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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
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VOL. III, No. 1
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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

War Department

Washington 25, D. C.
September 1944

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
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JAPAN

DEFENSE PLANS FOR ENIWETOK ATOLL

Japanese military thought regarding the defense of a typical ring of coral islands is well illustrated by a series of enemy orders providing for the defense of Eniwetok Atoll, in the Central Pacific. The basic Japanese plan was to fortify and garrison the three main islands of the atoll—Engebi, Eniwetok, and Parry—and to keep a mobile reserve in readiness to reinforce not only these garrisons, but, if necessary, still other points in the Marshalls. However, the Japanese never were able to put the latter part of the plan into effect. In a smoothly executed operation, U. S. amphibious forces landed on the atoll on 18 February 1944, and, after 5 days of fighting, ended all Japanese resistance. (To avoid confusion, this article will refer to Eniwetok Atoll as "Brown," following Japanese practice, and will reserve the name "Eniwetok" for Eniwetok Island only.)

WORK BEGINS

The Japanese made no military use of Brown Atoll until late in 1942, when several hundred construction workers, mostly Koreans, were landed on Engebi Is-

land to build an airfield. Early in the following summer, the airfield was completed, and most of the construction personnel were transferred elsewhere. Not long afterward, a small naval garrison was sent from Kwajalein to Brown Atoll. Most of this garrison maintained lookout posts and manned antiaircraft guns at the airfield on Engebi Island.

The Engebi airfield did not become operative until the end of November 1943. No flying personnel were stationed there; the field was used only for staging. The maintenance force consisted of 39 officers and men. In January an additional 110 officers and men were billeted there—"because of current operations in the Roi, Wotje, Mille, and Taroa areas," as the Japanese expressed it at the time. In other words, Japanese air personnel were being withdrawn from those areas because of the threat of U. S. attacks. (The Japanese followed this same procedure at Tarawa.) After the U. S. capture of Kwajalein, the Japanese decided to evacuate all air personnel from Brown Atoll and send them to Truk by flying boat, using the seaplane base on Parry Island. This move was still in progress when U. S. forces landed on Brown. About 80 of the Japanese air personnel were stranded on Parry and died there, although all the Japanese pilots had been taken out. Still other air personnel were stranded on Engebi.

AN AMPHIBIOUS FORCE ARRIVES

In January 1944 the 1st Amphibious Brigade, a fairly new unit, arrived at Brown Atoll and took over

its defense. Of a total of 3,940 troops and 120 civilian employees, 1,354 troops and about 25 civilians were detached as reinforcements for the garrisons at Kwajalein, Wotje, and Maloelap, and departed within a few days. The bulk of the force, 2,586 troops and the balance of the civilians, became the Brown Atoll garrison and were distributed among Engebi, Parry, and Eniwetok Islands. The Brigade commander, Major General Yoshimi Nishida, set up his headquarters on Parry Island.

The small naval garrison remained on Engebi, where it was placed under the new island commander and was assigned a sector to defend.

In mid-January about 200 Sankyu Corporation coolies arrived, apparently en route to Kwajalein, where they were to replace a like number of laborers whose time was up. The Sankyu Corporation, which engages in the loading and unloading of ships, holds contracts to supply the Japanese government with stevedores.

About 300 of the Japanese and Korean construction workers who originally had been sent to Brown to build the airfield and its installations still were on the atoll when the U. S. forces attacked.

On D-day the total Japanese strength on Brown Atoll was as follows:

1st Amphibious Brigade.....	2,586
Civilian employees of the Brigade.....	95
Naval garrison	59

no effort being made to garrison or defend any other part of the atoll. (All troops except the naval detachment were elements of the 1st Amphibious Brigade.)

Engebi Island Garrison Force (Col. Toshio Yano):

3rd Battalion headquarters	103
2nd Company, 3rd Battalion (8th Company)	193
Mortar Company (less 1 platoon), 3rd Battalion	113
Artillery Company (less 1 squad), 3rd Battalion	104
Infantry Engineer Platoon, 3rd Battalion	66
1st Platoon, Machine-cannon Unit	29
2nd Platoon, Tank Unit	17
2 squads, Engineer Unit	24
3 squads (2 radio, 1 wire), Signal Unit	16
Detachment, Medical Unit	27
Naval detachment (61st *Keibitai*)	44
	736

The Engebi garrison was armed with thirteen Model 89 heavy grenade dischargers, twelve Model 99 light machine guns, two Model 96 light machine guns, two Model 92 heavy machine guns, eleven Model 97 81-mm mortars, a Model 98 50-mm mortar, a Model 97 antitank gun (20-mm), two Model 100 flame throwers, two Model 94 automatic guns (37-mm), two Model 41 mountain guns (75-mm), two Model 98 antiaircraft machine cannon (20-mm), two "Armstrong-

type" 120-mm naval guns, two twin-mount Model 93 13-mm antiaircraft machine guns, and three light tanks (each mounting a 37-mm tank gun and two Model 97 heavy machine guns), and small arms.

Eniwetok Island Garrison Force (Lt. Col. Masahiro Hashida):

1st Battalion headquarters	103
1st Company, 1st Battalion	192
Mortar Company (less 1 platoon), 1st Battalion	107
Artillery Company (less 1 squad), 1st Battalion	104
Infantry Engineer Platoon, 1st Battalion	66
1st Platoon, Tank Unit	17
Detachment, Machine-cannon Unit	36
Detachment, Engineer Unit	143
2 squads (1 radio, 1 wire), Signal Unit	11
	779

(Of the above, 10 men of the Machine-cannon Unit and 119 men of the Engineer Unit were not included in the original garrison, but were a subsequent reinforcement from the reserve at Brigade headquarters.)

The Eniwetok garrison was armed with thirteen Model 89 heavy grenade dischargers, twelve Model 99 light machine guns, two Model 92 heavy machine guns, eleven Model 97 81-mm mortars, a Model 98 50-mm mortar, a Model 97 antitank gun (20-mm) two Model 100 flame throwers, two Model 94 automatic guns

(37-mm), two Model 41 mountain guns (75-mm), three Model 98 antiaircraft machine cannon (20-mm), and three light tanks (each mounting a 37-mm tank gun and two Model 97 heavy machine guns), and small arms.

Parry Island Garrison Force (Capt. Isao Matsushita):

2nd Company, 1st Battalion	197
1st Platoon, Mortar Company, 1st Battalion	48
1 squad, Artillery Company, 1st Battalion	17
1 squad, Artillery Company, 3rd Battalion	17
1 platoon, (less 2 squads), Engineer Unit.	26
	305

The Parry Island garrison was armed with twelve Model 89 heavy grenade dischargers, twelve Model 99 light machine guns, two Model 92 heavy machine guns, six Model 97 81-mm mortars, a Model 97 antitank gun (20-mm), two Model 41 mountain guns (75-mm), and small arms.

Brigade Reserve (Maj. Gen. Yoshimi Nishida)

Brigade headquarters	143
3rd Company, 1st Battalion	197
3rd Company, 3rd Battalion (9th Company	197
Machine-cannon Unit (less 2 platoons)	21
Tank Unit (less 2 platoons)	32

Engineer Unit (less 2 platoons and 2 squads)	119
Signal Unit (less 5 radio squads and 3 wire squads)	96
Medical Unit (less detachment)	134
	939
Less engineer and machine-cannon personnel sent to Eniwetok Island	129
Total reserve on Parry Island	810

These troops were to constitute a mobile reserve. However, the shipping situation seriously limited their ability to function in this capacity. The Engineer Unit and a squad of the Machine-cannon Unit were sent to Eniwetok Island, as previously noted. The rest remained on Parry Island, where they had first landed, and where the Brigade commander had set up his headquarters.

This meant that by D-day the Japanese strength on Parry Island had been increased by 810 men and the following weapons: twenty-four Model 89 heavy grenade dischargers, twenty-four Model 99 light machine guns, four Model 92 heavy machine guns, four Model 97 81-mm mortars, two Model 97 antitank guns (20-mm), one Model 98 antiaircraft machine cannon (20-mm), three light tanks (each mounting a 37-mm tank gun and two Model 97 heavy machine guns), and small arms.

A NOTE ON THE DEFENSE ORDERS

The Japanese are fully aware of the capabilities and limitations involved in establishing an island defense. The orders which follow have been selected because they are representative of Japanese concepts of island defense, and because they give the U. S. soldier an intimate glimpse of enemy plans for combat activity by small units.

It will be noted that reserves, about half the total force on the island, were to remain in positions under cover and were to enter the battle by prearranged routes if a U. S. landing was attempted. If the situation so demanded, communication and medical personnel were to take up arms and participate in combat.

Great stress was placed on the rapid reorganization of the defending troops and on the importance of launching night counterattacks. (U. S. officers who took part in the operation commented on the number of Japanese who were discovered inland, sitting patiently in covered foxholes. Although these enemy soldiers attempted to leave their positions during the night, the U. S. forces pushed inland so rapidly that the planned night counterattacks never materialized.)

The standard Japanese plan was, and is, to annihilate a hostile landing force before it reaches the shore, or at least to destroy it on the beaches. On Brown Atoll this plan was to be accomplished by forcing the landing craft, tanks, and infantry to split up and by destroying them individually. To achieve this, obstacles were to be erected on the beaches and

in the shallow water in front of Japanese prepared positions, and fire power was to be concentrated in these positions. The Japanese fire power was to be used suddenly and aggressively, to surprise the attackers. If this plan failed to prevent the hostile force from landing, the Japanese were to reorganize and counterattack under cover of darkness.

The Japanese had learned a good deal from previous encounters with Allied landing forces, and were aware that certain tactics probably would be repeated. The atoll garrisons were cautioned to expect a landing any time after a heavy sea and air bombardment of the island. They were told of the U. S. use of smoke to cover landings, and that the landing of tanks, artillery, and infantry would be coordinated.

The Japanese soon became aware that they would be unable to reinforce other islands of the atoll from their main strength, because of the distance between islands and because of the lack of transportation facilities. Weather and the nature of the soil hampered the construction of defenses. Except for a very few local materials, supplies were hard to obtain. The intense heat made it necessary for the Japanese to employ island laborers for much of the construction work that troops might otherwise have been able to perform.

The defense orders reveal that, on the whole, General Nishida and the commanders of the three garrison forces were determined to make the best of a distinctly unfavorable tactical position.

FIRST PLANS FOR DEFENDING THE ATOLL

Before the 1st Amphibious Brigade arrived at Brown, General Nishida gave the officers who were to command the individual island garrisons an outline of the general defense plan.

Our mission is to prevent an Allied invasion of Eniwetok, Engebi, and Parry Islands, and to protect the anchorage and the various naval installations within the atoll.

Each island garrison force will defend its assigned sector to the last man.

The Brigade Reserve will be prepared to move in its entirety, or in part, to reinforce the other island garrisons or to go outside Brown Atoll, depending upon the situation.

The three island garrisons will commence construction of positions immediately after landing, and should have them completed within a month. Subsequently, they will try to strengthen the works and will add permanent installations as personnel and matériel become available.

The following points are to be given special consideration in the organization of positions:

1. Positions must be strong, and must be so planned as to allow for all-around defense. [Later, special emphasis was placed on the threat from the lagoon side.]

2. Try to convert key terrain features into strongpoints and successively complete permanent installations in vital sectors so that it will be possible to conduct a strong, flexible defense. However, be careful not to jeopardize the safety of the various naval shore installations.

3. In planning the defenses, pay special attention to the shore line, the ocean bottom, and the depth of water. Erect suitable artificial obstacles along the shore line where landings are anticipated. The importance of splitting up and isolating hostile infantry forces must be remembered.

4. For protection against enemy artillery and bombs, build covered positions, cave-type shelters, and hangars. Use local materials. Prepare at least four alternate positions for heavy weapons, and build individual shelters at least 7 yards apart. In addition, pay attention to dispersion, deployment, and camouflage, so that we will suffer fewer casualties and less damage.

5. Prepare a large number of dummy positions and dummy installations of all kinds.

As soon as we land on Brown, each garrison commander will start devising his own defense plan. By 15 January the units on Eniwetok, Engebi, and Parry Islands are to present their individual defense plans, complete with maps showing the organization of positions, to Brigade headquarters.

Shortly after the 1st Amphibious Brigade landed on Brown, General Nishida sent his garrison commanders the following estimate of U. S. capabilities and intentions.

1. Hostile landing strength is believed to amount to at least 3 infantry divisions and a tank division, and an escort fleet of 6 aircraft carriers, 4 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 40 destroyers, and 60 transports of approximately 5,000 tons each.

2. To establish beachheads as quickly as possible, the enemy will launch assaults against Engebi, Eniwetok, Meriren, and Japtan Islands.

3. The hostile landing force will appear after about 3 days of air reconnaissance and bombing, and will invade Brown Atoll with the object of isolating the rear of the Marshalls. The assault will coincide with attacks on Kusaie and Wake Islands.

4. The enemy often anchors within a lagoon and debarks after 0200. Enemy forces may attempt surprise assaults from the sea side of the atoll about midnight.

5. During the period of debarkation, landing forces will be covered by bombing and naval gunfire. The enemy will use submarines to blockade all passages into Brown Atoll.

6. The enemy expects rapid successes. Landings will continue day and night, and in one day enough supplies will be put ashore to last a week.

7. Amphibious tanks probably will lead the enemy landings and will be followed by a flotilla of boats 50 to 100 yards apart.

8. Employing boats and barges of many types, the enemy conducts the first phase of debarkation in coordinated waves. During the second phase and thereafter, each boat navigates independently, taking about 30 minutes for each round trip.

9. When debarking in the daytime, U. S. forces use smoke on a large scale.

DEFENSE PLANS FOR ENGEBI ISLAND

Early in February, Colonel Yano, commander of the Engebi Island Garrison Force, issued this order regarding the improvement of the existing defenses of the island.

As commander of the garrison and naval installations on Engebi Island, I intend to safeguard the island and its airstrip against certain tactics which I fully expect the enemy to use.

A hostile force will bomb this island either with carrier-based or land-based planes, and will bombard us from all sides with battleships and heavy cruisers. Directly after these attacks, an amphibious force will attempt to land.

It will be extremely difficult for the enemy to land on Engebi from the open sea, because of the high waves and rugged reefs.

Whether or not the enemy is able to land on the islands to the east and west, it is expected that he will force his way through one of the passages and enter the atoll and carry out

landing operations from the lagoon. The enemy must be expected to approach this island from all directions while making simultaneous assaults on the other islands in the atoll.

If any of these events take place, and if sea and air control are in hostile hands, this garrison must be responsible for its own defense. Because of this, it is essential that we make the utmost use of every available man and of every position that we can possibly fortify. Our plan must be to let the enemy approach the shore line and then annihilate him with withering fire power.

Installations and fortifications on the present defense line must be strengthened, and new tactical positions must be built on the lagoon side of the island.

The 8th Company, less two platoons and with an automatic weapon attached, will occupy and defend the east corner of the island. The 1st Platoon of the 8th Company will occupy and defend the west corner under my direct command. The naval detachment will occupy the north corner. The detachment, as well as seamen who have taken refuge on this island and who now are under my command, will defend the area of Lookout Post No. 1, and deliver artillery fire from the fixed guns in the north corner of the island. The 2d Platoon of the 8th Company will be stationed in the vicinity of Lookout Post No. 2, and will defend that area.

The main body of the garrison force will be deployed in the manner indicated on the map (see fig. 2).

Two shelters will be built for each squad, and will be placed as far apart as practicable to reduce casualties from hostile bombing and bombardment.

I am issuing special instructions regarding plans for the construction of obstacles at the water's edge and for laying mines in the reefs.

Construction workers (the Japanese group, the Sankyu group, and the Korean group) will be used for work on addi-



Figure 1.—Japanese Defenses on Engebi Island.



Figure 2.—Deployment Plan, Engebi Island.



Figure 3.—Area of Main Strength. Engebi Island.

tional fortifications, repair work on the air strip, and the preparation of dummy installations. The Reservists with the Japanese group will be organized into a unit and will be placed under the commander of the 8th Company.

A splinter-proof shelter will be constructed immediately in the north corner of the island, for the naval communications post. Brigade radio personnel will be established in strong emplacements. Six telephones will be allocated to each corner of the island, and auxiliary means of communication will be established. Necessary steps will be taken for recognition-panel communication with friendly aircraft.



On the coast of Engebi Island, the Japanese set tanks in holes and used them as improvised pillboxes.



This concrete pillbox on Engebi Island was demolished by an aerial bomb.

The food ration is reduced to 540 grams per day. It must be remembered that the Navy is hard pressed to supply us. Fishing, and anything else that will help achieve a measure of self-sufficiency, must be encouraged.

The medical detachment will establish a first-aid station in the palm grove near Lookout Post No. 2. Individual combat units will establish their own dressing stations.

DISPOSITIONS ON ENIWETOK ISLAND

This order to the Eniwetok Island Garrison Force indicates the disposition of all combat units on the island.

The garrison will occupy positions as shown on the map (see fig. 4) and will check all hostile landing attempts, annihilating the enemy at the water's edge with defensive power and counterattacks.

A strong defense area will be built up on the northeast (lagoon) side of Eniwetok Island.

Forces will be disposed along the water's edge in the following manner:

Right sector force: one infantry platoon (less two squads); one mountain gun.

Center sector force (Artillery Company commander in charge): one infantry platoon (less one squad); one mountain gun; one automatic weapon.

Left sector force (commander 1st Platoon, 1st Company, in charge): two infantry squads; one mountain gun; one automatic weapon.



Figure 4.—General Development Plan, Eniwetok Island.

Support force (commander 1st Company in charge): one infantry platoon plus one squad; one platoon of infantry engineers; two squads of engineers; one tank platoon.

Right flank, rear-guard force: one infantry platoon (two squads); one infantry mortar platoon; observation personnel.

DEFENSE PLANS FOR PARRY ISLAND

General Nishida, who undertook personal supervision of the defense of Parry Island from Brigade Reserve headquarters on that island, issued the following order.

General Policy

Each unit on Parry will split up the enemy's landing craft as they approach the beaches and will annihilate the attacking force piecemeal. For this purpose we shall construct various types of antiboat obstacles, skillfully coordinate our fire power, and launch vigorous surprise counterattacks. If the enemy attempts to land tanks with the infantry, we must destroy the tanks first. If the enemy actually succeeds in landing, we shall annihilate him by the most original night counterattack methods that we can devise. We must plan to hold for at least a month, if necessary, by relying on our system of fortified positions.

Check List Regarding Positions

1. It must be expected that the principal enemy attack will be made from the lagoon side; therefore, the principal defense areas will be situated on that side of the island. Since there is at least a possibility that the enemy will attempt a landing from the sea, alternate positions will be constructed on the sea side and the necessary lookouts maintained.

2. Pay special attention to antitank defenses; bombproof installations; observation, command, and liaison and communication installations.

3. After making a study of the shore line and of the beaches where the enemy may be expected to land, unit commanders will supervise the construction of obstacles in shallow water and at the water's edge. In the construction of

these obstacles, local materials will be used as far as the tactical situation and the terrain permit. Wherever possible, design the arrangement of obstacles at the water's edge so as to lure the hostile landing craft into traps.

4. In planning fortifications, make the most of existing terrain features and be careful not to change their original form. However, this rule may be broken in the case of antitank ditches around fortified positions. To be effective, these ditches will have to be dug deep, thereby altering the natural lay of the land somewhat.

5. In areas where we can not place our troops in prepared positions, construct dummy positions to draw hostile fire.

6. By studying weather and the tides, it should be easy to determine in advance the time and places of landing.

7. Approximately half the total combat strength on Parry will defend the water's edge. The remainder will be held in reserve near the fortified positions. The intervals between strong points occupied by troops along the water's edge will be approximately 500 yards each.

8. Note the prevailing wind direction, and store explosives accordingly in beach areas which are not to be defended by guns. [Later it was found that the Japanese had stored smoke pots on certain small islands of the atoll.]

9. To annihilate the enemy at the water's edge, weapons will be used in the following manner:

a. Mountain guns and automatic weapons will fire on the advancing landing craft.

b. Heavy machine guns and light machine guns will fire on landing craft both before and after these boats reach the obstacles in shallow water and those at the water's edge.

c. Mortars and grenade dischargers will deliver concentrated fire on enemy soldiers landing in localities between our strong points and our more extensive fortified areas. If possible, our mortars and grenade dischargers will fire on the

enemy's automatic weapons and will be prepared to place barrages in the vicinity of underwater obstacles.

d. Hostile tanks which are halted by obstacles must be destroyed by means of hollow-charge antitank-rifle grenades, land mines, water mines, and Molotov cocktails. Men must be sent to destroy halted tanks in close combat, especially at night.

10. A reasonable number of fields of fire will be cleared in the coconut groves.

First Stage

1. As each unit goes to its position, it will become responsible for the security of its own sector.

2. Each unit will complete its positions quickly, and thereafter will continue to strengthen them.

3. An officer will head the lookout patrol. Noncoms and privates will assist him. Every effort will be made to detect hostile ships at the farthest possible range. The lookout patrol must be especially diligent during the night. We also will use an infantry patrol to ensure that no unauthorized person approaches any position.

4. So that casualties will be kept to a minimum, all personnel must take cover the moment the enemy bombardment begins.

Second Stage

1. As the enemy's landing plans become clearer, we must maintain an even stricter watch. The security officer will estimate the enemy's feints and actual landing points, and will make an immediate report.

2. Brigade Reserve troops will advance quickly along prearranged approach routes, toward the landing points of the enemy's main force.



Figure 5.—General Defense Plan, Parry Island.

3. The tanks and engineers of the Brigade Reserve will advance toward the actual landing points. The Machine-cannon Unit will lay down a barrage on prearranged targets. Signal communication personnel will carry out their regular duties until the situation becomes so acute as to warrant their participation in actual combat. Medical personnel will remain in their positions and await special orders.

4. In this stage the outcome of the battle and the fate of the Brigade will be decided. The highest spirit of self-sacrifice—wholehearted willingness to die for the Emperor—must be shown.

Third Stage

1. Should the situation deteriorate seriously, Brigade headquarters will analyze the over-all situation and decide that all personnel are to make a stand to the death.

2. Of the living, all personnel still able to participate in combat will assemble in the enclosure on the east side of the old warehouse.

3. In keeping with the traditions of the Imperial forces, no soldier will permit himself to be captured. Sick and wounded men who no longer are able to fight will commit suicide.

4. All men who assemble in the enclosure will be directly under the orders of the Brigade commander. If it is still possible to do so, they will reorganize, return to the battle as a unit, and die fighting.

NOTES ON BEACH OBSTACLES

The 1st Amphibious Brigade considered beach obstacles especially useful in preventing a surprise attack, and in delaying hostile landing operations long enough

to give defending forces time to concentrate their strength.[1]

In deciding where to establish beach obstacles [a Brigade order directed], choose those approaches which are most difficult for the enemy to cross, even at low tide. When the difference between low tide and high tide is great, use fixed obstacles. If a beach slopes considerably, the obstacles must be established in depth; if this is not done, the barrier will be utterly ineffective. If a beach slopes gradually, obstacles should be erected well out into the water at low tide. In any case, good covering fire must be provided from the shore, wherever possible. In preparing obstacles, it is best to sacrifice height for depth.

When there is a difference of more than 3 feet between high and low tides, it is almost impossible to conceal fixed obstacles from the enemy's view, and even obstacles constructed under the surface of the water probably will not escape discovery from the air, unless the water is muddy.

The principal types of beach obstacles vary in effectiveness. Study the following analysis carefully before you make your decisions:

1. *Water barges:* These are effective barriers. However, it is best not to fill them with water, inasmuch as this lessens their effectiveness.
2. *Pickets:* Not very effective.
3. *Wooden barricades:* Not very effective.
4. *Barbed wire:* Very effective. It is difficult for landing craft to pass over or through barbed wire or to destroy it.
5. *Booms:* Not very effective. Boats can pass through them. However, iron spurs attached to the booms can be effective in damaging hulls.

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[1] A number of typical Japanese beach obstacles were described and illustrated in *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 7, pp. 1-35.

6. *Abatis constructed of tree branches:* These are easy to construct and relatively easy to maintain if there is no surf. They are fairly effective in delaying the advance of hostile troops on foot.

7. *Abatis constructed of tree trunks:* If the tree trunks are not buoyant, and if the water is deep, these abatis are ineffective against landing craft. However, if the abatis are used in wide shallow approaches, they will be very useful in hindering the advance of landing craft.

8. *Chevaux-de-frise:* Very effective against landing craft.

9. *Floating wire entanglements on rafts:* When three lanes of these are prepared in depth, they are effective against landing craft and personnel advancing on foot.

10. *Floating bamboo-raft barricades:* A single lane of this type of barricade is ineffective. Effectiveness is gained only when a number of lanes are prepared in depth.

11. *Horizontal nets:* Vertical nets are inadequate obstacles against landing craft. When rope nets and straw nets are used together, and are arranged horizontally on the surface, or just under it, the advance of landing craft is made extremely difficult.

12. *Mines:* These are highly effective and should be used as generously as possible. When the necessary materials are at hand, the improvisation and laying of beach mines should proceed unremittingly. The more mines, the better.

U. S. ENLISTED MEN DISCUSS THE JAPANESE SOLDIER

In an informal discussion a number of U. S. soldiers, who had been fighting the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific, recently offered some interesting and useful comments on enemy combat methods and on the individual Japanese soldier as an opponent in battle. During the discussion this question was asked: "Did you notice any particular action or behavior on the part of the Japanese that would serve as a basis for predicting their next move, or that would foreshadow any action to follow, whether offensive or defensive?" In replying to this, the men added a number of related comments.

"When we put heavy artillery fire on the Japs, they crawled up close to our lines to keep from getting hit. Moreover, while they were up there, they put light mortar fire on us during our own barrage. When our barrage stopped, they slipped back. The Japs vary their tactics a good deal, attacking one way one time and then another way another time. They don't let their tactics get into a groove; instead, they always try for surprise."

"The Japs love mortars of every kind. They also use

their grenade dischargers extensively. These are the weapons that were incorrectly called "knee mortars" at first, because of the shape of the base plate. They're really used on logs and fallen trees, on the ground, and against upright trees.

"Some of the enemy soldiers looked about 14 or 15 years old, but don't ever let anyone tell you that all Japs are small. Some of the men from Kyushu are really big guys, and I saw an Imperial Marine from Formosa who was at least 6 feet 2 inches tall. They yell '*Banzai!*', 'Blood for the Emperor!', and so on as they come running toward us. As a rule, the heavier the action is going to be, the louder they yell."

"Sometimes the Japs buried their equipment. We discovered whole piles of it covered with dirt. They had the stuff well oiled and greased, and plenty of ammunition all ready for use. Then at night they crept in, dug up the equipment, and used it on us."

"Screaming and yelling, tracer bullets, and general fireworks—all this is a favorite Jap preface to an attack. It's like kids playing Indians, and war-whooping before they pounce on another gang. Except that the Japs aren't kids and they aren't playing."

"They're exceptionally good at night infiltration, and they do a lot of it.

"For some reason the Japs are very likely to travel in pairs. Whether they're afraid to operate independ-

ently, I don't know, but there it is—where there's one, there's invariably another.

"The grenade discharger, which is widely used, has a concussion effect, mostly. Very little fragmentation. The Japs always use a lot of mortar fire before they move in. They use most of their heavy fire from the rear, so that it goes over their own troops. Their aim is pretty good.

"Another thing they like to do is to wait until they see us advancing in a horseshoe formation, and then close in on our flanks. You may be going up a hill and think you're advancing, when all of a sudden you see a Jap coming around your rear with a machine gun.

"When they're on the defensive, they're forever digging in, like natural-born ground hogs."

These Japanese infantrymen are intrenching from the prone position.

"The Japs capitalize on the failure of some men to hold hand grenades for the right count before throwing them. Often the Japs have snatched up the grenades and thrown them back at us.

"They drop parachute mines along beaches where they expect us to make landings."

"The bayonets on Japanese rifles aren't camouflaged. The enemy would attack with the damn things glittering in the sun."

"The Jap .25-mm sounds like the Browning automatic rifle. It's useful to know this, especially in the jungle.

"The Japs had some sort of skin disease on their hands, perhaps from a jungle fungus, and some of us found ourselves getting the same thing. You know, the Japs don't make as much of an effort as we do to maintain sanitation in the field. They're filthy. It's startling to capture their field hospitals and find them so dirty. I don't see how they can stand it. The Japs usually are pretty careful about their dead, but leave the sick and wounded behind if they are in a hurry. Incidentally, if the sick and wounded are still capable of pressing a trigger, they're mighty likely to do just that."

"No sooner was our radio communication system set up on Kwajalein than the Japs began to intercept our messages. Many of them spoke good English over the radio.

"A favorite enemy trick was to fire mortars over our artillery barrage some 100 to 200 yards into our advancing infantry troops. As we ceased firing our 105-mm shells, the Japs would stop firing their mortars, also. The enemy intention was to deceive our infantrymen into thinking that our own field artillery was placing fire on them out of sheer carelessness.

"A trick I saw the Japanese employ on Kwajalein was to send a lone soldier out of a pillbox, with hands raised as if in surrender. As five of our men went after him, the Japs in the pillbox shot three of them. I saw them use this same ruse on several other occasions also.

"If a Jap sniper picks off a buddy and you rush to his side immediately, the Jap will have a bead on you, too. I repeatedly saw men go to a pal's rescue, only to be shot themselves.

"Whenever we killed a Japanese officer, his men seemed to have a hard time thinking for themselves and often went to pieces.

"In the daytime we had to dig the Japs out, and at night they always counterattacked.

"Jap marksmanship is definitely inferior to ours. True, their snipers are likely to be good, but, even so, I've had the experience of having their snipers fire all around me and of not being hit by a single bullet.

"Although Jap riflemen are hard to detect in the jungle, the movement of bushes and leaves made by the traveling bullet can be a help in locating the enemy. Also, muzzle flashes from their 75-mm guns help to reveal enemy positions in the jungle."

USE OF ANTITANK MINES IN THE ARAKAN

Early in 1944 the Japanese began to use their Model 93 pressure-fuze antitank mines on an appreciably large scale against British forces in the Arakan. Although the Japanese in this area also had at their disposal magnetic mines, designed for use by tank hunters operating from ambush, it is reported that no magnetic mines were used in this manner, and that only in a few instances were they used as hand grenades.[1] However, it may be assumed that the Japanese will use magnetic



Figure 6.—Japanese Antitank Mine (with pressure fuze), Model 93.

[1] The Japanese magnetic mine is a type of armor-piercing grenade which, when placed on an armored surface, will cling to this surface until detonation occurs. The mine is actuated by a hand-operated delay fuze and is not intended to function by pressure from a tank tread.

mines very readily against tanks which do not have strong infantry support. Throughout this article the text and illustrations will deal solely with the enemy's tactical use of the Model 93 pressure-fuze antitank mine (see fig. 6).

HOW THE MINES ARE LAID

From the Japanese point of view, the Model 93 antitank mine has two deficiencies. When it is placed below ground level, it does not always detonate when a car or Bren carrier passes over it. Also, the mine contains such a small amount of explosive that the detonation does not always damage the track of a medium tank sufficiently to disable the tank. To overcome these deficiencies, the Japanese lay one mine on top of another, or even place a supplementary charge under two mines laid in this manner. The enemy also has been known to place boards above and below the mines so that a larger and more stable surface will receive the pressure of the vehicle.

In nearly all instances, the Japanese have laid the mines armed with the brass cap on. The mines have been laid so that the cap, or the board covering the mine, has been at ground level or ½ inch below the ground.

Figure 7 illustrates the various methods of laying these mines.

A picric explosive, which the Japanese call "Yellow Powder," appears to have been a common supplementary charge in the Arakan. Some of the supplementary



Figure 7.

charges were prepared bulk, or demolition, charges and consisted of sticks of explosive wrapped in wax paper and primed with detonators and safety fuzes. It is reported that supplementary charges vary in weight from 6 to 16 pounds, but that most of them weigh between 6 and 8 pounds.

When the mines are buried with their caps exposed in open roads, visual deception is relatively easy; however, when the mines are buried in grass, very careful searching is necessary. It is reported that mines concealed beneath the surface of the ground can be detected only by clearing parties equipped with the Polish

mine detector. In general, the mines are skillfully concealed.

WHERE THEY ARE LAID

The Japanese display a good deal of ingenuity in choosing sites for their mines and often send patrols inside British lines at night to perform the work. They are likely to lay the mines under the wooden ramps leading up to trestle bridges; under the edges of the bamboo corduroying at fords; in all roads suitable for tank use; in the shoulders of roads—sometimes far enough to the side to escape detectors and yet near enough to catch a vehicle which might be trying to pass another; and in dry paddy fields which might be used as tank parks.

Figures 8 to 10 illustrate these methods.



Figure 8.



Figure 9.



Figure 10.

In addition, figure 10 shows a random distribution of mines at a road junction. The distribution is such that mines may be detonated by vehicles using the road in a normal manner; moving over to the edges of the road to pass each other or to make a wide swing into the side road; or entering the dry paddy field to deploy or park.

From the evidence at hand, it appears that the Japanese do not lay mines in great depth along the probable lines of a British advance. The enemy practice seems to be to lay mines immediately in front of the British advance, or along lines of communication behind the British line of advance. For example, if the Japanese estimate that the probable line of advance will be from A to B to C, they refrain from laying mines at the same time along the entire route. Instead, they lay mines as the advance takes place from A to B. When the British reach B, the Japanese begin to lay mines from B to C, and also infiltrate behind the line of advance from A to B to lay mines, perhaps with the hope that rear echelons moving forward will prove less mine-conscious than the vanguard.

In country like the Arakan, where infiltration by large bodies of men is always possible, an area cannot be assumed to be free of mines once it has been cleared. Continuous observation must be maintained. Japanese night patrols repeatedly have laid mines in areas cleared by the British only the day before.

MINEFIELD PATTERNS

Up to the present time the Japanese in the Arakan have made very little effort to lay patterned minefields. Two examples of patterned fields are shown in figure 11. When these patterns were used, the minefields were not covered by fire; therefore the Japanese could have hoped only to create temporary road blocks provided that the mines were not detected before vehicles used the roads.



Figure 11.

The minefield shown in figure 11b is of special interest, since the rather unusual pattern was repeated after a 100-yard interval. The mines in both fields were double mines with supplementary charges, as shown in figure 7.

A GUN THAT SAT ON A BURMA BOTTLENECK

A captured Japanese antitank gun position which "literally sat on top of a bottleneck" in the Arakan, Burma, has been inspected by a U. S. observer, who reports that it was an excellent example of enemy cleverness in siting and camouflage. Situated on a small spur of a hill which dominated a road, the gun harassed British troops almost until the very end of a battle for a pass. The exact location of the position was discovered only after the Japanese had evacuated the area.

No gun and no shells or shell cases were found in the emplacement. Later on, however, the British captured three 47-mm antitank guns in the Arakan, and it is believed that a gun of this type had been emplaced in the position. Apparently because their antitank guns were so few and were not powerful enough, the Japanese fired from the position only at rare intervals. A more powerful gun might have closed the bottleneck; instead, the position proved to be little more than an annoyance to the British. Destruction of a British Lee-Grant tank was the only damage definitely attributed to the gun.

THE "INVISIBLE" SIGHT

The hill on which the emplacement was constructed was densely covered with bamboo and other trees. All around were open rice paddies. This combination of hills and rice fields is typical terrain in the Arakan. During the battle the British often scrutinized the hill from a road about 350 yards distant, on the edge of the rice paddies, but were unable to determine the position of the gun.

After the position was captured, the bamboo camouflage and the natural growth in front of the loophole were removed. Nevertheless, the position still was almost invisible from the road. It could be spotted, the observer reported, only when one stood on the road at the point of intersection of lines drawn through the center of the position and through the loophole of the gun pit. From this point the observer could see a shaft of light below the hill crest; this shaft of light created the illusion that a very small tunnel had been cut through the hill. Actually, this light was the sky showing through the gap in the vegetation. When the Japanese were occupying the position, even this small clue did not exist.

The emplacement—loophole, gun pit, and entrances—was dug into the hill, just below the crest (see fig. 12). The gun pit was roofed with bamboo and earth, about 2 feet thick. This roof afforded sufficient protection against mortar shells and instantaneous-fuze 25-pounder shells, but not against delayed-fuze shells. Two shelters were tunneled into the hill; they were not


Thick bamboo jungle
Cover
Loophole
Path
Gun pit
6'
15'
Antitank gun pit covered with bamboo and earth. Note slope of gun-pit floor.
Path leading to AT gun position and entrances to shelters tunnelled into hill


Shelters
6'
5'
Path
Direction of fire
7'
AT gun pit
12'
Slit trench
Bamboo and earth cover

Figure 12.

reinforced in any way. There were no revetments in the position. The earth, although powder-fine, was compact and firm when dry. The position was suitable



Figure 13.

for the dry season, but for the wet season or monsoons it would have needed revetted walls, drains, and brush mats or bamboo corduroying.

The observer reports that the tactical siting of the position was excellent. The floor of the chamber was inclined towards the road so that when the gun was in position at zero elevation, it pointed directly toward the road. As indicated in figure 13, the possible angle of traverse was small because the loophole was long and narrow. Evidently a greater field of fire was sacrificed in order to perfect the camouflage. It was assumed that the Japanese trained the gun on the road and fired when vehicles approached from left or right at the proper lead points. Since the position was at a right angle to the road, a shell would hit a vehicle broadside, with a maximum chance of penetration. Also, the elevation of the position offered opportunities for hitting the relatively vulnerable top of a tank.

On the basis of results obtained, the observer said, the camouflage was perfect. The narrow loophole concealed the flash. No more vegetation was removed than was necessary during construction of the emplacement and this was replaced with cut bamboo stuck upright in the roof of the position. This blended well with the rest of the vegetation since the position was occupied during the dry season, when living bamboo appeared withered and yellow.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

During the battle in which the position played a

role in the Japanese defense, tanks and other vehicles passed from one important British area to another, along the road covered by the gun. The Japanese evidently fired only when they thought the gun would be effective and when it was unlikely to be spotted. The one tank which was destroyed was hit on the engine head with a high-explosive, armor-piercing shell, and the tank caught fire. Other tanks hit in the area suffered only minor damage.

A British tank unit made several efforts to locate the position. When careful observation failed to produce results, the British tried ruses. On one occasion they sent out a lead tank with one or more other tanks following at "dust distance" (the distance one tank must stay behind another so that dust from the lead tank does not blind the following tank). The lead tank proceeded along the road as if it were leading a normal column moving from one defended area to another. The rear tanks, however, scanned the hill. The Japanese were not deceived by this trick.

Another trick which was tried several times was to hide tanks in hull-down positions in brush and along a gully of a stream while one tank moved along the road as a decoy. This ruse failed, too. The Japanese evidently had excellent observation and fired only when they were confident of success and concealment. Toward the end of the battle, when more urgent missions had been completed, British infantry partially cleared the hill, and the Japanese eventually evacuated the "invisible" antitank position.

SNIPER TRAINING

In the early months of the war against the Japanese, there was a tendency to exaggerate the abilities of enemy snipers. Then, after a time, it became evident that, when they were employed against a well prepared opposition, they were more of a nuisance factor than anything else. From fresh information which is at hand regarding the enemy's sniper-training program and combat methods, it is possible to form a clearer picture of this opponent and to evaluate his capabilities accordingly. Although the material in this article has been obtained from prisoner-of-war sources, it is considered reliable. It covers individual training experiences in the Japanese Army.

THE MEN AND THEIR WEAPONS

Candidates for sniper training were selected, without an examination of any kind, by the respective platoon leaders of each company. However, it was customary to select only those men who had superior marksmanship records. Approximately 80 percent of the men selected had the rank of superior private. The men did not consider it a special honor to be selected to attend sniper training classes; instead, the work was looked upon as just another phase of the training program.

Men of short stature were preferred to tall men. The Japanese reasoned that small men would present less conspicuous targets to hostile fire. The wearing of glasses did not necessarily disqualify a soldier from becoming a sniper.

Sniper-training courses were conducted every 6 months, and covered a 4-week period. Classes were held either at battalion or regimental headquarters, depending on the disposition of troops. When troops were distributed over a wide area, each battalion trained its own snipers.



Japanese Sniper's Rifle, 6.5-mm, Model 97.

The snipers used either the 6.5-mm rifle, Model 97, or the 6.5-mm rifle, Model 38. The former was regarded as distinctly superior. In addition, the snipers were supplied with a telescopic sight, Model 97. Since all the men selected for sniper classes were familiar with the nomenclature, field stripping, and operation of the rifle they were to use, no time was spent in teaching these matters. After receiving his rifle, a marksman took steps to determine its individual characteristics by firing it from a fixed mount. Any error or discrepancy had to be compensated for visually by

the marksman. Hence it is not surprising that sniper candidates were taught to "know" their rifles.

MISSIONS

Japanese snipers were taught that their missions, in order of importance, would be:

1. To kill or capture hostile personnel—especially unit leaders and snipers.
2. To neutralize or destroy hostile installations which might obstruct the successful completion of a Japanese unit's mission.
3. To destroy the opposition's heavy weapons and the personnel manning them.
4. To deal effectively with all targets of opportunity which might come within range.

FIRING POSITIONS

Except in the following positions, the rifle grip and stance compared with those employed by our forces:

In the prone position, the body and feet of the marksman formed a 30-degree angle with the extended line of the rifle. Both feet were placed together, with the heels pointed up. (A Japanese prisoner insisted that this position afforded good stability.) For firing against aircraft, the men were taught to lie on their backs, point the rifle and feet toward the approaching plane, and fire the rifle by following the plane's line of flight until it was out of range. Leather slings were not used at any time as an aid in steadying the marksman's hand and rifle.

TYPES OF FIRING

Most of the practicing was done on a 300-yard range. The morning of each day was spent at the range, and 50 rounds were issued to each man daily for practice. As a rule, an officer personally supervised each sniper's firing.

For firing at targets at ranges of 300 yards or more, telescopic sights sometimes were used. When soldiers fired rifles without the aid of these sights, they were instructed to aim without closing either eye.

For regular target practice, ball ammunition was used, but for determining the characteristics of the rifle, flat-nosed, reduced-charge ammunition was occasionally used on a 50-yard range.

RANGE ESTIMATION

The men were taught to estimate ranges with the naked eye. The instructors placed objects at measured distances, varying from 200 to 600 yards, and the men then estimated the ranges of these objects. Excellent eyesight and continual practice were necessary for accurate estimation. The men were not required to judge the distance of objects over water.

For firing at targets above the horizontal, the men were taught to decrease the range. For example, if the range was estimated to be 600 yards, the sights were set for 500 yards. The procedure was reversed when the men were firing at targets below the horizontal. The exact reason for this method is not known.

When estimating ranges for objects more than 600 yards away on level ground, the men were taught to sight a nearer object, the range of which could be estimated readily, and then to judge the probable distance between the two objects. The Japanese believed that this ensured a more accurate total.

In target designation, the clenched fist was used as a means of hasty measurement. For example, in designating a target for a reference point, the clenched right hand was raised and extended fully, with the palm downward, so that the first joint of the index finger or the middle finger was in line with the eye and the reference point. The target then was designated as being ½, 1, or 2 "knuckles" to the right or left of the reference point. Apparently the fingers were not used for designation purposes.

FIRING AT PLANES

The telescopic sight never was used in firing at aircraft. In judging the distance for leading the planes, the width of the rear sight leaf was used. For planes flying within a range of 500 yards at 180 miles per hour, a lead of 1½ widths of the rear sight leaf was used, while at 310 miles per hour a lead of 2½ widths was used.

In firing at planes, the men did not aim their rifles by swinging them along the line of flight from a position behind the plane and then overtaking the plane until the desired lead was established. They were taught that such a technique would waste valuable time. They

were told that it was preferable to compute the desired lead mentally, aim the gun at the desired lead, and fire as rapidly as possible until the plane was out of range. The men were taught that the primary purpose in firing at aircraft was to prevent the planes from bombing or strafing effectively, and that it was not of paramount importance to register hits.

SNIPERS IN MACHINE-GUN SQUADS

According to a prisoner, every light machine-gun squad had a sniper; however, all snipers were not equipped with the Model 97 rifle and the Model 97 telescopic sight. There were only three Model 97's in at least one company of the 45th Infantry Regiment. Japanese soldiers were inclined to regard only those men equipped with Model 97 rifles as being true snipers; it was felt that men equipped with the Model 38 rifle could not hope to perform as efficiently.

After the month of special training, snipers returned to their respective squads and trained with them. There was an alternate for the sniper in each squad. He was the No. 11 man in the squad. Although ordinarily an ammunition carrier, he might also have had the special course in sniper training.

If the marksmanship of all members of a light machine-gun squad was poor, a member of another squad might be assigned as its sniper. When a sniper became a casualty, another man immediately was assigned to take his place, for the Japanese regard the sniper as one of the key men of the squad. There are said to be

no snipers in the grenade-discharger squad of the rifle company.

CAMOUFLAGE

A thorough course in individual camouflage was given. Men were taught that the camouflage of the upper half of the body was especially important. Helmet nets and body nets were issued to all men for camouflage purposes. For additional camouflage, the nets were garnished with foliage. A prisoner remarked that even though all men strictly observed such techniques during their period of training, they did not actually carry out such measures during combat, especially in the jungle. The nets became entangled with the various shrubs and vines, and hindered movements. Often, instead of using nets, the men cut small branches and twigs and stuck these into their pockets and buttonholes. A prisoner said that his particular unit never had heard of the use of camouflage suits, straw hoods, or fiber capes. In localities where the background was not green, appropriate camouflage measures were taken, such as using dry branches and leaves and dry bark to blend with the color of the background.

TACTICS

Defensive tactics were neglected in training. The theory of defensive tactics was taught, but maneuvers did not permit a thorough practical application of these principles.

When encountering a superior hostile force, the sniper and the rest of the squad were to fire their rifles rapidly, with or without taking aim, in order to warn Japanese troops to the rear. The squad then was to fight a delaying action as best it could, while withdrawing by a roundabout route to avoid disclosing the dispositions of these troops.

When a hostile attack suddenly was made on a flank, the snipers were held responsible for handling the emergency until a Japanese force could deal with it.

Snipers made no special effort to stop tanks. If tanks came within close range, the sniper was to aim at the front vision slits or any other opening. Snipers never used grenade launchers of any type, nor did they receive any instructions regarding such weapons. A prisoner remarked that there was only one grenade launcher in his squad.

Since it was always hoped that captured Allied soldiers would prove a source of military information, snipers were ordered to take prisoners whenever possible. No definite instructions were given as to the methods which were to be employed when prisoners were captured. Usually there was someone in each squad who understood enough English to urge surrender if hostile soldiers should be surrounded. Under such circumstances the sniper was to fire on the hostile squad leader and on men with automatic weapons—in accordance with the Japanese principle of eliminating leaders in the hope of demoralizing their men. In trying to identify the leader of a hostile patrol or squad,

the Japanese looked for a man carrying a pistol or one who seemed to be issuing instructions. The relative age of the men in a hostile force was not used as a criterion in determining rank.

One of the sniper's duties included the spotting of hostile snipers. Allied soldiers were believed to be "snipers" if they were found trying to locate Japanese light machine-gun positions or gunners. It was supposed that snipers are used in the U. S. Army much as they are in the Japanese Army, and that they would have had similar training. Believing them to be key men in their respective units, the Japanese tried to eliminate them without delay.

The sniper in each squad usually remained within voice range of his squad leader so that contact might always be maintained. When snipers were obliged to go beyond voice range, simple hand signals were used. However, the squad leaders did not always give the sniper special instructions, and in many cases the snipers had to act according to their own judgment.

When fighting in open terrain, a sniper usually fired at a range of 500 yards. There was no established range for firing in the jungle, since trees and other vegetation were so likely to obscure the sniper's vision.

As a precautionary measure, the safety of the rifle always was set when the squad was deployed near the front lines. This was especially true in the jungle, where the trigger might become entangled in the undergrowth and be tripped accidentally.

Techniques of muffling the sounds of ejecting and

reloading were not taught. If a sniper wished to do so, he could take the expedient of moving the bolt slowly.

It was not possible to use flash hiders on Model 97 rifles for night attacks. However, flash hiders were fitted onto Model 96 light machine guns. In night attacks snipers usually used grenades instead of rifles.

Although snipers recognized the distinct advantages offered by high ground, it was said that Japanese training made no mention of firing from trees. Since so much is left to the discretion of the individual sniper, this may be true. It must be remembered, however, that Japanese snipers repeatedly have posted themselves in trees, especially to fire on targets of opportunity.

JAPANESE LANDING CRAFT MOST FREQUENTLY ENCOUNTERED

The Japanese landing craft most often encountered nowadays (see fig. 14) are much like the models which were in service at the outbreak of the "China Incident" in 1937.

The Type "A," a large barge with a landing ramp in its bow, is the Japanese landing craft most commonly used. It is known as a *Daihatsu.* This barge is intended for personnel, light artillery, and small vehicles. The hull is of steel, partly sheathed in wood. There is a raised deck aft, to accommodate the control personnel, the antiaircraft machine guns (usually of rifle caliber), and the stern anchor and winch. The winch is used to pull the craft off the beach after it has been grounded. Some *Daihatsu* have an armor shield to protect the control personnel. During landing operations, units which are to go ashore with infantry howitzers or antitank guns may mount these weapons in the bows of *Daihatsu,* to fire directly forward.[1] Recently constructed *Daihatsu* are likely to be at least 10 feet longer than the hitherto standard 49-foot type.

To land personnel, the Japanese may use a craft (Type "B") resembling an ordinary lifeboat. This type is quite seaworthy, and can effect landings under conditions more adverse than those the low-sided craft can cope with. The Type "B" is 30 feet long, and can carry about 40 men. At least some landing craft of

[1] Some models of this craft are armed with a short 75-mm gun on a pedestal mount in the waist of the boat.



Type "A" Landing Barge *(Daihatsu)*



Type "B" Landing Craft

Armored Patrol Boat



Type "D" Landing Barge



Type "H" Landing Barge

Figure 14.

Type "B" have an armor shield in the bow. This is intended to protect one of the light machine guns of the infantry unit on board.

A fast Diesel-powered armored craft with two gun turrets is in use as a patrol boat. More recent versions may mount dual 12.7-mm antiaircraft machine guns forward. The craft of this general type shown in figure 14 mounts machine guns of rifle caliber; it is armored, and can do 25 knots.

Type "D," another barge for personnel and freight, is a more seaworthy craft than the *Daihatsu*. Type "D" usually has a flared clipper bow and a slightly raised deck aft. Evidently an older type, this barge may or may not be equipped with engines.

Recently a *Daihatsu* with a square bow and stern (Type "H") has been used extensively. Its high poop and high gunwales make it a seagoing vessel, and suitable for supplying isolated garrisons. Like the original *Daihatsu*, it has a bow ramp, which can be lowered.

At Truk the Japanese have been constructing still larger barges, with lines similar to those of Type "D." These larger barges can carry medium artillery and similar loads, although the absence of a bow ramp would make unloading difficult. Encounters between PT boats and Japanese barges attempting to supply garrisons in the Solomons and New Guinea have resulted in reports that there are several types of these large barges, all of which seem to vary considerably in armament. It is believed unlikely that these large barges, which are about 54 feet long, can carry more than one piece of artillery as large as a 105-mm gun.

NEW JAPANESE UNIFORMS

Recent operations in the Southwest and Central Pacific and in Burma have revealed that the Japanese are trying to improve the tropical clothing of their armed forces. The purpose is to increase comfort and combat efficiency. Although some of these developments may appear sensible, field experience has indicated that not all are satisfactory and that the Japanese have sometimes adopted new models hastily, without making proper field tests.

The Japanese Army has a new lightweight tropical uniform. In line with the enemy policy of stressing individual camouflage measures for ground forces, the entire uniform is a solid dark green. Even the cap, the wrap puttees, and the *tabi* (split-toed sneakers) are dyed the same color as the blouse, breeches, and shirt. The uniform is almost featherweight. The blouse and breeches are of a very light cotton sheeting, while the pocketless shirt is made of the lightest muslin. The cap and puttees also are made of cotton, instead of the usual wool. Unfortunately for the Japanese soldier, the uniform lacks the requisite thickness —or, in default of thickness, the necessary tightness of weave—to repel insect bites, including those of the malaria-bearing Anopheles mosquito. The uniform's extreme lightness also seems to affect its durability; Japanese troops newly equipped with these light-



a. New Army Lightweight Tropical Uniform.

b. New Lightweight Uniform Without Blouse.

c. New "Long" Shorts With Drawstring Legs.

d. New Tropical Uniform of Japanese Marines.

weight uniforms were in rags after a few weeks of jungle combat in Burma. The extremely light weight also makes impregnation against gas impossible. The uniform is cut in the style of the standard Japanese woolen winter uniform and cotton summer uniform. To date, this new issue has been encountered both in Burma and Hollandia. The photographs on pages 62 and 63 show the uniform with and without the blouse. In the tropics, the blouse collar may be worn unbuttoned. The breeches are made like their standard wool and cotton counterparts, and are secured around the waist with tape. The legs of the breeches reach below the knee.

More practical for tropical wear are the new "long" shorts with drawstrings at the bottoms. This style permits the legs of the shorts to be worn loose when the soldier is not in malarious country, and closed whenever the presence of malarial mosquitoes is suspected. The standard heavy summer khaki (cotton twill) of which the shorts are made furnish good protection against mosquito bites. In the photograph, the soldier is wearing one leg loose and the other closed. The shirt is a common type of cotton khaki with reinforced collar. The shoes, which are rather unusual, are of pigskin and very suitable for moist climates; they have a rubber sole with rubber cleats instead of the usual heavy leather sole with steel-edged heels and metal hobnails.

A green uniform worn by detachments of the Japanese Navy known as the "Special Landing Forces,"

which perform the duties of Marines, is equally practical. It differs from Japanese Army uniforms in that the blouse collar cannot be closed at the neck in cold weather; also, the blouse pockets are of the patch-type, instead of being slashed into the sides and chest. The breeches have two large hip pockets with a greater capacity than most U. S. uniforms. In material and clothing, blouse and breeches are similar to the U. S. Army herringbone twill clothing. The olive-drab wool cap and the brass buttons of the blouse are decorated with the Japanese Navy anchor. This uniform, which probably has been designed for tropical duty, has been encountered in the Gilberts and the Marshalls. In the past, Japanese Marines in China have worn khaki uniforms.

IN BRIEF

NEW AMPHIBIOUS TANK

A Japanese amphibious tank captured in the Marshall Islands appears from preliminary examination to be a new model, although components of the vehicle closely resemble components of the Japanese Light Tank, Model 2595 (1935). It is reported that amphibious tanks are employed in tactical teams, possibly to attempt landings in the rear of Allied forces.

The suspension springs of the amphibious tank recently captured are inside the hull and a trailing idler has been added. The engine is similar to the type used in the Model 2595, but the interior arrangement of the hull has been changed because of the absence of bulkheads and the greater size. The pontons mounted in the front and rear can be released by screw-operated clamps controlled from the interior of the tank. The interior of each ponton is divided into compartments.

With pontons attached, this tank weighs 24,915 pounds and is 24 feet 4 inches long, 7 feet 8 inches high, and 9 feet 2 inches wide. The front pontons weigh 2,300 pounds and the rear pontons 1,515 pounds. On land the tank is steered by a clutch brake; in the water it is steered by twin rudders, with two propellers for propulsion. The armament consists of

a 37-mm gun mounted in the turret, a 7.7-mm machine gun mounted coaxially with the 37-mm gun, and a 7.7-mm machine gun in a ball mount in the left front hull. The 37-mm gun has a 360-degree traverse, and may be depressed 11½ degrees and elevated 5½ degrees.



Two Views of the New Japanese Amphibious Tank.

ON THE EVE OF BATTLE

A Japanese regimental commander's final operation instructions, issued 19 March 1944, "on the banks of the Chindwin" in Burma, is reproduced here. This unit was about to launch a drive across the Chindwin towards Kohima, and the colonel's final order is notable for its restrained tone and military soundness.

1. Ever since I assumed command of this Regiment, your work has more than satisfied me. Today we are on the eve of a great battle, which will decide the fate of Burma, India, and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Respect and obey your senior officer without question, and always remember that you are fighting for the Emperor. Keep in contact, and on friendly terms, with all other troops. There will be no cookhouse; every man will carry his own food and must be prepared to eat only one-third as much as he is accustomed to.

2. The object of this operation is to cut the enemy's supply lines and to destroy his main force. Captured equipment and food must be used as much as possible, in view of our own precarious supply lines. Do not neglect camouflage, especially camouflage of captured food dumps. Our lives depend on the amount of food we are able to take from the enemy. Do not leave anything in the field, and be particularly careful to evacuate all wounded. Any scrap of paper that you find may be of the utmost importance. Send everything back for expert translation.

3. Our enemies are the British and Americans. If you have to fight the Indians, try to induce them to surrender and, if they do so, treat them kindly. They should be evacuated to the nearest I.N.A. [Indian National Army] headquarters. After crossing the Chindwin, treat all the natives kindly. Do not steal, and, above all, don't get wrong ideas about the women.

4. The enemy's strongest suit is his light machine gun. We have suffered heavy losses on this account in previous operations. The best counter-measure is a bayonet charge. Be on the lookout for land mines and booby traps, especially in vehicles and houses and on the main trails. Don't be afraid of tanks; they are very vulnerable to our attacks. Experience has shown that our most successful method is to lever open the tank door with a pick and then throw in a grenade. Whenever we are at the halt, or in bivouac, air sentries must be posted. The enemy has a large and very active air force. Fires will not be lighted within 1,000 yards of the bivouac area, and every effort will be made to ensure that the smoke does not give away our positions.

5. Signal equipment is very hard to replace these days. Protect it carefully. Do not carry secret documents. Destroy all papers which contain unit names. Diaries will not be kept under any circumstances. Take care of your animals, especially the bullocks and ponies.

6. In conclusion, I send you all a message of good cheer. We are fighting to liberate 400 million Indians, and to drive the British and American armies out of Asia. Remember that this is the Emperor's will.

MORE IMPROVISED WEAPONS

Japanese improvised hand grenades have been so varied that it would be impossible to describe and illustrate the many kinds which have been encountered. A specimen found at Madang this summer (see fig. 15) is interesting, if only because its simplicity of construction is typical of Japanese efforts along this line. Obviously, the enemy can assemble a weapon of this type in a very few minutes.



Figure 15.—Japanese Improvised Hand Grenade.

The grenade found at Madang was built around a yellow cardboard cylinder containing a cast charge, believed to be picric acid. The igniter, a 1½-inch length of slow-burning fuze, had a small detonator crimped to one end. The detonator was set in a cavity in the picric. Four rounds of 7.7-mm small-arms ammunition were fastened to the cylinder by means of tape, to add weight and to provide fragmentation.

Recently the Japanese issued instructions regarding the use of a makeshift weapon against Allied ground

forces. Shells or bombs are to be fastened inside a wooden-frame cylinder, about 5 feet long and 5 feet in diameter. These are to be time-fuzed, and rolled down hillsides into the midst of a hostile force.

BOOBY-TRAPPED MOUNTAIN GUN

North of Waru, on New Britain, the Japanese booby-trapped a mountain gun in the following manner. A small sapling near the left wheel of the gun carriage was cut off about 10 inches above the ground. The trunk then was bound to the stump in such a way that the top of the sapling was inclined over the gun. A small prop was placed under the firing mechanism, and a fairly taut wire was strung from this prop to the upper branches of the sapling. Vines then were strung out in all directions from these branches. The vines looked like an attempt at camouflage, but in reality served as trip wires. Later, this trap was exploded by a patrol. Witnesses agree that no member of the patrol was standing within 5 feet of the weapon at the time. Someone had disturbed one of the vines, thereby pulling the taut wire, dislodging the prop, and causing the trigger to disengage and the firing pin to fall on the live round in the chamber. The barrel apparently had been plugged with mud; dirt still remained in the barrel after firing, and the breechblock was completely blown off just forward of the chamber.

JAPANESE 75-MM AMMUNITION

U. S. troops in the field who have occasion to make

use of captured Japanese 75-mm guns should find the chart of Japanese 75-mm ammunition on page 73 of considerable value. The list includes ammunition manufactured during 1943, with the exception of gas shells, which are not included. There are 10 different Japanese 75-mm guns, some of which are widely used throughout the Japanese Army. However, the ammunition for these guns differs appreciably. The shell cases vary in length from 7.28 inches to 19.55 inches, and the projectiles vary in weight from 8.34 pounds to 15.43 pounds.

Although a wide variety of fuzes is shown on the chart, it will be noted that the Model 88 (1928) can be used with most of the ammunition.

Throughout this chart the letter "M" is used as an abbreviation for "model."

ANTITANK MEASURE

Enemy respect for the achievements of U. S. tanks on Bougainville and in the Marshalls is evident from the manner in which Japanese training now is emphasizing antitank tactics.

Japanese soldiers are being taught to use magnetic antitank mines against the underbelly of U. S. tanks. Current enemy doctrine urges troops to dig and camouflage foxholes in the middle of the routes along which tanks may be expected to move. It is recommended that, as a U. S. tank passes over such a foxhole, the soldier reach out with a magnetic antitank mine, attach it to the belly of the tank, and "hope for the best."

Description		Weapons										Standard Fuze
		M41 Mtn	M38 Field	M41 Cav (horse)	M38 Field (improved)	M96 Field	M94 Mtn	M11 AA	M90 Field	M88 AA	M88 AA Special	
Cartridge Case Length (inches)		7.28	11.51	11.51	11.51	11.51	11.51	11.51	16.71	19.55	19.55	
Propellant		No. 1 Flake	No. 1 Strip	No. 1 Strip	No. 1 Strip (except M87 which has No. 2)	No. 1 Strip	No. 1 Flake	No. 1 Strip	No. 1 Strip (except M90 Ptd which has No. 2)	No. 3 Strip	No. 2 Strip (except M90 Ptd AA which has No. 3)	
Projectile												
M94	HE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	M88 Instantaneous M88 Delay
M94	HE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	M88 Instantaneous M88 Delay
M95	AP HE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	M95 AP Small Base
M90	HE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	M88 Instantaneous M88 Delay
M10	HE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	M88 Instantaneous M88 Delay
"A"	HE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	M3 Combination
"B"	HE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	M88 Instantaneous M88 Delay
M90 or M97	HE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	M88 Instantaneous M88 Delay
M90	Shrapnel	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	M5 Combination (for guns)
M38	Shrapnel	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	M3 Combination
M38 (see fuze)	Shrapnel	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	M5 Combination (for guns)
M90	Smoke	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	M88 Instantaneous
M90	Incendiary	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	M5 Combination (for guns)
M90	Illuminating	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	M5 Combination (for guns)
M90	Pointed HE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	M88 Instantaneous M88 Delay
M10 (pig iron and steel)	HE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	M88 Instantaneous M88 Delay
M87 (pig iron and steel)	HE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	M88 Instantaneous M88 Delay
M90	AA Pointed HE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	M89 Pointed AA
AA	HE	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	M10 AA Time
	AP HE	Yes	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	Base Delay
M2	HE AT	Yes	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	M88 Instantaneous
M98	HE (improved)	Yes	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	M88 Instantaneous M88 Delay

This is better, Japanese training goes on to suggest, than committing hara-kiri or dying in some other manner not directly useful to the Japanese war effort.

YARUZO!

In an effort to keep Japanese fighting spirit from flagging, the enemy command at Torokina issued this novel order:

To bring certain destruction to U. S. troops, it has been decided that hereafter the following exercise will be performed at morning and evening assembly.

1. Close the eyes, clench one or both fists and raise them to the forehead, and then bellow out, *"Chikusho!"* ("Damned animal!"). Thus will Yankee courage be sapped.

2. In addition, the ranking officer present will shout, *"Yaruzo!"* ("Let's do it!"), and all the others will follow in chorus with *"Yarimasu!"* ("We will do it!").

3. Finally, the ranking officer will take a saber in the right hand, and, assuming a rigid stance of steely determination, pretend to cut straight down between the shoulders of the enemy, shouting, *"Sen nin kiri!"* ("Kill a thousand men!").

GERMANY

TWO ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

CONCRETE BALL MINE

The Germans now are using spherical concrete antipersonnel mines, which may be rolled down hillsides or buried in the ground. These mines are made in several types, each of which consists of a ball of concrete having a large shrapnel content and an explosive charge in the center.



Figure 16.—German Concrete Ball Mine.

One type is 10 inches in diameter. Its charge consists of three blocks of explosive (approximately 26 ounces), detonated by a *Zdschn. Anz.* (fuze cord) friction igniter, Model 29, and a prepared (10-second safety fuze) detonator screwed into the charge. The igniter and detonator extend beyond the outside surface of the mine when three blocks of explosive are used. However, by reducing the charge to two blocks (approximately 17 ounces), it is possible to countersink the igniter and keep the shape of the mine purely spherical.

Another type of concrete ball mine is 13 inches in diameter, and is manufactured in halves, which are clamped together by steel rods. The concrete in the outer ring is coarse, while the remainder is fine. Some of these mines have trip wires attached. A carrying strap is attached to the steel rods which hold the two halves together.

A third type is 6 inches in diameter, and has a 7-ounce standard charge cast in the concrete.

It is reported that casualties are caused by these mines at distances of as much as 150 yards. Personnel who have been authorized to do so may neutralize the mines by removing the trip wires and unscrewing the igniter assembly from the primer charge.

SCHÜ-MINE 42

The German antipersonnel *Schü*-mine 42 (see fig. 17), which contains approximately 7½ ounces of

TNT, must be sought with painstaking diligence during mine-clearance operations, since its small metal content makes discovery with mine-detecting equipment difficult. Experience has shown that the mine-detector search coil must pass very close to the *Schü-*mine before any reaction is obtained. Detection is still more difficult when the search is made in ground containing shrapnel. Also, it is hard to locate the *Schü-*mine by observation or probing, because it is relatively small.



Figure 17.—German Schü-mine 42.

The *Schü*-mine box is 4.72 inches long, 3.55 inches wide, and 1.77 inches deep. The lid of the box is 5.04 inches long, 3.86 inches wide, and about 1.77 inches thick. The mine weighs 1.1 pounds.

Formerly the boxes were made of wood or plywood. However, the boxes of *Schü*-mines found recently have been made of a compressed fiber material rather like cardboard, but much harder. The box is assembled by means of mortised joints. Only two nails are used; these form the hinge pins for the cover.

The *Schü*-mine has a *Z.Z.* 42 bakelite pull-igniter with a No. 8 detonator.

The Germans transport these mines (empty) in light crates, each containing 20 mines. Detonators and charges are transported separately.

Personnel authorized to do so may prepare the *Schü*-mine for use by unscrewing the safety-cap (1) and inserting the detonator. The igniter is *not* provided with a safety device. The pin (2) is held in position by the spring-loaded striker (3). The pin is withdrawn from the hole in the striker by pressure transmitted by the lid on the link (4) of the pin or tension on the loop (5) along the axis of the pin. The striker, thus released, strikes the cap (6) and fires the detonator.

To lay the mine, open the lid (7) and place the charge in such a way that the socket faces the hole (8). Insert the igniter (9) with its detonator in position, through the hole, and carefully screw into the charge (10). Push the charge and igniter toward the

back of the box until the pin (2) touches the outside of the case. The striker and pin are then turned so that the link (4) lies below the striker. The slot (11) in the lid leaves the end of the striker free, while the lower edge of the lid rests on the link on both sides of the striker. The mine is then ready for use. In this condition, it should be as near as possible to the place where it is to be laid. When it must be transported over short distances, it can be disarmed by placing the link in a vertical position and securing the lid in the closed position. The link must be in the horizontal position to enable the mine to function.

When the mine is laid, the lid should lie approximately level so that pressure will be transmitted easily onto the igniter. If the lid is steeply inclined, the mine may not explode. The mine may be buried, or it may be laid on the surface of the ground when there is sufficient vegetation to conceal it. It can be secured against lifting by means of a wooden peg, which can be secured to the loop of the pin by a piece of wire.

Personnel authorized to neutralize the mine should lift the lid without exerting any downward pressure. If no anti-lifting wire can be found, the mine then is lifted and the igniter removed. If the pin is in a dangerous position, the mine should be destroyed where it has been laid.

GERMAN AUXILIARY TROOPS

Up to the outbreak of war in 1939, the German *Wehrmacht* (Armed Forces) consisted of the German Army, Navy, and Air Force. Although these three branches were primarily combat organizations, each had a special corps of administrative officials called *Beamter*, who attended to technical and administrative duties and who were provided with special uniforms and insignia. The Armed Forces proper were aided and supported to a considerable extent by a series of semi-military and auxiliary forces created within the Nazi Party. These assisted in the functions of supply, transport, construction, and maintenance in rear areas.

The *Reichsarbeitsdienst* (German Labor Service) or *RAD* was the most important of these organizations. When youngsters had completed their compulsory part-time duty in the Hitler Youth, they were drafted at 18 into the *RAD* for 6 months of pick-and-shovel work. The primary purpose of the *RAD* was supposed to be political indoctrination; its secondary mission was to harden the men physically, as part of their pre-military training. Actual construction work was intended only to be incidental to the *RAD* program.

German expansion through conquest led to changes in the *RAD* program. The occupation of Poland, France, and the Low Countries necessitated the ini-

tiation of tremendous construction projects, with the result that the *RAD* assumed many of the tasks as a means of freeing Army Engineers and Construction Corps personnel, both of the Army and the Air Force, for important combat duties. As the war progressed, the *RAD* was called on to assume an increasing number of military responsibilities. Finally, after the opening of the Eastern Front in June, 1941, *RAD* personnel were given rifles so that they could participate in combat against partisan units. This past spring the *RAD's* military status was legalized. Its members were officially declared part of the *Wehrmacht.* In addition to their own insignia, they were ordered to wear on the left sleeve of their coats a yellow arm band with the inscription "*Deutsche Wehrmacht*" in black. Official German broadcasts have announced that each *Arbeitsmann* (worker) in the *RAD*, no matter how young, is to be regarded as a soldier.

As a matter of fact, the arming of *RAD* personnel has proceeded at an ever-increasing rate during the past three years. They have been equipped not only with captured rifles and machine guns, but with captured armored vehicles, such as the Russian 3-ton armored antitank-gun and infantry-gun prime mover. This vehicle serves the *RAD* as a tractor, but, since its driver's compartment is armored and has a machine gun, the vehicle may operate as a light tank.

Manpower shortages in the German Army have forced the *RAD* to lower its induction age limit first to 17 years and then to 16½ years. This means that



a. Employee of the National Railways. b. Private of the National Police.



c. Private First Class of the *TN*. d. First Sergeant of the *RAD*.

Figure 18.

the youths now filling out *RAD* cadres were only 5 years old when Hitler came into power. Since they have known no government except that of the National Socialists, they are likely to be fanatically loyal to the Party.

The *Organization Todt,* or *OT,* has always been quite different in concept from the *RAD.* It was originally formed to recruit skilled engineers and labor to build the *Westwall* (Siegfried Line), and afterward was maintained to work on large-scale construction projects. Its German personnel have always been skilled laborers or engineers, instead of manual laborers, as in the *RAD.* Today the *OT* is a huge engineering organization, directing slave labor on major construction projects throughout the whole of occupied Europe. The only Germans left in the *OT* are likely to be in key positions; most of the laborers are men from France, Belgium, Russia, and other countries which have been exposed to German oppression. Besides building the Siegfried Line, the *OT* has constructed railways and bridges in the wake of advancing German armies in France and in Russia, has built numerous air fields and depots, and lately has constructed the Atlantic Wall and the giant submarine pens in France.

The underground threat, coupled with that of Allied raids, has resulted in a gradual arming of the *Organization Todt.* Because of the large-scale introduction of foreign elements, only the reliable Germans in the *OT* have been provided with rifles and pistols. However, to make the widest possible use of manpower,

German members of the *Organization Todt* were made part of the German Armed Forces in November 1942. In the spring of 1944, *OT* personnel were ordered to wear on their brown uniform blouses or overcoats the yellow arm band with the inscription *"Deutsche Wehrmacht."* Formerly, officers and men of the *OT* wore on their left arm red bands with a black swastika in a white circle, and below that a silver band with the lettering *"Organization Todt"* in black.

In practice, both the *RAD* and the *OT* may be broken up into small detachments and used to reinforce trained combat and construction engineers of the Army and Air Force. They may even be used to fill out Army or Air Force cadres, the trained military personnel acting as instructors and unit commanders. At an airfield, for example, there might be a limited number of *Luftwaffe* Construction Corps soldiers, and larger detachments of *OT* and *RAD* personnel. The latter would do most of the work, and would be assigned posts in the airfield defense scheme, but at all times probably would be subordinate to military personnel heading work details and commanding the posts.

While the *RAD* and *OT* work on general labor and construction projects, the Germans have another organization to deal with work calling for highly skilled technicians. This service, the *Technische Nothilfe* (Technical Emergency Corps), was formed after the last war as a counter-revolutionary group of strike-breakers to assist the Army and the conservatives in their efforts to suppress the Communists. It usually is

referred to as the *TN* or *Teno*. The *TN's* original mission was to be prepared to seize and protect—or, if necessary, to destroy—vital public utilities in urban centers, and thus hold the whip hand over any revolutionary movement. Therefore, after the Nazi regime was established, the *TN* logically came under the control of the police and Heinrich Himmler. In this war the functions of the *TN* have been expanded to include maintenance and construction work at Army, Navy, and Air Force bases and depots, as well as the installation and reconstruction of public utilities in occupied countries. *TN* personnel always have been armed with rifles and pistols. Clad in white fatigues or in blue-gray, they are distinguished by an arm band with the lettering "*Technische Nothilfe*" on their lower left sleeves. These men appear to have been the first who were authorized to wear the yellow arm band with the "*Deutsche Wehrmacht*" inscription, and therefore were the first semi-military organization to become part of the German Armed Forces.

The militarized "brigades" of the *Nationalsozialistische Kraftfahr-Korps* (Nazi Motor Corps) have been used only in full strength; elements have not been detached and subordinated to other units. This Corps usually is referred to as the *NSKK*. Organized with the object of arousing interest in motor vehicles and giving training in driving and maintenance, the *NSKK* has furnished two of these so-called "brigades" of motor vehicles for transport purposes to the Army and Air Force and one to the *Organization Todt*. Part of

the Air Force brigade was wiped out in Tunisia. *NSKK* men are also armed, but no announcement of their entry into the *Wehrmacht* has yet been made.

The German police organization very definitely is of a military character. The Germans have no municipal police or state police, as such; instead, all police organizations have been unified into a national police force. A distinction is made between city police and *gendarmes*, or rural police, but all belong to the same organization. This organization is really controlled by the *SS* Chief, Heinrich Himmler. He has converted the German police from an efficient crime-prevention agency into an instrument of Nazi power and repression. More and more identified with the *SS* (Party Elite Guard), the police have cavalry, mountain, motorized, and even tank units. Within Germany their mission is to suppress anti-Nazi activity, as well as to perform normal police duties. In occupied countries German police regiments and battalions have been used to enforce severe repressive measures against patriot saboteurs and partisans. It is the German police who have the job of burning villages and selecting and shooting hostages. In this they often are aided by their own armored units, which usually are equipped with old French 5-ton Renault and Hotchkiss light tanks, or with French Panhard armored cars. The normal armament of the German police is that of ordinary infantry; their Mauser rifles either are obsolete German types or are of Czech or Polish origin.

An acting corporal in the *Waffen-SS*.

The police have a special uniform, which has colored cuffs and a fancy double fly on the back of the coat. Both cuffs and back fly are decorated with gold buttons. The steel helmet is the regular army helmet, but usually has a swastika on one side and the *SS* "double-lightning" insignia on the other.

The *Waffen-SS* (Armed Party Elite Guard) has its own police, who are reputed to be even tougher than the Nazified national police. These *Waffen-SS* police are organized in an infantry division. They have uniforms much like the Army's but wear the *SS* eagle on the middle left sleeve. These troops have different insignia from that of the *Waffen-SS* divisions proper, for the latter wear the *SS* "double-lightning" or a death's head on their collar patches, while the *SS* police wear collar patches like the Army's.

Troops of the *Waffen-SS* have been operating in increasing strength as first-line troops ever since the beginning of the war, and are not to be regarded as a semi-military organization. Once consisting exclusively of strongly pro-Nazi Germans, the *Waffen-SS* has become a catch-all organization for Fascist-minded soldiers throughout Europe. It is the rest of the *SS*—the Security Service, the Death's Head Units, and the General *SS*—that carry on as the backbone of Hitler's Germany. Unfortunately, these organizations usually are hard to detect. The General *SS* and the Security Service (which works with the Gestapo) usually appear in Army uniforms to avoid censure for not being

soldiers. Only the Death's Head men, who are concentration camp guards, and the uniformed personnel of the Gestapo, may be singled out readily. On combat duty in *Waffen-SS* divisions, these men wear silver death's heads on the cap and the right collars of the blouse.

Since all Germany is regimented, still other auxiliary organizations may rise in military importance. For example, the German State Railway personnel in occupied countries gradually have been armed and are helping to secure railway installations against partisan attacks. Railway personnel have been provided with captured rifles and with light and heavy machine guns. It is perfectly possible that they may be called upon to participate in combat against United Nations forces, especially parachutists. The Railway Police, who wear the black trousers and dark blue overcoats of the regular railway personnel, now are apparently part of the *SS* police. The Railway Police were adequately armed, even in peacetime, and have been accustomed to work with well trained dogs.

It is not believed that the Germans intend any of their counterparts of the U. S. Women's Army Corps to do any front-line fighting. Women in the Army, Navy, and Air Force are used primarily for communication and administrative jobs. Only in the Air Force do they receive combat assignments; in this service, *Flakhelferinnen* man the guns and fire-control gear in home-defense units. In this they are assisted by boys 15 and 16, who are known as Flak Youth. A home

guard known as the *Heimatflak* also mans antiaircraft weapons. Personnel of all these organizations can be recognized by their uniforms of normal Army, Navy, or *Luftwaffe* color, and by the appropriate eagle worn on breast of their coats. Off duty, the *Heimatflak* personnel are likely to appear in civilian clothes.

The *Stadtwacht* and *Landwacht* (Urban and Rural Guards, respectively) should be of particular interest to United Nations flying personnel. These auxiliary police organizations were created in 1942 as vigilante groups to round up hostile aircraft crews parachuting to safety, as well as escaped prisoners of war and roving bands of escaped foreign workers. Like the British Home Guard, these vigilantes are part-time volunteers, mostly of older age groups. They usually wear white arm bands with *Stadtwacht* or *Landwacht* in black lettering.

IN BRIEF

NEW AUTOMATIC MACHINE CARBINE

The German Army is using a new automatic machine carbine, the *M.P.* (*Machinen Pistole*) 43, which serves the same tactical purpose as the U. S. carbine, M1, caliber .30. Like the U. S. carbine, this German weapon is a gas-operated, locked-breech weapon, and fires ammunition of service caliber which is not interchangeable with any other German small-arms ammunition. The new weapon has a caliber of .31 inches (7.92 mm), is 37 inches long, and weighs 10 pounds without the magazine. With the full magazine (30 rounds), the total weight is 12 pounds.

New German Automatic Machine Carbine (*M.P.* 43).

It consists almost entirely of stamped parts, with the exception, of course, of the action, the barrel, and the

wooden stock. This is in accordance with the present trend in German small-arms manufacture.

The use of rivets in the trigger mechanism makes detail stripping of this weapon difficult.

The new carbine is reported to have a theoretical cyclic rate of fire of 800 rounds per minute. This rate of fire is not realized in practice, however, because a recent German order forbids troops to use the automatic fire setting, which leads to pronounced overheating of the weapon's only barrel. In effect, this new carbine is a magazine-fed, semi-automatic weapon.

The *M.P.* 43 therefore compares very unfavorably with the U. S. carbine, M1. The German weapon is practically twice as heavy, and has no apparent advantage except for the slightly higher muzzle velocity of 250 feet per second.

USE OF HAND FLAME THROWERS [1]

In one of the attacks against U. S. forward positions on the Anzio beachhead, the Germans used hand flame throwers (Models 41 and 42) in the following manner. Each weapon was worked by a two-man crew. The flame throwers were employed in pairs. Two flame throwers were allotted to each of the two attacking platoons, and it is believed that a fifth and sixth were held in reserve.

The Germans attacked under cover of smoke. Even though this may have interfered somewhat with the

[1] For a discussion of the types of German hand flame throwers, with illustrations, see *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 8, pp. 22-28.

vision of the crews, flame was directed toward the U.S. forward positions. Either because of the smoke or because of inexpert calculation, the Germans opened fire before they were within flame-thrower range (roughly, about 30 yards) of the defenses. Bursts of 6-second duration were used.

Defensive fire effectively prevented the enemy from bringing the weapons within range, and no casualties were suffered. That the crews of German hand flame throwers operate under handicap is evident from the fact that, after this action, all four flame throwers were found to have been left behind by the Germans.

PATROL RUSE

A ruse employed by German patrols is described in the following comment by an enemy soldier:

"I went forward with a patrol. Six Tommies came toward us. We adopted the same methods that we had used in Tunisia. When the British soldiers came in sight, only one of us showed himself. They fired on him and then came nearer. They did not see the rest of us. At the blast of a whistle, we all opened fire. It's a good ruse, and we've found that it nearly always works."

It should be added, however, that a ruse seldom works if the opposition is on the lookout for it.

QUARTERS AND DUMPS

Recent evidence suggests that German units on the Italian front now are forbidden to use buildings for

the billeting of troops or for the storage of matériel. Only once in a great while is an isolated shed or barn used for storage purposes. In Italy, dumps are usually under natural or improvised cover, and not more than 1 mile from a main road. Natural camouflage is employed, and normally is renewed every day. German camouflage discipline continues to be excellent.

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