

EASTERN AIR

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Command

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SUPPLY DROPPING in BURMA
SECTION VI PAGES 1-6

WEEKLY
Intelligence Summary

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN AIR COMMAND SOUTH EAST ASIA

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3 Nov 1944

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN AIR COMMAND
SOUTH EAST ASIA

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

NO. 10

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Eastern Air Command, a component of Air Command, South East Asia, is an integrated headquarters controlling the operations of United States Army Air Force, Royal Air Force and Indian Air Force units on the Burma front through the following lower formations:

Tenth Air Force
Strategic Air Force
Third Tactical Air Force
Photo Reconnaissance Force
293 wing, R. A. F. (Defense of Calcutta)
Combat Cargo Task Force

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This summary contains no TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE section; Technical Intelligence in this theater is published by Air Command, South East Asia.

By command of Major General STRATEMEYER:

A. T. Richardson
A. T. RICHARDSON
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EASTERN AIR COMMAND WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

3 November 1944

Number 10

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
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Section
I

EASTERN AIR COMMAND
*SITUATION
REVIEW*



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ENEMY ACTIVITY

During the past week the enemy carried out four offensive night missions against widely separated Allied air installations in Burma and India. Operating from airfields in the Meiktila, Heho and Namsang areas, attacks were made against Myitkyina on the 27th, Cox's Bazar on the 28th, and the Fenny-Chittagong area on the 29th. Details are given in the Resume of Enemy Activity. To carry out these missions, the Japanese detached about eight or ten light bombers from a unit in training at Phnom Penh and moved them to the Namsang area. It is evident from the manner of execution of the second and third missions that the enemy was having trouble in locating his targets.

If these three missions are indicative of the degree of training that has been obtained in the enemy's light bomber unit, there is no doubt but that a good deal more training will be required before really successful attacks can be obtained.

EASTERN AIR COMMAND OPERATIONS

We have concentrated our operations during the past week upon both close support operations for ground troops and the more distant, but equally important attacks against the enemy's lines of communication. The arrival of enemy light bombers in Upper Burma during the week necessitated a revision of this program somewhat but in the main, our air forces have been engaged in supporting our ground force operations.

In the Northern Combat Area Command, P-47s of the 10th AF were busy bombing and strafing enemy strong points ahead of British troops advancing down the railway corridor.

More Bridges Down

As the week came to a close, the P-47s were extending their scope of operations by knocking out bridges and RR installations below Indaw and Wuntho. Bridge-busting B-25s of the 10th AF have again been active against bridges deep in enemy territory. Included in the number of bridges destroyed was the important road bridge at Hsenwi and the RR bridge at Wuntho.

Again this week, Spitfires and Hurri-bombers of 3rd TAF have given superlative support to our ground forces operating in the Kennedy Peak-Fort White area. Sorties flown averaged some 150 per day. In addition, night rhubarbs were carried out far behind enemy lines.

In addition to the direct support operations for our ground forces the following counter air force missions have been run:

1. Namsang airfield was attacked by P-38 escorted B-25s with hits running through the dispersal area.
2. Thunderbolts of the 3rd TAF attacked the airfield at Meiktila in daylight claiming heavy damage to an enemy aircraft discovered on the ground.

In Central Burma

Military areas at Pakokku and Monywa, the dumps at Taungup, and bridges in central Burma were attacked by B-25s while at night Beau-fighters have been active against railway and motor traffic south of Pyinmana.

In the Arakan our forces have performed the usual escort and support missions and in addition carried out interception patrols over our forward installations.

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Our strategic effort was characterized by widespread attacks on a variety of targets.

The Burma-Siam railway was attacked at Hnongpladuk; the barracks area at Vinh Yen was attacked; and the dumps area at Taungup was bombed with excellent results.

The greatest single feat performed by Eastern Air Command's aircraft was the mining of Penang Harbor on 27 October by RAF Liberators operating with the Strategic Air Force. This mission entailed a round trip flight of 3000 statute miles which is believed to be the longest mission ever completed by this type of aircraft.

Strategic Air Force closed the week by knocking out the Dara bridge (over the Nan River in central Siam) in a very successful mission carried out by RAF Liberators on 1 November 1944.

* * *

BURMA WEATHER FORECAST

For the week 2-9 Nov 1944

Northern Burma: (N. of 22°N): At about 12,000' broken high overcast through 6 November with cumulus forming during middle forenoon. Bases at 3000' increasing to about five tenths by noon with scattered showers. Some tops to 15,000'. Fine weather during last of the period. Morning valley fogs when sky clear or only broken clouds.

Southern Burma (S of 22°N): From Mandalay to Toungoo five tenths cirrus above 25,000' with patches of altostratus and altocumulus at 12,000' and four tenths daytime cumulus based at 3000' with tops at 8000' at beginning of the period with eight tenths cumulus on ridges either side of valley in the middle of the day with showers.

On and after 4 Nov generally good weather with three tenths daytime cumulus in valleys and five tenths on ridges.

Toungoo South, eight to ten tenths cirrostratus at 20,000' with extensive cumulonimbus build-ups during the day, particularly on ridges with conditions becoming fair to good in the last half of the period.

* * *

SCALE OF EAC AIR EFFORT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The following is a preliminary report based on official advices received by this Headquarters up to 0700, 1 November, and is subject to revision upon receipt of complete reports:

Aircraft Dispatched

Dates	26	27	28	29	30	31	1	Totals
Strategic	13	36	12	16	0	1	4	72
Tactical	453	240	386	184	336	292	291	2182
Photo Recce	9	17	33	10	16	13	10	108
Troop Carrier	377	413	417	270	335	304	93	2209
Combat Cargo								
Totals	852	706	848	480	687	610	398	4571

Troops Carried

Totals	800	1782	1687	1111	1284	1033	287	7984
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Tons Cargo Delivered

Totals	196	1163	1067	786	842	821	287	5893
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1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26



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RESUME OF DAILY AIR OPERATIONS

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- Based on early reports and consequently not necessarily complete in detail.

<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Activity</u>
		<u>26 October</u>
Strat AF	1&6	Liberators of the RAF and US AAF B-24s carried out a special recce and bombed Prome dump with poor results due to bad weather. One a/c bombed Akyab high school but results not reported.
10th AF	5	B-25s bombed Sedaw; bombs exploded in main under-pass, collapsing tunnel at one end.
	3,5	P-47s strafed Nawngkhio airfield barracks with excellent results. Namsang air strip was attacked with hits on hangarages, and damage was done to buildings and revetments at Onbauk airfield. They also demolished buildings in Naungsawn and in military area at Bhamo, left Mon Lon monastery smoking, bombed bivouac area at indaw and hit buildings near Pinwe and Naba RR stations. They further bombed and strafed troop concentrations in Mawhun area, knocked temporary bridge into river at Wanting, knocked out center of Pangkam by-pass bridge and damaged E approach of Hinlong by-pass bridge. The building area at Hante and Jap headquarters area at Nansiaung were bombed, destroying buildings. They also attacked troops in Khanleing and damaged Henu RR bridge with a near miss and attacked troop concentrations in Si In.
3rd TAF	5	B-25s bombed Pyinmana RR bridge No. 3 scoring one hit on center, bombed Kantha RR bridge No. 5 possibly damaging structure, and bombed Lewe RR bridge No. 4, hitting tracks to SW.
	2	Hurris bombed Insein and Jap positions in area and attacked Ingon. They also bombed and strafed Tanko and Thaungdara.
	3	Wellington bombed Namsa a/f in night attack with hits in dispersal area causing flashes.
	5	Beaufighters attacked Heho a/f observing strikes on stores, hit a small factory near Moulmingyon, strafed a loco at Anisakan and shot up MT and troops along roads and RRs.
		<u>27 October</u>
Strat AF	5,6	B-24s of the US AAF bombed Pakokku police barracks with fair to good results. RAF Liberators bombed Fort Dufferin with bursts S and E of moat; Shwebo a/f with bombs believed in dispersal areas; and Pegu, probably hitting RR station area. Liberators also mined Penang approaches.
10th AF	5,3	B-25s destroyed both ends of Lashio by-pass bridge and N portion of main road bridge. P-47s swept RR S of Mawlu setting box cars afire at Pinwe and Naba.
3rd TAF	5,2	B-25s bombed military area at Pakokku and Monywa starting fires.

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Resume of Daily Air Operations (cont'd)

27 October
3rd TAF 5,2 Hurris bombed and strafed Jap bunker positions in Kindat and Mawlaik areas scoring many hits.
Beaufighters covered RRs in Pyinmana area but observed no movement.

28 October
Strat 6 Liberators bombed Hnongpladuk with bursts straddling line W of RR station, scored one direct hit on E end of Nakon Chaisri RR bridge and bombed RR line near Ye and Banpong without observing results.
10th AF 4,3 B-25s destroyed E RR bridge at Hsenwi and knocked out 25 feet of the W bridge.
P-47s attacked troops and supply dumps in Sikkan area and troops and RR installations in Pinwe, Auktaw and Naba area causing explosions.
3rd TAF 5 B-25s bombed Namsang a/f hitting S half of dispersal area and bombed Kinlon a/f hitting five revetments without observing results.
2 Hurricanes and a Wellington bombed and strafed Shwegyin with good results. Hurris also attacked Jap positions in the Vital Corner, Mawlaik, Panma Taung, Fort White and Sabin area with many hits scored. Hurris destroyed two sections of E end and damaged center of Natkyigon bridge.
Mosquitos destroyed buildings and pens at Heho a/f and attacked Meiktila a/f with results unobserved.
6 Beaufighters patrolled Pyu to Pegu RR but found no targets and patrolled defensively in the Chittagong-Cox's Bazar area.

29 October
Strat AF 5 B-24s bombed Taungup stores area with excellent results. Liberators bombed RR at Vinh Yen barracks area and road bridge across Chau River with results unobserved due to clouds.
10th AF No operations reported.
3rd TAF 5 B-25s bombed Taungup Stores area scoring hits which caused fires and explosions.
2 Hurricanes bombed smoke indicated targets near Kennedy Peak, Sabin, Inthe, Gazet and Indaingale scoring many hits.
5 Beaufighters flew night defensive patrols and searched RR lines hitting and damaging two locos and trains near Ye-U and Sinthegon.

30 October
Straf AF Nil operations.

10th AF 3,5 B-25s destroyed S end of center bridge at Namhkai, destroyed RR bridge at Wuntho, destroyed S end RR bridge Nankan, destroyed N end RR bridge at Thegyaung, possibly destroyed W end RR bridge at Okkyin and damaged RR bridge at Zawchaung. They also bombed Shwegu a/f, starting fires in night sweep.
3 P-47s bombed RR bridge S of Kyauktalon hitting S approach, E end and center piers but missed RR bridge E of Tongsi. N and S spans of RR bridge at Bongyaung were knocked off concrete piers at river banks. They also bombed and strafed wooded areas thought to contain Japs near Mansi, Man Yut and Pinwe as directed by ground radio. RR bridge S of Naba received damage to tracks.

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Resume of Daily Air Operations (cont'd)

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30 October (cont'd)

- 3rd TAF 5 B-25s bombed Chaung-U town hitting S part, caused possible damage to E approach Mu River by-pass bridge and bombed Kyaukse RR bridge without noting results.
- 5 Thunderbolts strafed pens at Meiktila a/f badly damaging one enemy a/c and scored hits on an armored car and hangars.
- 2 Hurricanes bombed Jap positions in Sialum Vum area hitting smoke indicated targets and enemy camp and destroyed a bridge.
- 5 A Wellington bombed Meiktila a/f, hit road-runway intersection.
- 5,6 Beaufighters carried out night rhubarbs along RR S of Mandalay and to Prome and Taungup hitting two locos with trains, MT and boats.

31 October

- Strat AF Liberator* carried out special weather recce.
- 10th AF 3,5,6 P-47s bombed and strafed Nakang starting fires. They also bombed bridges destroying S span at Lenaung, knocked out N span at Nyaungwun, destroyed center span at Zawchaung and damaged approaches at Kudon. Loco sheds at Wuntho were destroyed.
- 3 B-25s on sweep on river and roads in Bhamo area attacked barges and Meza bridge with unobserved results.
- 3rd TAF 2 Hurris attacked smoke indicated targets and bombed Tonmakeng and Fort White. They further bombed Jap positions in the Dolluang and Kennedy Peak area with good hits.
- 5,3 Mosquitos attacked Mingin military billet with results unobserved. They also bombed Meiktila and Kangaung a/f with possible damage to runways and pens in night mission and bombed Myittha RR station.

1 November

- Strat AF 6 B-24s attacked Dara bridge.
- 10th AF 3,5 P-47s destroyed buildings and bashas in the Nankhawn, Indaw and Naba area, and bombed Kawng hka bridge. B-25s damaged bridge at Hswenwi, Namhkai, and Kawng hka.
- 3rd TAF 2 B-25s on armed weather recce bombed road from Kennedy Peak to Vital Corner causing explosions and later bombed Kennedy Peak area causing black smoke to 3000 feet.
- 2 Hurricanes continued to bomb and strafe Jap positions at Pyingaing, Kalembo, Kennedy Peak and Vital Corner with good results.
- 2 B-25s bombed Kennedy Peak area causing smoke to 3000'.
- 5 Wellington bombed Namsang a/f hitting runway.
- 5 Thunderbolts strafed pens at Meiktila and Thedaw a/fs and trucks N of Shwebo.
- 5 Beaus in night rhubarbs shot up MT and RS in the central Burma area and in vicinity of Chiengrai.
- 5 Mosquitos bombed a/fs covering pens and dispensal areas at Meiktila and in night rhubarbs shot up intersection on E side of Onbauk.

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COMMENTS ON ESTIMATE OF JAP AIR STRENGTH -- G-2 WASHINGTON, D. C.

(See Following Gatefold Chart)

This week, Washington shows a further decrease in the estimated total strength of the Japanese air force amounting to 206 aircraft. Over two weeks, the decrease has been 819. Thus, for the first time since the outbreak of the Pacific War, we are witnessing a wastage rate in excess of replacements.

The period has, however, been an exceptional one, covering massive carrier-borne air attacks on Formosa and the Philippines and Allied landings on Leyte. This loss is almost entirely in naval strength, for the army air force has actually increased its strength and from being very much the junior service, it is rapidly reaching parity with the naval arm, the greater part of which is now concentrated in defense of the homeland.

The defense of the Philippines and Formosa remains a naval commitment. That the utmost importance is attached by the Japanese navy to holding them, is borne out by the reinforcement of the former at the expense of Japan itself. It is estimated that there are more than twice the number of aircraft in the Philippines that were there last week, and the majority of these are floatplanes and fighters for systematic reconnaissance and defense.

Formosa has lost more aircraft than the Philippines have gained, but if one considers these two zones together, making allowance both for losses and reinforcements, the net decrease in the estimated number of aircraft from last week is only twenty-five.

Small increases in China and Manchuria, with small decreases throughout the Netherlands East Indies emphasizes the relative strategic importance attached to these two areas respectively.

Losses are fairly well spread over all types, but once more, naval light bombers have suffered most severely.

The only type of aircraft which shows an increase in numbers is the floatplane.

Abstract of Estimated Strength

Army and Navy

Japanese Army Air Force Strength	2369
Japanese Naval Air Force Strength	
Land Based	2318
Ship Based	97
Total	4784

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JAPANESE AIR ORDER OF BATTLE -- ~~SECRET~~ AT 26TH OCT.

FIRST LINE A/C	Zone 1A Kuriles, Karafuto Hokkaido			Zone 1B JAPAN			Zone 1C Marcus & Bonin Islands			Zone 2 Manchuria & Korea		
	ARMY	NAVY Ship Based Land Based		ARMY	NAVY Ship Based Land Based		ARMY	NAVY Ship Based Land Based		ARMY	NAVY Ship Based Land Based	
MEDIUM BOMBERS	12		12	62		196			4			
LIGHT BOMBERS						192			5			
S/E FIGHTERS	76		6	329		318			16	77		
T/E FIGHTERS				79						32		
RECONNAISSANCE				29		32				54		
TOTALS	88		18	499		738			25	163		
ANTI-SUB AND 2 ND LINE A/C												
MEDIUM BOMBERS	45			31		48						
LIGHT BOMBERS			13			267						
S/E FIGHTERS				192		225						
T/E FIGHTERS				32								
FLOAT PLANES			4			168			6			6
FLYING BOATS						48			2			
RECONNAISSANCE	87		9			9						9
TOTALS	132		26	255		765			8			15
TOTALS BY ZONE	220	0	44	754	0	1503	0	0	33	163	0	15
FIRST LINE A/C	Zone 3A China, Hainan, North Indo China			Zone 3B Formosa, Ryukyu Islands			Zone 4A Burma, Thailand, South Indo China			Zone 4B Malaya, Sumatra, Andamans		
	ARMY	NAVY Ship Based Land Based		ARMY	NAVY Ship Based Land Based		ARMY	NAVY Ship Based Land Based		ARMY	NAVY Ship Based Land Based	
MEDIUM BOMBERS	25					36						
LIGHT BOMBERS	52			25			35					
S/E FIGHTERS	218		12	28		85	104			209		
T/E FIGHTERS	9									50		
RECONNAISSANCE	27						20					
TOTALS	331		12	53		121	159			259		
ANTI-SUB AND 2 ND CLASS A/C												
MEDIUM BOMBERS				10		6				44		
LIGHT BOMBERS			10		12	7					12	15
S/E FIGHTERS				15								
T/E FIGHTERS				15								
FLOAT PLANES			24			62			20			17
FLYING BOATS			4			4						
RECONNAISSANCE	62			25		6				21		
TOTALS	62		38	65	12	85			20	65	12	32
TOTALS BY ZONE	393	0	50	118	12	206	159	0	20	324	12	32
FIRST LINE A/C	Zone 5A Philippines			Zone 5B Neth E Indies except Sumatra and New Guinea			Zone 6 New Guinea & Bismarks			Zone 7 Carolines & Marianas		
	ARMY	NAVY Ship Based Land Based		ARMY	NAVY Ship Based Land Based		ARMY	NAVY Ship Based Land Based		ARMY	NAVY Ship Based Land Based	
MEDIUM BOMBERS			53	8								
LIGHT BOMBERS			77	18								
S/E FIGHTERS	26		116	35		25						10
T/E FIGHTERS	21											
RECONNAISSANCE	7		16	12		8						
TOTALS	54		262	73		33						10
ANTI-SUB AND 2 ND CLASS A/C												
MEDIUM BOMBERS	7		4	54		4						
LIGHT BOMBERS												
S/E FIGHTERS												
T/E FIGHTERS												
FLOAT PLANES		73	33			43						13
FLYING BOATS			10			3						
RECONNAISSANCE	14			36								
TOTALS	21	73	47	90		50						13
TOTALS BY ZONE	75	73	309	163	0	83	0	0	0	0	0	23

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RESUME OF ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY

26 October - 1 November '44

Three nights in succession Lily light bombers, operating singly or in pairs, have made low-level attacks on our installations in North Burma and the Arakan. Targets actually attacked were the airfields at Myitkyina and Cox's Bazar and army positions at Rangamati and Ultakhali.

The end of October brings the end of the monsoon, and the end of the monsoon has previously been the signal for a recrudescence of enemy air activity. The night raids of 27-28 and 29 October may have an element of "face-saving" about them, but they may be forerunners of something more ambitious on the same lines.

Though carried through without loss, they cannot have been encouraging to the enemy. It appears that on each of the three occasions two aircraft were operating, but only one found a suitable target each night.

The 27 October, the "first night" was most successful. A single Lily came in low with its lights on and dropped its bombs in the dispersal at Myitkyina before any warning could be given.

Raids in Arakan Area

On 28/10, two Lilies approached Cox's Bazar simultaneously, one from the SE. One of these attacked the airfield while the other wandered about the Arakan and then dropped a container of fragmentation bombs, which did not explode, at Ultakhali.

On 29/10, one e/a was picked up by radar, 60 miles N of Chittagong and another 2 miles W of Fazilpur at 2117 hrs. flying N. Both plots faded 50 miles E of Fenny. Beaufighters were scrambled and may have added to the confusion of the enemy navigators.

The only attack made was on Rangamati, the chief village of the Chittagong hill tracts, but not a place of any great military significance.

Details of these attacks as well as particulars of sightings of enemy aircraft during the week are shown in the following day-to-day summary.

27 October One Tojo made a pass at Thunderbolts near Pinwe and then disappeared.

One Lily bombed Myitkyina airfield at 1845 hrs. It came in low with its lights on and was assumed to be a friendly transport. Three P-47s were damaged on the ground.

28 October One Lily made a low level bombing attack on Cox's Bazar airfield at 1913 hrs. and a second Lily dropped a container of "frag" bombs on army installations at Ultakhali five minutes later. From the confusion of the Lilies' tracks it seems likely that they were having difficulty in locating targets. Beaufighters were airborne and one was vectored on an e/a and chased it across the Kaladan, but did not make interception. At Cox's Bazar, one Spitfire was slightly damaged on the ground and three others superficially damaged. No damage was done at Ultakhali.

One s/e unidentified e/a was seen by a P.R. Lightning (F-5) at 22,000 ft. over Prome.

One s/e enemy aircraft was seen by Liberators at 11,000' over Mandalay at 2127 hrs. It was lost to view when the Liberators entered cloud.

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Resume of Enemy Air Activity(Continued):

29 October

One e/a, probably a Lily, bombed and strafed Rangamati in the Chittagong hill tracts, about 2115 hrs. It was one of two aircraft in the vicinity at about this time, both of which seemed to be searching unsuccessfully for some more worth-while target, probably Fenny or Chiringa. Beaufigh-
ters were vectored on one of the bogies. One of them caught a momentary glimpse of an enemy aircraft which dived steeply and disappeared. One civilian was killed, 6 I.O.Rs and one civilian injured by the e/a's machine gun fire at Rangamati.

Three s/e, enemy aircraft were seen by a P.R. Mosquito taking off from Mingaladon.

Eastern Air Command Claims and Losses

Claims --- By U.S.A.A.F. --- 1 fighter(Tojo) destroyed on ground.

By R.A.F. ----- 1 fighter damaged on ground.

Total for Week--- 1-0-1

Losses --- (Over enemy territory or as a result of enemy action).

27 October -- 1 B-25 of 490 Squadron flew into bomb blast and crashed near Lashio.

30 October -- 1 B-25 of 82 Squadron missing from attack on bridges in Mandalay area.

* * * * *

JAPANESE ARMY AIR FORCE STRENGTH IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

The estimated total of 465 available aircraft compares with the figure of 483 given last week. Of these 465 available, 409 may be regarded as first line strength with the balance as second line.

Half-hearted and ineffective attacks were made on three consecutive nights this week by Lily light bombers on Myitkyina, Cox's Bazar and Rangamati. Conforming to their usual practice, these bombers were brought up from rear bases to carry out a planned operation.

Twelve light bombers are therefore carried in Upper Burma though by the time this is in print, they will probably have again been withdrawn. Their return, possibly after a further period of training is almost a certainty.

The fighter strength in Burma remains fairly level around about 75 single-engine aircraft, Oscars, Tojos and Tonies. The majority of these are in the Rangoon area; but it would appear that there are still a few at Meiktila, where one was destroyed and another damaged during the week, and on the Salween.

Sumatra has still more aircraft based there than in all the rest of enemy-held South East Asia put together. The estimate of numbers there, has however been re-assessed at a lower figure.

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JAP OPERATIONAL ARMY AIR STRENGTH in SOUTH EAST ASIA

UPPER BURMA

22

10 ⁵/_E FIGHTERS
12 LIGHT BOMBERS

1 NOVEMBER 1944
TOTAL No. JAP. A/C

465

LOWER BURMA

84

64 ⁵/_E FIGHTERS
20 ⁷/_E RECCE

SIAM and
SOUTH INDO-CHINA

53

30 ⁵/_E FIGHTERS
23 LIGHT BOMBERS

MALAYA

52

32 ⁵/_E FIGHTERS
20 MED. BOMBERS

SUMATRA

254

168 ⁵/_E FIGHTERS
50 ⁷/_E FIGHTERS
24 MED. BOMBERS
2 ⁵/_E RECCE
10 ⁷/_E RECCE

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GROUND SITUATION IN BURMA

The outstanding news this week is the continued progress made by our offensive in northeast Burma. British troops in the railway corridor have now captured Mawlu, and Chinese troops have occupied Myothit on the Myitkyina-Bhamo road. The Chinese have also occupied "Broadway". On the Salween front this week has also been the start of a Chinese offensive against Lungling and Mangshih, on the Burma Road. In the Kabaw Valley our troops have overcome Japanese positions south of Yazagyo. There is no outstanding news from other areas.

Arakan. Activity on the main Arakan front has been limited to patrolling and artillery fire. A report that a Japanese force had crossed the Kalapanzin and established themselves on the western side of the river at Punkori was proved to be false.

West African forces in the Kaladan area have made further progress and a column was last reported to be in contact with a small Japanese force on the Palet Chaung, eight miles north of Paletwa.

Reports still tend to show that the Japanese are continuing to decrease their forces north of Akyab Island.

Tiddim Area. Our troops have occupied the very fiercely held Japanese position at Milestone 11 on the road from Tiddim to Kalembo, and are now in contact with another position at Milestone 12. Strong attacks have also been made on the enemy position on the Letha Range north of Vital Corner, all unfortunately without success. The Japanese have responded with vigorous counter-attacks, and it is estimated that they have 300 troops disposed in depth.

On the road, immediately south of Kennedy Peak, guerrilla platoons are operating against enemy troops and supply columns. In the Dolluang area, our troops have carried out extensive patrolling and have located defensive positions on the Dolluang-Kennedy Peak track as well as strongly held positions in the Lesam Mual area, two miles north of Dolluang.

Three highly successful ambushes have also been staged on the track which runs south from Dolluang to Pimpi. As was expected, it is now becoming apparent that Japanese resistance in the Chin Hills, which cover the western road into the important Kalembo area, is considerably stiffening, and all further advances are likely to mean hard fighting as the terrain of this country lends itself very much to defensive activities.

There has been little news this week from our forces which occupied Haka and Falam, but a patrol reported Hata, 17 miles ENE of Haka, clear of the enemy on 27 October.

Kabaw Valley. East African troops have overcome the enemy resistance six miles south of Yazagyo. These positions were fiercely held and the first attack only partially succeeded, but by the 30th we had succeeded in driving out all the enemy, who fled northeast.

In the hills further to the east, the Japanese had occupied PT 1161 which had previously been reported clear. Again here, our first attack only partly succeeded, and for three days our troops shared the hill with the Japanese, before we finally succeeded in driving them off. Our troops have also occupied Nyaungbin, in the hills nine miles SE of Yazagyo and on the track leading to Palusawa on the Chindwin.

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Ground Situation in Burma (Continued):

In the Mawlaik area, on the track leading from the Kabaw Valley, our patrols have penetrated to within nine miles west of Mawlaik without encountering any enemy. Further north at Mawku, some of the Japanese positions guarding the approaches to the village have been captured, but the enemy still tenaciously hangs on to his main defenses on Sadwin Cliffs, two and one-half miles to the NW. A column is attempting to by-pass these positions to the south.

Trans-Chindwin. Indications are that there is no enemy build-up west of the Zabyutaung range. There have been reports of Japanese in Sinlamaung salvaging an old dump, and it is also believed that there is a small number in the Kaungasi area. Patrols report normal village activity on the east bank of the Chindwin between Thaungdut and Paungbyin.

Railway Corridor. Our offensive here continues to make progress and the latest report is that British troops have occupied Mawlu and are in contact with enemy forces in the southern outskirts of town. The advance as far as Mawhun was made against very light opposition, but southwards from that town resistance began to stiffen and Mawlu itself was actually occupied in face of mortar, machine-gun and artillery fire. All reports, however, during the past month had indicated that the Japanese would put up a much more stubborn resistance, and it is very encouraging from our point of view that they have already yielded so much ground without offering the resistance generally expected of them.


Further east, 16 miles from Mohriyin the Chinese have occupied Broadway, the strip made and used by the last Wingate expedition.

Myitkyina-Bhamo Road. The Chinese have continued their advance down this road to Bhamo, and during the week have occupied Myothit, on the Taping River, against very slight Japanese resistance. Active patrolling in the area has so far failed to contact any enemy. This Chinese advance represents a very real threat to Bhamo, only 20 miles away. On this front, Japanese effective resistance was expected in the Myothit area but it failed to materialize.

Salween Front. The Chinese have also started an offensive in the Lungling and Mangshih areas. Initial gains have been made and Japanese strong points captured -- in both areas but no major advance has yet been made. The Chinese succeeded in ambushing a Japanese convoy six miles southwest of Mangshih, destroying six vehicles and one light tank as well as killing 30 Japanese.

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GROUND SITUATION IN BURMA



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Section
II



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OSCARS DROP AERIAL BOMBS ON B-24 MOULMEIN MISSION

22 October Preliminary Report from 356 Squadron (RAF)

Thirteen Liberators (B-24s) dropped bombs on Moulmein between 1159 and 1202 hours from 2000 feet to 2500 feet. Immediately after this attack two enemy aircraft; one Oscar and one Tojo, were sighted at two oclock, 2000 yards away and 500 feet above. One of these rolled off the top and dived through the first formation. (The Liberators were in two formations, 2000 yards apart - ahead and astern.) As it dived, enemy aircraft fired and hitting aircraft "D" inflicted slight damage to that machine's leading and trailing edges. Enemy aircraft leveled off at 1000 feet.

The second of these two enemy aircraft stood off at 2000 yards then disappeared in the direction of Rangoon, performing aerobatics as it went on it's way.

Two Oscars(Mk 11) were sighted 37 minutes after leaving the target area. Standing off, they remained in sight of the squadron for 35 minutes. At 1314 hours in position 1630 N 9500 E these two enemy aircraft split up and attacked simultaneously. The Liberators were now at 10,000 feet.

Attacking from ahead and above, one enemy aircraft dived and dropped what appeared to be aerial bombs which seemed to flutter down slowly in pairs. One bomb burst with a reddish yellow flash in front of and below the Oscar while it was still diving, but no damage was done to our aircraft.

The second Oscar came in level from astern. It closed to 250 yards but did not fire. Two rear gunners and one mid-upper gunner opened fire and tracer from aircraft "J" appeared to enter the Oscar's wings. Enemy aircraft broke away apparently undamaged.

* * *

22 October Preliminary Report from 7 Bombardment Group

Twenty-three B-24s after bombing Moulmein jetties at 1200 hours with 13 Liberators of 356 Squadron, were intercepted five minutes after leaving the target area by eight to twelve Oscars(Mk 1) with a single Nick and possibly Tony.

Enemy aircraft were reported as generally gray-silver in color with some painted black. They pressed attacks closely for 30 minutes, mainly from slightly above with several most straight down. One attacked from four oclock low and two enemy aircraft flew through the formation almost ramming one bomber. One enemy aircraft performed diversionary aerobatics while others attacked. The Nick remained out of range and did not attack.

The report states that one B-24 was last seen diving into cloud while being attacked by enemy aircraft.

In the attacks on the formation, three B-24s were slightly damaged.

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JAP T/E FIGHTER DROPS AERIAL BOMB ON TRUK STRIKE

Thirteen B-24s bombed N Moen Airfield, Truk, from 19,500 feet on 19 September 1944. A twin-engine Jap fighter attacked the formation and dropped a phosphorous aerial bomb. (7th AF Intelligence Summary No. 53, 7 October, 1944).

The attack was made at noon and was unescorted. One minute after "bombs away" our planes were intercepted by 3-4 Zekes and one possible Nick. One two-plane coordinated attack was made from one oclock high. Both of these planes dropped aerial bombs, after coming in from out of the sun. This attack was followed by five individual passes from between twelve and two oclock. These fighters also came in high and released three aerial bombs and made two shooting passes. The bombs hit low and wide.

One of our planes had a feathered engine and was subjected to two fairly aggressive attacks from five and eight oclock high. However, the formation protected this plane by slowing down and keeping him well covered.

The twin-engine fighter came in from the nose, high and out of the sun, and pressed his attack to 250 yards. He broke away to the right at two oclock, exposing the belly of the plane. A phosphorous bomb was dropped, bursting approximately 300 yards at three oclock. Although twin-engine fighters have been seen on many previous missions, this aerial bomb attack is the first reported from this type fighter. (Illustration 4).

ZEKES COORDINATE ON AERIAL BOMB ATTACK

Fifteen more B-24s hit the same target. (See story above). The attacks were coordinated so that after "bombs away" the two formations gave mutual support. Separate bomb runs split the AA defenses.

Interception of this second formation was started just before the bomb run. Three Zekes made a coordinated attack, two coming in trail from 11 oclock high and the third diving steeply from out of the sun. The first pass was a shooting pass, the second was an aerial bomb attack, and the third was an aerial bomb and shooting pass. The first fighter broke away at 500' rolling down toward 5 oclock. His trailing wingman also broke off the attack at 500 feet and pulled off toward 3 oclock low. The Zeke that dove out of the sun, reached a position about 600' in front of the formation but then pulled up and rolled into a spiral breakaway above the formation.


Both of the aerial bombs released in this coordinated attack were a new type. (Illustration B). One of the bombs was observed prior to bursting and was described 1½ feet in diameter, 6 feet long and spinning to the left as it fell. The burst was orange-red and shrapnel was thrown out which looked like tracers. Both bombs were accurate as to altitude. One burst to the left and one to the right of the formation. One burst was close enough to No. 2 plane in B-Flight for the blast to jar loose lighting fixtures in the cockpit.

All other passes were very unaggressive. The mission was notable since after leaving the target, all 27 planes offered mutual support instead of the two formations leaving separately. The 431st crew members expressed the opinion that this may have been responsible for the unusually unaggressive tactics on the part of the enemy pilots. No damage to our aircraft resulted from enemy fire.

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
T/E JAP FIGHTER DROPS AERIAL BOMB




TWIN ENGINE A/C CAME IN HIGH, ON THE NOSE, AND OUT OF THE SUN, DROPPED 1 AERIAL BOMB AND BROKE AWAY TO 2 O'CLOCK, HIGH

TRUK
19 SEPT.
1944

ZEKES DROP NEW TYPE AERIAL BOMB



ALTITUDE ACCURACY ENOUGH TO SEVERELY SHAKE UP ELECTRICAL FIXTURES OF No. 2 A/C "B" FLIGHT



FROM HQ. 7th A.F. INTELL. SUMMARY #53

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WHAT JAP PILOTS EXPECT OUR FIGHTERS TO DO

Captured on Saipan, the following document issued by Japanese Imperial Hq. Army Section as No.28 of its Battle Lessons Report series, dated 5 Feb.1944, reveals Jap aerial combat experience over eastern New Guinea and informs Jap pilots of lessons to be learned from these experiences.

The more important battle lessons learned in the New Guinea area and the more unusual features of enemy activity in that area are herein recorded (November 1943).

At times the enemy, with several picked planes, (pilots of superior skill in P-47s) has flown over our air bases and reaped the advantages of a surprise attack or has broken up one of our attacks in its initial stages.

When fighter strength permits this type of guerrilla warfare, an air army (KOKU GUN) should seize any opportunity for surprise attack afforded by climate, atmospheric conditions, time, place, etc. Attacks carried out by a few daring planes in stormy or cloudy weather, or at dawn or dusk, are believed to be most effective and will catch the enemy by surprise. It is especially advisable to aim at inertia arising from the daily routine and to employ speed and cleverness in the attack. Achievements of commonplace talents are small; it is therefore necessary to form several select groups in each force and prepare them for this work.

There is room for much study concerning selection of attack paths and combat altitudes. It is important that we plan, instruct, and train in detail how to lure enemy planes with superior high-altitude performance down to the level at which we want them, there to force combat on our terms.

The urgent necessity for long-distance, friendly-plane identification methods to reduce losses in personnel.

Fighter plane radios in good working order are absolutely vital, both for fighter unit commands in the air and for liaison among fighters, reconnaissance planes and bombers. We regret to admit the present situation is far from perfect.

When transmission of inter-plane or air-ground commands by radio is imperfect, proper display of fighting strength becomes difficult, even though our total strength be superior.

On numerous occasions the enemy has come over to attack one of our airfields only to realize that we were already prepared and advantageously situated; utilizing his inter-plane communications he has called off the attack and returned to his base.

We are in the position of being hopelessly inferior in plane strength to the enemy. Yet we must exhaust all communication methods and excel in seizing opportunities instantly while in the air.

The necessity for not allowing the enemy to take advantage of us, despite the great disparity in our respective strengths.

The enemy, relying on his superior numbers, conducts a search in force with a powerful first wave of fighters. These lure our fighters to one area of the sky, and after a light skirmish leave the battle zone. Because of our limited fighter strength, we intercept with our entire available strength and then land after the fight with the first wave.

The second enemy wave attacks 20 or 30 minutes later (being disposed to meet our air and ground conditions, as reported by the first wave). It catches our planes either landing or hastily taking off and climbing, and has them at a disadvantage.

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The enemy does not always leave a definite interval between the first and second waves. With his plane radar he can determine before attacking the approximate condition of our intercepting force. His bomber units, accompanied by a direct escort of fighters, watch for their opportunity, keeping clear of the aforementioned aerial combat, then they leisurely carry out their high altitude bombing without any interference. At times, the enemy will lure the entire strength of our fighter units into an engagement above the clouds. Then, other enemy planes will swoop down under the clouds to strafe and bomb leisurely at minimum altitude. Though they are our enemy we must admit their maneuvers are superb.

We should divide our air combat areas into upper and lower levels when there are clouds, and should dispose our forces accordingly, even though our fighter strength be small.

The necessity of bomber unit actions being performed with a minimum of direct escort fighters.

When we attack enemy positions with combined fighters and bombers, he lures our fighter units into air engagements before we can run in on our targets, separating them from our bomber units. The latter, forced to attack alone, are then met by the concentrated strength of the remaining enemy fighters. There have been times when considerable numbers of our light bombers were thus destroyed. Considerable precaution should be taken against such tactics.

In spite of the fact that enemy planes are equipped with precision bombsights capable of good bombing results at high altitudes, they frequently attack at very low altitudes for the sake of point-blank accuracy. Adequate reference on this point is furnished by the outstanding example of the attack on our shipping anchored at Wewak, on 1 September and by other similar examples which have occurred elsewhere.

The necessity for all the caution and resolve of a 'lion fighting a hare'.

The characteristics of the majority of the enemy's flight personnel are as mentioned previously. His wealth of planes is astonishing; and he is safe as long as he can produce the armament, armor and other self-protection and safety devices for his planes. The enemy always tries to keep strength of his superb joint fighter-bomber attacks as high as possible, arranging the large formations of planes in an impressive manner to give inexperienced flight personnel a feeling of security and of faith in certain victory. The inexperienced men carry out exclusively and mechanically those fundamental principles which they have been taught en masse. Not having the added ability to make on-the-spot decisions, they have rarely been noticed to deviate from their basic training principles: a beginner's strong point. For this reason, our pilots have carelessly made light of the enemy, only to be caught napping at times by these unskillful novices. We must be more vigilant here and adopt the caution and resolve of a 'lion fighting a hare' regardless of the size of the enemy forces.

With occasional exceptions, once the enemy has carried out the attack in a perfunctory manner, he considers his mission completed no matter what his adaptability, power of decision and individual efficiency. We should not flinch from the enemy's large formations, but should thoroughly exploit his weakness by skillful piloting, and a versatility and freedom of action backed with many elaborate flying tactics.

It is a fact that the enemy makes plentiful use of radar equipment, even on his planes. We certainly must not ignore the way in which the enemy makes use to such great extent of the caprices of electricity; on the other hand, we must not be overwhelmed by the superiority of his equipment. We should actively devise ways of disposing our strength, coming in for the attack, timing our attack, which will deceive the enemy's inanimate devices and prevent their functioning.

Night raids carried out by single or several planes remaining in the air over important enemy bases for long periods of time or patrolling frequently over shorter periods will wear the enemy out by making him maintain constant air alert. This procedure has been clearly shown by our own experience to produce considerable results with a comparatively small effort and is one we should adopt from time to time.

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Section
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OBJECTIVE FOLDER

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**TARGET CHART
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• ENEMY AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT

This week further evidence of Japanese constructional activity has become apparent on airfields.

Signs that the Japanese intend to further extend their facilities in the Meiktila Group are evident from the fact that an additional strip is being laid down at Kwetnge. The potentialities of this Group have always been considerable. Enclosed within a very small area of approximately 20 x 20 miles, there are no less than seven airfields, all of which, with the exception of Kyaunggon (still under construction) are serviceable, and most of which are capable of operating all known types of Japanese aircraft. The new strip at Kwetnge is situated approximately 1250 yds. east and parallel to the existing strip. Approximately 1400 x 150 yards have been cleared running northward from the taxi track and about one-third of it appears to have been rolled. Developments in the Meiktila area have recently been the subject of close attention. In addition to major developments, a great deal of work is being carried out on the construction of hangarettas and the number of aircraft shelters has also been increased. There is shelter accommodation available for approximately 430 aircraft on the seven airfields in this area. Recent photo cover, however, shows that the numbers of aircraft visible there has been negligible.

In the Magwe Group work continues on the new strip under construction south of the main strip at Wetthaik. Activities in this group seem to be directed to improving airfield serviceability, and Magwe and Maida Vale are now reported as being serviceable again. Work on the construction of hangarettas at Magwe, Magwe Satellite and Maida Vale is also being attended to.

Further details are now available of the new strip under construction at Namsang. It is situated approximately 3000 yds. N of the runway and within easy access of the extensive NE dispersal pattern. Construction is still in very early stages but indications are that the dimensions will be approximately 1200 x 120 yds. Two new aircraft shelters and five hangarettas have been added, bringing the totals to 67 and 20 respectively.

Photographic cover of airfields shows the following developments:

KAWLIN WEST

Since last cover (2/Sep/44) the runway appears to have been re-rolled and further reconditioning work around the unfilled craters at the N end appears to have been carried out.

KAWLIN EAST

The strip and taxi tracks have been re-rolled and the airfield now appears serviceable.

TAVOY SATELLITE

Construction of further shelters is in progress and the road leading into the strip from the NW is being widened and levelled to provide a new taxi track.

TAVOY

Progress has been made on the southern extension of the N/S runway and on the taxi tracks in the SW dispersal. Defensive trench systems NW and SW of the runway intersection have been extended.

TAVOY WEST

Some progress has been made with rolling of taxi tracks and construction of shelters. Levelling has taken place at the S end of the strip and a drainage trench on the W. side extended. New defensive trench systems are seen on the W and E sides of the strip.

PYINMANA 1

Rolling of the strip has taken place together with a slight extension of the strip at each end.

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Enemy Airfield Development (Continued):

TOUNGOO The main runway has been extended southwards by 280 yards.

YWATAUNG SOUTH Some levelling has been done at the east end of the E/W runway.

PEGU The E/W runway is unserviceable; surfacing continues on the N/S runway.

MUDON A second building has been built on the W edge of the E/W runway, and some tree felling has been done at the S end.

KUNLON The S end of Strip No. 1, and the N end of No. 2 appear to have been obstructed. Considerable rolling of taxi tracks has been accomplished and it appears that two new shelters are being constructed NW of the N end of No. 2 strip.

HANGSAT A new track has been cut through the trees slightly W of the E strip, there is also marked track activity just off this side.

LAMPANG Work continues on the E/W strip. Two short lengths of taxi tracks have been rolled from this strip in the SW dispersal area.

CHIENGMAI Surfacing continues on taxi tracks in the W dispersal.

SATAHIB EAST An extension of approximately 230 yds. has been made to the northern end of the strip where trees and scrub have been partially cleared. The earth strip appears serviceable.


SATAHIB SEAPIANE STATION The tarmac strip in front of the two northern hangars has been extended to the south hangar. Further constructional activity is noted in the area south of the slipways.

PAUNGDALE Work continues on aircraft shelters and in filling ditches across the strip.

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JAPS BUILD HANGARETTES AT HMAWBI AIRFIELD



Photos by 177 Sq. Beaufighters

From these photographs it is possible to see clearly the construction of the hangarettes which have recently been built around the Japanese airfields at Hmawbi. They consist of a light bamboo scaffolding structure open on one side and have a curved gable roof. The whole structure is covered with matting, rendering it impossible to see through the roof. It is possible to see inside six of the hangarettes through the open side and they are empty. Some of the structures have no blast wall protection around them.

Construction of these hangarettes has been noted at most of the principal airfields in the Burma area.

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JAPANESE LINES OF COMMUNICATION

BURMA RAILROADS

The attached notes, based on information received up to 31 October 1944, reveal:

1. The Rangoon-Mandalay line still remains broken at Sinthe and Myittha.
2. The Sagaing-Mawlu line is broken at Meza and just S of Mawlu.
3. The Myohaung-Lashio line may possibly be interrupted at Sedaw and Bawgyo.
4. The Ywataung-Ye-U line is temporarily interrupted at Alon.
5. The Pyinmana-Kyaukpadaung line is broken at Natmauk.
6. The Pegu-Ye line remains broken at Sittaung.
7. The Henzada-Bassein line is broken at Daga.

Rangoon-Mandalay RR

Tawgywe-In (over Kun Chaung) - A. 183 - Construction has progressed considerably on a new by-pass W of the bridge (21 Oct 1944).

Pyu - A. 203 - An approach road is under construction from the RR to the Pyu Chaung on the E of the bridge, possibly in preparation for a by-pass line (22 Oct 1944).

Swa - A. 306 - Bridge appears serviceable (21 Oct 1944).

Pyinmana - A. 393 - Attacked by B-25s on 26 Oct. Bomb bursts bracketed the two N spans and N approach with near miss to N abutment. Cover of 28 Oct revealed that the damage to the N abutment has been repaired.

The by-pass line which was seen to be probably damaged on 12 Oct was still broken by three craters on 26 Oct, though construction was continuing. Work on the by-pass bridge was noticed on 26 Oct but the new section had disappeared by 28 Oct.

Sinthe - A. 453 - Main bridge still unserviceable and no further progress on the by-pass line to the W of the main bridge (18 Oct 1944).

Samon - A. 683 - A by-pass is being constructed 100' W of the main bridge. No tracks are visible and construction of the bridge has not yet commenced (21 Oct 1944).

Myittha - A. 719 - The center span of the bridge which was damaged by B-25s on 12 October is not serviceable, but the bridge is being repaired (21 Oct 1944).

Kyaukse - A. 748 - This bridge was bombed by B-25s on 11 Oct when the second span from the N was claimed destroyed. Photographs on 20 and 21 October revealed the bridge to be serviceable. It was again bombed by B-25s on 30 October, with unobserved results.

Sagaing-Mawlu RR

Shwebo - B. 105 - Main bridge is serviceable. Little progress has been made in the construction of the by-pass line first reported on 8 Oct. (28 Oct 1944).

Myingatha - B. 116 - Main bridge is serviceable and the by-pass is still under construction (28 Oct 1944).

Pauktaw - B. 137 - Main bridge serviceable. By-pass loop for bridge to the W appears to have been completed but the bridge has not yet been completed (21 Oct 1944).

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Japanese Lines of Communication, Burma RRs
Sagaing-Mawlu RR (Continued):

Tantabin - B. 159 - Main bridge is serviceable but the by-pass bridge has not yet been completed. (26 Oct 1944).

Zawchaung - B. 281 - A new loop line and bridge was reported as being under construction on 24 Sept. Photography of 21 Oct revealed that the frame work of the by-pass bridge has disappeared.

Kodaungbo - B. 302 - This bridge was bombed by a B-25 on 8 Oct and photographs revealed that the S end had been hit and that the girders and cross frames of nearly half the length from the S end had been destroyed. In addition a line of track had been completely thrown out for a length of about 300 ft. The bridge was reported still unserviceable on 12 Oct. By 21 Oct the track damage appeared to have been repaired and the bridge to be serviceable, though some damage to the S end of the bridge was still apparent. Photographs of 22 Oct revealed this damage to have been repaired.

Kawlin - B. 323 - Attacked on 8 Oct by a B-25. The S half of the bridge was knocked into the river. A further attack on 12 Oct resulted in 120 ft. of track at the N approach being knocked out. The damage to the bridge was repaired and it appeared to be serviceable on 21 October.

Nankan - B. 372 - The bridge was bombed on 23 Sept and seen to be under repair on 2 October. Appeared to be serviceable on 21 October.

Bon Chaung - B. 403 - Attacked and claimed to be knocked out on 2 Oct, the bridge appears to be serviceable again on 15 October.

B. 405 - The S approach was hit and rendered unserviceable on 2 Oct but the bridge appeared to be serviceable on 15 Oct.

Meza - B. 408 - The bridge was attacked by B-25s on 17 October and photographs brought back showed it to be unserviceable.

Naba - B. 445 - Reported unserviceable on 15 Sept, this bridge was serviceable on 18 October.

Mawlu - B. 499 - P-47s claimed to have knocked out the S span and damaged several hundred feet of track to the S during an attack on 19 October.

Myohaung - Lashio RR

Sedaw - Reversing stations at the point were attacked by B-25s on 26 October when the pass-over tunnel was claimed damaged. (See illustration in EAC WIS No. 9).

Bawgyo - The bridge was bombed on 23 October by B-25s when one span was possibly thrown out of alignment.

Ywataung-Ye-U RR

Budalin - D 18 A - Bridge remains unserviceable (22 Oct 44). By-pass - this bridge was attacked on 10 Oct when the line was cut but no damage was effected to the bridge. Bombed again on 19 Oct by B-25s, photographs showed it to be probably impassable. A further attack was made on 19 Oct, but photographs revealed no damage and on that date it was probably serviceable.

Chantha - D 18 E - The bridge was attacked by B-25s on 20 Oct, but no claim was made. Photographs of 22 Oct revealed it to be serviceable.

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Japanese Lines of Communication, Burma RRs

Mu River - D 35 - Main bridge has been unserviceable since 20 August and still remains so (28 Oct). By-pass bridge. Since 23 Sept, when the bridge was rendered unserviceable by direct hits, much work has been put in by the Japs and it was reported serviceable again on 25 Oct. Further attacks were made on 30 Oct, and although damage to the E approach was claimed, no claim was made in respect of the bridge.

Chaungu - D 79 - Attacked by B-25s on 20 Oct, no damage to bridge was claimed, though the tracks at the N and S were damaged. Photographs of the 22 Oct showed the bridge to be serviceable, with damage to the N approach.

Alon - D 99 - B-25s attacked the bridge on 20 Oct and claimed to have knocked the center span out of alignment. This was confirmed by photographs of 22 Oct.

Thazi-Myingyan RR

Taungtha - E. 136 - Main bridge remains broke, but the by-pass is serviceable. (28 Oct 1944).

Pyinmana-Kaukpadaung RR

Lewe - G 4 - Bombed on 26 Oct by B-25s when probable damage to the embankment and tracks at the W approach was caused.

Kantha - G 5 - Bombed by B-25s on 26 Oct, but photographs brought back showed the bridge to be obscured by smoke and no statement as to damage was possible.

Kyaunggon - M.B. 10 - Bombed on 21 Oct, but no claim was made and photographs on 23 Oct showed the bridge to be still serviceable.

Natmauk - G 162 - B-25s attacked on 22 Oct and claimed two hits on one span. Photographs of 23 Oct showed the second span from the N to be down.

Pegu-Ye RR

Moulmein - Damage resulting from the attacks of 19-22 October was as follows:

Moulmein S Station - Station building destroyed and track damaged.

New RR jetty - Two large transit sheds destroyed and direct hits to tracks. Jetty unserviceable.

RR Goods jetty - N. transit shed destroyed, S transit shed extensively damaged and direct hits on tracks. Jetty probably serviceable.

Wagon Jetty - Direct hits on godowns E of jetty. Jetty unserviceable.

Henzada-Bassein RR

Daga - K 96 - This bridge was known to be badly damaged on 12 May with the three S spans down. Cover of 11 Oct showed that it is still unserviceable though a footbridge at a lower level appeared to span the gap. RR spurs were seen to be under constructions on both sides of the river. Further cover of 21 Oct showed the spur on the N bank of the river to be in use.

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RAIL LORRIES IN BURMA

In recent months photographs have revealed that the Japanese are using motor lorries, converted to run on rails, for light loads on the Burma-Siam Railway. . . The lorries have now made their first appearance on the Burma railways north of Moulmein.

On 5 October, 1944, 23 of these lorries were seen in the sidings at Martaban. On the same date, one and possibly four rail lorries were seen at Mokpalin.

The following day, 6 October, 1944, photographs revealed some change in the disposition of the lorries, at the same time four of them were seen on a pontoon ferry craft alongside the East Passenger Jetty at Martaban, one of the lorries actually moving off the pontoon on the jetty head.

Four further lorries were seen parked on a road just west of this jetty.

As some of the lorries were on rails in the sidings and others on the road, it is evident that they are capable of a dual function for either railway or road usage, made possible by a simple wheel conversion.

It seems probable that the lorries are being sent into Burma to enhance the position of the depleted number of locomotives in the country.

It is interesting to note that on the two days when the lorries were seen at Martaban, none were noted in the Moulmein area, although they had evidently been transshipped across the Salween from Moulmein.

The lorries at Martaban were 15 ft. to 16 ft. in length, approximately two ft. to three ft. shorter than those seen in use on the Burma-Siam Railway and judging by the shadows, of slightly different construction. They appear to be capable of hauling loads of three or four wagons, totalling about forty (40) tons.

Extracted from C.P.I.C., DIR "OW" 11 25/Oct/44

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"Burning Up" THE ROADS

TAC. R. P-40s FIRE JAP TRUCKS

These photos show what is happening to Jap trucks in the Bhamo area.

Major Angus Lytch and Lt. Grote of the 20th TAC Recon Sqdn a unit of the Photo Recce force, caught these trucks on the Bhamo-Namkan Road. They strafed all seven of the trucks, set them on fire, then photographed the results.

These photos were taken with oblique cameras set in the fuselage of P-40s.

Note the attempts to camouflage the trucks by draping branches of trees over the hoods.

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LETPADAN
IMPORTANT
R.R. STATION



LETPADAN RR STATION
(17°47'N 95°45'E)

Letpadan is situated on the Rangoon-Prome RR 77 miles from Rangoon and 84 miles from Prome. The RR to Tharraway branches off at this point. Interruption of the lines here will hinder the conveyance of supplies destined for the Arakan front by way of the Prome-Taungup road.

Including the through line, there are 13 sets of tracks in the station and Sidings area. Sixteen wagons can be accommodated at side loading ramps.

Overhead water tanks are situated at north and south ends of the station yard.

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ROAD: HSIPAW TO LOI-LEM

Maps:

1" 93 F/6 (1941), F/7 (1941), F/8 (1941).
93 G/5 (1942), G/10(1941), G/11(1941).
G/12(1941).
93 H/9 (1941).

$\frac{1}{2}$ " 93 G/NE(1942)

(No photo cover on 93 F/7, F/8, G/5, G/NE, and G/10)

Sorties:

EA/336	18/Aug/44	1/16,500
ND/227	14/Feb/43	1/17,000
EA/36	5/Mar/44	1/15,600
EA/278	13/May/44	1/17,200
BN/258	5/Apr/44	1/25,000
BN/111	23/Jan/44	1/18,400

Introduction:

Only four small parts of the road are covered by photographs these being Hsipaw, Lai-Hka, Nawngmong and Panglong, and Loi-Lem. They are covered on medium-scale, good photographs.

The road is 12' wide, metalled and fit for MT all the year round. No comment can be made relating to the surface and no statement can be made on the major part of the road not covered by photos.

Leaving Hsipaw, the road runs through densely wooded undulating country with a few places for dispersal, but passes through paddy cultivation about 10 miles from Hsipaw. At Lai-Hka, the country is open and undulating with some paddy, thus giving more opportunity for dispersal and deployment. The same applies to Nawngmong, Panglong and Loi-Lem.

93 F/G

1. 215127 Road leaves Hsipaw.

2. 220121 Bridge 490' x 13', over Nam Tu or Myitnge River 3 piers spaced 160', 150' and 180'.

Road follows river bank with wooded hills on right.

3. 223122 Possible small bridge or culvert concealed by trees.

4. 225128 Bridge about 50' x 12' over stream. Probably timber.

Level ground contained within bend of river is partly paddy, mainly scrub and trees.

5. 225128 Between these two points there are a number of small bridges or culverts. The road follows the Nam Tu River (on left) until it reaches the Nawngkaw Chaung which it follows until it crosses the chaung by the bridge at 286136.

Thickly wooded hill country on right, dispersal possible. Hsipaw race course 225136 and Hatsakawn 254149. Between 234142 and 241-142, road runs on ledge between steep slope and river bank.

6. 286136 Bridge 40' x 12', over Nawngkaw Chaung. (Note: Maps show this bridge running W to E. Actually it is on loop in chaung and runs approx. N to S.)

Road follows stream valley between thickly wooded hill country.

7. 286136 Between these points are a number of small bridges and culverts.
to
316137

Road leaves stream valley and crosses ridge, with trees and thick secondary growth.

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Road: Hsipaw to Loi-Lem(Continued):


8. 316137 Road forks right from main Lashio road.
9. 318136 Bridge 50' x 12', over small stream. Road embanked over paddy for approx. 1 mile, then runs into wooded, hilly country.
10. 329127 Small bridge or culvert obscured by trees.
11. 336114 to No photo cover for approximately 93 G/11 100 miles.
339867
12. 338863 Bridge 100' x 13' over tributary of the Nam Teng. Two spans with heavy center pier. Tung plantation on east side provides no cover.
13. 352816 Bridge 95' x 15', over tributary of the Nam Teng. Country open, undulating, with scrub on ridges, low ground appears liable to flooding. Road runs through Lai-Hka airfield.
14. 356794 Small bridge.
15. 358786 Small bridge or culvert obscured by trees.
16. 360774 Bridge 60' x 10', over Nam Pwi. Single span.
17. 362773 Road to Wan Hti branches east.
18. 362773 Road passes through Lai-Hka to 360764
19. 352757 Small bridge or culvert.
20. 351755 No photo cover for approx. 25 miles to 93 G/12 214475
21. 213468 Small bridge.
22. 211454 Bridge 80', over the Nam Pawn.
23. 209454 Culvert. Road passes through open, undulating country with some trees.
24. 93 H/9 207436 Bridge 100' (approx.) over stream.
25. 198427 Road passes through Panglong.
26. 196421 No photo cover for approx. 4 miles to 206369
27. 218363 Small bridge 25' x 10' over stream. Road descends from ridge into open cultivated ground.
28. 221358 Culvert.
29. 227352 Small bridge or culvert obscured by trees. (C.P.I.C. Dist "T" 166 4/Oct/44)
30. 234345 Road enters Loi-Lem

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HSIPAW-LOI-LEM ROAD


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REF - E.A.C./R.M./9 OCT./44
SOURCE: D.I.R. T-166

Prepared By-
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE E.A.C.

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HUTTED CAMPS AND STORES

The following descriptions and locations selected from recent P. I. reports show changes and developments of Jap hutted camps and stores and is not intended to be a complete review of hutted camps and stores for this theater.

VICINITY OF NANKAN RAILROAD STATION - Map Ref: 83 P/16 - SM618747 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D13-14.

A probable bivouac area (175 yds. x 400 yds.) is seen in heavy trees on west side of tracks, $6\frac{1}{4}$ miles northeast of Nankan Railroad Station

VICINITY OF NANKAN RAILROAD STATION - Map Ref: 83 P/16 - SM-606736 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D 14-15.

A probable underground stores entrance or shelter is seen in hill-side on west side of tracks, $3\frac{1}{4}$ miles ENE of Nankan Railroad Station.

NANKAN BRIDGE - Map Ref: 84 M/13 - SM588725 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D16-17.

A small stores area, 75 yds. in diameter, is located in trees on south side of tracks at west approach to bridge.

A second stores area, 150 yds. in diameter, is seen in the trees just north of tracks one mile west of the bridge at SM-573724.

NANKAN TOWN AND RAILROAD STATION - Map Ref: 84 M/13 - SM-556722 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D19-20.

A probable stores area, 250 yds. x 150 yds. in area, is seen in thick trees 950 yds. ESE of Station.

Probable underground shelters are seen in an area (40 yds. x 175 yds.) 350 yds. northeast of Station.

A large amount of timber is seen in an open area (130 yds. x 400 yds.) just west of Station and on south side of tracks.

Two camps and stores areas approximately 150 yds. in diameter, are located on both sides of road 600 yds. north of the station.

A brush covered basha is seen 1325 yds. north of the station in woods, 130 yds. east of north-south road.

A lean-to basha is seen 600 yds. WNW of Station and 230 yds. north of railroad tracks.

VICINITY OF NANKAN RAILROAD STATION - Map Ref: 84 M/13 - SM-625697 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D22-23.

A possible stores area extending 150 yds. along the edge of trees on south side of tracks is seen, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles southwest of Nankan Railroad Sta.

MYAUKYWA AND VICINITY - Map Ref: 84 M/13 - SM-470668 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D26-29.

A probable stores area and bivouac area (150 yds. x 400 yds.) is seen in wooded area 325 yds. ENE of center of town.

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Hutted Camps and Stores
Myaukywa and Vicinity (cont'd)

A probable camp and defended area is seen 1250 yds. north by east of town in wooded hills on either side of the railroad, each 600 yds. x 300 yds. in area. A number of bunkers are seen, and track activity suggests use of area as a camp.

A well used road extends alongside the railroad from the defended camp area to a point approximately 1500 yds. north by east of town where it turns east and extends through heavy woods to edge of cover. Approximately 1500 yds. southeast of the railroad, and 3200 yds. ENE of town is a small community and rice paddy area, with a recently cleared area, showing much activity. A well used road runs to the edge of the clearing, and a path leads to a footbridge with a camouflaged basha or hut nearby.

KAUKKWE - Map Ref: 84 M/9 - SM-378608 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D39-40.

Wooded hill area for a square mile north of Kaukkwe is active, suggestive of personnel or stores area.

KYIDAING - Map Ref: 84 M/9 - SM-346602 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D41-42.

A probable stores area (300 yds. x 1000 yds.), extends in a general northeast direction from Kyidaing in wooded low hills. A few bashas are visible under the trees. There is a machine gun position at east end of town.

GONNYINSHO - Map Ref: 84 M/12 - SM-352367 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D63-64.

There is a large timber storage area (approximately 500 yds. x 300 yds.) just northwest of town. This timber area is probably being used for construction and repair of railroad bridges to the northwest of Kyakat-Aing.

KO AUGBO - Map Ref: 84 M/10 - SM-338332 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D66-68.

Area immediately surrounding town shows much track activity and the monastery appears active.

One mile north of town on east side of railroad are two stores areas in woods, each 400 yds. in diameter, with track activity leading to a probable unloading point on the railroad.

PAUKSEINGON - Map Ref: 84 M/10 - SM-342213 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D78-79.

The town appears quite active and track activity, leading from town to the west to wooded areas across tracks, is quite heavy.

A stores area, 250 yds. in diameter, is seen in woods 400 yds. SSE of town.

Track activity running south of town and parallel to the railroad is quite heavy for approximately 1 1/2 miles. Small probable stores areas are located in woods in several places along this line.

HLEBWE - Map Ref: 84 M/11 - SM-333094 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D90-93.

Two hundred fifty yards east of town in woods is a small stores area, 200 yds. in diameter, with track activity leading west from this across the railroad to a larger probable stores or bivouac area (125 yds. x 500 yds.) located 1200 yds. WSW of town.

MEZALIGON AND VICINITY - Map Ref: 84 M/12 - SM-168017 - Photo No: 4MA 292 - D140-141.

The town appears quite active. 1200 yds. northeast of town, in an area 200 yds. in diameter, is a probable camp area. Three small huts and several possible tents are seen here. Track activity is very heavy for a distance of one half to 1 mile on either side of the railroad tracks, and the entire area appears to be a possible stores dispersed area.

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Hutted Camps and Stores (cont'd)

BODEGON AND VICINITY - Map Ref: 84 M/12 - SR-188554 - D146-148 - Photo No: 4MA 292.

A stores area, (100 yds. x 700 yds.) is seen in a wooded area 1700 yds. south of Bodegon. Just north of this, a number of bunkers are seen on top of a small hill 120 yds. in diameter.

YE-GYAN-O - Map Ref: 93 B/12 - LG-059716 - Photo No: 4MA 275 - RF5-6.

Town is partially cloud obscured but about 24 buildings have been destroyed. Sixteen of these were barracks type buildings.

NAWNG-ANG - Map Ref: 93 F/2 - ST-071042 - Photo No: 4MA 275 - RF45-46.

A probable stores area (approximately 65 yds. x 210 yds.) is located in the woods, west of road, approximately 490 yds. southwest of town.

WENGKAU - Map Ref: 93 F/6 - ST-219142 - Photo No: 4MA 275 - RF57-58

A probable stores are (approximately 50 yds. x 280 yds.) is located approximately 1500 yds. east of town at the intersection of trail from village and road. The stores area is on the south side of road in the woods.

SE-ENG RAIL STATION - Map Ref: 93 F/10 and 14 ST-446267 - Photo No: 4MA 275 - RF86-87.

(a) Large pile of open stores (approximately 120 ft. x 100 ft.) stacked in clearing about 40 yds. north of tracks and approximately 500 yds. WNW of reference point. No attempt has been made to hide or camouflage these stores.

(b) Small stores area consisting of two bashas with open stores directly behind them (to the north) is located just north of the track in the crook formed by the railroad, as it turns at the intersection of the stream. No attempt has been made to hide or camouflage these stores.

TONKWA - Map Ref: 93 A/14 - SN-773300 - Photo No: 4MA 311 - D2-3.

The town appears very active for its size. A possible stores area (350 yds. x 125 yds.) is located in the woods on both sides of the main road, 4 miles due south of town.

KANNI - Map Ref: 93 E - SN-8551 - Photo No: 4MA 311 - D18-19.

A possible camp and stores area (300 yds. x 240 yds.) is located approximately one mile SSE of town, on both sides of the main road.

The road crosses the Namkao Chaung by ford at SN-857481, 1200 yds. SE of Kanni.

MAN THA - Map Ref: 92 H/4 - SN-921804 - Photo No: 4MA 311 - 1D27-28.

Road bridge, approximately 130 feet long, at SN-921805 just north of town is serviceable.

There is a possible stores area, approximately 300 yds. in diameter just south of town. The pagoda in southern part of town, on north side of possible stores area, is possibly being used for stores.

To the west of town, approximately 400 yds. there is a timber stores area on south bank of Naunghu Chaung. It is approximately 150 yds. x 70 yds. in area.

To the southeast of town, approximately 1300 yds. there is a possible stores area, approximately 300 yds. in diameter.

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Hutted Camps and Stores (cont'd)

SHAN - Map Ref: 92 H/4 - SN-922814 - Photo No: 4MA 311 - D28-29.


The small road bridge at SN-922811 just south of town, is out; but the by-pass, approximately 50 yards to the west, is over land and is serviceable.

To the NNW of town approximately 300 yards, there is a possible stores area approximately 300 yds. in diameter.

To the NNE of town, approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, on the east side of road (print 1D31), there is a small possible stores area, approximately 170 yards in diameter.

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==== Road
 --- M.T. Tracks

A to G Hides for Launches shown

1. Probable stores area.
2. Camp.
3. Dump area; chiefly road on line of chaung N of road and S of road.
4. Monastery area - considerable activity.
5. Track activity by ferry crossing.
6. Dump area.
7. Probable stores area, two huts.
8. Two small dump areas.
9. Dump areas on both sides of road.
10. Dump area.
11. Dump area.
12. Small dump area.
13. Small dump area.
14. Activity - 8 small huts, 15 native huts.
15. Activity - 20 small huts.
16. Activity - 9 small huts also native huts.
17. Activity - 6 small huts and native huts.
18. Track activity.

C-P-C M⁰⁵ S-I-R N⁰X86
TAUNGUP
 DUMP AREAS
 (BURMA)
 Map sheets: -85 1/4 & 1/2
 1000 0 1000
 YARDS (approx)
 ND/814 (3-1-44) ND/893 (27-1-44) BN/80 (3-1-44)
 AC-SEA/2705/G

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Section
IV

WAR NEWS
From
**WORLD
BATTLEFRONTS**



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
BATTLE OF CHINA

--- BATTLE LINE OCT. 26

— BATTLE LINE NOV. 2

← POSSIBLE DIRECTION
OF JAP DRIVES

→ CHINESE DRIVE



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The Japanese have renewed their ground offensive in the Kweilin-Pinglo sector and in the Kweiping-Samkong area on the West River. These drives may be forerunners of a large-scale movement on the part of the Japanese to take Kweilin and Liuchow. 14th AF air action continues strong in both fighter and bomber activities.

Jap Columns Closing in on Kweilin

Ground Situation:

North China: Small scale guerrilla attacks and Japanese counter measures.

Central China: Two enemy columns, totalling 6000 troops, with artillery moved from Kaotien and Lingtien on 28 Oct. On 29 Oct. these two columns reached the north railway station at Kweilin. Another Jap column moved from Kwanyingko, recaptured Tahsu; then moved into the vicinity of Erhtong A/F where heavy fighting was in progress. The town of Kweilin was being shelled. Chinese estimate some 6000 Japs in the immediate vicinity of Kweilin and 3000-4000 on the E flank of the city. SW of Kweilin a serious threat is developing towards Pinglo. Two Jap columns, moving from Fuchwan, captured Tunganchu and Wangkiochu. Observers report that Japs were at Chungshan, 15 miles S of Fuchwan. The Chinese report having retaken the town of Sinning located NE of Kweilin.

South China: Japanese retook Menghu with 1000 troops on 29 Oct. Heavy fighting reported NE of Samkong with Jap forces endeavoring to drive west.

East China: Fighting in Wenchow and Foochow is continuing. Japs have cleared the banks of the Min River thus opening a water route from Foochow to the sea. Japanese are reported busy building coast defense positions at points they now control along the E coast of China. Reported enemy strength 4000 at Amoy and 15,000 on Quemoy Island. Roads in Wenchow area being repaired and airport under construction.

14th AF Activity: Tigers Hit Japs On Land and Sea

North China: On the Yellow River front, P-51s bombed airfields at Yuncheng and Anyi scoring hits, damaging runways and taxi strips. B-25s and P-40s bombed RR yards at Hsuechang.

Central China: P-40s attacked airfields, villages and compounds in the Pao-ching area and R/S between Siaokan and Sinyang with three locos destroyed, one probably destroyed. Radio station and barracks were strafed at Ichang.

South China: Shipping on the West River attacked by P-40s on 28 Oct. with 10 or more boats left burning. On the 27 Oct. P-40s attacked river shipping destroying many with ground fire. P-51s struck at targets in the Menghu area inflicting much damage on buildings and installations. P-51s covered NE French Indo-China destroying one steamboat, sinking two barges and damaging others.

South China Sea: Sea search missions were conducted in cooperation with the Philippines operations. Victoria Harbor at Hongkong was successfully mined by B-24s. A B-25 attack on enemy convoy 80 miles SE Hainan Island resulted in one transport sunk, one freighter sunk, one cargo ship probably sunk and one tanker damaged. Photo reconnaissance over Hongkong on 27 Oct. revealed 16 ships -- 51,000 tons.

XX Bomber Command

One B-29 on a photo mission on 26 October over Omura, sighted 100 enemy aircraft and shot down seven during 25 attacks, damaged two with no damage to the B-29.

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The War Against Japan (Continued):

Philippine Islands:

Leyte Under Allied Control

Ground Situation: Reports from MacArthur's Hq. on Leyte indicate that the island of Leyte is under Allied control with U. S. forces within eight miles of the west coast. U. S. troops also have captured two-thirds of the island of Samar. In the 10-day period since the first landings on Leyte, the Japs suffered 24,000 casualties on Samar and Leyte. Our losses during this same period were 706 killed, 270 missing, and 2000 wounded.

Naval Activity:

Japanese Navy Dealt Paralyzing Blow

Admiral Nimitz has stated that out of 60 enemy naval vessels involved in the battles off the Philippines, only two escaped without damage. The Japs suffered 24 first-line warships sunk, 13 vessels badly damaged, which were probably sunk and 21 vessels damaged. In addition Admiral Nimitz announced one heavy cruiser sunk and two heavy cruisers damaged. Our losses were six warships including the "Princeton".

The naval engagements with the enemy are shown on the Philippine Island map. At dawn on 21 October, a convoy of naval vessels was sighted heading north near Palawan. The same evening they were sighted passing south through Mindoro Strait, having been joined by other units from Manila Harbor. In the Sulu Sea they split into two Task Forces, one heading east through the Sibuyan Sea to the San Bernardino Straits. The other Task Force sailed east through the Mindanao Sea to Surigao Straits. A third enemy carrier force of 17 ships was sighted off Luzon heading south on 23 October.

When these two major enemy task forces were discovered heading east through the central Philippines torpedo planes and dive bombers of the Third Carrier Fleet were launched to attack both forces. The enemy force off Luzon was surprised on the morning of 24 October by units of the Third Fleet that steamed north during the night to meet them.

According to the latest report, elements of the Fifth Air Force have been brought forward and are operating from Leyte air bases. Far East air forces have now relieved Naval Air Carrier Force in the area.

Our PT boats are operating on the west coast of Leyte Island.

A report from Admiral Nimitz's Hq. stated that during the past two months, carrier-borne planes of the Third and Seventh Pacific Fleets have destroyed 2600 Japanese aircraft against a loss of 400 of ours.

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PHILIPPINE ISLANDS


REPORTS TO NOV 1
NAVAL

BOX SCORE

JAPS	ALLIED
24 SUNK	6 SUNK
13 SUNK or 5. DAMAGED	
21 MAJOR DAM.	

0 50 100 200

— ENEMY CONVOY ROUTE
 APPROXIMATE POSITION
 of ATTACKS
 ALLIED INVASION



(Reports to and including, 1 November, 1944)

Western Front

Battle for southwestern
Holland won.

Latest reports indicate that the battle for southwestern Holland has been won. . . . The Canadian First Army and the British Second Army inflicted a series of defeats on the Germans at every point of contact. The Germans south of the Maas attempted to flee across the river, using the Moerdijk bridge in their retreat. As a result of the German disasters in Holland, a forward movement was resumed 1 November. North of Tilburg, the British are less than 2000 yards from the Maas.

The present German retreat in southwestern Holland resulted from the capture of Bergen-op-Zoom, mightiest German stronghold in western Holland. That capture coupled with the fall of Tilsburg and Breda forced a breakdown in the German defense line.

British and Canadian troops, landed on South Beveland Island 26 October, controlled that island by 1 November and forced the Germans to retreat over the causeway to Walcheren, east of Beveland.

Field Marshal Model attempted a four-pronged counter-thrust against the east flank of General Dempsey's Dutch salient in the Nimwegen sector, in an effort to protect 60,000 Nazis fighting below the Maas who were threatened by the British push through western Holland.

There was very little activity in the Moselle Valley. The Paris-Toul railway is now being used to bring up supplies to the American Third Army front. Toul is 12 miles west of Nancy and connected with it by a good railroad.

Mediterranean Front

Eighth Army pushes north
across the Florence-Forli
highway at Locca San Casciano.
Germans evacuating Greece.

British troops of the Eighth Army advanced rapidly from their Cesena bridgehead and crossed the Bevano River. West of the Bevano, the town of Forlimpopoli was captured and the British established a broad front on the Ronco River. Patrols came within five miles of the important road junction town of Forli.

The main body of the Eighth Army crossed the Florence-Forli highway at Locca San Casciano, about 13 miles from Forli, and are pushing north. No exchange was made in positions near the Adriatic Coast.

American Fifth Army troops continued to make slow but methodical progress against unrelenting resistance southwest of Bologna. An attack was made by armored infantry, supported by tank fire, north of Marano on the Reno River, six miles southwest of the German strong point at Vergato, on the Pistoia-Bologna Road.

The Germans apparently have decided upon a complete withdrawal of troops from Greece because of the threat to the rear of the German position in the Balkans. The Nazi High Command stated that the decision came into being because "of betrayal by Rumania and Bulgaria". The Germans are desperately attempting to unite their retreating and separate forces in the Salonika area, but the Greek partisans and the British are cutting all lines of communication. The Germans, on abandoning Greece, lost all prospect of saving approximately 23,000 men caught in Crete, Rhodes, and other Aegean Islands.

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The War Against Germany (Continued)

Russian Front

Germans suffer crippling losses in huge counter-attacks against Russian lines in East Prussia. Russians ready for overwhelming surge onto the Hungarian plains.

In a series of vain counter-attacks against Russian lines in East Prussia, the Germans suffered heavy losses. Elite German grenadier regiments and battalions lost from 50 to 60 per cent of their men in the attacks. The battle, continuing in East Prussia, was waged with undiminished ferocity.

Desperate Nazi forces attempted a new technique of successive counter-attacks, each successive attack being greater in violence than the preceding attack, but all were in vain. On 27 October the Germans launched hourly counter-attacks, each with upwards of 70 tanks.

The German defense lines in East Prussia are sixty miles in depth, probably the most formidable defense lines in the world. The Germans have first, second, and third line fortifications, deeply embedded pill-boxes, line after line of trenches and anti-tank traps.

The Russians are attempting to exploit their penetration of the German lines near Stallupohnen. The main battle appears to be raging around Gumbinnen.

During the past week the Russians have struck at key points in the German defense system on a 1500-mile front across Europe. They now have three fronts from which to reach the heart of Germany:

- (1) East Prussia
- (2) The new front in arctic Norway
- (3) The front on the great central European plain.

The Red Army advanced deeper and deeper into Czechoslovakia and across northeastern Hungary. Main action appears to center along the Tisa River on a front of 40 to 50 miles, pivoting on the key town of Szolnok, 55 miles southwest of Budapest. An important capture was made by the Russians in Czechoslovakia, the downfall of the railway junction town of Csop.


Russian forces under General Petrov and Marshal Malinovsky united with some of their units below the Czech town of Uzhorod and the way is clear for an outflanking move on Budapest as well as a push into Slovakia.

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THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY

BATTLE LINE **Oct. 25** - - - - -

BATTLE LINE **Nov. 1** —————



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Section
V

JAP
ANTIAIRCRAFT
DEFENSES



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ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES

(To Include 29 October 1944)

AA Fire Encountered. As before, all enemy AA fire, of all types, is listed chronologically in the accompanying table. Accuracy of fire from light AA appears to be improving -- during the week, several planes received minor damage from this type of fire at minimum altitude.

No reports of railway flak cars, land mines, trip wires or other unusual devices were received.

Photo Cover. All revisions and changes are shown in the following tables, which includes new sites reported. Not much movement of equipment, other than light AA and machine guns was noticed.

Crew Reports. Of interest this week was the report of the B-24 crew men of 355 Squadron of the apparent use of AA rockets by the enemy. While over Pegu at 8000 feet on 27 October 1944, they noticed 12 rockets fired at them which were fairly accurate for deflection but inaccurate for altitude, the rockets bursting above them. They were observed to leave a white trail on the way up and they burst in a cloud of white smoke.

The following are new sites which will not appear in the status table as they are empty:

MANDALAY	10	LF588618 -- 5x13' LAA	Empty	25/10
ZIBYWTHAUNG	1	ST703944 -- 2x15'	Empty	25/10
HSIPAW	2	ST219122 -- 2x13' LAA	Empty	25/10
AKYAB	19	PR878549 -- 3x20' CP. 5x8 MG	Empty	27/10
MINGALADON	18	QL488513 -- 4x22'	Empty	27/10
KUNLON	2	LM499496 -- 2x10' LAA	Empty	27/10
MEIKTILA	18	LL272316 --		30/10
SHWEMYINDIN	13	Y0909559 --- 2x14'	Empty	30/10
TAUNGUP	6	Y0367935 -- 2x25'	Empty	30/10
TATKON	2	LQ668411 -- 3x14'	Empty	30/10

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Page 2 - Section IV

AA Fire Encountered -- Week Ending October 1944

Date	Time	Place	Type	Height	Accuracy	Intensity	Reported By	Remarks and Comments
23/10		GOKTEIK	HAA		inacc.	intense	83 Sq. B-25	Position 22°25'N 97° 26'E. Silenced
		NAMTU	LAA		inacc.	intense	83 Sq. B-25	
		NAMSAM	MG				83 Sq. B-25	
	1043	SHWEO	SA		inacc.		82 Sq. B-25	
	1050	HSIPAW RR Br. and ST2915	HAA & Gr.Fire	9000	acc. inacc.	15 rds.	83 Sq. B-25	Two planes hit. Appear to be 2 HAA at N end bridge and one HAA at S end br.
	1110	NAMHSIM (ST130055)	HAA				434 Sq. B-25	One gun near 3 small shacks 25 yds. W of stream.
	1330	SM8398 INDAW	SA	low			90 Sq. P-47	
	1805	PADAUNG (2 mi.N)	LAA	1000	acc.ht. defl.fair	moderate	4 Sq.	
	1835	MERGUT	LAA & MG	450	acc.	intense	159 Sq. B-24	
24/10	1835	MERGUT to KALWIN POINT	HAA	450	inacc.		159 Sq. B-24	Ground flash only
	1835	KALWIN POINT	LAA	450	acc.		159 Sq. B-24	
	1923	TAUNCUP	HAA & LAA	4500 7000	inacc.	moderate	159 Sq. B-24	One hole in plane.
	1112	MONYWA	HAA & LAA	5000	inacc.	moderate	81 Sq. B-25	LAA fire from Sites 1,2,4,& 5 and 2 others. HAA from W of rly,station.

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AA Fire Encountered -- Week Ending 29 October 1944

Date	Time	Place	Type	Height	Accuracy	Intensity	Reported BY	Remarks and Comments
24/10	1115	MONYWA	LAA	8900	inacc.	moderate	B-25	Fire from 5 positions: - 20mm or 40mm. Coordinate - PK5286, PK5287, PK515830, 4th & 5th on W bank of river.
	1120	MONYWA	LAA HAA		inacc.	moderate	43 Sq. B-25	
	1120	ALON	HAA		inacc.	meager	43 Sq. B-25	Possible gun site across river from Alon 22°05' N 95° 05' E
	1245	MEZA RR St. & Ferry	IMG SA		inacc.	meager	58,59,60 Sq. P-47	
	1245	GOKTEIK Viaduct	HAA		inacc.	5-6 bursts	58,59,60 Sq. P-47	1 a/c slightly damaged.
	1400	MAYMYO	SA		acc.		490 Sq. B-25	Hole in left aileron and hole in left engine nacelle.
	1610	PANTHA	LAA				146 Sq. P-47	Believed to be 20mm fire from center of town.
	1735	S. of SWA Sta. on road.	IMG	50	inacc.	meager	459 Sq.	
25/10	0920	HANTE	MG		inacc.	moderate	88 Sq. P-47	
	1030	S. of MINGEN	20mm				P-47	1 burst from town. Believed 20 mm
	1230	MYITTHA Br.	HAA	20000	inacc.	meager	459 Sq.	
	1415	SEDAW	MG	300	inacc.	moderate	490 Sq. B-25	Positions at south switchback.
	1415	ANISAKAN Airdrome	MG		inacc.	moderate	490 Sq. B-25	

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AA Fire Encountered -- Week Ending 29 October 1944

Date	Time	Place	Type	Height	Accuracy	Intensity	Reported By	Remarks and Comments
25/10	1210	MYITNGE SAGAING	HAA	14,000 14,500	acc.	meager	356 Sq.	Minor damage to 3 a/c.
	1515	MINGIN SQ0532	20mm				146 Sq. P-47	
26/10		MANSAM FALLS	LAA	50	inacc.	moderate	177 Sq. Beau	West side line.
		PYINMANA	LAA	3000	inacc.		459 Sq. P-38	
		YEWANGYANG	HAA	10,000	acc.	moderate	459 Sq. P-38	
		MEIKTILA A/F	LAA	3000	inacc.	meager	459 Sq. P-38	
		KANGAUNG	LAA	3000	inacc.	meager	459 Sq. P-38	
	1022	PROME	HAA&LAA	16,000	inacc.	meager	213 Gp. B-24	Fire from known positions.
	1105	LASHIO	MG & LAA	300	acc.	moderate	490 Sq. B-25	Positions strafed. Slight damage to one plane.
	1315	NAWNGHKIO	HAA	13,000	acc.	30 bursts	90 Sq. P-47	Black bursts, bracketed flight, two bursts within 50 yds. No damage. AA fire thought to be from position formerly reported at Gokteik viaduct.
	1425	SEDAY	SA	low	acc.	meager	490 Sq.	Hit in wing & fuselage wounding radio gunner.
	1717	NYAUNGU	LMG	50	inacc.		211 Sq. Beau	
	1721	ANISAKAN	LAA	50	acc.	intense	177 Sq. Beau	Plane hit in wing.
	1730	GOKTEIK	HAA&LAA	5000	acc.	moderate	177 Sq. Beau	
	1750	GWEGYO	LMG	50			211 Sq. Beau	Probably from E. side of town.

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
Date	Time	Place	Type	Height	Accuracy	Intensity	Reported By	Remarks and Comments
26/10	2108	NAMSA A/F	IMG	low	inacc.		42 Sq. Hurri.	From W bank position. Strafed and silenced.
	2330	HEHO A/F	40mm/MG	500	acc.		89 Sq. Beaus	N end of a/f.
27/10		MOMAUK	SA&IMG		inacc.	moderate	33 Gp P-47	Position strafed and silenced.
		NABA	"		"	"	"	
		INDAW	"		"	"	"	
		PINWE	"		"	"	"	
	2136	MANDALAY	HAA	11,500	acc.hgt. inacc.dir.	meager	355 Sq. B-24	
	2150	PEGU	Poss. LAA	8000			355 Sq. B-24	Flashes observed S of rly.station.
	2150	PEGU	Rocket	8000	inacc.	12 rockets fired	355 Sq. B-24	Rockets fired S of rly station. Burned white with white tail bursts. White flash of bursts above aircraft.
	2150	PEGU	HAA	8000	inacc.		355 Sq. B-24	3 HAA around bridge.
28/10	1125	HEHO A/F	HAA	13,800	acc.	30 bursts	82 Sq. B-25	Bursts believed from guns at a/f and east of a/f. Bursts occurred among formation.

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Date	Time	Place	Type	Height	Accuracy	Intensity	Reported By	Remarks and Comments
28/10	1140	HEHO	HAA	13,500	acc.	17 bursts	83 Sq. B-25	Positions 650 yds. NE of runway, intersection.
28/10	2330	BANPONG to BANGKOK RR	LAA	Varies	gen.inacc.		356 Sq. B-24	
28/10	2330	HEJOHNGPLADUK	LAA HAA	3000	acc. inacc.	meager	356 Sq. B-24	Position N of station, a/c damaged. Site No.1
28/10	2355	RAJBURI	HAA LAA	2500	inacc.	meager	356 Sq. B-24	
29/10		TAUNGUP	HAA LAA		inacc.	meager	493 Sq. B-24 9 Sq.	Minor damage to 1 a/c
29/10	0956 1003 1020	TAUNGUP " "	HAA LAA HAA	8100 500 8500	acc. acc. acc.ht.	5 bursts 40 bursts	434 Sq. B-25 82 Sq. B-25 81 Sq. B-25	Site No.4 Site No.4 Barrage fire in front of formation from 2 sites.
29/10		HSEHWI	LAA MG	300	inacc.	meager	490 Sq. B-25	
29/10	1910	YEDASHE	IMG	500	acc.ht.	moderate	177 Sq. Beau	Fire from 2 positions. One from train or railroad, and other from town of Tennant or Kalaywa.

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LEGEND.

- H.A.A. Fire.
- L.A.A. Fire.
- ⊗ M.G. Fire.
- × S.A. Fire.

A.A. FIRE ENCOUNTERED.
Week Ending 29th. Oct. 1944.

BURMA AND WESTERN THAILAND.

100 50 0 100 200 MILES.

FACTORS AFFECTING FLAK EFFECTIVENESS

In the EAC Weekly Intelligence Summary of 20 Oct 1944 the AA defense of the Rangoon and Mingaladon areas were analysed and certain conclusions derived therefrom. This week the same general procedure is followed using an analysis of the Bangkok defense to help explain some of the factors governing flak effectiveness.

It is the job of the Flak Analyst to detect and exploit "unbalances" in defenses. There are numerous causes for a gun defense being unbalanced, some are obvious while others are not so readily apparent. Among the more obvious causes are the irregular shape of defended areas, normal limitations of the availability of sites for fire units, restrictions on fields of fire and terrain. Other factors that must be considered are altitude of attack, length of bomb run, direction and velocity of wind over the target. These factors are discussed, using the analysis of the Bangkok area for illustration.




Figure 1. RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS VERSUS DIRECTION OF FLIGHT.
One Airplane, 75second Bombing Run at 250m.p.h.

SECRET.

27th October, 1944.

Figure 1 shows the effect on the Bangkok defenses of an increase in altitude of attack for all headings through 360 degrees. It is apparent that as altitude of attack increases, effectiveness of AA fire decreases rapidly. For example: on a heading of 330 degrees, an approach at 10,000 feet is

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approximately eight times as dangerous as an approach on the same course would be at 20,000 feet.

Altitude Decreases Effectiveness

Figure 2 shows that the rate of decrease in effectiveness depends not on altitude alone, but also on the length of the bombing run. Note that an altitude increase does not affect all parts of the defense equally. If the accompanying map of Bangkok is studied together with Figure 1, it will be seen that an increase in altitude of attack will affect the weak sectors of a defense more quickly than the strong sectors. In general, it may be stated that a defense whose effectiveness is only slightly unbalanced at medium altitude, is considerably more unbalanced when attacks are made at higher altitude. Since bombing accuracy decreases as altitude of attack increases, the altitude of attack must be selected with this fact in mind. Flak analysis will provide a useful comparison of the variation of the amount of damage with altitude.




Figure 2. ALTITUDE VERSUS FLAK EFFECTIVENESS. 27th Oct. 1944.
(Evasive action taken prior to and immediately after Bomb Run.)
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


Figure 3. FIRE EFFECTIVENESS VERSUS LENGTH OF BOMB RUN.
Conditions: One Plane - Altitude 10,000ft. - True Air Speed 250m.p.h.
SECRET. 27th October, 1944.

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For an AA battery, using fire control devices, to engage a hostile plane with any great hope of success, it is necessary for the aircraft to maintain rectilinear or predictable flight for a relatively long period of time. Predictable flight is the maintenance of more or less constant speed, altitude, and direction of flight.

Only then can a battery fire accurately at a hostile plane. For this reason the length of bomb run is an important factor in determining the effectiveness of a defense. Effect of length of bomb run variation is shown in Figures 2, 3 and 4.

Figure 3 shows the effect of an added thirty seconds of predictable flight against Bangkok for any heading around 360 degrees. For instance, at 30 degrees the AA defense will be approximately half again as effective against a 75 second bomb run as against a run of only 45 seconds. On a course of 180 degrees the difference is even more striking due to the fact that the longer bomb run gives the battery to the north, sited along the canal, a chance to fire while the plane is maintaining predictable flight. Figure 2 illustrates how rapidly a short bombing run, coupled with high altitude, will decrease the effectiveness of a gun defense.




Figure 4. EFFECT OF HEAD WIND. 27th. Oct. 1944.
Conditions: Altitude 10,000ft. - Single Plane - Course Heading 90°.
Wind from 90° - True Air Speed 250mph.
SECRET.

In general, the shortest possible bomb run consistent with good bombing results should always be employed.

Headwind Greatly Strengthens AA Defenses

While altitude and length of bomb run are both very important factors governing flak effectiveness, the speed and direction of the wind over the target should also be considered. Figure 4 shows the effect of headwind of 40 and 80 miles per hour on the Bangkok defenses. For this purpose it is assumed that the wind in all cases is blowing from 90 degrees. Study of Figure 3 will reveal that for a 75 second bomb run on heading of 90 degrees, an 80 mile per hour headwind doubles the strength of the AA defense; while for a 45 second bomb run on the same heading and bucking the same headwind, the AA defenses will be half again as strong as they would be with no wind at all. Wind, then, should be considered before bombing an objective.

The effect of a headwind is to decrease the speed of an airplane. This, in turn, moves the point of bomb release closer to the objective. Every defense is set up to bring under fire a plane approaching from any possible direction. However, due to range, terrain, and other difficulties, not all batteries will be able to fire on all courses. In other words, no plane may approach without being the object of fire from some of the defending batteries but on some headings there may be units that will not be able to engage due to the fact that the plane is out of range of those particular batteries. With the point of bomb release moved closer to the objective, the plane must necessarily move closer to the objective; hence be subjected to fire from batteries otherwise unable to engage. Furthermore, due to decreased ground speed, the airplane will take more time to pass over the defended area and thus be under fire for a longer period of time.

Tailwind Favors Attacking Planes

The effect of a tailwind is obviously the reverse of a headwind and the reverse of the points given above is true. Effectiveness decreases, bomb release point is farther away from the target, and the airplane is under fire for a shorter period of time.

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For these reasons it is important to utilize any available information about the wind to be met over a target during the planning phase of a mission. Definite information on the wind is seldom available in this theater; when it is, or when there is knowledge of prevailing winds over a target, such information should be used.

When Planning A Mission, Remember

Altitude, length of bomb run, and velocity and direction of wind over the target are all very important factors governing flak effectiveness. The higher the altitude, the less effective will be the flak encountered. This is true of any gun defense, but particularly true where the Japanese 75 mm gun is employed, because the effectiveness of this weapon drops off sharply above 10,000 feet.

The length of bomb run should be as short as possible since an increase in predictable flight greatly increases flak effectiveness. It is felt that every effort should be made to hold the bomb run under 60 seconds, if possible. Each second under 60 will pay off in reduced effectiveness of AA fire. Against a balanced defense the attack should be made downwind to reduce effectiveness.


Against gun batteries at or near the objective, a bomb run is approximately twice as dangerous when made against a 40 mile per hour wind as when made with the wind.

A thorough knowledge and proper exploitation of all these factors will combine to reduce damage from enemy flak.

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FLAK CLOCK

SHOWING RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF FLAK AGAINST DIRECTION OF FLIGHT. BANGKOK.



Conditions : Target - Makasan R.R. Workshops.

Altitude : 10,000 feet.

Length of Bomb Run : 45 seconds.

True Air Speed : 250 m.p.h.


Type of Bomb : 100 lb. G.P.

No Wind.

Formation : Single Airplane.

Evasive flight prior to Bomb run and after Bomb release.

Radius of B.R.L. 279 yds.



Conditions : Target - Makasan R.R. Workshops.

Altitude : 20,000 feet.

Length of Bomb Run : 45 seconds.

True Air Speed : 250 m.p.h.

Type of Bomb : 100 lb. G.P.

No Wind.

Formation : Single Airplane.


Evasive flight prior to Bomb run and after Bomb release.

Date : 27th. October. 1944.

Radius of B.R.L. 274 yds.

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- LEGEND.
- 75mm. 4 GUN BATTERY.
 - 1U 75mm. 3 GUN BATTERY.
 - 2U 75mm. 2 GUN BATTERY.

1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 YARDS.

SCALE = 1:100,000
27th. October. 1944.

HEAVY A.A. DEFENSES
OF THE
BANGKOK AREA.

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NEW PHOTOCOVER OF ENEMY AA DEFENSE SITES IN BURMA

To Include Cover Through 29 October 1944

The following are amendments to the table of status of AA sites from photocover published in EAC WIS No. 8, Section V, Pages 10 through 13, 20 October 1944.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Site No.</u>	<u>Grid Coordinates</u>	<u>Occupied By</u>	<u>Date of Cover</u>
Akyab	16	PR845555	No change	26/10
Anisakan A/F	7	LF930605	Empty	28/10
	8	LF949612	Empty	28/10
Chauk	1	PP111376	No change	27/10
Elephant Point	1	QQ713987	2 HAA	21/10
Gokteik	1	LB468090	No change	21/10
	6	LB462092	3 HAA	21/10
Heho A/F	4	LM351145	Empty	27/10
	6	LM351150	No change	28/10
	7	LM342158	Empty	27/10
	10	LM342173	4 HAA	27/10
	13	LM355116	1 MG	25/10
Hmawbi A/F	2	QL422778	Empty	22/10
	5	QL429787	Empty	22/10
	6	QL431756	Empty	29/10
Hsipaw	1	ST218121	LAA	23/10
	3	ST222124	1 LAA	23/10
Kalaywa L/G	1	LV825156	Derelict	28/10
Kuhlon No.2 L/G	1	LM495500	Empty	25/10
Magwe A/F	15	PU208495	No change	28/10
Mandalay	2	LF588630	No change	28/10
Martaban	2	QN218027	No change	24/10
	3	QN219027	No change	24/10
	5	QN221025	No change	24/10
Meiktila A/F	11	LL306340	No change	27/10
	16	LL284388	HAA Poss Dummy	26/10
	17	LL285390	HAA	26/10
Mingaladon A/F	10	QL491494	No change	26/10
	11	QL506496	No change	29/10
	13	QL494533	No change	26/10
Monywa	2	PK524850	No change	22/10
Moulmein	2	QS242944	2 HAA	24/10
	3	QS229996	No change	24/10
	4	QS228989	No change	24/10
Myohaung L/G	1	PN300026	Derelict	20/10
Namsang A/F	7	LN416296	7 MG	25/10
	8	LN492325	6 MG	25/10
Pangkham Bridge	1	ST319187	No change	23/10
Prome	4	UE500847	4 HAA	27/10
Pyinmana	1	LV657942	Empty	26/10
Rangoon	6B	QL518367	6 HAA, 2 LAA	29/10
	10	QL529339	2 HAA	26/10
	24	QL484379	No change	29/10
	27	QL527341	No change	26/10
	30	QL583433	No change	27/10
	43	QL544386	No change	27/10
	46	QL528338	No change	26/10
Rangoon River	3	QL569299	2 HAA	28/10
	4	QL622200	No change	26/10
Sagaing	1	LF463545	No change	25/10
	5	LF464553	2 HAA or 2 LAA	25/10

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Enemy AA Defense Sites - Burma (cont'd)

<u>Location</u>	<u>Site No.</u>	<u>Grid Coordinates</u>	<u>Occupied by</u>	<u>Date of Cover</u>
Shwebo A/r	2	SR430009	No change	28/10
	3	SR434602	No change	28/10
Sittang Bridge	2	QG383158	No change	28/10
	3	QG382158	No change	24/10
Taungup	4	UD375945	No change	21/10
	5	UD386939	No change	21/10
Tavoy A/r	2	PO165602	2 HAA	22/10
Yenangyaung	1	PU188832	No change	27/10
Zayatkwinn A/r	5	QL733778	Prob Occup MG	19/10
	6	QL736791	Prob Empty	19/10
	7	QL744780	Empty	19/10
	8	QL746791	No change	19/10
Laem Fa Pha	1	LQ963889	3 HAA Poss Occup	28/10
Sattahib	1	LW360777	No change	26/10
	3	LW284793	3 Coast Defense Guns	26/10

* * *

STATUS OF JAP AA SEARCHLIGHT SITES

Heho A/r	SL3	LM317120	Empty	23/10
	SL5	LM341189	Prob Empty	25/10
Mingaladon A/r	SL1	QL488507	Empty	29/10
	SL2	QL494526	No change	25/10
	SL5	QL514588	No change	25/10
	SL7	QL498486	Derelict	29/10
	SL14	QL482549	No change	25/10
	SL16	QL505492	No change	29/10
	SL17	QL449509	Empty	26/10
	SL18	QL454494	Occupied	26/10
Rangoon	SL1	QL548354	No change	29/10
	SL5	QL530372	No change	28/10
	SL10	QL524339	No change	26/10
	SL12	QL488388	No change	29/10
	SL14	QL571345	No change	29/10
	SL17	QL555393	No change	29/10
	SL20	QL479464	Empty	26/10
	SL24	QL470478	Occupied	26/10

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EARLY LESSONS IN SUPPLY DROPPING
ARE EFFECTIVE DOCTRINE TODAY

Troop Carrier/Air Supply Dropping

Without air supply dropping, Gen. Stilwell's invasion of N. Burma would have been impossible. While the Ledo Road has been successful in providing a line of communication, still for the speedy delivery of vital war materials the C-47 has been the only satisfactory answer. All advance units and friendly native workers are supplied by air. The following article presents a very lucid picture of air supply problems and the steps taken to overcome them.

Special Techniques Developed under Extreme Difficulties

The units now doing this work had to develop their technique by the old "trial and error" method, as there was no previous combat experience in this work especially under the North Burma conditions of terrain and weather. With mechanical regularity, a heavy schedule of air supply drops has been carried out - some by parachute (400'), other items by "kicking" from 200'. The standard procedure is to locate the target either by pre-arranged smoke, panel, or other type signal. The pilot circles to left once to get the lay of the land and size up the target; then from about 200', at approximately 100 mph, he flies over the target; the co-pilot gives an arm signal to the three kickers who kick out the load stacked in the doorway. Repeated circle passes are made until the full load has been delivered. When parachutes are dropped, (400') the pilot lifts the aircraft tail upon release to insure against shroud lines catching on the tail surfaces; otherwise the main technique is entirely dependent upon the pilot's individual ability to pick the target and time his release so that he hits the target. Because of the slight dip at the dropping point, the pilot dives slightly on the target, levels off just before the release, and then kicks the tail up (nose down) to clear the tail from cargo drop. With a standard load of 7000 lbs, anywhere from seven to twenty-five passes are made to complete the drop. The whole operation requires highest type of coordination between pilot and "kickers" - once the signal is given to unload, the kickers must respond immediately or the drop is sprayed all over the countryside.

Precautionary Measures Taken

On parachute drops the static lines are between 15' and 20' long - this to insure safety factor in delayed action chutes. There have been occasions where the prop wash has effected premature chute openings which foul up the leading edge of the port tail surfaces. Another precautionary measure is not to stack the "kick" cargo too high, otherwise full clearance is impossible. Rollers to bring cargo from forward to stern of ship have not proved satisfactory because of turbulence and rough air continually encountered in North Burma operations.

Multiple Chutes Used

A few items of general interest on air supply dropping follows: the only commodities dropped free (without chute) are rice, salt, sugar, flour, dahl (animal ration) - all the rest is dropped by parachute. The British 18' chutes can carry a maximum of 140 lbs, while the 24' American chute safely carries 220 lbs. The heaviest item dropped has been the 75 mm pack howitzer (2000 lbs.) on which ten American chutes are used (1200 lbs. is the heaviest single item of this unit). One of these weapons was ordered at 1630, and at 0230 the following morning, 185 miles away, it was in position firing and frustrating an intended Jap advance.

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Troop Carrier/Air Supply Dropping (cont'd)

It normally requires 14,000 American chutes for eight weeks operation (50,000 British). One hundred fifty packers can perform base air dropping requirements for one standard regiment. Less than one half of one percent chute failures have been experienced; fifty percent of these "failure drops" are salvageable. American 24' chutes, but not British, can be repacked and efficiently reused. British repacked chutes have approximately forty percent failures on second drop. Six DC-3s covering a 200 mile radius can drop 30,000 lbs. a day. Where aircraft landing is possible, a 7000 lb. load is carried - 2000 lbs. is dropped before the plane lands.

Anticipation of Needs and Coordination Necessary

From the quartermaster's point of view, the secret of success in air supply dropping is a thorough knowledge of exactly what the troops took into the brush so that when communications are garbled or completely fouled up a steady supply of required items can be maintained. The most complete type of cooperation and coordination between S-3 and S-4 is necessary. The ideal which has been attained in the offense at Myitkyina is to keep up daily requirements, never leave a dump, and always maintain close touch with base so that every opportunity to anticipate needs may be met.

From the pilot's viewpoint, the target must be ready and prepared for the drop and his kickers must respond immediately to the unload signal. Whenever possible, radio communication assists tremendously in the accurate placement of drops (pin-pointed supply dumps were hit in some cases). Pre-determined panels and smoke signals must be prepared to authenticate troop location in case enemy is in the immediate dropping area - this of course when R/T is impossible.

Preliminary Preparation Saves Valuable Time

In summary, the air supply situation is a most efficient and effective operation. Numerous innovations and improvisations have been made, all producing greater operating results; for example, at base quartermaster packing warehouse individual kits are assembled providing the exact requirements of K rations, cigarettes, Halazone, etc., for one man's use during a 24 or 48-hour period.

This saves unpacking, sorting and assembling the kit on the ground and makes the pack immediately ready for individual issue. Other operating "rules of thumb" from "Supply Drovers Guide Book" follow: ten 50 lb. bags is usual free drop per pass. One kicker lying on his back uses his feet to push while other two standing on either side of doorway push the top of the pile. Three parapacks or two bamboo containers are standard paradrops. Kickers must work fast to prepare succeeding drops to shorten TOT subject to enemy attack. The standard complete drop load is 6000 lbs. equal to about 1000 American rations; the C-47 cubical capacity limits the parapack load to about fifty parapacks, or 45 bamboo crates. Extreme care and thoughtful planning in the loading of the aircraft is necessary for safe delivery; fragile goods are loaded first and dropped last. The dropping area must be cleared to prevent breakage from succeeding drops. Ammunition is best dropped protected by parapacks or bamboo crates. Average dropping area size is 150 x 50 yards.

Most supply dropping transports fly individually unescorted through the enemy's operating area. When escort is given, the fighters are used to beat down ground fire if no interception is made.

From: JICA Report 442 dated 7 July 1944.

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HOW TROOP CARRIER AIRCRAFT SUPPLY JUNGLE FIGHTERS

While a dropping mission is being planned, supplies are prepared. Building of woven bamboo containers in which supplies are packed is step No. 1. Here native workers, with bamboo and burlap construct sturdy dropping baskets.



ALL PHOTOS BY PHOTO RECCE FORCE




Finished baskets are filled with great variety of supplies, ranging from blood plasma to Christmas gifts. Articles are cushioned in baskets by layers of spongy rice husks. In one of the packing sheds, men of 1st Btry, 518 QM Truck Reg, attach cargo chutes to fully packed baskets.

Requests for fragile items, as this radio transmitter, do not faze the men of Co A 478 QM Truck Reg. Their job is to pack all such special items. Cotton waste packing around each tube, plenty of rice husk cushioning, and two chutes will get the set down without a broken part.




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
Loaded C-47s depart in formation; will soon separate and go to different targets. Some-

times they fly formation to single target; drop while circling target in line astern.



Troops on the move may clear an area only 30 feet wide. Solid jungle makes locating tar-

get a tough job. Planes fly at tree-top level, locate target, make precision droppings.



With signal panels ground troops can signal needs, also plans to move dropping grounds.

Recognition and counter-signs are important to prevent dropping supplies in Jap hands.

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Small baskets can be released 2 or 3 at once. Plane has made several passes; aim was good as shown by chutes near panels.




More chutes in the target. Men at right are seen carrying baskets up the trail from the dropping grounds to main camp.

PRECISION SUPPLY DROPPING

2nd. TROOP CARRIER SQ. "ON TARGET"
WITH SUPPLIES FOR FORWARD TROOPS




Only one chute opened fully, but with the carefully cushioned packing given to each article, little or no damage will result.



The load floats down exactly on the target. Basket will be within a few feet of signal panels in lower left hand corner.

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Japs lined this target on three sides. Carrier planes circled low over enemy positions while making drops; several got well peppered by ground fire. Most planes carried hand

grenades and mortar shells, urgently needed by besieged troops. Parachute pattern shows accurate dropping near trenches made imperative by deadly enemy fire on retrievers.




Dropping finished, ground troops rush out to retrieve supplies. This particular shipment was 75mm cannon in nine baskets. Troops will soon have gun assembled, all ready for action.


CAMERAS IN 7th BOMB GROUP B-24s SHOW STRIKE ON MOULMEIN JETTIES



493 SQ. A/C #40



9th SQ. A/C #29



492 SQ. A/C #91

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The following is a consolidation of reports from officers of the "Galahad" force and Liaison Officers with the Chinese units on Air Support, Fire Bombs and Depth Charges.

Quality of Close Support Operations

It was found ineffective to brief pilots in the air on targets closer than 500 yards to friendly troops. Many attempts were made to do this but several times our own troops were bombed.

By briefing pilots on the ground, sufficient accuracy was achieved to enable dive-bombers to attack targets within 100 yards of friendly troops. In one case the target was successfully attacked within 35 yards of our troops. Close coordination was essential and every effort was made to have ground officers pinpoint targets on single verticals, and describe the targets as accurately as possible. No attempt was made by ground sources to prescribe bomb type. Direction of attack and time of attack were given by ground units.

Types of Bombs in Close Support

Demolition bombs used were largely 250 and 500 lb bombs, together with a number of 100 lb bombs. Results as indicated on the following tables were the general agreement of ground officers.

Target	Observed Result 100 lb bomb		Observed Result 250 lb bomb		Observed Result 500 lb bomb	
	Direct Hit	Near miss	Direct Hit	Near Miss	Direct Hit	Near Miss
Pillbox and Trench System	Demolished	Slight damage	Demolished	Severe Damage	Demolished	Destroyed by caving in, burying occupants
Reinforced dugout	Slight damage	No effect	Destroyed	Moderate Damage. Best when fuse is delayed 8 seconds.	Demolished	Destroyed by caving in.
Under-ground storage	Very slight damage	None	Destroyed	Severe damage	Demolished	Destroyed
Pukka Bldgs	Damaged not destroyed	No effect	Destroyed	Damaged	Demolished	Severe damage
Bashas	Demolished	Very slight	Completely demolished	Severe damage	Demolished	Demolished
Rail-way Boxcars	None observed	None observed	Part of car severely damaged, most effective	Slight damage	Wood & partial steel complete destruction	Severe damage
					Steel cars overturned, exposing emplacements.	

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Ground-Force Analyzes Results at Myitkyina (cont'd)

Targets were pinpointed, in many instances, on a certain house, and fighter bombers based at Myitkyina dropped their bombs directly through the roof not only destroying the house and emplacement underneath, but also killing and burying the enemy occupying it. Needless to say, the closer the hit the more damage done. The accuracy of the fighter bombers based at Myitkyina would be difficult to improve upon.

Fire Bombing

Fire bombing was used in the later days of the action. Opinion differs as to its effectiveness. These are the general conclusions:

a. Very effective against all wooden buildings. Many such buildings were burned either killing or forcing out all occupants.

b. No so effective against partial wood and brick buildings. Many tanks were found in this type structure with moderate burning on one side, but few of these actually burned to the ground. Few were found that failed to ignite.

c. Ground troops like them for the psychological effect caused (i.e. results noted. Japs forced out of these positions, weakening their line of defense).

d. It must be remembered that little short of a direct hit on the target will do much damage to the emplacements.

Depth Charges

During the campaign a number of 350 lb depth charges were used against suspected and reported concentrations of enemy troops. These were known to completely dismantle houses within the target areas, and it is agreed by the ground troops that many casualties were inflicted and great damage was done to enemy morale.

Depth charges would be most effective against concentrations of personnel caught in an area by surprise. Actual ground examination of the effect of these bombs is most difficult because of the combination of fires of mortars, artillery, and other aerial bombs.

Medium Bombardment

It was found impossible to use B-25 aircraft closer than 500 yards without inflicting casualties on friendly troops. Again it was found advisable to brief squadron leaders on the field prior to missions within 500 yards of friendly troops. In general, B-25 aircraft were used on area targets well away from front line troops. Suitable targets were supply points, bivouac areas, and troop concentration points.

Opinion on Our Bombing from Prisoners and Refugees

Opinions vary among them and most of them cannot tell the difference between the size of bombs. However, it is generally agreed that the 250 and 500 lb bombs, with delayed action fuses, do tremendous damage to enemy emplacements. Reports have told how near misses by these bombs caved in the emplacements, burying the occupants. This verifies reports from our own ground officers.

Prisoners and civilians have a distinct dread of the fire bombs. Many have been found very severely burned by these bombs.

In regard to death charges, the report many casualties from concussion.

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George T. Laughlin,
Lt. Col. Infantry,
AC of S, G-3."

From: JICA CBI Report No. 483, 6 Sept 1944, by G. T. Laughlin, Lt. Col. Infantry.

TONS DROPPED

10000

9000

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

EASTERN AIR COMMAND

TONS BOMBS DROPPED

- 1944 -

FIGHTERS

TACT. RECCE.*

BOMBERS

BALANCE OF
INFORMATION
FOR SEPTEMBER
NOT COMPLETE
AT PRESENT
TIME

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NO. OF
SORTIES
50,000

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EASTERN AIR COMMAND

EFFECTIVE TACTICAL SORTIES

JAN. - DEC. - 1944

30,000

20,000

10,000

0

JAN. FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUN. JUL. AUG. SEP. OCT. NOV. DEC.

TROOP CARR.
PHOTO RECCE.
FIGHTERS
BOMBERS

BALANCE OF
INFORMATION
FOR SEPTEMBER
NOT COMPLETE
AT PRESENT
TIME

DECLASSIFIED

