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Reg. No. 267
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U.S.S. HEERMANN

(DD 532)

12 1393

Action Report - Philippine Operations

Battle East of Samar - 25 October 1944

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 1 November 1944

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From: The Commanding Officer.
 To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
 Via: (a) Commander Task Unit 77.4.3.
 (b) Commander Task Group 77.4.
 (c) Commander Task Force 77:
 (d) Commander Seventh Fleet.

Subject: Action report - Philippine Operation; Battle East
 of Samar Island, 25 October 1944.

References: (a) Art. 874(6), U.S. Navy Regs., 1920.
 (b) Com7thPhibFor conf. serial 0212 of
 17 February 1944.

Enclosures: (A) Executive Officer's report. - p. 25
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PART I

1. This vessel was attached to Task Unit 77.4.3 (Rear Admiral C.A.F. Sprague, USN, ComCarDiv 25, U.S.S. FANSHAW BAY (CVE70), Flagship) which sortied with Task Groups 77.4 and 77.2 from Seeadler Harbor, Admiralty Islands, the morning of 12 October 1944. Zone minus nine (-9) time was used throughout the operation. The mission of these forces was to support elements of the Sixth Army in the seizure, occupation, and development of the Leyte area of the Central Philippines.

2. Task Group 77.2 (Rear Admiral J.B. Oldendorf, USN, ComCruDiv 4, U.S.S. LOUISVILLE (CA28), Flagship) consisted of battleships, heavy and light cruisers, screening destroyers, and APD's carrying underwater demolition teams. Task Group 77.4 (Rear Admiral T.L. Sprague, USN, ComCarDiv 22, U.S.S. SANGALON (CVE26), Flagship) was to furnish support aircraft for the operations. The U.S.S. FANSHAW BAY (CVE70), U.S.S. KALININ BAY (CVE68), U.S.S. WHITE PLAINS (CVE66), U.S.S. SAINT

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LO (CVE63), U.S.S. HOEL (DD533), U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532), U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557), U.S.S. RAYMOND (DE341), and the U.S.S. S.B. ROBERTS (DE413) were ships present at this time in Task Unit 77.4.3. On 20 October 1944 ("A" day) the U.S.S. KITKUN BAY (CVE71), U.S.S. GAMBLER BAY (CVE73), U.S.S. DENNIS (DE405), and U.S.S. J.E. BUTLER (DE339) were to join this group after proceeding to the objective area with the transport group.

3. From 12 October 1944 to 18 October 1944 we steamed to objective area, fueling from Task Unit carriers on 17 October 1944. Fueling was delayed approximately eighteen hours due to bad weather which delayed rendezvous with the fueling unit for Task Group 77.2. During the evening of 17 October Task Group 77.4 departed from Task Group 77.2 and proceeded to assigned operating area. Task Unit 77.4.3 further proceeded to northern operating area as designated in Commander Task Group 77.4 operation order 2-44. This area was to the East of Samar Island.

4. During the period 18 October to 20 October Task Unit 77.4.3 provided air strikes in support of preliminary bombardment of Leyte Island. Later air strikes up to and including 24 October were delivered in accordance with schedule in Commander Task Unit 77.4.3 operation plan 1-44.

5. At 0645 on 25 October the CIC watch aboard this vessel observed that the SG-A radar was being jammed. This was confirmed by the radar officer. At this time the Task Unit was in cruising disposition 5R. The wind was force 2 from 070°T, sea 1, swells 1, visibility good but spotty due to scattered rain squalls. Ten minutes later the gunnery officer, who at that time was the Officer-of-the-Deck, noticed large splashes near the carrier formation, and reported to the captain the possibility that the formation was being bombed by high level bombers. At this time these splashes were believed to be bomb splashes, because the Officer-of-the-Deck had heard the contact report to be 50 miles rather than 15 miles. All hands went to general quarters just as the OTC stated by TBS that our ships were under fire of an enemy fleet.

6. The OTC maneuvered formation into the wind, and ordered carriers to launch all aircraft, at the same time ordering screen commander to lay a smoke screen between our force and the enemy. With the enemy thus blocked from view by our own smoke screen, contact was not gained until 0725 when the combat information center reported that contact with the enemy, bearing 320°T, 35,000 yards, was made with Sugar George radar. Enemy attempts at jamming were by this time successfully countered. Before radio contact report could be made we maneuvered at

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flank speed to form a column on the U.S.S. HOEL (DD533) as directed by TBS transmission from commander screen, Commander William D. Thomas, U.S. Navy, aboard that vessel. During this time smoke from screening vessels and intermittent rain squalls made visibility extremely poor and uncertain, varying from 100 to 25,000 yards.

7. While approaching the enemy a true column was never formed on the U.S.S. HOEL (DD533), as the U.S.S. HEERLIANN (DD532) had to maneuver to avoid U.S.S. ROBERTS (DE413), and then proceed at full power to join the U.S.S. HOEL (DD533). At 0749 the U.S.S. HEERLIANN (DD532) backed emergency full to avoid collision with the U.S.S. HOEL (DD533) then formed loose column following her in. We were barely underway again when we commenced firing main battery at an enemy TONE class heavy cruiser which was leading a column of three other heavy vessels. This vessel fired seven torpedoes at this cruiser at 0754. The torpedo director set up was as follows: True bearing of target, 355°T; depth setting, 6 feet; distance 9,000 yards closing; estimated course 120°T; estimated speed 25 knots; own ship course 300°T; track angle 093°; torpedo speed, intermediate. Commanding officer ordered half salvo fired at the enemy. Torpedo control ordered number one tube mount to be used. The tube trainer on number two mount hearing the commands "Fire one", and "Fire two", did not look at his firing lights, and fired two torpedoes by percussion until he was stopped by the mount captain. These two torpedoes ran on parallel tracks to their corresponding numbers from mount one.

8. During the time the first half salvo was being fired G.L.C. reported another heavy enemy column to the southwest of the first unit which we had under fire. While our torpedoes were in the water, the gunnery officer observed an enemy battleship sharp on our port bow. Course was immediately changed to the left, and the remaining torpedoes were readied for an attack on enemy battleship. Five inch fire was also shifted to this same target, which was already firing on us. The target, which was leading ship in a column of four, was identified by gunnery officer as a KONGO class battleship. The second ship in column was identified by Officer of the Deck and the captain as a battleship, although the class was never ascertained. Torpedo Director set up for this firing was as follows: Bearing of target, 350°T; range 4,400 yards; estimated target course 100°T; speed 20 knots; own ship course, 270°T; track angle, 080°; depth setting, 6 feet. Torpedoes were set on high speed. The identification as a battleship was not made in time enough to change the depth setting. All torpedoes, both salvos, ran hot, straight, and normal. About three minutes later the gunnery officer

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and rangefinder operator observed a torpedo hit on the starboard quarter under number four gun turret of target. During this phase of the engagement, the right hand end window of the rangefinder was hit, and starboard boat was holed.

9. Action with the enemy battleship was broken off at 0803, after which time we proceeded to the starboard quarter of the carrier formation. The commanding officer ordered the gunnery officer to fire at enemy targets of opportunity; firing was conducted in full radar control at a heavy enemy vessel. This vessel continued to lay the smoke screen which had been started when ordered by the OTC. During this period this vessel was continuously under fire, and the commanding officer chased salvos to make the firing more difficult for the enemy. Yellow splashes were observed close aboard. As our target was astern, this complicated the gunnery problem for this vessel. Before the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) rejoined the carriers, the screening vessels were ordered by the OTC to engage enemy cruisers firing on our carriers from the port quarter of that formation. At this time the U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) was a short distance ahead, and it is believed that the U.S.S. HOEL (DD533) was about two and a half miles slightly abaft our port beam. When the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) first took this station it was believed that the U.S.S. HOEL (DD533) was the vessel which turned out to be the U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557), and we proceeded to take station on her for further action as a section. By the time identification was made, OTC had issued the above order. The U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) started to take station on the U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) to proceed as a section, but it was obvious that the U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) was slowed and damaged, so the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) proceeded independently for port quarter of the carriers. At this time the following visual dispatch was received from the U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557): ONLY ONE ENGINE X NO GYRO X NO RADARS. Shortly thereafter the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) backed emergency to avoid the U.S.S. FANSHAW BAY (CVE70). The U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) went ahead, passed astern the U.S.S. FANSHAW BAY (CVE70), and sighted U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) on port bow, turned right to bring battery to bear on enemy which was known to be close aboard, and stopped, expecting U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) to pass clear ahead. The U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) appeared to be swinging left very slowly. The U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) backed emergency full, and the U.S.S. JOHNSTON's bow missed the U.S.S. HEERMANN's bow by about three inches. All hands on both vessels believed that the ships would collide. When the collision was avoided, a very loud spontaneous cheer arose from all hands on the topside of both vessels. While still backing away from the U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557), the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) made visual contact with

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an enemy cruiser on our port bow, distance approximately 12,000 yards. When first sighted, the U.S.S. GAMBLER BAY (CVE73) was between the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) and this cruiser which was firing full salvos into that vessel at point blank range. The U.S.S. GAMBLER BAY (CVE73) had a starboard list of about 20 degrees, and a fire was observed amidships. Commenced firing forward guns immediately. Target was identified by the gunnery officer as a TONE class heavy cruiser, which was leading vessel of a column of six, the first four of which were definitely identified as heavy cruisers. The leading vessel quickly shifted fire to the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532). All vessels in this column were firing in the direction of our forces. At least four vessels concentrated on the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) during the next few minutes, as red, yellow, green, and no color splashes were observed. At 0845 action with TONE class heavy cruiser was still continuing and we suffered a shell hit in the pilot house which killed three men, and fatally wounded a fourth. It was this hit which destroyed the quartermaster notes covering the period from 0700 to 0845. Other shell and shrapnel hits were observed on the hull forward of number 1 gun mount, the forward uptakes, and number 2 gun mount and handling room. During this period water from near misses drenched the director and director platform deck from which station the commanding officer was coming, making him wish he had a periscope with which to see over the wall of water. Everything looked rosy, but only because the splashes were colored red by the dye loads. This ship was between the port enemy cruiser column and our own carrier formation during this phase of the battle. At 0902 the TONE class cruiser turned sharply to her port, and retired to the eastward. At this time a large fire was observed on her fantail.

10. When the TONE class cruiser retired to the eastward, no other targets were immediately available. The U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) changed course to the westward to lay a smoke screen across the rear of the carrier formation between them and the heavy enemy units which were known to be astern. This decision was made as a result of information received from CIC. An enemy cruiser, identified by the gunnery officer as being a MAYA or ATAGO class heavy cruiser, was sighted to starboard at 0907, and was taken under fire. At 0910 action with the enemy was broken off as range opened, and this vessel attempted to rejoin carrier formation, laying smoke screen all the while. Just prior to the last firing, the gunnery officer believes that he observed the U.S.S. HOEL (DD533) and the U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557). The U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) was about 2,000 yards on our port beam and was afire amidships. The U.S.S. HOEL (DD533) was about 4,000 yards on our port quarter, and both of these ships had their masts shot away. These were hanging down over

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the superstructure decks of both ships which appeared to be underway although they were under constant enemy gunfire at this time. These vessels were not sighted again. At 0917 Admiral Sprague ordered, "Two small boys get on port bow of formation and make smoke out." The commanding officer, knowing that the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) was the most effective destroyer left, proceeded with all possible speed from the starboard quarter toward the port bow of the carriers, continuing to lay smoke as we went along.

11. At 0930 the OTC ordered the formation to form cruising disposition 5R. The U.S.S. BUTLER (DE339) asked commander screen if screening vessels should take normal stations. At this time the commanding officer of the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) was endeavoring to locate the U.S.S. HOEL (DD533) and the U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557). Commander screen was called on the TBS, but no answer was received. The commanding officer then assumed that he was then senior officer present in the screen, and ordered the screening vessels to take the nearest station and to equalize the spacing between them. At this time the ship was noticeably down by the bow, and a report was made to the OTC. At 0959 permission was requested of the OTC, and subsequently granted, to slow down in order to shore bulkheads which were about to give way. We stopped to shore bulkheads in the forward part of the ship, and at the same time, searched for additional damage. Examination indicated that we were flooded to frame 42, and were down about 5 feet by the bow. This shoring took about 45 minutes, during which time we were stopped, but used the engines to head into the swells. The U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) then proceeded at 10 knots in the direction of the carrier formation.

12. Enroute, we observed a Japanese VAL with retractable landing gear dive into the flight deck of the U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63). It was noted that the VAL had no visible landing gear. The U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) immediately increased speed to 15 knots to close carrier formation. At the same time 3 enemy dive bombers heading for this vessel were taken under fire for a period of 3 minutes, after which, enemy planes turned away. This vessel maintained speed of 15 knots during aircraft attack, and slowed to 10 knots upon completion of the attack at the request of the damage control officer, to assist in the control of the flooding. At 1102 a large explosion was observed on the after part of the flight deck of the U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63). Almost immediately we commenced firing on a diving enemy VAL with no visible landing gear. Mark 32 fuze projectiles were used, and two hits were

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observed after which the plane continued its dive into the water without releasing its bombs. Firing was continued on one high flying enemy dive bomber which turned away without attacking.

13. At 1112 all screening vessels were ordered by the OTC to stand by the U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63) to pick up survivors. Eleven minutes later the U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63) sank stern first, having previously capsized to starboard. Our position at this time was 11°10'N, Long. 126°05'E. Seventy two (72) men and eight (8) officers, U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63) survivors, among them Captain F.J. McKenna, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, were picked up by this vessel which with the U.S.S. RAYMOND (DE341), U.S.S. J.C. BUTLER (DE339), and U.S.S. DENNIS (DE405) searched the area for four hours. It is considered that the conduct and seamanship of Lieutenant Commander S. Hanson, U.S.N.R., commanding officer of the U.S.S. DENNIS (DE405) during the rescue of the U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63) survivors was outstanding. During this time repeated attempts were made to inform OTC via VHF of two radar surface contacts to northward. At 1510 this contact was visually identified by the gunnery officer as a TONE class enemy cruiser. Smoke was rising from her fantail. The other contact was believed to be a Jap destroyer circling the cruiser. The contact report was finally made via relay through a friendly aircraft.

14. At 1534 this vessel in company with aforementioned destroyer escorts attempted to rejoin carrier formation by steaming on course 120°T speed 15 knots. The speed of our formation was limited to fifteen knots, by the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) and U.S.S. DENNIS (DE405), both of which had flooded compartments forward. At 1625 the U.S.S. RAYMOND (DE341) and U.S.S. BUTLER (DE339) were ordered to proceed ahead to try to contact and rejoin Task Unit Commander in U.S.S. FANSHAW BAY (CVE70). These vessels were subsequently ordered to Leyte gulf by the OTC. At 1932 this vessel requested U.S.S. RAYMOND (DE341) and U.S.S. BUTLER (DE339) to inform OTC that the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) and the U.S.S. DENNIS (DE405) were proceeding to Kessel Passage, Palau Islands. At 1937 received word that this message was received by Task Unit Commander. At 2003 we attempted to obtain approval from the Task Unit Commander of proposed movements. No answer was received, and at 2019 U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) directed U.S.S. BUTLER (DE339) and U.S.S. RAYMOND (DE341) to tell Task Unit Commander the next day that the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) and the U.S.S. DENNIS (DE405) had proceeded to carry out schedule proposed by the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532).

15. The enemy force was estimated to consist of at least four battleships, four heavy cruisers, and eight destroyers; these vessels showing on PPI during the approach for the first torpedo attack and were later visually identified. In addition to this, at about 0810 the

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commanding officer saw one three stack light cruiser at range of over 20,000 yards believed to be of NATORI class.

16. The commanding officer considered the mission of the screen to be to protect the carriers from the enemy forces, using torpedoes, gunfire, and smoke.

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- 0645 - Observed that SC-A radar was being jammed.
- 0651 - Enemy fleet reported 15 miles astern. Officer-of-the-Deck called the Captain.
- 0655 - Officer-of-the-Deck observed shell splashes falling to port from an unknown source. At this time true bearing of enemy was not known as we were maneuvering and radar contact had not been made. At first these splashes were believed to have been caused by bombs. Ship went to general quarters.
- 0656 - Task Unit Commander stated we were under fire of enemy fleet.
- 0700 - Formation headed into wind to launch all aircraft.
- 0702 - Commenced making smoke from F.S. generators.
- 0723 - Formation came to course 200°T.
- 0725*- Radar contact bearing 320°T, distance 35,000 yards.
- 0725*- Left assigned screening sector to assist U.S.S. HOEL (DD533) with smoke to rear of carriers.
- 0728 - Proceeded through carrier formation to form column on U.S.S. HOEL (DD533) and U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) for torpedo attack on enemy battle line. This in accordance with TBS orders from Commander William D. Thomas, U.S. Navy, OTU 77.4.33. Enroute and just before joining U.S.S. HOEL (DD533), maneuvered to avoid U.S.S. ROBERTS and then proceeded at full power to join U.S.S. HOEL (DD533).

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- 0749 - Backed emergency full to avoid collision with U.S.S. HOEL (DD533), and then formed column on U.S.S. HOEL (DD533).
- 0750*- Commenced firing 5" battery at nearest Japanese heavy cruiser, identified by gunnery officer as being of the TONE class, as an unknown enemy vessel was firing at this vessel.
- 0753*- U.S.S. HOEL (DD533) fired torpedoes.
- 0754 - Commenced firing seven torpedoes at enemy TONE class heavy cruiser bearing 355°T, distance 9,000 yards, closing. This target was the leading ship in a column of four large ships. Estimated enemy course and speed were 120°T, 25 knots. Torpedoes were set at intermediate speed. This vessel made its approach on course 330°T, speed 35 knots. Just before firing torpedoes, this ship changed course to 300°T. During the firing of torpedoes, gunnery officer sighted an enemy battleship on port bow.
- 0755 - Changed course to approximately 270°T, and shifted 5" fire to leading ship in a column of four enemy ships bearing about 295°T, distance about 9,000 yards. Enemy column estimated on course 100°T, speed approximately 20 knots. Gunnery officer identified leading ship as an enemy KONOO class battleship. Captain and Officer-of-the-Deck identified second vessel in column as a battleship, class unknown. Remaining two ships in column were identified as battleships, class unknown, by the gunnery officer.
- 0800*- Commenced firing remaining three torpedoes on leading battleship bearing 350°T, estimated target course was 100°T, estimated target speed was 20 knots. Torpedoes were set on high speed. Gunnery officer and rangefinder operator definitely observed a torpedo hit on starboard quarter under number four gun turret of leading enemy battleship. During this period shrapnel hit starboard motor whaleboat and rangefinder.
- 0808*- Firing on targets of opportunity astern, laying smoke screen, and proceeding to starboard quarter of our retiring carrier formation.
- 0824 - Received TBS orders from OTC to intercept enemy cruiser firing on carrier from port quarter of carrier formation. Changed course to approximately 100°T. During this period sighted U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) ahead, and U.S.S. HOEL (DD533) to port. Ceased firing on targets of opportunity, and started to form column on U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) to proceed to port quarter of formation. U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) was obviously slowed, so proceeded independently at 35 knots, then received following despatch from U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557): "ONLY ONE ENGINE X NO GYRO X NO RADARS."

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- 0835 - Backed emergency full to avoid collision with U.S.S. FANSHAW BAY (CVE70), which crossed our bow from port to starboard. Went ahead flank speed again.
- 0840 - Backed emergency full to avoid collision with U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) which crossed our bow from port to starboard. U.S.S. JOHNSTON was apparently having steering difficulty.
- 0841*- Commenced firing on enemy cruiser bearing 120°T, range 12,000 yards. Enemy identified by gunnery officer as being a heavy cruiser of the TONE class.
- 0845*- Received a shrapnel hit in the pilot house which killed three men, and mortally wounded the steersman. At this time the quarter-master's notes covering the period from 0700 to 0845 were destroyed.
- 0850*- Received heavy calibre shell hits forward.
- 0855*- Fox Dog radar out of commission. Commenced using Sugar George ranges.
- 0900*- Fox Dog again in operation. Changed course to 200°T. Continued fire on enemy cruiser now on port beam. Noticed U.S.S. HEERLMANN (DD532) was down by bow.
- 0902*- Ceased firing. TONE class cruiser turned away to eastward.
- 0905 - Changed course to lay a smoke screen across rear of carriers between them and enemy heavy units to the rear and starboard quarter.
- 0907*- Commenced firing on an enemy cruiser identified by the gunnery officer as being of the MAYA or ATAGO class. Enemy on starboard quarter, range 14,000 yards.
- 0910*- Ceased firing on enemy cruiser range 17,500 yards. Proceeded to rejoin our carrier formation. Laid smoke between carrier formation and enemy force. Enemy range opening.
- 0930 - OTC ordered formation to form disposition "5R".
- 1000 - Slowed and stopped to shore bulkheads in forward part of ship. Inspected ship for additional damage.

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- 1044 - Proceeded at 10 knots to rejoin carrier formation.
- 1050 - Observed Japanese VAL dive into flight deck of U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63).
- 1051 - Commenced firing on three enemy dive bombers which were headed towards this vessel.
- 1053 - Ceased firing on enemy planes as they changed course away from ship.
- 1102 - Observed large explosion on after part of U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63).
- 1103 - Shot down enemy dive bomber after observing two hits from our Mark 32 fuze projectiles. Plane identified as a VAL without landing gear.
- 1104 - Shifted fire to one high flying Japanese dive bomber.
- 1108 - Ceased firing as plane turned away without attacking.
- 1112 - All screening vessels ordered by OTC to stand by U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63) to pick up survivors.
- 1123 - U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63) was observed to sink stern first. Position 11-13N Long 126-05E.
- 1130 - Commenced picking up survivors of U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63).
- 1137 - Captain F.J. McKenna, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer of U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63), came aboard.
- 1140 - Put motor whaleboat in water to pick up survivors.
- 1149 - Obtained position by radar fix: Lat. 11-10N, Long. 126-05E.
- 1300 - Commenced trying to send contact report of radar contact dead in water bearing 050°T, distance 10 miles believed to be Japanese CA.
- 1355 - Formed scouting line with U.S.S. RAYMOND (DE341), U.S.S. J.C. BUTLER (DE339), U.S.S. DENNIS (DE405) to search area for additional survivors.
- 1405 - Stopped to continue damage repairs in forward part of ship. Ships in company continued search for survivors.

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- 1445 - Contact report delivered to OTC via VHF.
- 1510 - Sighted enemy cruiser, identified by gunnery officer as being of the TONE class dead in the water, bearing 050°T, distance 20,000 yards with smoke rising from her fantail.
- 1513*- About 50 SB2c's seemed to be about to make run on this group. All ships were ordered by U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) to make proper identification by light.
- 1518*- Planes received our identification and proceeded on mission to northward.
- 1533 - Intercepted VHF message from OTC stating that the enemy force was retiring towards San Bernadino Strait.
- 1534 - Underway. Course 120°T, speed 15 knots. Attempting to rejoin carrier formation.
- 1621 - Secured from general quarters. Set condition 1E.
- 1625 - Detached U.S.S. RAYMOND (DE341) and U.S.S. BUTLER (DE339) ordering them to proceed ahead to attempt to contact and rejoin OTC in U.S.S. FANSHAW BAY (CVE70). Speed of U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) and U.S.S. DENNIS (DE405) limited to 15 knots by flooding forward.
- 1919 - Intercepted TBS message from OTC to U.S.S. RAYMOND (DE341) and U.S.S. BUTLER (DE339) ordering those vessels to proceed to Leyte Gulf.
- 1932 - Requested U.S.S. RAYMOND (DE341) and U.S.S. BUTLER (DE339) to inform OTC that U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) and U.S.S. DENNIS (DE405) are proceeding to Kossol Passage, Palau Islands.

* - Time as estimated from TBS log and other sources.

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PART III

1. The operation of all ordnance equipment and material was excellent. There were no casualties as a result of defective equipment. The following casualties were direct results of enemy gunfire.

(a) A piece of shrapnel hit the right hand end window of the rangefinder located in the Mark 37 director. This hit destroyed its use as a rangefinder, however, the left hand end window was still usable for spotting purposes.

(b) A piece of shrapnel hit gun #2 which entered the mount at the left hand edge of the gun port shield causing a small piece of the shield, approximately two inches by five inches, to drop down between the gun slide and gun housing. This obstruction prevented the gun from returning to battery and prevented the breech blocks from closing. This casualty was repaired by running the gun out of battery and removing the obstruction. This piece of shrapnel also hit the gas ejector line just aft of its entrance and severed the line. No gas ejection air was available after this hit was received. This casualty did not affect the fire power of the gun.

(c) A piece of shrapnel entered the upper handling room of gun #2 on the port side and hit the inboard door on the projectile hoist causing the door to be sprung. Hoist had to be operated in manual during remainder of engagement.

(d) The gun bloomer on gun #5 caught fire which was due to heat from the gun barrel. This fire emitted much smoke, some of which entered the mount. This smoke could have caused a reduction in the rate of fire of gun #5 if we had been firing at the time.

2. The ammunition expended during the different phases of the engagement ~~is~~ estimated. The total ammunition expenditure is accurate. It is believed that these estimations are reasonably correct as they are obtained from the rates of fire, guns bearing, and Gun Captain's counts. The following table of ammunition expended is submitted:

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TIME FROM - TO	TARGET	RANGE IN YARDS MIN. MAX.	TYPE OF FIRE	ROUNDS EXPENDED	REMARKS
0750 - 0755	Tone Class CA	6,000 - 10,000	Salvo	25 AA Com 100 Com.	Shifted to continous fire when target be- came vis. and hits were observ- ed.
0755 - 0803	Kongo Class BB	4,000 - 8,000	Cont.	210 AA Com 50 Com.	
0808 - 0824	Unknown	12,000 - 16,000	Salvo	Salvo 40 AA Com.	
0841 - 0902	Tone Class CA	12,000 - 17,000	Salvo	500 AA Com.	
0907 - 0910	Maya or Atago Class CA	14,000 - 17,000	Salvo	100 AA Com.	
1051 - 1053	Formation of 3 "Vals"	5,000 - 8,000	Cont.	54 AA - Special	
1103 - 1108	Two "Vals"	3,000 - 5,000	Cont.	103 AA - Special 5"/38 Cal. 150 40MM	
TORPEDOES EXPENDED					
0754	Tone Class CA	9,000 yards closing		7	Results unknown
0800	Kongo Class BB	4,400 yards closing	--	3	One hit observed

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1. The major part of the damage suffered was due to two direct 8" hits, and one very near miss, which exploded underwater.

(a) The first 8" hit entered the spray shield at frame #72 port, main deck, passed through the forward uptake space, B-101E, the number 1 boiler uptakes; the forward starboard corner of the vegetable preparation space, B-103L, and through the main deck bulwark, frame #91 starboard. Vegetable lockers adjoining the port side of B-101E were demolished, and a four foot hole was made in the port side of B-101E. Number two boiler remote control for auxiliary steam stop was destroyed, and searchlight power and control cables were damaged. An aerofoam storage rack, frame #85 starboard, was destroyed with its contents, about 30 cans of foam. In the vegetable preparation space, the vegetable peeling machine, motor, and controller were destroyed, as was power panel 1-87 (FE-405), and the salt water supply to the vegetable peeler. Operation of #1 boiler was not impaired. Starboard holes in B-101E were plugged with mattresses, and the four foot hole on the port side was covered with a $\frac{1}{4}$ " steel plate held in place by lines and shores.

(b) Hit #2 entered the port side three inches forward of frame #18, six inches below the second platform deck level, passed through provision storeroom A-403A, and left at frame #16, starboard, fifteen inches below the second platform deck. Shell plating on the port side was ruptured from frame #17 to #21, and was indented for a radius of four feet around the hole. Frames and longitudinals in this area were damaged and bent. On the starboard side the shell plating was ruptured two feet around the shell hole, and the plating, frames and longitudinals were indented over a radius of three feet around the hole. The forward loops of the Mike and Peter degaussing coils were damaged, and the connection box D-2 was torn and rendered useless. Bulkheads at frames #18 and #21 on third platform deck were wrinkled on both sides, and pierced on the port side. This resulted in solid flooding of the following compartments: A-404A, A-405C, and A-502A. The latter was flooded through the vent supply line at frame 17 starboard, which was pierced. A-301-3A, A-302L, and A-403A were partially flooded and in communication with the sea.

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(c) A near miss, at approximately the same time as hit #2, exploded close to the keel and slightly to starboard, at frame #32. The starboard "A" strake was holed between frames $29\frac{1}{2}$ and $34\frac{1}{2}$, from the vertical keel to 24" outboard. A two foot section of the bottom flange of the vertical keel and the flat keel was blown away, and the vertical keel deflected slightly to port at frames 31 - 32. At these frames the keel brackets were torn from the vertical keel at the weld. All frames in the holed area were damaged. The sound dome was pierced, and damage to the sonar projector is as yet undetermined. A-503 $\frac{1}{2}$ C, A-504M, and A-505M were solid flooded. It is believed at this time that the force of the explosion forced loose manholes 4-31 and 4-39, causing flooding of A-407M and A-409M. Failure of the magazine crews of guns #1 and #2 to dog down doors 4-30 and 4-38 and hatches 3-30 and 3-38 led to eventual solid flooding of A-406M and A-408M, and to partial flooding of A-303L. Upon arrival of forward repair party, A-303L was flooded to a depth of about two feet. Hatches 3-30 and 3-38 were tightly dogged, and immediate steps were taken to remove the free surface water from A-303L. Leakage was observed around hatch 3-30 which was stopped by shoring to the overhead. On arrival in port all doors and manholes were tightly closed by divers, and these four compartments, A-406, 7, 8, and 9M were pumped dry.

(d) The flooding caused by these two hits increased the draft forward to about 17' 6". All possible fuel was pumped aft, raising the bow about 5". All fully flooded compartments were left dogged down. An attempt to control flooding with free communication with the sea in compartment A-302L by use of mattresses and shores proved unsuccessful, due to the size of the hole and the tactical situation, which did not permit very slow speeds for any length of time. Depth of water in A-302L varied between 3' and 5', as water surged in and out. The forward bulkhead of compartment A-303L was shored.

(e) Shrapnel riddled the hull at and above the waterline forward of frame #22, causing flooding of compartments A-1W, A-301-1T, and A-301-2A to the level of the holes in those compartments. Compartment A-1-W was plugged and pumped out the morning following the engagement, raising the bow an additional 4 inches. Other shrapnel fragments caused damage as follows: A fragment entered the pilot house from the port side, killing 4 men and damaging miscellaneous gear and wiring. A fragment carried away a 15" area of planking on the gig, severed the keel, jarred the engine loose from its mountings, and damaged the

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storage batteries. Fragments entered #2 mount and #2 handling room injuring several men and damaging miscellaneous fittings, as described in part III. The port stay of the foremast was severed, but resulted in no structural failures or weakness in foremast. Other fragments caused minor damage and indentations in the forward part of the ship.

(f) Damage to communication equipment is as shown in enclosure (C), the comments of the Communication officer.

ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

2. The commanding officer fully realizes that in many previous surface engagements claims of damage inflicted on the enemy tended toward exaggeration, and were later proven to be false. He also realizes the difficulty exaggeration, whether intended or not, imposes on the high command as they seek to determine exact facts. In the following estimate of the damage we claim to have inflicted on the enemy we were guided by this above knowledge and have definitely and positively remained on the pessimistic side of the line.

(a) We claim no enemy ships sunk, as none were seen to sink.

(b) We observed numerous hits from approximately 125 rounds of 5"/38 ammunition fired at one heavy cruiser positively identified as the TONE class. (Seven torpedoes were fired at this cruiser with unknown results.

(c) We observed continuous hits throughout the superstructure of one battleship positively identified as of the KONGO class. Approximately 260 rounds of 5"/38 ammunition were fired at this ship. Three torpedoes were fired at this battleship one of which hit on the starboard quarter under number 4 turret.

(d) Results of fire on unidentified heavy ship are unknown.

(e) We observed approximately 50 hits from 500 rounds of 5"/38 ammunition fired at a heavy cruiser of the TONE class. These hits started a large fire on the fantail of this vessel. It is not known whether or not this is the same cruiser mentioned in sub paragraph (b), but it is highly probable that it is.

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(f) We observed approximately 10 hits from 100 rounds of 5"/38 ammunition fired at a heavy cruiser of the MAYA or ATAGO class.

(g) We shot down one Japanese dive bomber positively identified as a VAL; two hits with mark 32 fuze projectiles were observed. The plane continued its dive into the water without releasing its bomb load.

PART V

1. CIC comments are covered in enclosure (A), the executive officer's action report.

2. There are no special comments concerning Navigation department.

3. There are no special comments concerning the Engineering department.

4. Damage Control comments are as follows:

(a) The importance of proper watertight integrity is magnified by the progressive flooding of the magazine spaces: A-406M, A-407M, A-408M, and A-409M.

(b) Consideration was given to removal of water from magazine areas during passage, but because of transfer of fuel and ballast to increase freeboard forward, it was felt that removal of this low center-line weight would decrease the ship's dynamic stability. The after fuel tanks were not ballasted in order to prevent a hogging condition of the ship. Safe speeds and condition of the sea were considered at all times proceeding to port.

(c) The ship carried shoring material well in excess of allowance widely distributed below the main deck. Nearly all material was used. It is felt that present allowances of these items for destroyers is insufficient to cope with major underwater damage, and the commanding officer feels that the policy of carrying extra shoring material paid dividends.

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(d) There was no method of determining the extent of flooding in compartments A-406M, and A-408M from the second platform deck. It is recommended that these compartments be fitted with sounding tubes.

(e) Portable submersible pumps were invaluable in removal of water from flooded compartments. A large expanded metal cage, to fit over present strainer, would help prevent clogging due to paper, clothing etc.

(f) Fragment and shrapnel holes were fairly symmetrical in shape and in most cases could be plugged with round or square tapered wooden plugs of assorted sizes.

(g) Extra long extension cords for submersible pumps and portable lighting must be carried because of power and lighting failures which occur in damaged areas. The extra extension cords carried by this vessel proved invaluable.

5. Communication comments are as follows:

(a) The commanding officer noted that recognition of voices with which he was already familiar was a sure and rapid method of authentication.

(b) The commanding officer heartily agrees with paragraphs 1(c), 5(b), 9(b), 3, and 12 of enclosure (C), the communication officer's comments. Especially true was his criticism and comment concerning the similarity of voice radio calls assigned to the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) and the U.S.S. S.B. ROBERTS (DE413).

6. Conclusions.

(a) Although the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532), and presumably the U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557), encountered some difficulty passing through the formation to join on the U.S.S. HOEL (DD533), Commander William D. Thomas, U.S. Navy, the screen commander, led the destroyers in in a loose column formation and executed the torpedo attack as planned.

(b) The reluctance of the Japanese to close the formation and "polish off" all of our task unit leads the commanding officer to think that the enemy believed the 2100 ton destroyers to be cruisers and the destroyer escorts to be destroyers. The excellent fire control installation, and high accurate rate of fire of the destroyers, plus the torpedo attack of the destroyer escorts must have strongly influenced them in coming to this probable conclusion. It is further believed that if the enemy had accurately known the composition of this task unit, they

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would have engaged more vigorously, and pushed the action to a more favorable ending for themselves.

(c) It is probable that the many hits obtained on the topside of the TONE class cruiser were instrumental in making her break off the action, and it is possible that fires and internal explosions resulting from these hits eventually led to her being put out of action. It is also believed that the TONE class cruiser lying dead in the water to the northeastward of the U.S.S. HEERLENN (DD532) during the rescue of the U.S.S. SINT LO (CVE63) survivors, was the same cruiser which had been fired on twice during the action. This is born out by the fact that this cruiser, when seen in the afternoon had a fire burning in the same place as did the ship of this class which we hit during the action ending at 0902.

(d) It is considered that the Japanese battleship commander was influenced by the torpedo hit on the leading battleship such that he maneuvered his ships in a rather conservative manner in the latter part of the action, and did not close for a kill such as he definitely should have done. This is the second time that this officer has observed Japanese ships in daylight surface action. On both occasions he has noticed a reluctance on the part of the enemy to close the range, and wipe out an outgunned allegedly inferior force. It is probable that the excellent smoke screen, aided by scattered rain squalls led the Japanese OTC to an indecision regarding the composition of our task unit, which lost for him the initiative and gave the aircraft sufficient time to attack and drive off the enemy force. This action on the part of the Japanese cannot be reconciled with their vigorous prosecution of attacks under other circumstances no more nor less favorable to them, such as some of the night actions, and numerous aircraft and land force battles.

(e) It is further considered that the Japanese destroyer commander handled his destroyers in a weak and vacillating manner, and that if he had prosecuted his attack more vigorously, he should have, with his superior numbers, shot up our screen and pushed home more closely his torpedo attack. This last conclusion is mainly based on information obtained from the radar PPI, and the fact that at no time did the enemy destroyers take any definite and positive action to engage this vessel.

(f) It is possible that the retirement course chosen by the American OTC surprised the enemy OTC, and it is very probable that it led the enemy admiral to believe that we were retiring on our own heavy units.

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7. Recommendations.

(a) It is recommended that the pitometer log be so modified that speed can be set into the DRT analyzer manually. Prior to the action, the pitometer log became highly inaccurate and finally inoperative. Tender and Ship's Force repair were ineffective. Had it been possible to set speeds manually, the DRT could have been used with a fair degree of accuracy and would have made the tracking and summary plot much more accurate and easy to keep, as well as providing a permanent record. It is believed that this modification could be accomplished by installing bypass switches for the electrical contacts on the hydraulic balance bar of the pitometer unit, thereby utilizing the differential electro-magnets for closing the contacts, and thereby permitting manual setting in of speeds by means of these switches.

(b) Rubber mattress covers would materially aid in protecting the mattresses on the bunks on which seriously injured personnel are placed. This is the second time within a year in which our mattresses were badly blood and/or oil soaked. It is impossible to obtain replacement mattresses in a forward area, and extremely difficult to remove the odor of the blood.

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1. (a) The commanding officer feels that the teamwork and perfect coordination of the entire ship's company was outstanding. This coordination coupled with the terrific urge of each officer and man to fight hard proved to be the deciding factor in overcoming the odds under which the battle was fought. Due to the fact that all hands performed their duties so efficiently, the commanding officer somewhat reluctantly singles out specific individuals for special praise. However, some few personnel definitely deserve to be mentioned by name.

(b) From the moment contact was first made with the enemy the services of the executive officer and evaluator, Lieutenant Commander William L. Carver, U.S. Naval Reserve, to the commanding officer were outstanding and indispensable. His judgement was excellent. The action at times was something of a malce, and being fought in the smoke and rain, many conditions normally found only in a night action were present. During the last phase of the approach to fire the first torpedo salvo, Lieutenant Commander Carver informed the commanding officer that the rear ships of the enemy column had separated and presented a new threat to the carriers. When this group was later identified by the gunnery officer as enemy battleships, Lieutenant Commander Carver organized an immediate and effective torpedo attack on the enemy battle line. During the entire action, he supplied a continuous flow of pertinent information to the commanding officer; the information arriving at about, or before the time the commanding officer first desired it. At no time was it necessary for the commanding officer to question the decisions of the evaluator.

(c) Lieutenant William W. Meadors, U.S. Naval Reserve, the gunnery officer, performed his duties in an outstanding manner. His choice of targets, in accordance with doctrine, was always correct and rapid. He coolly and efficiently brought each target in turn under an effective fire. The manner in which he raked the superstructure of a Japanese battleship was a joy to behold. When one Jap V/L of three which he was tracking pushed over into a dive, Lieutenant Meadors alertly shifted fire to this plane in time to track and then hit it. The untiring training efforts of Lieutenant Meadors in past months proved their value in the excellent performance of the personnel of the Gunnery department.

(d) At the time of the hit on the hit on the bridge which went into the pilot house killing one officer and three men, outstanding

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assistance to the commanding officer in a critical situation was rendered by three men. Their immediate, useful, and proper reactions, even though all of them were badly stunned, and one painfully wounded, were instrumental in maintaining the high standard of efficiency of the bridge force.

(1) John P. Miller, CQM, U.S. Navy, hauled himself to his knees, took the place of the mortally wounded steersman, and expeditiously carried out an important unexecuted order from the captain who was busy chasing salvos.

(2) Harold E. Whitney, CY, U.S. Navy, realized the necessity for the immediate execution of the captain's orders, and sensing that something was amiss with the normal voice tube method of communication between captain and steersman, properly stationed himself, relayed the orders, and verified that they were understood. At the same time, he continued to carry out his duties as captain's talker, sending and receiving important information to and from CIC and Control.

(3) Jack J. Woolworth, Q12c, U.S. Naval Reserve, although painfully wounded, continued his duties as quartermaster of the watch, and took over the duties of bridge radioman and engine order telegraph operator. Woolworth carried out these duties in such a cheerful and light-hearted manner that he aided in quickly restoring the confidence of other bridge personnel. The commanding officer took full advantage of Woolworth's services during this period, and did not know that he was wounded until after the action was broken.

(4) The general high state of training of the Engineering department was clearly demonstrated by its excellent performance in answering many emergency bells. To Lieutenant John P. Hirvela, U.S. Naval Reserve, engineering officer, goes credit for exhibiting cool supervision and leadership, and making possible this superior performance by his men.

(5) The commanding officer believes that both Lieutenant (j.g.) Alexander H. Swain, U.S. Naval Reserve, damage control and repair I officer, and Lieutenant (j.g.) William H. Sefton, U.S. Naval Reserve, repair III officer, deserve a great deal of credit for the high state of training and successful performance of duty by the repair party personnel. Both individually and collectively these officers, by the high quality of their resourcefulness, skill, bravery, leadership, and example

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inspired the repair parties during their two and one half day struggle to control the battle damage.

(g) The communication officer, Lieutenant (j.g.) John A. Frey, U.S. Naval Reserve, deserves a word of praise for his forethought in having gear stowed at hand with which to immediately effect rapid repairs to various radio antennae.

(h) The navigator and officer-of-the-deck, Lieutenant Robert F. Newsome, U.S. Naval Reserve, who had the conn during the greater part of the engagement, coolly, efficiently, and with excellent judgment carried out his duties throughout the battle, even after the shrapnel hit on the bridge stunned him, and lacerated him about the face.

(i) The work of a doctor during and after action is difficult to praise, because of the high professional standard all men expect of the medical profession. Lieutenant Edwin C. Bebb, (MC), U.S. Navy, and his three pharmacist mates worked tirelessly for a period of two and a half days. Doctor Bebb by his devotion to duty, high professional standard, and apparently inexhaustible store of energy, saved the lives of many men who otherwise probably would not have survived.

2. Personnel casualties are completely summarized in enclosure (K), copy of Medical Officer's report of Personnel Casualties.

PART VII

1. This report is forwarded directly to Commander Task Unit 77.4.3, because at the time of writing the whereabouts of Commander Task Unit 77.4.33 is not known. By copy of this report, the latter is requested to comment if he so desires.

A.T. HATHAWAY

cc: ~~CincPac~~ (2)~~Cominch~~ (Advance via airmail) ✓~~ComDesPac~~~~ComDesRon 47~~~~Com3rdFlt~~~~CTU 77.4.33 (Commander William D. Thomas)~~~~USS FANSHAW BAY (CVE70)~~~~USS SAINT LO (CVE63)~~~~USS GAMBLER BAY (CVE73)~~~~USS WHITE PLAINS (CVE66)~~~~USS KALININ BAY (CVE68)~~~~USS KITKUN BAY (CVE71)~~

cc: (continued)

~~USS HOEL (DD533)~~~~USS JOHNSTON (DD557)~~~~USS DENNIS (DE405)~~~~USS ROBERTS (DE413)~~~~USS RAYMOND (DE341)~~~~USS BUTLER (DE339)~~

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WLC/hs

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T I-A-L

29 October 1944

Enclosure (A) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action Report -
Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

From: The Executive Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer.
Subject: Action Report.
Reference: (a) Art. 948 U.S. Navy Regs. 1920.

1. The only outstanding impression received by me was the utter coolness of the men with whom I was in contact during the battle. The entire ship's company turned in an excellent performance during the action. Lieutenant (jg) Julius Steinberg's work in CIC was flawless. His summary plot of the action was invaluable and his supervision of the radar operators was perfect. The Plotting Room Officer, Lieutenant (jg) J.L. McGhee, USN, and C.H. Howell, FCR3c were on the JW telephone circuit with me in I.C. room and 5" director respectively. Due to their coolness all information flowed smoothly between the stations.

2. After the Japs retired to the northward, this vessel assisted in picking up survivors of the U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63). The men from repair parties did the major portion of the rescue work, and by using many "on the spot" improvisations succeeded in getting aboard many seriously wounded survivors. Martindale, R.C., S1c and Calloway, R.H., S11c in particular deserve individual praise. Each of them made swims of 50 yards or more to fasten lines to wounded survivors. Kindig, C.H., C11, and Stewart, D.B., S2c and Stanton, F.L., E12c, worked tirelessly during the entire rescue operation.

3. In connection with the hull damage forward, we were not very successful in preventing entrance of water through the four foot square hole, frame 18 at the waterline, port side. This was due however to the fact that we felt it necessary to try to rejoin carriers of TU 77.4.3, and after stopping to shore bulkheads, proceeded at a speed of 15 knots. The First Lieutenant determined the damage immediately, and his personnel kept it to a minimum. Hodges, E.R., SP1c; Martindale, R.C., S1c; and Kramer, B.A., E11c deserve much praise for their work. These three men worked continuously from about 0800, 25 October to 1800, 27 October 1944, a period of about 62 hours.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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29 October 1944

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.Subject: Action Report.

4. It is believed comments and recommendations concerning CIC may prove valuable to other vessels.

(a) All ships must be prepared in advance to keep a rough chronological record of events. In past actions we did so, but for some inexplicable reason no one was assigned to this duty. We now fully realize how valuable such a record would be as the bridge notes were destroyed by gunfire. The past actions referred to were shore bombardments and there was ample time to appoint a recorder, type forms, etc. Even if the bridge notes had not been destroyed, CIC notes including ranges, PPI appearance etc., would have been valuable.

(b) A summary plot is indispensable. The man designated as the Summary Plotter should absolutely have no other duties.

(c) Quiet in CIC is absolutely necessary. In our CIC there are three radio voice circuit speakers, namely TBS, MAN, and VHF. Each however can be guarded by the use of earphones. In all our drills we guarded the TBS and VHF circuits with talkers wearing earphones. However this action definitely proved to us that the TBS speaker must be used and not a talker, as the information must be evaluated immediately. The other two circuits should be guarded by the use of earphones.

(d) The talker efficiency and phone circuit discipline was excellent, however a few minor improvements can be made by constant elementary talker drill.

(e) During the action Fox Dog radar ranges were used exclusively except for a period of about five minutes during which time a blown fuse was replaced. During this time Sugar George radar ranges were used by transmission to plot over the JT phone circuit.

(f) It is recommended that a set of emergency spares be stowed in the radar transmitter room. Also radar spares should be distributed throughout the ship so that one hit will not destroy them all. We did have a set of emergency spares in the radar transmitter room, but the major portion

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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29 October 1944

Enclosure (A) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action Report -
Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

Subject: Action Report.

of our remaining spares were stowed in the underwater sound
room, which was flooded.

(g) The Pitometer Log was inoperative com-
mencing several days before the battle. This prevented our
having a DRT trace of the action. Such a trace, of course,
would be very valuable.

W. L. CARVER

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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Enclosure (B) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action report - Philippine
Operation: Battle East of Samar, 25 October 1944.

26 October 1944

From: The Gunnery Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer.
Subject: Comments on the Battle East of Samar Island, 25 October 1944.

1. The details of the action covered by these comments are, at best, estimated; although every attempt was made to adhere to the facts when they were known. The identification of Japanese ships is as in ONI 41-42, and the silhouettes in the addendum to CincPac - CincPOA "WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE" Volume 1, #7, dated 25 August 1944.

2. At 0750 I received orders to train the battery out to starboard and pick up target bearing 070° relative. The target was located immediately with Fox Dog radar and tracking was commenced, at which time I received orders to commence firing when ready. We commenced firing immediately, using salvo fire with three and one half second salvo interval at about 10,000 yards using Fox Dog radar ranges with a combination of Fox Dog radar bearings and optical bearings. Approximately 25 rounds of AA cannon and 100 rounds of common were fired at a Japanese heavy cruiser, identified as a TONE class, at ranges from 6,000 yards to 10,000 yards. The target was visible for only short spells, and during these periods many hits were observed, and fire was shifted to continuous fire. It is believed that light superstructure damage to the enemy cruiser was inflicted by the 5" fire of this ship. No gunfire was observed to be coming from the enemy cruiser, but some was coming from an unidentified source.

3. At 0755 I sighted an enemy battleship of the KONGO class leading the enemy battle line which consisted of four battleships, other classes unknown. I received orders to shift fire to the leading battleship. Check fire was ordered, and the designated target was located on Fox Dog radar immediately, and range set. Resume firing was ordered using continuous fire at about 8,500 yards using Fox Dog ranges with a combination of Fox Dog radar bearings and optical bearings. The enemy battleship was firing upon this vessel using both her main battery and broadside battery at this time.

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ENCLOSURE (B)

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Enclosure (B) to U.S.S. HEERMAN (DD532) Action report - Philippine
Operation: Battle East of Samar, 25 October 1944.

(a) The leading enemy battleship's broadside battery fired approximately five salvos. Shrapnel from one of these destroyed the right hand end window in the rangefinder located in our mark 37 director. This hit left the left hand end window in use for spotting only. No further firing was observed from the enemy's secondary battery although we remained near her beam for approximately four more minutes.

(b) Two half salvos and one full salvo were observed to be fired by the enemy battleship, from her main battery, at this ship. The first half salvo was fired from the two low turrets: Numbers 1 and 4. The second half salvo was fired from her two high turrets: numbers 2 and 3. The third salvo was fired from all four turrets. This last salvo illuminated the entire ocean on our starboard end. All salvos were heard passing over the ship about mast height or lower, and were observed to hit the water approximately 1,000 yards over. No further fire was observed from the enemy battleship; although we remained near her beam for approximately four more minutes.

(c) During the firing on the enemy battleship, this ship expended approximately 210 rounds of AA common and 50 rounds of common, at ranges from 4,000 yards to 8,000 yards. We ceased firing at 0803. Several small fires were observed to start on the enemy battleship during this firing. I believe that all through our firing on this target continuous hits were registered on the enemy, because I watched our shells explode throughout the superstructure of the enemy battleship. It is believed that heavy casualties to personnel topside, and superstructure damage was inflicted upon the enemy battleship. It is possible that the enemy's fire control system was put out of commission temporarily, or that key personnel were killed, for we were visible to the enemy battleship for a few minutes after she fired her last salvo at us without receiving additional fire from her.

(d) Approximately eight minutes after we took the enemy battleship under fire I observed one torpedo hit on the starboard side of the enemy battleship under her after turret. This was shortly followed by three explosions at approximately five second intervals. After the torpedo hit was observed, the enemy battleship was obscured as we both entered a rain squall.

4. At about 0808 I sighted gun flashes from a heavy enemy ship, astern to port, type unknown, and trained out on this target. The target was located immediately with Fox Dog radar and tracking was commenced. We commenced firing immediately, using salvo fire with irregular salvo interval, at 12,000 yards, with full radar control. Firing was difficult as we were attempting to lay a smoke screen and maneuvering

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ENCLOSURE (B)

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Enclosure (B) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action Report - Philippine
Operation: Battle West of Samar, 25 October 1944.

radically. The target was not identified, due to heavy smoke and rain, but it was believed to be a cruiser or battleship. We expended approximately 40 rounds of AA common at ranges from 12,000 yards to 16,000 yards. Straddles were observed on Fox Dog radar. Probable hits were inflicted on the enemy target. We ceased firing at 0824.

5. At 0841 I sighted six heavy cruisers in column, and received orders to commence firing on the leading cruiser which I identified as a TONE class. The other five cruisers were of the ATAGO or MAYA and NACHI classes. We commenced firing to our port side on the enemy cruiser at about 12,000 yards using Fox Dog radar ranges and optical bearings. At about 0855 we were unable to range on the enemy due to a casualty of our Fox Dog radar. Sugar George radar ranges and optical bearings and spots were used. At 0900 the Fox Dog radar was back in commission and we shifted to Fox Dog ranges and optical bearings. Ceased firing at 0902. The target could be seen during most of the firing.

(a) We fired approximately 500 rounds of AA common at ranges from 12,000 to 17,500 yards using salvo fire with four second salvo interval. I observed approximately 50 hits on the leading enemy heavy cruiser. Good patterns were observed. Several small fires and one large fire were observed on the enemy cruiser; the larger one being around the fantail. I believe that much topside damage was inflicted upon the enemy cruiser. Due to the long range which resulted in plunging fire, and my observation of black smoke arising after hits had been scored on her fantail, I believe that probable damage was inflicted upon the enemy cruiser hanger.

(b) About 0850 I observed gunfire from heavy cruisers on our port beam, battleships on our port quarter, and heavy cruisers on our starboard quarter. No friendly ships were in sight. This ship was being continuously surrounded by enemy gunfire splashes. Dye loaded splashes were observed with three colors prominent - red, green, and yellow. I saw an enemy destroyer that resembled our destroyer escorts except that it had two twin turrets forward. We were firing on an enemy heavy cruiser at the time.

(c) During this firing a heavy explosion was felt coming from the forward part of our ship. Shortly thereafter I received word that the ship had been hit, and that gun #2 was out of commission. The casualty to gun #2 was due to shrapnel entering the mount on the left side of the gun port shield causing a small piece of the gun port (approximately 2" x 5") to drop down between the gun slide and the gun

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ENCLOSURE (B)

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Enclosure (B) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action report - Philippine
Operation; Battle of Samar, 25 October 1944.

housing. This obstruction made it impossible for the gun to return to battery or for the breech to close. BOULTON, J.H., CGM, U.S. Navy, whose battle station is Gun Captain of gun #2, took immediate steps to place the gun back in operation by running the gun out of battery and removing the obstruction. The gas ejection line was severed by this same shrapnel hit. The absence of gas ejection air did not affect the operation of the gun later during the battle. This gun was used against the air targets later in the morning.

(d) At the time gun #2 was hit a piece of shrapnel entered the port side of the upper handling room of gun #2, and hit the inboard door to the projectile hoist causing the door to be sprung. The hoist would function only in manual, thereafter. Another piece of shrapnel hit the center column and expended its force, leaving a small hole and a big dent. No damage was done to the cables in the center column.

(e) The Fox Dog radar was out of commission during part of this phase. Lieutenant (j.g.) J. Steinberg, U.S. Naval Reserve, took immediate action and placed it back in commission for the last few minutes of firing. His action greatly assisted in obtaining hits as the range began to open.

6. At about 0905 I believe I saw the U.S.S. JOHNSTON (DD557) about 2,000 yards on our port beam, making very little headway, and burning amidships, with splashes landing around her. I also believe I saw the U.S.S. HOEL (DD533) about 4,000 yards on our port quarter. She appeared to be underway at reduced speed. Both ships had their Sugar Charlie radar hanging down their masts.

7. At 0907 I sighted an enemy cruiser to starboard, which was identified as a MAYA or ATAGO class heavy cruiser. We commenced firing on the enemy at 14,000 yards using salvo fire with four seconds salvo interval. Fox Dog ranges and a combination of Fox Dog radar bearings and optical bearings were used. Ceased firing at 0910. The target could be seen during the major portion of the firing.

(a) During this firing, approximately 100 rounds of AA cannon were expended at the enemy with approximately 10 hits observed. No fires were observed on the enemy cruiser. The enemy was maneuvering during this phase, which he failed to do during the preceding phases. The ranges were from 14,000 yards to 17,500 yards. During the latter part of this firing the maximum range of our guns appeared to be about 16,500 yards, as shorts without hits were observed at a target range of 17,500 yards. Splashes also were observed on the Fox Dog radar, short of the target.

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ENCLOSURE (B)

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Enclosure (B) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action report - Philippine
Operation; Battle East of Samar, 25 October 1944.

8. During the battle, HOLCOMB, J.D., CFC, U.S. Navy, whose battle station is LJP phone talker, rangefinder operator, and range spotter was outstanding in performing his duties. As range spotter, he performed excellently by continually bracketing target without the advantage of depth perception.

(a) The director crew carried out their duties as a unit perfectly. The entire battery performed their duties with the utmost precision and dispatch while under fire from the enemy for over one hour and one half against tremendous odds.

9. The Japanese task force did not appear to have an effective gunnery doctrine. The most noticeable observation that supports this statement occurred during the fourth phase. A combination of at least four Japanese cruisers and battleships were firing at this vessel. I believe that the enemy ships were spotting each others splashes; although dye-loaded projectiles were used. At times two salvos of the same color dye were seen to splash at almost the same instant.

(a) I also noticed that one of the enemy cruisers on our port hand during the fourth phase spotted down 1,000 yards, and commenced walking her salvos out towards us using 100 yard ladder. I identified this cruiser to be an ATAGO class. I watched her ladder approach us and after the 100 yard short salvo, plus the salvo interval that she was using, (approximately 30 seconds) I felt a heavy explosion forward. I, therefore, believe that the hit in our port bow was registered by this cruiser. I do not believe this spotter knew when he hit us as he continued to walk his salvos over us and never returned.

(b) I also noticed that the Japanese battery alignment was excellent, as very tight patterns were observed.

(c) I observed a bed spring type of radar antenna on top of the mainmast of the Japanese battleship, which I identified as a KONGO class from a distance of 4,000 yards. This antenna was rotating, appearing to be in different positions during the time when we were firing at the battleship.

(d) The Japanese destroyer, which I first believed to be an American Destroyer Escort, also had a bed spring type of radar antenna on top of her foremast. Although this enemy destroyer was not over 2,000 yards away, she was not firing her guns which were trained on the center-line. We had an enemy heavy cruiser under fire at this time, and I did not consider the destroyer a suitable target.

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ENCLOSURE (B)

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Enclosure (B) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) - Action report - Philippine
Operation: Battle East of Samar, 25 October 1944.

(e) At about 0700 LINDO was observed to be dropping from the clouds. This showed up on our Fox Dog radar, but did not affect our firings as it was not properly located.

10. During the anti-aircraft action, in which three targets were fired upon, the functioning of the mark 32 fuzeed projectiles appeared to be normal. Two hits were observed on one VAL, with no visible landing gear, which continued its dive into the ocean without releasing its bomb. 157 rounds of mark 32 fuzeed projectiles were expended at the three targets.

11. The operation of all ordnance equipment was considered excellent. There were several casualties which were due to enemy gunfire and not to defective equipment. Casualties have been enumerated in these comments.

W. T. MENDORS.

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ENCLOSURE (B)

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

30 October 1944.

Enclosure (C) U.S.S. HEERLENN (DD532) Action Report -
Philippine Operation: Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

From: The Communication Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer.

Subject: Comments and Recommendations - Battle East of Samar
Island, Philippine Islands, 25 October 1944.

1. In general, communications during this operation were not so satisfactory as on previous campaigns.

(a) C.M.F. 3-44, although repeatedly referred to in operation orders, was not received by this vessel until two days before departure from port. This delay, coupled with the fact that ship's communication officers are apt to be quite busy just prior to leaving on a large operation, made it difficult to become adequately familiar with the communication plan, to instruct thoroughly personnel and to iron out minor points that inevitably arise.

(b) Minor differences that exist between C.M.F. 3-44 and C.M.T.O.O. 2, although not serious or troublesome, could possibly be eradicated. There would thus be less confusion, necessity for indoctrination and possibility of error on the part of units transferred from one area to another.

(c) Ship, command, and unit voice calls were troublesome. Calls were found in three separate lists; C.M.T.O.O. 2, C.M.F. 3-44 and C.M.F. 4-44. One master list of calls would save time and confusion. Although it is realized that the preparation of a list of some 3000 voice calls that cannot be confused with one another, and at the same time be readily recognized, is a difficult job, it is felt that some improvement is in order. For example, USS ROBERTS (DL413) and USS HEERLENN (DD532), assigned the voice calls JUGGERNAUT and DRUMMAUCHT respectively, were both in the same screening unit.

2. (a) This vessel experienced great difficulty in copying BELLS 1 X. The signal was generally weak on all frequencies. By comparison, Radio NPL was putting through a satisfactory signal. From one hour before sunrise until one hour after sunset, the signal was quite unsatisfactory. Greatest difficulty was had between 1900Z and 2200Z, or until such time as transmissions were started on 12170 kcs. 12170 kcs, however, was not a clear channel, being interfered with by other rather strong signals. It is suggested that transmissions be extended on this frequency to run from 2000Z until 0700Z rather than from 2200Z, which is the present schedule. The signal on 16410 kcs was difficult to copy because it was not "clean", having a slight chirp and an echo that sounded somewhat like a backwave.

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ENCLOSURE (C)

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Enclosure (C) to U.S.S. HERRANN (DD532) Action Report -
Philippine Operations; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

Subject: Comments and Recommendations - Battle East of Samar
Island, Philippine Islands, 25 October 1944.

(b) It is recommended that a uniform procedure be adopted on the transmission of headings. It is believed that the most satisfactory method is to send each group twice, rather than to repeat the heading as a whole after it has been sent completely through once.

3. This vessel had occasion to transmit a contact report at a time when it was inadvisable to break radio silence. Communication on TBS with the main body was not possible due to the distance involved. After some delay, communication was finally established with the main body on a VHF channel by means of a relay through a plane in contact with it. The circuit was not busy at the time, no interference was noted, but the planes were reluctant to accomplish the relay. A special voice call which would indicate to planes hearing it that a surface vessel had important traffic for the base, or for further relay, would be a great help for this sort of situation.

4. (a) This vessel kept a continuous receiver watch on these frequencies, which were logged as noted:

Frequencies	Name of Circuit	Where Logged
BELLS	Force Fox	Radio
8820	Task Force 77 Common	Radio
430	Task Group 77.4 Common	Radio
3115	Local Air Warning	Radio
72.1	TBS Voice	Radio and others
142.58	Local MSP	CIC
37.6	Inter Fighter Director	CIC

During operations, these are necessary circuits to a screening destroyer in a carrier group. The first three, plus TBS, are actually intercept circuits that a destroyer is either directed to cover or finds it advisable to cover. Four such circuits, if well guarded, places a severe load on a destroyer radio gang. It is felt that the number of intercept circuits required on destroyers can be reduced appreciably with a resulting increase in the efficiency of communications on these circuits remaining.

(b) It was noted that Task Force Common frequency, 8820 kcs, was interfered with by Manus Fox, which is on 8830 kcs.

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Battle East of Samar, 25 October 1944.

5. (a) This vessel is equipped with SCR 274-N type of VHF gear. It has 4 channels, but only 2 are useful, these being channels #1 and #4. The other two are 116.1 mcs and 126.18 mcs, neither of which is of any use to a surface unit. Unsuccessful efforts have been made to secure crystals for channels #2 and #3. During this operation, channel #3 would have been a much better channel to guard than was channel #4, but this was impossible due to the aforementioned limitations.

(b) MAN equipment as installed is a temporary measure at best. As supplied for installation by ship's force, it is battery powered, must be installed on the bridge and therefore, transmissions cannot be made from CIC. During the operation, it was set up on 37.6 mcs, a circuit which is a necessity for screening destroyers, particularly if one has the screen radar guard. It is suggested that material and equipment be made available for proper installation, and that power supplies for operation from 110 volt AC be procured.

6. Visual communications during the engagement were, in general, impossible due to chemical smoke, rain squalls, haze and the distance involved. This situation can be expected to prevail in any surface engagement of this type. TBS or Task Group CW common therefore, are the primary systems for tactical communication. TBS was the primary means of communication during this surface engagement. Task Group common, 430 kcs CW, was not employed as a tactical circuit.

7. (a) To the best of our knowledge, TBS was not jammed at any time by the enemy. It is felt that a closer watch could have been maintained on this circuit. Several transmissions went unanswered, but whether this was due to confusion or carelessness cannot be estimated. No authentication was used; perhaps it was not necessary to employ any. Direct reading tactical signals were, however, being transmitted in plain language while in direct contact with the enemy at a time when he was known to be on another VHF channel. Courses and speeds were shackled, but signals such as "Turn 9" etc. were transmitted in the clear.

(b) It is felt that there was some loose talk on TBS, messages that if heard by the enemy, would have been of great help to him. "My fish are off", or, "I have no fish left", are examples.

(c) 37.6 mcs., the inter Fido circuit, was thoroughly jammed by the Japs, and in turn, by ourselves. It was useless during the engagement, and was gradually abandoned.

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ENCLOSURE (C)

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Battle East of Samar, 25 October 1944.

8. A contact report was transmitted on four frequencies, namely: 4135, 8270, 4205, and 430 kcs. No receipt was received, so the message was sent blind, repeating it several times. Authentication was used in each instance. Although not definitely established, it is believed that the Japs were jamming the first three frequencies used for this report.

9. (a) Interior communications functioned satisfactorily. It is suggested that personnel be thoroughly instructed in methods of isolating damage to sound powered circuits so that the whole line is not put out of action by one hit. It is felt that, in general, the 21 MC system is of little use during times when the ambient noise level is comparable to that of a surface engagement.

(b) The 21 MC, however, is considered to be sufficiently valuable during some general quarters conditions such as air attacks, submarine attacks, and condition watch periods, to definitely warrant its retention.

10. (a) This vessel and the two other destroyers in the engagement suffered immediate damage to the antenna systems. Although we suffered no damage to radar, TBS or VHF antennas, we did lose two high frequency receiving antennas and the TBL antenna. This loss further multiplied in that antennas shot away fell in such a fashion as to ground out every receiving and transmitting antenna going into main radio. Immediate repairs were made to all antennas, using spare wires and insulators which were available at separate locations above the main deck. Prefabricated antennas were not used, although they were available. It was found easier to splice existing antennas than to string assembled emergency antennas.

(b) It is of vital importance that tools and spare gear be available above the main deck. Without these, in our case, repairs would have been impossible since most radio and radar spares were flooded.

11. It is suggested that, in view of the probability of early antenna damage in surface engagements, an easily attached spare TBS antenna and feeder be made available. It is understood that kits of some sort are being procured, but none have been seen or located. We were prepared to rig an emergency TBS antenna using twisted pair feeders to a half wave dipole, but this would have been an insecure lashup at best.

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ENCLOSURE (C)

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Enclosure (C) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action Report - Philippine Operation;
Battle East, 25 October 1944.

12. It is also suggested that the spare ABK unit now reposing in CIC be installed in emergency radio, along with additional ABK antenna on the after stack. Battery power for this unit could come from the battery locker adjacent to Radio #2.

13. All hands under my observation performed their duties in accordance with the highest standards.

J.A. FREY.

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ENCLOSURE (C)

(40)

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Enclosure (D) to U.S.S. HEERANN (DD532) Action Report -
Philippine Operation: Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

COMINCH F-01 AA-1

Feb. 1944

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REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

Location of ship (area) Philippine Islands U.S.S. HEERANN (DD532)Zone Time Minus Nine (-9) Date 25 October 1944

NOTES

- (a) REPEL ATTACK FIRST -- then collect data for this report.
- (b) Do not "Gun Dock" this report. If data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy, enter dash in space for which no data is available.
- (c) These sheets are to be filled out immediately after action is completed with data available from ship's log, memory, and consultation with ship's officers. Information is essential in order that the effectiveness of our equipment can be determined. Where data are of doubtful accuracy, fill in with general terms.
- (d) Forward under separate cover to Readiness Division, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

1. Surprise attack (yes or no) No Day or night Day
2. Method picking plane up (Radar, binoculars, naked eye) Radar
3. Range plane was picked up (50, 30, 10, less than 5 miles) 10
4. Total number of planes observed Three Type Val
5. Number of planes attacking own ship None Type
6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship Loading plane in formation
 - (a) Of those attacking own ship ----- Type -----
 - (b) Others ----- Type -----

(41)

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ENCLOSURE (D)

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7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet-----
 8. Number of guns firing - by caliber 5 - 5"/38 Caliber
 9. Ammunition expended - by caliber 54 rounds 5"/38 cal. AA-Special.
Fitted with Mk. #32 Fuse
 10. Percent service allowance expended 10%
 11. Method of control Partial Radar Method of spotting None
Method of ranging Fox Dog Radar Method of firing Continuous
 12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot One minute
 13. Approximate time of first hits None
 14. Approximate time first shot to last shot three minutes
 15. Approximate position angle open fire-----
 16. Approximate position angle cease fire-----
 17. Approximate bearing first shot-----
 18. Approximate bearing last shot-----
 19. Approximate range first shot 5,000 yards Altitude of Plane-----
 20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached 5,000 Altitude-----
 21. Approximate range last shot 7,000 yards Altitude of Plane-----
 22. Approximate altitude of bomb release None Size of bomb None
 23. Approximate range torpedo release None Size of torpedo None
 24. Number hits on ship by bombs None by torpedoes None Was ship
 strafed? No
 25. Number near bomb masses damaging ship None
 26. Planes shot down:

	SURE (By own ship alone)	SURE (Ass't)	PROBABLE	DAMAGED
(a) Those attacking own ship	<u>NONE</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>NONE</u>
(b) Other aircraft	<u>NONE</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>NONE</u>

(An aircraft is considered destroyed "Sure" when, as result of own ship's fire: 1. It is seen to crash. 2. It is seen to disintegrate in the air or be enveloped in flames. 3. It is seen to descend on friendly territory and be captured. 4. Pilot and entire crew are seen to bail out.)

(A "Sure-Assist" may be claimed when plane is destroyed result of own ship's and assisting fire by friendly planes, shore batteries, or other ships.)

(An aircraft is considered probably destroyed when, as result of own ship's fire: It is so damaged as to have less than an even chance of reaching its own territory safely.)

(An aircraft is considered damaged when, as result of own ship's fire: It is so damaged as to require repair before beginning another mission, but has better than an even chance of reaching its own territory safely. Claims shall be based on careful interrogation by proper authority, and every effort shall be made to eliminate duplication of claims.)

27. Best estimate of size gun or guns responsible for each "Sure" None
 28. Performance of ammunition (Excellent, good, bad poor) Good
 29. What failures in material occurred in this action None
 30. Sketch: (a) Indicate direction of attack relative ship's head.
 (b) Show relative position of sun.
 (c) Indicate own maneuvers.

Note. - Ship on approximately steady course and planes were very high.

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Philippine Operation: Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

COMENCH F-01 AA-1

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REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

Location of ship (area) Philippine Islands U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532)Zone Time Minus Nine (-9) Date 25 October 1944

NOTES

- (a) REPEL ATTACK FIRST - then collect data for this report.
- (b) Do not "Gun Deck" this report. If data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy, enter dash in space for which no data is available.
- (c) These sheets are to be filled out immediately after action is completed with data available from ship's log, memory, and consultation with ship's officers. Information is essential in order that the effectiveness of our equipment can be determined. Where data are of doubtful accuracy, fill in with general terms.
- (d) Forward under separate cover to Readiness Division, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

1. Surprise attack (yes or no) No Day or night Day
2. Method picking plane up (radar, binoculars, naked eye) Radar
3. Range plane was picked (50, 30, 10, less than 5 miles) Less than 5 miles
4. Total number of planes observed Two Type Val
5. Number of planes attacking own ship None Type
6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship Two
 - (a) Of those attacking own ship Type
 - (b) Others One Type "Val"
7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet
8. Number of guns firing - by caliber 3 - 40 MM, 5 - 5"/38 caliber
9. Ammunition expended - by caliber 103 rounds 5"/38 c.i. AA Special
Pitted with 1 k. 32 Fuzes. 150 rounds 40 MM
10. Percent service allowance expended 20%
11. Method of control Partial Radar Method of spotting None
12. Method of ranging Fox Dog Radar Method of firing continuous

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot 30 seconds
13. Approximate time of first hits 1104
14. Approximate time first shot to last shot three minutes
15. Approximate position angle open fire -----
16. Approximate position angle cease fire 10°
17. Approximate bearing first shot -----
18. Approximate bearing last shot -----
19. Approximate range first shot 4000 yards Altitude of Plane -----
20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached 3000 yards
Altitude -----
21. Approximate range last shot 3000 yards - 5000 yards Altitude of Plane -----
22. Approximate altitude of bomb release None Size of bomb None
23. Approximate range torpedo release None Size of torpedo None
24. Number hits on ship by bombs None by torpedoes None Was ship strafed? No
25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship None
26. Planes shot down: -----

	SURE By own ship alone)	SURE (Assist)	PROBABLE	DAMAGED
(a) Those attacking own ship	<u>NONE</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>NONE</u>
(b) Other aircraft	<u>ONE</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>NONE</u>

(An aircraft is considered destroyed "Sure" when as result of own ship's fire: 1. It is seen to crash. 2. It is seen to disintegrate in the air or be enveloped in flames. 3. It is seen to descend on friendly territory and be captured. 4. Pilot and entire crew are seen to bail out.)

(A "Sure-Assist" may be claimed when plane is destroyed as result of own ship's and assisting fire by friendly planes, shore batteries, or other ships.)

(An aircraft is considered probably destroyed when, as result of own ship's fire: It is so damaged as to have less than an even chance of reaching its own territory safely.)

(An aircraft is considered damaged when, as result of own ship's fire: It is so damaged as to require repair before beginning another mission, but has better than an even chance of reaching its own territory safely. Claims shall be based on careful interrogation by proper authority, and every effort shall be made to eliminate duplication of claims.)

27. Best estimate of size gun or guns responsible for each "Sure" 5"/38
caliber
28. Performance of ammunition (excellent, good, bad poor) Good
29. What failures in material occurred in this action? None
30. Sketch: (a) Indicate direction of attack relative ship's head.
(b) Show relative position of sun.
(c) Indicate own maneuvers.

Note. - Add descriptive text on additional sheet if required to clarify report.

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944, ALL TIMES GCT. OP: MARTIN

1905	MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3	SIGNAL EXECUTE TO FOLLOW TURN 9
	V CATNIP	CATNIP OVERTURE ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
	V OVERTURE	WILCO OUT
11	MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3	WILCO OUT
		STAND BY - EXECUTE BY TURN 9 DERBY
30	MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3	NEBRASKA ACKNOWLEDGE
	V DEXTER	SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT FORMATION
	V MONGREL	5RN DEXTER MONGREL ACKNOWLEDGE
33	MERCURY 2 V TAFFY 2	WILCO OUT
	MERCURY 2 V TAFFY 2	WILCO OUT
		EXECUTE TO FOLLOW TURN Z G
	V FLAPPER	STANDEY EXECUTE TURN Z G FLAPPER
34	V SANDP	SANDP ACKNOWLEDGE
	MERCURY 2 V TAFFY 2	WILCO OUT
		WILCO OUT
		EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT C 5RN EMPIRE
	V BAILBOND	BAILBOND ACKNOWLEDGE
35	V EMPIRE	WILCO OUT
	TAFFY 3 V GEORGIA	WILCO OUT
37	V TAFFY 3	NANCY HANKS OVER
	MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3	ROGER OUT
		SIGNAL EXECUTE TO FOLLOW TURN
		SHACKLE K D R UNSHACKLE TACKLINE
		SPEED SHACKLE I M UNSHACKLE GEORGIA
		JUGGERNAUT ACKNOWLEDGE
41	V GEORGIA	ROGER OUT
	V JUGGERNAUT	ROGER OUT
	MERCURY 2 V TAFFY 2	EXECUTE TO FOLLOW TURN SHACKLE B.
		UNSHACKLE TACK LINE (OUT OUT)
	V CIRCUS	WILCO AR
44	V TAFFY 23	WILCO AR
	MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3	STANDEY EXECUTE BY TURN SHACKLE
		KING DOG UNSHACKLE TACKLINE SPEED
		SHACKLE I M UNSHACKLE FIDO AND
		FIGLEAF ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
46	V FIDO	WILCO OUT
	V FIGLEAF	WILCO OUT
49	TAFFY 3 V CATNIP	FOX IS AT THE DIP
	MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3	SIGNAL EXECUTE TO FOLLOW 2 TURN
		CATNIP OVERTURE ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
	V CATNIP	WILCO OUT
50	V OVERTURE	WILCO OUT

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944 ALL TIMES GCT. OP: MARTIN

	MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3	STANDBY EXECUTE MY 2 TURN DERBY
	V DERBY	NEBRASKA ACKNOWLEDGE K
1951	V NEBRASKA	WILCO OUT
	TAFFY 3 V CATNIP	WILCO OUT
		REQUEST PERMISSION TO HAVE TWO WIND-
		WARD DD'S DISPLAY WHITE TRUCK LIGHTS
		IN PLACE OF RED TRUCK LIGHTS OVER
52	V TAFFY 3	ROGER OUT
	MERCURY 33 V TAFFY 3	TURN DISH PAN AND RED TRUCK LIGHTS
		DREADNAUGHT AND BRASSLOCK ACKNOWLEDGE
53	V DREADNAUGHT	WILCO OUT
	V BRASSLOCK	WILCO OUT
53	V CATNIP	FOX IS TOO BLOCKED
	TAFFY 33 V TAFFY 3	COMPLY WITH CATNIP'S REQUEST FOR 2
		WHITE LIGHTS ON WINDWARD DD'S OVER
54	TAF 33 V V TAF 3	DID U RECEIVE MY LAST XMISSION OVER
55	FIGLEAF V TAFFY 33	COMPLY
	MERCURY 2 V TAFFY 2	EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT 1 TURN CIRCUS
		JITTERBUG ACKNOWLEDGE
57	V CIRCUS	WILCO OUT
	V JITTERBUG	WILCO OUT
58	FIDO V TAFFY 3	IS YOUR FOX AT THE DIP OVER
	V FIDO	INSTRUCTED LAST NIGHT THAT LAUNCH
		WOULD NOT BE MADE BY FIDO
	FIDO V TAFFY 3	LAUNCH FOUR CHICKENS AS SOON AS
		POSSIBLE OVER
59	TAFFY 2 V FLAPPER	FOX IS TOO BLOCKED OUT
2000	V TAFFY 2	EMERGENCY VICTOR PORT SIDE FLAPPER
05	TAFFY 2 V FLAPPER	CORPEN SHACKLE B Z G UNSHACKLE
	MERCURY 2 V TAFFY 2	EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT SHACKLE B Z G
		UNSHACKLE TURN EMPIRE FAMOUS AC-
		KNOWLEDGE OVER
06	V EMPIRE	WILCO
	V FAMOUS	WILCO OUT
06	TAFFY 3 V CATNIP	FOX IS DOWN HAVING LAUNCHED SHACKLE
	V CATNIP	J UNSHACKLE CHICKENS OUT
		WHITE TRUCK LIGHTS NO LONGER
		REQUIRED BY ME
	FIDO V TAFFY 3	HOW SOON CAN U COMPLETE LAUNCH OVER
	V FIDO	FOX IS AT THE DIP OVER
07	V TAFFY 3	ROGER OUT

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GCT. OP: MARTIN

	TAFFY 3 V C.TWIP	I HAVE SHACKLE C UNSHACKLE MORE CHICKENS READY FOR YOU IF YOU DESIRE THEM OVER
2010	V TAFFY 3 FLAPPER V VALOR	ROGER OUT MAN RECOVERED RETURNING TO STATION OVER
12	V FLAPPER	THANK YOU OUT
14	MERCURY 2 V FLAPPER MERCURY 2 V TAFFY 2	FOX IS DOWN OUT TURN OUT ALL LIGHTS TAFFY 23 ACKNOWLEDGE
15	V TAFFY 23	WILCO OUT
16	TAFFY 3 V FIDO TAFFY 2 FLAPPER V VALOR	FOX IS TOO BLOCKED OUT PILOTS CONDITION S.TISFACTORY WILL TRANSFER WHEN DESIRED OVER
17	V TAFFY V FLAPPER MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3	ROGER OUT ROGER OUT SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT 1 TURN DEXTER MONGREL ACKNOWLEDGE K
18	V DEXTER V MONGREL MERCURY 2 V TAFFY 2	WILCO OUT WILCO OUT TURN 2 FLAPPER ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
19	V FLAPPER MERCURY 2 V TAFFY 2	WILCO OUT STANDBY EXECUTE TURN 2 JITTERBUG ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
	V JITTERBUG	WILCO OUT
	TAFFY 3 V DERBY	FOX AT THE DIP OUT
	TAFFY 2 V CIRCUS	FOX AT THE DIP OUT
20	TAFFY 2 V FLAPPER	FOX AT THE DIP OUT
21	TAFFY 2 V VALOR	WHAT STATION DO YOU WISH ME TO TAKE OVER
23	TAFFY 3 V FIDO	LAUNCHED SHACKLE C UNSHACKLE CHICKENS FOX IS AT THE DIP OUT
25	TAFFY 2 V GALLEY	FOX IS TOO BLOCKED OUT
	TAFFY 2 V FLAPPER	FOX IS TOO BLOCKED OUT
26	TAFFY 2 V CIRCUS	FOX IS TOO BLOCKED OUT
29	MERCURY 2 V TAFFY 2	EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT ANSWERING TURN FLAP ACKNOWLEDGE K
	V FLAPPER	WILCO OUT
	MERCURY 33 V TAFFY 3	TURN OUT DISHMAN DREADNAUGHT JUGGERNAUT ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
30	V DREADNAUGHT V JUGGERNAUT	WILCO OUT WILCO OUT
	MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3	ALL ESCORTS SHOW RED TRUCK LIGHTS OVERTURE AND MONGREL ACKNOWLEDGE

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES OCT. OP: MARTIN

2031	V OVERTURE	WILCO OUT
	V MONGREL	WILCO OUT
	MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3	SET CONDITION ONE FIDO NEBRASKA
		ACKNOWLEDGE
32	V FIDO	WILCO OUT
	V NEBRASKA	WILCO OUT
	TAFFY 3 V DERBY	FOX IS TOO BLOCKED OUT
33	TAFFY 3 V FIDO	FOX IS TOO BLOCKED OUT
	MERCURY 33 V TAFFY 3	TURN OFF ALL LIGHTS NEBRASKA FIGLEAF
		ACKNOWLEDGE
34	V NEBRASKA	WILCO OUT
	V FIGLEAF	WILCO OUT
35	TAFFY 2 V FLAPPER	FOX IS DOWN OUT
38	MERCURY 2 V TAFFY 2	TURN ON RED TRUCK LIGHTS
39	TAFFY 3 V DERBY	FOX IS DOWN OUT
	MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3	SIGNAL EXECUTE TO FOLLOW SHACKLE F
		R E UNSHACKLE TURN TACKLINE SPEED
		SHACKLE V P UNSHACKLE DERBY FIGLEAF
		ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
41	V DERBY	WILCO OUT
	V FIGLEAF	WILCO OUT
42	TAFFY 2 V EMPIRE	FOX IS DOWN OUT
	TAFFY 3 V OVERTURE	WOULD YOU REPEAT COURSE OVER
	V TAFFY 3	REPEATING COURSE SHACKEL FOX ROGER
		EASY UNSHACKLE TURN OVER
43	V OVERTURE	ROGER OUT
44	MERCURY 23 V TAFFY 23	TURN ON RED TRUCK LIGHTS BAILBOND
		ACKNOWLEDGE K WILCO OUT
	V BAILBOND	WILCO OUT
	MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3	STAND BY EXECUTE MY SHACKLE F R E
		UNSHACKLE TURN TACKLINE SPEED
		SHACKLE V P UNSHACKLE GEORGIA AND
		MONGREL ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
45	V GEORGIA	WILCO OUT
45	T.O.L.E.	
	TAFFEY 23 V MAILBOND	DO YOU WANT THE RED TRUCKS ON OR
		OFF OVER
	V TAFFEY 23	YOU SHOULD HAVE ON RED TRUCK LIGHTS
		AND DISPLAN LIGHTS OVER
47	V MAILBOND	THANK YOU OUT
	MERCURY 2 V TAFFEY 2	EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT 1 TURN FAMOUS
		AND GALLEY ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
48	V FAMOUS	WILCO OUT
	V GALLEY	WILCO OUT
	MERCURY 2 V TAFFEY 2	GREAT DANCES TURN OUT RED TRUCK
		LIGHTS CIRCUS AND EMPIRE ACKNOWLEDGE
		OVER

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ENCLOSURE (F)

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GCT. OP: MARTIN

2049 V CIRCUS WILCO OUT
V EMPIRE WILCO OUT
MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT TURN
ZEBRA SHACKLE N D UNSHACKLE FIDO
AND OVERTURE ACKNOWLEDGE OVER

2100 V FIDO WILCO OUT
V OVERTURE WILCO OUT
10 MERCURY 2 V TAFFEY 2 EXECUTE SHACKLE C B M UNSHACKLE
CIRCUS V TAFFEY 2 WHEN READY LAUNCH FOLLOWING SEARCH
MIND SEA DISTANCE SHACKLE Y X
UNSHACKLE MILES FROM PENNION ISLAND
USE SHACKLE G V T UNSHACKLE SHACKLE
P UNSHACKLE VF X FRIENDLY PT'S ARE
IN THIS AREA CLEAR AREA BY SHACKLE
B S X UNSHACKLE X MAINTAIN CONTACT
HALIFAX ON SHACKLE C S V D UNSHACKLE
KILOCYCLES OVER

14 (UNDETERMINED WHETHER CIRCUS ACKNOWLEDGED OR NOT)
22 MERCURY 2 V TAFFEY 2 STANDBY EXECUTE CORPEN SHACKLE S
G W L UNSHACKLE RUTHLESS AND GALLEY
ACKNOWLEDGE OVER

V GALLEY WILCO OUT
V RUTHLESS WILCO OUT
29 MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT C SR GEORGIA
FIGLELF ACKNOWLEDGE OVER

V GEORGIA WILCO OUT
V FIGLELF WILCO OUT
35 NEBRASKA V TAFFEY 3 ROGER OUT
45 MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 SET CONDITION 3 AT DESCRETION FIDO
AND OVERTURE ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
ANTI AIRCRAFT BURST BEARING 300 OVER
ROGER OUT

50 TAFFEY 3 V OVERTURE EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT SHACKLE B U E
V TAFFEY UNSHACKLE TURN FIDO NEBRASKA
MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 ACKNOWLEDGE OVER

V FIDO WILCO OUT
V NEBRASKA WILCO OUT
51 MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 STANDBY TO LAUNCH ALL PLANES ENEMY
FLEET 15 MILES ASTERN
54 V TAFFEY 3 START ALL ENGINES
V TAFFEY 3 ALL CARRIERS LAUNCH AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE
55 V FIDO WILCO OUT

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ENCLOSURE (F)

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By NARA Date 4/19/05

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Philippine Operation, Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES OCT. OP: MARTIN

	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	CAUTION ALL PILOTS TO IDENTIFY ALL SHIPS BEFORE ATTACKING DERBY DEXTER ACKNOWLEDGE
2156	V DEXTER	WILCO OUT
	V FIDO	WILCO OUT
	V TAFFEY 3	WE ARE UNDER FIRE OF ENEMY FLEET
58	V TAFFEY 3	ALL CARRIERS FULL SPEED AHEAD
2200	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	SHIPS ZIGZAG 15 DEGREES
	V TAFFEY 3	COME RIGHT TO 070
	V TAFFEY 3	LAKE SMOKE SCREEN EASTERN OF US
01	DERBY 1 V TAFFEY 1	COME IN PLEASE
	V DERBY	COME IN PLEASE
02	TAFFEY 33 V TAFFEY 3	LAY SMOKE SCREEN EASTERN OF US
	TAFFEY 33 V DREADNAUGHT	DO YOU WANT US TO COME BACK AND HELP ON THIS SCREEN OVER
	V TAFFEY 33	??????
03	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	CUT ACROSS
05	V TAFFEY 3	ALL CARRIERS LAUNCH ALL AIRCRAFT OVER
09	ALL SHIPS THIS COMMAND	COME TO COURSE SHACKLE J SIGNAL OUT OUT)
	V DERBY	WILCO OUT
	V TAFFEY 33	I AM REVERSING COURSE
10	ALL SHIPS	THE COURSE IS B K
12	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	NEW COURSE SHACKLE W E UNSHACKLE CATNIP ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
13	V CATNIP	WILCO OUT
	TAFFEY 3 V DEXTER	SAY COURSE GAIN OVER
	CATNIP V DEXTER	WILL YOU GIVE ME THE LATEST COURSE OVER
	DIXTER V CATNIP	THE LATEST COURSE SHACKLE B J K UNSHACKLE OVER
14	V DEXTER	ROGER OUT
18	ALL CARRIERS	REPORT IF LAUNCHED ALL PLANES
	V TAFFEY 3	DEXTER HAVE YOU LAUNCHED ALL PLANES
19	V DEXTER	HAVE LAUNCHED PLANES IN CONDITION
	V TAFFEY 3	11
	V TAFFEY 3	GEORGE HAVE YOU LAUNCHED ALL PLANES OVER
	V TAFFEY 3	COME IN GEORGE
20	TAFFEY 3 V GEORGE	ONE TO GO

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Enclosure (F) to U.S.S. ALERMAN (DD532) Action Report -
 Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, ES
 October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GCT. OP: MARTIN

2221	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	MY COURSE SHACKLE B U 3 UNSHACKLE
	TAFFEY 3 V CATNIP	DIRECT AND TIDO ACKNOWLEDGE
22	TAFFEY 3 V TIDO	WE HAVE 3 FISH WHICH WE ARE PRE-
	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	PARING TO LAUNCH OVER
	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	WHAT IS YOUR COURSE OVER
		TURN SHACKLE Y I B UNSHACKLE EXECUTE
		ON RECEIPT OVER
25		EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT TURN 9 DERBY
	V FAMOUS	AND DEXTER ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
	V DEXTER	WILCO OUT
28	V DERBY	WILCO OUT
	MERCURY 33 V TAFFEY 33	WILCO OUT
		FORM ON ME SHACKLE A UNSHACKLE
30	TAFFEY 3 V	FROM CENTER
		PLEASE REPEAT YOUR LAST TRANSMIS-
	UNKNOWN STATION V TAFFEY 3	SION OVER
		TURN NINE OVER
31	V DERBY	WILCO OUT
	V TAFFEY 33	UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED WILL
		FORM 1000 YARDS BEARING 300 YARDS
		FROM YOU OVER
	TAFFEY 33 V DREADNAUGHT	DO YOU WANT US TO FORM COLUMN OVER
	V TAFFEY 33	THAT IS CORRECT FORM COLUMN ON ME
		OVER
33	V DREADNAUGHT	WILCO OUT
	FIGHTER V TAFFEY 3	I BEAR SHACKLE C A K UNSHACKLE
		FROM CENTER OVER
34	V FIGHTER	WILCO OUT
	TAFFEY 2 V GALLEY	I HAVE 4 FISH LOADED WITH TORPEDOES
		AND FIGHTERS READY TO GO WHEN
		DIRECTED OVER
35	V TAFFEY 2	ROGER OUT
	CATNIP V DERBY	I WILL LAUNCH ONE FISH WITH A FISH
		IN IT IN ABOUT A MINUTE OVER
36	V CATNIP	ROGER OUT
38	TAFFEY 3 V BRASSLOCK	HAS CONTACT REPORT BEEN MADE OVER
39	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	OPEN UP ON YOUR PER-SHOOTERS ON
		YOUR STERN OVER
	TAFFEY 33 V TAFFEY 3	DELIVER FISH ATTACK OVER
	TAFFEY 33 V TAFFEY 3	DELIVER TORPEDO ATTACK OVER
40	TAFFEY 33	WILCO OUT

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Enclosure (F) to U.S.S. NEBRASKA (DD532) Action Report -
Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GCT. OP: MARTIN

	V TAFFEY 33	BRASSLOCK AND NEBRASKA
2240	TAFFEY 33 V JUGGERNAUT	LINE UP AND LETS GO.
		DO YOU WANT THE LITTLE FELLOWS
		WITH YOU OVER
41	V TAFFEY 33	SMALL BOYS FORM FOR SECOND ATTACK
		OVER
42	SMALL BOYS	ARE YOU LISTEN NOW P T
	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 33	ALL GREAT D N E S STANDBY OPEN UP
		TRAIN YOUR GUNS WHEN RANGE IS CLEAR
		GEORGIA ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
43	V GEORGIA	WILCO OUT
	V TAFFEY 33	ARE YOUR TORPEDOES READY OVER
	V OVERTURE	AFFIRMATIVE
50	V TAFFEY 3	ALL SMALL BOYS GO IN AND LAUNCH A
		FISH ATTACK
53	V TAFFEY 3	ALL CARRIERS MAKE SMOKE OVER
	V DREADNAUGHT	TORPEDOES READY
54	V NEBRASKA	MY FISH ARE OFF
55	NEBRASKA V DREADNAUGHT	ROBIN
56	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT TURN
		SHACKLE G X UNSHACKLE OUT
	FIDO V TAFFEY 3	ARE YOU HIT OVER
58	V FIDO	NEGATIVE
59	TAFFEY 3 V JUGGERNAUT	FISH HEADED FOR GREAT D NE OUT
2300	TAFFEY 33 V DREADNAUGHT	MY EXERCISE IS COMPLETED OVER
	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT
		SHACKLE N P T UNSHACKLE OUT
13	UNKNOWN STATION V TAFFEY 33	REPEAT OVER
14	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT SHACKLE
		G K R UNSHACKLE TURN DREADNAUGHT
		ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
2514	T.O.L.E.	
17	DERBY 3 V CATNIP	?????
	FIDO V TAFFEY 3	HAVE YOU BEEN HIT OVER
18	V FIDO	NEGATIVE
20	V TAFFEY 3	GOOD GOING HARD
24	TAFFEY 3 V CATNIP	I HAVE BEEN HIT HAVE LOST ONE
		ENGINE OVER
24	V TAFFEY 3	ROGER OUT
	V TAFFEY 3	SMALL BOYS ON MY STARBOARD QUARTER
25		INTERCEPT ENEMY CRUISER COMING IN
		ON MY PORT QUARTER OVER
	SMALL BOYS V TAFFEY 3	INTERCEPT ENEMY HEAVY CRUISER
		COMING IN ON BENDIX 3 PORT QUARTER
26		EXPEDITE OVER

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

FBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GCT. OP: MARTIN

27 DERBY V GEORGIA THINK WE SHOULD COME RIGHT TO
PREVENT TARGET OVER
TAFFEY 3 V MONGREL WE HAVE NO FISH LEFT OVER
V TAFFEY 3 STAY ON STATION AND CONTINUE
SMOKING OVER
TAFFEY 3 V FIGLEAF WE HAVE NO FISH LEFT OVER
30 V TAFFEY ROGER OUT
V DREADNAUGHT I HAVE SHACKLE B UNSHACKLE
REMAINING OVER
MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT TURN
SHACKLE C P B UNSHACKLE OUT
SMALL BOYS ON MY STBOARD QUARTER INTERPOSE WITH SMOKE
BETWEEN ME AND ENEMY CRUISER FROM
TAFFEY 3
V MONGREL WILCO OUT
V OVERTURE WILCO OUT
V FIGLEAF WILCO OUT
33 V JUGGERNAUGHT WILCO OUT
44 TAFFEY 3 V DERBY THERE ARE 8 SHIPS CLOSING ON MY
STBOARD QUARTER OVER
44 MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT
SHACKLE Y W E UNSHACKLE TURN
DERBY ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
45 V DERBY WILCO OUT
47 MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT TURN
SHACKLE G H B UNSHACKLE C TNP
ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
48 CATNIP V TAFFEY 3 ARE YOU STAYING WITH US OVER
50 MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT TURN
SHACKLE N C K UNSHACKLE TAFFEY 3
OUT
MERCURY 33 V TAFFEY 3 HAVE YOU ANY TORPEDOES LEFT OVER
52 V DREADNAUGHT NEGATIVE
TAFFEY 3 V GEORGIA CRUISER ON MY STBOARD QUARTER
54 V TAFFEY 3 ROGER
TAFFEY 3 V (UNKNOWN) I BELIEVE THE SHIPS ON THE QUARTER
AND DD'S IF YOU HAVE ANY FIGHTERS
BELIEVE THEY COULD HELP BY STRIFF-
ING
55 V (UNKNOWN) THERE ARE DD'S ALSO A CRUISER OVER
TAFFEY 3 V MONGREL WE HAVE BEEN HIT BELOW THE WATER
LINE ASTERN OVER
2400

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

PBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GGT. OP: MARTIN

25 OCTOBER 1944

0000 MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT SHACKLE
G N K UNSHACKLE TAFFEY 3 OUT
V DREADNAUGHT HAS CONTACT REPORT BEEN MADE OVER
TAFFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT REPEAT PLEASE
01 V TAFFEY 3 ROGER OUT
02 MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 NEW COURSE SHACKLE G N K UNSHACKLE
OUT
03 TAFFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT PLEASE REPEAT YOUR LAST TRANSMISSION
OVER
V TAFFEY 3 THE LAST SIGNAL EXECUTED WAS CORPEN
SHACKLE G N K UNSHACKLE OVER
04 V DREADNAUGHT ROGER OUT
08 MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT TURN
SHACKLE G N K UNSHACKLE FROM TAFFEY
3 OUT
17 MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT SHACKLE
N G E UNSHACKLE TURN FROM TAFFEY 3
OUT
TAFFEY 3 SMALL BOYS TWO SMALL BOYS GET ON PORT BOW OF
FORMATION AND MAKE SMOKE OUT
V OVERTURE ROGER OUT
19 V FIGLEAF WILCO OUT
GEORGIA V TAFFEY 3 OKAY (INTERROGATORY)
20 DERBY V TAFFEY 3 OKAY (INTERROGATORY) OVER
21 TAFFEY 3 V DERBY AFFIRMATIVE I AM OKAY OUT
GEORGIA V TAFFEY 3 OVER
22 DEXTER V TAFFEY 3 OVER OKAY (INTERROGATORY)
CATNIP V TAFFEY 3 OKAY (INTERROGATORY) OVER
V TAFFEY 23 SEE NO VALUE IN COMBAT PATROL HOW
23 ABOUT USIN THEM FOR STRAPPING OVER
FIDO V TAFFEY 3 ALL OKAY (INTERROGATORY)
24 V FIDO ALL OKAY OUT
25 CATNIP AND GEORGIA V TAFFEY OVER
BRASSLOCK V TAFFEY 3 OKAY (INTERROGATORY) OVER
26 V TAFFEY 3 LOOK OUT FOR ASTERN OVER
MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 OUR PRESENT COURSE G N E GEORGIA
ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
28 V DEXTER ROGER OUT
29 FIGLEAF----- STANLEY SHIP HIT ON OUR STARBOARD
QUARTER OVER

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GCT. OP: MARTIN

TAFFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT DO YOU STILL WANT US ON THE PORT
BOW OVER
V TAFFLEY NEGATIVE
TAFFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT ROGER OUT
MERCURY 3 V TAFFLEY 3 EXECUTE SPEED Q D DEXTER AND FIGLEF
ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
0030 V DEXTER WILCO OUT
V FIGLEF WILCO OUT
MERCURY 3 V TAFFLEY 3 CHARLIE FORM S R EXECUTE BRASSLOCK
DREADNAUGHT ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
31 V DREADNAUGHT ROGER OUT
TAFFEY 33 V OVERTURE DO YOU WISH US TO TAKE OUR REGULAR
ASSIGNED STATION OVER
33 I HAVE ONE FISH READY TO GO ON
CATAPULT WITH FISH OVER
34 MERCURY 3 V TAFFLEY 3 SPEED ITEM BLE EXECUTE DERBY
FIGLEF ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
WILCO OUT
TAFFEY 33 V DREADNAUGHT OVER
MERCURY 33 V DREADNAUGHT TAKE THE NEAREST STATION YOU CAN
WE WILL EMULIZE THE SPACING MONGREL
ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
38 V MONGREL WILCO OUT
TAFFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT DO YOU WANT DAMAGE REPORTS FROM
40 SMALL BOYS ON THIS CIRCUIT OVER
MERCURY 3 V TAFFLEY 3 EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT TURN SHACKLE
N Y E UNSLCKLE FIGLEF DERBY
ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
V FIGLEF WILCO OUT
44 V DERBY WILCO OUT
46 MERCURY 3 V TAFFLEY 3 EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT SHACKLE I J K
UNSLCKLE TURN DERBY BRASSLOCK
ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
V DREADNAUGHT I DONT THINK BRASSLOCK HAS THIS
CIRCUIT ANY MORE OUT
47 V DERBY WILCO OUT
MERCURY 3 V TAFFLEY 3 SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT SPEED
ITEM DOG DEXTER JUG ERHAUT
49 ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
V DREADNAUGHT WILCO OUT
50 V DEXTER WILCO OUT

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

0051 ALL GREAT DINES

51 V FIDO

52 V TUFFLY 3
V (UNKNOWN)53 TUFFLY 3 V DERBY
DERBY V TUFFLY 354 V DERBY
TUFFLY 3 V DEXTER55 DERBY V TUFFLY 3
DERBY V TUFFLY 3
(CALLS GARBLD)
ALL GREAT DINES56 V DEXTER
TUFFLY 3 V OVERTURE

57 V TUFFLY

TUFFLY 3 V DREADNAUGHT

TUFFLY 3 V DREADNAUGHT

58 V TUFFLY 3
TUFFLY 3 FIDO

DREADNAUGHT V TUFFLY 3

59 V DREADNAUGHT
DREADNAUGHT V TUFFLY 3
V DREADNAUGHT

0100 V TUFFLY 3

REPORT IF YOU ARE ABLE TO PANCAKE
PLANES OVERWE WILL BE READY IN 4 FEW MINUTES
OVER

ROGER

READY AT ANY TIME OVER

READY TO PANCAKE AT ANYTIME OVER
REPEAT OVER

READY TO PANCAKE AT ANY TIME OVER

I HAVE SHACKLE H UNSHACKLE VT
PLANES ON DECK LOADED WITH FISH
WILL BE READY TO LAUNCH AT SHACKLE
Y K UNSHACKLE MINUTES OUT

WHERE ARE YOU GOING OVER

WHERE ARE YOU GOING OVER

CHARLIE FORMATION????????

GET INTO POSITION AS SOON AS

POSSIBLE WE WOULD LIKE TO PANCAKE
DEXTER ACKNOWLEDGE OVER

WILCO OUT

WILL YOU SAY AGAIN YOUR TRANSMIS-
ION CONCERNING FORMATION OVER

GET INTO POSITION AS SOON AS

POSSIBLE TO PANCAKE

WILCO AM CONTINUING WITH PREPARA-
TIONS -- I AM WELL FLOODED FORWARDAND MAKING KNOTS SHACKLE Y UN-
SHACKLE NOW OVERDID YOU RECEIVE MY LAST TRANSMIS-
SION OVER

ROGER OUT

WE ARE TRYING TO GET INTO POSITION
AS QUICKLY AS WE CAN OVERWHAT IS YOUR BEARING AND DISTANCE
FROM US OVER

I AM IN THE SCREEN WAIT

DO YOU REQUIRE ASSISTANCE OVER

THE ONLY THING I WANT TO KNOW IS
IF IT IS SAFE TO SLOW DOWN TO WORKON MY BULKHEADS -- THEY ARE ABOUT
TO GIVE BECAUSE I WAS MAKING A LOT
OF SPEED OVER

AFFIRMATIVE OVER

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

	V DREADNAUGHT	WILCO WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING AIRMO SHACKLE G B K UNSHACKLE IF NECESSARY WE CAN SPEED UP AND KEEP UP WITH YOU FOR A WHILE OVER
	V TAFFEY 3	ROGER OUT
0102	TAFFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT	MY SPEED SHACKLE K E UNSHACKLE OVER
	V TAFFEY 3	ROGER OUT
	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	ALL GRE T DAVES PREPARE FOR OPERATIONS TO SLING SHOT AND PAN- CAKE DEXTER SLINGSHOT ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
	V DEXTER	I AM PREPARING TO SLINGSHOT OUT
	V DERBY	I HAVE ONE FISH READY TO LAUNCH
03		DO YOU DESIRE TO LAUNCH HIM OVER TO LAUNCH HIM OVER
	DEXTER V TAFFEY 3	AFFIRMATIVE AND RENDEZVOUS WITH DEXTER OVER
04	V FIDO	ROGER OUT
	TAFFEY 3 V FIDO	I HAVE 2 FISH READY TO GO WITH FISH DO YOU DESIRE I LAUNCH THEM OVER
	V TAFFEY 3	AFFIRMATIVE RENDEZVOUS WITH DEXTER OVER
05	V FIDO	ROGER OUT
06	TAFFEY 3 V MONGREL	MESSAGE FOR YOU OVER
07	TAFFEY 3 V MONGREL	MESSAGE FOR YOU OVER
	V TAFFEY 3	SEND YOUR MESSAGE OVER
08	TAFFEY 3 V MONGREL	URGENT M DICAL AND WE HAVE TWO KILLED AND EIGHT SEVERELY WOUNDED ARE PREPARING REPORT ON DAMAGE AND WILL SUBMIT AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME OVER
09	V TAFFEY 3	ROGER OUT
	TAFFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT	I AM GOING TO UNLOAD A HOT GUN -- THE DAMAGED ONE ON A SAFE BEARING
	V TAFFEY 3	AFFIRMATIVE OUT
20	TAFFEY 3 V FIDO	FOX IS DOWN ALL FISH LAUNCHED OVER
	V TAFFEY 3	ROGER OUT
30	GEORGIA V TAFFEY 3	MIKE CORPEN SHACKLE Y F D UNSHACKLE OVER
34	MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3	SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT SHACKLE K I E UNSHACKLE TURN DERBY AND GEORGE ACKNOWLEDGE

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GOT. OP: MARTIN

0135 TAFFY 3 GREAT DAILS V TAFFY 3 LOAD ALL AVAILABLE WITH
TOMPODGE TO THE EMILY DERBY
ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
45 RIDO V TAFFY 3 HOW BAD ARE YOU HIT OVER
46 DERBY V TAFFY 3 AFFIRMATIVE OVER
48 (UNKNOWN) V TAFFY 3 HAVE YOUR BOYS STAND BY STRICKEN
CARRIER OVER
53 DERBY V TAFFY 3 TOM BADLY DAMAGED ARE YOU
55 DERBY V TAFFY 3 COME IN PLEASE OVER
57 V TAFFY 3 ALL GREAT DAILS COME INTO THE WIND
OUT
0207 MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3 SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT TURN
SHACKLE I J B UNSHACKLE OUT
09 MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3 SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT SPEED
SHACKLE Y Q UNSHACKLE FROM TAFFY
OUT
11 V TAFFY 3 ALL SMALL BOYS STAND BY DERBY FROM
TAFFY 3 OUT
TAFFY 3 V OVERTURE IS DERBY OUR FRIEND IN TROUBLE OVER
12 V TAFFY 3 AUTHENTICATE OVER
13 OVERTURE V TAFFY 3 WERE YOU CALLING ME OVER
14 V OVERTURE REPEAT OVER
16 TAFFY 3 V OVERTURE ASSUME DERBY IS OUR FRIEND
OVER
V TAFFY AFFIRMATIVE OVER
17 V OVERTURE THANK YOU OUT
18 MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3 LOOK OUT FOR FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT
WHICH MAY BE OVERHEARD SHORTLY OUT
LAUNCH TWO VE FOR ??????
20 V TAFFY 3 ROGER OUT
21 V TAFFY 3 WATCH FOR DIVE BOMBER
30 MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3 SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT SHACKLE
Y F R UNSHACKLE TURN FROM TAFFY 3
OUT
33 MERCURY 3 V TAFFY 3 EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT SHACKLE J N H
UNSHACKLE TURN FROM TAFFY 3
ACKNOWLEDGE
39 V TAFFY 3 CANCEL SIGNAL NOW FLYING
42 V TAFFY 3 PREPARE TO PICK UP THIS IS TAFFY
3 OUT

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TES LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES OCT. OF: MARTIN

0510 MERCURY 3 V TAFFEY 3 I AM EXPECTING SMALL BOYS TO COME
AND JOHN DE DEXTER ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
ROGER OUT
V DEXTER
TAFFEY 3 V DEXTER THAT WE THAT WAS LAUNCHED WITH
FISH HAVE COMPLETED MISSION AND
I HAVE ADVISED THEM TO ORBIT 3 SE
OVER
13 V TAFFEY 3 ROGER OUT
TAFFEY 3 V FIGLETT WE ARE UNLOADING ONE OF OUR GUNS
THROUGH THE MUZZLE OUT
14 TAFFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT WHO ARE YOUR SMALL BOYS OVER
15 TAFFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT I HAVE NO SMALL BOYS WITH ME
V TAFFEY 3 WHY ARE YOU FLYING OVER
FIGLETT V DREADNAUGHT WERE YOU UNLOADING OVER
V DREADNAUGHT YES THROUGH THE MUZZLE OVER
16 V FIGLETT DID YOU JUST PUT OUT SOME
21 TAFFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT INFORMATION ABOUT ENEMY FORCE OVER
TAFFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT OVER
22 MERCURY 3 V DREADNAUGHT DID ANYONE HEAR TAFFEY 3 OVER
0410 MERCURY 33 V DREADNAUGHT REPORT TO ME BY VISUAL WHEN YOU
HAVE FINISHED PRESENT OPERATION
TAKE US OUT NOW IS TO HOW MUCH
LONGER IT WILL TAKE YOU OVER
V FIGLETT ROGER OUT
11 DREADNAUGHT V OVERTURE REFERENCE YOUR LAST MESSAGE ABOUT
10 MINUTES
V DREADNAUGHT ROGER OUT
16 OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT HOW MUCH LONGER WILL IT TAKE YOU
OVER
MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT HOW MUCH LONGER WILL IT TAKE YOU
OVER
DREADNAUGHT V MONGREL ABOUT 20 MINUTES
V DREADNAUGHT ROGER OUT
18 OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT HOW MUCH LONGER WILL IT TAKE
YOU OVER
DREADNAUGHT V OVERTURE ABOUT 10 MINUTES OVER
19 V DREADNAUGHT ROGER OUT
FIGLETT V DREADNAUGHT HOW MUCH LONGER
20 V FIGLETT ABOUT 30 MINUTES OUT
22 DREADNAUGHT V MONGREL THERE ARE STILL SOME MEN HELD
OF US CAN YOU ASSIST OVER

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES OCT. OF: MARTIN

0423 MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT WE WILL OUT
44 TERRY 3 V DREADNAUGHT I HAVE UNIDENTIFIED SURFACE CON-
TACT BEARING SHACKLE B D UN-
SHACKLE DISTANCE SHACKLE Y M
UNSHACKLE EARS TO BE DEAD IN
WATER OVER
45 TERRY 3 V DREADNAUGHT LISTING OVER
55 DREADNAUGHT V OVERTURE REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS I HAVE NOT
FOUND ANYMORE OVER
OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT MAKE SOME MORE TURNS THROUGH
THE AREA AND LOOK SOME MORE
56 MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT ARE YOU READY YET OVER
V MONGREL WE ARE READY TO GET UNDER WAY
57 V DREADNAUGHT RO IN
FIGLE F V DREADNAUGHT ARE YOU READY OVER
59 FIGLE F V DREADNAUGHT ARE YOU READY OVER
V FIGLE F AFFIRMATIVE OUT
MERCURY 35 V DREADNAUGHT WE ARE STARTING NOW ON PRESENT
COURSE TAKE NEAREST STATIONS
V MERCURY 35 ROGER OUT
V DREADNAUGHT SPEED SHACKLE B D UNSHACKLE
MONGREL NO LONGER OVER
59 V MONGREL WILCO OUT
MERCURY 35 V DREADNAUGHT FORM SCOUTING LINE ON DREAD-
NAUGHT SPEED SHACKLE B D UN-
SHACKLE OUT
0500 V FIGLE F WILCO OUT
07 MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT IF YOU CAN SENIOR TAKE CHARGE
GO BACK TO AREA AND SEARCH AGAIN
I HAVE TO STAY RIGHT HERE WHERE
I AM OVER
V MONGREL WILCO OUT
FIGLE F OVERTURE V MONGREL EXECUTE TO FOLLOW EXECUTE
ON RECEIPT FORM 18 FIGLE F OVER-
TURE ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
10 V MONGREL MY SPEED SHACKLE D UNSHACKLE OUT
11 MERCURY 35 AND FIGLE F REPORT AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION AND
DISTANCE BRIEFLY BY LIGHT
19 FIGLE F AND OVERTURE V MONGREL FIGLE F TAKE GUIDE OVER-
TURE FIELD IN REAR -- TAKE INTER-
VAL SHACKLE Y M B UNSHACKLE

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ENCLOSURE (F)

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Enclosure (F) to U.S.S. HERRMAN (DD532) Action Report -
Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. 11 TIMES GCT. OP: MARTIN

0520 MERCURY 3 V DREADNAUGHT COURSE SHACKLE Y Z E UNSHACKLE
SPEED SHACKLE I R UNSHACKLE
MONGREL ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
WILCO OUT
V MONGREL
OVERTURE V MONGREL WE HAVE SUSTAINED QUITE A BIT
OF DAMAGE WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE
WE ARE - OUR DRT OUT DO YOU
HAVE PRESENT PLOT OVER
30 MONGREL V OVERTURE WE HAVE PLOT WHICH WE WILL SEND
YOU I AM TAKING PLOT 1
DREADNAUGHT V MONGREL I HAVE A QUITE SOME DAMAGE TO
OUR NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT AND
UNABLE TO PLOT PROPER COURSE
SUGGEST YOU TAKE CHARGE AND
CARRY US THROUGH
V DREADNAUGHT WILL DO IT AS LONG AS I CAN -
I HAVE BEEN HAVING TROUBLE
35 MONGREL V OVERTURE POSITION SHACKLE I D B UN-
SHACKLE SHACKLE Y N O G N
UNSHACKLE
MERCURY 33 V DREADNAUGHT USE VISUAL WHENEVER YOU CAN
OVERTURE V MONGREL TROCK OUT
MERCURY 33 V DREADNAUGHT DO NOT ORIENT GOING TO THE
AREA AGAIN JUST GO INTO SURVIVORS
AREA AND A SHARP LOOKOUT
MONGREL ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
40 OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT CALL A TURN TO THE FUR END OF
THE SURVIVORS AREA AND SEE IF
CAN SEE ANYTHING WE ARE TRYING
TO TURN
V OVERTURE WILCO OUT
FIGHTER V DREADNAUGHT YOU ARE AT LIBERTY TO DO THE SAME
56 V FIGHTER WILCO OUT
57 TAFFY 3 V DREADNAUGHT COME IN PLEASE
58 TAFFY 3 V DREADNAUGHT MESSAGE FOR YOU OVER
DREADNAUGHT V OVERTURE PLEASES OVER HEAD ARE THINKING OF
ATTACKING OVER
0600 OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT SAY AGAIN
DREADNAUGHT V OVERTURE FRIENDLY PLANES THING OF ATTACK-
ING
MERCURY 33 V DREADNAUGHT BOJANGLES

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ENCLOSURE (F)

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Enclosure (F) to U.S.S. HERRMAN (DD532) Action Report -
Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GMT. OP: MARTIN

MERCURY 33 V DREADNAUGHT THE PHONES ARE FRIENDLY CALL
THEM AND TELL THEM WE ARE
FRIENDLY AND IDENTIFY YOURSELF
0600 DREADNAUGHT V OVERTURE QUOTE THEY ARE GIVING PROPER
IDENTIFICATION TO LAY OFF
DREADNAUGHT V OVERTURE WE HAVE ALSO EXCHANGED MESSAGE
WITH PHONES OVER HEAD
18 V DREADNAUGHT WILCO OUT
OVERTURE V MONGREL DO YOU SEE THOSE PEOPLE IN WATER
ON YOUR PORT SIDE
V MONGREL WAIT OUT
24 MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT WHOEVER SAW THEM RESCUE THEM NOW
DREADNAUGHT V MONGREL AFFIRMATIVE
25 OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT DO YOU NEED MY HELP IN RESCUING
THEM OVER
DREADNAUGHT V OVERTURE NEGATIVE
26 V DREADNAUGHT ROGER OUT
MERCURY 33 V DREADNAUGHT SPEED SHACKLE Y I UNSHACKLE
ENGINE WHEN UNDERSTOOD FIGHTER
AND MONGREL ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
V FIGHTER WILCO OUT
V OVERTURE WE SEE SOME SURVIVORS DEAD HEAD
OF US AND ARE PROCEEDING TO PICK
THEM UP
MERCURY 33 V DREADNAUGHT MAKE SPEED SHACKLE C H UNSHACKLE
FIGHTER ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
30 V FIGHTER WILCO OUT
OVERTURE V MONGREL ASSURE YOU SEE THOSE MEN AND ARE
PICKING THEM UP
MERCURY 33 V DREADNAUGHT USE ALL POSSIBLE SPEED IN RE-
COVERY WE HAVE A CONT. OF REPORT
AND MUST USE ALL OF OUR SPEED
OVER
35 V FIGHTER WILCO OUT
MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT WOULD IT HELP ANY IF FIGHTER
ASSISTED YOU OVER
37 V MONGREL OUT
MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT WHAT SPEED CAN YOU MAKE WHEN WE
START SHACKLE IF PLEASE OVER
V MONGREL BELIEVE WE CAN MAKE SHACKLE Y H
UNSHACKLE OVER

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ENCLOSURE (F)

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
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Enclosure (F) to U.S.S. BRAWLEY (DD532) Action Report -
Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TLS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GOT. OP: MARTIN

0923 V OVERTURE ILCO OUT
OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT WE STILL CAN HEAR YOU OUT
35 V OVERTURE WE HEAR YOU 5 BY 5 OUT
UNKNOWN STATION V DREADNAUGHT I HEAR YOU VERY FAINTLY
37 COME AGAIN PLEASE OVER
39 TAFFLY 3 V DREADNAUGHT OVER
KONGREL V DREADNAUGHT I SEE A LIGHT ON YOU PUT IT OUT
PLEASE OVER
V DREADNAUGHT YOUR LIGHT IS BY THE FORWARD
MOUNT
40 V KONGREL NO ER THANK YOU AND OUT
OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT REQUEST THAT YOU CALL TAFFLY
3 OCCASIONALLY AND LET ME KNOW
WHEN YOU GET HIM OVER
V OVERTURE I WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO CON-
TACT TAFFLY 3 WHEN I DO I WILL
CALL YOU OVER
44 V DREADNAUGHT THANK YOU OUT
45 DREADNAUGHT V KONGREL TAFFLY 3 IS CALLING YOU ON THIS
CIRCUIT OVER
V DREADNAUGHT GO AHEAD AND TALK TO TAFFLY 3
AND I STILL SEE THE LIGHT PUT
IT OUT OVER
V KONGREL THE LIGHT YOU SEE IS THE REPAIR
PARTY ----DO YOU WISH ME TO DIS-
CONTINUE OVER
V DREADNAUGHT IF IT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP THE
LIGHT ON IN ORDER TO KEEP ALOCAT
AND KEEP YOUR SPEED I SUGGEST
YOU SHUT IT OFF OTHERWISE PUT IT
OUT
46 TAFFLY 3 V KONGREL WE WILL RELAY YOUR MESSAGE TO
DREADNAUGHT OVER
TAFFLY 3 V DREADNAUGHT I HEAR YOU 2 BY 2 PLEASE SAY
YOUR MESSAGE VERY SLOWLY AND I
SHOULD GET IT OVER
47 TAFFLY 3 V DREADNAUGHT WE HEAR YOU 2 BY 2 SAY YOUR
MESSAGE SLOWLY PLEASE OVER
48 OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT RELAY MY LAST MESSAGE TO TAFFLY
3 SLOWLY PLEASE OVER
V DREADNAUGHT GO AHEAD AND SEND YOUR MESSAGE
I WILL KEEP OFF THE AIR THIS TIME

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Philippine Operation; Little East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TES LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GMT. OF: MARTIN

0948 MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT GAIL TAFFY 3 AGAIN OVER
49 V MONGREL TAFFY 3 SAYS BOJANGLES OVER
MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT WE'RE TRYING TO COLFLY DO YOU
50 KNOW IF WE ARE SUCCEEDING OVER
51 DREADNAUGHT V MONGREL DO NOT GET YOUR BOJANGLES
DO YOU GET OURS OVER
V DREADNAUGHT WAIT OVER
OVERTURE FIGLE F V DREADNAUGHT BOJANGLES OVER
V OVERTURE WILCO OUT
52 V FIGLE F WILCO OUT
DREADNAUGHT V OVERTURE I HAVE BOJANGLES DO GET ME OVER
DREADNAUGHT V OVERTURE I HAVE BOJANGLES DO YOU GET ME
OVER
V DREADNAUGHT I WILL SHACKLE IT AND PUT IT OUT
53 WE HAVE BOJANGLES ON SOME OIL OUT
54 UNKNOWN STATION V DREADNAUGHT I SEE YOU BEARING SHACKLE
3 J K UNSHACKLE DISTANCE SHACKLE
Y D UNSHACKLES OVER
OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT AND YOU THE UNKNOWN STATION OVER
V OVERTURE I DO NOT HAVE TAFFY 3 YET WHERE
YOU CALLING ME OVER
55 OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT I WAS CALLING YOU TAFFY 3 WANTED
US TO ALL BOJANGLES
OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT YOU WERE UNKNOWN STATION UNLESS
YOU WERE NOT IN THE VICINITY I
THOUGHT YOU WERE IN OVER
V OVERTURE HAVE NO CONTACT WITH MY FIGLE F
OVER
V DREADNAUGHT ROGER OUT
OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT DO YOU HAVE MY BOJANGLES OVER
V OVERTURE AFFIRMATIVE
58 V DREADNAUGHT THANK YOU OUT
V OVERTURE DID YOU RECEIVE MY L. T MESSAGE
OVER
FIGLE F V OVERTURE COME IN PLEASE OVER
V OVERTURE CALL TAFFY 3 ON THIS CIRCUIT
GIVE HIM SHACKLE DISTANCE AND
BEARING FROM HIM OVER
V FIGLE F WILCO OUT
59 FIGLE F V TAFFY 3 DO YOU RECEIVE ME OVER
TAFFY 3 V FIGLE F WE HEAR YOU 2 BY 2 OVER

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GCT. OP: MARTIN

0959	FIGLE F V TAFFY 3	I HAVE YOU LOUD AND CLEAR I
1000	TAFFY 3 V FIGLE F	HAVE MESSAGE FOR YOU WAIT OUT
		SEND YOUR MESSAGE OVER
01	FIGLE F V TAFFY 3	WAIT
02	UNKNOWN STATION V FIGLE F	I HAVE YOU BEARING SHACKLE
		I C R UNSHACKLE DISTANCE SHACKLE
		Y R UNSHACKLE BOJANGLES OVER
03	UNKNOWN STATION V FIGLE F	I HAVE YOU BEARING SHACKLE
		I C R UNSHACKLE DISTANCE SHACKLE
		Y R UNSHACKLE BOJANGLES OVER
	V TAFFY 3	---- V D UNSHACKLE REPEAT MY
		COURSE SHACKLE Y R E UNSHACKLE
		SPEED SHACKLE V D UNSHACKLE FROM
		TAFFY 3 OVER
	TAFFY 3 V FIGLE F	REPEAT YOUR LAST TRANSMISSION
		OVER
	V TAFFY 3	I SAY AGAIN MY COURSE SHACKLE
		Y R E UNSHACKLE SPEED SHACKLE
		V D UNSHACKLE OVER
04	TAFFY 3 V FIGLE F	ROGER OUT
	FIGLE F V TAFFY 3	INTERCATORY YOU ARE ON COURSE
		AND SPEED
	FIGLE F V OVERTURE	GIVE US THE DOPE AND POSITION
		FROM ME OVER
	FIGLE F V OVERTURE	COME IN PLEASE OVER
05	OVERTURE V FIGLE F	TAFFY 3 IS ON COURSE SHACKLE
		Y R E UNSHACKLE SPEED SHACKLE
		VICTOR DOG UNSHACKLE OVER
	DREDDAUGHT V FIGLE F	DID YOU GET THAT OVER
	FIGLE F V DREDDAUGHT	WE GOT HIS COURSE AND SPEED
		THAT IS ALL WE HAVE SO FAR OVER
	V DREDDAUGHT	WE RECEIVED TAFFY 3 COURSE AND
		SPEED WAS THERE ANYTHING ELSE
		OVER
06	FIGLE F V DREDDAUGHT	STANDEY TO WRITE AND RELAY MSG
		TO TAFFY 3 OVER
07	V FIGLE F	ALSO OUT
	FIGLE F V DREDDAUGHT	MY COURSE SHACKLE Y G B UN-
		SHACKLE SPEED SHACKLE VICTOR
		ROGER UNSHACKLE FROM THE MESSAGES
		WE HAVE INTERCEPTED BY BEARING

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Enclosure (1) to U.S.S. LEBRON (DD532) Action Report -
Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

YES LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES CST. OP: MARTIN

1007

TO YOU AND YOURS FROM LEBRON
BELIEVE TAPFEY 3 TO BE SHOCKLE
I V B UNSHOCKLE DISPLACE SHOCKLE
C T UNSTUCK FROM US OVER

09 OVERTURE V DREADNAUGHT
UNKNOWN STATION V DREADNAUGHT MONROE IS CALLING DREAD-

10

DREADNAUGHT V TAPFEY 33

NAUGHT PLEASE TELL IT ALL WE
HEARD WAS DREADNAUGHT OVER
PREPARE YOUR DECK FOR EMERGENCY
LANDING WE HAVE PLANES WITH LOW
GAS OVER

V TAPFEY 33

WILL YOU LET US KNOW WHEN YOU
ARE READY OVER

11

V DEXTER

WILCO AND OUT

12

DREADNAUGHT V CAPT OF THE MONGREL FROM INFORMATION RE-
CEIVED WE BELIEVE INTERCEPT COURSE
APPROXIMATELY SHOCKLE Y G M UN-
SHOCKLE OVER

V DREADNAUGHT

AS WE FIGURED WE COULD NOT INTER-
CEPT AT PRESENT SPEED OVER

13

V MONGREL

ROGER OUT

MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT

PLEASE RELAY MY INFORMATION
YOU HAVE THAT WE HAVEN'T RECEIVED
BECAUSE YOUR CIRCUIT IS BETTER
THAN MINE OVER

OVERTURE V TAPFEY 3

DO YOU HAVE MANY SURVIVORS ON
BOARD OVER

14

TAPFEY 3 V OVERTURE

COME IN PLEASE OVER

OVERTURE V TAPFEY 3

DO YOU RECEIVE ME OVER

15

V OVERTURE

I RECEIVE YOU 1 BY 1 OVER

TAPFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT

WE RECEIVE YOU 3 BY 3-OVERTURE
HE DESIRES TO KNOW THE NUMBER OF
CASUALTIES YOU HAVE PLEASE SEND
IT OUT OVER

16

TAPFEY 3 V FICHEL

WHICH COURSE OVER

19

FICHEL V TAPFEY 3

PROCEED TO PORT WHERE HALIFAX

TAPFEY 3 V FICHEL

AND CODLIVER HAVE BEEN OVER

V TAPFEY 3

REPEAT OVER

TAPFEY 3 V FICHEL

PROCEED TO PORT WHERE HALIFAX

AND CODLIVER HANG OUT OVER

20

ROGER OUT

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ENCLOSURE (F)

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GMT. OP: MARTIN

1027 V DEXTER WILCO OUT
DREADNAUGHT V MONGREL WE APPEAR UNABLE TO RAISE FIGLEAF
OR TAFFEY 3
STANDEY TO EXECUTE TURN SHACKLE
G 2 V UNSHACKLE ACKNOWLEDGE
28 MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT ROGER OUT
31 FIGLEAF V OVERTURE WHAT COURSE DO YOU RECOMMEND ON
THAT MESSAGE
FIGLEAF V OVERTURE THANK YOU WE WILL STAY ON PRESENT
COURSE FOR THE PRESENT MY COURSE
AGREES WITH YOURS OVER
32 V FIGLEAF WAIT
FIGLEAF OVERTURE TAFFEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT -- DREADNAUGHT
AND MONGREL ARE PROCEEDING TO
THE PORT WE WERE TO FUEL FROM
THE SECOND TIME OVER
V OVERTURE WILL RELAY
V DREADNAUGHT PLEASE ADD BECAUSE OF OUR
CONDITION OVER
33 TAFFEY 3 V OVERTURE COME IN PLEASE OVER
FIGLEAF V OVERTURE CAN YOU RELAY TAFFEY 3
OVERTURE V FIGLEAF AFFIRMATIVE
V OVERTURE WILL YOU RELAY DREADNAUGHTS
MESSAGE PLEASE OVER
34 V FIGLEAF WILCO OUT
35 TAFFEY 3 V FIGLEAF MESSAGE FOR YOU OVER
V TAFFEY 3 GO AHEAD
V FIGLEAF MESSAGE RELAYED FROM DREADNAUGHT
- DREADNAUGHT AND MONGREL ARE
PROCEEDING WHERE SCHEDULED TO
FUEL THE SECOND TIME OVER
36 V DREADNAUGHT THANK YOU FOR RELAYING THAT
MESSAGE PLEASE TELL TAFFEY 3 OUR
SPEED IS DUE TO CONDITION FOR-
WARD SHACKLE V R UNSHACKLE OVER
37 V FIGLEAF WILCO OUT
TAFFEY 3 V FIGLEAF DREADNAUGHT AND MONGREL ARE
LIMITED TO SHACKLE V R UNSHACKLE
OVER
FIGLEAF V TAFFEY 3 ROGER FOR YOUR MESSAGE OVER
38 V FIGLEAF OUT

-25-

ENCLOSURE (F)

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GMT. OP: MARTIN

1040 FIGLEAF V OVERTURE HAVE YOU CHECKED YOUR NAVIGATION
OVER
FIGLEAF V DREADNAUGHT PLEASE RELAY TO TAPPEY 3 THIS
PRELIMINARY COUNT TOTAL DEREY
SURVIVORS SHACKLE J X UNSHACKLE
THIS FROM HICKENNA OVER
FIGLEAF V DREADNAUGHT DID YOU RECEIVE MY RELAY TO
TAPPEY 3 OVER
V FIGLEAF REPORT PLEASE OVER
41 FIGLEAF V DREADNAUGHT THIS COUNT TOTAL DEREY SURVIVORS
ALL SHIPS SHACKLE J X UNSHACKLE
THIS FROM HICKENNA OVER
V FIGLEAF BOG R OUT
FIGLEAF V TAPPEY 3 I HAVE THE MESSAGE OVER
42 DREADNAUGHT V FIGLEAF TAPPEY 3 HAS YOUR MESSAGE OUT
FIGLEAF V OVERTURE DOES YOUR NAVIGATION CHECK WITH
TIME ON THIS COURSE OVER
V FIGLEAF AFFIRMATIVE OVER
43 V OVERTURE ROGER OUT
FIGLEAF V DREADNAUGHT BOJ NGLES OVER
V FIGLEAF WE ARE BOJ NGLES OVER
44 V DREADNAUGHT DO YOU SEE US OVER
DREADNAUGHT V FIGLEAF AFFIRMATIVE OVER
V DREADNAUGHT PLEASE SEND ME BEARING AND
DISTANCE OVER
45 DREADNAUGHT V FIGLEAF CORPEN SHACKLE Y J B UNSHACKLE
46 FIGLEAF V OVERTURE DO NOT UNDERSTAND OVER
OVERTURE V FIGLEAF CORPEN SHACKLE U J B UNSHACKLE
TO AVOID COLLISION OVER
V OVERTURE STANDBY TO EXECUTE COURSE
SUGGESTED OVER
47 V FIGLEAF WILCO OUT
FIGLEAF V OVERTURE EXECUTE SHACKLE I J B UNSHACKLE
TURN ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
V FIGLEAF TLOC OUT
MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT STANDBY TO EXECUTE 4 TURN OVER
V MONGREL DID YOU SAY 4 TURN
V DREADNAUGHT THIS IS CORRECT STANDBY EXECUTE
OVER
V MONGREL DID YOU SAY 4 TURN OVER
DREADNAUGHT V FIGLEAF WE HAVE YOU BEARING SHACKLE J B
UNSHACKLE DISTANCE Y J OVER

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Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TBS LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GST. OP: MARTIN

1047	FIGHTER V DREADNAUGHT	WE CHECK WITH YOU OUT
48	V OVERTURE	ROGER OUT
	MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT	STANDBY EXECUTE 4 TURN OVER
49	V MONGREL	WILCO OUT
	FIGHTER V OVERTURE	STANDBY TO EXECUTE SHACKLE E U K
	V FIGHTER	UNSHACKLE TURN ACKNOWLEDGE
50	FIGHTER V OVERTURE	WILCO OUT
	V FIGHTER	EXECUTE 36 CRUISE U K UN-
	OVER U.S. V DREADNAUGHT	SHACKLE TURN ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
	V OVERTURE	WILCO OUT
		I CAN NOT UNDERSTAND YOUR
		MOVEMENTS
		CAN NOT ENTER PORT IN NIGHT SO
		AM-----GOING OUT
51	V DREADNAUGHT	ROGER OUT
	FIGHTER V OVERTURE	NIGHT ORDERS FOLLOW TURN SHACKLE
		N O K UNSHACKLE TACKLINE J
		SHACKLE G C R UNSHACKLE ACKNOWLEDGE OVER
52	V FIGHTER	ROGER OUT
55	DREADNAUGHT V MONGREL	INTERROGATORY COURSE OVER
	DREADNAUGHT V MONGREL	(REPEATED ABOVE)
	V DREADNAUGHT	MIKE CORBIN SHACKLE K C R UN-
		SHACKLE OVER
56	V MONGREL	ROGER OUT
	V GOLDKEEPER	DID YOU CALL IN ABOUT 4 OR 5
		MINUTES AGO (WIK SIGNALS)
57	V (UNKNOWN)	IF LOST US
	MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT	DO YOU HAVE SUFFICIENT FUEL TO
		MAKE MY PROPOSED DISTILLATION OVER
58	V MONGREL	WAIT
	DREADNAUGHT V MONGREL	REFERENCE YOUR LAST TRANSMISSION
	V DREADNAUGHT	AFFIRMATIVE OVER
		WILL IT BE CLOSE- I E N DO YOU
		HAVE A SAFE MARGIN OVER
59	V MONGREL	WAIT
	DREADNAUGHT V MONGREL	WE DO HAVE A SAFE MARGIN WE HAVE
		SHACKLE O B UNSHACKLE PERCENT
		ABOARD OVER
1100	V DREADNAUGHT	ROGER OUT

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Philippine Operation, Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

THE LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GCT. OF: MARTIN

1102 MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT SELECTED TO FOLLOW COURSE SHACKLE
V N H UNSHACKLE OVER
V MONGREL WILCO OUT
03 MONGREL V DREADNAUGHT EXECUTE BY CORRESP SIGNAL OUT
V MONGREL MESSAGE FOLLOWS WE HAVE 60 PER-
CENT TOTAL CAPACITY OF FUEL
BELIEVE WE ALSO CAN MAKE A LITTLE
SPEED OVER
V DREADNAUGHT I DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN MAKE MORE
WE TRIED A LITTLE WHILE AND IT
DIDN'T WORK SO WELL OUT
V MONGREL POWER OUT
FIGLE F TAFLEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT --FIGLE F TAFLEY 3 RELAY
THIS MESSAGE TO TAFLEY 3 IF
NECESSARY OVER
FIGLE F TAFLEY 3 V DREADNAUGHT--QUOTE DO YOU APPROVE OF
MY PROSPECTIVE DESTINATION AS
GIVEN IN MY EARLIER TRANSMISSION
--MONGREL HAS SOUND GEAR DREAD-
NAUGHT DOES NOT SPEED IS LIMITED
BY FLOODING FORWARD JUST ENOUGH
FUEL TO MAKE PROPOSED DESTINATION
OVER
05 FIGLE F V DREADNAUGHT DID YOU RECEIVE MY MESSAGE OVER
V FIGLE F MY INTENTIVE WILL RELAY OUT
TAFLEY 3 V FIGLE F MESSAGE RELAYED FROM DREADNAUGHT
QUOTE DO YOU APPROVE OF MY PRO-
SPECTIVE DESTINATION AS GIVEN IN
EARLIER TRANSMISSION MONGREL
HAS SOUND GEAR DREADNAUGHT DOES
NOT SPEED IS LIMITED BY FLOOD-
ING FORWARD JUST ENOUGH FUEL TO
07 FIGLE F V DREADNAUGHT MAKE DESTINATION OVER
PLEASE CORRECT THAT TO PROPOSED
DESTINATION OVER
08 V FIGLE F WILCO OUT
TAFLEY 3 V FIGLE F CORRECTION ON MY LAST TRANSMISSION
LAST SENTENCE SHOULD READ JUST
ENOUGH FUEL TO MAKE PROPOSED
DESTINATION OVER

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U.S.S. HERMAN (DD532)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

WLC/hs

SECRET D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Enclosure (F) to U.S.S. HERMAN (DD532) Action Report -
Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

TES LOG, COMMENCING 24 OCTOBER 1944. ALL TIMES GCT. OF: MARTIN

1109 MEXICO 7 V TAFFY 3 YOUR BEARING AND DISTANCE I
BELIEVE ARE CORRECT OVER
V TAFFY ROGER OUT
FIGLEAF V DREADNAUGHT WILL YOU PLEASE GET AN ANSWER
FROM TAFFY 3 OVER
11 TAFFY 3 V FIGLEAF MESSAGE FOR YOU OVER
12 TAFFY 3 V FIGLEAF MESSAGE FOR YOU OVER
FIGLEAF V DREADNAUGHT IF YOU CAN NOT REACH TAFFY 3
SEND IT BLIND OR TRY TO REACH
MEXICO 7 PLEASE OVER
13 V FIGLEAF WILCO OUT
MEXICO 7 V FIGLEAF MESSAGE FOR YOU OVER
14 MEXICO 7 V FIGLEAF MESSAGE FOR YOU OVER
TAFFY 3 V FIGLEAF MESSAGE FOR YOU OVER
15 TAFFY 3 V FIGLEAF MESSAGE FOR YOU OVER
DREADNAUGHT V FIGLEAF CAN NOT REACH EITHER TAFFY 3
OR MEXICO 7 OVER
16 V DREADNAUGHT SEND IT BLIND PLEASE OUT
TAFFY 3 MEXICO 7 RELAY TO TAFFY 3 MESSAGE RE-
LAYED FROM DREADNAUGHT DO YOU
APPROVE OF MY PROSPECTIVE MOVE-
MENTS AS GIVEN IN MY EARLIER
TRANSMISSIONS X MONGREL H.S.
SOUND GEAR DREADNAUGHT DOES NOT
RESPOND IS LIMITED BY FLOODING
FORWARD HAVE JUST ENOUGH FUEL TO
REACH PROPOSED DESTINATION OVER
19 OVERTURE FIGLEAF V DREADNAUGHT TOMORROW PLEASE TRY TO
DELIVER THE MESSAGE I GAVE YOU
FOR TAFFY 3 AND TELL US WHAT
WENT AHEAD AND CARRIED OUT WHAT WE
PROPOSED TO DO OVER
21 V OVERTURE ROGER OUT
35 OVERTURE V FIGLEAF WHICH WAY ARE YOU SWINGING IT OVER
V OVERTURE ROGER WAIT
FIGLEAF V OVERTURE EXECUTE TO FOLLOW TURN SHACKLE
H UNSHACKLE OVER
V FIGLEAF WILCO OUT
FIGLEAF V OVERTURE EXECUTE MY TURN SHACKLE H UN-
SHACKLE OVER
41 V FIGLEAF WILCO OUT

Note: Minor corrections to obvious errors were made by the
Commanding Officer from memory as assisted by CIC personnel.

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Enclosure (G) to U.S.S.
HEERMANN (DD532) Action
Report - Philippine Action;
Battle East of Samar Island
25 October 1944.



This track is based on
the assumption that the
track of FANSHAW BAY is
reasonably correct.
relative positions are
approximately correct.
Speed of HEERMANN is
logical and checks with
Bell Book and known
maneuvers.

126-15 E

zigzagging

Approximate
course and
distance
made good

0907
ATAGO or MAYA class
maneuvering 0835

11-30 N

0841
GAMBIER BAY
approx.

zigzagging

0910

0902

Laid smoke across
rear of Carriers

0917

KEY

--- HEERMANN
--- FANSHAW BAY
--- ENEMY

ENCLOSURE (G)

0902-Landing Cruiser
retired by sharp
left turn.

-1-

0725-First radar contact on
the Japanese formation

0754-TONE

Approximate
course of
enemy Cruisers
0754-0841

0755 KONGO
0800 0803

0754 FANSHAW BAY

0800 0725

0725
HEERMANN

0800

0814

0554

HEERMANN

0841

0841 TONE

45

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Authority NND 965137
NARA Date 4/19/05



72

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Enclosure (G) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532)
Action Report - Phillipine Operation;
Battle East of Samar, 25 October 1944.

SECRET



This track is based on the assumption that the track of FANSHAW BAY is reasonably correct. Relative positions are approximately correct. Speed of HEERMANN is logical and checks with Bell Book and known maneuvers.

ENCLOSURE (G)

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By **AR** NARA Date **4/19/05**

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
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San Francisco, Calif.

~~SECRET~~
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Enclosure (H) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action report - Philippine
Operation: Battle East of Samar Island, 25 October 1944.

Sketch of SC-A PPI scope - 15,000 yard scale.
Estimated time - 0745, 25 October 1944.

N



(47)

ENCLOSURE (H)

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Authority **NND965137**
By **AR** NARA Date **4/19/05**

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c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.


~~SECRET~~ C-0-1-F-1-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Enclosure (I) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action report - Philippine Operation;
Battle East of Samar, 25 October 1944.

Sketch of SC-A PPI scope - 15,000 yard scale.

Estimated time 0752 - 25 October 1944.

N



(48)

ENCLOSURE (I)

75
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By AR NARA Date 4/19/05

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Enclosure (K) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action Report -
Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25
October 1944.

SECRET

U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

30 October 1944

From: The Medical Officer.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and
Surgery, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.
Via: The Commanding Officer.

Subject: Personnel Casualties occurring in action;
reporting of.

References: (a) Art. 1138 U.S. Navy Regs., 1920.
(b) Para. 3820, Man. of the Med. Dep't.
(c) Para. 3424, Man. of the Med. Dep't., and
Appendix D, Man. of the Med. Dep't.
(d) PacFlt ltr. 9L-44, Pac-45-ccc, A2-11,
P6-1, serial 293, Para 2(a), of 19
January 1944.

Enclosure: (A) Subject casualty report.

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c),
and (d), personnel casualty reports for the U.S.S. HEERMANN
(DD532), and the survivors from the U.S.S. SAINT LO, are here-
by submitted.

E.C. REEB

1st ENDORSEMENT U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) WLC/hw
DD532/P6-1 c/o Fleet Post Office
Serial 259 San Francisco, Calif.

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D 30 October 1944

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and
Surgery, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Forwarded.

A.T. HATHAWAY

- 1 -

12 1393

ENCLOSURE (K)

50

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By NARA Date 4/19/05

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
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SECRET

Enclosure (J) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action report - Philippine Operation;
Battle East of Samar, 25 October 1944.

Sketch of SG-A PPI scope - 15,000 yard scale.

Estimated time 0840.



ENCLOSURE (J)

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By **AR** NARA Date **4/19/05**

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Enclosure (K) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action Report - Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25 October 1944.

Personnel casualties among survivors from the U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63), picked up by this vessel 25 October 1944, off Samar Island, Philippine Islands.

NAME	RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	PROGNOSIS	DISPOSITION
ANDERSON, G.L.	S2c	251 11 86	WOUNDS, MULTIPLE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
ANDERSON, J.D.	SK2c	660 28 20	WOUNDS, MULTIPLE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
ANTHONIS, E.F.	SK1c	411 11 00	BLAST CONCUSSION, WATER, SEVERE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
BARBER, M.M.	S2c	924 46 68	BLAST CONCUSSION, WATER, SEVERE	FATAL	USS BOUNTIFUL
BARKER, T.H.	WT3c	563 74 89	WOUNDS, MULTIPLE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
BATES, C.A.	F2c	865 21 83	BURN, SEVERE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
BIELEFELDT, G.D.	S2c	306 79 38	FRACTURE, Simple rt. Clavicle	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
BROWN, P.J.	EM2c	223 95 24	BURN, SEVERE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
BUIE, T.H.	S1c	556 95 43	BURN, SEVERE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
CAYWOOD, G.L.	S2c	861 21 41	FRACTURE, COM- POUND, Right tibia.	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
COLE, G.H.	AGM1	279 31 60	BURN, SEVERE	FATAL	DIED
COTA, R.R.	FC2c	563 28 33	WOUND, SHRAPNEL	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
ESTLE, R.O.	GM2c	654 11 46	BURN, SEVERE	FATAL	DIED
HARRIS, F. (n)	StM1c	846 69 06	WOUND, LACERATED	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
HUKINS, O.	S2c	846 40 30	FRACTURE, COM- POUND, Right Femur	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
HUNTSMAN, S.R.	AOM2c	645 11 81	BLAST CONCUSSION, WATER, SEVERE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
KEIDERLING, F.R.	MM1c	321 26 69	WOUND, SHRAPNEL	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
LESINSKI, J.	SK2c	311 06 91	WOUND, SHRAPNEL	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
MARTIN, B.D.	Cox	632 16 62	WOUNDS, MULTIPLE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
MCCOLLUM, J.K.	S1c	822 47 67	WOUNDS, MULTIPLE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
MESSTNA, S.S.	AOM2c	615 27 81	FRACTURE, COM- POUND, Left tibia	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
MURPHY, E.L.	GM1	393 38 18	FRACTURE, COM- POUND, Lt. radius & ulna	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
SMITH, R.	StM1c	840 28 20	AVULSION, MUSCLE, right thigh	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
WEBER, - -	F1c	- - - - -	INTRACRANIAL IN- JURY	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
WILKERSON, R.B.	SK3c	871 57 - -	WOUNDS, MULTIPLE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
YARBOROUGH, H.Y.	CPhM.	670 17 38	BLAST CONCUSSION, WATER, SEVERE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
ZIETAN, J.E.	S2c	383 19 00	BLAST CONCUSSION, WATER, SEVERE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
UPCHURCH, Timothy M.	F2c, USNR		KILLED IN ACTION	FATAL	DIED
WEST, Byron L.	S1c, USNR		KILLED IN ACTION	FATAL	DIED

- 1 - Enclosure (A) to Enclosure (K)
ENCLOSURE (K)

(5)

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By **AR** NARA Date **4/19/05**

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C-O-D-E-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-

Enclosure to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action Report - Philippine
Operation Battle East of Samar Island, 25 October 1944

Personnel casualties among survivors from the U.S.S. SAINT LO
(CVE63), picked up by this vessel 25 October 1944, off Samar Island,
Philippine Islands.

NAME	RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	PROGNOSIS	DISPOSITION
SHELL, Artemas J.	Capt.	USA.O-1165957	KILLED IN ACTION	FATAL	DIED

The above army officer was recovered from the water among
survivors from the U.S.S. SAINT LO (CVE63). He was attached as a
passenger aboard that vessel.

Personnel casualties occurring on board the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532),
25 October 1944, in action off Samar Island, Philippine Islands.

NAME	RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	PROGNOSIS	DISPOSITION
BRIGGS, Ralph Paul	MM1c	299 96 58	WOUNDS, MULTI-	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
DOAN, Howard	QM3c	306 09 73	INTRACRANIAL INJURY	FATAL	DIED
GREENWOOD, William	EM2c	225 19 63	AVULSION, muscle	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
HARTMAN, Emmett	S1c	376 86 63	WOUNDS, MULTIPLE	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
MELIOR, Robert	M3c	393 56 41	AVULSION, muscle, left ankle.	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
MURPHY, James Carl	GM2c	647 56 06	WOUNDS, MULTI-	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
SCARBOROUGH, James	BM1c	279 69 75	WOUNDS, MULTI-	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
STRECKER, Paul (n)	GM3c	618 80 74	AVULSION, muscle, lower left thigh.	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
WOOLWORTH, Jack	QM1c	632 64 81	WOUND, PUNCTURED, Right hip	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
YOUNG, Robert Hugh	QM3c	655 73 39	WOUND, PUNCTURED, Throat.	GOOD	USS BOUNTIFUL
EVANOWSKI, Thomas	SoM2c	710 13 52	KILLED IN ACTION	FATAL	DIED
ROSSUM, Althon	MM2c	621 40 88	KILLED IN ACTION	FATAL	DIED
WARREN, Chester	RM2c	671 05 07	KILLED IN ACTION	FATAL	DIED

- 2 - Enclosure (A) to Enclosure (K)

52

ENCLOSURE (K)

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Authority NND968137
B. AR NARA Date 4/19/05

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Enclosure (K) to U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532) Action Report - Philippine
Operation: Battle East of Samar Island, 25 October 1944

Personnel casualties occurring on board the U.S.S. HEERMANN (DD532),
25 October 1944, in action off Samar Island, Philippine Islands.

NAME	RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	PROGNOSIS	DISPOSITION
DAHLAN, W.A.	Lt.(jg)	145556	KILLED IN ACTION	FATAL	DIED

The above officer was TEM pilot from the U.S.S. GAMBIER BAY
(CVE73), rescued from a plane crash 24 October 1944, and killed on
this vessel 25 October 1944.

SECRET

- 3 -

Enclosure (A) to Enclosure (K)

ENCLOSURE (K)

53

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By NARA Date 4/19/05


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U.S.S. HEERLMANN (DD532)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

~~SECRET~~
C-S-R-T-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Enclosure (L) to U.S.S. HEERLMANN (DD532) Action report - Philippine
Operation: Battle East of Samar, 25 October 1944.

Formation "5R" (4 CVE's on circles 1.5 and 2) (5DD's, DE's on circle 5)
Carrier Axis



The screening vessel within whose sector the course lies takes station at the intersection of the designated circle with the median of his sector.

Other screening vessels take stations on the designated circle at a linear spacing between ships of 4200 yards (or as directed) or as nearly as they can do so without leaving their sectors. When only five screening vessels are present a ten degree overlap beyond sector limits is permitted if necessary to close to 4200 yards spacing.

Scale: $\frac{1}{2}$ " = 1000 yards

ENCLOSURE (L)

54

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Authority NND 968133
By AR NARA Date 4/19/05


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U.S.S. HEERMAN (DD532)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

SECRET

C-3-N-1-1-L

Enclosure (1) to U.S.S. HEERMAN (DD532) Action report - Philippine Operation;
Battle East of Samar, 25 October 1944.



Formation "5R" (6 CVE's on circle 2.5) (7 DD's, DDE's on circle 6)

The screening vessel within whose sector the course lies takes station at the intersection of the designated circle with the median of his sector.

Other screening vessels take stations on the designated circle at a linear spacing between ships of 4200 yards (or as directed) or as nearly as they can do so without leaving their sectors. When only five screening vessels are present a ten degree overlap beyond sector limits is permitted if necessary to close to 4200 yards spacing.

Scale: 1" = 1000 yards

ENCLOSURE (1)

(55)

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Authority
AND 965133
82

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COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION
 TWENTY-FIVE
 c/o FLEET POST OFFICE
 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

File
 CCD25/A16-3
 Serial:

CONFIDENTIAL

5 November 1944.

1st Endorsement to
 DD532/A16-3 Serial
 040 ltr. of 1
 November 1944.

From: Commander Task Unit 77.4.3.
 To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
 Via: (1) Commander Task Group 77.4.
 (2) Commander Task Force 77.
 (3) Commander Seventh Fleet.

Subject: Action report - Philippine Operation; Battle East
 of Samar Island, 25 October 1944.

1. Forwarded.

C. A. F. Sprague
 C. A. F. SPRAGUE

12 0853

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 Authority NND 965133
 By *AR* NARA Date 4/19/05

02186

A16-3(4)

A16-3

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION TWENTY TWO

(fj)

Serial 0409

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
8 November 1944.~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO HEERMANN Conf. ltr.,
DD532/A16-3 Serial 040
of 1 November 1944.

From: Commander Task Group 77.4 (Commander Carrier
Division TWENTY TWO).
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Task Force 77.
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet.

Subject: Action report - Philippine Operation; Battle
East of Samar Island, 25 October 1944.

1. Forwarded.



T. L. SPRAGUE.

cc: ComCarDiv 25

12 0853

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Authority **ND965133**
By **AR** NARA Date **4/19/05**

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Box No.	1204
R. S. No.	12 0853

A16-3(F-3-4/wmw)

Serial: 03129

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NOV 28 1944

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THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
CO HEERMANN conf ltr.
DD532/A16-3 serial 040
of 1 November, 1944.

From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Action Report - Philippine Operation; Battle
East of Samar Island, 25 October 1944.

1. Forwarded.

J. H. Long
J. H. LONG
By direction

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Authority *ND965133*
By *AR* NARA Date *4/19/05*