

U.S. MARINE CORPS

MEMORANDUM:

White Poppy
December 4, 1942.

From: Capt. Guy Richards, USMCR and
2nd Lt. Francis T. Farrell, USMCR.
To: Commanding General, First Marine Amphibious Corps.
Via: Intelligence Officer, First Marine Amphibious
Corps.
Subject: Extended use of Natives for improving Marine
Operations in Island Combat Areas.

1. OBJECTIVE - To improve Marine Operational Technique among 250,000 Solomon Islanders, who are possible collaborationists, and to expand as follows:

- (a) Training of Marine coast-watching patrols in all the tricks used by natives and Australians under Lt. Mackenzie.
- (b) Training of Marines in the employment of natives for reconnaissance in force.
- (c) The Marines' employment of natives as spies smuggled on and off labor crews on Japanese-held positions.
- (d) Employment of natives as instigators of other natives to destroy enemy lives and property.

2. RECENT BACKGROUND - This plan was fostered by Capt. Richards back in January, 1942, and received the support of COMINCH and the Lieutenant General Commandant of the Marine Corps. Its practical execution, was deemed best to await the expedient moment which has now arrived. In the meantime, Capt. Richards, assistant of a former expedition in the Solomon Islands, and Lt. Farrell, worked in Naval Intelligence and at Marine Corps Headquarters, on other phases of the Solomon campaign.

3. PLAN OF ACTION -

- (a) First-hand collection of dope. All the tested methods and lessons developed by the existing coast-watchers should be obtained in toto and immediately for the permanent files of the Marine Corps. This should include data on patrol security, defense and native liaison. Therefore, Capt. Richards and Lt. Farrell should spend a month or two in the bush now with one of Mackenzie's patrols. Capt. Richards already has spent months in the Solomon Island bush as a bird-hunter (Lt. Farrell similarly elsewhere) and the Solomon Island kanaka is an old story to them. A brushing up under present war-time conditions is all that is necessary to complete their experience.

- (b) Assembly and training of natives and Marines under field conditions and together. The Australians have already learned that a small nucleus of off-island natives are preferable for infiltration patrols. Off-islanders, who look to their employers for eventual escape and salvation, are guarantees against betrayal. A large supply of suitable off-islanders, all indistinguishable in color and appearance from natives of the Solomons, are available in quantities. By happy chance, all of those under consideration have had military experience as follows:

- (1) The Native Police of British Papua and the Australian Territory of New Guinea, trained for 30 years by Sir Hubert Murray and Moncton; the Fijian Defense Force, a battalion of three companies; the New Hebrides Native Constabulary; the Samoan (New Zealand) Defense Force; the Police of the Kingdom of Tonga; and selected famous bushman and hunters of New Guinea, Malaita and Thursday and the Torres Straits Islands. Capt. Richards and Lt. Farrell will be glad to explain in detail how they can obtain the use of these natives without diplomatic and governmental complications.

4. TRANSPORT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PATROLS - These groups can be landed at strategic beaches via large native canoes, native schooners, and other disguised small boats dropped from PT Boats, DDs and SSSs.

5. SUPPLY - A complete table of organization, rationing, defense, communications, weapons and medical necessities has been worked out for these units. These plans will be offered in detail upon request.

6. SUMMARY - This plan has been discussed with and seconded by William Tailby, External Affairs and Cook Islands Dept., Wellington; Commander F.M. Beasley, RN, director of Naval Intelligence, New Zealand; Lt. H.A. Mackenzie, leader of the Australian coastwatchers in the Solomons; Col. J.L. Donaldson, director, Army Intelligence, New Zealand; members of the Intelligence staffs of COMSOWESPAC and the Australian Army which have jurisdiction over New Guinea, New Britain and New Ireland tribes.

Capt. Richards and Lt. Farrell have also established close personal contact with the vast commercial network of Burns, Philp & Co., and Lever Bros., and have at hand the resources of these two firms for intelligence purposes.

Some obstacles to the plan, admittedly, lie ahead. Nevertheless, effective means of meeting them have been prepared already. Only the permission of the Commanding General of the First Marine Amphibious Corps is necessary, we believe, to bring the plan to a swift and practical execution. In fact, all things point to its success now. A month ago it might have been stifled by the political opposition of the British civil and colonial authorities.

Guy Richards, Capt., USMCR.

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