

24

JAPANESE NIGHT COMBAT

(C) U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

JAN 1955

AD 673113

ACQUISITION NO
FOUNDED

PART I OF 3 PARTS

PRINCIPLES OF NIGHT COMBAT

**Combined Arms Research Library
Special Collections and Archives
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST
AND
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION
JAPANESE RESEARCH DIVISION**

Special
355.422
U56j
pt 1
c 1



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO:

CMH

SUBJECT: Distribution of Manuscript

TO : Addressee

The inclosed manuscript is forwarded for your use and retention.

FOR THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY:

1 Incl
Is

Joel F. Thomson
JOEL F. THOMSON
Colonel Artillery
Executive

JAPANESE NIGHT COMBAT

Part 1 of 3 Parts

PRINCIPLES OF NIGHT COMBAT

**HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST
and
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION
Japanese Research Division**

FOREWORD

Japanese Night Combat, compiled by a number of former officers of the Imperial Japanese Army, is presented in three parts. Part 1 is a general discussion of the principles and accumulated experiences of the Japanese in night combat; Part 2, an appendix consisting of appropriate excerpts from Japanese Army training manuals; and Part 3, a supplement containing a series of twelve examples of night combat engagements of the Japanese Army.

It will be noted that there is some variation in the style and composition of the several parts of the study. The different styles employed by the writers, the type of material, and the fact that the translated manuscripts were delivered to the Editor piecemeal, all combined to make standardization a virtual impossibility if undue delay in completion was to be avoided.

Because of the time limitation and the mass of material this study was not intensively edited, although redundancy was eliminated wherever possible and efforts were made to make the text understandable. Part 2, in particular, was handled with a minimum of re-writing in order to retain the spirit and style of the Japanese Field Manuals as completely as possible.

Information contained in this study indicates that Japanese training in night combat was basically sound. Employed by thoroughly trained Japanese soldiers against Chinese forces, often of vastly

superior numerical strength, the prescribed methods were highly successful. The same tactics were equally effective against the British and American troops in the early days of World War II.

Later in the war the Japanese night combat tactics, in which surprise played a vital part, were less successful as the microphones and mechanical warning devices of the Americans were encountered. The established night combat tactics broke down entirely when well-trained Japanese troops were replaced by hastily trained recruits.

One of the most important lessons learned by Japanese students of military affairs, if not by the field commanders, was that night attacks must employ a diversity of methods. Neither the Japanese soldier nor his officers were, apparently, trained to be versatile and were almost invariably inclined to repeat the same time-worn tactics in each attack.

For their invaluable assistance in the preparation of Japanese Night Combat the Editor is indebted to Lt. Col. Kengoro Tanaka, formerly a consultant with the Japanese Research Division and now a member of the Japanese Self Defense Force, and Mr. Masataka Ida, a former lieutenant colonel in the Imperial Japanese Army and presently a consultant with the Japanese Research Division of the Military History Section, Headquarters United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army.

10 May 1955

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page	
CHART I	Introduction	
Section A.	Basic Effect of Night on Combat	1
Section B.	Origin of Night Combat in Japan	5
CHAPTER II	Changes in Concept of Night Combat 1904 to 1938	
Section A.	Night Attacks in the Russo-Japanese War	9
Section B.	Indecision After World War I	11
Section C.	Re-adoption of Night Attack Tactics and Employment in the Manchurian Incident	13
Section D.	Conception of Night Tactics Suitable Against Characteristic Soviet Positions	17
Section E.	Night Attack Conducted During the China Incident and Establishment of the Principles of Night Combat	38
CHAPTER III	Basic Concept of the Principles of Night Combat in the Field Service Regulations for Operations and the Infantry Manual	
Section A.	General	49
Section B.	General Concept of Night Attack	49
Section C.	Night Attack of the Infantry	54
Section D.	Attack at Early Dawn and Dusk	70
Section E.	Night Defense	71
Section F.	Other Night Operations	73
CHAPTER IV	Training in Night Combat	
Section A.	General Training	79
Section B.	Training in Hearing and Noise Prevention	112
Section C.	Distance Estimation and Utilization of Terrain Features and Objects	114
Section D.	Orientation and Maintenance of Direction	115
Section E.	Movement Training	117
Section F.	Assault Training	121
Section G.	Training in Night Firing	122
Section H.	Night Training Mottoes	123
Section I.	Unit Training	125
Section J.	Special Training	151
Section K.	Attacking Pillboxes	158
Section L.	Team Tactics	163

		Page
CHAPTER V	Experience in Night Operations During World War II	165

Figures

No 1	General Concept of Soviet Defense	19
No.2	Defensive Disposition of a Soviet Division	21
No 3	Defensive Disposition of a Soviet Sniper Battalion	23
No 4	Defensive Disposition of the 1st Sniper Battalion	25
No 5	Soviet Division's Defense in Depth	29
No 6	Construction of a Tochka with Machine Guns	39
No 7	Organization of Special Type of Defensive Position of Sniper Battalion	41
No 8A	Infantry Battalion in Night Attack	57
No 8B	Infantry Battalion in Night Attack	59
No 9	Company Approach Formation	63
No 10	Company Assault Procedure	67
No 11	Night Attack Training Problem	129-134
No 12	Early Dawn Attack Problem	135-142
No 13	Dusk Attack Training Problem	143-150

Charts

No 1	Program for Night Combat Training (First Period)	83-87
No 2	Program for Night Combat Training (Second Period)	88-94
No 3	Program for Night Combat Training (Third Period)	95-100
No 4	Visibility at Night	103-104
No 5	Visibility on Moonlight Nights	105-106
No 6	Organization and Equipment of the Pillbox Assault Team	160-162

CHAPTER I

Introduction

Section A. Basic Effects of Night on Combat

1. Basic Mental and Physical Effects of the Night

Although there may be a slight difference in the degree of darkness which may be tempered by the light of the moon and the stars, night darkness obviously limits man's visual acuity. On the battlefield at night soldiers with their visibility restricted by darkness cannot learn accurately the movements of friendly troops nor determine conditions of terrain and terrain features, let alone the enemy situation. Sometimes friend is confused with foe and distance is difficult to estimate. A wood or a grove is often mistaken for high ground, and the darkness makes it exceedingly difficult to preserve control, execute movement, firing, maintenance of direction, reconnaissance, security, or mutual support.

The sensitivity of the ear is greater at night than in the daytime, which may be attributed to the relative quietness of night and the natural tendency of man to offset limited visibility with audibility. However, this tendency toward increased sensibility sometimes adversely affects man's reaction to fire, light, or flashes observed at night. There are many instances in which a force closing in with the enemy at night lost the direction of advance under the effect of the report of guns, the flash of firing, or searchlight

beams from enemy flank positions. An example is recorded in the history of Japan when about 1180 a force of the Heike confronting a force of the Genji across the Fuji river (Shizuoka Prefecture) beat a hasty retreat one night due to mistaking the noise made by water fowl for sounds of the attacking Genji force.

Limited visibility and increased sensibility to sounds inevitably cause uneasiness in the human mind. Soldiers are never certain when or where they might encounter the enemy. When fired upon by the enemy it is very difficult to ascertain the origin of fire and to devise appropriate countermeasures. Constant vigilance must also be exercised for high and low ground as well as obstacles on the terrain the soldiers traverse. Thus in darkness man is seized with "fear of the unknown", a condition aptly described by the ancients as, "the doubtful mind pictures devils in the dark". Such a mental condition is frequently accompanied by a feeling of loneliness and helplessness and may be responsible for the development of tendencies to overestimate enemy power or to be excessively pessimistic of the combat situation.

Man has long regarded night as the time for rest. At night troops generally are prone to lack alertness except those on special duties such as sentry and patrol duties. Even those performing special duty have to combat the formidable foe called sleepiness. Combat activities conducted at night are against the natural habit of men to rest at night - and under the unfavorable conditions of limited

visibility and mental uneasiness, the physical and mental fatigue of troops will inevitably increase. This tendency may be further aggravated by other factors such as hunger and cold.

2. Basic Effects of Night on Attacks and Defense

The night affects soldiers mentally and physically whether they are on defense or offense, making night combat more difficult than daylight combat. However, a knowledge of the extent and nature of difficulties and disadvantages encountered by combatants at night may make it possible for one side to profit by the difficulties and disadvantages of its opponent.

The greatest advantage to the defense is the deadly effect of well-planned fire. Naturally, the limited visibility of defenders hampers the maximum application of fire power unless some special measures are taken to overcome the handicap. Restriction on effective employment of tanks and aircraft is another serious drawback for the defender. Moreover, the element of tenseness characteristic of the defender's psychology that exists even in daylight becomes accentuated at night and is likely to develop into extreme uneasiness. Even so, the defender can derive advantages from darkness. A defending force can utilize darkness to change dispositions, prepare for a shift to the offensive, or attack with a part of its strength to hinder enemy attack preparations.

The attackers are also handicapped by great difficulty in the maximum use of fire power. The ordinary procedure of attack -

destroying an enemy position by artillery fire, tanks, and aircraft in support of an infantry assault - is in most cases difficult to adopt. Also, since it is absolutely necessary for the attackers to approach the enemy before the assault, they are handicapped by many difficulties in movement and control, disadvantages which the defenders do not suffer. Moreover, because it is difficult at night to contact and destroy the enemy, the objective of the attack is in most cases limited to the occupation of a single point or position. These disadvantages will necessarily impose considerable restriction on both the objective and scope of night attacks. On the other hand the attackers have a great advantage in exploiting the disadvantages of the defenders. The attackers can move secretly by taking advantage of the reduced visibility of the defenders. It is also possible for the attackers to operate when the enemy is unable to make the maximum use of his ground fire, armor, and aircraft.

3. Comparison of Attack and Defense Advantages in Night Combat

Assuming an army skilled in close combat, well trained in night movement, and with high morale, the night will be decidedly to its advantage. Such an army is capable of surmounting disadvantages and enjoying the advantages of a night attack. It is able to approach secretly, taking advantage of the reduced visibility and suddenly force the enemy to close combat. To an army which is well trained and fully prepared, the night definitely affords opportunities of surprising the enemy. Considering these points it may be concluded

that while night combat is difficult for both the attackers and defenders, the attacking side has greater opportunity to utilize the advantages and disadvantages than does the defending side.

The Japanese Army concept concerning advantages and disadvantages of night combat is expressed most concisely in Article 146, Part II, Field Service Regulations, Operation (Sakusen Yomurei).

"The coordinated movement and control of units is difficult at night and errors are likely to be committed. On the other hand, it has advantages in that intentions can be concealed, loss can be minimized, obstruction from enemy air power can be minimized, and combat effectiveness can be displayed even with a shortage of ammunition. An army well trained in night movement can surmount the disadvantages and utilize advantages. Even if inferior in strength, such an army can expect success in an attack against a numerically superior enemy".

Section B. Origin of Night Combat in Japan

1. Night Attack. A time - honored tactic

The advantages and disadvantages of darkness discussed in the preceding section are applicable to warfare as conducted since firearms came into use. But as far as Japan is concerned, the tactics of night attack were employed in the days before firearms were introduced.

When the principal arms were swords, spears, bows, and arrows, the warrior's view of the basic effects of combat in darkness was virtually the same as that held after firearms were introduced. This was especially true because comparatively little technological progress had been made in those days, and the mental uneasiness of the defender at night was far greater than today. In

addition, backwardness in the technical phases of night defense afforded the attackers greater chance of success than today. A further advantage to the attacker was that in fighting in which swords, arrows and spears were used as principal weapons, daylight combat preparations were not especially necessary for night combat. In Japan the night attack has long been a preferred form of combat known as "Youchi" or "Asagake". In the year 1180, at Kurikara Pass (near the present boundary between Ishikawa and Toyama Prefectures), Kiso Yoshinaka, leader of the Genji forces taking advantage of inadequate security measures, carried out a night attack on the flank of the Heike forces and destroyed the bulk of the defending force. This historical attack is the most famous of many examples of night attacks recorded in the military annals of Japan. Centuries later, about the middle of the 16th century, the historic battle of Kawanakajima (in Nagano Prefecture) was opened with a night attack conducted by the forces of Uesugi Kenshin. Later in the period (circa 1590), when Toyotomi Hideyoshi sent an expedition to Korea, the night attack is said to have been the favorite tactic employed by Kato Kiyomasa, who carried his army as far north as Chientao Province after overrunning the northeastern part of Korea.

2. Adoption of Night Attack by the Japanese Army

When Japan abandoned 300 years of isolationist policy and adopted the open-door policy, under the influence of Commodore Perry and other foreigners, the Imperial Army was founded in 1873 (the sixth

year of Meiji). The newly created Army, based on the conscription system, originally took the French Army as its principal model, although later it adopted the pattern of the German Army. Firearms consisted mainly of rifles and mortars and accordingly stress was placed on combat utilizing the firepower of small arms.

Western type rifles and powder had been introduced to Japan in 1543, and firearms of this type were in use about the middle of the 16th century when the country was under the rule of Oda Nobunaga. However, the 300 years of peace and tranquillity during the Tokugawa period retarded the development of firearms with the result that swords, spears, bows and arrows still remained the principal arms. As the influence of the Tokugawa Shogunate waned toward the middle of the 19th century, feudal clans began importation of rifles, mortars, and other firearms from countries abroad and these firearms were distributed among clan troops in considerable numbers.

The superiority of firearms over swords was demonstrated in the civil war of 1877 (the so-called Southwestern Rebellions) which broke out only four years after the creation of the Imperial Army. In that war the Government forces composed of draftees armed mainly with rifles destroyed the Kagoshima Clan forces composed of Samurai using swords as their principal weapons. From then on Japan proceeded with the "firepower-first" principle, and organization, equipment and tactics of the Army were based on this principle. Nevertheless, Japanese respect for and attachment to swords and spears were

unshakable. The sword is one of the Three Sacred Treasures of the Imperial Household: The mirror symbolizes wisdom, the gem represents benevolence, and the sword is the symbol of valor. Wisdom, benevolence, and valor have long been regarded as the three major requisites for men of highly accomplished character in the Orient, and the sword and spear were the symbols of the warriors to whom valor was an indispensable moral requirement. The arts of fencing and spear exercise were recognized as the most noble martial arts, and training in these arts had reached high levels. In view of this attitude, it is not surprising that tactics of close combat with swords and bayonets were adopted by the Japanese Army created in the early days of the Meiji Era (circa 1873). These tactics called for assaults with swords wielded by the officers, and bayonets by the men. Close combat was considered the climax of infantry fighting and the art of fencing and bayonet exercise, together with marching and firing, were the three key subjects of infantry training.

The concept of hand-to-hand fighting held by the Japanese Infantry called for continued employment of night attacks. Since swords and bayonets can be used most advantageously in darkness, the tactics of surprise attacks were adopted as a primary ^e _A tent of infantry training.

CHAPTER II

Changes in Concept of Night Combat 1904 to 1938

Section A. Night Attacks in the Russo-Japanese War

During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, several night attacks were carried out against the Imperial Russian Army by Japanese units of division or brigade size. A night attack was conducted by the 2d Division at Kung-Chang-Ling; by the 12th Division at Mt. Han-P'o-Ling; by the 10th Division at Mt. San-Ku'ai-Shih; by the 7th Division at Mt. Pei-Ling; by the 3d Division at Shou-Shan-Pu, and by the Shirodasuki unit, led by Maj Gen Nakamura, at Port Arthur.

A characteristic common to those night attacks was that they were almost invariably a mass assault leading to a decisive battle. As a result only the 2d Division was entirely successful, the 7th, 10th and 12th Divisions barely succeeded, while the 3d Division and Maj Gen Nakamura's Shirodasuki Unit failed.

The reason for the failure of the night assaults was twofold. One was the stubborn resistance of the Russian Army. The night attack on Shou-Shan-Pu was conducted by the units of the 3d Division including a battalion led by Lt Col Tachibana, who had the reputation of being the highest authority on night attacks in the Japanese Army. The attacking forces once seized the Shou-Shan-Pu height but the attack ended in failure owing to fierce counterattacks by the Russian forces. Similarly, the do-or-die night attack on the fortress of Port

Arthur conducted by Maj Gen Nakamura's Shirodasuki unit failed because of stubborn resistance by the Russian defenders. The second contributing factor was the difficulty of surprising the enemy when attacking with large units. The assault made on the Port Arthur fortress by the Shirodasuki unit lost the advantage of surprise in its early stages because a frontal attack method was used against the fortress.

A description of the successful night attack on Kung-Chang-Ling carried out by the 2d Division is given as Example 1 in the Supplement. This attack has since been considered a classic example of night attack, but the success is ascribed mainly to the fact that preparations were comparatively well made, that the attack was aided by moonlight, that there were a number of excellent officers, and that the enemy resistance was relatively weak. However, the fact that the moonlight was considered an important factor in the success of the 2d Division indicates that the Army units of those days were not highly trained for movement under cover of darkness. At any rate, after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, greater stress was placed on courage and bayonet practice in training for night combat, while tactically orderly movement in darkness and careful attack preparations were emphasized.

It is strange that despite the stress placed on training for night combat immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, the value of night attack itself was rated less and less as the years passed.

During the Russo-Japanese War the night attack was invariably conducted with heavy loss of lives, notably those of officers and non-commissioned officers. This gravely affected the fighting power of units committed to night assault and made it difficult for them to continue the attack or to pursue the enemy. The 2d Division, which succeeded in the night attack, was ineffective on the following day, and it is said that the 10th Division which attacked San-Ku'ai-Shih-Shan had to spend the whole of the following day regrouping. These facts, together with the difficulty of achieving a surprise in a night attack conducted by a large unit, gave rise to skepticism regarding the advisability of conducting night attacks involving large units. The theory gained ground that it would be wiser to limit the size of a unit committed in the night attack to approximately an infantry battalion and to limit its objective to seizing a vital point of the enemy position so as to facilitate an attack by the main body in a subsequent daylight attack.

Section B. Indecision after World War I

The skeptical attitude toward night attacks which was manifested after the Russo-Japanese War became even more pronounced owing to the influence of World War I. During that conflict, with the exception of reducing the German fortress at Tsingtao, the Japanese Army did not conduct any large-scale operations. Because the tactics employed against the Tsingtao fortress were the orthodox method in which infantry troops advanced under the support of artillery fire, the Japanese Army

did not encounter any major problem which would prove the merits of night attacks. (A patrol unit, taking advantage of the enemy's lack of adequate security measures, seized the central position when it reconnoitered the fort at night, but this isolated instance did not serve as a major example for the study of night attack principles.)

On the contrary, the great lesson gained, from observation of the European battle ground, was that the vital factor in winning a victory in modern warfare was to excel the enemy in material strength such as artillery, automatic weapons, tanks, etc. This lesson had a profound effect on the Japanese Army. The need for an increase in automatic weapons and artillery was argued strongly and to some extent increases were made. Such a trend inevitably lessened the enthusiasm for infantry assault in close combat and increased the skepticism in connection with night attack tactics.

Although the army adopted the policy of increasing national combat strength with artillery, automatic weapons, tanks, and similar weapons, Japan's limited natural resources were not sufficient for full realization of the policy. Moreover, after World War I pacifism engulfed the world and a rapid succession of reductions in armaments was enforced by world powers. For these reasons it was impossible for the Japanese Army to possess modern arms in sufficient quantities. In spite of armament limitations, no decision was made to adopt a doctrine placing importance on close combat and the situation in the

Far East was not sufficiently tense to force such a decision. The Soviet Union was still preoccupied in domestic reconstruction following the revolution, while China was deeply absorbed in civil wars. The attitude of the Japanese Army toward armaments, tactics, and night attacks strategy remained undetermined until the late 1920's.

Section C. Re-adoption of Night Attack Tactics and Employment in the Manchurian Incident

1. Re-adoption of Night Attack Tactics in the Late 1920's

Under the conditions prevailing in the latter part of the 1920's, the Japanese Army had no hope or confidence of defeating the army of any major power. In the meantime, the Soviet Union had made substantial progress in internal construction, and the possibility of her eventually becoming Japan's potential enemy was realized. Therefore, those responsible for organization and training of the Army sought to devise tactics which would promise victory. However, the resources of Japan still were not adequate to permit satisfactory modernization of the Army.

In 1928 the Army began compilation of its new Infantry Manual (Hohei Soten) and centered its studies on infantry tactics. The Army General Staff believed that central Manchuria would be the probable battlefield in the event of war with the Soviet Union. The terrain of central Manchuria is characterized by vast undulating areas with the distance between crests averaging six kilometers. It was assumed that such rolling terrain would make it difficult for the Japanese artillery to give adequate support to ground forces and would make

daylight attacks hazardous and difficult. On the other hand, the Soviet army was inadequately trained in night combat. For these reasons, Col Obata Toshishiro (later Lt Gen), chief of the 2d Section (Operations) of the Army General Staff, and Capt Miyano Masatoshi (later Lt Gen), member of the Committee for Compilation of the Infantry Manual, stressed the need of adopting the night attack as one of the highly important infantry combat tactics, maintaining that the Japanese infantry would find the way to victory in the night attack.

Their opinion was accepted and the tactical doctrine was established that an attack should be carried out by an augmented company or battalion as a surprise involving no firing, with a limited objective relatively easy to approach. In view of the lessons learned in the Russo-Japanese War, restrictions were placed on night attacks to be conducted by a large unit, such as a division. The general provisions of the newly published Infantry Manual required that emphasis be placed on training for night combat. Gen Suzuki Soroku, then Chief of the Army General Staff, at a meeting of division commanders urged vigorous training in night combat as an operational requirement. Thus, training in night combat was launched by the entire Japanese Army, and became the most characteristic tactic of the Japanese infantry.

Of course, the army had no intention of depending solely upon the effectiveness of close combat in darkness if Japan could

surpass the potential enemy in material combat strength as represented by aircraft, tanks, artillery, and similar weapons. On the contrary, efforts were being made to place material combat strength on a par with that of the potential enemy and there had also been training in tactics in which material combat strength would be employed. Unfortunately there was no possibility that the material strength of Japan would be superior to that of the Soviet Union. Inferiority in material combat strength could be offset only by improved quality of equipment and weapons, adequate training, superior tactics and strategy, and the adoption of methods of combat which would utilize conditions which restricted the full use of the material combat strength of the foe. The restrictive effects of darkness, combined with such factors as the boldness, quickness, and diligence which are part of the traditional Japanese character, were thought to meet the necessary requirements.

Such a change in military thinking encouraged a tendency in some quarters of the Japanese Army to belittle material combat power but the major motive leading to the adoption of the night attack was the realization on the part of the Japanese Army of the impossibility of attaining material superiority.

2. Night Attack in the Manchurian Incident

The Manchurian Incident broke out in 1931, soon after the Infantry Manual was issued. The numerical strength of the Japanese forces in Manchuria was estimated to be less than one-tenth that of

the Chinese forces in Manchuria, and Japan's artillery power was not adequate. Hence, the night attack was the favorite combat tactic employed throughout that incident. The size of the forces committed in a night attack was usually small, units of less than battalion strength, but all of them obtained excellent results. Among the reasons for the success were the excellent fighting spirit of the Japanese troops as opposed to the low fighting effectiveness of the Chinese forces, but at the same time, it was considered that success was largely due to skill in night assault, the result of intense training.

The usual objective of night attacks in those days was to capture a single objective such as a village, a town or a hill, but the night attack conducted by the 2d Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Nan-Tien-Men as recorded in Example 2 of the Supplement differs markedly from the rest. The objective of this night attack, selected before its execution, was similar to that of other night attacks, but actually the battalion broke through a strong enemy position of about two kilometers in depth. Moreover, the success attained by this battalion served as the immediate cause of greater success subsequently attained by a brigade attack. This battalion was the first to employ its companies in leapfrog fashion in night combat. These experiences later served as factors supporting adoption of the new method of night attacks to penetrate Soviet positions prepared in depth.

Section D. Conception of Night Tactics Suitable Against Characteristic Soviet Positions

1. As the Manchurian Incident progressed, the Japanese Army found itself confronted by the Soviet Army along the Soviet-Manchurian border. In the Soviet Union steady progress was being made and the build-up of the Red Army was especially conspicuous. Powerful elements of that Army were being disposed along the Soviet-Manchurian border, enveloping Manchuria.

2. The organization, strength, and equipment of the Soviet units, particularly their sniper force (infantry), excelled the Japanese Army especially in fire power.

3. After the conclusion of the Manchurian Incident the main duty of the Japanese Army was to defend Manchuria. However, the border was extensive (approximately 4,000 kilometers) and the border region was mainly vast plains which made defense, by purely defensive operations, very difficult. Consequently the Japanese Army conducted an exhaustive study of the offensive and defensive tactics of the Soviet Army and mapped out a general strategy calling for destruction, by offensive operations, of any invading Soviet force.

The basic tactical concept of the Soviet Army was based on the Basic Field Manual of the Red Army issued in 1929. The main features of their defensive tactics were as follows:

- a. Stress was placed on combat within the defensive position.

The main components of a force defending a position were

a stationary defense unit and a striking unit. The stationary defense unit was to strive to destroy the offensive power of the attacking enemy in front of the position and, should the enemy penetrate into the position, throw him into confusion by conducting limited counterattacks and raising fire barriers to facilitate a subsequent full-scale counterattack by the striking unit. The striking unit which was to be held separate from the reserve unit was to counter-attack the enemy, breaking through the position to eject him from the penetrated area. Usually the striking unit was from two-thirds to one-third of the strength of the defense unit. The reserve unit was to be organized only when circumstances required and its strength was generally limited to less than one-ninth of the total.

The Soviet concept of defensive warfare was markedly different from that of the Japanese Army which considered that the sole object of the defending force was to destroy the attacking enemy in front of a position, holding the battle position to the last by means of fire power and counterattacks.

b. Defensive positions were generally disposed in depth.

The Soviet Army's general concept of the disposition of defensive positions is illustrated in Figures 1 to 5. The tendency to dispose defensive positions in depth was considered closely connected with the placing of stress on combat within the position area.

According to the Japanese concept of defense, the defending force was to hold the battle position which was in effect a line




FIGURE NO. 2




FIGURE NO. 3





FIGURE NO. 4

Defensive Disposition of the 1st Sniper Battalion
 Along the Left Bank of the Naukam River
 19 August



LEGEND:

- ↑ Machine gun of MG Company
- ↑ Machine gun of sniper company
- ⊕ Antiaircraft machine gun
- ⊗ Battalion ammunition supply point
- ⊥ Battalion medical aid station
- △ Battalion commander's observation post
- Ⓜ Message center

Defensive Disposition of a Sniper Battaion

Situation

1. The Sniper Regiment occupies a defensive position in the area south of Melo village along the left bank of the Naukam river on 19 August to check and delay the enemy advance eastwards from area (A).

2. The 1st Sniper Battalion is disposed in the area extending from the vicinity of Melo village to the (A) - (B) road.

Four regimental guns and the 2d Battalion of the Division's Artillery Regiment support the 1st Sniper Battalion directly.

The 3d Cavalry Regiment is disposed in the wooded area Tal to cover the right flank of the 1st Sniper Battalion. The 3d Sniper Battalion is disposed on the left abreast of the 1st Sniper Battalion.

Defensive Disposition of the 1st Sniper Battalion

1. The 2d and 3d Companies are disposed on the main line of resistance and the 1st Company is support as shown in the sketch.

2. Machine gun company:

The 1st Machine Gun Platoon is with the 1st Company (a). One machine gun of the platoon directs flanking fire to the area north of Melo village.

The 2d Machine Gun Platoon is disposed in rear of the 3d Company (b). One machine gun of the platoon is located to cover its flanking fire the gap between the 2d Infantry Company and the 3d Infantry Company.

Half of the 3d Machine Gun Platoon is disposed at a point 500 meters northeast of Sau village to fire at hostile aircraft. The other half is disposed on the hill northwest of Sau village.

3. Antitank guns are disposed in rear of the 3d Company (c), to direct their fire at the area north of the junction of the Naukam river and the C river. (The area south of the junction is not suitable for tank movement.)

4. The regimental guns are disposed in the area south of Sau village as shown in the sketch.

5. Artillery battalion:

The 4th Artillery Battery is disposed in the wooded area (d) to support the 1st Infantry Company.

The 5th Artillery Battery is disposed in the valley northwest of Hill 178 to support the 2d Infantry Company.

The 6th Artillery Battery is disposed in the wooded area (e) to support the 3d Infantry Company.

6. The battalion headquarters is located in Sau village, the battalion commander's observation post on the hill northwest of Sau Village, and the message center at "c".

7. The 1st Sniper Battalion's ammunition train and the 2d Artillery Battalion's ammunition platoon are located in Oranui (about four kilometers east of Melo).

Notes:

1. One machine gun of each sniper company and an element of the machine gun company are employed in short range firing.

2. Most of the machine gun company is committed to long and medium range firing.

3. The 1st Sniper Battalion is supported by four regimental guns and one artillery battalion. (Supporting guns are not attached to the 1st Sniper Battalion.) Each artillery battery is assigned to directly support one infantry company.

Defensive Disposition of a Sniper Battaion

Situation

1. The Sniper Regiment occupies a defensive position in the area south of Melo village along the left bank of the Naukam river on 19 August to check and delay the enemy advance eastwards from area (A).

2. The 1st Sniper Battalion is disposed in the area extending from the vicinity of Melo village to the (A) - (B) road.

Four regimental guns and the 2d Battalion of the Division's Artillery Regiment support the 1st Sniper Battalion directly.

The 3d Cavalry Regiment is disposed in the wooded area Tal to cover the right flank of the 1st Sniper Battalion. The 3d Sniper Battalion is disposed on the left abreast of the 1st Sniper Battalion.

Defensive Disposition of the 1st Sniper Battalion

1. The 2d and 3d Companies are disposed on the main line of resistance and the 1st Company is support as shown in the sketch.

2. Machine gun company:

The 1st Machine Gun Platoon is with the 1st Company (a). One machine gun of the platoon directs flanking fire to the area north of Melo village.

The 2d Machine Gun Platoon is disposed in rear of the 3d Company (b). One machine gun of the platoon is located to cover its flanking fire the gap between the 2d Infantry Company and the 3d Infantry Company.

Half of the 3d Machine Gun Platoon is disposed at a point 500 meters northeast of Sau village to fire at hostile aircraft. The other half is disposed on the hill northwest of Sau village.

3. Antitank guns are disposed in rear of the 3d Company (c), to direct their fire at the area north of the junction of the Naukam river and the C river. (The area south of the junction is not suitable for tank movement.)

4. The regimental guns are disposed in the area south of Sau village as shown in the sketch.

5. Artillery battalion:

The 4th Artillery Battery is disposed in the wooded area (d) to support the 1st Infantry Company.

The 5th Artillery Battery is disposed in the valley northwest of Hill 178 to support the 2d Infantry Company.

The 6th Artillery Battery is disposed in the wooded area (e) to support the 3d Infantry Company.

6. The battalion headquarters is located in Sau village, the battalion commander's observation post on the hill northwest of Sau Village, and the message center at "c".

7. The 1st Sniper Battalion's ammunition train and the 2d Artillery Battalion's ammunition platoon are located in Oranui (about four kilometers east of Melo).

Notes:

1. One machine gun of each sniper company and an element of the machine gun company are employed in short range firing.



2. Most of the machine gun company is committed to long and medium range firing.

3. The 1st Sniper Battalion is supported by four regimental guns and one artillery battalion. (Supporting guns are not attached to the 1st Sniper Battalion.) Each artillery battery is assigned to directly support one infantry company.

FIGURE NO. 5

SOVIET DIVISION'S DEFENSE IN DEPTH
(FRONTAGE: 2,000 METERS)

DEFENSIVE DISPOSITION USUALLY TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNITS		
	FRONTAGE	DEPTH
DIV:	ABOUT 10 KM	ABOUT 5 KM
REGT:	" 4 KM	" 3 KM
BN:	" 2 KM	" 1.7 KM



- LEGEND
- () SNIPER SQUAD
 - ⦿ MACHINE GUN
 - ⦿ ANTITANK GUN
 - ⦿ REGIMENTAL GUN
 - ⦿ MORTAR
 - ⦿ COVERED AT GUN EMPLACEMENT
 - ⦿ ARTILLERY OBSERVATION POST
 - XXXXX WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS
 - ⦿ ANTITANK DITCH
 - ⦿ ANTITANK MINE FIELD
 - ⦿ CONCENTRATED TROOPS
 - ⦿ PRECIPICE

with a depth of from 100 to 200 meters connecting strong points composed of front line infantry platoons. This was in striking contrast to the Soviet battle position with a zone from 1,500 to 2,000 meters in depth formed by battalions disposed side by side.

- c. Cross fire and flanking fire were basic principles in the fire plan.

Both the Soviet and Japanese armies considered the combination of fire power and counterattack basic to the effective defense of a position. But while the Japanese Army used frontal, oblique, and flanking fires in daytime defense and concentrated on frontal fire at night as the basic fire plan, the Soviets used oblique and flanking fires in both day and night defense.

- d. Other features of the defensive tactics of the Red Army.

- (1) Special stress was placed on anti-tank defense.

The defending force was required to establish anti-tank defense sectors by organizing the defense with guns, mines, obstacles, etc.

- (2) Stress was placed on means of concealing defensive positions. The defending force was required to avoid concentration of defensive positions and was required to use dummy positions and camouflage.

- (3) Each battalion sector was to be independent and to continue defensive combat independently even if the neighboring sector fell to the enemy. The enemy penetrating to the rear of a position after breaking through a battalion sector was to be dealt with by the striking unit.

(4) In addition to artillery, tanks and aircraft were to be employed mainly in defensive warfare as a striking force.

4. As stated before, the Soviet Army of the 1930's had not emphasized training in night defense. Following are the main points of night defense as shown in their field manual of 1929:

a. At night the defending force dispatches infantry reconnaissance units, concealed security units, and observation parties (provided with war dogs) to the foreground of the defensive position.

b. At night it is advantageous to shift machine gun positions so as to avoid hostile artillery fire prepared during the day. In case the distance between firing positions (squad positions) is more than 300 meters, machine guns are disposed between the intervals close to the front line.

c. In preparing for night firing, the artillery makes preparations during the daytime by dividing the foreground of the position into smaller sectors (TN Grid reference system). The artillery opens fire on a pyrotechnic signal from the front line infantry unit facing the area being subjected to attack by enemy infantry. The type of pyrotechnic signal is decided by the division commander.

d. The rocket, flare, and searchlight are used for illumination, to facilitate the firing of machine guns and other weapons. When effecting illumination, care must be taken not to expose friendly defensive dispositions. When using searchlights, cross and direct beams of light are projected jointly.

e. The striking unit counterattacks the enemy penetrating the friendly position before he consolidates the sector. For this purpose the striking unit is located comparatively close to the front line.

5. After studying the defensive dispositions of the Soviet Army, the Japanese Army formed the following conclusions:

a. Defensive positions of the Soviet Army are composed of firing positions (Usually a sniper squad position. When a firing position contains a heavy machine gun it is specifically called a machine gun position) which are dispersed and disposed in depth and width in a checkerboard pattern. Such a position lacks a key or vital point.

b. The distance between the firing positions is usually about 300 meters.

c. A penetration of a Soviet position to the depth of 1,000 meters has no decisive effect. It is obvious that a penetration executed to such an extent will merely result in playing into the hands of the enemy striking unit and the attempt will end in failure. It is necessary for an attacking force penetrating a Soviet position to reach the rear of the battalion area.

d. Should an infantry battalion with a frontage of 200 meters penetrate a Soviet battalion defense area at night, to a depth of about 2,000 meters, the enemy positions the battalion will directly encounter number only about five. (Three firing and two machine gun

positions.) The number of enemy firing positions encountered would, of course, be less should the attacking battalion penetrate through a gap in the enemy position or shorten its frontage.

e. The night attack would be advantageous in nullifying the effect of the superior number of Soviet tanks and aircraft.

6. As a result of studies of Soviet offensive and defensive tactics the Japanese Army issued a series of manuals on methods of combat against the Red Army. (These manuals were commonly called "Red Books" as they were classified and bound in red paper.) The Red Books, compiled mainly on the basis of studies conducted by the Infantry School, contained information on a wide variety of combat methods to be employed against the Soviet Army, including engagements, attack on positions, defense and combat on special terrain. New methods of night attack were emphatically emphasized and intensive training conducted.

The night attack as treated in the Red Books was designed for the infantry battalion as the attack unit, and is described in the Red Books as follows:

a. The battalion conducting a night attack on the enemy position chooses a distant point within the enemy position (usually the rear limit of the battalion position) as the vital attack objective. This objective is not an enemy force but a vital point within the enemy position.

b. The frontage of the attacking battalion is very narrow (usually a two company front with units advancing in parallel columns). Attacking troops advance boldly, proceeding normally at a speed of six kilometers an hour. The bold or daring advance method (KANI ZENSHIN) is a special rapid walk utilized to approach the desired objective in spite of difficult terrain and

hostile fire. This manner of walking requires troops to lower their hips and lift their feet high so as not to stumble over low obstacles on the ground and at the same time increase their walking speed.

c. During the advance enemy resistance which may be expected from firing positions and counterattack units is repulsed by several firing position attack units (KATEN KOGEKI BUTAI), each composed of one or two squads, and counterattack repulsing units (GYAKUSHU HAIGEKI BUTAI) also composed of one or two squads, both units will be designated and organized before the attack. These units are under the immediate control of the battalion commander whose position, during the attack, is at the head of the battalion. As the occasion requires he employs these units to liquidate enemy resistance.

d. Ordinarily no serious consideration is given to enemy fire from the front and flank. Of course, at a temporary halt, employment of the firing position attack unit and the use of a smoke screen is permitted, but as a rule, losses from enemy fire are to be minimized by an increase in the pace of advance.

e. Protection of both flanks of the advancing battalion or exploitation of successes in areas along the flank is conducted by other units assigned by the regimental commander.

While the adoption of such a bold method of night attack was primarily the result of studies of Soviet positions, reference was made to the night attack at Nan-Tien-Men in 1933 (Example 2) as an example proving the feasibility of the new method of night attacks.

7. The Red Books also laid stress on special attack methods utilizing meteorological characteristics of high latitude districts (about 50 degrees north latitude) in northern Manchuria. These attack methods were known as early dawn attacks (REIMEI KOGEKI) and dusk attacks (HAKUBO KOGEKI).

A type of dawn attack (FUTSUGYO KOGEKI) was a method of attack which had been favored by the Japanese Army since the Russo-

Japanese War. It called for an infantry attack immediately following a preparatory bombardment by the artillery, commencing at daybreak and continuing for one or more hours. In northern Manchuria the Japanese Army discovered that the half-light of the early morning continued for a comparatively long period. The early morning light normally permitted visibility up to several hundred meters but did not afford that of several thousand meters, the distance required to permit the artillery to open fire. To the infantry of both sides the morning light was practically daytime, but as far as the artillery was concerned, night conditions prevailed. The Japanese Army called this period, "early dawn" (REIMEI). How long this early dawn would last depended on the latitude, the season, and weather conditions. It usually lasted from 30 to 60 minutes, although it frequently lasted more than an hour.

The old concept of a dawn attack as applied to northern Manchuria had an obvious disadvantage: If the infantry attack was to be preceded by artillery preparation, the period during which the infantry stands by under enemy infantry fire would have to be extended until the end of the early dawn period. On the other hand, the earliest period of early dawn, a brief period of about ten minutes when visibility is limited to forty or fifty meters, was recognized to be a time of greatest advantage to the attacking infantry. This period meant night time visibility for distances over 100 meters for the defense, but it was possible for attacking infantry troops to

advance, since they required a shorter range of visibility. Thus it was considered possible for infantry to advantageously employ night combat tactics in the early dawn. Accordingly, a new concept of early dawn attack was initiated: An early dawn infantry attack to be followed by the combined action of infantry, tanks, and artillery with the coming of full daylight.

8. In northern Manchuria the period of dusk is also comparatively long, and a dusk attack was another application of night combat tactics. The infantry committed in a dusk attack starts action after sunset as visibility becomes progressively less, and penetrates the enemy position under the concealment of full dusk. It was considered possible for attacking infantry troops to approach enemy defense positions without observation.

The dusk attack method could be used advantageously in continuing an attack to exploit successes gained in daylight attacks or in assaulting enemy outposts. It could also be utilized as the initial phase of a night attack which would require most of the night to complete.

9. Importance was also attached to studying the possible effect of the superior air power of the Soviet Army. While studies were made in air strategy aimed at gaining air superiority over the Soviet air force, training of ground forces was so conducted as to minimize the Soviet advantage of stronger air power. Emphasis was placed on the fullest possible use of the night, not only in combat but in all


military activities including movement of troops and transportation of supplies, as offering the greatest advantage for minimizing losses and concealment of intentions.

10. One of the characteristic features of the Soviet defensive system were the tochkas, special pillboxes disposed in the fortified zone along the Soviet-Manchurian border, which constituted the backbone of the frontier fortifications of the Red Army. The ground plan of a typical tochka is shown in Figures 6 and 7. (From the manual, "Soviet Army"). These pillboxes were constructed of concrete and were designated as machine gun tochka or gun tochka according to the principal weapons they contained. Much time was devoted by the Japanese Army to studies on how to neutralize or seize these pillboxes in order to break through the frontier defensive positions of the Red Army.


Night attack by infantry and engineers was seriously studied as was a variation that employed night attack principles. This latter attack method was characterized by the use of smoke to create night conditions for the enemy manning the tochka and to create conditions similar to dusk or dawn for the attacking force. Methods adopted for the use of smoke were shooting by artillery, projecting by hand projectors, and spreading by wind. The smoke candle, to be discharged by the grenade thrower, was invented as a simple agent for producing screening smokes available to the infantry.

Section E. Night Attack Conducted During the China Incident and Establishment of the Principles of Night Combat

CONSTRUCTION OF A TOCHKA WITH MACHINE GUNS
 PLAN VIEW




ELEVATION ALONG THE LINE A—B



NOTE:

1. AMMUNITION CHESTS ARE ON THE FLOOR.
2. A MACHINE GUN IS MOUNTED IN EACH FIRING SLIT AT ALL TIMES.
3. UNIT OF MEASUREMENT: METERS

ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL TYPE OF DEFENSIVE POSITION OF SNIPER BATTALION



Density of final protective fire:

1. About 3 rounds per minute per meter of frontage west of the Tochka No. 11.
2. About 2 rounds per minute per meter of frontage east of the Tochka No. 11.

Legend:

- : Tochka with machine guns
- ⊙ : Tochka with guns
- Ⓢ : Sot (Tochka with disappearing machine guns)
- ▭ : Tochka with guns, in which the commander is located.
- ▭ : Covered ammunition dump.

1. Some Army tacticians, particularly students of war history, were very skeptical of the possibility of the success of the bold tactics advocated in the Red Books. According to the Infantry Manual, the objective of a night attack was limited and contemplated relatively shallow penetration (400 to 500 meters). In view of this skepticism, the Infantry School began to study a new method of night attack to be conducted by infantry deployed in two successive assault echelons - a method which was a slight modification of that described in the Red Books. This method, like that mentioned in the Red Books, was aimed at penetrating deeply into the enemy defense area. According to the new method, however, the depth to be penetrated by the first echelon (a company or battalion) was limited, and the second assault echelon was to leapfrog the first and penetrate to the desired depth. While this method was considered more sound than that of the Red Books, in that it set a limit to the distance to be covered by one assault echelon, it created the difficulty of executing a leapfrog movement at night.

2. Meanwhile, studies were commenced on the problem of firing during a night attack.

Heretofore the loading and firing of weapons had been prohibited in night attacks for fear that firing might cause confusion among the attackers. This was justifiable in the days of the Russo-Japanese War where the enemy defensive positions were shallow in depth and the final issue of an attack was often decided by the

initial surprise. However, in breaking through the Soviet positions constructed in great depth, the initial surprise assault, even if successfully delivered, would disclose the attackers' intention, and subsequent assault efforts would be met by enemy fire.

Thus the advantage of firing during the second or later assaults and for holding the occupied ground came to be realized, and studies were made along this line.

On the other hand, the modern armies of the world were tending toward systematic security measures and defense reconnaissance, with great strides being made in organizing defensive fires for night combat. Consequently, it was generally agreed that a night attack depending solely on the element of surprise without first neutralizing or destroying the enemy defensive fire network might prove too hazardous. To reduce such risks, studies were begun on assault with the combined initial employment of infantry, artillery, heavy weapons, tanks, and engineers. In connection with the use of supporting fires, some quarters expressed views favoring the adoption of the extended formation in addition to the mass formation in assaulting an enemy defensive position.

3. In July 1937 when the China Incident broke out, the new concepts of night attack, utilizing two assault echelons and attack by the use of supporting fires, were being developed in addition to the basic principles laid out in the old Combat Regulations, the old Infantry Manual, and the Red Books. Consequently, various methods of

night attacks were employed during the China Incident. Commanders of Japanese units made frequent use of night attacks, adopting tactics to suit their preference and the situation.

The Japanese infantry usually resorted to night attack whenever it was difficult to obtain artillery support, and most of those night attacks were highly successful. This was due in great measure to the thorough training of the Japanese troops and the inferiority of the Chinese troops.

The night attack, as shown in Example 3, which was made by the 14th Division in the area north of Pao-Ting was an example of a night attack made by a large unit with the objective of achieving a decisive battle. The night break-through in depth, as illustrated in Example 4, which was conducted by the main body of the First Army in the initial phase (May 1941) of the Battle of Chung-Yuan was conducted after the new Field Service Regulations and the new Infantry Manual were issued, but many of the concepts of the Red Books were employed.

4. The Japanese Army employed a night attack against Soviet positions for the first time during the series of disputes that took place near the Soviet-Manchuria border in 1938.

The first, a night attack made by the 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry Regiment in Chang-Ku-Feng in the latter part of July 1938, is described in detail in Example 5. The 1st Battalion carried out the attack generally according to the Infantry Manual of that

time and succeeded in capturing firing positions arranged in several lines. The Soviet positions were only about 300 meters in depth, but the fact that several lines of firing positions were captured was highly significant. Furthermore, it became clear that the Soviet positions, terrain permitting, were composed of an organized network of positions. It is important to note that the Soviet Army began to stress night combat training after that time.

The second of the night attacks was made during the Nomonhan Incident in 1939. During that border incident which lasted from May to September, night attacks were made to compensate for the Japanese weakness in artillery. The terrain in the Nomonhan area was flat and barren, the typical Soviet positions were deep, broad, and widely spaced and, since the strength of Japanese infantry battalions was depleted (200 to 300 men), the maximum capability of a battalion in a night attack was the capturing of one firing position on the front line of the Soviet positions. Moreover, in almost all cases, battalions that succeeded in capturing a firing position were forced to abandon it on the following morning in face of heavy counterattacks by enemy artillery and tanks. While such an outcome might have been expected from the study of the Soviet positions, the Nomonhan Incident provided the proof.

5. After the outbreak of the China Incident, serious studies were continued to improve the tactics of night attack. About that time, the Soviets showed a strong tendency to intensify night combat

training and to change from extremely deep and broad defense positions to a defense with an organized network of positions (collection method).

After the outbreak of the Russo-German War in 1941, the Soviet Army switched completely to the system of organized defense positions.

Experiences in the early stage of the China Incident proved that the strict adherence to the tactical doctrine of the Red Books was not practical even against Chinese positions. These battle experiences demonstrated the advisability of the night attack by two assault echelons. The general principles of night attack contained in the new Field Service Regulations for Operations, issued in September 1938, embodied the concept of the Red Books, the lessons gained in the early stages of the China Incident as well as experiences acquired since the Russo-Japanese War. Shortly thereafter, in February 1940, the Infantry Manual was revised and the general principles of night attack contained in the new Field Service Regulations, were given in detail in that manual.

The Red Books were abolished after the new Field Service Regulations and the new Infantry Manual were issued.

CHAPTER III

Basic Concept of the Principles of Night Combat in the Field Service Regulations for Operations and the Infantry Manual

Section A. General

The Field Service Regulations for Operations, published in 1938, and the Infantry Manual, published in 1940, were the last field manuals on tactics issued by the Japanese Army and maintained their positions as the final authority of the Japanese Army, being neither amended nor modified during the Pacific War. Both publications contained details of night movement and other types of maneuvers in addition to combat, but they placed special emphasis upon positive utilization of the advantages inherent in offensive combat at night. The text of the tactical doctrine of night combat given in the Field Service Regulations for Operations and the Infantry Manual, are given in Appendices I and II.

Section B. General Concept of Night Attack (From the Field Service Regulations and the Infantry Manual)

1. The following conclusions are drawn concerning night attacks and the size of units.

a. Small units will endeavor to take the enemy by surprise under cover of darkness.

b. Large units will execute ~~a~~ night attack under the following circumstances: 1) in case an attack is to be continued in order to exploit and complete gains obtained during a daylight attack, 2)

if the situation requires it, or 3) when it is advantageous to take strong points of the enemy position to facilitate the attack of a larger unit on the following day. The foregoing, 1) and 3) are self-explanatory. The phrase "the situation requires it" in 2) was provided chiefly for cases when time was limited. It is also possible that the phrase was chosen to permit the application of the tactics stressed in the Red Books (i.e. deep penetration of the enemy position on a narrow frontage).

Night attacks by small units were encouraged without reservation, but limited encouragement was given to the night attack by large units. Infantry units of regimental-size or larger did conduct night attacks in actual battle after the Field Service Regulations were issued, but generally speaking the Japanese Army considered the infantry battalion the unit of the most suitable size to conduct a night attack.

2. Seizure of key positions, capturing hills or hamlets within the enemy defense area or other specific tactical positions where hostile strong points are situated, as well as penetration in depth were recognized as the objects of a night attack. While the Red Books had placed the primary objective of night attack upon penetration in depth rather than on seizure of key positions, in view of the characteristics of Soviet positions, the Field Service Regulations approved both the capture of key positions and penetration in depth as objectives of night attacks.

3. The changes in the types of Soviet positions and the lessons learned during the early phase of the China Incident made it advisable to adopt a two-echelon system as being less hazardous for penetration in depth by night attack. After the first assault echelon occupied the preliminary objective, the second echelon would leapfrog the first and become the front line unit, penetrating deep into the enemy position.

4. Preference was shown for surprise attack without supporting fire rather than sudden attack with artillery support, although the latter was also approved. While it was recognized that supporting fires might warn the enemy of an impending attack in actual practice, support for an infantry assault with artillery and infantry weapon fire was often provided, even in cases in which surprise was intended.

The employment of tanks was also approved for the purpose of destroying enemy wire or neutralizing heavy weapons, especially flank defense weapons, providing that there were no other suitable means available and that the maintenance of secrecy was not essential.

In all concepts of night attack methods, the infantry companies remained the primary components of night attacks, although participation by machine guns, artillery, tanks, and other weapons was approved under certain circumstances.

5. Preference was given to a concentrated attack formation as opposed to an extended formation, since a concentrated formation was decidedly advantageous from the standpoint of control and movement

in darkness. Also, the infantry assault is more effective in applying pressure against the enemy and maintaining the morale of attacking troops when conducted in concentrated formation. It is impossible to ignore the adverse effects the extended assault formation may produce in the minds of individual soldiers. When an extended formation is used at night each officer and man is freed from the eyes of his commanders, subordinates, and fellow-soldiers, and because his deeds, whether merited or otherwise, are not observed by others, troops tend to become less aggressive in action. However, minimization of losses must also be an important consideration in selecting an assault formation and for this reason the employment of extended formation was not precluded entirely in the Infantry Manual.

6. The need for completely familiarizing the assault unit with the terrain and hostile positions and the need for making thorough attack preparations were stressed as factors essential to a successful night attack.

7. Taking advantage of the enemy's lack of security was emphasized in choosing the time of attack.

Also recognized was the greater possibility of gaining the initiative when the attack against the enemy was launched just after dark as well as the advantage of early dawn attack in which gains could be exploited in the subsequent daylight attack.

8. In selecting the assault point, preference was given to the location offering ease of attack maneuver, but directing the assault

against a soft spot in the enemy position was also approved.

9. The importance of adopting the simplest dispositions in the night attack and avoiding intricate dispositions was emphasized.

However, night attacks in modern warfare generally require complex organization. Consequently, the Field Service Regulations. required the commander to formulate detailed plans for night attacks and to thoroughly familiarize his subordinate units with his plans. The manual also stressed the necessity for support units to make adequate attack preparations during daylight, if the attack is to be supported by fire.

10. The infantry taking part in the night attack was required to seek decisive combat by suddenly closing with the enemy and fighting hand to hand. For this purpose, the infantry approaching the enemy position was required to place in the first assault echelon strength sufficient for decisive combat and then rush the attack objective rapidly and resolutely with an assault formation as compact as practicable. Company commanders as well as platoon leaders were especially enjoined to maintain firm control of subordinates and to lead their units in the final assault.

Since it has been proven that the success of an attack by the infantry is dependent largely on the valor of the company commanders and platoon leaders, platoon leaders were required to be at the head of their men even in daylight assault, although company commanders were required to lead only in night attacks.

11. Emphasis was placed on measures for holding occupied ground after a night attack had succeeded.

The need for holding measures was emphasized on the basis of the lessons gained from the unsuccessful night attacks against Shou-Shan-Pu during the Russo-Japanese War and from the studies conducted after the failure of the night attacks against Soviet positions in the Nomonhan Incident.

12. Provision was made in the Field Service Regulations for the allotment of targets between the artillery and infantry heavy weapons in night attacks executed under supporting fire.

As a general rule, the artillery fired on pre-determined objectives, whereas the infantry weapons fired on targets of opportunity.

The Infantry Manual prohibited the firing of rifles and light machine guns even when the night attack was conducted under supporting fire, presumably because the unaimed fire of small arms is seldom effective at night and to avoid confusion resulting from wild firing under the psychological influences of darkness.

Section C. Night Attack of the Infantry (From the Infantry Training Manual)

1. Since units of battalion or company size were most commonly used in night attacks by the infantry, the Infantry Manual was devoted mainly to battalion and company training.

At the beginning of the section on Company Tactics in Night Combat, the Infantry Manual stressed the need for thorough preparation

and resolute execution of the assault with the company commander and all his men firmly convinced of victory, and taught that a high offensive spirit and a firm unity among officers and men were of the utmost necessity in the conduct of night attacks.

Likewise, at the beginning of the section on battalion tactics in night combat, the Infantry Manual stressed the fact that the night attack provided an opportunity for the infantry to display its special characteristics to the utmost, that the battalion size infantry unit was best suited for executing an independent night attack, and that the battalion commander must always be willing to plan night attacks and have the courage to execute them resolutely.

2. When the decision to carry out a night attack was made, the battalion commander was required to immediately inform the subordinate company commanders of his intentions, specifying the time of attack, objectives, and other necessary information, so that the assault units would have sufficient time to prepare for the attack.

3. Commanders were required to assemble their subordinate commanders during daylight near the scene of the scheduled attack and issue detailed orders based on the night attack plan.

Normally, in a night attack, a company had no reserve, but a battalion was divided into a front line echelon and a reserve. If deep penetration of the enemy position was desired, the battalion was divided into two assault echelons and a reserve. The machine gun and infantry gun units moved with the reserve. The formation of a batta-

lion in a night attack is shown in Figure 8.


4. Prior to the advance of the main body in a night attack, the battalion commander normally dispatched minor elements to occupy key points along the route of advance or in the foreground of the hostile position in order to cover the advance of the main body and facilitate attack preparations. In the normal situation, the main body of the battalion approached up to a certain designated point in a closed formation, and from there front line companies moved forward in column to their respective attack positions.

5. Maintenance of direction at night is a matter of great importance. To maintain direction in darkness, the battalion was not only required to depend on a compass, as well as the moon and stars, but also to: 1) establish natural objects as reference points; 2) install markers; 3) place men at intervals; 4) use picked patrols as guides and 5) employ star shells. The manual also stressed the necessity of individual soldiers knowing their own location in relation to the enemy position by measuring the distance of advance by rope or pace.

6. During the approach march for a night attack, each company advanced in a formation that offered ease of maneuver. The company commander directed the troops at the head of his company with baton, marking flag, white cloth, or similar means, with the direction of advance maintained by keeping contact with the battalion commander. When subjected to hostile searchlights or effective fire, short halts


INFANTRY BATTALION IN NIGHT ATTACK

When the capture of a front line enemy position is desired.



INFANTRY BATTALION IN NIGHT ATTACK

When a deep penetration of the enemy position is desired.



were authorized. Even when small enemy elements, sentries or dogs, were encountered the main body of the company continued the approach march. Ordinarily such enemy obstructions were eliminated beforehand by the security patrols but, if necessary, the company commander might employ an element under his command to eliminate them. The company approach formation is shown in Figure 9.


7. Clearing away obstacles in the foreground of the enemy position was planned to be completed well before front line companies reached their assault position.

Obstacles were cleared either by the battalion or by each front line company acting independently. In the latter case, the battalion commander designated the time of dispatching obstacle clearing parties, methods of protection, points and method of clearing, time of completion, and other pertinent matters.

8. The attack position of the front line company was ordinarily selected about 200 to 300 meters in front of the enemy position. Upon arrival at this point, the front line company immediately contacted its obstacle clearing parties and advance guards in the forward areas. These groups provided information on the enemy situation, the terrain and the condition of cleared lanes through obstacles. The company commander then determined the company assault dispositions, familiarized his subordinates with those dispositions, and completed preparations for attack.

9. The battalion commander ordered the assault as soon as the

COMPANY APPROACH FORMATION



LEGEND :

- CO CMDR
- ⊙ PLAT LEADER
- ◐ NCO

front line company had completed attack preparations.

The assault formation of the company depended on the situation but was invariably one which assured the maximum degree of control with a minimum of loss.


Company assault procedure is illustrated in Figure 10.

10. The company commander, immediately upon taking the assigned objective, regrouped the company, dispatched elements to reconnoiter the enemy situation and terrain, established contact with the battalion commander and adjacent units, prepared close-range fires, ordered construction of necessary defenses, enforced strict security measures against enemy counterattack, and prepared the company for the next action. The battalion commander, likewise disposed the battalion to meet possible enemy counterattack and prepared for the subsequent action.

11. When a battalion conducted a night attack in two assault echelons, the strength of each echelon was determined in consideration of the depth and condition of the enemy position to be attacked.

The battalion commander committed the first assault echelon to seize the enemy front line position prior to penetration by the battalion's main body. The width of the enemy position to be captured by the first echelon was determined by the terrain and the manner in which the enemy fire was organized.

The battalion commander, after determining the degree of success of the first assault echelon, personally commanded the second



echelon and the reserve. After placing the obstacle clearing squads and other necessary elements at the head, he executed a leapfrog movement to pass the first assault echelon in order to continue to assault the enemy position and capture their key points. The leapfrog movement was made as soon as possible after the initial assault to avoid giving the enemy time to rally.

12. Normally the second assault echelon adopted attack dispositions from the outset and advanced in a formation suitable for the attack. However, to avoid confusion during the leapfrog, the second assault echelon closed its formation and returned to the attack formation after the first assault echelon had been passed.

13. When tanks joined the infantry in a night attack, they were employed chiefly for destroying wire entanglements of the enemy front line positions, his known heavy weapons and flanking fires. In tank-infantry employment, the battalion commander usually distributed tanks to each front line company and regulated the time of their joining the attack.

14. The company was required to take every possible measure for concealment in order to make the night attack successful. The company commander was required to exercise the strictest security measures, enforce thoroughgoing sound and light control, prohibit loading of firearms and refrain from using verbal orders except when ordering the final rush.

15. Maintenance of contact during the night attack was stressed

as being of vital importance.

The battalion commander was required to make his position known with markers or some special means of identification, and to keep his subordinates always under his control.

Section D. Attack at Early Dawn and Dusk (From the Infantry Training Manual Published by the Infantry School and the Field Service Regulations for Operations)

1. The "early dawn attack", previously described as a combination of the ordinary dawn attack and a night attack, is infantry assault conducted during the period shortly before dawn. Combat organization for an attack of this type can be obtained by proper modification of dawn and night attacks, with a rapid switching over to the coordinated attack of the infantry, tank and artillery after day-break.

2. In order to take advantage of the night to approach the enemy, to reach the attack position and to make the assault at dawn, reconnaissance and other attack preparations should be made during the daylight hours whenever possible.

3. In the battalion advance to the assault position for an early dawn attack procedures for the night attack are followed.

4. As in the case of the night attack, the company sometimes assaults a single objective with its entire strength concentrated in a close formation, but usually in the early dawn attack the company assigns attack objectives to its front line platoons and allows them

to assault individually using methods similar to the daylight attack procedures. In the latter case, the intervals between platoons are kept greater than in a night attack and the company usually holds some reserve strength.

5. In the early dawn attack, tanks are usually committed to the action after the front line infantry has penetrated the enemy position. However, depending on the conditions of enemy obstacles, it is sometimes advantageous to employ a part or the whole of the tank strength from the start.

6. The artillery is, in principle, required to render the fullest possible support to the infantry, particularly at daybreak. However, when it is possible to complete preparations for action in advance, the artillery opens fire at early dawn and supports the infantry assault, although it is advisable for the artillery to delay opening fire until after the first infantry assault in order to conceal the attack.

Section E. Night Defense (From the Infantry Training Manual published by the Infantry School and the Field Service Regulation for Operations)

1. The defensive doctrine of the Japanese Army required that the front line infantry positions, be defended to the last and the enemy attack stopped before the line.

The requirements of night defense took into consideration both the Japanese Army's defensive doctrine and the fundamental effect which night has upon combat. Consideration was given to the

fact that redistribution of troops under hostile fire at night results in confusion and that, in view of the difficulties of cooperation by adjacent units or reinforcement from troops in the rear at night, simplicity was required in defense assignments.

2. Generally speaking, at night patrols and more stringent security measures were used to detect the enemy approach, contact between security detachments was strengthened and a sentry line organized in front of each platoon position. Also, if available, searchlights were prepared to illuminate the ground in front of the defensive position.

3. If necessary for defense at night, the battalion commander disposed elements where the gaps between companies were great or where terrain conditions made it necessary, and dispatched elements to reinforce companies in critical areas. He also moved the reserve close up to the front line.

4. The company commander usually increased the strength at his strong points dispatched reserve elements to occupy other points and to organize new strong points.

5. In night defense, the infantry company organized its fires to deliver frontal fire at a close range. Machine guns attached to the companies and those under direct control of the battalion commander were employed for frontal fire to cover important sectors in the immediate foreground of the defensive position.

6. If the enemy succeeded in closing with the defensive position, defenders of each strong point subjected them to heavy fire or engaged in hand-to-hand fighting. As soon as the enemy was thrown into confusion, or if he had penetrated the company position, the company commander led the reserve in a counterattack. The battalion commander likewise counterattacked with his reserve. However, the performance of the original mission of defending the assigned position was not to be jeopardized by counterattacking too hastily.

Section F. Other Night Operations

1. The Japanese Army, regarded the pursuit as the means to complete the victory and required commanders of all echelons to carry out pursuit actions. Because an enemy attempting to withdraw usually takes advantage of darkness, the necessity of combat units carrying out the pursuit at night was particularly stressed.

2. Before executing a night withdrawal, preparations must be made so as to facilitate the retrograde movement by secretly sending to the rear, during daytime, the sick and wounded as well as excess ammunition.

The common procedure in the daylight withdrawal is to post a covering force (SHUYO BUTAI) in a suitable position behind the front line in order to cover the assembly and withdrawal of the front line force. No covering force is used in the night withdrawal, although it

is commonly protected by small screening detachments (ZANCHI BUTAI) left at key points along the front line. Detachments are disposed so as not to arouse in the enemy any suspicion of withdrawal intentions. It may be advisable to deceive the enemy by making a night attack with elements of the screening force.

3. Darkness should be utilized in amphibious landing and river crossing operations, as secrecy and surprise are vital elements in such operations. Having the invasion convoy approach the landing beach under cover of darkness will often have the advantage of taking the defending force by surprise and since the approach to the landing point will be concealed, may permit the debarkation of the entire main body without detection by the enemy.

In river crossing operations all efforts must be made not to betray the time and place of crossing. Darkness can be used to excellent advantage to conceal the progress of operational preparations from enemy air and ground observation. Actual crossing by the combat elements gains advantages similar to those of night attack. In order not to betray the crossing attempt by the sound of engine powered pontoons, the normal procedure is to take the first wave across by rowing, unless the width of the river renders such a method impractical. However, the element of surprise is seldom attained along the entire crossing sector in river crossing operations. In most cases prior preparations for forced crossing under support of artillery and heavy infantry weapons must be made, as it may be necessary

to change from a surprise crossing to a forced crossing. The combination of surprise attack and all-out assault was called sudden attack (KYUSHU) by the Japanese Army.

In both river crossing and amphibious operations, carrying across or putting ashore the bulk of the combat force before daybreak is highly desirable. Moonlight nights should be avoided in amphibious operations.

4. There are numerous other cases in which utilization of darkness is recommended by the Japanese Army. To outflank the enemy position secretly during the night and attack the flank or rear at daybreak or to carry out supply transport and troop movements in rear areas in order to avoid enemy observation and hostile air attack are typical examples of the utilization of darkness. The movement of a large force over a long distance, including the assembly, march, and deployment with the operation extended over several nights has been used to good advantage in some instances. The strategic surprise achieved by the First Army in the battle of Chung-Yuan described in Example No. 4 was accomplished mainly through application of this method. The night was also utilized in assaulting pillboxes and in clearing artificial barriers by infantry and engineers.

Author's Note:

The fundamental rules for assaulting pillboxes were described in Part 4 of the Field Service Regulations for Operations. Unfortunately, this document is not available, as it was destroyed at the time of the surrender.¹ The methods described, although seemingly elementary, were actually very effective. As an illustration of their effectiveness, the following story is told about Part 4 and its author, ex-Major General Miyano:

"The substance of Part 4, including the section on assaulting pillboxes, was originally conceived by Major General Miyano in 1933, but the methods advocated were not accepted by the General Staff on the grounds that they were too elementary. When Major General Miyano visited Germany, later in 1933, he was asked by the German General Staff for suggestions on how to penetrate the Maginot Line. At that time he recommended the assault tactics he had conceived earlier. The German General Staff adopted his recommendations and succeeded in breaking through the Maginot Line in 1940. When this news reached Japan, the Japanese General Staff adopted the assault methods conceived by Major General Miyano and made them Part 4 of the Field Service Regulations for Operations."

1. Editor's Note:

Although reported to have been destroyed, a copy of Part 4 of the Field Service Regulations was located by research consultants employed by the Japanese Research Division. Translation is included as Appendix V.

The methods advocated in Part 4 called for a dawn or dusk surprise attack, with penetration in depth, by a battalion. Tochkas were by-passed and the attacking and neutralizing of those pillboxes were accomplished by specially trained and equipped Tochka Attack Units, composed of 30 to 40 infantrymen and engineers.

The assault tactics of the Tochka Attack Units and its component groups were divided into four phases:

a. Neutralization firing directed against pillbox firing slits by the Support Group (snipers and light machine guns) and light artillery.

b. Demolition of obstacles by Obstacle Demolition Group (wire cutters and clearers as well as demolition teams). Heavy artillery was also employed to clear obstacles and soften up tochkas.

c. Placement of demolition charges on and in tochkas by Assault Group.

d. Mop-up of personnel inside tochkas by Assault or Reserve Group.

Flame throwing tanks ("SO") operated by special engineer groups ("KI") were also employed against tochkas. The use of regular assault tanks in lieu of light artillery in firing on slits was contemplated, although normal employment called for their use in support of the break-through of the main body.

CHAPTER IV

Training in Night Combat

Section A. General Training

1. Reference materials used for writing this chapter are:

Infantry Manual

Night Movement Training Manual
(Yakan Kodo Kyoiku no Sanko)
(Published in May 1936 by the Infantry School)

Infantry Training Manual (Volume IV)
(Hohei Kyoren no Sanko)
(Published in June 1941 by the Infantry School)

Individual Combat Training Manual
(Sento Kakko Kyoren no Sanko)
(Published in December 1937 by the Infantry School)

Night Attack Manual
(Yakan Kogeki no Sanko)
(Published in September 1944 by the Inspectorate General
of Military Training)

Maneuver Guide
(Enshu Binran)
(Published in February 1944 by the Military Academy)

Night Observation Training Manual
(Yakan Shiryoku Zoshin Kunren no Sanko)
(Published in March 1944 by the Inspectorate General of
Military Training)

Infantry Position Construction Manual (Volumes I & II)
(Hohei Chikujo)
(Published in August 1941 by the Infantry School)

Field Fortification Manual (Volumes I & II)
(Yasen Chikujo Kyohan)
(Published in March 1944 by the Inspectorate General of
Military Training)

Field Fortification Manual (Volume I, Supplement)
(Yasen Chikujo Kyohan)
(Published in October 1944 by the Inspectorate General
of Military Training)

2. That training in night combat in the Japanese Army occupied a very important part of the training program is evident from the emphasis placed on it in the Infantry Manual. The manual stressed that "The infantrymen must be especially proficient in night combat. For this reason the infantrymen must attain a degree of proficiency equal to daylight combat through repeated training and exercises. Mastery of taking advantage of the dawn and dusk is also vital." The phrase "especially proficient" is the strongest of all expressions of this sort, and the phrase "the proficiency equal to the daylight combat" means to attach to night combat training equal importance with daylight combat training. In other branches, too, considerable stress was placed on training for night action, although not so much as in the infantry.

3. In the night combat training of infantry, the emphasis was laid on offensive action, with the surprise attack being stressed. The reason for the emphasis probably stemmed from the fact that the basic concept of night attacks invariably contemplated a surprise attack followed by close combat, fire power being considered of secondary significance - although both the Field Service Regulations for Operations and the Infantry Manual approved the night attack with use of fire power.

Therefore, in combat training much effort was exerted in how to attack the enemy by surprise under concealment of darkness. Such measures as sound prevention, blackouts, silent marches, silent

orders, and silent assault are all designed to take the enemy by surprise, concealing our intention and movements.

Great efforts were put into the basic training to overcome the disadvantages of the night. Training eyes and ears, finding bearings and maintaining direction in darkness, movement in various terrain at night, assault firing, and maintaining control at night were included in the training program.

Mental conditioning for the night attack was centered on an undaunted fighting spirit, firm unity, boldness and a strong sense of responsibility.

4. Night combat training by the Japanese Army in peacetime was conducted parallel to the daylight combat training. The progress attained in the daylight training was utilized in the night combat training, sometimes conducted intensively by designating a "night combat training week." Generally, however, it was conducted progressively with daylight training during the training year.

The training year of the Japanese Army began in December and ended in November of the following year. This training year was divided into three periods: The first period (December to March), the second period (April to July), and the third period (August to November). (The training year system was formulated by taking into consideration the mobilization plan, which began from April of each year. The recruits who completed the training of the first period in March were listed in the mobilization plan as combat ready soldiers.)

The company commander in charge of the training of recruits prepared the training program for each period based on the Military Training Guide. The examples of night combat training during each period of a typical training year for the rifle company of an infantry regiment is given in Chart Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

The number of hours allotted to the night combat training of the infantry throughout the training year was approximately one-fourth of the total hours for training, although training for daylight combat was applicable to night combat to a considerable extent.

5. Special equipment used by the infantry in training and actual combat at night were as follows:

a. For maintenance of direction and course marking: Luminous compass, route marker, lime, tape, rope, and marker light.

b. For control, contact, and sign: Small white flag, luminous watch, whistle, contact rope, luminous marker (used by commander), white sash, white belt, white cloth, position marker light, blinder light, flashlight, and signal cartridge.

c. For reading maps and documents: Dim light, flashlight, and luminous mirror.

d. For sound prevention: Cloth, straw, or other material for wrapping the metal parts of the bayonet, canteen, mess kit, saber, shovel, pick, and hobnail of shoes.

e. For use in attack: Smoke candle, self projecting smoke candle, wire cutter, sandbag, movable barrier, and individual camouflage net.

Program for Night Combat Training During the First Period of the Training Year for a Rifle Company of an Infantry Regiment					
Policy	To instruct and train the individual in the subjects essential to night action according to the progress of daylight training, thus completing the preliminary training and developing the ability of each individual to act as a member of the unit.				
Sub- jects for Training	Weeks	8th Week (18-25 Jan)	9th Week (26 Jan-1 Feb)	10th Week (2-8 Feb)	Hrs
Combat Training		Vision training: 1. Visibility under various conditions of darkness. 2. Utilization of terrain features and objects at night	Vision training: Identification of the enemy. Camouflage, and identification of objects.	Training in hearing Estimate of enemy situation. Noise prevention 1. Noise prevention in handling individual arms and equipment. 2. Silent movement.	4 2 3 6
March Security and Reconnaissance					
Bayonet Training					
Training Hours		4			4
					9

Weeks Sub- jects for Training	11th Week (9-15 Feb)	12th Week (16-22 Feb)	13th Week (23 Feb-1 Mar)	Hrs
Combat Training	Distance estimation 1. By pace 2. By eye 3. By sound	Orientation Maintenance of direction 1. By celestial bodies 2. By compass 3. By terrain objects and features	Route marking 1. Road markers 2. Other markers Silent march 1. Movement by signal. 2. Action to be taken when exposed to light. 3. Action to be taken when exposed to fire.	2 3
March Security and Reconnaissance			March Runners and connecting files	3
Bayonet Training				
Training Hours	6	9		8

Notes:

1. Special attention will be given to the following matters to obtain better results in the training for night combat.
 - a. Accomplishments in daylight training will be utilized in night training to the fullest extent.
 - b. Proficiency in training for night combat will be improved through simulated night conditions.
 - c. In general, no training will be scheduled for the afternoon preceding and the morning following night training in order to achieve a high degree of proficiency in the night training.
2. The mental state essential for night training will be developed along with combat training. Bayonet exercise will be encouraged during off duty hours to improve skill and develop a strong fighting spirit.
3. In order to further improve the combat efficiency of individual soldiers, each squad will repeat night training during unscheduled time*.
4. The Period 1 Inspection will be conducted in the early part of April.

* Periods allotted on MTG for review and extra training.

N. B.

Charts were prepared by the following ex-officers who were training officers in the 15th Infantry Regiment about 1935.

Ex-Lt Col Tokunaga, Hachiro

Ex-Lt Col Maruyama, Yoshiharu

Ex-Lt Col Matsushita, Sansei

Program for Night Combat Training During the Second Period of the Training Year for the Rifle Company of an Infantry Regiment				
Policy	To conduct advanced training with emphasis on unit training so as to make it possible to carry out night combat by a company or battalion and accomplish security and reconnaissance missions at night. To conduct supplementary training in the parts found to be unsatisfactory in the Period I Inspection.			
Weeks Sub- jects for Training	2d Week (6-12 Apr)	3d Week (13-19 Apr)	4th Week (20-26 Apr)	Hrs
Combat Training	Platoon attack Approach, preparations for assault and assault		Obstacle clearing Clearing in secrecy and forced clearing	6
March Security and Reconnaissance		Sentry duty		4
Bayonet Training			Dummy thrusting after advancing over uneven ground	3
Training Hours				9

Sub- jects for Training	Weeks (27 Apr-3 May)	Hrs	Hrs	6th Week (4-16 May)	Hrs	7th Week (11-17 May)	Hrs
Combat Training	Platoon attack Assault after clearing obstacles (switching over to forced clear- ing from clearing in secrecy)	8			4	Occupation of defensive position and defensive combat by a platoon	4
March Security and Reconnaissance	Outguards Training in sentry duties	4	8	Outguards Training in patrol & visiting patrol duties			8
Bayonet Training							
Training Hours		12	8			4	4

Sub- jects for Training	Weeks	8th Week (18-24 May)	9th Week (25-31 May)	10th Week (1-7 Jun)	Hrs
Combat Training		Company night attack Approach and prepara- tions for assault Company night attack Assault and holding a captured position	Company night attack Assault after clearing	Occupation of a posi- tion and defensive com- bat by a company	8 8 4
	March Security and Reconnaissance	Outpost support Training in outguard and sentry duties	Outpost support Training in security by the main body of the company	March and bivouac	8 12
Bayonet Training					
		(Field maneuver)	(Field maneuver and inspection)		
Training Hours		24	16	16	16

Sub-Weeks jects for Training	11th Week (8-14 Jun)	12th Week (15-21 Jun)	13th Week (22-28 Jun)	Hrs
Combat Training	Battalion night attack Attack against weak position 8			
March Security and Reconnaissance	Outpost reserve Training in conversion from the advance guard to the outpost reserve 8		Outpost training Measures to be taken when attacked with gas 4	
Bayonet Training		Dummy thrusting Thrusting several dummies successively 4		
	(Field maneuver and inspection)			
Training Hours	16	4	4	4

Sub-Weeks jects for Training	14th Week (29 Jun-5 Jul)	15th Week (6-12 Jul)	16th Week (13-19 Jul)	Hrs
Combat Training	Attack after passing through a contaminated area 6			
March Security and Reconnaissance				
Bayonet Training		Advanced bayonet drill	Advanced bayonet drill	3
Training Hours	6			3

Sub- jects for Training	Weeks 17th Week (20-26 Jul)	Hrs	18th Week (27 Jul-2 Aug)	Remarks
Combat Training				<ol style="list-style-type: none"> The recruit will be trained in unit combat and in independent action under various conditions at night by training together with the second-year men in the joint company training. From the beginning of the Period 2, the efficient recruits will be trained for as first class privates or non-commissioned officers (squad leader, NCO of the guard, and others) through general and special training.
March Security and Reconnaissance	Patrols, visiting patrol and messengers	8		
Bayonet Training	(Field firing at the maneuver ground)			Soldiers will be trained in hand-to-hand fighting at night.
Training Hours		8		

Notes:

1. Special emphasis will be placed on the following points to obtain better results in the training for night.
 - a. The accomplishments of daylight training will be utilized in night training as much as possible.
 - b. Night training will be facilitated by preliminary training in the daylight.
 - c. Depending on the nature of the night training, no training should be scheduled on the afternoon preceding and the morning following night training in order to achieve a high degree of proficiency in the night.
2. The mental state essential for the efficient soldiers in night combat will be developed along with combat training. Bayonet exercise will be encouraged during off duty hours to improve skill and develop a strong fighting spirit.
3. Efforts will be made to schedule the training so that the night training can be conducted on the company drill day (normally every Tuesday and Friday).
4. The Period 2 Inspection will be conducted at the maneuver ground; the company exercise (security, reconnaissance and others included) in the latter part of May and the battalion exercise (security, reconnaissance and others included) around middle of June.

Program for Night Combat Training During the Third Period of the Training Year for the Rifle Company of an Infantry Regiment									
Policy	To further promote the soldiers's skill in individual action at night and to continue the unit training to make units proficient in all types of night attack. To conduct supplementary training in the parts found to be unsatisfactory in the Period 2 Inspection.								
Sub- jects for Training	Weeks	2d Week (3-9 Aug)	Hrs	3d Week (10-16 Aug)	Hrs	4th Week (17-23 Aug)	Hrs	5th Week (24-30 Aug)	Hrs
Combat Training		Company dusk attack Conversion from daylight attack to night attack	4					Battalion night attack Attack supported by fire	8
March Security & Reconnais- sance				Outpost support Sentry duties & measures to be taken when attacked by enemy	8				
Bayonet Training						Advanced bayonet	3		
Training Hours			4		8		3		8

Weeks Sub- jects for Training	6th Week (31 Aug-6 Sep)	7th Week (7-13 Sep)	8th Week (14-20 Sep)	9th Week (21-27 Sep)	Hrs
Combat Training	8 Joint maneuver of infantry & artillery		5 Company early dawn attack Conversion from night attack to day- light attack	8 Joint maneuver of infantry and tanks	8
March Security and Reconnaissance					
Bayonet Training		4 Advanced bayonet drill with soldier and dummies			4
Training Hours	8	4			8

Weeks Sub- jects for Training	10th Week (28 Sep-4 Oct)	Hrs	11th Week (5-11 Oct)	Hrs	12th Week (12-18 Oct)	Hrs	13th Week (19-25 Oct)	Hrs
Combat Training			Battalion night attack Attack by a unit disposed in assault echelons	8				
March Security and Reconnaissance	March with military precautions	6			Forced march and village bivouac	12		
Bayonet Training								
Training Hours		6		8		12		

Weeks Sub- jects for Training	14th Week (26 Oct-1 Nov)	15th Week (2-8 Nov)	16th Week (9-15 Nov)	17th Week (16-22 Nov)	Hrs
Combat Training			Assault against pillbox 4		
March Security and Reconnaissance					
Bayonet Training				Hand-to-hand fighting bayonet and sword	3
Training Hours					3

Weeks Sub- jects for Training	18th Week (23 Nov-29 Nov)	19th Week (30 Nov-6 Dec)	Remarks
Combat Training			<p>1. The recruits will be trained in unit combat and in independent action under various conditions at night by training together with the second-year men in the joint company training.</p> <p>2. The training of efficient recruits will be continued and be completed by the end of this period.</p>
March Security and Reconnaissance			
Bayonet Training	Hand-to-hand fighting bayonet and sword	3	Advanced training will be conducted to improve the skill in hand-to-hand fighting at night.
Training Hours		3	

Notes:

1. Special emphasis will be placed on the following points to obtain better results in the training for night.
 - a. The accomplishments in the daylight training will be utilized in the night training as much as possible.
 - b. The night training will be facilitated by the preliminary training in the daylight for the night training.
 - c. Depending on the nature of the night training, the afternoon preceding and the morning following the night training should not be used for the daylight training in order to achieve a high degree of proficiency in the night training.
2. The mental state essential for the efficient soldiers in night combat will be developed along with the combat training. Especially the bayonet exercise will be encouraged during the off duty hours to improve the skill and a strong fighting spirit.
3. Efforts will be made to schedule the training so that the night training can be conducted on the company drill day (normally every Thesday and Friday).
4. The training during the division's autumn maneuver will be conducted according to the maneuver schedule of the division. Any part of the training found to be unsatisfactory during the maneuvers will be corrected in the supplementary training which will be conducted before the expiration of the current training period.

f. For use in defense: Searchlight, flare and movable barrier.

g. For elementary training: Dark eyeglasses.

Individual Training, General

The object of night training for the individual is to make the night combat training of units possible.

The Infantry Manual gives the following points as vital objectives of night training.

(1) To train soldiers in the ability to discover the enemy quickly and to estimate their strength, distance and movements.

(2) To develop soldiers in the ability to correctly identify terrain features and objects and to make the best possible use of them.

(3) To train soldiers in orientation and the ability to reach the desired point by maintaining direction through the aid of conspicuous landmarks or other terrain features and objects observed during the daytime.

(4) To train soldiers in the method of silent march, noise prevention, movement by signals, and the action to be taken when exposed to light.

(5) To train soldiers in movement in various situations and terrains, by crawling or rapid and daring advance.

(6) To train soldiers in bold and silent assault at night and in the throwing hand grenades.

(7) To train soldiers in preparing for night firing and in effective night firing even when there is no advance preparation.

1. Vision Training and Camouflage

In training eyesight at night, it is essential to adapt the eyes to darkness. Experiments indicated that the eyes adjust gradually to the darkness, with the maximum night sight of a person generally being reached in about 30 minutes to an hour. It was also determined that the maximum night sight of individuals can be developed to a considerable extent by constant training.

The next step is to adapt the eyes of the trainee to the appearance of various objects at night and to enable them to correctly identify the objects. Groves of small pine trees are often mistaken for enemy patrols and a low bank is sometimes taken for an enemy column. Small natural objects unnoticed during the daytime are sometimes mistaken for enemy soldiers.

2. The second phase of training vision at night was concerned with moonlight - the variations of visibility according to the age and slant of the moon, the relative position of the moon, the object and the observer, the weather, particularly the cloud conditions, the background and condition of the objects.

The results of experiments conducted on the Visibility Range by well trained soldiers at the Infantry School are shown in Chart Nos 4 and 5. Noteworthy in Chart No. 5 is that the visible range differs greatly according to whether the observer faces the moon or has the moon behind him.

Visibility at Night (in meters)

Moon Age Object	Starlit Night			12th Day from the Full Moon (Crescent)			7th Day from the Full Moon (Half)		
	Single Soldier	Patrol	Unit	Single Soldier	Patrol	Unit	Single Soldier	Patrol	Unit
Ground and Background									
Level, Grassy Ground	25	30	40	30	60	75	60	70	80
Level, Bare Ground	30	40	45	30	45	50	35	50	55
Dark Background	10	10	15	10	15	20	10	15	20
Silhouetted Against the Sky	35	55	80	130	140	180	140	170	230

1. Patrol is three or four men. Unit is a platoon in column.
 The above figures show the visible range when the object is not in motion.
 It is easier to identify an object in motion especially when it is moving crosswise.

Notes: 2. This experiment was conducted on clear nights during January and February.
 It can be assumed that the brightness is practically equal for two or three nights before and after each age of the moon in the chart.

3. This chart applies for visibility after the full moon as well as before.


(Cont'd)

Moon Age Object	3d Day from the Full Moon (3/4)			15th Day of the Moon (Full)			Remarks
	Single Soldier	Patrol Unit	Unit	Single Soldier	Patrol Unit	Unit	
Ground and Background							
Level, Grassy Ground	70	75	120	75	100	150	When the object is not silhouetted against the sky.
Level, Bare Ground	40	50	70	50	30	100	Vary slightly with the amount of humidity in the air.
Dark Background	15	20	25	15	20	25	When the object is in the shadow of wood or grove and the background is dark, the light of the moon makes very little difference.
Silhouetted Against the Sky	160	220	280	180	250	300	


- Findings:
1. On the terrain features where attackers will be silhouetted against the sky, the final protective line may be selected 200 to 300 meters ahead of the front of the position because it is possible to identify the attackers at that range at moonlight night.
 2. On level ground, on the moonlit night, it is possible to fire at a column at a distance of about 100 meters, and on a starlit night at a distance of 50 meters.

Visibility on Moonlight Nights				
Object			Single Solider	Unit
Standing Position	Halted	Facing moon	190 meters	264 meters
		With moon behind	115 "	113 "
	In motion	Facing moon	223 "	310 "
		With moon behind	121 "	151 "
Kneeling Position	Halted	Facing moon	128 "	171 "
		With moon behind	69 "	102 "
	In motion	Facing moon	150 "	184 "
		With moon behind	75 "	76 "
Prone Position	Halted	Facing moon	79 "	127 "
		With moon behind	41 "	56 "
	In motion	Facing moon	83 "	131 "
		With moon behind	45 "	59 "
Notes:				
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Soldiers employed in the experiment were equipped with full pack and camouflaged. The unit was approximately a squad in extended order. 2. 16th day of the moon (Full Moon), position 60 degrees from the ground, no background. Ground covered with grass 30 centimeters high. There was no haze, but a high percentage of humidity. 3. Visibility when the observer faces the moon is half as great as when the observer has the moon behind him. 4. It is almost impossible to determine colours even in bright moonlight. Recognition except at very close range is by silhouette or outline. 				

A. When the moon is faced by the observer



B. When the moon is behind the observer



3. The third phase of vision training at night is the application of training acquired in the first and second phases in approaching the enemy without being discovered, care to be exercised in the reconnaissance mission, and utilization of terrain features and objects and selection of direction in carrying out a successful assault.

In this phase of training the soldier learned that the use of lights and smoking at night are undesirable, not only for the concealment but for adaptation of eyesight. The importance of covering the metal parts of swords, steel helmets, rifles, and bayonets with cloth or other materials in order to prevent reflection in the moonlight or enemy illumination was also taught.

In scanning for enemy soldiers, it is advisable to look upward from a lower position in order to silhouette them against the sky. Men on patrol should occasionally lie down on the ground and scan all directions for suspicious objects.


4. Camouflage is used at night to prevent reflection of moonlight and to disguise the silhouette of the figure to make identification more difficult.

5. The "Night Observation Training Manual" published in March 1944, was based on studies undertaken at the Army Medical School and experiments at the Toyama Army School. Although this manual was not widely used in the night training of Army units, it contained valuable data. The principal object of this manual was training in off-center vision. The manual admitted that the night vision can be improved by


The Japanese Research Division does not guarantee the medical accuracy of the following optical discussion.

training other than the off-center vision method, but it stressed that by following this method, night vision can be increased from two to six times.

Off-center vision is using that portion of the retina where the red cells (rods) which enable the eye to see objects in the dark are in the greatest number. In light, the central part of the fundus of the retina (where cones are in the largest number) performs the chief visual function, but in the dark the part surrounding the central part of the fundus of the retina performs the visual function. This is illustrated in the following diagram.



Fundus of Eyeball




In order to achieve the maximum vision at night, one should not look directly at the object, fixing the center line of sight directly as in the daytime, but look at an angle to the object. This angle depends on the amount of light, in full moon the angle should be about 7.5 degrees whereas on a starlight night the angle should be about 10 degrees off center. Off-center vision is not effective when it is lighter than 0.02 lucas. The comparison between the visual power (the visual power of the central part of the fundus of the retina) in direct vision and the visual power (the visual power of the part surrounding central part of the fundus of the retina) in the off-center vision in various degrees of illumination, and the angles of proper off-center vision are shown in the following chart.

Vision		Illumination (lucas)							
		0.02	0.01	0.005	0.002 (Full Moon)	0.001	0.0002 (Starlit Night)	0.0001	0.00002
Visual Power of Direct Vision		0.11	0.048	0.03	0.017	0.009	0.0046	0.0032	0.0022
Off-center Vision	Off-center Angle (degrees)	3.5	5	6	7.5	9.0	10.0	12.0	13.0
	Visual Power	0.12	0.09	0.07	0.052	0.035	0.024	0.018	0.013
Ratio of the Visual Power of Off-center Vision to Direct Vision		1.1	1.9	2.3	3.05	3.9	5.0	5.8	6.0

In an experiment conducted at the Toyama Army School, several officers and non-commissioned officers underwent off-center vision training for two hours every night for one week, and it was found that their visual power on a starlit night had nearly doubled.

The manual also gives the following results of experiments on dark adaptation, and states that for practical purposes one hour is required to adapt the eyes to darkness.

Sensitivity of the Retina
to the Light in Dark Adaptation



Remarks: Point (a) indicates that the sensitivity to light is increased by 10,000 times after 20 minutes of dark adaptation.

The manual stresses the importance of taking into consideration the time required in dark adaptation in preparing schedules for sentry and patrol duties. It also points out that special caution must be exercised in using lights at night because eyes adapted to darkness would immediately return to their original condition when exposed to light, even for a short time, and would require about one hour to adapt to darkness again.

Section B. Training in Hearing and Noise Prevention

1. The main purpose of training in hearing is to familiarize soldiers with battlefield sounds so that they may correctly judge its cause, direction and distance. The footsteps of a single soldier or a group of soldiers, the sounds made by handling individual arms and equipment by soldiers on the march or starting the march must all be identified. The noises incident to constructing positions and obstacles, the sounds of voices in conversation, characteristic sounds of various weapons when fired, airplane, tank and truck noises, and the sounds of communication apparatus must be demonstrated and soldiers adequately trained to identify them correctly.

2. Sounds of footsteps and engines in the distance can easily be caught by placing the ear to the ground. Well-trained soldiers should be able to estimate the number of enemy soldiers by the sound of footsteps, although this method may often result in overestimation.

Attention must be paid also to the resulting of leaves, animal noises, and the sound of the wind. Barking dogs may indicate

troops passing through a village and the sudden stopping of insects' singing may indicate an approaching enemy.

When the wind is strong, it is especially difficult to hear sounds in forests or koaliang fields and sounds do not carry in dense fog. Men on guard duty must be particularly vigilant under these conditions.

3. Soldiers moving at night must take every care to prevent making noise. They must:

- a. Secure equipment firmly.
- b. Prevent rattling of articles in the pack by wrapping them with cloth and bind mess gear securely with cloth or straw around the handle.
- c. Put the mess gear in the holdall or haversack when the pack is not carried. Separate the wood and metal parts of the shovel and secure them under the belt separately.
- d. Completely fill the canteen to prevent noise.
- e. Stuff ammunition pouches and chests with paper in order to prevent rattling. Wrap the bayonet sheath with cloth or enclose the sheath in a cloth bag.
- f. Refrain from needless conversation and coughing; signs and gestures should be used at night. Orders, information, or reports which must be given orally should be in a whisper.
- g. When marching over a hard-surfaced road, step lightly in order to prevent noise. Walk on the soft shoulder of the road, if

possible and, if necessary, muffle noise by covering the shoes with straw rope or cloth.

Section C. Distance Estimation and Utilization of Terrain Features and Objects

1. Estimating distance is difficult at night, but is necessary on many occasions. For instance, in approaching the enemy position at night, one must know his position in relation to the enemy and for this purpose the direction and distance of advance from the starting point are often estimated and the position oriented on the map. The distance from the starting point is usually measured by pace, which is fairly accurate even at night, although the margin of error greatly increases when the terrain is rough or sloped and overestimation of distance may result.

2. Great distances cannot be estimated by the eye, at night, but the ability to accurately estimate a short distance is vital. For instance, the distance to weapons being fired, to the enemy or position to be assaulted, for throwing hand grenades and the distance to the counterattacking enemy force must often be determined at a glance.

Distance to or from flash and illumination is likely to be underestimated at night whereas the distance to or size of obstacles and terrain features are likely to be overestimated. Estimating distance or measuring at night also varies greatly according to the degree of darkness and the posture of the individual. Consequently

training must be conducted in various degrees of darkness and in different postures, especially the prone position.

3. Training must be given in estimating distance by sound as well as by vision. When a single shot is fired at a considerable distance, estimation may be made by measuring the time required for the sound of the shot to be heard after the flash is observed.

4. Proper appreciation of the differences between the night and daylight in the utilization of terrain features and objects is vital.

Movement over flat and open ground is restricted by enemy fire during daylight but becomes comparatively easy at night. High ground commanding an excellent view in daylight may become an unfavorable spot at night because movement may be silhouetted against the sky. In many cases, the objects conspicuous in the daytime, particularly if distinguished because of color, become inconspicuous at night and can no longer be utilized. Grass and bushes, utilized for concealment in the daytime, sometimes becomes a hindrance at night and impede maintenance of secrecy.

At night, a break in the ground or a river becomes a greater obstacle and movement through woods and some types of terrain, which offer excellent concealment during the daytime, becomes very difficult.

Section D. Orientation and Maintenance of Direction

1. All officers and men must acquire the ability to orient themselves and maintain direction. The heavenly bodies, compass, route

markers (Keiroki), and other aids are used in orientation training.

a. The principal heavenly bodies used in orientation are the moon, the North Star, and familiar constellations.

b. When a compass is used, particular stress must be placed on correcting the variation. The route marker is used for recording the direction and distance covered. (The route marker is used only by guide patrols and others having a specific mission as special training is required for its use.)

c. In the Northern Hemisphere, houses and trees generally face south and the ridges and furrows in the fields are usually made in the east-west direction. When there is a snowfall, north can be determined by observing the manner in which the snow melts. Direction can be also determined when the prevailing wind is known. However, all these vary considerably according to the theater of operations, and it is essential to give troops training in conditions peculiar to the theater before commencing operations.

2. Direction can be maintained at night by the methods described, but the following points are important.

a. Daytime preparation is vital. When the compass is used, the angle between the direction of advance and the magnetic north must be studied and memorized. It will be particularly advantageous to bear in mind the destination in relation to some easily recognizable terrain objects such as a mountain top, a single tree, or isolated house. Maintaining direction would be further facilitated by

memorizing the location and directions of roads, railroads, electric wires, streams, openings in the ground, and other objects which would be encountered en route to the destination.

b. Direction is likely to be lost when bypassing obstacles and, because of the psychological effect, when subjected to enemy fire or flares.

Section E. Movement Training

1. Since night movement is vital to a successful night assault, the training in silent marching, crawling, daring advance, movement through difficult ground, and actions to be taken when caught in flares is important.

2. The following points must be stressed in silent movement training.

- a. The strict observance of noise prevention.
- b. Control by signals.

Night movements are usually controlled by arm-and-hand signals and each soldier must be trained to make all movements on signal. Each man must constantly watch the commander and the man next to him for relayed signals.

3. At night, crawling is the most suitable method for advancing silently to reconnoiter the enemy or to clear enemy obstacles, and for advancing under enemy fire or flares. Soldiers must be trained in four methods of crawling.

a. Method 1:

A method of moving forward bearing the weight on the left leg, below the knee, and the palm of the left hand. While this is the fastest method, because the position of the body is high and because noise is more likely to be made, this method is used at a comparatively long distance from the enemy position.

b. Method 2:

In this method the body is moved forward carrying the weight on the left elbow and right toe, with the left hip touching the ground. The advantages of this method are virtually the same as in Method 1.

c. Method 3:

In this method the body is moved forward with the weight on the left elbow and right toe, with the stomach touching the ground. This method is quiet and is used when advancing close to the enemy.

d. Method 4:

In this method the body is moved forward on both elbows and both toes, with the body flat on the ground. The body may be propelled by using both elbows and both toes simultaneously or using the left elbow and toes and the right elbow and toes alternately. This is the slowest method and is used by obstacle clearing teams and others when silence is most vital.

In the first three methods, the rifle is held with the right hand but in the fourth method it is cradled in both arms or held horizontally with both hands.

4. "Daring Advance" is a rapid and resolute advance. This new method was originated especially for the rapid movement required in night attacks when shifting from a surprise attack to a forced attack, when advancing immediately before rushing, or when advancing within the enemy position.

The daring advance resembles the rapid walk in most respects. However, speed is increased by lowering the center of gravity of the body, by taking slightly longer steps, and by swinging the left arm harder. Pressure is applied to the lower abdomen and the hip is pulled forward. The eyes are fixed on the head gear of the soldier ahead and never at the ground.

The rifle is held with the right hand just forward of the balance with the wrist pressed lightly against the hip. Although the rate of advance varies with the ground, it should be 7 to 8 kilometers an hour. Developing the spirit to advance resolutely should be stressed in the daring advance training.

5. Generally speaking, double time is inadvisable at night because the soldiers are likely to stumble and break formation, making noise. However, double time for short distances is used in rushing the enemy. For this reason the training in double time at night is conducted in conjunction with night assault training.

In double time at night, the leg muscles should be relaxed, and the feet lifted a little higher and brought down on the ground toe first.

6. In night movement training, special emphasis should be placed on walking through difficult terrain.

a. In rough or rocky ground, the foot is brought down gently, heel first, and then the body weight is gradually placed on the outside of the foot in order to avoid stumbling and making any sound.

b. In a silent walk over grassy land, it is better to lift the forward foot higher, reduce the pace, and take longer steps.

c. In a silent walk through kaoliang fields or shrub-covered fields, the kaoliang or shrubs must be held aside to avoid noise.

However, the daring advance through a kaoliang field or a shrub-covered area must be made resolutely, ignoring obstacles.

d. Silent night movement across or over a ground opening, small streams, ditches, embankments, or other natural obstacles is comparatively easy, but the formation is likely to be broken. Consequently, cooperation between men is especially vital.

e. Gaps in enemy wire must be passed with the greatest possible speed. Training in passing over the enemy wire quickly by laying boards or other material over it is essential.

f. Training in ascending and descending mountains, fording rivers, and passing through forests is also necessary.

7. Actions of the individual caught in the light of a flare are also taught.

a. When caught in a flare, soldiers will halt and drop to

the ground only when the signal is given by the commander.

b. Dropping to the ground must be done silently. Soldiers must not move while lying prone, but must watch the commander and the direction of the enemy with the head to the ground while carefully protecting the eyes.

c. When caught in a strong flare, soldiers must not look at it directly because of the blinding effect. If possible, they should wear smoked glasses or cover their eyes.

d. When caught in a flare at a short distance from the enemy, the soldiers should assault without delay.

Section F. Assault Training

1. Assault training is particularly essential for developing confidence in night combat and is conducted in close conjunction with bayonet drill.

2. Two methods of rushing, silent or forced, may be used.

a. Silent rushing is conducted following a silent and cautious approach, with the rifle held in readiness and the enemy being rushed from close proximity.

The method of rushing is employed by a single soldier, a patrol, or other small body in surprising an enemy sentry or guard.

b. Force rushing is conducted following the daring advance, with the rifle held in readiness and the enemy being rushed on the double. This method is commonly used in assault by a unit of platoon or company size.

c. When assaulting searchlights, covered machine gun emplacements, or when counterattacking, it is often advantageous to rush the enemy after checking him by throwing hand grenades. In assault training of this type, emphasis is placed on the proper judgment of throwing distance and in rushing immediately after the explosion of the grenade.

3. Training in hand-to-hand combat at night should be conducted in close conjunction with bayonet exercise and should be given on rough ground as well as flat terrain. It should also include hand-to-hand combat against several men, and bayoneting while advancing. It must be remembered that in close quarters combat at night the distance to the enemy soldier is likely to be underestimated and that stabs are likely to be made from too far a distance.

Section G. Training in Night Firing

Japanese infantrymen were trained in night firing mainly for general defense and for holding newly captured ground following a night assault. Although the Japanese Army believed that night firing was far less effective than daylight firing, it was aware of the great effectiveness of close range night firing when properly conducted.

Two methods were stressed in the infantry night firing. One was plotting the fire to cover a special target or a target area by fixing the rifle before dark. The other was to fire parallel to the ground when firing was necessary immediately after a night assault or in similar instances. These methods are not peculiar to the Japanese

Army, but are common to the modern armies of the world and will not be discussed in detail.

Although the general rule was that the infantry did not fire during a night assault, the Toyama Army School in Tokyo did experiment with firing in close combat and firing from the hip in daylight assault, but the method was not adopted for night assault.

Section H. Night Training Mottoes

The Japanese Army believed that the memorizing and frequent reference to mottoes, not only aided in teaching, but was also an important morale factor.

1. Mottoes for night combat:

"The night is one million reinforcements." (Emphasis on the advantage of night.)

"Firing in the dark is sure to miss." (Encouragement of boldness and calmness.)

"Suspicion will create a bugbear." (Caution against fear.)

"A dog bays the moon and a thousand curs follow suit."
(Caution against panic at night.)

"Don't hear the enemy in every leaf that rustles."
(Caution against panic at night.)

"Don't rely on your bullets, rely on your bayonet."
(Emphasis on the effectiveness of hand-to-hand combat.)

"Untrained comrades are more to be feared than the enemy."
(Emphasis on military training.)

2. Mottoes concerning mental attitudes of commanders and men:

"Lead at the van or from a prominent place." (Leadership encouragement.)

"When surprised by the enemy, pause for a smoke." (Caution against panic.)

"One man's carelessness is the whole army's loss." (Stress on sense of responsibility.)

3. Mottoes concerning night movement:

"Move onward regardless of fallen comrades." (Emphasis on boldness.)

"Heed the enemy flares, but ignore the enemy fire." (Emphasis on secrecy and daring.)

"Lower your hip and bring your feet down vertically." (The method of moving through rough ground.)

"Don't glance aside during the daring advance." (Emphasis on boldness.)

"No sudden halt or sudden advance." (Prevention of confusion.)

"Time is a vital factor in movement." (Emphasis on importance of synchronizing timing.)

4. Others

"Be cautious of the direction in which no enemy can be seen." (Stress on the importance of exercising caution in all directions.)

"Moving objects are often overestimated in number." (Caution against overestimating enemy strength.)

"Fire and light appear close at night." (Caution against underestimating distance at night.)

"When lost among the enemy, wait until dawn." (Caution against panic.)

"It is easy to get lost in a forest or village." (Stress the importance of selecting a proper route of advance.)

"Prepare for night before dark and prepare for daylight before dawn." (Emphasis on the importance of adequate preparations.)

"Hold on to your gun and equipment." (Caution against loss.)

"Don't leave articles, clean the place before leaving."
(Caution against the loss of articles and the betrayal of intentions to enemy intelligence.)

Section I. Unit Training

1. In general, the basic combat training of the Japanese infantry was completed at company level. Unit training on battalion level or above was conducted primarily in cooperation with infantry heavy weapons, or the units of other branches.

This general rule also applied to night combat and in the night assault when the company attacked independently or as an element of a battalion, it was believed that the success of the attack depended on how well the company was trained. Squad training was begun when individual training had progressed satisfactorily. The squad training then progressed through platoon training to company training.

2. The unit training on company level was based primarily on the Infantry Training Manual, but details of the training were also drawn from the manuals published by the Infantry School. The following excerpts from the section on company training in the Infantry Training Manual concerning reconnaissance of the enemy situation and terrain as a preparation for a night attack will illustrate to what detail the training was conducted.

a. Reconnaissance objectives: Enemy disposition, the location of the attack objective in relation to its surroundings, location and size and type of obstacles and flank defenses, the terrain in front of and within the enemy position, routes of approach, existence of contaminated areas.

b. Reconnaissance methods:

- (1) Personal observation by the company commander.
- (2) Continuous observation by the company command section.
- (3) Observation by subordinate platoons.
- (4) Dispatch of patrols.
- (5) Forward observation points.
- (6) Contact with the observation organization of other units, particularly heavy weapons and artillery.

c. The following points are important in reconnaissance.

- (1) The company commander must conduct coordinated reconnaissance.

(2) Frontal reconnaissance will be made whenever possible. However, observation of the target from several directions is also essential.

(3) Because the situation in the enemy position is often revealed when the enemy opens fire on observation patrols, such opportunities may be used to reconnoiter the enemy.

(4) When the location of the enemy has been reconnoitered, the distance and the angle from a clearly defined terrain features (reference points) must be measured as accurately as possible.

(5) Information obtained from various means of reconnaissance must be entered on maps, sketches, and photomaps as obtained.

(6) In long range observation, in undulating terrain, caution must be exercised since valleys, ravines, and openings in the foreground cannot be seen and distance is likely to be underestimated and frontage overestimated.

(7) Caution must be exercised not to betray intentions through careless movements and open use of glasses or range finding instruments.


3. The main objects of company night combat training were the control and the maintenance of direction and guidance by the company commander as well as the assault made under the company commander's leadership.

The Japanese stressed that the company was the basic spiritual unit and should be a family whose head is the company commander.

It was said that a glance at a company training in night attack was enough to see whether the unity in the company was firm.

4. In night attack, the battalion commander normally approached the enemy directly commanding the main body of his unit, but in training it was more convenient to train the company independently. Figure 11 indicates the manner in which a battalion commander directs the company training.

5. Figure 12 illustrates training conducted to push through an enemy position, taking advantage of the early dawn, and Figure 13 shows training in a dusk attack following a daylight attack.



Night Attack Training Problem

(Attack by the First Assault Echelon of
a Battalion Planning Penetration in Depth)

1. Objects of Training

- a. Preparations for attack.
- b. Rapid advance to a given objective with attack intentions concealed from the enemy.
- c. Holding a captured position.

2. Situation

At 1500 hours, 23 December, the 2d Company of the 1st Battalion of the South Army is preparing for a night attack in the disposition shown in the sketch. The gist of the battalion order received by the company commander, at that time, is as follows:

a. The 1st Battalion (plus one infantry engineer platoon) will attack the enemy position V, W and Y to capture Y Hill. The 2d Battalion is to occupy Z Hill.

b. The 1st Company (plus one infantry engineer squad) on the right will capture V, and the 2d Company (plus one infantry engineer squad) on the left will capture W.

c. The 3d Company (plus two infantry engineer squads) in the second assault echelon will prepare to capture Y Hill. The 4th Company will be the support.

d. The 1st and 2d Companies are scheduled to launch the attack at 2200 hours, but the formal attack order will be issued separately. The 1st and 2d Companies will secretly open paths through wire by 2100 hours.


e. At dusk the 1st Company will employ an element to drive out the enemy security element disposed at point (2), and the 2d Company will use an element to expel the enemy from point (3). The time of attack against the enemy security elements is scheduled at 1700 hours, but the formal order will be issued separately.

f. Machine guns and battalion guns will remain in the position they presently occupy and prepare to support the attack against the enemy security elements.

g. Each unit will assemble after sunset as follows.

(1) The 1st and 2d Companies will commence movement after 1800 hours and assemble in the proximity of their present position by 1900 hours.

(2). The main body of the battalion will commence movement after 1800 hours and will assemble in the area west of the place where the battalion headquarters is now located by 1900 hours.



3. Company Training Plan

(I) Attack Preparations:

1. Procedure

a. The company is disposed as ordered by 1430 hours. The oral battalion order is issued at a point from which the terrain can be pointed out. The exercise is then commenced.

b. The enemy disposed at points (a), (b) and (e) deliver sporadic fire.

c. Enemy artillery bursts are simulated by exploding practice charges.

d. The enemy at point (a) retire when the company begins advance.

2. Training objectives

a. Prompt and clear communication of the company commander's decision to his subordinates.

b. Reconnaissance of the enemy situation and the terrain.

c. Thorough knowledge of the terrain and the enemy disposition.

d. Issuance of orders.

e. Repulse of enemy security elements.

f. Disposition for cutting lanes through wire.

g. Maintenance of direction.

(II) Approach:

1. Procedure

a. Advance is ordered.

b. Flares are fired from time to time while the company is advancing.

c. Surprise enemy counterattack is made in the (j) area.

2. Training objectives

a. Approach disposition and approach march.

b. Action to be taken against enemy illumination and counterattack.

(III) Preparations for Assault:


1. Procedure

a. Two lanes are considered to be successfully cut through wire by 2100 hours.

2. Training objectives

a. Contact with an advance element.

b. Assault disposition.



Notes:

(1) The 3d Platoon (less two squads), which was dispatched for cutting lanes through the enemy wire, return to the company when the company approaches the lanes.

(2) One squad each from the 1st and 3d Platoons, in advance security, are prepared to lay smoke screens to cover the company in passing through the lanes.

c. Measures to be taken to support the troops in passing through lanes.

(IV) Assault:

1. Procedure

- a. The assault is ordered.
- b. Enemy machine gun fire opens from positions (b), (c), (d) and (f).
- c. When the assaulting unit captures position (c), the enemy machine gun at position (i) opens fire and counterattack is made from (g) area.

2. Training objectives

- a. Passing through lanes in wire.
- b. Assault.
- c. Action to be taken against the enemy attempting to obstruct the penetration.
- d. Maintenance of direction, and estimation of advanced distance.

(V) Holding a Captured Position:

1. Procedure

- a. When the position (d) is captured, fire is opened from the position (e) and counterattack is made from (h) area.
- b. The exercise is ended after the enemy counterattack from (h) area is repulsed and platoons are disposed in defensive positions.

2. Training objectives

- a. Occupation of a given attack objective.
- b. Holding a captured position.
- c. Action to be taken against enemy counterattacks.
- d. Contact with the battalion commander and other units.
- e. Reconnaissance and mopping up of the area through which the 3d Company is to pass in a leapfrog movement.

Early Dawn Attack Problem


1. Objects of Training

- a. Attack position.
- b. Assault preparations and assault.
- c. Cooperation between infantry and artillery immediately after daybreak.


2. Situation

a. The 2d Battalion, assigned the mission to attack the enemy which occupied a position near Komatsugahara several days earlier, is preparing for an early dawn attack on the following morning, the 3d. The enemy situation around 1600 hours of the 2d, and the outline of the battalion's attack plan is as shown in sketch.

b. The commander of the 6th Company is assigned the mission to attack X and the company is making the attack preparations.



COMPANY DAWN ATTACK TRAINING PLAN



3. Company Dawn Attack Training Plan

(I) Attack Preparations:

1. Procedure

- a. Attack preparation is ordered.
- b. Fire is received from enemy artillery and security units.
- c. Information is received from the battalion commander.
- d. The assault is ordered.
- e. A counterattack is made by a small enemy unit.

2. Training objectives

- a. Formation and disposition of the raiding unit to be employed against hostile security unit.
- b. Reconnaissance of contaminated areas, and measures to be taken.
- c. Employment of the attached infantry engineer squad.
- d. Occupation of attack position, including reconnaissance for selection of position, markings for maintenance of direction, selection of platoon release point, and maintenance of contact.
- e. Constant observation of the enemy situation.
- f. Occupation of the obstacle clearing support point, and support measures.

(II) Assault and Early Dawn Combat

1. Procedure

- a. Caught in enemy searchlight beam.
- b. Exposed to sudden enemy flanking fire.

2. Training objectives

- a. Selection of assault formation.
- b. Assault by surprise.
- c. Contact with battalion commander and heavy weapons unit.

(III) Early Dawn Combat within Position**1. Procedure**

- a. Heavy fire received from enemy machine gun position on the right.
- b. Counterattack by enemy.
- c. Artillery support delivered against Y.

2. Training objectives

- a. Change in assault formation as visibility increases.
- b. Preparation to use smoke candles to prolong early dawn light conditions.
- c. Measures taken against counterattack.
- d. Use of heavy weapons after daybreak.

LEGEND

~~~~~	Wire Entanglement
↑	Automatic Gun
↑	Light Machine Gun
↑	Heavy Machine Gun
☞	Searchlight
⊥	Regimental Gun
⊥	Battalion Gun
⊥	Antitank Gun

## Dusk Attack Training Problem

## 1. Objects of Training

- a. Attack disposition of the assault company.
- b. Approach and assault taking advantage of dusk.
- c. Holding the captured position.

## 2. Situation

a. For past few days the battalion has been attacking an enemy disposed in the area south of the Norm river. This evening the battalion, taking advantage of dusk, intends to advance rapidly to the left bank of the river. The disposition of the battalion at 1500 hours and the enemy situation are as shown in sketch.

b. The gist of the battalion order issued to the commander of the 2d Company at 1500 hours is as follows.

(1) The battalion will assault W, X and Y positions at dusk this evening and attack Z and penetrate to the left bank of the Norm River.

The first assault echelon companies, the 2d and 4th, will be employed to capture and hold W and X respectively, but the main attack emphasis will be placed on the left company.

The second assault echelon will be committed to attack Y and Z positions after leapfrogging the first assault echelon in the Twin Mound area.


(2) The 2d Company will have as its objectives W, and a machine gun position located near the Twin Mound.

Limit of advance: Rear limits of X position.


Time of attack: The attack is scheduled to be launched at 1700 hours, but the formal order will be issued separately.

Passing obstacles: Using lanes already made in wire, and clearing lanes by demolition.

DUSK ATTACK TRAINING PROGRAM



COMPANY DUSK ATTACK TRAINING PROBLEM



### 3. Company Dusk Attack Training Problem

#### (I) Attack Preparations

##### 1. Procedure

a. Issuance of the battalion attack order.

b. Situation

(1) Enemy air attack.

(2) Heavy enemy fire. The battalion has suffered 20 per cent casualties by this time.

##### 2. Training objectives

a. Issuance of the company order.

b. Concealment of intentions.

c. Measures to be taken against enemy aircraft.

d. Cooperation with heavy weapons.

#### (II) Approach

##### 1. Procedure

a. Change in the enemy disposition.

##### 2. Training objectives

a. Selection of pace and formation.

b. Maintenance of contact.

c. Advancing security elements to reconnoiter change in the enemy disposition.

#### (III) Assault

##### 1. Procedure

a. Obstruction by a small enemy unit.

b. Part of the enemy machine guns disposed in the rear are moved forward.

##### 2. Training objectives

a. Passing obstacles (demolition by infantry engineers unit).



b. Feint and surprise against the enemy.

c. Assault under enemy fire.

(IV) Holding a Captured Position

1. Procedure

a. Enemy counterattack from the right flank is made before assault company is reorganized.

b. Heavy firing by enemy machine guns accompanied by searchlight illumination.

2. Training objectives

a. Reorganization and reconnaissance.

b. Contact with the lower and higher echelons and adjacent units.

c. Disposition for holding the captured position.

d. Construction of defense works.

e. Employment of machine guns.

## Section J. Special Training

Maintenance of direction, (including instruction on the use of route and road markers, and the training of guide patrols), the firing of heavy weapons, methods of fighting in teams, the clearing of paths through obstacles, and attacks against pillboxes, were taught either as part of the general training for night attack or in close conjunction with it.

Clearing paths through obstacles requires careful planning combined with bold and quick action. Consequently, extra effort was exerted and training in this field was extensive. Methods of clearings differed according to the type of obstacles and also for varying general conditions at the time of clearing.

The smallest unit for clearing obstacles was usually called an obstacle clearing team (Hakai Gumi). This team was assigned to make one passageway through one obstacle. Organization and equipment of typical teams is shown in the following chart:

	Equipment for Clearing with Wire Cutter	Equipment for Clearing with Demolition Tube
Leader	Markers, contacting rope, and two smoke candles	Markers, contacting rope, and two smoke candles
Clearer (One or several men)	One wire cutter, one smoke candle, and a pair of leather gloves for each member	One wire cutter and one smoke candle for each member. One demolition tube per team
Reserve members (One or several men)	One wire cutter, one smoke candle, a pair of leather gloves for each member of the team, and a few markers	
Remarks:	Each team member will carry one or two hand grenades. When required, screen, sand bag, or shield will also be carried.	


In the training a number of obstacle clearing teams were organized into an obstacle clearing party (Hakai Han), and an additional number into an obstacle clearing unit (Hakai Tai). Each party or unit usually had a necessary number of reserve or support teams and were equipped with defense equipment such as movable barriers.

The commander of the unit prescribed the number of paths to be cleared, their location and direction, the extent of clearing, the method to be employed, and the time of execution. The clearing in preparation for the night attack was usually conducted in secrecy.


Even in preparation for a supported night attack, it was advantageous to effect the clearing in secrecy, although forced clearings were sometimes used. In an attack to seize an enemy position after a penetration had been made, a forced clearing was generally employed, for speed was then the major consideration.

The clearing unit, after careful preparation, approached the enemy wire entanglement by night and set up a clearing support point (Hakai Kyoten). Clearing teams were released at the clearing support point. Under certain circumstances clearing teams set up their own clearing support point.

All movement was accomplished with strict concealment of intentions with the last stage of the approach usually made entirely by crawling. An example of the team's approach is shown in the following diagram.




When one man is assigned to cut wire without an assistant, he first searches for an alarm wire and determines how it is connected, and after removing the alarm he begins cutting. Wire will be cut about 30 cm from posts and will not be done in one snipping. Wire will first be notched by the cutter, and then will be grasped by on both sides of the notch and the shorter portion bent quietly back and forth several times until the wire is broken. The loose ends of the broken wire will be thrust into the earth to prevent loose ends from making a noise by striking other wire. When the work is done by two men, the assistant will hold the wire at both sides of the cut as shown in the following sketch.




Wire is usually cut as indicated below.

a. Net-type wire



b. Double-apron type wire



For clearing a path in a short space of time only the lower wires of the net or double-apron type entanglements will be cut, a path being made for crawling under the wire. Wire three meters in width can be cleared in about three and a half minutes by one man, although much more time is generally allotted. Time required is shown on the following chart:

Time Required for Clearing in Secrecy		
		Technique
Approach from the unit occupying key point to the clearing support point. (Assuming that the distance between the two points is 250 meters.)	First 150 meters	Quiet advance with body bent low 20 minutes
	Next 50 meters	Crawling, Method 3 20 minutes
	Next 50 meters	Crawling, Method 4 50 minutes
Approach from the clearing support point to the wire	Next 60 meters	Crawling, Method 4 60 minutes
	No alarm wire	Cutting wire by one man 2 hours
To clear a path through a barbed wire entanglement about six meters in width		Cutting wire with one assistant 1 hour & 30 minutes
		Cutting wire by one man 3 hours
	Alarm wire	Cutting wire with one assistant 2 hours & 40 minutes

In a forced clearing using a wire cutter, cutting will be done openly in the kneeling or standing position, ignoring the enemy fire, giving primary consideration to speed. Direction of cutting will be the same as in clearing in secrecy in the case of net-type wire, but with double-apron type wire, a right-angled clearing will be preferable to an oblique one. The work will be made very much easier if an assistant wearing white gloves is employed to grasp the wire. A skilled man can clear a path through a six meter net-type wire in about one minute.

Clearing with a demolition tube may be necessary in the event of a forced clearing. The standard demolition tube is an iron tube filled with explosive, about seven centimeters in diameter and about two and a half meters in length. It is threaded at each end so that tubes may be extended to the width of the obstacle. When the standard tube is not available, a bamboo or metal pipe may be used as an expedient.

As circumstances may necessitate changing over from a secret clearing to a forced clearing in the middle of path clearing operations, the demolition tube must be included in the equipment of the obstacle clearing team. It is also necessary for the obstacle clearing team to maintain contact with the party or unit commander by signaling with contacting rope or other suitable device. In the case of a forced clearing, the obstacle clearing team usually operates under supporting fire and uses smoke to conceal its operations.



When the path is cleared, the obstacle clearing team reports the fact together with the width and height of the clearing to the party or unit commander, and will attach markers to indicate the cleared path.

In training, the technique of secret clearing was emphasized, as well as the keeping of cleared paths open and the maintaining of contact with troops waiting to begin the attack.

At the completion of training each company had four or five trained obstacle clearing parties.

#### Section K. Attacking Pillboxes

Methods of close quarter assault against pillboxes by the infantry and engineers included throwing an exploding armor piercing charge, demolition tube, or hand grenade into a pillbox through its firing-slits, demolishing the entrance or overhead cover with an explosive charge, or attacking the firing-slit with a flame thrower. Since it was often necessary to make the assault in the teeth of strong enemy resistance, it was considered best to make a surprise assault at night. In all methods of assault, taking advantage of the vulnerable dead space of the pillbox was strongly urged.

The number of men to be employed in assaulting a pillbox varies according to circumstances, but for maneuverability and surprise it is advisable to make it as small a group as possible. Although care must be exercised to provide for possible casualties lest the death

of one man make the accomplishment of the assault mission impossible.

Examples of the organization and equipment of pillbox assault parties are shown in Chart No. 6.

Thorough preparatory reconnaissance is a very essential factor in successful pillbox assault.

Reconnaissance is conducted to ascertain: (1) Strength, shape, and the internal construction of pillboxes. (2) Number, direction and aboveground height of firing slits. (3) Kind and number of weapons housed in pillboxes. (4) Position and construction of entrances. (5) Ventilation, water supply, illumination, and periscope installation. (6) Communication trenches. (7) Mutually supporting fires between pillboxes and other fire positions. (8) Terrain features, location of natural cover and pillbox dead spaces. (9) Type and size of artificial obstacles, existence of mines and electrically charged wire.

Means of reconnaissance included continuous observation, sending out reconnaissance and combat patrols, taking prisoners, and other means coordinated with the application of military knowledge.

When artificial obstacles surround enemy pillboxes, a path is secretly cleared through the obstacles, the assault party stealthily approaches the pillbox and then begins the assault. The order for the charge is usually given at a point about 10 meters from the pillbox.

When firing slits are protected against hand grenades by wire

Organization and Equipment of the Pillbox Assault Team

Team & No. of Members	Mission Assigned to Each Member		Equipment	Objective & Enemy Situation
Team A	Leader (NCO)	Control of the team	One luminous compass, one flashlight, one wire cutter, a contacting rope, two hand grenades, two self-projecting smoke candles, a few armor-piercing mines, and explosive charges.	A concrete pillbox which forms the key point of enemy defense
	No. 1	Clearing a path through wire	Two wire cutters, six hand grenades, one demolition tube, one flashlight, armor-piercing mines, explosive charges, and an instrument to detect wire entanglements charged with electricity.	
Seven men including a leader	No. 4	Mopping up inside the pillbox		
	No. 5	Assault against the firing slit and entrance	One wire cutter, eight hand grenades, one flashlight, one demolition tube, two armor-piercing mines, equipment to block a firing slit, smoke candles, and a ladder or plank	
	No. 6	Mopping up inside the pillbox		
	No. 2 No. 3	Support with machine gun	One wire cutter, two hand grenades, four self-projecting smoke candles, and light machine gun and ammunition	

(Cont'd) Organization and Equipment of the Pillbox Assault Team

Team & No. of Members	Mission Assigned to Each Member	Equipment	Objective & Enemy Situation
Team B	Leader (NCO)	Control of the team	One luminous compass, one armor-piercing mine, two hand grenades, one pistol, one flashlight, one shield, two explosive charges, one wire cutter, a contacting rope, two self-projecting smoke candles, one Type 89 binocular, and one rifle.
Five men including a leader	No. 1	Clearing path through wire	One wire cutter, one cutting pliers, one demolition tube, one pistol, two armor-piercing mines, six hand grenades, two smoke candles, one shovel, one flashlight, two explosive charges, one contacting rope, one shield, and one rifle.
	No. 2	Mopping up inside the pillbox	A concrete pillbox. (Wire is damaged in places by artillery fire.)
	No. 3	Assault against the firing slit & entrance	Four smoke candles, one pistol, two armor-piercing mines, one 5 kilogram charge, six hand grenades, one flashlight, one contacting rope, one small pick, one shield, and one ladder.
	No. 4	Mopping up inside the pillbox	Communication trench is open type.

(Cont'd) Organization and Equipment of the Pillbox Assault Team

Team & No. of Members	Mission Assigned to Each Member		Equipment	Objective & Enemy Situation
Team C	Leader (NCO or lance corporal)	Control, and assault	One small pick in addition to equipment carried by the leader of Team B.	A concrete or wooden pillbox. (Path is already opened through wire.)
Three soldiers including a leader	No. 1	Clearing a path through wire	Equipment to be carried is the same as that carried by No. 1 man of Team B.	
	No. 2	Assault against firing slit Mopping up inside the pillbox	Equipment to be carried is the same as that carried by No. 3 man of Team B.	
Team D	Leader (superior private)	Control, and assault	Equipment to be carried is the same as that carried by No. 1 man of Team B.	A wooden pillbox. (there is no wire.)
Two soldiers including a leader	No. 1	Assault against firing slit Mopping up inside the pillbox	Equipment to be carried is the same as that carried by No. 3 man of Team B.	

netting or canopies, it is necessary to destroy these protective nets and canopies with hand grenades or a demolition tube prior to attacking the firing slit.

When discovered by the enemy during the assault, soldiers must move to dead space at the side of the firing slit, taking advantage of intervals in enemy fire, terrain features, and natural cover before throwing in explosive charges. Smoke may be used to conceal movements.

Upon throwing in the explosive charge, the thrower must take shelter to avoid injury from the explosion. He should keep clear of the entrance or firing slits, and drop to a prone position, utilizing a natural cover or nearby trench, if available.

When an armor piercing charge is used, it is necessary to attach it to the object to be demolished. While a 400 gram charge would suffice to disable the enemy in the pillbox, for demolition purposes even a light wooden shelter would require a bundled charge of about five kilograms. Against a pillbox with unknown strength, an explosive charge of one or two kilograms is used first for the purpose of neutralizing the enemy within the pillbox. Under certain circumstances, explosive charge is attached to the end of a wooden pole to assist in handling or placing.

#### **Section L. Team Tactics**

The concept of fighting team formation was developed about 1936

when the new organization which equipped each infantry squad with a light machine gun was conceived and adopted. A team method, designed to seize enemy positions by infiltration, was developed by Lt. Gen. Ishihara, Kanji, commanding general of the 16th Division. As one of the principal features of this tactic an infantry squad was divided into a support team (two or three soldiers with a light machine gun), a sniper team (two or three good marksmen) and two assault teams (about three men to each team). Assault teams approached the enemy pillbox by crawling and attacked it from its side or rear, under the covering fire of the support and sniper teams. The basic consideration underlying this tactic was the belief that a Russian pillbox could be captured by an assault conducted by seven to nine men instead of requiring an entire infantry squad, previously considered necessary.

The system of close quarter combat in pairs was taught in all infantry regiments and was put into practice in many night engagements. Later, the method of fighting teams was adopted by the 16th Division and other units followed suit. Although attempts were made to have this tactic adopted by the Infantry Manual, it was not accepted until near the end of WWII. However, in the Night Attack Manual published in 1944, the 16th Division method was recommended as the most common attack formation of the infantry squad. The manual recommended also that the supporting and sniper teams be made into assault teams under certain circumstances.

## CHAPTER V

### Experience in Night Operations During World War II

When the Greater East Asia War started in December 1941, the Japanese Army successfully displayed in its initial operations the results of its night combat training.

In launching the War, special importance was attached to surprise attack and nearly all initial invasions commenced with night operations and landings. Among these were the landing operations in Malaya and at Lingayen Gulf, Lamon Bay and Davao in the Philippines. In accordance with the principle of tactical surprise, the attack on the British force on the Kowloon Peninsula started with a night attack, as did the operations against Hongkong, Singapore, Borneo, Java, Ambon, Guam, Wake and Rabaul. In Kowloon, Hongkong and Ambon, there were also night attacks against enemy pillboxes by infantry and engineer units.

All the initial night attacks were highly successful, except the first attack against Wake Island, which was carried out by a naval force, alone. While successes were attributed to the superior training and morale of the Japanese forces, the advantages gained by advance preparation and the achievement of tactical surprise cannot be discounted as they were vital factors in gaining and holding the initiative. In addition, the Japanese Air Force and Navy were generally superior to that of their enemies and not only



enabled the concentration and movement of troops to be concealed from the enemy but facilitated transportation and landing operations.

The initial combat successes did not long continue, as in less than a year from the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese Army suffered serious setbacks. Significant among the reverses were the night attacks carried out by the Kawaguchi Detachment and the 2d Division against the American beachhead on Guadalcanal during September and October 1942. (See Examples 9 and 10 of Supplement.)

Great prestige was at stake in these attacks which, carried out with the purpose of recapturing Guadalcanal Island, employed the traditional night attack tactics in which the Japanese Army was proudly confident. The failure of the attacks not only dealt a severe blow to the confidence of the Japanese Army in the efficacy of its night attack tactics, but marked the turning point in the overall situation of the war between Japan and America. The causes of failure, were attributed to the fact that the Americans possessed air superiority over Guadalcanal Island and its vicinity. America also possessed superior surface strength most of the time, although it was occasionally regained by the Japanese. The Kawaguchi Detachment and the 2d Division had to be transported at night to Guadalcanal by Navy destroyers and as it was impossible to supply sufficient quantities of materiel essential for ground action, the equipment of both units was totally inadequate and even their food supplies were dangerously low.

The Guadalcanal Operation occurred at an unexpected time and at an unexpected place and operational preparations were generally inadequate. The Army was unfamiliar with the local topographical conditions and no accurate, detailed maps were available.

The difficulties presented by the jungles and rugged terrain of Guadalcanal also contributed to the Japanese defeat. Both the Kawaguchi Detachment and the 2d Division carried out night attacks after having moved great distances through jungles and over mountains. The movements, although chosen to avoid the enemy air force, were physically exhausting and adversely affected the night attacks. In addition, neither unit had been adequately trained for jungle fighting and the units lacked the perfection of the initial Japanese army operations insofar as preparation, disposition, and enforcement of attack are concerned.

As the strategical initiative was in American hands, the Japanese were required to change their plans frequently. Unlike the American troops who had fought in the Philippines in the initial phase of the war, those on Guadalcanal Island were well trained and equipped and geared for counterattack, while the Japanese lacked the high morale which they possessed during their advances in the earlier phase of the war.

Intense ground and air fire were important contributions to the defense, but the trip-wire warning system which the Japanese encountered for the first time, in these attacks, was also most effective.

Japanese attacking units sustained heavier losses than had been anticipated and were prevented from making a silent approach for a surprise attack. The attacks were doomed to failure when the troops of the Kawaguchi Detachment and the 2d Division started their operation by losing most of their equipment due to American air raids, then experienced difficulties in the jungles during the tropical nights, and finally became victims of the American defensive fire.

In December 1942 when the situation on Guadalcanal was becoming more and more unfavorable, the Japanese forces began to adopt a new method of night fighting, later referred to as "surprise raiding tactics" (Teishin Kishu Sempo). Earlier, the groups using this tactic were called "raiding parties" (Teishin Tai), "raiding attack parties" (Teishin Kogeki Tai), "infiltration raiding parties" (Teishin Sennyu Kogeki Tai), "close-quarter attack parties" (Nikuhaku Kogeki Tai), "marauding parties" (Kirikomi Tai) or "suicide parties" (Kesshi Tai).

Night raiding tactics were simultaneously adopted by units under the command of the Eighteenth Army in the Buna sector and the units on Guadalcanal. In both areas, raiding was carried out to offset inferior air and artillery strength and, at first, the attacks were directed against enemy aircraft and artillery positions. Later, the enemy headquarters, billets and warehouses were added to the list of attack targets. The raiding parties, each consisting of a maximum of 20 men, approached through the jungle under cover of darkness, in

many instances spending several nights in the approach. As this type of action was considered to be very hazardous, they were generally regarded as suicide parties.

Among the new ideas of night operations developed was "stepped-up debarkation" (Tansetsu Yoriku), in which various methods were adopted to improve debarkation efficiency under cover of darkness.

A second formula was the so-called "rat transportation" (Nezumi Yuso) which was night transportation by high-speed destroyers. In order to minimize the time for debarkation from the destroyers, a method was employed whereby materiel packed in oil drums was released at sea and floated ashore.

A third method was night transportation by large landing barges. In connection with the debarkation system, bases to conceal boats during the day were established about 60 to 100 kilometers apart -- the distance that the barges could travel in one night. This was nicknamed "ant transportation" (Ari Yuso).

The general practice of night movement, as a countermeasure to thwart the enemy air force, was widespread during this period. Virtually all large troop movements were undertaken at night. Cooking and transport in the rear was also carried out under cover of darkness.


As a result of the failure of the night attacks on Guadalcanal, studies were hurriedly made to establish methods of coping with the superior enemy fire, securing and occupying a position after succeed-

ing in an attack and dealing with the enemy's trip-wire warning network. Part of the study made by the Army Infantry School in February 1943 concerning the first two of these problems is summarized from "A Study on Night Attack" which appeared in the June 1943 issue of the Monthly Report of the Infantry School Research Department:

a. There is no change in the basic principles of either attack by surprise or attack by force, but it is imperative that in both types the enemy fire power be neutralized. Therefore, even when attacking by surprise, prior preparations must be made to permit change to an attack which utilizes fire power to neutralize that of the enemy.

b. It is necessary for both battalions and companies to deploy in width when they attack. The drawbacks attending the adoption of such a formation must be eliminated by training. An example of the deployed attack formation of a company is shown in the following diagram:

# Formation of a Company in a Night Attack



## Legend:

- ↑  
⊥ Heavy machine gun
- | Grenade thrower
- ↑  
| Automatic gun (light antitank gun)

Remarks:

- (1) Squads advance in one or two columns with three paces between men.
- (2) Distance between squads varies between 10 and 30 meters, according to the degree of darkness.
- (3) The company commander keeps an element of the Command Section with him.
- (4) The demolition unit (Haigeki Butai) is composed of men who are particularly courageous and reliable.
- (5) Squads at the flank are responsible for security.
- (6) It is advisable to have the third platoon commander follow in the rear of the company to pick up stragglers.
- (7) This diagram gives only one example, formations may differ greatly according to the situation and the terrain.

c. In executing night attacks, utilizing the power of firearms, it must be recognized that illumination should be provided by the attacking unit to facilitate accurate firing.

d. In night attacks in which the element of surprise is paramount, it is advantageous to dispatch raiding parties into the enemy position for the prior neutralization and destruction of the enemy command post, positions of principal weapons, observation posts, etc.

e. Action to be taken when fired upon by the enemy while advancing should be based on the principles prescribed in the Infantry Manual, but consideration must be given to minimize losses. A reckless advance should be avoided.

f. The mass attack principle whereby a company assaults in one body with its commander in the lead should be adhered to, but, there may often be cases in which it will be more advantageous and will reduce losses, to have an element of a company seize the company's objective first and temporarily hold the position until the main body which follows closely can adequately secure the captured position.

g. Effective use of combat team tactics is to be recommended. Men to be assigned as members of a raiding party with such special duties as the destruction of enemy fire positions and the command

system should be trained, by organizing them into combat teams. In executing night attacks, combat teams are formed by temporarily combining courageous and cowardly soldiers. (Sic)

h. The attack of a battalion formed in two assault echelons can be carried out even against a position defended by American forces.

i. Measures to secure a captured position are extremely important. For this purpose, attention must be paid to the following points:

(1) In establishing the hour of attack sufficient time must be allotted for the construction of defenses within the occupied position so that the task may be completed before dawn.

(2) In deciding on the attack disposition consideration must be given to a formation which will enable units to move readily into defense positions after succeeding in the attack.

(3) On succeeding in the night attack a unit must immediately make preparations for daylight defense and construct positions. Attention must be given to defense, against heavy artillery and air bombardment and persistent counterattacks by enemy ground troops and tanks after daybreak. In establishing the defense disposition, flank support must be given to friendly troops and communication routes leading to the rear must be maintained.

(4) Defensive positions must be dispersed, and battalion and company commanders must personally direct the occupation of positions.

j. Preparations for a night attack on a position as strongly organized as an American beachhead require at least two days and a night.

k. The area of a strongly organized beachhead which an infantry battalion is capable of breaking through and securing is approximately 600 meters in frontage and 300 to 400 meters in depth.

In connection with the studies on the trip wire warning system of the American forces, the following items were extracted from the "Night Attack Manual" issued in September 1944, by the Inspectorate General of Military Training:



a. The Japanese Army has no information on the type of trip wire warning system employed by the Allied forces. However, the use of telephones by roving or stationary patrols for reporting to the rear was encountered on Guadalcanal Island. Information on the use of microphones indicates that one method calls for the strategic distribution of microphones alone, and the other uses microphones in connection with lookouts. From this, the Japanese Army concludes that the American forces will, in the future, adopt defense methods using radio, ultra short wave and infra-red rays, etc.

b. The method of destroying the trip wire warning system differs greatly according to the type of trip wire warning system in use. For example, the type using telephones as relays can be decommissioned by cutting the wires, but the type using radio must be destroyed or the signals jammed to render them ineffectual.

c. The destruction of the trip wire warning system must be executed prior to the demolition of ordinary obstacles. The demolition teams may be charged with the mission of searching and destroying trip wires prior to demolishing other obstacles.

d. Since the destruction of the trip wire warning system will eventually be discovered by the enemy it cannot be limited to a narrow front as in the demolition of obstacles. In order to conceal the exact location of attack, destruction extending over a wide front is necessary.

After the operations on Guadalcanal, defensive combat was fought more frequently than before and large-scale night attacks aimed at a decisive battle became rare. Although the night attack which was a traditional tactic of the Japanese Army was abandoned, there are many examples of night attacks executed as counterattacks, by units smaller than an infantry battalion, in each theater of operations. Some of these units achieved considerable success, particularly in the defense of Biak, from May to June 1944. There are also several examples of night attacks carried out by large units. Night counterattacks were executed by units of division size in

Saipan and Guam, but they all ended in failure due to the defensive fires of the American forces.

Combat Examples Nos. 11 and 12 illustrate night attacks executed by the units of the Eighteenth Army in eastern New Guinea during 1944. In No. 11 the Nakai Detachment achieved brilliant success against the Australian force in the sector south of Madang, while in No. 12, the main body of the Eighteenth Army barely succeeded in achieving success against an American force in a night river crossing operation on the Driniumor river. The success of the Nakai Detachment in its night attack was due mainly to the use of perfect surprise attack tactics, and the moderate success which the main body of the Eighteenth Army gained in the night attacks on the Driniumor river must be attributed to the fanatic offensive spirit of officers and men. At that stage of the war, the adoption of some new tactic or a fanatical display of offensive spirit was the only way to break the impasse; mere repetition of conventional night attacks invariably ended in failure.

After the operations of Guadalcanal Island the conception of night attacks underwent a change which had a bearing upon the original motive for adopting night attacks. Formerly, emphasis was placed on offsetting an inferiority in ground fire power by the advantages gained in a surprise attack under cover of darkness. After Guadalcanal, emphasis was shifted to executing attacks at night to offset the effects of enemy air power. While the effect of air

power had been considered in the training manuals and during the operations on Guadalcanal, it appeared that air power had not been given sufficient consideration, and in 1943, as the difference in air power between the Japanese and American forces became more marked, daylight attacks of ground troops became virtually impossible due to interference by the American air force.

Also in 1943, in the Burma area, the balance of air power began to turn against Japan, forcing the army to attach greater importance to night attacks by force as had been done in the Pacific area.

Against the Wingate airborne raiding force which landed in March 1944, near Mawlu in northern Burma, the Japanese forces carried out a series of night attacks with a unit composed of the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade, reinforced by troops absorbed from other units, but the attacks ended in failure. There is little doubt that the failures were attributable to the shortcomings of the Japanese force itself, since attack preparations were inadequate and units were composed of troops whose training was not up to par. The net of fire carefully and skilfully organized in the jungle by the Wingate force was a surprise to the attacking units, and as a result the brigade not only failed in its night attacks but also suffered heavy losses. From the failure the Japanese forces in the Burma area learned that the neutralization or destruction of enemy fire power is the prime requisite to successful night attacks on enemy positions defended with modern weapons and facilities.

In mid-May 1944, when the Imphal operation was under way, the necessity of neutralizing enemy fire power was further substantiated by the success of the night attack which was carried out by units of the Fifteenth Army in the vicinity of Torbung (south of Bishenpur). Japanese night attacks had failed repeatedly for the first few days, but finally succeeded on the night of May 19th when they resorted to the neutralizing of enemy fire by the use of artillery and tanks. Other night attacks were carried out by units of battalion strength, without fire support, but they were not successful.

At that time Allied forces had command of the air over the entire Imphal area and Japanese front line units were suffering from an acute shortage of weapons and ammunition as well as food, but in accordance with the desire of the Commander of the Fifteenth Army to continue offensive action, night attacks were attempted as a last resort. The attacks failed when the Japanese, seeking to engage in hand to hand combat, encountered the powerful defensive fire networks of the Allied forces.

Although the regular night attacks of the Japanese Army gained no satisfactory results either in the Pacific theater or the Burma area, the raiding combat tactics which were developed during the operations on Guadalcanal Island and in Buna were used throughout the entire army, during and after 1943, with many variations being added.

The Eighteenth Army, after suffering a serious setback in the

Buna operation, was the first major command to improvise and use raiding tactics, which they continued to utilize until the termination of the war. (See Combat Example No. 13)

The Kwantung Army, in Manchuria, had earlier planned to carry out raids on important targets in the Soviet territory surrounding Manchuria in the event of an outbreak of hostilities with the Soviet Union and had, since 1941, kept one mobile regiment under its command. In the summer of 1944 the 1st Mobile Brigade was organized with the mobile regiment as a nucleus. At the time of organization, the primary purpose of the brigade was to carry out attacks on targets in Soviet territory, but with the change in the operations policy of the Kwantung Army, in the Fall of 1944, the mission of the 1st Mobile Brigade was also changed. Under the new delaying action defense concept, the brigade would remain in the rear of Soviet forces invading Manchurian territory, throw the Soviet rear organization into confusion and facilitate the overall **delaying** action of the Kwantung Army. In 1945, one additional raiding battalion, with a mission similar to that of the brigade, was assigned to each of the divisions in Manchuria.

The central authorities of the Army acknowledged the advantage of raiding tactics and took measures to recommend their adoption. In 1944, they organized units which specialized in raiding tactics and disseminated information to all commands. A first step was the organization, in early 1944, of the 1st Raiding Unit Headquarters

and ten raiding companies which were dispatched to the Second Area Army (region north of Australia). Later, other similar units were dispatched to other southern areas, including Burma.

In July 1944, the Inspectorate General of Military Training issued a training manual titled: "Raiding Combat Manual" as a guide for the training and combat of units in general as well as specialized raiding units. Another manual titled "Night Combat Training" was published in May 1945.

The two training manuals acknowledge in principle the advantages of surprise attack in night combat and state that at least the initial action must be an attack by surprise even in instances where an attack in force is the eventual aim. Further, front line units must endeavor to carry out diversionary small scale surprise attacks even during a general attack in force.

However, both manuals stress the need for night attacks in force by admitting that night attacks by surprise had become more difficult to achieve due to the battlefield illumination, obstacles and trip wire warning systems increasingly employed by the American and British forces to forestall surprise attacks. One of the most important concepts underlying the two training manuals was that although a surprise attack was desirable, it was not permissible to depend entirely upon them. Training and planning were to be based on the principle of ensuring the success of night attacks by means of attacks in force and that the advantages of surprise attacks should be sought when the

situation permitted.

In relation to the concept of attaching primary importance to the attack by force in night attack, the two training manuals approved and encouraged use of day combat methods at night. For example, they emphasized that:

a. Infantry battalions and companies should attack in an open formation, practically the same as used in daytime attacks.

b. Firing of light machine guns and rifles by infantry, would be permitted under certain conditions.

c. As in day combat, the necessity of cooperation between infantry, tanks, artillery and engineers was stressed. The fire power of infantry and artillery should be used freely to prepare for and support attacks and assaults and in securing captured points.


The team combat method was adopted and close order assaults abolished in accordance with the following instructions in the manuals:

a. With the exception of special instances, the assault of an infantry company should be carried out by its elite platoon with the main body of the company following to secure the occupied area.

b. The infantry platoon or squad will not use its entire strength to carry out close order assault. Single enemy firing positions will be neutralized by the squad assault team. Other squads, grenade dischargers or the heavy machine guns assigned to the company may be used to neutralize the enemy force at points other than the penetration point.

c. An example of the procedure of the squad's assault on an ordinary pillbox is shown on the following sketch.

Procedure of the Squad's Assault  
on a Pillbox



**Note:** Enemy machine guns and mortars will be neutralized by heavy weapons and artillery.



A characteristic common to both manuals was the stress placed on the importance of raiding. The mission of a raiding unit was described as facilitating the attack of the main body by destroying or neutralizing enemy tanks, artillery, command posts, important pillboxes and searchlights. The manuals laid down the following principles governing raiding units:

a. The time of action and the objectives of raiding units will be planned by a high echelon commander so that their activities will be coordinated with the general attack.

b. The front line forces (battalions or less) will dispatch raiding units against objectives in their zone of action, a higher echelon commander will dispatch raiding units under his direct control against important objectives located deeper in enemy territory.

c. If the situation warrants, an entire infantry battalion may be used as a raiding unit.

d. First line force will dispatch a raiding unit prior to the commencement of an attack or immediately after the capture of the enemy first line.

e. Raiding units not able to approach objectives by stealth, may at times be forced to break through the enemy's first line position and then take up duties as a raiding unit.

The two manuals considered it possible to effect penetration in depth of an enemy position by attacking in two echelons. However, they expressed the opinion that only an assault made by a company with a limited objective can be reasonably certain of success in a night attack. They proposed the following plan for the organization of an attack designed for the progressive occupation in depth, of an enemy defense position.

a. The enemy first line company position will be captured in a

night attack by the first echelon attacking company. Attack will be started as early in the night as possible.

b. The defense positions of the enemy battalion and regimental reserve will be captured by the second echelon company. This attack will be started at daybreak the following day or early the following night.

c. The defense positions of the enemy division reserve will be captured by the second echelon battalion. The time for this attack will be determined in accordance with the prevailing situation.

Importance was also attached to active and passive antibombardment and antitank measures, action to be taken when coming within close range of the enemy position and the conduct of warfare within the enemy position. In this connection, the manuals stressed the following points:

a. Assault positions will be prepared by digging cover trenches in open formation a short distance from the enemy.

b. Following the capture of the attack objective there will be a prompt shift to daytime defense disposition in order to secure the position.

c. Preparation for antitank defense by rapidly moving up anti-tank weapons and materials.

The manuals also stressed the necessity of careful preparation for attack and explained the essential points.

The new concept of night attack revolutionized the old theories of the Japanese Army in many respects. After the issuance of the new manuals, training was conducted in accordance with their principles but, after the Fall of 1944, there were no opportunities to carry out large-scale night attacks against American or British forces and the war ended before the new concepts could be evaluated by actual use in combat.

Some military authorities expressed doubt as to the practicability of the new concept and questions were raised concerning the difficulties of control of troops in extended formations as well as the possibility of confusion which might arise as a result of the employment of complicated tactics and fire plans in a night time operation. The only answers to these questions were that Allied air power had made night combat a necessity and that the manuals gave the only practical solution to the problem.

The operations of the Kwantung Army against Soviet Russia opened on 9 August 1945 and ended in about a week or ten days. Throughout this period the Japanese forces were engaged principally in defense actions and withdrawals and, as the Soviet forces seldom carried out any night attacks, the Japanese had few opportunities to conduct night attacks (sic). Of course, withdrawals and occupation of positions were often carried out at night and night counterattacks were conducted several times by small units, but there were no night attacks by large units.

Because the period of the operation was limited and because the battle fronts of both sides shifted too rapidly, the Mobile Brigade, organized within the Kwantung Army, and the raiding battalions in each division, did not achieve the expected results. Night raiding was carried out against the rear of the Soviet mechanized units on the eastern front, but it is not known to what extent the advance of the Soviet forces was delayed by those actions.

4

# JAPANESE NIGHT COMBAT

CG Ft Leavenworth, Kan

JAN 9 1956

AD673114

ACCESSION NO. _____  
PO REGISTER _____

PART 2 OF 3 PARTS

## APPENDIX:

### EXCERPTS FROM JAPANESE TRAINING MANUALS

Combined Arms Research Library  
Special Collections and Archives  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST  
AND  
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY  
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION  
JAPANESE RESEARCH DIVISION

(1955) 3  
USAF/AF/USA/2

Special  
355.422  
U56j  
pt 2  
c 1

JAPANESE NIGHT COMBAT

Part 2 of 3 Parts

APPENDIX:

EXCERPTS FROM JAPANESE  
TRAINING MANUALS

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST  
and  
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY  
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION  
Japanese Research Division

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX I	Extracts of Items Relative to Night Combat from Part II of the Field Service Regulations for Operations, Established in September 1938
APPENDIX II	Extract of Items Relative to Night Combat from the Infantry Manual Established in February 1940
APPENDIX III	Extracts from "Raiding Combat Manual"
APPENDIX IV	Extracts from "Night Attack Manual" Published in September 1944
APPENDIX V	Field Service Regulations, Part IV Attack Against Special Defensive Zone

APPENDIX I

Extracts of Items Relative to Night Combat  
from Part II of the Field Service Regulations  
for Operations, Established in September 1938

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		<u>Page</u>
	BOOK II     Attack	
CHAPTER II	Meeting Engagement	191
CHAPTER III	Attack on Positions	193
CHAPTER IV	Night Attack	199
	BOOK III     Defense	
CHAPTER II	Defensive Action	207
	BOOK IV     Pursuit and Retreat	
CHAPTER I	Pursuit	209
CHAPTER II	Withdrawal	211



CHAPTER II

Meeting Engagement

103. In cases where night comes in the course of an attack, decision as to whether the attack should be continued or whether it should be resumed at dawn the next day under a new disposition depends upon the general situation, especially the prevailing battle situation. If the attack is not to be carried out immediately, it is important for each unit to take adequate measures for reconnaissance and security at nightfall and, if necessary, change to a column formation, thereby prepare for employment in a subsequent new mission and be alerted against enemy attempts during the night. In this case, it is important and usual for tanks to assemble in the rear, recover their fighting power and prepare for subsequent actions.

Under the circumstances mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the division commander must promptly inform subordinate commanders of his plans and direct them to make necessary preparations as quickly as possible. Also, the commanders of various units must take the initiative to report data necessary for the decisions of the division commander.

104. It sometimes is advantageous to maneuver at night and launch an attack against the enemy at dawn. In this case, it is necessary to make various preparations during the previous day, insofar as possible,

especially conduct thorough reconnaissance and observe the movements of the enemy's main body, and at night, assemble troops at a suitable time by secret maneuver, dispose them for attack, direct the various units to complete necessary preparations by dawn and then resolutely strike the enemy.

In order to carry out the attack mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it is necessary to maintain control over subordinate troops at all times and prevent the general plan from going awry by the enemy's harassing actions.

## CHAPTER III

### Attack on Positions

125. It is often advantageous to approach the enemy and reach the attack positions under cover of night and start the attack at dawn. In this case, it is necessary to effect reconnaissance and various preparations during the preceding day insofar as possible and at the same time, attempt to conceal our plans from the enemy; especially, it is important to continue reconnaissance of the enemy situation at all times in view of the possible change of enemy disposition during the night. Although it is advantageous to locate the attack position, which must be occupied at dawn, as near the enemy as possible, in consideration of the enemy situation, the terrain and the existence of contaminated areas, discretion must be exercised to prevent unexpected fighting.

In order to set up attack positions at the shortest possible distance from the enemy front, it is sometimes necessary to advance the units for more than two nights.

The time to leave the position held at nightfall depends upon the situation, but must be based on the plan to enable various units to establish contact, perform necessary construction and complete attack preparations by dawn, at the latest. It is advantageous to occupy key-points in the advancing area beforehand to facilitate the advance after dark.

Tanks must establish their starting position as near the front line as possible, maintain contact with necessary units and prepare for the attack to follow. In this case, they must refrain from approaching too close to the enemy lest our plans be exposed.

The artillery must, insofar as possible, make preparations during the day for combat action to be carried out after dawn and deploy or advance its position under cover of night so as to be able to cooperate effectively with the infantry after dawn.

The engineers will perform such duties as reconnoitering the terrain, especially the enemy's demolition work, remove obstacles and repair and mark the advancing routes.

It is advisable to decontaminate contaminated areas secretly at night.

126. When attacking at dawn, assaults are at times carried out by taking advantage of daybreak from the attack position established at the shortest possible distance from the enemy front. In this case, it is most important to keep our plans in strict secrecy, and, in launching the assault, take the enemy by surprise. Decisions as to the action of the infantry and the time and method of participation in combat by tanks and artillery must be based on this consideration.

In case of assault by taking advantage of daybreak, the infantry, tanks and artillery must cooperate closely in carrying out combat within the enemy position, especially the fighting immediately after daybreak. Therefore, the disposition and movements of each

unit must be established as long before as practical and possible.

The attack position must be located as near the enemy position as possible so that careful preparations may be made subsequently and the assault delivered swiftly and readily. It is most advantageous to start the advance for the assault directly from this position.

As for tanks, it is usually advantageous to utilize them so that they may effectively enter combat after the penetration of the hostile position by the first line infantry. Depending upon the situation, especially the conditions of enemy obstacles, it is sometimes advantageous to commit part or all of the tanks to cooperate in the assault of the infantry from the beginning.

The artillery will make various preparations so as to be able to cooperate as closely as possible with the infantry, particularly at dawn. When it makes preparations as adequately as those for night firing the artillery can commence firing at dawn and cooperate in the assault of the infantry to no small degree by direct support firing, interdiction firing and neutralization of enemy artillery. In this case, too, firing must not commence before the infantry charges into the enemy position in order to conceal our movement as long as possible.

128. When troops attempt to approach the enemy under cover of darkness in order to occupy the attack preparation position from which to launch an attack at daybreak, or gradually move the attack position

forward toward the strong enemy position, each unit must make preparations as adequately as possible in daylight and, if the situation permits, it must plunge forward. However, when the enemy enforces a strict lookout or our attempt must be concealed, small units are sometimes pushed forward in a surprise move to cover the advance of the main body. In this case, the infantry and artillery should, as occasion demands, make preparations to neutralize the enemy obstructing our approach.

When troops reach the scheduled position at night, they will immediately engage in the construction of positions. The artillery must make careful preparations for firing, and, if possible, adequately push forward its position under cover of darkness before the front line troops occupy the final attack position so that it may provide adequate support to the assault of the infantry.

143. The time to start from the attack preparation position to carry out an assault by taking advantage of pre-dawn darkness will depend upon the situation, especially, our plan, the manner of subsequent advance, the length of dawn and the distance between the attack preparation position and the enemy position, but it must be selected in the early period of dawn so that it may not be too late.

When the front line infantry rushes the enemy position and seizes his foremost defense line, the commanders at various levels must exploit the success insofar as possible by taking advantage of pre-dawn darkness, and, at the same time firmly control their troops

so that they can carry out combat after daybreak in a normal manner.

In case tanks are employed from the beginning to support the assault of infantry, they will start from the starting position so that they may pass over the infantry's first line before the infantry launches the assault, and usually such limited missions as the destruction of obstacles, or the neutralization of heavy weapons in the vicinity of the first line are assigned to them. When tanks are employed in combat in the enemy position, they will usually depart from the starting position after the front line infantry rushes the enemy position, they are then committed to combat as occasion demands or ordered to participate in combat after assembling behind the front line infantry.

## CHAPTER IV

### Night Attack

146. Night has such disadvantages as difficulty of coordinated action and direction and greater possibility of committing errors, whereas it has such advantages as concealment of plans, prevention of losses, freedom from various interferences wrought by enemy aircraft and tanks, and an opportunity to display combat strength even without ammunition. And highly trained troops which are accustomed to night movement can often overcome these disadvantages and achieve success, especially, they can lead an attack to success by destroying an enemy superior in number.

A large unit may continue the attack to complete a success gained during a daylight engagement or execute night attacks with an element to seize some key points in the enemy position needed to facilitate the attack to be launched the following day. A small unit will often attack the enemy by surprise under cover of darkness.

If the situation demands, night attacks may be executed by a large unit or sometimes local night attacks may be launched to deceive the enemy or to conceal the activities of friendly forces.

147. Night attacks are executed mainly by the infantry, but, depending upon the situation, the artillery and other arms may cooperate in the attack.

148. In troop disposition for night attacks, minute and complex details must be avoided and positive performance of action, must be



stressed. A thorough knowledge of the terrain of the area to be attacked and condition of enemy positions and adequacy of preparations on the part of troops are indispensable prerequisites to the success of an attack.

149. The hours for executing night attacks may vary depending upon the general situation, especially, according to the mission of our force, but they must be selected after thorough study of the enemy situation so as to enable the attacker to take advantage of enemy unpreparedness. An attack launched immediately after dark may often enable an attacker to take the initiative and preclude the enemy's night movement, and an attack commenced shortly before dawn may enable him to take advantage immediately of the effect of the attack and thereby exploit the success of the attack.

150. The targets of a night attack must be selected based on the attack mission and also the situation, especially the condition of enemy position, but its depth is usually limited in comparison to that of a daylight attack.

In designating attack targets, it is important to clearly indicate the line or point to be reached.

In an attack by a large unit, the clearly defined individual attack objectives must be pointed out to each unit. And the coordination of various front line units will usually be limited to the extent expected to be attainable from the viewpoint of the selection of objectives assigned to each unit and the decision of the hour of attack.

151. In night attacks, the commander will formulate a detailed plan, issue an order to commanders of various units by assembling them in daylight, if practicable, and issue orders for necessary preparations. In this order, attack objectives of each infantry unit, zone of advance or advance route, method of mutual liaison and identification and measures to be taken after the success of an attack must be indicated. In case the movement is launched from a distance or the terrain is such as to render movement difficult, an intermediate point and the hour of arrival thereat should be indicated to regulate the movement of various units.

In night attacks, strict precautions must be taken against gas and gas-contaminated areas must be avoided by detouring or neutralized by adequate disinfecting measures. Wire entanglements, heavy weapons and, especially, flank defense weapons must be destroyed or neutralized swiftly, and tanks may be used when there are no other adequate means and the employment of tanks does not hamper the concealment of plans. In this case, a small unit is assigned to the infantry and its mission must be limited.

In order to effect coordination of the artillery with the attack of the infantry, the division commander will clearly indicate the mission of the artillery, especially, matters necessary for infantry-artillery coordination and the objectives or areas to come under fire and the time to fire as occasion demands.

The commanders of various units, if the situation requires, must

conduct attacks by taking every possible measure even when he does not make thorough preparations in daylight.

In night attacks, it is often preferable to study the measures to be taken when the situation does not develop as scheduled and instruct the necessary commanders thereon in advance.

152. The infantry assigned to night attack will usually be divided into the first line unit and the reserve force. And in case the enemy position is to be occupied by attacking in depth, a second line attacking unit is often organized. Even in this case, a reserve force will be organized if necessary.

The point which the first line unit should penetrate at night differs in accordance with the purpose of the attack, but it is usually desirable to select a point where the enemy defense, especially obstacles, are weak or a point which is near the friendly force and can easily be attacked. As regards a salient in the enemy position, it is sometimes desirable to attack the rear thereof and penetrate into the position so as to cut off the route of retreat of the troops in that sector. Also, it is sometimes desirable to break through a gap in the enemy position and attack the enemy from the rear. In these cases, it is especially necessary to exercise extreme precaution to avoid clashes between friendly forces.

If obstacles must be destroyed beforehand, the time and method of such destruction will be decided according to the prevailing situation.

153. The infantry assigned to night attack must make careful preparations and engage the enemy swiftly in hand to hand combat to win a decisive battle.

When the infantry assigned to night attack has approached the enemy, a strength necessary for a decisive battle must be disposed on the front line and all units must enter into as close formation as possible. Although the reserve force will be disposed as near to the front line as possible, care must be taken not to throw it into the vortex of battle too soon.

Night assault must be launched from the shortest possible distance and the commanding officers at all levels will secure control of their subordinates and rush this objective of attack swiftly and fiercely. If the force has succeeded in the assault and advanced to the designated line or point, it will mop up the remaining enemy. At the same time, it will promptly restore order, enforce strict security and if necessary, carry out necessary construction and thereby prepare for the enemy's attack aimed at recapturing the lost position. Furthermore, it will establish liaison with adjacent units, maintain contact with the enemy and make preparations for subsequent actions.

154. If there are attacking units in two lines, the first line attacking unit will restore order promptly, enforce strict security measures against enemy counterattack as soon as it captures the designated line or point. The second line attacking unit will enter into close forma-

tion at an appropriate moment and follow the first line attacking unit. As soon as the first line attacking unit captures its objective, the second line attacking unit will readily move ahead of the first line attacking unit at the flank and advance toward the designated objective. In this case, utmost precaution should be exercised to avoid such errors apt to occur at night as fighting between friendly forces and confusion of troops.

155. When night attack must be carried out by utilizing effective fire power, the artillery normally neutralizes the enemy position which is the target of attack and cuts off the enemy front line force from his rear echelons, and, if necessary, neutralizes the enemy troops likely to hinder our attack. The infantry forces will cut off the enemy position from other positions by destroying or neutralizing the enemy's automatic weapons, illuminating equipment, etc. with their heavy weapons or by checking the enemy counterattack force. And in case of firing in order to secure the point where the attack has succeeded, the artillery will maintain close contact with the infantry, and fire against key points at a suitable time in order to check the enemy's counterattack. The use of firearms is apt to expose our plan, cause discrepancies and inflict damage on the friendly force. Therefore, the infantry and artillery commanders who are to cooperate will meet during daylight and make careful arrangements at the actual site as regards such necessary matters as the action of the infantry force, the artillery firing related to this

action, the relation between the artillery firing and the infantry firing of heavy weapons and the firing for securing the point where the attack has succeeded. Furthermore, all units will make adequate preparation during daylight and, in fighting, they will maintain close contact with each other to prevent any error.

156. Because an attempt to divert the enemy's attention through the action of a unit, artillery firing or illumination, etc, with the object of facilitating night attack will sometimes have the adverse effect of alerting the enemy and defeat our general plan, careful consideration and thorough preparation will be especially necessary for such attempt.

157. If a night attack has succeeded, the infantry commander will secure control over his force, advance the heavy weapons and various other attached units at suitable moments, ensure liaison with the units concerned and gradually shift to daytime formation to secure advantage in the battle from daybreak. The divisional commander must ensure the successful execution of the subsequent combat action by promptly estimating the general situation, assigning necessary units to the front line infantry and advancing the artillery and reserve force. In the meantime, commanders at all levels must promptly reconnoiter the enemy situation.

CHAPTER II

Defensive Action

208. At night, the units on the defensive must prevent an enemy approach by taking various means such as maintaining especially strict guard, carrying out thorough reconnaissance or illuminating the foreground and check the enemy from carrying out its attempt.

Depending upon the situation, particularly the terrain conditions, the occupation beforehand of important points on the foreground will sometimes prove to be advantageous to check the attack attempt of the enemy.

New dispositions of troops after being attacked at night will end in confusion in most cases. Therefore, commanding officers at all levels must increase the first line troops as required, fill up gaps in troop disposition, dispose the reserve unit near the front, station it at several points, if necessary, and take other measures to speedily reinforce the front.

Troops holding the positions must establish necessary facilities for night firing beforehand and the artillery must make careful arrangements with the infantry so that they can effect timely firing.

If it has become known by reconnaissance that the enemy has approached our positions and is engaging in fortification work or moving to prepare for such work, the first line units must obstruct

it by the sortie of small groups or by taking various other means and if the enemy is discovered destroying our obstacles, he must be repulsed.

209. In night defense, cooperation of adjacent units and support of rear units at proper moment cannot be expected. Therefore, each unit must hold its position with firm determination, the artillery must maintain close liaison with the infantry and fire when occasion demands and troops at the foremost line must pour heavy fire upon the enemy troops or hurl hand grenades against them as they approach our positions and annihilate them with bayoneted rifles at the moment the enemy ranks waver. In such instance, even a single small unit must endeavor to attack the flank and rear of the enemy.

If enemy troops have penetrated our position, the commander of that sector must immediately launch a counterattack and endeavor to recapture the position.

210. In night defense, fighting takes place usually in various localities. Therefore, commanding officers at all levels must secure their positions by taking various means such as estimating the situation calmly, directing the combat with firm will and, if necessary, reinforcing the first line with the reserve force at the appropriate time or using the reserve force in a counterattack.



CHAPTER I

Pursuit

218. The enemy which attempts to retreat usually takes advantage of the darkness of night. Therefore, our forces must carry out pursuit insofar as possible even at night.

At night the opportunity to pursue the enemy is apt to be lost. Therefore, commanding officers at all levels must always maintain close contact with the enemy, carry out night attacks with an element of their respective units depending upon the situation and detect the enemy plans by taking every conceivable means such as taking prisoners or using intelligence agents.

When the enemy retreat at night has been detected, commanding officers at all levels must immediately destroy the remaining hostile troops and carry out pursuit. In this instance, if even a single small unit succeeds in penetrating deep into the enemy position by dint of intrepid action, the enemy will be thrown into utter confusion and great results will be obtained.

It is particularly important for the division commander to dispose his troops speedily to carry out night pursuit and he must assign necessary units to the various lines of advance and use them in close pursuit of the enemy. If enemy resistance is encountered and an engagement results, it is very important not to commit large troops

in the engagement but attempt mobile pursuit insofar as possible.

In night pursuit, it is especially important for the commanding officers to endeavor to control their units and maintain liaison.

## CHAPTER II

### Withdrawal

223. The time to start withdrawal must be fixed depending upon the enemy situation and the situation of the friendly forces, our plans and the terrain conditions, etc, but withdrawal must be carried out under cover of darkness so long as the situation permits.

230. In carrying out withdrawal at night, all preparations must be made beforehand during the day insofar as possible in such manner as to avoid detection by the enemy; especially necessary preparations in the rear must be completed at the appropriate time to ensure smooth execution of withdrawal under cover of darkness.

In order to conceal preparations for and execution of withdrawal at night, it is usually necessary for each unit, if it is located near the enemy, to leave a small element of its strength at important points on the first line so that the enemy may not perceive the change in the existing situation and thereby cover the withdrawal of the main strength. Sometimes, it is desirable to carry out night attack on the enemy with an element of the unit to conceal our attempt or deceive the enemy.

It is advantageous to assemble the units, which withdrew from the first line, in the immediate rear of the battle front, promptly secure their control, move them gradually to the designated routes of withdrawal and organize them into march columns. It is highly

necessary to assign the withdrawal sectors with this consideration.

231. The time of withdrawal of the units which are left behind when withdrawing at night will be fixed usually by order of the division commander in consideration of the situation, especially the relative difficulty of withdrawal and the subsequent plans.

The remaining unit must check the pursuit by the enemy, throw the enemy into confusion by launching an intrepid counterattack if the situation requires it, and attempt to break away from the enemy by seizing that opportunity. In such instance, all members of the units from the commanding officer down to the men, must act especially in a self-composed and bold manner. In case the withdrawal is carried into the morning of the following day, a covering force will be established specially for the remaining units, if necessary. In this instance, it is desirable to use as mobile a unit as possible.

APPENDIX II

Extract of Items Relative to Night  
Combat from the Infantry Manual  
Established in February 1940

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Preface	217
General Principles	217
BOOK I    Individual Training	
CHAPTER II    Combat	219
CHAPTER III    Night Actions	221
BOOK II    Company Training	
CHAPTER III    Night Combat	223
BOOK III    Machine Gun and Automatic Gun Training	
CHAPTER IV    Night Combat	233
BOOK IV    Infantry Gun Training	
CHAPTER IV    Night Combat	235
BOOK V    Battalion Training	
CHAPTER II    Combat	237
CHAPTER III    Night Combat	241
BOOK VII    Regimental Training	
CHAPTER III    Night Combat	251

## Preface

11. Infantry is the nucleus of the army. As the pivotal force for cooperation among various arms, it always performs the principal mission in the field of battle and deals the final, decisive blow in combat.

The primary mission of the infantry is to carry out combat irrespective of terrain conditions and time elements and annihilate the enemy by shock action. Moreover, the infantry must carry out combat single-handedly even if no cooperation is forthcoming from other arms.

The infantry will handle weapons carefully at all times, economize on ammunition and materials and treat horses with due kindness.

## General Principles

6. The infantry must be skilled especially in night actions. Therefore, it will conduct training at night repeatedly as in the day to attain consummate skill in night actions. Total familiarity in the utilization of dawn and dusk is also indispensable.

CHAPTER II

Combat

68. Among the actions of troops, the assault is especially important. The men must have implicit faith in the superiority of friendly forces in hand to hand combat, charge the enemy with intrepidity at the risk of their lives and overwhelm and annihilate the hostile force. They must never fall behind their commanding officer or fellow soldiers in the assault.

The men will fix their bayonets freely when they have approached the enemy and the time to launch the assault has drawn near.



CHAPTER III  
Night Actions

71. The men must become accustomed to the darkness of night, especially in using their ears and eyes effectively and in acting with presence of mind and a daring spirit. For this purpose, it is essential to be thoroughly proficient in night actions, especially in the advance and assault in undulating or fortified areas and be capable of negotiating steep terrains.

72. The men must be trained to develop their capacity to detect the enemy swiftly, and estimate its strength, distance and activities at night. They must also be trained in distinguishing terrain features and natural objects as well as the change in their utility and actions while wearing gas masks.

At night, it is necessary to maintain direction and reach the scheduled point without fail. For this purpose, the men will be trained not only in developing their capacity to determine directions but also to accustom them to maintain direction with the aid of conspicuous marks of the terrain features or natural objects they memorized in the day.

73. It is necessary to train men thoroughly in the essentials of marching in stealth to conceal plans at night, measures for the prevention of noise caused by body-strapped equipage and the handling of weapons, actions to be taken in response to signals and actions

to be taken in illuminations. Develop in them the habit of avoiding unnecessary utterance and train them in quick and resolute advance and crawling advance under various conditions and through various terrains.

74. Night assault must be carried out resolutely without being restrained by terrain conditions and natural objects. Training in hurling hand grenades is also necessary. Do not raise a battle cry when carrying out a night assault.

75. The men must be capable of making at their discretion the preparation for night firing and rendering accurate fire. Even if no facilities are available, riflemen, light machine gunners and grenade discharger operators must be able to render effective fire against the enemy at the shortest range, the former two by holding the rifles or light machine guns parallel with the ground and in correct firing positions, the latter by holding the grenade dischargers in the proper position.

CHAPTER III

Night Combat

Section A. Attack

207. Night attack must be carried out after making especially thorough preparations, with all company personnel from the company commander down to the men believing firmly in certain victory. A well-trained company full of aggressive spirit and with strong unity is able to succeed in night attack by overcoming all difficulties.

208. Upon receipt of orders on night attack, the company commander will disclose his plan to the platoon leaders, reconnoiter the enemy situation and terrain conditions, have his subordinates memorize the terrain features and natural objects as thoroughly as possible, inform them in detail of the condition of enemy positions and if the situation permits, conduct preliminary exercises by using similar terrains and natural objects.

209. When attempting night attacks, the company commander will gather the platoon leaders during the day insofar as possible, issue precise orders at the actual site and instruct them to make various preparations. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph he will indicate necessary matters such as the situation, the company commander's plans, especially the targets of attack of the company, the procedure to carry out the combat, the disposition for advance and assault, the

methods to maintain direction and of destroying obstacles, security, liaison and the measures to be taken after enemy positions, are seized.

Heavy weapons are usually employed to secure captured positions, and for this purpose, they will be moved forward in the rear of the company. Automatic guns will sometimes be left behind depending upon the situation.

210. In night attack, strict control over security should be exercised in order to conceal the plans. Equipage and weapons will be strapped firmly to the body and other measures will be taken to avoid making sounds and verbal command will be avoided except in case of assault. Furthermore, all lights will be thoroughly concealed from the enemy and no loading will be permitted, troops will carry markings in order to facilitate identification. At the same time, all officers and men will be thoroughly informed of the advance route to be taken after charging into the enemy position.

211. In executing a night attack by destroying obstacles, the enemy situation, especially the conditions of obstacles and the measures for flank defense, will be reconnoitered. A careful plan based on our intentions will be established concerning the destruction points, the number of breaches and the time and method of destruction and adequate preparations will be made.

212. In consideration of the possible hindrance by the enemy, sufficient time should be allotted to the task of destroying obstacles.

However, premature destruction of obstacles may reveal our plan and give the enemy time for repairs.

The destruction of obstacle will be carried out in utmost secrecy, and only when the situation renders this impossible will it be carried out by aggressive action. In this case, it is necessary to advance an element to the vicinity of obstacles to cover the operation in case of an enemy sally or obstruct the enemy repair work on the destroyed section.

213. A company approaching the enemy at night will advance quietly in a formation to facilitate action, dispatch patrols in such directions as may be required for security, ensure liaison with the battalion commander and maintain the advancing route so as to be able to reach the object without fail even if contact is broken.

214. In order to approach the enemy at night, the company commander must advance at the head of his troops, command by means of signs and prevent deviation from the advancing route due to rifle shots or battle cries from various directions.

If the advancing company is caught in the illumination of effective fire of the enemy, it should halt temporarily or utilize shadows. In this case, the company must neither delay its advance nor deviate from the route of advance.

If small enemy units or enemy sentinels or dogs are encountered during the advance, the security patrol will raid them or the company commander will take such appropriate measures, as placing

some troops at his disposal and employing them as required, while the nucleus of the company will continue to approach the enemy aggressively.

215. Upon arrival at the position to prepare for assault, the company will promptly contact its advance elements and become thoroughly acquainted with the enemy situation and the terrain, especially the conditions of destruction of obstacles, establish its position for the assault and thoroughly orient the subordinates with regard to the disposition, and complete all preparations. In this case, it is advisable to take such measures as preparing for smoke screening to cover passage through the breaches or advancing an element to the front beforehand.

216. The attack formation of the company at night varies according to the situation, but it must be such as to ensure command and control and be suitable for effective close-quarter combat and moreover, to facilitate movement as much as possible. The minimizing of losses will also be taken into consideration.

217. In an assault, the company commander will lead the company and, normally commanding its entire strength, ensure control over his subordinates. Utilizing the terrain, the troops will approach the enemy as stealthily as possible, by crawling if necessary. They will then penetrate the enemy position without firing and advance to the assigned target in a swift move. In this case, if necessary, an element will be used to overcome enemy obstruction or capture necessary pill-

boxes. In case the troops come under heavy enemy fire from short range, whether they should charge immediately or further approach the enemy by taking advantage of the terrain or by crawling and then assault the enemy position, will depend upon the situation.

In capturing pillboxes, it is advantageous to take the enemy by surprise and penetrate the enemy position from its flank or rear, if possible. In this instance, it is sometimes advisable to divert the enemy's attention skilfully. When capturing the target assigned to the company, it is sometimes advantageous to use an element to capture it by taking advantage of the terrain and the enemy disposition and then use the main strength to secure it. In night attack, it is necessary to take precautions to prevent accidental fighting among friendly forces.

218. Immediately after capturing the assigned objective, the company commander will promptly restore order, reconnoiter the enemy situation and the terrain, secure liaison with the battalion commander and adjacent units, dispose his company, provide against enemy counterattack by preparing to fire within the shortest range, conducting necessary fortifications and exercising strict control over security, and prepare for subsequent actions.

#### Section B. Defense

219. As night, the company normally increases its strength along the first line and defends itself at each strong point. In this instance, it is essential for the company commander to take such steps as changing the disposition of posts or disposing an element of the reserve

force at necessary points as may be required and thereby ensure defense at night and forestall the enemy.

In effecting the change in disposition from day to night, it is necessary to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of the occasion.

220. The fire net at night will consist mainly of frontal fire and be set up so as to be effective at the shortest range. For this purpose, the company, as required, will change the daytime firing area, advance the position of heavy arms to the vicinity of the foremost line, and fire at important areas in the immediate front of the position especially by use of machine guns.

If there is danger of a tank attack at night, automatic guns will be disposed, and close-quarter combat squads (teams) will be disposed in the vicinity of the foremost line of the necessary area -- in front of the position -- if necessary.

As for firing at night, careful arrangements must be made among the friendly units to avoid danger to each other.

221. At night, the strongpoints must concentrate strength insofar as the display of fire power is not restrained and secure command and control, thereby enabling close-quarter combat to be carried out effectively.

At night, the reserve unit will be employed mainly for counter-attack. It normally moves its position forward to the vicinity of the first line and undertakes preparations so as to be employed readily.



222. Various obstacles, especially mobile obstacles, must be skillfully utilized, because even simple ones are effective at night. In this case, the obstacles must be set up so as to render it difficult for the enemy to hurl hand grenades.

223. Security at night will be chiefly maintained by the outguard and the sentries disposed in front of the positions by the strong point. The company commander normally maintains close liaison with units concerned by indicating the line of sentries to be dispatched from the strong point, the return route of the outguard and other necessary matters. When using obstacles, special measures will be taken to prevent them from being destroyed.

To guard against the approach of the enemy and increase the fire power, the frontal area will be illuminated with flares or other various illuminating devices. However, care must be taken not to expose our position and produce the adverse effect of facilitating enemy action.

It is desirable to use dogs effectively for security purposes at night.

224. Especially at night, liaison must be secured. In case of emergency, it is advantageous to dispatch an element to obstruct the enemy with grenade dischargers or hand grenades. In this case, however, care must be taken to prevent confusion in the combat of the company.

If the enemy troops are known to be approaching and fortifying

their position or destroying obstacles, they will be obstructed by the sally of an element or by firing and repairs will be carried out speedily.

In any case, necessary signs will be fixed so as to prevent friendly troops from opposing each other and the field of fire will be designated by every means possible with a view to facilitate their action.

226. If the enemy troops have reached a point at the shortest range, the guards of the strong point will act calmly and annihilate them by heavy firing, hurling hand grenades and engaging in hand to hand combat. In this case, premature sallies must be avoided.

If the enemy troops have penetrated the strong point, the guards will annihilate them in desperate hand to hand combat.

227. A strong point not attacked by the enemy will maintain strict watch, secure liaison with adjacent points, and if circumstances permit, cooperate in the combat of the adjacent points. However, care must be taken not to be confused by the local attack into hastily moving troops from the strong point and neglecting the primary task.

228. If the enemy troops have been thrown into confusion at the shortest range in front of the position or have penetrated the company position, the company commander will boldly carry out a counter-attack and annihilate them with the reserve unit. If the enemy is repulsed, the company commander will restore order, exercise strict

control over security and observe the enemy's subsequent action.

### Section C. Pursuit and Withdrawal

229. At night, the company commander will maintain close contact with the enemy, detect his retreat at the earliest moment and pursue him rapidly. In this case, the company commander will secure control over his subordinates, protect the front and sides, be constantly prepared for close quarter combat and carry out a determined thrust into the enemy.

230. In withdrawing at night from a point near the enemy, the plan will be kept in utmost secrecy. For this purpose, enemy reconnaissance will be obstructed and troop movement, before sunset, will be avoided.

In withdrawing, if the enemy is near, small units will normally be left at key points along the line formerly occupied by the battalion, thereby covering the withdrawal of the main body.

231. The remaining units will maintain strict security, prevent the enemy scouts' reconnaissance and penetration, and deceive the enemy by every possible means. It will attempt to repulse the attack of the enemy by heavy firing and, if necessary, launch a counterattack, thereby concealing the withdrawal plan and holding its position to the very end.

In this case, the self-sacrificing spirit of the commander and his subordinates will enable the friendly troops to withdraw from the fighting zone.

When the time for the covering units to withdraw is at hand, it is desirable for all units to try to withdraw simultaneously by maintaining contact with adjacent units.

CHAPTER IV

Night Combat

330. The machine gun section and the automatic gun section must be adept in night movements, especially in advancing over uneven ground, taking up of firing positions, firing preparations and firing actions, particularly, loading, laying and remedial action.

331. In approaching the enemy at night, the pack-horse, usually unloaded, will be attended by a person in charge and left behind so that it may be brought forward any time.

The movement of the ordinary infantry company in approaching the enemy at night will apply hereto.

332. In night attack, the machine gun section or the automatic gun section will ensure liaison with the commander of the unit to which it is attached, and when ordered to secure a captured position it will readily advance to the ordered point, contact the infantry along the first line, reconnoiter the frontal area, and promptly prepare to fire.

333. In firing at night, careful preparations will be made during daylight, and an agreement will be made, beforehand, with units concerned, as to firing targets (area), firing time, positions, the method to mark the location of friendly troops and the liaison system so that all dangers to friendly troops may be precluded.

Firing at the enemy's illuminating facilities at night will be best conducted from the shortest range.

334. In changing from the day disposition to that of night, arrangements will be made with related units, reconnaissance carried out quickly, firing preparations and the marking of routes to new positions completed before sundown. It is advisable to take advantage of dusk for the change of positions but care must be exercised to prevent enemy detection of the plans.

335. In night defense, the machine gun section or the automatic gun section, usually situated near the foremost front, will maintain close contact with friendly units, detect enemy approach by various means and carry out timely and effective firing. In this instance, it is advantageous to illuminate the enemy position.

336. At night, the company commander and the platoon commander must take special measures for their respective defense; the squad leader and the machine gunner or the gunner, usually located near the machine gun or the gun, must maintain strict watch against enemy surprise attacks. If enemy troops approach the machine gun or the gun, they must be annihilated in determined hand to hand combat.

CHAPTER IV

Night Combat

467. Infantry gunners require a thorough training in night actions, especially in advance over undulating ground, taking up of firing positions, firing preparations and firing actions, particularly loading and sighting.

468. In approaching the enemy at night, pack horses or draft horses, usually unloaded or unhooked, will be left behind, protected and attended by a person in charge and measures will be taken so that they may be brought forth when necessary.

The actions to be taken in approaching the enemy at night will be similar to those of the infantry company in general. In this instance, special care must be exercised to avoid vehicle sounds.

469. For night firing, careful preparations must be made during daylight, including arrangements with the related units, the location of the position, the time to fire, the firing target (area), etc., communications with these units and connecting files to be dispatched to eliminate all dangers to friendly troops. In this instance, it is advantageous to utilize illumination.

470. In night firing, indirect aiming with a light as the aligning point is usually adopted in the case of regimental or battalion guns, while direct aiming at a light or an illuminated target is adopted in

the case of antitank gun. Care must be taken to prevent enemy detection of the light.

471. At night, the company commander and the platoon commander must take special measures for their respective defense; the squad leader and the gunner, usually located near the gun, must maintain strict watch against enemy surprise attacks. If enemy troops approach the gun, they must be annihilated in determined hand-to-hand combat.



CHAPTER II

Combat

514. When attempting to approach the enemy in taking up the attack position under cover of night and launching attack from dawn, the battalion commander must, during daylight insofar as possible, conduct reconnaissance and make arrangements with the regimental gun section, the tank section and the artillery, conceal his intentions and indicate the plans relative to the attack as soon as possible and issue necessary orders regarding the outline of the attack disposition, the attack position, the advance to assume that position and the destruction of obstacles and thereby enable the various units to make adequate preparations from daylight.

515. To assume the attack position at night, the battalion will act in accordance with the principles adopted for night attack.

As soon as the battalion advances to the attack position, the battalion commander will maintain control over his subordinates, start fortification work, conduct close reconnaissance of enemy positions, take measures to cope with enemy sallies and endeavor to complete by daybreak necessary assault preparations such as the destruction of obstacles, supplementation of the arrangements with the regimental gun section, the tank section and the artillery, effecting combat readiness of equipment, and, if possible, the destruction of the enemy's flank defenses.

If a contaminated area exists in the vicinity of the attack position, it is advisable to make attack preparations after advancing beyond that area, if possible. Decontamination will be conducted by each unit under the over-all supervision of the battalion commander.

516. In conducting dawn attack, if the assault is to be carried out subsequent to artillery firing after daybreak, the battalion commander must avoid losses as much as possible by utilizing the fortifications and at the same time, change the assault disposition gradually as the enemy situation or the terrain becomes clear, also seize opportunities to destroy the enemy's heavy weapons, especially flank defenses, and thus complete preparations for the assault. In this case, the disposition of the units will be inspected by taking advantage of daybreak and be changed if necessary.

517. In executing an attack at daybreak, if the assault is to be carried out by establishing the attack position at the shortest possible range from the enemy and by taking advantage of the dawn, the assault disposition of a battalion will be similar to that in attack in daylight, but the units of company strength and below will appropriately maintain close formation to facilitate their movement and assault the enemy position swiftly without exchanging fire.

With the approach of sunrise, the unit which has penetrated the enemy position will gradually shift to daytime formation so that it can successfully carry out subsequent actions. In this instance,

smoke will sometimes be used to prolong the early daylight conditions.

The battalion commander will make careful attack preparations to ensure complete cooperation among infantry, tanks and artillery immediately after sunrise, and at the same time, he will make careful preparations, especially regarding liaison with artillery and the use of heavy weapons, in consideration of the possibility of the assault continuing until sunrise.

518. In case of an assault at dusk, approach the enemy and launch assault by tactfully utilizing the cover of the growing darkness. In this case, the attack disposition of the battalion will be at first in accordance with the procedure of a daytime attack, but with the growing of darkness, the troops will be gradually concentrated, and the units of company strength and below will charge the enemy position without exchanging fire. The action to be taken after the charge will be in accordance with the procedure of night attack.

The battalion commander will have the heavy weapons and cooperating artillery complete adequate preparations and support the attack as required. Moreover, it would be advantageous to be able to secure the cooperation of tanks in the initial assault.

## CHAPTER III

### Night Combat

#### Section A. Attack

538. In night attack, an out numbered force can defeat its foe by conspicuously displaying the characteristics of the infantry. A battalion is especially suitable for the execution of an independent night attack. Therefore, the battalion commander must positively under-take to plan and carry out night attacks.

539. If it has been decided to launch a night attack, the battalion commander will promptly indicate his plan to the company commanders, etc., so that they may have sufficient time for preparation and familiarize the commanders and their subordinates with the terrain of the attack area and the conditions of the enemy position. In this case, it is essential that they memorize the terrain features and natural objects especially in consideration of their appearance in the darkness of night.

Reconnaissance will be continued from day into night; especially, changes in the enemy situation will be reconnoitered by taking advantage of the dusk.

540. In order to carry out a night attack, a battalion will usually be divided into the first-line force and the reserve force. In case the enemy position is to be occupied in depth, a second-line attack force is often organized. In this case, too, a reserve force is organized as required.

In either case, a highly flexible disposition instead of a precise and complex one must be adopted for night attack.

541. In order to execute a night attack, the battalion commander will assemble company commanders, and others during the day, if possible, and issue precise orders at the actual site. His orders will include necessary matters such as the situation, his plans, especially the attack targets and combat procedure of the battalion, designation of the first-line company and its attack objective, assignment of heavy weapons, disposition for advance and assault, action of the reserve force, maintenance of direction, destruction of obstacles, reconnaissance, security, liaison, method of distinguishing the friendly forces from the enemy force, and if necessary, repulsion of security elements, disposition for mopping up within the position, action to be taken after capturing the position and decontamination. Sometimes, the company commanders concerned will be instructed beforehand in measures to be taken in case the attack does not progress according to schedule.

Regarding the attack objective of a company, the points to be captured by each company will be indicated.

If required by the situation, attack must be carried out regardless of the fact that complete preparations may not have been made during the day.

542. Machine guns will be used mainly to secure a captured position. For this purpose, they will usually cooperate with the reserve force.

Infantry guns will usually be used for combat after sunrise and sometimes for such purposes as securing a captured position. For these purposes, they will cooperate with the reserve force or will be temporarily left behind and moved forward again at a suitable time.

If necessary, part of the machine guns and infantry guns will be used to fire upon illuminating equipment, etc.

Even when an attack is carried out by taking advantage of the power of artillery fire, from the beginning of the attack, firing of rifles and light machine guns is prohibited.

543. The battalion commander normally captures the sector of advance or the key points in front of the enemy position with small units beforehand and cover movement or facilitate the preparation for assault. In this instance, it is necessary to conceal plans and maintain close contact so as to avoid mistakes.

544. In night attacks, the battalion commander will ordinarily assemble the main body and approach the enemy and then order the companies to advance in columns and make preparation for the assault.

Depending upon the situation, it is sometimes advantageous to have the front line companies separately approach the enemy and prepare for the assault, in which case the battalion commander exercises necessary control over their action.

545. When approaching the enemy at night, the battalion commander advances at the head of the battalion and gives over-all direction regarding the movement of the battalion by keeping a unit directly

under his control.

The formation of a battalion must be decided in consideration of subsequent employment and must be as simple as possible to facilitate advance and ensure control.

546. For the maintenance of direction at night, it is preferable to fix the direction by natural objects, and indicate in either front or rear a base point which shows the direction of advance, or indicate the routes of advance by marking materials or markers. It may be advisable to have selected patrols lead the unit. In either case, the compass and route marker are used together. The maintenance of direction in the enemy position requires careful preparation. In this case, the use of tracer bullets is advantageous.

547. In night attacks, it is of particular importance for a commander to indicate his position from time to time and for officers and men to be in constant readiness to come under the control of their respective commander. For liaison at night, a particularly sure method must be used and for the concealment of intention, excessive use of communications should be avoided and the headquarters and each company should indicate their respective routes of advance and connect them appropriately with each other.

548. Whether the demolition of the enemy's obstacles at night should be executed under the unified direction of the battalion commander or on the initiative of each front line company will depend upon the situation. When each front line company destroys obstacles on its

own initiative, the battalion commander will exercise general control over the time to dispatch demolition squads, their protection, point to be demolished, method of demolition and hours of completion, etc.

549. Upon completion of preparation for an assault, the battalion commander should order the front line companies to launch the assault, and resolutely direct the fighting, if necessary, repulsing enemy counterattacks with the reserve.

If the front line company seizes the scheduled point, the battalion commander will promptly restore order, secure liaison with various units, and, if necessary, commit heavy weapons to the firing position, take measures for search and security, guard strictly against the enemy's attack for recovering positions previously lost, mop up the remaining enemy and prepare for subsequent actions.

550. The strength of the two attack echelons to be employed in an attack carried out in two waves will be decided in consideration of the depth and condition of the enemy positions to be captured.

The battalion commander will order the first attack wave to capture the first line position necessary to break through the enemy position. The frontage to be seized will be decided in consideration of the terrain, especially, the field of fire of the enemy position.

The battalion commander, upon observing the success of the first attack wave, will command the second attack wave and the reserve. Placing demolitions squads at the head of the second wave,



he will seize key points within the enemy position by passing through the first attack wave, and will order the second attack wave to charge at the proper time and seize the desired points.

The time for the second attack wave to pass through the first attack wave should be as soon as possible after the initial assault so as not to give the enemy time to recover; but care must be taken not to plunge the first attack wave units into confusion.

551. Liaison with the second attack wave which passes through the first attack wave must be secured so as to avoid mistakes and confusion. Even when the enemy counterattacks, firing is not permitted except when it can be recognized that firing does not endanger the units which have broken through.

552. The second attack wave normally determines its attack disposition prior to an attack and advances in a formation appropriate for an attack. It should follow the first attack wave, reducing the distance and interval between units in order to avoid confusion that is apt to arise when passing through the first attack wave, and assume the required formation immediately after passage is accomplished.

553. When the second attack wave takes the point ordered for seizure, the battalion commander will secure the area it has been ordered to secure, and prepares for subsequent actions by calling up the first attack wave, if necessary.

554. When tanks are attached for night attacks, they will be employed mainly for the destruction of wire entanglements, previously

located heavy weapons, and flank defense weapons on the enemy front line.

The battalion commander will ordinarily attach tanks to companies and coordinate the time of their entry into action. The infantry will furnish as much support as possible to tanks by opening and marking the routes of advance and giving protection to them.

555. If necessary, commanders will be designated for heavy weapons left behind when carrying out night attack and measures taken for their respective defense. At the same time, all conceivable measures such as liaison and the marking of the line of advance for follow-up at the suitable time will be taken.

#### Section B. Defense

556. In night defense, ordinarily the first line companies will firmly defend the areas occupied during the day and at the same time, foil the enemy's attack plans by taking various positive measures.

557. For the purpose of night defense, the battalion commander will newly dispose, as required, an element of his strength in the area where the gap between companies is great or at a point of special geographical importance. It may also be used for reinforcement of the company in an important area, and advanced to the vicinity of the first line prepared to counterattack.

558. At night, the battalion commander must detect the enemy attempt and take precautions against enemy approach. For this purpose, he will take various measures such as conducting careful reconnaissance,

assigning additional security duties to the first line companies, effecting close coordination among the security units, obstructing the enemy movement through occupation of important points in the forward area by small units or obstructing the enemy movement by the sortie of small units.

559. At night, the battalion commander normally returns the company machine guns placed under his direct command to the company, advances and disposes necessary heavy weapons near the front line and prepares them for firing upon important sectors immediately in front of the positions.

560. At night, the battalion commander will effect close liaison especially with the front line and prepares to use the reserve force at a suitable time. If enemy troops are thrown into confusion in the area immediately in front of the positions or if they penetrate the battalion positions, he will immediately carry out a resolute counterattack with the reserve force and destroy them. In this instance, it is advantageous to use even a single small unit to attack the flank or rear of the enemy. However, hasty sorties abandoning the positions must be avoided.

561. The battalion commander will issue orders at a suitable time regarding the change from day to night disposition so that sufficient time may be available to prepare for such change. This also applies when reverting to the day disposition.

Section C. Pursuit and Retrograde Movements

562. Upon detection of the enemy retreat at night, the battalion commander will immediately carry out close pursuit of the enemy. In this instance, it is necessary to send forward even a single small unit deep into the enemy position by bold actions, also indicate objectives at appropriate time and secure control over the subordinates.

The enemy situation and the pursuit measures will be promptly reported to the higher commander and the adjacent units notified.

563. When withdrawing at night, the attempt will be concealed by taking the greatest possible precautions. For this purpose, it is necessary to obstruct enemy reconnaissance and avoid troop movement before sunset insofar as possible. It is advantageous to deceive the enemy by taking positive measures such as intensifying patrol activity and sometimes attacking the enemy with a small unit.

When withdrawing, it is essential to make thorough preparations such as making preparations in the rear area beforehand, reconnoitering the route of withdrawal, etc. and setting up necessary markers.

564. In case some units are left behind in a night withdrawal, definite missions will be assigned to them, necessary matters relative to their subsequent actions will be indicated to them and insofar as possible, a single officer will be designated to command these units to ensure close coordination among them. In night withdrawal, even simple obstacles set in the route of the enemy advance will serve to retard pursuit.

CHAPTER III

Night Combat

667. In night attack, usually the key-points in the enemy position will be chosen as the objectives of attack in accordance with the purpose of the attack and the situation, especially the condition of the enemy position, and in consideration of tactical requirements.

In night attack, the regimental commander will assign attack targets to each battalion.

When carrying out night attack by disposing battalions in rows, the regimental commander will indicate the time of assault by each battalion and, if necessary, matters required for the regulation of movements.

When the attacking force is disposed in two lines by paralleling the battalions to capture the enemy position in depth, the regimental commander will show in his orders where and when the second line battalion should over-take the first line battalion.

668. In night attack, regimental guns will usually be left behind to fire at the enemy's illuminating equipment, etc. as required.

APPENDIX III

Extracts from "Raiding Combat Manual"

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	257
General Principles	259
CHAPTER I      Command and Employment of Raiding Units	263
CHAPTER II     Preparation for Surprise Raids	269
CHAPTER III    Infiltration and Concealed Movement	275
CHAPTER IV     Preparations for Attack	281
CHAPTER V      Attacks Against Various Targets	287

### APPENDED CHARTS

No 1	Field Rations to be Carried by Each Man	295
No 2	Organization and Equipment of a Raiding Unit Consisting of Five Infantrymen (or Engineers)	296-297
No 3	Equipment to be Carried by Raiding Unit	298-299
No 4	Organization, Equipment and Disposition of a Raiding Unit in the Approach (Size: One-half Platoon)	300-301
No 5	Organization and Equipment of a Raiding Unit in the Attack (Size: One-half Platoon)	302
No 6	Example of the Execution of an Attack by a Raiding Unit (Size: One Infantry Platoon)	303-304
No 7	Attack Procedures Against Various Targets	305-314

## INTRODUCTION

1. The term "raiding" as used in this book refers primarily to small units which infiltrate enemy positions to accomplish any or all of the following missions:

- a. The destruction of enemy personnel and war materiel.
- b. The collection of information (Either capture of prisoners or documents).
- c. General harassment of rear areas.

2. As a general rule, raiding units are composed of rifle units.

3. Strength of raiding units will range from a few men to a full infantry company, and the period of activity will range from several days to two weeks.



## General Principles

1. There is no fixed method for executing a raiding operation inasmuch as each differs according to the nature of the operation, the enemy situation, the terrain, and the trend of the local inhabitants' sentiment. It is of particular importance that initiative and originality be exercised, and that the procedures contained in this manual be applied when an applicable situation exists.

2. A surprise raid is primarily a raid upon a superior enemy force carried out for the purpose of assaulting enemy troops and supply points, utilizing elusive movement and ingenious means to pave the way for victory of other friendly forces. Therefore, the commanding officer of a raiding unit, as well as the rest of the raiding personnel, must be possessed of a strong sense of devotion and must maintain solid unity and develop fighting ability to such a degree that each man can kill 1,000 enemy troops. They must be capable of exercising originality in their tactics in order to confuse the enemy, and maintain an unyielding spirit that will inspire each man to fight to the last.

3. In training the raiding unit particular attention must be paid to the following matters:

a. Each man will familiarize himself with:

(1) Combat tactics for night assault especially for a night assault to be launched by a small team.

(2) Basic rules for handling explosives and for demolishing various targets.

(3) Sniping, hand grenade throwing, and close combat tactics.

(4) Speedy deployment and assembly, and execution of command, liaison, and movement by means of signals (such as gestures, flares, and whistles).

(5) Patrol procedures, particularly the method of quickly discovering enemy troops, obstacles, firearms, and tanks by intuition or by interpretation of various phenomena.

(6) Basic knowledge of trickery and deceptive tactics.

(7) Methods of handling and utilizing enemy equipment and materials.

b. Each man will familiarize himself with the following matters necessary for executing infiltration and concealed movement:

(1) Methods of determining direction, measuring distance, and locating source of sounds.

(2) Concealed movement and ambush.

(3) Ways in which to pass through natural obstacles, especially jungles, to cross rivers, and to ascend or descend a cliffs and trees.

(4) Immediate recognition and interpretation of various phenomena.

(5) Methods of swift advance and retreat, concealment of trails, deceptive movement, and secret communication.

c. Attention must be paid also to the following:

(1) Customs, manners and language of local inhabitants and method of appeasement.

(2) Clever disguise and camouflage.

(3) Requisition of local clothing and food supplies.

(4) Cultivation of the ability to observe and memorize the enemy situation and terrain features.

(5) Sanitation and first aid.

5. Solid unity of the raiding party behind its leader is a vital requisite. Accordingly, it is advisable that a raiding unit be organized from personnel selected from a regular army unit, and that they be given special training. In case a raiding unit is organized from troops selected from among various army units or from temporarily assigned troops, sufficient time must be given so that friendly relations and mutual understanding will be established among the personnel. Special consideration must be paid to the selection of the leader of the unit. However, in view of the fact that the necessity for surprise raids has increased recently, and since there are limits to the degree of success attainable, the number of the raiding units will have to be increased. In view of the lack of personnel who have received specialized training in raiding, it is important that necessary preparations be made to employ infantrymen, engineers, or any other troops on raiding missions.

## CHAPTER I

### Command and Employment of Raiding Units

1. The principal duties to be charged to a raiding unit are:
  - a. Infliction of casualties upon the hostile troops, especially officers.
  - b. Destruction of hostile command channels, firearms, tanks, airfield installations, aircraft and other installations.
  - c. Reconnaissance of the enemy situation (including capture of prisoners and classified documents).
  - d. Interruption of hostile supply. (Blasting of ammunition, burning of provisions, fuel, supplies, and attack upon transportation facilities.)
  - e. Destruction of hostile vessels.
2. Judicious selection of the leader and other personnel of the raiding unit and appropriate employment of the raiding unit by the higher commander are vital requisites for the success of a surprise raid. Therefore, the higher commander must pay careful attention to the duties assigned to the raiding unit; the point and time of infiltration; its route, organization, equipment, clothing, food, and medical supplies; dispatching the unit with firm confidence in its success. At the same time, he must apply every available means to facilitate the accomplishment of the mission of the raiding unit.
3. Organization of a raiding unit will differ according to the mission, the situation of the enemy and the terrain; the condition

of forests, weather, and period of operations. However, it is generally advantageous to employ a small and efficient force, although if the situation warrants a large unit may sometimes be employed.

Note: The following are examples of the situation requiring larger units:

a) In case the raiding unit must make a long detour to reach the rear of the enemy position and attack in cooperation with the main force.

b) In case the raiding unit must repulse a resisting enemy element before launching a raid.

c) In case the raiding unit must reach the rear of the enemy through a breach effected in the enemy line, and intercept his retreat during the attack by the main force.

If, in consideration of the objective and the expected enemy situation, there is a need for specialized personnel, an effort must be made to assign such personnel to the raiding unit to insure the success of its mission.

The raiding unit must be equipped in such a way as to facilitate its operation. It will carry all necessary equipment, supplies, ammunition and food. The raiding unit will, if possible, carry radio equipment because it will be advantageous in conducting liaison with the higher commander or with cooperating units.

Examples of organization, equipment and disposition, of a raiding unit are shown in charts following Chapter V.

4. In organizing a raiding unit (or team), care must be exercised in the selection of qualified men who have special technical knowledge or skill. (For example, those who excel in demolition,

climbing, or sound-locating.)

5. In giving his order to the raiding unit, the higher commander must clarify the prevailing general situation, and particularly his operational intentions, the mission of the unit, and methods of cooperation with related units. Also, if possible, he should show in detail the course of action to be pursued by the raiding unit.

In assigning a mission to the raiding unit, it is a vital requisite to clearly indicate such matters as the organization and equipment of the unit, date, time, and place for initiating the action. The procedure of infiltration, the designation of units which will be in charge of diversion and feint operations, support of infiltration and covering movement, and the procedures for executing these operations will also be given. In addition, the raiding party will receive instruction regarding the route of infiltration, the operating zone, the procedure of attack including sectors and targets; the order in attacking the targets, the time of attack, the means and methods of attack in case there is no suitable target, and the course to be followed in case the assault ends in failure; liaison (including air-ground liaison), movement of the unit after its mission is accomplished, estimated period of operations, supply, and the methods of identification of all parties.

The higher commander will scrupulously examine the operations plan mapped out by the raiding unit and give necessary instructions.

6. In designating the attack objective for the raiding unit, the higher commander will generally designate the sector to be attacked, and will have the unit search for targets in that sector and attack them. In designating the attack sector, information on the estimated location of targets is of prime importance.

In case the designation of targets is made for a small raiding unit it is advisable to assign a limited target. In this case, it would be advantageous to pinpoint the target by using prominent terrain features or natural objects as a guide.

7. Should our forces be located close to the enemy positions in a stalemate combat situation and want to employ a number of raiding units to destroy the combat strength of the enemy, the higher commander generally will map out a plan for the employment of the raiding units. In this case, he will employ a raiding unit directly under his control and assign attack sectors to his subordinate unit commanders.

In assigning the attack sectors, it is advisable to assign the sector lying deepest in the rear of the enemy to the raiding unit of the higher command and those lying near the front line of the enemy to the raiding units to be dispatched by subordinate commanding officers. In this case, the higher commander will normally indicate to the subordinate commanding officers such matters as the time for employment, number of the raiding units to be employed and their strength.

8. In order to facilitate the infiltration of the raiding unit, the higher commander will occasionally find it necessary to launch feint operations with other units so as to divert the attention of the enemy to other areas and enable the raiding unit to infiltrate or to break through part of the enemy line during the confusion. In such a case, the higher echelon commander must pay scrupulous attention to the coordination of the time and method of operations of both units so that the objective will be achieved.

9. The vital requisites for achieving success in raiding operations are thorough preparations, concealment of plan and movement, elusive movement and swift attack and retreat. The secret of success of command lies in the commander's initiative and bold leadership.

10. The raiding unit must always be prepared to make efficient use of enemy equipment, ammunition, provisions and supplies.



## CHAPTER II

### Preparations for Surprise Raids

1. The success of a surprise raid is solely dependent upon effective preparations. Therefore, when planning the employment of a raiding unit, it is essential for the higher commander to disclose his intentions to the leader of the raiding unit as early as possible so that there will be sufficient time for making thorough preparations.

2. Preparations to be made by a raiding unit for launching a surprise raid generally include the following matters:

a. Collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence information.

b. Liaison and agreement with related units.

c. Drawing-up of the raiding plan.

d. Preparations and training necessary for the assigned mission.

e. Maintenance of equipment, supplies, provisions and other equipment.

3. Intelligence information normally needed for launching a surprise raid is summarized below:

a. Over-all situation of the enemy, terrain, condition, attitude of the native populace, traffic, communications, weather, local supplies, water source, sanitary matters, etc.

b. Suitability of the terrain features for concealment of plans and preparations, concealment of movement of the raiding unit from the point of departure to the preparatory point for infiltration, independently or under support of friendly forces, and suitability for advance from the preparatory position to the point of infiltration.

c. Location of infiltration point. Knowledge of locations where security is neglected by the enemy, gaps, vulnerable points and undefended wings of the enemy, as well as determining the location of terrain features which will either hinder or support the infiltration.

d. Routes suitable for withdrawal will be governed by the provisions of paragraph "c" above, and whether the route can be covered by friendly forces.

e. Condition of the adjacent areas along the route of movement of the raiding unit will be studied to determine whether it is easy or difficult to conceal operations from the enemy and reach the attack objective without fail. All efforts will be made to gain information on the enemy situation, especially the state of his security, terrain, the condition of forests, rivers and swampy areas, traffic conditions, paths used by natives, conditions of communication, weather, and the living quarters of inhabitants, places suitable for halt (or ambush), locally available supplies, and sanitary conditions.

f. Place suitable for making preparations for attack will be chosen in consideration of the detailed enemy situation, especially the location, type, characteristics and number of the attack objectives, and state of security, terrain features (especially well-known natural objects), traffic, communication, weather, the living quarters of inhabitants, supplies and sanitary conditions in the neighborhood of the attack objective, and if necessary, base (or hiding place) and convenience to rendezvous point after the raid.

4. In accordance with the mission, the commander of the raiding unit will decide on ways and means of accomplishing the mission after studying the existing situation, and will work out a raiding plan.

The raiding plan will be decided after thorough consideration is given to all probabilities expected to arise in both the preparatory and operating phases. Since there may be occasions when actions cannot be carried out as scheduled, alternate plans must be prearranged in regard to the points, routes, targets, and the means of executing the surprise. It is particularly important that sufficient time be allowed for the operation.

Matters generally to be incorporated in the surprise raiding plan for attacking certain targets are shown below.

a. Matters concerning preparations. (Collection of intelligence information, organization and equipment, and preparatory training.)

- b. Date for commencing movement.
- c. Movement up to the point of infiltration.
- d. Procedure of infiltration and concealed movement.
- e. Procedure of attack.
- f. Procedure of retreat and return.
- g. Measures to be taken in case the attack ends in failure.
- h. Medical measures and measures for dealing with casual-

ties.

- i. Liaison, clothing, food, and supplies.

Note:

a) Whether the raiding plan should be committed to writing is dependent upon the mission, size of unit, period of preparations, and ability of the commander. However, in consideration of the fact that the commander may become disabled in the course of the operation, it is advisable to reveal the details of the plan to at least the deputy commander and the gist of the plan to all personnel. This is particularly necessary when the plan is not committed to writing.

b) Priority should be given as to the time for revealing the plan to subordinate personnel to insure security of secrets. Written plans will be destroyed before departure and transmission of the plan should be avoided as far as possible. Code will be used in the written plan so as to insure secrecy.

5. With the progress of the planning of a surprise raid, the commander of the raiding unit will reveal his intentions to his subordinates as early as circumstances permit and have them make necessary preparations. The commander will revise the surprise raiding plan at each clarification of the situation, and before execution of the raid, he will issue orders for executing the raid at an opportune time.

The schedule and course of movement will be clearly indicated in the commander's orders so that every man will know what to do to the very end even if the staff officers are lost.

6. Taking into consideration the mission of the raiding unit, the date for commencing movement, the enemy situation, especially the condition of targets, availability of supply, terrain, weather and sanitary conditions, the higher commander will decide on the type, quantity, and method of transportation of equipment, ammunition, food, and supplies to be carried by the raiding unit and arrange them in accordance with the transport capacity of the unit. In this case, the commander of the raiding unit will submit his opinion concerning the equipment to the higher commander, and at the same time will scrupulously inspect equipment and supplies to insure adequacy.

7. The equipment, supplies and food to be carried by the raiding unit must be light and portable. All items should be damp-proofed and treated against decay.

8. When the area in which the raiding unit is to be employed becomes known, practical training in matters listed in Paragraph 3 of General Principles will be conducted in such a manner as to conform with the actual local terrain and requirements. At the same time, preparatory training concerning the procedure of movement and combat suitable for the actual situation will be conducted. For this purpose, all personnel must familiarize themselves with the terrain

and targets in the operating area through liaison with related units and by referring to maps, photographs, and sketches. At the same time, personnel will undergo thorough training in infiltration procedures, concealed movement and attack, conducted by means of a war game, or on a sand table or in a sector which resembles the actual combat zone, with various combat conditions simulated.

9. Concealment of plans during the preparatory phase of a raid is a vital requisite for accomplishing the mission of the raiding unit. Accordingly, it is essential for the commander of the raiding unit to impress the importance of security on his men, and at the same time, to take precautions against revealing his mission and the attack objectives too early, the purpose being to prevent disclosure of the plan.

Note:

a) In consideration of a possible emergency, classified documents (such as cryptographic publications) will be printed on highly combustible paper, or, if not, they will be incinerated promptly with canned heat.

b) Preparation will be made for emergency destruction of secret equipment and materials with explosives.

c) All personnel will be cautioned against leaving any mark on maps indicating disposition of our troops, location of installations, or movement of troops.

## CHAPTER III

### Infiltration and Concealed Movement

1. The important thing about infiltration tactics and concealed movement is to swiftly approach the target area without enemy detection.

Concealed movement is extremely difficult because there are various obstacles to be overcome. In conducting movement it is essential that the raiding unit advance towards the area where the enemy least expects to be hit, execute feint attacks daringly and determinedly while mixing with the enemy troops, employ deceptive tactics and catch the enemy off guard, or attack with such lightning swiftness as to deny him an opportunity for counteraction. The essential elements are versatility and surprise.

Note: In order to avoid detection, it is advantageous to resort to sign signals (the use of small flags, tree branches, or gestures) instead of sound signals (special whistles) in conveying orders.

2. For secrecy of plans it is extremely important that traces of infiltration and concealed movement be destroyed. For this reason everyone from the commanding officer on down, must be very careful. To insure successful accomplishment of its mission, the raiding unit should, if possible, assign to one man the special duty of inspecting the area to make sure that all traces are eradicated.

Before taking breaks, plans for destroying traces are drawn up and all members informed about them so that they may act accordingly.

During the break, the commanding officer will announce, in detail, such matters as the area in which to place equipment, location of latrines and the methods of destroying traces, gathering firewood, extinguishing fires, and disposal of drink and food remains, cigarette butts, packing material and notes.

The following is a concrete example of the method of destroying traces:

a. Extinguishing traces

Since this requires close attention to many details, it may be advantageous to distribute the work. In concealed movement little trees and branches are pushed aside and every effort is exerted to avoid leaving traces of a path. In order to destroy traces, first, the terrain features and natural objects of the particular area to be crossed are carefully studied and a route selected, second, the unit is deployed during the advance and regrouped at a suitable distance beyond, about 100 meters.

(1) Withdrawal of river-crossing equipment.

(2) Removal of markers.

When using route markers or an improvised distance measuring instrument, it is necessary to charge one person with the responsibility of removing the string.

(3) With respect to enemy dogs, poisonous compounds will be used. If possible the troops will leap over obstacles in order not to leave any footprints.



(4) Use of terrain features, climatic, and weather conditions.

a) Whenever possible, activity will be conducted in heavy rain and passage in and out of wooded areas will be done in the rain.

b) Movement will be made on native pathways (secret paths), ravines, wet grounds, marsh lands, and jungles. Passage through villages and the use of roads will be avoided wherever possible.

(5) With respect to moving on foot, hard ground, rocky areas, fallen tree leaves, etc. are utilized, and each one must endeavor to follow in the footsteps made by the one in front of him.

(6) In crossing roads or in entering rest areas, fallen trees and leaves will be utilized, while special care will be taken against leaving any traces.

b. Deceptive traces

(1) In order to leave footprints similar to the inhabitants, local types of footgear will be worn.

(2) In putting up route markers, enemy type markers will be used.

(3) Planning deceptive traces

In taking a break, or in entering a concealed area (base of operations) or advancing therefrom, the movement will

be made on an entirely different course than the intended one. Deceptive footprints will be left behind and several detours made before proceeding on the right course. When a fork is reached the false course is taken for some distance before proceeding on the desired course. When crossing a road, the road is traversed for some distance before crossing over to the opposite side, leaving deceptive footprints along the way. Other methods of deception may be:

- a) Resorting to felling trees and leaving deceptive markers.
- b) Reversing indicators during passage or from the outset.
- c) Leaving footprints pointed in the opposite direction.
- d) Leaving articles behind which are used by the enemy or inhabitants.

On the whole, in planning deceptive traces, bear in mind that the traces may afford clues to guide the enemy on your trail.

c. Silencing sounds

(1) Methods regarding the silencing of sounds are the same as stated in procedures for night attack.

(2) Silencing sounds

In covering up the actual infiltration, feint attacks

or aircraft may sometimes be used for drowning out sounds created by infiltration tactics and concealed movement.

3. In order to guard the attack intentions the raiding unit while on the move must carefully observe the defined methods of smoking, eating, drinking, using the latrine, conversing, sneezing, and coughing:

a. Smoking will be avoided as much as possible. The commanding officer will designate the time and plan for smoking. He will send a few persons at a time to concealed areas, gullies, uneven grounds, and caves. In smoking, care must be taken so that the smoke will disappear on the ground surface. When smoking at night one must be extremely careful concerning light leakage (from striking matches and lighted cigarettes). Helmets, tents, and pipes for concealing lighted cigarettes are used in addition to terrain features and natural objects.

b. Mess gear will not be used.

c. The latrine will be located nearby so as to prevent a surprise attack by the enemy.

d. Conversation will be conducted in whispers.

e. Sneezing is checked by rubbing the ridge of the nose with the palm of the hand. It can also be done by holding the nose. If a sneeze or a cough is unavoidable, it must be done close to the ground while pressing the nose or the mouth hard with a garrison cap or part of the clothing.

## CHAPTER IV

### Preparations for Attack

1. As the objective is approached, a suitable site near the target is established for the preparation of the assault. The preparation includes activities such as, assembling troops, studying the terrain, reconnoitering enemy positions, supplementing and revising the plans of the attack, examining equipment and supplies, securing rest, and planning good opportunities for the attack.

When time is limited and the enemy situation is clear, there is no need for establishing this site, and the unit will proceed directly into the attack phase from the movement phase.

Within the limits of the situation, the preparatory time at the preparation site must be as brief as possible.

The following matters must be considered in the selection of the attack preparation site:

- a. Concealment of planning and movement. Facility in launching an attack.
- b. Cover from enemy ground and air forces. Afford early warning of enemy approaches and good defensive position.
- c. A nearby site for stationing reserves and a suitable assembly point after the attack.
- d. Facility in troop dispersion and opportunity for good liaison system between units.

e. Facility for concealment of supplies and provisions and, if possible, location for medical treatment.

At the attack preparation site, measures for a warning system are taken, a defensive position constructed and camouflage work is done.

Note: The distance between the final concealed position and the preparation site depends on the terrain features and the enemy situation. Generally from 600 to 700 meters is advisable. The proper distance between the final concealed attack position and the objective is approximately 100 meters.

2. It is important that the commanding officer himself go out in search of intelligence information. At the same time, he carries out tree-top observation and sound location. It would also be profitable to capture a few prisoners.

In general, the following should be given special attention with respect to gathering intelligence:

a. Position of enemy headquarters.

(1) Routes frequently used by the commander's orderly and staff members.

(2) Concentration of communication lines and installations.

(3) Tree-top installations (message center, observation posts, spotting stations, etc.).

(4) Areas where low-altitude flights are frequently made.

(5) Availability of captured documents, inhabitants, and spies.

(6) Indications and traces left by the enemy.

(7) Antennas of radio stations and sounds of generators.

(8) Spotting of radio transmitters by the use of radio direction finder.

b. Varieties and positions of enemy guns.

(1) Plotting of sounds.

(2) Gun approach routes.

(3) Communication lines.

(4) Tree top observation posts.

(5) Activities of ammunition vehicles.

(6) Traces

Note: A person gifted in sound discrimination is trained and assigned the job of plotting the sound source of enemy guns.

a) It is important to know that errors can be caused by wind velocity, wind direction, mountain echoes, or echoes caused in the woods.

b) Gun positions are usually located along a crest line near an open field where clearing of trees and bushes is not necessary.

c) During the night the guns may be moved from the daytime position to a gun shelter.

d) The ability to judge the variety of guns in use must be cultivated during firing exercises.

3. In case the attacks from one base of operations on various targets continues over a long period of time, or the base is used for reconnaissance work, a site located at a considerable distance from the objective should be selected in order to avoid enemy

detection, and facilities concerning shelter, maintenance, supplies, and sanitation should be established.

4. When the objectives are found to be too numerous in comparison with troop strength, the attack could be directed at vital points as the situation permits.

5. At the attack preparation site, the commander of the raiding unit will gather detailed intelligence data, make his decision, and issue appropriate attack orders on the basis of his decision.

Note: The following are matters which must be included in an attack order as, for example, in a surprise attack on enemy headquarters or artillery (mortar) positions.

a. The enemy situation as well as the situation of friendly forces.

b. The plans or the essential points on the execution of the attack.

c. Detailed disposition of troops for the attack. Assign to each attacking unit (team or group) a specific objective, indicate the time for attack and the steps and means for carrying it out.

d. The assembly point and the procedure on falling back after successful conclusion of the attack.

e. The measures to be taken in case of an unsuccessful attack (only to officers and NCO's concerned).

f. The means of communication between the commanding officer and attack units (teams or groups).

g. Other matters of importance.

In assigning objectives, enemy forces or certain sections should be designated.

6. While still in the attack preparation site and before the departure for the attack, the commander of the raiding unit will, as far as possible, clearly state in detail his intentions and the course of action to each and every soldier so that, as the situation changes in the attack, each will be able to act on his own initiative.

Note: The team (group) leader will direct the attack on the objective or auxiliary objective from a position affording a commanding view.



## CHAPTER V

### Attacks Against Various Targets

1. An attack is made in the form of a surprise, employing such means as ambush and sudden attack.

Note: To advance concealed and attack the enemy is called sudden attack, and to attack the advancing enemy from a concealed position is called ambush.

a. A raiding force, in order to attain its objective, carries out all sorts of engagements, such as, a general attack, defense, delaying action, etc. whenever necessary.

b. In making a surprise attack, it is advantageous to secretly creep up to the target and at one stroke hurl hand grenades, explosives, etc., subsequently taking advantage of the enemy's state of shock.

c. Depending upon the condition of the terrain, it is, at times, possible to approach within five meters of the target without being detected by the enemy.

d. It is advisable that the jump off time be designated in advance and if there is no firing, the commander will throw a hand grenade or an explosive to signal the time. However, in the midst of firing, it may be necessary to signal with a wooden clapper, high-pitched flute, etc., without solely depending upon the blasting of explosives.

e. For the purpose of screening or signalling during an approach, it is advantageous to use branches.

2. The question of priority in an attack, that is, between inflicting casualties and disposing of weapons, equipment and provisions, is determined by the nature of the mission, the target condition, and the method of attack. It is exceedingly advantageous if we are successful in capturing the enemy commander and staff officers.

As for captured weapons, equipment, and provisions, consideration regarding their utilization is always necessary before destroying or burning them.

Utmost effort will be made to capture important documents, maps, etc.

3. Although the time for attack will be determined in accordance with the nature of the mission and the method of the attack, it is still necessary to take advantage of opportunities.

The time for the commencement of the attack (shifting into sudden assault) differs depending upon the method of the attack itself. Attack may be made:

a. At a time when the enemy is lax about security measures (observation will enable us to mark the time when the enemy is lax or off guard in the following activities; patrol duty, posting of sentries, working, sleeping, eating, and headquarters activity).

b. At a time when we have reached an ideal position from which to launch an ambush.

c. At a time when diversionary and luring tactics have proved successful.

It is imperative that the commander be well acquainted with the enemy situation and details of the terrain, and be shrewd and decisive in exploiting the enemy's weak points.

If detected by the enemy immediately before the commencement of the attack, it is advisable to shift to sudden assault without losing the opportunity, provided the unit is near its objective. The commander of the raiding force usually determines the time suitable for shifting to the sudden assault. There are also situations which call for a section leader's judgment in determining the time of assault.

4. The place of attack is generally governed by the fundamental principles of attack. It is selected particularly in areas where enemy troops are sparsely deployed or where the enemy least expects an attack. At the same time it is necessary to take into consideration the factor that the area must afford an easy route of withdrawal.

In the execution of the attack, all personnel from the commander on down, should push forward resolutely in accordance with the established plan. No unauthorized alteration in the plan, even because of accident, will be permitted.

5. There are occasions when it is advantageous to resort to feints in an attack or a retreat. In making a feint, do not resort to worn-out tactics. It is essential that we exercise our wits and ingenuity. For this purpose, we must skilfully employ such means

as setting fires, showing lights, imitating sounds, simulating attacks, feigning traces, decoying troops, emitting smoke, etc.

6. The deployment of troops in an attack will be determined in accordance with the condition of the target, method of attack, terrain features, degree of brightness or darkness, etc. It is advisable to minimize the number of personnel to be assigned to a single target so as to attain the element of surprise. Whether or not a reserve force is used depends upon the situation.

Depending upon the condition of the enemy security measures, the troops are divided into covering and attack (operations) groups.

In either case, the commander is expected to take the lead in attacking the main target.

Note:

a) A team usually executes an attack under the command of a section leader. The commander of the raiding force has several teams under his direct command and, depending on the situation, may assign to each team a single independent mission as a limited objective.

b) Arms and supplies to be allotted for the attack will be determined by the kind of objective, condition of the attack, number of troops to be used, and so forth.

The utilization of local fuel and explosives, as well as enemy weapons and supplies is necessary.

c) There are many combat examples whereby a cannon or an airplane was destroyed by one to three men assigned for the mission.

7. In launching an attack it is advisable to take measures to cut off the outside communications of the enemy and delay reinforcements. In destroying the lines of communication caution must be used in choosing the proper time so as not to reveal plans prematurely.

8. In cases where repeated attacks are carried out in the same sector or on a series of targets located at several places but within the same general area, it is necessary to exercise ingenuity, particularly in selecting the time, direction, and method of attack, so as to deny the enemy the opportunity for devising countermeasures.

9. In attacking an enemy headquarters or observation post it is advantageous to inflict casualties upon important personnel, such as the commander and staff officers, and also to capture classified material. At the same time, communication facilities and observation instruments should be destroyed.

In order to inflict casualties upon the commander and staff officers, it is necessary to gather detailed information concerning their movements in the headquarters and try to take advantage of laxities in the security system.

10. If the overall plan is to inflict the greatest number of casualties, it is advisable to employ explosives, hand grenades, submachine guns, light machine guns, etc. If possible, it is advantageous to attack camps which are condensed in a small area.

In inflicting casualties, a submachine gun is preferable to a light machine gun, and usually, there is little chance of using a grenade-thrower. In place of a bayonet, a double-edged dagger which can readily be converted into a spear is recommended.

11. Matters which should be considered in launching an attack on enemy gun positions are as follows:

a. It is advisable to choose the time for a daytime attack either when the enemy guns are firing or its crew is in movement.

b. The direction of the attack changes according to the circumstances but it should be noted that there are, at times, openings in the enemy's frontal position due to the laxity in security measures.

c. It is advisable to destroy the gun barrel, breech block, etc. with explosives or hand grenades, and also inflict casualties on the gun crew.

12. Against tanks and motor vehicles, it is advisable to destroy or set fire to the engine with explosives at a time when the enemy has lowered its guard.

13. In attacking an enemy airfield, it is advisable to destroy the command post, aircraft, bombs, fuel dump, and communications facilities, and inflict casualties upon the personnel, particularly, important flight duty personnel. Since aircraft and important installations are usually scattered and concealed, it is necessary to determine the most important target. On this point, attention must be paid to the fact that large numbers of decoy planes are often placed within an area.

The destruction of aircraft will be carried out by means of blasting or burning. Blasting will be done by placing and igniting explosives in the engine assembly.

14. In the event blasting or burning is to be carried out on

warehouses and supply dumps, it is advisable to use materials locally available.

Depending upon circumstances, there are occasions when it is advantageous to thoroughly blast and burn up only articles of the same type.

15. In destroying communication lines, attention should be paid to the vital trunk line. As to the time for the destruction, it is advantageous to choose an important moment when the enemy is busy with the lines. In case strict concerted action is required, precautions against exposing the plan prematurely must be taken. It is advantageous that the destruction be carried out at a remote distance from the enemy and where discovery and conditions for repair of the destruction are difficult.

16. Against enemy vessels, it is advisable to blast or set fire to the hull, engine room, and fuel compartment, and also inflict casualties upon officers who are responsible for the command and operation of the vessels.

## Field Rations to be Carried by Each Man

Basis for Planning Rations	The operating period of a raiding unit usually covers approximately two weeks. However, rations to be carried by each man are limited to ten days supply to that he will not be required to carry a heavy burden. Consideration is given to supplying a standard quantity of calories. Rations do not require cooking.	
Name of Article		Quantity
Dehydrated bread		2 day's supply
Special rations (A), (B), (C), (D) & (E)		1 day's supply
Combined rations		3 day's supply
* Nutritious food (Square-shaped)		5 day's supply
* Combined supplementary rations		5 day's supply
* Compressed auxiliary rations		2 day's supply
* Powdered soy sauce * Powdered bean paste		5 bags
* Salt		5 day's supply
Refreshments		5 packages
Sweets		5 bags
Plum extract		1
Canned heat		2
Portable filter tube		1
"RAIHAN*" bag (Ed. Note: Compressed, cooked rice sealed in cellophane bag.)		2 (Large size)
Matches		1 box
Notes:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Special Rations (A) thru (E) were specially prepared for raiding units and not used for ordinary ration issue.</li> <li>2. Symbol * indicates auxiliary rations to be issued when additional supply is necessary.</li> <li>3. Total weight of the above-listed items is less than 9 kilograms.</li> </ol>	



Organization and Equipment of a Raiding Unit Consisting of Five Infantrymen (or Engineers)

<p>Assumption:                  1. Organization and equipment is based upon the assumption that the duty of the unit is to destroy three to seven enemy guns.                  2. The commanding officer is a noncommissioned officer.</p>				
Classification	Main Duties	Clothing & Accessories	Equipment and Supplies	
Commanding Officer	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Over-all command.</li> <li>Selection of advance routes and maintenance of bearings.</li> <li>In case of attack, he will lead and execute attack upon the main target.</li> </ol>	Leggings, laced shoes, canteen, haversack, tent (without poles), rucksack, rubber-soled shoes, gloves, socks (2 pairs), mosquito mask.	Submachine gun or rifle, bayonet, 1 armor-piercing mine, 3 hand grenades, 2 lighters, matches or lighter, luminous compass, covered lamp, watch, pole climbers, semaphore flags, special whistle, barbarian sword, luminous paint, rope (30 meters).	
1st Group	No. 1 Man	Same as above	Submachine gun or rifle, bayonet, 1 1-kg demolition can, 1 armor-piercing mine, 3 hand grenades, igniter, matches or lighter, sickle, luminous compass.	
	No. 2 Man	Same as above	2 armor-piercing mine, 2 1-kg demolition cans, 3 hand grenades, igniter, matches or lighter, hatchet, luminous compass, flashlight, wire cutter, special whistle, rope (30 meters).	

(Cont'd)

Classification	Main Duties	Clothing & Accessories	Equipment and Supplies
No. 3 Man	1. Flank and rear security. 2. Range estimation. 3. In case of attack, No. 3 and No. 4 will cooperate and attack one target.	Same as Commanding Officer	Weapons and Demolitions Same as No. 1 Man Plus Sickle, saw sharpener, grindstone, oilcloth containing can, luminous compass, portable rangefinder, rope for range estimation (30 meters).
2d Group No. 4 Man			Same as above
Remarks: 1. It is advisable for the raiding unit to take carrier pigeons to facilitate liaison. 2. Sickles and hatchets used by the local inhabitants will be most useful. 3. The type of equipment and supplies to be carried depends on the type of the targets. If possible, medicines for appeasement of the inhabitants should be carried. 4. Gas masks will be carried if deemed necessary. 5. The weight of the load of each soldier is approximately 25 kilograms.			

## Equipment to be Carried by Raiding Unit

Classification	Required Equipment	Optional Equipment
Equipment and Supplies	Submachine gun (automatic rifle), light machine gun, rifle, pistol, bayonet, hand grenade, glasses	Incendiary compound (such as Molotov cocktail, portable fuel), grenade thrower, mine detector rod, smoke candle, flare compound
Demolition Materials	1 kg demolition can, igniter, armor-piercing mine, wire cutter, detonating cord	Pale yellow explosive, yellow color explosive, land mine, bangalore torpedo
Tools	Hatchet or sword, jack-knife, rope, pole climber, grindstone, oilcloth container can	Sickle, saw, saw sharpener, axe, pick, shovel, pliers, pruning shears
Bearing Control Materials	Luminous compass, portable compass, applied telemeter, map or aerial photograph, portable range finder, measuring cord	Plotting board, goniometer, route finder, height finder
Liaison Materials	Radio equipment, special whistle, flashlight, carrier pigeon, marking materials, incense sticks or slow matches for short distance signaling	Air-ground liaison materials (signal panel), Very pistol, signal shell, national ensign
Food	1. Staple food: Compressed ration (special emergency ration). 2. Supplementary rations: Salt pills, powdered shoyu, pickled plum essence, nutritious ration, compressed supplementary ration	Dried bonito, dried liver, preserved food boiled down in soy, powdered and seasoned fish, dried fish, salted fish, sugar, rice cake, dried vegetables

(Cont'd)

Classification	Required Equipment	Optional Equipment
Medical Materials	Water purification agent, quinine hydrochloride tablets (or quinine sulphate tablets), plasmochin tablets, tincture of iodine in ampoule, adhesive tape, germicidal tablets, anti-thirst tablets, packed bandage; gas-protective equipment	Mosquito ointment, insect powder, water eczema ointment, sodium bicarbonate tablets, creosote, bismuth subnitrate tablets
Clothing	Field sneakers (avoid split-toe sneakers), gloves, socks, antimosquito mask, camouflage net	Native's clothing, enemy military uniform
Other	Matches (or lighter), portable tent, canteen, watch, haversack, No. 16 steel wire (approximately 10 meters long).	Bamboo tube (as supplementary canteen), fishing set, potassium cyanide, night vision tablets (Ed. Note: Possibly carotin), poisonous preparation for dogs, portable filter tube, auxiliary receiver (with needle).
Remarks:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Explosives and igniters will be wrapped in cellophane paper, rubber sack or oil paper. Primers will be wrapped with cellophane or oil paper.</li> <li>2. Clothing will be made of quilted cotton cloth, dyed dark green.</li> </ol>	

Organization, Equipment and Disposition of a Raiding Unit in the Approach  
(Size: One-half Platoon)


Classification of Teams and Order of March	Strength and Duties	Main Equipment and Supplies	Remarks
Security	2 privates. Direct frontal security.	2 rifles, 2 luminous compasses, 2 hatchets or 2 sickles, 2 whistles.	1. Advance road will be cut open by the two security personnel, each of whom will if necessary, be assisted by a laborer. 2. When jungle situation requires, the security personnel will advance directly ahead of the road-opening team
Road-opening	1 NCO, 3 privates. 1. Opening of advance road. 2. Frontal security.	4 pistols, 2 hatchets, 2 sickles, 1 luminous compass, 1 colored lamp, 1 whistle, 1 glasses, 2 land mines, 1 grindstone	Leader of the road-opening team will direct laborers while regulating the direction on the road.
Guides	1 NCO, 1 private. Regulation of direction.	1 rifle, 1 pistol, 1 luminous compass, 1 pole climber, 1 map, 1 colored lamp, 1 glasses, 1 whistle	
Commanding Officer	1 officer Command	1 pistol, 1 luminous compass, 1 aerial photograph, 1 colored lamp, 1 map, 1 semaphore flag, 1 glasses, 1 whistle	When the situation requires, the platoon leader will advance immediately behind the road-opening team and regulate the direction.

(Cont'd)

Classification of Teams and Order of March	Strength and Duties	Main Equipment and Supplies	Remarks
Reserve	<p>3 privates.</p> <p>1. Reserve fatigue detail (chiefly to replace the road-opening team).</p> <p>2. Right-flank security.</p>	<p>3 pistols, 2 hatchets, 1 sickle, 1 whistle</p>	<p>Reserve personnel are frequently disposed at the rear of the unit. In this case, facility of relief must be considered.</p>
Range-finding	<p>1 NCO, 3 privates.</p> <p>1. Range-finding and range-recording.</p> <p>2. Left-flank security.</p>	<p>3 rifles, 1 whistle, 1 pistol, 2 ropes, 1 measuring rope, some luminous paint, 1 luminous compass, red and white tapes, 1 colored lamp, 1 filled glass, 1 portable range-finder, 1 map</p>	<p>Three of the team members will be assigned to range-finding and the remaining one to range-recording.</p>
Signal	<p>1 NCO, 3 privates</p> <p>1. Liaison.</p> <p>2. Rear security.</p> <p>3. Obliteration of traces.</p>	<p>4 rifles, 1 No. 5 radio equipment, 1 luminous compass, 1 colored lamp, 1 whistle</p>	
<p>Note: This chart shows an example of a raiding unit consisting of a platoon leader and 19 men, operating under conditions where it will have to cut a road through a dense jungle which obstructs its advance.</p>			

Organization and Equipment of a Raiding Unit in the Attack  
(Size: One-half Platoon)

Classification of Teams	Duty	Strength	Principal Weapons and Supplies				
1st Group	Destruction of enemy guns	1 NCO 2 privates	2 rifles, 3 hand grenades for each, 1 pistol, 1 colored lamp, 1 wire cutter, 1 whistle, 1 1-kg demolition can for each man.				
				2d Group	Destruction of enemy guns	3 privates	2 rifles, 3 hand grenades for each, 1 pistol, 1 colored lamp, 1 wire cutter, 1 whistle, 1 1-kg demolition can for each man
4th Group	Attack against enemy commander and camps. Capture of important documents.	1 officer 1 NCO 2 privates	1 rifle, 2 smoke candles, 2 pistols, 1 colored lamp, 3 hand grenades for each, 1 whistle, 3 1-kg demolition cans, 2 armor-piercing mines, signal shells.				
				5th Group	Destruction of enemy line of communication and connecting roads	1 NCO 2 privates	1 rifle, 1 pistol, 1 wire cutter, 2 armor-piercing mines, 3 hand grenades for each person, 2 smoke candles.
Reserve Group	1. Covering of attacking teams. 2. Communications and liaison.	4 radio operators	4 rifles, 1 whistle, 1 No. 5 radio equipment, 3 hand grenades for each man, 1 colored lamp				
				Notes: 1. This chart shows an example of a raiding unit consisting of a platoon leader and 19 men. 2. Weapons and supplies shown in this chart are only those which are to be carried in an attack, and do not include those to be carried during a concealed movement.			





Example of the Execution of an Attack by a Raiding Unit  
(Size: One Infantry Platoon)

Procedure of Attack:

1. Artillery Attacking Unit will leave the attack preparation position and approach the objective in concealed movement and destroy it. After completion of the attack, the unit members will individually hide in adjacent jungles and assemble at the attack preparation position at an opportune time. When assembly has been completed, a designated guide will lead the men to the platoon rendezvous point.

2. Headquarters Attacking Unit will leave the attack preparation position at an opportune time and attack the objective. After the attack, the unit members will assemble by teams and proceed to the platoon rendezvous point.

Explanation:

Ⓐ Attack Preparation Position of the Platoon

After completing attack preparations, the platoon will leave its nonessential combat materials in this position to make its equipment as light as possible and each attacking team of the platoon will separately proceed to the objective.

Ⓑ First Attack Preparation Position of the 1st Team

After conducting reconnaissance of the enemy situation and the terrain from this position, the 1st Team will proceed to the 2d Attack Preparation Position to complete further preparation for attack.

Ⓒ The 5th Team will cut off the communication line just before the attack of the main unit.

Attack Procedures Against Various Targets

Target	Vulnerable Targets, Time or Point for Attack	Expected Results	Procedure of Attack	Principal Materials to be Used
Commanders and Staff Officers	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>When they are strolling.</li> <li>Inside the officers' official residences, especially bedrooms.</li> <li>When they are on scouting patrol, especially when they are alone, or passing through defiles.</li> </ol>	Killing and injuring (Confusion)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Snipping and bayoneting. Ambush will be advantageous.</li> <li>Demolition. To be effected by throwing grenades or employing time bombs.</li> <li>Traps. To be employed together with ambush.</li> </ol>	Small arms, hand grenades, explosives, etc.
Men	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inside the billets, especially when they are sleeping, or eating the evening meal.</li> <li>At kitchen or water supply center. When they are gathering together at night.</li> <li>When a small number of them are acting separately.</li> </ol>	Killing and injuring (Confusion)	<p>Remarks: Special attention will be directed to the capture of important documents.</p>	Small arms, hand grenades, explosives, etc.
Wire: Telegraphic instruments, telephone switchboards & generators	<p>Vacuum tubes. Complicated parts of the wiring. Generators.</p>	Destruction	<p>Blasting: For demolishing field equipment, use one or two hand grenades, or, if possible, insert explosives weighing more than 200 grams into the equipment. Wrecking: Striking. Clipping: Clip the wiring into as many sections as possible. Interior wiring is preferable.</p>	Hand grenades, explosives, picks, clubs, swords, etc.
Headquarters				
Communication Facilities				

Target	Vulnerable Targets	Expected Results	Procedure of Attack	Principal Materials to be Used
Communication Facilities  Wire: Lines	Power lines	Disconnection	<p>Clipping: Clip wires in case maintenance of the communication lines is believed to be difficult for the enemy. If possible, clip wires at as many points as possible, and over a long distance.</p> <p>Secret Destruction: Clip the interior wires, without changing the outward appearance of the cable.</p> <p>Remarks: It must be noted that the effect of the destruction of lines is temporary.</p>	Wire cutters etc
	Poles	Cutting Destruction Burning	<p>Sawing, Blasting, Burning:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Destroy as many poles as possible.</li> <li>2. Conceal or cut in pieces the sawed poles.</li> </ol> <p>In certain cases, it may be advantageous to send the cut pieces floating down a stream.</p> <p>Remarks: Method of computation of the amount (in grams) of explosives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Wooden, Iron or Ferro-concrete poles</li> </ol> <p>Amount of explosive-50F                      F signifies the area of the pole to be cut (expressed in square centimeters)</p>	Saws, Axes, explosives, petroleum, etc.
Wireless: Comm Equipment, Generators	Vacuum tube. Complex section of the wiring	Destruction	<p>Blasting:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Attack against field equipment is the same as for wire communications equipment.</li> </ol>	Hand grenades, demolition cans

Target	Vulnerable Targets	Expected Targets	Procedure of Attack	Principal Materials to be Used																																
Wireless: Comm Equipment, Generators Communication Facilities	Vacuum tube. Complex section of the wiring	Destruction	2. In case the size of the target is large, demolition cans or hand grenades will be fixed to several points.  Wrecking: Attack is the same as for wire communications equipment.	Hand Grenades, demolition cans																																
Firearms	Gun barrel	Destruction	Blast- ing	In case explosive is inserted in the bore of gun In case the explosive is fastened to the outside the gun barrel																																
			<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Type of Gun</th> <th>In case gun barrel alone is to be blasted</th> <th>In case the whole gun is to be blasted</th> <th>In case explosive is inserted in the bore of gun</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Fld or Mt Gun</td> <td>300 grams</td> <td>1,300 grams</td> <td>800 grams</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10cm How</td> <td>750 "</td> <td>3,000 "</td> <td>2,800 "</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10cm Gun</td> <td>1,000 "</td> <td>4,500 "</td> <td>3,000 "</td> </tr> <tr> <td>15cm How</td> <td>2,000 "</td> <td>8,500 "</td> <td>3,000 "</td> </tr> <tr> <td>15cm Gun</td> <td>3,000 "</td> <td>9,000 "</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>20cm How</td> <td>4,500 "</td> <td>18,000 "</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>20cm Gun</td> <td>8,000 "</td> <td>32,000 "</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Type of Gun	In case gun barrel alone is to be blasted	In case the whole gun is to be blasted	In case explosive is inserted in the bore of gun	Fld or Mt Gun	300 grams	1,300 grams	800 grams	10cm How	750 "	3,000 "	2,800 "	10cm Gun	1,000 "	4,500 "	3,000 "	15cm How	2,000 "	8,500 "	3,000 "	15cm Gun	3,000 "	9,000 "		20cm How	4,500 "	18,000 "		20cm Gun	8,000 "	32,000 "		
Type of Gun	In case gun barrel alone is to be blasted	In case the whole gun is to be blasted	In case explosive is inserted in the bore of gun																																	
Fld or Mt Gun	300 grams	1,300 grams	800 grams																																	
10cm How	750 "	3,000 "	2,800 "																																	
10cm Gun	1,000 "	4,500 "	3,000 "																																	
15cm How	2,000 "	8,500 "	3,000 "																																	
15cm Gun	3,000 "	9,000 "																																		
20cm How	4,500 "	18,000 "																																		
20cm Gun	8,000 "	32,000 "																																		
1. The figures in the above table indicate the amount (in grams) of explosive to be used in case <u>yellow color</u> explosive is employed. 2. When gun barrel alone is destroyed, it can be replaced by a new barrel. But, its destruction will render the enemy ineffective for a considerable time, because replacement requires time.																																				

Target		Vulnerable Targets		Expected Results	Procedure of Attack	
		Gun barrel		Destruction	Blasting	3. It is also effective to put armor piercing mines or hand grenades into the bore of the gun.
Fire-arms		Breech block		Destruction	Blasting	Fasten a demolition can (1-kilogram bundled charge) to the exterior of the mechanism, on the shaft, if possible. If the mechanism can be opened, insert the demolition can in to it.
		Recoil buffer		Destruction	Blasting	Fix one or two demolition cans to the exterior of the mechanism.
		Gun sight and its mount		Destruction	Wrecking Blasting	1. Remove or smash them. 2. 100 grams of explosive.
Ammunition dumps		Charged shells, Charges		Detonation	Blasting, Burning	Detonate directly with hand grenades, armor piercing mines or demolition cans. If three of the abovementioned explosives are placed on one dump, the desired results will be obtained. If unavoidable, buildings, containers and others will be blasted or burnt.  Remarks: If there are detonators in the vicinity of the dump, they will be set on fire or be actuated.
Aircraft		Wing root		Destruction (Burning)	Blasting	Fasten one or two demolition cans.  Remarks: Fuel tank is generally mounted close to the wing root.

Target	Vulnerable Targets	Expected Results	Procedure of Attack
Aircraft	Pilot's seat	Destruction	<p>Blasting</p> <p>Fasten one or two demolition cans or several hand grenades on the face of the instruments.</p> <p>Remarks: In some cases a small quantity of explosive is placed on the wheel assembly in order to burn up the frame.</p>
	Landing gear, tail assembly and instruments	Destruction	<p>Smash the wheel assembly, instruments, tail assembly, and crankshaft.</p> <p>Remarks: Pouring murky water into the fuel tank will be effective temporarily, because it will cause engine trouble in the air.</p>
Air search radar	Oscillator, Power unit	Destruction	<p>Blasting, Smashing</p> <p>1. Fasten one or two demolition cans or hand grenades to several points and detonate them.</p> <p>2. Smashing will be done by hitting.</p> <p>Remarks: The oscillator is located at the side of the main tower base. Some are protruding in box-like shape.</p>
Fire control radar	Transmitting apparatus, Receiving set, Range finding device	Destruction	<p>Destroy as shown above:</p> <p>Remarks: Transmitting apparatus and receiving set of air search radar are installed separately. In attacking trip wire warning system, destroy magnifying apparatus and cathode-ray tube.</p>

Antiaircraft Equipment


Target		Vulnerable Targets	Expected Results	Procedure of Attack
AA Equipment	Search lights	Reflector, Lighting system Generator	Destruction	1. Fix one demolition can or several hand grenades. If possible, insert explosives inside. 2. Procedure of wrecking is same as shown above.
	Sound locators	Sight, Trumpet-type sound detector	Destruction	1. Insert one or two hand grenades in the trumpet-type sound detector. 2. Smashing is done by hitting
Tanks and Motor vehicles	Cylinder, Magazine, Fuel pump, Fuel tank	Destruction Burning	Blasting, Burning, Smashing	1. In destroying the inner parts of a vehicle, demolition cans will be placed on the cylinder, fuel tank or loaded magazines. (200 grams of explosive). 2. Drain the fuel from the fuel tank and then set fire directly to the fuel tank with matches. 3. It may be necessary to disconnect the fuel pump at as many points as possible and immediately set fire to the fuel.
Boats	Bottom of boat, Engine, Propeller	Destruction	Blasting, Smashing	1. Blast the bottom and sink the boat. For a small craft, 1 kg of explosive. 2. Method of destruction of engine is same as for tanks and motor vehicles. 3. In case the interior of the boat cannot be reached, its propeller will be destroyed (using a 1 kg demolition can). (Explosives, picks, timbers, etc.)  Remarks: Occasionally, a boat can be sunk by removing its plug, and its propeller or the bottom can be destroyed by sending down into the water various articles (such as weighty substance of a torpedo).

Target	Vulnerable Targets	Expected Results	Procedure of Attack
Fuel dumps	Container filled with fuel	Detonation	<p>Blasting, Burning</p> <p>1. Hand grenades or 200-gram explosives will be laid at intervals of several meters. Explosives will be thrown into tanks whenever possible.</p> <p>2. Remove the filler cap and set fire to the fuel.</p> <p>Remarks: Detonation may also be caused by rifle shooting.</p>
Locomotives	Fire door, Cylinder, Axle	Destruction	<p>Blasting</p> <p>1. Demolition cans will be fastened to the inside of the fire door or to the cylinder.</p> <p>2. In order to destroy a locomotive secretly, remove lubricant from the axle housings and put sand in them. (Several hours after the locomotive starts operation, it will be rendered inoperative as a result of the burning of the bearings.)</p> <p>Remarks: In certain case, a locomotive can be stopped temporarily by shooting its steam boiler with rifles.</p>
Water reservoirs (Water supply installations)	Water tank, Water supply can, Lock	Destruction	<p>Blasting</p> <p>1. In order to destroy a water reservoir, the lock will be blasted. (Usually, explosives are laid in the water inside the lock.) Water supply tower will be blasted or smashed.</p> <p>2. Explosives or one or two demolition cans will be thrown in the water trough.</p> <p>3. Poison may be thrown in the water.</p>



Target		Vulnerable Targets	Expected Results	Procedure of Attack	
Railway stations and tracks	Railroad switch, Signaling apparatus, Interchange point, Water tank, Rolling stock	Destruction	Blasting, Smashing	<p>1. Signal stations will be destroyed. (Complex junction of railroad tracks and switch levers.)</p> <p>2. Two demolition cans will be laid on one side of the railroad track at each interchange point. In order to destroy other tracks, one demolition can be placed on one track. In the latter case, curve of the track should be used. In order to wreck the tracks, dog spikes and ties will be removed.</p> <p>3. With regard to the procedure of attack against water tanks and rolling stock, refer to the columns on locomotive and water supply installations.</p> <p>Remarks: 1. Occasionally, it is advantageous to blast the railroad tracks while the train is passing.</p> <p>2. In some cases, ties are burned.</p> <p>3. Explosives will be fastened securely on the rails.</p>	
				Bridges	Wooden Bridge

Traffic Facilities

Target	Vulnerable Targets	Expected Results	Procedure of Attack	Principal Materials to be Used
Traffic Facilities Bridge	Wooden bridge	Destruction, Burning	<p>Blasting, Wrecking, Burning</p> <p>that the enemy cannot use them again. In case a bridge is of weak construction, it may be destroyed by letting objects float down the river and ram into it.</p> <p>3. In order to burn a bridge, combustibles will be piled up on it and then set afire.</p>	
	Suspension Bridge	Severance	<p>Blasting</p> <p>1. One or two km of yellow color explosive will be used for the main suspension cable. 1 km demolition can will be enough for a main suspension cable having an inside diameter of three centimeters or less. To obtain the necessary weight (in gram) of the explosive, multiply the circumference of the main suspension cable (centimeter) by 270.</p> <p>2. It is advantageous to cut off both sides of the main suspension cables.</p>	
Steel Bridge	Buttress & lower bridge chord or plate girder	Destruction	<p>Blasting</p> <p>1. A section will be blasted completely. 2. With regard to the amount of explosives to be used, refer to the manual on demolition.</p> <p>For blasting the first truss section of a girder bridge, the amount of explosive necessary for end buttress is $\frac{1}{2}$ X kg, and the amount of explosive necessary for lower bridge chord is $\frac{1}{4}$ X kg. (X signifies the length of span in meters.) In blasting the plate girder in each section, the amount of explosives necessary for a deck bridge is 3 X kg and that for a through bridge is 4 X kg.</p>	

Target	Vulnerable Targets	Expected Results	Procedure of Attack	
Tunnel	Ceiling, Side wall	Destruction Blockade	Blasting, Blocking with obstacles	In order to insure total destruction a tunnel will be blasted at several places.
Road	Roads running through paddy fields. Raised roads and sunken roads. Roads running through forests	Destruction	Blasting, Earth- works, Tree felling	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Land mines will be laid (in defiles).</li> <li>2. Trenches will be dug on roads running through paddy fields or on raised roads.</li> </ol> Walls will be constructed on sunken roads. On roads running through forests, felled trees and knife rests will be placed.
Remarks:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. This table shows how to attack field equipment and installations with portable implements.</li> <li>2. The adoption of the above-mentioned procedure of attack is dependent upon the degree of priority of operations, and upon the condition of available supplies.</li> </ol>			

APPENDIX IV

Extracts from "Night Attack Manual" Published in  
September 1944

In view of the importance of night attacks, this book was speedily compiled for the purpose of explaining tactics and techniques which are of special importance in initiating night attacks against the US and British Forces. The main emphasis in the explanation is placed upon combat by units smaller than an infantry battalion. Although this book is incomplete, it shall nevertheless be distributed.

September 1944

NODA Kengo, Chief of the  
Inspectorate General of  
Military Training, General  
Affairs Department

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Part 1 - Application of Daytime Combat Tactics to Night Combat and Necessity of Creating New Tactics	321
Part 2 - Thorough Training for Night Attack	322
Part 3 - Importance of Concerted Action by Various Arms in a Night Attack	322
Part 4 - Measures Against Artillery Bombardment, Aerial Bombing and Tank Attacks	323
Part 5 - Training Required by War Situation	323
Part 6 - Points to be Noted	325
CHAPTER I      Tactics	327
Section A. General Attack Procedure	327

1. Application of Daytime Combat Tactics to Night Combat and Necessity of Creating New Tactics

The US and British Forces which dread our night assaults, are strengthening warning measures such as illumination, obstacles and trip wire warning systems. At the same time, they are trying to guard against surprise attacks by organizing key positions and are trying to destroy our attacking strength by readying a fierce night firepower. This has served to make it more difficult to realize success in a surprise attack and has increased the necessity of initiating night raiding attacks. There is a growing tendency to apply daytime attack procedures to night attacks, although the enemy's increasing superiority in material fighting power is making it more difficult to carry out night combat. As a result, there has arisen the urgent necessity to create tactics and techniques that will enable us to resolve the difficult war situation.

Under these circumstances, the Japanese forces must, in the light of the situation confronting them, make a careful comparative study of their fighting power with that of the enemy and carry out night attack preparations taking into account the enemy's favorite tactics and the topography of the battlefield. It is imperative that ingenuity be exercised to devise means for successful night attacks without adhering to conventional tactics. Furthermore, they must make the best of all tactics available, putting ingenuity in the attack disposition and coordination between the various arms,

carrying out a demonstration, feint, or a raiding attack at a proper time. Thus, they must exert maximum efforts to achieve success in night combat.

## 2. Thorough Training for Night Attack

The employment of night attacks is a traditional characteristic of the Japanese Army, and success or failure depends solely upon the thoroughness of training. And it was by no means an easy task even in the past. In most cases, night attacks are of doubtful value because they produce many casualties among the officers as well as a considerable loss of material fighting power. Commanding officers are prone to be against the employment of night combat. However, they must conduct vigorous training for night attack, bearing in mind that a night attack, if carried out without proper preparation, will result only in a waste of fighting power. In order to insure success in night combat, the entire unit, including the commanding officer, must act calmly and boldly in perfect unity, and destroy the material fighting power of the US and British Forces by full display of a strong sense of responsibility and a death-defying spirit.

## 3. Importance of Concerted Action by Various Arms in a Night Attack

Previously, it was taught that a night attack was primarily the work of the infantry, supported possibly, by artillery and other arms. However, since night combat has come to resemble daytime combat more and more, it has become increasingly necessary



for various arms to display their power in concert. Night combat is, therefore, fought by various arms in order to help the infantry to achieve its objective. The vital thing is to maintain close coordination and cooperation.

#### 4. Measures Against Artillery Bombardment, Aerial Bombing and Tank Attacks

Throughout a night attack, the most important matter is to take proper measures against artillery bombardment, aerial bombing and tank attacks from the enemy. Therefore, future developments in the fighting must be anticipated and various measures must be taken, such as, preparations in regard to weapons and supplies, proper disposition of troops, coordination among different arms, the choice of combat terrain, and determination of size of attacking unit.

#### 5. Training Required by the War Situation

a. Since knowledge of the enemy situation is a prerequisite to this training, it is necessary to pay close attention to the actual combat on all the frontlines, examine the terrain and condition of our own units, and then select the appropriate subjects and procedures of training from the manual.

b. With emphasis placed on night raids, the following points must be studied constantly:

(1) Estimating the enemy situation and becoming acquainted with the terrain of the sector to be attacked.

(2) Procedures of coordination among different arms,

especially among infantry, artillery and engineers.

(3) Advancing for the attack in a dispersed formation, advancing in the right direction, command liaison, and rate of advance.

(4) Infiltration by means of engineering as well as creeping movement.

(5) Procedures of assaults, particularly the support of assault by various firearms, and procedures of close-quarter combat by the infantry.

(6) Firing and advance of heavy weapons and artillery, and forwarding of explosives and other supplies.

(7) Disposing of barbed wire entanglements and land mines.

(8) Disposing of trip wire warning systems.

(9) Attacking pillboxes and fire positions.

(10) Securing an occupied area.

(11) Raiding procedures.

(12) Utilizing night visibility.

c. Training is usually conducted as follows: First, combat techniques are taught one by one in the daytime and training in combined techniques is conducted at night. Then, tactical matters are taught in the daytime and training in practical application is conducted at night. However, even during the technical training, tactical matters must be taught to facilitate a better understanding of the technical

training. Also during the tactical training, combat techniques must be exercised constantly and repeatedly to achieve improvement and perfection.

d. As combat under dazzling illumination is considered important, it is advisable to conduct combat training in bright moonlight.

e. Creeping approach, foxhole digging, antitank combat, etc., are so important that even officers must undergo this training on every occasion, and excellence in these techniques must be achieved.

f. Necessary specialized training shall be conducted by taking into consideration the condition of the respective unit. In an infantry company, candidates shall be selected and trained for such missions as obstacle demolition, disposal of trip wire warning systems, capture of a fire position, antitank combat, direction of maintenance and infiltration for reconnaissance.

#### 6. Points to be noted in this book

a. This book deals primarily with the combat of an infantry battalion or a smaller unit in order to help readers better understand the essential tactics and techniques of night attack.

b. In view of the present condition of our armed forces, it is deemed necessary to encourage ingenuity both in tactics and combat technique. For this purpose, necessary suggestions, troop dispositions, etc. are set forth in concrete form. However, they

are merely examples. The armed forces should not follow them blindly nor restrict training solely to these examples.

c. Primarily, this book takes up beachheads and defense positions in strategic areas as imaginary enemy positions, but emphasizes that the form of combat should vary to meet changes in the type of enemy positions.

Concerning terrain, the general terrain of the homeland is discussed in view of the changed war situation and in order to aid the understanding of the general reader. In describing a special terrain, special mention will be made regarding the difference between special and general terrain.

## CHAPTER I

### Tactics

#### Section A. General Attack Procedure

##### 7. The Secret of Success in Attacks

The difficulty of an attack against American or British positions is due to the enemy's overwhelming superiority in material. However, since the battlefield situation still generally enables us to make preparations, we must make attack preparations with utmost care and prudence, and at the same time concentrate fighting power at strategic points. In carrying out an attack, it is necessary to maintain and build up fresh fighting strength constantly in order to overwhelm the enemy position. Since the success or failure of such an attack often determines subsequent developments in the situation, it is particularly important to display a most furious fighting spirit from the outset of attack preparations, with the determination to annihilate the enemy forces at one blow.

##### 8. Noteworthy Points in a Surprise Attack

It is difficult to make a successful surprise night attack. This is true, especially when the enemy occupies a strong, closely-organized position, such as a bridgehead, or when our attacking strength is large. However, inasmuch as the surprise element is the one great advantage in night combat, it will be utilized by all means. Even in the case of an assault, the initial movement of troops

will be kept secret and developed at an appropriate time into a full scale open attack.

Matters which must be carefully watched when making a successful surprise attack are as follows:

- a. To make attack preparations carefully and properly.
- b. To be careful to keep our intention a secret.
- c. To utilize terrain features, especially dead space and gullies, which make it easier to conceal our intent.
- d. To charge in through rugged terrain where the enemy little dreams of our approach.
- e. To attack when the enemy is in an unguarded state because of the time element or weather conditions.
- f. To conduct reconnaissance of the enemy's security condition and approach and charge into those points where his watch is not strict.
- g. To destroy or disable various trip wire warning systems.
- h. To frustrate the enemy's illumination tactics.
- i. To use demonstration and feint tactics skillfully.
- j. To attack the enemy after the war of nerves has exhausted him and caused slackness in his watch.
- k. To wreck the chain of command.

9. Necessity of Gradual Attack and Importance of a Blitzkrieg-like Attack

When the enemy is overwhelmingly superior in fighting power,

especially fire power, and occupies a strong position, it is customary to make a gradual attack against one target after another so that the casualties of the assaulting echelon are kept to a minimum, and supporting fire power equipment and supplies may be advanced smoothly. In this case, it is also necessary to maintain at all times a strength sufficient to break through the enemy position and to make preparations to meet tank or artillery attacks. However, such a gradual attack on the enemy position is apt to give the enemy the time to muster reinforcements from unperiled sectors or to make preparations for the concentration and employment of reserve force or fire power, which may result in frustrating our subsequent attacks. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the speed of attack as much as possible. When there is sufficient strength to break through the enemy position, we must carry out a daytime attack on the heels of a night attack. In the event of a successful break through, the penetration must be continued deep into the enemy position even in the darkness.

#### 10. Noteworthy Points in Combat

a. All commanding officers will try to overpower the enemy and capture his position by employing systematically the front-line attacking force, heavy weapons, artillery, obstacle removal sections, raiding parties, etc. At the same time, they will always continue to improve preparations to meet the enemy's tank, artillery or bombing attacks, in order to secure the occupied areas

and thus facilitate our subsequent attacks.

b. In view of the fact that command over troops in the dark becomes physically and spiritually difficult, especially when the troops are exposed to fierce artillery or bombing attacks, all commanding officers will make careful preparations to meet such attacks and at the same time require their men to obey orders.

c. In order to secure occupied areas and insure the success of attacks by front-line forces, it is necessary to speedily advance heavy weapons and artillery units to the front line and to make complete preparations to protect advance positions from the enemy's artillery or bombing attacks. For this purpose, all commanding officers must work out a detailed, elaborate plan concerning preparations for advance, especially the time and method of advance. They will also take steps to insure that the plan will be carried out satisfactorily.

d. The fighting power of front-line forces will be maintained and increased during break-through operations by maintaining an adequate supply of ammunition and material.

e. All commanding officers must constantly maintain the fighting power of front-line infantry units. For this purpose, they will order the units under their command to carry out a series of attacks according to their attacking capacity.

f. Transportation facilities, especially those within a position, will be improved in order to facilitate the advance of rear



echelon troops, artillery units, ammunition and supplies.


g. Timely liaison with important areas will be achieved, even when under the enemy's furious artillery and bombing attack, by insuring prompt communications.

h. In order not to suffer unnecessary losses, fortification works will be utilized throughout the offensive, forces will be deployed, advance will be made on all fours and camouflage will be emphasized.

i. Raiding parties will be employed to throw the enemy position into confusion, facilitating a subsequent attack by the main force.

11. An example of the plan for attacking the enemy position is shown in Charts 1-A, B and C.

a. When an attack or approach is made only at night, with the daytime spent in attack preparations for defensive action.



**Explanation:**

(1) In the event daylight movement is difficult due to the difference in the fighting power of both sides, particularly in regard to firepower on the ground and air power, a series of attacks based on this plan will be executed.

(2) In many cases when carrying out an attack, a small group of picked troops will capture an enemy position and the main body will be used to secure it firmly.


(3) Various methods will be devised for movements advancing to the position of preparation for the attack.

(4) Cover and help for the advance of heavy firearms and artillery and the transportation of ammunition and materials before X+1 day will be executed by the second line battalion.

(5) The regimental commander will draw up an integrated plan regarding the employment of raiding units. He will not only commit into the front line elements from the second line battalion troops under his direct command, but he may also command both front line battalion commanders to commit and employ other troops on their respective fronts.

(6) It has been decided to advance up to the enemy company's line of resistance during the night of X day because altogether ten hours would be necessary to approach, capture and secure firmly the enemy position, seven hours being required to approach and penetrate it, which means an average of one hour to advance 100 meters, and three hours to secure the position firmly. Moreover, because it is deemed that it will be extremely difficult to secure the enemy position firmly during the daytime of X+1 day inasmuch as tanks, mortars, artillery, etc, constituting the enemy's main fighting power, will be active during the day, it is essential to devise special effective measures for antitank combat and cover against enemy artillery bombardment in order to obtain excellent results in conducting raiding tactics against the enemy. On the night of X day, the deeper the enemy position is penetrated, the greater will be the damage inflicted on enemy tanks, mortars, artillery, etc, so it will become easier to secure the captured position firmly. Therefore, it will be planned to penetrate the enemy front as deep as possible, and, for this purpose, if circumstances permit, it is advisable to commence the attack at dusk.

b. When conducting an attack during the day and night.



Explanation:

(1) This plan was worked out on the premise that the night penetration would be exploited fully.

For the daylight attack on X+1 day, heavy fire arms and artillery will cooperate with their full strength in the front line fighting and preparations for this cooperation will be completed by the morning of X+1 day.


The heavy fire arms and artillery necessary for the above cooperation will be enroute to their positions, so their cooperation may not be expected in the night attack of X day.

(2) Depending on the circumstances, each battalion may be employed for additional aims.

(3) The second line battalions, in most cases, cannot expect the powerful cooperation of heavy fire arms and artillery for their night assault of X+1 day. Accordingly, the night assault for X+1 day may possibly be put off till after the daytime of X+2 day.

(4) In case attacks are to be continued throughout the day and night, sometimes the attacks will be commenced in the daytime instead of at night as shown in this plan. It will be advantageous to commence attacks at night when the fighting power including artillery is not sufficient but the darkness makes possible the completion of careful preparations. Attacks may be commenced at the daytime when the situation is otherwise.

c. When the Attack by the Main Force is Facilitated by a Powerful Raiding Unit.



Explanation:

(1) This is a plan, in view of the increasing difficulty for the raiding unit to infiltrate into the enemy position, to penetrate the enemy position by the use of force and then shift to raiding tactics in order to facilitate the day attack of the main force.

(2) The main duty of the front line battalion after turning to raiding tactics resembles the aim of the artillery's preliminary firing for attack, and it consists of destroying obstacles and trip wire warning devices, exterminating tanks, breaking down the command system and destroying artillery and trench mortars.

The movements of the front line battalion after shifting to raiding tactics will always be determined by the existing situation. However, heavy fire arms usually will be placed under the command of the second line battalion commander.

(3) Depending on the situation, various methods will be utilized such as the dispatching of strength formed principally around one company from each battalion which is to carry out the attack in place of the raiding battalion.

d. In launching a surprise night raiding attack, when the difference between the enemy's and our combat strength is too great to permit the maintenance and securing of an enemy position after its capture special care must be taken to conceal our intent. Also, the time, area or target of attack will be coordinated and determined mathematically and systematically, and preferably, as many raiding parties as possible will be used against the enemy position after sunset, but they must return to the position of attack preparation by dawn.

In case it is necessary to carry out an attack as mentioned above, it is important to utilize various means to obtain the greatest sum effect, by utilizing such methods as conducting a series of night attacks or uncovering secrets of the enemy position and attacking his neglected point.

#### 12. Use of Firearms in Night Attacks

In night attacks stress is laid on the surprise element, and since small arms are not as effective at night as during the day, and since there is the ever-present danger of shooting at friendly troops, the Army has hitherto preferred to carry out night attacks utilizing close quarter combat. However, when a large attack strength is to be employed due to the increasing necessity of carrying out night attacks and also, due to the frequency of attacks under illumination, the attack will be carried out by taking advantage of favorable terrain features and the effective use of fire arms.



However, as there is a limit to the effectiveness of our fire arms, it is essential to decide on the key target so that the effectiveness of a surprise attack may be demonstrated to its fullest extent.

13. Matters to be Noted in Carrying Out an Attack With the Support of Firearms

a. The senior commander will give a plain, preliminary explanation regarding the use of fire arms. At this time, it is better, in most cases, not to use rifles as stipulated in the Infantry Drill Regulations, but to use light machine-guns and submachine guns.

b. Generally, the time to use firearms will be determined definitely, but may be changed according to the enemy situation or to gain the most out of the surprise element.

In employing fire arms at night, it should be noted that various troubles will occur unless careful preliminary arrangements are made. And even when the situation is such that it can be anticipated that it will become necessary to employ raiding tactics from the middle of a surprise attack, the time to use firearms will be determined and planned, and changed only to meet changes in the enemy situation. Only in such cases can success in surprise attacks be expected.

c. Matters to be specially noted in fixing the time for a forced shift in tactics to meet changes in the situation:

(1) See whether the enemy has commenced firing on the entire

front.

(2) Know the condition of subordinates while under enemy fire and illumination.

(3) Utilize terrain features, so that when the enemy fires on the entire front, a minimum of losses will be sustained and the advance can be continued.

(4) Remember that, at very close range, it is more advantageous to charge into the enemy position instead of continuing to fire.

(5) When there is fear of being subjected to sudden fire attack due to the enemy's illumination and signals, efforts must be made to suppress the latter without loss of time.

Generally speaking, those decisions based upon the above conditions will be made by the infantry battalion commander, and executed by the front-line company commander as was ordered in advance according to the situation.

#### 14. Preliminary Firing for Attack

It would be to our advantage if we could carry out preliminary firing to prepare for night attack and destroy the vital points of the enemy's command system and fire network. However in view of our artillery strength and the difficulty in utilizing its power, this firing is feasible only on rare occasions. Accordingly, it will be necessary in most cases to carry out only destructive firing in preparation for charge or to concentrate on support firing during a charge.

In case preliminary firing for attack or destructive firing is practicable, it will usually be carried out shortly before the attack on the enemy's main position, so that our objective may be attained in the shortest possible time. In this event, the enemy's trench mortars and command center will be fired upon by the howitzers and trench mortars disposed to the rear and the enemy's special pillboxes will be destroyed with the light guns stationed on the front line as part of the support firing during a charge.

#### 15. Charge and Support of Charge

The principles of daylight attack apply to the charge and to the support of the charge when conducted through the use of fire-arms. However, inasmuch as close harmony between close combat and fire power, which is difficult even in the daytime, is necessary, the commanding officer concerned must determine careful and detailed procedures after studying the situation and terrain and thus do his utmost to make preliminary preparations complete.

For convenience in supplying support fire for the charge, positions for heavy fire arms and artillery will be selected as near the front line as possible with a view to suppressing or destroying special pillboxes, covered machine gun emplacements, and if necessary, illuminating apparatus. If artillery and trench mortars have to be stationed in the rear due to the situation, they will be used to subdue vital points in the enemy position, cut off communications between the enemy's front line and rear or suppress enemy trench

mortars.

Heavy fire arms and artillery assigned to giving support fire for the charge will begin surprise firing immediately before the charge of the infantry in order to aid in attaining attack aims in the shortest possible time. In this case, aligning points prepared in advance will be utilized usually for indirect aiming, but under intense illumination firing by direct aiming will be possible in some cases.

If it is possible to assign heavy fire arms and artillery exclusively for the purpose of destroying illuminating apparatus, it will prove advantageous. However, when the number of guns is not sufficient, those assigned to the suppression of special pillboxes or covered machine gun emplacements will be ordered, when necessary to destroy illuminating apparatus near the firing line.

The front-line infantry, after closing in upon the enemy position by means of creeping and crawling, will begin firing light machine guns and grenade throwers in concert with the heavy firearms and artillery and thus overpower the enemy by carrying out a surprise charge after advancing as close as possible to the enemy position.

It should be noted that heavy fire arms and artillery for night firing often delay the activities of the front line by taking more time than expected in making preparations for firing.

#### 16. Counterbattery (Trench Mortar) Fire

a. If our artillery strength is inferior to the enemy's it is difficult to conduct counterbattery fire, except under the most

favorable situations. Therefore, generally speaking, counterbattery fire shall be avoided, but it may be employed suddenly and for a short period against those hostile artillery and trench mortar positions which are inflicting the most serious damages upon our forces, to check the activities of these positions.

b. In carrying out counterbattery fire, it will be advantageous if methods other than the artillery are used to disperse the hostile artillery fire and to destroy his artillery, trench mortars and observation and commanding posts.

Enemy artillery fire should be dispersed by attacking from several directions and also by carrying out various demonstrations and feinting operations.

When employing a raiding party with the above objective in mind, it is better to carry out a surprise attack against the hostile artillery, trench mortar firing line, and observation posts, and to destroy his radio equipment, telephone sets, and sever his telephone lines. In particular, such attacks should be carried out by taking advantage of the enemy's bombardment.

#### 17. Guidance for Position Combat

In conducting position combat, it must be fully remembered that position combat is equal to counterbattery fire. Advance shall be made with ample preparations so as to be able to carry out anti-tank combat at any time, and every opportunity shall be seized to destroy tanks when attacked. At the same time, thorough preparations

for antitank combat shall be included in the activities to secure an occupied area.

18. Guidance on Coordination between First Line Units, and Heavy Weapons and Artillery, in Night Position Combat

a. In order to make a proper selection of the time and place for the full display of our fire power and to facilitate coordination between fire power and the activities of the first-line units, the commander shall give precise combat guidance and shall rigidly control the activities of the first-line units.

In position combat first-line units shall make all out efforts to conduct raiding tactics against the enemy, even when they have accompanying firepower.

b. The first-line units, shall maintain close liaison with the artillery and heavy weapons and shall advance or attempt to remove confronting obstacles while under fire cover. In this case, due attention should be paid to the disposition of troops and utilization of terrain so as not to obstruct firing. On the other hand, the first-line units shall continuously inform the artillery unit about their location, disposition, and fire effect, in order to aid the artillery.

c. Night firing by heavy weapons and artillery guns in position is generally limited, compared with daytime firing, but illumination is often used to facilitate night firing. Moreover, inasmuch as the effectiveness of firing is important in breaking down strong enemy resistance, it is necessary to make thorough preparations for night

riring by the artillery and heavy weapons and to improve command techniques, firing operation, observation, and liaison, in order to meet the demands of the first-line units.

19. Important Points in Planning and Carrying Out Night Attacks

a. Time to Commence Attack

Although it is better to surprise the enemy by taking advantage of his unguarded points, much time is required to approach enemy positions commence an attack immediately after sunset. Attack is sometimes started at dusk and continued throughout the night to secure or expand our gains.

b. Designation of Attack Targets

(1) Both areas to be captured and areas to be secured are generally to be designated as attack targets. On this occasion, the front and the depth of the areas concerned must be clearly indicated and conspicuous terrain and landmarks utilized for this purpose.

(2) It is provided in the regulations that a combat zone shall be assigned to units larger than the tactical unit, but for the purpose of facilitating combat in covered ground and promoting preparation for night attack, it is often advantageous to assign a battle zone to an infantry company, which is the combat unit.

c. Battle Front

Just as night fighting resembles day fighting in many respects, the battlefront of a night attack must resemble the front of a day attack in order to facilitate the capture and subsequent

securing of occupied positions.

d. In carrying out troop disposition for a series of attacks, importance must be attached to the task of firmly securing an occupied area. Therefore, the depth of penetration into enemy territory must be restricted properly. As a result, it is often the case that the size of the units to be employed for a series of night attacks is of company size or smaller.

e. Emphasis on Combat Team Tactics

Because of the importance of attacks on pillboxes and fire positions and closing-in tactics in antitank warfare, combat team tactics must be more and more emphasized in night attacks.

f. The distance to be maintained and other matters requiring special attention when the rear unit is following the front-line unit, are as described below:

(1) In order to avoid as much as possible casualties and losses from the same barrage fire directed against the front-line unit, the rear unit will advance by maintaining proper distance that will still enable it to remain in contact with the front-line unit.

(2) From the outset the rear unit will fix the point of attack disposition and advance in a formation ready for this disposition. It will exert efforts to minimize casualties and losses by deploying thoroughly as in the case of front-line units.

(3) The rear unit will dispatch beforehand a liaison officer (he will carry communication equipment as much as possible)



to the commander of the front-line unit to become acquainted with the conditions of the front-line unit.

When executing a leapfrog movement, the commanders of both units will directly meet in order to have a full knowledge of the enemy situation confronting them and the topography of the battle-front.

#### 20. Demonstrations and Feints

Demonstrations and feints must be carried out in accordance with the higher echelon commander's plan in such a manner as to make the enemy misjudge the time of attack, frontage of an attack, strength, plan, troop movement, etc. An example of the procedure for conducting demonstrations and feints is as given below:

The enemy shall be deceived by utilizing any of the following: false cooking smoke; deceptive illumination, signals, and sounds; dummy soldiers, guns, and installations; simulated fire, the occupation of false attack preparation positions; destruction of obstacles; removal of trip wire warning systems; reconnaissance of enemy positions; raiding attacks and simulated traces of a march, etc.

The demonstration or feint will usually be carried out against a sector other than the intended main sector of attack. But when it becomes necessary to deceive the enemy as to the time of the attack instead, because it has become difficult to conceal our projected attack, such means as repeated concentrated fire on the point of

assault during attack preparation and advancing of elements under cover of fire, or the use of smoke screens may be employed.

In conducting false demonstrations, careful preparations must be made so as not to produce the countereffect of exposing the true plan or hampering the over-all attack.

21. Since the execution of a night attack is liable to be hampered by various unexpected troubles or not carried out as expected, the commander must make full preparations to meet any emergency.

22. Brave and resolute actions by all commanding officers as well as tight control of troops are essential prerequisites to a successful night attack. If and when they are imprudent and reckless in action their troops will suffer such great casualties as to affect seriously the subsequent attack. Therefore, they must complete thorough preparations to meet enemy bombing and shelling attacks. Furthermore, commanding officers must take into account the possibility of death or disability of leaders during an action and take proper measures so that command may be continued and maintained.

### 23. Example of Casualties in Night Combat

The estimate of casualties resulting from a night attack is an important factor in formulating an attack plan, but since the details will vary with the situation, it is difficult to give examples.

However, the following example derived from recent combat experiences may serve as a guide.

In a series of night attacks, a front-line company will suffer the following casualties:

The pillbox seizure unit and obstacle removal squad will lose approximately 40 percent of their total strength before the seizure of an enemy position. The company main force will lose approximately 20 percent during an approach movement and approximately 30 to 40 percent during the securing of an occupied area during daylight. Heavy fire arms and artillery units will lose 15 to 20 percent. The second-line company will suffer casualties of 10 to 20 percent before leapfrogging the front-line company.

APPENDIX V

Field Service Regulations

Part IV

Attack Against Special

Defensive Zone

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
General	
CHAPTER I      General Procedures of Attack	357
General	357
Section A.    Attack Preparations	361
Section B.    Conduct of the Attack	366
CHAPTER II     Assault by Pillbox Assault Unit	371
General	371
Section A.    Organization	371
Section B.    Attack Preparations	372
Section C.    Conduct of the Attack	374
CHAPTER III    Night Attack	377
CHAPTER IV     Heavy Artillery Action	379
General	379
Section A.    Attack Preparations	380
Section B.    Conduct of the Attack	383
SUPPLEMENTARY CHARTS	
CHART I        Organization and Equipment of Pillbox Assault Unit, Example 1	
CHART II       Organization and Equipment of pillbox Assault Unit, Example 2	

## Attack Against Special Defensive Zone

### General

1. This book, a part of the Field Service Regulations (Sakusen Yomurei), discusses the peculiarities of the attack against special defensive zones (field positions organized around pillboxes).

The attack against a special defensive zone is conducted according to this book and the tactical principles laid down in Part II, Position Warfare.

2. Because the procedures for attack against a special defensive zone vary greatly according to the situation preceding the attack, the organization and equipment of our forces, the organization of enemy positions, the terrain and geological features and the weather; units conducting the attack must make a thorough study based on local conditions and must endeavor to effectively apply tactical principles with initiative and resourcefulness.

## CHAPTER I

### General Procedures of Attack

#### General

3. The strength of a special defensive zone depends to a large degree on the situation. A defensive zone, even when pillboxes are already constructed, is weak unless other supporting defenses are also completed. Further, the defensive zone is not strong, even if all construction is complete, unless the positions are manned by an adequate number of men or a timely troop reinforcement is possible. However, the well developed and adequately manned special defensive zone which maintains vigilant security measures is especially strong.

4. The following are generally considered the principle weaknesses of the special defensive zone:

(1) Because the organization of defense positions is difficult to conceal, the attacking side is able to plan appropriate measures for its destruction.

(2) Destruction or neutralization of a pillbox renders it difficult for the defender to redispense his forces without weakening the rest of the position.

(3) Cooperation between troops manning pillboxes and those manning other defense positions is difficult. This is especially true in cases of sudden change in the situation.

(4) The effectiveness of the entire defensive position is lowered when the limited visibility of night or fog prevents any

pillbox functioning with maximum efficiency.

5. Adequate preparations must be made in order to attack the special defensive zone. The attack must be made with surprise and speed and must penetrate the entire depth of the hostile defensive zone. It is highly essential to determine the weak points of the enemy defense and to surprise the enemy by opening the attack suddenly, taking advantage of foul weather and difficult terrain whenever possible. Once the attack is launched every effort must be made to accelerate the speed of penetration and to overpower the defenders before the arrival of enemy reinforcements.

The various points with the hostile defensive zone may be seized in successive stages, depending on the strength of our force and the condition of hostile positions. In a progressive attack the front line unit must exert every effort to advance to the designated objective.

6. It is important to utilize the cover of darkness in attacking a special defensive zone.

Depending on the season and the situation, an attack is often launched utilizing the half-light of dawn or dusk. Sometimes large-scale use of gas or smoke is advantageous in facilitating the attack.

7. The front line unit assigned to attack the special defensive zone must organize the necessary number of pillbox assault units and employ them in direct attack against the pillboxes while the main



body is attacking the rest of the hostile defensive zone.

In the event that the pillboxes in the hostile defensive zone are neither numerous nor strong, the front line unit may have its components dispose of the pillboxes at their own discretion, without organizing special pillbox assault units.

8. The division commander will support the front line unit with heavy artillery and engineer "Ki" units¹ in order to speed the seizure of enemy positions. In such a support action, it is advantageous to progressively employ the full support strength against each objective without dispersing maximum power. This is especially so when the "Ki" and heavy artillery units are available only in limited strength. When these support units are not available, the division commander must employ a part of his field artillery to neutralize pillboxes or in laying down a smoke screen to obstruct enemy observation.

9. In general, the following are the weak points of pillboxes:

- (1) Concealment of pillbox is difficult.
- (2) Limited fields of vision and fire often leave a number of dead spaces or angles in front of the defensive zone.
- (3) It is difficult to open the steel shutters and deliver fire while the firing slit is being subjected to direct fire.

---

1. "Ki" was an abbreviation of the term Sogoki, the name applied to tanks which were especially designed and equipped to assault pillboxes. Equipment included flame throwers and trench crossing treads. A "Ki" Regiment was composed of 3 companies with 3 Sogoki tanks each.

- (4) They are susceptible to smoke screens.
- (5) A shell explosion inside a pillbox will invariably cause serious damage and many casualties.
- (6) Fire from a pillbox may be rendered less effective due to the accumulation of powder smoke within the pillbox.
- (7) It is almost impossible to purify the air in a pillbox as they seldom have an exhaust blower capable of removing gases.

10. In attacking a pillbox, the assault unit usually neutralizes the weapons first and then mops up the enemy inside. However, a separately organized mop-up unit may be employed.

Gas may be used effectively by the pillbox assault unit as it will either completely suppress the enemy or hamper the effective use of the pillbox.

11. The "Ki" unit is attached to the front line divisions and employed in the demolition of enemy pillboxes in close cooperation with infantry troops. Every effort must be made to utilize the characteristics of the "Ki" unit to the best advantage.

The division commander usually attaches the "Ki" unit to the front line unit in the sector of the main attack effort. A "Ki" company either being attached to the front line infantry regiment (or battalion) or employed in direct support.

Whenever the situation requires, the division commander directly employs all or a part of the attached "Ki" regiment in support of the front line unit in order to destroy enemy pillboxes in depth. The division commander may also attach a part of the "Ki"

unit to the tank unit.

12. The tank unit is, as a rule, employed to penetrate the rear positions of the hostile defensive zone. Tanks are normally employed in support of the attack against the general position, but may be employed in direct support of the pillbox assault units.

13. The direct air support of the attack against a special defensive zone is conducted in accordance with air support procedures for an attack against field positions. A bombing attack against pillboxes is not usually conducted because such attacks are seldom effective.

14. The unit assigned to attack a special defensive zone, taking into consideration the organization and character of enemy positions, the nature of terrain and the enemy disposition, must select the tactics and combat materials suitable for the situation in order to achieve the element of surprise and must conduct as much battlefield training as possible.

#### Section A. Attack Preparations

15. The attack must be thoroughly prepared by exercising tight security to conceal our intention, guarding against enemy intelligence activities, and endeavoring to the utmost not to give the enemy observers any impression of changes taking place. While making detailed attack preparations, it is also essential to complete preparations for immediate raiding if it should be possible to take advantage of enemy unpreparedness.

16. Attack preparations should include moving the front line unit as close to the enemy as possible. However, when the front line unit is familiar with the terrain, it may be more advantageous to first move picked officers and men of the front line unit to the attack position in order to secretly complete preparations, and then move the balance of the unit to the position during the night preceding the attack.

17. Reconnaissance of pillboxes is conducted to obtain information which may be evaluated and classified by taking into consideration the information acquired from past studies. Even during combat the captured pillbox must be studied in order to evaluate the capabilities of other pillboxes. Some of the items of information required are:

- (1) Organization of fire between the pillboxes and between the pillboxes and the other positions.
- (2) The terrain of the area in which the pillbox is located and the dead spaces in the fires of the pillbox.
- (3) The obstacles protecting the pillbox.
- (4) Existence of warning devices (electrical or other) for the pillbox.
- (5) The shape and the thickness of the walls.
- (6) The number of firing slits, the direction of fire, the height of firing slits from the ground, and the existence of loopholes for firing downward at close range.
- (7) The thickness of steel shutters of firing slits and the working of the shutters.

- (8) The type and number of weapons and the number of men in the pillbox.
- (9) Interior construction of the pillbox, especially the existence of a partition wall or lower deck.
- (10) Location and construction of entrance.
- (11) Ventilation, water supply, lighting, and periscopic equipment.
- (12) Existence of communication tunnel and the tunnel opening.
- (13) Location of sector command post.
- (14) Signal communication devices.
- (15) Detection of dummy or unmanned pillboxes.

18. The guns and automatic weapons to lay direct fire against the firing slits must be moved up as close to the enemy pillbox as possible and placed in a position directly facing the slits. Every measure must be taken to conceal the positions of these guns and automatic weapons.

19. The front line unit responsible for attacking a special defensive zone and the artillery unit to directly support the attack must, prior to the attack, agree on the respective sectors of responsibility in disposing of pillboxes, the time and procedures to be employed against the pillboxes, action to be taken by pillbox assault units and the method of maintaining liaison with those units.

20. In case a "Ki" unit is to be employed, the commanders concerned must coordinate and be in complete agreement on the following procedures:

- (1) The time to commit the Sogoki (tanks equipped with flame throwers and other weapons especially suitable for assaulting pillboxes.) and the attack objective of those machines.
- (2) Action by the infantry, tanks, artillery, and "Ki" unit.
- (3) The line of departure and the area of operation of Sogoki and the time and method of passing through the front-line infantry.
- (4) The timing of the assault by the front-line infantry and the demolition of pillboxes, and the distances to be maintained to avoid losses from the demolition activity. Support to be provided during each successive phase of action and infantry and artillery cooperation between tanks and Sogoki.
- (5) Cooperation by the other engineer units when the Sogoki pass the obstacles.
- (6) The means of signal communication.
- (7) The measures to be taken in case the attack does not progress as scheduled.
- (8) Action by the Sogoki after the mission is accomplished.

21. The usual practice is to dispose the front-line regiment so as to achieve rapid penetration throughout the entire depth of the hostile defensive zone which is the division objective. For this purpose the front-line unit may be disposed in two successive attack echelons (TN A battalion comprises each echelon) with one battalion leapfrogging the other during the attack. In such an attack, the regimental commander, taking into consideration the attack objective and the firmness of enemy defense, prescribes the limit of advance for each echelon.

22. The commander of the infantry regiment usually employs the regimental gun unit and attached artillery units to fire at the firing slits to neutralize the pillboxes or to support the assault unit. The regimental commander's decision whether to take direct command of the regimental gun unit and the attached artillery unit or attach these units to the first echelon battalion, rests on the number of enemy pillboxes and the strength of the attached artillery. When necessary, the regimental commander regulates the target and time of fire against the firing slits, and the positions of the regimental guns and attached artillery.

23. It is advantageous for the first echelon battalion commander to employ his first echelon company in a rapid penetration that bypasses the enemy pillboxes. In such an attack the battalion commander usually not only regulates the firing against the pillboxes, but organizes a required number of pillbox assault units from his infantry and engineer components and employs them under his direct command.

The regimental commander must take measures in accordance with Paragraph 22 to facilitate penetration of the hostile position by the first echelon battalion. For this purpose, the regimental commander may occasionally organize the pillbox assault units.

The battalion and regimental commanders must plan on the appropriate measures to be taken in case an unexpected pillbox is encountered or the attack by the pillbox assault units is stalled. For this purpose, it is advisable to organize reserve pillbox assault units, particularly at battalion level.

24. The battalion commander, taking into consideration the number of enemy pillboxes to be dealt with, regulates the action of the pillbox assault units and the deployment of the heavy weapons and artillery under his direct command in laying fire against the enemy firing slits and, if required, designates the pillboxes to be dealt with by the first echelon company.

When necessary, the heavy infantry weapons and artillery to be used to deliver fire against pillboxes may be deployed in an adjacent unit's zone of action.

In firing against firing slits, the usual practice is to employ one weapon to each main aperture.

25. Tanks employed in direct attack on pillboxes will neutralize the pillbox by firing against the firing slits or prevent firing through slits by placing the body of the tank immediately in front of the opening.

26. Units which are to advance into the hostile defensive zone in order to lay direct fire against the enemy pillboxes must be equipped to pass through obstacles and shell-pocked areas, to use camouflage and be ready to seize the initiative to open the fire first.

#### Section B. Conduct of the Attack

27. If possible, the attack must be launched suddenly to surprise the enemy. The front-line unit, while neutralizing the enemy pillboxes, must advance rapidly toward the objective and the division commander must be prepared to exploit the success immediately. Often, when the



situation permits, the principle pillboxes are seized at the onset by a surprise attack conducted by a part of the front-line unit.

28. During the preliminary bombardment, the field artillery must: direct the fire on enemy positions other than the pillboxes, destroy the defensive installations and facilities protecting the pillboxes, destroy the camouflage concealing the pillboxes, and disrupt the enemy command system.

Heavy artillery, when available for the attack, is employed to destroy key pillboxes in the inner areas of the hostile defensive zone.

29. If possible, the pillbox assault units must advance rapidly ahead of the attacking infantry and assault the pillboxes immediately.

The pillbox assault unit committed to attack the pillbox in the inner areas of hostile defensive zone is usually deployed behind the front-line unit. As the attack progresses, the assault unit is moved up ahead of the front-line prepared to assault the pillbox at the first opportunity.

30. The obstacles protecting the pillbox are usually destroyed by the pillbox assault unit, but it will be advantageous if the obstacles are destroyed by artillery fire before the assault.

31. The opening of direct laying against the firing slits of a hostile pillbox should be so timed as to suppress the pillbox in time for the front-line infantry to commence the assault.

32. Direct laying against the firing slits must be so conducted as to achieve the desired result in the shortest possible time.

Important points to be remembered in conducting such fires are:

(1) Field and mountain artillery and regimental guns usually fire high explosive shells with instantaneous or short delay fuzes. Whenever required, the field and mountain artillery fire gas or smoke shells. A shell explosion inside a pillbox is often confirmable by smoke emitted from firing slits and observation port.

(2) Antitank guns normally fire high explosive shells, with instantaneous or short delay fuzes but when the slit shutters are closed, armor piercing shells are used.

(3) Machine guns and machine cannons usually fire at the firing slits at close range when the shutters are opened, but when the shutters are closed, the firing of armor piercing shells are more effective.

(4) Light machine guns or rifles are usually fired at the firing slits (one light machine gun or several rifles against one slit) at close range. Even when the shutters are closed, it is advantageous to continue firing to discourage opening of the shutters.

33. Guns and automatic weapons which provide direct supporting fire to the pillbox assault unit continue direct laying against the firing slits, as long as possible, while the pillbox assault unit advances and act to suppress enemy firing points and counterattacking enemy troops which may hinder the advance of the pillbox assault unit.

34. Necessary preparations must be made to cope with pillboxes which are unexpectedly encountered as well as with those which are so located as to deny prior reconnaissance as to direction of fire, etc. The reserve pillbox assault unit should be committed to assault such positions. Sogoki can also be used to excellent advantage.

35. In case the assault by the pillbox assault unit is unsuccessful, heavy infantry weapons must be temporarily employed as an emergency measure. The reserve pillbox assault unit and others are committed after the cause of the failure is eliminated. In spite of delays in neutralizing individual pillboxes, the main body of the attacking unit must continue its relentless advance.

## CHAPTER II

### Assault by Pillbox Assault Unit

#### General

36. Each pillbox assault unit is usually assigned the mission of assaulting one hostile pillbox. The normal procedure for assaulting is first, the prompt suppression of its firing capabilities, followed by mopping up inside to put the pillbox completely out of action.

#### Section A. Organization

37. The pillbox assault unit is usually organized with both infantry and engineer troops. The numbers of each and their equipment being determined by the structure of the pillbox, the surrounding terrain and the weather and light conditions.

The pillbox assault unit is platoon size, or less, commanded by a picked infantry or engineer officer. However, under some circumstances a pillbox assault unit of less than 10 men commanded by a non-commissioned officer will suffice.

The organization and mission of a pillbox assault unit must be determined well in advance so as to allow the unit ample time for preparations. Troops of assault units should be equipped as lightly as possible.

38. The commander of a pillbox assault unit plans the assault on the basis of the mission of his unit. Units are normally organized into assault, support, obstacle clearing and reserve sections.

A small unit may be organized into a lesser number of sections by combining duties.

39. The assault section engages chiefly in the attack against firing slits and mopping up and destruction of the interior.

The support section neutralizes any enemy obstructing the movement of the pillbox assault unit. For this purpose the support section must direct fire at the firing slits at a very close range in conjunction with heavy infantry weapons and artillery fire and continue firing until the assault section closes in. It is also necessary for the support section to neutralize any enemy directly supporting the pillbox during the assault.

The obstacle clearing section destroys the obstacles protecting the pillbox.

Whenever necessary, the reserve section replaces men, carries extra demolition charges and other equipment for the assault section and assists in mopping up the interior of the pillbox.

40. Supplementary Charts 1 and 2 show the organization of a pillbox assault units.

#### Section B. Attack Preparations

41. When assigning the mission to a pillbox assault unit; the pillbox to be assaulted, the time of departure, the zone of action, the assault method, and the action to be taken after the success is achieved must be clearly prescribed. Prior arrangements between the pillbox assault unit and other units concerned must be made by

familiarizing the pillbox assault unit with the planned action of the main body and the units which are to support the pillbox assault unit.

42. If the situation permits, the commander of a pillbox assault unit should rehearse his men for the contemplated assault in order to thoroughly familiarize every man with his duties. He must also arouse in his men a willingness to die for the success of the main body and an unyielding determination to accomplish the mission.

43. The commander of a pillbox assault unit, accompanied by the noncommissioned officers picked to lead the sections and teams should reconnoiter the pillbox to be assaulted, studying the routes of advance, the dead spaces, and other important factors in order to perfect the assault preparations. Every caution must be exercised during reconnaissance in order not to attract enemy attention.

44. In order to assure perfect execution of the pillbox assault, the unit commander's plan should cover the following pertinent points:

- (1) Attack procedures and the organization and mission of each section.
- (2) Attack preparations:
  - (a) Distribution of equipment and material.
  - (b) Selecting the line of departure (where to select the line of departure depends on the location of the enemy pillbox, but the line is usually selected near the assault position of the front-line infantry.
  - (c) Disposition of each section.
- (3) Conduct of the attack:

- (a) Time of departure (relationship with the timing of supporting fire by the infantry and artillery is specified).
- (b) Method of advance.
- (c) Action of each section and coordination.
- (d) Action following the successful accomplishment of the mission.
- (e) Cooperation with other units concerned and means of liaison.

#### Section C. Conduct of the Attack

45. The pillbox assault unit approaches the pillbox, taking advantage of dead spaces and the suppression of enemy fire. The component sections cooperate to accomplish the mission promptly.

46. The support section approaches the enemy rapidly, clearing the obstacles without assistance, if possible, and suppresses the enemy impeding the advance of the assault section. The obstacle clearing section clears the obstacles with the cooperation of the support section.

47. The assault section must endeavor to approach the pillbox quickly and establish themselves in the dead spaces (dead angles of firing slits, rear or roof of the pillbox, adjacent shell holes, trenches, etc.). Working from these close-in positions they attack the firing slits and suppress the pillbox fire which may be interrupting the attack of the main body. At times the firing slit with the greatest capabilities is attacked first and the rest of the slits are attacked progressively, but whenever the situation permits, it

is advantageous to assign each firing slit to a team and attack them simultaneously.

48. The assault section, when it closes in upon the pillbox, promptly suppresses the fire from the slits by using a flame thrower or demolition tube (Bangalors torpedo). Under some circumstances, an implement is employed to block the firing slits or screening objects (straw, cloth, or smoke) are placed or spread in front of slits to obstruct firing before the pillbox is neutralized by the use of hand grenades, flame throwers, etc., fired through the firing slits, ventilation openings or periscope holes. Closed steel shutters are destroyed by armor piercing mines before attacking the interior.

49. When the firing from slits is successfully suppressed the assault section, avoiding unnecessary concentration, promptly enters the pillbox to mop up the enemy. Once inside, underground communication lines and tunnels are either blocked or utilized.

50. When the communication tunnel of a pillbox is demolished, the location of a tunnel entrance which may be located some distance from the pillbox is often revealed by the emission of smoke. It is important that the tunnel entrance be discovered promptly and demolished or blocked.

The absence of a direct entrance to a pillbox indicates the existence of a communication tunnel and efforts must be made to discover its location even after the pillbox is destroyed.



51. The ventilation opening must be plugged before introducing gas into a pillbox.

## CHAPTER III

### Night Attack

52. The night attack is used against a special defensive zone in order to capture key points to facilitate the daylight attack which follows. When the situation permits, the night attack is carried through the entire depth of the hostile defensive zone. If night comes while an attack is in progress the assault must be continued.

53. The organization of the pillbox assault unit used in a night attack is similar to that employed in the daylight attack, with the exception that the organization is simpler, usually the number of riflemen are increased and the assault section is not normally provided with a flame thrower.

At night it is often preferable to organize a team composed of a small number of picked men and have it approach the pillbox stealthily to carry out a surprise attack.

54. In the night attack, a reserve pillbox assault unit should be organized when a key pillbox is the objective.

55. The commander of a pillbox assault unit must exercise every precaution to prevent the component sections firing on each other in the confusion of darkness. He must also prescribe the anti-illumination measures and the means of liaison following the successful accomplishment of the mission. In addition, he must take into consideration the possible changes in enemy disposition.

56. The assault section must suddenly close in on the hostile pillbox and destroy it promptly by using a demolition charge, hand grenades, gas, or other means. Circumstances may make it advisable to block the firing slits first.

57. Although a pillbox located in the inner area of a defensive zone often has to be taken by storm, rifle firing by the pillbox assault unit should be avoided whenever possible.

## CHAPTER IV

### Heavy Artillery Action

#### General

58. The 300 mm howitzer, because of its tremendous destructive power and effective range, is most suitable for the destruction of strong pillboxes or those located at long range.

The 300 mm howitzer (long) is superior to the 300 mm howitzer (short) in both accuracy and destructive power.

The 240 mm howitzer is also suitable for destruction of strong pillboxes.

The 280 mm howitzer, older than the 240 mm or the 300 mm, is less effective than the newer weapons both in range and destructive power but is suitable for destruction of moderately strong pillboxes at close range.

Destructive power of the 150 mm gun is not great, but it can be employed in the neutralization of comparatively weak pillboxes.

59. The greatest possible power of heavy artillery must be brought to bear on the main defensive zone of the enemy. When an outer defensive zone exists in front of the zone of main resistance, that outer zone is sometimes captured prior to the deployment of the heavy artillery components.

60. Although close cooperation and strict adherence to the time schedule is necessary to insure that no delay will result, the deployment of heavy artillery should be executed as short a time as possible before the start of the attack.

The effectiveness of heavy artillery depends largely on the available ammunition supply. Because the transportation of heavy artillery ammunition in large quantities is time consuming and requires much transportation, it is often necessary to stockpile ammunition near the scheduled sites of artillery deployment.

61. The movement and attack preparations of heavy artillery must be carried out with the utmost care and secrecy in order to conceal the intention to attack.

#### Section A. Attack Preparation

62. Heavy artillery positions must be selected as close to the enemy as practicable so as to enable delivery of maximum fire throughout the depth of the hostile defensive zone. The sites selected must also afford concealment of weapons and for construction of positions as well as being convenient for the transport of ammunition.

63. The division commander must provide the artillery commander with the necessary transportation to deploy additional howitzers provided.

64. The heavy artillery position is usually constructed at night. Standard time requirement for construction is as follows:

300-mm howitzer (short) .....	3-4 nights
300-mm howitzer (long) .....	4-5 nights
240-mm howitzer and 150-mm gun (base mounted) .....	2 nights
240-mm howitzer and 150-mm gun (wheel mounted) .....	1 night

280-mm howitzer ..... 3-4 nights

The time required for construction of positions would be shortened if prior preparations have been made, but would be greatly prolonged in severe cold.

65. The division commander must regulate traffic in the deployment of heavy artillery, allotting it priority in the use of roads at night.

66. Aircraft and other air defense measures may be employed in order to conceal and protect deployment of heavy artillery and preparation of positions. The need for such employment is greater when tactical urgency requires construction of artillery positions during the day.

67. The heavy artillery commander must, at the earliest opportunity, work out necessary arrangements for coordination with the commanders of the field artillery, infantry attack unit, tank and "Ki" units as well as other units concerned.

Complete understanding and agreement must be reached regarding the missions of each unit; the pillboxes to be attacked by each, the sequence, the hour, and the procedures of attack; the actions of the pillbox assault unit, tank and "Ki" units, and the coordination of artillery fire with the actions of other units.

68. In order not to endanger the infantry, when employing low-angle fire with large caliber howitzers, the distance between the center of the impact area and the most forward infantry line should be

approximately 300 meters on level ground. The distance may be varied according to the situation, with greater distance being maintained when artillery fire is directed at the flanks of friendly infantry. However, the distance may be decreased when convenient cover can be utilized by troops.

69. The condition of each pillbox, the type of howitzer or gun to be used, and the range must be taken into consideration in distributing targets to heavy artillery components. Each battery is usually assigned one pillbox to destroy with target distribution being made to permit delivery of frontal fire against the wall of the pillbox.

The number of shells required to destroy a pillbox increases markedly beyond ranges of 7,000 to 8,000 meters for 300-mm howitzers, 4,000 to 5,000 meters for 240-mm and 280-mm howitzers; and 5,000 to 6,000 meters for 150-mm guns, this factor must be considered in target distribution and ammunition supply.

70. The extent to which each pillbox should be destroyed must be determined by taking into account its tactical value and strength, the kind of howitzer or gun being employed, and the available supply of ammunition.

To create an opening in the walls large enough to neutralize a pillbox usually requires one hour of firing by a battery at

medium range. The number of effective hits needed to achieve neutralization is as follows:

Types of Howitzer or Gun	Thickness of Wall (Reinforced concrete) (in meters)		
	1	1.5	2
300-mm Howitzer	2	3	5
240-mm Howitzer	4	8	13
150-mm Gun	20	35	x

A small opening in the wall of a pillbox would put the pillbox out of action temporarily and any hit registered sometimes serves the purpose of temporarily suppressing the pillbox.

#### Section B. Conduct of the Attack

71. The duration of artillery preparations should be as short as possible, but the time limit must be determined by the time estimated to be required to destroy all pillboxes throughout the depth of the hostile defensive zone to be captured.

72. Correct evaluation of the effect of fire by the commander of the heavy artillery unit is of utmost importance. For this reason the commander is usually required to accurately observe the location and penetration of hits, damage accomplished and the condition of openings in the pillbox wall.

73. While the attack is under way, the heavy artillery must move observation posts close to the front line in order to maintain



closer liaison with all units concerned. It will continue firing in accordance with the assigned missions and whenever required, will also destroy or neutralize pillboxes which the field artillery cannot cope with successfully.

The situation may require the employment of the heavy artillery to suppress a pillbox which opens fire when our front-line infantry penetrates the hostile position and enters the new phase of attack.

74. As the attack progresses the division commander moves forward necessary components of the heavy artillery according to the tactical plan. For this purpose, he must take measures to promptly repair the roads to be used in the movement and provide the artillery commander with required transport.

Organization and Equipment of Pillbox Assault Unit (Example 1)

Commander of pillbox assault unit .....	1 Officer
NCO in charge of liaison .....	1
Runners .....	2
Grenade thrower operators .....	4
Grenade throwers .....	2
Self-projecting smoke candles .....	as required

1st Support Section	
Section leader .....	1 NCO (or Sup Pvt)
Men .....	3
Snipers .....	2
Light machine gun ..	1
Wire cutters ...	as required

Obstacle Clearing Section	
Section leader .....	1 NCO (or Sup Pvt)
Men .....	8
Tubular demolition bombs .....	2
Wire cutters .....	as required
Smoke candles .....	"
Instrument to detect electrified wire entanglement .....	"

2d Support Section
Organization and equipment same as those of the 1st Support Section

Assault Section	
Team 1	Team 2
Team leader .....	1 NCO (or Sup Pvt)
Men .....	5
Tubular demolition bombs ..	1
Armor-piercing bombs .....	2
Flame thrower .....	1
Organization and equipment same as those of Team 1	

Organization and Equipment of Pillbox Assault Unit (Cont'd)

Assault Section	
Team 1	Team 2
Device to block firing slit ... 1 Vomiting gas candles ... as required Wire cutters ..... Smoke candles ..... Entrenching tools ..... Flashlights .....	Organization and equipment same as those of Team 1.

Reserve Section	
Section leader .....	1 NCO (or Sup Pvt)
Men .....	as required
Tubular demolition bomb .....	1
Armor-piercing bombs .....	as required
Sternutator candles .....	"
Wire cutters .....	"
Smoke candles .....	"
Ladders .....	"
Bundles of straw .....	"
Entrenching tools .....	"
Flashlights .....	"

- Note:
1. This example shows a pillbox assault unit composed of about 3 infantry squads and 1 engineer squad (or infantry engineer squad). Organization of units should be flexible.
  2. The number of teams of the assault section usually corresponds to the number of firing slits of the pillbox to be assaulted.
  3. If possible, the members of the support sections are equipped with an individual shield.

Organization and Equipment of Pillbox  
Assault Unit (Example 2)

Commander of pillbox assault unit ....	1 Officer
NCO in charge of liaison .....	2
Runners .....	2
Self-projecting smoke candles .... as required	

1st Assault Section	2d Assault Section
Section leader ..... 1 NCO (or Sup Pvt)	
Men ..... 9	
Light machine gun ..... 1	Organization and Equipment same as 1st Assault Section
Tubular demolition bombs ..... 2	
Armor-piercing bombs ..... as required	
Device to block firing slits ..... 1	
Wire cutters ..... as required	
Sternutator candles ..... "	
Smoke candles ..... "	
Entrenching tools ..... "	
Flashlights ..... "	

Reserve Section	
Section leader ..... 1 NCO (or Sup Pvt)	
Men ..... 6	
Tubular demolition bomb ..... 1	
Armor-piercing bombs ..... as required	
Sternutator candles ..... "	
Wire cutters ..... "	
Smoke candles ..... "	
Ladders ..... "	
Bundles of straw ..... "	
Entrenching tools ..... "	
Flashlights ..... "	

Note: This example shows the pillbox assault unit composed of about two infantry squads.

24

# JAPANESE NIGHT COMBAT

CG FILE AV 100-14 KAN

AD 67 3115

JAN 9 1956

ACCESSION NO _____  
FOR REGISTER _____ PART 3 OF 3 PARTS

## SUPPLEMENT:

## NIGHT COMBAT EXAMPLES *Supplement 1*

Combined Arms Research Library  
Special Collections and Archives  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

*(1956) 13*

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST  
AND  
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY  
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION  
JAPANESE RESEARCH DIVISION

*USAFIE/USA 12*

Special  
355.422  
U56j  
pt 3  
c 1

JAPANESE NIGHT COMBAT

Part 3 of 3 Parts

SUPPLEMENT:

NIGHT COMBAT EXAMPLES

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST  
and  
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY  
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION  
Japanese Research Division

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

		<u>Page</u>
Example No 1	Night Attack Against Mt Kungchangling by the 2d Division During the Russo-Japanese War	395
Maps		
No 1	Disposition of Friendly and Enemy Forces in the Mt Kungchangling Area, 22 Aug 1904	397
No 2	Progress of Night Attacks, 2d Division, 26 Aug 1904	402
No 3	Progress of Night Attack, 4th Infantry Regiment, 26 Aug 1904	407
		<u>Page</u>
Example No 2	Night Attack by the 2d Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment in the Vicinity of Nantienmen, North China	413
Maps		
No 1	Progress of Operation, Kawahara Raiding Force, 21 - 27 Apr 1933	415
No 2	Progress of Night Attack, 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 28 Apr 1933	421
		<u>Page</u>
Example No 3	Night Attack by the 14th Division on the Banks of the Tatse Ho (River) in North China	425

Maps and Sketch

		<u>Page</u>
No 1	Progress of Chochou and Paoting Engagements, 14 - 27 Sept 1937	427
No 2	Deployment of Enemy and Friendly Forces, 21 Sept 1937	431
No 3	Progress of Actions by Right Pursuit Unit, 22 Sept 1937	437
No 4	Progress of Attack of 50th Infantry Regiment in Huangtsun Area, 22 Sept 1937	443
Sketch	Attack of 9th Company, 22 Sept 1937	449

Page

Example No 4	Night Break-through by the Main Body of the First Army at the Beginning of the Chungyuan Battle, May 1941	455
--------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

Maps and Sketches

No 1	Plan of Chungyuan Battle, May 1941	457
No 2	Plan of Break-through by the Main Body of the First Army, May 1941	461
Sketch	Break Through Plan and Disposition of the 37th Division, 7 May 1941	467
Sketch	Disposition of Left Flank Force of 37th Division, 7 May 1941	471

Page

Example No 5	Night Attack by the 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry Regiment Against Changkufeng (Hill) in July 1938	477
--------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----



Maps and Sketch

		<u>Page</u>
No 1	Disposition of Japanese and Enemy Forces in Changkufeng Area, 30 July 1938	479
Sketch	Disposition of Enemy Position on Changkufeng Hill, 30 July 1938	487
No 2	Progress of Night Attack of 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment, 30 July 1938	491
		<u>Page</u>
Example No 6	Night Attack by the 228th Infantry Regiment Against the Kowloon Line, North of Hong Kong, December 1941	499

Maps

No 1	Disposition of Japanese and Enemy Forces, 9 Dec 1941	501
No 2	Progress of Battle South of Chengmen Reservoir, 9 Dec 1941	505
		<u>Page</u>
Example No 6a	Attack on Position on the South Side of Hill 255 by the 10th Company of the 3d Battalion of the 228th Infantry Regiment at Kowloon in December 1941	511

Map

No 1	Attack of the 10th Company Against Enemy Fire Positions; 9 Dec 1941	513
		<u>Page</u>
Example No 6b	A Night Attack by the Goto Platoon of the 6th Company of the 228th Infantry Regiment During the Occupation of Hong Kong	517

Map

		<u>Page</u>
No 1	Attack of Goto Platoon Against Enemy Pillboxes, 18 Dec 1941	519

Page

Example No 7	Night Attack by the 215th Infantry Regiment in the Vicinity of Kuzeik in South Burma	523
--------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

Map

No 1	Attack of 215th Infantry Regiment in Kuzeik Area, 11 Feb 1942	525
------	------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

Page

Example No 8	The Establishment of Raiding-infiltration Tactics by the Eighteenth Army in New Guinea and the Formation of the Takasago Volunteer Unit	529
--------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

Sketch

Sketch	Movement of Raiding Infiltration Attack Unit, in Buna and Giruwa Sectors, Late Dec 1942	531
--------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

Page

Example No 9	Night Attack by the Kawaguchi Detachment on Guadalcanal	537
--------------	------------------------------------------------------------	-----

Maps

No 1	Disposition and Attack Plan, Kawaguchi Detachment, 29 Aug - 7 Sept 1942	539
------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

No 1A	Defensive Disposition of the Kawaguchi Detachment, 12 Sept 1942	543
-------	--------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

## Maps

		<u>Page</u>
No 2	Progress of Attack, Kawaguchi Detachment, 12 - 14 Sept 1942	547
No 3A	Hydrographic Chart of Guadalcanal	553
No 3B	Aerial Photograph of Lunga Area	557
 <u>Page</u>		
Example No 9a	Summary of the 2d Battalion Attack on the Night of 13 September 1942	561
 <u>Page</u>		
Example No 10	Night Attack of the 2d Division on Guadalcanal	563
 Maps and Sketch		
No 1	Disposition of Enemy and Friendly Forces and Attack Plan of Seventeenth Army, 13 Oct 1942	565
Sketch	Situation of Enemy Positions, 20 Oct 1942	571
No 2	Progress of Attack of 2d Division, 20 - 25 Oct 1942	575
No 3	Aerial Photograph of Lunga Sector	581
 <u>Page</u>		
Example No 11	Night Attack by the Nakai Detachment in the Vicinity of Kesewa, New Guinea	587

## Maps

No 1	Situation Before Commencement of Fighting, 1 Dec 1943	589
No 2	Attack Plan of Nakai Detachment, 8 Dec 1943	593

Map		<u>Page</u>
No 3	Movement of No 2 Kesewa Surprise Attack Unit, 7 Dec 1943	595

		<u>Page</u>
Example No 12	Night Attack by the Eighteenth Army near Aitape, New Guinea in July 1944	599


Maps		
No 1	Disposition of Enemy and Friendly Forces, 3 July 1944	601
No 2	Enemy Positions and Attack Plan of the Eighteenth Army, 10 July 1944	603
No 3	Disposition of Units of 20th Division and 237th Infantry Regiment, 10 July 1944	611
No 4	Progress of Attack, 237th Infantry Regiment, 10 July 1944	615

Example 1. Night Attack Against Mt Kungchangling by the 2d Division During the Russo-Japanese War. (Based on the Battle Report of the 2d Division, First Army.) (See Maps No. 1 and No. 2)

In early August 1904, Field Marshal Oyama, Commander-in-Chief of the Manchuria Army, ordered the First, Second and Fourth Armies to commence a mass offensive toward Liaoyang area before the arrival of powerful reinforcements for the Russian Army.

The First Army which had been conducting the operations along the Antung - Liaoyang Road since April of that same year had broken through the Russian forces in the vicinity of Mt Matienling and Mt Yangtzuling during June and July, and had been undertaking preparations for the next offensive operation against Russian forces which were firmly entrenched in positions in the Hungshaling - Tatientzu Sector. At that time, the First Army was composed of the Guard Division, the 2d Division, and the 12th Division.

Enemy positions confronting the First Army were semipermanent installations which had been constructed several months earlier. Located on top of rugged mountains and defended by four divisions, they were virtually invulnerable. Owing to the fact that the terrain in the vicinity of the battlefield consisted entirely of rugged mountains and deep valleys, it was extremely difficult for our forces to establish artillery positions, except in the vicinity of the Liaoyang Road. The strength of the positions, the terrain of the battlefield and ratio of strength were all favorable to the enemy and the only thing which could be considered unfavorable was the fact



that the position was extensive, having a width of more than 40 kilometers.

Maintaining close contact with all its subordinate divisions, the First Army had been studying attack procedures since mid-August and finally decided to commit its main body to a night attack and effect a break through in the center of the enemy position, taking advantage of a weak point. On 22 August, the Army issued an attack order which read generally as follows:

1. The Army plans to attack the enemy forces in the Taan-pino and Liaoyang Road areas on the 26th, committing its main body and an element.

2. The 12th Division (less one mountain gun battery) will launch an attack on the enemy forces north of Mt Chipanling at dawn of the 26th.

3. Before daybreak of the 26th, the 2d Division (less the cavalry regiment and one field artillery battalion) plus one mountain gun battery of the 12th Division will attack the enemy forces disposed in the area between Mt Kungchangling and Hill 300, southwest of Tzekou.

4. Beginning at dusk of the 26th, the Guard Division together with the cavalry regiment and one field artillery battalion of the 2d Division will carry out an attack on the enemy forces in the vicinity of Tatientzu on the Liaoyang Road.

At that time, the 2d Division had concentrated its strength at a point about 10 to 15 kilometers from the enemy position and had been undertaking preparations for attack. The plan to employ the 2d Division in the night attack on Mt Kungchangling was decided prior to the issuance of the order and the 2d Division Commander had already directed all forces under his command to undertake terrain reconnaissance. Although the area between the friendly outposts and enemy

positions was extremely hazardous, owing to the fact that both friendly and enemy patrols and reconnaissance units were engaged in activities, by the 26th, most of the officers were familiar with the terrain in the vicinity of the attack objectives.

The enemy had constructed defensive installations along the crest line in the area extending from the high grounds north of Mt Kungchangling to Hill 300, southwest of the same sector, and it was estimated that its artillery positions were located near Mt Kungchangling. In addition, there were some defensive installations on the high grounds southwest of Hill 260 and south of Changchiakou. Enemy lookouts were stationed in the vicinity of Hill 260 and Changchiakou, and friendly patrols made frequent contacts. In the Mt Kungchangling area, enemy lookouts were posted on the high ground west of Kaochiakou. Skirmishes between small units took place occasionally in the Hochiaputzu, Titaiputzu, and Hsiawengputzu areas. The high grounds south of Kaochiakou were occupied alternately by the enemy and friendly forces. Also on Taheishan friendly patrols occasionally made contacts with enemy patrols. Reconnaissance indicated that the enemy's massed strength was located in the vicinity northwest of the ravines and Hill 300 in the Tzekou Valley.

Upon receipt of the First Army Order on 22 August, Lt Gen Nishi, commander of the 2d Division, issued the following order for attack on 24 August:

1. Before daybreak of the 26th, the Division will launch



attacks on the enemy forces located in the area between Mt Kungchangling and Hill 300 situated southwest of Tzekou.

2. After sunset of the 25th, the 3d Infantry Brigade (the 4th and 29th Regiments; plus two cavalry squads) will depart from Mt Wuchialing and the saddle north of Houwu, and before dawn of the 26th, will commence an attack on the enemy forces located in the area between the high ground approximately 1,500 meters south of the saddle of Mt Kungchangling and Hill 300 situated southwest of the sector.

3. After sunset of the 25th, the 15th Infantry Brigade (the 16th Infantry Regiment and the 2d Battalion of the 30th Infantry Regiment; plus one cavalry and engineer platoon) will depart from Hsihuangnikou, and before dawn of the 26th, will launch attacks on the enemy forces located between Mt Kungchangling and the high ground about 1,500 meters south of Mt Kungchangling.

4. The 30th Infantry Regiment (less the 2d Battalion) will be designated as the division reserve force and will concentrate its strength at Mt Santaoling before sunset of the 25th.

5. By sunset of the 25th, the 3d Cavalry Company (less one platoon and two squads) will assemble at Mt Santaoling.


6. Before sunset of the 25th, the Field Artillery Regiment (less one battalion) plus one engineer battalion will concentrate its strength in the area south of Hsihuangnikou. Later, it will follow the 15th Infantry Brigade, take a position in the area west of Hsikou and establish necessary installations.

The mountain gun battery assigned from the 12th Division will assemble at Mt Santaoling before sunset of the 25th. It will later proceed behind the 3d Infantry Brigade and establish positions in the vicinity of the high ground about 1,500 meters northeast of Hill 260. One engineer company will be assigned to assist the battery in the establishment of its positions.

The 2d Division Commander directed all officers and men to wear white armbands about 15 cm wide on their left arms during the night attack in order to facilitate identification.

Over-all Progress of the Night Attacks. (Based on the Battle Report of the 2d Division.) (See Map No. 2.)

In accordance with the division order, all forces departed from



the designated points after sunset on the 25th. The 3d Brigade concentrated its strength in the Shangwengchiaputzu area at 2100 hours and routed enemy lookout units stationed on the high grounds extending from Hill 260 to the area northeast of the hill. At 0130 hours on the 26th, it commenced an advance in the valley near Chatzukou in extended formation and about 0300 hours, it approached the crest line, extending about 2,000 meters westward from the grade-change point of the high ground situated approximately 1,500 meters south of Mt Kungchangling, with the 4th Regiment on the right and the 29th Regiment on the left.

The enemy was emplaced on the ridges of all the high ground in front of the 3d Brigade position. These troops opened fire on the 3d Brigade as soon as it reached the vicinity of Chatzukou, but the 3d Brigade did not return the fire and approached the enemy's main position utilizing the protection afforded by the valleys and spurs in the area. The difference in elevation between Chatzukou and the crest line where the main enemy position was located, was 100 to 180 meters. Despite the rugged terrain and steep grades, braving the heavy fire the 3d Brigade routed the enemy to the north and occupied the main positions about 0400 hours. The two infantry regiments suffered heavy casualties in this assault and the 4th Infantry Regiment lost its commander, Lt Col Yoshida.

The 15th Infantry Brigade massed its strength in the area west of Titaiputzu shortly after 2300 hours and approached the enemy

positions from the high ground west of Kaochiakou. Although the terrain in the area was rugged and the main enemy position was approximately 200 meters above the attacking brigade, the enemy offered only slight resistance and fired sporadically. The 15th Brigade succeeded in penetrating the enemy position without firing a single shot and had routed all enemy forces by about 0400 hours on the 26th, occupying the crest line extending about 1,500 meters southward from the south of the saddle of Mt Kungchangling.

It being a clear night with a full moon, objects were visible at a distance of 200 to 300 meters. For this reason our forces were subjected to enemy fire, however, it facilitated our movement. The moonlight made it possible for all friendly forces to reach their objectives in an orderly manner and to launch assaults without losing their bearings while advancing in the rugged terrain of this mountainous area.

Note: Some veterans say that the weather was partly cloudy and the moon was covered occasionally by drifting clouds. They claim that, although the night was of medium brightness, the visible range was approximately 150 meters. At all events, there is no doubt that it was a moonlit night.

The mountain artillery battery which was assigned from the 12th Division established its position near the high ground northeast of Hill 260 with the assistance of the 1st Engineer Company. The three field artillery batteries established their positions at the designated points and the division's reserve force assembled in the area south of Shangwengchiaputzu before dawn. Each force was prepared for battle after daybreak.

The casualties suffered by the 2d Division during this night attack are shown below:

Unit	Killed in Action		Wounded	
	Officers	NCO & Privates	Officers	NCO & Privates
4th Infantry Regiment	5	53	11	184
29th Infantry Regiment	3	69	13	201
16th Infantry Regiment		18	2	131
30th Infantry Regiment	1	10	2	38
Total:	9	150	28	554

Progress of the 4th Infantry Regiment. (Based on Speech by General Miura.) (See Map No. 3.)


Maj Gen Matsunaga, Commander of the 3d Infantry Brigade, planned to carry out the night attack by using as front line forces, the 29th Infantry Regiment on the left and the 4th Infantry Regiment on the right, with the 2d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment in reserve. Under this plan, the forces were to commence the advance at 0200 hours on the 26th from the vicinity of Chatzukou and occupy the enemy position by 0400 hours.

Lt Col Yoshida, Commander of the 4th Infantry Regiment, deployed the 1st Battalion on the left and the 3d Battalion on the right,

# PROGRESS OF NIGHT ATTACK 4TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

26 AUGUST 1904

→ JAPANESE ARMY  
→ RUSSIAN ARMY



and ordered the forces to advance for the assault from both sides of Iwayama. Together with the reserve (the 4th and 9th Companies), the regimental commander followed the 3d Battalion. This assault disposition was employed because it was believed that it would be difficult for the enemy to station troops on Iwayama, a towering jagged mountain. (However, as soon as the two battalions of the 4th Infantry Regiment commenced the advance, enemy troops suddenly appeared on Iwayama and opened heavy fire on the flank of the two battalions. Therefore, Brigade Commander, Maj Gen Matsunaga, ordered the Brigade reserve (the 2d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment less the 6th Company) to capture Iwayama immediately.

The 2d Battalion which had been eagerly awaiting the opportunity to take part in the battle, charged resolutely toward Iwayama. The 7th Company advanced along the central crest line, followed by the battalion headquarters and the 5th Company. The 8th Company, the front line force on the right, advanced by way of the right slope. Because of the heavy enemy fire and rugged terrain, it encountered considerable difficulty in advancing and the formation of both companies became confused. Nevertheless, the 7th Company finally scaled the summit, broke through the enemy lines and occupied the position.

1st Lt Miura (later, General Miura) adjutant of the 2d Battalion, who was inspecting the front line at that time, led the front line force and continued the advance along the crest line, accompanied by 1st Lt Nambu, 2d Lt Hosoda and approximately 60 men. To the right

front, the 10th Company of the 3d Battalion had occupied one crest line after losing the company commander and 30 men, either killed or wounded. Further to the front, several enemy positions were visible in the vicinity of Point A from which and enemy troops fired sporadically. The time was drawing close to 0400 hours, the time set as the deadline for capturing the enemy position and 1st Lt Miura decided to charge the position to the front.

After a brief, but fierce, hand to hand encounter in which Lt Miura was wounded, the enemy was routed and the position in the vicinity of Point B was captured.

#### Author's Observation

Of the many night attacks conducted during the Russo-Japanese War, the 2d Division attack on Mt Kungchangling brought about the most successful results. Although casualties were high, they could be considered as minor when compared with losses sustained in other engagements. The capture of Mt Kungchangling was the major factor in bringing about the total disintegration of the Russian Army positions. Among the principal causes of this success were:

1. Comparatively thorough preparations were made. Under the later concepts of highly developed night attack tactics, the preparations for night attacks undertaken by the 2d Division were far from adequate. Nevertheless, because reconnaissance of the enemy situation and terrain was conducted for several days prior to the attack, the officers were well acquainted with the terrain.



2. The moonlight greatly facilitated the movement of the assault force, although under the later concepts, it was generally believed that moonlight was disadvantageous to night attacks. This disadvantage was also recognized at that time, but owing to the fact that training for maneuvering under cover of darkness had not been intensive, it is assumed that the troops sometimes depended on moonlight to facilitate their movement during the night. As mentioned in the battle report of the 2d Division, the moonlight helped greatly in enabling the units move without losing their bearings.

3. Courageous acts of the officers were particularly responsible for the success of the attack conducted by the 2d Battalion, of the 4th Regiment. In other regiments and battalions, the courageous deeds of the officers were also instrumental in bringing about success.

In spite of the success of the night attack on Mt Kungchangling the Japanese Army was not entirely satisfied with the results. Study and deliberation were devoted to the following factors:

1. The success of the 2d Division was due to the fact that the Russian Army made no attempt to launch a counterattack. Had Russian Army carried out a full-scale counterattack, it was considered doubtful if the 2d Division would have succeeded in securing such a complete success.

2. During the day of the 26th, a heavy fog shrouded the entire battlefield and slowed down the assault and the pursuit action

of the 2d Division. In view of this, it was deemed unwise to commit the entire strength of the division to a night attack. It was considered that it might have been better to capture the enemy positions and strategic points in the vicinity of Mt Kungchangling by committing one regiment to the night attack and employing the rest of the division to exploit the battle success on the following day.

3. It was suggested that attack preparations were insufficient, considering the length of time available. Until sunset on the night of the attack, the 2d Division was located at a point approximately 15 kilometers from the enemy position and was, therefore, unable to obtain detailed information on the main enemy positions. It was considered advisable to select an attack preparation point nearer the enemy.


Example No. 2

Night Attack by the 2d Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment in the Vicinity of Nantienmen, North China

(Based on the statements of Lt Col Amano, color bearer of the 17th Infantry Regiment and Col Furuya, commander of the Machine Gun Unit of the 2d Battalion, and the battle report of the 1st Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment.)

This night attack was carried out in the course of the operations conducted by the Kwantung Army in North China during the spring of 1933, immediately following the occupation of Jehol. On March 1st, the Kawahara Raiding Force of the 8th Division (commanded by Maj Gen Kawahara, Commanding General of the 16th Brigade and having the 17th Infantry Regiment as a nucleus) had launched an operation at daybreak and on March 10th occupied Kupeikou (approximately 110 kilometers northeast of Peking) on the south side of the Great Wall. (See Map No. 1)

For political reasons, operations were suspended until 20 April when the Kawahara Raiding Force was reinforced by the assignment of the 32d Infantry Regiment, building the force to five infantry battalions, two field artillery battalions and two engineer platoons. The opposing Chinese force was an army of six divisions and one cavalry brigade under direct command of Chiang Kai-shek. Since it was estimated that the fighting power of one division of the Chinese Army was equivalent to one infantry regiment of the Japanese Army, the enemy had about three times the power of the Kawahara Force. In addition, the Chinese had made good use of the time since the 10th



of March in setting up formidable defense positions in the sectors south and west of Kupeikou.

General Kawahara directed that the main attack be made on the enemy facing the 32d Infantry Regiment which was on the right front, and planned to annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of Nantiennen by advancing from Mitsu Watch Tower toward Shangtientzu. The 17th Infantry Regiment plus one engineer platoon and one tank platoon (less the 2d and 3d Battalions, which were disposed in the rear on guard duty) constituted the left flank force and was ordered to commence an attack from the bank of the Chao Ho (River) toward Laokutien.

At dawn of 21 April, both the right and left flank forces attacked simultaneously, and about 1030 hours of the same day, the right flank force occupied Mitsu Watch Tower, it then proceeded southward and succeeded in penetrating about three kilometers into the enemy position by the 24th, but a succeeding assault was brought to a standstill by the stiff resistance offered by the Chinese. On the left flank, the 1st Battalion captured Hill No. 7 on the 23d, and Hills No. 8 and 9 on the 26th. The 3d Battalion, which had been brought up to the front, captured Mt Namako on the 24th. However, two Chinese divisions facing the left flank force offered stubborn resistance and the attack on this front did not progress according to plan.

Great importance was attached to this operation because it was to be the final operation to be undertaken by the Kwantung Army during

the Manchurian Incident and the outcome was believed to have a significant military as well as political affect. Consequently, the 8th Division commander effected a gradual reinforcement of the force under the command of Maj Gen Kawahara and urged the early completion of the operation. On the 25th or 26th General Kawahara's staff expressed as their opinion, that it would be advisable to surmount the stalemate by occupying the key points in the Nantienmen area, cutting of the enemy's route of withdrawal. On the 26th, General Kawahara ordered the 17th Infantry Regiment to make preparations for a night attack on Nantienmen.

The commander of the 17th Infantry Regiment decided to employ the 2d Battalion which had recently been sent to the front. On the morning of the 27th he summoned the battalion commander, Major Toya, and all company commanders to the regimental headquarters, located south of Hohsi, outlined his plan and directed them to commence preparations for a night attack. The following attack order was issued at 1830 hours on the same day:

1. On April 28th the left flank force will break through the enemy position situated to its front and advance to the line linking Laokutien and Nantienmen with the high grounds to the east of Nantienmen.

2. The 2d Battalion (less half a platoon each of the 5th and 8th Companies and less one platoon of the 7th Company) plus two engineer squads will constitute the first line force on the left flank, and after occupying the line half-way up Hill No. 17 by dawn of the 28th, it will push on to capture Hill No. 12.

3. The 1st Battalion will constitute the first line force on the right flank and after routing the enemy confronting it, will occupy as many enemy positions west of Nantienmen as possible.

4. The 3d Battalion will constitute the first line force on the central front and, from its present location, it will conduct coordinated action with the assault of the 1st and 2d Battalions. Later, it will launch an attack directed against the high ground east of Nantienmen.

5. The line linking the east edge of Mt Namako and the west edge of Hill No. 12 will divide the operational areas of the 2d and 3d Battalions.

As indicated in the order, the 2d Battalion was only required to conduct a night attack against Hill No. 17 and to occupy a sector only half-way up the hill. (This was considered to be a reasonable objective for a night attack.) Although it was not indicated in the order, the time for the commencement of the attack was set for 2200 hours on the 27th and it was hoped that the forces would occupy Nantienmen by 29 April, the Emperor's birthday.

Although the Chao Ho (River) was only 30 to 40 meters wide and 50 to 80 centimeters deep, there was an unscalable precipice on the northern bank, leaving only two points where a crossing was possible. Since it was not possible to cross the river and proceed directly towards the objective, it was planned to ford the river soon after sunset and to proceed eastward along the southern bank of the Chao Ho, under cover provided by the 1st and 3d Battalions, advancing to a point north of Hill No. 17. The attack was scheduled at midnight. Although the battalion arrived somewhat later than scheduled, its advance to the point north of the hill progressed smoothly. The Chinese forces, considering it inconceivable for the comparatively small Kawahara Raiding Force to attempt an attack against their strong

positions were unaware of the battalion's advance and were completely unprepared.

The battalion commander disposed the 5th and 7th Companies on the front line and soon after midnight commenced the charge on Hill No. 17. (See Map No. 2)

Note: The battalions of the 8th Division not being on a wartime organization, were composed of three companies each.

Most of the hills in this area, including Hill No. 17, had steep, rocky grades and could not be easily scaled. Nevertheless, the two front line companies charged up the steep, 210 meter slope and occupied the summit of Hill No. 17 at 0230 hours on the 28th.


As a result of the surprise attack the enemy was at first in a state of confusion, but later offered resistance, throwing hand-grenades and opening fire with rifles. After the main body of the 2d Battalion left Hill No. 17 in its drive westward, the Chinese launched an attack from the south in an attempt to reoccupy the hill. However, a machine gun unit remaining on the hill opened fire and the Chinese withdrew after suffering heavy losses.

Having succeeded in occupying Hill No. 17, the 2d Battalion continued its attack westward along the crest line, with the 6th Company, having leapfrogged the 5th and 7th Companies, acting as first line force. Although the crest of the rocky hills restricted the forces to single file passage, the first line force attacked one enemy position after another and occupied Hill No. 12. Later, the 5th and 7th Companies took part in the action and vied with the first line force



**PROGRESS OF NIGHT ATTACK 2D BATTALION  
17 TH INFANTRY REGIMENT**

28 APRIL 1933



- REMARKS:
1. THIS MAP IS BASED ON A PANORAMIC SKETCH LOOKING SOUTH FROM VICINITY OF LIANGCHIACHUANG.
  2. THE ALTITUDE OF HILL NO. 17 APPROXIMATELY 210 METERS FROM THE PLAIN.

in taking the lead. The entire battalion advanced toward Nantienmen, crossing into the operational zone of the 3d Battalion. Unable to recover from the shock sustained at the outset of the battle and being subject to attack on the flank, the enemy retreated in disorder.

By 0400 hours on the 28th the 2d Battalion occupied an area approximately two kilometers in depth and had succeeded in capturing Hill No. 15, Nantienmen and Hill No. 14, west of Nantienmen.

Upon being informed of the success of the attack by the 2d Battalion, the 1st and 3d Battalions launched a coordinated assault and occupied Hill No. 13 on the morning of the 28th. With all hills east of Hill No. 7 in Japanese control, the Chinese forces facing the right flank force commenced a withdrawal. The unexpectedly great success achieved by the 2d Battalion in this night attack was the principal factor contributing to the victory of the Kawahara Raiding Force.

**Author's Observations:**

This night attack is a fine example of effecting a penetration by employing leapfrog tactics. The attack was not limited to the capture of key points in the enemy positions, but involved the defeat of an enemy of overwhelming strength by a small unit, paving the way for a successful operation by the entire force.

Factors contributing to the success of the operation were:

The operational plans were kept hidden from the enemy and the surprise attack was effectively conducted.

The timing of the movement of the 2d Battalion and the fact that the enemy situation was favorable for a surprise attack by the battalion.

Japanese forces were well trained and possessed high morale, and exploited fully the initial effect of the surprise attack by making a subsequent assault.

The Chinese force was given no opportunity to regroup and subsequent attacks, exerting constant pressure, overwhelmed the enemy by maintaining the favorable situation brought about by the initial surprise attack.

Example No. 3

Night Attack by the 14th Division on the Banks of the  
Tatse Ho (River) in North China


(Based on Volume IV of the History of the China Incident,  
Compiled by the Army General Staff and on statements by  
Lt Col Ito, Commander of the 9th Company, 2d Infantry  
Regiment.)

This night attack was conducted by the 14th Division of the First Army on the night of 21-22 September 1937 against Chinese positions on the right bank of the Tatse Ho (River), located north of Paoting. The First Army (composed of the 6th, 14th and 20th Divisions) was then under the command of the North China Area Army. At the beginning of the China Incident offensive, the First Army had destroyed the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Chochou on the right bank of the Yungting Ho (River), and was pursuing the enemy toward Paoting. (See Map No. 1)

The battle at Chochou commenced on 14 September 1937 and by afternoon of the 18th, the enemy was routed and the pursuit was progressing favorably. At this juncture the Army commander decided to have his forces occupy positions in the Paoting sector by maintaining the pursuit and extending it toward the sector west of Paoting. Accordingly, at 1800 hours on the 18th, he issued the following order from Army headquarters at Fengtai.

1. The 20th Division will launch an assault in the vicinity of Mt Shihpanshan through Ichou, advance to the vicinity of Fangshunchiao and cut off the enemy's retreat.

2. The 14th Division will penetrate the enemy positions in the vicinity of Mancheng, advance to the sector west of Paoting and destroy the enemy.



3. The 6th Division will attack the enemy to the front from the area of the Peiping - Hankow Railway and destroy the enemy after advancing to the vicinity of Paoting.

The Japanese knew that the enemy's prepared positions on the right bank of the Tatse Ho north of Paoting were of considerable strength, having been constructed about one month previously. Nevertheless, the First Army Commander decided to occupy them by exploiting the momentum of the pursuit. This was not only in line with the intentions of the North China Area Army Headquarters, but was based on the First Army's estimate of the enemy situation.

Information obtained through air reconnaissance and other means indicated that the enemy along the Peiping - Hankow Railway would abandon serious resistance in the vicinity of Paoting and instead attempt fresh resistance in the Huto Ho (River) sector in the vicinity of Shihchachuang south of Paoting. The Army concluded that while the enemy might offer some resistance in the vicinity of Paoting, it would be limited to supporting a general withdrawal.

Following the orders of the First Army, the vanguard of the 14th Division advanced in line with Kaolitien on the 19th and Laotsun on the 20th after routing the enemy to its front during the advance. On the 21st, the division was continuing the pursuit of the enemy toward the Tatse Ho in accordance with divisional orders issued at 2120 hours on 20 September:

1. According to air reconnaissance, no enemy elements can be seen in the vicinity of Paoting, while many trains are observed moving southward in the area south of Paoting.

2. The division will continue pursuit toward the portion of the Peiping - Hankow Railway line which lies between the Paoting area and Chenchiachuang Station.

3. The Right Pursuit Unit, (under the command of the 27th Infantry Brigade Commander and composed of the 2d Infantry Regiment; the 59th Infantry Regiment, less the 3d Battalion; plus one artillery battalion and one engineer company) will pursue the enemy toward the heights north of Mancheng through Tawangchuang.

4. The Left Pursuit Unit (under the command of the 28th Infantry Brigade Commander and composed of the 15th Infantry Regiment, less the 2d Battalion; plus the 50th Infantry Regiment, less the 2d Battalion; and two field artillery batteries and an engineer regiment) will pursue the enemy toward the vicinity of Changchuang through Tunghsikuangmen and Mt Nanlung.

5. The remainder of the Division will advance along the road connecting Mutsum, Chucheng, Tawangchuang and Mancheng.

The Right Pursuit Unit advanced to the Fangshang - Tatseying line at 1830 hours on 21 September and reconnoitered the enemy situation and terrain on the right bank of the Tatse Ho, ascertaining the following conditions:



1. The enemy occupied a strong position in the sector on the right bank of the Tatse Ho.

2. Friendly artillery support would be difficult because of the terrain.

3. Forging the Tatse Ho would be comparatively easy.

The commander of the Right Pursuit Unit thought it advisable to penetrate the line of enemy positions to the front by a night attack. The two regimental commanders of the first line units concurred and the Right Pursuit Unit commander presented his views to the division commander, while ordering the two first line regiments to make preparations for a night attack. (See Map No. 2)

DEPLOYMENT OF ENEMY AND FRIENDLY FORCES  
EVENING OF 21 SEPT 1937





The commander of the Left Pursuit Unit had previously submitted a recommendation to the division commander to carry out the crossing of the Tatse Ho at night after passing the vicinity of Tawangchuang on the afternoon of the 21st. By having his first line troops advance to the line connecting Tachucheng and Hsichuang and reconnoiter the terrain and enemy situation, he had obtained information, which influenced him to decide on a break-through of the enemy positions located on the right bank of the Tatse Ho by a night attack, and ordered each unit under his command to make preparations for this action. His information indicated that:

1. The enemy occupied the entire area near the right bank of the Tatse Ho. In the vicinity of Huangtsun, they had constructed several lines of positions.

2. The Tatse Ho was about 50 centimeters deep and could be easily forded (Author's note: It was actually 80 to 100 centimeters deep).

The division commander, who reached Hsiayingkou at 1800 hours on the 21st, received the recommendations from the commanders of the Left and Right Pursuit Units as well as their estimates of the enemy situation. At the same time, he was given the following information regarding conditions:

1. The enemy confronting the division is probably the main body of the 25th Division and 2d Guard Brigade, plus elements of the 2d, 10th and 17th Divisions which had retreated from the Chochou and Chienchuntai areas. Total strength is estimated at over 10,000 men.

2. The enemy force had started construction of positions in the sector on the right bank of the Tatse Ho about one month before, with the apparent intention of making it a part of the left-flank defense of Paoting.

3. The enemy positions are constructed near the river bank and consist of a series of key points, making direct use of local settlements. In the vicinity of Huangtsun there are several lines of positions, the strategic parts of which are surrounded by wire-entanglements. Beach obstacles are placed along the bank of the Tatse Ho and mines are laid in the river.

4. The advance of the main body of our artillery and infantry units with heavy weapons have been greatly slowed owing to the muddy road conditions and the advance of troops carrying heavy equipment as well as transport units has also been delayed. Therefore, our ammunition supply is inadequate, while the greater part of provisions must be obtained from local sources.

In view of these conditions as well as the fact that the 14th Division had been concentrating on night attack training, the division commander approved the plan submitted by the commanders of the two pursuit units. He determined to penetrate the enemy positions to the front by dawn of the following day and then begin the pursuit of the enemy toward the sector southwest of Paoting. The division commander realized that it would be extremely difficult to deploy his units in front of the enemy positions that evening and then carry out an attack the same night, inasmuch as there was not time to make adequate preparations. However, he concluded that any delay would afford the enemy time to make preparations and, having sufficient confidence in the superiority of his first line troops and their fighting experience, he decided to carry out the night attack.

In accordance with his decision he issued the following order at 2000 hours on the 21st of September:

1. The once routed enemy now occupies positions in the sector on the right bank of the Tatse Ho. The 20th Division is pursuing the enemy toward Mt Shihpanshan and the 6th Division, on the left bank of the Tatse Ho, is preparing for an assault against the enemy on the right bank.

2. This division is to break through the enemy positions to its front by dawn tomorrow and immediately launch a pursuit of the enemy toward the sector southwest of Paoting.

3. The Right Pursuit Unit will break through the enemy positions to their front by dawn tomorrow and advance to the sector on the right bank of the Tatse Ho. With the arrival of daybreak the said unit will launch a pursuit of the enemy toward Kuanchuang by way of Chiangcheng.

4. The Left Pursuit Unit will break through the enemy positions to their front by dawn tomorrow and advance to the sector on the right bank of the Tatse Ho. With the arrival of daybreak the said unit will launch a pursuit of the enemy toward Fuchangtun by way of Nanchitsun.

5. The operational boundaries for the Right and Left Pursuit Units will be the line connecting Yentsun, Imuchuan, Lichuang, Peilangchuang, and Hsiao-chuchai, with the border line itself included in the operational zone of the Left Pursuit Unit.

6. The Cavalry Unit will concentrate in the right rear of the Right Pursuit Unit and advance to the sector on the right bank of the Tatse Ho at daybreak. It will then advance to the sector south of Paoting, severing the enemy's route of retreat.


7. The main body of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment will advance to the vicinity of Tatseying and come under the command of the Right Pursuit Unit Commander.

8. The 2d Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment will constitute the reserve force. It will depart from its present position at 0300 hours on the 22d and advance to Fangshang.

Attack of the Right Pursuit Unit. (See Map No. 3)

The commander of the Right Pursuit Unit, upon receiving the order from division, issued the following order at Yehchiehtsun at 2100 hours of the 21st:

1. The Right Pursuit Unit will start from the line of the Tatse Ho at 0100 hours of the 22d proceed toward the enemy's main positions located above the Tawangchung - Mancheng Road, carry out a night attack, penetrate the enemy's main positions, and pursue the enemy toward the southwestern sector of Paoting, during and after daybreak.



2. The 2d Infantry Regiment (less the 2d Battalion) on the right front line, will prepare for the attack on the line of the Tatse Ho south of Tasetsun, will cross the Tatse Ho at 0100 hours and carry out a night attack against positions south of Tasetsun. Advancing into Liuchiatsuo, it will exploit gains toward the Shunmen area after daybreak, and then advance to the Peiping - Hankow Railway, cutting off the enemy's retreat.

3. The 59th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) on the left front line, will prepare for an attack against the positions at Shihtoutsun. It will cross the river at 0100 hours, advance to the line formed by the western saddle of the heights north of Mancheng by daybreak, advance at dawn to the Peiping - Hankow Railway, through the sector west of Mancheng, and cut off the enemy's retreat.

4. The Artillery Battalion will occupy positions in the vicinity of Fangshang by 0500 hours of the 22d and with its main force, support the left front line regiment in order to exploit gains.

5. The loading and firing of artillery pieces is strictly prohibited during the night attack.

The 2d Infantry Regiment, the right first line unit, crossed the Tatse Ho in the sector south of Tasetsun at 0300 hours of the 22d. The 59th Infantry Regiment, the left first line unit, decided to make a night attack against the enemy's position at Wangkouchuangpu after crossing the Tatse Ho from Fangshang. This decision was made upon receipt of intelligence from the engineers that the river above Shihtoutsun was deep and the banks were swampy, making passage difficult.

At 0200 hours the commander of the Right Pursuit Unit received the following report from the 59th Infantry Regiment on the left front line.

The regiment crossed the Tatse Ho in the vicinity of and to the north of Wangkouchuangpu and came close to the enemy positions, but was detected by the enemy. The regiment attempted to penetrate enemy positions by a determined assault. However, since the positions are strong and difficult to penetrate, the regiment is engaged in a fierce battle. The depth of the Tatse Ho is more than one meter.

At that time no firing could be heard from the combat area of the 2d Infantry Regiment on the right front line, and since communication with this regiment had been severed, its situation was unknown. However, the commander of the Right Pursuit Unit was fully confident of the success of his unit.

At about 0300 hours the commander of the Right Pursuit Unit received a report from the commander of the 59th Infantry Regiment stating that owing to strong enemy positions the regiment was still unable to penetrate and desired the prompt and thorough neutralization of these positions by artillery and other heavy weapons. Around 0430 hours, the commander of the Right Pursuit Unit received a report from the commander of the 2d Infantry Regiment that the night attack had progressed satisfactorily and that the regiment had seized the heights north of Mancheng. At dawn artillery units occupied the positions on the southern side of the isolated hill north of Yehchieh-tsun and directed harassing fire upon the rear of the enemy on the hill north of Mancheng and in the vicinity Wangkouchuangpu.

At 0520 hours the commander of the Right Pursuit Unit received a report from the 2d Regiment intimating that the regiment was disposed on the hill north of Mancheng and requesting that artillery fire in that area be suspended. In view of this development in the area of the right front, the commander decided to exploit gains from this area, and advanced with the reserve force after crossing the Tatse Ho north of Shihtoutsun.

With daybreak, elements of the 2d Infantry Regiment began to attack the flank and rear of the enemy positions in the vicinity of Wangkouchuangpu.

The 59th Infantry Regiment on the left front line had been fighting at close range since the previous night. At daybreak the regiment closed in under the supporting fires of artillery and heavy weapons and occupied the positions. After a desperate battle and despite mounting casualties, the regiment was able to seize the rear position of the enemy in the vicinity of Wangkouchuangpu in cooperation with the 2d Infantry Regiment which had outflanked the position. It was then about 1130 hours and the regiment immediately concentrated in the vicinity of Wangkouchuangpu to prepare for further pursuit.

Attack of the Left Pursuit Unit. (See Map No. 4)

At 2000 hours on 21 September, the commander of the Left Pursuit Unit received a report from the commander of the 50th Infantry Regiment that the regiment was planning to attack the enemy to its front and advance toward Huangtsun by having elements cross the river in the vicinity of Nantsung while the main body crossed from the vicinity of Tachucheng at 2300 hours. The commander of the Left Pursuit Unit issued the following orders:

1. The Left Pursuit Unit intends to cross the Tatse Ho in the vicinity of Tachucheng at 2300 hours of the 21st.

2. The 50th Infantry Regiment will cross the river at 2300 hours with elements from the vicinity of Changchuang while the main body, from the vicinity of Tachucheng, will advance to attack toward the vicinity of Huangtsun.





3. The 3d Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment will secure Hsichuang village by 2300 hours and concentrate as many troops as possible in the area northwest of that village and be prepared to support the attack by the 50th Infantry Regiment.

4. The commander of the 15th Infantry Regiment shall advance to Tachucheng with the entire strength presently under his command (less the 4th Company and the 3d Battalion) by 2300 hours and prepare to meet further developments in the situation.

5. The Artillery Unit shall advance to the vicinity of Liu-chienfang early in the morning of the 22d, and prepare to respond to further developments of the situation.

In the area occupied by the main body of the 50th Infantry Regiment the troops on the front line advanced close to the left bank of the Tatse Ho from the vicinity of Tachucheng about 2200 hours of the 21st and at 2320 hours crossed the river in the face of intense enemy fire and advanced to the bank occupied by the enemy.

At 0030 hours of the 22d, the commander of the Left Pursuit Unit received the following report from the commander of the 50th Infantry Regiment on the left bank of the Tatse Ho:

"Our casualties on the front line seem to be great. I am now going to the front for inspection. It will be most effective to have troops of the 15th Infantry Regiment cross the river immediately from Hsiaochucheng and launch an attack against the enemy."

A little past 0100 hours, the commander received the following report:

"Wire entanglements are strung in front of the enemy positions to the front of the 4th Company, the extreme left flank of the front line of the regiment. It is requested that wire-cutters be sent to us without delay."

The commander of the Left Pursuit Unit immediately dispatched an engineer platoon with wire-cutters to that front and attached it to the 50th Infantry Regiment.

The enemy offered stubborn resistance relying upon the several lines of strong positions. However, front line troops captured enemy positions one after another by hand-to-hand combat, and at about 0300 hours they approached the third line of positions which was the main line of resistance. Meanwhile, the enemy steadily intensified his resistance and even launched frequent counterassaults. Friendly and enemy battle fronts became entangled and confusion reigned.

As casualties on the front line mounted steadily and many officers, including company commanders, were killed in action, the battle situation did not permit optimism. Despite the critical situation, the regiment launched repeated assaults.

In view of the intensity of the battle being waged by the 50th Infantry Regiment, the commander of the Left Pursuit Unit ordered the 1st Battalion (less the 4th Company) of the 15th Infantry Regiment to participate. At about 0330 hours right flank units, which had already captured the third line of enemy positions, were continuing fierce attacks and enemy losses mounted. The 1st Battalion crossed the river from the vicinity of Tachucheng at dawn, participated in the battle of the extreme left wing, and advanced toward the northeast corner of Huangtsun. The 3d Company of the 50th Infantry Regiment which had advanced from the Nantsung area established liaison with the right wing of the regiment and attacked the enemy to their front.

At daybreak, the situation developed remarkably, and the troops gradually pressed the enemy in the vicinity of Huangtsun. The right flank units and the main body of the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment rushed into the village of Huangtsun at about 0600 hours from the vicinity of the town's west gate and from its northeast corner, respectively.


The commander of the Left Pursuit Unit immediately ordered the units which had been awaiting further orders in the vicinity of Tachucheng to advance toward Huangtsun.

However, the enemy continued stiff resistance near Nanshangkan, Hsiaomafang, Houtailiu, and Chientailiu, and prevented the rear units from crossing the river and advancing into Huangtsun. The commander of the Left Pursuit Unit ordered the 3d Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment to break through the enemy positions between Huangtsun and Houtailiu and to advance to the sector southeast of Huangtsun.

At about 0930 hours the 3d Battalion repulsed the enemy, advanced to the designated line, and the Left Pursuit Unit, concentrated its units at Huangtsun at about 1300 hours and made preparations for further pursuit.

Personal Experience of the Commander of the 9th Company (ex-Lt Col Ito) of the 2d Infantry Regiment. (See Sketch)


The 9th Company held a position as the second line assault unit of the left first line battalion of the 2d Infantry Regiment at the beginning of the night attack. (See Map No. 3) The strength of the company at that time was 168 men equipped with 150 rifles,



6 light machine guns, 6 grenade-throwers, and about 300 hand grenades.

While the time for crossing the Tatse Ho given in the Right Pursuit Unit Commander's order was 0100 hours of the 22d, much time was consumed in shifting from Yentsun to the crossing point and preparing for the crossing and it was 0300 hours when the 3d Battalion started to cross Tatse Ho. Though the banks of the Tatse Ho prevented free movement of troops because of numerous marshes, the thick growth of willows and reeds provided cover for easy approach to the enemy. During the crossing, the unit received no fire from the enemy, while the moon clearly illuminated Mt P and Mt Q, which were the targets of the attack.

At about 0330 hours, immediately after crossing the river, the unit suddenly received fire from the enemy. The 9th Company Commander immediately deployed his troops into open formation and ordered them to advance.



At this time the 10th and the 12th Companies on the front line were forced to halt their advance, and communication with battalion headquarters was severed. The commander of the 9th Company ordered his company to advance between the other two companies charge into the enemy position.

When the 9th Company approached the enemy position, it unexpectedly encountered a large outer moat. The company commander ordered steps dug in the banks and jumped into the moat. With the moonlight brightly illuminating the water, the enemy delivered intense flanking fire. Nevertheless, the officers and men who jumped into the moat, following the commander, made footings on the slope on the far side. "Those who have climbed lower ropes," "Push up the hips of those climbing," "Beware of counterattack," - "Remember flank defense," were among the orders issued by the company commander standing in the moat.

Following some 10 subordinates, the company commander climbed out of the moat and rushed into the enemy position without waiting for the entire company, and then broke through into the enemy's position on R Hill. It was 0430 hours. After taking R Hill, an inspection revealed that there were only three casualties.

At R Hill the commander of the 9th Company prepared for the next attack while awaiting the concentration of the company. The regimental commander arrived at R Hill, approved the plan of the commander of the 9th Company for occupying Mt P and when the main body

of the 9th Company had completely assembled, the company bore down upon the enemy on Mt P, threading through gaps in the enemy positions, taking advantage of the dim light of dawn. The company occupied the mountain at 0600 hours.

During this period, though the noise of enemy counterattack with reports of rifles were heard from the rear and flanks, the enemy seemed to have been thrown into confusion and little resistance was offered. The 9th Company owed its success in occupying Mt P chiefly to the rapidity of its penetration.

#### Author's Observations

The outstanding feature of the night attack of the 14th Division against the Chinese positions on the southern bank of the Tatse Ho was that it was launched by almost an entire division to achieve a complete breakthrough of the enemy positions. This was the first example of such a large scale night attack since the Russo-Japanese War. The gains made by the 14th Division, on the night of the 21st, were exploited by the 6th and 20th Divisions, which made daylight attacks on the 22d.

In reviewing the success of the 14th Division, the enemy situation is of primary interest. Despite the fact that the enemy positions were strong, having been constructed just one month previously, the disposition of troops was inadequate. The positions along the Tatse Ho had an overall length of about 45 kilometers and, according to Japanese defensive tactics, the manning of such a line would

normally require about three divisions, but the enemy's effective strength was only about 10,000 men (the equivalent of about two-thirds of a Japanese division). Of these, a considerable number were committed to the direct defense of Paoting.

Of only slightly less importance was the high standard of training of each unit of the 14th Division and the high morale and confidence of its personnel, gained through the fighting in the vicinity of Chouchou.

A contributing factor was the advantage taken of the momentum of the pursuit. Had the start of the attack been delayed, pending arrival of heavy infantry weapons and the artillery, perhaps no choice would have remained but to adopt the plan to initiate the attack on the 23d as originally planned by the 6th Division. The results of the battle testify to the accuracy of the estimate of the 14th Division.

The competitive spirit among the divisions, which was especially noticeable during the early phases of the China Incident, undoubtedly motivated the 14th Division in launching its night attack on the 21st, in order to be the first division to cross the Tatse Ho and advance toward Paoting.

The Japanese Army, in selecting night attack targets, sought principally those targets which were conspicuous and readily accessible. Consequently, in many cases, the attack was directed toward enemy strong points. The results of this action show the advantage of directing attacks against the weaker parts of the enemy positions wherever the conditions permit easy and sure approach actions.



Night Break-through by the Main Body  
of the First Army at the Beginning  
of the Chungyuan* Battle, May 1941

(Based on operations records compiled by the Demobilization Bureau, the May 1942 issue of the monthly publication of the Army Officers' Club (Kaikosha), data possessed by Senior Officer Lt Col Kanda of the First Army and the statements of the 37th Infantry Group Commander, Lt Gen Nakajima.)

In the spring of 1941, in the southern part of Shansi Province, a strong Chinese Army had strongholds in the Chungtiao Mountains and in the southern part of the Taihsing Mountains. Detachments from this force frequently invaded the Japanese occupied areas and not only disturbed public order, but threatened attack. The total strength of the army was estimated at 24 divisions (168,000 men).

The Chungtiao Mountain area was rugged country with mountains as high as 2,500 meters, lacking in communications and being an inhabited area it presented difficulties for any military movements.

The Japanese First Army (36th, 37th and 41st Divisions and the 9th and 16th Independent Mixed Brigades), which was assigned garrison duty in Shansi Province under the North China Area Army, made plans to destroy the Chinese Army and advance its security patrol line to the Yellow River. Both the North China Area Army and the China Expeditionary Force supported the operation. The Commander-in-Chief of the CEF dispatched the main body of the 33d Division from Central China and it was placed under the First Army commander. The North China Area Army commander committed the 21st and 35th

* Code name given to operational area. (See Monograph No. 178, Page 221.)

Divisions which were under his direct command. (The operational concept of the North China Area Army is shown on Map No. 1.)


The First Army was to attack from the direction of Shansi Province and the 21st and 35th Divisions, under the direct command of the Area Army were to attack from Honan Province.

In accordance with recommendations of the First Army, the date for the attack was established as 7 May 1941.

The First Army divided its operational zone by a line running from Changma to Yuanchu, planning to direct the main effort to the western sector. In order to inflict maximum losses on the enemy, it was determined to utilize 39 out of a total of 47 battalions in the western sector and maintain a strength ratio of 70 per cent against the nine Chinese divisions (50,000 to 60,000 men) in the sector.

Note: In past offensive operations against the Chinese it had been usual to conduct operations with a ratio of about 30 per cent of the Chinese strength.

The Chinese Fifth Group Army and the Eightieth Army had constructed comparatively strong positions on a front extending about 100 kilometers from south of Changma to a point on the Yellow River east of Pinglu. The depth of the position was about ten kilometers with wire entanglements and pillboxes on the first line. The First Army planned to effect a double envelopment of the enemy positions and to cut off routes of retreat by utilizing the Yellow River as a barrier and by dispatching raiding units which would block all



possible river crossing points. After completing the envelopment, repeated mop-up operations would be conducted within the enveloped zones.

In accordance with that concept, the First Army Commander issued the following order: (See Map No. 2)

1. After sunset of 7 May, the 33d Division (seven infantry battalions and six mountain artillery batteries) will attack the enemy in the sector east of a line between Changma and Yuanchu from the vicinity of Yuncheng and advance to the area east of Yuanchu.



2. The 16th Independent Mixed Brigade (five infantry battalions and two mountain artillery batteries) will destroy the enemy in the area east of Pingliu. Powerful raiding units will occupy crossing points of the Yellow River and cut off the enemy's routes of withdrawal.

3. The 37th Division (ten infantry battalions, six mountain artillery batteries, three 10 cm howitzer batteries and two mortar companies) and the 41st Division (nine infantry battalions, six mountain artillery batteries, three 10 cm howitzer batteries and six heavy field artillery batteries) will make attack preparations at Yuncheng and at the sector west of Changma as an outer enveloping force. After sunset of the 7th, they will effect a surprise attack, penetrate the enemy position and advance to the Yellow River at top speed. The two divisions will maintain close contact and establish an outer enveloping zone after which they will change direction to the northwest and the north to destroy the enemy within the zone. The two divisions upon penetrating the enemy's line, will rush effective raiding units to each Yellow River crossing point to cut off the enemy's routes of withdrawal.

An element will be dispatched to secure key points on the route of advance of the main body to contact and destroy the retreating enemy.

4. The 36th Division (nine infantry battalions and nine mountain artillery batteries) and the 9th Independent Mixed Brigade (six infantry battalions, three mountain artillery batteries and one mortar company) will make preparations for attack at Wenhsi and in the sector west of Chianghsien, respectively. They constitute the inner enveloping force and will, after sunset of the 7th, effect a surprise attack upon the enemy position and drive a wedge deep into the enemy line. After establishing the inner enveloping zone both

PLAN OF BREAK-THROUGH  
BY THE MAIN BODY OF THE FIRST ARMY  
MAY 1941



units will advance to the north and destroy the enemy within the zone. In conducting the wedge attack on the enemy positions, an element of the raiding unit will be dispatched in advance to the key points within the enemy line to secure and expedite the execution of the annihilation operation.

5. The Army Reserve Unit (one and a half infantry battalions) will be at Chianghsien and with the development of the operation, will advance to the sector north of Yuanchu.

To accomplish the plan, the First Army Commander issued precise instructions:

1. Penetration speed

The penetration front of each division will be limited to about two kilometers. Each division will constantly maintain its strength in depth and, by rotating the first line strength, continue penetration attacks without surcease both day and night. Until the envelopment is established, effort will be concentrated entirely on penetration, no attempt will be made to expand the front laterally.

Note: In the past, the usual tactics of a Chinese force when attacked by the Japanese Army was to withdraw, avoiding decisive battle. Therefore, to contact the Chinese Army, it was essential to cut off its route of withdrawal and establish an envelopment by rapid advance.

2. Assault support

The assault will be supported by brief massed fires of small arms. Artillery preparation and assault support require more than one hour to be effective and then the effect of surprise is lost, allowing the enemy to withdraw and reducing battle successes even when the attack is successful.

Note: Lt Gen Shinozuka advocated the preparation and support of assaults with brief mass small arms fire, particularly in situations such as this where it was difficult to transport weapons heavier than heavy machine guns to the front line because of the rugged terrain. Therefore, for the attack on the enemy's first line position he directed an assault with mass surprise fire of light machine guns and rifles. Although artillery supporting fire was planned, it was directed to minimize the time for the preparation to about ten minutes.

### 3. The conduct of attack

To penetrate about 10 kilometers through the enemy main line of resistance and to exploit the initial effect of the surprise attack, it will be advantageous to utilize as many night hours as possible.

Note: Lt Gen Shinozuka, normally critical of the efficacy of night attacks and close-quarter combat considered it expedient in this case to effect the assault under cover of darkness.

All First Army units exerted utmost efforts to complete operational preparations, giving attention to the dissemination of information on operational procedures and tactics to all officers and conducting training in night penetration and raiding techniques. Particular emphasis was placed on the training of those units (one infantry company from each battalion) responsible for the disruption of the enemy's routes of withdrawal and those assault units charged with the penetration of the enemy positions.

Every effort was made to collect and disseminate detailed information on the enemy positions and surrounding terrain as well as the terrain of the route of advance, the names of the villages and distances between them. Individuals and units checked and prepared their weapons, ammunition, operational materials and equipment. The number of light machine guns in the first line units were increased and each man was equipped with a rope to aid in mountain climbing. Operational preparations progressed as planned and were completed by noon of May 7th.

At 0900 hours on the 7th, strong, dust laden northwesterly winds

reduced visibility to about five meters, effectively concealing attack preparations. Because of the dust storm and the reduced visibility the attack, which had been scheduled for sunset (1900 hours), was slightly advanced.

Each division was divided into two assault units which minimized their attack fronts and penetrated the enemy positions in column formation. In the beginning the enemy's resistance was very strong, but as a result of the rapidly effected break-through the enemy command was confused and organized resistance weakened as the attack progressed.

Each unit continued its assault until the morning of the 8th, maintaining its attacking strength by successively leapfrogging fresh troops into the first line positions. In ten hours the assault units succeeded in making a ten kilometer penetration.

In accordance with the plans of the First Army, units continued their advance, steadily overcoming enemy resistance, and within 35 hours after the commencement of the attack, they had completely established the outer envelopment zone and within 41 hours, the inner envelopment zone was completed.

The Yellow River crossing point at Yuanchu was secured by a raiding unit within 21 hours after the start of the attack and other crossings were subsequently secured.

After completing the envelopment, the main body of the First Army changed direction to the northwest and north and attacked the



enemy from the rear. Later it changed direction again and began mop-up operations toward the Yellow River. As a result of repeating the dividing and mop-up tactics, the First Army was successful in destroying the bulk of the enemy within the envelopment.

Losses inflicted on the Chinese were: Prisoners - 30,000, Dead - 41,000. Captured equipment included: Field and mountain guns - 28, Mortars - 124, Heavy machine guns - 161, Light machine guns - 528, Rifles - 13,081. Japanese losses were 553 officers and men killed, 1,804 wounded.


Break-through Plan of the 37th Division. (Based on the statement of Lt Gen Kichisaburo Nakajima, Left Flank Force commander of the 37th Division.)

During the attack preparations the 37th Division assembled the commanders of infantry and artillery regiments and battalions under its command and conducted on-the-spot training for about one week at a point 500 to 1,000 meters from the enemy position under the direction of Maj Gen Nakajima, Infantry Group Commander. The officers wore enlisted men's uniforms and particular attention was paid to conceal intentions from the enemy. After this on-the-spot training, more detailed training was conducted at each regiment and battalion.

The outline of the break-through plan and disposition of the 37th Division is shown on the following map:



**BREAK THROUGH PLAN AND DISPOSITION  
OF THE 37TH DIVISION  
EVENING 7 MAY 1941**

 JAPANESE ARMY  
 CHINESE ARMY




**LEFT FLANK FORCE**

**RIGHT FLANK FORCE**



**37TH DIVISION 2D LINE FORCE**



The divisional order was as follows:



1. On the 6th, one day before the commencement of the attack, the 37th Division will advance to the vicinity of the front line position, 700 meters in front of the enemy, under cover of darkness and complete attack preparations at the line by noon of the 7th.

2. At sunset, it will further advance its attack preparation line to about 300 meters of the enemy position and launch an assault just before darkness. Prior to the assault surprise fire will be delivered for about 10 minutes with all the artillery, infantry guns and machine guns. Direct assault support fire will be delivered with infantry guns; the artillery will fire mainly on the rear positions and targets in the vicinity of the crest line.

The two flank forces will advance to the crest line (saddle between Hills 1600 and 1700) by dawn of the 8th. Three raiding units (each unit consisting of one battalion) under the direct command of the division, will advance to a point just behind the front line and in accordance with the command of the flank force commanders, will leapfrog the flank units at this line and assault their designated targets.

The disposition of the Left Flank Force (226th Infantry Regiment) was as shown on the following map.

**DISPOSITION OF LEFT FLANK FORCE  
OF 37TH DIVISION  
EVENING 7 MAY 1941**



**REMARKS:**

THE DEPTH OF THE RAVINE BETWEEN THE FLANK FORCES WAS  
150 TO 200 METERS.

Since the attack front of the Left Flank Force was a crest line about 500 meters wide, the strength deployable on the first line was about one company. The Left Flank Force commander ordered the first line battalion to penetrate about 11 kilometers to the saddle of Hill 1600 by dawn of the following day, at which time the second line battalion was to move into the first line. In accordance with his instructions, the first line battalion commander assigned the following leapfrog attack disposition:

1. As the first line unit, A Company will penetrate the enemy position six kilometers along the crest line.

2. B Company will be the second line unit and will relieve A Company at this line and advance to the saddle of Hill 1600 by dawn of the following day.

3. C Company will be the third line unit, and will be prepared to reinforce or relieve B Company.

To effect the break-through, the Left Flank Force commander particularly stressed the following points to his subordinates.

1. Assault fire will be employed in the first assault; however, a later assault will be conducted without fire, and hand-to-hand combat will be effected.

2. After capturing the enemy position, units will pursue and overtake the routed enemy and storm the rear positions.

3. No consideration will be given to the enemy remaining on the flanks of the break-through. Even if enemy units on the flank deliver fire, the advance will be continued without halting or firing.

The break-through was conducted almost as planned. Although stubborn resistance was met initially, the first line battalion succeeded in capturing the saddle of Hill 1600 by about 2300 hours on

the 7th - much earlier than planned. Because of the speed of the break-through, the enemy was confused and resistance from the second line positions was comparatively weak.

#### Author's Observations

While the Chungyuan Operation cannot be considered a large-scale operation, compared with other operations conducted against the Chinese, the objective was completely attained and the results of the battle were extensive in comparison with the strength committed. From that standpoint the operation is without parallel. From the standpoint of tactics, it is an excellent example of a night break-through using leapfrog tactics and the procedure of developing a break-through to effect a complete envelopment and subsequent annihilation of the enemy forces.

The assembly of maximum strength, operational preparation based on a new and cautious concept, effective and careful direction, thorough dissemination of operational procedures to all subordinate units and the supply of necessary operational material and equipment are contributed to the success of the operation.

A more immediate reason for success was the break-through in depth. The attack objective was not to capture key points in the enemy position but to break completely through the entire enemy position area. The wedge penetration upon a very narrow front and the leapfrogging by second and third line attack units were conducted for the first time in a large-scale operation, this was made possible

because of the fact that the Chinese positions were disposed both in depth and width with strength widely dispersed. The result of the operation proved that it was effective to use such tactics in an operation of that size.

Since support fire was delivered at the beginning of the attack, the opportunity for complete surprise was abandoned. However, since the operational concept and date and time of attack had been completely concealed from the enemy the operation might well be termed a strategic surprise attack.

The tactics employed by the First Army, against an enemy disposed in both depth and width, proved correct. Particularly wise was the continuing of the advance without consideration for flanking fire, this method proved advantageous in that it gave the enemy no time to reorganize. The conducting of a brief period of assault support fire at the beginning of the attack also proved effective.

Paramount among the reasons for the success of the operation was the well planned attack preparations of each force under the First Army. Information of the enemy situation and terrain was collected in detail and disseminated to all officers and detailed training was conducted. The First Army commander considered that operational preparation was a prerequisite to victory and took several months for the completion of preparations. Unlike other Japanese Army commanders, Lt Gen Shinozuka personally directed the tactics and operational preparations whenever necessary. Although such direction sometimes caused command difficulties, it is now believed that his personal interest and attention was one of the most important factors in the success of the operation.

Example No. 5

Night Attack by the 1st Battalion of the  
75th Infantry Regiment Against Changkufeng (hill)  
in July 1938.


(Based on battle reports of the 75th Infantry  
Regiment and Charts and Maps of "The China  
Incident", Volume I)

On 9 July 1938, the Soviet Army dispatched a small force to Changkufeng (hill) and began construction of positions and a gradual build-up of strength. Although settlement of the matter was being attempted through diplomatic channels, in anticipation of the possibility of the failure of diplomatic settlement the Korea Army, which was in charge of the border defenses in that vicinity, ordered the 19th Division to move to the vicinity of Changkufeng on July 17th. (See Map No. 1)

In compliance with orders, the 19th Division (Headquarters at Nanam) advanced to the Tumen River with the 75th Infantry Regiment from Hoeryong as advance unit. However, in accordance with instructions from the Government and the Army High Command, the division took no action but remained in the sector along the right bank of the river for approximately ten days. On the 27th, the Korea Army ordered the division to return to its original stations.

On the 29th, the Soviet Army began to construct positions across the border, near the village of Shatsaofeng. The Korea Army immediately cancelled the return of the 19th Division and ordered it to secure Chiangchunfeng (hill) and the hill southwest of Shatsaofeng. On the





night of 29 July the entire 75th Infantry Regiment crossed the Tumen River and assembled in the vicinity of Chiangchunfeng (hill) by 0700 hours on the 30th. The regimental commander inspected the situation and concluded that settlement of the incident was impossible without the employment of military force. He ordered the 1st Battalion to commence preparations for a night attack against Changkufeng (hill) and at 1430 hours called all unit commanders to the southwestern base of Chiangchunfeng and issued orders for the night attack against Changkufeng:

1. The enemy is constructing defense installations on the line connecting Changkufeng (hill) and the village of Shatsaofeng.
2. The regiment will conduct operations to annihilate the enemy along a line extending north and south of Changkufeng.
3. An element (company size) of the 1st Battalion with attached antitank and regimental gun units will secure Hill No. 52 in the Wofeng (village) area and at 0100 hours on the 31st will launch an attack toward Changkufeng from the direction of Wofeng.
4. At 0100 hours on the 31st the 10th Company will attack in the area along the crest line at the northern foot of Changkufeng and disrupt the enemy's route of withdrawal.
5. Both attack units will make advance preparations. To avoid firing upon friendly troops, no advance north of the wire entanglements will be made after the capture of the enemy position at Changkufeng.
6. The 3d Battalion (less the 10th Company, plus the 6th Company) will assemble as the regimental reserve at the northwestern foot of Chiangchunfeng by 2300 hours today. The 6th Company will prepare for a night attack upon Changkufeng from the Chiangchunfeng front at an opportune time.

Matters concerning concealment of plans, the use of green flares as a signal of success and the pass words Shojiki (honest) and Yumo

(brave) were also mentioned in the order. After issuing his instructions, the regimental commander encouraged each unit commander as follows: "The secret of success of a night attack lies in a strict ban on the use of firearms and the carrying out of a daring assault. It is also necessary to act at the risk of ones life."

The regimental commander determined to direct the attack from Hill No. 52. About 1600 hours on the 30th, the commander of the 19th Division arrived at Chiangchunfeng and, observing the overall situation, expressed his approval of the plans. Great importance was attached to this action since it was the first battle of the Japanese Army against a Soviet force and the most efficient battalions were selected for the action and every possible attention was given to details which might assist in insuring victory.

At that time, the 75th Infantry was on a peacetime organization with its strength and equipment being about half the wartime organizational strength.

Each battalion was composed of a headquarters, three rifle companies, a machine gun company and an infantry gun platoon. The strength of each rifle company was about 100, organized into two platoons.

T/O and E of 75th Infantry Regiment  
30 July 1938

Classification Unit	Personnel									
	Colonel	Lt Col (Major)	Captain	1st Lt (2d Lt)	Warrant Officer	NCO	Private	Total		
Regimental Headquarters	1	2		3	1	7	53	67		
1st Battalion		1	3	4	2	45	338	393		
2d Battalion		1	1	4	3	42	339	390		
3d Battalion		1	2	4	2	37	338	384		
Regimental Gun Unit				1	2	5	80	88		
Antitank Gun Unit				1	1	4	47	53		
Total	1	5	6	17	11	140	1195	1375		
Remarks: 1. Personnel of the Medical, Veterinary, Intendance and Ordnance Departments are not shown.										

T/O and E of 75th Infantry Regiment (Cont'd)

Unit	Classification	Weapons								
		Rifle	Grenade discharger	Light machinegun	Heavy machinegun	Battalion gun	Regimental gun	Antitank gun		
Regimental Headquarters		53	1							
1st Battalion		230	19	12	6	2				
2d Battalion		240	19	12	6	2				
3d Battalion		233	19	12	6	2				
Regimental Gun Unit									2	
Antitank Gun Unit										3
Total		756	58	36	18	6	2			3



The Soviet force defending Changkufeng (hill) numbered approximately 300, equipped with two antitank guns, eight heavy machine guns, about ten automatic rifles, and 20 hand grenade throwers. Considering that the front was only a little over 300 meters wide, the armament was comparatively heavy. Furthermore, the position was strong, two heavy machine guns were installed in covered gun emplacements and during the attack it was discovered that there were mine fields between Positions C and D. The enemy artillery with an estimated 20 guns was east of Lake Hasan. (See attached sketch)


The attack was planned to be conducted in complete darkness between 2130 hours (moonset) and 0408 (sunrise). Actual visibility at the time of the attack was approximately ten meters, with a maximum visibility along the crest line of 40 meters.

Reconnaissance had indicated that the eastern and western slopes of Changkufeng were generally steep and that near the top the slope became steeper and very rough. In addition, there were many cliffs on the northwestern slope. Movement would be comparatively easy only on the southeastern slope, although in that area there were cliffs which would necessitate frequent halts and rests. Due to the rugged character of the terrain there were many dead spaces near the top which could not be covered by the Soviet emplaced weapons. However, they were covered by means of rifle grenade launchers.

The Changkufeng area was all quiet at noon on the 30th. Enemy patrols were sighted occasionally in front of the 3d Battalion position

**DISPOSITION OF ENEMY POSITION  
ON CHANGKUFENG HILL  
30 JULY 1938**

 ENEMY ANTITANK GUN  
 ENEMY MACHINE GUN



although there was no patrol activity in front of the 1st Battalion.

At 2310 hours on the 30th the 1st Battalion reached the line of departure and commenced moving forward. By 0020 hours on the 31st the battalion had succeeded in breaching two lines of enemy obstacles in front of Position A and had completed its assault preparations on the south side of the first line of obstacles. (See Map No. 2)

At 0115 hours the 1st Battalion commenced an attack through the breach in the wire entanglements with the 1st Company on the right flank, the 2d Company (plus one engineer platoon) on the left and the 3d Company (less one platoon-half its strength) as the reserve. When the first line troops reached the second line of wire entanglements, military dogs disposed in front of the Soviet position began barking, the attack was exposed and the enemy opened fire with all available weapons.


Despite the heavy fire, the 1st Battalion continued to approach the enemy position without returning the fire in accordance with their orders. Major Nakano, the battalion commander, was severely wounded but continued to advance.

The 1st Company, on the right flank, advanced up the eastern slope of Changkufeng and rushed Position E, with its antitank installations, occupied it and attacked the camp site. Captain Yamada, company commander, was killed at about 0230 hours and command of the company was taken over by 1st Lt. Inagaki, senior platoon leader, who succeeded in occupying the vicinity of the camp site by 0300 hours.










PROGRESS OF NIGHT ATTACK OF 1ST BATTALION  
31 JULY 1938

 JAPANESE ARMY  
 RUSSIAN ARMY



**LEGEND**

-  MACHINE GUN
-  ANTITANK GUN
-  BATTALION GUN
-  REGIMENTAL GUN
-  ENEMY MACHINE GUN
-  ENEMY ANTITANK GUN
-  ENEMY TANK

On the left flank area, the enemy intensified their fire and steadily resisted at Positions A, B and C. Japanese losses increased. Captain Sakata, 2d Company commander, was wounded at Position C at 0230 hours. Captain Kitahara, commanding the Machine Gun Unit, was delivering heavy fire against the enemy from a point about 20 meters from Position D but, at 0305 hours he also was killed. These losses caused the attack on the left flank to be temporarily suspended.

In the meantime, while the 1st Battalion was engaged in its attack on Changkufeng, one enemy company with several tanks attacked the platoon of the 3d Company which was holding Hill No. 52. Although the platoon was successful in disabling three tanks, the enemy continued the attack until dawn when the platoon counterattacked the decimated enemy company and drove it back in confusion.

In view of the critical situation, the reserve platoon (3d Company), entered the attack on Position D. Advancing on the left of the 2d Company it approached within about ten meters of the enemy position but was slowed down by the steep slope. The enemy began a heavy hand grenade attack and at 0330 hours, the company commander, 1st Lt. Nakajima, was killed and the platoon discontinued the attack. At 0400 hours the battalion commander, who had been severely wounded, was commanding the battle from a position in the rear of the left flank company. As he was about to assault the enemy position with men from the left of the 2d Company he was hit by a hand grenade and killed.

Colonel Sato, the regimental commander, on Chiangchunfeng was observing the battle situation. Worried because the flare signifying success had not been given by 0200 hours, at 0215 he ordered the 6th Company to attack Changkufeng from the direction of Chiangchunfeng. The enemy intensified its fire and shortly thereafter the regimental commander received the following message from the 6th Company:

"Request artillery support at dawn. The battle situation at 0400 hours is extremely critical."

Captain Sakata, commander of the 2d Company, although severely wounded was commanding the 1st Battalion. The 1st Company moved to the left flank of the first line after overrunning the campsite and gave support to the left flank units. The enemy was sending reinforcements on trucks and tanks from the direction of Shatsaofeng and enemy troops were sighted scaling the northern slope of Changkufeng.

Captain Sakata attempted a last assault with the 1st and 2d Companies. The 2d Company penetrated the enemy position on the southern tip of the summit and engaged in hand-to-hand combat. The 1st Company approached the rear of the hilltop position from the west slope. As a result of the coordinated attacks, the enemy suddenly began a withdrawal from their positions and their reinforcements withdrew to the north in confusion. At 0410 hours the 1st Battalion succeeded in capturing the hilltop.

The enemy artillery immediately started shelling the 1st Battalion forces on the hill, however, it began to rain very heavily and the

enemy suspended fire.

Enemy personnel losses totalled about 300 killed and wounded. Two antitank guns, four heavy machine guns, six light machine guns, six automatic rifles and six rifle grenade throwers were captured and seven tanks destroyed or damaged.

Japanese casualties were also high; four officers, including the battalion commander and three out of four company commanders were killed as were 30 enlisted men. Three officers and 96 enlisted men were wounded. This loss of approximately one-third of the battalion strength was sustained principally as a result of the enemy hand grenade attack.

As a result of this engagement, the Japanese Army learned a number of things about the Soviet Army. It was obvious that night security of the Soviet force was not adequate, although it was noted that military dogs were used successfully in giving the alarm. It was also noted that the Soviets did not employ reconnaissance patrols in all areas and that there were no standing patrols in the vicinity of the wire entanglements. Regarding the Russian reactions during the attack, it was observed that upon learning of the attack they opened fire at random with all available weapons, very much in the manner of the Chinese, and Japanese losses by this firing were comparatively light. The Soviets also cheered and shouted as they fired, revealing their positions to the attackers.

The Soviet use of tanks was also of interest. Although some

tanks were used in action at night, most of them seemed to have been established in fixed positions and used as defensive strong points. In this attack, most of the Soviet tanks were disposed half-way up the east slope of Changkufeng and were able to deliver heavy fire upon the attacking troops. Soviet hand grenade attacks were particularly effective and it was deemed necessary for the Japanese Army to improve grenade attack tactics.

#### Author's Observations

The Changkufeng Incident involved the first fighting by a Japanese Army force against the Soviet Army and was the first and most famous night attack since the Russo-Japanese War.

The 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry Regiment broke through the entire depth of the enemy position, and after three hours of desperate fighting, finally succeeded in capturing the summit of Changkufeng. The success of the attack is attributed to the strong fighting spirit of the officers and men of the battalion and their thorough training. From a strategic viewpoint, it should be borne in mind that although the Soviet position consisted of several lines, its entire depth was only about 300 meters. Consequently, the capture of the summit was the end of the battle, a big factor in the success of the attack. Since the 1st Battalion had expended its entire attacking power when it captured the summit, if there had been one more enemy position, it is doubtful if it would have been possible for the battalion to have

captured it.

In connection with night attacks, consideration should be given to providing artillery support. Although successful, this attack was conducted with only infantry without artillery support, and the summit was captured with difficulty and later than originally planned. Had there been artillery support to check enemy reinforcements, the battalion could have effected its victory more easily and with fewer casualties.

Example No. 6

Night Attack by the 228th Infantry Regiment Against the Kowloon Line, North of Hong Kong, December 1941

(Based on the record of operations compiled by the Demobilization Bureau, the collection of examples of small-scale fighting published by the Inspector General of Military Training in August 1943 and statements of veteran officers.)

In South China, the Twenty-third Army had been conducting operational preparations, since November 1941, with the aim of capturing the British positions in Kowloon with an attack by the 38th Division and the Army artillery unit. With the outbreak of war against Great Britain and the United States on 8 December, commencement of action was ordered at 0300 hours.

On the morning of the 8th, the advance unit of the 38th Division crossed the Chinese-British border and by evening of that day the first line unit had advanced to the Mt Tamaoshan line, a strategic point in front of the enemy's main position.

The Twenty-third Army commander believed that the enemy would offer full-scale resistance at the main defense line and, at 0900 hours on the 9th, he issued an order concerning attack preparations on the main position, with the principal attack to be made against the hill southwest of the Chengmen Reservoir.

In accordance with the Army order, the 38th Division designated the 230th Infantry Regiment as the Right Enveloping Unit, the 228th Infantry Regiment as the Center Enveloping Unit, and the 229th Infantry Regiment as the Left Enveloping Unit. On the afternoon of the


9th, the division commenced attack preparations with a disposition as shown in Map No. 1. In order to support the attack of the 38th Division, the main body of the Army artillery and an element commenced deployment to capture the position in the vicinity of Tapu and Chintien, respectively.

At that time the first British defense line in the Kowloon peninsula consisted of permanent positions with concrete pillboxes constructed in several echelons along a line linking Hsiakueiyung, Hill 255 (south of Chengmen Reservoir), Shinchung and Nushenshan. Although the number of the defenders of that line was not known, the total British-Indian defense strength in Hong Kong and Kowloon was estimated at approximately 10,000 men.

At the time of the border crossing on 8 December, the 228th Infantry Regiment commenced its advance as the second line regiment of the division. On 9 December it was ordered to advance to the first line as the Center Enveloping Unit. It leapfrogged the 229th Regiment at Tapu and advanced toward Chiensuangling (Lead Mine Pass).

On the afternoon of the same day, the 3d Battalion was assigned as the advance unit of the regiment. At 1700 hours on the 9th, the battalion arrived at a sunken place four kilometers south of Tsaoshan Hill and the battalion commander dispatched the 10th Company to the hill east of the Chengmen Reservoir to reconnoiter the enemy situation and terrain south of the reservoir. From Tsaoshan Hill Colonel Doi, commander of the 228th Infantry Regiment also reconnoitered the enemy





situation and terrain and found the terrain and the enemy position to be the same as shown on the maps the regiment had been using for the past two months. However, no enemy troops could be sighted in the position and it was assumed that they had either withdrawn or were not expecting an attack. The regimental commander therefore planned to effect a night attack on the hill south of the Chengmen Reservoir. Although the sector south of the reservoir was in the patrol area of the Right Enveloping Unit (230th Infantry Regiment) and was outside the zone assigned to the 228th, he considered that if the attack was successful, the division would approve his action. He was, of course, well aware of the orthodox attack plan of the army and the division, but harbored a desire to capture the enemy position by a surprise attack if there was a possibility of taking the enemy unaware.

The 3d Battalion commander, Major Nishiyama, and the 10th Company commander, 1st Lt Wakabayashi, were also planning to effect a surprise attack upon the Kowloon position at an opportune moment.

The regimental commander called all battalion and infantry gun unit commanders together, reported the results of his reconnaissance and asked the opinion of each battalion commander. All recommended a night attack. The 3d Battalion commander was particularly strong in his recommendation, giving as his reason that his reconnaissance, conducted from the saddle west of Tsaoshan Hill, indicated that the enemy disposed in the sector south of the Chengmen Reservoir was not


very strong. Because of the complete agreement of the various commanders, a night attack was decided upon.

The regimental commander immediately ordered the 3d Battalion to effect a night attack on Hill 255 and directed the main body of the regiment to advance to the sector east of the reservoir to support the battalion in the attack. (See Map No. 2)

At 2030 hours, the 3d Battalion advanced to the area north of the embankment at the southeastern end of the Chengmen Reservoir and conducted preparations for an attack. The night was dark and there was a light rain.

The 9th Company, assigned to capture Hill 255, crossed the embankment at 2100 hours and advanced. Although the company was fired on from both sides and the front, there was no enemy disposed on the embankment and the company successfully effected the breakthrough. The battalion commander ordered the attached engineer platoon to secure the embankment and assembled the main body of the battalion to the north of the embankment to await further developments in the 9th Company attack.

Since the battle situation was unknown. At 2130 hours, the 10th Company advanced across the embankment and arrived at the foot of Hill 255. At this time the enemy began directing heavy fire against the embankment and it appeared impossible for the other units of the battalion (the 11th and 12th Companies) to cross. The battalion commander, having determined to take personal charge of the



attack, halted the two rear companies and, accompanied by his adjutant, advanced to the foot of Hill 255. He sent one engineer squad each to the 9th and 10th Companies.

In the meantime, taking advantage of the incomplete disposition of the enemy, the 9th Company had effected its attack on the firing position located on Hill 255 and at 2240 hours captured the hill.

The battalion commander immediately ordered the 10th Company to execute a leapfrog movement and attack the summit of Hill 341 and directed the 9th Company to attack the northwest corner of the enemy position southwest of Hill 255. By 2400 hours the 10th Company had succeeded in capturing Hill 341 and by 0130 hours on the 10th the 9th Company captured the northwest corner of the enemy position.

Note: According to prisoner interrogations conducted after the operation, the enemy disposed in the positions captured by the battalion was approximately one company in strength.

As soon as Hill 255 was captured, enemy artillery began concentrating fire upon the 3d Battalion. The battalion commander ordered an element of the 10th Company to secure the highest point of the hill as a strong point for launching a future attack and ordered the 9th and 10th Companies to secure all captured positions, avoiding losses from enemy fire by utilizing occupied enemy positions. The 11th and 12th Companies were assembled at the northern foot of Hill 255 and made attack preparations.

Note: On the night of the 9th, the 38th Division Headquarters received the report of the decision to make a surprise night attack by the 228th Infantry Regiment. Division

headquarters considered that the attack force would be annihilated and the division commander ordered the regimental commander to withdraw his force. However, the regimental commander did not comply with this order. On the morning of the 10th, the division chief-of-staff came to the east side of the Chengmen Reservoir and after inspecting the situation of the enemy positions already captured and secured, the withdrawal order was cancelled. The main body of the 38th Division commenced its attack on the evening of the 11th, with the approval of the Twenty-third Army, and successfully broke through the enemy's main defense line on the 12th. The night attack of the 228th Infantry Regiment was the factor that expedited the occupation of the enemy's main Kowloon defense line earlier than had been expected.

#### Author's Observations

This is an example of a successful night attack against a strong enemy position effected by a force which had advanced in front of the enemy position in the evening and with little time to prepare for the attack, effected a two kilometer break-through. Several factors contributed to the success of this attack:

1. The first line commander was able to observe all movements of the enemy and to detect all weaknesses in the enemy position. Since the enemy was confused by the surprise move, their troop disposition was not complete and it was the opportune moment to effect a night attack.

2. A thorough study of the enemy position had been made prior to the attack. Although the actual preparatory time for the attack was limited, for two months the 38th Division had conducted study of the terrain and the enemy positions utilizing three dimensional maps.

3. The thorough military training given the troops, their high morale and the excellent abilities of the officers were also important contributing factors to the success of the operation.

Example No. 6a

Attack on Position on the South Side of Hill 255 by the  
10th Company of the 3d Battalion of the 228th Infantry  
Regiment at Kowloon in December 1944


(Based on the collection of examples of small-scale  
operations published by the Inspectorate General of  
Military Training in August 1943.)

Immediately after the capture of Hill 255 by the 9th Company  
(See Map No. 1), the 10th Company joined the fighting. Reaching  
the vicinity of Point B, after crossing the hill at 2240 hours on  
9 December, it received fire from an enemy position of the right.  
The company's advance was halted and temporarily thrown into con-  
fusion. Accompanied by the leader of the 1st Platoon, the company  
commander advanced to Point B and ordered the demolishing of the  
wire entanglements. He instructed the 1st Platoon to capture Hill  
C, sent a small detachment to capture Fire Position E, ordered the  
2d Platoon to take Fire Position D, and led the remainder of the  
company to Point F.

The 1st Platoon captured Hill C, meeting little opposition.  
The sergeant who had been ordered to capture Fire Position E, ap-  
proached with two men and attacked with hand grenades. The position  
proved, however, to be a concrete air vent rather than a firing  
position.

The leader of the 2d Platoon, with a non-commissioned officer  
and four men, approached Fire Position D and threw hand grenades but  
the attack was not effective as the enemy had closed the steel case-  
ment of the gun port. The detachment then rushed the position through





the entrance and effected its capture after a brief hand-to-hand struggle.

All three attacks were executed promptly and action was completed within ten minutes. The company commander had, in the meantime, advanced to Point F and with one orderly had captured three men who had been firing from an underground position at that point. He then sent the 3d Platoon to capture Hill 341, which was the highest point in the vicinity, and ordered a few men to cut some 20 telephone wires which were laid along the underground passage. One squad from the 3d Platoon was sent to capture Fire Position I.

With one squad under his direct command, the company commander moved to capture Fire Position G. Several hand grenades were hurled but since the enemy had closed the firing ports, no results were achieved. The occupants of the position threw hand grenades and fired pistols through the upper ventilation ports. Efforts were made to force an entrance through the firing aperture but because of effective machine gun fire, being received from a neighboring enemy position, the attempt had to be abandoned. The company's engineer squad was ordered to demolish the steel casement with a five kilogram explosive charge and two Bangalore torpedoes were thrown through the hole made by the demolition charge. Six of the occupants were killed and one officer and 20 men came out of the position waving a white handkerchief in token of surrender. The occupation of the position was completed at 2310 hours.

The capture of Fire Positions I and J was accomplished by 0010 hours on the 10th. Investigation conducted after the conclusion of the attack disclosed that the fire positions were built of concrete 1.5 to 2.0 meters thick and were connected by underground passages. Fire positions, however, had no individual obstacles and although there were field positions linked with the fire positions, fields of fire were not effectively established. At the time of the attack there were no guards or patrols posted and the enemy field positions were not manned.

**Author's Observations:**

Primary reasons for the success of this operation were the same as those advanced for the success of the 3d Battalion and the 9th Company.

Example No. 6b

A Night Attack by the Goto Platoon of the  
6th Company of the 228th Infantry Regiment  
During the Occupation of Hong Kong

(Based on the collection of examples of attacks on fire positions published by the Inspectorate General of Military Training in August 1943.)


On the night of 18 December 1941, the 38th Division carried out the Hong Kong landing operation. The Goto Platoon of the 6th Company of the 228th Infantry Regiment was deployed on the extreme left flank of the regiment and at 2050 hours it landed on the western coast near the Butterfield Shipyard.

The missions of the 6th Company were the capture of the shipyard and the enemy positions on the hill to the south as well as covering the left flank of the regiment. It was planned to capture the shipyard with the main body of the company, assigning the strongly fortified hill positions to the Goto Platoon. (See Map No. 1)

To accomplish its mission, the Goto Platoon organized the following units prior to the commencement of the landing operations:

Clearing Squad .....	Leader and 7 men	
First Assault Squad .....	Leader and 5 men	(2 or 3 hand grenades per man and
Second Assault Squad .....	Leader and 5 men	(2 armor piercing mines per squad.
Grenade Discharger Squad .	Leader and 5 men	

Upon completing the landing, the Goto Platoon advanced to the extreme left flank, concealing its move to the best of its ability.



It encountered two double-apron wire entanglements near the southwestern corner of the enemy position and successfully breached the obstacle within 30 minutes, without being detected. Under cover of darkness, the platoon passed through the break, approached Fire Position A and conducted reconnaissance.

Although it was a moonless night, the Goto Platoon easily found Fire Position A because, not yet aware of the platoon's approach, Fire Positions A and B as well as Field Positions a and b were continuing to fire toward the coastal area.

Fire Position A was surrounded by low wire entanglements. The platoon leader, with one assault squad, promptly demolished the entanglements, rushed into the position, through the entrance in the rear, annihilated the enemy and occupied the position. At this time the platoon began receiving machine gun fire and Field Position d and e were discovered further to the south. The platoon leader ordered one assault squad to capture Field Positions b and c and Fire Position B. At the same time he took personal command of the other assault squads and moved to capture Field Positions d and e.

Taking advantage of the confusion of the enemy, the assault squads attacked and soon captured Positions B, b and c. Platoon Leader Goto ordered the grenade squad to neutralize Positions d and e and then rushed into the positions and occupied them. By 2300 hours on the 18th, the Goto Platoon had successfully occupied all enemy positions on the hill.

Investigation conducted after the conclusion of the attack showed that the concrete of Fire Positions A and B was 50 to 80 centimeters in thickness and that gun ports were copper plate approximately 20 millimeters thick. The principal weapon at each fire position was the water-cooled machine gun.

Author's Observations:

The effective attack carried out by the Goto Platoon was primarily successful due to the factor of initial surprise. Although the platoon had, of course, conducted map and long range study of the terrain before the fighting started, it had had no opportunity for close observation. The locating of the positions was materially assisted by the firing at the coastal area by the defenders of the position.

Example No. 7

Night Attack by the 215th Infantry Regiment  
in the Vicinity of Kuzeik in South Burma

(Based on operations records compiled by the 1st Demobilization Bureau and the statements of Colonel Harada, commander of the 215th Infantry Regiment.)

On the morning of 20 January 1942 the Fifteenth Army crossed the Thailand-Burma border and invaded Burma and advanced to the right bank of the Salween River.

On the night of 3 February, the 215th Infantry Regiment, leading unit of the 33d Division, the front line division of the Fifteenth Army, occupied Paan on the right bank of the Salween and engaged in preparations for an attack on the comparatively weak British garrison in the Kuzeik area. (See Map No. 1)


The most difficult problem confronting the regiment was the crossing of the Salween River. As the regiment had no river-crossing equipment, local canoes were collected.

The regimental commander disposed the regiment in a wooded area east and southeast of Paan and issued orders for a river crossing operation:

1. On the night of the 10th, one infantry company will secretly cross the Salween River, occupy the area south of Kuzeik and act to cover the river crossing operation of the main body of the regiment.

2. On the night of the 11th, the main body of the regiment will cross the Salween River at a point south of Kuzeik, advance to the rear of the enemy positions in the vicinity of Pagoda Hill, and make a night attack upon the enemy. Capture of the positions will be completed by the morning of the 12th.





3. Simultaneously with the crossing of the main body of the regiment, the 3d Battalion will cross the river at a point near Pagat to cover the left flank of the regiment.

4. One platoon will be dispatched from the main body of the regiment to the vicinity of Duyinzeik to check enemy reinforcements.

5. Before the commencement of the river crossing operation, a feint will be made to deceive the enemy into thinking that the crossing will be made at a point between Paan and Pagat.

6. All machine guns and infantry guns will be disposed on the river bank northwest of Paan. If necessary, they will support the attack of the main body of the regiment.

The point south of Kuzeik was chosen for the crossing of the company on the night of the 10th because local inhabitants had been observed swimming there and it was believed that this indicated that there were no British troops in the area. This assumption proved to be correct and the company, operating according to plans, obtained the initial success by capturing Kuzeik.

At sunset of the 11th, the main body of the regiment began the crossing of the Salween and although the movement was slow due to the necessity of employing native canoes, there was no enemy interference. In general, the crossing made smooth progress and was completed by 2330 hours.

Upon completing the crossing, the regiment (less the 3d Battalion) advanced westward, swung northeast and attacked the enemy positions from the rear. It was a dark, moonless night and the enemy was taken completely by surprise. The 1st and 2d Battalions were deployed in a line and at 0230 hours of the 12th, made an assault.

After offering only light resistance the enemy withdrew in confusion.

Interrogation of 150 prisoners captured in the attack revealed that the area was defended by the Baruchi Battalion of the Indian 17th Division.

**Author's Observations:**

Under normal conditions this attack would have been made after dawn of the day following the river crossing but because it was impossible to transport the heavy machine guns and infantry guns by canoe, the regimental commander determined that, without the support of the heavy weapons, a night attack would be more favorable.

It must be noted that the British forces were not effective and failed to make careful reconnaissance or preparation.

Example No. 8

The Establishment of Raiding-infiltration Tactics  
by the Eighteenth Army in New Guinea and the  
Formation of the Takasago Volunteer Unit

(Based on statements of Lt Col Tanaka, former staff  
officer of the Eighteenth Army.)

In December 1942 the 41st Infantry Regiment and the 15th Independent Engineer Regiment were preparing for a final stand in the Buna and Giruwa sectors. Both units had lost virtually all of their artillery and supplies of all kinds were short. Allied armament was so superior that whenever the Japanese opened fire their guns were destroyed immediately after by heavy enemy counterbattery fire. It became obvious that some measures must be taken to destroy enemy artillery and supply depots without the use of the few artillery pieces remaining and without suffering disastrous retaliatory artillery bombardment.


The employment of raiding-infiltration tactics appeared to be the only solution. This was, coincidentally, the same solution which the Seventeenth Army arrived at in meeting a similar problem on Guadalcanal at about the same time.

Although Japanese soldiers were well trained in normal patrolling and infiltrating methods, the tactic of penetrating deep behind enemy lines and the employment of demolitions in the destruction of enemy weapons and depots was a departure from accepted practice and it was generally believed that those who participated in such missions had little chance of returning.

In early December 1942 Colonel Yokoyama, Giruwa Sector Commander, called for volunteers for artillery destroying raids and was successful in obtaining approximately 100 men, ranging from young men in fine physical condition to those suffering from wounds and illnesses who volunteered in order to have the opportunity of dying an honorable death. Volunteers were divided into groups of varying sizes and given training in demolition work and infiltrating tactics. Upon completion of training, missions were assigned to groups and the implementation of raiding-infiltration tactics began.

Note: Raiding-infiltration groups were composed of 5 to 20 men each and light machine gun and rifle squads were often sent to support or protect the demolition groups. Subsequent experience indicated that a group of more than 10 men was seldom successful because it was too easily detected.

The first raids were launched in the latter part of December 1942 and January 1943 with the mission of destroying artillery emplacements in the Soputa and Warisota areas, behind the enemy lines. Of the first six raids, two were successful, two were partially successful and two failed and the groups failed to return. Units which attempted to attack by force, using firepower in an attempt to neutralize installations before attacking were not successful while those which awaited an opportune moment and, approaching by stealth, conducted a surprise raid had a better chance for success. Contrary to expectations, losses were comparatively light and most units returned intact. (See attached Sketch)



Considering the lessons learned and the amount of success achieved in the early raids, it was determined to train special units to accomplish raiding missions rather than depend on hit or miss volunteer methods. Foremost among the special units were 200 young men from the Takasago Tribes of Formosa, commanded by highly trained officers and non-commissioned officers who were graduates of the Counter Intelligence School, chosen to form the Takasago Volunteer Unit in June 1943. Intensive training was conducted and that, combined with their natural aptitudes, physical ability, adaptability to the tropical climate, patience, marksmanship and bravery made them an ideal and highly valued raiding force. Due to the skill which they eventually developed in their special hit and run tactics, as well as their ability to conceal their movements, the raiding-infiltration attack was not considered by them to be a suicide mission and their losses were comparatively light throughout the numerous campaigns in which they were engaged.

The Takasago Volunteer Unit was assigned to the Nakai Detachment in the Ramu Valley where they spearheaded an attack in the Kesewa area and were successful in attacking and destroying an enemy billeting area. (See Example No. 11) Later, during the withdrawal of the Nakai Detachment from the Kaiapit sector, the unit was designated as a rear guard and by their continued harassing activities facilitated the withdrawal of the main body of the detachment.

Following the attack by the Eighteenth Army along the Drinumor

River in July 1944, the counterattacks of the heavily reinforced enemy forced the army to wage a wholly defensive battle because the men did not have the physical strength to launch an attack. Owing to a series of attacks, against which no counterattacks could be launched, one position after another had to be vacated and it was at this time that the Takasago Unit proved its real worth. They conducted many raiding attacks and expanded their operational methods to include a general mop-up of raided areas after each attack.

In the spring of 1945 it was realized that the Eighteenth Army was not capable of mounting a general offensive and it was determined to employ raiding tactics on a large scale. While the loss of the Takasago Volunteer Unit as a fighting force would be serious, it was felt that its personnel might better serve as instructors in order that the army, as a whole, might be taught the techniques of raiding. Officers and non-commissioned officers of the Takasago Unit were dispersed to all units of the Eighteenth Army area to act as instructors in raiding-infiltration tactics.

By June 1945 training had progressed to such a point that all Eighteenth Army units had raiding groups in constant use. Each unit defended its position during the day and employed raiding tactics at night. These harassing attacks enjoyed some measure of success in that the enemy was required to maintain strong defenses at night which had the effect of slowing down their drive and strength the following day.



**Author's Observations:**

One weakness of raiding-infiltration tactics is the fact that higher headquarters cannot invariably confirm the results achieved by raiding parties. It was found that many reports tended to be over-optimistic and although the raiding tactics employed against the Australians in eastern New Guinea were most effective, they were not as completely successful as was reported on several occasions. It is believed that in future employment some method must be devised to give the higher echelons of command sufficient accurate information to form a true and impartial picture of actual results.

Example No. 9

Night Attack by the Kawaguchi Detachment  
on Guadalcanal

(Based on operations records compiled by the Demobilization Bureau, "Examples of Small-scale Actions" compiled by the Inspectorate General of Military Training in October 1943, and statements of veteran officers.)

After an attack by the Ichiki Detachment had ended in failure on 21 August, the commander of the Seventeenth Army dispatched the Kawaguchi Detachment to Guadalcanal with orders to capture the island from the United States forces which had landed on 7 August 1942.

The main body of the Kawaguchi Detachment, which was sent to Guadalcanal aboard Navy destroyers, debarked under cover of darkness in the vicinity of Taivu Point between the nights of 29 August and 4 September. The total strength which Detachment Commander Kawaguchi had in the Taivu Point vicinity was the 35th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 124th Infantry Regiment, the 2d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment, the remnants of the Ichiki Detachment (about one infantry battalion) and one field artillery battery.

Note: The 2d Battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment embarked on small craft and landed on the morning of 5 September at Maravoro on the northwest tip of the island. This unit assumed the offensive from the west in cooperation with the offensive from the east by the Kawaguchi Detachment.

Apparently the United States forces had detected the debarkation of the Kawaguchi Detachment as beginning in the early morning of 1

September they mounted air strafing and bombing attacks.

To make attack preparations by securing a position to the west, the detachment advanced, on the night of the 2d, to the sector between Koli Point and the Balesuma River and made a reconnaissance of the enemy situation and terrain. (See Map No. 1)

Although the original plan as outlined by Seventeenth Army had called for an attack on the 11th, some doubt was expressed in army headquarters as to the capabilities of the Kawaguchi Detachment.

The detachment commander was queried on the 5th as to the advisability of delaying the attack. (See Map No. 1)

Although the Kawaguchi Detachment Commander Kawaguchi replied on the following day: on the 11th, some doubt was expressed in army headquarters as to the capabilities of the Kawaguchi Detachment.

"It would not be advisable to postpone the day of attack in order to wait for reinforcements. There will be no moon on the 12th and conditions will be suitable for a surprise attack. I plan to launch the attack on or about the 12th and am confident of accomplishing the mission with our present strength."

In spite of the fact that the attack scheduled for the 11th had



been coordinated with the navy, which was to attack the Lunga Airfield simultaneously with the attack by the Kawaguchi Detachment, I plan to launch the attack on or about the 12th and am confident of accomplishing the mission with our present strength."

In the meantime, reconnaissance had indicated that progress through the jungle would be exceedingly difficult due to the fact that many of the rivers had flooded as a result of the continuous rains. The transport of ammunition and provisions would be particularly difficult.

On the 7th of September the commander considered postponing the attack until the 13th and radioed a request to army headquarters to change the attack to the 12th. Reconnaissance had indicated that progress through the jungle would be exceedingly difficult due to the fact that many of the rivers had flooded as a result of the continuous rains. The transport of ammunition and provisions would be particularly difficult. On the 7th of September the commander considered postponing the attack until the 13th and radioed a request to army

# DISPOSITION AND ATTACK PLAN KAWAGUCHI DETACHMENT

29 AUG - 7 SEP 1942



REMARKS: DOTTED LINES INDICATE ATTACK PLAN.

headquarters. On the same day, however, the Seventeenth Army had received the following message from Imperial General Headquarters:


"A large enemy convoy with marines aboard, arrived at the Fiji Islands on the 5th."

Due to the imminence of immediate reinforcement for the United States forces on Guadalcanal, the army ordered the Kawaguchi Detachment to retain the attack date of the 12th.

At dusk on the 8th the detachment departed Koli Point and commenced a flanking movement through the jungle. Prior to departing from army headquarters at Rabaul a night attack had been determined as being the only possible tactic which might be effective against the United States forces. However, influenced by the failure of the frontal attack made by the Ichiki Detachment, the decision to make a flanking movement through the jungle to the south was decided on by Detachment Commander Kawaguchi after landing on Guadalcanal Island.

The movement through the jungle was conducted with the infantry battalions in four columns. Although considerably delayed due to unexpected difficulties all columns were able to arrive at the Tenaru River by the evening of the 11th. Three of the battalions merged into one column (the Mizuno Battalion, a mixed organization formed from the personnel of the Ichiki Detachment, remained on the extreme right flank), enabling the detachment commander to exercise direct control of the main body. (See Map No. 1A)

Note: One reason given for the difficulty of the movement was that bearings were often lost because of the magnetic



variation of the compasses. Such difficulties might have been due to lack of training in the use of compasses in jungle movement.

The enemy was still unaware of the approach of the detachment and success seemed assured. It was believed that enemy positions were established only on the sea front and on the east and west land fronts and that there were practically no enemy positions in the south. As a consequence of this belief, strong enemy resistance was not expected in the south nor at the Lunga Airfield which was to be attacked simultaneous with the main enemy positions.

Note: The detachment was confident that its movement had not been detected by the United States forces because an American flyer, captured when his plane crashed on the route of advance, informed them that the United States forces were not aware of the movement.

The detachment commander resolved to launch the attack at 2200 hours on the 12th, capture the airfield by the morning of the 13th, and advance to the shore line. Rations carried when departing from Taivu Point were sufficient for only about 13 days and little supply was expected after that time. Therefore, it was apparent that provisions would be exhausted about the 14th. It had been planned to depend on rations captured from the United States forces after that.

To effect an attack on the night of the 12th it would be advisable to place each unit in position for attack preparations at about 1400 hours and to reconnoiter the enemy situation and terrain until about sunset (1900 hours). The detachment commander realized that since the unit was well behind schedule it might be extremely difficult to effect an attack on the night of the 12th. However, since

coordinated plans called for the bombarding of the airfield by the navy on the night of the 12th, the attack could not be postponed at that late date.


The advance of the detachment was delayed even longer than had been anticipated and it was not only unable to take up positions for attack preparations by 1400 hours, but was unable to reach the preparatory positions by sunset.

Shortly after sunset contact between the detachment headquarters and all battalions was lost and until the morning of the 13th each battalion operated independently. The 3d Battalion, on the extreme right flank, discontinued advance and all action at sunset because of a leg injury received by the battalion commander. The 2d Battalion, assigned as the first line attack unit, continued its advance through the jungle and arrived at the vicinity for attack preparations. However, the battalion could not estimate the enemy situation or terrain and dawn of the 13th came before reconnaissance could be completed.

The 1st Battalion, on the extreme left flank, launched an attack against an enemy position at about 2200 hours and captured it but enemy artillery bombardment compelled the battalion to abandon the position the following morning. (See Map No. 2)

Note: It was believed on this night that the 1st Battalion had assaulted Hill 30 (northwest of the airfield). However, it was later determined that the battalion had been attacking one company of a U.S. raider battalion south of the airfield.





The Mizuno Battalion which had proceeded toward the Ilu River failed to carry out an assault due to obstacles in front of the enemy positions.

On the morning of the 13th, the enemy situation and details of the terrain still remained unknown; even the location of the detachment could not be pinpointed. However, out of necessity, the detachment commander ordered each battalion to resume the attack at 2200 hours on the 13th.

Earlier than the expected time, the 1st Battalion, on the extreme left flank commenced attacking about sunset and succeeded in occupying the enemy position to its front. Harassed by an enemy bombardment which was intensified at that time, the advance became difficult and was stalemated about 2200 hours. As on the previous night, the 3d Battalion did not attack.

Note: The attack of the 1st Battalion forced two companies of a raider battalion to withdraw from their position.

The 2d Battalion located roughly in the rear center, commenced an assault with considerable success after 2200 hours, in spite of a fierce bombardment which reached its height at that time. Some companies broke through the enemy position on Mukade Hill to advance to the sector southeast of the airfield. However, the success attained by the attacking companies could not be maintained nor exploited; in the darkness and the jungle the men and units were badly scattered and it became virtually impossible for the battalion commander to direct the action. (See Example No. 9a)

At dawn on the 14th, the enemy bombardment and air bombings were again intensified and an element of the enemy counterattacked. Continuous losses were sustained and it became impossible for General Kawaguchi to exercise any measure of control over the detachment. In view of this situation and the fact that the food supply had been exhausted, he decided to disengage temporarily and regroup his strength on the left bank of the Lunga River. The detachment commenced the disengaging action on the 14th and reached the left bank of the river on the 15th.

Because of the interruption of communication the Seventeenth Army was not informed of the failure of the attack until the 15th. Upon receipt of the news, the detachment was ordered to withdraw to the area west of the Matanikau River.

Losses sustained by Kawaguchi Detachment from the time of the landing on Guadalcanal until 2 October are as shown in the following chart.

Unit	Total Strength Involved in Fighting	Number Killed in Action	Number Wounded in Action	Ratio of Losses (%)
Detachment Hq	164	3	4	4%
1st Bn, 124th Inf Regt	1,034	208	185	38%
3d Bn, 124th Inf Regt	814	66	62	16%
2d Bn, 4th Inf Regt	658	107	79	28%
Mizuno Battalion	658	58	36	14%
Total:	3,328	442	366	24%

Remarks:

1. • Escort platoon of 41 men are included with Detachment Headquarters.
2. Deaths from wounds in action, sickness contracted at the front and missing are included in the number killed in action.

Note: Losses sustained amounted to close to one-fourth of the entire strength of the detachment. Although it cannot be denied that these were heavy losses, they had not reached the point which would justify the abandonment of the attack.

Author's Observations:


In the preparation of this record, the author interviewed Maj Gen Kawaguchi on 8 December 1953. In response to a query as to the reason for the failure of the attack, General Kawaguchi stated that the failure to postpone the attack until the 13th was the principal direct cause. His opinion was that if his radio message of 7 September recommending the postponement of the attack had been approved by

the Seventeenth Army or if he had used his own discretion, the attack of the Kawaguchi Detachment would definitely have succeeded and the subsequent situation on Guadalcanal might have changed greatly.


Other reasons advanced were; the lack of time to conduct attack preparations, the lack of accurate maps and the failure of the 3d Battalion to show proper fighting spirit.

The lack of adequate maps must have been an important factor in the failure of the attack. The mistake of thinking that the 1st Battalion, on the extreme left, had attacked Hill 30 would not have been made if accurate maps had been available and if time had permitted the making of proper reconnaissance. For a general map, the Kawaguchi Detachment had only a hydrographical chart of Guadalcanal and for the Lunga area, it had an aerial photo of the coastal sector north of Mukade Hill. Aerial photos were reproduced as simple maps but the aerial photos themselves were supplied only to detachment headquarters. (Copies of the hydrographic chart and aerial photograph are attached as Maps 3A and 3B.)

The Kawaguchi Detachment was under the impression that its flanking movement to Mukade Hill was well concealed from the American forces. However, it is now evident that the United States forces knew of the movement well in advance, although they were not aware of the exact time and place until the attack was begun. The detachment had lost its objective of strategic surprise and had little chance for anything other than a tactical raid. A full scale attack



HYDROGRAPHICAL CHART OF GUADALCANAL



HYDROGRAPHICAL CHART OF GUADALCANAL



AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF LUNGA AREA



following thorough preparation might have met with some measure of success.

If the detachment had succeeded in occupying the air strip, the entire defensive of the United States forces would have been adversely affected and might have crumbled. It was, from the Japanese point of view, a most regrettable failure.

Example No. 9a

Summary of the 2d Battalion Attack on the  
Night of 13 September 1942. (See Map No. 2)

The 2d Battalion completed its attack preparations about 1900 hours on the 13th and at 2200 hours the enemy intensified its artillery fire, bombarding the positions of the 1st and 3d Battalions. Without waiting for orders, Major Tamura, commander of the 2d Battalion, ordered an attack on Mukade Hill.

The 5th Company, on the left flank, broke through and captured points in the first line of the enemy and approached the secondary positions. At this time, enemy rifle and artillery fire was concentrated on the company but the company commander massed his remaining men, including the reserve platoon, and in spite of the heavy fire and the severe losses which it inflicted, by taking advantage of the terrain and advancing by crawling, the two assault platoons succeeded in occupying the secondary positions. During this assault the company commander was killed and the assault slowed down.

The 7th Company, on the right flank, broke through almost simultaneously with the 5th Company and occupied enemy first line positions. Later the company broke through several weak points in the secondary positions, crossed the crest line and advanced to the sector on the northeast side of the hill.

The battalion commander was aware of the fierce resistance of the enemy and the heavy casualties being sustained but, determined to

press the attack with the object of advancing to the shore line by dawn of the 14th, ordered the reserve company to advance. The 6th Company crossed the line of the 5th Company and approached the enemy position for a flanking attack. Although the company commander was wounded and over half the company were casualties, the remaining 50 or 60 men broke through the enemy line, crossed the crest of the hill and advanced to the sector southeast of the airfield about dawn of the 14th. The company halted in this area to regroup and make preparations for the next attack.

Example No. 10

Night Attack of the 2d Division on Guadalcanal

(Based on operations records compiled by the Demobilization Bureau, statements of surviving officers and the book, "Guadalcanal" by Masanobu Tsuji.)


After the United States forces landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942, the Seventeenth Army failed in two attempts to recapture the island by attacks of the Ichiki and Kawaguchi Detachments. Starting in the middle of September the army moved the 2d Division from Rabaul to Guadalcanal on destroyers and on the night of 9 October, Lt Gen Hyakutake, commander of the Seventeenth Army, arrived at Tassafaronga to personally direct the operation. Plans formulated at Rabaul had taken into consideration the failure of the attempted surprise attacks of the Ichiki and Kawaguchi Detachments and this third offensive was designed to overwhelm the enemy with power, making full use of superior artillery and fire power. At Tassafaronga, however, the army commander discovered that the actual strength of the 2d Division consisted of only five infantry battalions (excluding those attached to the Ichiki and Kawaguchi Detachments), two field guns, two mountain guns and four 15 cm howitzers, with only a small amount of ammunition.

Ship transportation capacity was only half of that scheduled and the number of men who debarked was between one-third and one-half of full division strength. The amount of munitions transported was also extremely small.

Imperial General Headquarters was strongly demanding the recapture of the Guadalcanal airfields by 20 October and in view of the reduced strength of the 2d Division, the army commander realized the necessity of revising the attack plan. On the morning of the 11th, the 2d Division reported that the mountainous area south of the enemy positions was not wooded and recommended the adoption of a flanking attack. The army commander decided that a flanking attack would be more advisable than the frontal attack originally contemplated and on the 12th he informally directed the 2d Division to employ an element to divert the enemy to the coastal area and conduct a flanking movement with the main body from the southern foot of Mt Austen to the right bank of the Lunga River and to occupy the airfield with a surprise attack. The 2d Division reported that it would be able to make an attack on or about 20 October and on the same day ordered the 2d Engineer Regiment to commence construction of the division route of march. (See Map No. 1)

On 13 October the Seventeenth Army issued an order to the 2d Division to commence preparations. The Kawaguchi Detachment Headquarters and one comparatively strong battalion were transferred to the division and the remaining detachment strength was placed under direct army command. In accordance with the army order, on the 14th at 0800 hours, the 2d Division issued an order to prepare for action:

"The 4th Infantry Regiment and the bulk of artillery strength on Guadalcanal will be organized into the Sumiyoshi Force to contain the enemy in the coastal area. The remaining combat strength will prepare for a flanking attack. Units will carry 12 days provisions and as much ammunition as possible."



Preparations proceeded well; by 14 October the 2d Engineer Regiment had constructed half of the route, by the morning of the 15th, reinforcements (the 16th and the 230th Infantry Regiments) had landed at Kokumbona and the massing of the attack force was completed. A bombardment conducted by the Sumiyoshi force and naval forces against the Lunga Airfield from the 13th to the night of the 14th covered the transportation and unloading operation. It was believed at first that this bombardment had been highly effective, however, as a result of enemy bombing which began at dawn on the 15th, three transports out of six were destroyed and only one-tenth of the ammunition and one-half of the provisions were unloaded.

On 15 October the Seventeenth Army issued orders to the 2d Division:

"After sunset of X Day the 2d Division will make a surprise attack on the enemy flank from the southern side of the Lunga Airfield and destroy the enemy on Guadalcanal."

Although tentatively scheduled for the 20th, the exact date of X Day was to be decided on in accordance with the situation of the division.

The 2d Division, at 1000 hours 15 October, ordered the commencement of movement to the upper Lunga River. At 1400 hours on the 16th, all units commenced movement from the left bank of the Oki River with the 29th Infantry Regiment as the leading element. With the start of the movement, the army commander placed the Sumiyoshi force under his direct command with the intention of using that force to expedite

the attack of the division by permitting it to concentrate on the airfield. The units of the former Kawaguchi Detachment were placed under the Sumiyoshi force, which was ordered to advance to the left bank of the Matanikau River to attack Mt Austen and the enemy positions on the right bank of the Matanikau River.

The movement of the 2d Division was extremely difficult and slow because of poor roads and rugged terrain. The lack of horses and other transportation facilities made the movement of heavy weapons impossible and artillery pieces were abandoned along the route of march. Eventually, the leading unit reached a point six kilometers northeast of the Lunga River crossing point about sunset of the 19th. A concentration of troops, in that vicinity, was effected on the 20th.

Note: The 2d Division had estimated that the point was two kilometers behind the scheduled line of deployment. However, it was later discovered that the division was actually located about a day's march to the rear of the scheduled line.

The army commander on being informed that the 2d Division was arriving at the scheduled point on the 19th, issued the following order:


1. The time has come for the decisive battle between the United States and the Japanese forces.
2. X Day will be the 22d.
3. Officers and men of each unit will exert the utmost efforts to accomplish their mission.

In accordance with the army order the 2d Division issued the following order at 1200 hours on the 20th:



1. The known enemy positions are shown on the appended map.
2. The division will deploy on the line of its present location, effect a surprise night attack, capture the enemy airfield and destroy the enemy on the left bank of the Lunga River. The direction of the main effort of attack will be along the right bank of the Lunga River to the northwest sector of the airfield. The time of assault is tentatively scheduled for 1800 hours on the 22d, but time will be confirmed in a separate order.
3. The Right Flank Force (3d Battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment, the 230th Infantry Regiment, less one battalion, and one engineer company under the command of Major General Kawaguchi) will prepare for attack at the present line, direct the main effort of attack on the left, conduct a surprise break-through of the enemy positions on the southern edge of the airfield, capture the enemy positions along the edge of the jungle on the north side of the airfield and advance to the coast line. After advancing to the coast line, the main body will concentrate in the vicinity of the south side of the Yamori River and will annihilate the remaining enemy west of the Ilu River.
4. The Left Flank Force (29th Infantry Regiment and one engineer company under the command of Maj Gen Nasu) will prepare for an attack at the present line and effect a surprise attack against the enemy positions near the southern edge of the airfield. Immediately after advancing to the motor road north of the airfield, it will cross the Lunga River, capture the Kuma position from the rear and complete the mop-up of the enemy on the left bank sector by dawn.
5. The boundary between the Right and Left Flank Forces will be the line connecting the open grassy area east of the Lunga River, the radio receiving station north of the airfield and the eastern mouth of the Lunga River.
6. The reserve force (16th Infantry Regiment) will follow the rear of the Right Flank Force. It will be prepared to cross the Lunga River and make preparation to attack the Kuma position from the flank.
7. The engineer unit will assist the Left Flank Force and the reserve force in crossing the Lunga River.

The strength of the 2d Division was, at that time, nine infantry battalions (about 5,600 men). The mortar, antitank, and mountain gun



units were assigned to both the Left and Right Flank Forces but had practically no guns and only four mountain guns with 50 rounds of ammunition per gun were actually used in the attack.

All units of the 2d Division departed from the assembly point in the morning of the 21st and advanced toward the line of deployment.

The division chief of staff had been with the engineer unit which was engaged in route construction, determining and designating the division's line of march. The construction work of the engineer unit made slow progress and because of a misjudgement in plotting they could not, even on the 21st, estimate precisely when they would reach the line of deployment. Because of this situation, the division commander was requested to postpone the attack one day. The division commander having received the approval of the army commander, issued an order to postpone the time and date of the attack from 1800 hours on the 22d to 1900 hours on the 23d.

On the morning of the 22d, the engineer unit advanced to the prearranged line of deployment and marked attack positions for the Left and Right Flank Forces. Although both forces exerted utmost efforts, the advance was slow and it was apparent on the evening of the 22d that even if the first line units of the forces should arrive in front of the enemy position by the evening of the 23d, the arrival of reserve units would be delayed and it would be impossible to make complete preparations for a night attack. In spite of this

situation, taking into consideration the coordination of the operation with the Combined Fleet, the division commander refused further postponement of the attack.

At 1600 hours on the 22d the division received the following report from Maj Gen Kawaguchi, commander of the Right Flank Force:



"If the attack is effected as scheduled (on the 23d) only the 3d Battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment will be committable. The main body of the 230th Infantry Regiment will not be available because of its slow progress. A postponement of one day is requested."

At that time, the Left Flank Force reported that it would be possible to attack after sunset of the 23d. The division commander accepted the recommendation of the Right Flank Force, postponed the date of attack to 1900 hours on the 24th but on the evening of the 23d he relieved Major General Kawaguchi from command and assigned Colonel Shoji, commander of the 230th Infantry Regiment, to the command of the Right Flank Force. (See Map No. 2)

Note: According to Major General Kawaguchi, there was another reason for his removal as commander of the Right Flank Force. After a study of the aerial photograph delivered during the advance, General Kawaguchi came to the conclusion that there were strong enemy positions in the attack front of the Right Flank Force and was most insistent in recommending a flanking attack from the right bank sector of the Ilu River. The recommendation was not approved by the division commander and hard feelings developed. As a matter of fact, General Kawaguchi's estimate of the situation was not altogether correct as it was later discovered that the right bank of the Ilu River was also strongly defended by the American 164th Infantry Regiment.

Early in the morning of the 24th, the commander of the 2d Division advanced with the reserve unit to the rear of the Right Flank

PROGRESS OF ATTACK OF 2D DIVISION  
20 - 25 OCT 1942



REMARKS: THE DISPOSITION OF THE U.S. FORCES WAS BASED ON THE DATA OFFERED BY THE U.S. FORCES.

Force and at 1400 hours issued the following order:

1. Through divine aid and desperate effort by the officers and men, the division has been able to advance to the enemy's flank without being detected.

2. With divine protection, the division commander will effect the attack in accordance with the established plan and defeat the enemy in the vicinity of the airfield.

3. The two Flank Forces will effect an assault at 1900 hours and penetrate deep into the enemy line.

4. The division commander will remain at his present location until 1600 hours and will then advance toward the airfield behind the Left Flank Force.

Infantrymen and engineers of the two division forces exerted their utmost efforts to construct the route of approach. However, the advance was still extremely difficult because of the rugged terrain and, as the jungle became more and more dense, it became difficult to plot points and take bearings. At about 1700 hours it began to rain heavily and at sunset it was virtually impossible to advance. The rain stopped about 2400 hours, the moon came out and while it was then possible to take action, the time scheduled for attack had long since passed.

The Right Flank Force was unable to make an assault because of insufficient attack preparations.

On the Left Flank, the right front battalion lost its bearings and was unable to attack. Infantrymen and engineers of the left front battalion demolished wire entanglements and assaulted the enemy position about 0030 hours. As a result of heavy enemy fire from

automatic weapons and mortars, the assault was checked just short of the enemy positions.

Colonel Komiya, commander of the 29th Infantry Regiment, took command of the left flank reserves (2d Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment) and, utilizing all available fire power of heavy weapons, assaulted the enemy position. After forcing a breach in the enemy's first line, the battalion penetrated deep into the enemy positions. However, before they could secure the breach the enemy closed it.

At dawn of the 25th it became apparent that the night attack had ended in failure along the entire line. The division commander again made preparations to capture the airfield and support the 2d Battalion of the 29th Infantry Regiment which had penetrated the enemy positions. He determined to effect an assault with the entire division strength on the night of the 25th. At 1200 hours he issued the following order:

1. The Left Flank Force will support the 2d Battalion of the 29th Infantry Regiment which has breached the enemy lines, penetrated deep into enemy territory and captured the airfield.

2. The 16th Infantry Regiment and the 2d Engineer Regiment (less two companies) will be added to the command of the Left Flank Force.

3. To night the Right Flank Force will attack, capture the airfield and accomplish other assigned missions.

After learning of the failure of the night attack on the 24th, the Seventeenth Army also issued an order to resume the attack on the night of the 25th. Throughout the entire day of the 25th the

enemy bombarded the front and rear sectors of the Left Flank Force and at noon enemy fighter planes strafed troops in the front line.

The Right Flank Force regrouped and prepared for attack. However, during the afternoon it shifted to the defense because of a report (later found to be erroneous) that an element of the enemy was approaching the right flank in an enveloping move. The dispatch of this information to division headquarters was delayed until that night and no further instructions were received by the Right Flank Force. As a consequence the Right Flank Force suspended all attack preparations and did not participate in the attack on the night of the 25th.

The Left Flank Force deployed the newly added 16th Infantry and the 2d Engineer Regiments on its right flank. With the approach of night Maj Gen Nasu, commander of the Left Flank Force personally led the force in a desperate attack. An element of the 16th Infantry succeeded in demolishing the enemy's wire entanglements and rushed into the enemy positions but were thrown back. The main body of the force also exerted all-out efforts to assault the enemy position but failed to accomplish a break-through. With daybreak the enemy fire with automatic weapons and mortars became extremely heavy and casualties increased.

In the attack General Nasu and the commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Hiroyasu, were killed. Virtually every key officer in the attacking force was seriously wounded or killed. No




contact could be made with the 2d Battalion of the 29th Infantry and the breach effected by that unit had been firmly closed.

The second night attack of the 2d Division ended in complete failure, the division had no reserves remaining, all provisions were expended and there was no supply transportation. On the 26th, the Seventeenth Army ordered the 2d Division to suspend the attack.

**Author's Observations:**

This attack failed of success because of the lack of two elements essential for a flanking surprise attack operation.

One was the lack of knowledge of the terrain and the climate of Guadalcanal. There were no accurate maps and the available aerial photographs were incomplete. The erroneous report of the 2d Division that the mountains were not densely wooded was undoubtedly a big factor in the adoption of this plan of operations. However the conditions in the jungle, the terrain and the rainfall proved contrary to all information, causing serious delays and the several changes in the date of attack. Furthermore, as a result of the long and difficult movement, the 2d Division lost the bulk of its artillery, heavy weapons and field rations, and the physical condition of the officers and men declined, causing a great decrease in fighting power. Map No. 3 is one of the aerial photo maps used by the 2d Division. It should be noted that this photograph shows mainly the Lunga Sector and does not include the areas along the route of advance. The fact that this photograph was delivered after the commencement of the



AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF LUNGA SECTOR

advance may also have had some bearing on the situation.

Secondly, the Seventeenth Army and the 2d Division made a serious error in their estimation of the enemy situation. The strength of the United States forces was estimated at about 10,000 men with declining morale. It later developed that American strength on Guadalcanal approximated 23,000 men and that neither their morale nor training was in any way inferior. This underestimate been largely responsible for the failure of the attack by the Kawaguchi Detachment but the Seventeenth Army and the 2d Division did not abandon its original estimates of enemy strength. The attack order of the 2d Division makes it clear that it was believed that the division could destroy the United States forces at one blow.

It was later discovered that on 23 October, just prior to the attack by the Japanese 2d Division, the United States 1st Marine Division had disposed two battalions of the 7th Marine Regiment on a 2,560 meters front along Bloody Ridge (south of the airfield). However, as a result of the diversion by the Sumiyoshi force on the 23rd, the 7th Marine headquarters and one battalion were transferred to the coastal area on the 24th. As a consequence of this move, when the 2d Division attacked, only the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines was defending a front of 2,560 meters. The artillery disposition had also been changed in accordance with a reconnaissance report that Japanese forces had been sighted south of the airfield. It was only in the late afternoon of the 24th that the 1st Marine Battalion

became aware of the approach of the Japanese forces and it was then too late to change dispositions.

The diversion created by the Sumiyoshi force obtained the expected results and the 2d Division succeeded in completely concealing its plan of attack until just before it was launched. Considering these circumstances, and despite various unfavorable conditions, the 2d Division had a possibility of success in the night attack. However, they failed to achieve success against a single marine battalion because the shortage of provisions, the strain of a long and arduous march through dense jungle terrain under difficult climatic conditions had had a most adverse affect upon the physical condition of the officers and men. The tendency to consistently underestimate the strength and fighting power of the United States forces and the restriction of movement as a result of the loss of air supremacy were also factors which materially contributed to the failure to achieve any measure of success.

Some degree of success might have been achieved had the attack been limited to a strategic surprise attack. It is apparent that the attack disposition of the division was not satisfactory and the order issued by the 2d Division was incomplete in that it did not designate whether both Flank Forces would conduct surprise attacks simultaneously or whether they would employ firepower at the same time. According to the order, "they would occupy the airfield and annihilate the main body of the United States forces by dawn of the

25th." Even without encountering resistance it would have been impossible to accomplish that mission in consideration of the past slow rate of jungle movement.

On two successive nights the Japanese forces repeated an attack against the same section of enemy positions and in the same manner, not attempting to break through weak points.

An important factor affecting the outcome was the American use of resourceful measures in their defensive operations. They inflicted huge losses on the attacking units and destroyed them by prompt dispatch of reserve units to the battle area. Their employment of artillery fire, intensive use of infantry fire power and fire control by means of detecting devices was particularly effective.

Night Attack by the Nakai Detachment in the  
Vicinity of Kesewa, New Guinea

(Based on operations records compiled by the First Demobilization Bureau and statement of Major Kawahigashi, commander of the 1st Battalion, 78th Infantry Regiment.)

In early December 1943, the main body of the Eighteenth Army was involved in the Finschhafen Operation in New Guinea. The Nakai Detachment, attached to the Eighteenth Army, was deployed on the Finisterre Mountain line south of Madang where it was engaging the Australian 7th Division which had advanced along the Markham and Ramu Rivers from Lae. The mission of the Nakai Detachment was to check the advance of the 7th Division at the mountains and to cover Madang, the advance operations base for the Eighteenth Army.

The Nakai Detachment had as its nucleus the 78th Infantry Regiment (less one company) and included the 5th Company of the 80th Infantry Regiment, the Saito Volunteer Unit (a raiding-infiltration unit of about 150 men from the Takasago tribe of Formosa), one field gun battalion, and one independent engineer regiment. The 239th Infantry Regiment was subsequently assigned by the Eighteenth Army.

During the first part of October the Australian 7th Division had made a strong attack in the vicinity of Mt Kankirei but had been repulsed. It was believed, however, that the enemy might plan to move an element west of the Kesewa area¹ and advance to Madang by breaking

---

1. No town or area of "Kesewa" appears on available maps and author of this combat example is not now available for questioning. According to the editor's best information, Kesewa was an arbitrary name used by the Japanese forces to designate the general area between the southwest slope of the Finisterre mountain range and the Ramu River. Points within the area were identified further as No. 2 Kesewa, No. 3 Kesewa, etc.

through the flank of the Eighteenth Army. An enemy battalion had advanced to No. 2 Kesewa and other elements of the 7th Division were disposed in the vicinity of Kadovar, Isariba and Soshi. The activities of Australian intelligence units in the Urigina area, west of Soshi, had been intensified. (See Map No. 1)



In consideration of this situation Detachment Commander Nakai determined to strike a blow at the enemy in the Kesewa area in order to frustrate their plan to advance northwest. On 2 December he issued the following attack plan:

1. A surprise attack will be made at 0400 hours on 8 December.
2. The 78th Infantry Regiment (less the 2d and 3d Battalions) plus the 5th Company, 80th Infantry Regiment, and the Saito Volunteer Unit will prepare for an attack in the vicinity of Mt Futabayama and attack the enemy at No. 2 Kesewa at 0400 hours on 8 December. The attack will commence with a raiding-infiltration attack by the Saito Volunteer Unit.
3. The 3d Battalion of the 78th Infantry Regiment will make a surprise attack at Soshi at 0400 hours on 8 December. Subsequently it will advance in the direction of No. 2 Kesewa.
4. The 239th Infantry Regiment (less the 1st and 3d Battalions) will attack the enemy in the vicinity of Kadovar and Isariba and later advance to Kesewa.
5. The 2d Battalion of the 78th Infantry Regiment will defend the position in the vicinity of Mt Kankirei.

In accordance with the detachment plan the assault units prepared for attack. The 78th Infantry Regiment organized the No. 2 Kesewa Surprise Attack Unit from the 1st Battalion (less the 3d Company), the 5th Company of the 80th Regiment and the Saito Volunteer Unit, under Major Kawahigashi, commander of the 1st Battalion.

SITUATION BEFORE COMMENCEMENT  
OF FIGHTING  
1 DEC. 1943

----- JAPANESE ARMY  
----- AUSTRALIAN ARMY





On the 5th of December the Kesewa Surprise Attack Unit obtained the following information regarding the enemy situation and terrain:

1. Enemy security at Asias was relaxed and there was no reconnaissance in the area of Hill 910.

2. There were three tent groups disposed south, east and west of No. 2 Kesewa. The number of tents in each group were estimated to be from 30 to 40, with a total of about 100 accomodating approximately 1,000 men. There was a defense position on the north side of No. 2 Kesewa but it was not manned at night.

3. The terrain from Mt Futabayama to Plantation C, via Hill 910, was heavily wooded. Further south was a grassland area with woods only along the river.

4. There was an old native trail on the crest line between Hill 910 and Plantation C.

5. The enemy did not seem to be aware of any unusual Japanese activity and reconnaissance activities had gone unobserved.

On December 5th the commander of the Kesewa Surprise Attack Unit issued the following directive:

1. The Unit will leave Junction A at 1800 hours on 7 December and make a surprise attack on the enemy in the No. 2 Kesewa area at 0400 hours on the 8th.

2. The 5th Company of the 80th Infantry Regiment will be the advance party and will move to Point D via Hill 910, Plantation C and Point D to cut off the enemy retreat in Asias and Segere.

3. The Saito Volunteer Unit will overtake the advance party at Point D and at 0400 hours on the 8th will, in a surprise attack, demolish simultaneously all tent groups in the No. 2 Kesewa area.

4. The 4th Company will accompany the Saito Volunteer Unit and will mop-up the tent areas following their demolition by the Saito Unit.

5. Remaining units will follow immediately in the rear of the 4th Company in the following order:


Battalion Headquarters  
1st Company  
Machine Gun Company  
Battalion Gun Platoon  
2d Company


These units will be prepared to support the battle after dawn.  
(Sunrise on the 8th was at 0500 hours.)

At 1800 hours the Kesewa Surprise Attack Unit commenced advance as planned and continued the advance through the night, utilizing luminous bars fixed on knapsacks to keep men in column. At 0200 hours on the 8th the leading unit arrived at the edge of the hill north of No. 2 Kesewa. The commander ordered the commencement of infiltration, indicating targets to the Saito Volunteer Unit and the 4th Company. (See Map Nos. 2 and 3)

The Saito Volunteer Unit approached each tent group by crawling and about 0500 hours blew all groups simultaneously, using two kilogram charges of TNT. (Due to unforeseen difficulties the time of attack had been delayed one hour.) The enemy was taken by complete surprise, thrown into confusion and routed to the southeast without resistance and in disorder. The 4th Company mopped up in the tent groups and the operation at No. 2 Kesewa was completed without committing the main body of the battalion. The mop-up being completed, the battalion, together with the other elements of the Surprise Attack Unit exploited their success by moving in the direction of No. 3 and 4 Kesewa areas.

In the Segere and Asias areas, the 3d and 7th Companies of the 78th Infantry Regiment were successful in driving the enemy out of





their positions at approximately 0400 hours.

The 3d Battalion of the 78th Infantry assaulted the enemy at Soshi at dawn and occupied that area. It subsequently advanced to Koroba, left an element there to cut off enemy retreat from the direction of Isariba and then advanced to No. 2 Kesewa.

All units achieved success in accordance with the original plans, with the exception of the 239th Infantry Regiment whose advance was slowed by flooded streams along the route of advance. Delayed by difficult conditions, the regiment did not attack until about 1000 hours on the 8th. In addition, because an enemy group of about one company strength at Kadovar and Isariba offered stubborn resistance, the advance to Koroba was delayed until the 10th.

Following the mop-up of the enemy in the Kesewa area it appeared that the Australian 7th Division would not constitute a serious threat in that area for some time and the units of the Nakai Detachment returned to their original positions.

**Author's Observations:**

The success of this operation hinged on the outcome of the attack by the Kesewa Surprise Attack Unit. To ensure success two phases had been adopted in the original planning. The first phase called for the surprise attack by the Saito Volunteer Unit followed by the 4th Company. In the event that those units failed to achieve their objective, preparation had been made to destroy the enemy with

an attack in force by the main body of the 1st Battalion. In the Soshi area, where the 3d Battalion attacked, ordinary night combat tactics were employed.

The overall operational plan was a combination of ordinary night assault and raiding-infiltration tactics, which came into use about the end of 1942.

The success of this operation can be attributed to the careful planning and detailed reconnaissance conducted as well as the fact that all units, particularly the Saito Volunteer Unit, were well trained in jungle and night fighting. The success may also have been due in a large measure to the relaxed security situation of the Australian forces.

Example No. 12

Night Attack by the Eighteenth Army near  
Aitape, New Guinea in July 1944

(Based on operations records compiled by the 1st Demobilization Bureau and statements of former staff officer of the Eighteenth Army, Lt Col Tanaka; commander of the 1st Battalion of the 78th Infantry Regiment, Major Kawahigashi; commander of the Infantry Gun Unit of the 80th Infantry Regiment, Major Samejima; and commander of the 1st Battalion of the 237th Infantry Regiment, Major Yamashita.)

Allied forces landed on Aitape and Hollandia on 22 April 1944 and the Eighteenth Army Commander immediately determined to annihilate these forces in order to support the Second Area Army in western New Guinea. The 20th Division, moving west from Hansa, was ordered to advance toward Aitape and Eighteenth Army headquarters began attack preparations. In early May the 20th Division passed through Wewak and moved westward, arriving at the Drinumor River about June 10th, where it deployed along the east bank. En route it had met and defeated several enemy advance groups in the vicinity of Ulau and Yakamul.

It had been the intention of the Eighteenth Army to attack before the United States forces had an opportunity to fortify the Aitape area. However, the 41st Division, which had also been ordered to participate in the operation was required to effect a long withdrawal from Madang and Hansa and did not arrive in Wewak until the middle of June. Transportation of munitions from Wewak was also slower than had been anticipated, particularly the ammunition for the 41st Division. Since the division was short of normal

transport a large percentage of the munitions had to be carried by the men.


In early July, therefore, the Eighteenth Army was still making attack preparations, with its units disposed as indicated on Map No. 1.

The enemy appeared to be constructing its main position in the vicinity of Aitape and had established a force, estimated to be three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion, in an advance position on the west bank of the Drinumor River. (See Map No. 2)

The enemy positions along the Drinumor were lacking in depth, being disposed in a single line, except along the coastal area, and because the enemy strength was comparatively small for a line extending over ten kilometers, there were many gaps in the defenses. Although positions were comparatively weak, some machine gun positions were covered and simple wire entanglements had been laid at vital spots. Command of the air and sea in that vicinity was completely in the hands of the enemy. With Aitape as their base, about 50 enemy aircraft and 20 naval ships delivered day and night attacks against the entire Japanese front, denying daylight movement almost entirely.


The provisions stocked by the Eighteenth Army were approximately half of the amount required and forecasts indicated that they would be completely expended by the end of August. It was, therefore, obvious that the early commencement of an attack was imperative. The Eighteenth Army Commander determined to launch an attack with





**ENEMY POSITIONS AND ATTACK PLAN  
OF THE EIGHTEENTH ARMY**  
10 JULY 1944

↑ JAPANESE ARMY  
U.S. ARMY  
COMMUNICATION WIRES



the objective of breaking through the advance positions on the bank of the Drinumor in order to establish the army in positions from which the main enemy position in Aitape could be attacked.

Two alternatives for the attack seemed possible and the Eighteenth Army staff studied the question as to whether it would be more advisable to make a flanking movement to the Afua area, around the right flank of the enemy position, or to attempt a break-through at the center of the enemy line. The 20th Division expressed the view that because of the decline in the physical condition of the troops, it would be difficult to accomplish the long and arduous move which a flanking attack would entail and recommended an attack at the center of the enemy line. Since reconnaissance had indicated that the advance positions were weak, a center break-through seemed logical and possible and the suggestion of the 20th Division was adopted.

On July 3d the Eighteenth Army Commander issued the following order:

1. Commencement of attack will be at about 2200 hours on 10 July.
2. The main attack will be directed at the center of the enemy position in the vicinity of Kawanakajima. After effecting the break-through, success will be exploited to the north and south and enemy forces in the Paup and Afua areas will be annihilated.
3. The attack will be a surprise night attack but preparations will be made for an attack by force should we fail to surprise the enemy and meet heavy opposition.
4. After breaking through the enemy position in the vicinity of Kawanakajima, the 20th Division will advance to the Afua area and annihilate the enemy in that vicinity.

5. The 41st Division Commander will direct the 237th Infantry Regiment to cross the Drinumor River abreast of the right flank of the 20th Division, turn north after accomplishing the break-through, and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of Paup.

This attack procedure was based on a plan of attack which had been formulated by the 20th Division which had favored the adoption of a night attack because of the inferiority of Japanese air strength and general firepower and because it was necessary to conserve ammunition for the attack on the enemy positions at Aitape.

Although it was preferable to commence the attack as soon as possible after sunset, since the men were in such poor physical condition, it was considered imperative that they be fed prior to making an attack. Because enemy air and naval attacks made it impossible to prepare meals during daylight hours and all cooking had to be done after sunset, it was determined to launch the attack at 2200 hours before the darkness was dispelled by moonrise at about 2230 hours.

The situation of the Eighteenth Army was desperate, its rear had already been cut by the Allied forces, food shortages and the continuous fighting of the past year and a half had reduced physical and numerical strength to a low ebb, since the middle of June the 20th Division had been forced to exist on one-third rations, morale was low and most of the men were unable to move at a pace faster than a walk. There were no horses available and, since manpower was the only means of transporting heavy weapons and ammunition, the number of guns of all types as well as the amount of ammunition had to be

drastically reduced. Strength and armament of attack units was approximately as shown below:

1. 78th Infantry Regiment (20th Division)

3 battalions: With 2 or 3 machine guns and 1 battalion gun each. A total strength of about 1,200 men, including 12 companies with strengths of 60 to 70 men and about 5 light machine guns each.

Antitank and Regimental Gun Units: 1 gun each.

Total Regimental Strength: Approximately 1,300 men.

2. 80th Infantry Regiment (20th Division)

3 battalions: With 2 or 3 machine guns and 1 battalion gun each. A total strength of about 900 men, including 12 companies with strengths of 50 to 60 men and 4 to 6 light machine guns each.

Antitank and Regimental Gun Units: 1 gun each.

Total Regimental strength: Approximately 1,000 men.

3. 79th Infantry Regiment (20th Division - Reserve)

Total Regimental Strength: About 550 men.

4. Artillery Regiment (20th Division) - 10 mountain guns.

5. 237th Infantry Regiment (41st Division)

3 battalions: With 4 machine guns and 1 battalion gun each. A total strength of about 1,450 men, including 12 companies with approximately 90 men in each.

Antitank and Regimental Gun Units: 1 gun each.

Attached Mountain Gun Battery: 2 guns.

Total Regimental Strength: Approximately 1,700 men.

The total strength of all attack units (including reserves) on 10 July was approximately 7,000 men, equal to only about five infantry

and one artillery battalions. The fact that the amount of ammunition which could be carried was very small, further weakened the fighting power of the force.

Except for the hilly section near Afua, the battle area consisted of marshland and dense jungle, while in the area near the coast there were many swamps where mud and water was chest deep. The width of the Drinumor River bed varied between 70 and 120 meters, with a meandering stream 30 to 50 meters in width. Water was waist deep and the velocity of flow comparatively fast (about three meters per second). River banks were generally steep, the east bank being one or two meters in height and the west bank somewhat higher. In many parts reeds grew to the height of a man's head. The steep banks, swift current and dense jungle growth were serious obstacles to men whose strength had so greatly deteriorated.

In spite of difficulties, the attack preparations of the 20th Division progressed smoothly. Patrols were dispatched to the banks of the river to reconnoiter the enemy situation and the terrain. In preparation for the attack, machine gun and heavy weapon positions, approach routes and target areas were established.

Since the headquarters of the 41st Division was located in the vicinity of Matapau, the arrival of the division order to the 237th Infantry Regiment, which was sent through channels, was delayed and the commencement of attack preparations by that regiment were delayed. Because of the delay, the main body of the regiment reached the east

bank of the Drinumor barely in time to commence the attack. However, the 1st Battalion, which had been dispatched to the first line in June, was thoroughly familiar with the terrain and the enemy situation and was employed as the first line attack unit.

The 20th Division and the 237th Infantry Regiment were disposed as shown on Map No. 3. The attack front was shortened to add the greatest possible depth to the attack and the 20th Division directed its main attack effort at a point directly to the front of the 3d Battalion of the 78th Infantry Regiment. Originally, the Eighteenth Army had planned to have the main effort directed from the right flank of the 20th Division. However, because liaison between the division and the 237th Regiment was unsatisfactory, the plan was changed.


The change in attack points made it unnecessary for the 237th Infantry to attack abreast of the 20th Division and it was possible for it to hit a weak point in the enemy position. Heavy weapons units were ordered to establish positions on the east bank by sunset of the day of attack and prepare to deliver fire against those enemy installations which were situated to permit delivery of flanking fire. The attack unit was to leave the assembly point, about 3 kilometers east of the Drinumor River, and deploy on a line of departure along the east bank by 2100 hours on the 10th.

As the day of attack approached, it became evident that the physical strength of officers and men of all units had so deteriorated that it would be impossible for them to run up the slope of the

DISPOSITION OF UNITS OF  
20TH DIV AND 237TH INF REGT  
10 JULY 1944

→ JAPANESE ARMY

▬ US ARMY





river bank without halting for rest and most of the 20th Division first line commanders considered it expedient to effect a heavy artillery attack to destroy the enemy guns before launching the assault. The suggestion to employ preliminary fires which would eliminate the element of surprise was submitted to the Army Commander and approved. The attack plan was revised to provide for a ten minute concentration employing all firepower, except rifles and light machine guns, to begin at 2150 and continue until the time of assault at 2200 hours.

In accordance with the established plan the artillery units of the 20th Division and the 237th Infantry Regiment opened fire at 2150 hours, the first line infantry companies advanced to the river and started their movement toward the enemy positions.


Within a minute after the commencement of the artillery concentration, the enemy opened fire with all available weapons and a few minutes later artillery units in the coastal area began firing. An accurate and heavy barrage which was laid down along the line of departure was lowered to cover the river bed as well. In addition to the artillery barrage, the east bank and the river bed were covered by cross fires. Particularly heavy fire was sustained by the 1st Battalion of the 78th Infantry Regiment, the extreme left flank unit. All units on the 20th Division front suffered heavy losses in the river bed and along the east bank, which delayed the commencement of the actual assault. However, the officers and men rallied and

crossing the river over the bodies of their fallen dead successfully penetrated the enemy position and captured it at 0130 hours on the 11th.

The 1st Battalion of the 78th Infantry Regiment suffered more heavily than other units, having 290 casualties out of a total strength of 360 and was forced to abandon the assault. About 600 men of the 78th Infantry Regiment were killed or wounded during the course of the attack and almost all heavy weapons were destroyed. Losses of the 80th Regiment were much lighter.

In the area of the 237th Infantry Regiment the enemy artillery fire was less intensive and since the regiment avoided a frontal attack, losses and casualties were comparatively light. At about 2200 hours on the 10th, the regiment secured a foothold on the west bank and conducted mop-up operation from its rear, routing the enemy to the northwest. Because of the possibility of firing into the 1st Battalion, the regiment did not conduct counter artillery fire. Progress of the attack by the 237th Infantry Regiment is shown on Map No. 4.

On the 11th, mop-up operations were conducted along the west bank and the enemy in Afua and on Hills 50 and 56 was routed. The entire enemy advance force having withdrawn to the west, the units of the 20th Division assembled in the western sector of the occupied area and prepared for a further advance westward. The 237th Infantry Regiment conducted regrouping and commenced attack preparations against Paup.



Author's Observations:

United States forces were reinforced immediately after the conclusion of the night attack and on the 12th began a series of counterattacks which continued until August 4th when the Eighteenth Army, having expended its fighting strength, was forced to break off the engagement. The original attack on the night of the 10th had been successful in that a break-through had been accomplished and the enemy forced to withdraw to the west.

Reasons offered for the success were the comparatively weak positions and shallowness of the enemy advance line. Some surviving officers of the engagement claim that the employment of fire power to neutralize the enemy position prior to the assault was responsible for victory; on the other hand Major Yamashita, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 237th Infantry Regiment, holds that the employment of fire power in this manner is a violation of the principles of night surprise attack and that its use in this case was responsible for the tremendous losses sustained by the 20th Division. However, the 1st Battalion did not have the problems which confronted the balance of the attacking units. Not having been through the entire New Guinea campaign the men of the battalion were comparatively fresh and in much better physical condition than the others, in addition the freedom given the 1st Battalion in the choice of an attack point, enabling them to drive through a weak part of the enemy line made fire support less necessary.