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ACTION REPORT

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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COMMANDING GENERAL
FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

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20 MAY 1945

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

ONE OF MAJOR REPORTS FOR IWO
LANDINGS - AS TASK GROUP 56.1
MAJOR GENERAL HARRY SCHMIDT
(5TH AMPHIBIOUS CORPS) HAD 3RD,
4TH AND 5TH MARINE DIVISIONS -
COVERS PERIOD 19 FEBRUARY - 26
MARCH 1945

VOLUME 1 OF 9 VOLUMES

PAGES 1 - 184

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
PHIB CORPS LANDING FORCE



REPORT
ON



IWO JIMA




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CAMPAIGN

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THE CORPS
LANDING FORCE

REPORT
ON

TWO JIMA



OPERATION

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013/124
Ser.0284B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

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20 May 1945.

From: The Commanding General.
To : The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Via : (1) The Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops.
(2) Commander Joint Expeditionary Force.
(3) Commander Fifth Fleet.
(4) Commander-in-Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
Subject: Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.
Enclosure: (A) Commanding General Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign and Annexes thereto.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.
2. SECRET and TOP SECRET material included in this report are hereby reduced to CONFIDENTIAL.

H. Schmidt
H. SCHMIDT.

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CG, 6th Marine Division
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Commander Fifth Amphibious Force
Commander Seventh Amphibious Force

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Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

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CG, V Corps Artillery
CG, AGF, APO 86

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13 May 1945.

From: The Commanding General.
To : The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Via : (1) The Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops.
(2) Commander Joint Expeditionary Force.
(3) Commander Fifth Fleet.
(4) Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

Enclosure: ✓ (A) Special Situation Map of IWO JIMA, p. 12

1. V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE

a. PLANNING

Information was received early in October, 1944, that the V Amphibious Corps with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions in assault would be employed as the landing force for the capture and occupation of IWO JIMA, VOLCANO ISLANDS. The Corps Headquarters was then at Guam but proceeded to Pearl Harbor, arriving in the middle of October. At this time the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, plus a number of miscellaneous units and garrison elements required in the assault phase, were placed under Corps control for planning, training, and operations. The 3d Marine Division was to be in expeditionary troops reserve.

The establishment of the Corps Headquarters at Pearl in the same vicinity with the Expeditionary Troops Commander, the Attack Force Commander, and higher echelons facilitated the overall planning and the adjustment of problems of interest to more than one agency. The separation of the Divisions and the bulk of the Corps elements from the Corps Headquarters obviously hampered the development of the Corps into a homogeneous combat team. This was overcome to the greatest extent practicable by frequent visits of the Commanding General and Staff to the Divisions and by visits of unit Commanders and staff officers to the Corps Headquarters.

b. TRAINING

In view of the separation of units noted above, it was necessary to delegate training of ground units largely to the subordinate commanders, although one Command Post Exercise was conducted with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, covering the coordination of control of air, artillery, and naval gunfire. Vessels were made available on request of subordinate units for various types of amphibious training and the Corps assisted insofar as practicable in training the new TRANSDIVS in the conduct of ship-to-shore movement.

872
+ 5 The original target date for the operation would have necessitated beginning embarkation of units about 1 December. Full replacements had not been furnished for all units until about 1 November, therefore it was fortunate from the standpoint of the

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Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign (Cont'd).

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Landing Force that the target date was eventually postponed approximately one month which permitted the assimilation of replacements in the combat teams. The battle replacements were received very late and there was insufficient opportunity to train them in their shore party duties and to prepare them for use as replacements in the Divisions when required at the objective. In general, however, troops were in a satisfactory state of training when embarked.

Rehearsals were held in the Hawaiian Area from 11 to 18 January and were well executed. The absence of the naval gunfire ships and the air support units on other operations made it impracticable for them to participate in this rehearsal. This was overcome to some extent by a short rehearsal in the forward area. Another element that detracted from the usefulness of the first rehearsal was the absence in the forward area of certain of the amphibian tractor units that were to participate in the assault. These units, including two battalions of cargo tractors and one armored amphibian battalion, received two days training with the units to which they were attached in the forward area rehearsal.

6. ORGANIZATION

The organization for the operation was generally very satisfactory. There were adequate engineering units available to carry on the base development plan as rapidly as the tactical situation permitted, and there was little, if any, lost time at the objective in the execution of base development in spite of enemy action.

Personnel available for initial shore party functions were far in excess of any previously furnished due to the provision of a field depot of some 1,500 personnel and the 5,000 battle replacements available to the two assault Divisions, with an additional 2,300 available when elements of the 3d Marine Division landed. There were on D-Day in excess of 10,000 men available for shore party. As the battle progressed and casualties were sustained, the battle replacements were gradually transferred from shore party duty to the combat units. This was done without any important loss of efficiency of the shore party, although the arrival of garrison echelons, the unfavorable beach conditions, and the necessity for alternating between eastern and western beaches for unloading created a strain on available facilities and personnel at times.

The ground echelons of the initial air units to be employed were carried in assault shipping. These were generally adequate for their mission. Some delay, however, was occasioned by

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the necessity for using every available cubic foot of space in shipping assigned to Corps and the desirability of dispersing such element throughout available shipping in order that the loss of one ship would not have completely eliminated any essential element or service at the objective.

d. TACTICS AND OPERATIONS.

There were only two beach areas available on IWO JIMA sufficient to permit the landing on a two-Division front. In view of the prevailing wind, the Preferred Plan called for landing on the southeastern beaches with an Alternate Plan for landing on the western beaches directly opposite. Only minor changes in the general scheme of maneuver were necessary to fit either plan. The landing was actually executed on the preferred beaches as planned and on schedule. As expected, heavy opposition developed immediately from the high ground on both flanks and the only substantial gain initially was direct to the front. The 4th Marine Division on the right reached the edge of Airfield No. 1, and the 5th Marine Division on the left captured a portion of the southern end of Airfield No. 1 and reached the high ground overlooking the west coast on D-Day. At nightfall gains of from 500 to 800 yards had been made with one regiment facing Mt. Suribachi to the south and the remainder of the force facing north and northwest, generally around Airfield No. 1. The assault elements of both Divisions, including reserve regiments, were landed by nightfall, plus a portion of the artillery and other supporting arms, making a total of some 30,000 men ashore that day.

The original plan based on estimates of enemy strength had provided for the 3d Marine Division to remain in floating reserve. In accordance with this plan, one regiment of the 5th Marine Division (RCT 26) had been held out for Corps Reserve. As additional information was received during the planning period indicating a continuously higher estimate of enemy strength and a large increase in the number of defensive installations, combined with a reduction in the planned naval gunfire support available, request was made on reaching the forward area to have one regiment of the 3d Marine Division (CT 21) available at the target on the morning of D-Day. This was approved and the regiment of the 5th Marine Division previously withheld in Corps Reserve was released to that Division.

On D+1 the attack was continued both to the north, and to the south against Mt. Suribachi, against heavy opposition. The beaches were continuously under fire from both flanks which hampered unloading, caused many casualties, and the loss of equipment,

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ammunition, and supplies. As it was imperative to push the attack and secure sufficient room to land supplies unobstructed and to expedite the initiation of airfield construction, the release of the 3d Marine Division, less one regiment, was requested. CT 21 of that Division had been landed on D plus 2 and attached temporarily to the 4th Marine Division. Two days later the 3d Marine Division, less RCT 3, began landing and took over the central zone of the front. By this time Mt. Suribachi had been captured which permitted the more or less unobstructed use of the southern beaches, cleared the southern end of the island for the landing of Corps and garrison elements, and permitted the release of part of the regiment that had been employed there for use elsewhere.

Thereafter a slow but steady advance was made up the island against determined resistance until on D plus 8 elements of the 3d Marine Division reached the northeast coast, splitting the enemy into two isolated groups. The northern tip of the island at KITANO POINT was reached on 16 March and as only one isolated pocket remained at that time the island was declared secured as of that date. Resistance in lesser degree continued for another ten days from this pocket and from groups that had been concealed in the thousands of caves and emerged each night to harass our units. The 4th Marine Division completed evacuation on 19 March and the 5th Marine Division on 27 March. In the meantime the 147th Infantry, the garrison regiment, had arrived, on 21 March and that regiment with the two regiments and miscellaneous units of the 3d Marine Division were passed to the control of the Island Commander together with responsibility for the defense of the island at 0800 on 26 March. Remaining units of the 5d Marine Division and Corps Service elements were withdrawn gradually as the situation permitted, the last regiment being evacuated late in April, 1945.

The cooperation of the Garrison Force was excellent throughout and the transfer of control was effected smoothly.

Our battle casualties were some 30 per cent of the entire Landing Force. In the infantry regiments, however, these casualties amounted to an average of 75 per cent in the two assault divisions and 60 per cent in the 3d Marine Division, of the original regimental strength. Furthermore, the loss in key personnel, particularly leaders, was even higher. Seven thousand five hundred (7500) battle replacements were provided, but this personnel was received too late to permit adequate training and integration into the combat units. As most of the infantry combat units involved were in contact with the enemy for total periods in excess of three weeks, the combat efficiency towards the close of the operation was very low.

CONFIDENTIALe. ENEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZATION, AND EQUIPMENT.

The enemy conducted an intelligent, passive defense from successive highly organized positions. As sufficient forces had been landed on D-Day to insure retention of a beachhead, the enemy did not attempt a major counterattack to eject our forces from the island but rather remained in position and fought to the bitter end.

The best estimate of enemy strength on the island derived from identification of units and interrogation of prisoners of war was from 21,000 to 22,000. The reports of enemy killed by subordinate units together with those reported killed or captured since completion of the occupation total over 30,000. It therefore appears that troop units reported more enemy killed from day to day than was actually the case; also that the overestimates were more or less evenly distributed throughout the three divisions. As the enemy removes his dead whenever practicable and as it is normally impossible to determine the numbers of enemy sealed in the innumerable caves, it is almost impossible to secure an accurate count of enemy dead based on troop reports.

It was found on landing that some 5,000 enemy naval troops had not been counted in any preliminary estimates of enemy strength. This underestimation of enemy strength has been true in every operation in which this Corps has participated.

f. SUPPLY, EQUIPMENT, AND LOGISTICS

Supply and equipment were generally adequate. The stubbornness of enemy resistance from blockhouses, pillboxes, and caves necessitated a heavy expenditure of artillery ammunition which, combined with considerable losses in ammunition dumps and on the beach by enemy fire, resulted in a continuing shortage. This was met in part by bringing up resupply ships and by restrictions on the amounts to be expended by subordinate units. The difficulties in unloading ammunition from cargo vessels indicates the desirability of embarking resupply ammunition in LSTs, which permits rapid unloading either directly on the beach or by amphibious vehicles. In fact throughout operations of this Corps the LST has been the best vessel available for both troops and supplies.

The ship-to-shore movement for the actual assault was executed with precision. It soon developed, however, that small craft up to LCMs could not use the beaches, and consequently reliance had to be placed on LCTs, LSMs, and LSTs, plus LVTs and DUKWs.

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As there was an inadequate number to meet all requests, it was necessary to allot such equipment by a central control. The unloading of equipment and supplies could be executed much more efficiently and with less confusion and lost time if adequate craft are available to permit each division or other separate unit to deal directly with the TRANSRON Commander concerned.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in landing reserves because of the facts outlined in the preceding paragraph and because the sea was usually rough in the transport area. It is believed this can be simplified in the future by utilizing LSTs to go directly alongside transports after they have debarked assault troops and transfer reserve elements to the LSTs directly. If enemy resistance is light and beach conditions are favorable, reserves can be landed directly on the beach from LSTs. If this is not the case, the LSTs can then return to the launching area and reembark the tractors for landing these reserves.

B. SPECIAL FEATURES.

Detailed comments and recommendations on various special features of the operation are contained in the various annexes and appendices to this report. Only those considered to be of particular importance are mentioned here. Comments relating to reports of subordinate units are covered by endorsement on those report.

NAVAL GUNFIRE

The naval gunfire on D-Day and thereafter was highly effective. The preliminary bombardment did not meet expectations because of the shortage of naval gunfire support ships and because of lost time in the preliminary bombardment due to bad weather and the interference of mine sweeping activities and UDT operations, which forced longer range fire or a diversion of available naval gunfire in support of these special operations.

AIR.

Air bombardment prior to D-Day, although continued over a long period of time, did not appear to have caused much damage. The air support on D-Day and for the two or three days following was highly effective, and the best that this Corps has received in any operation to date. Subsequent thereto the departure of the heavy carriers reduced the availability of aircraft for support of the

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ground troops to a point below that considered essential. Although land-based air was used to a certain extent after its establishment on Iwo Jima and was very effective when used, the areas open to aircraft bombing and strafing at that time were so limited as to prevent the realization of the full effectiveness of this support.

There has been a reluctance by aviation to use heavy bombs both in the preliminary and in support missions after the troops land. The destructiveness of such bombs against the type of installations found and their ability to strip camouflage and uncover enemy installations is so important as to warrant serious consideration of the use of the heaviest bombs procurable in any future attacks on well-defended positions. It is also considered that night air patrols over the objective are highly important in spite of their possible interference with identification of enemy aircraft attempting to attack.

The Landing Force Support Air Control Unit, when established ashore, proved very effective. Effective support was hampered initially to some extent by the fact that Naval Gunfire Control and Air Support Control were not in the same vessel with the Attack and Landing Force Commanders.

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS AND MAPS.

The maps used in this operation were prepared from aerial photographs taken several months prior to the operation and were inaccurate with respect to elevations and in many cases with respect to the types of roads indicated. These inaccuracies led to continual erroneous reporting of troop positions which, in turn, interfered with the effectiveness of naval gunfire, air, and artillery support. In order to obviate this difficulty in the future, it is recommended that successive editions of the basic maps be issued showing the latest information, in an effort to have the vertical control sufficiently accurate to permit proper reporting of front line positions and target designations.

Aerial photography should be continuous throughout the operation and particularly after important strikes by air or naval bombardment. These strikes uncover enemy installations and permit more effective subsequent attacks. Also, repeated aerial photography and interpretation will permit engaging deep support targets by naval gunfire, air, and heavy artillery and their destruction before the troops reach positions so close as to prevent this type of support.

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TANKS.

Tanks proved indispensable in this operation, particularly the flame-thrower and bulldozer tanks, which were required for the assault of close-in fortified positions. An increase in these special types of tanks has been requested. Also, tanks should be of the heaviest type available which can be lifted and which can negotiate the terrain to be expected at the objective.

AMPHIBIAN TRACTORS AND DUKW'S.

Amphibian tractors and DUKW's again proved their special adaptability to this type of warfare.

CONCLUSION.

This operation was conducted against a heavily fortified position in which there was little choice as to where to land.

It was not practicable to go around. The cost of the operation was heavy, but the present use of this base indicates that it was worth the cost. Some reduction in the number of casualties might have been effected by a more deliberate conduct of the attack and increased preparations prior to the day-to-day assaults, but time was considered to be an important factor. Other operations were pending, which required the utilization of elements released from this operation. Also, the position was exposed and there was a constant hazard of strong enemy air attacks on shipping and shore facilities at the target. These factors all indicated the necessity for rapid completion of the occupation.

The personnel of all echelons of the Corps conducted themselves in keeping with the highest traditions of the Military and Naval Service. It was a high privilege to command these troops.

H. SCHMIDT.

ANNEXES: ~~A~~BLE - VACLF Operation Plan No. 3-44 and 4-44 and Operation Orders 1-45 to 32-45 inclusive.
~~B~~AKER - General Staff Section Reports.
~~C~~HARLIE - Special Staff Section Reports.
~~D~~OG - Report by Commanding Officer Corps Troops.
~~E~~ASY - Division Reports.
~~F~~OX - Landing Force Air Support Control Unit Report.
~~G~~EORGE - IsCom IWO JIMA Preliminary Report.

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SPECIAL SITUATION MAP

of

IWO JIMA

Scale 1:20 000

To accompany the Commanding General's Basic Report

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
Ⅴ Amphibious Corps Landing Force

LEGEND



Enemy Main Defensive Line

Front Lines



SPECIAL SITUATION

IWO JIMA

Scale 1:25,000

To accompany the Command

V Amphibious Corps



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SPECIAL SITUATION MAP
of
IWO JIMA

Scale 1:20000

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HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE

- IWO JIMA -

Special Staff Section Reports
(Cont'd)

Appendix 2 - Report By Naval Gunfire Officer, [✓]p. 1044

Appendix 3 - Report By Air Officer, p. 1107

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Annex CHARLIE

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Naval Gunfire Report.

Appendix 2 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

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V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
In the Field.

30 May 1945.

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From: The Naval Gunfire Officer.
To : The Commanding General.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.
References: (a) VAC Top Secret ltr dtd 24Oct44 and FMF Pac
Top Secret Ser 00080 dtd 26Oct44.
(b) ComPhibsPac Top Secret Ser 000209 dtd 15Nov44.
Enclosure: (A) General Plan of Fires D-Day, p. 1121

1. TRAINING

(a) SHORE FIRE CONTROL PARTIES.

Training of the Shore Fire Control Parties attached to the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions was carried out under the supervision of the Naval Gunfire Section, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. This training included the following:

(1) Instruction in the gunnery installations of combatant ships in a course especially prepared for instruction of Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers and Spotters by the PACIFIC Fleet Gunnery and Torpedo School. The application of naval gunnery techniques and installations to the shore bombardment problem was stressed.

(2) Observation and spotting of all types of Naval Gunfire in Shore Bombardment Exercises at KAHOOOLAWE Island, T. H.

(3) Observation trips aboard ships conducting Shore Bombardment Exercises.

(4) Advanced training in the technique of Shore Fire Control Parties, including Command Post Exercises in which simulated prearranged fires, communications and problems of night illumination were stressed.

(b) TROOPS.

Command Post Exercises were held in battalions, regiments, divisions and corps, stressing the capabilities and coordination of Naval Gunfire, Air and Artillery. This training had a marked effect on the maximum utilization of all weapons in support of the Corps throughout the operation.

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(c) COMBATANT SHIPS.

The program of Shore Bombardment Exercises carried out under the supervision of the Commander Cruisers and Destroyers, U. S. PACIFIC Fleet, in cooperation with Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, resulted in the fact that all except a very few of the fire support ships involved in the operation had fired the required Qualification Courses, with great resultant improvement in, and standardization of, shore bombardment technique.

(d) REHEARSALS.

Four rehearsals were held in the HAWAIIAN Area and two in the SAIPAN-TINIAN Area, as indicated below:

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| 13 to 15 January | Shore Fire Control Parties were boated, but were not landed. |
| 15 January | Shore Fire Control Parties landed and established communications with assigned fire support ships. |
| 15 to 16 January | Shore Fire Control Parties landed, established communications and conducted simulated fire missions with assigned destroyers. |
| 17 to 18 January | Assigned destroyers, LCS(L)s and LCI(M)s supported a simulated landing on KAHOO LAWE Island with actual gunfire support. The gunfire support plan employed was as similar to the plan for the actual landing at the objective as possible, stressing the placement of ships in the boat lanes and the delivery of fire over the heads of troops in boats and LVTs, the rolling barrage, and the 4.2" mortar fire from LCI(M)s. After the completion of the simulated landing, the Shore Fire Control Parties of the 4th and 5th Divisions were landed on the shore bombardment range. Battalion Spotter Parties set up observation posts while Liaison Officers attached to battalions, regiments, and divisions set up in the appropriate Command Posts. Corps gunfire control was established |

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aboard the supporting destroyer squadron flagship. The exercise was tactical. All types of call fires, including air bursts, white phosphorus, and 1200 foot-second powder were fired; after dark, night illumination fires were delivered and adjusted for maximum illumination. The following morning a pre-King Hour preparation was delivered. Approximately 1800 rounds of five inch ammunition was fired in this exercise.

12 to 14 February

This was the first opportunity for many of the assigned fire support ships to be present during a rehearsal. Because of the lack of suitable landing beaches in the SAIPAN-TINIAN Area, it was necessary to land Shore Fire Control Parties in advance in order that Communication Drills might be conducted with the fire support ships which were initially assigned for the operation. Conferences between the Shore Fire Control Parties and assigned fire support ships, which had been found so desirable in the past, were consequently not feasible. Reports from Shore Fire Control Parties indicate that this lack of conference prior to the operation was a definite liability.

(e) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) That, in order to standardize training with use of the extensive facilities available in the PEARL HARBOR Area, personnel of the Shore Fire Control Parties be returned to the Naval Gunfire Section, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for retraining and reforming between each operation in which their organization is involved.

(2) That the successful coordination of Naval Gunfire, Air and Artillery was largely due to the indoctrination of all command levels of the Corps, as a result of extensive command post exercises.

(3) That a conference between each Shore Fire Control Party and the assigned fire support ship is vital and should be carried out in every case, even if Communication Drills must be curtailed.

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2.

PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT

(a) PLANNING.

(1) The initial plan for preliminary bombardment, as set forth in the Concept, provided for one Cruiser Division to bombard the objective beginning on Dog Minus Eight Day to be joined on Dog Minus Three Day by seven OBBs and six CAs or CLs. Based on a preliminary study of the number of targets at the objective, V Amphibious Corps on 24 October, recommended that ten days of bombardment by one Cruiser Division plus three OBBs be arranged. (Reference (a)). The Commander, Amphibious Forces, U. S. PACIFIC Fleet, stated in reply to this recommendation that "limitations on the availability of ships, difficulties of ammunition replacement and loss of surprise interpose serious obstacles to meeting your recommendation". He stated further that the objective would be bombarded by one Cruiser Division on 15 December and at irregular intervals thereafter, and that three days of bombardment by the designated ships would provide for delivery of more major calibre ammunition than had been requested by V Amphibious Corps (Reference (b)).

(2) On 8 November a study of the objective indicated a substantial increase in enemy defenses. Based on this study, V Amphibious Corps submitted a recommendation for a total of nine days of preliminary bombardment with all available heavy ships. Unfortunately, due to the strategical situation which limited the number of heavy ships available, and limitations of ammunition supply for those assigned, no additional preliminary bombardment over and above the three days already planned was made available for the period immediately preceding the landing.

(3) Further changes in ship's availability necessitated the substitution of NEW YORK, TEXAS, ARKANSAS, TENNESSEE, IDAHO, and NEVADA, plus WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA on Dog Minus One Day only, for various previously assigned ships.

(4) A special bombardment by INDIANA plus Cruiser Division FIVE was executed about Dog minus Thirty with unknown results. The allotment of WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA for bombardment on Dog Minus One Day was cancelled.

(b) DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS.

(1) Enemy defenses located on IWO JIMA are believed to have been the most elaborate in construction, the most numerous in density and the best integrated into an overall defense.

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plan of any so far encountered in the PACIFIC. This was probably the result of the following factors:

- a. A high priority in the assignment of construction materials for defense, combined with the relatively short distance from the JAPANESE homeland.
- b. The relative ease of digging in because of the sand and soft rock which made up most of the terrain.
- c. The excellence of the enemy defense plan.

(2) All types of defensive installations were encountered, ranging from massive reinforced concrete casemates for coastal defense guns to small concrete pillboxes. These defenses were so located as to be mutually supporting, and affording only relatively narrow sectors of fire for maximum protection. Firing ports of installations along the beaches were so located as to deliver flanking fire only, so that these ports were invisible from seaward. Camouflage was extensively and cunningly employed, utilizing planted grass, sand, brush, and other vegetation. This rendered the detection of installations most difficult until considerable firing had been done to strip away the camouflage.

(3) Coast defense guns, blockhouses and covered artillery emplacements were constructed with reinforced concrete walls and overheads ranging from three to five feet in thickness. Blockhouses and covered artillery emplacements were located so as to gain maximum visibility. They were constructed in two or three compartments to localize damage. Lookout towers were built on top of the blockhouses with speaking tubes giving communication with the weapons position. Installations were dug deeply into the ground so that maximum protection was afforded. Dirt, rocks, and sand covered the walls and overhead, leaving only the firing ports unprotected.

(4) Six inch guns were used for coast defense, while blockhouses and covered artillery emplacements contained one or two of the following weapons; or combinations thereof:

- a. 12 cm Short Barrel Cannon
- b. 47 or 37 mm Antitank Guns
- c. Single or Twin Mount 25 mm AA Machine Guns

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Ser.0187B Naval Gunfire Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

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Pillboxes were used for light machine guns. Walls and overhead cover consisted of one to two feet of reenforced concrete. Because of their small size, they were extremely difficult to pick out from seaward. In order to afford all around fields of fire, AA gun positions were of the conventional circular pit type and were consequently easier to discover. Personnel shelters for crews were deep and roomy, giving immunity against casualties except in the case of a direct hit from a large caliber shell or bomb.

(5) The following table shows the number of defensive installations listed as priority Naval Gunfire targets. The two lists show the increase of targets from October, 1944, to approximately Dog Minus Fifteen Day.

	<u>October Study</u>	<u>D-15 Study</u>
Coast Defense Gun	8	6
Dual Purpose AA Gun	37	41
Automatic AA Gun	189	203
Blockhouse	2	37
Pillboxes	37	316
Covered Artillery	4	70
Open Artillery Emplacement	22	8
Covered Structure	6	15
Total	305	696

In addition to these targets, there were many trench systems, mortar positions, caves, command posts, radio and radar stations, as well as a number of unidentified installations.

(c) FINAL PLAN FOR PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT.

(1) The plan finally adopted called for a three day preliminary bombardment with ammunition and firing times allotted as shown below:

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<u>SHIP</u>	<u>AMMUNITION ALLOTTED</u>	<u>AMMUNITION CARRIED</u>	<u>FIRING TIME Hrs. Mins.</u>	<u>A AND B PRIORITY TARGETS</u>
TENNESSEE	1000	1050	18 - 15	72
IDAHO	1000	1291	18 - 45	48
TEXAS	850	1030	18 - 30	56
NEW YORK	850	1041	19 - 15	53
NEVADA	1000	850	19 - 30	56
ARKANSAS	850	1423	17 - 45	39
CHESTER	990	1200	17 - 30	17
SALT LAKE CITY	900	1200	17 - 30	59
TUSCALOOSA	990	990	18 - 30	167
PENNSACOLA	990	1190	17 - 45	80
VICKSBURG	<u>2760</u>	<u>2760</u>	<u>18 - 30</u>	<u>77</u>
Totals:	12180	14030		
6-OBBs	5550 (Major Caliber)	6690 (Major Caliber)	201-45	724
			Average time 18 hrs. 20 min.	
4-CAs	3870 (8" caliber)	4580 (8" caliber)		
1-CL	2760 (6" caliber)	2760 (6" caliber)		

(2) Each ship was assigned an area of responsibility which was to remain in effect throughout the bombardment. These areas are indicated in Figure 1.

(3) Ships were to engage targets in accordance with the following priority system:

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PRIORITY A: Installations which threaten ships, aircraft, and UDT Operations.

1. Any Battery Opening Fire on Ships or Aircraft.
2. Coast Defense Guns.
3. AA Guns
4. Covered or Open Artillery Emplacements where presence of weapons was confirmed.
5. AT Guns.

PRIORITY B: Installations threatening the Landing Force in the Ship to Shore Movement.

1. Blockhouses
2. Covered Artillery
3. Pillboxes
4. CPs, Unidentified Installations, Earth Covered Structures, Machine Guns, Areas of Heavy Growth.

PRIORITY C: Installations which can oppose the troops after the landing, such as caves, near the beaches, radio radar stations, ammunition storage, fuel dumps, and bivouac areas.

(4) Qualified air observers of the 12th, 13th, and 14th Marines, after having been trained in naval gunfire control procedure in the HAWAIIAN Area and thoroughly briefed on the target, were placed aboard battleships and cruisers to assist in air spotting. Observers were placed aboard the:

NEVADA
NEW YORK
IDAHO
PENSACOLA
TENNESSEE
CHRISTIAN
SALT LAKE CITY
BILOXI
SANTA FE
TEXAS
ARKANSAS

(d) BOMBARDMENT ON DOG MINUS THREE DAY

(1) The primary gunfire mission on this day was

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the destruction of highest priority targets; ie., CD and AA guns. Firing was scheduled to commence at 0700 from ranges above 12,000 yards, closing to a 6,000 yard minimum as minesweeping operations cleared the fire support areas. Because light mist and rain rendered visibility very poor, ships were unable to open fire until about 0800, and firing was interrupted repeatedly throughout the day when both ships' spotters and air observers were unable to observe. In addition, even when visibility permitted, the OS2Us spotting for their parent vessels were unable to get below 3,000 feet without receiving intense fire from light AA positions; while at or above this altitude, spotters had difficulty in identifying targets and bringing accurate fire on them. As a result of visibility conditions the scheduled firing was abandoned and ships were directed to fire when visibility might make accurate fire possible.

(2) The results of the day's firing are impossible to assess because of lack of photo coverage and the visibility conditions which make difficult accurate reports from ships and planes. It is believed that generally very little major destruction was accomplished. The four-gun CD battery at the base of MOUNT SURIBACHI was not destroyed by TENNESSEE, (which fired only fourteen rounds at this target throughout the day, presumably because of lack of visibility), nor was the two-gun battery located in 219A, although it also received some 30 rounds of main battery fire from PENSACOLA. From fragmentary reports, light AA seemed somewhat reduced in intensity on the morning of Dog minus Two indicating some damage to AA positions.

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<u>DOG MINUS 3 DAY</u>										
Ship	No. of Targets Fired Upon	14"	12"	8"	6"	5"	Total Length of Time Ship Fired	Firing Time of Main Btry	Firing Time of Sec- ondary Btry	
							Hr-Min	Hr-Min	Hr-Min	
TENNESSEE	69	127				305	5 51	3 22	1 18	
NEVADA	81	240				603	5 11	2 16	3 2	
IDAHO	13	85				15	8 29	2		4
TEXAS	19	124				200	3 31	2 11	-----	
NEW YORK	56	194				125	4 45	1 38	1 23	
ARKANSAS	50		163			21	2 45	2 30		10
TUSCALOOSA	12			44		35	2 12	30	2 6	
SALT LAKE CITY	27			210		42	7 6	8 51	-----	
PENSACOLA	52			196		31	3 53	3 40		4
CHESTER	34			275		100	4	3 57	1 20	
VICKSBURG	56				248	0				
	471	770	163	725	248	1477	4 hr. 46 min	3 hr. 5 min.	1 hr. 11 min.	average

NOTES: High number of targets fired upon is the result of area coverage in which all targets in area were counted as being fired upon. Firing times of main and secondary batteries are actual count of minutes ship was delivering fire. This eliminates time lost to "Check Fire", "Suspend Fire" or shift of targets.

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(e) BOMBARDMENT ON DOG MINUS TWO DAY.

(1) The plan for this day called for ships which were assigned areas of responsibility on and near the eastern beaches to close to about 3,000 yards, beginning at 0700, and fire destructive, deliberate fire until UDT operations on the eastern beaches necessitated a withdrawal in order that UDTs and their supporting ships might approach the beach. Ships firing on and in the vicinity of the western beaches were to fire from medium ranges so as to remain out of the line of ricochets. Upon completion of UDT operations off the eastern beaches at about 1230, ships assigned the western beaches were to close the range and execute deliberate destructive fire until about 1430, when UDT operations on the western beaches were to commence. During this period, ships assigned to the eastern beaches remained clear of the line of fire executing medium range bombardment. After 1430 ships assigned to the western beaches withdrew to allow UDTs and their supporting ships to close the western beach. Ships assigned to the northern areas of responsibility were scheduled for about six hours of bombardment, firing from medium ranges in order to permit minesweeping operations and to avoid ricochets.

(2) The plan was generally adhered to although ships were slow in closing the range; UDT operations on the east beaches took longer than anticipated, thus further limiting the time for close range destructive bombardment. The comparatively complicated movement schedules described above and the necessity of keeping major caliber fire at least 1,000 yards from the beaches to prevent interference with UDT operations, also severely limited the amount of time for short range bombardment. Although visibility conditions were excellent and both ships and air spotters were clearly able to observe their assigned target areas, both ships' report and photo assessment indicated very little destruction on this day. The battery at the foot of MOUNT SURIBACHI delivered heavy fire on LCI(G)s and supporting destroyers, while the battery in 219A delivered; at about 0930, heavy fire on PENSACOLA, with resultant casualties and damage. Based on incomplete reports, light AA seemed to be considerably reduced on the morning of Dog Minus One, indicating continuing damage on such installations. As indicated below, ammunition expenditures and overall firing times were generally met.

(3) The UDT operations on the eastern beaches are particularly worthy of comment, since either the movement of the LCI(G)s supporting positions 2,000 yards from the beach either was mistaken by the enemy as a landing attempt, or "trigger happy" individuals in enemy gun crews opened fire without orders. In either

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case, the enemy opened fire from defensive positions so that twelve LCI(G)s supporting the UDTs were all hit by enemy fire, much of it three to six inch caliber, causing extensive casualties and severe damage. Supporting destroyers, as well as battleships, delivered supporting fires, but because of smoke and dust on the beach, they experienced difficulty in picking out enemy weapons. The heavy volume of fire, in addition to a white phosphorus smoke screen materially reduced the volume of enemy fire. A hitherto undiscovered four-gun battery situated in IDAHO's area was disclosed in TA 166VW on top of the bluff in a position which enfiladed the entire landing beach. This discovery of additional enemy defensive positions as well as this full realization of the heavy fire power the enemy was able to bring to bear, was of paramount importance. Officers conducting the preliminary bombardment were impressed far more by this development than by negative results of photographic assessment of the day's firing; it brought home the large amount of damage yet to be inflicted on the enemy installations, and impressed all concerned with the absolute necessity of placing the bulk of remaining fire power in the vicinity of the preferred landing beaches.

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
DOG MINUS 2 DAY

Ship	No. of Targets Fired Upon	14"	12"	8"	6"	5"	Total Length of Time Ship Fired Hr-Min	Firing Time of Main Btry Hr-Min	Firing Time of Secun- dary Btry Hr-Min
TENNESSEE	76	249				1323	10 24 3	45 6	31
NEVADA	41	224				976	6 42 3	25 4	40
IDAHO	27	173				640	11 22 3	18 2	49
TEXAS	57	242				439	7 14 4	35 3	32
NEW YORK	47	261				187	6 33 4	14 1	23
ARKANSAS	11		605			226	6 34 5	9 1	55
TUSCALOOSA	43			431		645	8 8 5	17 -	-
SALT LAKE CITY	53			344		409	8 17 4	11 3	13
PENSACOLA	31			227		275	3 32 1	52 1	54
CHESTER	36			223		151	7 36 2	58	54
VICKSBURG	55			222		145			
	477	1149	605	1147		5416	7 hr. 46 min. average.	4 hr. 4 min. average.	2 hr. 11 min. average.

NOTES: Same as DOG MINUS 3 DAY.

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(4) For the remainder of the day IDAHO and TENNESSEE fired on high priority targets in their assigned areas. NEVADA and NEW YORK fired on blockhouses and pillboxes with main battery, utilizing five inch batteries on caves, hulks, and small installations. 40mm was used against enemy personnel in the open who from time to time attempted to leave their damaged installations.

(5) Ships assigned other areas carried out their firing at long ranges in accordance with the original plan.

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Ship	No. of Targets Fired Upon	14"	12"	8"	6"	5"	Total Length of Time Ship Fired Hr-Min	Firing time of Main Btry Hr-Min	Firing Time of Secon- dary Btry Hr-Min
TENNESSEE	73	436				427	9 19	4 14	3 32
NEVADA	57	470				338	9 52	5 19	5 48
IDAHO	32	343					11 17	6 8	2 13
TEXAS	31	195				207	5 37	5 30	1
NEW YORK	22	586				387	9 42	9 14	7 10
ARKANSAS	45		436				8 14	7 36	- - -
TUSCALOOSA	47			289		112	4 39	2 21	36
SALT LAKE CITY	56			545		63	10 14	6 54	16
PENSACOLA	63			355		58	6 47	6 46	2 27
CHESTER	27			275		111	8 10	6 43	1 20
VICKSBURG	47					1382	29		
	499	2030	436	1464	1382	1732	8 hr.	6 hr.	2 hr.
							23 min.	12 min.	26 min.
							average.	average.	average.

NOTES: Same as DOG MINUS 3 DAY.

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


FIGURE 2

Area of Responsibility
D-1

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SHIP	AMMO ALLOWED					AMMO EXPENDED					TIME		ACTUAL TIME AT FIRING		OVERALL TFT		TFT		TARGETS, TARGETS		
	14"	12"	8"	6"	5"	14"	12"	8"	6"	5"	3"	ALLOTTED	TARGET	TIME	H M	H M	SEC	BTRY	ASST	GND	FIRING AT
												H M	H M	H M	H M	H M					D-3 D-2 D-1
TENNESSEE	1000					812				1840		18-15	33-40	25-34	11-19	11-21			72	74	76 73
NEVADA	1000					467				1776		19-30	33-15	21-45	10-58	12-20			56	83	41 57
IDAHO	1000					656				1021		18-45	33-00	25-00	11-26	5-06			48	31	27 32
TEXAS	850					561				646		18-30	32-40	16-22	12-19	1-52			56	26	57 31
NEW YORK	850					1037				712 526		19-15	33-10	21-00	14-06	9-46			53	36	47 22
ARKANSAS	850					935				495 435		17-45	33-00	17-23	15-15	2-05			39	42	11 45
TUSCALOOSA	990					764				792		18-30	31-50	14-59	8-08	2-42			167	12	43 47
SALT LAKE CITY	900					1009				514		17-30	32-25	25-37	19-56	3-29			59	25	53 56
PENACOLA	990					778				364		17-45	31-45	14-12	13-17	4-23			80	53	31 63
CHESTER	990					773				362		17-30	33-15	19-46	13-38	3-34			17	30	36 27
VICKSBURG	2760					1866				365		18-30	22-14	18-58	11-51	4-03			77	33	40 47
TOTAL	4700	850	3870	2760		3533	935	3414	1866	8887	961								724	445	462 500

TO BE EXPENDED AS REQUIRED

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The number of targets destroyed or damaged by the preliminary bombardment cannot be accurately determined until the results obtained from JICPOA intelligence teams have been analyzed. The photo coverage of the front and flanks of the main landing beaches was not complete, nor were the photos clear enough to determine all destruction or damage. For this reason API results undoubtedly indicate less destruction and damage than was actually accomplished.

Based on various sources including examination of installations, photographs, statements of SFCP personnel, and POW reports, the following target destruction and damage is believed to have been accomplished on and adjacent to landing beaches.

The four coast defense guns at the base of SURIBACHI were destroyed on D-1, (although API results indicated only two damaged) as were the seven coast defense guns at the top of the quarry in target area 183UV which had fired on D-2 at the LCI(G)s with such telling effect. Two additional guns to the east of the quarry were also destroyed. As far as is now known no high velocity gun remained capable of delivering direct fire on boats or the landing beaches on D-day.

All blockhouses in the 5thMarDiv zone of action were destroyed or damaged. At least one substantial covered artillery emplacement containing one short barreled 12cm cannon was undamaged. This gun was sited for firing on the 4thMarDiv beaches.

In the 4thMarDiv zone, at least two blockhouses are known to have been intact as well as one large covered artillery emplacement. Therefore, of the 37 blockhouses on the main landing beaches, it is reasonably established that almost all of these were destroyed or damaged.

Pillboxes, due to their small size and consequent difficulty of identification and of obtaining direct hits, were more difficult to destroy or damage. In the 4thMarDiv zone up to 400 yards inland from the beach, approximately 70% of the pillboxes were destroyed or damaged. From 400 yards inland to the eastern edge of No. 1 airfield about 30% were destroyed. In the 5thMarDiv zone the majority of pillboxes were destroyed.

Light anti-aircraft guns located on or near the beach areas were all slightly damaged. The percentage of these weapons that were still capable of firing is unknown. However, light anti-aircraft fire on D-Day was lighter in volume than on any previous day. Undoubtedly this was partially due to the heavy D-day firing.

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Heavy anti-aircraft guns (4.7 DP guns) was lighter in volume than on any previous day. The 5 gun battery in the 5thMarDiv zone was slightly damaged but apparently did not fire during Dog-Day. The cluster of dual purpose guns in 184XY, which were located in an excellent position to fire on the ship to shore movement apparently were either damaged by preliminary bombardment or neutralized by Dog-day fires, since ships reports indicate that these guns did not fire on Dog-day.

The 4 mortar battery at the western base of SURIBACHI was destroyed and abandoned by its crew; however a battery of 4-150mm mortars located near the Eastern base of SURIBACHI was not destroyed.

Mortars located on the North flank in the 4thMarDiv zone were not discovered during the preliminary bombardment. In this connection the impossibility of locating mortar positions during preliminary bombardment must be expected, due to their small size, ease of camouflage, and the fact that the mortars would not fire during this period.

The final results of the preliminary bombardment must be lumped with the Dog-day fires, for the enemy resistance encountered is a sure measure of their combined effectiveness. As pointed out later in section 3(h) and (i), resistance from direct fire weapons in and immediately adjacent to the landing beach was light compared with what might have developed had less damage or destruction been accomplished.

(g) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) Conclusions.

a. That the preliminary bombardment accomplished its major task; i.e. destroyed or damaged the majority of the beach defenses and allowed a landing to be made.

b. That the preliminary bombardment did not destroy or damage vital enemy installations and weapons which could have been destroyed had more time or ships been available. Specifically, the installations referred to are the pillboxes and covered emplacements between Airfield No. 1 and 2 (TAs 182A to J inclusive and MNORS), and those to the East and West of Airfield No. 2 (TAs 181EJ, 185A to J inclusive, 184AF, 1980TY, 199A to X inclusive, 200AFGKLPWXY, 201U, 216QPVMX). The capture of this terrain was a long and costly process extending over a period of about 8 days. Had additional bombardment time been available, this vital area could

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have been captured more quickly and at a lighter cost. It is fully realized that the broken terrain in the 4thMarDiv zone, as well as in the Northern portion of the island was such that destruction of all the defensive installations could not be readily accomplished with naval guns, nor was such destruction expected. But the areas outlined above were largely accessible to direct fire at relatively short ranges, a most favorable condition for destruction.

c. That the employment of Amphibious Group I to direct the preliminary bombardment was of major importance and vitally contributed to the efficiency of the bombardment conducted. The success of preliminary bombardment to a large measure hinges on adequate photo coverage with accurate damage assessment provided by trained photo interpreters.

d. Based on photo interpretation, the value of the bombardment by ships prior to D-3 Day, is not apparent, nor does the effect of heavy bombardment aircraft over a lengthy period appear productive of appreciable destruction of specific installations, and did not compensate fully for the additional preliminary Naval Gunfire requested.

(2) Recommendations.

a. That the time allotted for preliminary bombardment in future operations be based on a careful analysis of the vital targets to be destroyed, and that such analysis provide for the probability of increase of targets at the objective, both by construction and through the uncovering of camouflaged installations. In this connection, the value of heavy bombardment aviation should not be over emphasized.

b. That ships executing bombardments for the purpose of assisting future landing operations operate under the direction of the O.I.C. of the Amphibious Support Group designated to control the preliminary bombardment.

c. That Amphibious Support Group be designated to conduct preliminary bombardments in future operations, and that the Landing Force Naval Gunfire Officer accompany this group in the capacity of a Landing Force representative.

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(1) Summary of the Plan.

In the gunfire plans previously drawn for the capture of the MARIANAS and other PACIFIC Islands, gunfire had lifted from the beach area to a distance of approximately 1000 yards inland and to the flanks in order to insure a margin of safety for assault elements. On SAIPAN this had resulted in failure to cover many enemy weapons within this beachhead area. Heavy casualties had resulted from this lack of adequate coverage as well as from the failure to cover artillery in positions more remote from the beaches. Since VAC and the 4thMarDiv had participated in the SAIPAN operation, it was strongly felt by these organizations that the Dog-Day plan must include the closest practicable fire support for our troops after the landing in order to neutralize enemy weapons as long as possible and reduce casualties. It was felt that some casualties among our own troops were acceptable in order to get the closest possible fire support.

A rolling barrage patterned after that delivered by artillery, was deemed most suitable for supplying that close support. With the assistance of the 4thMarDiv assistant operations officer (who was the division's former naval gunfire officer), a rolling barrage plan was drawn up based on the probable rate of advance of our own troops. This plan was designed to keep the close limit of the fire 400 yards from our own troops, assuming a pattern size of 200 yards from the 5" batteries which were to execute the plan. The terrain inland from the landing beaches lent itself to this scheme since it was clear of vegetation and was a positive slope for an average distance of 500 yards inland. This would facilitate spotting as well as provide an additional overhead clearance factor. However, the prevailing winds were known to blow directly into the line of fire and it was anticipated that spotting would be complicated by smoke and dust from our own fall of shot, obscuring the impact area. The use of VOF spotting aircraft and WP projectiles used as marker slavs was expected to partially overcome this difficulty.

In order to position sufficient ships off the landing beaches so that adequate neutralization fire could be provided, it was necessary to place ships in boat lanes as indicated in the schematic drawing "General Plan of Fires D-Day". It was expected that this placement of ships would complicate the ship to shore movement but this was acceptable to VAC and ComPhibsPac in view of the necessity for the fire support.

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It was planned to commence firing with the main batteries of the heavy ships at H-140. This fire was to be directed at targets of opportunity within assigned areas of responsibility with particular attention to C.D. and AA batteries in order to cover the close approach of fire support ships and aircraft. An air strike was scheduled from H-55 to H-35 during which time the ships were to take their final positions for delivery of the close supporting fire. At H-35 ships firing on, and to the flanks of, the landing beaches were to fire air bursts to inflict maximum casualties on any exposed personnel manning trenches and open emplacements. As the leading wave of LVTs passed through the line of fire support ships (at about H-25) ships shifted to impact bursts with Mk 29 fuzes, concentrating on any enemy defenses located within their assigned area. At H-15 ships were to shift to 1200 foot/second powder and fire from the edge of the beach to a distance of 200 yards inland. The purpose of the 1200 foot/second ammunition was to give adequate clearance over the LCI(G)s and other support craft in the line of fire, as well as to give maximum clearance over the heads of troops. Thereafter the barrage was to lift in accordance with the schedule as shown in General Plan of Fire D-Day.

Fires on the flanks were planned so as to move laterally away from the landing beaches. Considerable attention was devoted, during the planning, to a determination of when to lift fire from the various blocks in the north flank. Many estimates of troop advance were made before a final decision to lift fire from the first block on the right flank at H plus 12 was agreed upon. This proved to be too early, as will be indicated later. On the left or southern flank, a particularly difficult problem was posed due to the conformation of SURIBACHI and to the troop scheme of maneuver in this zone. The 28th Marines, landing on BEACH GREEN ONE (the most southerly beach), planned to push BLT 1/28 directly across the island, while BLT 2/28 was to land at H plus 35, pivot and attack SURIBACHI. It was therefor necessary to keep the slopes of SURIBACHI and its base under fire so as to neutralize enemy weapons which could be brought to bear on BLT 1/28 as it moved across the island and until such time as BLT 2/28 could commence its attack on SURIBACHI. Initially it was planned to lift fire from the base of SURIBACHI at H plus 40 and from the slopes at H plus 60. Consideration of the absolute necessity of keeping this vital area neutralized until it could be taken under fire from infantry weapons dictated that the fire be scheduled to lift on order. This involved the delivery of accurate fire within 200 yards of the left flank of our own troops for an indefinite period.

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Previous experience had indicated the difficulty of establishing early SFCP-firing ship communication. Casualties to personnel and equipment, and trouble encountered in setting up the bulky TBX-8 or SCR 284 were problems that had to be taken into consideration. In order to provide an alternate means of communication, which would be able to function effectively soon after H-Hour, it was decided to boat NLOs in a "free" LVT equipped with a TCS radio. This radio was to be set on the SFCP-firing ship frequency. The NLO was supplied with SCR 300. The spotter landing with his team had an SCR 500 in addition to the team's organic radio. The SCR 300 was to be used to establish communications with the NLO afloat. This net was to operate until the spotter could set up and establish communications with the firing ship on the TBX-8 or SCR-284, at which time the NLO was to land and join the battalion.

It was felt that this plan would insure communication with the firing ship as early as possible and would provide the troops with a spotting agent if their attached spotter could not set up his larger radio or could not observe due to terrain conformation. This plan was approved by VAC and divisions were directed to make LVTs available for this purpose.

(b) GUNBOAT PLANS.

(1) LCS(L)

Ample supporting craft of the LCS(L) type were made available for fire support missions. Two units each composed of six LCS(L), were scheduled to fire 4.5" rockets for beach preparation and in close support of the landing.

In conjunction with two six-ship LCI(G) units they were to deliver rocket barrages from H-90 to H-45 on suspected inflammables along the landing beaches and were to support the ship to shore movement by salvos of rockets as the waves moved toward the beach.

The LCS(L) were to fire their first salvo in support of the leading wave at H-10 against the beaches. The second salvo was to be fired as rapidly as launchers could be reloaded against positions 300 to 500 yards inland.

Upon completion of the rocket salvos at about H-5, four boats of each LCS(L) unit were to take position off the northern and southern flanks of the beaches and support the battalions to which they were assigned by delivering 40mm fire.

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Four ships were assigned to BLT 3/25 on the north flank, two were assigned to BLT 1/28 and two were assigned to BLT 2/28, the south battalions. The gunboats came up on the frequency of the SFCP to which they were assigned and were available for call fire missions. A replacement NLO or spotter of the Marine division concerned was placed aboard the unit commander's flagship to assist in the location of targets of opportunity and to advise him on the troops scheme of maneuver.

(2) LCI(M)s.

Three six-ship units of LCI(M)s were scheduled to support the landings. Two units using Plan A (See FMF SOP MGF-1) were to deliver fire from H-35 to H-7 on the eastern slopes of SURIBACHI while the third unit, using the same plan was to fire on the high ground of the right flank.

At H-Hour the two units at the south flank were to cross the boat lane and follow the sixth wave toward shore. At H plus 20, when about 2000 yards from shore, all ships of these two units opened fire. An area approximately 2200 yards long and 1000 yards deep was covered. The ships closed to within 1000 yards of the beach and while lying to maintained fires 1800 yards inland until H plus four hours.

The third unit at H-7, shifted its line of fire eastward for safety reasons and at H plus 10 commenced neutralization fires which continued until H plus four hours.

(3) LCI(R) and LCI(G).

One LCI(R) unit consisting of nine ships was to deliver rocket fire against positions in the MOTOYAMA area. Their fire was to commence at H-135 and continue throughout the day.

The assigned plan called for the employment of two units of LCI(G)s each unit consisting of six ships. Due to casualties sustained during their support of UDT operations only three of these ships were available for supporting fires on Dog-Day.

Working in conjunction with the LCS(L)s they delivered supporting 4.5" rocket fire as has been indicated above.

(c) REPETITION OF FIRES.

In view of the impossibility of determining the rate

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of advance of our troops after the landing a means had to be proved to continue or repeat certain "blocks" of the barrage as dictated by actual troop advance.

Since the repetition of any blocks of fire had to be based on accurate and timely front line positions, and since the normal chain of communications would not provide such information in time to allow appropriate action to be taken, the Division Tactical Air Observers were directed to report the location of our front lines continuously direct to divisions over the SAO net. In addition the observer was to make positive recommendations for the repetition of fires whenever our troops appeared to lag behind the barrage. These decisions were to be based on the air observers knowledge of the naval gunfire barrage plan.

These air observers reports were received by the Division Naval Gunfire Officer, who in conjunction with the D-3, decided quickly whether or not to request repetition of a certain block or blocks of fire. If a decision was made to repeat fires, CTF 51 (controlling gunfire in the ELDORADO) was so requested over the gunfire control circuit.

In order to effect coordination between divisions in the repetition of fires, Corps maintained watch on the tactical air observers net of both the 4th and 5th MarDivs. Corps could rapidly determine the effect of a repetition of fires on the adjacent division, if such a request did not interfere with the adjacent division's movement, Corps would concur over the gunfire control. This information had to be passed over the gunfire control net since gunfire was controlled from the ELDORADO while the Corps staff was embarked in the AUBURN.

When concurrence from Corps was received, CTF 51 would direct the proper ships to repeat fires in the designated block or blocks and would state the duration of the repetition. After a repetition was delivered, the remaining schedule was adhered to as to the blocks of fires and their duration.

(d) VOF.

A squadron of specially trained air spotters made its first appearance controlling fires in the PACIFIC in this operation. The squadron was a veteran of EUROPEAN operations.

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Thirty-two pilots equipped with 24 FM-2 fighter type aircraft and 6 TBFs were available. The FM-2s were equipped with a two channel MF radio and a ten channel VHF set.

The unit trained with ships and SFCs in the HAWAIIAN area. Their workmanlike performance during this training period indicated that the squadron would be a valuable asset during an operation. The squadron was capable of maintaining 8 VOF on station throughout Dog-Day and Dog plus 1. Thereafter 6 planes would be kept in the air for spotting missions.

On Dog-Day the aircraft were assigned to the assault battalions and to the destroyers firing the rolling barrage. Larger ships were expected to supply their own ship based observation planes.

Due to the necessity of pre-setting MF radios prior to take off it was necessary to assign definite frequencies to a definite group of planes and to make provisions for their proper assignment and relief.

The air spotter working with the SFCs was considered an elevated spotting station. His mission was to work in close liaison with the SFC and to bring fire on targets of opportunity in the zone of action of the assault battalion. Control of these fires was given to the SFCs for safety.

(c) BRIEFING.

The plan as finally drawn was the product of virtually all echelons of command. The gunnery officers of PhibsPac and Com Grp II, the VAC gunfire officer and the Naval Gunfire Officers of the 4th and 5th MarDivs worked in close coordination. Questions were fully discussed and completely considered before they were incorporated into the plan. The plan itself was closely studied by all echelons and in its final form represented the efforts of all organizations, and three months of work.

It was realized that all hands had to know the plan completely. The assault troops who were to follow the barrage, the firing ships which had to maintain a complicated schedule of fire while keeping station in the midst of boats, had to be thoroughly familiar with all phases.

Briefing of our fire support ships was carried out at PEARL HARBOR, ULITHI and SAIPAN. The SFCs were briefed at PEARL HARBOR and all assault forces were advised of the naval gunfire plan en-route to the objective.

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(f) EXECUTION OF FIRES - DOG DAY.

(1) Naval gunfire on Dog Day commenced at dawn. Ships fired in their assigned areas of responsibility or at specific targets within these areas from H-140 to H-55, lifted fires for the air strike, and then resumed fire at H-35. Ships assigned fire support stations in the vicinity of the boat lanes moved into position in these congested areas smoothly and promptly.

The weather was clear and bright with the wind blowing almost along, rather than into, the line of fire (as had been expected). Visibility conditions for spotting were consequently excellent.

LVT(A)s and boats moved from the line of departure to the beach receiving light small arms, mortar, and artillery fires. During the ship to shore movement, six of the eight SFCPs established communications with the assigned firing ships. Unfortunately, neither of the vital flank battalion SFCPs working with the VICKS-BURG and SANTA FE were able to get into communication at this time.

Fires lifted from the first block of the barrage (200 yard strip along the beach) at H-3. Thereafter the fires continued to lift in accordance with barrage schedule (See diagram "General Plan of Fires D-Day") until repetition of fires was ordered by CTF 51, using the plan described in (c) above. The barrage as observed from seaward seemed to be accurately placed and to lift promptly at the required time. Ships had no apparent difficulty in maintaining their fires in the required block ahead of the troops by employing VOF spot and WP marker slaves. As the barrage progressed, troops lagged behind the fire due to enemy resistance encountered, and, as a result, it was necessary to repeat fires as indicated below.

The request for repetition included such information as blocks concerned, ship or ships concerned and time of commencement and duration of fire in the repeated block.

0934 - 5thMarDiv requests that series 1000 yards inland from its beaches be continued until H/45.

NOTE: It was too late to take action on this request, but ships did fire on specific targets in this area as directed by air spotters.

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- 0940 - NEVADA and BILOXI ordered to maintain fires in series 1200 yards inland in 5thMarDiv area until H/60.
- 1003 - NEVADA and BILOXI ordered to maintain fires in series 1200 yards inland in 5thMarDiv area until H/75.
- 1025 - 4thMarDiv requests repetition of fires in area 500 yards north of their right flank beach until H/105. VICKSBURG delivered the fire.
- 1043 - 4thMarDiv requests repetition of fires in area 1200 yards inland until H/120. NEWCOMB, TENNESSEE and H.L. EDWARDS delivered the fire.
- 1153 - 4thMarDiv requests repetition of fires in area 1200 yards inland until H/220. NEWCOMB, TENNESSEE and BENNION delivered the fire.
- 1342 - NORTH CAROLINA, IDAHO, INDIANAPOLIS, CHESTER, and TUSCALOOSA ordered to continue fires in their areas of responsibility until ordered lifted.

The SANTA FE maintained fires on the base of SURIBACHI on request of SFCs until about 1400; this fire being within 200 yards of our own troops. VICKSBURG maintained fires on the high ground north of the BLUE landing beaches.

Ships firing deep support missions in areas of responsibility outside of the barrage area maintained neutralization fires, except when specific targets were located by their plane or ships spotters. Tactical air observers reported many suitable targets in areas of responsibility which were relayed to general support ships for neutralization.

As in previous operations, SFCs established communications and fired their first mission at varying times. The first call fire mission was fired at H-Hour and the last SFC to gain communications and fire on Dog Day conducted a mission at H/270, although the assigned VOF plane fired missions considerably before this time.

Firing continued throughout the day with VOF spotters playing a very important role in call fires since the observation for SFCs was very limited.

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(2) SFCEP - FIRING SHIP COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Time of contact with fire support ship and method employed.

The assault battalions succeeded in establishing communication with their supporting ships on Dog-Day at times ranging from H-30 to H/360.

BLTs 1/28, 1/23, 2/23, 1/27, 2/27 and 1/25, who made use of the TCS radio in the LVT, were able to gain contact at about H-30, while still afloat. The other assault elements, whose initial contact was to be made after reaching the beach, had varying success

BLT 1/27 was in communication at H/20, while BLT 2/23, which suffered loss of men and equipment in its Shore Fire Control Party, did not reach its ship until H/270. BLT 1/28 suffered similar losses and it was not until H/150 that they were in communication.

The methods of contact used differed as much as did the times. The Shore Fire Control Party personnel displayed a great deal of initiative and knowledge of communication channels in establishing radio contact with their fire support units, whose assistance was so desperately needed during Dog-Day.

In some cases the liaison officer remained off shore and observed fire from the LVT, passing the commands directly to the ship. In other instances, though afloat, he used his radio as a relay station and passed to the ship commands which had been given him by the spotter, who was ashore with an SCR 300.

Other units did not conduct any fires until the Shore Fire Control Parties were ashore and had set up their TBX radios. As has been stated earlier, the times at which this was accomplished varied among the battalions.

The most novel method was employed in RCT 25. After the Shore Fire Control Party had become ineffectual because of casualties, the Commanding Officer of BLT 3/25 passed commands over his SCR 300 net to the RCT 25 Command Post afloat. The Regimental liaison officer passed these on to the fire support ships concerned and effective Naval Gunfire was placed on enemy positions which were firing on the battalion.

The following table illustrates the Dog-Day communication of SFCEP.

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(g) DOG-DAY EXECUTION OF GUNBOAT SUPPORT.

LCS(L)

This type of support craft carried out their assigned Dog-Day missions as specified in the Naval Gunfire plan.

Due to the loss of the LCI(G)s, which were destroyed or damaged during the UDT operation, it became necessary to make minor changes in the disposition of the LCS(L)s. To cover completely the assigned areas, the spacing of LCS(L)s was increased and each ship covered wider target area. No difficulty was experienced in accomplishing this, and, despite the absence of nine LCI(G)s, the assigned areas were well covered by 4.5" rocket fire.

The initial salvos were fired by these units between H-90 and H-45. Upon completion of these, the ships took stations and led the leading wave shoreward firing their two full salvos by H-5.

After delivering this fire, four ships from each unit took position on the north and south flanks and supported their assigned battalions by 40mm fire. Until communication was established with SFCs, their fire was directed by the replacement officers embarked in one LCS(L) of each unit.

The 40mm fire was directed against targets in the SURIBACHI and MOTOYAMA areas. The fire proved most effective and SFCs report that enemy small arms fire was considerably reduced when positions were covered by 40mm's.

Replacement spotters aboard these ships report that few actual call fires were requested. The SFCs contacted their assigned LCS(L)s and directed that 40mm fire which was in the process of being delivered be continued since it was proving an effective neutralizing agent.

The eight LCS(L) assigned to the flank units continued to fire close support missions throughout the day. During the night, four LCS(L) were assigned the flank battalions and continued to fire call fires with their 40mm's.

ASSAULT BATTALIONS COMMUNICATIONS ANALYSIS DOG-DAY (Based on SFC Reports)									
BLT	SFCP	SCR 536	SCR 300	TCS*	TEX-2	Time of Landing on Beach	Time of First Mission	REMARKS	
3/25	NLO	Contacted SFC at H-30	Bn CO to Reg. NLO in PC Boat at H-75		Reg. NLO to F.S. at H-120	H-730	H-120	Communications with F.S. never established. SFC suffered heavy casualties to personnel and equipment. NLO lost all equipment upon landing. Fire missions transmitted by Bn CO to Reg NLO afloat who in turn relayed to the VICKSBURG via TEX-2.	
	SFC	Contacted NLO at H-30				H-4			
	NLO		Contacted SFC at H-60	Contacted F.S. at H-60	Contacted F.S. at H-60	H-18	H-60	Spotter suffered casualties to equipment and personnel upon landing and was inoperative until H-7 when he joined NLO party in Bn CP. Fire missions conducted by NLO using plane spot exclusively.	
1/25	SFC	Contacted F.S. at H-90	Contacted NLO at H-60			H-18			
	NLO	Contacted F.S. and SFC at H-60	Contacted SFC at H-60	Contacted F.S. at H-60	Contacted F.S. at H-7 Hrs	H-7 Hrs	H-70	SFC suffered casualties to equipment and personnel. NLO remained afloat in LVT and relayed spotter's requests. NLO used spotting plane extensively to locate and direct fire on targets.	
	SFC	Contacted F.S. and NLO at H-60	Contacted NLO at H-60			H-8			
2/23	NLO		Contacted SFC at H-40	Contacted F.S. at H-60	Contacted F.S. at H-60	H-40	H-15	Casualties to SFC's TCS Jeep, SCR 300 and TEX-2 prevented continuous communication by spotter to F.S. and NLO. NLO's TEX-2 used from H-60 on. VOF used to conduct counter battery fire from H-15 throughout Dog-Day.	
	SFC	Contacted F.S. at H-30	Contacted NLO at H-40			H-7			
	NLO	Contacted SFC at H-30		Contacted F.S. at H-60		H-15		Casualties to personnel and equipment. VOF Spotting plane used to good advantage throughout day. First mission fired was targets in SURIBACHI Area.	
1/27	SFC	Contacted NLO at H-30			Contacted F.S. at H-20	H-2		Communication trouble throughout day. Rapid displacement of battalion and loss of equipment made SFC ineffective on Dog-Day.	
	NLO		Contacted Reg. and Div at H-15	Contacted F.S. at H-45		H-180	None Fired on Dog-Day		
	SFC	Contacted SFC 281 and Bn CO at H-12			Contacted F.S. and NLO at H-150	H-12			
1/28	NLO		Contacted SFC at H-20	Contacted F.S. at H-30		H-240		SFC suffered casualties to personnel and equipment. NLO fired first mission from offshore at enemy artillery emplacement.	
	SFC		Contacted NLO at H-20		Contacted F.S. at H-150	H-12	H-Hr		
	NLO		Contacted Div Gunfire Officer at H-40		Contacted F.S. at H-270	H-35	H-270	SFC experienced casualties to equipment and personnel. Unable to establish communications with F.S. Notified Div by SCR 300 and SFC 283 when committed was assigned the SAWA FE. When communications were finally established, the THOMAS E. FEASER was assigned for support.	
2/28	NLO					H-35			
	SFC					H-35			
	NLO								

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LCI(M).

The three units of LCI(M) followed the scheduled plan and delivered their fires on the flanks and in deep support. As was indicated above, these ships had definite areas to cover, and reports indicate that they effectively carried out their mission.

The mortar units fired a total of 17,400 rounds of 4.2" mortar shells in support of the landing; upon completion of their scheduled fires they withdrew from their beach area and replenished ammunition.

During the night of Dog-Day, two six-ship units delivered harassing fires as requested by Corps. Using Plan A, these units fired 24,000 rounds. Fires were kept about 1000 yards in front of our lines. Though the more northern unit was subjected to artillery fire from enemy positions, no withdrawal was made.

LCI(G) and LCI(R).

The three available LCI(G) delivered their scheduled 4.5" rocket fires in conjunction with the LCS(L) units. Upon completion of this mission, at about H-5, these ships withdrew from the beach area and were not used further on Dog-Day.

The LCI(R) unit delivered its schedule of fires on the MOTOYAMA Area. Fire commenced at 0645 and was maintained until 1300 when the supply of 5" SSR was exhausted. The unit had no further fire support missions during the operation.

(h) RESISTANCE ENCOUNTERED BY THE LANDING FORCE.

In order properly to assess the combined results of the preliminary and Dog-Day bombardments, it is necessary to examine the resistance actually encountered by assault troops. These reports of resistance are obtained from the SFCP personnel and are believed to be reasonably accurate.

RCT 25, landing on Beach BLUE, received small arms, mortar and artillery fire beginning at H-Hour and increasing in intensity after H plus one hour. Small arms and automatic weapon fire came from the high terrace and quarry on the north flank and from some pill-boxes about 200 yards inland and to the right front. Mortar and artillery fire seemed to be coming from the north and northwest. The resistance encountered by this RCT was the heaviest of any received by the landing force.

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RCT 23, landing on Beach YELLOW, received small arms, mortar, and artillery fire soon after landing. The small arms seemed to be coming from a few pillboxes and one intact blockhouse. After these installations were overcome, and some advance had been made, heavy machine gun fire was received from a group of pillboxes and a blockhouse at the foot of the Airfield No. 1. Mortar and artillery fire from the north flank increased in intensity after H-Hour.

RCT 27, landing on Beach RED, initially received little fire. Some small arms and mortar fire was received from the SURIBACHI area as well as some small arms fire from the front. The advance of this RCT was the most rapid and it is logical to assume that the initial resistance encountered by this RCT was the lightest on the front.

RCT 28, landing on Beach GREEN, initially received very little resistance; there was no artillery fire on the beaches, but intermittent mortar fire and some small arms fire was later received from the base of SURIBACHI and vicinity. This fire increased in intensity, and it is evident that the defenders were neutralized during the heavy bombardment, but regained some of their effectiveness when the supporting fires slackened.

(i) LOCATION OF CONTROLLING AGENCIES.

As has been previously mentioned, control of NGF and air support was exercised by CTF 51 on the ELDORADO while the Corps Commander and his Staff were located with CTF 53 on the AUBURN. This separation of the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer and the Gunnery Officer of CTF 51 introduced some confusion and misunderstanding, as well as considerable amount of additional transmissions over the NGF control circuit. However, NGF support did not suffer materially due to this separation of command agencies.

(j) CONCLUSIONS.

(1) That the Dog-Day bombardment, in conjunction with the destruction accomplished in the preliminary firing, enabled a successful landing to be made against one of the enemy's most heavily and skillfully defended possessions, with acceptable casualties.

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(2) That in spite of a particularly heavy area coverage in rear of the landing beaches, it was impossible to neutralize all artillery and mortars. This was partially due to the effectiveness of camouflage, and the protection afforded by carefully built emplacements. This prevented the discovery of these weapons, or when discovered, necessitated direct hits due to the excellent protection afforded.

(3) That the employment of a rolling barrage, with provision for a repetition of fires, if the troop rate of advance is not as fast as anticipated, should be employed whenever terrain conditions permit.

(4) That the use of 1200 foot/second powder is sufficiently accurate for overhead fire.

(5) That positioning of ships within boat lanes is feasible without excessive interference in the ship to shore movement. The positioning of ships within 500 yards is practicable.

(6) That the maximum employment of LCI(M) in Dog-Day bombardment is desirable due to large amount of fire power available, and the accuracy with which the fire can be delivered.

(7) That the use of LVTs equipped with TCS radios as offshore spotting stations offers a partial solution to the difficulty of establishing early SFCP-firing ship communications.

(8) That the use of replacement spotters and liaison officers in gunboat support craft adds greatly to the effectiveness of these craft.

(9) That the landing of SFCP spotters and their team in the 2d or 3d wave is generally too early, particularly where heavy opposition is expected, resulting in disorganization and casualties with no real gain in gunfire support.

(10) The introduction of VOF spotters, who were thoroughly trained in their duties, was a major contribution to the effectiveness of Dog-Day fires.

(11) To avoid confusion, the Corps and Attack Force Gunfire Officer should be on the same ship.

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(k) RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) That the rolling barrage, with provision for a repetition of fires, be used whenever practicable and that in planning this barrage, an average rate of troop advance or below be employed for assignment of zones of fire.

(2) That maximum use of LCI(M)s be made in the Dog-Day bombardments.

(3) That the LVT be used by NLOs as offshore spotting stations until the spotter ashore has established communications with the firing ship; and that the spotter land with his team in the same wave as the battalion commander.

(4) That replacement SFOP officer personnel be provided by FMF, Pac as necessary to act as liaison officers and offshore spotters with gunboat support craft.

(5) That in future operations the Landing Force Naval Gunfire Officer and the Gunnery Officer of the Amphibious Staff in control of bombardment, be together.

4. FIRES SUBSEQUENT TO DOG-DAY

(a) COORDINATION OF AIR, NAVAL GUNFIRE, AND ARTILLERY.

In order fully to exploit the capabilities of all supporting arms, emphasis in training had been placed on coordination of Air, Naval Gunfire and Artillery. Through this training all echelons of command were cognizant of the value of the fire support available and took steps to insure its proper utilization. The procedure employed in planning prearranged fires was as follows: After receipt of the attack order by the infantry battalion all liaison officers and the battalion commander (or his representative) discussed the plan of attack and the employment of supporting arms for assisting the attack. Targets for night harassing fires and for the preparation were assigned with due regard to the capabilities of each. This plan was forwarded to regiment for approval.

In the regiment the same system was employed, i.e., a meeting of liaison officers and the commander. Battalion plans for employment of direct support artillery and ships were examined, and if satisfactory to the regiment, were approved; if not satisfactory,

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battalions were directed where to place their fires. Additional fire support over and above that available from direct support was requested from division through Artillery and Naval Gunfire staff officers. In many cases the necessity of spotters being able to observe prearranged fires in support of the attack was not taken into consideration, and ships delivered unobserved fires. The necessity of a spotter either on the ground or in the air to spot the fire of direct-support ships is self-evident if accuracy is to be obtained.

On division levels, final coordination was achieved by the Commander, or his representative, and the division Air, Naval Gunfire and Artillery Officers. Regimental requests for additional fires were examined and either approved or disapproved. If approved they were consolidated into the final division plan, along with fires desired by the division based on the latest intelligence information. For the most part targets were selected with the view of using the most suitable weapon for their destruction or neutralization. When divisions had a heavy support ship allotted, targets were directly assigned. In the later phases when no heavy ships were assigned to divisions, requests for all additional naval gunfire had to be made to Corps. The system of coordination used in the 3dMarDiv seems to offer considerable advantage and a description thereof is quoted:

"The basic means of coordination between supporting arms was to achieve close and lasting personal liaison on all levels. Targets were freely interchanged according to the method of attack best suited, and whenever operations were in progress or prospect, the Artillery, Naval Gunfire, and Air Officers were together or readily accessible to each other by wire. Plans for scheduled fires or pre-King Hour preparations were habitually prepared jointly, and so presented to the G-3, Chief of Staff and Commanding General. Much of the success achieved can be traced to the separate maintenance of a "Supporting Arms Tent", so called, adjacent to the G-3 section. In this center, wire communications converged from the division switchboard, from the similar 5thPhibCorps establishment, from the Division Artillery fire direction center and from Naval Gunfire and Air radio centrals. It was thus possible to establish any sort of communication necessary, and to plan without interruption while being within a few steps of the G-3 section."

After Corps was established ashore, the division requests for additional naval gunfire were received by Corps about 2400 to 0200

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over a direct telephone line. Prior to the Corps being established ashore, such requests were received on the AUBURN over the NGF control circuit. These requests were discussed in detail by the Corps NGFO with the Div NGFO concerned. In connection with this, it was the tendency of divisions during the early phases to request additional naval gunfire support on a large number of small target areas for the King-Hour Preparation. In view of the fact that usually only two or three heavy ships were available for such firing and since the preparation usually lasted about thirty minutes it was found uneconomical to fire on a relatively large number of small targets. This was due to the large pattern size of heavy ships, the length of time necessary to adjust the fire on the targets, and the inability of the ships to shift rapidly from one target to another without adjusting the fire on the new target. Divisions were afterwards requested to assign the relatively small target areas to Corps Artillery, whose smaller pattern size would allow more efficient coverage and to reserve large single target areas for the general support ships. When requests for fire exceeded the support available the decision as to what fires would be delivered was made by the Corps NGFO based on the location of the main effort, the type targets available for engagement and on directives from the Chief of Staff and the Corps Artillery Commander. These requests for King-Hour preparation fire and general support missions were passed to CFF 51 over the Naval Gunfire Control or overload radio circuit.

The plan for coordination of Air, Naval Gunfire, and Artillery on the Corps level provided for the Corps Air Officer, Corps NGFO and a representative of the Corps Artillery Commander to operate in one large tent, known as Supporting Arms. Here an up-to-date target information center was maintained for joint use. Direct lines to Division Air and NGF officers were provided, as well as a direct line to Corps Artillery F.D.C. The two gunfire radio circuits and SFCP monitor were located here. The function of the Supporting Arms center, under the direction of the Corps Artillery Commander, was to coordinate all pre-arranged fires in support of the Corps as well as to pass information on air strikes which would involve restriction on artillery or naval gunfire.

The functioning of the Supporting Arms center was never completely effective because of lack of sufficient qualified representatives of Artillery, NGF and Air to permit continuous functioning. However, since division requests for naval gunfire and artillery were well coordinated, repetition of fires on the same targets was

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avoided. Further with the checking by the Corps NGFO with the Air Officer, who was always present, or with the Corps Artillery representative or Corps Artillery F.D.C., duplication of fires on the Corps level was prevented. It is also essential that the LEASCU be located near the Supporting Arms Center and that the closest liaison is maintained.

Small air strikes were delivered without checking naval gunfire and artillery. As a result very little restriction was placed on naval gunfire due to air operations. However, in some cases when restrictions were necessary, positive information was difficult to obtain concerning the exact time and duration of the air strike.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

While the effectiveness of the support furnished did not materially suffer in this operation, due to this lack of full coordination, it is felt that this was due to the limited area of the objective with a consequent restriction in the amount of gunfire support missions possible. In large target areas, positive means for coordination and distribution of targets among the Supporting Arms must exist at all times, and sufficient personnel must be provided to insure this.

(b) DIRECT SUPPORT.

(1) General.

IWO JIMA was ideally suited for the employment of direct support ships. Its small size combined with sufficient depth of water close inshore and its lack of reefs allowed ships to be positioned on both flanks and still be within range of any part of the island. As in the past the bulk of missions fired for battalions were furnished by destroyers, although all types of ships, including fast battleships and cruisers of Task Force 58 delivered call fires. Ships again demonstrated their cooperation, technical ability and ingenuity in the execution of their supporting missions.

The rugged terrain encountered, the enemy's skilful employment of well-concealed heavily constructed fortifications slowed the advance of our units and increased the demand for weapons which could aid the infantry's progress. The ships mobility enabled them to move into position and fire against targets in ravines, caves and reverse slopes which were inaccessible to artillery.

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In the early stages of the operation, when no ammunition limitations were set for call fires, some SFCs expended excessive amounts in unobserved neutralization fires. While it is realized that front line units were receiving heavy mortar fire during much of this phase, and that area neutralization substantially reduced much of these fires, it is felt that the same results could have been achieved by using less ammunition. It is also felt that ammunition expenditure must be limited by higher authority, with the provision that, in case of emergency, additional rounds will be authorized.

Data compiled indicates that more call missions were fired and more naval ammunition expended on IWO JIMA than in any other previous campaign in the PACIFIC Theater. 53 DDs, 6 CLs, 8 CAs and 8 BBs executed gunfire support missions, and virtually all of these ships delivered call fire missions during the operation.

(2) Summary of Call-Fire Missions.

a. Purpose.

The majority of call fires delivered were placed against enemy positions which were immediately impeding the advance of our troops. Missions were fired for purposes of neutralization, destruction, harassment and illumination, in short, for every purpose which would aid the infantry in the execution of the attack.

Targets were as varied as the purpose; blockhouses, pillboxes, caves, gun positions, enemy troops, machine gun positions, storage areas, truck parks, water points and countless other targets of every conceivable type were taken under fire by naval guns.

b. Method of Observation.

Throughout the call fire phase, various methods of spotting were employed as dictated by the terrain. All divisions zones of action were characterized by a lack of observation. This was particularly noticeable in the zone of the 4thMarDiv. The SFCs, who normally had control of the firing ships, were able to use all methods of observation and showed marked proficiency in selecting that which was most applicable to the situation. In broad terms, three agencies were used, i.e., ashore, afloat and aloft.

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ASHORE

The spotter observed most of the call fires although some missions were directed by the liaison officer.

Unit-commanders of platoons, companies and battalions had all received indoctrination in the method of calling for fires. In a number of instances during the operation these officers called for and successfully directed ships fire. The normal procedure was to pass commands to the N LO, using organic infantry communication channels, this officer would then relay the information to the firing ship in support of his unit. Though a slow process, it did enable fires to be delivered in areas where the spotter could not observe because of his location.

AFLOAT

Direct fire using shipboard spot was employed to a great extent. In the MARIANAS, the failure of spotters to take advantage of direct fire had been noted. In the intervening training period, SFCs were fully instructed in the use of this method, and it resulted in its increased employment at IWO JIMA.

Two general methods were used. The first was to send the ship a normal target designation followed by a complete description of its appearance. If the ship was still unable to identify the target, salvos were fired and spotted onto the positions. The ship would identify it in this manner and take it under direct fire.

This method was of continual utility especially in the zone of action of the 5thMarDiv where terrain conditions favored its employment. In the attack on SURIBACHI, the excellent direct fire furnished the 28th Marines broke up a number of counterattacks, neutralized machine guns and other positions and was a dominant factor in the early seizure of this part of the objective.

The second method of employing the fire support ships for direct fire missions was to place qualified observers aboard who would direct fires from seaward against enemy installations. This method was employed successfully by all three divisions. An excerpt from the report of the 3rd Division Naval Gunfire Officer is quoted below.

"For two days, a DD was employed in direct-fire shooting under the control of the Division Naval Gunfire Officer or his assistant,

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with additional SFCP control for safety. Due to the proximity of friendly troops, and the lines of fire (frequently pointed directly at our lines), it was not considered safe to conduct such missions unless under control of an embarked officer from the division. These missions were very useful in sealing off cave entrances and demolishing beach defenses which would otherwise have had to be attacked by infantry. Approximately twenty (20) caves were attacked with uniformly good results. The usual method of target designation was visual; however, smoke-grenades and mortar smoke were also employed by SFCP."

Previous mention has been made of the use of LVTs and gunboats as spotting stations. This function of the LVT ceased on Dog-Day, but gunboats were used throughout the operation.

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As in all phases of gunfire support VOF aircraft played a most important part in the call fire phase. In many instances spotters ashore were denied observation of enemy targets because of the nature of the terrain encountered; it was in these circumstances that the spotting aircraft-SFCP teams proved its usefulness. Based on SFCP reports approximately 40% to 50% of the call fire missions were fired by VOF aircraft.

The normal method of employing these planes was to have them check in on the firing ship - SFCP net, at which time ships and SFCP would zero-beat to the plane's frequency. There were some instances of the planes and SFCPs failing to gain communication because of one or the other being off frequency. In such cases, the ship would employ two receivers, one adjusted to the plane, the other to the SFCP, in this way the ship was in communication with both and could relay any important transmissions.

The SFCP informed the plane of the zone of action in which he was working and either directed the plane to search for suitable targets, or designated targets which were invisible from the ground. Positive control of the firing rested with the SFCP for obvious safety reasons.

The technical ability of VOF spotters, their familiarity with the target area, their ability to recognize and bring fire on enemy positions rapidly and efficiently was an outstanding feature of

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the operation. They definitely increased the effectiveness of this phase of naval gunfire as attested to by SFCs and ships.

Battleship and cruiser planes were used in the same way whenever their ships were assigned to direct support and contact was possible. These planes also did much spotting of general support fires well in advance of our front lines. In such cases the SFCs were not in contact with them, since safety factors were not as stringent.

(3) Harassing Fires.

Direct support ships habitually fired an average of 100 rounds a night of harassing fire on targets located 1000 yards or more in advance of our front lines. These targets were selected after careful coordination with artillery. The procedure used in the selection is described in section 4(a).

Indirect fire was used in the majority of cases; the ship was spotted on to the target area by SFCs whenever observation permitted. When observation was not available indirect fire without spot was employed. On a number of occasions while engaged in night harassing missions, ships discovered enemy artillery and rockets firing and took them under direct fire.

(4) Prearranged Fires.

Direct support ships were used daily in pre King-Hour attacks. Specific target areas were selected in coordination with air and artillery as described in section 4(a).

These missions varied in duration and ammunition expenditure; however, the average fired was 100-125 rounds in a half hour period. These fires were for the purpose of neutralization.

The careful coordination of such fires with Corps and Divisional artillery, effectively neutralized the enemy defenses and allowed the infantry to advance.

(5) Night Illumination.

Night illumination was more extensively employed than ever before. Available information indicates that some 19000 rounds of stars were used over the 32-day period of the operation. As in the past, illumination was for the most part furnished by starshells, although some searchlight illumination was employed to excellent advantage. As has been customary, direct support ships furnished all illumination to front line troops.

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Until D-4 starshell expenditures were excessive due to the failure of corps, division, and regimental naval gunfire officers to exercise suitable control over spotters and liaison officers with the battalions. In addition, in the early phases there was little coordination of the illumination between adjacent units. Some Oboes and Charlies ascertained the number of stars aboard the supporting ship and then proceeded to expend the entire load carried. This excessive expenditure resulted in the necessity of limiting starshell expenditures to fifty per ship per night, after Dog plus four, because of the fact that the operation promised to be considerably longer than had been anticipated, and the consequent necessity of insuring an adequate supply to complete the operation. When it is considered that at this time some 11 or 12 ships were habitually assigned in direct support across the narrow Corps front this limitation did not seriously affect the illumination provided the front lines. In addition, in case of counterattack, authority to exceed this allowance was automatic.

Later this allowance was increased to 75 rounds per ship but the number of fire support ships in direct support were somewhat less. Finally, when only about six ships were furnishing direct support, this allowance was again increased to 100 per ship.

The desire of front line units for almost continuous illumination is understood, since perhaps the greatest morale factor provided by naval gunfire is the furnishing of effective illumination. It reduces the effectiveness of Jap infiltration tactics and prevents counterattacks from forming undetected. However, the expenditure of more than 6-8 stars an hour per ship is impracticable unless a consequent reduction in other types of support is accepted. In view of the fact that about 40 seconds of illumination is provided by a properly adjusted star shell, and that this illumination is effective over a regimental front (1000 Yards) starshell illumination at the rate of 6 per hour will provide about one minute of illumination for every five minutes of darkness. In addition if illumination is coordinated on a division basis, periods of darkness will be even further reduced. When it is considered that no counter attacks or infiltration to a large extent can take place in this small space of time, an increase in this rate is not deemed necessary.

The procedure used to prevent star shell cases from falling

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into our own front lines was the exercise of coordination by Corps. Divisions were directed to report the desired line of fire of their assigned support ships for star shell illumination to Corps. These lines of fire were plotted on the map and from the front line positions it was determined whether or not any starshell cases were likely to fall in our own front lines. Divisions were directed to change the line of fire of any ship likely to produce this condition. As a result of this coordination, no star shell cases were reported to have fallen in our own front lines throughout the operation.

When starshell expenditure was reduced, regiments and divisions used various methods of coordination in order to more efficiently employ available stars. These generally provided for one ship to illuminate at a time across a regimental front until its allowance was expended at which time the other ship took over the task of illumination for the regiment.

(c) GENERAL SUPPORT MISSIONS.

(1) General Plan.

The plan for employment of general support ships called for the use of one heavy ship to be assigned each division for the execution of deep support missions in the division zone of action. VOF planes were assigned when needed to replace the ship's own aircraft. The remaining heavy ships worked in areas of responsibility 1000 yards or more in front of our troops employing air spot. Their mission was to destroy specific targets assigned by Corps as well as to destroy or neutralize any other targets which were discovered in the ships area of responsibility.

All heavy ships were to be employed in harassing fires, which were coordinated with other supporting arms. The LCI(M) were to furnish the bulk of harassing fires 1000 and beyond our front lines.

(2) Pre-King Hour Preparation Fires.

Naval gunfire general-support ships habitually supported King-Hour attacks. The general plan followed was to supply divisional artillery to targets closest to our front lines, followed by Corps artillery and direct-support naval gunfire in the intermediate zone 400-800 yards from our own lines, and, finally

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general-support naval gunfire from main batteries of battleships and cruisers. These general-support fires would be used either to augment Corps artillery or would be fired in deeper areas.

In most cases two or three heavy ships were available daily. An allowance of 100-200 rounds of main battery ammunition was available for support of King-Hour attacks and about the same amount for general support missions throughout the remainder of the day.

Ships were assigned areas of responsibility and, within the areas, specific high-priority targets visible from seaward were assigned for destruction. Lists of other high-priority targets located inland were also supplied ships, and were to be placed under fire in order of their priority. Active enemy weapons enjoyed the highest priority, and ships were instructed to destroy them whenever they were discovered.

In the early phases of the operation, when ample heavy ships were available, a battleship or cruiser was assigned to a division for general support missions. This was particularly valuable in the first part of the campaign since it provided division with a rapid means of getting immediate fire on targets without having to go through a crowded radio channel to Corps. The Division Naval Gunfire Officer would establish communication with the ship on one of the available SFCP radio frequencies, and would brief the ship on this circuit.

In the later stages, heavy support units were reduced to less than four battleships or cruisers. General support ships were no longer assigned directly to divisions.

Targets well in advance of our infantry were selected and assigned to these heavier units whose missions was to destroy them. Thus when the troops did reach the positions, and safety requirements made heavy calibre fires impossible, the installations would have already been eliminated.

Some heavy calibre ammunition was fired extremely close (400-600 yards) to our front lines with excellent effect. An example of this was the performance of the IDAHO and PENSACOLA in delivering the pre-King-Hour fires on the morning of 23 February. The IDAHO expended 162 rounds of 14" H.C. within 400 yards of our lines. The PENSACOLA fired 390 rounds of 8" H.C. and brought

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her fires within 600 yards of our lines. Results were excellent and the success of an attack following the preparation is an indication of its effectiveness. For safety reasons a SFCP near the target area assigned was in contact with the ships during the delivery of this fire. If fires become dangerous to our troops, the spotter was to make necessary adjustments.

Although the majority of the defensive installations required direct fire for destruction, the concussion effect of large calibre naval projectiles reduced the effectiveness of the Japanese defenders even when their emplacements were not destroyed. The infantry was able to make substantial gains following such a preparation though it was necessary to take immediate advantage of these fires by rapid advance since the effect of such a bombardment wears off rapidly.

(3) Deep Supporting Missions.

A large amount of destruction of targets visible from seaward was accomplished by general support ships. This was particularly true in the 5thMarDiv zone on the north-west side of the island and in the northern part of the 3dMarDiv zone.

In addition many targets invisible from seaward were damaged or neutralized. Five inch fire cleared away camouflage and exposed new targets repeatedly, some of which were engaged by gunfire, others by air or artillery. The result of this destruction and damage substantially reduced the task of our infantry. Adequate photographic coverage immediately following such fires with a repetition after interpretation would do much to increase the value of deep support fires by naval gunfire, artillery and aerial bombing.

General support missions were last fired on 5-6 March, thereafter the tactical situation would not allow general support fires. Call fires continued until resistance ceased.

LIST OF GENERAL SUPPORT SHIPS USED

19-20 February

WASHINGTON
NORTH CAROLINA
IDAHO
WEST VIRGINIA
SANTA FE

(329) 872

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19-20 February

BILOXI
PENSACOLA
INDIANAPOLIS

20-21 February

WEST VIRGINIA
NORTH CAROLINA
TEXAS
NEVADA
BILOXI
SANTA FE
TUSCALOOSA
ASTORIA
PASADENA
BOSTON
WILKES-BARRE
SAN FRANCISCO
SALT LAKE CITY
TWIGGS

21-22 February

WEST VIRGINIA
IDAHO
PASADENA
WILKES-BARRE
SAN FRANCISCO
BOSTON
PENSACOLA

22-23 February

WEST VIRGINIA
IDAHO
SALT LAKE CITY
TUSCALOOSA
BRADFORD
SHANNON

23-24 February

WEST VIRGINIA
IDAHO
PENSACOLA
GUEST

24-25 February

WEST VIRGINIA
SALT LAKE CITY
TUSCALOOSA

25-26 February

VICKSBURG
PENSACOLA
BOYD

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26-27 February

WEST VIRGINIA
TENNESSEE
TUSCALOOSA
SALT LAKE CITY

27-28 February

TENNESSEE
VICKSBURG
SALT LAKE CITY

28 February-1 March

WEST VIRGINIA
NEVADA
TENNESSEE
PENSACOLA
INDIANAPOLIS

1-2 March

TENNESSEE
VICKSBURG
SALT LAKE CITY
TUSCALOOSA

2-3 March

No general support
ships used.

3-4 March

No general support
ships used.

4-5 March

No general support
ships used.

5-6 March

NEVADA
TUSCALOOSA
SALT LAKE CITY

6-7 March

General support fires
ceased.

(d) EMPLOYMENT OF LCI TYPES AFTER DOG-DAY.

Subsequent to Dog-Day, LCI type support craft were used extensively to deliver call and harassing fire missions for our troops. Marked success was experienced with both the 40mm fires of LCS(L) in support of our flank battalions and with the mortar fire delivered to harass the enemy. These ships showed remarkable ability to provide needed fire support and their

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employment was of definite benefit to our infantry.

The following is a brief resume of the operation after Dog-Day

LCS(L)

Dog/1. Four ships of both unit #3 and #4 furnished 40mm fire to the flank battalions. During the night four ships were detached to continue this support.

Dog/2. Throughout the day and night one LCS(L) supported the assault elements of RCT 28.

Dog/3. Four LCS(L) were assigned duty with the flank elements and were employed day and night.

After Dog/3 Various numbers of boats were made available to flank battalions for fire missions and to transport reconnaissance parties on searches of the cliff areas. The ships were used up to 8 March when all LCS(L) units departed.

LCI(M)

Dog/1. From 1242 to 1400 Mortar Support Unit #3 delivered a total of 6000 rounds of 4.2" ammunition into the southeastern coastal areas in an attempt to neutralize enemy artillery which was shelling our beaches. During the night two units delivered 12000 rounds of harassing fire on the same areas as were covered Dog-Day night.

Dog/2. One unit fired 540 rounds into the southeastern coastal region. At night two units were used to harass the areas in the northern portion of the Island.

Dog/3. One unit delivered harassing fires on the northern portion of the Island.

After Dog/3 Units continued their night harassing fires until our troops had reached a position which prevented further missions. Ships had been departing from the area almost daily and the last LCI(M)s were ordered out on 1 March.

LCI(R) and LCI(G)

LCI(R)s were not employed after Dog-Day

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LCI(G) were used together with the LCS(L) units and delivered 40mm fires for flank battalions.

Ammunition expended by LCI types exclusive of Pre Dog-Day fires was as follows:

4.2" Mortar	60,000 rds.
5.0" SSR	9,500 rds.
4.5" Rockets	8,000 rds.
40mm	116,000 rds.

(e) AMMUNITION

(1) 5" common was employed with some frequency against located pillboxes and similar point-targets with which IWO JIMA abounded. Perhaps its most successful employment was in conjunction with 1200 f/s charges, when large angles of fall could be obtained, thus causing positive setback. The delay, combined with the reinforced ogive, made this type of projectile effective against many targets beyond the capabilities of AAC, especially small pillboxes and similar pieces of reinforced construction.

(2) 5" AAC as always, was the work-horse. In this operation however, it was not always usable with the best results, due to the strength of enemy fortifications, and to the fact that virtually all enemy personnel stayed below ground. Nevertheless, this type of shell accounted for the great majority of rounds fired, and was used against an infinity of targets.

(3) Intermediate and major caliber AP were rarely used although ample targets existed where its employment would have been particularly effective.

(4) Intermediate and major caliber HC were employed in the majority of general support or reinforcing missions, usually for the thickening and deepening of the intense pre-attack preparations.

(5) Air bursts was used to a negligible extent by SFCs although, on several occasions, VOF spotters employed it against open mortar positions with good results.

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(6) Impact bursts comprised the majority, due naturally to the overwhelming proportion of materiel and covered targets. Due to factors, the nature of which may only be hazarded, there appeared to be a disproportionate number of impact duds, many of which were rounds with steel nose-plugs.

(7) WP was, as usual, in much greater demand than could be supplied. It was uniformly used, and highly valued, as a casualty-producing agent, whereas the screening role was usually left to artillery smoke, of which the supply was more generous. Enemy prisoners indicate that it is one of our most-feared munitions. Current modification of WP rounds with the Mk 29 fuze give good results on impact, but it is believed that a WP round constructed on the same design as the 5" anC - namely, with both time (Mk 13) and impact (Mk 29) fuzing would be most satisfactory.

(8) 40mm was used to excellent advantage by LCS(L) in firing on caves, enemy personnel in the open, and other targets visible from seaward.

(9) 1200 f/s charges- The outstanding performance of 1200 f/s i.v. charges should be emphasized, for it was with this type of ammunition, employing overhead fire, that, in the 3dMarDiv 5" fires were brought to within 75 yards of a supported battalion the troops of which had previously been warned. In other cases, this fire was brought within 100 yards, always with consistent performance, close grouping both in range and deflection. Targets attacked with these charges were in general those against which large angles of fall were desired, and results were comparable to those of overhead howitzer fire. It was noted, however, that some ships seemed reluctant or hesitant to deliver these fires, due apparently to inexperience in applying the necessary computer corrections for the differing trajectory and change in i.v.

Conclusions.

(a) That the doctrine for the employment of direct support snips is sound, but that Shore Fire Control Parties still need a more thorough understanding of the doctrine.

(b) That landing force units must realize that 6 - 8 starshells an hour for routine illumination is the most that may be expended except in emergency.

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(c) That a better system for coordination of star shell illumination must be developed, in order to more suitably employ available ammunition.

(d) That the contribution of VOF to both direct and general support fire missions was outstanding.

(e) That the doctrine for employment of general support ships is sound.

(f) That the employment of LCM(3) in night harassing fires as close as 1000 yards to our front lines is highly effective.

(g) That once again our combatant ships and special amphibious support craft have demonstrated their versatility, technical ability, and a most high spirit of cooperation with the landing force, and in so doing, played a vital part in the seizure of IWO JIMA.

Recommendations.

(a) That Shore Fire Control Parties be more thoroughly indoctrinated in the technique of employment of direct support ships.

(b) That an SOP for star shell coordination be developed in the Division and Corps level.

(c) That a higher percentage of star shells be carried in ammunition re supply ships.

5.

NAVAL GUNFIRE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.

(a) PERSONNEL

1. Composition of Parties.

a. Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties.

The organic JASCO table of organization, together with FMF PAC SPECIAL ORDER 86-44, provided for a battalion SFOP of two officers and eleven enlisted men.

CONFIDENTIALb. Regimental Liaison Team.

FMF Special Order 86-44 provided for an increase in the JASCO which supplied to each regiment a Naval Gunfire Officer and radio team.

The Naval Gunfire Section of FMF Pacific furnished experienced officers to JASCOs to act in this capacity.

c. Division Naval Gunfire Section.

FMF Special Order 86-44 provided for a Division Naval Gunfire Section composed of the Division Naval Gunfire Officer, the Division Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer and sufficient personnel to man the radio equipment.

As in regiments, the Naval Gunfire Section of FMF Pacific made available to JASCOs qualified officers to act as Division Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers.

d. Corps Naval Gunfire Section.

In FMF Special Order 86-44, Corps was authorized a Naval Gunfire Section.

The Naval Gunfire Officer of FMF Pacific was assigned to Corps as the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer. The regularly assigned Corps Naval Gunfire Officer and two Naval officers from FMF Pacific were also made members of the section for the operation.

Seven radio operators, one clerk and two drivers were provided by Special Order 86-44. During the course of the operation, Corps Signal Battalion furnished an experienced Staff Sergeant to act as team chief and provided four additional radio operators.

e. Miscellaneous Personnel.

Four (4) radar beacon teams were assigned to the 3d, 4th and 5th MarDivs. These teams consisted of two (2) enlisted men who had been thoroughly trained in the operation of the radar beacon. A team was assigned to the naval gunfire section of each regiment and a replacement team was attached to division naval gunfire sections.

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The 4th and 5th MarDivs were furnished two (2) Naval officers and two (2) Marine officers to act as replacements. These officers were employed as assistants on regimental and division teams, as observers aboard gunboats and later, as casualties occurred, were used as replacements.

In the absence of such replacement personnel, the 3dMarDiv ordered the shore fire control parties of the 3d Marines ashore and used them to replace casualties and as reliefs for the shore fire control parties of the 9th and 21st Marines.

f. Conclusions and recommendations.

The Table of Organization of the JASCO now provides a sufficient number of qualified radio operators to man the equipment which SFCs employ. However, these teams have consistently suffered heavy losses with the result that during the course of an operation trained personnel are not available to operate the communication equipment.

Wire and general duty men, though willing, have neither the technical knowledge of the radio equipment nor sufficient grasp of the gunfire situation to be of any great value as replacements for radio operators. Since SFCs are expected to function efficiently and continuously, provisions must be made to insure adequate replacements for casualties among their trained radio operators.

It is recommended that each JASCO be provided with a replacement pool of 12 radio operators, who would act as on-the-spot replacements for SFCs.

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It is also recommended that Division Naval Gunfire Officers and JASCC commanders insure that all enlisted personnel in the SFC Section be given training between operations in the upkeep, repair and operation of the radio equipment employed.

(b) EQUIPMENT.

(1) Radio and Telephone.

a. Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties.

The basic radio employed by the Shore Fire Control Parties was either the SCR 284 or the TBX-8.

Battalions of the 4thMarDiv were also furnished a jeep-mounted TCS but in many instances this set was destroyed or lost upon landing, and the TBX-8 was the primary means of communication between firing ship and Shore Fire Control Parties. No real difficulties were experienced because of this loss, and the teams functioned effectively without it.

The SCR-300 was used by all units and proved to be extremely useful as an intra-divisional set. Much administrative traffic was passed over it and in some instances it was used as a relay between spotter and liaison officer who passed the information to the firing ship over his larger radio with good results.

The 4thMarDiv also furnished their Shore Fire Control Parties with SCR 536s pre-set on spotting frequencies. When it was possible to assign a battalion this frequency for the larger set, the SCR 536 proved helpful in establishing direct contact with the ship, and was used by some SFCs on Dog-Day. However, since it was necessary to switch frequencies of battalions, it was not always possible to insure each battalion the use of a frequency on which its SCR 536 was set.

Battalions depended upon the wire communications of the infantry and in almost all cases had their own local from the battalions' switchboard.

b. Regiments

Regimental teams were furnished either SCR-284s or TBX-8s.

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The regimental teams were also furnished with SCR-300s. These sets proved most valuable to the regimental liaison officers since coordination of battalion fires, administrative traffic and other such messages could be handled over them.

The regiments, like the battalions depended upon the infantry's wire communication.

c. Divisions.

The Naval Gunfire sections of divisions used either TBX-8s, SCR-284s or the jeep mounted TCS as their primary radio after getting ashore. With the more stable set-up, communications of divisions was no serious problem and in all cases their equipment functioned well with only minor breakdowns.

Prior to landing the divisions used ship-board radio equipment to coordinate and control the fires of their battalions and regiments.

Divisions also were furnished SCR-300s, and had the same success with them as did the subordinate units.

Divisions had direct telephone communication with Corps over a direct wire to the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer. In addition, the regular infantry telephone system was available for their use.

d. Corps.

While afloat the Corps Naval Gunfire section employed the radio facilities of the Gunnery Department of ComPhib Grp 2. There was no difficulty experienced with any of this equipment and communications were excellent.

Two SCR-300s were set up on the Flag Bridge and contact with the 4th and 5th MarDivs was established on this circuit. Though reception was not always good, the set was invaluable in keeping the gunfire control channels free of much administrative traffic.

On D/5 days a section of the Naval Gunfire team of Corps went ashore with a TBX and an SCR-300. It was hoped that the TCS and SCR-193 belonging to the team, but loaded on other Corps shipping, would be ashore, but when the section arrived on the beach it was found that the equipment had not yet been unloaded, and it was not until D/8 that these radios were placed ashore.

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The SCR-300 and the TBX were both set up and checked into the gunfire net, but it was felt that the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer should not come ashore until additional communications were available.

On D/6, two (2) TCS jeeps were borrowed from Signal Battalion and set up. They were dug in and remoted to the site of the Air, Artillery and Naval Gunfire center and communication established with them. The Corps Naval Gunfire Officer and the remainder of the team came ashore the following day on D/7. Two TCS-12s were set up and this equipment was employed throughout the rest of the operation with excellent results. An RBM receiver was available and was used to monitor spotting frequencies.

On D/13 days, a Mark IV transmitter receiver van was brought ashore and set up for the use of the Air, Artillery and Naval Gunfire center. In view of the satisfactory communication facilities already established, this equipment was not used.

Supporting Arms was furnished a local switchboard, with a line running through the Corps board and with direct lines to the Air, Artillery and Gunfire centers of the three divisions. This board was most valuable as it allowed immediate telephonic communication with division.

e. Conclusions.

The radio equipment furnished all echelons was sufficient and, considering the hard usage it received, worked exceptionally well. The need for a lighter, more compact radio still exists. The present sets, while adequate, are still far from that desired. The SCR-694 is again suggested by all units as the ideal radio for this work.

Difficulties were experienced with jeep-mounted equipment but most of these difficulties concerned getting the set ashore under adverse conditions. Once ashore the TCS and SCR 193 functioned well. This equipment should not be landed in any of the assault waves.

The TCS-12 as employed by the Corps Naval Gunfire section was a most satisfactory set. The transmitter and receiver units were both set up in the Supporting Arms tent. The operator could use either the head-set or the loud speaker and could make adjustments on either unit as was necessary. The fact that the operator was physically present and kept a continuous typed log proved of great help to the officer on watch since constant check on all traffic could be made.

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One RBM receiver is not sufficient to satisfactorily monitor spotting frequencies.

The SCR-300 was most useful. The set was indispensable during the early days of the operation before wire was in. Even after telephone communication was established it proved useful as a means of contact between units. It is desired that in future operations an SCR-300 Naval Gunfire Control channel be assigned for each division (as a division gunfire common frequency) and for Corps.

Wire communications were excellent and the direct line from Corps to divisions was used constantly. This direct line should be laid in all future operations.

Due to the small size of the island - and the relative ease of delivering indirect fires through designations by grid coordinates the radar beacon was not necessary and not used. In operations against larger land masses it will be of value.

Repair and replacement facilities were excellent. Division Signal Companies and JASCO performed yeoman service in repairing and replacing Shore Fire Control Party equipment, and results were most gratifying. Corps Signal Battalion was cooperative and helpful in performing the same function for the Corps team.

The equipment furnished all echelons was sufficient. Repair facilities were good.

f. Recommendations.

1'. A lighter, more compact field radio such as the SCR-694 be given the battalion Shore Fire Control Parties.

2'. An SCR-300 control frequency be assigned Corps and to each division.

3'. The use of Supporting Arms switch board with direct lines to divisions should be made SOP.

6. COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) RADIO

(1) Landing Force.

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CONFIDENTIALa. Frequencies.

Naval Gunfire was assigned a total of twenty (20) frequencies for control of gunfire. Eighteen of these were assigned battalions as spotting frequencies, one was used as the Naval Gunfire Control frequency and one was used as the control overload frequency.

Corps, divisions and regiments were the only Landing Force units which employed the Gunfire Control frequency. This channel was used for all operational traffic concerning fire support. Corps guarded the control overload. Administrative traffic and other lengthy transmissions including ammo reports were cleared on this circuit.

These frequencies proved sufficient in number, and little difficulty was experienced with interference from other circuits. The Gunfire Control frequency (3845 Kcs) did receive one interference from one of the Landing Force Command nets which was operating on 1918 Kcs. The interference was sporadic and did not hinder operations in any way. Japanese interference was encountered on some spotting frequencies but it was infrequent and caused no trouble.

VOF spotting aircraft were given eight of the spotting frequencies as their primary frequency, and four others were made available as their secondary. Since these frequencies were pre-set and not changeable while the planes were in the air, it was necessary that it be the battalions who made the necessary shift. There was no difficulty experienced with this method, although because of it, units were not able to keep the frequencies which had been assigned them on Dog-Day.

This procedure of shifting Shore Fire Control Party frequencies made the SCR 536s of the 4thMarDiv battalions unusable for contact between ship and shore. The radios were set on the frequency assigned for Dog-Day and it was necessary to change this in order to allow VOF to be employed.

The sets were still employed as relays between spotters and liaison sections.

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Initially the 5thMarDiv had one SCR-300 channel while the 4thMarDiv had four. Corps at first monitored all these frequencies, but for purposes of control it was necessary that all units remain on one frequency. The channel of the 5thMarDiv was selected and all units concerned checked in on it. Thereafter it was used by all echelons down to and including regiments for control purposes.

b. Procedure.

Radio procedure on the whole was fair. The Gunfire Control frequency, which even under ideal conditions is an overcrowded and busy circuit, functioned fairly well.

It was noted on Dog-Day, and to some degree in the later days of the campaign, that many ships operators continue to break in on circuits when important transmissions are in progress.

c. Equipment.

See Section 5(b).

(b) WIRE.


Telephone communications were excellent and well maintained throughout the operation. See Section 5(b).

Donald M. Weller
DONALD M. WELLER,
LtColonel, USMC,

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GENERAL PLAN OF FIRES D-DAY
(Ammo Allowances & Areas of Responsibility)



NOTE

1. Target "blocks" are designated by one or two digit numbers or letters.
2. Times shown in each block are the times at which all fire was scheduled to be lifted from those areas.
3. KEY TO COLORS
Red - 6", 8", 12", 14" & 16".
Broken Red - Mortar and Rocket areas.
Black - 5".
4. Figures below ships represent ammunition allowances for D-Day schedule of fires.

GENERAL PLAN
(Ammo Allowances & Areas of Responsibility)

ARKANSAS
250 Rds 5"
200 Rds 12"

PENSACOLA
300 Rds 5"
450 Rds 8"
TUSCALOOSA
200 Rds 5"
150 Rds 8"

BILOXI
100 Rds 5"
210 Rds 6"

STEMBLE
200 Rds 5"

WASHINGTON
500 Rds 5"
500 Rds 16"

MORTAR
SUPPORT
UNIT 5

TEXAS
200 Rds 5"
190 Rds 14"

H.A. WILEY
800 Rds 5"

TERRY
620 Rds 5"

NEVADA
1160 Rds 5"
190 Rds 14"

SANTA FE
200 Rds 5"

HALLIGAN
620 Rds 5"

MULLANY
530 Rds 5"

TENNESSEE
1550 Rds 5"
190 Rds 14"

NEWCOMB
550 Rds 5"

EDWARDS
H.L.
550 Rds 5"

VICTOR
485
1000

MORTAR
SUPPORT
UNIT 2

NOTE

1. Target "blocks" are designated by one or two digit numbers or letters.
2. Times shown in each block are the times at which all fire was scheduled to be lifted from those areas.
3. KEY TO COLORS
Red - 6", 8", 10", 14" & 16".
Broken Red - Mortar and Rocket areas.
Black - 5".
4. Figures below ships represent ammunition allowances for Dog Day schedule of fires.

SECTOR 2

SECTOR 4

ARKANSAS

PENSACOLA

SECTOR 3

GENERAL PLAN

(Ammo Allowances & Areas of Responsibility)

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Air Report

Appendix 3 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

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1107

CONFIDENTIAL

30 April 1945.

From: The Air Officer.
To : The Commanding General.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.
Reference: (a) VACLIF Staff Memo 5-45, dtd 10Mar45.
Enclosure: (A) Chronological summary of air support from D-Day
through D plus 25, p. 1114

1. INTRODUCTION:

(a) Air support for the IWO JIMA campaign was in most respects excellent but in some features fell below the desired level. Preliminary land-based air bombardment apparently failed to reduce defenses, disrupt communications, or affect the morale of the enemy to any appreciable extent. On the other hand, direct support rendered by carrier-based aircraft, and, in the latter stages of occupation by land-based P51 aircraft, more nearly approached the desired goal.

2. TRAINING

(a) During the rehabilitation and training period between the MARIANAS and the IWO JIMA campaigns, air liaison sections of the 3d, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions Joint Assault Signal Companies conducted air-ground training, utilizing facilities of aviation squadrons and units available. Aviation groups which were to participate in the assault of IWO JIMA were not available for joint training, nor were organized air support control units.

(b) Each of the three divisions employed in the operation conducted continuous schooling of tactical and gunnery observers, using attached VMO Squadrons and facilities of naval aviation units locally available for the aerial phases of training.

(c) Two rehearsals for the IWO JIMA operation were conducted; the first was held in the HAWAIIAN area, 13-17 January;

Appendix 5 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLIF Special Action Report, IWO JIMA
Campaign.

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the second in the MARIANAS during the period 12-13 February. Corrective measures were taken to overcome deficiencies observed.

(d) During the movement to the forward area, periodic command post exercises were conducted aboard the USS AUBURN, Landing Force Headquarters ship. Exercises were planned and supervised by section umpires, thereby integrating section work.

3. PLANNING

(a) During the planning phase of the operation, requests were submitted to higher headquarters covering aviation requirements of VAC Landing Force. General application for preliminary area bombardment by land-based and carrier-borne aircraft was made. More detailed requests outlined the direct support requirements, defining areas and schedules of attack and numbers and types of aircraft.

(b) Other requirements forwarded to higher echelons concerned tactical air observers, artillery air spotters, photographic coverage, DDT spraying, propaganda leaflet drops, air delivery of supplies, air evacuation, and VMO employment.

(c) With some compromise, requests were honored and formulated in ComPhibsPac's Air Plan. In view of the limitations imposed by availability of escort carriers and the strategic employment of fast carrier groups, the Air Plan was considered to cover the landing force air support requirements adequately; there was one exception to this: failure to provide dusk to dawn flights over the target area for night observation, night adjustment of artillery and suppressing enemy fire by harassment.

4. AIR OPERATIONS.

(a) Air operations during the campaign were generally as planned.

(b) After the capture of SAIPAN, land-based air attacks were directed against IWO JIMA with increasing frequency and strength. Further, in accordance with plan, daily land-based strikes and nightly harassing missions were conducted between D minus twenty and D minus three. During this period and throughout the operation, land-based aircraft made neutralization and interdiction raids against enemy bases within radius of action.

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(c) From D minus three to D Day, inclusive, one daily land-based strike, under control of Command Air Support Unit, was scheduled. But on D minus three and D minus one, weather prevented employment of land-based planes. On D Day the bombers arrived too late to give the pre-H-Hour coverage specified in the air plan; however, one flight arrived in time to deliver an attack upon designated areas north of East Boat Basin.

(d) Fast Carrier Force aircraft contributed greatly to the success of the operation, both by strategic raids against the JAPANESE EMPIRE and the RYUKYU ISLANDS and by supplementing close support operations of the escort carriers.

(e) From D Day to D plus three, inclusive, fast carrier forces supported our troops by furnishing numerous large strike groups in addition to augmenting support flights of the escort carrier group. During the night of D plus three-four, Task Force 58 departed for its second great attack on JAPAN.

(f) From D plus three to D plus seventeen, all direct air support was provided by escort carriers. On D plus seventeen, eight P51 aircraft of the 78th Fighter Squadron were employed very successfully in a strafing mission; from that day through D plus nineteen, close support missions were flown both by P51's based on IWO JIMA and by TBM's and FM-2's from escort carriers. The P51's flew all remaining close support missions, the last occurring on D plus twenty-three. Escort carriers left the target area on the night of D plus twenty.

(g) Between D-Day and D plus 24, a total of 341 bombing, rocket, strafing and napalm attacks were conducted in direct support of troops. Approximately 1,315 tons of bombs and rockets and 456 napalm bombs were expended during this period. In addition to strikes delivered, twenty-four photographic and seven DDT spraying missions were flown.

5.

CONCLUSIONS:

(a) Preliminary bombardment by land-based aircraft did not produce the desired damage. Few installations showed evidence of destruction caused by high altitude bombardment.

Recommendation: Greater volume and frequency of low level precision bombing employing bombs and fuzings as dictated by the nature of the targets to be destroyed.

872 (b) In this operation as well as past operations, the success of close support groups varied directly with their familiarity with terrain and the procedure and tactics peculiar to close support. This was particularly noticeable as the campaign progressed. Accuracy and speed of delivery showed marked improvement as pilots developed such familiarity.

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Recommendation: Include close troop support in the training syllabus of all CVE air groups. It is further considered that the practice of designating air coordinators by seniority alone might better be supplanted by training and maintaining a group of highly qualified officers for this specialized task.

(c) The great amount of coaching and clearance observation passed between air liaison teams and the Air Support Control Unit for the control of close air support missions seriously overloaded the Support Air Request net.

Recommendation: Designate an alternate SAR frequency to handle air direction traffic between air liaison teams and air support control.

(d) In general, communications were good, but again the need for a light weight, crystal-controlled set of good range for air liaison parties was demonstrated.

Recommendation: Provide SCR 694's for air liaison parties.

(e) From experience gained, it becomes increasingly evident that a central agency is required for coordination and base control of VMO Squadrons employed in combat with the Corps.

Recommendation: Form and attach to Corps an operations section of VMO Group Headquarters.

(f) The lack of prior joint training and personal contact resulted in delays and misunderstandings among Air Liaison Parties, Air Support Control Units, and supporting pilots.

Recommendation: Establish a joint training center for the centralization and coordination of training of Air Liaison Parties, Air Support Control Units, and CVE Support Groups. Between operations all units involved in air support should be ordered to temporary duty with the training agency and should conduct unit and joint training until ordered to rejoin parent organizations. In this light, it is considered highly desirable that a qualified non-flying officer from each carrier of the fleet participate in the training and be thoroughly briefed in all phases of a pending amphibious operation prior to rejoining his carrier. This will establish an intelligence link with supporting carriers and, regardless of preliminary Fast Carrier employment, will permit the briefing of pilots on dates which eliminate the possibility of security compromise.

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(g) Although air support doctrine provides for the filtering of air requests by each echelon in the chain of command, in practice the establishment of priorities falls upon Air Support Control. It is common knowledge that the time required to deliver an air strike is influenced by various factors: Communications, nature of the target, distance of target from front lines, contour of front lines, rates of movement of front line elements, nature of the terrain, target designation, weather, ease with which flight can identify target, required briefing of flight leader and flight; further, the number of support missions that may be run simultaneously on a Corps front is greatly restricted by air space, control facilities, and other equally confining factors.

Recommendation: To establish responsibility for air support request filtering at the proper level of command, it is recommended that the number of unfulfilled requests from any battalion, regiment or division be limited to one. To carry out this procedure, it is suggested that each division be assigned an intra-division frequency, that division requests to Air Support Control be submitted over the Support Air Request net, and that observations and coaching traffic between front line battalion parties be handled on a previously designated alternate Support Air Request frequency.

(h) Again the need for and value of night flights over enemy areas was demonstrated. Front line reports were unanimous in evidencing cessation or diminution of enemy fire when our planes were overhead. The possible interference of such flights with the detection and identification of approaching enemy aircraft is recognized.

Recommendation: In future operations provide a regular schedule of night harassment, observation, and spotting flights from night carriers to be supplanted by land-based night aircraft as soon as practicable. Radar control and radar beacon checks for front line fixes should be investigated and exploited.

(i) Coordination of air, artillery and naval gunfire was greatly improved but still did not attain the desired goal.

872 Recommendation: Target assignments and volumes of fire should be under immediate control of a designated officer or his qualified representative who is in constant and immediate contact with the controlling officers representing artillery, naval gunfire and air. A target analysis, assessment and prediction section should be included in the coordination center. Air should be permitted a minimum of interference with other arms; this presumes a more specific recognition of past over-emphasis on the

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hazards of friendly artillery and naval gunfire to friendly aircraft and further recognition that quick exchange and dissemination of information, rather than suppression or negation of fires largely reduces these hazards.

B. F. PREWITT,
LtCol., USMC.

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V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

30 April 1945.

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF AIR SUPPORT FROM
D-DAY THROUGH D-PLUS TWENTY FIVE

DOG Day

Including pre-Hour strikes, twenty-six missions were flown, and although assessment was difficult, they were in general considered very effective. A total of 606 planes - 354 VF, 67 VB, 170 VT and 15 B-24's (only four of which attacked because of late arrival) - flew 765 sorties dropping 1,558 bombs which weighed 274,500 lbs. (248-500's, 130-250's, and 1180-100's). 104 napalms, of which it is estimated only 50% detonated, and 2254 rockets were also used.

Major Ray Dollins, senior observer of the 5thMarDiv, in a TBM was shot down and killed.

D Plus One

Thirty missions, including two photographic, were flown. A total of 610 planes - 334 VF, 94 VB, and 182 VT - flew 719 sorties dropping 439,120 pounds of explosives (315-500's, 146-250's, 1,076-100's, 2292 rockets, and 68 napalms. Fast carrier task forces augmented CVE strike groups with 203 VF, 93 VB, and 101 VT.

Captain Joseph Cook, 5thMarDiv observer in a VT was shot down but was rescued by a destroyer.

D Plus Two

Including three photographic, thirty missions were flown of which thirteen were requested by ground units. Some missions were run very close to our troops with excellent results, although adverse weather conditions in the afternoon made close support difficult. A total of 738 planes - 352 VF, 99 VB, and 287 VT - (Fast carrier task forces provided 300 VF, 104 VB, and 167 VT) made 754 sorties dropping 491,620 pounds of explosives (512-500's, 206-250's, 580-100's, 2102 rockets, and 80 napalms).

D Plus Three

Twelve missions, including one photographic, were flown with excellent results before zero visibility halted air support at 1325K. Fast carrier forces furnished all except 39 of the 508 planes, which flew 389 sorties dropping 252,980 pounds of explosives (290-500's, 138-250's, 354-100's, and 448 rockets). 64 napalms were dropped of which only seven were reported to have detonated.

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Availability of aircraft for direct support was materially reduced by the departure of TF 58 for its second attack on JAPAN, and by a full CVE schedule which included special survivor searches, heavy ASP and CAP and strikes against CHICHI JIMA. The resulting lack of aircraft available for direct support forced neglect of many important targets but thirteen missions, including one photographic, were flown by 99 planes which dropped 26,020 pounds of explosives (12-500's, 2-250's, 80-100's, and 192 rockets).

An OS2U crashed behind enemy lines killing the pilot and injuring Captain John A. Friday, Naval Gunfire Spotter. Captain Friday was rescued by a patrol of the 24th Marines.

D Plus Five

Twenty-two missions, including 3 photographic, were flown by 132 CVE planes in 144 sorties. A total of 48,160 pounds of explosives (26-500's, 120-100's, and 386 rockets) was expended.

One TBM carrying Captain Warren Wright, 5thMarDiv observer, was shot down, crashing about 1,000 yards off shore. A destroyer recovered Captain Wright's body.

D Plus Six

Twenty missions, including two photographic, were flown by 162 planes (including 9 B-24's from SAIPAN) in 176 sorties in which 96,100 pounds of explosives (95-500's, 270-100's, and 360 rockets) were expended. The B-24's dropped nine 500's each on an area north of our lines.

For the first time enemy aircraft made no attempts to attack our forces.

D Plus Seven

Between 0730K and 1230K, eleven missions were flown; however, bad weather necessitated canceling the strike schedule for the remainder of the day. 79 planes in 112 sorties dropped 44,960 pounds of explosives (30-500's, 110-100's, and 316 rockets).

Two OY-1's of VMO-4 were launched from the USS WAKE ISLAND and landed on South Field at 1005K. 1stLt. Olson was pilot of the first U. S. aircraft to land on IWO JIMA.

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D Plus Eight

Twenty-two missions, including one photographic, were flown by 182 planes (included 9 B-24's) in 204 sorties. 99,220 pounds of explosives (123-500's, 190-100's and 312 rockets) were expended.

Three OY-1's of VMO-4 landed from the USS SAGINAW BAY and USS MAKIN ISLAND. One OY, the first of Squadron VMO-5 came in from LST 776.

CASCU on USS AUBURN took over direct support control between 0800K and 1300K from CASCU on USS ELDORADO, and ran off a strike every 25 minutes for a total of 12 missions.

Three PBM's, the first of a group of search planes, landed.

D Plus Nine

Twenty-three support missions, including one photographic and the first DDT spraying, were flown by 200 planes in 252 sorties in which 57,800 pounds of explosives (78-500's, 16-250's, 100-100's, and 80 rockets) were dropped. Of 16 napalms dropped, only eight were seen to detonate.

Success of the first air delivery by parachute drop by C-47's from SAIPAN was limited by difficulties experienced in establishing and maintaining air-ground communication.

The remainder of the CVE-borne OY-1 aircraft landed at South Field.

The long range search program was furthered by the arrival of 15 additional PBM aircraft.

D Plus Ten

Twenty-two missions, including two photographic, were flown by 232 planes in 248 sorties in which 79,000 pounds of explosives (72-500's, 36-250's, 120-100's, and 370 rockets) were dropped. Again there was a large percentage of duds among the 28 napalms dropped.

Commander Landing Force Air Support Control Unit No. 1 assumed control of troop support aircraft at 0920K, and retained control for the duration of the operation.

A TBM carrying 1stLt. D. A. Timmer, 3dMarDiv artillery spotter was shot down, crashing behind our lines. There were no survivors.

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Four OY-1 aircraft from LST 776 were flown ashore.

Air delivery from SAIPAN continued with a mail drop.

D Plus Eleven

Twenty-two missions, including one photographic, one DDT spraying and two propaganda drops, were flown by 169 planes in 200 sorties in which 70,760 pounds of explosives (54-500's, 230-100's, and 346 rockets) were expended. Twelve out of 16 napalms ignited, the best percentage of the operation thus far.

Four thousand feet of runway on South Field were declared ready as Seabees continued work on the field under mortar and shell fire.

Another mail drop was made by transports from SAIPAN.

D Plus Twelve

Twenty-two support missions, and two photographic missions were flown by 155 planes in 230 sorties in which 88,260 pounds of explosives (72-500's, 213-100's, and 516 rockets) were expended.

Ten R4D's made parachute drops of critical supplies, chiefly 81mm mortar ammunition, on the airfield; and the first of the evacuation planes, five R4D's and one R5C landed.

D Plus Thirteen

Passage of a cold front with ceilings from zero to 1000 feet and visibility from 1/2 to 4 miles canceled all direct support. Nine transports, however, dropped supplies, and four others landed. Two TBM's sprayed DDT.

A B-29, 1stLt. Malo, pilot, on a return trip from JAPAN made an emergency landing, refueled and after minor repairs took off.

D Plus Fourteen

Close air support resumed with 18 missions, including one photographic, by 175 planes in 254 sorties. A total of 105,280 pounds of explosives (80-500's, 240-100's, and 688 rockets) was expended.

PB4Y search planes began to stage through South Field, and evacuation and supply planes continued to land.

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D Plus Fifteen

LFASCU ran twelve very close support strikes during the day, in addition to one photographic and one DDT mission. 162 planes in 203 sorties dropped 81,200 pounds of explosives (42-500's, 344-100's, and 430 rockets).

An OS2U from the USS SALT LAKE CITY crashed and burned behind our lines. There were no survivors.

The seadrome was discontinued and PBM search planes returned to SAIPAN.

Twenty-eight P-51's and twelve P-61's landed.

BrigGen. Ernest Moore, USAAF, arrived and assumed Island Air Command.

D Plus Sixteen

Although past the point at which close air support normally has been secured in previous operations because of constriction of enemy held territory and consequent proximity of friendly troops and targets, LFASCU delivered ten deliberate, closely-coordinated missions using 119 planes in 147 sorties. 76,060 pounds of explosives were dropped (67-500's, 170-100's, and 426 rockets). Of 40 napalms carried seven failed to release, and of the 33 dropped, seven were duds.

Twelve plane loads of casualties were evacuated in ten hours.

Three PBY5-A's landed to commence air-sea rescue operations.

D Plus Seventeen

Despite difficulties imposed by closeness of targets and lack of direct observation, ten support missions were conducted. 122 planes in 160 sorties, dropped 71,280 pounds of explosives (66-500's, 180-100's, and 338 rockets). Of 26 napalms, 16 ignited, eight were duds, and two failed to release. Eight P-51's made an excellent strike on a strafing run.

A TBM carrying Lt. Rice, 5thMarDiv observer, was hit by anti-aircraft fire and made an emergency landing on the field. Lt. Rice suffered a shrapnel wound in the foot.

VMTB 242 landed.

Target CAP was taken over by the P-51's and P-61's.

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Enemy planes entered the area at night but did not attack. One of our night fighters made contact, but was eluded by violent evasive tactics.

D Plus Eighteen

With P-51's augmenting CVE planes, seventeen missions were flown. 141 planes in 172 sorties dropped 59,220 pounds of explosives (35-500's, 20-250's, 192-100's and 292 rockets). The precision low-altitude work of the P-51's was particularly pleasing to the ground troops.

Landing Force Headquarters announced that carrier planes no longer would be required for close support.

A B-29 made an emergency landing on South Field.

D Plus Nineteen

Six support missions were confined to the northern tip of the island, four of these by P-51's which dropped 38-500's, and two by VOF carrying 10 napalms. A seventh mission, flown by the VOF was directed against KANGOKU ROCK.

Five B-29's returning from a 300 plane raid on TOKYO made emergency landings on South Field.

D Plus Twenty

Three very effective missions were flown by a total of 15 P-51's which dropped 15,000 pounds of 500's. Support missions were controlled from radio jeeps, the LFASCU equipment having been secured for movement to another operation.

Air delivery of 1764 rounds of 60mm mortar illuminating ammunition was effected.

D Plus Twenty-One

Two missions were flown by P-51's. Eight planes in each, dropping 16,000 pounds of 500's, succeeded in destroying several installations and uncovering others.

During the day seven B-29's, in difficulty after a strike on NAGOYA, made emergency landings on the field; two B-24's, short of gas after a CHICHI JIMA strike, made night landings.

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D Plus Twenty-Two

No close air support.

A VMO-5 OY-1 carrying a 5thMarDiv artillery observer was shot down in enemy territory. The pilot, 2dLt. Leon Ellsworth, and observer, 2dLt. Guy Raines, were killed.

D Plus Twenty-Three

The last close support strike of the operation was run by five P-51's which dropped fire bombs (gasoline and diesel oil mixture) and strafed ahead of Third Bn, 27th Marines. One photographic mission was flown.

Nine B-29's made safe emergency landings.

D Plus Twenty-Four

A 5thMarDiv observer, Captain William Gillespie, working over enemy territory in a VMO-5 OY-1 was wounded in the foot by anti-aircraft fire.

D Plus Twenty-Five

Organized resistance on IWO JIMA was formally declared to have ceased at 1800K. The center airfield was declared operational.

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HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE

- IWO JIMA -

Special Staff Section Reports
(Cont'd)

Appendix 4 - Report By Arty Officer (CO 1st Prov FA Group), p. 1123

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Annex CHARLIE

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Artillery Report

Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C

TO VAC LanFor

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

CORPS ARTILLERY OFFICER'S
REPORT

-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS,
1ST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX CHARLIE TO V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING
FORCE SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN.

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Headquarters, 1st Provisional
Field Artillery Group,
V Amphibious Corps
Landing Force.
In the Field.
18 March, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Special Action Report, Iwo Jima, Campaign.

References: (a) FMF, Pac Gen Ord #36-44 (Confidential).
(b) Pac Fleet Confidential Letter LCL 45.
(c) VAC Lan For Spl Ord #2-45.
(d) VAC Lan For Staff Memo #5-45.

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(O) Recommended Table of Organization, Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, Group operating as Corps Artillery Headquarters, p.1263
(P) Staff Functions Corps Artillery Officer, p.1266
(Q) Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, Iwo Jima, Scale 1/10,000, p.1273
(R) Supplies Embarked, p.1274
(S) Aerial Observer Conduct of Fire Report, p.1276
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(U) Special Action Report, Commanding Officer, 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, p.1315

1. In accordance with instructions contained in references (a), (b), (c) and (d) a Special Action Report on the Iwo Jima operation is herewith submitted. The period covered by this report is that from 12 October, 1944 to 16 March, 1945.

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2. Narrative.

A. Introduction.

The 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group consisting of a Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, the 2nd and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalions and the 473rd Amphibian Truck Co, USA attached, composed the Corps Artillery under the V Amphibious Corps Landing Force in the subject operation, and was assigned the mission of general support of that Force.

B. Organization and Planning Phase.

1. On 12 October, 1944 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Special Order #49-44 activated the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group. Colonel J. S. LETCHER, U.S.M.C. was by the same order designated Commanding Officer of the Group and assumed command the same date. The following table shows attachment and detachment of units to and from this Headquarters during the period covered by the report.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ATTACHMENT DATE</u>	<u>DETACHMENT DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
2nd 155mm How Bn	21Oct44*		Hawaii	
4th 155mm How Bn	21Oct44*		Hawaii	
10th 155mm Gun Bn	21Oct44*	Sailed from Hilo for Guam 15Jan45	Hawaii	FMF Pac Secret Dispatch 03043 Jan reverted unit to oper. control FMF up on arrival Gua.
12th 155mm Gun Bn	21Oct44*	"	Hawaii	" " " "
Rear Echelon, 5th 155mm How Bn	21Oct44*	Sailed from Hilo for Guam 16Dec44	Hawaii	" " " "
Rear Echelon, 11th 155mm Gun Bn	21Oct44*	"	Hawaii	" " " "
Rear Echelon, Hqtrs Btry, Corps Arty, VAC	21Oct44*	"	Hawaii	Reverted unit to operational control VAC by same dispatch. VAC Lan For G.C #5-45 trans. to Garrison Force Iwo Jima.
473rd Amph Truck Co.	1Dec44	11Mar45	Hawaii	

* Authority Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Special Order #60-44.

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2. The Commanding Officer was designated Corps Artillery Officer for the V Amphibious Corps Landing Force on 21 October, 1944 and was ordered to report to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps for duty. He was at that time given the Mission of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and the decision was announced that the Corps Artillery was to be composed of two 155mm Howitzer Battalions, the 2nd and 4th. This on 9 November, 1944 was confirmed by V Amphibious Corps in writing. The first readiness and mounting out date was set at or about 17 December, 1944. In view of this, immediate action was required in the organizing, equipping, and training of a Headquarters Battery for the Group. Further the task of molding the two separate battalions and the Headquarters into a smoothly functioning unit both operationally and administratively was demanded.

3. After a very brief study of the personnel needs for a Headquarters Battery performing both Group and Corps Artillery Headquarters functions it was evident that the Table of Organization as set forth in enclosure (A) to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Special Order # 49-44, (10) Officers and (78) enlisted did not provide an adequate allotment of personnel to meet the requirements. The dual missions assigned the Group Headquarters made it manifest that additional Officers and men would have to be assigned the Headquarters in order for it to function in both capacities.

4. To arrive at the number of additional personnel required for this, it was necessary to make a study of certain conditions affecting the employment of Corps Artillery against Iwo Jima. First, there would be no displacements of either Corps or Divisional Artillery during the operation. Telephone lines to divisional artillery regiments and to Corps Artillery Battalions would be comparatively short. Batteries would be only approximately a half mile from the point where the ammunition would be landed on the beach. If the operation progressed as expected after the initial landing, it would be of short duration. Furthermore, the fact that all personnel required to form the Group Headquarters and to make any additions thereto would have to be taken from units of Corps Artillery, which were already understrength, acted to limit to the barest minimum the personnel assigned to the Group Headquarters. After all of the above considerations it was decided that fourteen (14) Officers and one hundred and fifteen (115) enlisted men would be required. Enclosure (C) sets forth the tentative Table of Organization as modified and submitted by this Headquarters for approval of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Accordingly on 1 November, 1944, these Officers and men were taken upon verbal authority G-1, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific from the units of Corps Artillery then present at Camp Tarawa, Hawaii (paragraph 1 above). The major portion coming from the 10th and 12th 155mm Gun Battalions. In addition, and after the formation of the Group Headquarters, the 2nd and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalions were brought

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to full strength by transferring to them the necessary commissioned and enlisted personnel from those same units.

5. It can readily be seen from paragraph 1 above that during the major portion of the planning and training phase there was an added administrative burden upon the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group in connection with the other Corps Artillery units present. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific General Order #50-44 was published on 18 November, 1944 designating 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group Headquarters and all attached units as Fleet Marine Force units and helped considerably to clarify administrative functions of this Headquarters.

6. Prior to the return of the Commanding Officer from Pearl Harbor on or about 25 October, the tentative draft of the artillery annex to the Corps Operation Plan was submitted. With minor changes this was approved as Annex FOX to Corps Operation Plan # 3-44. Based upon a study of all available intelligence data the following facts were noted:

- (a) Absence of reefs.
- (b) Excellent beaches suitable for all types of landing craft.
- (c) Limited exits from beaches.
- (d) Extremely limited position areas for artillery contemplated to be employed.
- (e) Absence of natural water supply for drinking and materiel maintenance.
- (f) Condition of soil in position areas making easy digging possible.
- (g) In view of enemy capabilities the necessity for great quantities of sandbags.
- (h) Lack of tall vegetation requiring artificial means of placing wire lines overhead.
- (i) Short supply hauls.
- (j) Short Communication lines.
- (k) Foreseeing extreme congestion and needs for strict sanitation measures.
- (l) Extremely short base for flash ranging from only satisfactory OP's on Mt. Suribachi.
- (m) Minimum temperatures of 45 degrees F.
- (n) Maximum range required 7,5000 yards.

Battalion Commanders and key staff personnel at Hawaii immediately embarked upon a study of the prospective target and the problems confronting them in conjunction therewith. On or about 1 December, 1944 the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps by dispatch set back the amounting out date to mid-January, 1945. By 26 December, 1944, all plans and orders had been materialized and were ready for distribution.

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D-Day was now set for 19 February, 1945. While engaged in the planning phase the wealth of information made available to the organization by the intelligence section of the 5th Marine Division at Hawaii proved to be a considerable aid.

C. Training Phase.

1. The period of time available for training the Corps Artillery for the Iwo Jima operation was extremely short. At the commencement of the period equipment shortages particularly in the headquarters Battery, seriously handicapped these activities. There was one fact which operated in favor of the standard of training strived for. Both Battalions had seen previous combat of a most recent nature. The 2nd participated in the Solomons, Gilbert and Marianas campaigns while the 4th had the Marshalls and Marianas to their credit. In view of the above it was decided to channelize training and emphasize the aspects that were felt to be of prime importance in the forthcoming operation. These were (1) Fire Direction in which stress was laid on rapid and accurate FDC procedure both in Battalion and Group to the ultimate end of efficient delivery of Group massed fire at any point on the Corps front, (2) Survey, (3) Gunnery with emphasis on securing highest possible efficiency and accuracy in firing batteries, (4) OP and air observer conduct of fire with emphasis on rapid and accurate registration by precision methods, (5) Communication procedures to include effects of enemy jamming on radio circuits, (6) Flash ranging both short base (250 to 400 yards) and long base methods. A great deal of work was done in flash ranging with conditions paralleling those which would be obtained if OP's were established on Mt. Suribachi. This work was done under direct supervision of the Group 2 and satisfactory results were obtained with a base of 250 yards or better, (7) Training in defense against an enemy infantry and mechanized breakthrough.

In the furtherance of this training program two units of fire were made available and on or about 1 November, 1944 intensive training was begun. Numerous Battalion firing exercises, three Group firing exercises, one combined service practice with the 13th Marines, one Group CPX and one 48 hour continuous flash ranging exercise were conducted. During these periods the fires of the Battalions and the Group were successfully massed and at the conclusion of the period the state of training in all respects was excellent. Also during this period Administrative, Intelligence, Fire Direction and Survey SOP's were prepared and published. Artillery regiments of 3rd, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions were placed on distribution list of any such material which would be of interest or concern to them in the prospective operation.

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D. Equipping Units.

1. At the time of activation of the Group Headquarters Battery there was no Table of Allowances in existence for such a unit, and one of the first tasks before the newly formed staff of Group Headquarters was the outlining of a Provisional Table of Allowances. This action was immediately taken and AAA priority requisitions were submitted on that basis. In order to immediately provide transportation and other items of equipment vital to the launching of the intensive training program outlined, stocks of all Corps Artillery Battalions present at Hawaii were tapped.

2. The primary function of the Group 4 initially was that of insuring the expeditious equipping and supplying of the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery. But with the presence of the other Corps Artillery units, whose efforts at continuance of training coupled with their prospective departure for Guam prior to or coincident with that of 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group Units soon made it mandatory for the 4 section in Group to exercise coordination of ammunition supply, procurement functions, loading plans and movement in connection with mounting out of these units.

3. Headquarters Supply Service, Pearl Harbor, took prompt action on requisitions submitted 2 November, 1944 for the equipping of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and commencing the latter part of November, 1944 material and supplies began to flow in. By the latter part of December, 1944 Headquarters Battery was 95% equipped while the two Howitzer Battalions were up to 98%. The few remaining items were secured by emergency air delivery and prior to departure on the operation there was no critical item lacking. For transportation, and supplies authorized for the operation see enclosures (H) & (R) respectively.

E. Mounting.

1. Early in December, 1944 the allotment of shipping for the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group in the coming operation was announced. UP&T tables having previously been submitted. Six (6) LST's were assigned and enumerated by serial numbers, later materialized as LST 760, 779, 784, 788, 724 and 808. The plan evolved and executed in lifting the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group was as follows: A firing battery on each ship, the first group of three ships being assigned to the 2nd Battalion and the second group of three to the 4th. Headquarters & Service Battery of the 2nd was split between 779 and 784 and in the 4th between 724 and 808. Group Headquarters Battery was split between 760 and 788. Information was received that the last group of three LST's were not scheduled to arrive at the target until D plus 1. Accordingly Group Headquarters & Headquarters Battery was broken down so that the Group Executive with staff section

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heads of the 2, 3 and 4 sections plus Communication Officer and Surgeon and sufficient key personnel to operate ashore were mounted in 730 to cover a possible landing on D-Day. Of the 50 DUKWS comprising the 473rd Amphibian Truck Co, USA, 8 were available to the Group for reconnaissance and were assigned 3 to each battalion and two to Headquarters. The remaining 42 were preloaded with infantry supplies to be landed on call. Having reached a decision on the general plan of loading, detailed plans were drawn up under the supervision of the Group 4, reproduced and distributed to all loading officers and Corps Transport Quartermaster. Responsibility for execution of same was placed on the firing battery loading officer for each ship. See enclosure (N) for loading plans.

2. The following table outlines the personnel embarkation by strength:

Ship	Unit	Officer			Enlisted		
		Marine	Navy	Army	Marine	Navy	Army
LST 760	Hq&HqBtry, 1st Prov FAGrp	9	2	0	57	3	0
LST 760	H&SBtry, 2nd 155mm How Bn.	0	0	0	0	2	0
LST 760	"A" Btry, 2nd 155mm How Bn.	7	0	0	150	0	0
LST 760	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	1	0	0	27
LST 779	H&SBtry, 2nd 155mm How Bn.	5	0	0	66	4	0
LST 779	"C" Btry, 2nd 155mm How Bn.	5	0	0	138	0	0
LST 779	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	1	0	0	25
LST 784	H&SBtry, 2nd 155mm How Bn.	7	1	0	62	4	0
LST 784	"B" Btry, 2nd 155mm How Bn.	6	0	0	149	0	0
LST 784	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	1	0	0	23
LST 788	Hq&HqBtry, 1st Prov FAGrp.	4	0	0	56	1	0
LST 788	H&SBtry, 4th 155mm How Bn.	0	0	0	0	2	0
LST 788	"C" Btry, 4th 155mm How Bn.	5	0	0	141	0	0
LST 788	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	1	0	0	35
LST 724	H&SBtry, 4th 155mm How Bn.	6	1	0	68	3	0
LST 724	"B" Btry, 4th 155mm How Bn.	7	0	0	136*	0	0
LST 724	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	0	0	0	26
LST 808	H&SBtry, 4th 155mm How Bn.	7	0	0	70	5	0
LST 808	"A" Btry, 4th 155mm How Bn.	6	0	0	143	0	0
LST 808	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	1	0	0	27
USS Auburn	Hq&HqBtry, 1st Prov FAGrp.	1	0	0	0	0	0
USS Saginaw Bay	Hq&HqBtry, 1st Prov FAGrp	1	0	0	0	0	0
USS Saginaw Bay	2nd 155mm How Bn.	1	0	0	0	0	0
USS Saginaw Bay	4th 155mm How Bn.	1	0	0	0	0	0
USS Wake Island	2nd 155mm How Bn.	1	0	0	0	0	0
USS Wake Island	4th 155mm How Bn.	1	0	0	0	0	0
LST 399	2nd 155mm How Bn.	1	0	0	3	0	0
USS Hendry	4th 155mm How Bn.	1	0	0	2	0	0
PA 66	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	1	0	0	12
TOTALS.		82	4	6	1241	24	175

* 1 Enlisted man removed at Guam due to sickness.

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See Enclosure (A) for complete roster of personnel embarked and landed. Of all personnel embarked only one man did not reach the beach of Iwo Jima.

3. In order to expedite the lifting of this organization at Hilo, on or about 27 November, 1944 camp areas and a large outdoor storage area were procured there. Each unit including those to be mounted for Guam was allotted a space in this area. Those supplies arriving at Hilo by water, rations, fuel, ammunition, sandbags, telephone poles, water containers, etc., and which were not needed in the training camp were divided and placed in unit storage areas. As rapidly as organizational equipment could be released from the training camp it was also moved to the storage area. Prior to the arrival of the LST's at Hilo 7 units of artillery ammunition were preloaded on the tank decks to a height of 32 inches. An Officer representative from each Battalion was sent to Pearl Harbor to observe this loading in order to be thoroughly familiar with the disposition of the ammunition components in the ships. Of the ammunition components only the shells were palletized.

4. On 6 January, 1945 the first LST, 730, beached at Hilo. Before loading could commence, supplies for the 42 DUKW preloads had to be unloaded. The same was true in the 779 when it beached 2 days later. Loading then proceeded satisfactorily and by 1330, 10 January, 1945, all 3 LST's of the first group were loaded and under way for the rehearsal area. The average overall loading time for each ship was 30 hours. The second group of 3 LST's lifting the remaining part of Headquarters & Headquarters Battery and the 4th Battalion commenced loading on 20 January and were ready for sea mid day on the 21st. Average loading time 18 hours. The 4th Battalion did not participate in the rehearsal off Maui, T.H.

5. Prior to departure of the first half of the Group on 7 January, 1945, a group order was published temporarily attaching the rear echelon of Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group to the rear echelon of 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion. 1st Lieutenant Paul A. Winn was designated Commanding Officer, rear echelon, of the Group and instructions pertaining to his duties and administrative functions in connection therewith were issued. On 10 January, 1945 the Commanding Officer embarked on the USS Auburn as Corps Artillery Officer with Commanding General, Landing Force, at Pearl Harbor and sailed for the rehearsal. By the latter part of December a liaison team each from 2nd and 4th Battalions had reported to the 5th and 4th Division Artillery Regiments respectively to remain with them throughout the remaining phases of the operation. The aerial observers, two from each Battalion and one from 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, departed Hawaii on 15 January, 1945 for Ulithi where one from each battalion and one from the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group embarked 4 February, 1945 on the USS Saginaw Bay. The remaining two embarked 9 February, 1945 on the USS Wake Island.

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F. Rehearsal and Transit.

1. The first rehearsal for the Iwo Jima operation took place off Maui, T.H. and was conducted during the period 12 to 17 January, inclusive. That part of Group Headquarters embarked with the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion, the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and 1/2 of the 473rd Amphibian Truck Co., USA, were the only elements of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group to participate in this rehearsal. The only operations performed in the rehearsal by the Group was that of establishing and testing those primary radio circuits which would open at H minus 4 on D-Day. Satisfactory results were obtained. No equipment was landed. Neither were any Dukws launched, this action taken because of possible corrosion and deterioration of preloaded ammunition resulting from the drainage off the Dukws upon reembarking above the cargo. The LST's were not beached due to the existence of a reef off the landing beaches. Upon completion of the rehearsal, Tractor Group Charlie, of which LST's 760, 779 and 784 were a part, sailed for Kanoeh Bay, Oahu.

2. From 18 to 22 January the above group remained at anchor and all hands were able to get one shore liberty, with additional periods of recreation at Kanoeh Air Station. Beer and coca-cola were provided in satisfactory quantities during the organized recreation periods. Movies and sports were other added diversions. On 22 January Tractor Group Charlie sailed from Kanoeh, arrived at Eniwetok 3 February, departed 5 February and arrived at Saipan 10 February, departed 15 February and arrived at Iwo Jima 19 February.

3. LST's 724, 788 and 808 arrived at Pearl Harbor 23 January, departed 24 January, arrived at Eniwetok 6 February, departed 8 February, arrived at Guam 13 February, departed 16 February, arrived at Iwo Jima 20 February. From the above it can be seen that the two parts of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group sailed with different task groups. At all staging points in the voyage mail was received and distributed. This event was highly beneficial to the morale of the troops. All outgoing mail was turned over to the custody of the Fleet Post Office at Saipan and Guam in accordance with orders received from Commanding General, Landing Force, to be held there until released by dispatch from same authority some time after D-Day.

4. A second rehearsal was held off Saipan during the period 12-13 February. LST's did not participate but again it was possible to recheck communication channels. At this time certain liaison and communication personnel, one officer and two enlisted, members of the Corps Artillery Officer's party which had originally embarked on LST 760 were transferred to the USS Auburn.

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5. Commencing two days out from Pearl Harbor and continuing until D-Day every effort was bent toward thorough indoctrination of all personnel in all available information concerning the coming operation. Schools in computation, on flash range work, FDC procedure, first aid, sanitation and other pertinent subjects were held.

6. On 18 February, 1945, the following message from the Commanding Officer was read to all officers and men:

"This operation for the landing on and capture of the island of Iwo Jima will be perhaps the most difficult and dangerous operation which the Marine Corps has ever been engaged in. We will be victorious if each man does his duty to the utmost of his ability. Let every man's conduct be such that his country and his family will not be ashamed of him and that in after years he will always recall with pride the manner in which he conducted himself at Iwo Jima.

Good Luck and Good Shooting.

J. S. LETCHER."

G. Assault Phase.

1. Early in the morning of 19 February, 1945 Tractor Group Charlie moved into position off the Island of Iwo Jima. Transfer of the remaining member, the Liaison Officer, for the Corps Artillery officers party to the USS Auburn was immediately accomplished. Radio communication on all channels required in pre-landing phase was established. No unit of Corps Artillery was landed this date. By 1800 all of 13th Marines were in position on the beachhead.

2. The following day the occupation of positions of the 14th Marines was completed and indications were that some of Corps Artillery units might be landed. The LST's 724, 788 and 808 in which the 4th Howitzer Battalion was embarked arrived in the transport area by 0900, and that unit checked into the required radio nets immediately. At about 1530 the preloaded DUKWS of the 473rd Amphibian Truck Company embarked on LST's 760, 779 and 784 were ordered into Yellow 1 beach. Orders to land Charlie Battery of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion on Red 2 and attaching same to 13th Marines came at 1600. That battery, embarked in LST 779, was in position laid and ready to fire under control of 4th Battalion 13th Marines with 1400 projectiles and 700 powder charges on hand at 1830. Reports from the beach, and conditions thereon, indicated that the problems of handling heavy equipment over it would be difficult. LST 779 during unloading operations of this night was hit by mortar fire, caught fire and retracted. On order from its Captain all 80-Octane gasoline (40 drums) was jettisoned.

3. Upon orders from Corps Artillery Officer reconnaissance elements of Group Headquarters (Group Executive, Group 2, Group 3, Group 4, Communication Officer and Survey Officer with small enlisted party) and 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion landed on the north end of Red 1 at 0740 and 0920 respectively 21 February, 1945. First glance showed wreckage, debris, miscellaneous equipment and extreme congestion on the entire beach. Bulldozers and tractors would be necessary to move all equipment up through the volcanic ash and sand to the high ground. To add to these problems was the intermittent falling of enemy mortar and artillery fire in the area. The Group 4 with radio communication was stationed on the beach to make necessary contacts and arrange clearances with the shore party commander and beachmaster. The tentative plan prior to disembarking of reconnaissance parties that morning had been to beach the 2nd Battalion LST's at 0900 and 4th Battalion LST's at 1100. This plan, however, never materialized that day. The only satisfactory exit for Corps Artillery from beach Red 1 or 2 was at the north end of Red 1 and all traffic to and from the beach was using this road.

4. The Group reconnaissance party, less Group 4, proceeded to the 13th Marines EDC, checked available position areas, obtained initial survey data and then selected on the ground a tentative position area for both the 2nd and 4th Battalions and a Group CP area.

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(147 I). A rendezvous point at the road junction in target area 147 FG had previously been designated for the meeting of all parties. Accordingly the Group Executive met the 2nd Battalion reconnaissance party at the appointed place at 1000, issued the latest intelligence information allotted a position area and informed him of the probable delay in the beaching of LST's.

5. During the reconnaissance of the C.P. area one key Non-Commissioned Officer in the operations section of the Group was killed by Jap rifle fire from a bypassed blockhouse in that area. Due to difficult and congested beach conditions no further elements of Corps Artillery landed until 22 February. The period was spent extending survey control and installing what communications were possible with the limited equipment ashore. The excellent cooperation and consideration extended Group by the 13th Marines in providing local security and much needed items of equipment for initial establishment of this organization's CP pending arrival of LST's is a subject worthy of the fullest expression of gratitude.

6. Early on 22 February additional key personnel and communication equipment for Group Headquarters were ordered in by small boat from LST's 760 and 788. However, personnel from the latter LST was never permitted to disembark prior to the beaching of the 788. After several requests from, or passed through, the shore party commander on the 5th Division beaches, LST 760 with Able Battery of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and one-half Group Headquarters was cleared and beached on Green 1. This at 1530. Able Battery, also attached to the 13th Marines, was in position and ready to fire at 1900. In view of delays and speculation as to when remaining Corps Artillery LST's would beach, a position area tentatively selected for one battery of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion had to be released to the 13th Marines who were now hard pressed to displace one battalion out of the congested beach area.

7. At 0920 on 23 February, 1945 the 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion reconnaissance party reported in to the Group FDC. Their position area was assigned and all available information on intelligence survey and logistics was issued. LST's 788, 808 and 779 (for the second time) beached on Green 1 during this date and unloading proceeded satisfactorily. Both Battalions had accomplished on A.O. registration and at 1600 Group Headquarters took control, on authority from Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, of all Corps Artillery ashore. By the same order Able and Charlie Batteries, 2nd Battalion, were detached from the 13th Marines and Corps Artillery status then became that of general support of V Amphibious Corps Landing Force. The 2nd and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalions each had two batteries in position and ready to fire at that time, with approximately 3000 rounds of ammunition in the Group. By 1800 all of Group Headquarters personnel

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and equipment was ashore. At 1830 an advance reconnaissance party from the 12th Marines reported to the Group FDC. Possible position areas were indicated. Late in the afternoon of the 23rd the first OP on Mt. Suribachi was established by Charlie Battery of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion. Casualties in Corps Artillery to date, including those of 473rd Amphibian Truck Company, were 1 Officer missing in action, 3 enlisted men killed, 9 enlisted men wounded in action and 2 enlisted men missing in action.

8. Harassing missions were fired during the night of 23 February, 1945 and on 24 February a 30 minute preparation for the 4th and 5th Divisions was delivered from 0845 to 0915. The punch and effect of the massed fires of the medium artillery was immediately noted and from here on requests for Corps fires never ceased. Eleven Group missions and forty Battalion missions during the period 1800 23 February to 1800 24 February were fired. One Group mission caught two enemy batteries in the act of displacing and weapons and personnel were destroyed. This day LST 784 (which up to this time had been working on a damaged screw) and LST 724 beached on Red 1 and Green 1 respectively. From this time on the unloading operations smoothed out considerably and by 1600 all batteries of Corps Artillery were in position and firing. Average elapsed unloading time per LST was 3 1/2 hours (All six LST's were 100% unloaded 1800, 26 February, 1945). DUKWS of the 473rd Amphibian Truck Company were utilized both in unloading ships while beached and afloat. The Corps Artillery Officer had arrived at the Corps C.P. ashore at approximately 1500 and wire communication with him was immediately established. At 1200 this date the two Corps Artillery flash range OP's on Mt. Suribachi were manned by 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion parties and ready for flash range work, survey having already been completed on same. The timely occupation of these OP's produced immediate and excellent results, for that same night, 24 February, the Japs opened with medium caliber counterbattery fire and worked the Corps Artillery area over. One Howitzer of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion was knocked out while the 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion suffered damage to two tractors. Two periods of shelling, one of 45 minutes early in the evening and one of about 2 1/2 hours in the early hours of the 25th, were experienced and each time, with flash cuts and surveillance, were fired upon until silenced.

9. Early the morning of the 25th a Liaison party from the 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion was sent to the 12th Marines C.P. as Group liaison. For the attack of the 3rd Marine Division this date a battalion each from the 13th and 14th Marines was placed under 12th Marines control. That regiment was experiencing transportation difficulties in getting its material ashore, and as of 1530, 27 February, had its regimental Headquarters, 1st and 2nd Battalions complete, but

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only 5 guns in the 3rd and 2 in the 4th ashore. The last piece of the regiment was finally in position at 0900, 1 March.

10. During the period 23 February to 1 March the firing activity of Corps Artillery was at its peak. There was sufficient ammunition then on hand to answer all calls with very light restrictions. The records on the evening of 25 February showed 16,800 rounds in battery dumps. The first ammunition resupply began arriving in position areas on the morning of 27 February. The major portion of all missions accomplished was counterbattery. The record day was 26-27 February in which 5,652 rounds were expended on 6 group missions and 62 Battalion missions. Each night harassing missions were executed on the Corps front, a preparation was fired for the general King hour attack the next day and the remainder of the periods were devoted to counterbattery fires on guns, rockets, mortars, destruction fires on pillboxes, blockhouses, emplacements and neutralization and reinforcing fires for the light regiments. The Corps Artillery air observers operated from carriers until 1530 on 1 March at which time flights were commenced from airfield # 1.

11. The night of 28 February-1 March enemy artillery showed more than usual activity, commencing at 2400. Flash base locati showed new enemy positions indicating that our previous counterbattery fire had forced his displacement. At 0200 enemy fire scored a hit in the 5th Division ammunition dump approximately 100 yards from the Group FDC. At 0430 a direct hit by a 75 or 105 was sustained on the FDC temporarily disrupting communications. No casualties to personnel were received in the headquarters. However 90% of the wire in the Group dump was destroyed by fire. By 0525 the FDC was back in operation. From this and previous shellings it was evident that the enemy had good knowledge of Corps Artillery locations. But, since the ground afforded easy digging, the positions were well protected and the only problems to confront the artillery was maintenance of wire lines. Each shelling invariably caught the OP lines, Corps Headquarters lines as frequently Battalion and Divisional Artillery lines.

12. March 1, 2, 3 and 4 normal missions continued. Limitations on ammunition expenditure had to be imposed due to the resupply flow not equalling or approaching that of demand. 3 March showed a definite decrease of enemy artillery activity particularly on our rear areas. On 5 March no preparation was required since a reorganization for a final push on the 6th was ordered. Plans were prepared for a TOT preparation the morning of 6 March in which 11 battalions including the two Corps battalions were to participate. It was fired in two phases: the first commencing 0750 to 0821 in front of 5th and 3rd Divisions and the second 0845 to 0921 across 3rd and 4th Divisions front. Corps Artillery fired 2,500 rounds and Division

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Artilleries expended a total of 20,000 rounds of 75 and 105 in this preparation. The infantry were unable to make any appreciable gains following this preparation. The enemy was holding virtually a fortress position composed of a series of mutually supporting blockhouses, pillboxes and caves interconnected by an elaborate system of communication trenches. In the midst of the preparation the Japs fired a counter-preparation with mortars and artillery.

14. From 7 to 11 March normal missions were fired but the number and type of Corps Artillery targets became more and more restricted. At 0030, 11 March enemy artillery renewed efforts to damage friendly artillery. His locations were immediately picked up, but except for one, were found to be too close to the front lines for Corps mission. A Group TOT was fired on the one which was within safe limits and silence. On the morning of the 11th another major preparation of 12 battalions, this time under control of the 13th Marines, was fired on the 5th Division front. After 11 March the missions of Corps Artillery became almost entirely of a harassing nature. Effective 1600, 11 March the 473rd Amphibian Truck Company was detached and ordered to the island Command.

15. On 7 March, 1945, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Special Order # 52-45 was received directing the transfer of 155mm Howitzers and certain personnel of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and the 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion to the 5th Marine Division and 4th Marine Division respectively upon completion of the Iwo Jima operation. The 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion closed station and commenced effecting the above transfer at 1800, 14 March. The same day the 14th Marines secured and began reembarkation operations. At 1200, 15 March orders were received from Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps effective 1800 same date that functions of Corps Artillery Headquarters passed to Headquarters, 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and to commence preparation for reembarkation of Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion aboard the S.S. Sea Runner for transportation to new base. At 1200, 16 March the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion received orders to commence effecting the material and personnel transfer to the 5th Marine Division, and further, to prepare for reembarkation. Iwo Jima was announced secured at 1800, 16 March, 1945. The 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion embarked in the S.S. Santa Isabel and sailed with the other elements of 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group at 1000, 18 March, 1945.

16. To briefly summarize the activities of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group during the assault phase the following facts are enumerated. The first element of the Group (less 473rd Amphibian Truck Company) landed on Iwo Jima at 1620, 21 February, all communications were in and all weapons emplaced at 1600, 24 February. From 1600, 23 February when Group took control until 1800, 15 March, a period

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of 20 days, the mission of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group remained that of general support of the V Amphibious Corps Landing Force. Position areas remained unchanged throughout the operation. During the entire period Group Headquarters performed the functions of Corps Artillery Headquarters. Ammunition expenditures of all artillery units were: 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group 43795 rounds 155, 14th Marines 156598 rounds 75 and 105, 12th Marines, as of 14 March, 109441 rounds of 75 and 105, 13th Marines, as of 16 March, 129962 rounds of 75 and 105. Results of Corps Artillery fires are found under paragraph 3 B (5), page 27 of this report.

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3. Discussion, Comments and Recommendations.

A. Intelligence.

1. Observation.

a. Ground.

Mt. Suribachi provided the only satisfactory ground observation for Corps Artillery fires. A 182 yard flash base was established there and maintained until the island was secured. Due to the nature of the terrain, the O.P.'s established in the forward areas by the Division Artilleries were never able to observe more than 1000 yards beyond the front lines. Such observation was not suitable for deep supporting fires and therefore no other Corps Artillery O.P.'s were established. When close fires were requested surveillance on same was obtained by Division Artillery observers.

Results obtained from the flash base were most encouraging. Observer Right and Observer Left were intervisible and consequently could be oriented directly with the O-3200 μ line running from Observer Right to Observer Left; azimuth of this line was 3641.5 μ . Each O.P. was equipped with an azimuth instrument, stop watch, an SCR 610 and a telephone. The O.P. teams were under direct control of the Group-2 section at the flash central. Radio communication was constantly ready to replace wire. Frequently within 3 minutes from the time both O.P.'s obtained an A reading on enemy flashes the final plot was dispatched to the FDC. Often previous API information confirmed these plots. Results of the fire for effect were obtained by flash cuts on the left most burst of the concentration. An O.P. on Kama or Kangoku Rock would have provided fair observation for one end of a long base with the other on Mt. Suribachi, but the rocks were not secured until very late in the campaign.

Observation difficulties were ever present with the smoke, dust and fires over the front. Frequently the Japs started fires behind or in front of their gun positions prior to opening fire in order to hinder friendly observation. Wire communication problems were continuously present due to enemy shelling. Camouflage of enemy positions was superb, thereby making detection doubly difficult. The practice of firing but a few rounds at a time and then removing weapons into caves and enclosures was an effective trick employed by the Japs.

Examination of records show that flash base operations obtained accurate location of 50% of all active enemy artillery of a calibre larger than 70mm. Had the Corps Artillery been equipped with sound ranging material to supplement and confirm flash operations the enemy would rarely have escaped retribution. Division Artillery

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lery intelligence worked very closely with that of the Corps Artillery, however, and interchange of all information, including that from Dodar plot, by artillery regiments enabled timely and effective fires to be delivered on the major portion of enemy artillery. See enclosure (M) to this report for observation and sound posts.

b. Air.

Aerial observation was indispensable in this operation. Without it many targets would have remained undetected and very few observed fire missions would have been possible. Aerial observers were employed for all types of fire missions including registrations adjusted time K and precision adjustments. Because of positions on reverse slopes, and masks interfering with artillery fire a goodly number of targets located could not be subjected to effective artillery fire.

Observers were artillerymen trained in aerial observation and aerial free gunnery under the supervision of the Group Air Liaison Officer, who selected four (4) observers for this operation.

Missions were flown from carriers from 1400, 22 Feb. to 1800, 23 Feb. A TBM-3 was used on these flights; missions averaged 4.5 hours each; altitude over the target area varied from 800-2000 feet, and only light inaccurate AA fire was encountered. It was found necessary to descend to 300 feet over a target to identify an active installation.

Aerial Observers began operations from airfield number 1 at 1530, 1 March. Until 1230, 13 March, OY planes were used; at that time, due to the loss of a 5th Division OY plane, a TBM was made available to Corps Artillery. Flights with the OY plane averaged 1.6 hours; altitude from 800-2000 feet; no AA fire was encountered. When deemed safe, single passes as low as 100 feet were made to identify objects in caves and other well camouflaged positions.

After 1 March, when aerial observers became land based, a detailed intelligence report was submitted daily to the Group-2. Vital items of intelligence were reported at once to the Group-2.

For results of firing by air observers in operation, see enclosure (S), Aerial Observer Conduct of Fire Report.

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2. Maps and Photographs.

The following maps and photos were issued to this organization for the operation:

Special Air and Gunnery Target Maps, IWO JIMA, with Target Area Grid, scale 1/5000, 1/10000, 1/20000.

Special Terrain Maps, IWO JIMA, without Target Area Grid, scale 1/10000, 1/20000.

Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, IWO JIMA, scale two (2) inches equals one (1) nautical mile.

Special Aerial Mosaic, IWO JIMA, scale 1/10000, without Target Area Grid.

Special Aerial Mosaic, IWO JIMA, scale 1/5000, with Target Area Grid.

Relief Map, IWO JIMA, scale 1/7000.

Rubber Relief Map, IWO JIMA, horizontal scale 1/5000.

Beach Diagrams Southeastern and Southwestern beaches, IWO JIMA, from photographs 4 July 1944.

G-2 Special Study, IWO JIMA, VAC.

Photographs:

Vertical overlapping strips, high and low level obliques suitable for stereo study.

3. Enemy Artillery Action and Effectiveness.

For enemy artillery action and effectiveness, see enclosure (C). That, however, can not possibly be 100% complete for the operation as a whole. The landing beaches and the area occupied by the 14th Marines were continually harassed and because limited space prevented adequate dispersion of personnel and equipment, abnormal casualties in that regiment resulted. The shell and mortar fire from the Japs effectively prevented full scale occupation of position on D-day by the 14th Marines. After the artillery once gained a degree of protection in well dug-in emplacements, the effectiveness of Jap artillery on materiel was minor.

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4. Tactical Employment of Enemy Artillery.

Employment of artillery by the Japs in this campaign as compared to previous ones showed a marked improvement. In a comparison of his tactical use of fires and maneuvers with our own, particularly in the massing of fires, he is still inferior. But aside from employment in mass he displayed some noteworthy ability, and respect for same is now definitely on the uptrend. Gunnery was good as indicated by observed adjustment of fires. When locations of weapons and installations were known, fires were placed there, not once but many times. It appears that he sacrificed fields of fire on weapons for camouflage and protection, but with the number of artillery pieces available he still might have not made a bad decision. As always he is an accomplished camouffleur. His attempts at versatility are not to be overlooked. Weapons of all types and calibers were employed. Artillery was constantly maneuvered, making our efforts to locate same more difficult. Recoiling Guns were daily evident. The largest number of weapons employed as a fire unit appeared to be a battery. Numerous occasions when our own preparations would seemingly devastate the entire front, he replied with a counter-preparation of artillery and mortars. He employed or paralleled our tactics of interdiction and harassing fires at night. Artillerymen appeared well trained and disciplined in view of persistent return fire immediately following and sometimes even during our counterbattery fire. Time fire was employed, but it is not known whether fired by field artillery weapons or by dual purpose AA. Rockets were extensively employed but the degree of efficiency and accuracy did not approach that of his artillery.

5. Types of material used by enemy artillery.

a. Mobile.

<u>Model</u>	<u>Caliber</u>
94(1934)	37mm Gun
01(1941)	47mm AT Gun
92(1932)	70mm How
38(1905)	75mm Gun
90(1930)	75mm Gun
38(1905)	120mm How

b. Fixed:

93(1933)	25mm twin mount DP Gun
93(1933)	25mm single mount DP Gun
10(1921)	3 inch DP Gun 4.7 inch DP Gun 10cm twin mount DP Gun in turret mount
3(1914)	14cm CD Gun

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c. Mortars, mobile:

3(1928)	81mm mortar
97(1937)	81mm mortar
97(1937)	90mm mortar
97(1937)	150mm mortar

d. Mortar, fixed:

300mm (12 inch) mortar Spigot type.

e. Rocket positions:

10(1935)	Bomb thrower, rocket motor.
	20cm (8 inch) rocket.
	30cm (12 inch) rocket;
	550 pound bomb body with a rocket motor attached.

6. Liaison.

Liaison Officers with V Amphibious Corps, 2 section, 3 section, 12th, 13th and 14th Marines provided excellent and reliable sources of intelligence information.

7. Miscellaneous.

a. The 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion provided all metro data for the Group after 1600, 23 February.

b. Metro resume for the operation is found on page 8 of enclosure (T).

8. Recommendations. It is recommended that:

a. All units, particularly infantry, be thoroughly schooled in the elements of a shelling report. The more complete the report, the more effective will be the action.

b. Corps publish on D-day a damage assessment report of pre D-day naval gunfire and bombing on enemy artillery. Corps Artillery is primarily interested in remaining active enemy artillery. Delayed intelligence only serves to confuse. Following this report, a daily report as of a certain time of two parts (1) damage assessment on old targets (2) new targets appearing since previous report, all based on a daily API coverage.

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c. The Iwo Jima Air and Gunnery Target folder containing 1000 yard grid square coverage be expanded to include 4 such squares on a 1/10,000 scale. This item was extremely valuable to aerial observers, but orientation of so small an area from the air at times was difficult.

d. The VMO pilots receive just prior to the operation a basic observation course with the view to indoctrination in trajectories of artillery and naval guns and the capabilities and limitation of each. Also that an SOP be published indicating who is in command over the target area, pilot or observer, and the status of each.

e. The equipping, organization and training of the sound and flash unit in the Corps Artillery Headquarters & Headquarters Battery be given a high priority for future operations.

f. The Corps 2 section in its daily report of enemy artillery installations include when the artillery installation was last observed to be firing or otherwise active.

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B. Firing.

1. Survey.

(a) General plans were made prior to embarkation for the artillery survey to be used on the Iwo Jima operation. The 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group was to act as Corps Artillery for the operation, but since the Group had no organic or attached survey or flash and sound ranging personnel, the 13th Marines was designated to establish survey control. The 13th Marines had a Coast and Geodetic Survey Officer and since they were the division artillery of an assault division they would have a higher priority in landing.

In planning for the operation it was decided to use the intersection of a narrow-gauge railroad and an unimproved road on Red Beach 1 for the Corps I.P. with the line Corps I.P.-North-east tangency of the island as the direction line. Upon landing the 13th Marines survey party found that the planned Corps I.P. had been demolished and could not be located. Point Airport was located by inspection and coordinates taken from the map. The Corps I.P. was located from this point by short base offset.

(b) The coordinates of the Corps I.P. and Corps AB line were published by Group to all survey units as they came ashore. The 13th Marines, since they had established control, were already tied into the Corps control. Upon landing the survey elements of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion reconnaissance party tied into the survey control, using points 13th I.P. and Station Airport. The 14th Marines survey team tied into the Corps I.P. directly by traverse. The 12th Marines were furnished surveyed points in their general position area, and they tied into the survey control by traverse from the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion I.P. All units located their own regimental I.P.'s. The control was carried as far forward as the tactical situation permitted. All units used the Corps AB line to compute their base angle.

(c) The survey for the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group was executed by the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion survey team. Point 13th I.P. was used, and the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion I.P. was established by traverse from it, using Point 13th I.P. Point Airport for direction. Station Bomb was located by triangulation from the 13th I.P. and Point Airport. The 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion I.P. was located by traverse from the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion I.P., and direction was taken from the line 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion I.P. Station Bomb. The Corps Artillery Flash Range O.P.'s on Mt. Suribachi were located by triangulation from the 2nd Battalion I.P. and Station Bomb.

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(d) Distribution of all survey information was made as soon as possible. All units were instructed to turn in all survey information to the Group Survey Officer, who passed on this information when called upon, in addition to the periodic mimeograph sheets distributed. The following units were included on the distribution lists: VAC Engineering Officer, ISCOM Engineering Officer, 135th AAA Group, 12th Marines, 13th Marines, 14th Marines, 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and the 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion.

(e) The survey control for this operation was considered quite satisfactory. On more than one occasion either two or more regiments and Corps Artillery, or a regiment and Corps Artillery, were successfully massed.

Survey and map locations varied somewhat as indicated in part 2 to Enclosure (K). Vertical control carried from the water's edge by two different units indicated a difference of nine or ten yards from map altitude. The map check points showed that the difference horizontally and vertically between map and survey were not constant, and a single correction could not be used.

(f) See Enclosure (K) for overlay of major survey control, and Appendix 1 to Enclosure (K) for coordinates, altitude and description of stations.

2. Fire Adjustment:

(a) Adjustment of the observed fires of Corps Artillery was principally by air observers.

(b) The adjustment of fire was also accomplished by Flash Range, sound range, Corps observers, and Division Artillery forward observers.

(c) All registrations were made by air observers using forward observer precision methods and the Marine Corps spotting system. Time corrections were obtained in addition to range deflection corrections. All destruction missions, whether adjusted by aerial observers or by Divisional Artillery forward observers, were precision adjustments. Fire for effect was made with a single piece or with a battery with a converged sheaf, using T105 (concrete-piercing) Fuze, or Fuze M51A3 set for delay.

(d) All adjustments, except the precision adjustments, were bracket-type adjustments. The Corps aerial observers and the forward observers of the Division Artillery used standard forward observer methods of adjustment. Counter-battery fires at night were sometimes adjusted by flash or sound range; if not adjusted, the flash base or sound range gave surveillance on the fire for effect, and any corrections needed were made and the fire for effect repeated.

Because of the poor terrestrial observation, very few adjustments were made with axial, small T or large T methods. What few missions were conducted from O.F.'s were fired with axial bracket adjustments. Excellent results were obtained.

(e) Preparations and harrassing missions were fired as K-transfers with latest weather applied. The flash base, however, was used to give surveillance on some of the harrassing missions, and the air observer gave surveillance on all preparations. Shell Allo (W) was used to aid in adjustment occasionally.

(f) The following is a breakdown of missions fired (this does not include preparations or harrassing fires):

TYPE OBSERVATION	NO. OF MISSIONS
Air Observer	132
Flash Range	46
Sound Range	15
F.O. or O.F.	47
Unobserved	188
TOTAL MISSIONS	428

3. Fire Direction:

(a) Firing Chart: The firing chart was a battle map, the 1/20,000 Special Air and Gunnery Target Map of Iwo Jima, prepared by the 64th Engineer Topographical Battalion, USAFICTA, dated November, 1944. A position area survey was established in the two battalions, using control furnished by the 13th Marines. Map locations of check points were used in the computation of base angles, and map altitudes were used for vertical control.

(b) Communications: In the Group FDC there was a BD-72 switchboard. Through this direct lines were run to the FDC's of the 2nd and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalions and the three regiments. Fire missions and requests for reinforcement were handled over these circuits. In addition, two radio nets were available as alternate means of communication. One of these radio nets was used for the transmission of airstrike data.

(c) Gunnery:

(1) All registrations were, as previously stated, made by air observers. Deflection, range and time corrections were determined. Registrations were usually made just prior to dark each day. All fires delivered were K-transfers with latest weather applied.

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(2) Reenforcing Fires: When a battalion of the Group or one of the artillery regiments requested reenforcement, a battalion (or battalions) was (were) assigned to reenforce, and was (were) connected by telephone to the adjusting battalion. The adjusting battalion controlled the mission from that time until its completion, with the Group FDC listening-in only. Upon completion of adjustment the adjusted altitude was computed and reported by the adjusting battalion. This data was used by the reenforcing battalion in fire for effect. This system worked very satisfactorily. Since all units were tied to a common survey I.F. and direction line, the Corps battalions could reenforce any unit on request. This was done repeatedly. On one occasion a 13th Marines' air observer caught two batteries of artillery in march order and displacing. A light battalion was adjusted on the target and Corps was requested to reenforce. Corps assigned the two medium battalions to reenforce, and the 13th Marines also assigned two light battalions to reenforce. Adjustment was completed and five battalions massed for effect. The guns, prime movers and personnel were destroyed.

(3) Preparations: Corps battalions habitually reenforced the divisions during the King-hour preparations each day. Since there were only two medium battalions of Corps Artillery and there were three divisions in the line, some coordination was necessary in order to both reenforce the divisions and also fire the Corps missions. Each night after receipt of the attack order for the next day, the Division Artillery would, by telephone or overlay, submit their requests for fires to be delivered in support of the attacks in their zones of action. These were then assigned to the battalions in the schedule of fires. This system worked very satisfactorily.

(4) Harrassing and Defensive Fires: Each night the latest intelligence data was studied for suitable harrassing targets. These included enemy C.F.'s, O.F.'s, assembly and bivouac areas, dumps, important communication routes, and all known active batteries, AA positions and rocket-launcher sites. In addition, the Divisions submitted their harrassing fire requests for targets they wished Corps to hit during the night.

(5) Attack of Targets: In the attack of enemy batteries both battalions were assigned the mission whenever possible. The enemy artillery was seldom active during the day, but became very active at night. The fire for effect was usually fired E-C apart, and if both battalions were assigned the target, the method of fire was TOT. One battalion was then assigned the mission of harrassing the battery for the remainder of the night. The next day the air observer was assigned the target, and if any guns remained in the area, they were destroyed by precision adjustments. In destruction

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missions Fuze T105, (concrete-piercing) and Fuze M51A3, set for delay, were used with excellent results. Very little time fire was used. This was due to the fact that the enemy was well-entrenched in pill-boxes, bunkers, caves, and other fortress-type emplacements.

(6) Conclusion: The fires of Corps Artillery were maneuvered and accurately placed in the area where needed at all times. This was possible because of the narrow front of the Corps and the excellent survey control that was established. The Corps Artillery could thus maneuver and mass its fire with any Division Artillery at any time.

4. Liaison:

The Corps Artillery maintained normal liaison. Liaison with the Corps Commander was maintained through the Commanding Officer, 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, who was at the Corps C.F. at all times. In addition, one officer maintained liaison between the Corps-2 and the Corps Artillery-2, and two officers maintained liaison with the Corps-3. The liaison with the Corps operations section was primarily for the purpose of coordinating air, artillery and naval gunfire. A liaison party was at each Divisional Artillery FDC, and in addition to performing the normal liaison, aided in the promulgation of information on air-strikes.

5. The enemy was extremely well-entrenched and defended a series of fortified positions. He pursued a passive defense throughout, preferring to remain in pill boxes, bunkers, block-houses, and other heavy-type fortifications, until death. His artillery generally consisted of field pieces, AA Artillery, large-calibre mortars, and rocket launchers. These weapons were well-concealed, and, except for the AA guns, were kept under cover in large caves or block-houses when not in use. This made our counter-battery work very difficult and reduced the effectiveness of our fires. A great percentage of Fuze Delay and T105 (concrete-piercing) fuze was fired. Very little time fire was used. Following are the results of the Corps Artillery fires:

TARGETS	TOTALLY DESTROYED	PARTIALLY DESTROYED	EXCELLENT EFFECT
Enemy Batteries	4	-	3
Enemy Guns of Unidentified Calibre	15	2	14

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TARGETS	TOTALLY DESTROYED	PARTIALLY DESTROYED	EXCELLENT EFFECT*
Enemy 15cm. Guns	3	-	1
Enemy 8 in. Naval Guns	1	-	-
Enemy 5 in. Naval Guns	1	1	1
Enemy AA Guns	13	2	2
Enemy Rocket-Launchers ³	5	-	10
Enemy Mortar Batteries	4	1	6
Enemy Tanks	3	-	1
Enemy Ammo & Fuel Dumps	11	-	3
Enemy Blockhouses	14	10	1
Enemy Ill Boxes	9	1	7
Enemy Trucks	16	-	-
Enemy Gun Emplacements	-	8	5
Enemy Troop Concentrations	-	-	20
Enemy Command Posts	-	-	2
Enemy Truck Parks	-	-	2

* Exact assesment of damage other than excellent effect was not reported.

6. Targets were located by practically every known means. Target locations were reported by aerial observers, flash range, sound range, forward observers, AFI work, normal intelligence channels, and the normal 3-section liaison.

7. For ammunition expended, by type fire mission, see Enclosure (FOX).

8. For ammunition expended by item, see Enclosure (GEORGE).

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9. Comments and Recommendations.

(a) All phases of the Gunnery as executed by the Corps Artillery battalions were excellent.

(b) The Corps battalions fired approximately 200 concentrations each, and the light artillery of the divisions fired many more. The plotted concentrations, special grid and intelligence overprint all combined to make the firing chart a mass of confused and unreadable detail. For this reason the firing chart had to be changed frequently. It is recommended that additional maps be provided for artillery units for use as firing charts in future operations, without the intelligence overprint. The intelligence data contained in the overprint is of no use on the firing chart, but is of definite value for the situation map that is kept in the Fire Direction Center.

(c) The lack of medium divisional artillery was acutely felt in the Iwo Jima operation. Neither the 75mm pack howitzers nor the 105mm howitzers were capable of destroying the type of fortifications found on Iwo Jima. This resulted in Corps Artillery being called upon to execute many missions that normally would fall to the general support battalion of Divisional Artillery. Even the 155mm howitzers in Corps Artillery found it difficult to destroy some of the blockhouses that were brought under fire. The T105 fuze ultimately accomplished the mission, but often as many as ten or twelve direct hits were required to destroy the target. It is recognized that plans are now completed for the equipping of one battalion of Divisional Artillery with medium artillery, and also that in the future Corps Artillery will consist of four 155mm Gun battalions. It is recommended that provisions be made so that 8-inch howitzers and 155mm howitzer material be readily available to Corps Artillery. This is in excess of the 155mm Guns of the now organic 155mm Gun battalions. This recommendation does not contemplate a change in the table of organization of the four 155mm Gun battalions, but will provide a pool of 155mm howitzers and 8-inch howitzers from which to draw should the nature of the terrain in which an operation is to take place, together with the defenses that might be expected, warrant this substitution. In the Iwo Jima Operation, the 8-inch howitzers would have proven invaluable for the destruction of the heavy fortifications encountered there. Its small probable error, heavy projectile, and all-around versatility would have accomplished the many missions in less time and with the expenditure of less ammunition than was required by the 155mm howitzers that were employed. It is felt that the Corps should not tie itself to a fixed material of 155mm Guns, but should be prepared to meet the needs of any operation at the commencement of the planning phase. Thus

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during the planning and training phase of future operations the Corps Artillery Officer could select that weapon which would best accomplish the Corps Artillery mission, after due consideration had been given to the beaches, terrain features, and enemy forces and defenses that would be encountered.

(d) In this operation, as in previous operations, reports of short rounds were received from time to time. All such reports were thoroughly investigated and an officer sent to the scene of the reported short rounds. In every case investigated by Corps the reported short rounds were proven to be enemy artillery. However, the reports of short rounds received were in all cases incomplete. This resulted in delays and in many cases the unnecessary lifting of artillery fires. It is therefore recommended that all units be indoctrinated to make complete reports, to include particularly the exact time, caliber, type fires (WP, HE or time), direction of fire, and the method of fire, so that investigation can be made effectively.

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C. Communications.

1. The communication plan for the operation was in accordance with normal procedure for Corps Artillery. Communications during all phases was very good.

2. (a) Wire lines were established as rapidly as the situation permitted. All construction was overhead on 2" X 4" poles carried for this purpose. No difficulty was experienced in protecting the wire lines from wheeled or tracked vehicles. Enemy shellings caused numerous failures of telephone communication. These were quickly repaired and no serious communication interruption occurred.

(b) Two wire laying 1-ton, 4 X 4 trucks were carried for Group Headquarters. These were supplemented by two 1-ton 4 X 4 trucks, borrowed from other sections, which made possible the rapid installation of wire lines. Without these larger vehicles wire installations would have been greatly impeded. While on this specific operation, the need for a vehicle such as the Cargo Carrier M-290 was not acute, it would have been invaluable in the initial phase.

(c) Prior to departure of this unit for the staging area the Telephone Central Office Set TC-4 authorized had not been received, and it was necessary to substitute three switchboards type SD-72. These did not adequately fill the needs for the main switchboard. The connection of three such switchboards in multiple tends to slow connections and resultant poor service.

(d) It is recommended that one (1) Telephone Central Office Set TC-12 be authorized for each Corps or Group Artillery Headquarters. This equipment would be used in the Fire Direction Center to replace the multiple connection of one (1) switchboard SD-72 and one (1) switchboard SD-71. The need for immediate connections, frequent conference calls, and the number of lines to be terminated requires equipment designed for the task, such as is the Telephone Central Office Set TC-12.

(e) Insulators IN-53 were used in the construction of wire lines and proved very satisfactory. It is recommended that an allowance of two thousand (2000) be authorized for Corps or Group Artillery Headquarters. The Bracket IF-57 and Insulator IN-25 were authorized in the T/A for this organization but were not carried on this operation. It was considered that the bulk and limited usefulness of these items precluded their efficient employment in artillery wire line construction.

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(f) Fifty (50) lance poles FC-2 were supplied this unit; these were insufficient. It is recommended that an allowance of five hundred (500) be authorized for Corps or Group Headquarters and an allowance of one hundred (100) for each Gun or Howitzer Battalion.

(g) It is recommended that wire vehicle allowance be authorized as follows for Corps or Group Headquarters:

2 Truck, 2 ton, 4X4
 2 Truck, 1-ton, 4X4
 2 Cargo Carrier, M-290.

3. (a) All radio nets required by plan were established on D-Day when radio silence was lifted. The VHF channel assigned for observation was used as a voice command channel during ship to shore movement and performed very satisfactorily. Upon establishment of units ashore the normal Command Net opened and this channel was used for unloading operations. Upon completion of this phase it reverted to primary function and another VHF channel was then made available for further unloading and 4-section activities.

(b) The Fire Mission Net (Model MZ, Radio Equipment) operated excellently during the entire operation. It is felt that a set of greater power output is required for this net due to occasional communication difficulties attributed directly to insufficient power output for the task.

(c) The Air-Ground Net (Model MZ, Radio Equipment) operated very satisfactorily. This net was operated at the Fire Direction Center, each Battalion and a ground set on the airfield.

(d) Minor difficulties in the form of interference was experienced on VHF channels. This was due to nearby location of stations on adjacent channels.

(e) The Remote Control Unit, RM-29A, is not suitable in its present form for satisfactorily controlling the transmitter from a remote point. It is recommended that a modification be incorporated in this equipment which will enable the operator at the remote point to have control of the transmitter.

(f) It is recommended that the four (4) Radio Equipments, Model MZ, authorized for a Group Headquarters, be replaced with two (2) Radio Equipment SCR-193, and three (3) Radio Equipment, Model MZ.

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4. (a) The Message Center of this organization operated continuously from D-day. Difficulty was encountered due to the lack of an adequately-trained Message Center Chief. It was necessary to select a non-commissioned officer of the communication section who had "some" message center experience in order to have proper supervision and coordinated function with the overall communication system. This arrangement worked very well and all functions of the message center were carried through effectively.

(b) The Shackle Code was the only cryptographic aid used, and this proved very effective.

5. The only materiel failures were those experienced by one battalion with their Radio Equipment Model MZ. This was largely attributed to the length of time these sets had been in service (two years combat service). The repair facilities of the V Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion and the 8th Field Depot Signal Company were available and used, resulting in no serious communication failure.

6. Materiel losses during all phases of the operation were as follows:

(a) One (1) Radio Equipment, Model MZ, during ship to shore movement.

(b) 35 Wire W-110B on DR-4, miles.
25 Wire W-110B on DR-5, miles.
2 Control Units, COL 23270, remote for Model MZ, Radio Equipment.

The above equipment was destroyed when a nearby friendly ammunition dump was set afire by enemy action.

7. See enclosures (D) and (E) for final circuit diagram and radio net.

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D. Supply and Logistics.

1. General.

(a) Supplies were distributed equally among all six LST's with the exception of LST 808 which did not have any fuel or water due to the LCT carried on the deck (see enclosure "N").

(b) Responsibility for unloading each LST rested directly and completely with each firing battery loading officer.

(c) Unloading was directed by the Group-4 through each Battalion-4. Orders were for all First Provisional Field Artillery Group supplies to be taken from each LST to the respective battalion position areas for later redistribution by the Group-4. Preloaded Corps supplies were to be taken to a common Group Headquarters dump. From time to time Corps supplies were issued to assault elements of both 4th and 5th Marine Divisions and to batteries of this group. (An accounting was made by the Group-4 to the C-4, VAC in a letter dated 4 March, 1945).

(d) Redistribution was later affected so that each unit in this command received its share based on the Administrative Order to the Operations Plan.

(e) The Corps Quartermaster supplied all of this organization's requirements throughout the operation with the exception of sand bags and water during the first 15 days.

2. Supplies authorized and landed.

(a) With the exception of the following, all supplies authorized were landed (see enclosure "R"):

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Reason for Losses</u>
40	55-gal. Drums	80 Octane Gasoline	Jettisoned from LST 779 by order of CO during shelling.
250	Cases	Cal .30 ammunition	Dukws (2) sunk.
300	5-gal. Cans	Water	Dukws (3) sunk.
475	Cases	"C" Rations	Dukws (3) sunk.
12	55-gal. Drums	6 Diesel Oil, 6 80 Octane Gasoline	Dukw (1) sunk.

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3. Equipment authorized and landed.

(a) With the exception of the following all equipment authorized was landed (see enclosure "H").

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Reason for Losses</u>
10	Dukws, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6X6	Sunk.
5	Dukws, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6X6	Broached.
2	Truck, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4X4, Radio.	One in dukw that sunk. One in dukw that broached.

4. Equipment and Supplies lost; or destroyed due to Enemy Action during the Campaign.

(a) Supplies.

- (1) Rations: 632cs. "C" Ration.
4cs. "B" Ration (asst'd)
- (2) Water: 850 gals.

(b) Equipment.

- 1 Tractor, TD-18 w/angle dozer.
- 1 Tractor, TD-18 w/winch.
- 1 Trailer, 6-ton Athey.
- 35 Wire W-110, DR-5 on reel, reels.
- 1 Sight Mount, M25.

(c) Ammunition.

300 powder charges.

5. Ammunition Authorized and landed.

(a) Seven units of fire plus vehicle preloads were unloaded from each LST, a total of 26370 rounds.

(b) First resupply shipment arrived and unloaded.

- 10440-H.E. projectiles.
- 5484-M3. Propelling Charge (Green bag)
- 7118-M4A1. Propelling Charge (Grey bag)

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11088-M51A3 Fuze, SQ-D
 1825-M55 Fuze, Time.
 6000-CP105 Fuze, Time.
 19200-Primers.

(c) Second resupply shipment arrived and unloaded.

8590-H.E. projectiles.
 2693-M3 Propelling Charge (Green Bag).
 1764-M4A1 Propelling Charge (Grey Bag)
 7800-M51A3 Fuze SQ-D
 9600-Primers.

6. Comments and Recommendations.

(a) Mounting out supplies were extremely well planned and entirely adequate, with the exception of sand bags. Each battalion could have profitably utilized 100,000 bags while Headquarters Battery required 40,000.

(b) The resupply shipments of ammunition were sufficient but the execution of the unloading left much to be desired. (See paragraph 3 E (3), page 40, unloading difficulties.)

(c) Palletizing of 155mm projectiles is the best way to handle ammunition if the proper unloading equipment is available, such as jumbo cranes, cherry pickers, "A" Frames, LST cranes, tractors, Athey trailers and dump trucks.

(d) Powder packed in metal cases and palletized reduces losses in the ship to shore movement and speeds unloading, if the proper unloading equipment as indicated in paragraph (c) above is available. On LST's, where no water runs are ordinarily involved, the clover leaf packing suffices.

(e) 50-55 gallon drums are an excellent means of bringing adequate water supply ashore for men and guns, due to the fact that we have the heavy equipment to handle them.

(f) It appeared that Red Beaches one and two and Green Beach could have been better organized during the period 20 to 25 February.

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(1) Apparently there was very little liaison between the Commander Landing Forces, the channel control vessels and the beach masters. Conflicting orders and countermanded orders resulted in LST's and LCT's

(a) Not beaching.

(b) Not beaching on the best available beach.

(c) Beaching and retracting.

(2) Although woven wire mesh and marston matting were available in large quantities and were critically required for efficient unloading of heavy equipment, supplies and ammunition, there were apparently few real efforts to lay same.

(3) Continued traffic snarls indicated that very little traffic control was effected. There were some attempts to remedy this situation by 23 February, but by that time things were out of hand and it was too late.

(4) Very little apparent control was exercised over shore party personnel. Critically needed sandbags, marston matting and heavy dunnage were side tracked by shore party personnel for "foxholes". Frequent pleading with the men over the loudspeaker to return these was indicative of the situation.

(5) Lack of early salvage operations on beached small boats, Dukws and LVT's resulted in lost equipment, lost supplies, less room to beach small craft, LST's, LSM's and general disorganization of the beach, all of which stopped vital unloading.

(6) Due to the apparent disorganization indicated in the preceding paragraphs it is recommended that the following steps which are now covered in current S.O.P.'s be more rigidly adhered to in order to insure rapid and effective handling of equipment and supplies on the beach in the future.

(1) That only the Landing Force Commander order ships ashore. That only the channel control vessels indicate on which beach the ships are to land. That only the beachmaster order the ships where to beach on his particular beach.

(2) That the beaches be organized and prepared for unloading prior to any attempt to unload heavy equipment.

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(3) That traffic control personnel and premade traffic signs be landed and organized prior to the major unloading.

(4) That military police be landed if necessary to control the disposition of such critical supplies as sandbags, matting and heavy dunnage.

(5) That salvage crews and equipment be landed immediately to maintain accessibility to the beaches and exits from the beaches.

(h) That heavy leather gloves be an item of issue to all ammunition handlers.

(i) That ear plugs or blast helmets be issued for the gun crews. Several instances of ruptured ear drums were noted.

(j) That conveyor rollers without stands be issued on the basis of thirty per battalion. This item was of extreme value in moving projectiles from the pits to the howitzers.

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E. Transport Quartermaster - Comments and Recommendations.

1. Time required to load.

(a) The average time required to completely preload (including shoring and flooring) seven units of fire of 155mm ammunition and components aboard LST's of this command by a trained twenty man C.B. working party, was 30 hours.

(b) The average time required to load supplies, equipment and personnel aboard LST's of this command was 30 hours. The shortest time required was 12 hours (nothing on main deck) and the longest time required was 36 hours (time consumed unloading last minute supplies sent down aboard LST's).

(c) Two factors definitely contributing to the efficiency, ease and speed with which LST's were loaded were:

(1) Preloading all supplies on the proper ships on the ground by use of LST serial numbers prior to the arrival of the ships.

(2) Loading the main and tank decks simultaneously by means of the attached Dukw company which hauled drums and other heavy supplies alongside the LST's for the main deck crane to lift aboard. This left the tank deck available for loading at all times.

2. Time required to unload.

(a) The average total elapsed time required to unload ammunition, supplies, equipment and personnel from LST's of this command was 35 hours. The shortest time required was 20 hours, the longest was 79 hours.

(b) The movement and/or threatened movement of the LST's from the beach during reported enemy air raid, harassing gunfire and mortar fire reduced considerably the efficiency of unloading. It is recommended that the mission of the LST's be clarified so that threatened enemy air action and harassing fires do not result in retracting or attempted retracting by LST's. It is suggested that only actual air raids and/or concerted and well directed enemy shell fire be the only cause for leaving the beach.

(c) The beach on Iwo Jima required definite preparation before heavy equipment and supplies were landed. It was found that ramp extension mat 22' x 12' which was aboard every LST

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was far superior to woven wire mesh or marston matting because both rolling stock and tracked vehicles were able to negotiate this mat without tearing it up.

(d) The attached Dukw company aided immeasurably in unloading the LST's while they were still in the transport area and was also extremely effective in unloading drums, rations and organizational equipment on the beach. It is recommended that a portion of a Dukw company be allocated to Corps Artillery to expedite unloading in the future.

3. Difficulties Encountered in Unloading.

(a) Dukws.

(1) Because of the fact that LST's stayed so far out from the beach 10 Dukws were sunk in the heavy sea either being launched or being taken back aboard.

(2) The Dukw Company Commander did not have a clearly defined mission for his company in the Iwo Jima operation, specifically regarding his employment following initial unloading of preloads.

(3) The preloaded Dukws were not expected on the beach. The Corps Shore Party Commander was not ashore when the Dukws arrived. Time and vehicles were lost deciding what to do with the supplies.

(b) Ammunition resupply.

(1) The Corps commandeered all Dukws and put them under a central control. Following this the drivers were not instructed where the 155mm ammunition dumps were. Only those who had been hauling for Corps Artillery knew their whereabouts. As a result components were found in almost every dump on the island.

(2) All unit ordnance officers and working parties were ordered off the resupply ship thereby cutting off

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the flow of such information to the Group-4 as (a) where working parties, guides and radios were required on the beach, (b) what type of equipment would be needed to unload what type of landing craft, (c) the amount of ammunition sent ashore, (d) the amount that remained aboard, (e) general unloading plan aboard including ammunition priorities.

(3) Because of the above the Group-4 was not able to keep the Corps Artillery Officer fully advised of the ammunition resupply status.

4. It is recommended that:

(a) LST's or LSM's be substituted for liberty ships in 155mm ammunition resupply.

(b) The Corps Artillery echelon be in direct charge of unloading its own ammunition.

(c) The attached Dukw company remain under control of Corps Artillery until ammunition resupply has been insured.

(d) Specifications of LST's be kept corrected to date. Only by actual measurements were loading plans able to be accurately prepared.

(e) Information of any additional personnel and equipment to be embarked on assigned ships be supplied when ships are assigned.

(f) A qualified TQM NCO be an addition to the T/O for the 4 section of Group.

(g) That at least 1/3 of Corps Artillery be loaded in AK's regardless of how good the beaches are. A change of plan may require landing of these weapons where beaching of LST's would be impossible.

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F. Administration.

1. A breakdown of personnel of Headquarters, 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and attached units who landed on Iwo Jima is as follows:

	OFFICERS			ENLISTED		
	USMC	USN	USA	USMC	USN	USA
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery	15	2		113	4	
2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion	33	1		568	10	
4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion	34	1		559	10	
473rd Amphibian Truck Company			6			175
TOTALS	82	4	6	1240	24	175

2. A complete roster of personnel of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and attached units participating in the operation on Iwo Jima is submitted as Enclosure "A".

3. A complete roster of casualties, during the operation on Iwo Jima, of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and attached units is submitted as Enclosure "B".

4. Morale of troops.

(a) An issue of post exchange items consisting of cigarettes, candy, and toilet articles was obtained for distribution on the LST's during the period in transit.

(b) Pocket editions of all types of reading material and games was also made available to the men.

(c) Mail was distributed at each staging point.

(d) The first mail received on Iwo Jima was 26 February. This factor alone was highly influential to the morale.

(e) All units were authorized to commence cooking B rations on 28 February, construction of fly proof galleys having been completed.

(f) Water supply for bathing was limited on this operation and did to a minor degree effect morale.

5. Comments and Recommendations.

(a) It can now be said from experience that even the T/O as shown in Enclosure (C), much less that authorized by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Special Order #49-44, is insufficient personnel to handle both Group and Corps Artillery Headquarters functions. The need, over and above the strength of the recommended

T/O, was mainly felt in officer personnel, particularly the 2 and 3 sections. Three officers are necessary for each section to maintain a continuous watch. Also, the Corps Artillery Officer requires at least two officer assistants at Corps Headquarters to perform the functions of coordination in air, naval gunfire and artillery. However, since orders for the disbanding of the Group Headquarters have been published and since employment of a Group Headquarters in a similar capacity in future operations is not immediately contemplated no further discussion need be made.

(b) It is recommended that an administrative SCP be published for subsequent operations with sample forms enclosed so that there can be a uniformity and completeness to information submitted from subordinate units.

(c) It is recommended that each H^Uwitzer section be increased by two (2) men. Over prolonged periods of firing necessitating working in shifts this is mandatory.

6. The following is a list of the Commendations and Citations recommended for personnel of 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and attached units (Except for 473rd Amphibian Truck Company):

(a) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery,
1st Provisional Field Artillery Group:

Legion of Merit:

Lieutenant Colonel Marvin H. Floom, (05111), USMC.
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas E. Reeve, (05404), USMC.
Major Earl J. Rowse, (07175), USMC.
Major William G. Winters, Jr., (07909), USMC.

Navy-Marine Corps Medal:

Captain Frank P. Shearer, (09834), USMCR.
Private Alvin Y. Lanier, (975849), USMCR.
Private First Class Ivan E. Perlman, (535284), USMCR.

Bronze Star:

Major Melvyn A. Estey, (05601), USMCR.
Captain John S. Reany, (07104), USMC.
First Lieutenant John N. Kowalchuk, (018439), USMCR.
First Lieutenant George A. Wrisley, Jr., (017857),
USMCR.

Enclosure (P) to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to VAC Lan For Special Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

STAFF FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPS ARTILLERY OFFICER

1. On 20 October, 1944, the Commanding Officer of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group was ordered to report to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps. Upon reporting, he was informed by the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps that he would be the Corps Artillery Officer for the operation against Iwo Jima.

2. During the period from 20 to 27 October, 1944, the Corps Artillery Officer remained at V Amphibious Corps Headquarters. On the 21st, he was briefed concerning the plans for the operation against Iwo Jima. In his capacity of Corps Artillery Officer, he made several recommendations. First, that the Corps Artillery for the operation consist of 155mm Howitzer Battalions only. In view of the fact that the extreme range which would be fired by Corps Artillery would be only 7500 yards, the inclusion of 155mm Guns with the Corps Artillery would be undesirable due to their characteristics of weight, difficulty of landing, and comparative flatness of trajectory at short ranges. In view of this recommendation, and because of the availability of only two 155mm Howitzer Battalions, it was decided that the Corps Artillery for the operation would consist of the 2d and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalions and the Group Headquarters. Because of personnel shortages in the Fleet Marine Force, the Group Headquarters would have to be organized by taking personnel from units of Corps Artillery, V Amphibious Corps.

3. The Corps Artillery Officer further recommended that the coordination of Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support be accomplished as set forth in Annex Able of this enclosure. This method of coordinating Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support was proposed at a conference held on 24 October, 1944, where the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, the Commander TF 51, and the Commander TF 53 were present with their staffs. The plan was tentatively adopted for further study. After a conference between the Corps Artillery Officer and the Commander Support Aircraft, held on 11 December, 1944, during which some additions to the plan were made, the plan was officially adopted.

4. On 25 October, 1944, the Corps Artillery Officer submitted a tentative Artillery Annex to the Corps Operations Order. With minor changes, this annex was approved as the Artillery Annex to the Corps Operations Order No. 3-44.

5. During the period from 20 October, 1944 until 1 January, 1945, the Corps Artillery Officer kept the commanding officers of the divisional artillery regiments apprised as to what he was doing to effect coordination of artillery matters by sending them copies of tentative procedures and inviting comment and changes thereto. In connection with the plan for the coordination of Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air, he sent pads of forms containing the information given in paragraph 1-c of Annex Able to all divisional artillery regiments to facilitate the functioning of the plan of coordination.

STAFF FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPS ARTILLERY OFFICER (CONT'D)

6. On 12 and 13 December, 1944, the Assistant Corps 3, the Corps Artillery Officer, the Naval Gunfire Officer and the Corps Air Officer visited the Fourth and Fifth Divisions, respectively. These Officers outlined to the division staffs and their officers, including battalion commanders and their executives, the plan which had been made and the manner in which Corps would function in regard to Corps Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support. Matters which were placed before the officers of the divisions were the Plan for the Coordination of Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air. (Annex Able to this enclosure). The limitations governing the use of artillery, naval gunfire and air support were discussed and in connection with this, the importance of the coordination of those weapons being accomplished in every echelon, battalions, regiments, divisions, and finally corps. It was emphasized that an infantry battalion commander should use the weapons available to him in close support of his troops in the following order: first, his infantry weapons, mortars, rocket launchers, etc., and his direct support divisional artillery; second, the Corps Artillery; third, naval gunfire; fourth, Air support. The risks to his own troops by using Corps Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support for close support were emphasized by pointing out the characteristics of Corps Artillery weapons, Naval Gunfire and Air Support which tend to render them generally unsatisfactory for close support of infantry. The fact that during the Iwo Jima operation there would be only 32 airplanes available for support missions every 90 minutes, and that this meant that each of two operating divisions could only rightfully expect two 8-plane strikes to be delivered in support of the division every 90 minutes, was emphasized with the hope that battalion commanders would realize that air support is an ace-in-the-hole weapon to be called for only when no other weapon can obtain the desired results. Finally, it was propounded as a guiding principle that the mission of the Corps Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support is to assist the divisions and that when a request for the use of those weapons was made by an element of a division that it would be granted if possible, because it would be assumed that the man on the ground making the request knew what was required and had found his divisional weapons unsuited or inadequate for it. Only when the use of the requested weapon would interfere with the activities of another division or was not available would it be refused.

7. On 19 and 21 December, 1944, the Assistant Corps 3, the Corps Artillery Officer, the Naval Gunfire Officer and the Corps Air Officer, with key personnel from each of their sections, again visited the Fourth and Fifth Divisions, respectively. On these dates CPX's were held with each division. The members of the Corps Staff felt they had gained great benefit from these exercises, because the exercises enabled them to function together as they would in battle. The exercises enabled the command group of battalions, regiments and divisions to practice the coordination of artillery, naval gunfire and air support in each command echelon. The exercises also brought out matters which could be cleared up by discussions and critiques, rather than having these matters arise for the first time when the Corps was in action.

8. During the rehearsal, the Corps Artillery Officer, embarked upon the Landing Force Command Ship, sent out warnings of simulated air strikes as required by the provisions of Annex Able to this report. The communication, using

STAFF FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPS ARTILLERY OFFICER (CONT'D)

one of the ship's radios on a frequency of 2862 worked excellently and battalions in all cases received notice of air strikes in less than ten minutes after the data concerning them was given by the Air Officer to the Corps Artillery Officer. The Commander Air Support was embarked upon a different ship, but an alternate Commander Air Support was embarked upon the Landing Force Command Ship and operated in the same room as the Corps Artillery Officer. When the alternate Commander Air Support was in charge of supporting aircraft coordination with artillery was much improved over the times when the Commander Air Support handled it from another ship. It is believed that in future operations the Commander Air Support should be on the ship in which the Landing Force Commander is embarked.

9. On D-day the Corps Artillery Officer began the coordination of artillery and air support as soon as the divisional artillery was landed and continued to do so until the termination of the operation. The procedure as set forth in Annex Able to this enclosure was found to be satisfactory and was not changed in any respect during the operation. Despite the fact that for a great part of the operation fourteen (14) battalions of artillery were firing on the island, which has a very limited area, none of our strike planes was hit by our own artillery fire and at no time was artillery fire suspended for a period of time greater than was necessary for an announced strike to be made. It is believed that the system set forth in Annex Able to this enclosure is the best that has been devised to date for attaining coordination of artillery fire and supporting aircraft strikes. It requires the minimum of personnel and equipment for its operation and it functioned satisfactorily during the operation which lasted twenty-five days and during which approximately 440,000 rounds of artillery shells were fired and two hundred thirty-four strikes were made by approximately 3100 planes acting as supporting aircraft.

10. The Corps Artillery Officer daily at about 1600 received information of the current situation from the Chief of Staff and the plans for the next day's attack. From this information and considering the ammunition available, he made recommendations to the Chief of Staff concerning the employment of Corps Artillery. These recommendations included the number of rounds to be used for the night harassing fires, the number of rounds for preparations and supporting fires during the following day, and the proportion of each to be made available to each division and to be used for the Corps missions. When these recommendations were approved the Corps Artillery Officer wrote the artillery paragraph of the Corps Order and immediately notified all divisional artillery regiments how many rounds the Corps Artillery would have available for the support of their divisions. This early notification enabled the divisions to immediately start planning the use of this support without having to wait until the Corps order was received.

11. The Corps Artillery Officer, after consultation with the Corps Air Officer, recommended to the Chief of Staff what period of time should be allotted for air strikes which would interfere with artillery preparations for the attack, and if the recommendation was approved it was embodied in the Corps order so that Division air officers would know the time during which their requested strikes would have to be executed, and divisional artillery officers would know when their preparation fires would have to be suspended or otherwise limited because of air strikes.

ENCLOSURE (P) to APPENDIX 4

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STAFF FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPS ARTILLERY OFFICER (CONT'D)

12. At 0700 each morning the Corps Artillery Officer, with fires plotted on the map, showed the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General what harassing fires had been executed by Corps Artillery during the previous night and what fires would be delivered for the preparation for the attack. He also gave a resume of counterbattery and other missions fired during the night.

13. Prior to the operation it had been planned and hoped that in every echelon (battalions, regiments, divisions and Corps) that thorough coordination of artillery, naval gunfire and air support could be accomplished, in order to assure the most efficient use of these weapons and prevent duplication of effort. However, during the operation it was soon discovered that time was insufficient to allow each echelon to fully coordinate all weapons. From the time when the order was issued for the next day's attack until all plans had to be complete and in the hands of the agency which was to execute them was a period of time insufficient for complete coordination in all echelons. However, each echelon planned the use which it desired for supporting weapons as best as it could in the time available, and it is felt that, in general, there was not a great deal of duplication of effort or loss of efficiency in the use of different supporting agencies. The coordination in Corps consisted only in deciding and letting divisions know as soon as possible when artillery fire would be limited because of air strikes, and in the Naval Gunfire and the Corps Artillery Officer deciding where fires of general support ships and Corps Artillery firing on Corps targets would be placed. The coordination of Naval Gunfire with artillery was largely accomplished in the divisions, since most of the Naval Gunfire was delivered by ships assigned for direct support missions to each division. No effort was made to rearrange division plans because such a rearrangement would have inevitably resulted in the changed plans reaching the divisions at too late an hour to be executed.

14. Daily at 1800 the Corps Artillery Officer submitted a summary concerning all artillery activities to the Artillery Officer on the staff of the Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, Pacific, in order to keep that headquarters promptly informed concerning all artillery matters.

ENCLOSURE (P) to APPENDIX 4

COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY, AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE

1. a. In order to insure the maximum coordinated effort on the part of all arms engaged in close support of the ground forces, the staff procedures outlined herein are announced.

b. The basic concept governing the coordination of the several supporting arms is that in their employment on fire missions ashore, direct troop support aircraft, and naval vessels providing naval gunfire are, in effect, additional artillery with the Corps, in the one case airborne and in the other case waterborne. Accordingly it is considered that the Commanding Officer, Corps Artillery, in his staff capacity as Corps Artillery Officer, is the proper agent of the Corps Commander to perform the duty of coordinating air, naval gunfire and field artillery support of the landing forces. Succeeding paragraphs describe the procedure to be observed by the Corps Artillery Officer and others in effecting this coordination. In the application of these procedures it must be borne in mind that Commander Support Aircraft is not a subordinate of the Corps Commander, but furnishes air support pursuant to the requests of the latter or his subordinate commanders. The same situation exists in the case of Naval Gunfire support. Approval by the Corps Commander of an air mission expressed through the Artillery Officer is construed by Commander Support Aircraft as a request that the mission be executed by him.

c. With each Artillery Regimental Headquarters, afloat or ashore, there will be a liaison officer from Corps Artillery who will set up a radio transmitter and receiver on a frequency designated by Corps Artillery. On this receiver he will receive from the Corps Artillery Officer the following information of scheduled air attacks, and will transmit it to the Artillery Regimental Commander or his designated representative who will be responsible for disseminating it to all battalions under his command before the air attack takes place:

- (1) Serial number of the strike.
- (2) The time of the attack (from-to).
- (3) Coordinates of point of attack.
- (4) The direction of approach to the target.
(azimuth true bearing).
- (5) The direction of the pull out. (azimuth true bearing).
- (6) Number and type of plane.
- (7) Altitude of mission. (lowest point of flight).
- (8) Signal, if any, which will be given to signify end of attack.
- (9) Any other pertinent information.

No artillery battalions, except in cases of emergency, will open fire initially until they have checked into their Regimental radio net, or their communication system which the Regimental Commander will set up to be used to give them information of air attacks by our own forces.

d. Upon receipt of information concerning an air attack the Battalion Commander or his representative at the Fire Direction Center will determine whether fire from any batteries of his battalion will endanger aircraft making the attack and he will discontinue, or suspend, such fires that will endanger the airplanes making the attack until the attack is finished.

COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY, AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE (CONT'D)

e. It is hoped that the information concerning air strikes as stated in paragraph (c) above can be disseminated to all artillery battalions prior to the beginning of a strike, but it may frequently happen that when strikes are urgently required and are made by planes on station, that the information of the strike may not reach artillery units before the strike is made. For this reason it is necessary that all personnel at artillery batteries, and also observers, be instructed to be continually alert to watch for planes making strikes, and if they see that the planes will be endangered by the fire of their units, they will immediately order their units to cease firing while the strike is being made. All artillery personnel must positively understand that even though information concerning the strike does not reach them prior to the strike, they are not justified in continuing fire if they see that their fire is endangering the planes making the strike.

f. If it becomes necessary to limit the trajectory of or call off entirely supporting fires in an area to allow an air strike, either of the two following plans may be placed in effect by the representative of Corps Artillery and Naval Gunfire:

Plan VICTOR: While Plan VICTOR is in effect, Naval Gunfire, Artillery, mortar and rocket units adjust their fire so that no trajectories over 1100 feet altitude exist over stipulated areas. Under Plan VICTOR, the smallest area free of trajectories of over 1100 feet altitude is the area enclosed by a circle of 2500 yards radius whose center is the center of the target area. Air craft can safely operate over this area only as long as a minimum altitude of 1500 feet above sea level is maintained.

Plan NEGAT: While Plan NEGAT is in effect, Naval Gunfire, Artillery, mortar and rocket units adjust their fire so that no trajectories of any kind exist in or over stipulated areas. Under Plan NEGAT the smallest area free of trajectories is the area enclosed by a circle of 2500 yards radius whose center is the center of the target area.

- (1) EXAMPLE: "All Naval Gunfire and Artillery observe Plan Victor, Target Area 5135 BAKER 1020 to 1040" means "No Naval Gunfire nor artillery trajectories of over 1100 feet are allowed over a circle of 2500 yards radius whose center is the center of Target Area 5135 BAKER, from 1020 to 1040".
 - (2) EXAMPLE: "All Naval Gunfire and Artillery observe Plan Negat, Target Area 5135 Baker 1020 to 1040" means "No Naval Gunfire nor artillery trajectories are allowed in or over a circle of 2500 yards radius whose center is the center of Target Area 5135 Baker, from 1020 to 1040".
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COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY, AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE (CONT'D)

g. Prior to the commencement of an artillery concentration which is to be fired by two or more battalions, the common superior of the firing units concerned will inform the representative of Corps Artillery of the location of the target so that Commander Air Support can be informed, in order that he will not send a strike into the area where the fire is passing or falling.

h. The number of airplanes used for artillery and naval gunfire spotting will be considerable, probably twenty or more. If these planes are constantly flying over the target area they will seriously interfere with air strikes. In order to minimize this interference, spotting planes will, as much as possible without interfering with the carrying out of their missions, fly over the water surrounding the island and keep out of the air over the land.

i. Since it is believed that the possibility of enemy airplanes strafing attack on artillery positions is extremely remote, and in order to keep from shooting down our own planes due to mistaking them for enemy planes, it is ordered that no machine gun or small arms fire will be directed against planes unless the position of the units firing at the plane is actually attacked.

2. a. In order to lessen the risk of spotting planes being hit by projectiles by keeping maximum ordinates of trajectories below 2700 feet except when high angle fire is used, the following will be observed at all times:

b. All artillery will use low angle fire whenever it can be used to accomplish a mission. High angle fire will not be used except when the tactical situation prevents the use of low angle fire.

c. When firing the 155mm howitzer, charge 1 will not be used for ranges greater than 3500 yards, charge 2 for ranges greater than 4500 yards, charge 3 for ranges greater than 5500 yards, charge 4 for ranges greater than 6500 yards, charge 5 for ranges greater than 7000 yards, and charge 6 or 7 for ranges greater than 7500 yards.

d. All artillery spotters will be instructed to keep their planes above 2700 feet altitude when they are over the target area, unless it becomes impossible to adjust fire from that altitude. In such cases, they may fly at a lower altitude.

AERIAL OBSERVER CONDUCT OF FIRE REPORT

The following missions were accomplished over IWO JIMA by the aerial observers firing the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, 12th Marines, 13th Marines and 14th Marines artillery:

Mission or Target	Number Observed & Reported	Number Fired Upon	Number Damaged	Number Destroyed
Registrations	54	54		
Adjusted Time K	16	16		
Arty Positions (occupied)	7	4	3	1
Gun Positions (suspected)	10	4	4	
MG emplacements (occupied)	26	9	3	6
20mm AA Guns	40	23	9	12
8cm DP Guns	29	20	10	10
12cm DP Guns	8	5	2	3
37mm AT Guns	2	2		2
81mm & 90mm Mortars	3	2		2
125 lb Rocket Launchers	4	3	3	
200mm CD Gun	1	1		1
Concrete Pill-boxes	84	7	6	1
Fuel Dumps	7	4		4
Ammunition Dumps	4	2		2
Vehicles	62	42	22	17
Tanks	29	10	4	4
Trenches (recently constructed)	11	4	4	
Troop Concentrations	19	7		
Supply Dumps	4	2	1	1
Caves w/suspected gun positions	40	28	17	4
Total Targets Reported.....	390			
Total Targets Fired Upon.....	179			
Total Targets Damaged.....	88			
Total Targets Destroyed.....	70			