

N-3748



~~N~~
~~S~~-3748

JUN 21 1965

EX-100
CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

⑨
#-3748

0077019

3748

TACTICS AND STRATEGY
OF THE
JAPANESE ARMY
IN THE
BURMA CAMPAIGN
FROM

NOVEMBER 1943 TO SEPTEMBER 1944

JUN 21 1944

PREPARED BY
UNITED STATES MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA
AND
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGENCY, CBI/SEA
OCTOBER 1944

UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGENCY
CHINA BURMA INDIA

UNCLASSIFIED

CSG/WWE/reh

Pouch No. _____

SN NO. 9082

From JICA/CBI/SEA at New Delhi, India.

Date 23 October 1944.

Reference _____
(for identification with previous reports)

Source Personal observations, interviews, and Evaluation B - 2
British and American official reports

Subject JAPAN TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF THE JAPANESE ARMY IN
(nation reported on) THE BURMA CAMPAIGN, NOVEMBER 1943 - SEPTEMBER
(subtitles) 1944
(main title as per index guide)
(make separate report for each title)

Brief: (Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates etc).

The purpose of this report is to present the salient features of Japanese tactics and techniques employed during the Burma Campaign from November 1943 through September 1944. The report is written for the benefit of (1) combat units which have not been, but will be employed against the Japanese in terrain such as encountered in Burma in order that some knowledge of the Japanese may be gained prior to actual combat, and (2) staff officers who plan operations against the Japanese in order that the tactical picture presented herein may be added to order of battle and other intelligence to gain a sounder appreciation of enemy capabilities.

CONTENTS:

- | | |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------|
| I Introduction | VIII Antitank and Obstacle Warfare |
| II Operations | IX Chemical Warfare Capabilities |
| III Air | X Medical |
| IV Infantry | XI Supply System |
| V Artillery | XII Intelligence, Operations, and Planning |
| VI Engineers | XIII Summary: Japanese Capabilities |
| VII Armor | |

The report was prepared by the U.S. Military Observer Group and the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency, CBI/SEA. The authors of the report are Major AXLING, Inf; Major DUNLEVY, FA; Captain DURE, AC; Lt. Colonel EHRMANN, CE; Captain KNOWLES, FA; Major SLATER, MC; Major TRAYLOR, CE; Captain TRELEVEN, CWS.

Approved and forwarded:

Carl S. Graybeal
CARL S. GRAYBEAL,
Colonel, G.S.C. *H*
Chief, JICA/CBI/SEA.

Winston W. Ehrmann

1782 WINSTON W. EHRMANN,
Lt. Colonel, CE.,
U.S. Military Observer,
Editor.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

JIARC	(5)	D of I, SEAC	(1)
MIS	(10)	11th Army Group	(1)
G-2 Hq, USAF, CBI	(2)	BGS (T) 11th Army Group	(1)
G-2 FE, APO 879	(1)	14th Army	(1)
G-2 Hq NCAC, APO 689	(5)	4 British Corps	(1)
G-2 Hq 5332 Brig (Prov)		15 Indian Corps	(1)
APO 218	(2)	33 " "	(1)
G-2 Hq (Prov) 5303		SEATIC	(5)
Area Comd, APO 689	(1)	DMI, GHQ (I)	(2)
CG, RTC, APO 628	(2)	GSI (t) DMI, GHQ (I)	(1)
CG, Yunnan F.A.School, APO 627	(1)	DI, GHQ (I)	(1)
G-2, "Y" Force Op Staff APO 627	(1)	DRA, GHQ (I)	(1)
G-2, "Z" Force Op Staff, APO 430	(1)	E-in-C, GHQ (I)	(1)
Col. Hayne, Hq USAF, CBI	(1)	DAFV, GHC (I)	(1)
OSS R & A, Sect. Det 101	(1)	Medical Directorate, GHQ (I)	(1)
" " " " 202	(1)	DMT, GHQ (I)	(2)
" " " " 303	(1)	D of Research, GHQ (I)	(1)
OSS, New Delhi	(1)	USMA, London	(1)
OWI " "	(1)	CG, Hawaiian Dept	(2)
FEA " "	(1)	CG, S. Pacific, New Caledonia	(2)
EEIS, Hq USAF, CBI	(1)	JICA/CBI/SEA Br. APO 432	(2)
20th Bomber Command APO 493	(1)	" " APO 465	(2)
A-2 10th Air Force APO 465	(3)	" " APO 879	(2)
A-2 14th Air Force APO 627	(3)	" " APO 627	(2)
EAC, SEA	(3)	Office of the USMO APO 881	(2)
SEAC	(2)	JICA, File	(80)
Historical Section, Hq USAF,		OSS Det 404	(1)
CBI	(1)		

(Space above this line to be filled in by JICA)

JICA SN _____ AAF _____

ARMY _____ OSS _____

NAVY _____ FEA _____

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944

WWE/reh _____ Page 2.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
TABLE OF CONTENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

		<u>Page</u>
I.	INTRODUCTION	5-6
	1. Purpose	5
	2. Sources of Information	5
	3. Classification	6
	4. Order of Battle	6
	5. Technical Details of Armament and Equipment	6
II.	OPERATIONS	7-19
	6. General Situation	7
	7. Climate and Terrain	7
	8. Principal Lines of Communications	11
	9. The ARAKAN Operation	12
	10. The CHIN HILLS (Trans-CHINDWIN) Offensive	14
III.	AIR	20-23
	11. Introduction	20
	12. Significance	20
	13. Operations	21
	14. Capabilities	23
IV.	INFANTRY	24-37
	15. The Japanese Infantryman	24
	16. Fire Power of an Infantry Regiment	24
	17. Use of Weapons	24
	18. The Individual Infantryman as the Basis of Japanese Tactics.	25
	19. Combat Orders.	25
	20. Concealment and Camouflage	27
	21. Ruses	28
	22. Ambushes	28
	23. Material Raiding Parties	31
	24. Attack	32
	25. Defense	34
V.	ARTILLERY	38-51
	26. Introduction	38
	27. Terrain and Tactical Consideration	38
	28. Organization and Strengths	38
	29. Equipment	41
	30. Tactical Employment	42
	31. Tactical Employment of Artillery Fire.	48
	32. Anti-aircraft Artillery	50
	33. Summary and Estimate of Future Capabilities of Japanese Artillery	50
VI.	ENGINEERS	52-58
	34. Organization, Assignment and Mission	52
	35. Combat Operations	53
	36. River Crossings	53
	37. Line of Communication Work	56
	38. Construction Capabilities.	57

From JICA/C.I/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No.9082. Date 23 October 1944.

WWE/mmed.

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

Page 3

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

	<u>Page.</u>
VII. ARMOR	59-64
39. General	59
40. Enemy Equipment	59
41. Tanks in the IMPHAL Campaign	59
42. Employment of 14 Tank Regiment	60
43. Other Notes on Japanese Armor.	62
44. Conclusion	64
VIII. ANTITANK AND OBSTACLE WARFARE	65-88
45. Introduction	65
46. Principles of Japanese Antitank Employment	66
47. Antitank Artillery	67
48. Grenades, Mortars and Small Arms Against Tanks.	70
49. Tank Hunting Parties.	71
50. Antitank Magnetized Mine	71
51. Antitank Land Mine	75
52. Demolitions	79
53. Antitank Obstacles and Road Blocks	80
54. Antitank Defenses in Villages	84
55. Antitank Capabilities	84
56. Booby Traps	85
57. Antipersonnel Obstacles	87
IX. CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES	89-90
58. Offensive	89
59. Defensive	89
60. Estimate of Capabilities	90
X. MEDICAL	91-104
61. Introduction	91
62. Japanese Army Medical Organization	91
63. System of Evacuation	92
64. Medical, Hospital and Food Supplies	92
65. Sanitation and Hygiene	93
66. Diseases Occurring Among Japanese Troops.	94
67. Malaria	94
68. Dysentery and Diarrhea	97
69. Nutritional Disease	98
70. Typhus Fever	98
71. Venereal Disease	101
72. Other Diseases	101
73. Animal Diseases	102
74. Standard of Medical Care	103
75. Casualty Reports	103
XI. SUPPLY SYSTEM	105-109
76. General	105
77. Supply Routes for the CHIN HILLS Offensive	106
XII. INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONS, AND PLANNING	110-112
78. Intelligence	110
79. Planning and Operations	111
XIII. SUMMARY: ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE CAPABILITIES	113-116

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082. Date 23 October 1944.

WWE/nmcd.

Page 4

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

FIGURES

UNCLASSIFIED

	<u>Page</u>
1. BURMA 1/4,000,000	8
2. Mountainous Perimeter of BURMA 1/7,500,000	9
3. Battle of NGAKYEDAUK PASS 1/500,000	13
4. Area of CHIN HILL Offensive 1/1,000,000	16
5. Japanese initial moves in CHIN HILL Offensive, March 1944.	17
6. Situation on First of May prior to Japanese Withdrawal	18
7. Japanese Ambushes	30
8. Japanese Defense Position	36
9. Characteristics of Japanese Artillery Weapons in BURMA	43
10. Japanese 75 mm Forward Slope Gun Position	45
11. Japanese Slope Gun Position	46
12. Japanese Minefield Patterns	78
13. Principal Supply Points for the CHIN HILLS Offensive	107
14. Road Net Used in the CHIN HILL Offensive.	108

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082. Date 23 October 1944.

WWE/mncd.

Page 4.A.

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECTION I
INTRODUCTION

UNCLASSIFIED

1. Purpose.

The purpose of this report is to present the salient features of JAPANESE tactics and techniques employed during the BURMA campaign from November 1943 through September 1944.

The report is written for the benefit of (1) combat units which have not been, but will be employed against the JAPANESE in terrain such as encountered in BURMA in order that some knowledge of the JAPANESE may be gained prior to actual combat, and (2) staff officers who plan operations against the JAPANESE in order that the tactical picture presented herein may be added to order of battle and other intelligence to gain a sounder appreciation of enemy capabilities. The report also may have value in that the characteristics of JAPANESE methods discussed herein are based on operations conducted over a relatively large territory. By contrast most of the operations in the PACIFIC have been against strong though static island defense. In BURMA, however, the JAPANESE have had room for maneuver and have utilized movement, infiltration, and encircling tactics on a much larger scale than in the PACIFIC. It is believed that the characteristics of the fighting and lessons learned about the JAPANESE in BURMA will be more similar to what will be encountered in CHINA or JAPAN than what has been learned in the PACIFIC.

The report is not an encyclopedic coverage of JAPANESE methods. The material has been selected on the basis of availability and pertinence. Some subjects - such as signal communications - have not been included because no member of this group was qualified to handle the material. Other subjects - such as supply - have been included because of the vital bearing they have had on operations even though the evidence has been sketchy on some phases.

Some of the information is new and has not been previously reported. Facts universally known about the JAPANESE, though treated briefly, are included in the proper setting under each topic so that an undistorted picture is obtained. New intelligence and indicated trends are treated in more detail.

The subject matter is presented primarily so that JAPANESE methods may be understood and, more importantly, JAPANESE capabilities may be predicted.

2. Sources of Information.

All of the contributors to this report, except one, have spent some time in the operational areas, particularly with the BRITISH forces in the CHIN HILLS and the ARAKAN. The bulk of the information has been obtained by these officers from the BRITISH FOURTEENTH ARMY through personal observation, personal interviews with innumerable officers and men, and official reports of components of the Army. Because the principal JAPANESE military effort in this BURMA campaign was in those areas, the

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944

WWE/reh

[REDACTED]

Page 5. - I

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BRITISH

best information has come from the 4/and 33 INDIAN CORPS. A considerable, though lesser amount has come from the 15 INDIAN CORPS, and a small amount from the AMERICAN CHINESE forces operating in NORTH BURMA. Supplementary and corroborating evidence has been obtained from translation, interrogation, and other general and special intelligence reports issued by SEAC and the various BRITISH and AMERICAN headquarters in this theater.

The report as a whole is evaluated B-2. Actually much of the factual matter in the report, particularly the section on tactics, has been verified repeatedly and can be considered A-1. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the writers and are not to be construed as official.

3. Classification.

The report as a whole is classified SECRET. The BRITISH order of battle information is SECRET; the JAPANESE order of battle is CONFIDENTIAL; the remainder of the report is RESTRICTED.

4. Order of Battle.

No attempt will be made herein to give details on the enemy order of battle except where it relates to a particular tactical method or operation. This information is available from operational intelligence agencies.

5. Technical Details of Armament and Equipment.

Technical details of armament and equipment are discussed only in so far as they affect tactical employment in the BURMA terrain. Full technical information on enemy weapons is furnished to interested officers by the Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service (EEIS) in each theater.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 6. - I

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION II

OPERATIONS

UNCLASSIFIED

6. General Situation.

A brief review of the military operations is given here so that the reader will not have to read other reports to refresh his mind concerning the BURMA Campaign from November 1943 through September 1944. Only the salient features of the campaign, terrain and climate, operations, and order of battle are given so that the analysis of tactics and techniques may be understood in the proper setting. The three principal operational areas in BURMA during the period under review are (1) the ARAKAN, (2) the CHIN HILLS, and (3) NORTH BURMA. (See Sketch Map Figure 1.). The term CHIN HILLS, though not truly descriptive of the central operational area, is used for brevity; it includes the general area West of the CHINDWIN from TIDDIM to KOHIMA. The term NORTH BURMA covers the area south of LEDO to MYITKYINA and MOGAUNG. The entire fighting in the ARAKAN has been confined primarily to the area about MAUNGDAW and a supplementary excursion into the KALADAN RIVER VALLEY to the east. In the CHIN HILLS fighting has taken place over an area 300 miles long from north of KOHIMA to south of TIDDIM and east to the CHINDWIN RIVER. The drive by the AMERICAN CHINESE forces in NORTH BURMA down the LEDO ROAD culminated in the capture of MYITKYINA. The WINGATE force was flown into BURMA south of MOGAUNG and MYITKYINA. This force cut the main JAPANESE supply route into NORTH BURMA and contributed materially to the seizure of NORTH BURMA by Allied forces.

7. Climate and Terrain.

a. Climate.

The best campaign season in BURMA, as determined by the seasons, is from November through April. The months of December, January, February and March are dry, the average monthly rainfall throughout BURMA during this time is less than one-tenth of one inch per month. The greatest physical menace to men and equipment during the dry months is the powder fine dust that is churned up from roads and trails by marching men and moving vehicles. This dust is so fine that it filters through the smallest opening, and once stirred up hangs in still air like a cloud for hours.

The rains actually commence in April. The amount is small during that month, being only one-half to one inch in all the campaign areas. Of the three operational areas, the ARAKAN, the CHIN HILLS, and NORTH BURMA, the ARAKAN receives the heaviest rainfall. The other two areas receive about the same amount and, though less than the ARAKAN, is still very heavy. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the bulk of this rainfall comes in the six months May through October. The average yearly rainfall in the ARAKAN is over 150 inches and in the CHIN HILLS and NORTH BURMA from 75 to 100 inches. The rainfall reaches a peak in July and August and is over 50 inches per month in the ARAKAN, and 15 to 20 inches per month in the CHIN HILLS and NORTH BURMA.

In the dry season the soil is hard. Wheeled vehicles and tanks can operate with ease over dry weather roads, grass areas, and cultivated fields. In the rainy season the entire operational area becomes a morass.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report 9082

Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 7. - II

UNCLASSIFIED

BURMA

FIGURE 1.

UNCLASSIFIED



Approx Scale 1/4,000,000 or 1/4 M.

100 0 100

COMBAT AREAS:


- 1. ARAKAN
- 2. CHIN HILLS
- 3. NORTH BURMA.

BURMA

From JICA/CBI/SEA New Delhi
 Report No. 9082
 Date: 23 Oct 1944
 Page 8. - II

WWE/nem

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

FIGURE 2.

Schematic Representation of the Mountainous Perimeter of Burma.

Scale 1:7,500,000

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/nem

Page 9. - II

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

The soil and dry weather roads are like axle grease and, for all practical purposes, bottomless. Flat paddy lands that in the dry season supported vehicles and tanks become lakes; dry river beds (chaungs) turn into raging torrents; roads through hills are obstructed by repeated landslides.

Under these conditions military operations come almost to a standstill. Patrols operate only with extreme difficulty, and the simple necessity of keeping alive in this completely wet environment is an arduous task. Overland supply is maintained in a few places with the maximum exertion; and in most places it collapses completely. Supply to forward areas for allied troops is maintained by air, but even this method is severely handicapped by clouds and rains that blanket the dropping areas most of the time.

b. Terrain.

Although the terrain varies considerably among the three operational areas and within each area, characteristics that are universal to all are ruggedness and difficulty to passage.

BURMA, topographically speaking, is divided into two parts, a perimeter and an interior. The perimeter is composed of hills and mountains. (See Figure 2.) The highest portions are (1) the mountain ranges along the BURMA-CHINA border to the east of FORT HERTZ and MYITKYINA that are 12,000 to 13,000 feet high and (2) the CHIN HILLS that range from 8,000 to 10,000 feet. The interior, or core of BURMA is the valley of the IRRAWADDY RIVER and its tributaries.

The ARAKAN is the only area of BURMA that lies on the exterior side of this mountainous perimeter. No natural entrance into BURMA proper exists from the ARAKAN. Hill features and ridges in the ARAKAN run parallel to the coast in a northwest-southeast direction. These hills are not high and average between one and two thousand feet in height. The hills are, however, very steep and covered with a dense jungle bamboo growth. The areas between hills are flat, open paddy fields. Nearly all the fighting has taken place in the bamboo jungle hills for possession of dominant hill features.

The CHIN HILLS extending south of IMPHAL and the NAGA HILLS (so called for the purpose of this report) extending north of IMPHAL along the INDIA-BURMA border are extremely rugged. Although called hills, they are actually mountains with extreme slope gradients. Most of the country is heavily wooded. Although called by the BRITISH and indicated on their maps as "jungle" of varying density, much of the so-called "jungle" is "forest" to AMERICANS. In the TIDDIM area, for example, about one-half of the country is open forest, one-fourth is forest with heavy undergrowth (true jungle) and one-fourth is open grassland and cultivated plots. The ridges run generally north and south in the CHIN HILLS and northeast and southwest in the NAGA HILLS. The rivers likewise flow in these directions parallel to the ranges except where they flow through passes into the BRAHMAPUTRA watershed on the west and the CHINDWIN on the east.

The NORTH BURMA operational zone lay south of the BURMA-INDIA border through the HUKAWNG VALLEY to the MOGAUNG-MYITKYINA area. The mountain barrier on the border south of LEDO along the famous LEDO ROAD is comparatively narrow and low and is crossed at an elevation of about 4000 ft.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9C82 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 10. - II

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Much of the area to the south is the HUKAWNG VALLEY and is covered with heavy forest and true jungle. Between the HUKAWNG and the MOGAUNG-MYITKYINA area are hills also covered with heavy tropical forests.

8. Principal Lines of Communication

Prior to the JAPANESE occupation of BURMA no overland supply route existed between BURMA and INDIA. To CHINA the only supply route was the BURMA ROAD. After the occupation, the JAPANESE initially had a comparatively simple problem of defending the mountain perimeter. This perimeter was served by an effective network of rivers, and for this part of the world, a relatively adequate road and railroad system. The Allied forces on the other hand were on the exterior side of this barrier operating on exterior lines of communication, and possessed no overland means of crossing the barrier. The fundamental task of the Allied forces to date has been by means of military operations and road construction to break through this barrier so that the main JAPANESE forces could be attacked in BURMA PROPER. The completion of this task has been slow, but has been greatly accelerated in recent months by the greater use of and dependence upon air supply.

In the ARAKAN, the BRITISH forces have been supplied overland from the port of CHITTAGONG. Although no mountain barrier exists here, the JAPANESE have had the advantage. The rivers in the ARAKAN flow southeast parallel to the coast and empty into the BAY of BENGAL around the port of AKYAB. The JAPANESE move supplies by road and by rivercraft from AKYAB to the forward troops.

The situation on the CHIN HILLS front is similar though magnified with difficulties many times. Supplies were carried from the railhead at DIMAPUR (MANIPUR ROAD) 130 miles to IMPHAL by road. At the beginning of this campaign season, part of the supplies were taken from IMPHAL 77 miles by road to TAMU, and the remainder 160 miles by road to TIDDIM to forward troops. The JAPANESE in this area also had a comparatively easier task. Supplies came over existing roads and up the CHINDWIN RIVER. From the plains supplies were carried only a few miles to JAPANESE screening forces dominating the interior edge of the mountain barrier and the roads and trails leading to the BURMA plains.

Although the natural advantage also favored the JAPANESE in NORTH BURMA, the degree of advantage was not so great as in the CHIN HILLS. Supplies for the AMERICAN CHINESE forces were carried overland by the LEDO ROAD from the railhead at LEDO over the mountain barrier through the HUKAWNG VALLEY and south. The JAPANESE carried their supplies by road and river north from MOGAUNG and KAMAING. The road and river net here, however, was longer and less adequate than those from the CHINDWIN RIVER into the CHIN HILLS.

The supply advantage that accrued to the JAPANESE initially because of the nature of the topography and lines of communications in BURMA, has been virtually wiped out in recent months by the employment by the Allies of the large scale use of air supply. Air supply has vastly increased their mobility, which was formerly limited by

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944

WWE/reh

Page 11. - II

UNCLASSIFIED

the speed of building roads through jungle and mountains, and has allowed them to remain in areas in the monsoons that were previously untenable. The strategical advantage gained through air supply will undoubtedly increase enormously in the coming months.

9. The Arakan Operation.

In November 1943 BRITISH forces in the ARAKAN by a surprise move had seized the NGAKYEDAUK PASS area a few miles north of the MAUNGDAW-BUTHIDAUNG road. By strenuous engineer efforts a fair-weather road was built through the NGAKYEDAUK PASS so that a division could be supported east of the MAYU RANGE, called the "EAST MAYU" area. In December, the 5 DIVISION was between the NAF RIVER and the range, and the 7 DIVISION between the range and the KALAPANZIN RIVER. Both held a general line just north of the MAUNGDAW-BUTHIDAUNG ROAD. By the first of March 1944, 5 DIVISION in the WEST MAYU area had captured MAUNGDAW. The 7 DIVISION in the EAST MAYU area had embarked upon the initial phase of a flanking attack on the east bank of the KALAPANZIN RIVER to capture BUTHIDAUNG.

The JAPANESE, however, attacked first on 4 February. The attack came as a complete surprise to the BRITISH. The attack is shown diagrammatically in Figure 3, "BATTLE OF NGAKYEDAUK PASS".

The JAPANESE plan was:

- (1) To attack frontally as a diversion and to create as much damage as possible.
- (2) To encircle the BRITISH forces and to cut the NGAKYEDAUK PASS ROAD to prevent supply, reinforcement, or evacuation of the 7 DIVISION; and to cut the BAWLI BAZAAR - MAUNGDAW ROAD to prevent supply reinforcement, or evacuation of the 5 DIVISION.
- (3) To destroy the 7 DIVISION by attacks from north and south, and then
- (4) To destroy the 5 DIVISION.

The JAPANESE accomplished initially only part of their mission. They succeeded in closing the NGAKYEDAUK PASS and isolating the 7 DIVISION for 3 weeks. The BAWLI BAZAAR - MAUNGDAW ROAD was cut only intermittently for a few days. The BRITISH moved two additional divisions immediately into the ARAKAN. After heavy fighting the JAPANESE attack was decisively defeated, and the NGAKYEDAUK PASS reopened on 24 February.

This engagement is of interest because the tactical plan of the JAPANESE attack is typical of their offensive operations in BURMA and because the battle and the outcome were miniature replicas of the subsequent large-scale trans-CHINDWIN offensive against IMPHAL and KOHIMA. The JAPANESE attack was bold in concept and execution, but the JAPANESE did not possess enough troops to complete their original intention.

The battle is of interest historically because air supply for BRITISH forces was resorted to for the first time on a large scale.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944

WWE/reh

Page 12. - II

UNCLASSIFIED


BATTLE OF NGAKYEDAUK PASS

GENERAL SITUATION AND JAPANESE


PLAN OF ATTACK 4 FEB 44.

UNCLASSIFIED

PASSES
 GOPPE PASS from BAWLI BAZAAR to GOPPE - Mule Track.
 NGANGYAUNG PASS is 3 miles north and parallel to CHOTA MAUNGH PASS - Trail.
 CHOTA MAUNGHNAME PASS is 3 miles north and parallel to NGAKYEDAUK PASS * Trail.
NGAKYEDAUK PASS
 From WABYIN to NGAKYEDAUK. Dry weather road - 3 ton.



LEGEND



Scale. 1:500,000

- Bamboo Covered Ridges
- Roads and Trails
- Villages
- Direction of Japanese Attack
- 15 INDIAN CORPS (BRITISH)
- 5 and 7 IND. DIVISIONS (BRITISH)
- 55 JAPANESE DIVISION

FIGURE 3.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

JAPANESE tactics followed a well-known pattern and included:

(1) A wide encircling move with fleet "jungle foot cavalry" to cut the enemy lines of supply and to destroy him in detail.

(2) Attempts to destroy the tactically weak, yet essential, headquarters, supply bases, and lines of communications; in other words, the brain, stomach and nerves of the opposing forces.

(3) Night attacks.

(4) Use of rifle, hand grenade, machine guns and mortars.

(5) Maximum concealment.

(6) Dependence upon captured supplies.

In the final analysis it failed because the JAPANESE did not possess enough striking power - manpower and fire power - to destroy the BRITISH force that was encircled. The contributing factors to the failure of the JAPANESE attack were (1) lack of artillery, both field and antitank (2) lack of supplies both from failure to capture BRITISH supplies and non-existence air dropping supply system of their own. The dependence of the JAPANESE upon the expectation of utilizing BRITISH supplies was like a finesse in a game of cards: had it succeeded it would have been hailed as brilliant; when it failed, it was labelled a blunder.

The 81 WEST AFRICAN DIVISION was operating in the KALADAN RIVER VALLEY about 40 miles to the east of the MAYU RIDGE. Although this operation was of minor importance and apparently had little bearing on the total military situation in BURMA, it was supplied entirely by air and many valuable lessons were learned.

10. Chin Hills Offensive.

For operations beginning in November 1943, 4 INDIAN CORPS, based at IMPHAL and composed of 17 INDIAN LIGHT DIVISION (2 Brigades), 20 INDIAN DIVISION and 23 INDIAN DIVISION, was charged with protecting the INDO-BURMESE border on a roughly 300 mile front north and south of IMPHAL. Further they were to engage the enemy west of the CHIN-DWIN RIVER in an attempt to clear them from its west banks, and also to serve as a demonstration of strength, drawing attention from the LONG RANGE PENETRATION Forces operating in CENTRAL BURMA under GENERAL WINGATE. The CHIN HILLS operational area is shown on Figure 4.

By February 1944, 4 BRITISH CORPS had 17 DIVISION attacking the enemy in the rugged CHIN HILLS between TIDDIM and FORT WHITE, approximately 170 miles south of IMPHAL. This division was supplied by an unprotected 165 mile road L. of C. from IMPHAL, built by the division itself. Repeated attacks on well dug-in JAPANESE on narrow routes of advance yielded little ground. The enemy "Bunker" in spite of heavy artillery support, halted any advance.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944

WWE/reh

Page 14. - II

UNCLASSIFIED

Approximately 100 miles southeast of IMPHAL in the vicinity of TAMU a second division, the 20th, were active in patrolling eastwards to the CHINDWIN RIVER and also advancing down the YU RIVER where isolated forces of JAPANESE were dug in on commanding hill features. This advance too was halted by the "Bunker" positions held by seldom more than a company of JAPANESE.

23 DIVISION, in reserve, was training in the IMPHAL VALLEY.

By early March, there were some indications that the enemy was preparing a large scale offensive. The WINGATE LONG RANGE PENETRATION Forces were starting their airborne operation into BURMA.

By using every conceivable means of concealment, the JAPANESE 15 ARMY, consisting of the 15, 31 and 33 DIVISIONS, struck swiftly and skilfully at the extended 4 CORPS. The enemy between the 7th and 18th March accomplished the following moves (See Figure 5.):

(1) One division, by two wide encircling movements starting from FORT WHITE, cut the Road L. of C. between IMPHAL and TIDDIM, thus isolating 17 INDIAN LIGHT DIVISION.

(2) Began wide encirclements to cut the IMPHAL-TAMU ROAD.

(3) Launched a completely concealed division plus attack through the NAGA HILLS, from TAMANTHI, HOMALIN and MAUNGTAN towards UKHRUL and the KOHIMA-IMPHAL ROAD, the sole 4 CORPS L. of C. from INDIA PROPER.

The salient features of these attacks were (a) their nearly complete concealment and thus surprise, (b) the rapidity with which large units of enemy, carrying all their equipment, traveled through jungle and forest covered hills containing no roads, (c) the first use by the enemy of large amounts of artillery, including medium (d) the first use of large numbers of tanks and (e) the rapidity with which JAPANESE engineer troops with little mechanical equipment were able to construct - through extremely difficult terrain - roads suitable for motor transport, tanks and medium artillery.

By the first part of April the KOHIMA-IMPHAL ROAD had been blocked. 20 DIVISION withdrew along the TAMU-IMPHAL ROAD and finally stabilized the situation near PALEL; 17 DIVISION was retreating up the TIDDIM ROAD to the IMPHAL PLAIN with the assistance of one brigade of 23 DIVISION moving southward from IMPHAL. Two brigades of 5 INDIAN DIVISION were transported by air from the ARAKAN into IMPHAL to help counter the threat from the north and northeast.

In early April the JAPANESE attacked KOHIMA in force. To counter this threat 33 CORPS, including the 2 BRITISH DIVISION, the other brigade of 5 DIVISION, and other corps troops were concentrated by air and rail in the DIMAPUR area to relieve the small garrison at KOHIMA and to clear the KOHIMA-IMPHAL ROAD. In addition one brigade from the WINGATE FORCE was diverted to attack the JAPANESE lines of communication that extended from the CHINDWIN RIVER through the NAGA HILLS to KOHIMA.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.


WWE/reh

Page 15. - II

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FIGURE 4.




Area of the Chin Hills
Offensive.

1:1,000,000

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India.
Report No. 3082
Date 23 October 1944.

FIGURE 5.




Routes of Japanese attacks on IMPHAL - KOHIMA areas.

Figure 5.

From JICA/CHI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 2082. Date: 23 Oct. '44.

UNCLASSIFIED



N
Sketch showing disposition
just prior to Japanese
retreat from IMPHAL -
KOHIMA area.

Figure 6.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India.
Report No. 9082.
Date: 23 Oct. '44.

UNCLASSIFIED
Page 18 - 11

~~SECRET~~

By May 1st the major JAPANESE moves had been stopped. 17 DIVISION, 23 DIVISION, 20 DIVISION and 5 DIVISION were in the IMPHAL PLAINS resisting a determined JAPANESE attempt to capture IMPHAL. 2 BRITISH DIVISION had prevented the enemy from penetrating further into INDIA and an additional division, the 7 INDIAN DIVISION, was being brought from the ARAKAN to assist the 2 DIVISION in clearing the KOHIMA-IMPHAL ROAD. (These dispositions are shown on Figure 6.) Not until June 22nd was it possible to drive the enemy from this road, clearing it for motor transport.

For three months the sole route of supply from INDIA to IMPHAL had been blocked. In addition to the four plus divisions in the IMPHAL PLAINS, there were roughly 40,000 non-combatants who had to be supplied. Probably for the first time in history, a force of this size was maintained completely by air supply. Food, reinforcements, ammunition and equipment were flown into IMPHAL. In one month alone 1,311,000 lbs of supplies were flown into IMPHAL airstrip by the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. In addition, ground units operating in the vicinity of IMPHAL and KOHIMA were supplied by air drop giving them complete freedom of movement.

The enemy by the first of July, showed definite signs of disorganization and desperation. They had on all sectors suffered heavy casualties. Their primitive and limited routes of supply were over-taxed. The monsoons made movement very difficult. They had not captured IMPHAL, where they had expected to obtain quantities of food and supplies. The ever-present malaria and other diseases were taking heavy tolls.

With the opening of the KOHIMA-IMPHAL ROAD, 4 BRITISH CORPS was relieved by 33 INDIAN CORPS, consisting of 20 INDIAN DIVISION, 5 INDIAN DIVISION, 2 BRITISH DIVISION and 11 EAST AFRICAN DIVISION. Their task has been to pursue the remnants of JAPANESE 31 DIVISION retreating east of KOHIMA, and JAPANESE 15 DIVISION withdrawing northeast of IMPHAL, and to clear the IMPHAL-TIDDIM and IMPHAL-TAMU roads.

To the present date the enemy has been cleared from the area north of TAMU to the CHINDWIN RIVER, the IMPHAL-TAMU ROAD has been opened, the enemy is retreating southwards down the KABAW VALLEY toward KALEWA, and the IMPHAL-TIDDIM ROAD is clear to the TIDDIM area. The enemy has shown no indications of being able to offer serious resistance.

In all operations around IMPHAL, brought on by ^{the} JAPANESE offensive, the fighting has been severe. The JAPANESE are estimated to have lost up to 40,000 men in these operations. BRITISH losses were also high.

For the first time in BURMA, the BRITISH forces were able, through air supply, to operate without having to protect a weak supply route behind them. The success of air supply of large units of ground troops was beyond all expectation. This, plus the fact that BRITISH and INDIAN troops have learned to fight in the jungle more successfully than the enemy, turned an initially successful JAPANESE offensive of unprecedented size in this theater into a complete rout of the enemy.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944

WWE/reh

~~SECRET~~

Page 19. - II

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SECTION III

AIR

11. Introduction.

Enemy air operations in BURMA are reported more completely through regular air intelligence channels than operations on the ground, for two reasons: (1) All tactical aircraft in the INDIA-BURMA theater are under a single integrated USAAF-RAF headquarters, EASTERN AIR COMMAND, which is not the case in regard to ground forces, and (2) air intelligence report procedure necessarily is more rapid and thorough than that of ground units. Hence, the details of reported enemy air activity are almost as readily available in WASHINGTON as they are in the theater and, for that reason, will not be repeated here.

This section, therefore, will be limited to a general summary of enemy air activity thus far this year and a brief estimate of apparent capabilities in the near future. The situation in CHINA, theater of the 14TH AIR FORCE, will not be covered except insofar as air traffic over the "HUMP" is concerned.

12. Significance.

The significance of air power in the INDIA-BURMA theater became fully apparent this spring when, for the first time, sufficient aircraft became available to have decisive effect on the battlefield. The nature of the BURMA frontier - more than 700 miles of tortuous mountain jungle - is such that ground operations up to this year had been unusually difficult and inconclusive.

Since the first of the year, however, the JAPANESE have attempted two major offensives - first, in the ARAKAN in February and second, in the CHIN and NAGA HILLS on the Central (IMPHAL) front in March. In each case, the enemy succeeded in enveloping large INDIAN ARMY forces by surprise infiltrations through jungle terrain. In each case, all ground supply lines were cut and, in the case of IMPHAL, the whole IMPHAL PLAIN was surrounded for several months. Yet, in each case, the INDIAN ARMY was able to hold out and, eventually, to turn an apparent disaster into a major victory by one means only - supply by air. The failure of the JAPANESE to prevent, or even seriously interfere with, the thousands of troop carrier and combat cargo sorties necessary to sustain the INDIAN ground forces meant the failure of both campaigns.

Offensively, the significance of air power became just as apparent in the two major joint air-ground operations launched by the Allies this year. First was the WINGATE Airborne invasion of CENTRAL BURMA in March, when up to 20,000 LONG RANGE PENETRATION troops were transported, supplied and supported entirely by air, 150 miles behind the actual front. Second was the CHINESE-AMERICAN campaign in NORTH BURMA, also largely air-supplied, which resulted 17 May in the capture of MYITKYINA WEST airfield, and, in consequence, the occupation of all BURMA north of the MOG-UNG-MYITKYINA line. Neither of these operations would have been possible if the enemy had been able to prevent

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944

WWE/reh

~~SECRET~~

Page 20. - III

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

the constant movement of transports and light planes necessary for sustenance of the ground campaign.

The fact that Allied air power was able to convert disaster into triumph on two fronts this spring and then, in NORTH BURMA, to make possible the only advance on the third front, testifies to the overwhelming superiority achieved in the air over BURMA. The JAPANESE air force has been hammered back to bases in rear areas and now ventures forward only at great risk from Allied fighter and intruder planes.

13. Operations.

The last enemy attack of any importance occurred 5 December 1943, when two waves of fighter-escorted bombers raided the KIDDERPORE docks at CALCUTTA, inflicting some 500 civilian casualties and causing native labor to desert the waterfront for several days. The first wave consisted of 27 bombers, which bombed the dock area at 25,000 feet in a tight formation of VICS line abreast with an escort of 20 - 50 fighters in four groups, on either side, ahead and above. The second wave, which may have been navy planes, appeared less than an hour later, consisting of 8 BETTYS in VICS line abreast at 27,000 feet, with 7 OSCARS weaving above. Due to the unfortunate movement of SPITFIRE squadrons from CALCUTTA to the ARAKAN then in process, only two HURRICANE squadrons were available for fighter defense. These squadrons met the first wave at serious disadvantage and suffered 8 losses and 2 damaged, for claims of 1/1/4.

Since the CALCUTTA raid, enemy air operations have had only negligible, if indeed any, effect on the war on this front this year. Only in isolated instances has the enemy been able to obtain local air superiority, and then only for a limited period. Moreover, the failure or inability of the JAPANESE to exploit such local superiority as he has been able to obtain, as by close air support or air supply, has robbed him of even this success. Thus ground commanders have been able to plan and carry out campaigns with little regard for danger from the air. Similarly, enemy ground forces have been unable to expect any close air support or air supply. Striking evidence of this failure is afforded by the recent IMPHAL debacle, in which INDIAN ARMY troops have come upon hundreds of dead JAPANESE, killed by hunger and disease.

The present well-developed JAPANESE practice is to base the majority of his air force in BURMA, in such rear areas as RANGOON, moving aircraft forward only a day or two in advance of an operation. The interdiction of such stagings has become a specialty of long-range Allied fighters, which time and again have caught the enemy on the ground, wiping out a threat while it was still potential. The development of new fields near MYITKYINA in NORTH BURMA should greatly improve prospects for clearing the air over BURMA of all enemy aircraft.

The following summary of enemy air activity from January through August is published in the EASTERN AIR COMMAND WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY for 8 September:

"ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY IN BURMA"

JANUARY. Attacks were made on our HUMP transports in the FORT HERTZ area on the 14th and 18th. It looked as if a serious threat were developing but it did not do so, and enemy effort soon shifted

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 5082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

[REDACTED]

Page 21. - III

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

to the ARAKAN. In addition to regular reces to some "safe" distance northwest of AKYAB, six fighter sweeps of 30-40 aircraft were put over our forward area.

FEBRUARY. Up until the middle of February 1944, the enemy had at his disposal for offensive and defensive action in BURMA, about 140 fighters and 80 bombers. At that time about 50 fighters and 30 bombers were pulled out to reinforce his tottering defenses in NEW GUINEA. They did not return. Losses were heavy, but reinforcements came forth quickly.

On 1 February, the first successful recce of CHITTAGONG for three months was made. On the 4th, the JAPANESE ARAKAN offensive was launched simultaneously with a series of fighter sweeps in which up to 50 OSCARS took part every day for eight days continuously, and thereafter intermittently 'til 21 Feb. The enemy's objective in this spurt of effort seems to have been to cover his troops and keep Allied aircraft from interfering as far as possible within the limits of the sweep, to lend direct support by attacking our positions, and to heighten morale. It is very remarkable that with the exception of a night attack on MAUNGDAW on 16 Feb., bombers were not used. Bomb-carrying OSCARS operated for the first time. Flying boats, operating singly by night, made a total of seven ineffective attacks in an area between CEYLON and the mouth of the HOOGLY. By the middle of the month, reconnaissance showed a growing interest in the IMPHAL area.

MARCH. On 8 March, Allied aircraft destroyed 46 enemy planes on the ground at SHWEBO and ONBAUK. On 11 March, we destroyed 15 more enemy aircraft at HEHO. The JAPANESE had moved up a considerable striking force of bombers and fighters to NORTH BURMA. What particular operation they were scheduled to carry out is not known for certain, though it was probably intended to give massive support to their ground offensive. In the event, air support in the early stages of their MANIPUR offensive was negligible and air reaction to our airborne invasion slight. There were night attacks by bombers in twos and threes on KUMBIRGRAM and IMPHAL and a few fighter sweeps towards the end of the month. On 27 March, a daylight raid was planned on DIGBOI area, but did not materialize, since it was intercepted and 11 out of 18 JAP bombers and 13 out of 20 fighters destroyed.

APRIL. Extremely small numbers of enemy bombers continue to operate: two on TAMU by night, one on KUMBIRGRAM by night, six escorted LILLIES on IMPHAL and PALEL by day.

MAY. The fighter forces of the enemy had been replenished and, during this month, in support of his army (which failed to capture its first objectives of IMPHAL and KOHIMA) sweeps were carried out on 15 days over MANIPUR, LUSHAI HILLS and SURMA VALLEY. They consisted normally of from 20 to 30 fighters and one of their purposes was to pick off our transports and other aircraft vulnerable to attack. Deteriorating weather and absence of warning made it increasingly difficult to ensure interception.

JUNE. It became evident during this month that the JAPANESE were keeping a force of about 90 fighters in BURMA to use as opportunity offered. Sweepers were continued spasmodically 'til the middle of

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

~~SECRET~~

Page 22. - III

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

the month. Then came a lull until 29 June when fighter sweeps began over the MYITKYINA-KAMAING area. The JAPANESE had ceased to challenge our air superiority over MANIPUR.

JULY. Fighter sweeps continued spasmodically over the MYITKYINA area. There were twelve such sweeps during the month, including one on which MYITKYINA airfield (already in our hands) was attacked. Towards the end of the month there were instances of SALLYs in ones and twos, escorted by fighters, dropping supplies to their forward troops.

AUGUST. This month, enemy effort dwindled away still further though there were believed to be about 20 fighters in UPPER BURMA ready to carry out sweeps, aimed at intercepting our unarmed transports, as and when weather permitted. Interception occurred on only three days during the month and there was one recorded instance of JAP supply-dropping. The monsoon and EASTERN AIR COMMAND had effectively grounded the J.A.A.F. in BURMA.

14. Capabilities.

Following his practice of the last two years, the enemy virtually withdrew his air force from BURMA during the summer monsoon. However, the total number of enemy aircraft in this theater is believed to have increased this year, and is now estimated at 534 operational aircraft (Army and Navy) in BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA, MALAYA, SUMATRA and the ANDAMANS. (EASTERN AIR COMMAND Estimate of the Situation, 12 Sept 1944) Moreover, this air force is exceedingly mobile and has plenty of forward bases in BURMA for staging threats in almost any direction. The return of units to the RANGOON area and elsewhere in BURMA may be expected at any time, now that the rains are slackening.

JAPANESE fighter strength in UPPER BURMA is estimated to have been slightly increased in September, presumably in support of ground forces concentrated against the CHINESE on the SALWEEN front. Recent sightings have been numerous, but no significant action has resulted. The possibility exists, however, that the JAPANESE may attempt to recapture fields at TENGCHUNG and PAOSHAN, which would enable him to threaten the "HUMP" traffic to CHINA, or to move against the Allied concentrations directly north at MYITKYINA.

However, the enemy forces believed available for BURMA this winter are not considered sufficient to ensure more than a temporary local superiority in any area. Such a long-range, one-punch attack as the raid last December on CALCUTTA is always a possibility, but it is not believed that such a capability could have more than a nuisance value. The re-equipping of Allied squadrons in this theater with modern aircraft, such as the P-47 in place of the HURRICANE, should make any such ventures disastrous for the enemy.

The inability, or unwillingness, of the JAPANESE to use what aircraft they have for close air support should continue to give Allied ground commanders this tremendous advantage. Furthermore, the enemy neither has, nor has appeared much interested in, troop carrier aircraft or supply-dropping by air. Only a few isolated instances have been reported all year. Thus the enemy air appears to have no capability for this form of joint operations - an Allied development which appears to offer the greatest possibilities for offensive action on this front.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

[REDACTED]

Page 23. - III

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECTION IV

INFANTRY

15. The Japanese Infantryman.

Much has been written about and little of value can be added concerning the JAPANESE infantryman. He is a well trained soldier. He is able to endure hardships and privation. He has a fanatical and fearless conception of death on the battlefield. This feeling by the individual soldier of a personal honor in death, has enabled the JAPANESE soldier to be aggressive in battle and perform almost unbelievable individual feats.

It can, however, by no means be said that the JAPANESE infantryman is super-human. In many cases, imminent death has caused him to panic. He is just as subject to hunger and disease as is his enemy. Physically he is only another soldier, sometimes well-trained, sometimes not. Mentally and spiritually he often conducts himself in a very inhuman manner. Although he will often continue to fight, even with a club after his arms and equipment are gone, yet he is only an effective fighter when he is well equipped with supplies, arms and munitions.

16. Fire Power of an Infantry Regiment.

A JAPANESE Infantry Regiment has a normal strength of about 105 officers and warrant officers and 3,300 NCO's and men. The fire power of such a regiment is generally as follows:

- 2450 rifles and carbine
- 235 pistols
- 108 grenade dischargers
- 108 light machine guns
- 24 medium machine guns
- 6 37 or 47 mm A.T. guns
- 6 70 mm Bn. guns
- 4 75 mm Regt. guns
- 6 20 mm A.T. rifles
- 6 81 mm mortars

Other weapons sometimes found are the 50 and 70 mm mortar, mines and various types of booby traps and grenades. The actual strength and organization of units and the types and number of weapons carried has varied considerably in the BURMA operations. Sometimes they have shown little resemblance to those laid down by official JAPANESE regulations.

17. Use of Weapons.

The JAPANESE infantry encountered in recent combat has been well armed. Much of the fighting thus far has been in jungle country, and the JAPANESE weapons have been well suited to the tactical requirements of such terrain. There is nothing particularly new or remarkable about JAPANESE infantry weapons. Technically, their equipment is remarkable only for the number of features copied from weapons of other countries. The JAPANESE soldier, however, is well trained in the use of his weapon so as to obtain its maximum effectiveness in combat.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082. Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

[REDACTED]

Page 24. - IV

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

The arms of a JAPANESE infantryman, like the circumstances under which he operates, vary. Generally he is armed with his rifle and two grenades. Cases are on record where, fighting at close quarters against prepared positions, fanatical JAPANESE have dashed forward armed only with a bag of grenades with the apparent intention of emptying them into Allied prepared positions if they ever reached them. Others have rushed forward with only explosive charges of various types. Apart from these "death or glory boys", who grow more numerous as the battle progresses and desperation increases, the JAPANESE infantryman in an attack is generally armed with a rifle or a grenade discharger or a light machine gun and as many hand grenades as he can carry, usually two fastened on to his belt. Except in the case of snipers, the JAPANESE in BURMA appears to take very little interest in targets of opportunity. On BURMA roads within range of JAPANESE small-arms and mortar fire, our vehicles often travel without hindrance. On numerous occasions groups of observers have sat in a "grandstand" and watched Allied attacks without the JAPANESE firing at them. The JAPANESE, of course, is not easily induced to give away his position. With his comparative inferior fire power he is wary of disclosing himself and bringing our fire power down upon himself. It seems to be quite the general rule that JAPANESE machine guns and mortars are used for specific purposes in the attack and defense rather than to engage targets of opportunity.

18. The Individual Infantryman as the Basis of Japanese Tactics.

The essence of JAPANESE tactics is reliance on the individual, and the success of JAPANESE arms is largely attributable to the fighting qualities of the individual soldier. JAPANESE tactics are, therefore, the results of individual and small group training rather than that of mass maneuver training.

The tenacity of the individual and small group is the JAPANESE strongest suit and his training is calculated to exploit that strength. His bull-dog determination to carry out a mission, even to annihilation, often gives an erroneous impression of JAPANESE strength. Frequently this results in small forces overcoming larger ones, as their units do not become ineffective until they are nearly all casualties. This capacity to drive on despite losses is common to both officers and men. The JAPANESE soldier is generally so well trained that he will continue on his own mission until it is completed, regardless of cost. Discipline, lack of imagination and fatalism drives them on despite losses.

Tactics is an art to the JAPANESE militarist. Decisions are gained by skill rather than by sheer fire power. Training and the delegation to subordinates of the initiative for independent action are factors which make JAPANESE tactics seem so simple.

19. Combat Orders.

JAPANESE operation orders are generally extremely brief and lacking in detail. The brevity and general absence of detail suggests that battle, wherever possible, is reduced to a drill. Seldom is reference made in JAPANESE orders to frontages, zones of responsibility, dividing lines between units and similar detail given in U.S. Army operation orders. JAPANESE operation orders usually take the following forms:

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944

WWE/reh

~~SECRET~~

Page 25. - IV

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

a. "Lt. MARUMARU and 15 men will, on the night of 26 May, capture the airfield southwest of IMPHAL and destroy the aircraft there."

b. In the case of a battalion, "OGAWA BUTAI will occupy the high ground south of BURI BAZAAR and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity".

In the first example it is reasonable to presume that the formulation of the plan for the attack and the arrangements for a local diversion by the remainder of the company if necessary was left to the initiative of the junior commander (always remembering that the lieutenant in the JAPANESE infantry is not so very junior).

In the second case the formulation of a plan for the execution of the order is the responsibility of the battalion commander. His operation orders are almost invariably expressed in most general terms dealing with the objectives, supporting arms, location of headquarters, and so forth but never enlarging on the method to be employed. Verbal instructions regarding details of the plan are issued undoubtedly to officers, but information on this point is lacking. A JAPANESE document captured in the IMPHAL area in July 1944 gave a list of instructions by a JAPANESE Chief of Staff to his units, for an attack on a BRITISH position. This translation appeared in SEATIC (T) No. 30 Item 717. Although this is not an actual operation order it still portrays generalities dealt with by JAPANESE commanders in such statements as, "All possible preparations for the attack will be made". Extracts of the translation follow:

1. A detailed reconnaissance of enemy positions will be made to discover the enemy strength and dispositions. When his fire-power and fighting strength have been assessed, the strength of his individual concentrations of infantry, engineers, artillery and armour should be calculated. The time for attack can then be fixed.

2. Models of positions will be constructed and NCO's and men of sections will be instructed in section and platoon attack. This will instil self confidence.

3. The reconnaissance of enemy positions will take time but will yield information about obstacles and minefields so that the attack can be pressed home. The fire-power of our forward positions, our main positions, and our rear positions will be organized so as to cover enemy counter-attack and AFV approaches.

4. Objectives having been selected, all possible preparations for the attack will be made.

5. The enemy position will be captured by an efficient combination and concentration of all arms.

6. If front can be contained with less strength due to finding enemy in fewer in numbers, a gap could be made by a detachment thrust forward between defensive flanks.

7. The enemy defenses in depth will be probed and preparations made for a barrage defense inside the position.

From FJICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

[REDACTED] Page 26. - IV

UNCLASSIFIED

8. Accuracy of firing from behind cover with the principal infantry weapons - in particular M.Gs, Infantry Guns, Regt. Artillery and A/Tk Guns -- which depends upon direct aim is important right up to the final infantry assault. M.Gs and LMGs will draw out the enemy. Our own patrol activity however, must be borne in mind. Engineers will assist our tank attack by clearing obstacles and removing mines. The field and mountain artillery will work on the same principle of direct aim as the infantry. Using loopholes they will coordinate their fire en masse with that of the infantry. Enemy counter-attacking units will be engaged by the artillery. It must be remembered that long-range fire is not effective. This must be left to the heavy artillery.

9. The difficulties of capturing this type of position in one attack at night are very great. Unless the circumstances are exceptional, the attack will be made at dawn. The enemy mortar positions must be attacked and captured at one blow.

10. After the position has been taken the enemy must be pursued and must not be given time to fire on the move. Do not remain in an area which the enemy has pin-pointed and on which artillery is ranged.

11. The enemy is aware of our normal custom of attacking by night and would not expect a daytime attack under cover of rain.

12. In the event of our failure to achieve this advance we shall lose no time in building defenses and preparing for a later attack.

It is apparent from this document that this commander relies heavily on prior reconnaissance in determining the course of his attack. He even orders models made of the BRITISH positions so that small units can be instructed in the procedure of the attack. It is interesting to note that this commander gives instructions in the event of a possible failure of the attack. Most all documentary evidence shows that the JAPANESE never contemplates failure and seldom withdrawal. He may reluctantly admit "an advance southwards" when retreating from the north, but seldom does a plan on paper cater for failure. The heavy casualties so often sustained in an attack, and the frequent instances of individuals and small groups loitering around after an attack has failed, also suggests that their training, physical and spiritual, does not countenance failure. On a larger scale it was obvious from the JAPANESE conduct of the IMPHAL offensive in 1944, that the course to adopt in the event of the operations not going according to plan had not been considered by higher authority who were, in the event, at a loss as to what to do.

20. Concealment and Camouflage.

The JAPANESE is well trained in the effective use of concealment and camouflage. He uses camouflage not only on his person, but on his weapons, emplacements, installations and vehicles of all kinds.

Prior to the initial attacks by the JAPANESE in the IMPHAL area in the early Summer of 1944, no troop movements were seen by day until a few days prior to the offensive being launched. Then, air patrols

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944

WWE/reh

Page 27. - IV

UNCLASSIFIED

reported small parties of mules, bullock carts and motor vehicles on the roads. Very little new road and trail construction and very few new tracks were visible from the air in forward areas. Despite this, the JAPANESE concentrated their whole force in the forward areas immediately prior to the attack. Part of the JAPANESE force crossed the CHINDWIN RIVER by a ponton bridge that was constructed after dark and dismantled before daylight as described in detail in the section on Engineers (SECTION VI). Movement was made by night and the day spent lying up under cover of thick jungle.

A BRITISH commander in BURMA has stated that the JAPANESE is an expert at concealment and holding his fire. Only by carefully laid and cunning ruses were the BRITISH able to draw his fire and thus gain an accurate picture of his dispositions. This same officer stated that in a flight over JAPANESE lines, he could see nothing of the JAPANESE, not a tent, not a sampan, not a vehicle, not a human-being. The JAPANESE ability to conceal men and material from air observation is remarkable.

21. Ruses.

All the usual JAPANESE ruses such as calling out in URDU (or HINDUSTANI, the language of the INDIAN ARMY), cracking bamboo together and using native dress have been used with only fair success during the 1944 fighting in BURMA. This may be due to the fact that the BRITISH, INDIAN, CHINESE, and AMERICAN troops in BURMA are now accustomed to and better trained in jungle warfare, and their imaginations have become less active. Some recent reports indicate that the JAPANESE is of late using much less deception of this type.

22. Ambushes.

The JAPANESE have employed various types of ambushes with various degrees of success. He is a cagey operator in the jungle and one must be constantly alert mentally to out smart him. Carelessness in movement through the jungle in the proximity of the JAPANESE will mean casualties in your unit. The JAPANESE will follow a patrol sometimes for long distances, then set an ambush in case the patrol comes out again on the same route it went in. Never use the same route to return from a patrol as you used going out.

The following are two examples of successful ambushes used by the JAPANESE against the CHINESE in BURMA:

Ambush Along a Trail.

Figure 7 a. gives a schematic picture of the position where an ambush occurred. The letters referred to in the following subparagraphs can be located on this sketch. A company of CHINESE troops were advancing down the trail in the direction of the arrow in an attempt to contact the JAPANESE who were known to be withdrawing. The company had an advance guard and was in conventional approach march formation. Between X and Y the trail ran comparatively straight for about 150 yards. The trail followed an old stream bed here and was about 60 feet wide. This is much wider than average. The advance guard carefully examined the edges of this small clearing for any signs of a JAPANESE ambush and finding none so informed

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 28. - IV

UNCLASSIFIED

~~_____~~

the main body and they were then ordered to move on. What the advance guard had not discovered was that the JAPANESE had built platforms in trees located at X and Y and emplaced a section of machine guns in each tree. The advance guard did not notice, or if they did, they paid no attention to a number of old game trails which led out from this clearing. These trails converged at A and B where the JAPANESE had a rendezvous point for ambush parties. As soon as the advance guard had moved past the clearing the JAPANESE ambush parties at A and B quickly moved in and stationed themselves along the edges of the clearing. When the head of the main body reached Y the tail was approaching X. At this moment the four JAPANESE machine guns opened fire. The CHINESE immediately headed for the cover of the jungle, but here they were met by the ambush parties. The casualties of this second phase were all severely slashed by knives on the shoulders and arms. Since no gunfire was reported it is indicated that the JAPANESE in the jungle were armed only with knives. The total casualties were about 40 per cent of the company and included the company commander. In the confusion following the attack the entire JAPANESE ambush managed to escape. Precisely the same type of ambush was employed against a column in the WINGATE EXPEDITION.

Ambush of an Attacking Force.

Figure 7 b. gives a schematic layout of a position which had been stalemated for some time. JAPANESE lines are indicated in red and CHINESE in blue. This fighting was taking place along the one trail that leads down the valley. The location was particularly important since it controlled the only ford along the river and neither side had any bridge building equipment. The CHINESE had probed the defense and had concluded that the weakest part of the position was that in front of the small paddy field marked X. The plan called for a two platoon attack. One platoon to make a holding attack in front of D, the other platoon to smash through between C and B as indicated by the arrow. The attack was launched as planned, but the JAPANESE anticipating this very move had evacuated their ground defensive positions. Encountering no opposition, the CHINESE platoon burst into the clearing and headed for the opposite side to flank the enemy at D. When they were well into the clearing, machine guns located in trees at A, B, C, and D opened up and caught them in a deadly cross fire. Only 14 men escaped, the other 18 including the platoon leader were killed. It is believed that an alert advance guard can prevent a column from being ambushed by ground troops. This does not mean that small, hit and run ambushes can be avoided by troops moving along jungle trails, but organized ambush sites can and should be located by the advance guard. Examining the sides of a trail is slow tedious work, but examining each tree top for machine gun emplacements is practically impossible. If troops must move down known trails toward the JAPANESE they should never follow the trail, if it is both wide and straight, until all trees are known to be clear of the enemy. This will necessitate cutting some new trails to bypass the clearings but it will also mean that ambushes such as described above under "Ambush Along a Trail" can be avoided. The type of ambush described above under "Ambush of an Attacking Force" can be avoided in the same manner. Troops must be made aware of the fact that simply because the JAPANESE jumps out of his foxhole, trench, dugout, or pillbox and runs does not mean that he is licked. The chances are far better that he is trying to play you for a sucker and lead you into a death trap. Machine guns can be successfully employed from platforms constructed in trees. The JAPANESE gun emplacements were about 25 feet from the ground, carefully camouflaged and practically invisible from the ground.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.


WWE/reh

~~_____~~

Page 29. - IV

UNCLASSIFIED


a.



AMBUSH ALONG A TRAIL

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi
 Report No. 9082
 Date: 23 October 1944.

b.



AMBUSH OF AN
ATTACKING FORCE.

JAPANESE AMBUSHES
Figure 7.

23. Materiel Raiding Parties.

In addition to the customary employment of fighting and reconnaissance patrols the JAPANESE have made great use of "materiel raiding parties" in both the ARAKAN and trans-CHINDWIN operations. The purpose of these parties is to infiltrate into and behind the enemy lines and to destroy critical items of equipment and armament. The favorite targets for these patrols have been artillery pieces and motor vehicles. Other destruction performed by these parties has ranged from the sabotage of telephone lines to the demolition of aircraft.

Materiel raiding parties have been most active during periods of JAPANESE attacks, and have been directed at the destruction of equipment that could have an important bearing on the course of the battle, such as motor transport bringing supplies to the BRITISH, or artillery that is seriously harassing the JAPANESE attack. Parties are not sent out willy-nilly with general instructions to destroy what can be found. Apparently the objects of these attacks are predetermined with care. Furthermore, the JAPANESE scrupulously avoid the wilful destruction of any items of enemy equipment they believe they can capture and put to their own use.

These parties have not hesitated to attack with stealth and aggressiveness troops that were operating, protecting or bivouacked around the equipment selected for destruction. On one occasion, for example, a raiding party attacked a vehicle harbor; drove the defenders, the drivers, into the surrounding hills; then destroyed the vehicles by the simple expedient of bayonetting the gasoline tanks and igniting the escaping gasoline by rifle fire. On another occasion, a raiding party actually got amongst some BRITISH artillery gun crews while they were firing at night, destroyed some of the equipment with magnetized antitank mines and killed some of the crews before the BRITISH gunners realized what was happening. In this instance the BRITISH rallied and killed most of the raiding party and drove the rest off before much damage was done.

Raiding parties apparently are composed primarily of infantry with such additions of other troops, generally engineers, as may be required.

The most spectacular single feat executed by a raiding party was the destruction of 8 Allied aircraft on the fighter strip at PALEL near IMPHAL in July. A brief account of this action is given here because both the composition and accomplishment of this party are known from captured JAPANESE orders and BRITISH reports of the raid. Captured orders of the 213 INFANTRY REGIMENT, 33 DIVISION, dated 30 June give the organization of the "Surprise Attack Unit" as 2 officers, 1 WO, and 15 men of infantry; 2 men of signal unit; and 1 officer and 18 men of engineers; or a total of 3 officers, one WO, and 35 men. Another order of the same series dated 4 July stated that this raiding party penetrated into the PALEL airfield and destroyed 9 aircraft certain and 4 probables. The BRITISH report confirming this action states: "On the night of 3-4 July, about 30 JAPANESE slipped through the perimeter defenses of an airstrip in the IMPHAL area and placed bombs in front of the aircraft radiators, in airscoops and in one baggage compartment. Eight aircraft were destroyed. No metal fragments of the bombs were found and it appears the bombs had blast effect only. The bombs either had a short delay fuse or were of the magnetic type. A bangalore torpedo had been brought to use against wire defenses."

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

UNCLASSIFIED

24. Attack.

Characteristics of JAPANESE tactics in the attack and in preparation for the attack may be summarized as follows:

a. He goes to very considerable length in carrying out his preliminary reconnaissance of our positions. This is done in the following ways:

- (1) Watching our movement from well concealed observation posts.
- (2) Patrolling by day and night simply to draw our fire.
- (3) Use of locals.

b. He launches his attacks more frequently by night than by day.

c. He usually always attacks from several directions.

d. His approach is silent and well concealed.

e. He employs mortars and artillery for "softening up" and for covering fire for the infantry, except in surprise attacks.

f. He prefers to attack positions which after reconnaissance, he decides are less well mutually supported from adjacent positions.

g. He will often choose the most difficult approach if thereby he gets better concealment and more chance of surprise.

A BRITISH commander who has fought in BURMA has described JAPANESE attacks on his units as follows:

"Once patrols had revealed our positions, further more intense patrolling against our forward troops was made to cover a flanking move to cut our L. of C. to the rear. Only when our troops were practically surrounded was the main attack launched.

"He almost invariably puts in heavy and continuous attacks on one position, to cover concentration and preparation for an attack on another position, or a move around the flanks. These have been well timed on several occasions, causing us to reinforce the first position attacked, from reserves essential to cover his main attack or encircling move. A very strong and mobile reserve is essential to defeat these tactics.

"Attacks always came in hours of darkness. They were made in considerable force, often regardless of casualties, accompanied by very determined infiltration. The necessity for occupying positions in thick jungle country, made infiltration an easy task for the JAP, and the problem to clear him out next day, difficult for us. Good positions in more open ground which were easy to defend, were in some cases ignored by the JAP.

"When artillery was available, the JAP attack is normally preceded by a heavy and concentrated bombardment usually starting about half an hour before sunset. Rarely have more than sixteen guns been employed at one time. Favourite times for the infantry zero hour are 2000, 2400 and 0300 hours. If the main attack is a failure or even a partial failure, they always put in a second attack on a small scale in o

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 32. - IV

UNCLASSIFIED

in order to retrieve their casualties, both dead and wounded. This gives an excellent opportunity for D.F. which has caused heavy casualties on several occasions."

In most cases the JAPANESE objective in an attack is the high ground. It is safe to say that that will be his primary or ultimate objective. At the same time there may be others such as a water point, a field supply depot or in the case of a raid a motor park, artillery positions, or an airfield. Examples of all these being chosen as objectives were experienced in the MANIPUR operations. In an attack on a locality the objective can be summed up as the capture of the key points and that is usually synonymous with the high ground. It should be noted in this respect that no effort is wasted in capturing ground which will present no tactical advantage to its captors. The effort is directed against key points because if they are taken, the less important ground if held, will almost certainly be vacated if the JAPANESE can beat off the counter attack on the key points.

Allied tactics in operations during the past year of siting their positions for all round defense has nullified the advantage the JAPANESE used to gain, and depend on, by attacking from the flank or rear. The JAPANESE has been slow to react to this and still favors the stereotyped flank attack. So far no alternative tactics seem to have been evolved to deal with the situation when our troops no longer react to the threat of an enemy force behind them. In several cases this has provoked a frontal assault by the JAPANESE resulting in expensive results to him. Determined all round defense does appear to leave the JAPANESE at a loss as to how to deal with it. All round defense entails a mobile reserve ready to move to the points of attack.

An excellent illustration of the fanatical extent to which the JAPANESE will go in order to try to carry a well defended position occurred during the WINGATE operation. One column of this force had established a strong fortified position, called "a road block", astride the principal JAPANESE line of communication to the north. A BRITISH officer's account of the JAPANESE attacks follows:

"One of the objects of the plan for the block was to make a formidable defensive position against which the JAPS must attack. The JAPS being rather fanatical would consider any such position an insult to their honour. The result was that at first they attacked with too few troops, then later pushed themselves night after night without any real resemblance of skill at the same sector, where we had 8 MMG's, relying on the numbers and courage of their troops to break through. The results were that they suffered very heavy casualties and obtained nothing.

"The determination of the JAPANESE to succeed despite loss means that any defeat is a complete rout as he puts everything into his attacks and only stops when he is completely finished.

"The sequence of attack was the same practically every night and only varied in intensity. He would start shelling about 5 p.m. continuing till dusk. He would then attack the East and South East perimeter through the jungle after last light. He would be met by

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 33. - IV

UNCLASSIFIED

500 mortar shells on his forming up places and would run against our booby traps which were regularly re-elected each day. He would then meet our outer wire, where he would be greeted by the continuous fire of 8 MMG's, 2" mortar flares lighting him up and a very large amount of small arms fire and grenades. He would pump in discharger grenades into the block during his attack and a few heavy mortar shells. Having done his best and all his suicide bangalore torpedo parties having been wiped out, fighting would die down. Sometimes he would make a further attempt. Then about 2 or 4 a.m. shell and mortar fire would start which would keep our heads down, during which he would remove his dead or wounded. At dawn we would collect documents off the dead, re-erect booby traps, evacuate our wounded and repair any wire broken. As we used to say 'the forces of evil would be at work in the darkness but as soon as dawn came they vanished away leaving us in complete domination of the open paddy to the west'."

25. Defense.

JAPANESE small unit defenses have been by far the most difficult single feature of JAPANESE tactics to deal with and to defeat. In fact it can be said that the superior defense of small units has contributed more to the combative effectiveness of the JAPANESE ARMY in BURMA than all other tactics combined. The strength of these defenses has depended upon a profound knowledge and clever use of the terrain, maximum effectiveness from available weapons, and a will to fight unto death.

The JAPANESE depends on the following methods to defeat an attack on his positions:

a. Well sited and concealed foxholes, slit trenches, crawl trenches, and covered weapon emplacements (bunkers) on commanding ground with the principal defenses on reverse and forward slopes.

b. Machine guns on fixed lines, firing just in front of or across his forward or rear defense lines.

c. Defensive mortar and artillery fire brought down on his own positions if penetrated.

d. Immediate counter-attack against any penetration of his defenses.

No specific instance has been recorded showing details of the operation of a JAPANESE outpost line in front of a defensive position. It appears to be more normal for the JAPANESE to prepare a locality for defense and fight within that locality to defend it. He, therefore, prefers to post sentries throughout the day and night within the defended locality to give warning of danger. Where he knows an attack is imminent, he frequently employs a light sniper screen to disrupt the attack. The primary role of these snipers is to pick off the officers rather than to shoot indiscriminately at any enemy that comes within range.

JAPANESE defensive positions are usually sited on commanding ground. Thick jungle is often chosen with approaches from all directions if possible. The main position is sited on the reverse slopes with covering observation posts and patrol on the summit and forward slopes in

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 34. - IV

UNCLASSIFIED

initially. As the position is developed, bunkers are constructed on the forward slopes as well. The whole position is frequently connected with crawl trenches. JAPANESE field work construction and camouflage are excellent. Given some time he will construct a really powerful defensive position in the jungle. The JAPANESE digs fast and thoroughly. Even at short halts in an advance, slit trenches are dug. The JAPANESE confers due credit to Allied air forces in BURMA.

In villages on the plains he immediately digs himself in, usually in hedges, under trees or in thick bamboo clumps. This has proved an effective obstacle to our tanks.

Machine guns, battalion guns and even light regimental artillery are used well forward and with great skill. Artillery is frequently employed by firing direct fire. The JAPANESE almost invariably holds his fire with all weapons until there is a good target and then brings down intense fire. Mortars are placed well forward, but their use has not been fully exploited by the JAPANESE. Grenade dischargers are well used, but do not cause a great number of casualties. Of late, the tendency of the JAPANESE to reply to our jitter parties or small reconnaissance patrols has increased. This is possibly due to a recognition that the Allies are winning and the consequent deterioration of JAPANESE morale in BURMA.

A schematic representation of a typical strongly held JAPANESE defensive position as encountered in the KOHIMA - IMPHAL area is shown in Figure 8. This type of defense was designed to halt or disrupt the steady and effective advances of the BRITISH armored-infantry columns.

The position is well sited and cannot be detected by observation from the road. Road block or demolished bridges are made behind rather than in front of the position. The block is placed behind the position so that the block itself and the existence of the defense position would not be detected unless a patrol actually went around the hill. If an armored spearhead attempted to by-pass the positions, then the armored vehicles that were halted in front of the block would come under fire of the anti-tank gun from the defilade position on the reverse slope of the hill on the right.

When the infantry attacks, they are first met by a sniper screen. The snipers generally do not make a stand, but attempt to disorganize the attack, then withdraw.

Although some of the defenses may be on the forward slopes, most are on the rear slopes. They are mutually supporting and covered by MG fire from adjacent positions. When the attack is pressed up the forward slopes, the JAPANESE usually retire over the crest of the hill to the reverse slope. In addition heavy mortar fire up to ten minutes' duration is brought down from defilade positions in the rear onto the attacking force when they reach the forward slopes or hill crests. If attacking forces attempt to flank the positions or to go over the top on to them, they are met by fire from the attacked and adjacent positions.

An interesting variation in JAPANESE defensive tactics was that although the JAPANESE made no determined stand along stream or riverlines in the CHIN HILLS, they did in NORTH BURMA, particularly in the HUKAWNG VALLEY. The reason for this variation apparently was that stream lines rather than hills were the dominant terrain features in the north.


From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 35. - IV

UNCLASSIFIED

FIGURE 8.



JAPANESE DEFENDED
POSITION

SCHEMATIC
REPRESENTATION

LEGEND

o o o o Sniper Screen

- - - Slit trenches on reverse slopes



MMG in bunkers on reverse slopes and covering reverse slopes of adjacent positions or avenues of attack.



Antitank gun.



Road block or demolished bridge.

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

In conclusion it can be said that the JAPANESE infantryman is a well trained fighter. His weapons are generally good and suited to their intended purposes. Battle is a drill to the JAPANESE soldier. He does certain things in a certain way. He lacks imagination and becomes confused if his enemy does not react as he thinks he will. It must be remembered, however, that he fights with determination and lack of fear. Yet his morale is not unshakeable. Cut off his supplies and his food and he no longer is as an effective fighter as he was before. One thought remains, however, in his mind until death: that he is fighting as his duty to his Emperor.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

[REDACTED]

Page 37 - IV

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECTION V

ARTILLERY

26. Introduction.

The purpose of this report on JAPANESE field artillery tactics and technique is to summarize the information on the enemy's field artillery gained in BURMA during the 1943-44 campaign. Heretofore, little was known of his tactics and technique. Little emphasis had been placed by the enemy on the use of quantities of artillery employing modern weapons and tactics. In the early part of 1944 in two major attacks on the BRITISH forces in BURMA he employed artillery in considerably larger quantities and of larger caliber than had been encountered before in this theater and, it is thought, in any other theater. As a result of this artillery activity, a large amount of reliable information has been gathered on his artillery methods. In this report, technical details of enemy artillery weapons used in this theater will not be covered. The characteristics, however, of enemy artillery weapons found in this theater will be discussed in the light of their effect on the tactical employment in terrain such as found in BURMA. Full technical information on enemy weapons is furnished to interested offices by the ENEMY EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE units in each theater.

27. Terrain and Tactical Consideration.

As discussed in the Introduction there were two major areas of operation. The operations in the IMPHAL sector were on a considerably larger scale than those in the ARAKAN. This applied as well to JAPANESE artillery.

In all operations, the character of the terrain in each sector vitally affected the employment of artillery. In the area about IMPHAL and KOHIMA the terrain consists of sharp precipitous forest or jungle covered mountains. Roads are few and useable during the monsoon periods only with extreme difficulty. Off-road travel in the monsoons is practically impossible for motor transport and heavy weapons. Light artillery can be transported over most terrain provided time and manpower are available. From November to April the weather in both the ARAKAN and IMPHAL areas is dry and cool. Roads and tracks are firm and observation is seldom restricted.

28. Organization and Strengths.

Division Artillery.

On the IMPHAL front the enemy committed three divisions. The organic artillery strength of these three divisions is given below:

33 DIV.

33 Mountain Artillery Regt. of 3 Bns each having 3 (4gun) batteries = 36/75 mm mountain guns (type 94).

15 DIV

21 Field Artillery Regt. of 3 Bns each having 3 (4 gun) batteries = 36/75 mm field guns (type 90).

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

[REDACTED]

Page 38. - V

UNCLASSIFIED

31 DIV

31 Mountain Artillery Regt - same as 33 DIV.

In the ARAKAN Coastal Sector to the south the enemy employed one division having the following artillery:

55 DIV

55 Mountain Artillery Regt. - same as 33 DIV

North of IMPHAL in the HUKAWNG VALLEY the JAPANESE employed the 18 DIV against the CHINESE and AMERICAN forces. This division contained the 18 Mountain Artillery Regt. consisting of 2 Bns each of 3 Btys (4 gun) of 75 mm mountain guns (type 94) and 1 Bn each of 3 Btys (4 guns) of 75 mm Field Guns.

Reinforcing Artillery.

In addition to the organic divisional artillery listed above the following army artillery was available:

IMPHAL AREA

15 ARMY

18 Medium Artillery Regt. of 2 Bns of 3 (4 gun) batteries - 24/105 mm guns or 24/150 mm Howitzers, or 12/105 mm guns and 12/150 mm Howitzers (92 type 105 mm gun).

3 Medium Artillery Regt. - Same as 18 Medium Arty. Regt.

1 Independent A/Tk Bn. - 2 Coys of 3 (2 gun) Platoons = 12/37 mm or 12/47 mm.

11 Independent A/Tk Coy - 4 (4 gun) Platoons = 8/37 mm guns.

51 Independent AA Bn - 3 Coys each of 4 or 6/75 AA guns = 12 or 18 guns.

HUKAWNG VALLEY

18 DIV

21 Medium Arty Bn probably 3/4 gun battery of 105 mm gun or 150 mm Howitzer.

13 Independent A/Tk Bn.

ARAKAN

55 DIV

1 Battery of 4/150 Howitzers.

Organizations Encountered.

Whereas the organizations as outlined above are believed normal and are available in BURMA, these organizations were changed to fit the nature of the operation undertaken. Listed below in outline form

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944

WWE/reh

Page 39. - V

UNCLASSIFIED

are the variations from the normal organizations encountered during operations:

31 DIV

31 Mtn Regt. An organization not yet met elsewhere:-
1 and 2 Battalions organized similarly to Independent Mtn Bn
i.e. 3 Battalions each of 3 x 75 mm Mtn guns.
3 Bn 3 Tps each of 2 x 105 mm Fd Hows.
Regimental Total:- 18 x 75 mm type 94 Mtn guns.
6 x 105 mm (? Type 91) Fd Hows.
The 75 mm batteries had pack horses and no mules.
The 105 mm guns were left in BURMA.
The Regt was not equipped with wireless.

124 Inf Regt

It appears that originally the Regt and A/Tk gun Coys had an establishment of 6 guns each. This is more than the usual number.

A/tk Gun Coy. Organized into a HQ pl., 3 gunspls each with 2 x 37 mm A/Tk guns, and tpt sec. It seems that half the coy was at one time allotted to the Regt Gun Coy.

Regt Gun Coy. Is said originally to have had 2 x 75 mm Regt., 2 x 70 mm and 2/3 x 70 mm and 2/3 x 37 mm.
Possibly the establishment was less these 37 mm guns, which were loaned from the A/Tk Coy.

Mortars. Report said the regiment had a pl manning 6 small BRITISH mortars (probably 3 inch). This regiment is said to have had no other mortars.

138 Inf Regt.

The Regt had both Regt and A/Tk Gun Coys.
One report said that the A/Tk Coy had 7 x 37 guns; six (as in 124 Regt) is a possibility.

Mortars. At KOHIMA, the 10 inch mortar is reported to have been the armament of separate units, the basis being the section of 10 men under 1 officer. This is likely to have had one mortar. The mortar, in three pieces, together with one projectile, is reported to be the equivalent of three truck loads. At KOHIMA the loads probably were pack carried.

There are occasional mentions of mortars attached; it is very probable from sketch maps and note books that mortars were put under command of mountain artillery, and were adjusted by the same officer from a single OP. These were medium mortars (90 mm) and not 10 inch.

In 31 DIV, there was no evidence that medium mortars belonged, as in the regiments of 15 DIV, to the Regt Gun Coy.

15 DIV

21 Fd Regt.

An example of the 'augmented' Fd Regt., having 24 x 75 mm Fd guns and 12 x 105 mm Fd Hows. None of these were brought at first;

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 40. - V

UNCLASSIFIED

the unit was re-equipped with Mtn guns (apparently only obsolete types). These were found inadequate, and part of the regiment went back to BURMA and brought some 105 mm Hows, some old (1905) Ft. guns and some modern Mtn guns.

33 DIV

1 Independent A/Tk Bn.

Consisted of 3 gun coys instead of the more normal 2. Each coy had 3 pls of 2 sec, each sec having 1 x 47 mm and 1 x 37 mm Bn total : 9 x 47 mm, 9 x 37 mm. This shows that the re-equipment of the JAPANESE ARMY with the newer A/Tk gun can be considered in the midway stage.

On the IMPHAL front the JAPANESE divided part of their artillery into two artillery groups. The initial strength of these groups was as follows:

KUROGANE TAI

1 Bn, 3 med. Regt. Plus one section (14 guns)
1 Bn, 18 med. Regt. (12 guns)
Hq, 18 Medium Regt.

YAJIRI TAI

3 Bn, 33 Mtn Regt. less one section (10 guns)

MITSUI TAI

1 Bn, 3 Med Regt. less one section (10 guns)
2 Bn, 18 Med Regt. (12 guns)
2 Bn, 3 Mountain Regt. (12 guns)
Hq, 3 Med Regt. plus elements A/Tk.

IN RESERVE

1 Bn 33 Mtn Regt. (12 guns)

The weapons used in each medium regiment are not definitely confirmed as yet. The enemy mixes his weapons in a medium regiment. Both 105 mm guns and 150 mm Howitzers have been found in 3 Med Regt. Guns are switched for particular tasks.

29. Equipment.

Weapons and Prime Movers.

Given in Figure 9. is a list of the artillery weapons found to date in BURMA. For convenience some characteristics are also listed. Further details on the characteristics of these weapons are available from the TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICE, Office of Chief of Ordnance, WASHINGTON, D.C.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page Page 41. - V

UNCLASSIFIED

* UNCONFIRMED SOURCE

TABLE OF CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE ARTILLERY WEAPONS FOUND IN BURMA.

WEAPON	RANGE		TRAVERSE	ELEVATION		PROJECTILE WEIGHT	NO. OF CHARGES	TRAVELING POSITION		PRIME MOVER	TUBE LENGTH
	EFFECTIVE	MAXIMUM		MAX.	MIN.			WEIGHT	WIDTH		
94-Type - 37 MM Anti-Tank Gun	2500 yds	5000 yds	60°	+27°	-7°	H.E. 22.06 ozs. A.P. 25.05 ozs.	1	714 lbs.	47 ins.	Drawn by 1 horse pack- ed by 4 horses	66.5 ins.
94-Type - 37 MM Tank Gun	Effective 1 1/2 in. at 100 yds.	against armor	*21 1/2	*+20°	*-15°					Tank mount	53 3/4 ins.
1-Type - 47 MM A.T. Mobile Gun	Est. Range 8400 yds.		60°	+19°	-11°	A.P. 3.08 lbs. H.E. 3.37 lbs.	1	1660 lbs.	68 3/4 ins	(Believed) Vehicle	83.8 ins.
92-Type - 70 MM Howitzer	1500 yds.	3000 yds.	90°	+50°	-10°	H.E. 8.36 lbs.	4	468 lbs.	36 ins.	Horse drawn or packed by 10 men.	30 ins.
41-Type - 75 MM Mountain Gun	2100 yds.	7800 yds.	7°	+25°	-8°	H.E. w/o/f 13 lbs A.P. w/f 14.46 lbs Shrapnel w/o/f/ 13 lbs. 12 ozs.	1	1220 lbs,	48 ins.	*Drawn by 3 cavalry horses	54. 1/2 ins.
88-Type - 75 MM Field Gun		*9300 yds.	8°	+40°	8°	H.E. w/o/f/ 13 lbs	*1	*3000 lbs.		*Drawn by 6 horses	91 1/2 ins.
92-Type - 105MM Gun		*2000Cyds.	*36°	*+45°	*5°	* H.E. 33 lbs.	*2	*7700 lbs.	*59.84 ins.	* Tractor drawn	
4-Year-Type 15 Cm. Howitzer		8000yds.	5°	+55°	-3°	H.E. 79.35 lbs.	5	*Barrel vehicle wt. 4731 lbs.	6.30 ft.	*12 Horses on two vehicles.	7.05 ft.
96-Type-150MM Howitzer		13200 yds.	30°	+75°	-3°	H.E. 79.35 lbs.	5	10582 lbs.	6.6 ft.	98 Type six ton tractor	11.57 ft.
82-Cm.-Spigot Mortar			Belie- ved 150mils.	Fixed		w/o/f/ 674 lbs.		5 components totaling 888.12 lbs.	2000 mm.		806 mm.
88-Type- 75MM A.A. Gun	Hor. Range Ver. Range	15080yds. 29848 ft.	360°	+85°	-0°	H.E. 11 lbs. 4 1/2 ozs.		5830 lbs.	Road clearance 13 1/2 ins.	Six cyl 6x6 truck.	130.5ins.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India.

Report No. 9082.

Date 23 October 1944.

WWE/jhb.

FIGURE 9

Page 43-V.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

b. Gun Positions.

General.

The enemy light artillery positions which were normally well forward were characterized by their siting for maximum protection and accomplishment of a single task such as firing on a road junction or a defended position. Their fields of fire were confined in many cases to approximately 15°. Difficult terrain seldom prevented them from using the most suitable positions. Favorite positions for light weapons were on hill crests or in deep nullahs. After firing from crests the weapon would be lowered down the reverse slope for protection. When positions were on the forward slope, strong fortifications were built for protection with usually a sacrifice of field of fire. Sketches of typical JAPANESE forward and reverse slope positions are shown on Figures 10 and 11 respectively.

Camouflage.

In all cases excellent natural cover was utilized. Wire covered with fresh foliage was the most common type for weapons. Trees and ground contours were used to maximum advantage. No evidence of artificial camouflage was found. The enemy in a few cases, however, were negligent about leaving tracks leading to and from positions. These tracks were easily picked up on aerial photographs. All equipment such as cartridge cases, limbers and general debris were always found carefully disposed of under some sort of camouflage. The enemy strongly fears counter battery fire and thus he generally takes great pains to conceal his position from both ground and air observation. He moves his positions frequently and when any type of aircraft is in the air he immediately ceases firing.

Ammunition Storage.

Ammunition is usually well protected in trenches and bunkers. There have been definite indications, however, that the enemy does not properly protect ammunition from weather and foreign matter. Ammunition completely unprotected has been found in abandoned gun positions.

Local Protection.

The enemy is an industrious digger. He builds strong bunkers near his positions and also makes effective slit trenches near and above the guns. There was one case where an infantry platoon tried to attack a gun position containing 2/75 mm guns and 1/50 mm Howitzer and the local defense was so strong that the infantry was forced to withdraw.

Air Defense.

Air defense was passive. There was no evidence of anti-aircraft guns sited for protection of gun positions.

c. Communications.

Communications for fire control varied considerably and it is evident that the enemy used any means which were readily available.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh


~~SECRET~~

Page 44. - V

UNCLASSIFIED

FIGURE 10

UNCLASSIFIED



- Height 5'7" to 6'.
- 20' square
- Some logs 2' thick.
- A - Gun Posn Pointing N.W.
- B - Gun Entrance
- C - Exit to Sleeping and Cooking Quarters.
- D - Exit to Amn Dump.
- E - Exit to L.M.G. Posn.
- F - Sand Bags.

Logs held together throughout with iron dogs.

JAPANESE 75MM FORWARD SLOPE GUN POSITION

From JICA/CBI/SEA New Delhi, India.


Report No. 9082

23 October 1944.

WWE/nem

FIGURE 11.

TYPICAL JAPANESE REVERSE SLOPE GUN POSITION
150 MM HOW.



Where guns were located well forward on ridges, voice was used from close O.P.'s. Forward observers are thought to have used either wire or radio and in many cases visual signals. Prisoners have also reported the use of runners from the O.P.'s to the gun position. The slowness of many of the enemy's adjustments indicates that this may have been true. One Mtn Regiment did not have any radios and used wire exclusively. The radios found are thought to belong to the medium regiments.

d. Gunnery Methods.

Observed Fires.

Observation.

The JAPANESE use forward observers boldly, often operating well in advance of their forward positions and relying principally on mobility for protection. Also he adjusts fire from O.P.'s in the normal manner using B.C. telescopes, aiming circles, range finders and field glasses. It is known that especially with light weapons the O.P.'s are usually located within voice range of the gun positions. There are indications that the enemy attempts to locate his O.P.'s in the line of fire. Air O.P.'s were never used.

Method of Adjustment.

The enemy was probably at all times short of ammunition. Adjustments and number of rounds used in each were undoubtedly restricted by this shortage. The enemy was extremely slow in all adjustments of fire, in some cases taking 20 to 30 minutes. The normal method of bracketing is used. An adjustment appears to be considered correct after 5 to 6 rounds. At 1 to 3000 yds. range his adjustments and subsequent transfers of fire appear to be accurate.

Unobserved Fires.

It is doubtful if the enemy has made extensive use of the normal methods of unobserved fire. Artillery maps of 1/25000 scale have been captured possibly indicating some use of unobserved fire. There has been no evidence of artillery survey during operations. Although it is known that the JAPANESE have units comparable to an observation battalion no evidence of the presence of such a unit has been found in BURMA. Further, range tables and computers for applying weather corrections to firing data have been captured but no equipment for determining these corrections has been found. Contrary to this evidence, the enemy at one time placed fire without registration on a razor-back mountain 9,000 ft. high from a position not over 4,000 ft. high and at a range of 10,000 plus yards. The initial rounds were in the center of a gun position. There are no other examples of such accurate unobserved fire which may have been merely good luck. However, it is believed the enemy is capable of accurate unobserved fire and with the use of increased medium artillery he will attempt to perfect its use.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 47. - V.

UNCLASSIFIED

31. Tactical Employment of Artillery Fire.

a. General:

In any study of the enemy's use of artillery it must be remembered that, in the JAPANESE ARMY, the infantry is considered the most important arm and all other arms are subordinate to it. All enemy tactics are predicated on the superiority of the infantryman. The infantry are expected to be capable of victory without the assistance of other arms. The presence of supporting arms is considered a luxury and must not be counted on for decisive support. Thus in the JAPANESE ARMY, the infantry are given first choice of troops which probably results in the supporting arms having troops inferior in ability to the infantry. The enemy too has not considered that artillery strength in the proportions normally found in other modern armies is required for fighting in terrain like that in BURMA since the effectiveness of highly mechanized equipment is markedly reduced in this type of terrain. Although in 1944 the enemy has vastly increased its artillery strength in BURMA, this strength is still considerably less than that of the Allied forces. It is evident that the enemy's artillery tactics in BURMA are controlled by the following considerations: (1) the artillery is subordinate to the infantry, (2) their artillery strength in numbers is vastly inferior to the Allies, (3) ammunition supply through the lack of roads and mechanized equipment is very difficult in BURMA.

b. Deployment:

Guns are normally in single gun positions, sometimes in sections. Sniping or roving guns are extensively used but even in this role are generally dug in and most effectively camouflaged. These guns are generally sited for special tasks and their role is believed to be that of arty directly attached to forward infantry.

Battery positions which seldom exist are sited with one gun behind the other (about 100 to 200 yards apart), down the line of fire. They are rarely at right angles to the line of fire.

The enemy has been known to deploy 1/105 mm gun and one 150 mm Howitzer at the same position and in another case 1/105 mm gun and 2/75 mm Mtn. guns.

Mountain guns are usually located just over the crests of hills in the sides of steep slopes, or in saddles between hills. Again they are sited for one special task with sometimes an alternate position nearby for another 'fixed line' task.

At one of the few battery positions encountered, 75 mm guns were sited in a square, with sections in depth. One section fired its guns alternately at one target while the other section did likewise at another target. At the same time they covered medium guns which were registering the same targets and which were sited, in depth, down the line of observation.

Medium gun positions have usually been widely separated single gun or section positions again sited in depth (e.g. 2 guns sited close together, with two other guns 500 to 1000 yards in rear and in front, res-

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 48. - V

UNCLASSIFIED

pectively of section position.) The range of the medium weapons was used to its fullest in order to keep out of range of counter battery fires. They were located so that they could bring fire in support of their infantry but normally not into the BRITISH rear areas.

The enemy uses alternate gun positions extensively. He fires one task and then immediately moves to another position or into a protected area. He sometimes abandons a position for a week or more and then comes back to it.

c. Fire Plans.

It is evident that the enemy conceives of artillery as primarily a weapon for direct support of the infantry. Their fires are usually confined to pre-arranged infantry support tasks. This is evidenced by his ignoring many tempting targets. Time and again magnificent opportunities for inflicting heavy casualties and causing great disorganization appear to have been missed. It is presumed that this was done because the target had no direct bearing on the immediate operation.

The enemy does not use concentrations of fire as are used by the Allies. The most he has been known to fire at one time is 6 medium guns. In large scale attacks he used a steady slow rate of fire lasting for long periods in shelling the area to be attacked and any locations from which covering fire might be expected.

Enemy attacks are usually defended hill features or isolated objectives. In these attacks the enemy rarely employs more than 16 guns. A general estimate of the types of fire employed in one sector is as follows:

H.F. prior to small scale attack or covering attack -
45 to 60 min. - slow rate.

H.F. prior to a large scale attack - 18 to 36 hours slow
rate with an occasional 6 hour pause at night during
a 36 hour programme.

H.F. prior to main assault - 45 to 60 minutes - slow rate.

Enemy defensive fires have only occasionally been encountered. It is usually aimed at their own bunkers and brought down when attacking infantry reaches the objective. This is usually registered by only a small proportion of the artillery deployed.

The enemy probably does not have a counter battery organization and rarely employs counter battery fires. However, he does use counter battery measures in the form of 'Gun busting' parties trained to infiltrate into battery positions and by surprise attempting to kill the personnel and destroy the weapons.

The enemy appears to concede the superiority of the Allied artillery and thus takes many passive measures to protect their own artillery. He seldom fires at night. Since 90% of his infantry attacks take place at night, his artillery has had to fire in support. In these cases he rarely fires more than an hour. When there is no pending attack he never fires, hoping to conceal his position. The presence of aircraft of any sort causes the enemy to cease firing. Air patrols over the enemy have been a useful counter battery measure for the Allies. The enemy is aware of sound ranging

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 49. - V

UNCLASSIFIED

and flash spotting units being used to obtain information on his artillery. This has forced him to take counter measures such as firing several calibers from widely separated localities, firing alternately from two locations during registration, and employing small caliber covering fire for medium weapons.

There has been no evidence that the enemy has employed smoke in his artillery firing.

d. Accuracy and Effect of Fires.

In general the accuracy and effect of the enemy fires is good. Although he does not concentrate his fires in a short period he does concentrate them accurately over a period of time. He seldom wastes ammunition. The accuracy of his weapons has been noticeably good. The zone of dispersion of the medium weapons has in all cases been small. The effect of individual rounds can be considered comparable to Allied artillery rounds. The fragmentation of rounds is good and the speed of his impact fuze is approximately the same as BRITISH and AMERICAN fuzes.

32. Antiaircraft Artillery.

In the forward areas where ground troops were active there was only one report of A.A. fire by anything larger than 20 mm A.A. fire. Only few cases of these have been reported.

On the IMPHAL FRONT 51 INDEPENDENT A.A. BATTALION was known to exist. It is believed that the 12 to 18 - 75 mm guns in this Battalion were scattered throughout the area protecting important supply installations well to the rear of the forward units. Two additional A.A. Bns of 75 mm A.A. guns are known to exist in BURMA and two more are suspected. These units also are centered in the more important towns such as RANGOON and MANDALAY.

In general JAPANESE A.A. fire is not accurate and most pilots report it to be very wild.

33. Summary and Estimate of Future Capabilities of Japanese Artillery.

In operations in BURMA during 1943-44 during which the enemy made one determined large scale attack and another somewhat smaller attack on the BRITISH Forces and also in their operations against the CHINESE and AMERICAN Forces in the HUKAWNG VALLEY, it is estimated that approximately 50 percent of the enemy's artillery weapons have been either captured or destroyed. This percentage is known to be true in the IMPHAL area and approximately correct in the other areas. The amount of equipment still remaining in BURMA is, of course, not accurately known but it is reasonable to assume that by far the majority of the equipment originally in BURMA was used in the JAPANESE attacks of this year. Further, the losses in artillery personnel is certainly very high. A prisoner of war report stating that in one division in BURMA no replacement of artillery pieces has been forthcoming this year, indicates that the enemy is laboring under a shortage of such equipment. With the coming of the end of the monsoon and thus an increase in the intensity of operations in BURMA, it is believed doubtful if the enemy will be able to rebuild and re-equip the units he used in the fighting during the first part of the year.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 50. - V

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

The enemy has undoubtedly learned in the past operations in BURMA the value of artillery strength since both light and medium artillery opposing him inflicted severe damage on his forces. This year was the first time that he used medium artillery in BURMA. It is believed that this was the first time that he had on any front used the quantities of artillery that he did here. His artillery was, however, weaker in numbers and quality than the Allies opposing him. His inferiority in number of weapons and supply of ammunition was more serious a disadvantage than the quality of his units. It was shown that although the JAPANESE artillery was not as well trained and did not use the modern tactics of the Allied armies, nevertheless the artillery tactics he did employ were effective in the terrain of BURMA and can be expected to be so in the future.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

~~SECRET~~

Page 51. - V

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECTION VI

ENGINEERS

34. Organization, Assignment, and Mission.

a. Organization.

Each of the JAPANESE divisions in BURMA during this period contained one Engineer Regiment. This regiment is analogous to the U.S. Engineer Combat Battalion in the number of personnel, but not in the amount of equipment carried. The Divisional Engineer Regiment takes the number of its Division. For example, the engineer regiment of the 15 DIVISION is known as the 15 DIVISIONAL ENGINEER REGIMENT. In addition to the nine engineer regiments with each of the infantry divisions, the following JAPANESE engineer units have been identified in BURMA:

An Engineer Battalion with the 24 INDEPENDENT MIXED BRIGADE, and
The 5 ENGINEER COMMAND consisting of the
 4 INDEPENDENT ENGINEER REGIMENT
 20 INDEPENDENT ENGINEER REGIMENT
 21 SHIPPING ENGINEER REGIMENT.

b. Assignment.

Engineers are employed in small detachments assigned to small combat teams, infantry battalions, companies, or even smaller units. In other words, engineer work is highly decentralized. This practice is in direct contrast to the AMERICAN and BRITISH practice of keeping engineer units under centralized control as much as possible.

c. Mission.

The JAPANESE Division Engineers are primarily combat pioneers. By contrast and comparison, the BRITISH Division Engineers are tradesmen and craftsmen, in other words, highly trained technicians; the GERMAN Division Engineers, or more properly speaking Pioneers, are combatant troops; and the U.S. Division Engineers occupy an intermediate position. The role of the JAPANESE Engineers is analogous to the GERMAN Pioneer. The principal difference is that the JAPANESE have much less engineer mechanical equipment than the GERMANS.

The primary mission of the JAPANESE Engineer is the same as the U.S. Engineer and is to increase the combat effectiveness of their own forces by engineer works that (1) facilitate the movement of their own troops and (2) impede that of the enemy.

The customary tasks of the JAPANESE Engineers appear to be:

- (1) Construction of bridges and other means of crossing roads.
- (2) Demolitions.
- (3) Mine-laying and construction of antitank obstacles.
- (4) Passage and removal of mines and other obstacles.
- (5) Construction of defensive positions behind the front.
- (6) Employment as infantry when necessary.
- (7) Other engineer services, such as maps, water supply.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

[REDACTED]

Page 52. - VI

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

d. Equipment.

All available evidence indicates that forward engineer units depend upon hand tools and equipment (and the assistance of coolies where possible). An illustration of this fact is given by the statement of a JAPANESE prisoner of war from the 15 DIVISION ENGINEER REGIMENT. He stated that the company equipment used in the operations against IMPHAL consisted of 60 shovels, 60 mattocks, 4 large saws, wire cutters and axes. The prisoner stated that the engineer unit was apparently aware of the kind of bridges to be found in INDIA. Only small "canned" explosives (bulk charges) on the scale of six per company were brought for demolition work. In the crossing of the CHINDWIN RIVER, he added, 20 collapsible boats were used, presumably by his regiment to assist in the crossing. The use of rubber boats in this particular crossing, of course, was supplementary to other means, such as light ponton bridge, ferries, rafts, and boats.

35. Combat Operations.

In the advance the principal mission of the engineers is to aid the forward movement of other troops. This includes line of communication work, already discussed, the removal of obstacles, and such other work as assignment to artillery units to assist in the forward movement of the guns. In the attack of defended positions, engineers cooperate with or form part of the infantry attack party with the mission to clear obstacles, particularly barbed wire entanglements, with bangalore torpedoes. The cooperation of engineers with the infantry is mentioned in the section on "Infantry". Another important use of engineers in combat operations is as part of "suicide squads" or "raiding parties" already discussed.

When the JAPANESE are on the defensive and particularly during a withdrawal, combat engineer operations consist primarily of creating obstacles. The infantry undoubtedly placed most booby traps and other anti-personnel obstacles in the vicinity of their defended positions and in some cases laid scattered antitank mines and may have constructed some of the lesser road blocks. From captured orders it is evident that the engineers (1) constructed the antitank ditches and the more elaborate road blocks such as encountered in the KOCHIMA - IMPHAL area, (2) laid most of the land mines, and (3) performed bridge demolitions. The tactics and techniques of obstacle warfare in this campaign are discussed in Section VIII "Antitank and Obstacle Warfare".

In addition, engineers are often employed as infantry, particularly during the defense. The JAPANESE seem to employ their engineers as infantry more frequently by comparison than do the BRITISH.

36. River Crossings.

River crossing operations have played a significant part in the BURMA campaign even though the JAPANESE made no assault crossings. JAPANESE river crossing techniques as demonstrated in this campaign are of primary interest for logistical and technical rather than tactical reasons. The engineers provide the means for initial river crossings, usually by boats, rafts and ponton bridges. They use some standard equipment, principally rubber boats, but depend primarily upon expedients. JAPANESE engineers are outstanding in improvisation and use of expedients made from bamboo, standing timber, and other locally occurring materials, particularly in the construction of rafts and bridges.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

[REDACTED]

Page 53. - VI

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

a. Crossing the CHINDWIN.

Prior to the advance of the JAPANESE into MANIPUR STATE, INDIA, in March 1944, the bulk of their forces were concentrated on the East bank of the CHINDWIN RIVER. Air reconnaissance a month prior to the attack showed a large concentration of rafts on the CHINDWIN around and South of HOMALIN. The BRITISH 4 CORPS did not suspect a large-scale attack from this direction because (1) the country between the CHINDWIN RIVER and the MANIPUR ROAD appeared to the BRITISH too difficult to allow movement through it of a large attacking force and (2) no appreciable movement of JAPANESE troops across the CHINDWIN was detected.

When the JAPANESE attack developed and the BRITISH lines of communication around IMPHAL were cut, the BRITISH were completely surprised by the size of the force and the secrecy of the entire advance. The JAPANESE achieved this surprise principally by secret and ingenious crossings of the CHINDWIN at night.

The JAPANESE concentrated along the CHINDWIN RIVER at THAUNGDUK bridging materials, boats and rafts. Boats and rafts were concealed along the East bank under overhanging trees and in chaungs. According to eye-witness reports bridge construction started at sundown. At dusk, rafts consisting of six boats each were assembled along the bank. This operation required about 30 minutes. The rafts were brought together and joined to form a continuous length of bridge parallel to the river bank. The bridge was as long as the river was wide, a distance of 300 to 400 yards. The connecting of the rafts to form the bridge required another 30 minutes. The downstream end of the bridge was picketed to the bank, and the upstream end pushed out into the stream. The whole bridge then swung slowly round with the current towards the far bank. On one occasion when the far shore end of the bridge was about half way across, the motion of the bridge stopped. The bridge may have been grounded on a sandbank. A motor boat was sent out and towed the end of the bridge the remaining distance into position on the far bank. The time taken to pivot the bridge into position was about 10 minutes. It did not appear to be anchored in any way except at the two banks. In consequence it curved downstream in the middle. It may have been guyed to the bank, but not sufficiently to prevent the downstream bend. Just before daybreak each day the bridge was towed back to its original position parallel to and along the East bank, dismantled, and the boats dispersed and concealed under overhanging trees and in chaungs.

The maintenance of secrecy in this crossing and also in innumerable ferry crossings was facilitated by the non-necessity of building access roads. In the country where the JAPANESE crossed the CHINDWIN RIVER innumerable cart tracks lead down to the water's edge on each bank. Many of these are suitable for ponton or ferry crossing sites.

The bridge was used to cross foot troops, porters, bullocks, horses, and handcarts. Medium artillery and vehicles were crossed undoubtedly by existing large ferries.

The bridge is also of interest technically because it is the only JAPANESE ponton bridge that an eye-witness observed while being constructed and also obtained approximate specification. The floats were blunt bow and stern wooden boats approximately 8 feet long, 4 feet broad, and 2½ feet deep. They appeared to be factory-made, mass-produced articles.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

~~SECRET~~

Page 54. - VI

UNCLASSIFIED

All boats had what was believed to be an outboard motor attachment on the stern though no outboard motors were seen. The boats were painted black. The bridge consisted of the wooden boats, bamboo roadbearers (balk), and timber decking. Each boat was fitted with 8 steel brackets, 4 on each gunwhale through which bamboo roadbearers were fitted. The brackets were large enough to take two bamboos. Boats were spaced about two feet apart. Each roadbearer spanned two boats, the space between the boats, and overlapped the next boat by the width of the boat. (The diameter of the bamboo is not given. Because of the short span and the light load, the bamboo would not have to be very large. Bamboo of 4 inches diameter occurs everywhere in this area, and bamboo of 6 inches diameter is not uncommon). Decking was timber, not bamboo, made up in panels approximately 8 feet long and 4½ or 5 feet wide. The panels had wooden slats approximately 3 inches wide with 1½ or 2 inches space between each slat. Each panel was a one man load and probably weighed between 80-100 pounds. The panels were laid direct onto the roadbearers. (The informant stated the panels were not fixed in any way. It seems probable, however, that the panels were lashed down). A thin rope, approximately one-fourth of an inch in diameter, was used for mooring boats. The rope was fiber and seemed exceptionally strong.

b. Bridges Over the Manipur and Yu Rivers.

The other large bridges built by the JAPANESE during the MANIPUR campaign were (1) two bridges over the MANIPUR RIVER at MS 126 on the TIDDIM ROAD just North of TONZANG at the same site previously used by the BRITISH, and (2) one bridge over the YU RIVER East of TAMU on the SITTAUNG ROAD. At the YU RIVER site the JAPANESE used equipment that the BRITISH had assembled and been forced to abandon.

One of the bridges over the MANIPUR RIVER for some time showed a gap in the decking whenever it was photographed. At the time this was the only bridge over the MANIPUR RIVER at this point. Motor vehicles, animals, and foot troops were known to use this bridge at night. The JAPANESE left the gap in the decking by day by removing a few planks in order to give the impression that the bridge was unserviceable, and replaced these planks at night to allow their convoys to cross.

At the MANIPUR and YU RIVER crossings no work was ever seen to be going on by aerial reconnaissance. The reason may have been because the JAPANESE invariably cease all activity during an air raid alert or alarm or because the JAPANESE only worked on the bridges at night.

c. Mule and Foot Bridges near Imphal.

The JAPANESE constructed two small bridges across the IMPHAL TUREL (River) at SAFARMIANA about 18 miles north of IMPHAL. One was a mule bridge. The piers were old car chassis, and the roadbearers and decking bamboo or wood pole ballies. This bridge was soon washed away. The other was a foot bridge, with tripod piers, roadbearers, and decking of ballies. (Bamboo foot bridges with tripod or bipod triangular piers or bents are the most common type of bridges constructed in the BURMA hills). This bridge stood up for some time. Both the mule and foot bridges were well camouflaged with foliage and on an air photograph looked like a tree had fallen across the river.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 55. - VI

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

d. Bridge at Hsenwi, Burma.

Another illustration of the JAPANESE use of "bridge deception" to disguise a likely aerial target and to conceal the movement of troops and supplies is the dismantling and reassembling of the NAMTU BRIDGE on the BURMA ROAD at HSENWI, northeast of LASHIO. The bridge is made passable by placing short section steel girders locked together over the damaged portion of the original bridge. The bridge is:

dismantled at 0700 hours and remade at 1300 hours,
" " 1400 " " " " 1600 "
" " 1700 " " " " 2000 "

Traffic collects and crosses the bridge during the period when the steel girders are in place.

e. Collapsible Rubber Boats.

A prisoner from the 15 DIVISION ENGINEER REGIMENT stated that the usual foot bridge used by the JAPANESE consisted of board and bamboo slats (presumably stringers and flooring respectively) about 5 feet long, placed on rubber boats. The rubber boats were placed 13 feet apart.

f. Ferries and Fixed Bridges.

Behind the immediate operational area the universal type of bridge built by the JAPANESE in BURMA, as well as the BRITISH, is the standard pile stringer bridge. The bridge is built with the aid of a pile driver erected on a raft.

Because of (1) the lack of time or labor or (2) the streams are too wide or deep, pile bridges are not built and reliance must be placed upon the use of ferries and river boats. Ferries are constructed from existing timber and bamboo and country boats. In some areas the JAPANESE are entirely dependent upon these means. Along the entire CHINDWIN, for example, no bridges are known to have existed during the MANIPUR campaign except the light ponton bridge constructed at THAUNGDU. Apparently a large part of the supply sent West of the CHINDWIN and all medium artillery, motor vehicles, and other heavy items were ferried across.

Even though the ferrying of supplies is slow, this method of transport appears to have been functioned quite satisfactorily and was not a bottle-neck in the line of supply. The eventual breakdown of the JAPANESE supply systems in both the ARAKAN and CHIN HILLS operations was caused by other reasons.

37. Line of Communication Work.

Forward engineer units generally do not construct roads on any appreciable scale. The road work of forward engineer units consists of clearing obstacles, constructing bridges, and performing minimum repair and maintenance so that troops can advance and take forward their artillery and vehicles and, in some instances, tanks. Behind the very forward areas, wherever possible, coolies are used to the maximum extent. Where the supply is ample, all road work and pile bridges are constructed by coolie labor working under the supervision of engineers.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

~~SECRET~~

Page 56. - VI

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

The combined use of engineer troops, coolies, and prisoners of war on line of communication work is illustrated in the following example. A BRITISH source reports that the officer commanding an engineer unit of 50 JAPANESE, engaged since late June 1944 in maintaining the road TIDDIM - TONZANG with the assistance of 30 CHIN coolies and 10 GURKHA prisoners, is said to have stated that on 22 August 1944 the unit would move back to do maintenance and bridging between KALEMYO and KALEWA. (Note: the distance from TONZANG to TIDDIM is 31 miles and KALEMYO to KALEWA 24 miles).

An example of the speed with which JAPANESE construct a railroad by-pass and bridge is the construction accomplished near BUDALIN, approximately 60 miles WNW from MANDALAY. In August photographic coverage indicated that the JAPANESE began work on a second bridge across the MYOTHIT CHAUNG river, 2 miles North of BUDALIN. Just 21 days later aerial photographic reconnaissance showed that the bridge piers had been installed, roadway built, and railway tracks laid to the structure.

In the use, improvement and construction of roads, the JAPANESE consistently follow the practice of making the maximum use of minimum available means. (This same procedure is characteristic of the JAPANESE in most of their other military activities). When the JAPANESE seize an undeveloped though potentially important overland supply route, they do not attempt to convert it immediately into a motorable road. A trail is used first to move foot troops and supplies that can be carried on the backs of men. As soon as possible and while being used by foot traffic, the trail is improved sufficiently to allow its use by animal transport trains. The next step in this evolution and concomitant with its use by men and animals, is to widen and improve the track enough so that field artillery can be drawn forward by horses and manpower or winched into position to support the advance of forward units. Generally, the final phase is to improve the track, while it is still being used to the maximum extent, so that it becomes a fair-weather road capable of being used, even though with difficulty, by motor vehicles, tanks, and prime movers pulling medium artillery.

This method of pushing as many men and as much supplies and equipment forward on minimum lines of communications in the IMPHAL - KOHIMA offensives had both tremendous advantages and disadvantages. Initially it contributed in large part to deceiving the BRITISH as to the size of the force and to giving the JAPANESE a marked advantage because of the surprise attained. Subsequently, the procedure was disastrous because the JAPANESE could not maintain a sufficient scale of supply to support their offensive. When their attack did not succeed and they were caught at the end of this precarious road net by the monsoon, the supply system collapsed completely, and when they withdrew, they were forced to abandon nearly all their heavy equipment.

38. Construction Capabilities.

Some criticism has been made of JAPANESE engineering methods because roads and bridges constructed by the JAPANESE have not come up to the technical specifications of BRITISH and AMERICAN standards. The criticism is based upon a false comparison. The size and amount of equipment moved by the BRITISH, and even to a more pronounced degree by the AMERICANS, is much greater than that moved by the JAPANESE. JAPANESE engineer works, therefore, need not be as strong as BRITISH or AMERICAN. The true measure of the engineers' effectiveness is whether or not they have fulfilled their mission

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

~~SECRET~~

Page 57. - VI

UNCLASSIFIED

~~_____~~

for their own forces. By this measure the JAPANESE engineers have performed exceedingly well in the dry season. The JAPANESE engineer means failed in the monsoon. So did those of the Allies. The reason why this failure was disastrous for the JAPANESE and not the Allies was not dependent upon engineer works but upon the fact that the JAPANESE had no system of air supply, whereas the BRITISH and AMERICANS did.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh ~~_____~~

Page 58. - VI

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECTION VII

ARMOR

39. General.

The enemy used no armor in the ARAKAN operations, but his 14 TANK REGIMENT was employed in the trans-CHINDWIN offensive against IMPHAL in March. Apparently this regiment was based in the SHWEDO - YE-U area in BURMA prior to the offensive. Documents captured during recent operations indicate that 14 TANK REGT consisted of five companies, four equipped with tanks while 5 COY appeared to be an armored car Coy equipped with only 4 armored cars. No.1 COY had a Command Section of 4 tankettes, 3 platoons of 3 medium tanks each and 1 platoon of 3 light tanks. From external evidence it would appear that the Regt was organized on the basis of 3 medium Coys and 1 light Coy, each with 16 tanks, with 3 or 4 tanks in REGT. H.Q. From all documents translated, it appears that the total strength of the unit prior to the present operations was 667 men and the total number of vehicles was 134, of which approximately 70 were tanks.

40. Enemy Equipment.

Five types of JAPANESE tanks have been encountered during the IMPHAL campaign. Type "98" Tankette, Type "98" Tankette (modified to carry a 37 mm gun), Type "95" Light, Type "97" "Special" Medium (mounting a 47 mm gun) and STUART Mk I. The STUART Tanks are thought to be part of the BRITISH 7 ARMoured BDE which was forced to abandon its tanks at SHWEGYIN on the CHINDWIN RIVER during the 1942 retreat from BURMA because of no available ferry. By the end of August 44 APVs from this Tank Regt. (including 3 tankettes, 20 light tanks, 14 medium tanks, 6 STUART Mk I tanks and 1 armored car) have been captured or certainly destroyed.

41. Tanks in the Imphal Campaign.

14 TANK REGT moved across the CHINDWIN in early March, thence to KALEMYO and up the KABAW VALLEY road towards TAMU; 5 light tanks remaining for L. of C. duty and 5 other light tanks being attached to a small task force containing all arms with the mission of following up the BRITISH retreat on the TIDDIM road, while the main JAPANESE force attempted a wide flanking movement.

The Regt. reached TAMU by the end of March and later during the middle of April tanks were used against BRITISH positions East of PALEL on the IMPHAL - TAMU ROAD. In the meantime 4 of the 5 tanks forming part of the small Task Force on the TIDDIM ROAD ran on to a minefield and were disabled and then destroyed. During the latter part of April and the first part of May, 14 TANK REGT., less some tanks left in the TAMU area, moved back down the KABAW VALLEY to KALEMYO thence to TIDDIM and up the road towards IMPHAL. This switch from the TAMU area to the BISHENPUR area apparently took between three weeks to one month to complete. (See Figure 4. in Section II for the routes followed.)

The first contact with JAPANESE tanks on the TIDDIM ROAD was in the early part of May during the battle for the village of POTSANGBAM about 19 miles below IMPHAL. From then until the middle of July enemy tanks were employed both offensively and defensively along the road. In their retreat

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

[REDACTED]

Page 59. - VII

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

the JAPANESE abandoned some tanks but were able to evacuate the remainder over the MANIPUR RIVER at MS 126.

There has only been one appearance of enemy armor on the IMPHAL - UKHRUL ROAD, when two light tanks or tankettes supported an infantry attack on a road block about 12 miles Southwest of UKHRUL in early July. The exact number of tanks remaining near TAMU after the switch over to the TIDDIM ROAD is unknown, but during this period these tanks gave fire support on several occasions on the TAMU - PALEL ROAD. The number of tanks, if any, that the enemy was able to evacuate over the CHINDWIN RIVER in their retreat on this Front is unknown.

42. Employment of 14 Tank Regt.

While it has not been possible to obtain detailed information of all actions in which JAPANESE tanks were involved in the IMPHAL Campaign some idea of his tank tactics may be gained from the experiences of these operations. The limitations of ground, weather etc., should be kept in mind. The conspicuous defect of these tanks, so far as fighting in close country is concerned, is the lightness of their armor which is the general factor governing the employment of his tanks.

a. Reconnaissance.

Only two instances of enemy use of tanks for reconnaissance are known, both occurring during March in the KADAW VALLEY, where the nature of the country and, at that time, the state of the ground, permitted the employment of a number of tanks. On the first occasion a number of light tanks were part of the advance guard of the JAPANESE forces. On the second occasion tanks infiltrated between BRITISH forward positions, but withdrew without an action developing and were presumably engaged on a reconnaissance. On all other occasions approach has been by night.

b. Offensive Action.

On some eight occasions enemy tanks were used in support of infantry in attacks on defended perimeters. In the majority of cases the attack was put in at night. On one occasion the attack was put in at dusk under cover of a smoke screen. On another occasion two tanks were used in an attack at 1700 hours during an air supply drop being made on BRITISH troops. The maximum number of tanks employed in such an attack has been 10 in one instance in the KADAW VALLEY. On the TIDDIM ROAD, no more than 6 tanks were employed in a single attack.

Tanks have twice been used in attacks on our road blocks. On the first occasion 4 tanks at night without infantry support and with full headlights attacked a road block on the TIDDIM ROAD. The road block had only been established that morning, so the tanks concerned may have had no information of its presence. On the second occasion, however, enemy infantry supported by two light tanks or tankettes succeeded at night in breaking through a block on the UKHRUL ROAD after a previous infantry attack had been beaten back.

7 enemy light tanks with infantry set an ambush on the edge of a clearing south of TAMU. The tanks were well concealed and camouflaged. A tank versus tank action developed when a half squadron of BRITISH LEE Tanks entered the clearing. The JAPANESE tanks held their fire until almost point

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

[REDACTED]

Page 60. - VII

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

blank range. One LEE tank was "brewed up" by a JAPANESE 37 mm tank gun and at least 3 enemy tanks were knocked out in the engagement.

As mentioned above the small Task Force, designed to harass or follow up the BRITISH retreat during March on the TIDDIM ROAD, included 5 light tanks. 4 of these tanks, unaccompanied, moved up the road by night and were disabled on a minefield before reaching the BRITISH positions. They were destroyed the next day by BRITISH Sappers. In May enemy tanks followed up the withdrawal Northwards of 48 BDE from its road block established 33 miles South of IMPHAL on the TIDDIM ROAD. On at least two occasions tanks attacked in support of infantry and these were in effect attacks on a defended perimeter.

So far as is known the use of enemy tanks in a fire support role has been confined to the TAMU - PALEL ROAD, where up to 3 tanks (probably type "97 Special" Mediums) were employed on several occasions on harassing fire tasks or in softening up BRITISH defences prior to an attack. Firing was carried out from the flank at a range of 3400 yards.

There have been no reported instances of the employment of enemy tanks for exploitation. On the TIDDIM ROAD, his tanks were content to assist the infantry to secure initial gains, generally by night, and then withdraw before daylight. However, JAPANESE plans for the capture of WITOK in the KABAW VALLEY show that the despatch of a combined infantry and tank force for rapid pursuit after the capture of the position was contemplated, although there is no evidence that the plan was ever put into execution.

c. Defensive Action.

The JAPANESE have used tanks to stiffen up their defensive positions in villages along the TIDDIM ROAD. In two instances tanks were dug in. One, a tankette mounting a 37 mm gun, was heavily camouflaged and used primarily as an additional anti-tank gun. At least 12 JAPANESE tanks were used to strengthen the fire power of a light infantry screen covering the withdrawal of the main JAPANESE force. Although the enemy succeeded in breaking contact, 11 tanks fell into the BRITISH hands. Some of these tanks were bogged while others had been knocked out by bombing or artillery fire. It is clear that the tanks were not intended to act as a mobile reserve for immediate counterattack and that their role was primarily static. The tanks were disposed in hull down positions along the lanes of the village and formed strong points in the defensive layout. By traversing their turrets, they could collectively have covered with fire the total perimeter of the village.

In only one instance have enemy tanks been used for counterattack within a defended perimeter and on that occasion the counterattack supported by tanks did not materialize until 12 hours after the BRITISH infantry had established themselves in the enemy position. The JAPANESE use of tanks within a defended perimeter has been largely characterized by entire lack of mobility.

The only instance of the enemy using tanks as road blocks may or may not have been deliberate. A medium tank, undamaged but disabled by the enemy, was found blocking the only piece of road left between two waterlogged bomb craters. It is possible that the tank may have become bogged while attempting to withdraw.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

[REDACTED]

Page 61. - VII

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

d. Miscellaneous Uses.

During June, 4 enemy tanks were employed for L. of C. protection in escorting motor transport convoys to forward areas on the TIDDIM ROAD.

The JAPANESE are reported to have ferried some infantry on tanks in the advance up the KABAW VALLEY in March. Captured documents showed that at a later date tanks were used to ferry some enemy infantry elements up the TIDDIM - IMPHAL ROAD; the concentration of the tanks and infantry in the BISHENPUR area coinciding.

43. Other Notes on Japanese Armor.

a. Concealment.

An outstanding example of JAPANESE concealment was the concentration of 14 TANK REGT. prior to the trans-CHINDWIN offensive. Shortly before the operations started, this Regt. was brought up into the KALE VALLEY and concealed there without its presence being known. One unconfirmed report was received several weeks before the JAPANESE advanced to the effect that 5 possible light tanks had been seen North of KALEMYO, but there was no other indication from ground or air sources of the presence of tanks in the valley. In view of the long move up from BURMA and the number of tanks involved, the manner in which the enemy managed to conceal the TANK REGT. was a noteworthy achievement.

On the other hand, it has been reported that the concealment of tanks during the IMPHAL campaign was not particularly good as only occasionally had the TAC R failed to find them, either by observation of the track marks or the actual tanks themselves.

b. Harboring.

Not much is known about JAPANESE methods of harboring, but he has undoubtedly been influenced by complete Allied air superiority on the IMPHAL front. There are indications that in the IMPHAL plain the enemy had been dispersing his tanks in groups of 2 to 4 over a distance of several miles. This would appear to apply with special force to villages just behind the battle line and likely to receive attention from aircraft. Further to the rear, providing adequate facilities for concealment exist, administrative considerations are likely to result in a greater degree of concentration. Nothing is known of arrangements for ground protection of harbors.

c. Passage of Obstacles.

The JAPANESE tank unit appears to possess no equipment to facilitate the passage of obstacles. Experience does not suggest the enemy tanks have a particularly good mud performance and they appear apt to get bellied. Otherwise their cross country performance would appear to be good.

d. Communications between Tanks.

The allotment of wireless sets would seem to be one per platoon. This set has a range of approximately 6 miles, but has the disadvantage that best results can only be obtained on a fixed frequency of 4.333 mc/s. The

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

[REDACTED]

Page 62. - VII

UNCLASSIFIED

~~_____~~

set is not fitted for intercommunication. Communication within the platoon is by flag. Two flags, one red and white and the other blue and white, are provided for each tank.

e. Recovery.

The enemy is not believed to have possessed any special recovery vehicle for disabled tanks. It is thought that on one occasion a disabled tank was recovered at night by another tank. It is also possible that the JAPANESE 105 mm gun tractor could be used to recover light tanks or tankettes.

f. Workshop facilities.

All enemy tanks carry a considerable number of spares and the burden of repairing anything other than major battle damage would appear to fall on the crews themselves. A welding lorry accompanied 14 TANK REGT. on the TIDDIM ROAD, but there is no information at present regarding further workshop facilities.

g. Targets engaged.

In general, primary targets engaged by enemy tanks have been infantry bunkers and wire; while secondary targets have been tanks and antitank guns. With the exception of the fire support missions on the TAMU-PALEL ROAD targets have been engaged from 100 yards distance or less. All his tanks carry a higher percentage of HE than AP/HE rounds. Except against other AFVs the JAPANESE appears to fire HE from his main armament.

h. Employment of Smoke.

There have been no instances of use of smoke by tanks themselves, although they carry Type "99" Smoke Dischargers and some smoke candles. As stated before, enemy tanks on one occasion attacked through a smoke screen.

i. Tank Design.

It has been impossible to determine the date of manufacture of all enemy tanks captured to date, but in cases where it has been ascertained, no tank was found to have been manufactured later than March 1942. At that time JAPANESE views on tank design and tank warfare were necessarily limited by experiences in CHINA - in more open country and against an enemy deficient in antitank guns - so that speed, rather than protection or armament, was the most important consideration. The JAPANESE must have realized after his BURMA experience in 1942 that the tanks he then employed were insufficiently armed and armored. However, no tank, except that of the STUART, captured to date in the present operations exceeds 25 mm armor. The medium tank, modified for the 47 mm gun, appears to be the only important change in armament.

From JICA/CBI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

~~_____~~

Page 63. - VII

UNCLASSIFIED

44. Conclusion.

In general, it may be said that the employment of 14 TANK REGT. during present operations has been unenterprising, hesitant and ineffectual, and that it has incurred losses out of all proportion to results obtained. The fact that the tanks are insufficiently armored for this type of warfare has not, it would appear, been lost on the enemy. He has consistently shrunk from deploying the maximum number of tanks which the ground permitted, and from giving close support to infantry in daylight when there was any danger of antitank guns or Allied tanks being encountered. The conception of mobility in defence has also been conspicuously absent.

While the 47 mm gun mounted in the medium tank is an excellent weapon, unless the enemy introduces a more heavily armored tank it would appear that employment of his armor in this theater in the future against Allied forces equipped with adequate antitank weapons would be unlikely to meet with any more success than he has experienced in the recent IMHAL campaign.

From JICA/CDI/SEA, New Delhi, India. Report No. 9082 Date: 23 Oct 1944.

WWE/reh

Page 64. - VII

UNCLASSIFIED