

SPECIAL BULLETINS
FROM THE 1939-1940
ACTIVE CAMPAIGN IN EUROPE

LESSONS 1-10

THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL

LIBRARY



Class Symbol **M 9405-E1**

Accession Number **60968**

FILE COPY
C & GSS LIBRARY
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE

DECLASSIFIED

SPECIAL BULLETINS

Nos. 1 - 10

- Bulletin No. 1: The German campaign in Poland. (October 6, 1939)
- " 2: Soviet-Finnish War. Operations from November 30, 1939 to January 7, 1940. (January 10, 1940)
- " 3: The German campaign in Poland, September 1 - October 5, 1939. (February 1, 1940)
- " 4: Royal Air Force Empire training scheme. (February 21, 1940)
- " 5: Soviet-Finnish War. Ground and naval operations, January 8 - 31, 1940. (March 5, 1940)
- " 6: Soviet-Finnish War. Ground and naval operations, February 1 - March 13, 1940. (April 1, 1940)
- " 7: See Letter dated September 21, 1940.
- " 8: Construction of a German Field Army. (July 18, 1940)
- " 9: The German attempt to capture the Hague by the 22d German Division (Air Infantry). (August 12, 1940)
- " 10: Major military operations in the German invasion of Holland. (August 19, 1940)

SEP 1944

DECLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIEDG-2
HEM/TSM.I.D., W. D.
Special Bulletin No. 1
October 6, 1939.THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND

German military operations in Poland having been brought to a successful conclusion, a short summary of the campaign, together with some outstanding lessons, is presented. It should be realized that detailed information of the campaign will be unavailable for some time. However, enough is known of the organization of the two forces; enough can be gleaned from official communiques and an analysis of the events themselves to draw some important conclusions as to strategy and major tactics at this time.

The German campaign in Poland, between September 1st and 17th, constitutes one of the most rapid and overwhelming victories of military history.

This Cannae of Cannae was the result of marked military superiority of the German Army over its brave, stubborn, but poorly led opponent. This German superiority was expressed in the relative number of troops placed in the field by the two antagonists, in the quantity and quality of military materiel on each side, in the far higher training standards of the German Army, though perhaps most dramatically of all by the comparative leadership displayed by the two High Commands.

Just as it takes a Hannibal to create a Cannae, so also does it take a Varro. In the Polish campaign of September 1939, the Polish High Command can scarcely lay claims to a higher quality of leadership than that displayed by Varro two thousand years ago.

The Plans of Campaign of Germany and Poland (See Map 1).

The German plan of campaign in Poland was essentially that of the classic Schlieffen double envelopment. Its goal was the complete destruction of the Polish Army. The execution of this plan was favored by the political geography of eastern Europe. Before the campaign began Poland was already half double enveloped from East Prussia in the north and Slovakia in the south.

The German plan received material assistance from the initial concentrations of the Polish Army. The three Polish armies were concentrated far forward, with the German flanks already initially overlapping them. The strongest of these three Polish armies was drawn up in the Posen promontory, flanked to the north by the German armies in


NOV 7 '39

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Pomerania and East Prussia, and to the south by the German Silesian army group of three armies in Silesia. On the other hand the two flank Polish armies were weaker than this center one. The northern Polish army, the so-called "Corridor" army, in the area north and northwest of Warsaw and in the Corridor itself, was fairly strong; the southern one, the "Silesian" army between Czeszochowa and Cracow in immediate proximity to the German frontier, protecting the exposed Upper Silesian industrial area was the weakest of the three. Fate decided that this weak Silesian army would have to bear the "main effort" attack of three German armies. The total strength of these three Polish armies was about 30 active divisions. No reserve divisions took part in the first phase of operations.

These Polish armies were organized and equipped in World War style. Large mechanized units were nonexistent. Tanks were grouped in corps battalions, and assigned at the rate of one or two per army. Motor transport units were rare. Hence supply and regroupment of units after the campaign had begun, depended on the smooth and undisturbed operation of the Polish railroads. The Polish Air Force was fairly numerous (1000 first line planes of all types) and sufficiently well trained according to Eastern European standards. The technical design of the average Polish airplanes was inferior. Probably Poland possessed only a few pursuit planes capable of overtaking standard German bombers.

The reasons which induced Poland to adopt this extraordinarily daring plan for concentrating their armies far forward cannot be determined at this time. The German High Command claims that Poland envisaged an offensive campaign against East Prussia. There is much in the initial Polish troop dispositions which supports this idea. In fact, the massing of considerable bodies of Polish troops within the exposed Corridor can scarcely be explained under any other assumption.

Whether Poland actually planned such an East Prussia offensive or merely threatened one cannot as yet be discerned. It is certain, however, that the few and pitifully inadequate Polish pill-box lines, on the Narew, along the Warta and in Upper Silesia cannot but have induced their High Command to seek battle in open warfare, rather than in defensive positions which, at best, could but delay the issue, and thereby surrender voluntarily two-thirds of Poland's fuel and mineral resources to the enemy without a struggle.

Poland proposed to create on mobilization a fourth army and concentrate it in the Grodno area, to the southeast of East Prussia. It appears doubtful whether this army was ever actually created. Certain it is, however, that the area selected for its concentration turned out to be just about as far away from the decisive battle area, as any which could have been selected.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

The German plan for double envelopment of the Polish armies foresaw a main effort drive in the south from Silesia on Warsaw, and a secondary drive from East Prussia, across the Narew and Bug rivers aimed at the area between Siedlce and Warsaw, to the east of the Vistula. The initial plan, however, even went further and sketched a second double envelopment to be achieved by the Southern and Northern Groups pushing their extreme outer flanks forward simultaneously to the areas of Chelm and Brest Litovsk respectively.

These main operations were to be preceded by limited local operations involving the capture of the Corridor and the Upper Silesian industrial area.

The initial German concentrations involved the creation of two army groups. The stronger, the southern one under General Oberst von Rundstedt concentrated in Silesia, Moravia and Slovakia. General Oberst von Rundstedt is one of the senior officers of the German Army, a polished restrained aristocrat, highly and widely regarded in the Army for his strategic, tactical, and political ability. His army group was composed of three armies. To the north was the Third, concentrated to the north and northeast of Breslau, under General of Infantry Johannes Blaskowitz. In the center was the Fourth army, in and around Kreuzburg under General ~~Walter~~ Walter von Reichenau. Reichenau, widely known in the German Army as "The Bull" is a former Olympic athlete, a close adviser and friend of Chiang Kai-shek and notorious for his requirement that all his staff officers be able to accompany him, twice a week on a four-mile cross country run. He wears a monocle and plays an almost Davis Cup brand of tennis.

The southern army of this army group was commanded by General of Infantry List, Germany's suavest diplomatic general. This army contained the Austrian units and two Slovak divisions under the Slovak Commander in Chief, General Catlos. It was foreseen by German general headquarters that the Fourth army under Reichenau should make the main effort. Its direction of attack was to be northeastward on Warsaw. The Third army, to the left of the Fourth was given the task of protecting the flank of the Fourth army against the expected counter attacks of the strong Polish forces known to be concentrating in and around Posen.

The southern army of List, the Fifth, was given the missions of initially capturing the Upper Silesian industrial area with as little damage to the mines and steel works as possible; secondly, of protecting the right flank of the Fourth army's advance on Warsaw; and thirdly, of pinning down and destroying the Polish forces in and around Cracow. To achieve the latter mission, strong forces, partly German, partly Slovak were concentrated initially in Slovakia to the east of the High Tatra Mountains.

In the concentration of this southern army group, it is

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

noteworthy that the frontier concentrations were exclusively composed of infantry divisions of the World War type. The Panzer divisions were drawn together in two groupings forty miles in rear of the front lines. The larger of these, five or six divisions in all, was located between Breslau and Glatz; the smaller, two divisions in Moravia, to the east and southeast of Brunn.

The northern army group was placed under the command of General Oberst von Bock, generally considered Germany's most aggressive field soldier. The designations of his two armies are still unknown. One was formed in Pomerania, under General of Infantry Kluge, the Group commander of the Sixth Army Group in Hannover. The other was composed of the East Prussian formations, reinforced by one division transported by sea from interior Germany under General von Kuechler, the I Corps Area commander. This latter army was from 10 to 12 divisions strong. Its mission was initially to drive directly on Warsaw from the north, but then to avoid a direct attack on the Polish Bug fortifications, and to shift its attack southeastward and outflank Warsaw by an attack over Narew and Bug, in the direction of Siedlce in order to seize the area due east of Warsaw.

The Pomeranian army was given the initial task of wiping out the Corridor. Later its left wing was to cross the Vistula between Graudenz and Thorn and drive on Modlin from the northwest.

The southern group of this army was to attack along the axis Graudenz--Wloclawek--Warsaw and seek to make contact with the Silesian army group driving from the southwest on Warsaw.

Between the northern and southern army groups, stood facing the strong Polish Posen army, a very weak and thin chain of fortresses, frontier, and Landwehr troops. It can truly be said that the German concentration envisaged two strong wings without a center. Contrariwise the Poles created a strong center army with weaker armies on both flanks. The total strength of all German armies operating against Poland appears to have amounted to between fifty and seventy divisions.

It was also planned that the left wing of the East Prussian army and forces of General List's Fifth army on the extreme southern flank should seek to make contact at a later stage of campaign between Chelm and Brest Litovsk, then re-double enveloping such Polish forces as might successfully withdraw to the line of the Narew and Vistula rivers.

Operations. (See Map 2)

(A) Closing of the Corridor.

The German Pomeranian army opened its attack to wipe out

 **DECLASSIFIED**

the Corridor on September 1st, 1939, the opening day of the war. This drive was launched from the line Schneidemuhl--Butow, southeastward towards the Vistula and Bromberg across the broad mouth of the Corridor. This advance met little opposition. Advanced German mechanized units reached the Vistula between Graudenz and Thorn by the evening of September 2d. Bromberg was occupied on September 5th. This advance from Pomerania was assisted by the advance of a weak force of the East Prussian army in the direction of the obsolescent fortress of Graudenz. The line of ring forts of this city was broken through on the 3d and the city occupied on the 4th.

The rapid German advance across the Corridor to the Vistula cut off surprisingly large Polish forces in the Upper Corridor, estimated as totaling between 40,000 and 50,000 men. These forces continued to resist for some time, but eventually were forced to surrender between the 6th and 9th, as ammunition and other supplies began to run low. Among the units here captured were the 9th and 27th Polish Divisions as well as the Pomorske cavalry brigade and certain Army and GHQ units.

Of interest in the German conduct of this operation was the initial German neglect of the port of Gdynia and the northern portion of the Corridor along the sea coast. No German detachments in the Corridor or for that matter anywhere were used for spectacular but unessential successes not contributing to the main mission of the army; i. e., the destruction of the Polish field forces.

From a strategical standpoint, the leaving of considerable Polish forces in the Corridor by their High Command appears indefensible. It would seem that this massing of Polish troops can only be explained by assuming an intention to attack Danzig and East Prussia from the west.

German Air Operations.

The German Air Force struck hard at dawn of the opening day of the war. Its initial mission was to secure for Germany domination of the air by destroying Polish air formations and ground installations. Practically every known Polish airfield, air depot and aircraft factory was subjected to attack on September 1st. As a result of these attacks Polish air reaction thereafter was minimal, spasmodic and ineffectual.

The Polish air power disposed of, the German Air Force which consisted in the Polish war of Air Fleet 1 (1770 airplanes) and one division of Air Fleet 4 (480 airplanes) then proceeded to cooperate with the Army in achieving Germany's strategic goal; viz., the destruction of the Polish Army.

Poland lacking roads, and hence depending unduly on railroads,

DECLASSIFIED

had been placed in a critical situation, by an initial faulty concentration. A regrouping of her forces was essential, if she was to meet the drives of the enemy's East Prussian and Silesian armies. Yet to check them, the smooth functioning of the railroads was necessary in order to build up adequate defensive forces on these fronts. This regrouping was prevented by the German Air Force by mass attacks on the railroads. These attacks resulted in such destruction as to paralyze the entire Polish railroad net in that part of Poland extending as far east as Brest Litovsk and Lemberg.

Other units of the German Air Force, attached to the Army, notably dive bombing and reconnaissance units also contributed greatly to the tactical successes achieved by the German Army between September 1st and 17th. This assistance however was of slight importance compared to the strategical success of depriving Poland of her railroad net, a success largely achieved between September 1st and 5th.

Upper Silesian Operations.

The seizure undamaged of the highly valuable Polish portions of the Upper Silesian industrial area was an essential economic-strategical element of the German plan of campaign. No direct attack on Polish Upper Silesia was contemplated. Rather was a wide German flanking operation launched on September 1st from the Carpathian mountain chain to the south. Slovakia proved for this purpose a highly useful ally, inasmuch as geographically it provided a secure base for the southern German flank. The direction of the main effort of this southern pincher was in the direction of Cracow. The Fifth German army carried out the operation. Little Polish resistance was encountered. The Fifth army's rapid advance, forced the almost battleless evacuation of the Upper Silesian area which provided Poland with far more than half of all its industrial products.

The Advance from Silesia on Warsaw (The main effort).

The main German effort, the advance in the direction of Warsaw, aimed at cutting off the Polish forces in Posen and the Corridor was carried out by Reichenau's Fourth army, with flank protection in the direction of Posen provided by Blaskowitz' Third army. The weaker Polish Silesian army opposing this two-army attack was forced back rather rapidly between September 1st and 5th to the line Sieradz-Lodz-Pietrkow-Kielce. By September 6th the fighting had reached this line and Kielce had already been occupied by Reichenau's right wing. While this German advance was exceedingly rapid, the Polish forced withdrawal, up to September 6th, had not been disorderly. Nevertheless there were already indications that the Polish retreat was tending to become eccentric. The left wing of the Polish Silesian army was withdrawing along the axis Kielce-

DECLASSIFIED

Radom-Deblin while the right wing was still holding firm southwest and south of Lodz. Between these two groups a gap, either weakly held, or totally empty was beginning to open up.

Up to the 6th, the German advance had been essentially an open warfare advance of the World War type with normally organized infantry divisions pushing forward from eight to ten miles a day. The powerful mechanized divisions of the German Army were still unused, but it would appear that on the 5th and 6th one or more "Panzer" divisions had been brought forward close behind the center of the advancing armies in reserve, but in a position to support instantaneously a break-through.

The Decisive Thrust of the Silesian Army Group (Sept. 7th and 8th). (See Map 3)

A broad gap in the Polish front on both sides of Piotrkow opened up directly before the center of the German Silesian armies on the morning of the 7th of September. From Piotrkow runs a paved road northeastward to Warsaw, a road which is probably the best in all Poland. Along this road was at once pushed forward by the German Fourth army a mechanized force, probably amounting to one "Panzer" division. This force advanced with extreme rapidity. By the morning of the 8th, it had reached Mszczonow, 40 miles southwest of Warsaw, and by evening its advanced reconnaissance elements had even entered the extreme southwesterly suburbs of Warsaw itself. Though this force did not capture the city on the 8th or at any time thereafter, it did drive forward a thin wedge, entirely dividing the Polish "Posen," "Corridor" and a small element of the "Silesian" armies, from the bulk of the latter and such other Polish forces as were engaged in Galicia and east of the Vistula. Provided this wedge could be maintained, the Polish forces west of the wedge must face certain extinction. For the German High Command, the strategical problem from this point on was to broaden and maintain this wedge at all cost. This required that motorized and horse-drawn infantry division be brought forward as rapidly as possible into the area, immediately west and southwest of Warsaw and to thicken the wedge and to form a double front with the main force facing the "Posen" and "Corridor" armies, and smaller elements hemming in the Polish capital.

Meanwhile Blaskowitz' army advanced on Lodz from the southwest, south and southeast. Lodz itself was captured on the 9th.

Operations of Pomeranian Army after Seizure of Corridor.

Following the capture of Graudenz the operations of the Pomeranian army became double pronged. The larger group crossed to the east bank of the Vistula, between Thorn and Graudenz, and then in a succession of forced marches pressed forward southeastward in the

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

direction of Modlin and Warsaw. Units of this part of the army participated later in the siege of Modlin. A smaller group of the Pomeranian army remained west of the Vistula and pressed forward towards Kutno. This group, operating from the northeast, participated in the later operations of the Third and Fourth armies which resulted in the encirclement and capture of the mass of the Polish "Posen" and "Corridor" armies near Kutno.

The German Advance from East Prussia.

The German forces in East Prussia amounted at the outbreak of the war to between ten and twelve divisions under General von Kuechler. Only half of these however were fully mobilized at the outbreak of the war. Later, after the Corridor was abolished, the East Prussian army was reinforced by divisions from the interior of Germany. Those ready for action took the offensive in two groups immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. The weaker force, about a division strong, advanced on Graudenz to assist the Corridor operations. The main force struck due south from the line Neidenburg--Ortelsburg in the direction of Warsaw and the Polish pill box line along the Narew. Przasnysz was captured on the 3d, Mlawa on the 5th. On the evening of the 6th the Narew had been reached. However, this East Prussian army was not aiming to attack Warsaw directly. The Polish capital was too strongly defended to the north by the fortress of Modlin (Novo Georgiesk). Rather it was the intention of this army to break through the Narew line, Pultusk and Ostrolenka and then in a rapid pursuit force the Bug river and cut off Warsaw from East Poland. On the 7th and 8th there was heavy fighting along the Narew. On the 9th river crossings had been forced at Pultusk and Rozan and the advance pushed by mechanized elements even as far as the Bug. On the 9th bridgeheads had been created to the south of the Bug at Wyszkow and Brok. These latter two successes secured the attainment of the strategic goal of the East Prussian army; viz., the occupation of the area due east of Warsaw. This latter operation sealed the fate of the Polish capital.

The German Advance in Galicia.

The bulk of the Polish Silesian army withdrew in the face of the German advance on Warsaw not in an easterly direction towards the San, but towards Deblin and the Vistula crossings to the northeast of Radom. As a result of this direction of withdrawal only smaller Polish units remained in Galicia to oppose List's Fifth German army. In consequence, the Fifth army's advance eastward from September 5th took on the character of a pursuit. Two mechanized divisions of the army pushed forward at the rate of twenty or thirty miles a day, outstripping the following infantry units. Cracow was captured on the 6th. The advance of the Fifth army eastward beyond Cracow was assisted by attacks of combined Slovak and German mountain divisions who

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

debouched from eastern Slovakia in the direction of Neu Sandez (Nowo Sacz) and Gorlice. The operations of the German Fifth army present little of tactical interest except the speed of its advance. By September 15th advanced units had reached the suburbs of Lemberg. On 17th mechanized reconnaissance units of its left wing had made contact with similar detachments of the East Prussia army near Wlodowa, 40 miles south of Brest-Litovsk. This contact insured a German line being drawn along the Bug river from East Prussia to Slovakia, cutting off all Polish forces west of the Bug. Nevertheless this line established along the Bug was so thin and comprised of such scattered isolated units that it could not be considered on the 17th as an effective bar to Polish withdrawal eastward.

The Destruction of the Main Polish Armies.

The Fate of the Polish Posen Army.

On the morning of September 9th the situation of the Polish armies was as follows:

The bulk of the Polish "Posen" and "Corridor" armies was withdrawing from Posen and Pomorze provinces towards Warsaw, followed at arm's length by weak German occupying detachments. A small part of the "Posen" army had reached Warsaw. The larger part had attained the Bzura river 60 miles west of Warsaw. Strong rear guards held Kutno and Wloclawek.

Along the Bzura, the further advance of these armies was held up by German delaying detachments of the German Third and Fourth armies. These German forces were being constantly reinforced. North of Lodz, Blaskowitz' Third army was seeking to close in on the Polish "Posen" army from the south, but had been forced temporarily on the defensive by the courageous attempts of his opponents to break out of the trap. The Germans were fighting defensively, the Poles offensively. The German defense had only to maintain itself and the Polish "Posen" and a part of the "Corridor" army would have ultimately to surrender.

The Fate of the Silesian Army.

On the morning of the 9th, the bulk of the Polish Silesian army was still far from safety behind the Vistula. Some divisions had, to be sure, reached temporary security at Deblin (Ivangorod). Others were fighting north of Lodz in conjunction with the Posen army. The main body was still holding defensively south of Radom, along the Lysa Gora, a wooded hill chain stretching from Piotrkow to Sandomierz. This defensive position had been turned by the Germans to the north-west, by the penetration of mechanized units to the suburbs of Warsaw.

German mechanized unit now secured a second striking success

DECLASSIFIED

of a decisiveness seldom paralleled in military history.

One or more mechanized divisions previously assembled near Piotrkow struck due eastward, captured Radom and Zwolen by evening of the 9th and barred the further retreat of Poles in the Lysa Gora to the Vistula. Simultaneously other mechanized troops, pushed eastward from Kielce, struck the San at Sandomierz, then turned northward along the west bank of the San, and joined up with the other mechanized force near Zwolen.

The fate of the Poles in the Lysa Gora was thus sealed. By September 13th, 60,000 officers and men, 43 guns and 38 tanks had been captured. The larger part of the Polish "Silesian" army had been destroyed.

The Fate of the Polish "Posen" Army.

The efforts of the Polish "Posen" army to break through from Kutno to Warsaw constitute the major action of the war. It is noteworthy that in this battle, the strategically attacking German forces fought actually on the defensive thereby using all the advantages which accrue to the employment of modern weapons on the defense, while the strategically defending Poles, were forced to take the tactical offensive, with all its disadvantages. The only very partial successes of the Polish attacks therefore sealed the army's fate. By September 18th the "Posen" army had begun to disintegrate. By the 20th, resistance had ceased and 170,000 Polish troops had surrendered with 300 guns and 40 tanks.

German Operations East of the Vistula and South of the Bug. (See Map 4)

The attainment on the 8th by East Prussian troops of bridgeheads to the south of the Bug at Wysograd and Brok was followed by an almost complete collapse of Polish defense in this area. A mechanized force on the left wing of the East Prussia army struck rapidly eastward and southward from Lomza. By the 14th it had reached Brest-Litovsk. Further west, Warsaw was surrounded on the eastern bank of the Vistula by the German forces which had crossed the Bug at Wysograd.

A few Polish active divisions reinforced by reserve units around Lublin still maintained some coherence of organization and fighting efficiency. These however were now threatened from all sides. The loss of the Narew and Bug lines rendered simultaneously the Vistula defense line untenable. On the 17th Reichenau's Fourth army, not resting after its Radom victory, crossed the Vistula near Deblin and the San northeast of Sandomierz.

DECLASSIFIED

The Polish Lublin forces realizing that the Vistula line was no longer tenable sought to draw off eastward. Their fate however had already been decided by the Russian invasion of East Poland which began on the 17th. The units of this force soon began to scatter. All semblance of coherence therefore rapidly disappeared. On the 20th the Silesian army commanded by General Piskor was captured near Zamosc. By the 21st a total of 103,000 officers and men of this force had surrendered in a half dozen minor capitulations. A few detachments later slipped through the German net on the Bug, only to fall into the hands of the Russian troops advancing westward.

The Capture of Warsaw.

By the 13th German forces which had crossed the Bug a few days previously had reached the suburbs of Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula, thus hermetically closing every avenue of escape for its garrison. Nevertheless, the Polish capital continued to hold out doggedly until September 28th. Badly battered by German artillery and aircraft, with reduced stocks of ammunition and with food supplies for the civil population running low, the brave garrison then realized that further defense was futile. The Polish forces which surrendered in Warsaw between September 28th and October 2d amounted to approximately 100,000 men. Modlin, the old fortress at confluence of Bug and Narew, upon learning of the surrender of Warsaw, itself capitulated the following day, 30,000 further Polish troops at Modlin thus also becoming prisoners of war.

On October 2d the Hela peninsula off Danzig, the last Polish island of resistance in west Poland surrendered to German naval force. This capitulation ended the operations of the Polish campaign of 1939.

According to official German statements, approximately 700,000 Polish prisoners were captured, while the German casualties amounted to 10,572 killed, 30,332 wounded and 3,409 missing.

Critical Comments.

The defects of leadership shown by the Polish High Command in the recent German--Polish campaign are so striking as to nullify, in part at least, the effect produced by the excellent strategy of German General Headquarters, and the battle efficiency of the German Army and Air Force as a whole.

The wholly false Polish concentration plan; viz., the massing of their armies in close proximity to the German frontiers, preparatory to either threatening or actually taking the offensive against East Prussia indicates both a great overestimate of their own strength and an equally gross underestimate of the strength of their enemy. It can truly be said that no subsequent Polish reestimate of

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

the situation, and no amount of bravery or tactical success by their troops could compensate for this initial disastrous misestimate of the strategical situation. Even if Germany had had but an equal air force and had possessed no mechanized divisions, still a "Cannae" would have surely come sooner or later to the Polish armies.

The German strategical plan was sound in all respects. It aimed at the destruction of the Polish armies. It paid no attention to unessential prestige objectives, such as Gdynia or Warsaw. It stressed speed of movement, and wide envelopments. It can truly be said that Count Schlieffen was the spiritual leader of the German armies in this Polish campaign. The German center was kept weak throughout and never pressed forward; the flanks were maintained as strong as possible, and kept advancing ever faster, and in ever-widening envelopments. No such mistake was repeated as that made by the younger Moltke in 1914, when he permitted Kluck's first army to cut in too quickly, leaving the Paris fortified area on his flank. In the Polish campaign, both the right flank army, the Fifth army of List, and the East Prussian army of Kuechler kept their extreme flank-ing groups well spread and never permitted them to cut in too soon. It is noteworthy that these flanking groups eventually came together at least 150 miles in rear of Warsaw.

Nevertheless, even if a comparison of the German and Polish plan of campaign leads to the inevitable conclusion that a Polish "Cannae" must have come sooner or later, the speed and success of the German armies in this annihilating campaign appear to be due to two factors, which differentiated the organization and equipment of the German and Polish Armies.

The German High Command had at its disposal two modern weapons, not possessed by Poland, viz.:

- (1) A vastly more numerous and efficient air force;
- (2) A mass of mechanized divisions.

These two weapons spelled the difference in this campaign between a rapid or retarded Cannae. It can truly be said that the Polish Army was organized and equipped very similarly to the armies which ended the World War. The Polish Air Force was probably not even as strong relatively as the air forces of France and Great Britain in 1918. The Polish tanks were organized in corps and army battalions, and distributed to the armies and corps as the tactical situation seemed to require. Large motorized or mechanized units were non-existent.

The German Army had an air force of 1939 model, and if a much misused term may be permitted "streamlined" to the nth degree. The one and one-half air fleets employed, each approximately corresponding

DECLASSIFIED

to our G.H.Q. Air Force, were held under the strict control of the German Army High Command. These were used for general strategic objectives and not to assist the individual armies to secure local tactical successes. These air fleets first neutralized the Polish Air Force; they then promoted the general strategical success of the German armies by paralyzing the Polish railroad net. Other air forces, though much less numerous than those under G.H.Q. control, including reconnaissance, pursuit and dive bombing (attack) squadrons, were directly subordinated to the German armies and corps. These cooperated with the ground forces in achieving tactical successes.

If this German superiority in the air, when added to the superior German leadership, should have brought about a relatively short campaign, the extreme rapidity and completeness of the Polish disaster is believed due primarily to the possession by the German Army of a mass of mechanized divisions, and the skill and flexibility with which these were used.

A German mechanized, or, as they called it, a "Panzer" division is a mechanized force of all arms, approximately 12,000 men strong, with some 3,000 motor vehicles of all types. The Panzer Division is in no sense a motorized infantry of the present type of the American Army. It is more nearly the equivalent of a prewar cavalry division which the advance of science has now permitted to be mechanized. The division is built for speed. Hard hitting qualities are sacrificed to achieve this purpose. There are in peace nine mechanized divisions in the German Army compared to 42 infantry divisions. The latter are built for hard hitting and speed is sacrificed. The "Panzer" Division is organized in three echelons:

- (1) A reconnaissance echelon, organized as a motorized reconnaissance battalion with 50 armored cars, a motorcycle infantry company and supporting weapons;
- (2) A shock echelon organized as a Tank Brigade with some 450 tanks;
- (3) A ground holding echelon organized as a motorized infantry brigade, with two motorized infantry battalions, one motorcycle battalion, one artillery regiment and appropriate engineers, antitank units and signal troops.

These Panzer Divisions appear to have been under control of the various Army Commanders. However, lesser units such as corps and divisions received tank battalions specifically set aside for this purpose from the G.H.Q. reserve, as the tactical circumstances seemed to require. Some of these latter units assisted the German infantry in breaking through the Polish pill box line, southwest of Lodz, along the Warta river on September 5th and 6th.

 **DECLASSIFIED**

The Panzer Divisions were initially held far back, well behind the frontier, in two well defined groupings, one of five or six divisions to the southwest of Breslau, one of two divisions near Brunn in Moravia. These mechanized divisions were intended as "exploitation units." They were not scheduled to be used initially to break Polish resistance. Rather were they to be held back until the Polish forces began their withdrawal with all the inevitable disorganization, incident to any withdrawal. These mechanized divisions were then to be used in full force to intensify the enemy disorganization and to prevent the occupation at all cost of more rearward defense lines.


These objectives were fulfilled to the hilt by the German Panzer Divisions. After the breakthrough by the Silesian armies southeast of Lodz on September 7, no further coherent defense line was ever occupied by the Polish armies. Mechanized divisions had already outflanked and rendered untenable the strong Narew--Vistula--San line before the retreating Polish forces had even reached these rivers. German mechanized armies had meanwhile achieved two "Cannas" of their own. The dash of a Panzer division on Warsaw on the 8th had isolated west of the Vistula the larger part of two armies between Posen and Kutno. These forces eventually surrendered to the following German horse and foot divisions. The other success of the Panzer Divisions was achieved at Radom against a part of the Polish Silesian army which was seeking to withdraw behind the Vistula. Here, Panzer Divisions of Reichenau's army got around both Polish flanks simultaneously and surrounded 60,000 troops. These forces, like those at Kutno, were eventually forced to surrender when German foot divisions came up.


These three striking successes show the immense strategical and tactical value of Panzer Divisions to a modern army in open warfare. In fact, no army of the future will ever be able to lay claim again to being a "modern" army which does not number in its ranks one or more such mechanized units.


The Polish war is, to be sure, a school book model of correctly applied strategy by the German High Command. It proves, however, one thing more. An army of the 1939 model, fully provided with air forces and mechanized divisions, can defeat with ease and swiftness an army still organized along World War lines.


- o - o -

 **DECLASSIFIED**










 **DECLASSIFIED** 

G-2/2657-D-1054

G-2
WES

H.I.D., W.D.
Special Bulletin No. 2
January 10, 1940.

SOVIET-FINNISH WAROperations from November 30, 1939 to January 7, 1940.Contents:

1. Forces Involved.
2. Arctic Front.
3. Northern Front.
4. Central Front.
5. Southeastern Front.
6. Karelian Isthmus.
7. Personnel, Materiel, Morale, Economics and Organization.
8. Air Operations.
9. Naval Operations.
10. Tentative Military Lessons.

1. Forces Involved.

The Soviet attack on the Finns by air, sea and land and without declaration of war came on November 30. At the opening of this winter campaign Helsinki reports placed the Finnish Army at 300,000 men organized into ten divisions and four army corps. An additional 100,000 men of the Civic Guard formed a reserve force of three divisions.

Our military attache in Moscow estimated the Red Army on the Finnish front on December 15 at nineteen to twenty divisions; on December 19 he reported that this number had been increased to twenty-five.

An independent estimate of the forces involved from a source that we believe to be most reliable and which we are inclined to accept is as follows:



LIBRARY
COMMAND
AND
GENERAL
STAFF
SCHOOL

FEB 20 '40

DECLASSIFIED

U.S. SCHOOL
FT. LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
JAN 21 10 37 AM '40

DECLASSIFIED

Finns:

1. Karelian Army:
 - 2 Corps (4 to 5 divisions) on the Karelian Isthmus;
 - 2 Corps (3 divisions) north of Lake Ladoga.
2. Lapland:
 - 12 battalions of Civic and Frontier Guards.
3. Seacoast:
 - 1 groupment of 70,000 men.
4. Interior:
 - 4 groupments (divisions?) of Civic Guards.

Red Forces:

1. Karelian Isthmus:
 - 7th Army (6 divisions);
 - 10th Mechanized Corps (3 brigades);
 - 3 separate brigades;
 - 3 chemical detachments.
2. Other Fronts:
 - Lake Ladoga to Murmansk (from south to north);
 - 8th, 9th and 11th Armies (total 8 divisions).

2. Arctic Front.

The Reds began the war in the Arctic by the capture of the Finnish part of Fisherman's (Rybachy) Peninsula on the first day (November 30), which was followed by the capture of the important town of Petsamo the next. The Finns claimed to have recaptured Petsamo, but later admitted that it was in the hands of the Reds. The Reds started their march to the south with the apparent object of reaching the Norwegian frontier and cutting off Finland from contact with the Arctic. They seized the important nickel mines at Salmijarvi (December 15). By the 18th of December they had reached Pitkajarvi (85 km. south of Petsamo), and by the 23rd they claimed to have reached a point 130 km. south of the Arctic coast. Since about the 20th of December the Finns and Reds have been in contact near Hoyhenjarvi, and operations have almost been reduced to patrolling and reconnaissance, possibly on account of the extremely cold weather. On January 6 a minor Red attack in this sector was repulsed.

3. Northern Front.

On December 4 the Reds captured the village of Kuolajarvi (35 miles from the border); later they seized Salla; and by the 15th they had advanced as far as Markajarvi; two days later they were at Kursu. Later, under Finnish pressure, the Reds retreated to the vicinity of Salla, where fighting took place on January 3 and 5. On the 6th the Reds were repulsed with the loss of 300 killed.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Dr. Koht, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, on December 4, 1939 stated that he believed that the Reds might extend their military operations to Northern Norway; otherwise they would not have gone into Northern Finland, which is of no earthly use to them /except for the nickel mines at Salmijarvi and the ice-free port of Liinahamari, near Petsamo/. He added that the Norwegian Army /really a militia/ could do nothing. It has been reported that the Reds had from 3 to 6 divisions on these two fronts, but apparently only a small part of this force has been employed on account of the difficulty of supply and communications. The size of the Finnish force, probably principally ski troops, has not been reported.

The weather so far in the north has greatly favored the Finns, who are better skiers than the Reds and better trained and equipped for winter warfare. The winter is the best season for operations, especially for an army with good ski troops. Very soon the snow will be so hard and frozen that ski troops can easily maneuver over it and will not be handicapped by the lack of roads. When the snow begins to melt in the late spring the north will be almost a morass which will be very difficult to pass over, except on the north-south Arctic Highway, which is open the whole year. This condition continues until fall when the ground freezes again.

It seems to be probable that the Reds will be unable to conduct any extensive operations in the north until about April 1, unless, of course, they crush resistance in the south and have their hands free.

The three northern sectors are merely sideshows of relatively little importance: the Reds must penetrate the Southeastern and Karelian fronts in order to conquer the Finns--such, at least, has been their experience in the past (the last 8 times, according to a former Finnish G-2).

4. Central Front.

(Called the Repola and Ukhta sectors by the Reds.) The Reds first invaded Central Finland on December 2 and penetrated about 15 miles; they claimed to have reached the vicinity of Hurmes on the 2nd and to have reached the Hurmes-Joensuu railway line, but it is possible that only small forces operated in this region. A Red battalion was destroyed near Lieksa about the 20th.

On December 8 operations really began by the Red capture of Suomussalmi and advance to the southwest (towards Kivela and Kyyro). The Finns claim to have retaken Suomussalmi on the 9th. On the 17th the Reds claimed that they had advanced 132 kilometers from their frontier in the Ukhta sector. The Finns claim that on the 14th they

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

drove the Reds west of Kiantajarvi, and the next day they began to "mop up" the Reds near Suomussalmi.

Rather heavy fighting continued in the Suomussalmi sector December 22--30; on the last date the 163rd Red Division /not listed in our reports of August, 1939/ was "virtually destroyed" and the Reds fled towards Juntusranta. The Reds were also pushed back from Kuhmoniemi towards their frontier. The Finns continued to pursue the Reds until January 2 as far as Lake Kokko (about 8 miles from the border). Red attacks in the Kuhmoniemi sector were repulsed. Fighting continued at Suomussalmi, where the Reds lost 250 killed on the 4th, and at the nearby Raate River. The Finns claimed to have captured a large quantity of medical supplies and ordnance abandoned by the Reds. On January 7, the Finns claim that they virtually destroyed the 4th Red Infantry Division, and captured 102 guns, 43 tanks, 298 motor vehicles and tractors, 1,170 horses, etc.

The Finnish General Staff believed that the Reds intended to cross northern Finland in 3 columns: via Petsamo, Salla and Suomussalmi. This appears to be true. The attack in the direction of Murmes appears to have been a minor effort, which failed. The Reds evidently planned to make a mass attack against strategic points along almost the whole Finnish frontier. In the center their objective was apparently the railhead at Oulu, which is the only rail line to Sweden, the only country from which Finland can reasonably expect any supplies. The newspaper comments that the Soviet effort to break the "wasp waist" of Finland was their major effort and of great strategic importance were untrue: cutting off northern Finland--a barren country with 80,000 inhabitants--from the south would be like severing Alaska from the USA. In this sector the winter weather also favors the Finns as it is hilly, rough and wooded and unsuitable for winter operations except for highly trained and well equipped troops. There are poor roads and only one small single track rail line (Joensuu-Lieksa-Murmes-Oulu). In this sector it will also be difficult for the Reds to carry out any extensive operations until spring, unless they first win in the south.

From Helsingfors it was reported that the Red Ninth Army (6 divisions) was operating in this area; but Moscow reported that there were only 2 or 3 divisions, 1 bomber brigade and 1 pursuit brigade. No information as to the size of the Finnish forces has been reported.

5. Southeastern Front.

(Called the Petrozavodsk sector by the Soviets.) Red patrols crossed the frontier the first day of the war at Suojärvi, and soon

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

two Red divisions were operating in this area, where they made limited progress towards Suojärvi and Salmi. (The Finns claimed that the Reds used gas near Salmi.)

On the 11th the Reds captured Pitkaranta, while the Finns destroyed a small Red force at Ilomantsi (60 km. east of Joensuu). There was heavy fighting at Tolvajarvi, where three Red battalions were destroyed. The Reds captured several small villages on the north shore of Lake Ladoga (Koirinoja, Huunukka, Kitela and Hippola) and Syskyjärvi. On the 13th the Finns claimed to have recaptured the Tolvajarvi sector after destroying two Red regiments. A Red attack between Loimola and Lake Ladoga failed. The Finns continued to pursue the Reds in the Tolvajarvi sector, and hard fighting took place near Lake Aglajarvi, which the Finns finally captured on the 23rd of December. A Red attack at Kitela was repulsed and by the 23rd the Finns had reached Aittajoki. The Finns progressed beyond Lieksa towards the border. This sector remained relatively quiet until the 26th, when a Red attack towards Syskyjärvi was repulsed.

Late in December Red attacks northeast of Lake Ladoga (towards Ruokojärvi, Kitela and Syskyjärvi) and towards Ilomantsi were repulsed. Early in January Red attacks against Latvajarvi and Aittajoki failed. Again on the 4th another Red attack at the latter place was repulsed. By the 5th activity was limited to artillery fire and patrolling.

This sector is next to the Karelian one in importance and it was probably attacked by the Reds in conjunction with their main effort on the south in order to cut the Joensuu-Sortavala-Viipuri strategic railway line and to turn the Finnish rear along this railway as an axis. In the winter it would probably be impossible for a large Red force to penetrate the lake region beyond the line: Matkaselkä-Sortavala-Parikkala-Imatra (power plant)-Lappeenranta. This region is very hilly, swampy and rough and has many lakes. Probably only small ski detachments could penetrate it; mechanization probably could not.

Both Helsingfors and Moscow reported that there were four Red divisions on this front. Data about the Finns are lacking.

At the end of this period the Reds, who had lost much ground, apparently held the line: Latvajarvi-Loimola-Aittajoki-Ilomantsi. This front is probably not continuous.

6. Karelian Isthmus.

Operations on the Karelian Isthmus--the most important front--began on the first day of the war (November 30) and have continued ever since. The Reds at first easily drove back the Finnish delaying detachments in front of the Mannerheim Line, but when they reached this line

DECLASSIFIED

they were held up by the Finns and were unable to penetrate it in spite of numerous vigorous attacks. On December 6 the Reds claimed that they had broken this line (probably untrue) but since then they have not claimed to have done so. On the contrary, they have stated that they did not expect the war to be a "Blitzkrieg" and they emphasized the difficulty of the terrain (true). Details are given below. So far the weather--a very important factor--has favored the Finns. The Reds, who probably based their estimate of the weather on past years, attacked on November 30. As the winter has been unusually severe this year, it would have been better for them to have attacked about two weeks earlier. The Reds want clear, cold, dry weather in order that the lakes on the Isthmus may be frozen and their mechanization may not be obstructed by heavy snow. Moreover, they want clear weather for their aviation.

By December 1 there was contact along the whole front of the Isthmus. The Reds soon captured a number of small towns, including Terijoki. On the 2nd about 40,000 Finns were holding up the advance of twice as many Reds. On this date the Finns held the line: Vammelsuu-Kivenappa-Rautu-Taipale River. On the 6th the Reds claimed that they had reached the line: Hannila-Mesterjarvi-Perkjarvi-Vuoksi Waterway-Taipale River, which represented a substantial advance on the right and center. On the same day there was hard fighting along the Taipale River, Sakkola and Uusikirkko; and the Reds even claimed that they had broken the Mannerheim Line (apparently untrue). On the 9th the Reds again claimed to have broken the Mannerheim Line and to be advancing towards Karkisalmi, but this claim was never substantiated. By the 10th the line was approximately: Hannila-Maurisjarvi-Summa-Muolaa-Vuoksi Waterway-Taipale River. By the 11th the line had been advanced to Muurila-Siprola-Muolaa-Vuoksi Waterway-Taipale River, a considerable gain on the Red left flank. Powerful Red attacks near Muolaa and Loimola were repulsed by the Finns on the 11th. Fighting continued for several days without any change in the lines. On the 14th Red attacks at Punnus failed. The next two days the Reds attacked on their right along the Vuoksi Waterway and the Taipale River but again failed. The line then was approximately: Muurila-Siprola-Muolaanjarvi-Punnus-Vuoksi Waterway-Taipale River. Since about the middle of December there has been no known change in the front line. The Reds have launched numerous attacks against this line but without any apparent success: between Muolaanjarvi and Valkjarvi on the 17th; between Muolaanjarvi and Haukjarvi on the 19th and 20th; at the Taipale River on the 24th; on the Vuoksi Waterway on the 25th and 26th; at Kirvesmaki on January 4th; between Summa and Lake Matjalahden on the 6th; etc.

The Reds have apparently been unable to break thru the Mannerheim Line and, according to unconfirmed press reports, are now consolidating their position, reorganizing their forces and possibly preparing for a new attack against this line. As it will be difficult, if not impossible, for mechanization to cross the Isthmus after the

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] **DECLASSIFIED**

snow melts in March, it naturally is important for the Reds to penetrate the Isthmus before that time.

Our military attache at Helsinki reported on December 17th that the Seventh Red Army (11 divisions) was operating on the Isthmus. The military attache at Moscow, on December 15th, estimated this force at from 9 to 10 divisions, with six divisions and four tank brigades in the front line.

7. Personnel, Materiel, Morale, Economics and Organization.


On December 29th the military attache at Helsinki believed that all Finnish divisions had been wholly or partially employed; Finnish losses were estimated in excess of 20,000 and Soviet at more than 80,000.

Early in January the Finnish military attache at Riga stated that his country urgently needed artillery ammunition and planes; he added that a Swedish ski brigade was already in Finland. (It is believed that there are now about 10,000 Swedish troops in Finland and that another 10,000 are expected. Few, if any Norwegians are expected.)

The military attache, Helsinki, visited the Karelian Front early in January and reported: There exists a grave shortage of all kinds of ammunition and of antitank guns; the Soviets, on the contrary, appear to have unlimited ammunition and a great artillery superiority. It is expected that the Reds will employ even more tanks in the future than they have in the past. War equipment of many other kinds will soon be needed by the Finns. The defense position was excellent; the organization well suited to the terrain; staff work was excellent; and morale was high. ✓

It has been reliably reported that the Soviet prisoners captured by the Finns were in poor physical condition and appeared to be very much depressed. From another reliable source (January 6) the following has been learned: At first the Reds used soldiers from the Leningrad Military District, but later, on account of their poor showing, additional troops were brought from Mongolia, Buriat, North Caucasus, and the Ukraine, and Cossacks from the Don. It is estimated that there are now about 30 divisions of Soviet troops engaged, a total strength of from 500,000 to 600,000. About 50,000 soldiers suffering from wounds and frostbite were in Leningrad hospitals; the admission rate was about 1,000 daily. A mass attack against the Karelian Isthmus is expected to take place soon. . . . In Leningrad the food situation is gradually getting worse, but so far the shortage has not become acute; the general economic condition is also growing worse; the morale of the civilians there is at a low ebb. . . . There is no indication that Soviet officials have lost their political power to any serious extent.

[REDACTED] **DECLASSIFIED**

 **DECLASSIFIED**

The attitude of the population is designed and confused, but not revolutionary. . . . It is feared that the Finnish Air Force may destroy railway junctions and power plants. [Doubtful, due to the small size of the Finnish aviation.]

Early in November an observer in Moscow made this economic report: Early in September the sudden withdrawal of about one million workers from employment on account of practically general mobilization threw industry and transport into considerable confusion. Many thousand untrained women were placed in practically every branch of national economy. At the same time workers were obliged to operate at least one or two more machines than heretofore. . . . Largely because of the failure to exploit properly local resources, the U.S.S.R. has been suffering seriously during the past three years from a shortage of many important raw materials, including iron, coal, petroleum, and practically all non-ferrous metals. . . . It may be safely assumed that no serious attempt will be made by the U.S.S.R. in the near future to overcome the lack of equilibrium in national economy, arising from the relative neglect of consumer's goods and housing industries; consequently, poor living conditions will continue to cause extremely high labor turnovers, a plague which has beset Soviet industry for many years. [It is believed that the Red troops at the front will suffer far more from lack of proper rations, clothing, etc., than from lack of ordnance, which is probably adequate.]

8. Air Operations.

During the first two days of the war the Red Air Force attacked 7 or 8 Finnish airdromes. Bad weather apparently stopped air operations for several days. On December 6th the Reds bombed Petsamo and the nickel mines in northern Finland. Thereafter Red air operations were intermittent, probably due in part to bad weather. When raids were made, they apparently did not always have a strategical objective. Late in December raids on ports and railways in southern Finland were begun. So far in January there has been one bombing attack against the main railway line from Finland to Sweden.

The Finns claim that little damage has been done by bombing raids. According to an official report, however, incessant aerial bombardments have caused more industrial damage than the Finns admit.

The Reds appear to be incapable of choosing proper objectives and carrying out effectively air bombing missions. There is evidence of notable dispersion of effort. It is doubtful whether the flying weather in Finland is any worse than that over the North Sea where both German and British air units have consistently operated.

Little has been heard about Finnish air operations, except

 **DECLASSIFIED**

 DECLASSIFIED

reconnaissance and attacks on Soviet ground troops. As far as known, no air attack has been made on the important and vulnerable Leningrad-Murmansk single-track railway. It is not known whether the Finns have sufficient airplanes capable of making such an attack. In June 1939 it was reported that they had 33 Bristol Blenheim bombers, which are believed to be capable of operating, even if unsupported by pursuit, against railways and similar targets. (Additional information about air operations will be given in Special Air Bulletins beginning with No. 8.)

9. Naval Operations.

As the Red Navy is weak and inefficient, and as the Finnish Navy has only two coast defense ships, five submarines and smaller craft, naval operations have been relatively unimportant. At the beginning of the war the Red Navy seized the apparently undefended islands of Hogland (Suursaari), Lavansaari, Tytarsaari and Seiskari in the Gulf of Finland. Since then it has bombarded Hangö and Koivisto and has carried out minor operations in Lake Ladoga, but has apparently accomplished nothing of importance except partially blockading the Finnish coast. Early in December Finnish coastal batteries so badly damaged the Kirov, an 8,500 ton cruiser (1936), that she is now at Libau, Latvia, undergoing repairs and probably will not be fit for sea duty during 1940. The Finns also claim that they sank a Soviet submarine chaser early in December; while the Soviets claim that they sank a Finnish submarine.

Red naval landing parties are reported to have landed at Petsamo Fjord and to have assisted in the attack on that town.

The U.S.S.R. announced a blockade of Finland effective December 8.

On December 14th the Finns claimed that they sank another Soviet destroyer (one of the Gordi class--2,600 tons; launched in 1937). Since then the Red Navy has sporadically bombarded the Finnish coast, especially at Koivisto, but without appreciable result.

As the Finnish coast is very rugged, landing operations by the Red Army and Navy will be quite difficult until the Reds control the coast line. According to the press, Finnish coast artillery has been very effective, although the "Nenonen system" of fire direction and control is probably not a new system as reported.

The Gulf of Bothnia usually freezes in January and remains frozen until the latter part of March. During most of this period its northern part cannot be used, but the southern part can be kept open with icebreakers if necessary. In peace it is not usually worth

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

while to keep it open and ships use the sea route south of the Aland Islands; in war, routes north of these islands are used with the aid of icebreakers.

Usually the Gulf of Finland freezes in the latter half of January and remains so until the end of April. Similar conditions prevail in Lake Ladoga. The Baltic Sea, however, remains navigable. It seems probable that the Red ships operating against Finland will soon have to be based on Libau, Latvia, the only Red ice-free port on the Baltic. They will naturally use Tallinn and other ice-bound ports as long as practicable. In Finland Abo (Turku) and Hango (Hanko) are the only ice-free ports of importance.

Perhaps in order not to alarm Sweden prematurely the Red Navy has not attacked the strategic Aland Islands.

Early in November 1939 it was reported that the Finns had laid 20,000 mines along the entire southern coast of Finland as far as the Bay of Kronstadt. This work was carried out with extreme efficiency. Moreover, the Finns also had on hand 18,000 mines, both contact and observation firing categories. It is understood that many mines can be fired from shore observation stations but that mine fields elsewhere are of the contact type.

10. Tentative Military Lessons.

While it is too early to make complete observations as to the military lessons which may be learned from this campaign, some tentative conclusions, based upon available and incomplete sources, are given below:

a. Winter Warfare. The necessity for proper training in and equipment for winter warfare. The Finns have long concentrated on skiing, patrolling, camouflage, and other training for winter warfare. They have also studied the logistical side of this problem--proper clothing and food, arms, transport, etc. The Russians have tried to emphasize training for winter warfare and have experimented with snow motor sleds. They are not natural skiers, as they usually do not learn to ski until they join the Army. The Finns learn skiing in early childhood.

b. Tanks. The poor showing made by Russian tanks and, according to Finnish sources, the ease with which they were ~~destroyed~~, This tends to confirm reports of the poor showing of Russian tanks during the battles against the Japanese at Nomonhan last year. It seems clear that Russian tanks have proved vulnerable, probably because of material defects and also because of faulty employment. The difficult and close nature of the Finnish terrain provides a severe test for the

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

materiel and leadership of mechanized units, but does not explain away the consistent failures of and high casualties among Russian tanks.

c. Antitank and Antiaircraft Protection. The necessity for sufficient antitank and antiaircraft weapons.

d. Cultivation of Initiative. The necessity for the cultivation of initiative in subordinates. The Finns have apparently followed the German system and have encouraged initiative in junior officers and N.C.O.'s. There are no reports that the Russians have done so.

e. Dual Command. The fallacy of the system of dual command in the Red Army. Commanders can not efficiently exercise command if they share authority with political commissars.

f. Commanders. Commanders cannot be improvised in war. The great purge of Red officers which began in 1937 removed many capable commanders from the Red Army and their places were filled with less experienced younger officers. On the other hand, little change has been made in the Finnish High Command in recent years. Except for Field Marshal Baron Mannerheim, Commander in Chief, and General Linder, commander of the Swedish "volunteers", the Finnish general officers are mostly under 50, even though many have been generals for several years. Lt. Gen. H. V. Osterman, commander on the Karelian Isthmus, was born in 1892, and Maj. Gen. H. Ohquist, his second-in-command, was born a year earlier.

g. Intelligence. The necessity for a thorough knowledge of the theatre of operations based upon intelligence reports. This appears to have been lacking in the Red Army. For some time it has been believed that Soviet espionage in Finland was ineffective.

In intelligence work, truth is essential. Apparently the Red spies made reports on Finland which gave the Soviet authorities the information which they wished to hear, not the truth. The spies were afraid to report facts as they feared they would not be believed and would be punished. Intelligence should not be colored by wishful thinking.

Military operations should not be based primarily on political intelligence. Apparently the Reds believed that large elements of the "oppressed" Finnish workers were ripe for revolution and would support the Terijoki puppet government.

h. Landings on Hostile Shores. The difficulty of making

landings on hostile shores, except undefended islands, probably prevented any effective operations so far by the Red Navy against the strong, but lightly held, Finnish coast line.

i. Meteorological Information. In an Arctic war the necessity for proper climatic and meteorological information is self-evident.

- o o o -

DECLASSIFIED

G-2/2657-220

G-2
T S

M.I.D., W.D.
Special Bulletin No. 3
February 1, 1940

THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND
September 1-October 5, 1939

This document is being given an approved distribution, and no additional copies are available for distribution by the Military Intelligence Division. It may be reproduced in whole or in part under the provisions of the Letter TAG, November 15, 1939, AG 350.05 (11-1-39) M-B-M, subject, Dissemination of Military Information by the Military Intelligence Division and by Recipients of M.I.D. Information.

In view of possible reactions from the Governments of the belligerents, both of whom are recognized by our Government, its Restricted classification should be strictly observed.

Introduction

Page

Section I	The Armies of the Antagonists.	3
	A. Poland	3
	B. Germany	7
Section II	The Initial Concentrations and the rival War Plans	15
	A. Poland	15
	B. Germany	19
Section III	The Operations	25
	A. The First Phase September 1-5	26
	B. The Second Phase September 6-8	32
	C. The Third Phase September 9-15	37
	D. The Fourth Phase September 16-20	44
	E. The Fifth Phase September 21-October 5	48
Section IV	Criticism and Lessons	52
Map 1	General Map of Poland.	
Map 2	Sketch map showing Initial German and Polish concentrations, and the subsequent operations of the German armies.	

MAR-4'40

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



This narrative and analysis of, and lessons drawn from, the Polish campaign have been prepared by the G-2 Division of the General Staff from the following sources:

- (1) German official and semiofficial accounts of the campaign.
- (2) Reports of the office of the Military Attache, Berlin.
- (3) Reports of the office of the Military Attache, Warsaw.
- (4) Personal impressions of American officers who accompanied the German armies in Poland, and those who have recently returned to the United States.
- (5) The G-2 records dealing with the strength, organization and equipment of the German and Polish Armies.

This document cannot be considered wholly accurate with regard to the day by day troop movements of the two armies, inasmuch as full details of the operations have not yet been published by the belligerents. However, the utmost care has been taken to avoid misstatements of facts, while at the same time presenting a complete picture of the operations.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Introduction.

The ground and air operations of the German-Polish campaign of September 1939 afford unique historical examples of the use in war of air forces and mechanized forces on a hitherto undreamed of scale. These new arms performed brilliantly, but it is less to these that the German victory is due than to the power of their balanced army, to the quality of their leadership and to the stamina and skill of the German infantry which on the plains of Poland again renewed its claim to being "queen of battles".

The German victory was in itself no especial feat of arms. No foundation existed in fact to Poland's own claim of being a first-rate military power. Her extinction, sooner or later in this war, was to have been expected and was foreseen by professional soldiers the world over. However, the extraordinary speed and the overwhelming completeness with which the Polish Army met its fate is a matter of extreme professional interest to all soldiers. History affords no like example of an army of nigh to a million men being destroyed in less than a month's time. Even in this fast moving century it is not likely that a single military prophet could have been found prior to September 1, 1939, who would have dared to predict a decisive military victory for the Germans after eight days of warfare, and the surrender of the last free body of Polish troops in little over a month.

The military potentials of the two antagonists in this campaign were strikingly unequal. Germany with its eighty-six million inhabitants, its powerful industry, its highly developed transportation system and its modernly equipped and well trained army encountered an adversary with a numerically imposing army and a geographically extensive and populous state, but critically handicapped by a meager railroad and road net, an undeveloped industrial machine and limited reserve stocks of war supplies. This inequality of the adversaries was counterbalanced only in small part by the French and British declarations of war against Germany and the consequent concentration of strong French forces in Alsace and Lorraine. The West Wall fortification along the Rhine and in the Saar and Moselle valleys afforded Germany's west provinces full protection. While the threat of French attack, perforce, pinned down a fraction of Germany's military strength in the west (a force estimated at between twenty and twenty-five divisions), the steel and concrete of the West Wall forts nevertheless permitted the orderly initial concentration of sixty German divisions in the East and the uninterrupted conduct of the ensuing swift offensive against Poland without the necessity of diverting one infantry division or a single air squadron to the west front.

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

The Polish campaign offers much of interest to professional soldiers; far more, indeed, than can be found in the Abyssinian, Chinese or Spanish operations. Yet the professional soldier, more than anyone else, must be on his guard against accepting uncritically the lessons of this campaign, and must at every turn weigh the undoubted achievements of the German Army against the background of the military inequality of the antagonists.

Section I. The Armies of the Antagonists.

A. Poland.

On the eve of the outbreak of hostilities the Polish Army held a much overrated valuation in public opinion the world over. In Western Europe in particular the belief was strong that the Polish Army, while undoubtedly weaker than the German in numbers and in equipment, would succeed in offering serious opposition to its enemy, and perhaps even would be strong enough to delay the decision until Allied help in the west would tip the scales of victory in its favor. This opinion was not shared, however, by well informed professional soldiers most of whom foresaw the destruction of the Polish Army before the rains and snow of an eastern European winter could set in.

The Polish Army appeared on paper as a formidable military force, perhaps the fourth or fifth strongest army of Europe. It was generally recognized to be the soundest element in the Polish state; its officers held high places in the civil government, and it received a disproportionate share of the Polish budget. Its commander, Marshal Smigly-Rydz, was the veiled, but nevertheless real, power in the civil government.

The territory of the Polish state was divided in peace into ten corps areas. The mobile army was organized into thirty infantry divisions, twelve cavalry and one mechanized brigades. In the summer of 1938 its effectives were estimated at 266,000 officers and men. The army organization included a number of corps and army units, but the proportion of corps and army troops was not as high as in the German Army nor in the armies of the western democracies. The Polish tank development had not been pushed. The smaller part of the 600 odd tanks on hand at the outbreak of the war was organized as a mechanized brigade; the major portion was assigned to a number of corps and army tank battalions which might be either attached to divisions or army groups or held in G.H.Q. reserve. Polish mentality and the Polish terrain were alike un-receptive to modern military thoughts on mechanized warfare. In Poland as in no other country in the world the tactical mobility and speed of movement of horse cavalry held a firm grip on the

[REDACTED]

imagination of the military leaders. The Polish cavalry had performed creditably in the Russo-Polish war of 1920. It had thereafter become the favored arm of Poland's dictator, Marshal Pilsudski, and the elite branch of the Army. In view of the lack of roads in Poland and the poor quality of such as existed this Polish military opinion can not, in the light of what later occurred, be discarded now as having been hopelessly unmodern. It should be remembered that prior to September 1, 1939, large mechanized units were still largely untested in warfare; the small tests which had occurred in the Spanish civil war had in no way established their value.

The neglect of the Polish tank corps was matched by the neglect of the Air Force. This latter was due, however, less to an underestimate of its potentialities than the financial weakness of the state. An air force matching Germany's could not be afforded and the state lacked the technical experience to produce such an air force even if the finances had been available.

The Air Force, in being, consisted of about 900 first line planes, with a further reserve of 600 second line, training and transport ships. This Air Force was a branch of the Army. It was organized into six regiments with a total of 27 observation, 16 pursuit and 9 bombardment squadrons. Its principal mission was seen as the support of the ground armies and it had received special training to fit it for the execution of this mission.

The armament and equipment of the Polish Army and Air Force could only in part be classified as modern. The small arms and machine guns, while old, were, on the whole, of satisfactory quality. The artillery equipment, on the other hand, was of heterogeneous origin and in large part obsolescent. The field guns of 75 mm. caliber were of Russian, Austrian, German and French make. The heavy artillery was equally diversified and much less numerous. Artillery funds in recent years had been allotted largely to the purchase of Bofors 40 mm. antiaircraft and 37 mm. antitank guns. Nevertheless, the equipment of Polish units with antitank guns was far from complete when war broke out. Less than half of the prescribed 45 guns per division seem to have been on hand. Also, the number of anti-aircraft guns was pitifully small; there were only 200 heavy anti-aircraft guns and 200 light automatic guns of 20 mm. and 40 mm. caliber for all Poland. On the other hand the tank materiel, while limited in numbers, appears to have been quite good, and to have possessed satisfactory armor, armament and cross-country performance.

The aircraft were largely of Polish design and manufacture. Though these were in all cases inferior, class by class, to those of their German opponent, they were not much inferior to those in service at the same time in the French Air Force. The outstanding

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

Polish models were the P.Z.L. 27, a medium bomber of modern design, but untested and a machine with which the Polish pilots had had very little experience, and the P.Z.L. 24, a very maneuverable but slow pursuit ship with a maximum speed of but 267 miles per hour at 14,700 foot altitude.

The level of efficiency of troop training in the Polish Army must be adjudged fair according to East European standards, but could not be compared to the standards prevalent in France or Germany. The company officers probably comprised the soundest element in the Army. They had been uniformly trained in cadet schools established after the World War and were hard-working and devoted to their profession. The Polish soldier was a further plus for the Army. He was physically strong, inured to hardships and, in the World War, had served creditably in the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian Armies.

Far less satisfactory was the efficiency of the higher officers. These were of as heterogeneous origin as was the army ordnance. The majority of the officers from the grade of major up had received their first military training in the German, Austrian and Russian Armies. A minority had served initially with General Haller's Polish force which had been set up in 1917 in France. The elite of the Generals of 1939 had formed the nucleus in 1914 of the Polish Legion established by Pilsudski as a unit of the Austrian Army. These legionary officers had all been enthusiastic supporters of their chief, and when Pilsudski had assumed dictatorial power in 1926, they had acquired a stranglehold on the leading civil and military positions of the state.

The Commander in Chief and Inspector General of the Polish Army in 1939, Marshal Smigly-Rydz had been a close personal and political friend of Pilsudski since 1914. He had displayed creditable leadership qualities as an army commander in the Russo-Polish war. After Pilsudski's death he had inherited command of the army but had nevertheless displayed more interest in political matters than in the army itself. By 1939 his political power in the Polish state was greater than that of any other individual. The other higher army commanders of the German war were largely unknown to the world and even to the Polish public prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The Polish Army possessed no army commanders in time of peace. Sosnowski, Bartnowiak and Pekor, who were to command army groups in time of war, were employed in peace as Inspectors-General in the Warsaw war ministry.

Considerable attention had been paid in the higher Polish military schools to the lessons of the Spanish war, and it would appear that many faulty conclusions had been drawn with regard

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

to the ineffectiveness of tanks and airplanes and the tactical superiority of the defensive. These misjudgments of recent military experience were to profoundly and adversely affect the Polish conduct of the ensuing military operations.

The strategic and military-economic position of Poland in case of a war with Germany was certain to be difficult, especially if Russia's position was uncertain. Poland was entirely isolated from her western allies and could count on neither troop nor material assistance. Her all-important Upper Silesian mining and industrial area lay within cannon shot of the German frontier. The danger of a prompt German occupation of this area had, however, been foreseen. The Polish government about 1930 had embarked on ambitious plans for the creation of a new industrial and armament area around the town of Sandomir in south central Poland, in the triangle between the San and Vistula rivers. But the development of this new industrial base had made only limited progress when the German war broke out.

The Polish road net was a poor one according to West or Central European standards. In addition, a native Polish automotive industry was practically non-existent. In consequence the strategic importance of the railroads was immense. Both the initial concentration of the army and all subsequent regroupings depended on the smooth and uninterrupted operation of the railways.

The Hitler-Pilsudski non-aggression treaty of 1934 had had, without doubt, an unfortunate influence on the readiness of Poland for war with Germany. Polish military interest between 1934 and 1939 had largely centered on the frontier with Russia. Here lines of field fortifications of considerable strength had been constructed. The west border against Germany had been neglected. When, however, in March 1939, relations with Germany took a decided turn for the worse, the construction of west fortifications was hurriedly begun. Naturally little progress could be made by September 1. Earlier, the Hel peninsula, off Gdynia and Danzig, had been strongly fortified. Elsewhere the lines of pillboxes were rudimentary in plan and in large part incomplete. Facing East Prussia, the Narew river line with its bridgeheads at Pultusk, Rozan and Iomza received during the summer of 1939 a few concrete pillboxes. Some, but not much, fortification work was also carried out along the Warta river in southwestern Poland. Considerable progress on the other hand, had been made in Upper Silesia where a string of works had been completed on a north-south direction between Kattowiz over Pless and Biala to the Carpathian foothills. By and large, however, it is fair to say that Poland entirely lacked a modern system of land fortifications. In its absence the fate of Poland rested with the field Army.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

The strength and fighting efficiency of the Polish Army had been somewhat increased by preliminary mobilization measures taken in March and April 1939. As international tension continued to increase during the spring and summer still further groups of reservists were gradually called to the colors until, by August 1, the peace cadres of the Polish Army were at full strength. No major reserve units, however, had been called into existence up to the outbreak of war. The Polish soldier had proven his worth on many battlefields and under many foreign flags. It was now to be seen, whether under his own flag, with his admittedly inferior equipment and with his untested leaders, he could successfully resist the powerful enemy who was massing a double superiority of divisions all the way from East Prussia in the north to the High Tatra mountains of Slovakia in the south.

B. Germany.

The German Army and Air Force, as of August 1939, were among the world's most formidable fighting machines, the Army trying for military primacy with the French Army, and the Air Force far surpassing France or Britain in both numbers and quality of machines.

Hitler's new Nazi army was the lineal descendant of Bismark's Prussian and of the Kaiser Wilhelm's II World War armies. The fighting spirit, training methods, and tactical doctrine had come down from the days of Moltke and Schlieffen unchanged, despite the thirteen year interregnum of the Versailles treaty, when Germany had been limited to the small hundred thousand professional Reichswehr.

Rearmament had begun in 1933, soon after Hitler had acquired dictatorial powers. Conscription had been reintroduced in 1935. Since then, the national main effort had concentrated on the increase of Germany's military power. The fulfillment of this purpose had been facilitated by a smooth running authoritative form of government. By June 1939, the effective peace strength of the Army had reached a total of around 900,000 officers and men with a further 200,000 men in the Air Force.

The cadres of the Peace Army comprised six Army Headquarters, termed "Gruppenkommandos", 18 corps, 35 horse transport infantry divisions, four motorized infantry divisions, three mountain divisions, five heavy mechanized ("Panzer") and four light mechanized divisions. Besides these major units there were numerous corps, army and G.H.Q. units of all arms of the service and strong cadres of fortress troops. This peace army was homogeneous in its training and equipment.

DECLASSIFIED

The Air Force numbered in the spring some 300 squadrons with 3600 first line planes. During the tense summer of 1939, it was gradually increased in strength until by September 1, it numbered 480 squadrons with 7000 first line planes. This Air Force was organized as a striking force divided into four fleets with nine air divisions. Along-side these fleets were a large number of independent squadrons for cooperation with the fleets and with the ground forces.

The equipment of the Army and Air Force was first class throughout. Though not every piece of equipment was of superior quality and design, the general level of excellence was high and in some fields was unexcelled anywhere in the world. The Artillery had been newly equipped since 1933. Guns of the caliber of 75 mm. or 77 mm. had disappeared. All divisions were armed throughout with the 105 mm. Howitzers. Heavy Artillery was abundant. The heavy howitzers were of the caliber of 150 mm. and 210 mm.; the long range cannon of the caliber of 105 mm., 150 mm. and 240 mm.

The watercooled Vickers M G of World War model had been discarded, and an aircooled M G known as the "34" had taken its place. This gun served both as a light and a heavy machine gun, the only difference being that the light machine gun had a bipod mount, the heavy machine gun a tripod.

The infantry was equipped with an unusual number of supporting weapons. Every infantry regiment which took the field in Poland possessed:

12	37 mm.	Antitank guns
27	50 mm.	Infantry mortars
12	81 mm.	Infantry mortars
6	75 mm.	Howitzers
2	150 mm.	Howitzers

This army was extensively motorized, and the tank development had also been energetically pushed. Thirteen fully motorized divisions were included in the peace time organization. The tank force numbered about 6000 tanks. Three-quarters of these were organized in the Panzer and Light Mechanized divisions. The remaining one quarter were formed into a number of G.H.Q. tank regiments for close infantry support.

A German mechanized, or "Panzer" division is a mechanized force of all arms, approximately 14,000 men strong, with some 3,000 motor vehicles of all types. The Panzer division is in no sense a motorized infantry division of the present type in the American Army. It is more nearly the equivalent of a prewar cavalry

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

division which the advance of science has now permitted to be mechanized. The division is built for speed. Hard hitting qualities are sacrificed to achieve this purpose. There are in peace nine mechanized divisions in the German Army compared to 42 infantry divisions. The Panzer division is organized in three echelons:

(1) A reconnaissance echelon, organized as a motorized reconnaissance battalion with 50 armored cars, a motorcycle infantry company and supporting weapons;

(2) A shock echelon organized as a Tank Brigade with some 450 tanks;

(3) A ground holding echelon organized as a motorized infantry brigade, with two motorized infantry battalions, one motorcycle battalion, one artillery regiment and appropriate engineers, antitank units and signal troops.

The Army had also secured a vast supply of war equipment of first class quality through the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939. This acquisition had in particular added valuable reserves of tanks, heavy and light artillery and automatic infantry weapons. Much of this Czech materiel was earmarked to equip Reserve divisions of various categories.

The Air Force contained highly modern machines, which in large part had been tested under war conditions in Spain. Among the standard models which were to receive their first large scale test in Poland were the

Heavy Bombers

Heinkel 111. The Heinkel 111 was a 2-engine bomber, weight loaded about 27,000 pounds, high speed about 270 mph. at 16,000' altitude, crew of four, carried 4,400 pounds of bombs. About 2600 were on hand on July 1, 1939. The range of this airplane was more than 2,100 miles with 2,200 pounds of bombs. It was the standard heavy bombing airplane of the German Air Force in Poland.

Junkers 86. This was an obsolescent 2-engine bomber and carried a crew of four or five. Its weight loaded was 18,000 pounds. High speed was about 235 mph. This airplane had not been in production for about two years.

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

Dive Bombers

Junkers 87. This was the standard dive bomber of the German Air Force. The crew consisted of a pilot and gunner. The plane carried any size bomb up to and including the 500 Kilo bomb. Its high speed was 245 mph. This airplane was fitted with diving brakes, and attacks were launched from as high as 20,000 feet at a dive angle of 60 to 80 degrees. It was widely used in Poland for attacks on air-dromes, troop columns, fortifications, Polish light naval craft and similar targets. It carried either one or two fixed caliber 7.9 mm. machine guns firing forward.

Medium Bombers

Dornier 17. The latest version of this plane possessed a high speed of over 300 mph. The crew consisted of either 3 or 4 men. The normal bomb load was 2200 pounds. The range was about 1800 miles. There were three flexible guns which covered the nose and both the upper and lower areas of the rear. This airplane was widely used for long range reconnaissance. It was equipped with complete blind landing equipment.

Pursuit

Messerschmitt 109. This was a single seater, single engine pursuit airplane armed with either one motor cannon and four 7.9 mm. machine guns or two cannon (20 mm.) and two machine guns. It was the standard pursuit airplane of the German Air Force in Poland. Over 2300 were estimated to have been on hand on July 1, 1939. The first model, which had been used in Spain, had a speed of about 320 mph. An improved model with 1100 instead of 950 H.P. used in Poland possessed a high speed of about 355 mph.

Messerschmitt 110. This was a twin engine pursuit airplane and was called a "destroyer" by the Germans. It carried two 20 mm. cannon and four rifle caliber machine guns, mounted in one battery in the nose, between the engines, and one flexible gun to defend the tail. The crew

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

consisted of a pilot and a gunner. The first airplanes of this model carried two 950 H.P. engines and were rated at 340 mph. This airplane was described as the most successful airplane used in Poland. Its fire-power was heavy enough to destroy the boilers in railroad locomotives when used against such ground targets. It was also quite successful in attacking other aircraft by gun fire.

Reconnaissance

Henschels 126. This was the standard observation airplane for short range missions. It was a single engine airplane, carrying a crew of two. It was armed with one fixed and one flexible gun, and could carry ten bombs of twenty-two pounds weight. The plane possessed a high speed of 220 mph. at 10,000 feet altitude and a range of over three hours at a cruising speed of 175 mph. Like similar two-seater airplanes, this ship was an easy prey for hostile pursuit as it lacked the speed to escape.

Fieseler 156. This was an airplane distinguished by its low landing and take-off speeds. It could be operated from small areas and was used by both the German Army and the German Air Force for command and liaison work during the Polish campaign. The airplane was not armed. Its characteristics were such that it could not be used where hostile airplanes of any combat type could operate against it. However, it could be used for most of the missions which in America the auto-gyro is expected to perform. In Poland, where the German Air Force soon achieved complete air domination, such an airplane could be widely used. The high speed of this airplane was about 110 mph, its landing speed about 25 mph.

In general it may be said that the performances and fighting efficiency of each of these models far exceeded that of the planes of similar types in the Polish Air Force.

The level of training in both Army and Air Force was high, despite the inevitable difficulties consequent to the rapid numerical expansion of both forces. Very little emphasis

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

was placed in the Army on either administration or housekeeping. The higher commanders devoted the bulk of their time and energy to supervising troop training. Field exercises and maneuvers were frequent. The High Command had been repeatedly given the opportunity in peace to handle forces of as much as 100,000 men in the annual autumn maneuvers. In addition the military operations in Austria in March 1938, in Sudetenland in September and October 1938, and in Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 had given the High Command further valuable experience in concentrating large armies, in logistics and in the supply of corps and armies in the field.

The composition of the officer corps presented a doubtful factor in the estimate of fighting efficiency of the Army. While the senior officers, all veterans of the Reichswehr, could be regarded as highly efficient there was a large number of officers of World War service, reactivated since the rearmament began, whose physical condition and professional efficiency gave rise to doubt. There was also a marked shortage of officers in the grades of 1st lieutenant, captain and major. These vacancies would perforce have to be filled in war by reserve officers, who, to be sure, had had war experience in the World War, but who had received little training in the interim. An especially grave deficiency also appeared to exist in the lack of an adequate supply of properly trained general staff officers. This deficiency appeared to be so grave as to restrict the number of larger reserve units which could be set up upon mobilization. The ability of the High Command was also an uncertain factor. Von Brauchitsch, the Commander in Chief, and his Chief of Staff General Halder could be estimated however as being at least fair and possibly good field commanders. Both men were young for the grades which they held, were physically vigorous and had had World War experience as line and general staff officers in the junior grades. The same estimate could be made for the Army and Corps Commanders.

The traditional German tactical doctrines of the offensive had persisted from World War days through the Reichswehr into Hitler's new Nazi army. In the General Staff school nine tactical problems in offensive action were given for everyone dealing with a defensive situation. To achieve the tactical initiative under any and all circumstances could well be held to be a German maxim, even if thereby the risk of piecemeal attacks, of stumbling into ambushes and of exposing flanks was accepted as a regrettable corollary.

Much thought had been given to the advisability of utilizing in open warfare tactical units smaller than the division. Many officers had urged that a smaller division be introduced. This suggestion, however, had been rejected. Instead, the idea had taken

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

hold that the reinforced regiment was the logical tactical unit in open warfare, and that when not encountering fixed resistance, the division should play much the same role as the corps had previously done. In consequence the entire army had been trained to march and fight as reinforced regiments.

The only part of the German Army which had undergone serious reduction in recent years was the cavalry. At the outbreak of the Polish War only one two-regiment brigade of old style cavalry existed. This brigade was stationed in East Prussia. The other fifteen regiments of Cavalry existing in 1939 were organized and trained as reconnaissance regiments. Each was designed to be split up on mobilization and to furnish reconnaissance detachments of 300 men each to the infantry divisions. Every German unit from regiment on up was indeed provided with a special reconnaissance unit. For corps, armies and motorized divisions, these reconnaissance units were motorized. For infantry regiments and foot divisions these special detachments were cavalry.

A final matter worthy of mention in the German Army of 1939, was the great emphasis placed on the possession of an adequate antitank defense. Every infantry regiment possessed a company of twelve 37 mm. antitank guns. Each division possessed also a battalion of 36 guns of similar caliber. There were also a number of G.H.Q. reserve battalions of like composition. This antitank armament was the heaviest of any army in the world.

All in all, the German peace army was considered in European military circles as formidable no matter who the adversary might be, and in every country it was adjudged a far more effective army than that of Poland.

However, in certain military and non-military quarters, there were grave doubts as to the true worth of this German Army. It was felt that the expansion of the German Army to a war footing was certain to bring up many grave difficulties. It was believed that the lack of trained officers, already seriously felt in the peace establishment would present an even greater problem when it came to the organization of reserve units. Of importance also was the manifest lack of younger trained reserve soldiers. Only two full classes, perhaps 1,450,000 men in all had completed the full two years' active service and been furloughed to the reserve. This deficiency was counterbalanced in part by the existence of about one million partially trained reservists who had undergone two months' abbreviated training courses with military units between 1933 and 1939. A still more potent reserve of trained soldiers was the pool of 1,700,000 World War veterans between the ages of 40 and 45. It was planned by Germany to use this pool to

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

furnish every active and reserve regiment of the army with a small nucleus of soldiers with war experience who yet were in good physical condition.

It was estimated by military observers in the summer of 1939 that Germany would mobilize on M day some 130 divisions but that not all would be ready at once for active operations. Actually it would now appear that Germany commenced the mobilization on M day of between 140 and 150 divisions but that not more than ninety of these were considered as fully fit for operations during the first month of war.

The German preparations for war between 1933 and 1939 were by no means confined to merely strengthening the field armies. Commencing in October 1936, the construction of a great system of permanent fortresses had begun along the French and Belgium frontiers. This system was known as the "West Wall" and by September 1, 1939 it was completed except for a few sections opposite Belgium. The "West Wall" was believed by the Germans to be so strong that a minor portion of the German Army could hold off the whole French and British Armies, while the larger portion could be concentrated against Poland. Actually on September 1, 1939 only eleven of Germany's fifty-two active divisions were left facing France, while forty-one were concentrated along the Polish frontier.

On the East Front Germany had constructed two other very strong fortified areas. In East Prussia, the fortified line along the Polish frontier contained many permanent works. It was believed by the Germans to be adequate to ward off all but the strongest Polish attacks. This East Prussian fortified line was believed by the Germans to be very necessary in view of the isolated position of the province, cut off as it was from Germany by the Polish Corridor and hence exposed to a concentrated attack by the Polish Armies from three directions. The other fortified area, known popularly as the "Oder Quadrilateral", was located due east of Berlin between the Oder river and the Polish frontier. This fortified area was to play an important role in the coming campaign in that Germany utilized the defensive strength of this area to hold its center with very weak detachments, thereby enabling the flank armies to be increased to maximum strength.

The final feature worthy of note in Germany's war preparations had been the amassing between 1936 and 1939 of important reserves of raw materials and food stuffs. This heaping up of reserves, however, had been accompanied by a steady expansion of the factories producing such products as artificial gasoline, rubber, aluminum and wood textile fibre. This construction was believed

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

necessary to widen the national production of raw materials and to offset in advance the loss of supplies from neutral countries which Germany would be deprived of in war as a result of the expected British maritime blockade.

Section II. The Initial Concentration and the Final War Plans.

A. Poland. (See Map 1)

The Polish government had ordered partial mobilization of its Army as early as April 1939. By the middle of August the cadres of all active units had been brought to full strength, but the creation of reserve divisions had not been begun. It is believed that the Polish war plan foresaw an immediate increase of the field army upon the outbreak of hostilities by the creation of ten reserve divisions at garrisons in the East Polish provinces. There were, of course, enough Polish trained reservists available to fill three or four times this number of units but officers and equipment were lacking, and ten divisions appeared to Polish G.H.Q. the maximum which could be made ready for active operations. Actually, these reserve units played no role in the initial operations of the war and not a single one put in an appearance on the battlefield, until the last few days of September, when a 35th and a 41st Reserve division were reported as engaged in operations around Lublin. The crippling of the Polish railroads by the German Air Force in the first days of the campaign undoubtedly had much to do with the tardy appearance of these reserve divisions. For all practical purpose they should not be included in an enumeration of the Polish field forces. On the other hand, reserve units of regimental and battalion strength, mobilized in West Poland, joined the active divisions as extra units and thereafter participated in active operations. However, the numerical size and quality of these units is still obscure. Undoubtedly they contributed to increase somewhat the strength of the Polish Active Army which bore the brunt of the ensuing campaign.

The total strength of the Polish Army, which was concentrated facing Germany on September 1, 1939 is estimated at 600,000 men, and comprised 30 infantry divisions, 10 cavalry brigades and one mechanized brigade. This 600,000 total includes an estimated 85,000 for corps, army and G.H.Q. troops but excludes from consideration the Reserve divisions and many lesser reserve units the number and strength of which are not calculable. Probably the total mobilized Polish strength in September reached a figure somewhere between 900,000 and 1,000,000.

The concentration of the Polish Army for war with Germany was effected during August. Six separate groups, each

[REDACTED]

equivalent to an Army, were created, and each was directly subordinate to Polish G.H.Q. The latter was set up towards the end of August in Warsaw.

These six Groups were: (See Map 2)

- I. The North Group
In the area Warsaw - Lomza - East Prussian frontier -- Mlawa - Saldau - Modlin.
Strength-- Four divisions (1,8,18,20) and three cavalry brigades.
- II. The Thorn Group
In the area: Graudenz--Thorn--Bromberg--Corridor.
Strength-- Five divisions (4,9,15,16,27) and one cavalry brigade.
Note: Three of these divisions, the 9th, 15th, and 27th were placed in the exposed Corridor between Bromberg and Gdynia, an area, in which they were threatened with being cut off and annihilated.
- III. The Posen Group
In the area: Kutno--Wloclawek--Gnesen--Posen--Kempen.
Strength-- Five divisions (10,14,17,25,26) and one cavalry brigade.
Note: Four of the five infantry divisions of this group were initially concentrated, along and close to, the German frontier between Posen and Kalisch. The weight of this Army Group was thereby placed to the south of Posen.
- IV. The Silesia Group
In the area: Wielun--Sieradz--Lodz--Radom--Wloszczowa--Tschenstochau.
Strength-- Nine infantry divisions (2,3,7,12,13,19,28,29,30) and two cavalry brigades.
Note: The concentration of the Silesian group was effected in considerable depth. Five divisions were aligned in defensive positions along the German frontier, while four were placed in reserve in and to the south of Tomaszow, and around Radom.
- V. The Cracow Group
In the area: Kattowitz--Tschen--Neumarkt--Cracow.
Strength-- Four divisions (5,6,21,23), and one mechanized brigade.
Note: The concentration of this group was

DECLASSIFIED

effected close to the German frontier and without depth. All four infantry divisions were closely grouped in an area south of Kattowitz, and between Teschen and Cracow. The south flank of this group was covered by the mechanized brigade at Neumarkt in the foothills of the High Tatra mountains, a region seemingly unsuitable for mechanized operations.

VI. The Przemysl Group

In the area: Jaslo--Tarnow--Rzeszow--Przemysl--Sanok.

Strength-- Three divisions (11,22,24). This group was intended as a flank protection for the main Polish Armies to the North. The concentration faced the frontier of Slovakia which was reckoned on correctly by Polish G.H.Q. as being a German ally.

Each of the above Army Groups contained one or more heavy artillery battalions, several tank battalions, and detachments of corps and army troops. In addition two cavalry brigades were formed into a provisional cavalry division and stationed in the vicinity of Warsaw. The two remaining active cavalry brigades of the total included in the peace organization of the army were apparently left facing Russia. With this exception the long Eastern frontier was denuded of active troops; special frontier units and reserve troops were left to face the threatening but intangible weight of the huge Russian Army. Nothing is known with regard to the war preparations of the Polish Air Force. There are many indications, however, that the air measures taken in advance of the outbreak of hostilities had been singularly deficient. Emergency air fields had been prepared in only a few instances. Most squadrons remained at their permanent stations, the installations of which were soon to become an easy prey of the German bombers.

Polish Strategic Plan.

The original Polish strategic plan, which was adopted before the outbreak of war but which failed to materialize under pressure of the German attack, apparently was to make a determined final defense along the general line of the Narew, Vistula and San Rivers. The security of this defensive position was to be provided for by strong delaying action forward of the line and by the formation of highly mobile reserves in rear thereof, the latter constituted from the troops which were to have fallen back from the initial delaying positions along the frontier.

The Northern Group was distributed along the East Prussian frontier from Augustowo on the east to Strasburg, just east

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

of Graudenz, on the west, with the 1st division in army reserve east of Warsaw. It is believed that the mission of this group was to delay on the frontier and hold the line of the Narew at all costs.

The Thorn Group was disposed with two divisions and a cavalry brigade in the Corridor, two divisions just east of Graudenz and one division in the vicinity of Bromberg. The mission of this group was apparently to fall back from the Corridor to a delaying position east of the Vistula with the right flank resting on Graudenz, and then to retire southeast on the fortress of Modlin.

The Posen Group was generally along the Posen frontier between the Netze River and Kempen. The mission of this group was to oppose a German advance into Posen and to fall back to a delaying position between Bromberg and Kolo connecting with the delaying position of the Thorn Group behind the Vistula and with the delaying position of the Lodz Group behind the Warta. Ultimately all army groups were to retire in the general direction of Warsaw.

The Lodz Group was initially distributed in depth in the general area: Tschenstochau - Radom - Ozorkow, with five infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade on the frontier between Sieradz and Tschenstochau and with four infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade in reserve positions around Radom. The missions of this group were to defend strongly on the frontier, to fall back to a prepared delaying position east of the Warta, and then to retire toward the east and hold the line of the Vistula between Warsaw and Deblin.

The Cracow Group was initially disposed with four divisions in the Teschen Industrial Area, with a cavalry brigade protecting the right flank in the vicinity of Tarnowitz and a mechanized brigade protecting the left flank near Neumarkt. The missions of this group were to protect the industrial area of Teschen, to fall back on Cracow to extend the line of the Warta position, and eventually to retire east of the Vistula and the San with its right flank at Deblin.

The Przemsyl Group, consisting of only three divisions, was disposed along the Slovakian frontier to block the passes of the Carpathians and to protect the left flank of the Polish Army. It was ultimately to fall back in conformance with the Cracow Group behind the San River.

The above outlined plan must be accepted with considerable reserve. A plan for final defense, east of the Narew - Vistula - San river line, which initially placed the entire active army to the west and even far to the west of this river line is open

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

to suspicion. Of these three river lines, only the Narew had received permanent fortifications. If final defense was to be offered along these rivers it would seem that at least some part of the army should have been placed on the Vistula position initially, if for no other reason than to prepare field fortifications. Then, too, the placing of three Polish infantry divisions, and one cavalry brigade, one tenth of the total Polish Army, in the exposed Corridor is scarcely compatible with the plan of an orderly withdrawal in the direction of Warsaw. Though the Polish concentrations, with the mass of their troops in the triangle Lodz - Posen - Cracow, do not suggest a Polish offensive against East Prussia, or Silesia, they do offer ground for the belief that G.H.Q. intended to accept decisive battle to the west of the Vistula. The Polish war plan must therefore be considered still a debatable matter. The real truth may well not be known for years.

B. Germany.

The German plan of campaign against Poland in force in the summer of 1939 involved a further development of the "Cannae" concept of Field Marshal Graf Schlieffen, i.e., a double envelopment of the Polish armies in west Poland by means of two strong converging wing armies launched respectively from East Prussia in the north and from the Carpathian mountains of Slovakia in the south. The geographical objective of these two pinchers was a geographical area: the high ground east of the Vistula and San, stretching from Siedlce in the north to Lemberg in the south. The German plan, however, went even further and contemplated a second and inner double envelopment in case the Polish Army, contrary to expectations, accepted battle in Western Poland. The inner pinchers were to be launched from Neidenburg in East Prussia, over Mlawka and the Narew rivers towards an area on the east bank of the Vistula just east of Warsaw, and from Upper Silesia northeastward, also towards the Polish capital. In case the Polish armies escaped the inner pinchers it was felt that they must nevertheless fall victim to the outer ones, which were seeking to join far in the interior of Eastern Poland. The German plan also foresaw the adoption of a strict passive defense against the armies of the Western Powers on the "West Wall" fortifications.

The Germans began, or were far advanced in, the mobilization of a total of 120 active and reserve divisions on September 1, 1939. About ninety of these, including the 52 active divisions of all types, were on this date adjudged ready for active operations. Eleven active (5,6,9,15,16,25,26,33,34,35,36) and between seven and ten reserve divisions were moved during the last weeks of August to their assigned defensive positions in West Germany. About sixty divisions, including all mechanized and motorized divisions, were concentrated in the East for the Polish offensive. The remaining reserve divisions, which were not so far advanced, in organization, equipment and training were left

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

in their home stations to complete their war preparations. These, however, were sufficiently far advanced so that they could be made available without too great delay to the West Wall, in case of a serious French attack, or to the German Eastern armies in case, contrary to expectations, the attack of this powerful force should be checked by unexpectedly heavy Polish resistance.

Around the German reserve divisions was thrown a shroud of secrecy. The numbered reserve divisions identified include only the following:

50th, 80th, 208th, 217th, 221st, 224th, 228th, 10th Panzer.

The divisions numbered from 200 on up appear to have been formed around Landwehr cadres. The tenth Panzer division was organized during the summer of 1939 and was equipped with Czech tanks and other materiel from the same source.

There were also employed in Poland a number of "S.S." regiments of Hitler's elite guard, which passed under army control upon the outbreak of war. These "S.S." formations appear to have been used as independent regiments and to have been attached, as circumstances warranted, to first one and then another division. There were also at Germany's disposal for this campaign two Slovak divisions, the 1st and 3rd, whose organization, equipment and training despite the youth of the Slovak state were sufficiently far advanced, to make them a valuable military reinforcement.

The geographical situation in Eastern Europe along the Polish-German frontier was highly favorable to the employment of the Schlieffen double envelopment maneuver. East Prussia and Slovakia extended like two flanking bastions to the north and south of Poland, potentially, ideal bases for the enveloping wings. Slovakia's adherence to Germany had been won by Hitler in April, when a diplomatic agreement concluded at Berlin provided in case of emergency for the use by German troops of Slovak soil and for the support of these troops by the Slovak Army.

The advantageous position in the north which Germany possessed by virtue of her sovereignty over East Prussia was in part diminished by the fact that this province was separated from Germany proper by the Polish Corridor. This operated against the strengthening of the local garrison to a size commensurate with the strategical mission foreseen for it in the general plan of operations, i.e., of forming the northern pincher of both the inner and outer double envelopments and of attacking simultaneously in the directions of Brest-Litovsk and Warsaw. The garrison was, to be sure, reinforced by sea

DECLASSIFIED

The German forces in the Polish theatre of operations were organized into two groups of armies which operated directly under the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Col. General v. Brauchitsch, whose headquarters remained in the vicinity of Berlin.

The two groups of armies were organized as follows:

<u>SOUTHERN GROUP:</u>	Colonel General von Rundstedt	Hq. Neisse
	Chief of Staff - Lt. General von Manstein	
Fourteenth Army	- Col. General List	Hq. Neutitschein
Tenth Army	- General of Artillery von Reichenau	Hq. Oppeln
Eighth Army	- General of Infantry von Blaskowitz	Hq. Breslau
 <u>NORTHERN GROUP:</u>	 Colonel General von Bock	 Hq. Bad Polzin
	Chief of Staff - Lt. General Salmuth	
Fourth Army	- General of Artillery Kluge	Hq. Jastrow
Third Army	- General of Artillery Kuechler	Hq. Mohrungen

Very little information has been received as to the number of corps in the various armies. Since in the German Army the corps is merely a tactical headquarters to which any number of divisions, usually varying from two to six, may be attached for a specific operation and since in Poland the composition of the army corps was constantly changing, the lack of positive identification of corps headquarters has little bearing on the relative combat strength of the forces involved. The following corps headquarters have been identified:

Fourteenth Army	VII, I (Mtn) Corps.
Tenth Army	XV (Mecz), XVI (Mecz), VIII Corps.
Eighth Army	X, XIII Corps.
Fourth Army	II, III Corps.
Third Army	I, XXI Corps.

The assignment of divisions to the various armies is still only partially known, and the assignment to corps is almost entirely unknown.

The assignments so far as known are shown by the following tabular list.

<u>Fourteenth Army</u>	(List)
5th, 7th, 44th and 45th Line, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Mountain, 2nd "Panzer", 4th Light Mechanized, 1st and 3rd Slovak.	

Total - 9 Infantry, one Panzer and one Light Mechanized Divisions.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Tenth Army

(Reichenau)

4th, 8th, 14th, 18th and 28th Divisions of the Line, 13th and 29th Infantry Divisions (Motorized), 1st, 4th and 5th "Panzer" Divisions, 2nd and 3rd Light Mechanized Divisions.

Total - 7 Infantry, three Panzer and two light mechanized divisions.

Eighth Army

(Blaskowitz)

10th, 17th, 24th, 27th and 30th Divisions of the Line, 221st and 224th Reserve Divisions.

Total - 7 Infantry Divisions.

Fourth Army

(Kluge)

3rd, 23rd, 32nd Divisions of the Line, 50th and 208th Reserve Divisions, one unnamed Landwehr Division, 2nd and 20th Motorized Infantry Divisions, 3rd Panzer and 1st Light Mechanized Divisions.

Total - 8 Infantry, one Panzer and one light mechanized divisions.

Third Army

(Kuechler)

1st, 11th, 12th, and 21st Divisions of the Line, 83th, 217th, and 228th Reserve Divisions, 10th "Panzer" Division, 1st Cavalry Brigade.

Total - 7 Infantry Divisions, one Panzer division, and one cavalry brigade.

Between the Northern Army Group of von Bock and the Southern Army Group of von Rundstedt stretched a broad gap which was very weakly filled with troops. It has been said that the German Armies for the ensuing campaign entirely lacked a center. This is only true if not taken too literally. The open gap in the center was strongly defended by the fortress works of the Oder Quadrilateral, between Frankfurt - Am - Oder and the Polish frontiers. These fortress works were garrisoned by active Frontier (Grenz) troops of a strength equivalent to a division. Other frontier formations of a militia nature lined the frontier between Schneidemuhl and Glogau. These were backed up by the 19th, 31st and 45th Active line divisions which constituted both a local protective force and a reserve for the whole eastern operation. Further reserves were available, however, in the many reserve divisions which could be brought up from the interior of Germany by September 10th at the latest.

About one-third of the total air strength of Germany

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

was made available to the Eastern Armies for the Polish campaign. The striking force, an element equivalent to our G.H.Q. Air Force, was organized as two Air Fleets, the First under General of Flyers Kesselring, comprising two or three divisions, and the Fourth, under General of Flyers Lohr, the former Austrian Air Force commander, consisting of one or two divisions. The headquarters of the two Air Fleets were located in close proximity to the two Army Group commanders near Bad Polzin and Neisse. They appear not to have been subordinated to the Army Group commanders, but to have operated under unified Air Force direction. Colonel Gen. Milch, the actual though not nominal commander-in-chief of the German Air Force, however, was a subordinate of the Army commander, Colonel Gen. von Brauchitsch, the commander of the entire Polish operation.

A certain number of pursuit, dive bombing, observation and liaison plane units were also attached directly to the Armies for the accomplishment of reconnaissance and close tactical support missions. In all, it is estimated that Germany used about 2500 planes in Poland in the course of September.

Considerable antiaircraft and air signal units were also attached to each army, while still stronger units of these types as well as pursuit squadrons were stationed in all important East German cities which might be liable to Polish air attacks.

The German strategic plan of simultaneous inner and outer double envelopments of the Polish Army must be considered one of the most daring in all military history, despite the acknowledged and clear-cut superiority of the German Army over its enemy in almost every respect. It would never have been attempted unless Germany had possessed intimate and exact knowledge of Polish intentions and disposition and had calculated the Polish Army at its true worth, that is as only a very mediocre army possessing even more mediocre leadership.

Fourteenth
The main efforts were to be made by the von Reichenau Tenth Army from Silesia on Warsaw, and by von Kuechler's Third Army from Ortelsburg in East Prussia on the area due east of Warsaw. These were to be the two prongs of the inner double envelopment. The outer double envelopment was foreseen for a later stage of the campaign, to be made by List's ~~Fourth~~ Army from the South and by reinforcements to be added at some later but uncertain date to Kuechler's Third Army in East Prussia. To execute the southern pincher of this outer double envelopment List's Army had first to gain ground to the east, force the San river line in Galicia and secure the high ground near Lemberg. To execute the northern pincher it was also a prerequisite that the Corridor be abolished and the roadway opened so that Kuechler's Army could be reinforced from interior Germany.

DECLASSIFIED

In detail, the plans of the individual Armies were as follows:

In the Southern Group the Fourteenth Army was given the independent mission to attack from Mährisch-Ostrau and Slovakia, to capture the industrial area of Teschen, to protect the right flank of the Tenth Army, to seize the high ground at Lemberg, and to cut the Polish communications with Roumania.

The Tenth Army, making the main effort of the German attack, was given the mission of attacking in the direction Oppeln-Siedlce destroying the Polish Army.

The Eighth Army, attacking from Breslau toward Warsaw, was given the mission of protecting the north flank of the Tenth Army.

In the Northern Group, the Fourth Army, attacking from Pomerania, was given the mission of wiping out the Corridor, gaining contact with the XXI Corps of the Third Army (East Prussia) near Graudenz, forcing a crossing of the Vistula between Bromberg and Graudenz, and then continuing the attack toward the southeast.

The Third Army, making the main effort of the Northern Group, was given the mission of reducing Graudenz (mission for a separate corps, the XXI), and of attacking south from East Prussia to force the crossings of the Narew and the Bug Rivers, isolate Warsaw from the east, and make contact with the Tenth Army in the vicinity of Siedlce.

The missions assigned the German Air Force were:

- (1) To gain air supremacy.
- (2) To disrupt Polish railroad, road and signal communications.
- (3) To destroy the Polish war industry and air industry.
- (4) To cooperate tactically with the German ground forces.

Section III. The Operations.

It is scarcely possible to divide a narrative of the Polish campaign into operation phases, which are demarked by sharply defined events. Indeed, the entire operation possesses a continuity which has been seldom equalled in history.

Nevertheless for purposes of convenience the narrative of the campaign has been divided arbitrarily into five phases, each of

which is sufficiently distinctive in character as to warrant the sub-division.

- A. Phase I September 1-5. The German Army breaks through the Polish frontier Defenses.
- B. Phase II September 6-8. Decisive German Victory.
- C. Phase III September 9-14. The Encirclement of the Polish Armies.
- D. Phase IV September 15-20. The Annihilation of the Polish Armies and the Russian Invasion.
- E. Phase V The Occupation of East Poland.

A. Phase I.

The German Armies opened their offensive campaign against Poland on September 1 at 5:30 a.m.

(1) Fourteenth Army (List).

The Fourteenth Army of Gen. List, with headquarters in Neisse, attacked on September 1 in two distinct attack groups. One group amounting in all to a strong corps, debouched from an area around Mahrish-Ostrau and struck due eastward in the direction of Cracow. The second group, also amounting to about one corps, and including at least one mountain division, launched its attack from the Silles area of northern Slovakia. The initial objectives of this latter group were the strategically important Jablunka pass south of Teschen and the town of Neumarkt, to the south of Cracow and just north of the High Tatra mountains. Its attack was made to the west of these high, rugged mountains, which were regarded by Gen. List and the army commander as a very difficult, if not impassable, obstacle. The Mahrish-Ostrau group sought to gain ground as rapidly as possible to the east, in order to outflank the valuable upper Silesian industrial area and force its evacuation by the Poles before they could destroy the mines and factories. The industrial area was not itself to be attacked. In this part of the front, the local German forces, consisting of frontier (Grenz) troops and S.S. detachments maintained a watchful defensive and awaited the strategic effects of the advance of the Mahrish-Ostrau group in the south. On September 2 and 3, this Mahrish-Ostrau group of the Fourteenth Army achieved an important local success. Attacking with tanks, it broke through the Polish pill-box line, which stretched from Nikolai over Pless and Biala to the Carpathians. By evening of the 4th, it had crossed the Vistula and as night fell on the 5th, it had reached the vicinity of Cracow. This

DECLASSIFIED

advance when coupled with a similar deep penetration of the Tenth Army to the north of Kattowitz rendered the industrial area untenable, and its evacuation was carried out by the Poles during the 5th. The occupying German detachments consisting of 2nd line troops found most of the mines and factories intact. Only one mine had been damaged.

The southern group of Gen. List's army made only slow progress during the first three days of operation, so rugged were the West Beskid hills over which their attack was launched. On the 4th, however, Neumarkt was captured and on the 5th, the line had been advanced to the vicinity of Cracow where its left flank obtained contact with the right flank of the Mährisch-Ostrau group.

On the 5th, a third corps of Gen. List's army commenced operations. This corps had concentrated in the Zips region of Central Slovakia east of the High Tatra mountains. The corps consisted of two Slovak and several German mountain divisions. Its first objective was Neu Sandez. By evening of the 5th, the corps had reached the outskirts of this town.

(2) Tenth Army (Reichenau).

The strong Tenth Army of General of Artillery von Reichenau concentrated its forces along the Silesian-Polish frontier to the north of the upper Silesian industrial area between the towns of Kreuzberg and Tarnowitz. The headquarters of Gen. von Reichenau was, initially, at Oppeln. The Army consisted of at least two corps, composed of infantry divisions, and of two mechanized corps, the XVI of Lieut. Gen. Hoepner and the XV of Gen. of Infantry Hoth. One of these mechanized corps was located on the left flank of the Army. There were also a number of additional active and reserve divisions which were held initially in second line, in order to give depth to an attack, which it was hoped, would succeed in continuing, unchecked, to Warsaw and the Vistula river. The concentration of this army was effected on a narrow front and in great depth, as befitted a force which was designed to make the main effort of the entire German army.

The Tenth Army was opposed during this first phase of the operations by four Polish infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade, which had been concentrated close to the frontier, in part behind the half completed pillbox line of the Warta river, in part to the west of Tschenstochau. The remaining divisions of the Polish Silesian Army were far to the eastward and out of supporting distance.

The Tenth Army succeeded in the opening days of hostilities in gaining an important tactical success. The Warta line

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

was overrun on a broad front, and the city of Tschenstochau captured. This success was primarily due to the aggressiveness of the German combat groups, each a reinforced infantry regiment, in part, however, to the successful advance of the German mechanized corps on the north flank of the army which succeeded on the third day in pushing its advance to Radomsko, a town 50 miles from the frontier. This advance rendered untenable the Polish defenses along the Warta, further to the south. Portions of this mechanized corps appear to have turned south after crossing the Warta, and to have attacked in rear the Polish defenders along the Warta line. By this maneuver the mechanized corps materially assisted the frontally attacking German infantry units.

By September 4 the Polish front had been thrown into grave disorder. The three northern Polish divisions began a rapid withdrawal in a northerly direction towards Tomaszow. The remaining division of the frontier forces of the "Silesian" Army Group, the 7th, was encircled by the Germans, a little to the east of Tschenstochau, and annihilated. Only a few minor elements of this division succeeded in escaping.

The retreat of the bulk of the Polish forces opposing the Tenth Army in the direction of Tomaszow, and the annihilation of the 7th division, opened up a wide gap in the Polish front. On the 4th and 5th, the right wing of the army made astoundingly rapid advances. A golden opportunity had appeared for the German mechanized forces. By the evening of the 5th, these units had reached the line Piotrkow-Chejny and the following infantry divisions, after a series of forced marches, were not far behind.

The Polish Silesian Army had lost all cohesion. One division had been destroyed. Three were withdrawing due northward, while the other four, initially in reserve, were withdrawing eastward towards the security afforded by the Vistula river. The Tenth German Army had won a tactical success of the first importance and had advanced 70 miles in five days.

(3) Eighth Army (Blaskowitz).

The Eighth Army, much the weakest of the German southern group of armies concentrated its forces, prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Middle Silésia between Trebnitz and Kreuzberg; Army headquarters was at Breslau. The mission of Gen. Blaskowitz was to protect the left flank of the Tenth Army of Gen. von Reichenau during its advance on Warsaw and the Vistula. The Eighth Army was organized in two corps, from left to right, the X and XIII. Each corps placed initially two divisions in first line. The X Corps had in line the 10th and 17th divisions, with the 27th following in close support. The composition of the XIII Corps is not known. The 30th Division

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

followed the X Corps, echeloned well to the rear and on its left flank in order to ward off a possible Polish counter thrust from the directions of Posen and Kalisch.

During this first phase the advance of the army was not seriously opposed. Only one Polish division (the 13th) held the Warta river line opposite the army sector, and this position was penetrated by the Eighth Army after sharp fighting on the 4th and 5th. By evening of the 5th the town of Zdunska Wola had been taken and bridgeheads established to the east of the Warta sufficiently broad and deep to permit a farther advance by the army in the direction of Lodz.

(4) Fourth Army (von Kluge).

The Fourth Army effected its concentrations prior to September 1 in two groupings. The stronger of these, consisting of three corps was drawn up along the German frontier between Schlochau and Schneidemuhl, and faced the broad base of the Corridor. A weaker corps of one or two unidentified but second line divisions concentrated in the vicinity of Butow opposite the seacoast section of the Corridor. Army headquarters was established in Jastrow.

Von Kluge's mission was to reduce the Corridor in the shortest possible time by an advance with the bulk of his army to the Vistula river between Bromberg and Graudenz, - then to effect a crossing of the Vistula river on both sides of Culm and continue the advance on the east bank, in the direction of Modlin and Warsaw.

The main effort of the Fourth Army, was to be made by the II Corps of General Strauss, consisting initially of three divisions in first line, and several more in reserve. On its south flank was a weak corps, probably the III, with the mission of protecting its south flank and on its north, a mixed corps of mechanized and motorized divisions under General Guderian, the peacetime inspector of the German mechanized troops. This main effort was to be supported by a supplementary attack of von Kuechler's Third Army (East Prussia), which had given the independent mission of attacking Graudenz to the XXI Corps. This combined attack of two armies was intended to pinch out the Corridor and cut off all Polish forces which were holding the seacoast region at Gdynia, and those farther south that might fail to withdraw beyond the Vistula river.

The German attack of von Kluge's Army which was begun at dawn on the 1st, proved extremely successful. By evening of the same day the line: Konitz-Nakel had been reached, and by the 4th the line of the Vistula and Netze had been attained from Marien Werder on the East Prussian border to Nakel. This success had been won in first line by the relentless advance of the German infantry of the

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

of the II Corps but this infantry attack had been materially assisted to this success by an important penetration by Gen. Guderian's mechanized corps on the left flank. Here, the 3rd Panzer division opened up a five mile gap in the Polish line, and then without giving a thought to the protection of its own flanks pushed on to the Vistula.

The closing of the Corridor, amounted in itself to an important German success. The booty obtained, however, exceeded all German expectation. Contrary to previous German expectations a large part of the Polish garrison in the Corridor amounting to two (9th, 27th) divisions and one (Pomorska) cavalry brigade, delayed too long and failed to make good their withdrawal across the Vistula. A part of these troops became dispersed and were captured by degrees. The main body, however, was surrounded in a wooded region to the west of Culm and, after several unsuccessful attempts to break the German circle, surrendered on September 5th. It was claimed in Berlin that the prisoners and booty here taken amounted to 25,000 officers and men and ninety guns.

The advance of the weak German corps from Butow into the maritime region of the Corridor encountered strong resistance from Polish reserve and naval shore formations. The battles of this corps around Gdynia and Putzig continued far beyond September 6. Assistance was given it by various Danzig military and semi-military units. The fighting at Gdynia, while fiercely contested possessed no strategic importance. Gdynia was not actually occupied by the German forces until September 15, and the Hela peninsula even succeeded in holding out until September 27. These subsidiary operations in the northern Corridor will not again be mentioned in this account of military operations.

The offensive of the Fourth Army in this phase was not concluded with its successful closing of the Corridor. During the night of September 4-5, a river crossing of the Vistula was effected on both sides of Culm by the II Corps and during the 5th, these bridgeheads were deepened and contact obtained with the XXI Corps of the Third Army near Graudenz. Thus, already in the first phase, the Fourth Army had not only successfully concluded its first assigned mission, but had initiated its second; the advance on Modlin and Warsaw.

The Army, however, on September 5 was already regrouping its forces, and preparing to transfer strong elements to von Kuechler's Third Army (23rd Line and 3rd Panzer Division), in order to permit this Army to commence its attack on Bialystock and Brest-Litovsk, an operation from which the German High Command hoped for decisive strategical success. These divisions crossed the Corridor in motors and on foot on the 5th and 6th, and after reaching the

DECLASSIFIED

German East Prussian railheads entrained for new concentration areas in the then eastern portions of East Prussia.

(5) The Third Army (von Kuechler).

The Third Army concentrated its main forces prior to September 1 in the triangle Osterode-Neidenburg-Allenstein, preparatory to breaking through the Polish fortified lines on both sides of Mlawa, and then pushing its advance southeastward over the Narew and Bug rivers to the area east of Warsaw. The occupation of this area was the principle army objective.

A subsidiary force of the army, known as the XXI Corps and whose principal element was the 21st Division was detailed from the army proper and given the mission of assisting von Kluge's Fourth Army to close the Corridor, by capturing the city of Graudenz. This force succeeding in breaking through the obsolescent forts protecting Graudenz during the 3rd and 4th, and in joining hands to the south of the city with the Fourth Army on September 5.

The main attacking force of the Third Army, consisted of the 1st, 11th, and 12th active line divisions, the 10th Panzer Division, the 1st Cavalry Brigade, one or two S.S. Regiments and an indefinite number of reserve and Landwehr formations, concentrated to the north of Mlawa. During the 1st and 2nd this large force made a determined effort to capture this Polish town; but strong enemy resistance, and the strength of the fortified line in this vicinity, allowed the Germans to make only minor progress. Several German tank attacks on these two days, are known to have been repulsed. During the night of the 2nd and 3rd, the main effort of the Army's attack was shifted eastward, and the motorized elements of the Army moved from the vicinity of Mlawa to Willenburg. This move caught the Polish forces unawares. The Third Army advanced on the 3rd with great rapidity and by evening had captured the important road junction of Przasnysz. This advance forced the Polish forces defending Mlawa to evacuate that city and withdraw towards Warsaw.

During the 4th, the Third Army continued further to draw together strong forces on its east flank, in order to be in a position to force the Narew river between Pultusk and Rozan. During the 5th, the German advance continued to gain ground rapidly and by evening the left wing of the Army had reached the Narew at Rozan, while the right wing, advancing from Mlawa had captured Ciechanow. At the end of this First Phase of Operations the Third Army had successfully penetrated the frontier line of Polish fortifications but had only just obtained contact with the main defense positions along the Narew. These defensive positions, however, were still intact. The depth of the Third Army's advance reached at no point a depth of more than forty miles.

(6) Air Operations.

The German Air Force struck at dawn on September 1 with full force against the ground installations of the Polish Air Force. Apparently every known Polish airdrome over the entire country was repeatedly bombed each day from September 1 to 4. Polish resistance, both in the air and from the ground was ineffective. Commencing on September 3 the weight of the German air attack was shifted to the lines of railroad communication west of the Vistula, in order to prevent the use of these railroads for the regrouping and withdrawal of the Polish Armies. On September 5 attacks began to be made on Polish troop columns. During this first phase also most of the known Polish aircraft factories were destroyed as well as the large ammunition works at Sandomir. At the end of this phase of operations, the Polish air force had been reduced to impotence, and the German air fleets had obtained full freedom of operation.

B. Phase II. September 6-8. Decisive German Victory.

(1) The Fourteenth Army (List).

During the period September 6-8, the Fourteenth Army of General of Infantry List made rapid advances to the east and northeast of the positions which they had reached on the evening of September 5 to the west and south of Cracow. The divisions of the Polish "Cracow" and "Przemysl" army groups which were facing the Fourteenth Army, drew back rapidly towards the San river line without attempting to offer decisive battle to their pursuers. The eccentric retreat of these army groups indicates that they hoped to organize a broad but firm defense of that river line, between Sandomir, at the junction of the San and Vistula rivers and Przemysl. However, the withdrawal of these divisions was not effected without considerable disorder. There are many indications that Polish G.H.Q. at Warsaw, even so early in the campaign, had lost touch with its Southern Army Groups, and that in consequence the commanders of these Groups were left to act on their own responsibility.

On September 6, the "Mahrisch-Ostrau" group of Gen. List's army, consisting largely of Austrian units, captured Cracow, the principal city of South Poland. No opposition was offered. The "Zips" group of the same army (operating from east of the High Tatra mountains), on the same day occupied Now Sandez and pushed on towards the Wisloka river. On the 8th the Galician towns of Tarnow and Gorlice were taken and a bridgehead seized at Debica on the east bank of the Wisloka.

The operations of Gen. List's Fourteenth Army between the 6th and 8th bore no decisive character. The San line, the main protective position of Poland in the south was still intact. Nevertheless the disorganized Polish withdrawal had taken on such

DECLASSIFIED

character, that the German High Command had already formed the opinion that no effective opposition could even be expected along the line of the San river.

(2) The Tenth Army (Reichenau).

Between September 6 and September 8, the army of General von Reichenau achieved very important tactical and strategical successes. On the evening of September 5, his army lay stretched out on a broad front of some seventy miles from Piotrkow in the northwest to Checiny facing the city of Kielce in the south-east. A Panzer Corps under Lt. Gen. Hoepner was concentrated around Piotrkow, while the other Panzer Corps of the Army, under General of Infantry Hoth, stood on the right flank observing the enemy divisions to the south around Cracow and guarding against a hostile attack from that direction.

The Polish division of the "Silesian" army group, which had opposed Reichenau's initial assault were on this day engaged in withdrawing northward towards Lodz, while the four reserve divisions of the Army, originally near Tomaszow were returning eastward towards the Vistula, and preparing to halt a German pursuit along the line of the Lysa Gora hills in front of Radom. The withdrawal of the "Silesian" Army Group in two distinct groups, one moving northward, the other eastward, opened up perforce a broad gap in front of Reichenau's left wing and center. Between Piotrkow and Warsaw, stood no Polish force of a size which could prevent or even seriously oppose Reichenau's advance. Also there stretched between these two cities, the best paved road in all Poland. At Piotrkow stood ready the powerful Panzer Corps of General Hoepner, consisting of two mechanized divisions. A unique situation had developed which permitted mechanized troops, for the first time in history, to show their strategic capabilities.

Reichenau's advance on the 6th, 7th, and 8th, assumed the character of a headlong race. Hoepner's Panzer Corps reached Tomaszow on the 6th. From this city the advance continued on the 7th and 8th towards Warsaw. One column captured Rawa Mozowiecka on the 7th, and reached the southwestern suburbs of Warsaw, by evening of the following day. The right column of the corps took a more easterly route in advancing on Warsaw moving from Tomaszow towards Gora Kalwaria on the west bank of the Vistula and thence following the river bank northward toward the Polish capital. This column also reached the outer suburbs of Warsaw about dusk on the 8th. Neither column, however, was sufficiently concentrated on this evening to undertake the occupation of the city, although resistance at first appeared to be slight and unorganized. Hoepner's Corps had far outstripped the following German infantry divisions, which on this evening were reported to be still seventy miles in rear of the

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

mechanized units. Caution was called for. Very strong and undefeated Polish forces were believed to be located in and around Lodz, threatening the left flank and rear of the Panzer Corps.

This deep penetration of Reichenau's left wing to the outskirts of Warsaw was a maneuver of such importance as to alter over night the entire strategical situation. Hoepner's Panzer Corps had driven a deep wedge between the Polish Armies. Strong elements of the "Thorn", "Posen" and "Silesian" Army groups stood to the west of this wedge, while very scattered forces lay to the east. From this moment the further retreat of the Western forces was to be a very difficult operation as between them and the Vistula, stood a number of German divisions. This wedge was still very weak on the 8th; and it was by no means a foregone conclusion that the Polish Armies in West Poland could not escape the threatening encirclement. Nevertheless, the dash of the Panzer Corps on Warsaw had cut in two the Polish Armies and by so doing had basically altered the whole situation. From the 8th on it was apparent that the Polish military situation was a desperate one and only a military miracle could have postponed the destruction of its armies.

While Reichenau's left wing was advancing on Warsaw, his center and right continued to advance in the direction of the Lysa Gora hill mass and Radom. The important industrial city of Kielce was taken on the 6th and by the 7th, the army was engaged in a frontal battle with the 3rd and 12th Polish divisions in and around Skarzysko-Kamienna. The 19th and 29th divisions of this Polish Army group were on this day withdrawing from Tomaszow through Radom to the safety offered by the Vistula.

The withdrawal of the Polish "Cracow" Army group from Cracow eastward had relieved Gen. Hoth's Panzer Corps from the necessity of further protecting Reichenau's right flank. This was no longer in danger. Reichenau's mission was now to prevent successful withdrawal of the enemy divisions at Radom and in the Lysa Gora across the Vistula. Hoth's Panzer Corps concentrated to the south-east of Kielce was directed to advance in the general direction of Opatow and Zwolen along the west bank of the Vistula and cut the lines of Polish retreat between Radom and the river. The advance of the corps was extremely rapid. As in the other Panzer Corps operating towards Warsaw, there was little Polish opposition. A flanking detachment captured Sandomir and its munitions factories on the 8th. The main body passed to the north of Sandomir, advanced rapidly northward along the west bank of the Vistula, and captured both Zwolen and Radom during the afternoon and evening of the 8th. This movement cut across the line of retreat of four Polish divisions, the 3rd, 12th, 19th and 29th, but of course it did not seal their fate, as Hoth's Panzer Corps lacked the strength by itself to defeat such

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

powerful hostile forces. Nevertheless this Panzer Corps advance on Radom was to bring further strategic results of the first importance. The southern Polish front was hereby shattered into fragments. Four Polish divisions were cut off and even the Polish hold on the middle Vistula front, the last natural line of the nation's defense was seriously threatened.

(3) The Eighth Army (Blaskowitz).

The advance of the Eighth Army during this phase of the operation continued in a general northeasterly direction without important incidents. On September 6 and 7 advances of normal depths were made from the Warta bridgeheads, which had been seized on the 6th. On the 8th the Army passed on both sides of Lodz, without, however, occupying the city and towards evening reached Ozorkow to the northwest of Lodz and Brzeziny to the northeast.

During this advance, the 30th division followed echeloned to left rear of the left flank of the Army, so as to prevent interference with the Army's movements by the strong Polish forces known to be still located in the province of Posen. It is noteworthy that on the 8th, the Eighth Army was still entirely unaware of the strong Polish force, of about five divisions which had begun to withdraw from Kalisch, Posen and Thorn and was rapidly approaching the Army's left flank. The failure of the German information service to function on this occasion was to result in the grave crisis which was to befall the Eighth Army in the succeeding week. It was, indeed, momentarily to threaten the success of the entire German plan of campaign.

(4) Fourth Army (von Kluge).

The operations of the Fourth Army during the phase of operations lasting from Sept. 6 to Sept. 8 are of relatively slight interest. The Army had been numerically much weakened on Sept. 5th, by the detachment of the 3rd Panzer, and 23rd Line Divisions to von Kuechler's Third (East Prussian) Army. The Fourth Army on the morning of the 6th was considerably dislocated. The left wing, the principal element of which was the II Corps, had established on September 5 fairly deep bridgeheads on the East Bank of the Vistula and had joined hands with the XXI Corps of the Third Army in Graudenz. From this time on the XXI Corps disappears from view. Some of its units appear to have been in part attached to von Kluge's Fourth Army, and the rest to have been transported by rail to eastern East Prussia in preparation for the advance on Brest-Litovsk.

The III Corps, the left wing element of the Fourth Army captured Bromberg on September 6, and on the 7th and 8th advanced halfway towards Hohensalza. It was the intention of the German High Command to press closely with this corps on the heels of

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

the enemy forces withdrawing from Posen and Thorn in the direction of Warsaw.

The II Corps, which had crossed the Vistula during the night of September 4-5, and established bridgeheads on the east bank in the course of the 5th, continued to press forward during the 6th, 7th, and 8th. By evening of the 8th, Strasburg had been taken and the river Drewenz crossed. Only weak Polish detachments remained before the front of the II Corps, and neither terrain nor fortifications seemed to bar the way to the corps' further advance towards the fortress of Modlin.

(5) Third Army (von Kuechler).

By night of September 5, the striking force of the Third Army stood in two groupments, one at Ciechanow and the other facing Rozan on the Narew river. Up to the 5th the direction of attack of the army had been due southward from East Prussia towards Modlin and Warsaw. However, it had been the intention of the Army Commander from the outset not to run frontally against the fortifications protecting the Polish capital to the north, but rather to drive southeastward over the Narew and Bug rivers toward Siedlce, a city fifty miles east of Warsaw, the capture of which would result in isolating the Polish capital. During September 5, the troop movements necessary to effect this change of front were in progress.

Commencing on the morning of the 6th, the attack on the Narew line began. The troops from Ciechanow reached the Narew opposite the obsolescent fortress of Pultusk, and the units near Rozan opened their attack to force crossings of the river at that point. The Narew was forced near both these towns on the 7th, after heavy fighting, and with the attacking troops suffering losses which in certain cases were severe. The Polish bridgehead fortifications on the west bank at Rozan and Pultusk were masked and the crossings effected on both sides of both cities. The success of these river crossings forced the Poles to evacuate both of their fortified bridgeheads on the 7th. On the 8th, the German pursuit was initiated towards the Bug river in the direction of Wyzkow and Brok.

The forcing of the Narew by the Third Army was a success of the first magnitude and profoundly influenced the entire strategic situation. The Narew was the only Polish defensive position north of Warsaw, and on its retention depended the ultimate fates of both the Polish capital and the whole Vistula defensive position. The Narew having been crossed, the road was opened for the Third Army into the interior of Poland, and the sequence of events commenced which led ultimately to the surrender of Warsaw and the Polish armies.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

While the Narew was being crossed, a new strong concentration of the Third Army was being effected in the area Lyck-Johannisburg, preparatory to advancing in the directions of Bialystock and Brest-Litovsk. The movement of this group across the frontier, however, did not begin until September 9.

(6) Air Operations.

During the period September 6-8, the German Air Force continued its operations against the Polish Airfields and the communications system of West Poland. Repeated heavy bombing attacks were made against the railroads leading from Thorn, Posen and Kalisch towards the Polish capital. The object of these attacks was to retard the regroupment of the Posen and Thorn troops which were known to be trying to retire westward.

On the 8th, the German Air Force scored a signal victory of more than local importance by destroying the Vistula bridges at Deblin. This destruction added further to the difficulties of the four Polish divisions near Radom whose retreat to the Vistula was already menaced by General Hoth's Panzer Corps.

fourteenth
C. Phase III September 9-14. The Encirclement of the Polish Armies.

(1) The Fourteenth Army (List).

The operations of the Fourteenth Army during the period September 9-14 took on the character of a pursuit. Nowhere did the Polish divisions of the "Cracow" and "Przemysl" Army groups seek to offer decisive resistance. On the evening of the 8th, the troops of the ~~Eighth~~ Army had reached the general line; Gorlice--Debica--Pinczow. In their front the Polish Armies were seeking to withdraw to defensive positions behind the San river. This withdrawal, which was not every where carried out in an orderly manner, was made in two directions. The "Cracow" Army group adopted a northeasterly direction of retirement towards Chelm in order to defend the lower San and Vistula river from Zawichos to Lezajsk; the "Przemysl" group on the other hand, retired due eastward in the direction of Lemberg in order to bar the Upper San river to their German pursuers from Lezajsk to the Carpathians. The latter group now consisted of but two divisions.

The German advance during this period was exceptionally rapid. The two mechanized divisions of the Army, the 2nd Panzer and 4th Light Divisions appear to have cut loose from the foot divisions and to have sought to take advantage of their high speed to seize the San crossings before these could be organized for defense.

On September 9, the Fourteenth Army reached the line: Dukla--Krasno--Rzeszow--Kolbuszowa. In places this advance had

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

reached on this day a depth of thirty-five miles.

On the following day, September 10, the Fourteenth Army obtained very important tactical and strategical successes. The advanced mechanized divisions which had occupied Rzeszow on the 9th, made a new forty-mile advance and seized bridgeheads on the east bank of the San at Radymno and Jaroslav. The withdrawing 24th Polish Division, which should have barred the crossing in this sector, had chosen a more northerly route of retirement and was not in the vicinity of Jaroslav when the German mechanized divisions put in an appearance. In the Carpathian foothills the 1st German Mountain Division gained an equally important success by forcing another crossing of the San at Sanok against strong resistance of the 11th Polish division, which then withdrew on Przemysl.

During the next three days, the pursuit of the fleeing Poles gained momentum. The Fourteenth Army pressed forward in a series of forced marches to the north and south of the fortress of Przemysl. On the 12th, the Armies' right flank reached Sambor and sent forward a strong detachment of infantry in requisitioned trucks towards Lemberg. Mechanized units, coming from Jaroslav, reached the outskirts of this city on the same day. For the next days, a series of confused fights occurred in the environs of this large city. Thirty miles to its west, the 11th and 24th Polish divisions seeking to retire towards Lemberg were intercepted near Crodek and their retreat brought to a standstill.

To the northwest of Lemberg, mechanized units also succeeded on September 13, in getting across the Lublin-Lemberg highway at Tomaszow and Pawa-Ruska. The main elements of the Polish "Cracow" Army group were on this day in the vicinity of Bilgoraj, along the east bank of the San, far in rear of these German mechanized advanced detachments.

The successful seizure of the San line on September 10 amounted to a new German strategical success. The San was the last suitable defensive position in south Poland. With its seizure, Eastern Galicia stood defenseless before the German invaders, and the retirement of the Polish forces in the South to Roumania became impossible. Nothing remained for the "Cracow" Army group at Bilgoraj but to seek to continue their retreat northeastward in the hope of finding temporary respite in the roadless and resourceless Pripet swamps.

(2) The Tenth Army (Reichenau).

During the period September 9 to 15, the Tenth Army of General von Reichenau fought in two distinct combat groups in far separated theatres of operations. The left wing of the Army

DECLASSIFIED

suffered a check in its first efforts to capture Warsaw, and then participated with varying fortunes in the desperate battles fought by the Eighth Army, to the north of Lodz and along the Bzura, against the Polish forces in the Kutno region, which were seeking to cut their way through to the Polish capital. The right wing of the Army was engaged during these days seventy miles farther southward and won the annihilating victory of Radom, in which four Polish divisions surrendered. The operations of this right wing of Reichenau's Army is one of the most interesting examples of the German use of mechanized units which the entire campaign affords.

On September 8, General Hoth's Panzer Corps had cut across the line of withdrawal of the 3rd, 12th, 19th and 29th Polish divisions at Radom and Zwolen, barring their retreat across the Vistula. This interception did not, however, by itself insure the destruction of these units. The Panzer Corps was scarcely strong enough to force the surrender of 60,000 troops. Assistance was necessary, and this was soon provided by the pursuing German foot divisions which were following frontally the Polish 3rd and 12th divisions, which had been holding the line of the Lysa Gora hills south of Radom. During the 9th and 10th the encirclement of this Polish force was completed. Though on the 10th and 11th, desperate efforts were made by the Poles to escape, the bulk of the force surrendered on the 12th. Sixty thousand officers and men, 143 guns, and 38 tanks were captured. A few stragglers alone succeeded in finding safety across the Vistula.

The struggle of Reichenau's left wing along the Bzura and in the suburbs of Warsaw in no way proceeded as favorably as had the action at Radom. On the evening of September 8, Lt. Gen. Reinhardt's 4th Panzer division of Lt. Gen. Hoepner's Panzer Corps had reached the western outskirts of Warsaw; but though Polish resistance was slight, it had failed to capture the city by a coup de main. Supporting troops were not available, but despite this absence Reinhardt renewed his attack early on the 9th, and ordered his two tank regiments forward in a coordinated attack, supporting this attack of the tanks with motorized infantry units. The attack at first gained ground and penetrated the city nearly to the main railway station. Polish resistance was too strong, however, and Reinhardt's division too weak. As soon as night fell the German troops were withdrawn to their initial positions in the western suburbs. Here they stood their ground for the next days and awaited reinforcements.

The awaited reinforcements arrived but slowly and then in inadequate numbers to permit a renewal of the attack. A great crisis had arisen for the Germans north of Lodz and along the Bzura where the main Polish Armies, coming from Posen and Thorn,

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

had attacked the Eighth Army of General Blaskowitz and had gained considerable initial successes. Every unit which Reichenau could spare had to be rushed to Blaskowitz's assistance. Gradually almost the entire left wing of the Tenth Army was thrown into the battle along the Bzura and a mere screen left to contain the Polish forces in Warsaw. The crisis of the Bzura battle came on the 11th and 12th, when Polish divisions captured Sochaczew and secured strong footholds on the right bank of the Bzura. Some minor units even succeeded in reaching Warsaw and Modlin by keeping to the north and close to the Vistula, a route still not closed by the Germans. It was not until the 15th that the crisis was fully surmounted. By this time Reichenau's left wing along the Bzura had been reinforced by reserve divisions and German preparations had been completed for a large scale counterattack against the encircled Poles.

The right wing of the Tenth Army after its successes at Radom did not rest on its arms. The surrender of the four divisions had left the right bank of the Vistula river between Warsaw and Sandomierz denuded of defenders. On the 13th, weak German detachments seized bridgeheads on the east bank of the river at Gora Kalwarja, Pulawy and Annapol. These bridgeheads were widened and deepened on the 14th and 15th and the forces, which had been fighting at Radom regrouped themselves to cross the Vistula and commence the advance on Lublin.

3. The Eighth Army (Blaskowitz).

In this third phase of operations the Eighth Army of General Blaskowitz was forced to participate in the most serious fighting of the entire Polish campaign, to bear almost unsupported the brunt of the attack of the strongest Polish Army and to pass through a series of crises, which at several moments appeared to be so grave as to threaten the very existence of the Army.

On the evening of September 8th, the columns of the Eighth Army after passing Lodz to the east and west had reached Ozorkow and Brzeniny to the northwest and east of the city. Lodz itself, according to plan, was not to be occupied until the 9th. The army commander hoped to seize the line of the Bzura next day and thereby, to fulfill the army mission of protecting the left flank of the Tenth Army. Polish forces were known to be in and around Kutno and along the Bzura. The strength of this grouping, however, was gravely underestimated. While the German High Command estimated these forces at only five infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades, their true strength was twelve divisions and two brigades. Over half of this strong army also had not hitherto been engaged. Its strength was more than double that of the Eighth Army. Blaskowitz from the first day of the campaign had carefully watched his left flank. Behind his left corps the X, he had echeloned to the left rear the 30th

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Division. As events turned out this disposition proved to be the Army's salvation. Nevertheless by itself the 30th Division was too weak to do more than stem the stream which was soon to break upon it.

Early on the 9th, the Eighth Army took the offensive against the line of the Bzura. Unclarified as was the situation in the Army's front, Blaskowitz in so doing was acting merely in accordance with a German precept, as old as 1870; in a doubtful situation, the offensive is the best policy and that the seizure of the initiative compensates for the weakness of one's own force. The necessary corollary to this German precept is that there shall be subsequent reinforcements close at hand to maintain the advantages gained.

The attacks of the Army proved at first successful. Lowicz and Sochaczew on the Bzura were seized on the 9th and 10th and to the northwest of Lodz, Leczyca was reached by the 30th Division on the 9th. These advances, nevertheless, were made only after heavy fighting and cost the Army many casualties. By the morning of the 11th the Army was spread out on a broad front and reduced to the defensive. On the 12th the Polish Army counterattacked along the whole front of the Bzura.

A local crisis, however, had occurred on the army's left flank on the 9th and 10th. Here the 30th Division was stuck in its left flank, while strung out in column of march. The attacking Polish force consisted of five divisions. The advance guard of the 30th was cut off in Leczyca. The division commander who was with his main body ten miles away to the south sought vainly by a counterattack to regain contact with his advance guard. The Polish pressure however, was too heavy and the division as a whole, including the advance guard at Leczyca, withdrew to the southeast, evacuating the latter town.

The crisis was averted by three German counteractions. The Tenth Army diverted every available man and tank from the vicinity of Warsaw to bar the further advance of the Polish units which had captured Lowicz and Sochaczew. The Polish attacks in this area were brought to a full standstill on the 13th as a result of the arrival of these reinforcements. The second cause for the successful German defense was the availability of reserve divisions close behind the Eighth Army. These were numerous and strong enough to bring the Polish attacks on the Eighth Army to a complete halt by the 14th. The German Air Force, however, was also a contributing factor in checking the Polish advance. On the 11th and 12th, strong bombardment elements of the German Air Force were taken off their strategic missions and launched against the Polish Armies north of Lodz, in order to impede

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

their troop movements, paralyze their reserves and destroy their supply installations. The effect of these air attacks was considerable and they contributed not a little to the successful defense of the Eighth Army. By the 15th the crisis had passed and the German armies renewed their offensive once more. The Eighth Army was now no longer to act by itself. Strong elements of the Tenth Army attacked due westward from Warsaw and the III Corps of the Fourth Army, was approaching the battlefield along the south bank of the Vistula from the direction of Bromberg and Hohensalza.

(4) Fourth Army (von Kluge).

The operations of the Fourth Army in this phase consisted principally of marching. At the start of the phase the Army was divided into two corps groups, one on each side of the Vistula. The III Corps had reached on the 8th, positions south of Bromberg, the II Corps on the north bank had passed the Drewencz river and reached the town of Lypin. The III Corps, consisting only of foot divisions, moved southeastward in a series of forced marches, to join in the great battle raging between Kutno and Lodz. By evening of the 15th, the corps was approaching the former city and preparing to throw in its weight to assist the Eighth and Tenth Armies.

The daily advances of the II Corps were of extraordinary depth. By the 10th Plock on the north bank of the Vistula to the northeast of Kutno had been captured and on the 12th the town of Wysogrod, opposite the mouth of the Bzura. These advances barred all lines of retreat of the Polish forces around Kutno to the north over the Vistula. By evening of the 15th, advanced elements of the corps stood in front of the Polish fortress of Modlin. The advance from Graudenz to Modlin had been at no place seriously opposed by the Poles.

While this advance of the Fourth Army was taking place, frontier detachments and second line units of the German Army entered the Province of Posen, now evacuated by Polish regular units and proceeded to occupy the entire province. No Polish resistance was offered and the entire region fell unwasted by war into German hands.

(5) Third Army (von Kuechler).

On September 8, at the close of the second phase of the campaign, the Third Army had forced the fortified line of the Narew river between Pultusk and Rozan, thus securing a decisive success. During this third phase of the operations, the army was to exploit this success and move against the rear communications of Warsaw. However, the Third Army was to commence also in this phase a major and far reaching operation against the cities of Bialystock and Brest-Litovsk, two of the principal cities of East Poland.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

The Narew having been forced, the Third Army lost no time in exploiting its success and moving against the Bug line some miles to the southeast. On the 9th, the north bank of this river was reached by the Third Army between Serock and Brok, and a foothold even gained on the south bank, in the vicinity of Wyszkw. On the 10th both Wyszkw and Brok were captured and on the 11th, two of the three Polish divisions defending this sector, the 8th and 20th, withdrew southwestward into Warsaw. The other division of this Army group, the 1st, retreated to the southeast in the direction of Siedlce. On the 12th, the rapidly advancing Third Army had cut the railroad lines leading from Warsaw in the direction of Bialystock and Siedlce. The bulk of the army then turned off westward towards Warsaw, in order to establish a strong cordon around Praga, the suburb on the east bank of the Vistula. On the 14th a line of investment opposite Praga was occupied and the encirclement of the Polish capital was completed. In the meantime other, but weaker German elements followed the retreating Polish 1st division towards Siedlce.

The second major operation of the Third Army, the advance on Brest-Litovsk was initiated on September 9 by the strong group of divisions which had been assembling in the area Lyck--Johannisburg. On the 9th, advanced detachments of this force came into contact with the Polish 18th Division around the antiquated fortress of Lomza on the Narew. On the 10th the river was crossed and bridgeheads seized to the east and west of the city. The Polish 18th Division, withdrawing in a southwesterly direction to Ostrolenka, left the roads free for the Germans to advance to Brest-Litovsk.

In the next three days the mechanized forces of this group made an astoundingly rapid series of advances and on the 14th captured Brest-Litovsk. For some days thereafter, a small Polish garrison continued to hold out in the citadel of that antiquated fortress. Bialystock was occupied by the 23rd German division on the 15th. Meanwhile the 18th Polish Division at Ostrolenka finding German forces on all sides sought to withdraw towards the southeast. It was, however, surrounded by German detachments near Ostrow-Mazowieckie and lost 6,000 prisoners and 18 guns. A few small detachments escaped the fate of the majority, by scattering into the forests.

The encirclement of Warsaw and the capture of Brest-Litovsk were the two most important successes of the Third Army in this phase. The first sealed the ultimate fate of the Polish capital; the latter insured that no effective resistance could be offered by Poland in its vast eastern territories.

(6) Air Operations.

During the period September 9 to 15 the German

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

Air Force carried out a series of large scale bombardment operations, designed to paralyze the entire Polish railroad net east of the Vistula, and to prevent the transport westward by rail of the reserve units known to be completing their organization in East Poland.

These operations were in part interrupted between September 11 and 14 by the necessity of diverting bombing squadrons to the assistance of the hard pressed Eighth Army north of Lodz. Nevertheless, this Air Force support proved of great importance and contributed materially to the success of the German ground Armies in this most severely contested battle of the War.

D. Phase IV September 15-20. The Annihilation of the Polish Armies and the Russian Invasion.

(1) The Fourteenth Army (List).

The principal event in this phase of the Galician operations was the opening of hostilities on the part of Russia, and the entry of their forces into East Galicia.

On the evening of September 14, the center group of the Army of Gen. List had reached, with its advanced mechanized elements, the outskirts of Lemberg and had erected a thin outpost line around three sides of the city; to the north, the west and the south. The right wing of the army still stood motionless around Sambor, a town in the Carpathian foothills, which it had reached on the 12th. The mechanized forces, composing the advance guards of the left wing had succeeded in getting across the Lublin--Lemberg highway between Tomaszow and Rawa--Ruska.

The Polish forces in Galicia, already half demoralized by their long retreat and much weakened by straggling and the loss of prisoners stood in two main groups. The larger, composed of the 5th, 6th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and the Mechanized brigade was slowly withdrawing to the northeast, and by the 15th, was along the San river, to the southeast of Sandomierz. The smaller group composed of the 11th and 24th Divisions lay between Przemysl and Lemberg. The further withdrawal of this latter force to Lemberg had been cut off by the German mechanized forces near that city. Similarly, their line of retreat to Stanislaw and Roumania had been barred by the German detachments in Sambor.

There are few details known with regard to the Galician operations in this phase of the campaign. The Russian invasion began on September 17; Tarnopol and Rowne were occupied on the 18th and the eastern outskirts of Lemberg were reached on the evening of the 20th.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

On the 16th, serious fighting began between the left wing of General List's Army and the strong Polish "Cracow" group of 5½ divisions around the town of Bilgoraj 80 miles northwest of Lemberg and forty miles east of Sandomir. The Polish withdrawal had been intercepted by German mechanized troops who had reached the region between Zamosc and Chelm, and German line infantry divisions had come up from the west and southwest to join in the fighting. The battles around Bilgoraj in which units of the army of General von Reichenau participated continued until about the 20th, when 60,000 Polish soldiers surrendered, among them the commander of the Polish Army groups in the south, General Pekor. One hundred thirty cannon were also captured. Remnants of this Polish Army eluded the German net, among them the 5th division. However, the rapid advance of the Russians westward had barred their further line of retreat and these scattered Polish units fell victims a few days later to the advancing Russian troops.

The "Przemysl" group's fate is less definite. Ten thousand men were captured near Rawa-Ruska on the 18th. Some small units appear to have got away to the southeast, and a minority of these seem to have eluded the Russians and reached safety and internment in Roumania and Hungary.

On the 17th, an event of considerable interest occurred near Wlodawa. At this point, scouting elements of the motorized reconnaissance battalions of Gen. List's Army made contact with similar units of Gen. Kuechler's Third (East Prussian) Army, which had reached Brest-Litovsk on the 14th. This junction marked the first stage in the completion of the outer double envelopment around the Polish Armies. This outer net was still but a thin screen and could have been penetrated by any Polish attack in force. However, the surrender at Warsaw, Kutno and Bilgoraj made this outer net unnecessary. The fate of the Polish Armies had already been sealed.

(2) The Tenth Army (Reichenau).

The Tenth Army continued to fight during this phase of the operations in two groups. While the left wing of the Army cooperated with the Eighth Army of General Blaskowitz and the III Corps of General von Kluge's Fourth Army in forcing the surrender of the Polish forces between Kutno and the Bzura, the right wing continued its advance towards Lublin, an advance initiated on September 13 when bridgeheads across the Vistula had been established at Pulawy and Annapol.

The battles between Kutno and the Bzura river will be dealt with in the paragraph dealing with the operations of the Eighth Army.

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

The advance on Lublin was carried out by the right wing of the Tenth Army with great rapidity. Deblin, an obsolescent ring fortress, better known under its former Russian name of Ivangorod, was taken on the 16th, together with an undestroyed Polish air depot at that place, containing one hundred airplanes. Lublin fell into German hands on the 17th, and advanced elements reached Krasnystow on the 18th, thus reaching positions from which they could assist General List's Fourteenth Army in forcing the surrender of the Polish Southern Armies at Bilgoraj.

(3) The Eighth Army (Blaskowitz).

The concentric attack of the German Armies on the surrounded large Polish forces, located between Kutno in the west and Blonie in the east, and from the Vistula in the north to the Bzura in the south, began on August 15th. The Tenth Army with strong forces attacked from Warsaw in a westerly direction. The entire Eighth Army pressed from the south against the line of the Bzura. Simultaneously the III Corps of the Fourth Army advanced southeastward from Wloclawek towards Kutno. Meanwhile other forces of the Fourth Army stood guard along the north bank of the Vistula from Plock to Wyszogrod, barring a Polish withdrawal across the river.

This concentric attack of very formidable German forces rapidly broke Polish resistance. The Polish Army seems to have been exhausted and even in part, demoralized by its brave but fruitless previous attempts to break the German ring. Air attacks by German bombing squadrons had assisted in bringing about this demoralization. Kutno was captured on the 16th by the III Corps of the Fourth Army. On the same day, the Eighth Army advancing northward, crossed the Bzura and Reichenau's forces, attacking from the direction of Warsaw, gained ground in the direction of Sochaczew and Lowicz.

By the 17th, the Polish forces had been pressed together into a very narrow area, to the southeast of Wyszogrod between the Vistula and Bzura. This same day, the decomposition of the Army began, isolated troop units surrendering to the advancing German infantry. The decomposition continued on the 18th, and the last resisting bodies of Polish troops laid down their arms the following day.

The German official communique of September 21 states that 170,000 persons were taken in all, and that one of the German Armies taking part in the battle had captured 320 guns and 40 tanks. No complete figures with regard to the booty taken at the Bzura have ever been issued by Berlin.

Polish prisoners taken in the battle of the Bzura belonged to the following divisions:

 **DECLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED

2nd, 4th, 10th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 25th, 26th, 28th, and 30th. The larger part of three cavalry brigades was also included in these surrenders. Small elements of all these divisions had eluded the German net before it was closed, and had slipped into the fortresses of Modlin and Warsaw. Nevertheless, the total of prisoners taken, 170,000 constitutes one of the largest surrenders of a field army in all military history.

(4) Fourth Army (von Kluge).

The operations of the Fourth Army in this phase center around the participation of its III Corps in the Battle of the Bzura. This corps played an important role in the encirclement of the Polish forces and its advance from the northwest hastened their rapid surrender.

While the Battle of the Bzura was in progress, the II Corps of the Fourth Army drew tight its blockade lines around Modlin to the west, north and east of that fortress. On September 19 the actual siege operations began.

It is believed, though still not fully confirmed, that about September 20 the forces besieging Modlin were reorganized as the "Army Strauss", under the command of General Strauss, the former commander of the II Corps.

(5) Third Army (von Kuechler).

The Third Army during the Fourth Phase pursued its siege operations against the fortress of Warsaw. The besieging lines closely blockaded the suburb of Praga, which lies to the east of the Vistula.

Several attempts of the Poles in the capital, to break the German blockade lines failed. One of these which took place on September 16 ended with the capture of 8,000 prisoners and 126 guns, in the region southeast of Praga.

All efforts by the German High Command to induce Warsaw to surrender failed owing to the firm and courageous, though perhaps foolhardy, attitude of the Polish authorities.

To the east of Warsaw, the 1st Polish Division, seeking to escape to the southeast, was brought to bay by pursuing German detachments in the region just southeast of Siedlce, and forced to surrender. Twelve thousand officers and men, 80 guns and 6 tanks were taken on this occasion, and only a few minor elements of the 1st Division succeeded in drawing off to the east.

The operations of the left wing of the Third Army had practically ceased with the occupation of Brest-Litovsk and Bialystock on the 14th and 15th. Motorized reconnaissance elements

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

of the 3rd Panzer Division of this force made contact with similar elements of General List's Fourteenth Army near Wlodawa on September 17.

The Russian Army began its invasion of East Poland on September 17. This advance was not opposed effectively. Russian troops captured Molodeczno and Baranowicze on September 18, and on the 20th Vilna the principal city of northeast Poland was occupied without Polish resistance.

(6) Air Operations.

The air operations during this phase were considerably less extensive than in the preceding periods. Bombing expeditions were carried out against Polish troop concentrations and columns in the regions east of the Vistula. The airfields adjoining the Russian border were extensively bombed. Also, the last remaining enemy radio stations at Vilna and Baranowicze were destroyed.

The German Air Force also continued to play an important role in the last phase of the Battle of the Bzura, bombing Polish troop units and spreading the demoralization which was fast seizing the Polish Army in this area.

E. Phase V September 21 to October 5. The Occupation of East Poland.

It is not possible in this phase to pursue the plan hitherto followed of describing the operations of the individual armies.

The only Polish troops still at large in the German-occupied portion of Poland on September 20 were:

- I. The garrison of Warsaw (The garrisons of these two cities)
(had intercommunication until)
- II. The garrison of Modlin (September 22)
- III. The naval garrison of the Hela peninsula.
- IV. A small mixed Polish force occupying Lemberg.
- V. A considerable number of Polish units, mostly reserve formations in the area between Deblin and Lublin.

Lemberg surrendered to the encircling German and Russian armies on September 21. Next day the German forces in this region began to withdraw to the San river which had been agreed on by Germany and Russia as a demarkation line.

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

The naval garrison of the Hela peninsula surrendered on October 1. This was the last fortified area in all Poland to hold out. No German attack had been made on this peninsula, but the garrison became demoralized when it learned of the fall of Warsaw and Modlin.

The sieges of Warsaw and Modlin are the most important military operations in this phase of the war. On September 20th the lines of Polish communications between these two cities were still intact.

The German operations on the west bank of the Vistula were conducted by the army of General Blaskowitz; those on the east bank, against the suburb of Praga, by the Army of General von Kuechler. A special army group under Gen. Strauss conducted the siege of Modlin. The German siege operations were conducted most vigorously against Warsaw, the main effort being made by the army commanded by General Blaskowitz against the west side of the city. On September 22 German divisions on both sides of the Vistula launched a series of local attacks to separate Modlin and Warsaw. Despite severe losses, both attacks were successful, and the besieging lines drawn still closer around both cities.

Commencing on the 24th, an intensified artillery and air bombardment was unloosed on the capital and continued unabated until the 27th. It is estimated that as a result of these fires about 20% of all the houses in the Polish capital were destroyed and that about 60% received one or more hits.

The only German infantry attack of the siege was launched on September 25th. This attack succeeded in bringing into German possession a part of the antiquated fort line on the western outskirts of the city and a portion of the suburb of Mokotow. Considerable information has been obtained with regard to this attack by an American officer who visited Warsaw shortly after the surrender. These details are of sufficient interest to warrant being included here:

"Another interesting action was the attack of an infantry regiment reinforced with one regiment of light and one battalion of medium artillery against the southern part of Warsaw, through the suburb of Mokotow.

"This attack was described in much detail by General Gallwitzer, the Regimental Commander, who had been promoted to general in recognition of his conduct of the attack. He took us over the ground, largely on foot, and pointed out even individual houses that had been particularly stubbornly defended.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

"Mokotow, with an old fort lying about 1,500 yards west thereof, was a completely fortified area. A deep ditch connected the town with the fort. This ditch served as a tank obstacle to protect the area between the two against tank attacks, and also as a covered route to transfer troops from one to the other.

"A main road entered the town from the southwest, each side flanked by separate villas constructed of stone and bricks. Towards the center of the suburb the buildings became larger, up to four stories high, and fifty yards square, and included such buildings as a hospital and apartment houses. Much of this construction was new and of concrete.

"The Poles had organized each and every building for defense. Outside doors, as well as stairways, were barricaded from the inside with sand-bags. Holes were broken through the floors and roof and communication maintained by means of ladders. Where buildings had common walls, holes were broken through on each floor. One of these houses was the dwelling of a Peruvian diplomat.

"Machine guns were so placed at street crossings that the intersecting streets could be swept with fire. Artillery was emplaced at the ends of streets so that the guns could fire point-blank down the street. Stone sidewalks were then torn up and used to build barricades across the streets. Streetcars were also used for this purpose.

"Riflemen in pairs were placed in rooms behind sand-bags, well back from windows. From such positions they could fire without being located through the flash and smoke.

"Artillery was placed in parks and open squares all through the city so that it was screened from observation from the front. On September 24 the German Air Force bombed all military objectives first with explosives and then with incendiary bombs.

"After a fifteen minute artillery preparation, commencing at noon on September 25, the German regiment attacked with two battalions in the front line. One battalion advanced astride the main road, leading from the southwest, with the right battalion east thereof. The approach led over cut grass land and potato patches, and was, for 500 yards, quite easy, until both battalions were met by heavy well aimed rifle fire from the edge of town. The fire could not be returned effectively because it was impossible to observe from where it was coming. The attack suffered considerable losses in continuing another 500 yards to the edge of the suburb itself. There it was absolutely brought to a stop by the heavy flanking fire coming from all directions from the houses.

DECLASSIFIED

 DECLASSIFIED

"In renewing the attack, the Germans either had to destroy each building by artillery fire or carry on operations with pioneers and infantry against each house. After taking one, they had to cover each window of the next house with fire and then break through its walls. Several unsuccessful attempts were made with infantry heavy weapons to silence a Polish field piece, which was set up in strong earthworks so that it enfiladed a main street and was breaking up the whole attack of the battalion. It was finally necessary to bring up a 105 mm. gun about one kilometer away at the other end of the street to silence the field piece and allow the attack to proceed.

"The Germans sustained exceptionally heavy losses in this action in spite of their strong artillery support. It shows again the great defensive value of towns and villages when properly utilized.

"The attack continued about one kilometer further into town under great difficulties until about noon of the 27th, when it was discontinued because of an armistice preceding the surrender of the city."

On September 27 Warsaw with its garrison of 102,000 men surrendered. Included among the prisoners were the whole of the Polish 8th and 20th Divisions. The destruction in the city had been so widespread, and the food supply of the civil population so limited, that despite the successful Polish repulse of the Mokotow attack, further resistance was impossible.

Demoralized upon learning of the fall of Warsaw the garrison of Modlin surrendered the following day, (September 28) 30,000 additional Polish soldiers became prisoners of war at Modlin.

Very little is known with regard to the concluding military operations in the area east of Deblin. The fighting, however, appears to have been of a fairly serious nature and the attacking German forces seem to have suffered many casualties. The Polish 37th and 41st Divisions, both reserve units, organized in garrisons east of the Vistula, participated in these engagements. The Polish forces which were led by General Kleber and which numbered about 8,000 surrendered on September 5 at Kock, a town thirty miles east of Deblin.

The German Air Force was largely inactive in this final phase of military operations except for its participation in the bombardment of Warsaw. Many units seem to have been

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

withdrawn from the eastern theatre and either returned to their home airfields or sent to the Rhine or North Sea front.

Section IV.

Criticisms and Lessons.

The following Comments and Lessons with regard to the German Campaign in Poland have been prepared with the purpose of focusing attention upon those features which deserve special emphasis, either because of the lessons which they teach or because they serve to give a better evaluation of the campaign as a whole.

In the first place, in order to refute the erroneous impression, which has apparently arisen from the rapidity with which the war was concluded and from the overwhelming success of the German Army to the effect that the campaign was little more than a maneuver which failed to afford a real test of German battle efficiency, one need only recall the German casualties as officially published, of over ten thousand killed, thirty thousand wounded and three thousand missing in three weeks of war. When it is realized that the majority of these were received in approximately eight days of actual fighting and that the strength of the forces engaged was nearly a million men, the campaign in Poland can be recognized as a major military operation in which the Polish Army offered a stubborn resistance and which required a major effort on the part of Germany.

In the second place, this campaign is of particular interest because it affords the most recent example of open warfare in which maneuver space was available and in which a modern army took full advantage of this condition to utilize the most modern weapons and equipment to the fullest advantage.

Although the Polish strategic plan was faulty in its strategic conception, the complete collapse of the Polish defense was due, not so much to poor strategy and leadership, as to the overwhelming superiority of the German Army, which broke the Polish resistance in the first four days of the war and prevented the Poles from carrying into execution their plan of campaign. This remarkable success of the German Army was not due to the Air Corps, nor to the mechanized troops alone, but must be ascribed to a balanced field army with a balanced organization and a balanced armament, executing a plan under almost perfect leadership.

It is unfair at this time, with incomplete evidence on hand to criticize too severely the strategy in this campaign of the higher Polish commanders. We do not know as yet with absolute certainty, whether it was the intention of Marshal Smigly-Rydz

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

to accept battle with the German Army in the field, or merely to fight a series of delaying actions along the frontier and then to withdraw to the strong Narew--Vistula--San line. In either case, however, it would appear that Smigly-Rydz's decision is open to criticism. For Smigly-Rydz to offer to meet the German Army in open warfare, on equal terms, suggests that either the Polish intelligence service had been seriously deficient or that the Polish general staff had made a faulty estimate of the worth of the German Army. Neither error is pardonable. Indeed, an underestimate of the enemy's power is perhaps the one unforgivable mistake of which a general staff can be capable.

If it was the real Polish plan merely to fight a series of delaying actions along the frontier and then withdraw to the Vistula, a very strong case can still be made out against the initial Polish troop concentrations. Only one Polish division was held initially on and in rear of this final defensive line, while 95% of the entire Polish Army took position along or closely in rear of the frontier. The dispositions actually adopted suggest that the Polish war plan envisaged a cordon defense. Depth, the primary requisite of any force seeking to fight a delaying action, was totally lacking. Indeed, the active Polish Armies were concentrated initially in such breadth and in such scattered grouping as to invite early defeat and annihilation.

The principal lesson which the German Army learned from the war in Poland was that its organization, armament and tactical doctrines were correct. To study the German tactics employed in the Polish campaign, one need only turn to the German maneuvers and German tactical doctrine. In no iota did the German Army deviate from its peace time training in the execution of its battle missions.

Before discussing further, specific features of the campaign, a glance at the proportion of German mechanized and motorized divisions to the infantry divisions in the Polish theatre of operations is illuminating. Of the total of 50 German divisions identified in combat, ten were mechanized, four were motorized, three were mountain, and thirty-three were infantry divisions. In addition to these army troops, there were at least four fully motorized S.S. regiments present. Exclusive of the S.S. regiments, one-fifth of the divisions engaged were mechanized and of the total number of infantry divisions engaged one-tenth were motorized. Since these figures are taken only from divisions actually identified in combat, if we include the total number of divisions assembled and available which brings the total to around seventy, the proportion of motorized and mechanized troops is even less.

Because the Germans recognized the difficulty



DECLASSIFIED

of organizing and equipping mechanized troops after mobilization commenced, all of the mechanized divisions which would be used in the initial mobilization plan were present and fully organized in the active peace time army. This gave rise to an exaggerated idea of the extent of mechanization of the German Army.

The question frequently has been asked as to whether the large proportion of infantry divisions to the number of motorized and mechanized divisions was due to lack of motor equipment and fuel or to purely tactical considerations.

Although fuel undoubtedly had some weight, and although it is known that an increase in both motorized and mechanized units was contemplated for 1940, the basic consideration for retaining the infantry division was tactical. The Germans believe, and this belief was justified in Poland, that no mechanization or motorization has yet been able to give the same degree of tactical mobility and flexibility on the field of battle that the horse and foot soldiers possess.

Keeping in mind the proportion of motorized and mechanized divisions to infantry divisions engaged, the importance of the role which the German infantry played can be more accurately evaluated. Like the backfield of a football team, it was the Air Corps and the mechanized troops which received the publicity, but like the line, it was the German infantry which bore the brunt of the attack, rolled back the Polish Armies and drove them into isolated groups where they were surrounded and destroyed.

In general, the infantry divisions attacked on broad fronts, each division within the corps being assigned a zone of action and an objective. Within the division zones of action the advance was conducted by reinforced regiments. These reinforced regiments, operating almost independently, were largely responsible for the rapidity of the German advance. In fact, one high ranking officer of the German Army remarked that the Polish war was a war of reinforced regiments.

This reinforced regiment is known as the basic "March Combat Group" in the German Army, and is a result of war experience, an experience gained, not only in the position warfare and restricted terrain of the western front, but in the vast plains of Russia, in the Carpathians and the Alps and in the sands of Syria and Palestine. After the war, many officers of the German Army believed that the infantry division as then constituted was too unwieldy and too large a unit for open warfare, lacking sufficient strategic as well as tactical mobility. Too many small divisions would complicate the supply system; fully motorized divisions lacked battlefield mobility and failed to take advantage of one of the chief resources of

[REDACTED]

the nation, the horse. A compromise was arrived at in which the comparatively large division was retained with its foot and horse elements, capable of division into three mobile groups each provided organically with sufficient striking power to make it an almost independent tactical command, but capable of being rapidly combined for concerted action. The trains of this unit and the auxiliary troops were motorized to increase strategic mobility, so that the division could operate at a distance from its base and be rapidly moved with the foot and horse elements by rail or motor transport and the trains by road from one theatre to another. Unlike our new division, each element of the German division is provided with appropriate battle transport for its heavy weapons and its ammunition. The battalion, the basic tactical and administrative unit, is organically equipped with transportation for its own supply so that the division organization remains flexible and is capable of reinforcement or alteration without disrupting its supply echelon.

The reinforced regiment itself consists of one regiment of infantry with one battalion of Light Field Howitzers attached and with such other divisional troops, signal, engineer, anti-tank and artillery as the situation demands. The strength of this unit usually aggregates about four thousand officers and men. The formidable striking power of the march combat group can be realized by a glance at the weapons with which the infantry regiment is provided. The infantry regiment of the German Army contains organically eighty-one light machine guns, forty-two heavy machine guns, twenty-seven light mortars, twenty-four heavy mortars, twelve 37 mm. anti-tank guns, six 75 mm. infantry howitzers and two 155 mm. infantry howitzers. When to this armament is added a battalion of twelve 105 mm. light field howitzers and often a battery of 150 mm. heavy howitzers, it attains a fire power of no mean proportions.

In the tactical employment of the German division, the march combat group is retained until enemy resistance necessitates employment of the division as a whole, when all attached troops immediately revert to division control. This is particularly true of the artillery which is almost invariably employed under direct control of the artillery commander once the division is committed to coordinated action.

German tactical doctrine and training stress the responsibility for individual leadership and initiative of subordinate commanders. Each combat unit from the basic group up is organized and aimed to provide for both fire and movement in each command. In battle, objectives are assigned and subordinate troop leaders accomplish their individual tactical missions with a minimum of interference from higher commanders. Written orders in the division are rare. It was to this tactical doctrine and training that the extraordinary speed of the German attack can largely be attributed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The discussion of the German infantry in the Polish campaign would not be complete without reference to the remarkable marching ability and superb physical condition of the German soldier, which played a major part in the German success. From personal contact of our Attaches it is known that in the II Corps in the attack on the Corridor, the infantry divisions advanced 72 kilometers against hostile resistance and forced a river crossing of the Vistula in three days. After the fall of Graudenz, these same units in taking up the pursuit, marched fifty kilometers a day for another three days.

While the German infantry bore the brunt of the fighting, engaging and destroying the Polish field armies, the mechanized and motorized units were employed on cavalry missions, both by exploiting the break through and by attacks around the flanks of the Polish Armies to gain their rear, disrupt their communications, prevent their taking up delaying positions and so cut off their retreat to their final defensive line.

These mechanized divisions working in close cooperation with the Air Corps were able to operate far in advance of the infantry, at times as much as fifty or sixty kilometers in rear of the Polish lines.

To appreciate how such daring tactics could be safely employed two factors must be borne in mind, first that the German Intelligence Service had thoroughly and accurately estimated the Polish strength and dispositions and second the composition of the mechanized division which provides for its own security forces.

In the 14th Army on the South and in Reichenau's 10th Army making the main effort, it is known that the mechanized and motorized troops were organized into corps consisting of one or two mechanized divisions and a motorized infantry division. In the mechanized division, itself, in addition to its tank brigade of four hundred and fifty tanks, the division contains a motorized reconnaissance battalion, engineer, signal and antitank battalions, a motorcycle battalion, a two battalion regiment of motorized infantry and a two battalion regiment of light field howitzers in addition to the normal division trains. It contains organically sufficient reconnaissance and security troops to seize and occupy terrain features along the route of advance and sufficient infantry and artillery to occupy ground taken by the tanks. In the tank units themselves, close artillery support is furnished by the medium tanks armed with either the 37 mm. gun or the 75 mm. gun, and having the same speed and maneuverability as the light tank.

In addition to these mechanized divisions there are also a number of independent tank regiments in the German Army

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

which it is believed are intended for attachment to infantry units. As far as is known, in only two instances, in the Teschen area and in the attack of the fortified line at Mlawa, were tanks used in coordinated attack with the infantry. Whether these attacks were made by tank units of armored divisions or by independent tank regiments attached to the infantry is not known.

One interesting feature of the German tank construction brought out by the campaign in Poland, was the weakness of the armor plate around the welded corners. It had been a matter of conjecture for some time as to whether or not the welding of armor plate would not produce a weakening of the steel adjacent to the weld, the Germans claiming that it did not. From personal conversation with an officer of the 3rd Armored division, one of our Attaches learned that most of the tank casualties occurred by penetration of the Bofors 37 mm. antitank projectile at the welded corners.

As stated before, the German mechanized units have sufficient organic transportation to make them self-sufficient in supply. Gasoline is supplied to combat units in small metal containers of twenty liter capacity, about 5 gallons. Tank trucks are used to supply filling stations, commandeered or captured, which serve as division and corps fuel refilling points.

In the tank units these metal containers are cylindrical in shape, about two feet high with an oval cross section and are made of an extremely hard, light metal, probably a steel alloy. Extra containers were carried on the tanks and when used were dropped off to be picked up by the trains. When the tank units of the 10th Army first arrived at Warsaw, they were completely cut off for several days from their own troops. During this period they were supplied by air, fuel being dropped in these same metal containers from airplanes without the use of parachutes.

Before ending the discussion of the mechanized troops, mention should be made of the work of the motorized reconnaissance battalions. In addition to the motorized reconnaissance battalion which is an organic part of the armored, light and motorized infantry divisions, there was a motorized reconnaissance battalion in each of the peace time Army Corps. The work of these units in the Polish campaign was outstanding. In the 14th Army a motorized reconnaissance battalion led the advance, was the first unit to reach the San and the first to reach Lemberg. Wherever these units encountered Polish anti-tank barriers, the motorcycle company supported by the infantry howitzers of the heavy company, was used to take the position and clear the advance for the armored cars. In addition to the armored cars of the reconnaissance battalion, it was learned that one or more armored cars were attached to each of the division trains for reconnaissance and

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

local security. The composition of the motorized reconnaissance battalion with its armored car company, motorcycle company and heavy company in which are antitank guns, infantry howitzers and an engineer platoon was particularly well adapted to the campaign in Poland.

In addition to the motorized reconnaissance battalions, the Germans made extensive use of their Corps cavalry reconnaissance regiments horsed for close-in reconnaissance with the infantry divisions. These units, composed of a battalion, a bicycle battalion and a heavy battalion containing the supporting weapons, signal and engineer platoons, are so organized that they can be split three ways to furnish reconnaissance detachments to the divisions of the Corps. In addition, to this division reconnaissance detachment, each infantry regiment has its mounted platoon of one officer and twenty-nine men. The Germans lay great stress on the use of horsemen and cyclists for reconnaissance on the immediate front and flanks of advancing troops and claim that no motor vehicle has yet been devised that can take the place of the individual horseman for this type of work.

In East Prussia, horse cavalry was used to reconnoiter for tank obstacles before the second tank attack was launched at Mlawa..

Since, in the German Army, by a recent re-organization, all mechanized troops, cavalry and motorized infantry have been placed under a single inspection, "Inspection of Mobile Troops", reference should be made at this time to the motorized infantry division which formed an integral part of the mechanized corps. This division is organized identically with the horse and foot division, with the exception that it contains one organic mechanized reconnaissance battalion. Unlike our motorized division, the German motorized infantry are provided with one-ton half track vehicles serving the heavy infantry weapons, the heavy machine guns, mortars, infantry howitzers and antitank guns. These so-called "Lilliput" tractors have an extremely low silhouette, a maximum road speed of sixty kilometers an hour and great cross-country mobility. They accompany the infantry in combat in the same manner as the horse-drawn vehicles operate in the infantry division. The standard troop carrier for the riflemen of the motorized division is the "Opel-Blitz", four-wheel drive light truck. Thus the motorized division not only has strategic mobility, but its tactical mobility on the battlefield is maintained through its heavy weapon carriers.

Few details are known of the functioning of the German motor transport in the Polish campaign. It is known, however, that the great bulk of supply fell on the motor transport, due to the destruction of the railroad bridges by the Poles, and that, in spite

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

of the rapidity of the German advance, at no time did the German supply fail. It has been said that the Opel trucks proved superior to other makes and it is known that in the division trains only light multiple drive trucks are used.

The one item of motor transport which did break down was the motorcycle and side car when used as a troop carrier. From a personal account of an officer commanding the motorcycle company of the 8th Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion with the 14th Army, it was learned that in the rapid advance, the motorcycle and side car proved too fragile for its heavy three-man load and that by the time the company reached Lemberg, all of its motorcycle troop carriers had broken down, necessitating the use of captured and commandeered Polish passenger vehicles of all makes and descriptions.

For messenger service and column control, however, the motorcycle proved entirely satisfactory and was extensively used in the German Army.

For reconnaissance, the Germans employed a four wheel drive open passenger car of military design. This is an exceptionally rugged vehicle possessing a high degree of cross-country mobility.

Another type of vehicle which proved eminently successful was the half-track prime mover. This is the standard prime mover of the German Army and is produced in different sizes and weights from the one ton "Lilliput" to the eighteen ton prime mover of the heavy artillery.

In addition to the military vehicles large numbers of private cars and trucks were commandeered. Government control of industry has made possible the manufacture of motor vehicles in different categories with interchangeable parts regardless of the make, which is a tremendous advantage to motor maintenance. Motor maintenance in the field is maintained through the mobile motor repair shops which are organic equipment for all motorized battalions and for the division trains.

For communication between headquarters of higher units the Fiesler-Storch airplane was extensively used and proved most satisfactory. This plane, as far as is known, was not used for observation missions, but only for command and liaison.

In the German Army antiaircraft protection of field units is supplied both by army antiaircraft and by attached air force antiaircraft units. In each infantry division one company of 20 mm. antiaircraft guns is added to the antitank battalion, and all

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

motorized artillery is also equipped with this weapon. The Air Corps antiaircraft units consisting of battalions equipped with 88 mm. guns, 20 mm. machine guns and searchlights are attached to the Corps and cover the Corps zone of advance by bounds operating close to the most advanced elements.

The Air Corps Signal Troops establish, maintain and operate the Air Corps net and listening posts. Although these units had little opportunity to demonstrate their effectiveness during the Polish campaign, they were present and participated throughout. The radio goniometric service which proved so effective against the Polish command system is operated by the Air Force Signal Service.

One of the greatest achievements of the German Army was the work of the German Engineers, particularly in establishing bridges over the many rivers which had to be crossed and in repair, and maintenance of roads and railroads behind the advancing army. For work in the rear areas the Arbeitsdienst had received especial training and was employed in large numbers.

Air Force

The German Air Force contributed to both the strategical and tactical success of German arms in Poland. The Polish Air arm was completely neutralized from the outset. After a few days it was no longer a factor.

Rail lines were interrupted when and where the German High Command desired. This continuous bombardment prevented the completion of Polish mobilization. Telephone and telegraph lines were cut by bombing and the initial interruption of service was maintained thereafter. Polish military headquarters, which were thus forced to use radio, were soon located and bombed. The civil, as well as the military, control broke rapidly down due to the destruction of rail and wire communications.

During the entire campaign air observation units provided the German Army with as complete information of its own and enemy troops as could be expected. Special airplanes for liaison work in friendly territory performed valuable service by disseminating information and orders to German troops.

The use of dive bomber units on the field of battle against Polish reserves and the extensive employment of bombardment squadrons against retreating Polish columns contributed materially to the disintegration of the Polish Army.

 **DECLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

While the military effect of air attacks in the pursuit and against the Polish reserves, being moved to counterattack positions was perhaps the most spectacular achievement of the air force, nevertheless the greatest contribution of the German Air Force was the early destruction of the military and civil apparatus of the Polish Army and Government. The integration of the air force into the combined German military effort was so complete that its operations cannot be identified as decisive but rather as indispensable in hastening the ultimate issue of battle.

As stated earlier in this bulletin, the German Army and the German Air Force did not deviate from their peace time training and tactical doctrines in the execution of their battle missions. An analysis of German maneuvers for the past three years will furnish the detailed information applicable to every phase of the Polish campaign. Sound tactics, sound training methods and sound application of the principles of organization prevailed in this Army. It was a balanced army with a balanced organization and balanced armament, rather than the development of a single arm, which won the war in Poland.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BASE MAP OF POLAND

SCALE

0 50 100 150 miles




Corp. H.M. Caldwell - Draftsman M.F.D. 6-2 War Dept.

Map 1 Special Bulletin No. 3, MID WD63

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



Traced by Corp. H. M. Caldwell - Draftsman M.I.D. G-2 War Dept.

Map 2 Special Bulletin No 3 M.I.D. WDGS.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Not U.S. Property

G-2/2083-1654

G-2
HC/ECW

6364

M.I.D., W.D.
Special Bulletin No. 4
February 21, 1940.

ROYAL AIR FORCE EMPIRE TRAINING SCHEME

This document is being given an approved distribution, and no additional copies are available for distribution by the Military Intelligence Division. It may be reproduced in whole or in part under the provisions of Letter TAG, November 15, 1939, AG 350.05 (11-1-39) M-B-M, subject, Dissemination of Military Information by the Military Intelligence Division and by Recipients of M.I.D. Information.

1. General. In December 1939 the Governments of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand agreed to set up in Canada a co-operative air training scheme for the purpose of training very large numbers of pilots, observers and air gunners for the Royal Air Force. The Union of South Africa is not a participant. The agreement expires March 31, 1943, but may be extended or terminated by general agreement. Negotiations lasted six weeks before the agreement was concluded. Sharp differences occurred at times between the United Kingdom representative and the Canadian Prime Minister. These differences were, for the most part, over the distribution of cost.

2. Costs. The total cost of the training in Canada is estimated at \$600,000,000 (Canadian currency), of which Canada's share will be about \$350,000,000.

In addition to the above cost Canada is required to furnish approximately 40,000 officers and men to staff the 67 schools to be used in Canada.

The United Kingdom will supply most of the airplanes, including engines and spares, as her share of the \$600,000,000. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada are to contribute in proportion to the student pilots, observers, and gunners trained in Canada for each Dominion. It is estimated that one-fifth of the students taking advanced training in Canada will come from Australia and New Zealand.

About \$90,000,000 will be spent by September 1, 1940. Canada's share of this will be about \$48,000,000.

Canada's additional war costs for the first year of the war are estimated at \$315,000,000.

DECLASSIFIED

LIBRARY
COMMAND
AND
GENERAL
STAFF
SCHOOL

APR 3 '40

3. Schools and Personnel. The following table sets forth the number of schools and the personnel required to man the entire scheme when it is in full operation:

	: Number :	: Officers :	: Airmen :	: Civilians :	: Works Main-tenance Personnel :
Commands and Groups, and Extra Headquarters Organization	-	288	603	134	-
Initial Training Schools	3	39	393	-	36
Service Flying Training Schools	16	752	11,376	64	320
Air Observer Schools	10	250	2,470	-	100
Bombing and Gunnery Schools	10	450	6,920	-	150
Elementary Flying Training Schools	13	351	4,134	-	130
Wireless Schools	4	96	1,284	-	80
Air Navigation Schools	2	126	1,278	-	40
Repair Depots	3	51	141	1,308	36
Equipment Depots	3	66	228	3,318	60
Technical Training Schools	2	41	627	-	30
Records Office	1	14	277	-	-
Recruit Depots	2	28	424	-	40
Recruiting Organization	-	134	211	105	-
Totals		2,686	30,366	4,929	1,022

In addition to the schools listed above, there will be an Air Armament School, a School of Aeronautical Engineering, a School of Administration, and an Equipment and Accountant School. This makes a total of 64 schools requiring 39,003 officers, airmen and civilians. The extent of this contemplated expansion is best appreciated when it is compared with the pre-war strength of the Royal Canadian Air Force. On June 30, 1939, it is estimated that the active strength was 260 officers and 2,009 airmen and that the strength of reserves was 100 officers and 900 airmen. Some or all of the Elementary Flying Training and the Air Observer Schools may be organized on a civilian basis.

4. Condition of Service of Trainees.

a. Pupils from Canada. All pupils from Canada will be enlisted as aircraftsmen, Class II (corresponding to private in our service). Upon completing the initial ground training course pupils taking the courses for pilots and observers will be given the rank of leading aircraftsmen (private, first class). Those taking the courses for wireless operators and air gunners will not be promoted. Upon

[REDACTED]

completion of training pilots will be appointed sergeants, observers will be appointed sergeants or acting sergeants, and wireless operators and air gunners will be promoted to a grade not higher than leading aircraftsman, depending upon the grades made in training. A limited number of pilots and observers retained in Canada will be commissioned. Upon embarkation overseas all personnel will be transferred in grade to the (British) Royal Air Force.

b. Other Pupils. Pupils from Australia and New Zealand will be enlisted in their respective Air Forces; while all others will be enlisted in the Royal Air Force. While training in Canada all will be attached to the Canadian Air Force with the same rank and pay as Canadian trainees.

c. Comment. The rank of pupils is unusually low; and, except for a limited number of pilots and observers retained in Canada, all will be enlisted men upon completing training. In contrast to this, about half of the pilots and some of the observers trained in Great Britain will be commissioned. This discrepancy probably will cause trouble when Dominion personnel begin to join the Royal Air Force.

5. Training of Australian and New Zealand Students. One-fifth of the student pilots in advanced training schools will come from Australia and New Zealand. Australia will train its own gunners, observers and wireless operators. All these categories from New Zealand will train in Canada.

The Empire Agreement provides that the United Kingdom will provide the students needed to keep up the proportion from outside Canada as well as Canadian deficiencies. The number of students and categories may be varied by agreement between the Governments concerned. Even though Canada, Australia and New Zealand fail to provide their proportion of students they agreed to bear their full respective shares of the cost.

Canada may fill vacancies in the Home Defense Squadrons of her air force from Canadian students graduated.

The United Kingdom agreed that students from Canada, Australia and New Zealand shall, upon completing training, be identified with their respective Dominion units. The organization of Dominion units is mentioned as one way. This seems to be undecided. So far as is known mechanics, command and staff officers and administrative personnel are not being trained in Canada in amounts needed. It is believed that the English hope to get enlisted pilots from the Dominions and use these in Royal Air Force squadrons under British command and staff control. This would mean that Dominion pilots, observers,

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

air gunners and radio operators would take the major part of the combat losses.

6. Length of Courses. The length of the pilot training course will be 28 weeks, of which four will be at an Initial Training School, eight weeks at an Elementary Flying Training School, 14 weeks at a Service Flying Training School, and two weeks at a Gunnery School. The observer course will take 26 weeks, with 4 weeks at the Initial Training School, 12 weeks at an Air Observer School, 6 weeks at a Gunnery School, and 4 weeks at an Air Navigation School. The air gunnery course will take 24 weeks. At least four more weeks will be spent by each graduate in transportation to England and in group pools there. Therefore from 28 to 34 weeks will elapse from the date of enlistment until a trainee enters a squadron in Britain.

7. Output of Trained Personnel. It is estimated that when the training scheme is fully developed there will be an output of more than 10,000 each of pilots, observers and gunners, with possibly half this number of wireless operators. It is estimated that this personnel will provide 100 per cent replacements of combat crews annually for 120 single-seater and 380 four-place bomber or reconnaissance squadrons.

8. Supply of Airplanes. News sources from Canada state that 4,367 airplanes will be required for this scheme and that they have been contracted for. Primary trainers will be built or assembled in Canada, but it is estimated that the majority of such craft will come from the United States. Avro Anson two-engined reconnaissance-bombers and Fairey Battle single-engined bombers will be provided in large numbers from England.

9. Landing Fields. About 20 existing landing fields will be enlarged and 60 new ones constructed to meet only the needs of the training program.

10. Training Organization. The training scheme will be directed by the Canadian Air Council, and its operation will be the principal duty of the entire Air Force. Two Training Commands will be organized, one in the East and one in the West. Each will consist of two training and one maintenance groups. In addition there will be an Overseas War Establishment, probably to be charged with the dispatch of personnel overseas.

11. Progress of Scheme. Late in January 1940 the Canadian Defense Minister announced the location of the first eight schools and four depots under the scheme. Locations for remaining establishments would be announced as rapidly as possible. There had been some 25,000 applicants for enlistment in the Air Force; and the first call for

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED


[REDACTED]

recruits would be made "soon." Recruits for the ground staff were being enlisted at the rate of about 300 a month. Two hundred British Air Force officers were to arrive shortly to assist in the training. For the time being no Australian or New Zealand personnel will be sent to augment the training staff.

--0000--

DECLASSIFIED

M44710
3
[REDACTED]
DECLASSIFIEDM.I.D., W.D.
Special Bulletin No. 5
March 5, 1940.SOVIET--FINNISH WARGround and Naval Operations
January 8-31, 1940Contents:

1. Forces Involved.
 2. Operations - General.
 3. Karelian Isthmus.
 4. Southeastern Front.
 5. Central Front.
 6. Northern Front.
 7. Arctic Front.
 8. Naval Operations.
- 

1. Forces Involved.

a. Finnish Army. On January 8 an observer at Helsinki estimated that the Finns had mobilized only 300,000 men, but he did not know how much this force would be increased by additional mobilizations. After deducting coast guard troops, the Navy, training cadres, and troops of the zone of the interior, he estimated that 200,000 effectives were engaged with the Reds. Another observer estimated the number of men mobilized at 300,000, and the number of available reservists at 50,000-70,000. On February 6 a Finnish source stated that 400,000 men had been mobilized; it is probable that this number is the maximum which can be mobilized.

On January 26 there were about 9-10 divisions on the Karelian Isthmus, two just north of Lake Ladoga, and two more on the remainder of the front. There were also three Civic Guard (militia) divisions, either in the north or in the zone of the interior. A division has about 11,000 officers and men.

The Finns have about 7,000-10,000 Swedish volunteers, and about 10,000 more are expected. There are about 500 Norwegians and a negligible number of other foreign volunteers.

b. Red Army. Estimates of the number of Red divisions in
[REDACTED]**DECLASSIFIED**

[REDACTED]

Finland vary from 30 to 39 divisions as shown below. No definite information can be obtained at present.

On January 26, according to a Helsinki report, the Reds had about 17 divisions on the strategic Karelian Isthmus, and 17 more north of Lake Ladoga; and they had about 1,000 tanks available for use in Finland. From Moscow it was reported, however, on January 23 that the Reds had 20 divisions in the Leningrad--Karelian Isthmus area; 10 in the Southeastern Front north of Lake Ladoga; and 9 on the remainder of the front. Finally a Riga report (January 13) gave the number of Red divisions as of December 18 as follows: Karelian Isthmus, at least 8 divisions and 7 tank brigades and possibly 10 additional divisions; Southeastern Front, 8-9 divisions; Central Front, 2-4 divisions and 1 tank brigade; Northern and Arctic Fronts, 2-3 divisions. Total: 20-34 divisions and at least 9 tank brigades. Seven of these divisions and three of these tank brigades were possibly withdrawn on account of heavy casualties and one division - the 163d - was destroyed.

According to the February 3 issue of "Le Temps" (Paris) the Red Army on the Isthmus consisted of three corps of four divisions each, four heavy tank brigades and three medium tank corps [brigades?]. On the whole front the Reds had 26 divisions, 5 heavy tank brigades and 6 medium tank corps, grouped into 9 corps and 4 armies.

Although the official strength of a Soviet division is 18,000 all ranks, at present they vary in strength from 10,000-20,000 with an average strength of 14,000-15,000.

c. Casualties. On January 25 the Finns claimed that 60,000 Reds had been killed and an equal number wounded; Finnish casualties were then estimated at about 5,500 killed and 14,000 wounded and missing. It is improbable that the Reds lost ten times as many men as the Finns did.

On January 30 a Finnish source stated that in December the Finns lost about 2,000 killed and 4,000 wounded, but that the rate had greatly increased since then.

A third source estimated that by January 10 59,000 Reds had been killed or had frozen to death.

In the present, as in the past, the Reds have not been afraid to suffer heavy casualties.

2. Operations - General.

The last three weeks in January were comparatively quiet as both sides apparently needed a breathing spell between the operations

[REDACTED]

of December and early January and the Red attack in force on the Karelian Isthmus which began on the first of February. It is believed that the Reds finally realized that the war could not be won without driving back the Finns on the Isthmus, and that operations in the Central, Northern and Arctic Fronts could not be decisive.

3. Karelian Isthmus.

Due possibly to intensely cold weather, there was very little activity on the vital Karelian Isthmus during this period. According to the Finnish communiques, the Reds made at least six attacks, apparently not on Taipale on the left of the Mannerheim Line, but without success, between the 15th and the 30th. There were minor actions on the center of the Mannerheim Line between Summa and Lake Muolaa, but all of them apparently failed. Usually the Soviet communiques laconically stated that nothing of importance took place at the front.

4. The Southeastern Front.

As already stated in a previous Special Bulletin (No. 2, January 10), the Southeastern Front, which is north of Lake Ladoga, is almost as important as the Karelian Isthmus, with which it forms the "main show." Their fates are interlocked and inseparable.

While there were no known major operations in this sector, there were almost daily clashes between forces about the size of a regiment and smaller units.

The Reds reported very little activity in this sector. On January 13 they claimed that their forces were 50 miles from their border in the direction of Sortavala (an important railway junction). Several clashes of infantry units were reported; and on the 19th the Reds claimed they routed a Finnish battalion at Kitela.

Finnish communiques, however, pictured much more activity on this front: Red attacks against Ruhtinaamaki, Aittajoki (7 attacks), Ilomantsi (5), Kollaanjoki (4) in the Loimola sector, and Kitela were repulsed, usually with "heavy losses." By the 27th the Red attack had weakened, but was vigorously renewed the next day, and continued then until the end of the month.

5. The Central Front.

Since the Finns claimed that they destroyed the Red 163d and 44th late in December and early in January (see Special Bulletin No. 2), they have made no claims as to major actions on the Central Front; the Reds scarcely mentioned it in their communiques.

[REDACTED]

On January 9 the Reds for the first time admitted that their troops had retreated east of Suomussalmi. The Finns claimed that they had advanced in this sector towards Raatajoki and had forced the Reds to withdraw into their own territory at four points. During the remainder of the month there was little activity on either side, except patrolling and clashes between patrols.

6. The Northern Front.

During this period the Northern Front was relatively quiet, except near Markajarvi. The Finns claim that the Reds were repulsed five times in the Salla sector between January 10 and February 2. On January 17 the Reds were pushed back from Joutsijarvi (near Kursu) to Markajarvi, where the Finns claimed successes on the 20th and 24th.

On January 13 the Reds claimed to be 75 miles from their own border in the Salla sector.

Operations on this front were of slight importance. The very cold weather greatly favored the Finns as they appeared to be much better trained for winter warfare than the Reds.

7. Arctic Front.

In January little activity was reported on the Arctic Front, probably due to the extremely cold weather; usually there was only scouting and patrolling.

The Finns claimed that three Red attacks on Petsamo failed, but no details were given.

On January 13 the Soviets stated that their troops were 80 miles south of the Arctic coast.

8. Naval Operations.

No naval operations were reported by the Reds. The Finns reported no actions of their own small Navy, but often reported firing by their coast artillery batteries on the Gulf of Finland or on the coast of Lake Ladoga. The batteries at Mantsinsaari on Lake Ladoga were particularly active. On January 26 it was reported that a Red submarine was lost in the Finnish mine field.

Note: This Bulletin supplements Special Bulletin No. 2, January 10, 1940, with which it should be filed.

--0000--

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

on Return file
with doc. #3

G-2/2657-231

G-2
WES

M.I.D., W.D.,
Special Bulletin No. 6
April 1, 1940.

SOVIET--FINNISH WAR

Ground and Naval Operations
February 1--March 13, 1940

Contents:

1. Introduction.
2. Forces Involved.
3. Casualties.
4. Operations - General.
5. Karelian Isthmus.
6. Southeastern Front.
7. Central Front.
8. Northern Front.
9. Arctic Front.
10. Navy and Coast Artillery.

1. Introduction.

This bulletin deals with ground and naval operations in the last phase of the Soviet-Finnish War (February 1--March 13, 1940), and supplements Special Bulletins No. 2 and No. 5, which deal with the first two phases, with which it should be filed.

When more information becomes available, a bulletin covering the tentative military lessons from this war will be issued.

The information as to operations in this bulletin is based primarily upon official Soviet and Finnish communiques and reports from the Military Attache, Helsinki.

2. Forces Involved.

a. Finnish Army. According to a Finnish source of February 16, 400,000 men and 100,000 women of the Lotta Svast auxiliary had been mobilized by Finland. No further information has been

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

received since Special Bulletin No. 5 was issued. On January 26 there were 9-10 divisions on the Karelian Isthmus, 2 just north of Lake Ladoga and 2 more on the remainder of the front. There were also 3 Civic Guard (militia) divisions, either in the north or in the zone of the interior. A division had about 16,000 (?) officers and men.

Field Marshal Baron Mannerheim, the Finnish Commander in Chief, stated in his farewell address that the only foreign help received by the Finns consisted of two reinforced infantry battalions with attached artillery and aviation. Swedish officials claim that there were 9,000 Swedes on the Finnish front at the end of the war; and that 5,000 more were ready to leave Sweden for the front. There were only about 500 Norwegian volunteers in the Finnish Army. Early in February it was known that neither Sweden nor Norway would enter the war unless the U.S.S.R. declared war on her. The Swedes were most anxious to aid Finland, but the Government was afraid to take any official action for fear of offending Germany. Supplies and a reasonable number of foreign volunteers were permitted to cross Sweden, but no Allied troops as such. This was because of the threat to the ore routes involved, which might have aroused German objections.

According to a reliable French source (March 1) the Allies planned to send an expeditionary force to Finland if the Finns asked for it, which they did not 7. This force was to consist of 3 divisions: 1 Polish, 1 French (largely Chasseurs Alpins), and 1 British (Canadians and British trained in skiing). According to an earlier rumor, this force was to be sent via Petsamo - a very difficult undertaking.7

b. Red Army. On January 30 the approximate strength of the Red troops in Finland was as follows:

Karelian Isthmus:
Seventh Army:

- X Corps: KAUR (Karelian), 43d, 70th and 136th Divisions.
- L Corps: 113th, 100th, and 138th Divisions and the 35th Tank Brigade.
- XIX Corps: 123d, 90th and 24th Divisions; and the 20th and 40th Tank Brigades, (in corps reserve).

Thirteenth Army:

- Group I: 142d, 4th, 150th and 49th Divisions; and the X Tank Corps probably really a division 7.

DECLASSIFIED

Southeastern Front:Eighth Army:

LVI Corps: 168th, 11th, *18th, 80th, 56th and 164th Divisions; and the *34th Tank Brigade.

I Corps: 75th, 139th and 155th Divisions.

Central and Northern Fronts (Lieksa-Salla):Ninth Army:

XLVII Corps: 54th, *163d, *44th, 122d and 88th Divisions.

Arctic Front: (Petsamo-Murmansk):Fourteenth Army:

104th, 52d, and 14th Divisions.

Note: Starred units were reported by the Finns as being destroyed.

On March 3 it was reported that the Red Armies had been reinforced as follows (assignment to corps not known):

Karelian Isthmus:

Seventh Army: 1st, 7th, 8th, 17th, and 84th Divisions.

Thirteenth Army: 39th, 42d, 50th, 62d, 80th and 64th Divisions; and the 39th Tank Brigade.

Southeastern Front:

Eighth Army: 25th, 37th, 72d and 93d Divisions.

Grand Total: 45 Divisions and 5 Tank Brigades.

According to former reports, it was estimated that there were at least nine tank brigades. It has also been reported that the 73d Division was moved from Siberia to Kem (on the White Sea) and Sosnovets, and two tank divisions were in the same sector; furthermore, the 16th Division was on the Karelian Isthmus.

According to one source, Soviet divisions vary in strength from 10,000-20,000 with an average strength of 14,000-15,000. According to another, the organization of divisions in Finland varied with their missions and the part of the front that they occupied. It is said that one division had one infantry regiment and 10 ski battalions; another had 5 infantry regiments. Artillery varied from none to 5

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

regiments. North of Lake Ladoga divisions had less artillery and mechanized units, but naturally more ski units. Units apparently were not permanently assigned to divisions as certain infantry regiments have been identified in different divisions at various times.

3. Casualties.

According to a Helsinki report, losses to include March 1 were as follows:

Finnish losses: 11,800 killed;
 11,000 severely wounded;
 18,000 slightly wounded;
 1,600 missing;

Total..... 41,400 casualties.

Soviet losses: /probably exaggerated/
 200,000 killed and severely wounded
 (estimated);
 7,000 prisoners;

 207,000 plus slightly wounded.
 1,200 tanks.

Premier Ryti of Finland stated that his country had suffered a total of 60,000 casualties, including 18,000 killed and an approximately equal number seriously wounded. According to unconfirmed press rumors, total Finnish varied between 58,500 and 90,000 (including 40,000 killed) and 2 Swedish volunteers were killed in action.

On March 29 Premier Molotov of the U.S.S.R. stated that Soviet casualties in the Finnish war were estimated at 48,795 killed and 158,836 wounded /a credible estimate/; Finnish losses were estimated at 60,000 killed and 250,000 wounded /an incredible estimate/.

4. Operations - General.

There was very little activity on all fronts during the last three weeks in January as the Red advance had been stopped at all points. The Reds devoted this time to building field fortifications and to completing vast preparations for the February offensive. After these relatively calm weeks, the Reds began their great offensive against the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus on February 1, and continued with very little let-up until the end of the war on March 13.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

The Reds wisely made their main attack against the Isthmus, and their secondary attack against the Southeastern Front, and carried on only minor operations in the three unimportant northern fronts.

Both sides made changes in their high commands during the last phase of the war. According to the press, on the Finnish side Lt. Gen. H. V. Osterman (Commander in Chief, 1933-39) was relieved as commander on the Isthmus and replaced by Maj. Gen. A. E. Heinrichs; Lt. Gen. K. L. Oesch, Chief of Staff since 1930 was relieved by Col. A. F. Airo; and finally Maj. Gen. Martti Wallenius was relieved as commander in the Northern and Arctic Fronts, and replaced by the aged Maj. Gen. E. Linder, commander of the Swedish volunteers. Whether or not these changes were justified is not yet known. On the Red side, it was rumored in February that Komandarm of the 2d Rank G. M. Shtern (former commander of the First Separate Far Eastern Army) was relieved as commander on the Finnish front by Komandarm of the 1st Rank B. M. Shaposhnikov, Chief of Staff of the Red Army since 1937 and a former Tsarist GS officer.

5. Karelian Isthmus.

During the last three weeks in January, there was little activity on the Isthmus except artillery fire, infantry reconnaissance, and aircraft activity. The picture, however, changed on February 1 when the Reds began their violent attack on the Mannerheim Line, which continued with almost unabated vigor until the end of the war on March 13.

At first the main attack was made between Hatjalahdenjarvi and Muolaanjarvi, although strong attacks were made on the Taipale front, which was never penetrated. The artillery bombardment was almost continuous, and all attacks were also strongly supported by tanks and aviation. Fire was often concentrated against reinforced concrete forts. The largest attack was made in the Summa sector, where a foothold was gained early in February. These battles were extremely exhausting to the Finns, who lacked adequate reserves. On February 12 the Reds attacked in force, with much artillery support, between Summa and the Perkjarvi-Kamara-Viipuri railway. Smaller attacks were made in the direction of Viipuri and between the railway and the Vuoksi waterway, and over the ice at Muurila. The Reds took a number of fortified positions. Summa was finally captured by the Reds on the 15th and the Finns withdrew to new positions in rear, as they decided that they could not hold the forward lines any longer. The new line was then: Muurila-Summa (exclusive)-Kamara-northern end of Lake Muolaa-north shore of Ayrapaanjarvi-Salmenkaita River (between Ayrapaanjarvi and Suvanto)-thence along the north shore of Lakes Vuoksi and Suvanto to Torenttila and Taipale. In spite of heavy Red attacks, the eastern part of line from Taipale to the

DECLASSIFIED

 DECLASSIFIED

Salmenkaita River was never penetrated by the Reds. On the coast the Reds fared much better as they captured the town and fortress of Koivisto on February 20th, the Island of Koivisto and two small nearby islands on the 24th.

By the 25th the Finns held the line: Kaislahti (on Viipuri-Koivisto railway)-Ylasomaa-Naykkijarvi-east of Viipuri-Perkjarvi railway to north shore of Muolaanjarvi-remainder of the line: no change.

During the last days of February the Reds pushed the western part of the Finnish line back to Vuoksi-Malkola-Hammarniemi-Heikurila-Kamara(north)-Sainio-Ylasomaa-Somaa-Ruonsaari-Piisaari.

On March 3 it was reported from Helsinki that the Finns were fortifying a line north of Viipuri to Vuoksi, and that they were expected to withdraw to this line from intermediate positions, where they were then carrying out delaying actions.

The Reds claim that they occupied the southern part of Viipuri and the railway station on March 2; closed a ring around the city and occupied the northeastern part on the 11th; and finally captured it on the 13th (the last day of the war).

Early in March the Reds began to capture small islands in the Gulf of Viipuri; Turkinasaari on the 2d; Uuraansaari and Teikarinsaari on the 4th; Ravansaari and Suonionsaari on the 5th; Esisaari on the 8th; etc. A beach-head was gained on the west shore of the Bay of Viipuri by the capture of Keihasniemi on the 2d; Vilajoki and Muhulahti on the 4th; and Nisalahti on the 10th. Due to the unusually severe winter weather, the Reds often moved infantry, tanks and artillery on the ice.

At the end of operation on March 13 the final front line held by the Finns was approximately: Taipale-Suvanto-Vuoksi to Ritasaari-Paakkola-Lapinlahti-Kaantyma-Naatala-Hannikkala-Saarela-Tammisuo-Viipuri (exclusive)-Keihasniemi-Tervassari-Nisalahati-Heinlahti-Vilajoki-Muhulahti.

During the latter part of the war there was considerable improvement in the cooperation between the arms in the Red Army. The Reds apparently sustained very heavy losses and carried out operations in extremely difficult terrain. They were, however, favored by the weather in both February and March as the frozen lakes permitted the movement of tanks and artillery. Finnish resistance appears to have been very stubborn and leadership excellent. The Finns, however, probably lacked both man power and munitions to hold out much longer on the Isthmus.

 DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

6. Southeastern Front.

The Finns fought violent battles on the Southeastern Front (north of Lake Ladoga) with a three-fold object; first, annihilation of the Reds in the Kitela sector; second, cutting off Red transport; and third, preventing further Red reinforcements along the Salmi-Pitkaranta road. The first mission was apparently accomplished by the destruction of the Red 18th Division at Syskyjarvi on February 18th, where the Reds lost 18,000 men and much materiel. The second by the destruction of hundreds of Red animal-drawn vehicles. The third was partially accomplished by the destruction of a Red ski battalion northeast of Lake Ladoga on February 6th and of about 800 Reds two or three days later. The Finns also claim that they destroyed the 34th Red Tank Brigade [not a known unit] on March 1 after it had marched via Uomas to assist the 18th Division; the Reds lost 2,500 killed, 105 tanks, etc. Reds were also repulsed at Aittajoki in both February and March; on the Pitkaranta archipelago in February; and at Kollaanjoki, Uomas and Latvajarvi in March. The Finns claim that they slowly but surely pushed the Reds towards their own border.

The Reds scarcely mentioned this front in their communiques. They did claim that they captured 5 Finnish forts near Lake Ladoga on February 8, 4 small islands west of Pitkaranta on March 4, and another one a few days later. The Reds finally reported a small engagement at Loimola station on the Sortavala-Suojarvi railway on March 11.

On this front the Finns apparently gained several victories over the Reds, but they had no effect upon the outcome of the war as the Reds had sufficient troops for their offensive on the Isthmus in spite of losses on other fronts.

7. Central Front.

Due partly to the bitter cold, which brought movements of large units to a standstill, and probably to their relative unimportance, there was little activity in the three northern sectors, except artillery firing and patrolling.

On the Central Front action centered around Kuumo, Suomussalmi, Kuhmoniemi and Lieksa, where the Finns claim they repulsed the Reds during both February and March. On February 16-17 a Red ski group (3 battalions and a reconnaissance detachment) was destroyed at Kuumo with a loss of about 1,900 killed. Fighting continued at Kuumo until March 13. At Suomussalmi the Reds were hurled back across the frontier on February 24.

The Reds did not mention this front in their communiques.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

██████████
DECLASSIFIED

8. Northern Front.

No actions of any consequence took place on the Northern Front; it was never mentioned in Red communiques. The Finns claimed that they repulsed Red attacks at Salla (February 2 and 24; and March 10) and at Markajarvi (February 4-5).

9. Arctic Front.

The Arctic Front remained quiet until about February 26, when as a result of a Red attack the Finns withdrew to Nautsi. The Reds withdrew slightly to north of Nautsi on March 4, but reoccupied it two days later.


10. Navy and Coast Artillery.

Due to an unusually severe winter, the ice was frozen even in part of the Baltic Sea and, as usual, in the Gulfs of Finland and of Bothnia; consequently there were no real naval operations on either side. As the Finnish coast artillery belongs to the Navy, its activities were classed as naval engagements.

In the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and on the northeast coast of Lake Ladoga, the Finnish coast artillery supported land operations by its fire and even by patrolling. On February 13, for example, the batteries at Koivisto Island shelled Red detachments advancing over the ice and inflicted appreciable losses on them and sank many tanks. The coast artillery aided in the defense of Muurila on the Gulf of Finland and of Taipale on Lake Ladoga; it repelled Red attacks across the ice against Haapasaari and Virolahti Island on March 4, 6 and 7.

██████████
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED FINLAND



LEGEND

Roads outside of Finland

- 2nd Class Roads
- 3rd Class Roads
- Trails
- Canal
- Railroad

Finnish Roads are as follows

- Concrete ----- 16 miles
- Asphalt ----- 13 miles
- Mecadam ----- 50 miles
- Block- Stone etc ----- 35 miles
- Improved Earth ----- 1981 miles
- Unimproved Earth ----- 80 miles
- Not Specified ----- 1966 miles
- Total ----- 3963 miles

Topographical Terms

Finnish	English	Finnish	English
Asema	Railway Station	Pieni	Small
Järvi (jaervi)	Lake	Suo	Big
Joki	River	Saari	Island
Kangas	Sandy Plain	Salmi	Strait
Koski	Waterfall	Suuri	Marsh
Lahti	Gulf	Vesi	Water
Mäki	Hill	Vuori	Mountain
Niemi	Cape		

DECLASSIFIED

MRK/fme

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
LIBRARY
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

21 September 1940

SUBJECT: Special Bulletin No. 7 (The Cuban Plan of the Communist Party

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, M.I.D., War
Department, Washington, D.C.

1. It is requested that this Library be furnished with copy of M.I.D., W.D. Special Bulletin No. 7 (Confidential), which has not been received. It is desired that our file of these bulletins be complete.

M. R. Kammerer
M. R. KAMMERER
Captain, Infantry
Assistant Librarian

RECEIVED
RECORD SECTION
M.I.D.

G-2/10058-1322

1st Ind.

JM/TJB/dfj

G-2, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C. September 25, 1940. To: Librarian, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Special Bulletin No. 7 pertained to matters of localized interest. With this in mind an extremely limited distribution was prescribed. It is thus unfortunately impracticable to comply with your request.

For the Acting A. C. of S., G-2:

C. M. Busbee
C. M. BUSBEE,

Lieut. Col., General Staff,
Executive Office, G-2.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Not U.S. Property

6452

M
9405
HC-C.93
E301P

G-2/2657-231

M.I.D., W.D.
Special Bulletin No. 8
July 18, 1940

CONSTRUCTION OF A GERMAN FIELD ARMY

During the battle of Flanders, a number of combat orders of the German Sixth Army (von Reichenau) were captured. Copies of these orders which have reached the War Department are of interest as showing the technique of the preparation of German field orders, as well as certain of their combat methods. One of these, Army Orders No. 11 of May 23, contains an annex which gives in detail the order of battle of the Sixth Army as of that date.

The Sixth Army contained no large mechanized units on May 23. It was basically an army of horse and foot divisions, although there were the normal motorized reconnaissance, artillery, and auxiliary elements. The Army had attacked on May 10 to the north of Liege across the Albert Canal, and by May 23, had captured Tournai and was advancing toward the line: Ypres---Lille. All three corps of the Sixth Army were in line: from north to south the XI, the IV, and the XXVII.

The annex of Orders No. 11 shows in detail the composition of the Sixth Army, and this permits us an insight into the organization of a German Army, particularly as to the types and numbers of corps and Army units.

The order of battle follows:

XI Army Corps

30th Division

19th Division

255th Division

Corps Troops

Engineers

1 Engineer Regimental Headquarters

1 Engineer School Battalion

1 Engineer Construction Battalion

7 Bridge Companies

Artillery

2 Artillery Commands and Staffs

1 Artillery Regimental Headquarters

5 Battalions, Medium Artillery, i.e.,

1 Battalion, Mixed (2 batteries 150mm.
howitzers, 1 battery 105mm. cannon)

2 Battalions, 150mm. howitzers (each of
three batteries)

LIBRARY
COMMAND
AND
GENERAL
STAFF
SCHOOL

DECLASSIFIED

SEP 18 '40

DECLASSIFIED

2 Battalions, 105mm. cannon (each of
three batteries)
2 Battalions, Flash and Sound Ranging
Aviation
1 Squadron, Army Observation
1 Battalion, Anti-Aircraft Artillery (88mm.)
Other Forces
1 Anti-Tank Machine Gun Company
1 Platoon, Propaganda Company

IV Army Corps

7th Division
31st Division
18th Division
14th Division
Corps Troops
Engineers
1 Engineer Regimental Headquarters
2 Combat Engineer Battalions
1 Engineer Construction Battalion
8 Engineer Bridge Companies
3 Engineer Parks
Artillery
2 Artillery Commands and Staffs
2 Artillery Regimental Headquarters
5 Medium Artillery Battalions
2 Battalions, 150mm. Howitzers
(3 batteries)
2 Battalions, 105mm. Cannon
1 Battalion (Mixed) 2 Batteries, 150mm.
Howitzers, 1 Battery 105mm. Cannon
1 Battalion, Flash & Sound Ranging, with
Balloon Company attached.
Aviation
1 Squadron, Army Observation
1 Battalion, Anti-Aircraft Artillery (88mm.)
Other Troops
2 Anti-Aircraft Companies
1 Heavy Anti-Tank Battalion
(caliber of guns unknown)
1 Platoon, Propaganda Company

XXVII Army Corps

217th Division
269th Division
253rd Division
35th Division
Corps Troops

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Engineers

3 Engineer Bridge Companies

Artillery

2 Artillery Commands and Staffs

2 Artillery Regimental Headquarters

12 Medium and Heavy Artillery Battalions

4 Battalions, 150mm. Howitzers

2 Battalions, 105mm. Cannon

3 Mixed Heavy Battalions

2 Batteries, 300mm. Mortars

1 Battery, 210mm. Mortars

2 Battalions, 210mm. Howitzers

1 Battalion, 240mm. Howitzers

1 Battalion, 300mm. Mortars

2 Battalions, Flash and Sound Ranging

Aviation

1 Squadron, Army Observation

1 Battalion, Anti-Aircraft Artillery (88mm.)

Other Forces

1 Special Infantry Battalion

1 Anti-Tank Battalion

1 Heavy Anti-Tank Battalion

1 "Smoke" (Chemical Warfare) Regimental
Headquarters

1 "Smoke" Battalion

Army Troops

61st Division

Engineer Troops

1 Engineer Regimental Headquarters

2 Engineer Combat Battalions

4 Engineer Bridge Building Battalions

1 Engineer Company

4 Bridge Companies

Artillery

1 Artillery Regimental Command and Staff

3 Heavy Artillery Battalions

2 Battalions, 240mm. Cannon

1 Battalion, 150mm. Cannon

1 Balloon Battery

1 Meteorological Platoon

Aviation

1 Air Force Headquarters

1 Distant Reconnaissance Squadron

1 Courier Squadron (Storch slow flying planes)

1 Air Signal Battalion

Other Forces

1 Map Battalion


DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

1 Meteorological Section
1 Special Infantry Company
1 Platoon Armored Cars.

Translations of Army orders numbers 10, 11, and 12
appended hereto marked Appendix I, II and III respectively.

 **DECLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX I

Army High Command 6
Section 1A/OP

G.H.Q. 22/5/40
2100 Hours

A R M Y O R D E R S N O . 10.

1. The attack of the XI Army Corps is progressing favorably.

2. The Army will continue its attack on the 23/5, the main thrust (Schwerpunkt) being strengthened by the XIV Army Corps advancing North West.

3. Own Troops.

IV Army Corps will assume command of the 14th Infantry Division. Arrangements to be agreed by the respective Army Commands. The IV Army Corps will report to these Headquarters when it is in a position to assume command of the 14th Infantry Division.

XXVII Army Corps will assume command of the 35th Infantry Division at 0600 hours on 23/5.

4. Objectives.

(a) The XI Army Corps will cross the LYS and advance to the road INGELIMUNSTER-COURTRAI. From this line it will advance South West in the general direction WYTSCHAETE. Having crossed the LYS the Corps will leave an Infantry Division at the disposal of the Army H.Q. in the area VIVE ST. ELOI-WAEREHEM-OYCKE-CRUYSHOUTEM.

(b) The IV Army Corps will attack on the left of the XI Corps and will be responsible for maintaining contact with it. It will advance to the road COURTRAI-COYGHEM so that a further advance can be made across the line MENIN-TOURCOING-ARMENTIERES. As the attack progresses this Corps will withdraw units of the 255th Infantry Divisional Artillery which have been attached to the 14th Infantry Division, and these units will return to their own Division. The Corps will take the necessary security measures in front of the enemy fortified line: TOURCOING-FOREST and will reconnoiter this line with strong patrols.

(c) The XXVII Army Corps will continue its local attacks on enemy positions and trenches so as to prevent the enemy from breaking off contact before retiring. Any retreat will be followed up immediately in the general direction of SECLIN.

5. Boundaries.

(a) Between the XI and IV Army Corps.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

RENAIX (IV) - KNOKT (XI) - TENHOVE (XI) - TIEGHEM
(XI) - TIEGHEM-VICHTE ROAD (XI) - VICHTE-COURTRAI
RAILWAY LINE (IV) - the LYS as far as MENIN.

(b) Between the IV and XXVII Army Corps.

CHIEVRES (IV) - LEUZE (XXVII)- TOURNAI (XXVII) -
LILLE (XXVII).

6. Army Headquarters will remain at Enghien.

(signed) Reichenau
C. in C.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX II

Army High Command 6
Section 1A/OP

G.H.Q. 23/5/40
21.30 hours

A R M Y O R D E R No. 11.

1. The enemy is behind the LYS and on the Eastern front has withdrawn from the fortified positions East of the line TOURCOING-LILIE. TOURNAI is in our hands.

Observations of enemy movements indicate an intention to break through in the region of ARRAS.

2. The sixth Army will attack on its right and first effect the crossing of the LYS; the left flank of the Army while containing the front ROUBAIX-LILLE in the east, will attack this fortress area from the southeast.

3. Flanks.

On the right the left wing (216 Inf. Div.) of the IX Army Corps will advance from a bridge head at SYNGEM to OLSENE. GHENT has been taken.

On the left the last defence of MAUBEUGE having fallen, the right wing of the 4th Army (1 Div.) is advancing from BAVAI to VALENCIENNES.

4. Objectives.

The XI Army Corps will cross the LYS, its main thrust being to the south of the canal from ROULETS and will be prepared at any time to make a flanking attack on YPRES.

The IV Army Corps will force the LYS and will swing round on MENIN. The necessary security measures will be taken towards TOURCOING and ROUBAIX.

The XXVII Army Corps will advance against the fortified line, FOREST-CONDE, its strengthened left wing advancing in the direction of ORCHIES-SECLIN.

5. Reconnaissance.

(a) Ground Reconnaissance. During the preparation of the attack, strong patrols will be sent out to ascertain whether the enemy is preparing fresh defences behind the LYS and along the entrenched line east of LILLE-ST.AMAND. It is specially important to obtain prisoners and to ascertain from them whether any hitherto unidentified units on the LYS are relieving enemy forces with-

DECLASSIFIED

drawing from the SCHELDE, or whether the units already identified are again appearing.

(b) Air Reconnaissance will obtain information on the following points:

1. Are the enemy forces which are retreating West and South West from the SCHELDE preparing further resistance along the line of the frontier fortifications, or along the DEULE Canal positions?
2. Are the enemy forces round GHENT and in the West retreating in the general direction of YPRES?
3. Are enemy forces retreating from the line YPRES-ST. AMAND in a south westerly direction to the line HESDIN-ST. POL-ARRAS?

6. Change of Boundaries.

(a) Between the XI and IV Army Corps.

KERKHOVE (XI) - DEERLYCK (IV) - HARLEBEKE (IV)

(b) Between the XXVII Army Corps and Fourth Army.

BOUVIGNIES (XXVII)- LE FOREST (Fourth Army) - CARVIN (XXVII) - FOURNES (XXVII).

7. Direction of Main Thrust.

217 Infantry Division, previously in the Army Reserve Group will be added to the XXVII Army Corps.

In addition the following units will be included in the XVII Army Corps: -

(a) From the XI Army Corps :

Artillery Regiment H. Q.	783
Heavy Artillery Bn.	II/60 (10cm. Guns).
Heavy Artillery Bn.	II/46 (Heavy Field Hows. 150mm,
Super Heavy Artillery Bn.	733 (21 cm. Mortars)
Super Heavy Artillery Bn.	736 (21 cm. Mortars)
"Smoke" Regiment	2
"Smoke" Bn.	1
Medium Anti-Tank Bn.	560

DECLASSIFIED

(b) From IV Army Corps :

Heavy Artillery Bn.	624
Heavy Artillery Bn.	815

8. Army Reserves.

61 Infantry Division has been placed at the disposal of Army Headquarters and will concentrate during the night 23/24.5.40 in the area VELAINCES - QUARTES - HERQUEGIES - MAINVAULT - LA HAMAIDE - ST.SAUVEUR, so as to be in a position to advance either in the direction of TOURNAI or south of that town. The Divisional H.Q. will be at ANVAING.

Army Reserve Group.

The 254 Infantry Division will move during the night 23/24.5.40 into a position west of the DENDRE in the area FLOBECQ - LESSAINES - GRAMMENT - NEDERBRAKEL under arrangements made by XI Army Corps. The 61 Infantry Division and the artillery units rejoining XXVII Army Corps will have precedence on the roads.

9. Army Headquarters will remain at ENGHIEU.

(Signed) v.Reichenau.
C.in C.

Distribution:

Full

Appendices:

Allotment of Army Troops
Special Orders for Signals
(Omitted)

DECLASSIFIED³ -

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX III

Army High Command 6
Section Ia/Op

G.H.Q. 24/5/40

A R M Y O R D E R S No. 12

1. The enemy has been unable to defend the Lys position in the face of our attack and is retreating to the West.

English and French forces are still defending the "stop-gap" positions along the French frontier.

On our flanks the left wing of the Eighteenth Army (216 Inf. Div.) has crossed the Lys and in the area DEYNZE-OLSENE and is attacking to the West. The objective for the 9th Army Corps on 25.5. is the heights of THIELT.

The right wing of the fourth Army is South of VALENCIENNES, attacking in the direction of MARCHIENNES.

2. The Army continues its double enveloping attack on both sides of LILLE.

3. Objectives.

The XI Corps secures the right flank of the Army by attacking across the ROULERS-DADIZEELE road in the direction of YPRES.

IV Army Corps will continue to attack; objective is the heights of WYTSCHAETE.

The 61 Inf. Div. will be placed under its orders.

7 Inf. Div. will remain in the area of AALBEKE-ESPIERRES canal at the disposal of Army H.Q. The Inf. Regiment of the 7th Inf. Div. which is holding the area South of the Espierres Canal will be relieved by a Regiment of 31 Inf. Div. by the 25.5. and will rejoin its division.

The XXVII will continue its attack with strong concentrated forces over the line NIVELLES-ORCHIES. It will relieve units of the 7 Inf. Div. who are holding the area South of the ESPIERRES Canal, with units of 35 Inf. Div. by the early morning of 25/5. It will concentrate units of 35 and 253 Inf. Divs. on either side of the boundary in preparation for the attack to be made by X Army Corps from RUMES TO SECLIN.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

4. The Heavy (Gun) Regiment will place harassing fire on road junctions in the area of ROULERS-YPRES-ARMENTIERES-LILLE.
5. Air Corps IV will support by attacking roads, road junctions, and known assembly points on the XI and IV Army Corps front. A Liaison Officer from Air Corps IV will be attached to IV Army Corps H.Q. for 25/5.
6. Air Recce. Will ascertain, in the area THOUROUT-CASSEL-BETHUNE DOUAI-ST.AMAND whether the enemy is retreating before the Sixth Army westwards or north westwards towards the channel ports.

Extent of Air recce.

ROULERS-YPRES-LILLE road to DOUAI.

7. The X Army Corps which has just been attached to the Army takes over as from the afternoon 25/5, command of the following areas:
Right boundary -HOUDAING (X) - road junction 6 kms. North of LEUZE (IV) - ESPIERRES (IV) - ESPIERRES Canal-WAMBRECHIES (IV) - PERENCHIES (IV).

Left boundary - PERUWELZ (XXVII) - BLEHARIES (XXVII) - MOUCHAIN (X) - PONT A MARCQ (XXVII) - PHALEMPIN (XXVII).

The time at which X Army Corps will take over will be given out later.

The units detailed in Appendix I will be placed under the orders of X Army Corps on taking over.

The objective of X Army Corps will be to break-through the fortifications East of Seclin. It will concentrate its principal forces on either side of the line RUMES-SECLIN.

Corps H. Q. in the area TOURNAI.

Air Reconnaissance and A.A. Defences for X Army Corps.

Air Reconnaissance for X Army Corps will be carried out by Reconnaissance Staffel 4(H)/12 of XXVII Army Corps, which will, however, remain under the orders of XXVII Army Corps. The Staffel will send an Air Intelligence Liaison Detachment to H.Q. X Army Corps, and will arrange for a message dropping post, and, if necessary landing ground in the vicinity of X Army Corps. X Army Corps will arrange for signals communications to the landing ground of 4 (H)/12 in AUTREPPE (6 km. East of LEUZE).

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

X Army Corps will co-operate with XXVII Army Corps for A.A. defence.

8. Boundaries.

Between Eighteenth Army and XI Army Corps.

ROULERS (XI) - LANGELIARCK (XI)

Between XI and IV Army Corps: HARLEBEKE (IV) -

DADIZEELE (XI) - GHELUVELT Church - DIEKE BUSCH (XI).

9. Army Reserve.

In the area AALBEKE-ESPIERRES Canal 7 Inf.Div. will hold the gap between the LYS and the Canal and will reconnoitre for a possible attack, against the line of enemy block-houses between HALLUIN and TOURCOING.

10. Army Reserve Group.

254 Inf. Div. will take over the area FRASNES-LEUZE-ATH-LA HAMAIDE from 6 Inf. Div.

11. Signals Communication. See Appendix 2. (Omitted)

12. Army H. Q. remains at ENCHIEU (EDINGEN).

(Signed) V. Reichenau

C. in C.

Appendices (Omitted)

1. Allotment of X Army Corps Troops
2. Special orders for Signals
3. Situation Map.

G-2//2657-231

M.I.D., W.D.
Special Bulletin No. 9.
August 12, 1940.

THE GERMAN ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE THE HAGUE
BY THE 22d GERMAN DIVISION (AIR INFANTRY)

This document is being given an approved distribution, and no additional copies are available for distribution by the Military Intelligence Division. It may be reproduced in whole or in part under the provisions of Letter TAG, November 15, 1939, AG 350.05 (11-1-39) M-B-M, subject, Dissemination of Military Information by the Military Intelligence Division and by Recipients of M.I.D. Information.

Contents

Documents of the 22d German
Division Revealing the German
Plans to Capture the Hague by
Parachute Troops and Air Infantry.

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction	3
Document 1. - The Order of Battle of the 22d Division.	8
Document 2. - Map of the Environs of The Hague.	11
Document 3. - Air March Table, 22d Division.	13
Document 4. - Air March Table, 22d Division.	18
Document 5. - Operations Order, 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry.	20
Document 6. - Notice to 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry.	25
Document 7. - General Order, 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry.	27
Document 8. - Air Ground Panel Code of the 22d Division.	30
Document 9. - Regulations Concerning Behavior of German Troops in Occupied Territories, Issued by the Headquarters, 22d Division.	32
Document 10.- Instructions of the 22d Division as to the Handling of Fifth Columnists by German Troops.	35

LIBRARY
COMMAND
AND
GENERAL
STAFF
SCHOOL

DECLASSIFIED

AUG 28 '40

DECLASSIFIED

	<u>Page</u>
Document 11.- Bulletin on Enemy Information Published by the 22d Division.	37
Document 12.- Intelligence Report of the German M.A. The Hague on Enemy Intelligence.	40
Comment on Documents.	42

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

I. Introduction. (See sketch map, Page 7.)

This bulletin contains a number of German military documents captured by the Dutch army at The Hague and dealing with the German attempt (on May 10th) to capture that city by means of parachute troops and air infantry. These documents have been so arranged and edited as to seek to give to the military student a general picture of the type of preparation which the German high command felt to be necessary for an air invasion.

These documents were captured by the Dutch army in two airplanes which were shot down at dawn May 10 in the environs of The Hague. Part of these belonged to the combat file of the 2d Battalion of the 65th German Infantry, a unit of the 22d Division (Air Infantry). The rest belonged to the Intelligence file of Division Headquarters. Both of these files are now in the possession of the War Department; however, only a selection of these papers are deemed of sufficient interest and value to warrant publication in this bulletin.

Captured files are scarcely ever full enough to permit a complete reconstruction of a military operation. Some key orders are certain to be missing, and these missing ones are as apt as not to be vital to the story of the campaign as a whole. This is the case in this instance. Nowhere in this file is there a trace of the operations order of the 22d Division, and without this order, neither the orders of minor units of the division nor the annexes to the division operations orders permit a more than fragmentary picture of the attack of the 22d Division against The Hague. Nevertheless, these documents tell us much; particularly covering the detailed preparations which were thought necessary to prepare such an attack. Much, however, remains to be learned, and many questions which the reader will undoubtedly wish to have answered will have to be left to history to clear up.

There is much evidence to suggest that the 22d Division, when its advance guard met heavy resistance at The Hague, desisted about noon May 10 from its attempt to capture the city, and diverted its still untransported elements to Rotterdam, where the first wave of parachute troops had obtained the success which had been denied them at The Hague. We know, in fact, that the commander of the 22d Division, Count Sponeck, was decorated for valor during the action at Rotterdam, an area which seemingly precluded him from having been at The Hague. Yet, in these documents, there is no word suggesting that the 22d Division ever intended to operate in any area other than The Hague.

The German attempt to capture The Hague was actually begun at dawn May 10 but failed promptly and completely. The American attache in the Netherlands was in The Hague on May 10. From dawn on, he reports having heard heavy firing in the suburbs and that toward noon, German patrols actually fought their way into the

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

outskirts of the city. During the day of the 10th and the morning of the 11th, some 1500 German troops which had landed from the air, were rounded up and forced to surrender. In addition, the German landing force suffered heavy but unknown losses in killed and wounded.

Nevertheless, the German failure at The Hague assisted the successful execution of their general operation against the Netherlands. This is definitely the view of our Military Attache in The Hague, and it is supported by other evidence from German sources. Therefore, to understand the German reasons for undertaking this highly risky coup de main against The Hague, it is necessary to examine the strategy of the German high command in the Netherlands operation and particularly to be clear as to how these landings of parachute troops and air infantry in the heart of the Netherlands fitted into their larger scheme of maneuver.

The German plan for the occupation of the Netherlands was but one minor phase of a major offensive which aimed at the destruction of the Allied armies in the west. The Netherlands was but a minor objective in the strategy of the campaign. Few troops could be spared by Germany for this sideshow, so necessary was it for her high command to keep great masses of troops intact for the attacks at Liege and in the Ardennes. Speed also was essential if the Allies were to be prevented from moving north from Antwerp and uniting their armies with that of the Netherlands.

A German frontal attack on Holland between the Zuider Zee and the Maas River appeared on its face as a military operation of the utmost difficulty. The Dutch on this area possessed a line of fortifications which had been rendered doubly strong by a belt of inundations in front of the forts along the entire front. In places this water area was as much as ten miles wide. The Dutch fortified lines were much less strong along their southern frontier facing Belgium. There, however, Holland was protected by a series of rivers flowing from east to west and forming the Rhine and Meuse delta. These delta rivers were crossed by a series of gigantic bridges, which formed the only communication links between Holland and Belgium. Among these was the mile-long bridge at Moerdijk, the longest in Europe. If these bridges should be destroyed by the Dutch, an attack on Holland from the south would prove almost as difficult as one across the inundated area further north.

The Dutch army comprised 14 divisions at the outbreak of the war. It would seem that about 400,000 men were mobilized in all. This army was mediocre in quality. Training was sufficient to permit a position defense, but offensive spirit and skill were lacking. There was no Dutch air force worthy of the name, and the anti-aircraft artillery was very limited in number; hence, German air superiority was overwhelming. The Dutch chances to defend their country rested on their ability to hold their fortified lines facing Germany and Belgium.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

The German plan of campaign against the Netherlands envisaged a back door attack on the fortress of Holland from the south, i.e., from the direction of Belgium. Only holding attacks were to be launched against the inundated areas north of the Waal and Maas rivers, i.e., from the direction of Germany. In these holding attacks, only three infantry divisions in all were employed to hold the mass of the Dutch army in their fortifications. The main German attack was to be made south of the delta from Cleves in the Rhineland through the weak Dutch line of forts east of Herzogenbusch known as the "Peel" position, thence northwestward toward Rotterdam. The quick success of this blow depended on Germany getting possession intact of the bridges across the Maas and Waal rivers. If these could be secured, the German army would have outflanked the Dutch defenses and forced its way through the back door into the fortress of Holland. This latter phrase is used to describe the area of the inner Netherlands, between Amsterdam and The Hague, which was surrounded by water areas on all sides.

The German high command seems not to have doubted that it could break quickly the "Peel" position and reach the southern bank of the Maas river. How to seize the bridges and prevent the Dutch from destroying them was the major military problem facing the high command.

To accomplish this purpose, Germany decided to employ parachute troops and air infantry on a scale never before attempted in war. The terrain in the delta region was flat in general, and there were numerous areas suitable for emergency air fields. The Rotterdam airport of Waalhaven also lay south of the city on an island between the Waal and Maas rivers. If this airport and the emergency fields selected by the German espionage service in peace could be seized by parachutists at dawn of the opening day of operations, there was a good chance that the bridges could be secured intact through a surprise attack, and that then sufficient air infantry could be landed from airplanes to defend them until the main German force could cut through the "Peel" position and bring them the reinforcements necessary to reduce the fortress of Holland.

This plan was executed perfectly. The air fields and bridges were seized by 8:00 A.M. May 10. During the next two days, between 10,000 and 12,000 German troops were landed in the delta. Feeble Dutch attempts to recapture the bridges were repulsed, and toward dusk on May 13, a German "Panzer" division, having broken the "Peel" position, gained contact at the southern end of the Moerdijk bridge with the isolated parachutists and air infantry in the delta. Next afternoon Rotterdam surrendered to this force after a devastating air attack by German dive bombers. The rear door into the fortress of Holland had thus been forced open after a four day military operation of a type hitherto unknown in military history. The Dutch army at once

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

drew the consequences from their untenable military situation, and to avoid the further destruction of their cities, surrendered unconditionally.

The documents contained in this bulletin do not bear on the decisive operations in the delta region south of Rotterdam. They tell the story of the parallel German air infantry effort further north. If The Hague enterprise had been successful, Holland would probably have surrendered a day earlier. The German failure at The Hague, however, did not prejudice their strategical success in the Netherlands. In fact, it acted as a major diversion and during the 10th and 11th, prevented the Dutch army from acting offensively against the decisive air landings south of Rotterdam. Thus, though the Hague attack was a tactical failure, it contributed to the strategical victory.

To the military student, the details of the German preparations for The Hague enterprise are even more important than a knowledge of the historical events of what occurred. The same type of preparations were undoubtedly made for Rotterdam as for The Hague. In one case, these preparations brought success; in the other, failure. Such is the fortune of war.

 **DECLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED

Document No. 1.

Order of Battle of the 22d German Division

NOTE: This document was found in the divisional intelligence file. It is dated March 2, 1940, over two months before the actual attempt to capture The Hague. There is much evidence in other documents to suggest that the organization of the division was changed, at least in some details, between March 2 and May 10.

The 22d Infantry Division had been originally one of the normal line infantry divisions of the German army. It had apparently been reorganized as an air infantry division in the course of the winter of 1939 and 1940, and its strength reduced from approximately 15,000 to 6,680 men. The armament had also been reduced in proportion. One complete Infantry Regiment of the normal three had also been eliminated. This reorganized division contained no transportation vehicles, as such vehicles could not be transported by air. As will later be seen in other documents, it was planned to requisition all necessary transportation as soon as the landing at The Hague had been effected.

The 22d Division was a unit of the German army and not of the air force. It operated in the Netherlands as part of the Eighteenth Army of Gen. von Kuechler and was in no way under the "Air Force" command. The division contained no parachute troops. These latter belonged to the air force. However, six companies of parachute troops were attached to the 22d Division for The Hague attack. These units then passed with their attachment under army command. It is of importance to note the German differentiation between parachute troops and air infantry divisions. The former belonged to the air force, the latter to the army. The air infantry divisions, however, possessed a "type" and not the normal organization and equipment. This "type" organization rendered them of limited value in normal land operations.

SECRET
(3rd Edition)

1 A 99/40
March 2, 1940

Order of Battle

22d Infantry Division

Division headquarters

One motorcycle section (attached)

Two Antiaircraft Machine Gun Companies, each equipped with four 20 mm. Antiaircraft Machine Guns.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

One Antitank Battalion, consisting of
Two Antitank Companies, each with six 37mm.
Antitank Guns.

One Reconnaissance Battalion, consisting of
One bicycle company
One motorcycle section
One heavy machine gun section (2 guns)

The 65th Infantry, consisting of
Staff
Signal Platoon
Bicycle Platoon
3 Battalions
 each battalion organized into 3 rifle
 and 1 machine gun companies and a
 medium mortar section.
One antitank company (4 guns)
One Infantry Howitzer Company (4 - 75 mm.
 Infantry Howitzers)
A light ammunition column. (no vehicles).

The 47th Infantry (similar organization to that of
65th Infantry.)

22d Artillery, consisting of
Headquarters
Signal Platoon
Three Battalions, each with a headquarters and
 two batteries of 75 mm. Mountain Howitzers.
A Signal Company (Radio)
A Pioneer Company
A Medical Company
Three Supply Platoons.

Strength of Division

241 Officers
1,105 Non-commissioned Officers
5,334 Men
6,680 Total

Armament of Division

4,371 Carbines
375 Machine Pistols
112 Antitank Rifles
54 Light Mortars (50 mm.)
36 Medium Mortars (81 mm.)

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

Armament of Division (continued)

8 75mm. Infantry Howitzers
16 20mm. Antiaircraft Machine Guns
175 Light Machine Guns
60 Heavy Machine Guns
30 37mm. Antitank Guns
24 75mm. Mountain Howitzers.

 **DECLASSIFIED**



DECLASSIFIED

Document No. 2.

Map of the Environs of The Hague

NOTE: The attached map found in the file of the 2d Battalion 65th Infantry shows roughly the location of three landing fields utilized by the 22d Division (Air Infantry) in their attempt to capture The Hague. Field I was a small emergency airfield of the Dutch air force, Field II was a minor airport of limited capacity, Field III was a football field.

The black line encloses an area in which the German air force was forbidden to bomb after a certain hour. The hour in question is not shown on the map, nor is it mentioned in any of the documents found in the files.



DECLASSIFIED

Sperrzone f. Bomben
gleichzeitig Moldekar

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U

1

2

3

g. Kdos

GERMAN MAP, belonging to the intelligence 4 Officer, 22nd Division.

Roman numerals I, II, and III show 5 landing fields of 22nd Division in the outskirts of the 6 Hague.

BLACK LINE encloses area

in 7 which bombing by German planes is forbid-8 den after Zero hour.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

Anlage 4a

g. Kdos

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U

DECLASSIFIED

Document No. 3.

Air March Table of the 22d Division (Air Infantry).

NOTE: The following document is an annex to the Operations Order of the 22d Division. It was found in the files of the Division Intelligence Officer. The Operations Order itself was not in the file.

The German form for this sort of movement table follows rather closely the form used by the American army for troop movements by motor. The differences between the German form and the similar American one arises almost entirely from the different type of movement employed by the Germans.

The exact meaning of the heading in Column III is not entirely clear, certain unknown German abbreviations (Kg. Z.B.V.) having been used. The probable meaning appears to be "Air Transport Headquarters."

The German abbreviation "x" used in the Columns "Starting Time" corresponds to our "H." as used to express "H" hour.

It should be noted that the parachute troops attached to the division are transported wholly as Serial 1. These parachute troops had been given the mission of seizing the landing fields and securing the safe landing of later serial numbers.

The list of "Troops to be loaded" in Column 5 does not correspond exactly with the composition of the 22d Division as given in Document No. 1. It is known that the "Air March Table" is the later of the two documents and more nearly corresponds to the organization in force on May 10, 1940. A total of 224 transport planes were used for the movement of the division. Some of the planes were used four times.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Annex to Operations Order, 22d Division, Section 1A, General Staff 176/40. April 12, 1940.

TABLE OF AIR MOVEMENTS (Loading and March Tables)										
Ser. No.	Air Transport Unit	Air Transport HQ.	Departure Airport	Troops to be loaded	No. of Air-planes Avail-able	No. of Air-planes Re-quired	Start-ing Time	Land-ing Time	Land-ing Field	Commander of Serial No.
M DAY 1st WAVE										
1A	IV Group Special Wing #1	1	IODDENHEIDE	1st Bn. Parachute Rifle Reg. #2	53	53	x-21	x+53	III	CO 1st Bn. Parachute Rifle Reg. #2
1B	I Group Special Wing #172 4th Squadron	2	PADERBORN	6th Co. Parachute Rifle Reg. #2	12	12	x-45	x+55	I+II	CO 6th Co. Parachute Rifle Reg. #2
2	Special Air Wing #11	2	LIPPSTADT	HQ 47th Inf. & Sig. Plat. HQ III Bn. 47th Inf. & Rec. Plat. 47th Inf., 9th, 10th, & 12th Co., 47th Inf.	53	53	x-05	x+85	I	CO 47th Infantry
3	Special Air Wing #12	2	STORMEDE	HQ 65th Inf. & Sig. Plat. 6th & 8th Co., 65th Inf. HQ II Bn. 65th Inf. & 5th Co.	53	53	x-07	x+85	III II	CO 65th Inf. CO II Bn. 65th Inf.
4	Special Air Wing #9	2	LIPPSPRINGE	Div. HQ, Motorcycle Troop HQ 22d Sig. Bn., 2d Co. 22d Sig. Bn., 13th Co. 47th Inf., Rec. Plat. 65th Inf., 1st Plat. 3rd Co. 22d Pioneer Bn. CO Bicycle Squadron & 1st & 2d Plat.	53	53	x+33	x+130	III II	CO 22d Sig. Bn. CO Bicycle Squadron

DECLASSIFIED

Ser. No.	Air Transport Unit	Air Transport HQ.	Departure Airport	Troops to be loaded	No. of Air-planes Avail-able	No. of Air-planes Re-quired	Start-ing Time	Land-ing Time	Land-ing Field	Commander of Serial No.
M DAY 2d WAVE										
5	IV Group Special Wing #1	1	LODDENHEIDE	HQ I Bn., 65th Inf. with 1st 2d & 3d Co. Wire Troop, Sig. Bn. #22 7th Co., Inf. Reg. #65	53	52	x+257	2+333	III	CO I Bn. 65th Inf. CO 7th Co. 65th Inf.
6	I Group Special Wing #1 - less 1st Squadron	1	WERL	HQ II Bn. 47th Inf. with 5th 6th & 7th Co.	41	39	x+248	x+330	I	CO II Bn. 47th Inf.
7	Special Wing #11	2	LIPPSTADT	2d Co. AA Bn. #31 HQ Rec. Bn. #22 III & IV Plat. Bicycle Squad. HQ Pioneer Bn. #22 3rd Co. Pioneer Bn. #22 (less one platoon)	53	53	x+325	x+415	I	CO Rec. Bn. #2.
8	Special Wing #12	2	STORMEDE	HQ Art. Reg. #22 2d Co. AA Bn. #52 4th Co. Inf. Reg. #65	53	51	x+342	x+434	II III	CO Art. Reg. #2. CO 2d Co. AA Bn. #52.
9	Special Wing #9	2	LIPPSPRINGE	HQ II Bn. Art. Reg. #22 5th & 6th Batt. Art. Reg. #22 13th Co. Inf. Reg. #65	53	52	x+437	x+534	III II	CO II Bn. Art. Reg. #22 CO 13th Co. Inf. Reg. #65
M DAY 3d WAVE										
10	IV Group Special Wing #1	1	LODDENHEIDE	HQ I Bn. 47th Inf. with 1st, 2d, 3d, & 11th Co.	53	51	x+585	x+661	I	CO I Bn. 47th Inf.

Ser. No.	Air Transport Unit	Air Transport HQ.	Departure Airport	Troops to be loaded	No. of Air-planes Available	No. of Air-planes Re-quired	Start-ing Time	Land-ing Time	Land-ing Field	Commander o of Serial No.
M DAY 3d WAVE (Continued)										
11	Special Wing #11	2	LIPPSTADT	HQ III Bn. Art. Reg. #22 7th & 9th Batt. Art. Reg. #22 2d Plat. Supply Co.	53	52	x+685	x+773	III II	CO III Bn. 22d Art. CO 2d Plat. Supply Co.
12	Special Wing #12	2	STORMEDE	8th Co., Inf. Reg. #47 CO & 3d Plat. Supply Co. 10th Co., 22d Medical Bn. (one Plat.)	53	49	x+706	x+800	I III	CO 8th Co. 47th Inf. CO Supply Co.
12A	Special Wing #9	2	LIPPSPRINGE	5th Co. AA Bn. #263	12	12	x+900	x+997	III	CO 5th Co. AA Bn. #263
M + 1 DAY 1st WAVE										
13	Special Wing #9	2	LIPPSPRINGE	14th Co., 47th Inf. 14th Co., 65th Inf. HQ & 2d Co., A.T. Bn. #22	53 (TsW)	45	x-27	x+75	I III	CO 14th Co. Inf. Reg. #47 CO A.T. Bn. #22
14	Special Wing #12	2	STORMEDE	HQ I Bn., Art. Reg. #22 with 2d & 3d Batt. Ammunition Column, 47th Inf.	38 (T) 15 (TsW)	52	x-23	x+73	I	CO I Bn. Art. Reg. #22
15	Special Wing #11	2	LIPPSTADT	4th Co., 47th Inf. 4th Plat., Div. Supply Co.	38 (T) 15 (TsW)	35	x+69	x+165	I III	CO 4th Co. Inf. Reg. #47 CO 4th Plat. Div. Sup. Co.
16	IV Group Special Wing #1	1	LODDENHEIDE	HQ III Bn., 65th Inf. with 9th, 10th, & 11th Cos.	53	39	x+92	x+165	III	CO III Bn. Inf. Reg. #65

DECLASSIFIED

Ser. No.	Air Transport Unit	Air Transport HQ.	Departure Airport	Troops to be loaded	No. of Air-planes Available	No. of Air-planes Required	Starting Time	Landing Time	Landing Field	Commander of Serial No.
M - 1 DAY 2d WAVE										
17	Special Wing #12	2	STORMEDE	HQ I Bn. Art. Reg. #2 Ammunition Column, Inf. Reg. #65 2/3 of Bicycle Squadron	38 (T) 15 (TsW)	50	x+360	x+473	III	CO I Bn. Art. Reg. #22
18	Special Wing #9	2	LIPPSRINGE	3rd Co., A.T. Bn. #22 12th Co., Inf. Reg. #65 2d Co., Medical Bn. #22	53 (TsW)	49	x+390	x+492	III II	CO 12th Co. Inf. Reg. #65 CO 2d Co. Med. Bn. #22
19	Special Wing #11	2	LIPPSTADT	8th Battery, Art. Reg. #22 1/3 of Bicycle Squadron	38 (T) 15 (TsW)	26	x+471	x+567	III	CO 8th Batt. Art. Reg. #22
20	Special Wing #12	2	STORMEDE	Reserved for detachments left behind.	12-15 Night Flight	-	x+776	x+872	I, II, III.	
21	Special Wing #11	2	LIPPSTADT	Reserved for detachments left behind	12-15 Night Flight	-	x+873	x+970	I, II, III.	

NOTE: The meanings of the abbreviations (T) and (TsW) in column headed "Number of Airplanes Available" are not known.

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

Document No. 4.
































Air March Table, 22d Division

NOTE: This table was found in the files of the Intelligence Officer of the 22d Division. It corresponds in content to Document 3, but the form used is quite different. In view of the unusual arrangement of the serial numbers, it has been reproduced untranslated in its original colors.

The right hand portion of the table shows the organization of the 22d Division. The German symbols are used. Different colors are used for the different units.

The left hand portion of the table shows the serial numbers of the Air March Table, as also given in Document 3. Symbols, however, are used to designate the troops to be transported. The same colors are used for the units in the left hand portion of the table as in the right hand portion; thus, the unit commander is able to pick out rapidly his serial number and grasp easily the whole arrangement of the air movement.

 **DECLASSIFIED**

Marschfolge				Geheim! Kräftegliederung der 22. Div.		22. Div. 1. Tag		8 Ausfertigungen! 4. Ausfertigung!	
Lfd. Nr.	Verband	Landung						-2. März 1939	
		Platz	Zeit						
1.		II u III I	x + 53 x + 55						
2.		I	x + 4:25						
3.		II III ^{x)}	x + 4:25						
4.		II ^{x)} III	x + 2:40						
5.		III II	x + 5:31						
6.		I	x + 5:50						
7.		I	x + 6:55						
8.		II ^{x)} III	x + 7:24						
9.		II III	x + 8:44						
10.		III I III	x + 53						
11.		I III III	x + 55						
12.		III I	x + 2:24						
13.		I	x + 2:25						
14.		III	x + 4:34						
15.		I	x + 7:33						
16.		III II	x + 7:38						
17.		I III	x + 9:08						
Verteiler: 22. Div. 1b 1c 2a 3a									

DECLASSIFIED

Document No. 5.

Operations Order of the 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry.

NOTE: The only combat order of any combat unit found in the files captured at The Hague is that of the 2d Battalion of the 65th Infantry. However, paragraph 2 of this order throws some light on the operations plans of the 22d Division as a whole.

The geographical locations mentioned in this order are shown on the attached pencil sketch, which appears to have been distributed to company commanders.

The mention of "German civilians" in Paragraph 6 refers to members of the Fifth Column. Elsewhere on the file were found identification cards made out in blank and signed by the division commander, which were to be given to agents of the Fifth Column, who reported to the troops at the landing field.

2d Battalion, 65th Infantry

In the field.
April 16, 1940.

Battalion Operations Order.

(3d Draft)

1. Enemy.

Information with regard to the enemy will be issued under separate cover.

2. The 22d Infantry Division with the 1st Battalion of the 2d Parachute Rifle regiment attached, surrounds and occupies the capital city of the Netherlands--The Hague. The division lands from the air on - - - - - (date not given in orders; actually, on May 10, 1940) on the following fields:

with reinforced Infantry Regiment No. 47 on Field No. 1 (about 10 Km. north of The Hague)

with the reinforced 2d Battalion of Infantry Regiment No. 65 on Field No. 2. (Sport Field about 2 Km. south of The Hague)

with reinforced Infantry Regiment No. 65 (less 2d and 3d Battalion) on Field No. 3 (about 2 Km. southeast of The Hague).

Our own air force attacks the hostile air fields, destroys air installations thereon and protects the landing of the division.

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

3. The 2d Battalion of Infantry Regiment No. 65 (less the 6th and 8th Companies) reinforced by the 13th Company (Infantry Howitzers) of the regiment and the 1st platoon of the 6th Company of Parachute Rifle Regiment No. 2 occupies and secures the landing field so that landings can be continued thereon until M+1 day. It also bars all roads leading from The Hague toward the southwest and halts all traffic in both directions. The battalion further reconnoiters constantly in the directions of the line: Monster-Poeldijk as well as the southwest edge of The Hague.

Together with other forces landed on A day, it prepares to attack (upon orders of the Division Commander) the government quarters of The Hague (from the southwest).

The 1st Platoon, 6th Company, Parachute Rifle Regiment No. 2 (1st Lieut. Gungelmann) jumps 32 minutes before the battalion is landed, seizes the landing field, and drives the enemy out of the sand dunes around Kijkduin.

4. In order to accomplish this mission, I order:

5th Company: One platoon occupies, as soon as it has landed, Loos-Duinen and bars all traffic in both directions on

- (1) the roads extending southeast from Poeldijk and Wateringen
- (2) as well as the northeastern exits of The Hague (Hout Weg), and
- (3) Loosduinsche Street.

An elevated observation post is to be located and occupied (a churchtower, if possible). Permanent reconnaissance is to be carried on as far as Poeldijk, Wateringen, and the south-east edge of The Hague. (At the latter point, liaison is to be established with Infantry Regiment No. 65.)

One platoon bars the southeast exits of The Hague (van Merdervoort Laan (4) and Shoxrt Laan (5)) against traffic in both directions. It also occupies and secures Kijkduin (6) with particular attention to the sea front. An elevated observation post will be occupied. Permanent reconnaissance (two patrols) will be carried on through the sand dunes in a northerly direction, as far as the southwest edge of Schevningen, and in a southwesterly direction as far as Terheiden.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

One platoon remains at my disposal. Initially, this platoon takes over the anti-aircraft protection of the landing field. Later, it will probably be assigned the following missions:

- Requisitioning of transportation and bicycles for the 5th and 7th Companies and the battalion staff.
- Erection of a prisoner-of-war cage.
- Erection of a booty dump.
- Attack toward the harbor of Scheveningen.

Constant reconnaissance (a bicycle patrol) will be maintained along the road (Loosduinen - Terheiden - Monster) as far as those villages.

The company command post of the 5th Company, Infantry Regiment No. 65, in Loosduinen (road junction toward Poeldijk).

The 1st platoon, 6th Company, Parachute Rifle Regiment No. 2, withdraws its air field security detachments when these have become superfluous through relief by the 5th Company of Infantry Regiment No. 65. It then reinforces and widens the road blocks on the road Loosduinen-Monster toward the southwest.

The headquarters of the 2d Battalion, Infantry Regiment No. 65, erects a command post in the Meerdervoort Laan (probably some 300 meters northeast of Air Field No. 2). It also erects an observation post with a scissors telescope, and establishes radio communication with the division command post and the 5th Company.

The battalion Surgeon erects a first aid station.

The 7th Company, Infantry Regiment No. 65, and the 13th Company (Infantry Howitzers) of the same regiment. These units arrive by air four and seven hours, respectively, after the initial landing receive their missions upon arriving at Air Field No. 2.

5. The boundary between the battalion and reinforced Regiment No. 65 for the security of the air field, reconnaissance, and the enclosing of The Hague, will run as follows:

Naalwijk (To Infantry Regiment No. 65)

Uitaofspolder (To 2d Battalion, Infantry Regiment No. 65) the middle of the southern edge of The Hague

6. A civilian representative is to be attached to every leader and assistant leader of the battalion, who will have to be explicitly instructed with regard to the situation and the mission of the battalion.

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

Until the arrival of the Battalion Commander, 1st Lieut. Lingner of the 5th Company, Infantry Regiment No. 65, is designated as his representative.

7. Constant watchfulness against air and ground attacks will be maintained at all times. Captured enemy weapons will be utilized for antiaircraft protection. Men are to remain scattered. The landing field is to be kept free of personnel.

8. Trenches with armored covering are to be constructed at once, for outposts as well as reserves, to prevent casualties from hostile air bombs.

9. To block roads, any material which can be found should be used, inclusive of wagons, automobiles, and street cars. Draw bridges will be raised.

10. Short objective reports will be submitted at frequent intervals.


(Signature Illegible)
Major & Battalion Commander.

Distribution:

Commander, 2d Battalion
5th Company
7th Company
13th Company
6th Company, Parachute Rifle Regiment No. 2.

 **DECLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED



[REDACTED] **DECLASSIFIED**

Document No. 6.

Notice Issued by the Battalion Commander, 2d Battalion,
65th Infantry to the Officers of the Battalion.

NOTE: The following notice appears to have been issued to the companies of the 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry, only a few days before May 10th.

There is mentioned in this note a "reserve emergency landing field" on the automobile parkway between The Hague and Rotterdam. According to the American Military Attache in The Hague, this parkway was actually used for landing troops when it was found impossible to land at certain of the previously designated air fields.

As in all these orders of the 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry, the strictest emphasis is placed on the maintenance of secrecy. Elsewhere in the battalion file were found certificates signed by various M.C.O.'s acknowledging that they had been informed of the Battalion orders for the expedition.

Notice to the Battalion

1. Platoon commanders are only to be informed of the operation upon direct order of the Battalion Commander. A written warning of the importance of secrecy is to be given the individual before being informed of the details of the operations.

Non-commissioned officers and privates are only to be informed as provided in Paragraph 1 of the Battalion Order.

2. All private letters and diaries are to be left behind with the battalion rear echelon.

3. Our slogan is "Ever fresh, and let's go." The first night should well be the most difficult time. During this night, men should be ever on their guard and sleep with their rifle on their arms.

4. In disarming enemy soldiers and officers, leave the sabers with them, but take their firearms. If they resist, disarm them completely.

5. Our main mission is to secure the landing field.
The bicycle patrol of the 5th Company, Infantry Regiment No. 65, must keep close watch toward the south.

[REDACTED] **DECLASSIFIED**

 **DECLASSIFIED**

6. Rationing. The issue of requisitioning slips will be carried out by the Battalion. German currency may not be carried by the troops.

7. The unit will be prepared to detail men skilled to work in electrical plants or gas works, at the request of the parachute troops.

8. If possible, assistance should be given in reclaiming the parachutes. Do not tread on them! The parachutes and the ropes are to be rolled up separately.

9. Special information will be given later with respect to the field post.

10. As reserve emergency landing field, the automobile parkway is foreseen between The Hague and Rotterdam. Personnel landed here will seek to reach their initially designated landing field. If this proves impossible, they should seek instructions from division headquarters. The division Command Post is to the east of Yppenburg (700 meters northwest of Air Field No. 3).

11. The fee for billets is set at 1 Mark 35 pfennigs.

12. Route of Flight on H Day.

Cleves
Elst (7 Km. north of Nijmegen)
Buren
Nieuwport
Bergambacht (6 Km. west of Nieuwport)
area around The Hague.

13. "M" day and "H" will be made known to all units by special courier.

14. Companies are to be held close to barracks. No soldier can, from now on, leave his barracks without permission of battalion headquarters.

15. One officer in every unit will be constantly so located that he can be reached by telephone.

(Signature Undecipherable)
Major & Battalion Commander.

Distribution

5th, 7th, & 13th Companies.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Document No. 7.

General Orders, 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry

NOTE: This order was issued on March 5, 1940, more than two months before the operation was executed. This time lapse permits an insight into the length of time required by the Germans to prepare the air invasion of the Netherlands.

Paragraphs 4 and 8 of the general order deal with the requisitioning of transportation for the division. Nowhere in any of these documents is there the slightest evidence that any divisional transportation was carried into the Netherlands by airplane. Hence, there developed a necessity to seize transportation soon after landing, in order to secure the necessary mobility for the landed personnel, weapons, and ammunition. These requisitioning measures are of considerable interest, as the same problem is certain to arise in any air infantry operation.

Special attention is also directed to the elaborate measures for maintaining secrecy, taken by battalion headquarters.

2d Bn. 65th Inf.
(3d Edition)

In the Field.
March 5, 1940.

General Orders for the Operation

1. The troops (inclusive of Non-commissioned Officers) are to be informed only what they absolutely must know in connection with the execution of their mission; however, they are not to be told the area in which they will operate. This latter information, as well as the name of the field on which they are to land, may be given to the troops just prior to loading in the airplanes. In this connection, great care must be taken to keep this information from persons not participating in the operation (for example, personnel of the airport).

2. Those portions of units remaining behind at the departure airports report to the unit loading office. These men are to be kept together in a group at the airport and fed as a unit. They are to be kept separate from the other men so that they receive no opportunity to mention their mission and objective. It is particularly necessary to keep informing the troops as to the necessity for these measures of secrecy. The unit loading officer arranges for sending these men forward at a later date.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3. If danger threatens on landing, all written documents, inclusive of maps, will be destroyed. No written document must be permitted to fall into the hands of the enemy. Complete instructions on this point must be given to all before departure.

All letters and diaries are to be left behind with the unit rear echelon. All commanders must take measures to convince themselves that this has been done.

4. Mobility. Every unit has to procure for itself as quickly as possible after landing sufficient motor cars to transport its entire personnel, as well as the necessary number of bicycles. (These should be secured, if possible, from large firms). The cars should at once be marked with German Swastika flags. If sufficient drivers are unavailable in the unit, civilian drivers may be impressed. Superfluous baggage, food, etc., of a unit may be placed on this auto and brought forward later on.

5. Civilian Traffic. All civilian traffic is to be prevented into and out of villages, as well as out of the operations area. Civilians who attempt to pass road blocks are to be arrested and transported to the battalion prisoner-of-war cages. Provided prisoners do not offer resistance, they are to be politely and considerately treated.

6. German civilians with special missions are operating in the operations area. They possess an identification card with photograph of the bearer. They are to be permitted to pass all road blocks, and every assistance should be given them by the troops. Complete instructions with regard to this matter must be given all units.

7. Food. The two days' rations taken with units must not be consumed until the landing has been effected. It then must suffice for the following two days. Special instructions will be issued later for the rationing from the third day on. The iron ration may be consumed only on the third day, and then only on orders of the Battalion Commander. As soon as the tactical situation permits, company kitchens will be erected in connection with civil restaurants.

8. Requisitions. Units receive requisition blanks from the battalion for requisitioning motor cars, bicycles, and food. (These are to be secured, if possible, through the civil authorities.) All officers and non-commissioned officers carrying out requisitions must be in possession of a special legitimization card. All other soldiers are forbidden to requisition.

Soldiers are to be repeatedly instructed as to their attitude toward civilians and that plundering must not occur.

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

9. Booty. Captured weapons, ammunition, and equipment must be assembled and delivered to the booty dump of the battalion. Large articles of equipment or piles of weapons should be kept under guard and reported to battalion headquarters.

10. Prisoners of War are to be assembled and delivered to the battalion cage. All documents are to be taken from prisoners and delivered to the non-commissioned officer in charge of the cage. Private property of the prisoners and family pictures are to be left in the prisoner's possession.

11. The "Proclamations to the Public" are to be posted in prominent positions.

12. The English air force has repeatedly dropped time-fuse bombs (6 to 8 hours). In case unexploded bombs are noticed, the utmost care should be taken, and the terrain roped off.

13. The civil population is to be handled politely, but there must be no fraternization. Civilians are to be kept well away from our weapons.

(Signature Illegible)
Major & Battalion Commander.

Distribution:

Battalion Commander

5th, 7th, 13th Companies

6th Company Parachute Rifle Regiment No. 2.

 **DECLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED

Document No. 8.

Air-Ground Panel Code of the 22d Division (Air Infantry)

NOTE: The following code was found in the file of the Intelligence Officer of the 22d Division. It probably was a local code for the Netherlands operation and was not in use along the entire western front. The limited number of prescribed panel signals in this code indicates the German view of a matter which is, at present, a subject of debate in our own army.

PANEL SIGNALS (AIR - ARMY)
(Invasion of the Netherlands.)

1. Signals for Air Assistance. (These may be laid out only upon orders of the commander of the ground forces.)




Enemy is preparing to attack.



Enemy is attacking.



Our center is penetrated.



Enemy has penetrated to our left.



Enemy has penetrated to our right.



We are surrounded.



Ammunition is necessary.




Support is necessary.



Food is necessary.



Gasoline is necessary.



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

2. Panel signals which may be laid out only at the request of our own airplanes:

≡ Here is the Battalion Command Post.

⊕ Here is the spot to drop messages.

▽ No.

Y Not understood.

✓ Understood or Yes.

— — — We are holding this line.

N The enemy's attack has been repulsed.

↑ We are attacking.

Direction of the Enemy.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Document No. 9.

Regulations Concerning Behavior of German Troops
in Occupied Territory, Issued by the 22d Division.

NOTE: A very similar German document had reached the War Department, regulating the conduct of German troops in Norway. In the case of Norway, every German soldier carried these instructions on his person. During the preparations for the Netherlands invasion, soldiers appear to have been given orally the gist of the following document.

22d Division

Division Hq., March 14, 1940.

Regulations Concerning Behavior in Enemy Territory.

(SECRET)

While the Division is operating in a foreign country, the behavior of every officer, NCO, and man must be so exemplary that the honor of the field-gray uniform will remain as unblemished as it was in the World War.

Any one who violates this rule will be punished. Serious violations are punishable by death.

Cases which occurred during the Polish Campaign have made it expedient to summarize the most important provisions:

1. It is forbidden:

a. To take goods from stores, hotels and inns, without paying the usual commercial price in full or making out and giving requisition receipts (memorandum receipts). Such goods include food, alcohol, tobacco, and articles of daily use.

Violations of this provision will be punished as theft.

b. To purchase large quantities of goods which the soldier does not require for his immediate use.

Violation of this provision constitutes hoarding. It is unworthy of a soldier.

c. To take from private houses or lands objects of any kind which are not absolutely necessary for the prosecution of the war, without a written order from a superior whose disciplinary power is equal to that of a battalion commander.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Violations of this provision constitute looting. Looting is punishable by death.

2. It is permitted:

To requisition food and fodder, motor vehicles, horses, bicycles, fuel, oil, etc., thru the use of force if necessary. An effort must always be made, however, to reach an amicable agreement.

This matter is governed by the following rules:

a. Goods may be requisitioned only by an officer, NCO, or private who has been expressly ordered to do so by a superior who has power to discipline him. An individual soldier may requisition without such an order only the amount of food that he absolutely needs, and then only in case he has lost contact with his unit.

b. When goods are requisitioned, a memorandum receipt must be given for them or else they must be adequately paid for (Receipts will be issued by the Division).

c. All payments will be effected, not in currency of the Reich, but in certificates issued by the Reich's Credit Office (Reichskreditkassenscheinen) or in foreign currency. Currency conversion tables will be issued to the troops at the proper time.

d. When motor vehicles, horses, etc., are involved, the owner's name must be noted if possible.

3. In order to secure supplies, the various units will designate an able officer or NCO, who must thoroughly familiarize himself with the "Service Instructions for Supply Officers" (Army Reg. Secret, 87) and the "Regulations concerning Supply during Operations" (Army Reg. 86, 1) before the troops are engaged.

3. If a building which has already been damaged or looted is occupied by a troop unit, the company or other commander should briefly discuss (with the owner) the condition of the building, so as to prevent subsequent trouble.

4. Offenses against discipline and order in the presence of the enemy will be punished severely and without mercy.

Every superior is obligated to take steps promptly and energetically to prevent the abuse of alcohol.

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

5. Every member of the Division must be thoroughly informed concerning this Order and concerning Secret Army Regulations 2, Section 9, on "Behavior in War".

(signed) Count von Sponeck
Lieut. General.

Signature authenticated by Captain Sommer.

Distributing agencies: Units no larger than companies, etc.

 **DECLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED

Document No. 10.

Instructions of the 22d Division as to the Handling
of "Fifth Columnists" by German Troops.

NOTE: There follows below an order of the 22d Division with regard to a number of general matters. Paragraph 4 of these "Instructions" deals with "Fifth Columnists" and furnishes the troops a sample identification card which is to be given to each "Fifth Columnist" to permit him to pass German military outposts. The enclosures mentioned in the document were not found.

SECRET MATTERS.

To the 22d Division
Battalion Ia, No. 150/40, secret, Hq.

Enclosure VII.

This Order will be "secret" from the hour of publication.

Special provisions relating to general measures in occupied enemy territory.

1. Imparting mobility.

In order to increase the mobility of the troops and their readiness to strike, all units must secure motor and animal-drawn vehicles in accordance with German regulations, as soon as possible after landing.

For details see the provisions of the orders relating to supply (Enclosure IX).

2. Civil traffic:

All traffic from places like Leyden, Delft, etc., and particularly all traffic bound for and coming from The Hague, must be kept out of the forbidden district by means of the prescribed street barricades.

Civilians who have been arrested will be temporarily detained, as there is danger that they will spread information. Consequently, each of the groups mentioned in Par. 6a of the "Operations" Order must establish a prison camp for civilians during the first two days.

For details, see the provisions of the Decree concerning supply (Enclosure IX).

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3. Treatment of prisoners:

See provisions of Decree concerning supply (Enclosure IX).

4. German civilians with special missions have been placed in The Hague. They have certificates like the sample given below. The troops are to give them any assistance requested.

IDENTITY CARD (Sample)

The has the right to pass thru the German lines in the execution of a special mission.

All troop units are requested to assist him in every way.

This certificate is valid only in connection with a personal identity certificate bearing his photograph.

(Service seal)

(Signature)

Distributing agencies: the same agencies which distribute orders for the employment of troops.

(signed) Graf Sponeck.

DECLASSIFIED

Document No. 11.

Bulletin on Enemy Information Published
by the 22d Division.

NOTE: The following divisional memorandum is undated, but appears to have been published between April 25th and May 5th.

Paragraph 5 is of special interest, as it shows the psychological measures taken by the German high command to instill the German troops with a feeling of superiority over the Dutch enemy.

Secret Intelligence

To the 22d Division, etc.

Enclosure 1.

Memorandum Containing Information About the Enemy.

There is forwarded herewith a memorandum containing information about the enemy relating to his order of battle.

1. New information about the enemy.

- a. Reserve depot of 3d Artillery Regiment has probably been located in The Hague since April 9; it was formerly at Bergen Op Zoom. The strength, armament, and location of this depot in The Hague are unknown.
- b. The reserve depot of the 15th Infantry Regiment is probably located in the barracks at the northern edge of Delft (formerly at Breda); it is certainly not the depot of the 6th Infantry Regiment.

2. It appears, from several articles in the Dutch press, that the Netherlands are preparing for the landing of troops by enemy aviation. In spite of this fact, the surprise caused by the landing of our parachute troops and airplanes will be so great that the enemy troops stationed around The Hague will probably be unable to offer any organized resistance. It must be expected, however, that resistance will repeatedly flare up at different points, especially at the landing fields. This resistance must be broken by quickly attacking and capturing even the smallest units.

The barracks located at the northeastern edge of The Hague will be attacked by fighting units of the air force before the parachute troops land, as will the crews of Landing Fields I and III

DECLASSIFIED

(Landing Field I only if it has a defensive force. This is at present uncertain). The fighting value of these troops must, therefore, be regarded as slight. Utilization of the moral effect of the aerial attack by boldly seizing the point attacked is, therefore, indicated. It should be noted that the Grenadier Regiment stationed in The Hague is the best regiment of the Dutch Army.

3. After the evening of A-day or after A + 1 day the enemy's resistance must, therefore, be expected to stiffen.

The elements of the reinforced 47th Infantry Regiment (German) to be employed on the Rhine must expect attacks by parts of the 3d Dutch Division (area south of Haarlem) and of the 4th Dutch Infantry Regiment (Katwijk - Noordwijk). The elements of the 2d Dutch Artillery Regiment reported in Katwijk on the Sea must, therefore, be driven out as soon as possible, before they succeed in preparing to fire.

It is impossible to state whether or not the depot troop elements stationed in Leyden are capable of active fighting, but they must be taken into account.

During maneuvers held in April, parts of the Delft depot battalion were sent to The Hague to guard buildings. The barracks on the northern edge of Delft should, therefore, be kept under constant observation. If necessary, they must be attacked and captured.

No enemy troops are reported in Rijswijk and to the northwest of it.

The elements stationed in the Monster-Poeldijk area and south of it will either try to go north to the relief of the Capital, or will push on via Delft toward the north and east. In this case, they must be held back until stronger forces are released to destroy them through the capture of the city. (Probably on A + 2 day.) Weak detachments feeling their way forward must always be attacked and disarmed, even by forces which are inferior to them in strength.

4. The intervention of strong forces coming from an easterly direction in the area around The Hague need not be expected before A + 2 day. It is possible, however, that reconnaissance detachments of motorcyclists and cyclists will appear as early as A-day.

5. All commanders and subordinate commanders (N.C.O.'s) should constantly be reminded of the moral and technical inferiority of the enemy, and of the consequent necessity of attacking them boldly. Every enemy detachment must be attacked, even when the attacking force is inferior to it in strength and must be forced to lay down its arms or be annihilated.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

6. The situation in the air.

- a. Isolated antiaircraft guns located in the vicinity of landing fields must be expected to fire, in spite of the attacks of parachute troops. These guns must be the first objectives to be attacked by the elements which land first.
- b. After noon on A-day, attacks by enemy aviation, and particularly by fighting units of the English Home Air Fleet, must be expected. It is, therefore, urgent that the landing fields be cleared as soon as possible after landing, and that our troops be protected against enemy planes both while marching and at rest. Preparedness for antiaircraft defense must not be overlooked, even when the situation on the ground is quiet. Every unit that remains in one place for a long time must quickly dig protective trenches resembling the pits dug for protection against tanks. As the example of Norway shows, the English do not hesitate to bomb even open towns and cities. Night air attacks must also be expected. It is, therefore, necessary to institute blackouts (even of civil buildings) and remain constantly prepared for an alarm.

Preparations for antiaircraft protection must be made by every troop unit, as well as by the antiaircraft defense battalion. Every machine gun which is not used in ground combat must be employed in the antiaircraft defense. The defense must be organized in such a way that the object to be protected will be surrounded by a ring of antiaircraft weapons which will be as deep as possible. Air-raid warning stations located in out-of-the-way places commanding good views will immediately give the air-raid warning to all the troops by blowing a whistle.

The use of time-fuze bombs by the British Air Arm will be pointed out to our troops.

(signed) Count von Sponeck,
Lieutenant General.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Document No. 12.

Intelligence Report of the German Military Attache - The Hague.

NOTE: In this letter, the German military attache at The Hague informed the military high command of the German Army of the details of Dutch protective measures in and around The Hague. This letter is published in order to show the great variety and exactness of the information gathered by the German intelligence service with regard to Dutch defenses in the weeks preceding the actual invasion. The enclosures referred to were not found with the document.

German Embassy,
Military Attache.

The Hague, April 9, 1940.

Secret Intelligence for Headquarters.
(For the Chief of the Division)

To the High Command of the Army,
General Staff of the Army; Attache Group
Berlin.

Appendix #2 to Report No. 381403, from Military Attache at The Hague.

Re: Communication dated March 2, 1940, No. 26/40, General Staff-
Intelligence Division, Group West, secret intelligence matters
for the Chief.

"Att. Gr. v. 23,3,40.

161/40 g.Kdos Chefsache."

For the reply to questions 1, 3, and 4, you are referred to the appended plan of The Hague. It was impossible to ascertain the residence of the Commander in Chief, Gen. Winkelmann.

With regard to question 2, it is observed that the Crown Prince and Princess have no palace of their own in The Hague, but live in the Queen's castles (the palace in Nordeinde St. and the Huis Ten Bosch) when staying in The Hague. As a rule, the Crown Prince and Princess live in Soestdijk Castle, which has been taken over from the Queen Mother and is marked on attached Fortification Map at #32.

Re 5. Information received on April 6 and 7, 1940, shows that Katwijk on the Rhine is occupied by a very weak force. The number of the regiment was not ascertained.

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

Katwijk on the Sea is occupied by elements of the 2d Artillery Regiment. The quarters of the 1st and 12th Batteries have been ascertained with certainty. The location of the infantry was not learned.

Two hundred meters west of the road from Katwijk on the Rhine to Noordwijk, and about 1.5 km. north of the point where this road crosses the Rhine, barracks for not more than two companies or batteries are under construction. Four hundred meters northwest of the bridge over the Rhine north of Katwijk on the Rhine, a new stone bridge over the Rhine is under construction; it will connect with the projected detour to the west of Katwijk on the Rhine.

Preliminary inquiries made in The Hague outside the barracks at Loosduinen and Poeldijk show that these places are occupied by grenadiers and chasseurs. We are making further inquiries.

I.V.

1 plan of city and 1 copy.

 **DECLASSIFIED**

Comment on Documents

A reading of the preceding documents permits considerable insight into the German staff preparations for this well planned but unsuccessful coup de main against The Hague. These preparations covered a wide variety of subjects. Every detail of the enterprise was worked out with an elaborateness which bespeaks the thoroughness of the German general staff.

The German hope of success in this risky attack was largely based on the success of their espionage service in collecting full information on the Dutch defensive dispositions at The Hague. Without the full success of such espionage activity, the attack on The Hague would never have been attempted. Based on this espionage activity, the 22d Division Headquarters could and did work out a sound plan for the capture of The Hague.

The parachutists were to seize the landing fields and then secure them with outposts at strategic points in this vicinity. The first troops of the 22d Division were to broaden and deepen this outpost zone. Until these fields were secure, no attack on The Hague was to be launched on the city.

The Air March Table is a first class pioneering document in a new field of staff work. It should be made the basis of careful study by our staffs, which may be called upon to execute air movements of American troops in the future.

The German organization table of an air infantry division suggests that they follow certain definite principles in organizing a unit of this type.

Compared to a normal division, the German air infantry division is:

- (1) Smaller--only 40% of the strength of a line division.
- (2) Contains only two infantry regiments.
- (3) Has a higher percentage of riflemen in the infantry and a smaller percentage of accompanying weapons.
- (4) Has no artillery of a higher calibre than the 75 mm. Mountain Howitzer.
- (5) Has a very reduced supply echelon.
- (6) Has a higher proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers than is normal.
- (7) Contains no transportation vehicles.

DECLASSIFIED

In connection with the last point—the absence of transportation—attention is directed to the frequent references in many orders to the system of requisitioning civilian transport promptly after landing.

The references to "Fifth Column" activity in these documents do not warrant assigning this form of activity any special importance. It is possible, however, that a wider use of German civilians was made at The Hague than is suggested in these orders of German troop units. There is some evidence that German "Fifth Columnists" actually participated in the fighting. In these papers, it appears that their principal use was as guides for the troops.

Lastly, attention is directed to the minute instruction given by the 22d Division to its soldiers regulating their behavior toward Dutch civilians. According to our Attache in The Hague, the instructions of the high command were followed by the German troops to a surprising extent, and resulted in easing the task of the invading army. Such careful instruction of the troops would seem to be an essential element of German staff preparations for an invasion.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

G-2/2657-231

M.I.D., W.D.
Special Bulletin No. 10.
August 19, 1940.

MAJOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE
GERMAN INVASION OF HOLLAND

This document is being given an approved distribution, and no additional copies are available for distribution by the Military Intelligence Division. It may be reproduced in whole or in part under the provisions of Letter TAG, November 15, 1939, AG 350.05 (11-1-39) M-B-M, subject, Dissemination of Military Information by the Military Intelligence Division and by Recipients of M.I.D. Information.

CONTENTS

- I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.
 - A. Events Leading up to Hostilities.
 - B. Situation at Beginning of Hostilities.
 - 1. Mission of Dutch Army
 - 2. Strength of Opposing Forces.
 - C. Weather.
- II. DETAILED ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONS, May 10-14.
- III. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS.
 - A. General Occupation of Holland.
 - B. German Troops in The Hague.
 - C. Materiel and Supplies Taken Over.
 - D. Disposition of the Dutch Army.
- IV. COMMENTS ON SPECIAL FEATURES.
 - A. The Element of Surprise.
 - B. German Air Force.
 - C. Method of Attacking Fortifications.
 - D. Weather Forecast.
 - E. New Weapon.

DECLASSIFIED

AUG 29 '40

DECLASSIFIED

V. OUTSTANDING IMPRESSIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMY.

This bulletin is a somewhat condensed version of an American observer's report on the invasion of The Netherlands.

I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

A. Events Leading up to the Opening of Hostilities.

The German invasion of Holland on May 10 was planned and executed for reasons of offensive strategy. Occupation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark and Norway was made for the same reason. Alleged defensive precautions, economic necessity and ideologic principles had little or no influence on these moves except as preliminary press fodder.

England is the ultimate decisive objective against which German political and military efforts have been directed since the seizure of Austria in 1937. Only by destruction or neutralization of England could Germany win a quick victory in her contest for European supremacy. In view of this fact, it seemed likely that, following the surrender of Poland, Germany would assume the offensive on the West Front if she were unable to obtain a peaceful settlement on terms which would assure the ultimate neutralization of British power.

In an offensive against England, the strategic advantages offered by occupation of Holland may be summed up as follows:

(1) Bases for air and sea planes within 150-200 kilometers of the English coast.

(2) Sea bases in Zeeland.

(3) Inland water communications connecting these bases with interior Germany. The Rhine and Waal are navigable for light submarines, motor torpedo boats, and shallow draft transport.

In a limited objective attack to secure Belgian channel ports, seizure of Holland offered the added tactical advantages of (1) securing the north flank of the attacking force, (2) threatening the rear of Belgian defenses, and (3) quick gain at small cost.

The only advantage in leaving Holland untouched or in crossing only South Limburg lay in the geographic position of

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

the neutral area. This was important only from the standpoint of the defense. Also, the British Air Force had shown little regard for Dutch neutrality during the past four months, and there was always the possibility that the British might attempt to land troops in Holland, if and when they were able to assume the offensive. However, there was no reason to believe that the Allies contemplated an offensive in any theater during the summer of 1940.

The official German reason for the invasion, handed to the Dutch Foreign Office by the German minister to The Hague on the morning of May 10, was that the Allies were planning occupation of the Low Countries with the full knowledge and connivance of the Dutch and Belgian governments. This explanation, already trite in connection with the invasion of Denmark and Norway, was, to the best of my knowledge, absolutely without foundation. The Dutch were as determined to reject premature protection by the Allies as they were to resist aggression by Germany. I had reason to believe after hostilities began that plans had been discussed between the French, Belgian and Dutch General Staffs for the coordination and cooperation of French, Belgian and Dutch troops in the defense of Brabant. Again I am convinced that this understanding was defensive in character and wholly contingent on German invasion of Holland and Belgium.

On a basis of German capabilities, Holland had been threatened with invasion since late October, 1939. The German force opposite Holland has been gradually built up from 15-18 divisions in October, 1939, to some 55 divisions in May, 1940. The bulk of this force was in the area: Viersen--Duren--Aken, and it always included, with those opposite Belgium, a high percentage of the armored and mechanized units present on the West Front. Other indications of offensive preparations throughout this period were the establishment of auxiliary air-dromes and ammunition and petrol dumps within 20-25 kilometers of the frontier, pontoons and bridging material at important Rhine crossings north of Cologne, and partially verified reports of armored trains in the vicinity of Kleef and Aken.

Arrival of reinforcements, the threat of shifting units closer to the frontier, and rumors of impending attack caused several crises prior to April 9, 1940, namely on November 11, and in mid-December, 1939, and on January 12, 1940. Attack on those dates seemed unlikely because of severely cold weather, short days and circumstances which were characteristic of German pressure tactics or "warfare of nerves". Also, it was believed by the Dutch General Staff that during the winter Germany would exhaust every possibility of obtaining favorable peace terms and would not commit herself to offensive action in any theater before

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

the arrival of good weather. Although precautionary defense measures were maintained, I believe the general staff did not take a serious view of those threats which occurred in December and January.

It was notable that the Allied press, especially the London Daily Telegraph, exaggerated the gravity of these crises to the point of misrepresentation. I believe this was deliberate British propaganda aimed at (1) frightening the Low Countries into requesting Allied protection, and (2) enlisting American public opinion. Certainly the Allied military and naval representatives here were familiar with the situation and showed little or no concern. In fact, I never could get one of them to admit more than a scant possibility of German attack on the West Front. They believe, or professed to believe, that Germany would not leave the protection of the Siegfried Line and the neutral strip of Holland and Belgium; frequently they said it would be a break for the Allies if Germany came out in the open by attempting to invade the Low Countries. This view was at wide divergence with that expressed by the press.

The German invasion of Denmark and Norway on April 9 put a different face on the situation as seen from here. The most logical explanation for this move was that it was preliminary to later offensive action against England. In my opinion it was aimed at accomplishing three things: (1) securing favorable air and sea bases opposite the North of England, (2) creating a diversion which, it was hoped, would draw important elements of Allied air, naval and land forces to Norway, and (3) perhaps chiefly, a reconnaissance by which the aggressiveness and combat efficiency of the Allies could be determined. This opinion was strengthened by the fact that German forces opposite Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg were not materially weakened at any time during the Norwegian Campaign.

The Allied, or English, reaction of committing an expeditionary force in Norway and the tardy and ineffectual way in which it was handled increased the chances of a German decision to attack on the West Front.

It is believed that the Dutch General Staff took much the same view of the situation as that expressed above. During the week of April 9-16, the entire country was placed under martial law, all leaves were suspended, inundations (especially in the Grebbe) were reported to have been extended, and special measures were taken to prevent subversive action by German Nazis and Dutch National Socialists.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

This latter precaution was emphasized because of the marked success of the German fifth column in Norway. Holland was very vulnerable in this respect--the German population numbered roughly 100,000, of which an estimated 30,000 were men capable of creating considerable trouble, and there were many Dutch National Socialists whose loyalty to the state was questionable. Accordingly all party meetings were banned, party leaders and German suspects were interned, and plans were made for disposing troops to protect the government. It will be shown later that this precaution was well taken.

Tension relaxed somewhat during the period of April 17 to May 3. The situation in Norway was being watched closely for any indication of action there assuming major proportions and especially as regards Allied intention or ability to control it. German troops opposite Holland were being maintained in formidable strength (55 divisions), but reports that units had withdrawn somewhat from the actual frontier, and were unloading combat trains and granting limited furloughs, were taken as a favorable indication. The Dutch Army restored emergency furloughs but maintained other defensive precautions.

The withdrawal of the bulk of Allied forces from Norway, announced on May 3, rendered the position of the Low Countries more precarious in that it was an admission that Allied troops in Norway were unable to hold out against German combined air-ground attacks. Any Allied assistance which might be despatched to the Low Countries in the event of invasion by Germany was therefore of questionable value. From that time on, eventual invasion of Holland and Belgium seemed likely, either to seize air and sea bases for action against England or in preparation for an envelopment of the French north flank.

The probable time of attack was obscure. Current Italian press activity and unrest in the Balkans could be interpreted either as a diversion in itself or as a forerunner of Italian military action in the Mediterranean to precede a German offensive on the West Front.

There was a perceptible increase in tension around general headquarters on May 7. All leaves were again canceled and a possible 23,000 additional reservists of the classes of 1924, 1925, and 1926 were called to duty. I was informed by the M.I. section that this was caused wholly by political developments, and that there were no indications of attack by German troops then opposite the Dutch frontier.

It developed that reports from Berlin and Rome

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

led the Dutch Foreign Office to believe that Germany was preparing to present Holland with an unacceptable short-term ultimatum. It was assumed that Germany would demand free passage of troops or complete military occupation on the pretext of protecting Holland against the threat of Allied invasion. This ultimatum failed to arrive by May 9, and members of the general staff had relaxed considerably; the M. I. section stated on the afternoon of May 9 that German troops were quiet and gave no indication of unusual activity. There was little to distinguish this crisis from others which had preceded it except that British Cabinet changes and weather and terrain conditions made the situation generally favorable for Germany. The Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff slept at home that night (May 9-10), whereas they had slept the two preceding nights at G. H. Q. The minister was informed by the Chief of the foreign office that the ultimatum was never received, and the first communication which reached the Dutch Foreign Office from Berlin was the official German explanation of the invasion, handed in by the German minister at 6:00 A.M., May 10, two hours and a half after the attack had begun.

B. Situation at Beginning of Hostilities.

1. Mission of Dutch Army: To defend Fortress Holland. South of the MAAS, to prevent a hostile advance west of the Peel position until Allied and Belgian troops had occupied a defensive position along the general line Heusden--Oiservijk--Hilvarenbeek--Hooze Mierde--Arendunk (Belgium)--Desschel (Belgium)--Genendyck (Belgium).

As previously mentioned in this report, conversations with the Dutch General Staff subsequent to the beginning of hostilities led me to believe that an understanding existed between Dutch, Belgian and Allied Staffs which would coordinate defensive action in Brabant in the event of German invasion. It is believed that the general plan was as shown above.

2. Strength of Opposing Forces.

a. German.

Although the M. I. section, Dutch General Staff, would not give me identifications of German units, the intelligence summary of May 4 showed a total of 55 German divisions opposite Holland, disposed as follows:

North of line Cleve--Munster ---- 17 Divisions
Including 1 armored division) Bocholt
1 motorized division) area

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

Between lines Cleve--Munster and
Aken--Bonn ----- 38 Divisions.
Including 1 armored division - Geldern area.
2 armored divisions) Area
1 light division) Viersen--
3 motorized divisions) Duren--Aken

This summary stated, in effect, that there was nothing threatening in the attitude or state or preparation of those troops near the frontier, although the strength and disposition of German forces south of Aken were not clear. It was believed that 25-27 divisions remained between the line Aken--Bonn and the Moezel River, and that units on the French front had been increased slightly.

Although questioned daily, the M. I. section reported no German troop movements of any importance between May 4 and 9. During and since hostilities, I have been unable to obtain accurate information on the number or identity of German divisions actually employed against Holland. I believe that it was a very small percent of the total shown above, not more than 6 divisions in all.

The bulk of the German force opposite Holland was in the area: Aken--Crefeld--Keulen, and was employed presumably in the break-through of the Albert Canal and the ensuing threat toward Brussels.

b. Dutch.

On German frontier ----- 20-21 frontier battalions. (Estimated). (Of this force not more than 3 battalions were in the Limburg area).

On the Grebbe Line ----- 2 Corps
IV Corps in area: Naarden--Amersfoort--
Utrecht
II Corps in area: Utrecht--Amersfoort--
Rhenen

In area: Rhenen--Ochten ----- 1 reserve
division (A)

In area: Deest--Batenburg -- 1 reserve
division (B)

On the Peel Line ----- 1 Corps, 1 reserve
division, 1 light division

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

III Corps in area: Grave--Griendsveen--
Helmond--Hertogenbosch.

Peel Division in area: Helmond--Griendsveen--
Meijel--Weert.

Light Division, in reserve, in area: Til-
burg--Hertogenbosch.

On the line: Amsterdam--Utrecht--Gorinchem---
2 reserve divisions (C and D).

In area: Haarlem-Hook of Holland
1 Corps (I).

At Rotterdam ----- 1 battalion of marines.

North of Haarlem--Amsterdam:
Detached elements of I Corps, strength un-
known.
1 battalion of coast artillery at Den Helder.

In Zeeland:
1 battalion of coast artillery at Flushing
2-3 reserve infantry regiments
Installations at the naval command

All bridges over the Ijssel and Maas Rivers
and important bridges east thereof were prepared for demolition and
guarded by small detachments.

Inundation in front of the Grebbe Line was
reported to have been brought to maximum effective depth. I doubt
that inundations protecting the south flank of the Grebbe were
maintained at the contemplated level throughout hostilities. Several
reports from reliable sources state that on the first day of attack,
dikes which controlled the water level in the area south of
Veenendaal, were destroyed by saboteurs and bombing. On June 5, I
drove through this locality, and there was no water and no indication
of there having been water for some time. Whether this is due to
sabotage or to unusually low water for this time of year is unknown.
As far as I have been able to find out little or no inundation was
made on the southern end of the Peel Line nor along the main water
line: Naarden--Utrecht--Gorinchem.

Main airdromes were obstructed and guarded.

Dutch forces were in assigned defense positions

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

and had been alerted on May 7. However, I am sure the actual day and time of German attack was not anticipated.

3. Allied Assistance.

With the exception of coordination of the defense of Brabant, as mentioned in paragraph I. B. 1. above, I am of the strong conviction that the Allies had made no definite plans for the assistance of Holland in case it was requested. I am sure there were no naval or military representatives, other than regularly assigned attaches, in the country prior to the opening of hostilities. This was due in large measure, no doubt, to Dutch determination to maintain absolute neutrality until forced to request assistance.

It is doubted that the British ever seriously contemplated landing a force of any size at Dutch ports; the geography of Holland is obviously unfavorable for maneuver. If they had previously envisaged such a landing, their experience in Norway must have demonstrated the difficulty of landing operations when opposed by a superior air force. There is no reason to believe the Dutch expected assistance in this manner.

The dispatch of an effective number of British planes for cooperation with the Dutch Army, if ever contemplated, was probably abandoned for the same reason. However, from previous conversations, I am sure the Dutch General Staff expected effective help in the air. Subsequent conduct of such elements of Allied forces as did arrive on Dutch territory leads to the conclusion that this assistance was purely perfunctory, both in number and in spirit.

C. Weather.

Rainfall during April was below normal. From May 1 to 28, there was practically no rainfall. Stage of water in main rivers was below normal for April and May. From May 10 to 17 the sky was clear; flying conditions were perfect.

II. DETAILED ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONS.

All information possible was obtained from the M. I. section, Dutch General Staff, during operations. As in Poland, the action moved too rapidly and communications were too frequently interrupted for the general staff to complete a detailed picture of the situation at any given time. Since surrender on May 14, it has been impracticable to obtain information from that part of the staff which remains. Naturally they are reluctant to give informa-

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

tion on German operations. Information obtained from the staff has been supplemented by reports from individuals who are considered reliable. Since May 17, with one exception, I have restricted my movements to The Hague, by request of the German military commander in The Netherlands. On June 5, I was permitted to drive through the Grebbe area.

A. May 10.

German air and ground forces attacked at daylight, about 3:20 A.M. Bomber formations appeared over The Hague at 4 A. M. The Dutch government immediately declared a state of war with Germany and requested assistance from England and France. The German minister to The Hague presented Berlin's demand for capitulation and reason for invasion at 6 A.M.

1. Air Action.

The German Air Force initially bombed all known airports, as well as detachments guarding the Maas Bridge at Rotterdam, the Moerdijk Bridge over Hollandsche Diep, Oude Maas Bridge at Dordrecht, and troop depots in Rotterdam and The Hague. German air infantry was landed almost simultaneously in rear areas as follows:

Rotterdam - Seaplanes landed on the Maas River. Infantry, disembarked in collapsible boats, seized approaches of bridges. An eyewitness stated that 20 seaplanes, each carrying 30 men with machine guns and light antitank guns, had landed by 4 A.M. These were immediately joined by numerous local Nazis.

Waalhaven (Rotterdam Airport) - Parachutists landed and cleared the field of guards and obstructions. Transport planes (JU-52) immediately began landing infantry. First troops to land were employed to further secure the Maas Bridge. Later, reinforcements were sent to Dordrecht and Moerdijk.

The Hague and Vicinity - Parachutists and transport planes were landed at Valkenburg, a small air field 4 kilometers west of Leiden, and on the beach between Scheveningen and Katwijk Aan Zee. Seven transports (JU-52) were cracked up at the latter point. An eyewitness stated that the initial force consisted of 9 planes, each of which disgorged 13 parachutists. Parachutists, estimated at 200, were landed in the dunes and fields west and north of Wassenaar, a northern suburb of The Hague. Other parachutists, as well as transport planes, were landed at Ypenburg, 3.5 kilometers southeast of The Hague. Twenty-five transports (JU-52), damaged or destroyed, were counted on this

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

field later.

Parachutists and transports were landed on the motor highway at the southern edge of Delft. Twenty cracked-up JU-52's were counted here; they had apparently been landed on the highway, unloaded, and then taxied into the ditches on either side of the road in order to clear the way for following planes. The paved highway is 50-60 feet wide at this point. Other parachutists and transports were landed at Okenburg, a small sport field 5 kilometers southwest of The Hague, in unknown numbers.

All troops landed in the vicinity of The Hague attempted to seize main roads, to commandeer automobiles, and to converge on the city. Elements of the Dutch I Corps and troops from the cavalry depot were able to keep the situation in hand.

Moerdijk Bridge (Hollandsche Diep) - Parachutists were landed on either approach to the bridge shortly after daylight and after Dutch guard detachments had been bombed. They succeeded in preventing demolition of the bridge and in holding it until reinforced later from the main landing at Waalhaven.

Dordrecht (Oude Maas Bridge) - Parachutists, followed by transport planes, landed on the highway, seized the bridges at about 4 A.M. and were successful in holding them until reinforced from Waalhaven.

The apparent objectives of the air infantry, were Rotterdam, The Hague, and the Moerdijk and Dordrecht Bridges.

Direct Support Units (German). Few details are available regarding the action of air units in direct support of German troop columns. Reports indicate that each column of ground troops was powerfully supported by formations of liaison or observation planes and dive bombers.

Dutch Air Force. Little is known of the action of the Dutch Air Force on the first day. It was too weak to make its presence felt by way of influencing the course of the action; however, in the 24 hours before it was destroyed as an active entity, it gave a rather surprisingly good account of itself. Some planes were destroyed or captured on the fields at Schipol and Waalhaven; 3 Fok G-1 fighters and several observation planes were seen later at Waalhaven, and it was apparent that they had never left their park. Of the bomber and fighter squadrons attached to the field army a number were shot down. An undetermined number of all types were flown to England, Belgium and France.

 **DECLASSIFIED**

[REDACTED] DECLASSIFIED

Allied Air Force.

At 9 A.M. the general staff informed me that both France and England had promised immediate assistance in the air, but at that time they had no reports of Allied planes over Holland. There has been nothing to indicate that French planes ever arrived.

Later I talked to a wounded English radio operator in a Hague hospital who said his squadron of Blenheim bombers arrived over Katwijk at about 9:30 A.M., May 10. Four were shot down on or near the coast and the remainder returned to England. Another formation of British planes was reported by the Dutch Foreign Office to have appeared over Waalhaven shortly before 4 P.M.

2. Land Operations.

At 5 A.M., May 10, when first contacted, the general staff stated that German troops had attacked along the entire frontier but that the exact position of their columns was unknown.

At 9 A.M., it was announced that the German attack had not progressed west of the Ijssel and Maas Rivers; details of German strength and dispositions were not available. An inhabitant of Arnhem, questioned later, said that German motorcycle units passed through that city at 7:30 A.M. At 9 A.M. the general staff had no information of the action in Belgium but believed that a strong German attack force was preparing to cross the Maas between Roermond and Maastricht. The destruction or capture of parachutists in the vicinity of The Hague was reported as progressing satisfactorily. Streets entering The Hague proper were barricaded.

At 3:30 P.M., it was reported that, after the withdrawal of frontier troops, all bridges across the Ijssel and Maas had been successfully demolished, except the Maas bridges at Gennep and Maastricht. No explanation was given for the failure to destroy these important bridges. I have been unable to verify the reports that demolition charges had been removed or tampered with by fifth column members or disloyal Dutch soldiers.

Except at Waalhaven and Rotterdam, attacks against German air infantry, landed at other points (see paragraph II. A. 1.) were reported to be progressing satisfactorily. At Rotterdam a destroyer was being employed to support the attack. The destroyer was bombed and sunk shortly afterward.

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

German columns had forced a crossing of the Ijssel between Arnhem and Zutphen. Further north another column had reached Groningen. In the south a column had crossed the Maas at Gennep and had reached the Peel Line near Mill. An armored train which had attempted to penetrate the defense line was reported destroyed. Another armored train had been destroyed at Venlo when the Maas bridge was blown up. Although not fully confirmed, it was reported that numerous columns were crossing the Maas south of Roermond.

At that time (3:30 P.M.) the liaison officer informed me that Dutch troops were withdrawing from advanced positions of the Peel. The strong German force crossing the Maas south of Roermond definitely threatened the south flank and rear of the Peel at Weert.

The chief of the intelligence section informed me that Belgium would not move troops north of the Albert Canal in an attempt to close the Weert--Maastricht Gap. He inferred that the Dutch General Staff had been in communication with the Belgians and did not expect reinforcements from them. He said he hoped that a French force was already well on the way to North Brabant.

B. May 11.

1. Air Action.

The German Air Force, beginning at daylight, attacked Dutch troops in the vicinity of Schipol, Leiden, The Hague, Delft and Rotterdam. From reports, special attention was paid to that part of Rotterdam which commanded the Maas Bridge. Formations in direct support of ground columns were reported as particularly active over the southern half of the Grebbe and the north flank of the Peel.

German air infantry continued arriving by transport at Waalhaven; at 10 A.M. it was estimated that 5,000 men of a German division had been landed.

Parachutists landed throughout the morning in the vicinity of The Hague at points reported in events of May 10. Shortly before noon an estimated force of 300 parachutists was dropped in the north end of the Haagsche Bosch, a wooded park, at points about 1800-2000 yards from the Parliament and other government buildings and about 1,500 yards from the American Legation. A smaller force landed at points in the vicinity of the 1813 Plein, which is about 5 blocks from the royal palace.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

These parachutists attempted to converge on the center of the city, using commandeered motor transportation. At the same time German fifth column members, previously assembled in designated houses, began firing on Dutch troops, and police engaged in rounding up the parachutists. A concerted fifth column attack was made on the central police station on the Alexander Plein. After about an hour and a half of street fighting, in which the Dutch employed a few armored cars and whippet tanks, and after a methodical house-to-house search during the ensuing 36 hours, the police and numerous detachments of soldiers from the cavalry depot succeeded in liquidating the threat. The commander of the cavalry depot told me later that during May 10 and 11, his troops had captured 850 parachutists, in addition to an estimated 400-500 killed, in The Hague and surrounding suburbs. These captured parachutists were transported to England.

The Dutch Air Force was reported to be operating with the field army and employed against advancing German ground columns. No official reports of Dutch air action were received after this date..

Allied Air Force. At 10 A.M., the Dutch General Staff reported a French aircraft carrier off the coast of Zeeland. This report was never confirmed by the appearance of French planes. The Royal Air Force bombed Waalhaven lightly during the night of May 10-11 and was reported to be operating over German rear areas and lines of communications. A squadron of 9 fighters appeared over The Hague in the early afternoon, but nothing is known of their having been in action. The general staff reported that no Allied planes were supporting Dutch troops.

2. Land Operation.

At 10 A.M., the general staff informed me that Dutch detachments were successfully mopping up scattered groups of parachutists in the vicinity of The Hague, that they controlled all airports with the possible exception of Waalhaven but their counterattack was progressing satisfactorily and they expected to recapture it at any moment. They estimated 5,000 men of a German division had already landed. A cyclist regiment of the Dutch light division had been ordered from Tilburg to assist in recapture of the Moerdijk Bridge.

In Friesland, German advanced detachments had reached Leeuwarden. North of the Rijn, German columns had reached Appeldoorn and Ede and advanced motorcycle units had come in contact with the Grebbe Line west of Ede. South of the Rijn, armored units had penetrated the Peel defenses at Mill, but they believed

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

that a counterattack, then in progress, would be successful in restoring the line.

At 3 P.M., the general staff reported that while the counterattack at Waalhaven was progressing they had not been able to recapture the air field, and German planes were still landing fresh troops. The cyclist regiment, in the endeavor to move via Dordrecht in order to cut off the Moerdijk Bridge from Waalhaven, had been held up by German troops in the vicinity of Dordrecht and was unable to advance.

North of the Rijn, the situation was unchanged. South of the Rijn, Dutch troops had not been able to restore the advanced Peel position at Mill and were withdrawing to the line of the Zuid Willems Vaart Canal from Hertogenbosch to Weert.

At this time (3 P.M.) it was announced that the head of a French motorized column had reached Roosendall in North Brabant at 6 A.M. after marching all night from the French--Belgian frontier; certain elements were probably landed from transports at Flushing. This force consisted of 1 tank division and 1 motorized infantry division, commanded by Colonel Giraux. At 3 P.M. the tank division was at Breda, and advanced mechanized detachments were in contact with Dutch troops on the Zuid Willems Vaart.

The assistant liaison officer, intelligence section, inferred that the arrival of this French force was in accordance with a previous French, Belgian, and Dutch plan for the defense of Brabant. Belgian liaison officers were present with the French Staff. French troops would occupy a defensive position just east of Tilburg pending withdrawal of Dutch troops from the Zuid Willems Vaart. Belgian troops would occupy the southern extension of the line from where it entered Belgian territory to its intersection with the Albert Canal near Genendyck.

No reports were received here to indicate that Belgian troops occupied their sector of the position. It was impossible to obtain accurate information of the progress of the German attack in Belgium; both Dutch G. H. Q. and the Belgium military attache stated that they were not in touch with the situation there. From radio reports, it appeared that a strong German effort was being made between Hasselt and Maastricht.

C. May 12.

1. Air Action.

The German Air Force showed no marked activity

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

over the interior of Holland, except in support of troops attacking the city Rotterdam. Considerable bombing and strafing of troop objectives was reported from the defense areas.

German Air Infantry continued to land at Waalhaven throughout the night of May 11-12 and the following morning. At 3:30 P.M., it was estimated by the Dutch General Staff that an entire German division of 10,000-11,000 men had been landed. Heavy materiel, including artillery, tanks and motor vehicles, was beginning to arrive by river boats and barges. It was reported and later confirmed by reliable sources that several horses employed by division headquarters had been landed by transport plane. The force was now of sufficient strength to threaten seriously the rear of Fortress Holland.

The British Air Force was reported to have bombed Waalhaven and German communications in east Holland during the night of May 11-12. In view of the uninterrupted landing of German transport planes at Waalhaven, reported above, it may be concluded that action against this air field was ineffective. Later, although not permitted to enter the field proper, I was unable to detect indications of heavy bombing. A few craters caused by light bombs and two damaged hangars were visible. The landing field and runways did not appear to have been torn up.

2. Land Operations.

At 9 A.M., the general staff reported the situation on the east front unchanged since May 11. Continued landing of transports at Waalhaven was building up the German attack on Rotterdam to a point where it threatened The Hague. Part of this force had been sent south to reinforce the Dordrecht and Moerdijk brigades. Sharp fighting was in progress both around Waalhaven Airport and on the north bank of the Rotterdam water front. French troops in Brabant were believed to be occupying the defensive position indicated under May 11.

At 3 P.M., it was reported that German troops had reached the Wadden Zee north of Harlingen and the IJsselmeer in the vicinity of Hindeloopen. German columns were in contact with the Grebbe position from Renswoude to Wageningen and with the Peel position in the Hertogenbosch area. The II. I. section stated that the Germans were not pressing the attack and Dutch troops were holding, without difficulty, the northeast end of the Zuiderzee Dike, the Grebbe position and the Zuid Willems Vaart.

The situation at Rotterdam was getting out of hand because of the constant arrival of air transports at Waalhaven

DECLASSIFIED

(See paragraph II. C. 1.) and doubt was expressed that Dutch troops in that vicinity would be able to defend Rotterdam and prevent subsequent advance on The Hague. There had been no report from the French force in Brabant since morning.

At 3 P.M. there was no verification of the reported landing of British troops at the Hook of Holland. Several hours later a member of the M. I. section told me that three British destroyers had landed a battalion of guards at the Hook during the afternoon and that a British Military Mission had arrived at G. H. Q. About 200 specialists were landed at IJmuiden for the purpose of destroying oil supplies in Amsterdam. It was reported from Weert that strong German columns had been crossing the Maas and Willems Vaart south of Weert throughout the day.

The Dutch General Staff and the Belgian Military Attache were unable to verify the reported break-through of the Albert Canal at Maastricht and on either side of Hasselt. A radio report had stated that bridges at both points were intact. In view of the fact that there had been no attack against the south flank and rear of the Peel position it seemed probable that German troops in this locality had been concentrated against the Albert Canal and had been successful in forcing a crossing.

By this time it had become fairly obvious that the Germans would not attack along the general front of the Dutch defenses but would attempt to break through with a relatively small force on each of several favorable roads. Judging from the points of contact with the defense lines they could not have employed more than three divisions north of the Rijn and two divisions south of the Maas, plus the two divisions landed by p planes, making a possible total of seven divisions employed against Holland.

It was therefore concluded that the great bulk of the force which had been opposite Holland was being aimed at Northern Belgium and that the main attack was taking the direction Roermond—Brussels or Roermond—Gent.

D. May 13.

1. Air Action.

The German Air Force was extremely active over all parts of Holland from daylight on. Severe bombing was reported in Rotterdam and in the defense areas. There were numerous alarms in The Hague before noon but few, if any, bombs dropped in the

 **DECLASSIFIED**

interior of the city.

No further landing of air infantry was reported from Waalhaven. The division which had landed was believed to have completed its assembly on the preceding day. This unit was continuing the attack on Rotterdam and had detached elements to reinforce those units which were holding the Dordrecht and Moerdijk bridges.

The Royal Air Force was reported to have bombed German communications between the Rijn and the Dutch frontier during the night of May 12-13. I can verify the presence of only one squadron of fighters over Holland during the day. Two British fighter pilots were brought to our legation by Dutch soldiers early on the morning of May 14. They stated that their squadron had arrived over Dordrecht on the morning of May 13, and had encountered Messerschmidts in such superior numbers that they were unable to proceed further. In attempting to turn back, their two machines--and they believed two more of the squadron--were shot down. The pilots were transported to the Hook of Holland by the Dutch and evacuated with other British citizens.

2. Land Operations.

At 9 A.M., the general staff reported heavy fighting at all points where German troops were in contact with Dutch defenses. Details of the action were not available at that time.

The German division in the Rotterdam area had received additional artillery and tanks by boat on the Waal or Rijn Rivers and seriously threatened the safety of The Hague. The Dutch marine battalion and troops of the I Corps in that vicinity had been forced back from the water front and severe fighting was reported in the city. German fifth column members were reported to be firing on Dutch troops from houses in their rear.

At 2:30 P.M., it was reported that the German attack in Rotterdam had progressed sufficiently to secure definitely the Maas Bridge. It was further reported that a German attack against Zuiderzee Dike was reported successful and that German troops were on both ends of the dike. Later, in the evening, this report was amended; Dutch troops still held the southwest end of the dike at Den Oever.

The Moerdijk Bridge was still held by German troops, reinforced from Waalhaven. Dutch attacks had been un-

 **DECLASSIFIED**

successful and the cyclist regiment was unable to force a crossing of the bridge at Dordrecht. German mechanized units had broken through the Grebbe position on either side of Veenendaal just before noon. The Zuid Willems Vaart had been crossed in the vicinity of Hertogenbosch, and a German armored column was approaching Moerdijk at 1 P.M. This column crossed the Moerdijk Bridge and reached Dordrecht at 4 P.M., according to a later report by a resident of Dordrecht.

The liaison officer made the observation that unless the pressure on Rotterdam had been relieved and the armored column at Moerdijk intercepted, the rear of Fortress Holland would have been turned.

The British guards battalion had dug in at the Hook of Holland to establish a beach head for the evacuation of the British Legation and a few selected British citizens. The two French divisions in Brabant had reassembled at Breda, where they had been rather heavily bombed. It was believed by the Dutch General Staff that this force would counterattack the flank and rear of the German armored column, which was then moving west on the Hertogenbosch-Moerdijk Road. This counterattack failed to materialize. The German break-through of the Albert Canal and the rapid advance toward Leuven and Antwerp, now verified beyond question, no doubt influenced the French decision.

Later that evening I had the opportunity to hold a long conversation with the assistant liaison officer, who is quite a good friend. His information relating to the Allied troops then in Holland was, that the British mission which had arrived on the preceding afternoon consisted of General Haywood, accompanied by 11 officers, 15 orderlies and 2 trucks of assorted provisions. The British guard battalion had been ordered to hold its present position and under no circumstances to become involved in the fighting at Rotterdam. It was to be prepared to embark on short notice. It was obvious that this force had been landed for the sole purpose of evacuating the British diplomatic mission and citizens. With the exception of the specialists landed at IJmuiden these were, to the best of my knowledge, the only English troops in Holland.

Regarding the French troops in Brabant, I asked if there was communication between their headquarters and Dutch G. H. Q. I was informed that there was none, and that, upon arrival on May 11, the French commanding officer had been requested to send a liaison section to The Hague. This had never arrived. The Dutch, then attempted to send a liaison party to French headquarters, but the party had been unable to get around

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

Dordrecht. The French military attaches evacuated with the rest of the French Legation on May 13. Throughout that day there had been no contact with the French force except once during the afternoon when a Dutch pilot had succeeded in flying a staff officer to Breda with a request from General Winkelman that the French counterattack at once to seize the Moerdijk Bridge. Colonel Giraux, the French commanding officer, had refused to move north of Breda. Similarly, there was no communication between the British and French forces in Holland.

It is upon this and similar reports from reliable sources that I based the statement that Allied assistance to Holland was uncoordinated, ineffectual, and obviously perfunctory.

The departure of the Queen and the government, which became known in the late afternoon of May 13, resulted in the very apparent relaxation of Dutch determination to resist. It was evident in the slack attitude of sentries and patrols in The Hague and in the despondency of officers at G. H. Q.

E. May 14.

1. Air Action.

The German Air Force showed little activity prior to noon except in bombing the British guards battalion at the Hook of Holland. Beginning at noon there were almost continuous alarms in The Hague, but the attacks were directed against Rotterdam. It was reported that the business section of the city, which commanded the north end of the Maas Bridge was being subjected to terrific bombing. Later, on May 17, I accompanied the American minister to Rotterdam. The bombed area was rather clearly defined by the Coolsingel--Hofplein--Goudsche Singel--Oost Plein; within these boundaries destruction was singularly complete and had apparently been accomplished from low altitudes.

While ostensibly directed against Dutch troops still holding on in the area, the complete destruction of the most important business section of Rotterdam was in the nature of a threat intended to hasten Dutch surrender. The assistant liaison officer, M. I. section, informed me that following this bombing, German Field Headquarters had advised the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, General Winkelman, that in case he did not surrender at once, Utrecht, The Hague and Amsterdam would be similarly destroyed.

The R. A. F., if over Holland on this date, was not present in sufficient strength to exert any influence on the

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

situation.

2. Land Operations.

At about 9 A.M., the general staff reported that Dutch troops held the southwest end of the Zuider Zee Diike—it is uncertain that German troops ever completely controlled the Diike—and had repulsed an attempted daylight landing by small boats on the Zuider Zee coast between Den Oever and Enkhuizen. They were assisted in this action by several British motor torpedo boats which had passed into the Zuider Zee through the Nordzeekanal (Ijmuiden-Amsterdam). From appearances, it seems permissible to explain the failure to destroy the Zuider Zee Diike, and perhaps the large Maas Bridge at Rotterdam, as due to inherent Dutch thrift.

During the night of May 13-14, the II and IV Corps had withdrawn from the Grebbe position to the water line of Fortress Holland; the III Corps and the Peel Division had withdrawn from the Zuid Willems Vaart to Zuid Beveland (Zeeland). The light division was attempting to recapture the Dordrecht Bridge from the east.

The French armored and motorized divisions had withdrawn during the night from Breda toward the southwest. It was not known whether they were moving toward Antwerp or Zeeland. Later, on May 17, about 1,600 men of this force surrendered with the Dutch III Corps in Zeeland, but the bulk of the force is believed to have reached the French Army in Belgium.

The British guards battalion, about 800 men and officers, were holding on at the Hook of Holland but were being bombed and were expected to embark at any moment. General Heywood, his military mission and the British military attaches had left The Hague at 4:30 A.M. for the Hook.

Two German columns were reported converging on Utrecht from Scherpenzeel and Rhenen. The German armored column, which had reached Dordrecht the evening before, was believed to be still in that vicinity, but advanced elements were in contact with the German air division in Rotterdam. This division was pushing its attack in an effort to clear a passage through the city.

At 3 P.M., it was announced that German troops in the Zuider Zee areas were showing little activity. Utrecht had been bombed lightly, later this bombing was verified as affecting a small area at the eastern exit of the city in the vicinity of the

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

first defense line. It was believed that German columns advancing from Rhenen and Scherpenzeel during the morning were in contact and preparing to attack.

Rotterdam was being heavily bombed with great loss of life. Armored elements from Dordrecht were reported to have reinforced the German air division. The light division had been badly cut up by German armored units at Dordrecht and was withdrawing northeast to Fortress Holland.

The assistant liaison officer reported that the British battalion had embarked and shoved off from the Hook of Holland shortly before noon. There was no reason to expect further Allied assistance.

The Dutch Chief of Military Intelligence inferred that the situation was hopeless and that nothing could be gained by further resistance. This conversation led me to believe that surrender could be expected within a few hours.

The Dutch could have continued the defense of Fortress Holland for 24 hours, possibly for 48 hours. During this time they would have been at the mercy of the German Air Force. Allied assistance in the air had been inadequate and ineffective; assistance on land, at this stage, was impossible.

Surrender was announced at about 6 P.M. Dutch units on all fronts, except in Zeeland, were ordered to lay down their arms. The exclusion of Zeeland from the terms of surrender was explained as being due to absence of communications. However, I think it likely that Allied plans contemplated continued defense in this area for the purpose of (1) protecting the rear of Belgian defenses, and (2) retaining a base for possible future land operations.

Resistance was continued in Beveland by the III Corps, elements of the Peel Division, units of the coastal command and a small contingent of French troops under the naval commander of Zeeland. Five British destroyers appeared in the Ooster Schelde on the afternoon of May 16 and supported the defense by firing on German troops in the area south of Bergen op Zoom. Resistance was broken by the German Air Force and Zeeland surrendered on the evening of May 17.

III. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS.

A. The General Occupation of Holland, preceeding immediately after surrender on May 14, was influenced obviously

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

by the German desire to encourage the Dutch to resume normal self-administration as quickly as possible, thus releasing the greatest possible number of troops for operations in Belgium and France.

The attitude of the military commanders, who preceded the establishment of a German civil governor, was therefore that of strict benevolence. Dutch military and civil officials retained their functions, subordinate, of course, to the German commander. Dutch officers were allowed to retain their side arms, troops were disarmed but remained in their normal organizations.

Administrative orders, issued during the first five days of occupation, restricted sale of gasoline, foodstuffs and clothing; prohibited increased prices and hoarding; established the rate of mark-florin exchange, and forbade the closing down of banking and industrial enterprises. All individual Germans were required to pay cash for purchases. German soldiers were provided with Kredit-kassenscheine, good only in Holland at the rate of 1.50 marks to 1 guilder. These were run off, in at least one instance, from portable presses in military headquarters.

B. German Troops Arrived in The Hague at daylight on May 15, the day following surrender. Identifications were not possible, but units here were evidently the headquarters and elements of a light panzer division. Soldiers were Austrian or Bavarian. Major General Hansen was in command and was for several days military commander of The Netherlands. Inasmuch as these troops moved in from the direction of Rotterdam, they are believed to have constituted a part of the force which broke through the Peel.

Ground troops which passed through The Hague from the north were, as far as I could find out, motorized infantry. Little heavy materiel was seen. The few tanks which were seen are believed to have belonged to the light panzer division cited above. It is assumed that other units which participated in the action against Holland were moved with the least delay to Belgium.

General Hansen's headquarters and all mechanized units moved south toward Belgium on May 23. General Hansen was succeeded by Major General Christiansen, air force, as military commander of The Netherlands. As such, he was subordinate to General Von Falkenhausen, who had been appointed military commander of Holland and Belgium pending arrival of Dr. Seyss-Inquart, Reichskommissar of The Netherlands. Seyss-Inquart took over on May 29.

Few regular ground troops have appeared in The Hague or have been reported in Holland since May 23. General Christiansen's air force command is believed to comprise at least an air division operating from the fields of Valkenburg, Ypenburg and Waalhaven. In addition to organic antiaircraft units, there is what appears to be a regiment of parachutists and an undetermined number of sea planes

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

attached to this command.

It is reported by Dutch military sources that a second air division is operating from fields at Schipol, Amsterdam and Aklmaar, with headquarters at Haarlem. Parachute troops are attached also to this unit. Work of repairing and enlarging air fields has been in progress since May 22.

Judging from the frequent appearance of naval officers and sailors in The Hague, there are naval units in this vicinity, probably at the Hook of Holland, Flushing and Rotterdam. Verified reports indicate that small boats of all kinds--tugs, river steamers, and barges--are being assembled in large numbers in Rotterdam, Flushing and Antwerp.

At least one brigade of the German cavalry division arrived in Amsterdam on May 22. As far as I have been able to find out, this constitutes the only unit of the regular ground force now present in Holland. There are, of course, detachments of party troops, S. A. and S. S., but these have neither been seen nor reported in large numbers.

Composition and distribution of German forces now in Holland indicate an attempt to land troops in England.

There is nothing to criticize in the appearance and deportment of German officers and men in Holland. All are neat and soldierly; individual equipment is adequate and extremely well kept. I have heard of no instances of infractions of discipline which involved mistreatment of civilians or looting. Soldiers have fraternized freely with the Dutch. The Dutch, racially Germanic, caught on the rebound from the disillusionment caused by the Queen's departure, are obviously impressed and already partially won over by this demonstration of good will. This is especially true of the lower classes who have had no opportunity to become cosmopolitan. Others who have more to lose and who consequently form a more cynical minority, are suspending judgment until the policy of the civil governor and his attendant party troops and Gestapo is clearly defined.

The materiel and motor equipment seen in The Hague offered nothing new in types or developments. The speed and precision of marching German motor columns is impressive. This is particularly true of the heavier equipment, such as half-track troop carriers, half-track prime-movers with 105 mm. howitzers, and divisional engineer vehicles which transport pontoons and light motor boats for ferrying.

C. Material and Supplies Taken Over, from the standpoint of immediate importance, consist mainly of oil and gasoline, motor vehicles and foodstuffs. The materiel taken over from the Dutch Army, other than motor transport and the comparatively small amount

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

of modern artillery and antiaircraft artillery, will not be much of an asset to the Germans.

The British have bombed the Rotterdam oil depots almost nightly, but it is reported that so far they have failed to destroy any great quantity of oil products.

All motor transport, including motorcycles, except a bare minimum for each higher Dutch headquarters, was taken over immediately by the German Army. This included an estimated 5,500 cargo trucks, ranging from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 tons, and an unknown number of radio trucks, kitchen trucks, ambulances, pickups, passenger cars and motorcycles.

An offer was made to purchase commercial buses, vans, trucks, new and used passenger automobiles and motorcycles. Since no one in a private capacity could obtain gasoline, most owners sold their vehicles. Agencies and sales rooms were stripped of new cars. As a very rough estimate it is thought that altogether some 14,500 trucks and an unknown number of passenger cars were acquired. Payment was made either with Kreditkassenscheine or with promises to pay good three weeks after termination of war. A new Chevrolet or Ford passenger car was evaluated at about 1000 marks.

As early as May 21, convoys of trucks and passenger buses operated by Dutch personnel were put in service to transport German troops and supplies from Cologne to the Belgian and French fronts. Similar convoys are operating between Rotterdam and Brussels; supplies and munitions, acquired locally or shipped from Germany by river, are loaded in Rotterdam and delivered to an advance depot in Brussels. On the return trip convoys have been used in several instances to evacuate wounded to Rotterdam or Eindhoven.

From such reports as I receive here now, it seems that German service of supply in communication and combat zones is based on motor transportation; little, if any, dependence being placed on rail transport west of the Rhine. This, no doubt, is due to the comparative rapidity with which highways and pontoon bridges can be repaired when subjected to frequent air bombing. It involves a considerable increase in the total daily consumption of motor fuel but appears to have been effective thus far in keeping supplies, especially munitions and gasoline, pushed up in rear of a rapidly advancing army.

The food items which have been taken out of Holland in great quantities consist mainly of bread, cheese, butter,

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

margarine and lard. Most of the bread, cheese and butter is believed to have been transported direct to the combat zone for distribution to troops. Margarine and lard are probably going to Germany. With the exception of a few cattle seized initially in Friesland and Groningen, there are no indications that fresh meat is being taken out.

D. Disposition of the Dutch Army.

1. Casualties are estimated now at 22-23,000 killed, wounded, and missing.

2. Prisoners of War taken during hostilities and transported to Germany numbered about 20,000. These are to be released. One half the number has arrived in Holland.

3. Demobilization began on May 24. Orders were issued for the demobilization of about 50% of the total force under arms. Roughly, 150,000 men and officers of the reserve are to be released and sent home. In general, this number is composed of those individuals who have some means of support and will not increase the number of unemployed.

That part of the army which remains in service includes the entire professional establishment, corps of military police, Royal Marechaussee and members of the reserve who have no employment on the outside. The Dutch Commander-in-Chief is responsible for discipline, administration and supply.

4. Employment at present consists of rehabilitation work in those areas where destruction took place, dismantling fortifications and filling in trenches, and repair of damaged highways and bridges. The army has been disarmed except for the few weapons necessary for guard duty. Horsedrawn transportation is retained.

IV. COMMENTS ON SPECIAL FEATURES.

As far as I can ascertain German land and air forces employed nothing especially new in the invasion of Holland. Tactics and technique employed here had been demonstrated previously in Poland and Norway, but the scope and mission of parachutists and air infantry employed in this campaign make it the first outstanding example of a successful "vertical envelopment". It may be said, literally, that the surrender of Holland was accomplished by the German Air Force. Surrender took place before the Dutch Army had been decisively defeated in land engagements. However, several of the outstanding factors which contributed to German success in

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Holland, and no doubt in Belgium and France, are worth considerable study.

The following are noteworthy:

- A. The Element of Surprise.
- B. German Air Force.
- C. Method of Attacking Fortifications.
- D. Weather Forecast.
- E. New Weapon.

A. The Element of Surprise is achieved by the coordination of all agencies which disseminate news or propaganda within Germany, by the German controlled press, and by official press attaches in foreign countries. The press has been remarkably successful in confusing and deceiving the prospective victims of German attack. This extreme supervision and coordination is made possible, of course, by the close control exercised by the Nazi government.

The Germans are past masters at "planting" information for eventual indirect delivery to the general staff of an opposing country. I was told by a German source, who was usually reliable, that most of the reports and rumors of inferior equipment, of an inefficient general staff, and inadequate junior officers and non-commissioned officers in the German Army had been originated in Berlin for English and French edification. The same is true of many reports of insufficient food, impending revolution, and dissension in the army. The same source predicted that after the consolidation of Europe, Hitler would use the same means to convince the American public that he had no designs on the Western Hemisphere.

During the week preceding the invasion of Holland, the Dutch General Staff was divided in opinion as to whether the attack on the West Front would precede or follow Italian action in the Mediterranean. This confusion was accomplished by the German press and radio and by subservient Italian agencies working toward the same end. At the same time the German minister in The Hague delivered an official denial of German plans to invade the Low Countries. As mentioned earlier in the report, I am convinced that the day and hour of German attack was a surprise to the Dutch General Staff.

The moral of this paragraph is that surprise and deception on a national scale is possible when all agencies, such as press, radio and diplomatic representatives, are subordinate to, and coordinated by, a central head.

DECLASSIFIED

 **DECLASSIFIED**

B. German Air Force.

1. Bombing observed in The Hague and reported from Rotterdam was mostly from low altitudes, even before Dutch anti-aircraft defenses were knocked out. The Germans either underestimated the effectiveness of the antiaircraft artillery or disregarded the comparatively heavy losses. The Dutch Chief of Staff told me that 430 German planes of all types had been destroyed during the five days' fighting.

Bombs which destroyed the military barracks in The Hague were estimated at about 1500 feet. With one exception, bombing was horizontal. One squadron of dive bombers dropped one load on the cavalry depot. In general, the horizontal bombing was more accurate than that observed in Poland. Little damage was done in The Hague proper; attacks were limited to barracks and antiaircraft batteries on the outskirts of the city.

Rotterdam sustained the greatest destruction. Roughly one-third of the total area of the city was completely destroyed during the five days' fighting. This area included the main business district and commanded the north end of the Maas Bridge. Dutch troops were defending the north bank of the river from this position. Destruction was completed during the afternoon of the last day's fighting, May 14, by 6-8 squadrons of dive bombers using heavy bombs, estimated at 500 kilos. This was in the nature of a demonstration to hasten surrender. During this bombing, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief was served with an ultimatum which threatened immediate destruction of Utrecht, Amsterdam and The Hague if he did not surrender at once.

Civilians killed in Rotterdam are estimated at 10,500-15,000. This is based on the report of a Dutch motor transport officer who stated that his truck battalion hauled an average of 1500 bodies from the ruins daily for a period of seven days.

Dutch reports indicated that aviation in direct cooperation with German ground forces consisted mainly of Stuka dive bombers and liaison planes. Preceding the attacks which broke through the Grebbe and Peel Lines, dive bombers attacked reserves, command posts, artillery positions, and supply installations, as well as critical points in the defensive positions. They were effective in preventing counterattack. It must be remembered that German aviation over Holland had practically a free hand, but Dutch officers repeated the story told by the Poles--that troops in the open or in field fortifications can-

 **DECLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED

not endure continued dive bomber attacks. It is humanly impossible.

2. Parachutists. Information received of German parachute troops indicates that service is voluntary. Only the best physical specimens from among young men are accepted. Trainees are given a strenuous course in physical training and gymnastics before the actual jumping begins. From observation of units in The Hague, organization appears to be in battalions of three companies each, each company about ninety men.

The uniform is distinctive, a dark grey jacket and trousers resembling ski clothes. A grey duck coverall is buttoned over this for jumping. The padded steel helmet resembles, in shape, those worn by racing motorcyclists. Each soldier, in addition, is equipped with a camouflaged smock or coat and a camouflaged cloth cover for the helmet..

Individual equipment consists of pistol, sub-machine gun, hand grenades, field glasses, knife, condensed emergency ration of chocolate, hard bread and vitamin tablets, extra ammunition and maps. Extra ammunition is carried in pockets of the duck coverall and in leather pouches attached to the belt.

Group equipment consists of light machine guns and portable two-way voice radios. Group equipment, radios and light machine guns were dropped in a special case attached to a parachute. Parachutists landed in the vicinity of The Hague carried the sub-machine guns slung on their backs. The transport plane employed was the old three motor JU-52. The usual load was 13 parachutists and a case for equipment.

Parachutists observed were dropped from a surprisingly low altitude, estimated at 400-450 feet. They jumped from either a side door or from a trap in the bottom of the fuselage and followed each other at closest interval possible. Parachutes were opened by a short rip cord attached to the plane. They appeared much smaller than our parachutes in diameter and descended rapidly.

Upon landing, each man cut loose his parachute, assembled with his group, and took cover, using bomb craters or natural objects. Civilians in the vicinity were immediately fired upon. If unopposed, the group moved to a designated assembly point. Each man was provided with a map marked with the point over which he had been dropped, the assembly point, and the objective. Dutch officers reported that their camouflaged

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

clothing and effective use of cover made parachutists extremely difficult to locate.

The employment of parachutists may be compared to the classic use of cavalry. Reports from Belgium and France indicate that they were employed independently in rear areas to terrorize the civil population, create confusion and interrupt communications. In Holland they were attached to air infantry divisions and functioned in the role of advance guards. They seized landing points, and blocked roads, furnished security for the landing of air transports, and seized important objectives pending the arrival of reinforcements of air infantry. For example, they took the Moerdijk and Dordrecht Bridges.

The technique demonstrated in Holland included several phases. The objective or defending force was bombed; parachutists landed almost at once and before the defenders recovered from the bombing. In many cases prisoners were taken and used as shields in a close approach to the objective. Having gained the rear of any existing casemates or bunkers, the parachutists tossed hand grenades in through the back doors. The parachute force was then disposed for all around defense. It established radio communication with supporting bombers which were prepared to act against any counterattack. At Waalhaven Airport the initial bombing produced a line of craters around the field, and these were used by parachutists in defending the field. This method of attack was signally effective in seizing the Moerdijk and Dordrecht Bridges and Waalhaven Field, all of which were guarded by comparatively small garrisons, estimated at about one company of infantry for each point. A similar attempt at the Hague was unsuccessful because of the large number of troops encountered in that vicinity, but it was effective in that it diverted at least a division from possible employment in Rotterdam.

3. Air Infantry was transported in JU-52 transport planes at the rate of about 15 men, with equipment, per plane. As far as I could find out, nothing heavier than infantry mortars and cannon were carried. It is believed that heavy equipment of the division which landed at Rotterdam was already in port in the holds of river barges. However, two horses, presumably parade equipment of the division commander, were in a plane which was shot down near Waalhaven.

Transports landed at Waalhaven in formations of five or six at the closest possible interval. Speed of unloading was all important. Ships and sometimes their loads were cracked up in the endeavor to put the maximum number of men on the ground within a short time.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

Near The Hague, troop transports were landed on the beach, on the Hague-Rotterdam highway, and on ploughed fields. The same disregard of materiel was demonstrated; once unloaded, transports were taxied into ditches in order to clear the way for following planes.

The employment of air infantry against Holland was that of a vertical envelopment of the Dutch defenses with the mission of seizing decisive objectives. The successful landing at Rotterdam and the seizure of the Moerdijk and Maas Bridges turned the rear of Fortress Holland and rendered it untenable. It forced the surrender of the Dutch Army, which had not been defeated in battle.

Had the 22nd Division been successful in capturing The Hague and the Dutch government, as it almost was, Dutch resistance would have been ended within two days.

C. Attack on Fortified Positions.

1. Small caliber cannon. Inspection of Dutch defenses after the surrender and reports from Dutch officers indicate that permanent fortifications, such as casemates, pill boxes, and bunkers, were attacked with 37 mm. and 88 mm. antiaircraft guns sited for direct fire. The 37's were used to chew out the ports of pill boxes while the 88's were used to destroy such fortifications. High muzzle velocity made these weapons peculiarly effective in reducing permanent obstacles.

2. Flame Throwers were not used in Holland. Numerous reports, partially verified, lead to the belief that they were successfully employed against Belgian and French fortifications. I cannot verify the report that the Germans have developed a flame thrower which had a range of 1500 meters.

3. Hand Grenades were used with great effect by German infantry which had infiltrated or enveloped a defensive position. These were tossed into the back door of casemates or thrown into a port by a soldier protected by dead space. This method of attack was used very successfully against the defenses of the Moerdijk Bridge and against the casemates of the Grebbe Line.

It should not be overlooked that German infantry assault units are carefully trained in this method of attacking fortifications. Dummy fortifications are constructed, and units are rehearsed in attacks with live ammunition, great stress being placed on infiltration, use of cover, and coordination of support-

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

ing weapons.

4. Envelopment by small boat. A unique method of envelopment was used against the south end of the Grebbe Line in the vicinity of Rhenen, where the position intersected the Rijn River. Infantry or combat engineers used collapsible rubber boats, and engineer motor boats in moving down the river and landing in rear of the defenses. Losses were considerable, but sustained attack, supported by dive bombers, was eventually successful in effecting a landing.

D. Weather.

The Dutch Military Attache in Berlin was positive that the German Meteorological Service has some means of making longrange weather forecasts. Certainly the unprecedented good weather which accompanied the German campaign in Poland and the operations in Holland, Belgium and France give weight to the opinion.

I think there is no doubt that, preparations having been completed, the time of attack has been contingent on weather forecasts. This is largely due to the fact that full use of air power is vital to the German method of attack, and favorable flying weather must prevail. This factor is of primary importance to any army contemplating large scale employment of aircraft.

E. New Weapon.

So far as I have been able to find out, the German Army has not employed up to the present time, any new or secret weapon. In my opinion Hitler's new-weapon is the Blitzkreig. However, the Blitzkreig is as fundamentally simple as Forrest's conception of "getting there fustest with the mostest men". German technique has streamlined the principles of war but has not departed from them.

German technique may be expected to change as mechanical means are developed or expanded. For that reason it would be as great a mistake to base our doctrine wholly on tactics demonstrated in Poland and France in 1939-40 as it was for the British and French to shut their eyes to anything which had not been proven in the war of 1914-1918.

I should like to recommend that we develop our own theory of Blitzkreig, based on our superior resources and ability to produce new mechanical means, which will enable us to take the offensive in any quarter of the Western Hemisphere from which our

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

 DECLASSIFIED

security may be threatened.

V. OUTSTANDING IMPRESSIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMY. (Based on observation of operations in Poland and Holland.)

A. Aggressiveness.

The entire military establishment is conceived, organized, equipped, and trained for offensive action.

B. Extreme Coordination and Balance.

1. Tactical groups are organized and equipped for the task in hand. They are given the means to accomplish the mission, and they are self-contained.

2. Complete coordination of elements is accomplished by combined training, detailed rehearsal of important operations, and adequate mechanical liaison, such as radio, planes, etc.

C. Superiority of Force, Both in Man Power and Materiel.

1. A superior air force is the most decisive single factor in German success. The Germans have amplified the capabilities of mechanized ground forces.

2. Cost in men and materiel is disregarded when a vital objective is to be taken. Quantity and speed of production, rather than quality and long life, have governed in the manufacture of materiel.

D. Thorough Preliminary Internal Preparation (Fifth Column).

E. Complete Information on Capabilities of Opposing Countries.


Adequate military intelligence is available. Detailed and minute knowledge is made possible by the fifth column.

 DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

MAP
OF
THE NETHERLANDS
June 6, 1940.
To Accompany
SPECIAL BULLETIN
N^o 10

SCALE
10 5 0 5 10 Miles



DECLASSIFIED