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DIRECT INTERROGATION

1. When the "registration Form" has been filled in, the supervising Intelligence Officer at once signals the important information contained in it to all areas likely to be affected thereby, and also advises Allied Air Headquarters by signal whether the prisoner is in a medically fit condition to travel and whether, in his view, judging from the demeanor and general behavior of the prisoners, further information is likely to be obtainable from him by detailed interrogation, if information on both these points is favorable, steps are then taken to send the prisoner to the nearest interrogation center, by the quickest possible means, for direct interrogation. In the meantime, the usual precautions are taken to keep him isolated and to prevent him from communicating, either with his fellow prisoners, or with Service personnel, whose curiosity or animosity may prompt them to enter into friendly or hostile discussions. This is an important point, as the first impressions which Prisoners form in their contact with personnel of the capturing power is likely to predetermine their attitude at the interrogation which is to follow.
2. On arrival at the Interrogation Center, the Prisoner is again kept separate and not allowed to mix or communicate with anyone until the direct interrogation is completed. For this reason also, apart from the importance of obtaining intelligence information from him as quickly as possible, the interrogation should commence as soon as possible and be continued to its conclusion without unnecessary interruption.
3. The information obtainable from Prisoners by means of direct interrogation is dependent only upon:
 - (a) The capacity of the Prisoner to give it.
 - (b) The ability of the Interrogator to obtain it.
4. The capacity of the Prisoner to give information of value primarily depends upon his knowledge of matters that are of intelligence interest. This in turn depends, in part, on what he has seen, and is generally directly related to the rank that he holds. The higher the rank of the Prisoner, the more valuable his knowledge is likely to be. In general, it is broadly true that Air Force Prisoners have more knowledge of matters of intelligence interest having regard to their rank and their numbers than Army Prisoners, since they have, generally speaking, greater technical knowledge and have seen much more than their more earth-bound compatriots. It is also true however, that these facts are likely to make it more difficult to obtain intelligence information from Air Force Prisoners since they are probably more conscious of the significance of what they know.
5. The method to be adopted in interrogating any Prisoner is necessarily dictated by the Prisoner's attitude towards his captors

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and the fact that he has been taken prisoner. This attitude, in turn, depends upon the Prisoner's racial and national characteristics and the doctrine and discipline to which he has been subjected in his own country.

6. Under Japanese law, Prisoners of War are treated as dead, and from the moment of capture they lose all civil rights and rights of property. They are not allowed ever to return to Japan and are disowned by their friends and relations. They, therefore, regard themselves as being stateless, and while the feeling of statelessness is, no doubt, something very different from a total absence of any ties of allegiance and loyalty to their country, the fact that they are disowned by their own Country makes it more possible to use the natural desire, which they share with all other human beings, of being recognized by some State or Government, for the purpose of obtaining information from them.

7. The fact that Japanese air crew do not, as a rule, wear parachutes on operational flights and, when in possession of them in their aircraft have on several occasions been found to be using them merely as cushions without strapping them on, confirms their own statements that they have been indoctrinated with the discipline that no Japanese warrior may allow himself to be captured alive and that if there is any danger of that happening his duty is to commit suicide.

8. Such doctrines are inconsistent with any training in security discipline under interrogation, since such discipline would imply the possibility of their being captured alive. It is probable, therefore, that Japanese Prisoners have not been told what they may or should not disclose under interrogation, if taken captive. The only guide which they appear to have on this point is their own common sense. This, however, is no substitute for security training, and probably explains the fact that they sometimes refuse to answer particular questions, which, no doubt, touch on some matter which they had been specifically told to treat as secret, while, at the same time, answering questions of far greater operational importance without demur.

9. It is also found that the Japanese are led by their own Country to believe that they are likely to be killed by their captors if they allow themselves to be taken Prisoners. While international law forbids the use of threats against Prisoners, that law does not impose upon the capturing power any obligation to advise the Prisoner of his rights under international law, if his own Country has seen fit to mislead him. There is, therefore, no reason why a Prisoner, who thinks that he is going to be killed, should be disillusioned, if that fact is likely to assist in obtaining information from him, provided that nothing is said or done which would tend to confirm his belief.

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10. It must not be assumed, however, that this belief on the part of the prisoner will always assist the interrogator. That entirely depends on the particular Prisoner's morale. Those Prisoners who have been in the Service since adolescence and have been taught to believe that to die in battle is the ideal consummation of a Japanese warrior's life, are likely to feel that they have been cheated out of their proper end and that to die by the hands of the enemy after capture is the next best object of their existence. Those prisoners, on the other hand, who have been conscripted from civil life are not likely to be inspired by the same heroics and will probably prefer to have another chance of living their own lives in their chosen peaceful avocation. But whether they be professional airmen, conscripts or volunteers under duress, it must be remembered that the Japanese all regard it as a disgrace, in any circumstances, to be captured alive, and do not regard death even by their own hand as in any way dishonorable. Suicide is their duty and always likely to be a temptation for them if they are made to feel their position too acutely and are kept in isolation for interrogation for too long.

The safest general principle to bear in mind is that Japanese Prisoners of War are nearly all at war with themselves and their consciences and are, therefore, psychologically very unstable. On the one hand they are mostly mortally ashamed of the fact that they should have allowed themselves to be captured alive and realize that they have thereby forfeited their country, their family, and their friends. On the other hand, their primitive human instinct for self preservation has tricked them from giving up their life in the way their conscience demands. In this unstable mental and emotional condition, they are liable to commit unaccountable acts of fanaticism or self-destruction if subjected to too great moral, emotional, or mental pressure, but are equally likely to be most profitable subjects for interrogation if handled with insight and understanding firmness.

RIGHTS OF PRISONERS OF WAR UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

1. Prisoners of War have very definite and well-established rights under the rules of international law, which have been codified in the international Convention of the 27th July, 1929, set out in Appendix 3. This convention provides, inter alia, that Officers and persons of equivalent status, who are Prisoners of War, must be treated with due regard to their rank and age, and that every Prisoner is required to declare, if he is interrogated on the subject, his true names and rank, or his regimental number, but that no pressure is to be exerted on Prisoners to obtain any other information regarding the situation in their armed forces or their country, and that Prisoners who refuse to reply to any such questions must not be threatened, insulted or exposed to unpleasantness or disadvantage of any kind whatever. The United States and the British Empire are parties to this Convention. It has sometimes been suggested that the brutalities meted out by the Japanese to persons taken captive by them justifies a departure by us from the humanitarian principle enunciated by the Convention. Such an argument is not only unsound, but at all events, in the case of Japanese Prisoners of War, is also likely to defeat its own object.

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2. It is a natural desire to give Prisoners something of the same kind of treatment which it is known our fellow-countrymen suffer at their hands. It must be remembered however, that quite apart from any other considerations, the purpose of an interrogation is to obtain intelligence information, and a desire for revenge should not be allowed to prejudice that one object. Experience has shown that the use of force or a threat of force does not induce Japanese Prisoners to give any more information than could be obtained from them by legal methods. Whatever the attitude of Prisoners of other nationality may be, experience has shown that Japanese Air Force Prisoners respond to just treatment, and at best merely become sullen and taciturn and at worst fanatical and suicidal in outlook if treated in a manner which they consider as offending their self-respect. It should be remembered, moreover, that even if a Prisoner were induced to talk by threats, it is more than doubtful whether any reliance could be placed on the information he gives. The use of any but authorized methods of interrogation is, there to be avoided. If a Prisoner refuses to give any information under direct interrogation, less direct methods may have to be employed. With firmness and fairness and with an understanding of human psychology, it should, however, be possible for an experienced interrogator to obtain most of the information which he desires from Japanese Air Force Prisoners, by the methods of direct interrogation.

METHOD OF DIRECT INTERROGATION

1. It is impossible to prescribe any definite set of rules for the manner in which Prisoners should be interrogated. This very largely depends upon the personality of the Prisoner and of the Interrogator. Certain general principles are, however, of universal application:

2. The room in which the Prisoner is interrogated should be impressive and the presence of the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack and His Majesty's portrait help in creating a formal and serious atmosphere. The Prisoner should be led into the Interrogation Room by a guard who should be smart, of good build, salute well, and stand at attention. The Prisoner, when brought before the Interrogator, should himself stand at attention, give the customary Japanese bow, and remain standing at attention throughout the interrogation, until the Interrogator releases him from this formality. The Interrogator himself should not unbend until he is satisfied that advantage will not be taken of the absence of formality on his part. He should, accordingly, not offer cigarettes to the Prisoner until he is quite satisfied that the atmosphere of friendliness thereby created will not cause the Prisoner to lose his respect for the proceedings.

3. The Prisoner, having been led in, the door of the Interrogation Room should be closed and kept closed, and persons from the outside no matter how high their rank, should not be allowed to interfere with the proceedings. Such interference is likely to detract from the position of superiority which the Interrogator must continue to maintain until he himself is satisfied that he can be less formal.

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4. It is usually a wise plan to commence the interrogation by raising questions based upon information given by the Prisoner on his "Registration Form". The reference to this form in the sight of the Prisoner itself tends to have a checking effect upon his statements and to make him realize that his answers will be compared with what he has written. Starting from the "Registration Form" it is generally a good plan to ask the Prisoner about the circumstances of his crash and capture. Not only are these matters which he will have no hesitation in discussing but they also relate to things capable of being checked, about which the Interrogator should have detailed information before he commences the interrogation. Every statement, no matter how trivial the thing itself, which the Prisoner makes in the opening stages of the interrogation, should be checked and this should be done until the Interrogator is reasonably satisfied that the Prisoner is telling the truth. For this purpose, the clothing tags on the Prisoner, and any maps or documents found in his possession are useful. These may in themselves be of no importance, but the insistence on absolute accuracy and care on the part of the Prisoner in giving his answers establishes the necessary intellectual superiority and dominance of the Interrogator over him. They are the only weapons which he has.

5. Once this mental dominance is established, it is usually advisable to obtain from the Prisoner by means of questions and answers, a broad outline of his more recent movements and his general background. These, also, Prisoners are generally willing to discuss and provide the framework which the Interrogator can then proceed to fill in by more detailed questions. This method has the disadvantage of delaying somewhat those questions that are of vital importance. It is, however, a mistake to touch upon these directly in the early stages of the interrogation, when the Prisoner has not yet committed himself on a large number of points of lesser importance, since he is likely to realize the significance of what he is asked at a stage during the interrogation when he can still withdraw. Even, however, when the Interrogator is reasonably satisfied that the Prisoner is telling the truth, it is desirable to recur to all important questions in a number of different ways after an interval of time when other matters have been discussed as the consistency or otherwise of the Prisoner's answers itself furnishes a useful indication as to his reliability.

6. Barristers accustomed to conducting cross-examinations are by training the best qualified to conduct interrogations. It is, however, necessary for them to bear in mind that the interrogation of Prisoners of War differs fundamentally from the interrogation of witness in a court of law, in two material respects; a barrister in a Court of Law frames all his questions for the purpose of either proving or disproving a particular set of points, and discards as irrelevant any matter that has no direct bearing on those points. The Interrogator, on the other hand, is not concerned to prove any particular point, but is rather out to discover what the Prisoner knows about any matter whatever that is likely to be of intelligence

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interest. It is a mistake, therefore, to check Prisoners if they appear not to address themselves directly to the questions put. Such answers should, on the contrary, be noted and pursued wherever they may lead. The Interrogator can always come back to his original question when he has exhausted the further lines of enquiry opened by the Prisoner's irrelevant answer.

7. The second difference arises from the fact that a Barrister is not, as a rule, primarily concerned with establishing any fact as a fact. He is concerned with admissions and what the witness states to be a fact, the absolute accuracy of the statement being of lesser importance. The Interrogator, on the other hand, is not out to obtain admissions. His object is not to ascertain what the Prisoner says, but to discover what the facts are. This can only be achieved by avoiding leading questions and by approaching every point circumstantially.

8. By leading questions are meant questions which proceed on an assumption, and imply a certain answer. They can take various forms. In their most common form they are direct questions which disclose what the Interrogator has in his mind. To ask a Prisoner, for instance, whether he has seen the aerodrome on Peleliu Island in the Palau Group implies that there is an aerodrome there, and thereby suggests an answer to the Prisoner. If it is desired to ascertain whether or not there is an aerodrome on this island, the proper way to put the question is to ask the Prisoner first whether he has been on Peleliu Island, and if he has, to describe how he arrived there and what he saw there. In this way the existence or otherwise of the aerodrome will gradually become established by a large number of circumstantial statements, each one of which can be checked.

9. Leading questions can, however, also take a more indirect form. If, for instance, a Prisoner is shown a map covering a small area and is then asked to point out on that map where his base is, that is as much a leading question as the more direct form, since the Prisoner is, by implication, obliged to point to some position on that map, whereas his real base may be somewhere not covered by it.

10. The only purpose for which leading questions can be used is deliberately to lead the Prisoner along a certain line of thought, in order then to suddenly to present him with an answer previously given, inconsistent with the point to which he has been lead. If he falls into this trap and allows himself to be led, it furnishes a clear indication of his unreliability, while the fact that he has been trapped is likely to have a salutary effect on his further answers. If, on the other hand, he does not allow himself to be led, that fact furnishes strong confirmation that he is reliable.

11. If a Prisoner refuses to answer a particular question, it is advisable not to press the point immediately, but to return to the subject at a later stage during the course of discussion on points which he is willing to discuss, when he is less on his guard, and

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when the point can be approached from another angle and is less likely to be recognized as being the same point which the Prisoner previously refused to answer.

12. The use of formal questionnaires is to be avoided. Such a questionnaire is far too rigid and, while it may direct attention to certain specific points, it prevents the Prisoner's mind from being followed, and lines of enquiry which arise during the course of the interrogation from being pursued. It also suffers from the serious disadvantage of attacking the points covered by the questionnaire directly, instead of circumstantially, according to the facts known to the Prisoner, in the manner above indicated. By approaching any question indirectly and gradually establishing points circumstantially, a good deal of information is likely to come to light, which would not be uncovered if questions were directly tackled and a series of specific questions were put. The only purpose to which a formal questionnaire may legitimately be put in as a guide or reminder to the Interrogator of the points which he should deal, and when the direct interrogation is completed, to clear up certain specific points. Even then notes about these points are to be preferred to formal questions, which tend to be slavishly followed.

RELATIVE FUNCTIONS OF INTERROGATORS AND INTERPRETERS

1. The ideal method of interrogating prisoners is by interrogators who can speak the prisoner's language fluently and are as familiar with the technical terms, with which they have to deal, in Japanese as in English. This ideal, however, is unattainable in the case of Japanese prisoners in the South West Pacific Area. In order to be able to do this, the interrogator would have:

- (a) To speak Japanese fluently.
- (b) To be familiar with the Japanese form of the many technical terms used in the Air Force.
- (c) To possess the necessary knowledge of Air Force matters to know what questions to ask.
- (d) To know how to conduct the interrogation in a manner which will produce reliable results.

2. In the South West Pacific Area, there are only about half a dozen fluent interpreters and none of them possess all four of the above qualifications, while the most experienced of them, having himself conducted interrogations in Japanese, has expressed the view that the difficulties of the language are such that the effort of asking questions in Japanese and at the same time devising the questions and following up lines of enquiry as they present themselves are too great for any one person to undertake and obtain satisfactory results. Experience has, in fact, shown that satisfactory results

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cannot be obtained by this method of conducting a detailed exploratory interrogation and that it is only satisfactory for the purpose of asking particular questions addressed to specific points.

3. It has accordingly been found essential to separate the functions of the interrogator who frames the questions and of the interpreter who translates them and the answers given to them.

4. The disadvantages of this separation of functions are:

(a) That it greatly slows down the interrogation; every question and answer being put twice - once in each language.

(b) That the delay involved gives the Prisoner an opportunity to think out his answers instead of giving them spontaneously.

(c) That it is more difficult for the interrogator to appreciate the significance of shades of meaning, which the Prisoner may introduce into his answers and indicate by his facial expressions and general reactions to particular questions. The advantages are:

4. That the interrogator is not worried by language questions and can concentrate

(a) his whole mind on his questions and the lines of enquiry he desires to pursue.

(b) That the interpreter can devote his whole mind to an accurate interpretation of the questions and answers.

(c) That the Prisoner does not become aware of any shortcoming in the interrogator's knowledge of Japanese, which is likely to give him a sense of superiority not calculated to produce the best results

(d) That the whole interrogation can be taken down in shorthand in English, with advantages stated later.

5. Both methods having been tried, it has been found that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages.

note
6. Prisoners can sometimes speak English. This slightly increases the disadvantages of interrogating through an interpreter, since the prisoner may be able to understand the question when first put, and thereby get more time to think out his answer. Nevertheless, it is not desirable that he should be allowed to answer in English, as that gives him a sense of superiority, and leaves it in doubt whether he means what he says and knows the significance of his answers.

7. The function of the interrogator is to conduct the proceedings and to obtain the information which he desires. This he can only do if he at all times retains control of the situation. His first step should, therefore, be to impress his personality upon the Prisoner.

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To do this he may have to be stern, or humor the Prisoner, according to the Prisoner's temperament and reactions. The Interrogator should, however, not adopt an accusing tone and, while checking every statement that the Prisoner makes, should not make the Prisoner feel that he is being distrusted. Such a feeling will prevent him from being helpful or volunteering any information, as it tends to place him on his guard and draws attention to the fact that he is giving away information. Interrogators should also bear in mind that Prisoners are as fallible as anyone else, and may genuinely make mistakes or forget, and are not necessarily deliberately unhelpful if they do make mistakes or do not answer questions. The judicious use of maps, documents and suggestions are, therefore, often desirable to assist the Prisoner's memory and to remind him of earlier statements made by him, without necessarily implying that he is lying or withholding information.

8. The inter-position of an interpreter undoubtedly makes it more difficult for the interrogator to impose his personality upon the Prisoner, but a fluent interpreter, possessing a mature personality, should have no difficulty in conveying the mood of both the Prisoner and the interrogator. It is advisable, however, that he should translate all questions and answers in the first person. If, for instance, the Prisoner answers "I made a steep dive", the interpreter should not translate this by saying "The Prisoner says he made a steep dive". He should follow the exact words used by the Prisoner. For the same reason, the interpreter should not embark upon a discussion between himself and the prisoner. If the Prisoner does not answer the question put to him, it is for the Interrogator to re-state the question or not, or to follow up the answer the Prisoner has given, and not for the interpreter to check the Prisoner, and to enter upon a discussion with him without the interrogator. If he does this, statements made by the Prisoner which are irrelevant to the question put, but nevertheless suggest important lines of enquiry, escape the interrogator and are lost altogether.

9. It is impossible to lay down any general rules, as the success of the particular method of interrogation adopted depends entirely upon the personality of the Interrogator. What can, however be stated as a universal rule is that an interrogation is as much a test of the Interrogator's knowledge of his subject as of the Prisoner's. The more an Interrogator knows, and the more thorough and detailed his knowledge, the more searching he can frame his questions, and the more information he is likely to obtain.

10. No Interrogator can, of course, be expected to have a detailed knowledge of all the technical aspects of either his own or the Japanese Air Force. He should, however, be able to recognize them when he comes across them. To enable him to deal with such questions it is advisable for him to invite technical officers to submit to him written questions on technical points, to discuss these in detail with the technical officers and acquaint himself upon them, and to understand them in sufficient detail to enable himself to examine the Prisoner about them.

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11. While technical officers have far greater knowledge about their own special interests than the interrogator is likely to have, it is inadvisable to leave them to conduct the interrogation on these points. Experience has shown that the advantage of such a course is far outweighed by the fact that their lack of experience in conducting interrogations generally leads to a confused general discussion, in which it is impossible to obtain any precise information on which any reliance can be placed.

RECORDING AND REPORTING RESULTS OF INTERROGATIONS

1. It is almost impossible for the Interrogator or for the Interpreter to remember everything that a Prisoner says during the course of an interrogation which may last several days. On the other hand, it is very desirable that his statements should be recorded, both for the purpose of having a record of every detail of the information of value given by him, and for the purpose of interrogation in order to check the Prisoner's statements previously made. It is, therefore very desirable to have a record of what he has said. It is, however, undesirable either for the Interrogator or the Interpreter to take copious notes. This is not only distracting to the Interrogator and to the Interpreter themselves, but is also likely to be disconcerting to the Prisoner. The interrogation is itself sufficiently embarrassing to the Prisoner, who cannot but realize the general purpose of it without drawing his attention to the fact that a permanent record is being made of his statements. For this reason, it is also undesirable to have a shorthand note taken of his statements in his presence.

2. This difficulty is not overcome by having a second interpreter in the interrogation room who takes notes either in his own or in the Prisoner's language. In taking down Japanese interrogations by this method, it will be found that very many misunderstandings occur which will be understood when it is realized that Japanese in conversation among themselves, frequently draw a character in the air or otherwise indicate the character to be understood, by a particular sound. This is due to a lack of precision in the spoken language as opposed to the written which of course greatly increases in service or technical matters.

3. The ideal method is to have a hidden microphone in the interrogation room, connected to earphones in a separate room nearby, where a stenographer can take down every question put by the Interrogator and the Interpreters translation in English of every answer given by the Prisoner. When this is done by the Interrogator and interpreter need take no notes whatever, though it is sometimes desirable that they should take an occasional brief note of technical names and figures for their own immediate guidance. The taking of such brief notes does not distract the Prisoner and tends, on the contrary, to confirm him in the belief that no other record is being made of what he says.

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4. As it is usually quite impossible to find a stenographer who can understand Japanese and can make a shorthand record of what is said in Japanese, the fact that an interrogation is conducted through an interpreter has the very great advantage that a verbatim record can be made. This record should be put into type at the end of each day's interrogation and read through by the Interrogator before he embarks on the next day's interrogation of the same Prisoner so that he can refresh his mind on the information already obtained, and pick out points which require further checking. He should, however, of course not refer to the transcript in the presence of the Prisoner, or bring it into the Interrogation Room with him.

5. When the interrogation has been completed, the Interrogator should read carefully through the entire transcript and use it as a basis for drawing up his report on the interrogation. There will be a great deal of transcript that is of no particular value for the purpose of the report. It is not unusual for the transcript to run into 60 pages of closely typed foolscap which is reducible in the report to one-tenth of that bulk. The Interrogator should sift the information of intelligence interest and correlate all the references which will be scattered throughout the transcript, to the various questions discussed, group them together, and weigh up the various statements made by the Prisoner at various times on the same subject matter, and arrive at his own conclusions as to what the ultimate effect of all these statements is. Considerable care and experience in valuating evidence is necessary to do this successfully, as it calls not only for the ability to sift evidence, but also for a certain judicial quality of mind in arriving at the substance of what has been said amid statements which may not always be consistent in points of detail without being false.

6. It is advisable, when the report on the interrogation is being prepared that a draft should be submitted to those technical officers likely to be concerned with various aspects of the information given by the Prisoner, for their comment, before the final report is drawn up.

TRAINING OF INTERROGATORS AND INTERPRETERS.

1. Interrogators must combine three qualities. They must have an enquiring and a patiently thorough type of mind, combined with a forceful, but understanding, personality. In addition to these native qualities, they must have a fairly wide general knowledge of the Service matters of their own Service, and as much knowledge of the enemy's Service as is available, to enable them to ask searching questions intelligently, and at all events, to be able to understand any new points that may arise, even if they have not any previous knowledge of them. No one person can be expected to know everything, even about his own Service; it is, however, not too much to expect an Officer to be able to follow and grasp in a short space of time explanations given concerning new matters not previously known to him.

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2. In addition to such general knowledge they must be familiar with the recognized methods of interrogation and cross-examination, which experience has shown to be necessary in order to obtain reliable information. Certain general rules are quickly understood. A good deal of practice is required, however, to carry these rules into effect and to avoid in practice the many little pitfalls and mistakes which are so easily made in conducting an interrogation.

3. If it is since establish that the Prisoner is reliable and anxious to be helpful, no difficulties are likely to arise and almost anyone can obtain information from them. It can, however, not be assumed that a Prisoner is either reliable or willing to give information, and the fact that he has proved to be a valuable source of information when interrogated by an experienced Interrogator is no guarantee that his attitude may not become very different when he realizes, as he is bound to do, that he is dealing with a less keen questioner.

4. The best practice for an Interrogator is to listen in on interrogations and study the methods used by barristers during cross-examinations in Courts of Law.

5. The qualities necessary in a good interrogator are:

(a) Thorough and fluent knowledge of the Japanese language and the innumerable technical terms of the Air Service.

(b) A general familiarity with the types of information which are sought in interrogations.

(c) A confident and understanding personality and the capacity to cooperate with interrogator.

6. A theoretical knowledge of the Prisoner's spoken language is not itself sufficient, nor is it enough for the Interpreter to know the Japanese for the technical terms which he is likely to meet. It may often happen that the Prisoner himself does not know the correct terms in his own languages. In such a case, the Interpreter must be able to describe what he means, and this he cannot do unless he has an understanding of the meaning of the technical terms, as well as the Japanese and English versions of them.

7. The best practice is for Interpreters is to witness and listen in on interrogations, and to practice their conversation with Japanese Prisoners of all ranks, it being remembered that Interpreters must adapt themselves and style to the rank, level and education of the Prisoner and must not be unnecessarily coarse or impolite in their manner of address.

8. As it is desirable that persons should not be present at interrogations, who do not have to be there, it is desirable that potential interrogators and interpreters should witness and listen to interrogations without their presence being known to the Prisoner. This can be done with the use of French mirrors and microphones.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~THE TRANSLATION OF JAPANESE DOCUMENTS

1. The classes of documents fall roughly into three categories of urgency, namely:

- (1) Operation Orders, dealing with current or pending operations, code books and messages.
- (2) Organization Tables, General Technical Orders, and Instructions, Availability Tables, Maps and Charts, Aerial and other photographs and Diaries and Note Books.
- (3) Maker's Plates.

2. It is, however, quite possible, and has indeed happened, that among a number of documents captured there are no operation orders as such, but detailed notes of operation orders occur as entries in private notebooks, especially in those which belonged to Officers or N.C.O.s. The above division can, therefore, not be accepted as final or rigid and it is advisable, when a number of documents come in, to go through them all cursorily with a translator and classify them regardless of their nature according to the urgency of their content. This is particularly important where there are a good many documents and it presupposes a knowledge of current and pending events and a background of intelligence information which a translator, who is merely a translator, cannot be expected to possess. It is advisable, there, for the Intelligence Officer responsible to sit at the side of the Translator and go through all the documents with him quickly at the outset. The degree of priority to be given to the various documents being determined by the Intelligence Officer.

3. Having determined the categories of relative urgency into which the various documents fall, it is usually advisable to assign the documents properly identified to their origin, among the translators and to leave them alone to translate them one by one, numbering each page of the original and of the translation to correspond, so that later references from one to the other will offer no difficulty. It is always a temptation at this stage for high ranking officers concerned with operations to interrupt the translators with this or that enquiry, which the translator is rarely able to answer. Such interruption in the end invariably delays the information from being obtained from the documents, besides tending to create hopeless confusion, and the production of entirely misleading information. It is, therefore, most desirable that translators should be given proper facilities to work by themselves undisturbed, but that the Intelligence Officer should always be on hand to assist in settling a doubtful point of translation in the light of intelligence information available to him, where, as often happens, more than one reading is possible. This officer should also, without undue interruption, keep an eye on all translations as they progress so as to ensure that nothing of immediate operational importance which may come to light, is delayed.

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4. In the case of Code books and signal messages in code or cypher, it is usually advisable to pass them, or photographs of them, immediately to those concerned with the interception of enemy wireless communications, without translating them. Those who deal with such matters do not as a rule work from translations and are themselves better qualified to translate the originals than the ordinary translator. To translate such documents, therefore, merely delays their usefulness.

5. Plain language messages may contain operational or other information apparent on the face of them. Such messages are, therefore, normally translated before they are passed on to interception centres. As, however, a comparison of such plain language message with an intercepted message in cypher, which can be identified as the cyphered form of the same message, may enable the enemy's cypher to be broken, the transmission of even plain language signal messages to intercept centres, should not be unnecessarily delayed. Such delay can generally be avoided by having photographic copies made of such documents.

6. In other theatres and services, officers and others qualified in languages have frequently been allocated miscellaneous duties apart from those involved in ordinary training. This has probably arisen from the fact that there are often long periods when no translation work is required, and in the case of Japanese from ignorance of the continuous study necessary to maintain competence in that language. It is not too much to say that a conscientious Japanese translator's time when not occupied in actual examination of documents will be entirely taken up with study, and due allowance must be made for this in allotting other duties. A case in point is that of an officer able to read Japanese with fair fluency when he entered a service but losing this fluency within a few months during which he was employed entirely on motor transport duties.

7. In translating, the special method of abbreviation used by Japanese must be borne in mind. Most words in the language are written with two or more Chinese characters and when contractions are formed, one character - not necessarily the first - is taken from each word, the combination then being read as a whole. The combination then tends to become shortened and corrupt as time goes on. Thus, two characters reading KAN, BAKU and meaning respectively "a warship" and "an explosion" are used together to mean a ship-borne bombing plane for which the full expression is KANJO BAKUGEKIKI.

8. Roman letters and Arabic numerals are often used interspersed with Chinese characters and hence the former are often distorted till they are barely recognizable. N meaning NORTH is written
and E for EAST

9. In dealing with proper names it must be remembered that alternative readings are nearly always permissible which are equally correct

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Failure to select the correct reading, therefore, seldom indicates faulty translation but rather lack of background knowledge. In translating names of persons, the surname is given last as in English.

10. Documents are frequently written in the literary language which bears little resemblance to the written colloquial: Letters etc. may be written in the epistolary language which is not like either. It is therefore necessary that translators should make themselves familiar with all three, especially with the characteristic verbal terminations which make considerable difference to the sense.

11. When translating note books it frequently happens that characters which appear to be completely unintelligible occur later in the book in a more recognizable form. Prolonged examination is therefore necessary before the best results can be obtained and isolated sheets should not be given to translators when other specimens of the same handwriting are available.

12. It should be noted that ability to read Chinese characters should not be accepted as in itself a qualification to translate Japanese. When the characters have been learned in China mistakes are apt to occur. Thus a translation was received which quite correctly gave the meaning of two characters as "middle island" when in Japanese they actually represent the proper name NAKAJIMA.

13. To obviate a fruitful source of misinterpretation, certain arbitrary translations have been decided on at this Headquarters and are rigidly adhered to: the main ones are set out hereunder. It will be observed also that certain words are left untranslated because an exact English equivalent is lacking.

(i) Aircraft.

REI SHIKI ICHIGO KANJŌ SENTŌKI NI GATA

Type Zero Mark One Ship-borne Fighter Model Two.

ICHISHIKI RIKUJŌ KŌGEKI KI NIGATA

Type One Land Attack Plane Model Two

REI SHIKI ICHIGO KANSOKUKI ICHIKATA

Type Zero Mark One Observation Plane Model One

KYŪKYŪ SHIKI KANJŌ BAKUGEKIKI

Type 99 Ship-borne Bomber

(ii) Formations & Units.

SHŌTAI)
CHŪTAI)
DAITAI) Not translated.
BUTAI)
BUNTAI)
KOKUTAI - Air Unit
KŌKŪ SENTAI - Air Wing
KŌKŪ KANTAI - Air Fleet

(iii) Ranks.

Commissioned Officers designations are not translated, i.e. those from TAISHO to SHŌI

Warrant Officers and ranks below are translated with the English equivalents as set out in this Headquarters Intelligence Information No. 12, Third Edition.

Qualifying words indicating the branch etc. of a Naval Air Force Officer are translated thus.

KIKAN TAI - Engineer TAI

TOKUMU SHŌI - Special Duty SHŌI

(iv) Engines.

Type names like KASEI should not be represented by English equivalents such as "Fire Star" or "Mars". Others of this type are KINSEI & ZUISKEI.

EI () has been used because it was heard from a P.O.W. However, as SAKAE has been used in other theatres, this alternative reading of the same character is also given in brackets.

JU () has been used on the analogy of the name mentioned in the preceding paragraph, i.e. that the ON reading is preferred. However, from two independent sources, it has now been determined that the character in question is read KOTOBUKI in this connection and accordingly this reading is adopted.

(v) Miscellaneous.

In technical matters a literal translation is often to be preferred, and translators must avoid reading more

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into characters than is actually there with or without the approval of technicians. However, the cooperation of the latter is often necessary as is that of an intelligence officer.

Names such as that of the engines mentioned in (iv) should not of course be translated: thus, the name of the 20 mm. cannon.

is KEI, not either "mercy" or "benevolence". In this case also the ON reading has been received from P.O.W. sources.

When the enumerations I, RO, HA, or KŌ, OTSU, HEI, TEI are used, they should be rendered in ROMAJI with a note explaining the position in the series of those used.

Geographical names in Kana are not always easy because of the distortion necessary by the limitations of the GOJUON. Mistakes are occasionally made by the Japanese in transcription but the map must be thoroughly searched before a mistake is assumed to have been made. In this matter, the help of Intelligence Officers is invaluable.

12. It is essential that translators should not be denied information that will assist their work. While discretion is necessary, it must be borne in mind that personnel of whose discretion and absolute security there is doubt could not be employed on this type of work.

As an example of what is meant the abbreviation for the name of an Air Unit (KOKUTAI) usually consists of one character from a place name and the character.

KŪ (sky). As the same characters with different readings are used in innumerable place-names it would be almost impossible for the most competent translator to determine what was meant without knowing the names of Air Units already known.