tonnage. For expert execution (utilization of full shipyard capacity, raw material quotas) the services of the Naval Construction Division are available, whose personnel will be increased correspondingly. The allocation of raw material is made by the War Economy Division of the Armed Forces High Command (Wehrwirtschaftsamt).

6. Whatever foreign tonnage becomes available will be administered like the German tonnage. As a rule it will be used for transporting commercial goods.

7. If tonnage becomes available unexpectedly, it will be reassigned to another shipper by the Organization of Naval Offices (K.M.D.-Organisation) of the Naval Staff. Representatives of merchant shipping are assigned to the organization for this purpose.

8. Questions of merchant shipping not yet mentioned will be decided by the Ministry of Transportation as before, unless the Navy has them already under its own jurisdiction.

Naval Staff  
Quartermaster Division  
Plans and Schedules Branch

signed: Schubert



Report of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines at Fuehrer Headquarters on 14 May 1942 in the Presence of the Commander in Chief, Navy.

The report was illustrated by a number of statistical tables.

1. Submarine Statistics: 124 submarines were in the operational zones on 1 May. Of these, 85 were stationed in the Atlantic, 19 in the Mediterranean, 20 in the Arctic Ocean. On the other hand, as many as 114 submarines, exclusive of training vessels, were in the Baltic Sea getting ready for combat duty. A submarine is normally supposed to be ready for operation about 4 months after commissioning. 49 of the 114 submarines mentioned above have been commissioned longer than that, and therefore should have been in the operational zones by 1 May. Everything possible must be done to relieve this congestion.

2. Submarine Operations: Submarine warfare is war against enemy merchant shipping. Since American and British ships are under unified command, they have to be regarded as one. Therefore we must sink ships wherever the greatest number of them can be sunk at lowest cost to us, i.e. where we lose the least number of submarines. We should not concentrate in one certain area if that means sinking fewer ships. This principle applies unless other military factors enter into consideration, as for instance, in the case of our attacks on the convoys to Murmansk, which served the purpose of relieving pressure on the Army. Naturally, in decisions pertaining to submarine warfare, the operational cost must also be considered.

From the point of view of operational cost, our submarine actions in the American area are justifiable. Sinkings from 15 January to 10 May amounted to 303 ships or a total of 2,015,252 BRT. However, submarine operations in the American area are also justifiable from another point of view: we are attempting to offset the merchant vessel construction program of the enemy. America is producing the largest number of merchant ships. Her shipbuilding industry is located in the eastern States. Shipbuilding and other allied industries depend mostly on oil for fuel and the most important American oil fields are found near the Gulf of Mexico. Consequently, the greater part of American tankers is used in coastal traffic, transporting oil from the oil region to the industrial area. From 15 January to 10 May 1942, we sank 112 tankers or a total of 927,000 BRT. About two thirds of these were employed in the above mentioned American coastal traffic. Every tanker we sink not only means one tanker less for carrying oil, but also represents a direct set-back to America's shipbuilding program. Therefore it seems to me that the destruction of these American oil supply vessels is of greatest importance to us. America will have to depend on transporting her oil by water for at least another year. It will take a long time to lay an additional pipeline overland. Besides, a pipeline will hardly be able to supply as much oil as is being shipped by water on tankers. It is also out of the question to transport the same amount of oil by rail as is now being transported by water. Furthermore it seems impossible to convert American industry from

oil to coal. Even if America can reduce its overall oil consumption by restricting its usage, all in all the tanker losses will have an ill effect on American industry in the eastern States, and thus on shipbuilding.

I do not believe that the race between the enemy shipbuilding program and the submarine sinkings is in any way hopeless. The American shipbuilding program calls for 2,239 ships or a total of 16,800,000 BRT for the period from fall 1939 to the end of 1943. 191 of these ships with a total tonnage of approximately 1,500,000 BRT were completed by 31 December 1941. Therefore the Americans must build 2,098 ships with a total of approximately 15,300,000 BRT in the years 1942 and 1943 in order to carry out their plan. If we figure that America can build 6,500,000 BRT in 1942 and 8,700,000 BRT in 1943, and add to this the shipbuilding capacity of the British Empire amounting to 1,600,000 BRT annually, the total tonnage the enemy can build will be about 8,200,000 BRT in 1942 and about 10,400,000 BRT in 1943. That would mean that we would have to sink approximately 700,000 BRT per month in order to offset new constructions; only what is in excess of this amount would constitute a decrease in enemy tonnage. However, we are already sinking these 700,000 BRT per month now; "we" meaning Germany, Italy, Japan: submarines, air forces, surface vessels and mines. In any event, enemy tonnage is definitely being reduced at the present time. Moreover, the construction figures quoted are the maximum amounts ever mentioned by enemy propaganda as the goal of the shipbuilding program. Our experts doubt that this goal can be reached and figure that the enemy can build only about 5 million BRT in 1942. That would mean that only about 400,000 to 500,000 BRT would have to be sunk per month in order to prevent any increase. Anything above that number cuts into the basic tonnage of the enemy.

To avoid miscalculations, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines himself bases his estimates on the highest figures of the enemy shipbuilding program known. He wishes to emphasize again and again that it is very important for us to inflict damage on the enemy by sinking his vessels as quickly as possible, with as many submarines as possible actually placed in the zones of operation. Whatever we sink today counts more than what we may sink in 1943.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines intends to operate submarines in the American waters as long as it is profitable. He closely watches the monthly results of submarine warfare; it means that the average of ships sunk by each submarine is calculated for every day at sea. This daily average amounted to 209 BRT in January, 378 BRT in February, 409 BRT in March and 412 BRT in April. The figures indicate that the average is still increasing slightly. Therefore we are still justified in operating submarines in the American zone. But the calculation of this daily potential also shows how much we are losing by operating submarines in the Norwegian zone. Even if we assume that only 10 of the 20 submarines now operating off Norway would be at sea in the Atlantic each month, according to the above average each of these 10 would sink approximately 400 BRT per day at sea, or a total of 120,000 BRT per month. (As a matter of fact, due to the adequate capacity of the western shipyards, the ratio between time at sea and time in dock at the present time actually is 60:40.) Most of this po-



tential is lost by operating these submarines in the Norwegian area.

One of these days the situation in the American zone will change. Even at this time everything points to the fact that the Americans are making strenuous efforts to prevent the large number of sinkings. They have organized a considerable air defense and are likewise using destroyers and PC boats off the coast. However, all these are manned by inexperienced crews and do not constitute a serious threat at present. In any case, the submarines with their greater experience in warfare are mastering these counter-measures. The American fliers see nothing, the destroyers and patrol vessels are traveling too fast most of the time even to locate the submarines, or they are not persistent enough in their pursuit with depth charges. As such, the shallow American coastal waters make it very easy to safeguard and protect shipping. The Americans could safeguard their shipping later on by organizing it in the following ways:

a. They could establish a so-called War Channel through which to conduct their shipping along the coast, protected on the ocean side by net and mine barrages. I do not believe that the Americans will choose this method, because it is too costly.

b. The other method would be to organize all shipping into convoys. This method will probably be chosen, and the convoys will be led along the coast in shallow waters. The daily traffic will then become lighter and our chances of success will become fewer. However, as long as their escorts are inexperienced, I believe that we will be able to attack the convoys in the usual manner even in shallow waters. It is due to our tested medium sized type of submarines that we are able to do this at all. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines will then also resort to the use of mines against American shipping. So far mines were not used because it was more economical to equip the submarines with torpedoes as long as the daily traffic was heavy. However, in anticipation of the expected decrease, it is planned to mine Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay and New York Harbor during the new moon period in the middle of June. Submarines equipped with mines will leave on missions within the next few days.

If operations in the American area should prove unprofitable, we shall resume warfare against the convoys in the North Atlantic with a large number of submarines. Up to this time locating the enemy was always the most difficult part of this warfare. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines believes that the larger number of submarines will make this easier in the future. More convoys will be located due to the large number of submarines, and it will be easier to maintain contact with them and to attack them.

It will then become more important again to work hand in hand with the Commander, Air, Atlantic Coast. This co-operation with the Air Force used to cause difficulties because no integrated training covering large areas was carried out. Such co-operation cannot be improvised. The later stages were, however, more successful. Powerful long-range planes must be assigned to Atlantic operations soon.

The large number of submarines which we expect to have available in the near future will enable us to attack shipping in additional and more remote areas, which are now brought within our reach through the existence of submarine tankers. Thus the tankers enable us to operate the 517 ton submarine for two weeks in the Gulf of Mexico and off Panama, or as far away as Cameroons and Bahia; the 740 ton submarine is capable of operating two weeks near La Plata and Capetown. Furthermore, the first type IXd II submarines will be ready by fall. These submarines will be able to conduct operations with certainty as far as Mombasa in the Indian Ocean.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines feels that the outlook in regard to submarine warfare is promising in view of the large number of submarines soon available and the variety of operations possible.

The defense situation must also be taken into account when the possibilities of submarine warfare are considered. Our submarine losses are extremely light at this time. There is no doubt that the number of losses will rise again once attacks on convoys are resumed and the defenses in some zones become stronger. Therefore we must strive with all means at our disposal to improve submarine weapons in order to keep the submarine abreast of defensive devices of the enemy. The most important thing in this respect is the development of a torpedo equipped with a non-contact pistol (Abstandspistole). This device would make hits on destroyers more accurate and thus provide greater safety for the submarine. Above all, it would considerably speed up the sinking of torpedoed ships, and would thus save torpedoes. The submarine would be more secure from countermeasures too since it can leave the scene of the attack much faster. Another great advantage of the non-contact pistol will be that the members of the crew of the torpedoed ship will not be able to save themselves due to the rapid sinking of the ship. This increase in personnel losses will no doubt make it more difficult to man the many ships America is building.

The submarine forces have faith in their equipment and believe in their fighting ability. Therefore, the first thing to do is to get the submarines out of the Baltic Sea as fast as possible, and in general to have as many submarines as possible out at sea engaged in operations.

signed: Doenitz



Berlin 17 June 1942

Commander in Chief of the Navy

Report on a Conference between the Commander in Chief,  
Navy and the Fuehrer at the Berghof the afternoon of  
15 June 1942.

Present: Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command  
Lt. General Jodl  
Vice Admiral Krancke  
Captain von Puttkamer

1. a. Submarine Attack on Brazilian Shipping and Ports (See Annex 1):

Permission was granted to execute the mission in the beginning of August. See Annex 1, section 3.

The political situation should be reviewed once more before operations get under way.

b. The Fuehrer proposes that an operational group of submarines be held in readiness for the purpose of quick interference in case the enemy should suddenly strike at such points as the Azores, Madeira or Cape Verde. The Commander in Chief, Navy points out that at this time we cannot afford to divert a considerable number of submarines for such a purpose alone. At the present time, all available submarines must be used in the war against enemy merchant shipping. It may be possible, however, to form such a group within the framework of our present submarine warfare. For instance, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines has had eight submarines patrol the convoy lanes to and from the U. S. via the Azores. In an emergency, these submarines could be used as suggested. The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division declares that it might likewise be possible to solve the problem by stationing several submarines for a certain length of time in the vicinity of the endangered area.

2. Attack of the Norway Forces on Convoy PQ17 in June (See Annex 2):

The Fuehrer considers aircraft carriers a great threat to the large vessels. The aircraft carriers must be located prior to the attack, and they have to be rendered harmless by our Junker 88 planes before the attack gets under way.

Upon the request of the Commander in Chief, Navy, our naval forces may be sent to their stations in the North in good time. There they must await the order to attack. This is subject to the Fuehrer's approval.

3. Precarious Situation of Northern Jutland (See Annex 3):

The Commander in Chief, Navy emphasizes that northern Jutland is particularly vulnerable to enemy landings because of its flat coast and the gigantic air base at Aalborg. If the enemy lands in force, he will be in a position to capture the 38 cm battery, and the Lim Fjord will provide him with a strong bulwark toward

the South. The troops stationed in northern Jutland should therefore be sufficiently strong to be able to keep an invading enemy from digging himself in.

The Fuehrer as well as the Reichsmarschall are of the same opinion.

4. Operation "Herkules" (See Annex 4):

The Fuehrer recognizes how important it is to capture Malta. However, he does not believe that this can be done while the offensive on the eastern Front is in progress, and especially not with Italian troops. During that time the Air Force cannot spare any transport planes. Once Tobruk is taken, most shipments will be routed to Tobruk via Crete. On the other hand, the British efforts to get convoys through to Malta from the East and from the West testify to the plight of the island.

These convoys, by the way, give us an opportunity to inflict much damage on the enemy. Once Malta has been bled white by the continuous air raids and the total blockade, we could risk the attack.

5. Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers:

The plans for the auxiliary aircraft carriers will be submitted within a week. Four weeks later the construction will reach the stage where the materials can be ordered.

Number of airplanes:

<u>EUROPA</u>	18 bombers 24 pursuit planes
<u>POTSDAM</u>	8 bombers 12 pursuit planes
<u>SEYDLITZ</u>	12 bombers 6 pursuit planes
<u>GNEISENAU</u>	8 bombers 12 pursuit planes

It will not pay to convert the SEYDLITZ, now 90% completed, since the superstructure of the vessel would have to be removed to the level of the armor deck.

6. Manpower Problem (See Annex 5):

The Commander in Chief, Navy points out that repairs are taking an excessively long time due to the manpower shortage. For example, it will take from eight weeks to three and a half months to repair the PRINZ EUGEN. Therefore he urgently requests the allocation of a few thousand workmen specified in Annex 5, sections A and B.1. and later also as set forth in section B.3. The Commander in Chief, Navy asks specifically that no worker engaged in submarine construction or repair be drafted into the Armed Forces, since the submarine war is of decisive importance, and affects



all land operations. The Fuehrer recognizes the fact that the submarine war will in the end decide the outcome of the war. Therefore he considers these requests justified. He directs the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command to see to it that Minister Speer attends to the matter. In any event, there will be no more inductions from July on.

7. Italian Requests for Fuel Oil:

The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division submits the latest requests for fuel oil made by the Commando Supremo. He shows that it is impossible to supply the Italians with additional oil. The Commander in Chief, Navy asks that this request be denied, thus confirming the negative reply he already made to Admiral Riccardi.

The Fuehrer agrees.

signed: Raeder

Re: The Opening of Hostilities Against Brazil.

1. The appraisal of the political situation and the military facts may be found in Secret Report No. 13638/42 of 4 June 1942 made by the Political and Propaganda Section of the Naval Staff, Operations Division (1.Skl. Ic 13638/42 gKdos). On the basis of these deliberations, the Naval Staff is planning to counter the measures taken by Brazil with a powerful blow. The fact that the Brazilian Air Force is attacking Axis submarines is not the only decisive factor. Equally important is our conviction that Brazil, because of her warlike actions, is actually in a state of war. She will make a formal declaration of war after she had time to make all preparations and to organize her defenses at leisure.

2. Data regarding naval operations against Brazilian ports have been forwarded with Secret Report No. 1035 by the Submarine Section of the Naval Staff, Operations Division, 1 June 1942 (B.Nr. 1.Skl. Iu 1035 gKdos). From this information the following possibilities become apparent:

a. General: If the submarines are to be successful, they must be refueled by submarine tanker (U-Tanker) prior to the actual operation, and the operation must begin about five to eight days before a new moon period. (13 June, 11 July and 9 August.) The submarines will require approximately twenty six days to proceed from the western French ports to the waiting zone where the refueling is to take place. From here it will take approximately six or seven days to the zone of operations.

Therefore the operations will begin about thirty two to thirty four days after the submarines leave the ports of western France.

b. Departure Dates of Submarines in June and July: The submarines which will be ready to leave the bases in Western France between 6 June and the end of July are divided below into three groups for the sake of clarity:

Group I: from 6 June to 16 June.

11 type VII C  
3 type IX C  
1 type IX B

Group II: from 22 June to 4 July.

2 type IX C  
8 type VII C

Group III: not yet specified. However, according to data so far available, this group will probably consist of approximately 15 submarines and should be ready any time after 26 July.

c. Submarine Tankers: At present, two submarine tankers are ready for operations, namely U 459 and U 460. The third sub-



marine tanker, U 461, will be ready for operations by about 21 June. U 459 is en route to the zone of operations off the American Coast. Its presence is needed there, since several submarines would be unable to reach their bases in western France without refueling.

U 460 left on 8 June.

d. Possible Procedure: Group I cannot possibly participate in the operations off the Brazilian ports because the submarines would be in the zone of operations at the time of the full moon, and because no submarine tanker is stationed there. U 460 would be unable to reach the waiting zone in time to supply the submarines with fuel before they begin operations. Group II will be in a position to execute the planned operations.

Advantage: The submarines will appear off the ports between 3 and 8 August, having previously been refueled by U 460.

Disadvantage: U 460 must proceed directly from its home base to waiting zone and therefore will have only enough fuel left to supply ten submarines at the most. Moreover, U 460 will be unable to supply the submarines leaving their bases in Germany in the second half of June; they will be forced to put into ports in western France for refueling before proceeding to the zone of operations off the American Coast. This will cause a delay of three weeks.

The zone of operation off the American Coast would be affected the least if Group III were to execute the operation. However, in that case the operation could not be undertaken before the new moon in the beginning of September. The third submarine tanker, U 461, would then be available.

3. Plans of the Naval Staff: The Naval Staff is planning to use the submarines of Group II for the operation outside the main Brazilian ports. Submarine tanker U 460 is to assist, and the operation is scheduled for 3 to 8 August approximately. The submarines will proceed to a waiting zone off the Northeast Coast of Brazil. In the order of their arrival they will refuel from the submarine tanker which has been sent ahead of them; they will then advance into the zones chosen for the attack. All the submarines have orders to attack at once.

It is planned to provide some of the submarines with two to four mines each, depending on their technical equipment.

Ten submarines are considered sufficient for this operation, since it will hardly pay to use more than that number within and immediately outside of the ports in question. Shipping in the other regions off the Brazilian Coast is comparatively limited at this time. Generally speaking, the success of the operation will depend greatly on how carefully the submarines have been prepared and equipped for this special task. This will take a certain amount of time. Therefore, if Group II is to be used, these submarines must get their orders no later than 15 June.

Operation "Roesselsprung".

1. Task: Attack on Convoy PQ 17.
2. Task Forces:

Trondheim Group:

TIRPITZ with the Fleet Commander aboard.

HIPPER

6 destroyers (IHN, LODY, GALSTER, RIEDEL, ECKOLDT, and STEINBRINK)

Narvik Group:

LUETZOW with the Commanding Admiral of Cruisers aboard.

SCHEER

6 destroyers (Z 24, Z 27, Z 28, Z 29, Z 30 and BEITZEN)

Submarines:

Three submarines will be stationed Northeast of Iceland beginning 10 June. They have the task of locating the convoy.

Other available submarines, probably three or four, will be in attack position between Jan Mayen and Bear Island.

Submarines becoming available at a later date will be stationed off Bear Island in attack position.

Note: There are at this time only two destroyers in Trondheim (IHN and LODY). The other four destroyers will be transferred from Germany to Norway within the next few days. Besides these, there are two or three torpedo boats in Trondheim, which are to serve as escorts to the Trondheim Group.

3. Command:

Operational Command for the entire mission:

Group North, with headquarters in Kiel.

Tactical Command:

Trondheim Group and all other forces:

Fleet Commander aboard the TIRPITZ.

Narvik Group:

Commanding Admiral of Cruisers aboard the LUETZOW.

The submarines will be under the command of Group North through Admiral, Arctic Ocean at Narvik by means of radio relaying sta-



tion. It is not intended to place the submarines directly under the command of the Fleet Commander.

4. Execution: As soon as Convoy PQ 17 has been located, the task forces will take their stations. This is to be done as late as possible!

The Trondheim Group will proceed to the Vest Fjord.

The Narvik Group will proceed to the northern exit of the Alta Fjord. There they will refuel. They will depart for the operation on receipt of the code word from Group North.

The Fleet Commander will head for the convoy at full speed.

The Commanding Admiral of Cruisers is to join forces with the Fleet Commander.

Main Task: Rapid destruction of the enemy merchant ships. If necessary these should only be crippled and the sinking left to the submarines and the Air Force. The escort forces should be engaged only if this is indispensable for accomplishing the main task. In such an event it is primarily the task of the TIRPITZ and HIPPER to fight the escort forces, while the LUETZOW and SCHEER dispose of the convoy during that time. An engagement with superior enemy forces is to be avoided. The operation should be executed quickly; should be completed before an enemy security unit composed of battleships and carriers - presumably stationed in the Faroe-Iceland area - has a chance to intervene. The operation can be called off by the Fleet Commander or by order of Group North.

5. Aerial Reconnaissance: Extensive aerial reconnaissance is prerequisite for the execution of the operation and especially for the participation of TIRPITZ and HIPPER. The Air Force has the following assignment:

a. After the convoy has been located, continuous contact should be maintained. The composition of the convoy and the strength of the escort forces should be reported as quickly as possible.

b. An attempt should be made to locate a heavy enemy naval force in the Shetland-Faroe-Iceland-Jan Mayen area, scouting Reykjavik, Scapa, Firth of Forth and Moray Firth in the process. Once the enemy force has been located, continuous contact should be maintained.

c. As long as the heavy enemy force has not been located, the area within a 250 mile radius of the convoy is to be carefully patrolled and all enemy forces sighted are to be reported.

6. Battle Operations of the Air Force: The Air Force has been requested to order the planes to attack only aircraft carriers and merchant vessels once our forces have engaged the enemy, unless the identity of the ships is unmistakable, or Group North has issued special orders.

Remarks:

1. This once we shall probably have twelve destroyers available for the operation.
2. The fuel oil situation permits an operation of this scope at this time.
3. The weather is especially favorable in June. The period of spring storms is over. Heavy summer fogs do not occur until July.
4. The ice situation likewise is especially favorable in June. The ice has receded very little to the North, so that it will be impossible for the convoy to evade us to the North. As a matter of fact, beginning about 150 nautical miles West of Bear Island, the enemy convoy has to sail East within 250 to 300 nautical miles off the Norwegian Coast. This area is completely dominated by our own Air Forces.

Therefore no heavy enemy vessels have sallied into this area so far.

5. The operation will be executed only if reconnaissance has established with certainty that there is no risk of becoming involved with superior enemy forces.

6. It is particularly important that the Air Force fulfill the request of the Navy in regard to aerial reconnaissance, if necessary at the expense of participating in battle. The Navy's request would appear to be justified in view of the total success it seems possible to achieve with the aid of our heavy naval forces.



Concerning the Defense of Jutland against Enemy Landings.

Reference is made to the letter of the Commanding Admiral, Denmark, B. Nr. gKdos 944 of 30 May 1942, addressed to the Naval High Command, etc.

Following is the text of the letter written by the Commanding General of the German troops in Denmark on 28 May 1942 to the Armed Forces High Command, the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff, and to the Staff of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commanding General of the Replacement Training Army (B. Nr. Abt. Ia 245/42 gKdos):

"The Commander in Chief, Navy visited Jutland this past week. The evaluation of the situation made by him of this occasion is contained in the letter of the Commanding Admiral, Denmark.

In this connection it should be reported that the strength of the coastal defense forces will be considerably increased by the addition of 1,000 recruits to the Army coastal batteries, i.e. 100 recruits per battery. (Cf. letter from Commanding General, Denmark, Ia/173/42 gKdos of 12 May 1942.)

Furthermore, the fighting power of the 416th Infantry Division will be considerably improved. One machine gun company will be added to each of the division's six infantry battalions and a heavy mortar unit will be added to each infantry company. The average age of the division will be lowered by replacing older troops by young recruits.

For occupation of the Danish islands, the Commanding General, Denmark left only three Infantry Replacement Training Battalions, the Copenhagen Guard Battalion and one Artillery Replacement Battery. All other available troops have already been transferred to Jutland. The troops have been distributed in view of the danger to the tip of Jutland North of the Lim Fjord.

That this occupation force of Jutland is insufficient to repel a strong enemy landing operation was reported orally. Nevertheless, no request for further troops is made in full recognition of the fact that they are needed worse in other theaters of war."

This letter carries the following addition for the Commanding Admiral, Denmark:

"Please take cognizance of the above. In recognition of the danger to the northern tip of Jutland, one battery of the 416th Infantry Division will soon be emplaced on Jammer Bay."

Operation "Herkules".

The Naval Staff once more carefully examines the operation from the standpoint of naval strategy. The difficulties involved are fully recognized by the Naval Staff. However, on the basis of operational principles and plans forwarded by the Commanding General, South, the operation is considered feasible from a naval point of view. There is no doubt about the strategic value of the island. The Naval Staff shares the Fuehrer's doubts and misgivings particularly in regard to the Italians' ability to carry out the operation. The Naval Staff concurs in the Fuehrer's opinion that the operation must under all circumstances be a success. Therefore, the success of the difficult operation will be assured only if German leadership has the decisive word in its execution and if strong German forces are employed.

In all probability the British will not launch a counter offensive with heavy naval forces, i.e. battleships and carriers, from either Gibraltar or Alexandria against our landing troops and supplies. It would therefore not be necessary for the Italians to employ their battleships and expose them to air raids and submarine attacks. All that would seem necessary is for the Italian battleships to be held in readiness. We must expect that an enemy carrier task force will be employed in the western Mediterranean for the purpose of giving Malta air support and supplying it with additional planes. We also may expect that enemy destroyers and cruisers sent from Gibraltar and Alexandria will appear in the immediate vicinity of Malta within a comparatively short time. If the Air Force locates and attacks the enemy naval forces as they approach, however, we have reason to believe that it will be possible to supply sufficient quantities of everything the Army requires by means of escorted convoys and Italian transport submarines once the bridgehead has been established. In spite of their known lack of training and faulty tactical leadership, Italian naval forces, i.e. cruisers and destroyers, promise to be effective for convoy duty in the area in question and in view of the enemy forces probably available.

Therefore, it seems unnecessary to resort to transporting supplies with the help of the air transport units so badly needed on the eastern Front, especially since a certain number of Italian air transport units are available.

The oil shortage in the Italian Navy is as yet unrelieved, and the Italian request for a large quantity of fuel oil has not been filled. The Naval Staff considers the request for an additional 40,000 tons of fuel oil exaggerated and ascribes it to the desire of the Italians to play absolutely safe. In all probability it will be possible to reduce the additional amount requested by cutting requirements down to an absolute minimum and by economizing in other places. Therefore the Naval Staff considers it possible to solve the fuel oil problem.

In conclusion the following may be said: The operation is difficult and risky. However, in the long run the Naval Staff con-



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siders it still more risky not to carry out the operation. From the standpoint of strategy, the Naval Staff considers the occupation of Malta an absolute necessity and therefore mandatory for us if we want to continue shipping supplies to Africa, to protect our position in North Africa, and later hope to launch an attack against Suez. And we must keep in mind that conditions for taking Malta will in all probability never again be as favorable as they are this summer.

Re: Manpower Requirements for Repair of PRINZ EUGEN,  
Conversion of GNEISENAU, Completion of GRAF ZEPPELIN.

These calculations were made with the understanding that the construction of new ships is not to be curtailed. Replacements for workers about to be drafted into the Armed Forces are not included in these figures.

The following additional workers are needed:

A.	PRINZ EUGEN. . . . .	779
	GNEISENAU. . . . .	1,307
	GRAF ZEPPELIN. . . . .	1,555
	Total: . . . . .	3,641

It is impossible to fill these manpower requirements by drawing on workers from other shipyards. The present number of workers in the shipyards is insufficient to handle the work to be done.

B. Manpower Shortages:

1. For Repair Work:

- a. Submarine repair. . . . . 2,200
- b. Repair of surface vessels  
(Norway, Aegean Sea, and  
Black Sea). . . . . 1,000

2. For Construction of New Ships:

- a. With the present number of workers only 19 submarines can be built per month.
- b. 5,200 men have already been transferred from the construction of new surface vessels to repair work. This has necessitated a considerable reduction in the construction of light naval vessels.

3. Workers required for the planned conversion of vessels to auxiliary aircraft carriers.

4. Replacements for the workers still to be drafted into the Armed Forces. We have to expect that as many as 20,000 of them may still be drafted.



Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy with the  
Fuehrer at Wehrwolf on 26 August 1942.

Present: Vice Admiral Krancke  
Captain von Puttkamer

I. War Situation at the end of August 1942. (\*)

The war situation continues to be determined by the following factors:

1. It is urgently necessary to defeat Russia and thus create a "lebensraum" which is blockade-proof and easy to defend. Thus we could continue to fight for years.

2. The fight against the Anglo-Saxon sea powers will decide both the length and the outcome of the war, and could bring England and America to the point of discussing peace terms.

A. Use of the Navy in the war against Russia:

- a. The Arctic Ocean
- b. The Baltic Sea
- c. The Black Sea

Referring to a.: The Arctic Ocean: (See Annex 1)

Evidently Convoy P.Q. 18 did not sail. We can thus assume that our submarines and planes, which totally destroyed Convoy P.Q. 17, have forced the enemy to give up this route temporarily or even to fundamentally change his whole system of supply lines. Supplies to northern ports of Russia remain decisive for the whole conduct of the war waged by the Anglo-Saxons. They must preserve Russia's strength in order to keep German forces occupied. The enemy will most probably continue to ship supplies to northern Russia, and the Naval Staff must therefore maintain submarines along the same routes. The greater part of the Fleet will also be stationed in northern Norway. The reason for this, besides making attacks on convoys possible, is the constant threat of an enemy invasion. Only by keeping the Fleet in Norwegian waters can we hope to meet this danger successfully. Besides, it is especially important in view of the whole Axis strategy that the German "fleet in being" tie down the British Home Fleet, especially after the heavy Anglo-American losses in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. The Japanese are likewise aware of the importance of this measure. In addition, the danger of enemy mines in home waters has constantly increased, so that the naval forces should be shifted only for repairs and training purposes.

The Fuehrer voices agreement and stresses the danger from mines to ship traffic to and from Norway.

(\*) The Fuehrer agrees explicitly with points 1. and 2.

Referring to b.: The Baltic Sea:

The particular type of warfare in the Gulf of Finland permits only the use of very small vessels. The most effective weapon for this region has proved to be the mines. Actions of the Russian fleet which were expected on a larger scale did not materialize due to mines. Only two or three submarines broke through into the Baltic, compared to at least twenty which were destroyed in trying to reach it. The conquest of Leningrad would terminate naval warfare in that region. This would improve the situation greatly for the Naval Staff and it would free forces for sea and coastal defense. To be sure, the number of Baltic forces which would become available is small; nevertheless it is of importance considering the growing lack of manpower on the one hand and the constant expansion of our sphere of influence on the other hand. Furthermore if we could eliminate the mines in those regions where a blockade would no longer be needed, we could greatly expand the training area in the Baltic Sea in summer 1943. This is especially important, since the western part of the Baltic can hardly be used at all for training purposes because of mines.

The Commander in Chief, Navy requests a directive that the shipyards in Leningrad be spared shelling and air attacks and not be destroyed with the city for obvious reasons. (See Annex 2.)

The Fuehrer declares that such systematic sparing of the shipyards is possible in the case of artillery but not in connection with air raids; however air raids never achieve complete destruction of docks in any case. The Fuehrer will take the Navy's request into account, although he is of the opinion that the Russians will destroy the docks themselves.

Referring to c.: The Black Sea:

We are still handicapped by lack of forces so that the main share of sea fighting has to be done by the Air Force. We intend to strengthen our forces with additional submarines, even though we hope that the Russian Black Sea Fleet will be put out of action by October or November. Submarines will remain important in the future when the Black Sea is used as a training area. Four units were added to the PT boat flotilla, but the motors could not yet be furnished. The minesweeper flotilla is to be reinforced by four boats. These forces afford only minimum protection of our supply routes against mines and Russian forces. Considerable losses in the Sea of Azov were caused especially by Russian mines. Further losses will be incurred in trying to put the ports acquired into navigable condition, always keeping in mind the fighting tenacity of the Russians. The Naval Staff therefore stresses the importance of great caution in the use of all valuable and irreplaceable transport vessels. This applies especially to the small number of steamers still available, which for the present cannot be replaced. In the opinion of the Naval Staff the only risks that should be taken are in using landing barges (MFP) in cases where Army operations depend on reinforcements by sea. Landing barges are replaceable.

The Italian submarines and submarine chasers (MAS) proved their



worth in the Black Sea. Unit and boat commanders showed great daring.

The only vessels which can be sent to the Caspian Sea at the moment are coastal mine layers (KM-Boot) and Italian units of the type used in the Black Sea. No final conclusions on how to transport the vessels have been reached. In the Caspian Sea we will be confronted with an enormous Russian superiority, since all our equipment must be brought by land.

Our three submarines for the Black Sea will not be ready until October when they may be used for training purposes. To a large extent however, we have to use the Black Sea as a training area because of mines in the Baltic.

The Fuehrer considers the submarines in the Black Sea important because they will have a very favorable political influence on Turkey. He suggests that six submarines for this reason be transferred there. The Commander in Chief, Navy agrees.

B. The war against England and the United States:

When our aim in the East, namely the creation of a blockade-proof "lebensraum" is achieved, we must still fight the naval war against the Anglo-Saxons to an end. The only way to bring them to terms is by constant successful attacks on their sea routes.

1. Submarine warfare:

a. The enemy transportation system in American waters underwent great changes, as the Naval Staff predicted and expected even sooner.

The Americans abandoned individual ship movements off their eastern coast and adopted convoy formation. They have considerably strengthened their defenses, particularly in the air. Only occasionally will submarines operate and mine harbor entrances in this area. Some individual ship traffic still takes place in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico; the enemy has just started to organize convoys there. He has increased his defenses there too, however. Accordingly submarine attacks in these areas must be focused on points where the largest number of ships, not sailing in convoys, has been observed; and where ships are expected to sail alone.

b. Recent submarine attacks were determined by the change in the enemy's transportation system and the increasing difficulty of operating along the American Coast. At the same time, the satisfactory increase in delivery of new operational submarines from home (twenty two in July and twenty six in August) enabled us to resume convoy attacks by stationing one or two submarine groups in the northern and middle parts of the North Atlantic. The favorable results of these operations indicated that opportunities for attack are not much worse than before as long as the convoy remains beyond the range of plane protection.

The Commander in Chief, Navy points out on the map the range within which British planes based at home can protect their convoys. The Ju 88, available for this operation, covers considerably less distance; the He 177 exceeds the flying-range of the Ju 88 by three hours (see Annex 3). He therefore requests immediate assignment of He 177 planes instead of the Ju 88 for submarine defense. Recently our submarines have suffered heavy losses because of the superior location finding devices on English aircraft (four submarines sunk in the Bay of Biscay, three damaged, four more damaged in contact with convoys, some badly).

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports that German submarines have been equipped with radar interception sets (FuMB) since 8 August 1942 and this device and the deception devices (Bolde) have shown some favorable results.

The Fuehrer recognizes the need for the best possible planes to support the submarines, but he makes no definite promises.

c. The Naval Staff considers it particularly effective to launch submarine attacks at several places simultaneously. The constantly increasing number of operational submarines offers such possibilities. Besides stationing several submarines in the Natal Passage and off Freetown, we have started an operation of some importance off Capetown with four submarines and a submarine tanker. We plan first to send two submarines into the roadstead of Capetown and follow up with four more outside the harbor.

d. Submarine operations in Norway: In order to attack the expected P.Q. convoys at the earliest possible opportunity, two submarines were assigned to patrol the Denmark Straits North of Iceland. Seven other submarines are now involved in operation "Scheer". As other submarines become available for action, they should be held ready at their bases until the P.Q. convoy has been located.

e. Submarine operations in the Mediterranean: In addition to the four submarines operating in the eastern Mediterranean, there should always be two or three others assigned to the western Mediterranean in order to attack the supply lines between Malta and Gibraltar (at present two boats are on duty in this area).

f. Losses (see Annex 4): Recent submarine losses were higher than we expected. We lost three in June and nine in July, and we must count on an additional loss of eight. These losses are partly due to strong enemy air forces in the Bay of Biscay.

## 2. Cruiser warfare:

Three auxiliary cruisers are in foreign waters as follows:

Ship 10 (GUMPRICH):	Indian Ocean
Sunk to date:	10 ships of 56,000 BRT
Ship 28 (RUCKTESCHELL):	Atlantic Ocean
Sunk to date:	9 ships of 60,000 BRT



Ship 23 (GERLACH):  
Sunk to date:

Atlantic Ocean  
4 ships of 22,000 BRT

The area of Ship 10 was reduced because of the operations planned by the Japanese Navy in the Indian Ocean. We intend to order Ship 10 to Japan for engine overhaul in September. The record of Ship 28 is especially gratifying because her captain previously had unusual success from May to October 1940 as captain of the WIDDER (Ship 21), when he sank ten ships totaling 58,000 BRT.

At the beginning of October we plan to send a fourth auxiliary cruiser (Ship 45) into action.

Movements of the SCHEER: The Commander in Chief, Navy shows on map the movements of the SCHEER (operation "Wunderland") in the Arctic Ocean. He also gives the reasons why it is desirable to send her to the South Atlantic in November 1942 for attacking merchant ships. (Reference: 1.Skl. 1434/42, Gkdos.Chfs, dated 1 August 1942.) The chances for success are very favorable, and the operation should have important political and psychological effects. Our chief difficulty lies in breaking out of home waters into the Atlantic.

The Fuehrer expounds at length why he wishes to keep all larger units available for operations in the North until further notice. (They discourage landing attempts; there is limited air reconnaissance in winter; the coast is insufficiently fortified, etc.) He therefore decides not to dispatch the SCHEER to the Atlantic this winter.

### 3. Mediterranean Sea:

The opinion of the Naval Staff regarding the importance of the capture of Malta remains unaltered.

We have no further comment on the strategic significance of operations against Egypt, especially in view of the operations in progress in the Caucasus.

The capture of Gibraltar remains a most desirable objective for the future. It is particularly important to seal off the Mediterranean completely in case a long-drawn-out war requires us to secure our European "Lebensraum" as thoroughly as possible.

We now have fifteen submarines in the area. Heavy damage was again caused by enemy bombers. Our PT boats are to be reinforced by an eight boat flotilla in October. No further additions are possible since we have no more boats of the small type that can pass down the Rhone River.

The Commander in Chief, Navy continues to regard a possible attempt of the Anglo-Saxons to occupy Northwest Africa and get a foothold in North Africa with the aid of the French as a very great danger to the whole German war effort. They would attack Italy from there and endanger our position in Northeast Africa. Therefore Germany must maintain a strong position in the Mediterranean and must above all have unquestionable domination over

Crete. By the same token, we cannot afford to relinquish Piraeus and Salonika.

The Commander in Chief, Navy points out in detail, with reference to l. Skl. I b 1381/42, Top Secret, dated 28 July 1942, why Crete must remain in German possession in peace as well as in war.

The Fuehrer concurs in this opinion and states that he wants to replace those troops which have been withdrawn from Crete. For the present he has no intention of giving it up. He does not conceal his increasing dissatisfaction with the Italians and alludes to plans which he is not yet able to discuss.

II. Concentration of our air attacks on destroying the largest possible amount of cargo space.

The Commander in Chief, Navy requests that our air attacks against England be concentrated on ships in port and on the ways. (Colonel Koller's photos of harbors filled with ships are shown.) In this way, our attacks would have a real influence on the outcome of the war, which they certainly do not have at present.

The Fuehrer stresses the strong defenses of such harbors but acknowledges the wisdom of such a procedure. He hopes for an improvement in the situation through the use of high altitude bombers which are being delivered now.

The Commander in Chief, Navy again points out how dangerous it is to have large airfields in the vicinity of important objectives on the coast since enemy airborne troops have easy access to them.

The Fuehrer states that the Air Force reported all fields are now sufficiently protected by 2 cm guns.

III. New destroyers, 1942 model (Flottentorpedoboote 42), and Walter submarines (see Annex 5).

The Commander in Chief, Navy, using a sketch, reports on the design of the new destroyer, 1942 model, and the Walter submarine. He urges that construction of V-engines for the new destroyers be expedited since the first engine will not be ready for testing until the spring of 1943. This means that the first new destroyer will not be completed until 1945.

The Fuehrer promises support.

IV. In discussing anti-aircraft guns, the Fuehrer wishes that the relative value of the 12.7 cm gun on destroyers and of the 10.5 cm twin mount anti-aircraft gun be established.

The 12.8 cm guns on the anti-aircraft towers in Berlin have interchangeable shells. They have fixed platforms, however, and do not need triple axes.

V. The Fuehrer gives permission to use the 20 cm turrets of the SEYDLITZ for coastal fortifications on the western front.

The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division suggests possible loca-



tions. It also mentions the possibility of converting the DE GRASSE at St. Nazaire into an aircraft carrier rather than a ship of the SCHARNHORST class. Tests are still being made, especially in regard to the engines.

VI. The Fuehrer inquires about the labor problem. Minister Speer said that it is impossible to take the 8,400 workers out of the munitions industry, substituting foreigners. The Fuehrer considers this move necessary nevertheless. The Commander in Chief, Navy suggests looking into the possibility of obtaining skilled shipyard workers from the Todt Organization.

VII. Private conversation between the Fuehrer and the Commander in Chief, Navy.

The Commander in Chief, Navy believes that the decision to build more battleships will have to await the outcome of the naval war between Japan and the Anglo-Saxons, because the battleship has not yet had a chance to prove its worth in action. In any event, it would probably be wise to prepare the design of a battleship equipped with guns of the largest possible caliber, despite the fact that more experience and future developments might require us to design smaller warships with new weapons, such as remote control glide bombers fired from catapults, perfected remote control rockets, etc. We must also work out plans for large aircraft carriers and cruisers with flight decks, better protected than ever before. These are now in progress.

The Fuehrer agrees with this opinion. He instructs the Commander in Chief, Navy to find out from the Krupp firm which artillery caliber (45 cm, 50 cm, or 53 cm) would give the best performance technically and tactically for the largest usable ships. This should be the basis for designing the ship.

Since the ship must have a high freeboard, the 15 cm guns could probably be mounted in casemates so that only the twin mount 10.5 cm anti-aircraft guns appear on deck. Everything above deck will have to be armored. The Fuehrer does not consider it advisable to mix the 15 cm with the 10.5 cm guns. Protection of the ship's bottom is particularly urgent. The Fuehrer mentions the gun loading gear aboard the CAVOUR which he considers more practical; he also speaks of the close proximity of the gun barrels in the turret, which makes the turret smaller.

VIII. Remarks of the Fuehrer concerning control of planning in port cities by the Gauleiters.

The Commander in Chief, Navy assumes that the Navy in Kiel was the cause of this directive. The Fuehrer denies this and traces it back to the efforts of the Army and Air Force to requisition large districts in cities without regard for over-all planning (e.g., without regard to railroads).

One person must decide these things, and that is the Gauleiter. In case of disagreement, the Fuehrer will make the final decision. The Commander in Chief, Navy stresses the need of considering the Navy's requirements before planning is undertaken in naval ports. Certain installations, such as docks, etc., can

be placed only at certain points and an over-all plan must be guided by this fact. This must be agreed upon by the Gauleiter and the Navy before the final plans are completed. The Fuehrer concedes this point. The Commander in Chief, Navy mentions the disagreement between the city of Kiel and the Navy over the Diedrichsen estate which has now been legally decided in favor of the Navy, as most of the heirs wished. The Navy needs these premises urgently for the 2nd Admiral of U-boats (2. A.d.U.). It is situated on the harbor right outside Bellevue near the Wik. The city of Kiel wants it for an official guest house.

The Fuehrer will look into this question. It has evidently already been brought to his attention, although he does not admit it.

IX. The Commander in Chief, Navy requests that the post of Chief of Staff to the Armed Forces Surgeon General be occupied in turn by the Air Force and the Navy. The determining factor here is not the number of personnel, but the number of problems to be dealt with.

The Fuehrer agrees. The Armed Forces High Command will be informed of the matter.

signed: Raeder



Winter Naval Operations in the Arctic Sea

I. The danger of air attacks on Brest compelled us to withdraw our ships from the coastal area of western France. Another reason for transferring our ships from the Atlantic was that on the basis of reports received, we had to consider the strong threat of an enemy landing in the Norwegian theater in the first part of the year. The Fuehrer reacted with extensive instructions for strengthening our Norwegian defenses, which led to the removal of the main body of our fleet to Norway.

The invasion did not materialize. It is quite possible that the enemy deliberately planted the numerous reports about an impending invasion which came into our hands in order to make us commit our forces to Norway. It is also possible however that the English, on learning of our increased defense measures, dropped the idea of a landing in this area. At the present time, the threat to northern Norway is not considered acute, because our defenses are strong, and also because the enemy is impeded by a scarcity of ships.

Nevertheless, the area will continue to be a worthwhile objective for the enemy, especially since the nickel supply from Petsamo is indispensable to our war effort, and since the Barents Sea route to Russia will remain important to the Allies. The strength of our defenses will help determine whether the enemy will ever be in a position to attempt large-scale action in this area.

II. The presence of the main body of our fleet - formerly in French waters, now in the North - ties up a considerable part of the English fleet in its home waters. This is especially significant when one considers the increased losses which the combined enemy fleets have suffered this summer in all theaters of war. Under the circumstances it matters a great deal whether our forces lie in a strategic position ready for action, or whether they are kept in German harbors from which they must be moved before they can begin to function.

III. It does not seem necessary, considering the points made in paragraph I., to make a particularly strong concentration of German naval forces in northern Norway in the near future. But the object of holding English forces in home waters, explained in paragraph II, confirms the continued significance for the whole German-Italian-Japanese war effort of keeping the fleet in the Norwegian area. We should therefore strive as far as possible to continue holding naval forces there which will be ready for action during the coming months.

IV. Along with these considerations, it must be borne in mind that the Rybachi Peninsula still remains to be captured in Spring 1943. Although execution of the task has not yet been ordered, the Fuehrer has instructed that preparations be started. Among these is the removal of the necessary naval forces to the zone of action. We could hardly conceal the landing craft which

we would have to assemble, and the renewed transfer of the fleet to Norway would especially attract the enemy's attention. It would seem advantageous for this reason, too, that the enemy consider the presence of our ships in Norway a well-established fact.

V. The following ships will presumably be available for operation in winter 1942-1943:

A. Battleships:

One battleship will be available at all times, the TIRPITZ until the end of October 1942 and from October on the SCHARNHORST.

B. Cruisers:

September - October 1942	1 heavy cruiser
November 42 - January 43	3 heavy cruisers
February 43 - April 43	2 heavy cruisers

HIPPER till the end of January 1943  
PRINZ EUGEN after 15 October 1942  
LUETZOW from November 1942 to April 1943  
Also the cruiser KOELN until further orders  
ADMIRAL SCHEER has a special mission

C. Destroyers:

Available at all times an average of about eight destroyers. Of seventeen destroyers:

1. Two are assigned to the Warship Construction Testing Command (EKK).
2. About seven will be undergoing repair or engine overhaul at all times.

This leaves eight destroyers. The number can be increased when the vessels under "1." are added.

D. Torpedo boats:

Available at all times an average of about seven boats.  
Of twenty seven torpedo boats:

1. Three are reserve boats in inactive status (T 2, T 3, T 11).
2. Three are with the Warship Construction Testing Command (EKK).
3. Three are with the Torpedo School Flotilla (GREIF, T 1, T 8).
4. Five in addition are assigned to the torpedo school.



5. About six will be under repair; having their engines overhauled.

This leaves seven torpedo boats. The number can be increased when the vessels under "2." are added.

The above are the maximum figures. They do not include possible reductions caused by delays in shipyard schedules or by unforeseen occurrences.

VI. Summary: The program for the coming months is to leave the battleships, cruisers and destroyers in the Norwegian area. The number of ships used is to be decided case by case. In doing so it must not be forgotten that Group West has urgent duties which require the use of torpedo boats and destroyers. The number of destroyers and torpedo boats allocated to Norway will thus be dependent, not on how many of these vessels could be fully employed by the project there, but rather on the very minimum of light forces necessary to keep the unit in readiness for action. All destroyers and torpedo boats exceeding this necessary minimum are to be placed at the disposal of Group West.

Shipyards in Leningrad and Directive No. 44

The continually growing threat of air raids and the damage already done to German shipyards in the North Sea and the western Baltic compel us to transfer our naval construction and repair installations farther to the East.

Our shipyard facilities are in any case too small. For these reasons it is necessary to utilize for naval warfare all shipyards which lie or will in the future lie within our sphere of power in the East.

The shipyards in Russian territory thus far captured (e.g., Libau, Riga, Tallinn) are unimportant because of their limited capacity. However, Leningrad possesses an especially highly developed shipbuilding industry. The handbook for Admiralty Staff officers "Soviet Russia", 3rd edition, 1939, contains detailed information of which we shall mention only the following:

The Zhdanov Shipyard (formerly the North Shipyard) and the adjoining Kirov Shipyards (formerly the Putilov Shipyards) with a personnel of 40,000 in three shifts.

The former Baltic Shipyard with a personnel of 29,000 in three shifts.

The former Petersburg State Shipyard with a personnel of 11,000 in three shifts.

In addition to these very large yards, which can build ships of any type and size, there are at least twelve other yards and repair shops in Leningrad.

Although we cannot expect that these establishments will fall into our hands undamaged in case Leningrad is taken, the Naval Staff places such a high value on them that it requests the following:

A. Confirmation that the order OKW/WFST 449/p 10 Abt. I (Org II) Nr. 2656/41, Gkdos., dated 19 September 1941 is applicable also to Leningrad and Kronstadt.

B. Before the possible fall of Leningrad release of an order similar to that issued when Nikolayev fell (OKW/WFST 173/42 Gkdos. (Org I), dated 9 February 1942).

C. After the fall of Leningrad, exemption of shipyards and similar plants from any intended reprisal measures.



Performance Data of Ju 88 and He 1771. Ju 88:a. Long range reconnaissance plane:

Maximum range:	2,800 km.	at	370 km./hr.
Maximum range at greatest fuel economy:	3,400 km.	at	295 km./hr.
Bomb load (maximum):	2,000 kg.		

b. Bomber:

Maximum range:	2,100 km.	at	310 km./hr.
Bomb load:	2,000 kg.		
Armament (for both "a" and "b"):	3 machine guns, model 81, single mount		
	1 machine gun, model 81, twin mount		

c. Long range fighter:

Maximum range same as "a" above.			
Bomb load:	ten 50 kg. bombs		
Armament:	3 machine guns, model 17, fixed mount forward		
	3 machine guns, model FF, fixed mount forward		
	2 machine guns, model 81, single mount		

2. He 177:a. Long range reconnaissance plane:

Maximum range:	3,800 km.	at	400 km./hr.
Bomb load:	1,000 kg.		
Armament:	1 machine gun, model 81, single mount		
	3 machine guns, model 131, single mount		
	1 machine gun, model 151, tail mount		

b. Long range fighter:

Maximum range:	3,740 km.	at about	390 km./hr.
Bomb load:	1,000 kg. possible		
Armament:	1 machine gun, model 81, single mount		

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2 forward mount moveable  
cannons, model 101 (30  
mm) or 2 model 151 ma-  
chine guns  
3 machine guns, model 131,  
single mount  
1 machine gun, model 151,  
tail mount

Remarks: The maximum ranges are theoretical ranges, subject to  
a tactical loss of about 10 to 15%.



Submarine losses up to 24 August 1942

		1939				1940				
		9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5
a.	No. of operational submarines in action each month	40	40	40	40	33	45	44	46	32
b.	No. lost each month	2	5	1	1	1	4	3	4	2
c.	Loss in percentage	5	12.5	2.5	2.5	3	8	7	8	6
		1940				1941				
		6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2
a.	No. of operational submarines in action each month	29	27	27	26	27	22	23	21	22
b.	No. lost each month	1	1	3	1	0	3	0	0	0
c.	Loss in percentage	3.5	3.5	11	3.5	0	14	0	0	0
		1941				1942				
		3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
a.	No. of operational submarines in action each month	30	32	36	60	64	75	75	81	86
b.	No. lost each month	5	1	2	4	0	3	3	1	4
c.	Loss in percentage	17	3	5.5	6.5	0	4	4	1	5
		1941				1942				
		12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
a.	No. of operational submarines in action each month	90	101	111	122	124	128	141	153	168
b.	No. lost each month	10	5	2	5	4	3	2	9	10
c.	Loss in percentage	11	5	1.8	4.1	3.3	3.4	1.4	5.9	6.0

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Losses in boats:

Total no. of submarines in operation since beginning of war: 304 boats.

Total no. of submarines lost since beginning of war: 105 boats.

Average monthly loss: 2.9 boats.

Average monthly loss to the number in operation: 4.9 %

Losses in personnel:

	Officers	Senior non-com. officers*	Other non-com. officers	Enlisted men	Total
Killed:	185	184	515	1,075	1,959
Cap-tured:	112	113	323	600	1,148
Miss-ing:	63	59	192	382	696
Total:	360	356	1,030	2,057	3,803

\*"Portepees-Unteroffiziere"

This means a 38% total loss of operating personnel each year.



A Submarine with a Dual-Purpose Engine for Surface and Underwater Travel.

I. The Walter firm in Kiel in co-operation with the High Command, Navy has been experimenting on the Schlei River and in the Gulf of Danzig off Hela since early 1940 with a submarine which it calls model v80. The special characteristics of the submarine and the results obtained are as follows:

- A. The size is approximately 80 tons.
- B. It operates with a dual-purpose engine for surface and underwater travel with especially high underwater speed.
- C. The hull is streamlined as far as possible.
- D. Steering is by means of a control stick similar to that on aircraft.
- E. Underwater and surface operation without complete weight adjustment is possible by making full use of the dynamic forces (except at slow speed).

F. <u>Underwater Performance:</u>	<u>to date:</u>	<u>desired:</u>
Estimated speed:	23 knots (probably more)	28 knots
Rpm of propeller:	885	1,000
Horsepower:	1,500	2,000

G. Seagoing Characteristics: The submarine rides the sea smoothly and does not pitch. It steers easily underwater and reacts very quickly.

II. In January 1940 the High Command, Navy placed an order for the construction of a submarine, model v300. The purpose was to promote the fastest possible development of a submarine for use in the Atlantic with an engine that attains excellent underwater performance, and to build such a boat depending however on experiences with model v80.

The specific characteristics of the design of v300 should be the following:

A. It is essentially the same as present submarine except for a special drive for speed underwater.

1. This drive consists of two turbines with 4,000 h.p. without any bubble track.

2. In addition, it has a special drive with electric motors for low speeds underwater.

3. On the surface it is propelled by two Diesel engines with 600 h.p.

B. Has a control stick; fast surfacing and diving.

C. The bridge is completely enclosed with plexiglas for optimum streamlining.

D. Calculated Performance:

1. Underwater speed: 19 knots  
Endurance at the top speed of: 19 knots: 205 nautical miles  
Endurance at a cruising speed of: 10 knots: 450 nautical miles
2. Endurance at a surface speed of: 9.3 knots: 3,500 nautical miles

E. Its seagoing characteristics are like those of v80.

In addition to v300, we began designing a new small submarine type in 1942 into which we incorporated all the knowledge and experiences that was not at our disposal when we began building the v300.

This small submarine is known as the Wa 201 or the Wk 202 and has the following characteristics:

1.
  - a. Size: 220 cubic meters
  - b. Over-all length: 35 meters
  - c. Beam: 3.35 meters
  - d. Draft: 4.1 meters
  - e. Diameter of pressure hull: 3.3 meters
  - f. Diving depth: 100 meters
  - g. Crew: 12 men
  - h. Provisions and drinking water for: 14 days
2.
  - a. Torpedo armament:  
2 bow tubes for 5 meter torpedoes  
2 torpedoes in the tubes  
2 torpedoes in reserve
  - b. No guns.
  - c. Communications equipment:  
1 short-wave transmitter and receiver  
1 direction finder  
1 hydrophone (K.D.B. Anlage)  
1 shallow sounder (Flachlot)  
1 underwater telephonic apparatus (U.T. Anlage)
3.
  - a. Open bridge for three men: no conning tower.
  - b. Combined horizontal and vertical rudder control.
  - c. Extensible attack periscope (up to 4 meters)



- d. Non-extensible sky search periscope (observation periscope)
- 4. a. Engine installations (single propeller)
  - 1. 2 turbines, 2,180 h.p. each
  - 2. 1 Diesel engine, 210 h.p.
  - 3. 1 electric motor, 50 h.p.
- b. Top Speed
  - 1. At depth of 12 meters
 

With 2 turbines	25.2 knots
With 1 turbine	18.7 knots
  - 2. On the surface
 

With Diesel engine	9 knots
With electric motor	5 knots
- c. Radius of action
  - 1. Submerged with 2 turbines
 

(at maximum speed)	105 nautical miles
Submerged with 1 turbine	
(at maximum speed)	160 nautical miles
  - 2. Diesel engine on surface
 

	1,500 nautical miles
--	----------------------

Blohm and Voss, Hamburg, (in June 1942) and the Germania Shipyard, Kiel, (in August 1942) were commissioned to work out plans for two boats each. The firms are working in competition with one another, and their methods are somewhat different. Blohm and Voss favors aircraft-type construction in many respects (e.g., streamlining and rudder equipment), while the Germania Shipyard tends more toward submarine-construction technique (e.g., torpedo hatch and shape of bridge). Each has its advantages, but the practical trials will determine which is better. It is our policy to allow each firm the greatest freedom in the designs.

The Blohm and Voss boats are called Wa 201, and those of the Germania Shipyard are Wk 202.

The boats should be completed by fall 1943. Even if the tests on the new-type equipment prove satisfactory, we can scarcely count on these submarines before spring or summer 1944.

III. In order to produce a submarine for the Atlantic with high underwater speed we persisted at first in the construction of model v300. The contract was given to the Germania Shipyard in February 1942. The boat was intended as a school boat both for training crews and for testing the disposition and suitability of guns.

In 1942 we gained new knowledge in relation to building the small boats (Wa 201) and to adapting their engines which brought the work on v300 to an end. In view of the new situation, v300

could no longer serve as a model for trans-Atlantic submarines.

Therefore we must begin anew the construction of an Atlantic boat. Plans to be drawn up by the Walter firm and later model construction at a shipyard (possibly Blohm and Voss and the Germania Shipyard again in competition) will require about six months. We can decide afterwards whether to build a boat of this kind or not. Certain difficulties are encountered at the Walter firm; they lack trained personnel. They asked that the Navy if possible release twenty engineers whom they have named. The request is under consideration.

The specifications for a submarine suitable for the Atlantic are as follows:

- |    |                   |                             |
|----|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| A. | Size:             | 800 tons                    |
| B. | Radius of action: | 7,000-8,000 nautical miles  |
| C. | Surface speed:    | 15 knots                    |
| D. | Underwater speed: | 26-27 knots                 |
| E. | Torpedo armament: | 4 bow tubes<br>16 torpedoes |

The model will be called type v301. The data are approximations made by the Walter firm which have not yet been worked out exactly or checked.

The contract for building the training boat v300 at the Germania Shipyard was cancelled in the meantime.



Report of the Conference with the Fuehrer in the  
Reich Chancellery on Monday, 28 September 1942  
from 1630 to 1830.

Present: The Fuehrer  
Grand Admiral Raeder, Dr. h. c.  
Field Marshal Keitel  
Admiral Doenitz  
Admiral Fuchs  
Vice Admiral Krancke  
Vice Admiral Maertens  
Rear Admiral Lange  
Captain von Puttkamer  
Baurat Waas

The Fuehrer opens the conference with the remark that he wishes to be informed about the present state of the submarine war; he likewise desires to form an opinion regarding the degree with which submarine warfare is keeping pace with the further demands of the war.

He continues with expressing his great appreciation for the achievements of the submarines. He is convinced that the monthly rate of sinkings will continue to be so high that the enemy will not be able to replace his losses by new construction. He considers it impossible that the increase in production of the enemy shipyards comes anywhere near what propaganda would have us believe. Even if the enemy should succeed in launching ships relatively fast, he would still not have the necessary engines, auxiliary engines, other equipment and, most of all, crews for these ships.

In regard to the manpower problem, he calls attention to the fact that it is very much to our disadvantage if a large percentage of the crews of sunken ships is able to go to sea again on new ships.

The Fuehrer stresses the necessity of having new technical developments put into practical use promptly; only in this way can full advantage be taken of the new invention. This was demonstrated in the construction of the heavy tank which would have given us a decided superiority in Africa had it been available earlier.

Admiral Doenitz reviews the present state of the Battle of the Atlantic. He says that the submarine conflict has moved back again from the American coast to the Middle Atlantic because fighting off the American coast was no longer sufficiently profitable. However there are still a few "soft spots" left along the coast where the enemy can be attacked successfully. He points out that we obtained some results by laying mines off the coast. Operations around the St. Lawrence River continue to be productive to a certain extent.

He then touches upon the prospects for success in the South Atlantic, especially along the African coast. He points out on the map however, that the chief task of the Navy is attacking convoys in the North Atlantic.

The increased number of submarines which we are now using makes it easier to locate the enemy. Besides, the enemy convoys usually travel the direct route on the Great Circle, permitting us to conclude that they are now avoiding circuitous routes because of ship shortages.

The convoys are very strongly protected. Some of the escort vessels closely surround the convoy while others are stationed among the ships themselves. In addition, the enemy has adopted a system placing destroyers at a distance, making it very difficult for the submarines to approach the convoys.

The greatest menace for the submarines today is airplanes, however.

Admiral Doenitz shows on a map what range the enemy planes based on the British Isles attained in the years 1940, 1941, and 1942, and in which sea regions therefore an effective attack on convoys by submarines had to be abandoned. This illustrates how concentrated attacks against convoys were pushed further and further towards the middle of the Atlantic.

If the same process should be repeated along the American coast, it would considerably weaken our present tactics of attacking in numbers.

This shows clearly the necessity of our own Air Force supporting the submarines to a much greater extent than has been the case up to the present time. The range of the Heinkel 177 exceeds the territory which is so strongly threatened today by enemy planes. Co-operation with aircraft of that type will provide advanced notice of the enemy and reduce air attacks on our submarines.

Attacks on convoys did not cause heavy submarine losses at all. Our losses are distributed rather evenly over the various regions; at times they rose in the Bay of Biscay due to airplane attacks. After our submarines were equipped with radar interception sets (FuMB) our losses decreased at once.

Emphasis is laid on technical improvements of the submarine and its weapons not because our losses have greatly increased, but because we wish to attain the same success as before in spite of improvements in enemy defense.

Most important of all is the demand for increasing underwater speed. This is to be accomplished by the new Walter submarine.

A submarine with great underwater speed will be able to come within shooting range of the convoy in spite of enemy escort vessels. It will also enable the submarine to elude its pursuers quickly. In this connection it is stated that enemy Asdic has not improved since the beginning of the war.

The Fuehrer fully supports these ideas and adds that, in his opinion, the introduction of a submarine with high underwater speed would have a revolutionary effect. It would immediately render ineffective the whole apparatus of enemy escort vessels and the construction program of the relatively slow enemy corvettes.



The next requirement is to increase the diving limit. At greater depth the submarine can avoid enemy Asdic more easily; also the effect of depth charges is lessened considerably.

In the fight against the enemy defense it is especially important to obtain a weapon with which one can successfully eliminate the escort vessels that keep the submarine out of shooting range. This could be a weapon for use either under water or on the surface. To the first group belongs the acoustic homing torpedo (Geraeuschtorpedo). The Commander in Chief, Navy declares that the development of this torpedo has now progressed far enough to consider prospects for its success favorable.

The Commander in Chief, Navy adds that we have also made good progress with the new non-contact pistol (Abstandspistole), so that we may count on using it within a reasonable time. This pistol will give the torpedo a tremendous destructive power, and will therefore increase the loss in human life considerably.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines brings to discussion the problem of surface attack on the escort vessels by submarines; he sees a solution in the remote-controlled rocket. The Fuehrer warns against becoming too optimistic about such projectiles, with which Army and Air Force are likewise experimenting. Nevertheless, it is felt that further research is justified since it may possibly lead to a revolutionary development for the submarine. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines emphasizes once more the necessity of evolving such projectiles for the submarine.

The Fuehrer on his part suggests continuing experiments with the remote-controlled torpedo, to which he attaches great importance.

In order to deal with the growing plane menace, it became necessary to strengthen the anti-aircraft equipment of our submarines. Rear Admiral Lange shows, using sketches and pictures, how this can be accomplished with the 15 mm machine gun, and how the shape of the conning tower will be changed correspondingly. The Fuehrer has some doubts as to the effectiveness of the 15 mm gun in the future against airplanes which are reinforced and armored. Rear Admiral Lange and Admiral Doenitz reply that the 15 mm gun was chosen because of satisfactory experiences with the Italian 13 mm machine gun.

Following this, the question of the 2 cm gun is discussed. The Fuehrer suggests filling the ammunition with cyclonite (Hexogenstoff).

The submarines are to be equipped additionally with 3.7 cm and 5 cm automatic guns.

The Fuehrer has serious misgivings about using the 5 cm gun because the Air Force had unfavorable experience with this weapon.

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports that an experiment with it is justifiable nevertheless.

The main difficulty with all automatic weapons on submarines lies in their exposure to the corrosive effects of salt water when the

boats are submerged. Consequently their efficiency is often doubtful.

The Fuehrer suggests examining whether the alloy of the material for these weapons can be improved by the addition of more precious metal in order to counteract the unfavorable effects of salt water. The requirement for the small number of submarine weapons is so low that he will not hesitate to make valuable restricted metals available for that purpose.

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports to the Fuehrer that experiments were made lately with shells filled with an explosive (N-Stoff). Some trial shots were fired at oil tanks which were filled with the heaviest mazut oil. The high flame which arose at first broke off; this however, may have been due to the unusually heavy kind of oil. In any case, some submarines are now being provided with this ammunition in order to try out their effect on the enemy. The Fuehrer personally places great hope in the use of such shells and gives orders to examine at once the possibility of using the explosive (N-Stoff) for loading torpedoes in order to send tankers up in flame.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports further that a weakness of the submarine lies in the low lookout level. The Chief of the Submarine Division of the Naval Staff explains what developments are being made in this respect:

1. The observation mast. This equipment is unsatisfactory due to its limited height (10 meters).
2. The lookout kite (Tragschrauber Bachstelze) which is intended for the larger submarines.

The model is explained in detail with the help of pictures. The Fuehrer doubted at first that the apparatus would stay in the air because of former experiments made by the Army. He thought too that an electric current should be sent up through the cable. Rear Admiral Lange explained that that system had been tried out and discarded because it was untrustworthy and he added that the kite worked only by wind pressure without a motor. Admiral Doenitz reported to the Fuehrer that he had seen the experiments in the wind tunnel in Paris and had been very favorably impressed by the performance of the apparatus. The Fuehrer then asked how the apparatus is stowed on the submarine and the Chief of the Submarine Division of the Naval Staff showed it to him on the drawing.

Next the question of providing submarines with airplanes with motors was discussed. The objections to such an innovation are first the difficulty of tending the motors and second the problem of stowage.

The Fuehrer recalled the unfavorable experiences of the French. The Chief of the Submarine Division of the Naval Staff reported on the SURCOUF incident.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines mentioned the two existing methods of counteracting enemy Asdic. Admiral Maertens explained the hull-coating experiments (Beklebeversuche) which are still being carried on. Mention was made of considerable difficulties



involved in this method and of the limited benefits one may expect from it. Nevertheless, it will be tried out in actual warfare in order to gain a clear picture of its potentialities. The anti-detection decoys (Bold) and their good results were then discussed. The Fuehrer was especially impressed by the good psychological effect it had on the submarine crew.

In regard to surface detection by enemy radar (DT-Geraet), the Chief, Naval Communications Division (MND) reported on the deflective reflection method of applying slanting surfaces to the conning tower and about the use of the radar interception set (Fu-ME).

The Fuehrer mentioned the possibility of feigning the destruction of submarines. He referred to numerous reports by fliers who took it for granted that a submarine had been destroyed after sighting a big oil slick.

The Fuehrer had in mind some kind of torpedo which would explode on the surface of the water and eject oil, blubber, and similar material.

An objection was made that the loss of one torpedo tube for actual attack would be unfortunate. The Chief of the Submarine Division of the Naval Staff reported that one could consider releasing such a missile from the upper deck of the submarine. The matter will be investigated. (Marginal note: I believe it would be more practical to have a container on the upper deck from which air and oil can be blown, so that all torpedo tubes will be saved for their real purpose. Possibly oil and air could be ejected from the bilges.)

In closing, the Walter submarine was discussed. The Commander in Chief, Navy reported that Blohm and Voss and Germania have each been commissioned to build two boats of the smaller type. The larger type has been assigned to the Walter firm for a preliminary design. As soon as the engines of the smaller type have been tried out, an order for twenty four boats is to be placed. We hope to be able to make a decision within two months regarding mass production of the larger type. In any case, mass production of these submarines is to be started as soon as possible, with corresponding adjustment of the present submarine construction program.

The Fuehrer was entirely in harmony with these plans and emphasized once more the need for quick action.

Using a sketch, Admiral Fuchs explained in greater detail the Walter submarine and how it differs from the present type of submarine. The Fuehrer asked about the supply of torpedoes and was informed of the production of the 5 m torpedo for this submarine.

The Fuehrer referred once more to his conviction that the submarine plays a decisive role in the outcome of the war.

Then the Commander in Chief, Navy reported to the Fuehrer that the danger from mines in the eastern Baltic could be of critical significance for the whole submarine training program, since we

are obliged to undertake our training in these waters, especially with the new boats. Mines in the Gulf of Danzig and in the neighboring sea regions thus present an extremely serious problem; everything must be done to safeguard these areas against further mining. The mines found so far were of a rather primitive type and could have been cleared away to some extent. Anti-aircraft protection must be increased in this area, but above all a very strong night fighter defense should be demanded which would conceivably have to cover the narrow passages in the Baltic. The Fuehrer recognized the importance of this question.

After the meeting was adjourned, the Commander in Chief, Navy reported to the Fuehrer that a Spanish steamer unfortunately had been sunk by one of our submarines. The Fuehrer decided that the sinking is to be admitted, and that Spain will be fully compensated for the loss of the ship, including the cargo of wheat. He also ordered that a public announcement be made that the guilty commander will be court-martialed. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines had already issued this order.



Berlin 21 November 1942

Commander in Chief of the Navy

Conference between the Commander in Chief, Navy and  
the Fuehrer at the Berghof the afternoon of 19 Novem-  
ber 1942.

Present: Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command  
Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division  
Captain von Puttkamer

Report on the Situation, 17 November 1942.

1. Own Situation:

Eastern Sector:

Ice will soon put a stop to enemy activity in the Bal-  
tic Sea. No submarines have been observed during the last few  
days.

For the conduct of naval warfare next spring, it is important to  
seal off Leningrad. The result of such an action would be a sav-  
ing of underwater defense devices and of naval vessels; at the  
same time it would make the blockade of Leningrad more effective.  
If it is absolutely impossible to take Leningrad this winter,  
then the occupation of the coastal strip Schepel-Oranienbaum and  
the islands of Lavansaari and Seiskari would considerably im-  
prove the situation (see Annex 1).

The British home air fleet is at present engaged in laying a-  
erial mines. Our effort to sweep these mines is taxing our for-  
ces to the limit.

Northern Sector:

The activity of our fleet is hampered by lack of fuel  
oil. The situation will not improve for the time being, since the  
amounts of fuel oil being handed over in the Mediterranean are  
increasing (see Annex 2).

The following German naval forces are stationed in Norway:

TIRPITZ is lying in Trondheim. The engines are being over-  
hauled, but the ship can be ready on short notice;

HIPPER and KOELN in the Alta Fjord;

NUERNBERG in Trondheim;

4 destroyers in the Alta Fjord, 3 destroyers in Trondheim;

PRINZ EUGEN and LUETZOW will be ready for transfer to the  
north at the beginning of December;

SCHARNHORST cannot be in Norway until January 1943 as a result of delays in repairs;

SCHEER returned to Germany the beginning of November.

Operations are intended only when we have actual proof that the objectives will be worthwhile. Passing QP convoys may prove to be such worthwhile objectives since it is expected that they will not be heavily guarded; therefore good results may be obtained.

Submarines will be less effective during the arctic night because of absence of aerial reconnaissance. At the present time twenty three submarines are assigned to the Arctic Ocean. Ten of these are in the operational zones, three near Jan Mayen, seven near Bear Island.

The Fuehrer decides that in view of the oil situation only LUETZOW is to be transferred, while PRINZ EUGEN will remain in Germany. The decision concerning the transfer of the SCHARNHORST is to be made at the beginning of January. The Fuehrer wants light naval forces to be sent to Norway, however, and desires Norway to be heavily stocked with supplies, since all available reports lead him to fear that the enemy will attempt an invasion during the arctic night. One PT flotilla is to proceed to the Trondheim area, and the artillery barges of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North are to proceed to Norway for the time being. The Fuehrer plans to reinforce the troops stationed there. One Jaeger Division is to be transferred to the Narvik area, and strong reserve forces are to be placed in the Oslo area. The Fuehrer believes that Sweden's attitude absolutely cannot be depended upon in case of an enemy landing attempt.

#### Western Sector:

The situation has not changed to any extent. The enemy is increasing his air activity over the Bay of Biscay and is apparently interested mainly in out-bound tankers which he suspects of being submarine supply ships; e.g. heavy air raids on SPICHERN.

So far, only two of the blockade runners left port undetected. Three others had to turn back because of damage.

Three blockade runners have so far returned from their mission. Enemy air raids on submarine bases such as La Pallice and St. Nazaire have increased lately.

#### Southern Sector:

This is the most important sector at present. We are aiding the Italians with whatever means we have. The 3rd PT Flotilla and the two available motor minesweepers are in Tunis and Bizerte. HERMES was left in the Aegean Sea in view of the importance of providing Crete with the necessary supplies.

All the fuel oil we can spare is being shipped to Italy. In addition, we are stocking the mines necessary for closing the



Straits of Sicily. The importance of closing the Straits of Sicily immediately was emphatically called to the attention of Admiral Riccardi.

The reinforcement of Crete is proceeding according to plan.

2. Enemy Situation:

The landing in North Africa proves that there is as yet no shortage of ships for strategic purposes. In case of an emergency, the enemy can make available a sufficiently large number of vessels by cutting down on all other shipping operations. The ships used in the North African operation total approximately 1,300,000 BRT according to reports received about ships passing Gibraltar, etc. There are enough troop transports. Most of these ships are at present on the way home. Approximately 300,000 BRT are necessary to supply the troops landed in North Africa so far.

The enemy can start another operation of greater scope by the middle of December, if he is able to continue the restrictions on other types of shipping.

Tunisia always was and still is the decisive key position in the Mediterranean.

The presence of Axis forces in Tunisia compels the enemy to employ considerable forces, which must be supplied over long and vulnerable routes. It is a simple task, however, to supply our Armored Army since our lines are short. At the same time the presence of our forces in Tunisia prevents enemy success, since passage through the Mediterranean is denied him. If we are able to hold Tunisia, the enemy will have gained only the advantage of moving his air bases closer to our North African position and to Italy. This is offset however, by disadvantages due to vulnerable supply lines and the large number of troops needed.

Should the enemy succeed in dislodging us from North Africa altogether, he will have enough ships and troops to start an all-out attack on the southern flank of Europe. This attack might be launched in any one of three directions:

- a. The Iberian Peninsula;
- b. Italy;
- c. The Balkans.

If the enemy does not have enough forces available for an operation of such scope, he may possibly occupy the various islands in the Mediterranean, such as the Balearic Islands, Sardinia and Corsica in the Western Mediterranean, and Rhodes and Crete in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The following is an evaluation of the possible advantages and disadvantages the enemy may derive from an attack directed against one of the three objectives mentioned above:

a. Iberian Peninsula:

Advantages: It would forestall an attack on the Iberian Peninsula by the Axis Powers which, if successful, could ruin the entire Anglo-Saxon plan. It would provide the enemy with bases which would enable him to close the Bay of Biscay by means of naval and air forces, so as to bottle up our destructive submarines, our blockade-runners and auxiliary cruisers. The Western Mediterranean and Gibraltar would be safe once and for all. The enemy would be provided with additional strategic points for an attack on France and Italy. This would be the beginning of a second front in Europe.

Disadvantages: Politically, an attack on neutral Spain and Portugal would be embarrassing, with repercussions in South America. However, this factor will not be decisive.

b. Italy:

Advantages: This would be an attack on a spot where the Axis is weak both from a military and political point of view. Italy might be knocked out of the war. The enemy would gain uncontested control of the Mediterranean.

Disadvantages: The enemy has to throw strong forces against our coastal defenses. This can be very costly for him since it is very easy for us to reinforce these defenses.

Therefore, an operation against Italy seems probable only when there is more evidence of internal disintegration in that country.

c. The Balkans:

Advantages: This would mean closer contact with Russia, a possible opening of the sea lanes into the Black Sea. It could be the beginning of an offensive against our southeastern flank through countries over which we do not have complete control. The enemy would get bases for air raids against our oil supply from Rumania. Crete or the Dodecanese Islands may be bypassed in an attack on Greece or Salonika.

The following factors cause the Commander in Chief, Navy to fear a sudden powerful attack on the Aegean from the Suez area: the quiet in the Eastern Mediterranean, the large number of troops landed in South Africa during the last few months, the complete absence of reports from the western\* Indian Ocean, and reports of increased commando activity on Cyprus. Paralysis of our oil sources in Rumania will, of course, always be one of the principal enemy goals.

\* Footnote: Japan has at present only five submarines and four auxiliary cruisers in the Indian Ocean, since she believes that she will need her forces for the battle near the Solomons. On 7 November 1942, Japan withdrew her naval forces to the treaty line, 70° East. Therefore, unfortunately, she is contributing hardly anything at this time to weakening the enemy and disrupting his transport shipments in the western Indian Ocean, in spite of the fact that she is fully aware of the situation.



The Fuehrer repeatedly voices agreement with this opinion. He considers it absolutely necessary that Crete and the troops in the Peloponnesos be reinforced, and that air units be left on Crete. The Fuehrer is convinced that the Bulgarians will live up to their treaty obligations under such circumstances.

### 3. Submarine Warfare:

Plans: The number of submarines in the Arctic Ocean is not to be permitted to fall below twenty three. There were twenty four submarines in the Mediterranean, five of which have been lost in the meantime. The number is to be brought up to twenty four again. Only five or six submarines are still in the western Mediterranean zone of operations because of the strong anti-submarine defenses and air patrols. It is planned to retain that number of submarines and, if possible, to hold several additional submarines in reserve. Fifty seven submarines and two submarine tankers are in the zone of operations in the Atlantic. Thirty three are en route to or from the zone of operations. Three submarines are still operating off the Cape, four in the Gulf of Guinea-Freetown area, and seven off Trinidad. The greater part of the submarines, twenty five in all, is west of Gibraltar, waiting to attack enemy supplies headed for the Mediterranean. A group of fourteen submarines is in the North Atlantic. This group is reinforced mainly by submarines coming from Germany. Attacks on enemy North Atlantic convoys are especially successful at this time, since the enemy escorts are weak. It has been planned that for the time being a group of twelve submarines is to continue to operate against enemy supply transports in the area between the Azores and the Iberian Peninsula-Strait of Gibraltar. The remaining available submarines will be used in the North Atlantic and current zones of operations in order to exploit the weakness of the enemy escort forces and to inflict the largest possible losses on enemy shipping.

The Fuehrer is in agreement concerning the number of submarines to be stationed in the Mediterranean and in the area west of Gibraltar. He feels that the opportunities in the Atlantic, resulting from the reduction in enemy escort forces, should be exploited. Above all he desires that measures be taken against enemy shipping to Egypt and the Middle East via South Africa, in order to relieve the pressure on our troops in Africa and to facilitate a later advance to the Near East. Furthermore, it must be possible to reinforce the submarines in Norway immediately in case of an invasion there. The Commander in Chief, Navy states that this can be done any time by issuing appropriate orders to submarines out-bound from Germany, and by diverting submarines from the North Atlantic.

The Fuehrer also wants transport submarines to be built. The reason he gives is that since the Americans took over Iceland, he has again taken up the idea of a sudden invasion and establishment of an air base there. The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division advocates that this task be delegated to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, since these submarines could be built as merchant submarines and as such could be used for merchant shipping purposes, e.g. as blockade runners. The Commander in Chief, Navy agrees to look into the matter.

4. Of the auxiliary cruisers, only ship "28" is at present operating in the southern Indian Ocean. The Commander in Chief, Navy gives an account of operations of ship "23". The crew of this auxiliary cruiser returned aboard TANNENFELS after sinking a camouflaged enemy auxiliary cruiser and scuttling their own badly damaged vessel.

5. North Sea West Wall:

The Commander in Chief, Navy emphasizes the necessity for reinforcing the North Sea coast and the principal islands by means of a West Wall. The conditions which permitted a certain weakness of the fortifications, namely presence of a strong Air Force able to repel the enemy, no longer prevail. Since our Air Force is operating over such a large area, it would not be able to keep the Allies from launching an attack in this area for the purpose of establishing air bases. The Commander in Chief, Navy requests permission to give Minister Speer directions accordingly.

The Fuehrer has always been of the same opinion and fully agrees.

6. Shipping Space in the Mediterranean:

The Commander in Chief, Navy points out the necessity of building more transport vessels and landing craft in Italy. According to our information, there is sufficient capacity for this in a number of shipyards. However, pressure will have to be put on the Italians from the highest quarters, since there is still an attempt on the part of the Italians to build with an eye toward peace.

The Fuehrer agrees.

signed: Raeder



The Question of Leningrad

Since the operation against Leningrad had to be abandoned for the time being, naval warfare will again flare up in the Baltic after the ice has melted in the spring.

The Naval Staff is convinced that the Russians will again try to get as many submarines as possible into the Baltic Sea, profiting by their experiences of the past summer. Deliberately risking great losses, they succeeded in getting a number of submarines through our very dense mine fields consisting of 13,000 mines and anti-sweeping devices. These submarines harassed our shipping and inflicted some losses. However, the fact that a great number of light vessels had to be used for escort duty, anti-submarine warfare, minelaying and patrolling of mine fields, weakened the German Navy in other important areas. German naval warfare would be helped considerably in 1943 if our mine fields could be concentrated in the easternmost narrows of the Gulf of Finland.

If we lay our mine field approximately in the latitude of Schepel, we will need only 3,600 mines. i.e. approximately 28% of the number required at the present time. At the same time the depth of the water is more suitable and the mines will be much closer together. A mine field in that location will also be much more effective because it can be watched from the coast and therefore only few ships will be needed to patrol it. At the same time, coastal batteries can prevent enemy sweeping attempts.

In view of our limited mine reserves and the number of mines now being produced, we cannot afford to lay as many as we did in the spring of 1942. Likewise for the sake of saving equipment which could be used for other important operations, it would pay us to lay the narrow and effective mine field, even though the deep mines are not affected by the ice and only the shallow ones, i.e. those layed at a depth of 20 meters or less, have to be replaced. We cannot do this, however, unless we occupy the coast from Oranienbaum to Schepel and the remaining islands of Lavansaari, Peninsaari and Seiskari. But even if we took only the western point of the coastal strip still held by the Russians, inclusive of Schepel, we would improve the situation considerably and make the islands untenable for the enemy.

If the operation is successful, we will also be in a much better position to watch and attack Kronstadt.

Therefore, the Naval Staff proposes that all available forces in the Leningrad area be primarily used for the purpose of occupying the entire southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, and advocates the permanent occupation of the three islands in the winter, when the Gulf is frozen over.

If we cannot occupy Schepel, considerable advantages would be gained by the permanent occupation of the islands alone.

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The Fuehrer agrees with what has been said. He hopes matters will progress as outlined by the Naval Staff. He believes that it will be possible to make the harbor of Leningrad unusable by a new method of attack.



The Fuel Oil Situation

A. Fuel oil consumption of the Navy was drastically reduced in April 1942. Between then and October, inclusive, naval forces consumed 472,892 tons, or 67,500 tons of fuel oil per month. Reserves, which must not be permitted to fall below a certain minimum in view of the numerous refueling stations which must be supplied at great distances, amounted to 150,000 tons on 1 April.

A total of 81,000 tons was placed at the disposal of the Italian Navy since April 1942. Deliveries were stepped up beginning August 1942. These amounts were taken only partly from the monthly quota of the German Navy; the remainder came out of the reserves. Consequently, the German reserves have now reached a low of 131,900 tons on 1 November 1942.

B. During the same period, the Italian Navy consumed a total of 411,000 tons, or approximately 60,000 tons per month. Now the Italians are asking for more than 80,000 tons per month. Italian fuel oil reserves amounted to 40,000 tons in the beginning of April. Since Rumanian deliveries have been decreasing steadily since June, the Italian reserves are down to 14,000 tons as of 1 November, in spite of all the German help. In other words, for all practical purposes there are no more reserves. As the result the Italian battleships had to relinquish all their oil and are consequently not ready for action; the cruisers at Navarino can keep their tanks only  $\frac{4}{5}$  full, and the cruisers at Messina only  $\frac{1}{2}$  full. The Italian bases in Dalmatia and in the Aegean Sea have no more oil at all. The naval forces in the Aegean Sea are at present being supplied with German fuel oil through the Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea. It has already become necessary to postpone the departure dates of convoys or even to cancel them. It has also become necessary to forego certain operations, such as pursuit of sighted submarines, because the naval forces simply do not have the necessary fuel oil.

It has been proven that the Italians have not given all the fuel oil received from the German Navy to their Navy. After this was discovered by a German officer especially assigned to look into the matter, the Italians kept him from getting further information regarding the disposition of our shipments.

C. Rumanian shipments will further decrease during the winter months. The German Navy has promised the Italians 20,000 tons per month. According to the Italians, their minimum monthly requirement is 60,000 tons, now even raised to 80,000 tons. Therefore the supply that can be counted on won't be sufficient under any circumstances.

D. Fuel oil shipments to Italy can be increased only in the following ways:

a. By increasing shipments from Rumania. (Rumanian fuel oil consumption amounts to 115,000 tons per month during the winter.)

b. By increasing shipments from Germany. This would necessitate curtailing German operations. This could be done only with respect to the nucleus fleet, which, in effect, would have to be completely immobilized. Some fuel oil can be saved by putting the ships into German ports where they need no oil for heating and for the generators. The operations of the defense forces and of the training ships for the schools and those under the commanding Admiral, Submarines cannot be curtailed any further.

c. By measures guaranteeing that the fuel oil intended for the Italian Navy is used exclusively by the Italian Navy.



Berlin 24 December 1942

Commander in Chief of the Navy

Report by the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer  
at the Fuehrer's Headquarters, 22 December 1942.I. Norway.

Distribution of naval forces:

In the Alta Fjord: HIPPER, LUETZOW, KOELN, and five destroyers.In the bay of Narvik: NUERNBERG, one destroyer.In Trondheim: TIRPITZ (ready for action again in January), three destroyers.

The SCHARNHORST, the PRINZ EUGEN, and five destroyers are ready for transfer from the Baltic Sea at the beginning of January.

The following amount of oil is needed for the transfer:

For the heavy ships:	2,200 tons
For the destroyers:	<u>2,600 tons</u>
Total (needed only once):	4,800 tons

If the vessels remain in home waters, the following amounts of oil would be saved per month:

For the two heavy ships (since there is only one large berth east of Kiel):	800 tons
For the destroyers: about	<u>200 tons</u>
Total saved each month:	1,000 tons

Since the destroyers are to be transferred to Norway in any case, the fuel oil saved by leaving the SCHARNHORST and the PRINZ EUGEN behind would be only as follows:

Saved because vessels are not transferred:	2,200 tons
Saved from then on per month:	800 tons

Therefore, it is planned to make the transfer in January during the time of the new moon.

The LUETZOW is assigned to cruiser warfare in the Arctic Ocean since supplies are apparently being carried to northern Russia in unescorted vessels at the present time, and submarines are not

very effective during the dark months of winter for patrolling the northern supply routes.

The fuel oil situation is going to become more difficult in the near future because the Italians need large additional supplies, due to the reduction in Rumanian deliveries during the winter months.

Even now our fuel oil situation is such that the large vessels cannot be refueled in the main harbors unless the allocations are made far in advance, since we are unable to keep sufficient supplies on hand.

Four PT boats, which were previously stationed in western Norway, (in Bergen), have been in Bodoe since 13 December.

The 8th PT Boat Flotilla with the KARL PETERS left for Norway on 18 Dec. with Bodoe as its destination.

The HIPPER is to be docked in mid-February and will therefore be transferred to home waters at the beginning of that month.

The Fuehrer considers that the danger of a possible Allied invasion of northern Norway is greatest in January. Anti-aircraft defenses are helpless because of the darkness. Therefore the Fuehrer postpones his decision until the beginning of February.

## II. Western Area

The situation has become worse due to our losses and because British naval forces, including destroyers, have repeatedly appeared along our coast. The enemy has apparently cleared channels through our mine fields. Our own forces are not sufficient to repulse such raids or to lay enough mines, particularly in the Channel. Strong enemy plane activity continues. The transfer of Ship "14" had to be postponed from January to February because adequate mine protection cannot be provided until then.

Because of this situation, the first eight vessels converted into artillery barges (Artillerie-MFP), which were supposed to be sent to Norway this month, were ordered to remain in the Western Area.

Of the twenty five artillery barges slated for the Northern Area, the first ones will reach the Commanding Admiral, Norway in January. Deliveries are as follows:

In service:	4
Having trials:	4
To be completed during January and February:	17
To be completed during March and April: ca	5
Additional ones to be completed by June:	16
Additional ones to be completed by September:	4

Concerning the occupation of the Isle des Croix (off Lorient, 7 x 3 km), see Annex 1, which sanctions occupation of the island by the Army.



The composition of the 22nd Submarine Chaser Flotilla (Tunisia) is treated in Annex 2.

### III. Baltic Sea.

Since we have so few escort vessels and these are so heavily taxed, we must review once more the advantages to be gained from an occupation of the islands of Lavansaari and Seiskari and of the Schepel-Oranienbaum strip before the spring of 1943.

Only a really effective blockade of the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, close to the enemy's key bases, could give us hope of saving fighting forces and mines. Even if Leningrad were completely destroyed by artillery fire, the submarine danger would still exist because Kronstadt remains a base. Every submarine, however, that gets through the blockade is a threat to the entire Baltic Sea and endangers our shipping which is already barely sufficient.

The Fuehrer recognizes the importance of this matter. He will keep it in mind and further it as much as possible.

The Allies are still using air-laid mines to a large extent. The situation is well in hand, however, in spite of some difficulties and occasional losses.

### IV. Submarines:

#### A. Summary:

#### 1. Operational submarines

210

(Fifteen of our submarines were lost during November; this exceeds the number becoming ready for operations (11) by four.)

- a. Of the above number, the following are in harbors in the areas indicated:

Western France	67
Norway	18
Mediterranean	13
Black Sea	<u>2</u>

Total: 100

- b. En route to or from operational area: 47

- c. In operational areas:

North Atlantic	40
Central Atlantic	13
South Atlantic	-
Mediterranean	8
Arctic Ocean	2

## Black Sea

Total: 63

2. School submarines (unchanged) 533. Submarines being tested and in training 119

Grand Total of submarines: 382

Losses up to 18 December 1942 147 (an average of 3.8 per month)

Decommissioned: 9

During this month for the first time one of our own U-boats, commanded by Lt. Gilardone, was rammed by another while operating against a convoy. The boat and most of the crew were lost. Losses for the last months:

October: 13  
 November: 15 (new output: 11)  
 December (up to the present): 3 (one in a convoy)

B. Walter Boats:

Now that the building program has been successfully met, we can carry out our decision, namely, mass production of the twenty four submarines and the construction of two large experimental submarines.

1. Small submarine, Type XVII; coastal and training boat.

a. Size: 260 cu.m.

b. Maximum surface speed: 9 knots

Maximum submerged speed: 26 knots

c. Armament: 2 forward torpedo tubes.  
4 torpedoes (5.4 m. long).

d. Surface cruising range at a speed of 7 knots: 2,900 miles

Underwater cruising range at a speed of 20 knots: 160 miles

e. Crew: 14 men

f. Construction will be completed by the end of 1943, and the trial runs by the beginning of 1944. The four experimental boats will be commissioned between April and June 1944, and the series of twenty four submarines beginning August 1944, two boats per month.



2. Large submarines, Type XVIII; Atlantic submarines.
  - a. Size: 1,500 cu.m.
  - b. Maximum surface speed: 15 knots  
Maximum submerged speed: 26 knots
  - c. Armament: 6 forward torpedo tubes.  
20 torpedoes (7 m. long).  
Light anti-aircraft gun aft (3.7 cm.).
  - d. Surface cruising range at a speed  
of 7 knots: 12,000 miles  
Underwater cruising range at a  
speed of 20 knots: 330 miles or 15 hrs.
  - e. Crew: 48 men
  - f. The two experimental vessels will  
be commissioned in April or May  
1945. Mass production is supposed  
to begin in May 1943; completion  
of ships from the middle of 1945  
on.

Notes in regard to the above dates.

The dates of completion which the High Command, Navy required of the shipyards are in some cases earlier. A safety margin has been added to cover unexpected difficulties. The experimental boats will be commissioned after completion of the test runs.

The Fuehrer suggests that such valuable construction should be carried out in concrete shelters. The Commander in Chief, Navy will check on this.

C. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports that the first of the 103 torpedoes equipped with P1 2 were sent to the combat area in the Mediterranean. Nothing is known yet about their performance. He also mentions that the Fat torpedoes will be introduced next month.

V. At dinner alone with the Fuehrer, the Commander in Chief, Navy discusses the Iberian question. See Annex 3.

The Fuehrer is of the same opinion. He intends to enter into negotiations with Spain and to prepare for an occupation. For the moment he wants to await the results which General Munoz Grande may obtain.

VI. Raw material quotas for the Navy for the first quarter of 1943 and their effect. Annex 4.

The Commander in Chief, Navy substantiates his report with the summary in Annex 4. He considers it his duty to state that action on some of the Fuehrer's orders must be delayed, that others cannot be carried out at all.

The Fuehrer understands the Navy's difficulties. He has also had to reduce greatly the quotas of other branches of the Armed Forces, however. He explains in detail how he must first of all prevent a collapse of any front where the enemy could substantially injure home territory. There is still a great deal to be done on this score. The Fuehrer has personally discussed the situation of the Navy with Minister Speer, but he cannot see his way clear to help the Navy at the present time. He hopes that the situation will be better in the second quarter but he can make no promises.

The Commander in Chief, Navy proposes that Admiral Schmudt be made a member of the committee for "Central Planning". This would improve matters greatly because the Navy could make its needs known promptly.

The Fuehrer will look into the matter; he points out, however, that the Army does not have a representative either.

VII. Decree concerning conscription of the German youth for auxiliary war service.

The Commander in Chief, Navy briefly explains the main objections of the Navy, as they were stated in the letter of protest which the Naval High Command sent to the Armed Forces High Command. He emphasizes the problem of naval replacements and the training of the Naval Hitler Youth. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command reports that the Fuehrer has already given orders for a new decree to be issued in which the wishes of the Navy are to be respected.

The Fuehrer himself now orders that the problem of the Naval Hitler Youth be handled as the Navy desires. The question of volunteers has already been taken into consideration.

VIII. New Mines.

The Commander in Chief, Navy briefly states that a report on new types of mines will soon be submitted. They should be very successful as a surprise weapon if they are suddenly used simultaneously by both the Navy and the Air Force after a sufficient quantity is procured.

The Fuehrer will issue an order at once. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command proposes that a preliminary draft be submitted.

signed: Raeder



In conformance with the Fuehrer's order the Navy occupied the following islands off the west coast of France:

a.	Ile de Croix	Light Naval Coastal Artillery Bn.	681
b.	Belle Ile	" " " "	682/3
c.	Ile de Noirmoutier	" " " "	684
d.	Ile d'Yeu	" " " "	685
e.	Ile de Re	" " " "	686
f.	Ile d'Oleron	" " " "	687

Our duties along the French Mediterranean coast necessitated the transfer of Light Naval Coastal Artillery Battalions 682 and 685 from the islands to southern France in order to man batteries there. In agreement with the Commanding General, West, the naval troops withdrawn from the islands were temporarily replaced by Army units.

Since the Army now wishes to recall these troops, Naval Group, West, with the consent of the Commanding General, West suggests that in the future Ile de Croix be permanently occupied by the Army. This will relieve Light Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion 681 which in turn can replace the Army units recalled from the other islands. That leaves one light naval coastal artillery battalion which will not be assigned but will be kept ready for operation "Gisela".

This is contradictory to the Fuehrer's recent decree which provided for naval occupation of all islands on the west coast of France. However, since there is such a shortage of personnel it would be very advantageous if the Army would occupy one of the islands, particularly since the Naval Staff considers operation "Gisela" very urgent. Before a decision is reached it must be investigated whether Ile de Croix, which is situated just in front of Lorient, and where the two 20 cm gun turrets from the SEYDLITZ are eventually to be stationed, would not better be retained by the Navy and another island be given to the Army.

The Fuehrer grants permission for Army occupation of one of the islands in view of the Navy's lack of personnel.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command doubts that the offer of the Commanding General, West still stands, since several of his divisions have been transferred in the last few days.

Composition of the 22nd Submarine Chaser Flotilla to  
be stationed in Tunisia.

Ten converted fishing steamers, each about 1,000 BRT, are intended for the 22nd Submarine Chaser Flotilla.

Six of these use oil, two use coal, and two have motors. The average speed of these vessels is 9 to 10 knots.

Four vessels are being converted in Marseille, four in Ciotat, and two in Port de Bouc. Conversion of the first five vessels will take twenty days; they will be ready about 16 January 1943.

Each vessel will have the following armament:

Two 37 mm guns (single barrel).  
Three or four 20 mm anti-aircraft guns.  
A number of machine guns, Model 1934.

Search receivers (S-Geraete) are being installed.

The first two crews with their commanding officers have already been assigned by the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West. Six more crews will be furnished by the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, East and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North.

The second group of ten vessels for this flotilla includes four fast freighters which could possibly be used as fast transports. Inquiries are being made whether they will be needed as such.



The Iberian Peninsula

The relationship of the Iberian peninsula to the warring nations and the possibilities of military action on the part of the enemy against Spain or Portugal are of the greatest importance for the strategic situation of naval warfare, especially of submarine warfare and of blockade-running. It is therefore the duty of the Naval Staff to analyze the possible developments on the Iberian Peninsula, to draw conclusions, and to suggest how we should proceed in a military and political way. The various possibilities for developments on the Iberian Peninsula are discussed below.

I. Portugal and Spain intend to stay out of the war. They want to maintain their neutrality if at all possible by adapting themselves to the current political and military situation. However, either nation is not entirely independent politically. Portugal is bound to Britain by old treaties and is especially dependent on Anglo-American sea power because of her extensive colonial possessions. Both countries have to import fuel and grain, which they can get in sufficient quantities at the present time only from the Anglo-American sphere of power. The Portuguese neutrality policy was strengthened somewhat by the agreement announced by Spain, which grew out of Spanish-Portuguese conferences. It provided that Spain would regard any attack on Portuguese territory in Europe, including her Atlantic islands, as an attack on Spain herself, even in the event that Portugal should not try to defend herself. Spain guarantees the full support of her armed forces in case of such an attack.

The domestic situation in both countries is unstable. Both governments are anxious to defeat at the start any attempts at interference either by the Anglo-Americans or by the Communists, and to escape the political, economic, and - since the occupation of French North Africa - the military pressure of the Anglo-Americans. However, this is hardly possible, particularly since the Spanish and Portuguese armies are badly equipped, and since no material or psychological preparations for war whatsoever have been made in either country.

The Franco government is probably conscious of the fact that even if it should yield completely to enemy pressure, it would not be acceptable to the Allies in the long run for ideological reasons. On the other hand, Great Britain at least would be willing to tolerate a Salazar government if it were entirely compliant with the Allies. Also for this reason, quite apart from the ideological reasons which stem from the civil war, Franco will be less obliging to Allied demands than Portugal. The Spanish aristocracy and the Catholic Church have recently approved Franco's leanings towards Germany because they fear the return of a red government.

II. The developments on the Iberian Peninsula, however, are not so much determined by the desires of Spain and Portugal as they are by the wishes and the war necessity of our enemies. We

may assume that the lack neither of cargo space nor of anything else will essentially influence their decisions.

A. We do not believe that the Portuguese and Spanish colonies, with the exception of Spanish Morocco, are endangered at the present time.

1. The Portuguese colonies are economically almost entirely dependent on British and more recently also on American capital. Since Madagascar was occupied and French West Africa went over to Darlan, the colonies on the African continent are strategically not so important to the enemy as they used to be.

2. The Portuguese islands in the Atlantic are exclusively at the disposal of our enemies who use them as a base under the protection of a neutral flag. It is not strategically necessary for us to occupy these islands at the moment, although it is a strong temptation to establish our own air bases there. Even though both America and England would like to control the Azores because of their general importance, still we do not consider that there is much danger of an attack on the islands at the present time.

3. The Canary Islands are also not nearly so important as they were before French North Africa was occupied.

Unless an attack is unavoidable for urgent strategic reasons, the Allies, especially Great Britain, will not attack Spanish possessions and certainly not those belonging to Portugal, to which England is bound by treaties. Such an undertaking would be a direct contradiction to all British political propaganda and could cause some unpleasant reactions, particularly in South America and Turkey.

B. Nevertheless, an attack against the Portuguese and Spanish homeland, including Spanish Morocco, is definitely feasible; as a matter of fact it is very likely, since such an attack is actually a strategic necessity for the enemy. It does not matter whether the political attack which has already begun is sufficient to force both nations to give up their neutrality and to make their territory, at least their harbors and airbases, available to the enemy, or whether military action will have to be taken against the peninsula. It would be a great military and economic advantage to the enemy to have the Iberian Peninsula in their power.

1. The strategic advantages which the occupation of the French west coast affords Germany could be largely offset if the enemy had the use of the northern coast of Spain. Submarine warfare would become much more difficult; at the very least the enemy would be afforded urgently needed relief from the grave problems of shipping space confronting him at present. A serious blow would be dealt to Germany's economy at the same time by completely paralyzing the movements of our blockade-runners, which are vitally important to us.



2. The British Air Force would be considerably closer to France and Italy. The strategic situation at sea in the western Mediterranean would change still more in favor of the Anglo-Americans.

3. An army which could effectively be used in opening another front could be assembled at leisure on the Iberian Peninsula.

4. Germany would be deprived of important raw materials which the Iberian Peninsula can supply, and these would be utilized by the enemy. But these resources are of most decisive importance for our war effort; the Iberian Peninsula supplies us with one million tons of iron ore, 3,500 tons of wolfram, 200 tons of lithium, 1,000 tons of tin, and mica and beryllium ore besides.

5. All problems which the enemy might still have in the Spanish or Portuguese colonies would solve themselves after occupation of the mother country.

6. Gibraltar would be protected permanently; there would be no further danger of Germany's securing the Atlantic harbors as submarine and air bases, thereby increasing her success in the naval war. We may assume that the enemy is ready to establish bridgeheads in the Portuguese harbors and to occupy Tangier and Ceuta at the first sign of an impending German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. In such a case, a German advance towards Gibraltar would be outflanked by units from the Portuguese area.

C. There is no doubt that our enemies would like to gain their ends on the Iberian Peninsula with the least possible military effort and as far as possible without injuring the propagandistic efficacy of their political ideology. By causing unrest within the countries, they will try to create a situation which will make it seem right for the Anglo-American troops to march in of their own accord under the pretext of restoring order or even at the request of a newly formed government submissive to the Allies. In any case we can take it for granted that the Allies are seeking to get control of the entire Iberian Peninsula, since a powerful position only in Portugal, which is the weaker state, would not be enough to allow them to achieve their strategic ends.

It is difficult to predict the developments in detail. One thing is certain, however, and that is that Portugal's political attitude is largely influenced by Spain's, and Spain's attitude by that of Germany. This means that our policies can and must influence future developments.

D. Since our military resources are restricted at the present time, our policy must be based on the following principles:

1. Any inner unrest on the Iberian Peninsula is a disadvantage to us. We must therefore support the governments

of Franco and Salazar in every way possible, particularly in their domestic, but also in their foreign policies. Co-operation between our intelligence service and the local police could be useful. Franco has to be convinced that he must now remove all higher officials and ministers who are politically unreliable.

2. All possible material and moral support must be given to the Armed Forces of Spain.

3. If we wish to strengthen Spain's self-confidence and her will to resist, we must do more than supply her with arms. Binding agreements must be reached to cover any emergency which may arise as, for instance, an Allied attack on Portugal or Spanish Morocco. Therefore political conferences and General Staff conferences should be arranged immediately; we should consider signing a secret mutual-assistance pact, similar to the Tri-Partite Pact. At the same time, conferences should be held to investigate how the economic life of Spain and Portugal can be maintained, particularly in regard to food, in case Spain should have to defend herself against an Allied attack. Spain and Portugal are primarily dependent on the import of 800,000 tons of coal and coke, 380,000 tons of liquid fuels, as well as 750,000 tons of grain and 136,000 tons of fertilizer.

Means must be found to enable continental Europe to maintain a minimum standard of living, if necessary by imposing severe restrictions on ourselves. The word "impossible" cannot be tolerated in this connection. It would be very helpful in this connection if our blockade runners could increase imports by making use of Portuguese harbors.

4. Germany must introduce and carry out the intended measures in the most careful, discreet, and secret manner possible in order not to provoke the enemy to premature and undesirable military or political reactions. Should this happen, the result would inevitably be increased pressure on both countries and further reductions in their imports in order to dissuade them from co-operating with Germany. It would thus be well to camouflage our procedure and to give the outward appearance as if Spain were leaning more and more towards the Allies.

### III. Summary.

1. It is a great temptation for the enemy to get the Iberian Peninsula in his power. Such a step would be the best way to fight the submarines.

2. It would likewise be of utmost strategic importance to us to take over the entire Iberian Peninsula, among other reasons in order to intensify submarine warfare and blockade running and to neutralize or eliminate entirely the Anglo-American occupation of North Africa.

3. However, since we do not want to divert either the military or the economic forces necessary for such action unless it is imperative, we must strive to maintain the neutrality of the Iberian Peninsula. This, however, requires exten-



sive military and political measures immediately.

4. If the enemy should take over the Iberian Peninsula, we would be confronted by an extremely critical situation from a military point of view. Moreover, the economic problem would be even worse, and almost impossible to cope with. Thus Germany must be ready to seize Spain and Portugal by force and to integrate them into the economic life of Europe at the very moment when the danger of an enemy seizure of the peninsula is imminent, even if such a step should entail great economic sacrifices for the rest of continental Europe.

Raw material quotas for the Navy in the first quarter of 1943 and their consequences.

I. Decrease in production in the first quarter of 1943.

In spite of incessant oral and written reports made by my office and by myself personally (my comprehensive report on 26 August), in spite of Minister Speer's efforts, and in spite of the additional allotments from the Fuehrer reserves received by explicit order of the Fuehrer, the quotas of raw materials allowed the Navy for the first quarter of 1943 (steel, non-ferrous metals, structural steel) continue to be insufficient.

The Navy has made an exhaustive investigation of all possibilities for reducing the amount of raw material needed and for changing the criterion determining whether metal or a substitute is to be used. The Navy, in collaboration with responsible officials of the industry, its construction and production experts, has thoroughly investigated the possibility of making the necessary adjustments in construction and production technique and in plant management in order to permit the widest possible use of substitutes.

Likewise all steps have been taken to reduce the required amount of arms, gear, and ammunition, and to decrease the number of accessories and the amount of equipment needed. All construction programs have been thoroughly checked and re-checked and have been reduced to the lowest minimum which military operations permit.

It is also no longer possible to use the stockpiles of the defense plants and shipyards to get through the first quarter of 1943. This was confirmed by both Minister Speer and the Ministry of Economics.

The following quotas for the most important raw materials were decided upon during the conference in the office of Minister Speer on 11 December:

	Requirement	Quota
Steel	183,000 tons per month	137,550 tons per month
Copper	2,200 " " "	2,028 " " "
Aluminum	2,200 " " "	1,661 " " "
Zinc	3,000 " " "	1,684 " " "
Lead	2,600 " " "	1,727 " " "
Structural steel	41,000 " " quarter	18,000 " " quarter (temporarily allotted:) 12,000 tons per quarter

The great reduction in raw material quotas has forced me to order drastic curtailments in production for the first quarter of 1943, in order to avoid misuse of raw materials and to use the remain-



ing contingents to the best military advantage. My principle is to concentrate on submarine warfare and to make certain that it at least will not be disrupted. All production essential for submarine warfare must be carried on with the least possible interruption. I have already taken into account the fact that the prefabricated products are being delivered much faster due to Minister Speer's new measures.

Because of their military importance I wish to report these measures:

A. Construction of Naval Vessels:

1. Repair and new construction of submarines (to be increased to twenty five boats) are being continued unrestricted.

The repair of surface craft is likewise being continued.

2. On the other hand, the following drastic curtailment in the construction and conversion of naval surface vessels and auxiliary vessels is necessary:

a. Conversion of the SEYDLITZ, POTSDAM and DE GRASSE into auxiliary aircraft carriers can be started with only a very small allotment. The same holds true with regard to the conversion of the EUROPA and GNEISENAU into troop transports.

b. Construction of landing craft is reduced by one third. This eliminates the construction of sixteen artillery-lighters out of a total of forty five landing craft.

c. The construction of more submarine chasers cannot be authorized for the time being.

d. The production of converted fishing craft is extended over a longer period of time. The planned increase cannot be carried out.

e. The construction of auxiliary vessels was greatly reduced. The following are to be discontinued:

Construction on merchant vessels seized by the Navy.

Conversion of the auxiliary cruiser AMMERSEKERK.

Preparations for converting more auxiliary cruisers.

Conversion or continued construction of the auxiliary supply ships OSTFRIESLAND, VIERLANDEN, STOMANN, and RHEINPFALZ.

Continued construction of the 8,500 ton tanker at the Cock-erill shipyards.

Continued construction of four more tankers of 2,500 tons each.

Construction of three more transports (KT-Schiffe) at the Nikolayev shipyards.

f. Completion of thirty nine fishing steamers in Holland is postponed.

g. The restrictions on the construction of utility vessels (tugs, water tenders, oil tankers, etc.) will affect supplies of the naval forces.

h. The stocks of ship equipment will diminish and may prove insufficient to fill any great demands. There will be a delay in the contracted return of ship construction material to Denmark and Finland. Diplomatic difficulties may ensue.

B. Arms and ammunition.

The cuts necessary in arms production (artillery, mines, communications equipment, nautical gear) correspond substantially to the decrease in the construction of vessels.

Details: 1. Artillery ammunition. Considering the fairly large stocks, the production of ammunition was reduced more than anything else; cut most was production of calibers intended for heavy and medium artillery of surface vessels, the 10.5 cm and 8.8 cm guns of submarines and the 10.5 cm guns of coastal anti-aircraft defenses.

2. Mines. The production of mines and minesweeping equipment has been decreased. The available stocks, which are already very small, have been reduced further. Only sixty per cent of the necessary underwater nets are available.

The following statement applies to all arms and ammunition: All stocks have been decreased considerably. In case of need the stocks might be insufficient. New military demands cannot be met on short notice. No more arms or ammunition can be supplied to our allies.

There are enough torpedoes for submarine warfare.

C. Construction projects.

Since we must concentrate on immediate, active naval warfare, all construction plans had to be curtailed radically due to lack of machine steel and structural steel (construction of fortifications, harbor facilities, facilities for troop supply and troop training as well as facilities for armament production.)

Details: 1. Fortifications. The construction of defenses on Crete is not possible; new military requisitions cannot be filled on short notice.

2. Harbor facilities. Expansion and equipment of navy yards, fitting-out depots and repair shops in the occupied territories has been delayed. Armament factories, torpedo depots and ammunition depots have been reduced considerably.

3. Facilities for troop supply and troop training. The construction of billets and air raid shelters on the bases in



the occupied territories has been delayed. Construction of facilities for training specialists has been postponed. There is a further delay in the construction of workers' quarters.

4. Increased facilities for armament production. There are great delays in the completion of important projects relating to the manufacture of underwater explosives, guns, communications equipment, etc. Expansion in the production of smoke acid (Nebelsaeure) has been slowed down. The completion of several private shipyards has been delayed, as was the transfer of repair shops to Gdynia and the Schichau shipyards in Koenigsberg.

Remarks. 1. For the following two new construction projects in the home territory, Minister Speer has allocated the construction material from the Atlantic Wall quota, not from the naval quota, thus making sure that construction can begin:

a. Submarine pens for submarine construction docks (twenty pens requiring 95,000 tons of steel).

b. Air raid shelters for the troops (thirty shelters requiring 8,000 tons of steel).

2. In the French area the following construction projects, which the Todt Organization is to take over, are particularly urgent for naval warfare. The raw materials must be taken from the quota of the Todt Organization:

a. Reinforcement of the ceilings of the existing submarine pens. There are sixty five pens which require approximately 800 tons of steel each. Total: 52,000 tons.

b. Construction of forty five new submarine pens requiring 5,000 tons of steel each. Total: 225,000 tons.

c. Air raid shelters for shipyard personnel in western France. The total required is 11,000 tons of steel.

Note: The reinforcement of the ceilings and the construction of the forty five new submarine pens are particularly urgent. If both requirements cannot be met at the same time, the construction of the new pens should receive priority.

D. Besides the restrictions caused by insufficient allotments of machine steel and structural steel, the following additional restrictions are caused by the insufficient non-ferrous metal quota.

1. Aluminum. Production of underwater explosives and mines made of light metals had to be reduced. Production of degaussing gear (MES) had to be cut likewise.

2. Zinc. Production of smoke candles (Nebelkerzen) had to be reduced to one fourth (!). Difficulties are being encountered in making zinc alloys, and the output had to be reduced.

3. Lead. There are difficulties in the production of storage batteries for submarines and torpedoes.

E. In conclusion attention is called to the fact that many difficulties and a great loss of time will be involved in trying to increase production later, once it has been so drastically curtailed.

II. Quota demands.

In any event we must definitely insist that future allotments recognize the importance of the Navy and the decisive significance of naval warfare for the whole war effort and reveal proper understanding of the constantly increasing duties of the Navy (ever greater numbers of operational submarines, constantly enlarging combat zones, and war conditions which are becoming more and more difficult). I cannot possibly find such recognition in our steel allotment, for example, which with its 127,000 tons represents a mere five per cent of the total contingent of 2,500,000 tons.



Notes for a Report on Regulations Concerning Auxiliary  
War Service of German Youth

1. Principal Objections:

Grave psychological reaction on the part of the parents to the drafting of fifteen and sixteen year olds.

Shift of education from school to Army.

Delay in the commissioning of officers due to necessary prolonging of training period (effect on the availability of U-boat officers).

Injury to health.

Effect on prospective university students.

Future shortages of teachers and of personnel for the health and welfare services.

Discontinuation of military training in Hitler Youth Naval Units and government pre-naval schools (Reichsseesportschulen).

Limitation of recruiting possibilities for the Navy.

Loss of new naval personnel derived from Hitler Youth Naval Units.

Other possibilities which have not yet been completely exhausted:

Great savings in personnel would be possible by closing all stores which have hardly anything to sell but keep their employees (department stores and small retail stores).

Great numbers of unoccupied women have not yet been employed.

Before causing permanent injury to our own youth, more persons of occupied and allied countries should be put to work.

It is highly undesirable to limit the education of the German youth, who will be called on to provide the leaders of the future, as long as the universities of the occupied countries are still open.

It is necessary to intensify the use of our human resources in this fateful struggle of the German people; the effect would be good on the people as a whole, but the immature youth of school age should be drafted only as the very last resort.

Therefore such a step is premature and should only be taken after the above possibilities have been exhausted.

2. Demands of the Navy in case the regulations go into effect in spite of our objections:

a. The plan decidedly favors the Air Force. Naval, Army, and civilian needs are not adequately cared for.

b. There should be no such one-sided enlistment of auxiliaries (male or female) for the Air Force, but such enlistments should be for the Armed Forces in general.

c. The Navy lays claim to male students in those regions in which air defense is carried out by the Navy.

Distribution of female students should be on the basis of need and in proportion to the size of the different branches of the Armed Forces.

d. The plans provide for continuation of the training of students who belonged to special Hitler Youth Organizations. At the same time military training is to be continued.

However, the technical training of students belonging to Hitler Youth Naval Units as well as their training in military camps and in the government pre-naval schools leading to Naval Hitler Youth B and C certificates would practically come to an end. Hence the Navy would lose this source of additional personnel.

This in our opinion endangers the possibility of getting officer replacements for naval warfare. Therefore it is requested that students belonging to Naval Units of the Hitler Youth be placed at the disposal of the Navy in proportion to its need. If their number exceeds the share of the Navy, the remaining students of Hitler Youth Naval Units should be used in closed groups and be given additional specialized naval training.

It is especially urgent to provide specialized naval training since if schooling is discontinued after fifteen years of age, a longer training period for prospective naval officers will be necessary in any case.

In spite of this directive, voluntary enlistment for the different branches of the Armed Forces must be maintained as before, and the provision must be made that the draftees will not automatically be assigned to the Air Force.

Copies of the following are enclosed:

1. Excerpts from the draft of the order.
2. Final protest against the order.

General Administration Bureau,  
Recruitment Division



Excerpts from the Regulations concerning Auxiliary War  
Service of German Youth in the Air Force.

Paragraph 1

For the performance of auxiliary war service in connection with air defense, the Commander in Chief, Air Force has at his disposal all male students from secondary schools who have completed their fifteenth year, and all female students from secondary schools who have completed their seventeenth year.

Paragraph 2 to 4 omitted.

Paragraph 5 (last sentence only)

Any diversion of personnel for similar functions within the spheres of the Army and the Navy or of other authorities engaged in vital tasks is to be decided by the Air Minister and Commander in Chief, Air in consultation with the branches of the Armed Forces concerned or with the proper government offices.

Paragraph 6

The Air Minister and Commander in Chief, Air together with the Reich Youth Leader will decide how many of the students from secondary schools liable to the auxiliary war service draft are to be deferred so as to guarantee a sufficient number of leaders for the Hitler Youth.

Berlin 18 December 1942

Subject: Auxiliary war service of German youth in the Air Force.

1. The Commander in Chief, Navy objected at the time to the exclusive use of students from secondary schools by the Air Force. He demanded that male students in those regions where the air defense is carried out by the Navy should be at the disposal of the Navy for auxiliary war service, and that the distribution of female students should be regulated on the basis of need and in proportion to the size of the different branches of the Armed Forces.

After the Reichsmarschall made it known through the Chief, Air Defenses that he was not in a position to comply with the wishes of the Navy, the Commander in Chief, Navy in his letter AMA/M Wehr Ia No. 17730 geh., dated 28 November 1942, asked the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command to oppose the directive in order to bring about a distribution acceptable to all branches of the Armed Forces.

2. In his conference with the Staatssekretaere on 14 December 1942 the Chief, Air Defenses indicated that the Reichsmarschall had reconsidered matters, making allowances for the needs of the other branches of the Armed Forces, especially for those of the Navy in regard to air defense and naval anti-aircraft defense.

The present wording of the directive concerning auxiliary war service of German youth in the Air Force does not, however, comply with the demands of the Navy, and offers no assurance that its demands will be respected to any adequate degree.

The Commander in Chief, Navy therefore asks that it be made clear both in the title and in paragraph one of the directive that auxiliary war service refers to service in the Armed Forces. The title and the text of paragraph one should be changed accordingly.

The Commander in Chief, Navy requires further that the last sentence of paragraph five concerning the demands of the Navy be formulated in such a way that fulfillment of the needs of the Navy for auxiliaries is assured, and that in those regions where air defense is assumed by the Navy, all male students of secondary schools be placed at its disposal for auxiliary war service. Furthermore the distribution of female students as auxiliaries should be determined by mutual agreement between the Navy and the Air Force on the basis of need and in proportion to the size of the two branches of the Armed Forces.

3. The stipulations to be sure indicate that students drafted for auxiliary war service who belonged to special formations of the Hitler Youth are to have further training in their



special fields, and that the military training of the Hitler Youth is to be continued.

However, for all practical purposes the technical training of students belonging to Hitler Youth Naval Units as well as their training in military camps and in the government pre-naval schools (Reichsseesportschulen) leading to Naval Hitler Youth B and C certificates would come to an end. The Navy would thus lose this source of additional personnel.

The Commander in Chief, Navy is of the opinion that this endangers the possibility of getting officer replacements for naval warfare. He therefore demands that students belonging to the Naval Units of the Hitler Youth be placed at the disposal of the Navy in proportion to its need. If their number exceeds the share of the Navy, the Commander in Chief, Navy asks that the remaining students from Hitler Youth Naval Units be used in closed groups and that their military and specialized naval training be assured.

It is especially urgent to provide specialized military training for the Navy, since if schooling is discontinued after fifteen years of age, a longer training period for prospective naval officers will be necessary.

Finally, the Commander in Chief, Navy requires that it be stated explicitly in the directive that the German youth drafted for auxiliary war service be permitted to enlist voluntarily in any of the branches of the Armed Forces as before according to existing regulations, and that they will not automatically be assigned to the Air Force.

By direction

signed: Warzecha

GLOSSARY 1942

Asdic

Underwater acoustic location of submarines.

Baurat

Civil servant engaged in construction engineering. This is a high civil service rating.

Beklebeversuche

These experiments were carried on chiefly with absorption materials such as "Alberich", the basic component of which was rubber.

BF 109

Same as Me 109. The "Bayerische Flugzeugwerke" was superseded by the Messerschmitt firm.

BRT

Brutto-Register-Tonnen. Gross register tons.

Central Planning, Committee for

An agency exercising government controls over national economy, armament and war industries, prices, labor, construction and utilities. It was headed by Goering.

Cerberus

Code name for the operation involving the transfer of the SCHARNHORST, GNEISENAU, and PRINZ EUGEN through the Channel in February 1942.

Cockerill

Shipbuilding firm, John Cockerill S.A., Hoboken-Antwerp.

Commando Supremo

Italian High Command.

Fat (Federapparat torpedo)

Designation of the course-setting mechanism in the German figure or pattern running T 1 and T 3. Also known as "Curly". The device enabled the torpedo to run in circles or loops. Its disadvantage was that it had to be fired with a 90 or 270 degree target angle. The improved Curly, Lut (Lageunabhängigkeitstorpedo) could be fired with virtually any target angle and rendered Fat obsolete.

G7a, G7e

Designation of German naval torpedoes, seven meters in length and 534 millimeters (21 inches) in diameter. G7a was air driven; G7e was electrically driven.

Gauleiter

Leader of one of the 42 Nazi Party administrative regions. See "Reichsstatthalter".



Gisela

Code name of the operation which proposed the occupation of the northern coast of Spain by German forces.

Herkules

Operation "Herkules" proposed the capture of Malta. Hitler wanted to subject the island to a long series of air raids and a strong blockade immediately after the anticipated fall of Tobruk to the Germans.

K.M.D., KMD-Organisation

Organisation der Kriegsmarinedienststellen. The Organization of Naval Stations was established by the Naval Staff to assure fullest utilization of naval and merchant transports. Privately owned shipping firms were represented in the organization.

KT-Schiffe

War transports (Kriegstransportschiffe). These were cargo vessels averaging about 800 tons in size and carrying a cargo of 350 to 400 tons.

MFP (Marinefaehrprahm)

Multi-purpose vessel similar to the American LCT. Had an average displacement of 300 tons. Used as munitions carrier (Munitionsfaehrprahm), landing craft, naval transport, artillery transport barge (Artilleriefahrprahm), small troop transport, etc.

Ministerialdirektor, Ministerialrat

Administrative officials holding high positions in a ministry. The Ministerialdirektor was immediately subordinate to an Undersecretary (Staatssekretaer) and was the head of a department (Abteilung). Subordinate to him were officials holding the rank of Ministerialdirigent and Ministerialrat.

N-Stoff

An igniting and incendiary agent ("Zuendstoff and Verbrennungsbeschleuniger"). The Walter firm in Kiel experimented with this substance in 1942.

Pi 2

Pistol or exploder in the warhead of the G7e. It was a combination impact and passive magnetic mechanism, either of which could be used at option.

PQ

Designation of convoys proceeding eastward from the United Kingdom to northern Russia. Convoys were usually numbered, e.g. PQ 17, PQ 18, etc. See "QP", "Roesselsprung".

QP

Designation of convoys returning to the United Kingdom from northern Russia.

Reichsmarschall

Der Reichsmarschall was a rank created especially for Goering. No other person in Germany held this military title.

Reichsstatthalter

Representatives of the Central Reich Authority in various German areas. Selected by the Fuehrer. In many instances identical with the Nazi Party district leaders (Gauleiter).

Roesselsprung

Code name for the operation which resulted in the annihilation of convoy PQ 17. See "PQ".

Scheer

Operation "Scheer" or "Wunderland" was the code name for attacks by the pocket battleship SCHEER on Russian ships and naval installations in the Arctic Ocean 16-30 August 1942.

Seeloewe

Code name of the operation for the invasion of England. The "Seeloewe" coastal sector was the strip along the Channel facing England and Wales.

Sk1

Seekriegsleitung; the German Naval Staff. 1/Sk1 was the Operations Division of the Naval Staff.

Staatsrat Blohm

A member of the shipbuilding firm Blohm & Voss, Hamburg. The title of "Staatsrat" (State Councillor) was bestowed upon him in 1933 by the government of the Free City of Hamburg.

Staatssekretaer

An Undersecretary of a ministry. He is directly responsible to the Minister.

SURCOUF

French submarine, 2,880 tons. She was fitted to carry a small reconnaissance plane.

Terboven

Reich Commissioner for Norway. He disagreed with the Naval Staff over the disposition of Norwegian vessels. The Fuehrer decided that those in the service of the Allies were to be treated as prizes and all others were to be placed at the disposal of the Quisling regime.

Tirpitz

Operation "Tirpitz" involved the transfer of the TIRPITZ from the Arctic to Trondheim in order to draw off British air and naval forces and keep them from attacking the Brest Group, GNEISENAU, SCHARNHORST, and PRINZ EUGEN, when the latter was to make a dash through the Channel. See "Cerberus".

Todt Organization

A construction organization (named for the founder), which built the German superhighways, the West Wall, and the Atlantic fortifications. It employed domestic and foreign labor on military projects in Germany as well as outside Germany.



Walter submarine

Submarine designed by the Walter firm, Kiel, distinguished by the addition of a turbine drive to the standard Diesel and electrical drives. The turbines were to be driven by a fuel obtained from the decomposition of hydrogen peroxide and were to give the submarine a high underwater speed. In addition, the hull was completely streamlined.

Wunderland

See "Scheer".