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BRIEF.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

This serial contains all pertinent information concerning the Navy of the U.S.S.R. available in the Division of Naval Intelligence. It covers the organization of the Soviet Navy, naval policy, personnel, tactics and operations, naval ordnance, an estimate of the strength and disposition of the various fleets and descriptions of the units which comprise them, descriptions of all known naval bases and yards, of the naval air force and of coast defense.

This serial supersedes OP-16-F-5 serials 41-42 and 45-42, all copies of which should be destroyed.

Information contained herein is necessarily incomplete and unconfirmed, as the Soviet Government has rarely given detailed information concerning its Navy or permitted accredited U.S. naval representatives to visit naval bases or units.

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~~SECRET~~ ~~DECLASSIFIED~~ Chapter I

## ORGANIZATION

### A. Organization in General

On December 30, 1937, the People's Commissariat of the Navy was organized; prior to that time the Navy was a mere sub-section of the Red Army, forming a part of the People's Commissariat for Defense, together with the Red Army and Air Force.

The People's Commissariat of the Navy trains navy personnel, administers the naval fleet, and naval bases, and land establishments of the nation; it is responsible for the training and administration of naval aviation, coast defense, coast guard, and marine corps. The navy is responsible for all coastal and port defenses, including anti-aircraft defense. It shares with the People's Commissariats of Munitions and of the Shipbuilding Industry the responsibility for the construction of warships and naval bases. It is responsible for the distribution of naval supplies, although the procurement and production of these supplies is under the People's Commissariat of Munitions, which function in these matters under local naval inspectors. Naval war plans are the responsibility of the Soviet Naval Staff.


Little is known of the present-day organization of the Soviet Navy. The chart on the following page shows its organization as of 1 December, 1940; however, since the outbreak of the Russo-German War in June, 1941, many changes must necessarily have taken place.

The People's Commissar for the Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, is the Supreme Commander of the Naval Forces of the U.S.S.R. under the 1936 Constitution. He is aided by the Deputy People's Commissar, Admiral L. M. Galler, and by the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral I. S. Isakov. Under the Chief of the Naval Staff, come the Commanders-in-Chief of the 4 fleets: The Baltic Fleet, Admiral V. F. Tributs; The Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Vladimirov; The Pacific Fleet, Admiral I. S. Yumashev; and The Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral A. A. Golovko, as well as the Commander of the Caspian Flotilla and of the flotillas of various inland waterways, notably the Amur and Volga Rivers. The actual command, however, lies in Joseph Stalin, absolute dictator and supreme commander of all Soviet military forces.

Prior to the outbreak of the Russo-German War, Soviet naval policy was dictated by the Polit bureau; decisions of this bureau were put into effect by the Supreme Naval Council. This council probably is no longer in existence, but it formerly consisted of 11 members. It decided on questions regarding the disposition of the fleets, naval construction, naval aviation, coast defense, coast guard, marine corps, and naval policies. Its membership included M. Zhdanov, Communist Party executive of Leningrad, the Commissar of the Navy, 4 Vice-Commissars, of whom 2 were political appointees, the Chief of the Naval Staff, and the 4 Chiefs of Naval Administration, i.e., armament, supplies, aviation, political. There was a subsidiary naval council attached to each fleet; they controlled all fleet activities within the district. In general, these subsidiary councils were composed of the 2 highest ranking naval political officers and the party secretary or executive of the district.

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\* CHART OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY COMMISSARIAT OF THE U.S.S.R. AS OF 1 JANUARY 1940.



\* AS THIS CHART REPRESENTS THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIAT OF THE NAVY OF THE USSR PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, IT SHOULD BE TREATED WITH GREAT RESERVE; THE US NAVAL ATTACHE, MOSCOW BELIEVES THAT IT IS NO LONGER EFFECTIVE. AS THERE IS NO MORE RECENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE, HOWEVER, IT IS INCLUDED IN THIS SERIAL.

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B. Political Intervention

At the end of the Russian Civil War in 1922, the Soviet Government found that the outstanding majority of its naval officers had been inherited from the Imperial Regime. All officers who did not immediately fall in line with the new government were, of course, either exiled or executed. There were, however, a fairly large number of naval officers who were retained; they formed the nucleus for the young Soviet Navy. On the other hand, the party officials in Moscow were not entirely certain of the political feelings of these men, and therefore set up what is now known as the "Politico" system. Under this system, each officer having command, whether of an entire fleet or a motor torpedo boat, was assigned at least one political officer, a member of the Communist Party, who looked after the political education of the men under his command, as well as making certain that the commanding officer would commit no act which would hurt the Soviet Government. As time went on, these "Politicos" assumed more and more power, so that at the time of the Russo-Finnish War, no decision, either of political or operational importance, could be made by the commanding officer without the approval of his senior politico; in fact, the political officer was equal in rank to the commander, if not superior to him. In September, 1941, there were no less than 9 political officers assigned to the 8,000-ton heavy cruiser VOROSHILOV. This system, which existed for the sole purpose of compelling officers to adhere to the rules set down by the Communist Party, made for great inefficiency at sea.

In order to meet, in part, the shortage of officers produced by heavy casualties and expansion, and to promote efficiency, discipline, and comradely cooperation among officers, the commissar system was, ostensibly, at least, abolished, both in the army and navy in 1943. Political commissars, formerly constituting as high as 1/5 of officer personnel, have been enrolled as regular naval officers, in which capacity they will, no doubt, continue to exert strong party influence upon military personnel, although without the power to counter-sign the orders of the commander.

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Chapter III

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SOVIET NAVAL POLICY AND POST WAR CONSTRUCTION

A. Basic Policy

The geographic position of the USSR compels a naval policy which is necessarily different from those of other nations. Instead of having one principal fleet which can be shifted from place to place as necessity dictates, the USSR must have five separate fleets i.e. Baltic, Black Sea, Pacific, Northern, and Caspian.

The Soviet authorities have done what they could to combine these fleets as much as possible. In the late thirties, the Stalin Canal was completed connecting, to a certain degree, the Baltic and Northern Fleets. Unfortunately, however, this canal is not sufficiently large to permit the passage of capital ships, or even of cruisers, but 3,000 ton destroyers and under could be shifted between the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean with comparative ease, prior to the outbreak of the Russo-German War.

Because of the opening of the Northern Sea Route, naval units, for the short period of two or three months a year, can be transferred from the Pacific Fleet to the Arctic and Baltic Fleets and visa versa; this is not entirely satisfactory, however, and exposes ships to the perils of ice and bad weather, as well as taking a minimum of 1 1/2 - 2 months.

Many attempts have been made to connect the Black Sea with the Caspian Sea. Prior to the outbreak of the war, construction on a canal between the Volga and Don Rivers was underway, but this would not have been of much naval value because of the shoals in the area of the mouth of the Volga. Even with constant dredging of a 25-mile strip, the depth of the river at this point is only 10 feet.

The possibility of digging out the dried-up Manych Canal, which crosses the Caucasus Peninsula, and allowing the water of the Sea of Azov to flow into it has been considered. The drawback of this plan is due to the fact that water in the Black Sea below a depth of 200 meters contains poisonous gases which would ruin the fisheries, first in the Sea of Azov, and later in the northern Caspian Sea.

Naturally, there is absolutely no possibility of connecting the Black and Caspian Seas with the Baltic--Arctic--Pacific group.

The necessity of maintaining strong fleets in each of her seas was amply illustrated during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, when it was seen that by the time the Imperial Fleet (Baltic) reached the Far East, it was of limited operational value, due to insufficient logistic support.

Consequently, in 1907 the first large-scale building program started. It was followed by the Naval Law of 1912, which provided for the following strength of the Baltic Fleet by 1930: (No information is at hand on programs for the other fleets, but it is presumed that they were to be of similar magnitude) 24 battleships, 12 battle cruisers, 24 light cruisers, 108 destroyers, 36 submarines.

At the outbreak of the World War in 1914, this program was well on its way. Seven dreadnought battleships were commissioned by

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1917 and one more was still building; four battle cruisers were still building, eight pre dreadnought battleships were in commission in addition to four obsolete battleships. Six armored cruisers and eight protected cruisers were built by 1914, and ten light cruisers were still under construction in 1917; also, two pre dreadnought battleships and one protected cruiser were returned to Russia by Japan after the war was well under way. In 1914, the Imperial Fleet also consisted of about 120 destroyers and 20 more building as well as about 40 submarines and 30 more building.

Due to the World War, the Russian Civil War, Allied intervention and post-war scrapping, the Russian Fleet in 1922 consisted of four dreadnoughts, one of which was never restored, one armored cruiser, which disappeared about 1925-26, and eight uncompleted light cruisers only 3 or 4 of which were eventually commissioned (1927-1930), as well as about twenty destroyers and twenty submarines.

During the reorganization of the Russian Navy by the Bolsheviks, two schools of thought existed regarding the strategical basis upon which changes should be made. A large number of former Czarist naval officers then still serving, supported the theory of "command of the seas", basing their ideas of new construction and technical evolution of the future development of a powerful Soviet Navy on the lines of the western capitalist powers.

A second school of thought, headed by Trotsky, claimed that the naval theories of imperial days were wrong and bore no relation to Russia's geographic and economic conditions, and that a "defensive fleet" only should be built. This was brought about by an attempt to give a reason for the realization that the Russian shipyards were in such a state that not even the smallest building program, much less the construction of a battle fleet, could be launched for many years to come.

In formulating this policy, there was no profound naval thinking involved as the fundamental reason for the existence of a navy, to gain or dispute command of the sea, was completely disregarded. No "defensive navy" ever has or ever will fulfill this function. Therefore, it became apparent at the very offset that this policy was dictated by political expediency coupled with economic necessity, and that it would be discarded as soon as the reconstruction of industry permitted.

Consequently, prior to 1937 the USSR concentrated on the building of submarines and small surface craft. Submarines are used extensively for patrol and home defense purposes by the Russians and are not considered as purely offensive weapons. In 1937, the only new units which had been added to the Soviet Fleet since the World War were: 1 2900-ton destroyer leader, about 30 torpedo boats 600-800 tons each, and 60 or 70 submarines.

#### B. Reversal of Soviet Naval Policy (1936 to 1939)

The first indication of a change in naval policy came during the latter part of 1936 when Fleet Flagman of the First Rank (Admiral of the Fleet) Orloff, Chief of the Naval Forces, announced "a new building program which would include ships of all classes and of the most up-to-date design." The Third Five-Year Plan, which began in 1937, provided for a large increase in the size of the navy.

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It is hard to say whether this change of policy was brought about by careful thinking and a conviction of the necessity for employing it, or whether it was the result of a desire for achievement on the part of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and demonstration to the world that the U.S.S.R. can produce a fleet equal if not superior to that of a first-class naval power.

Probably Admiral Orloff was too slow to see the change in the minds of the ruling clique; in addition, Soviet shipbuilding yards were not equipped to meet any such increase in the demands made upon them. Therefore, in 1937, the purge of the Navy took place. It was the most far-reaching purge ever instituted, and when it was over, every high-ranking officer with the exception of Admiral Galler had been "liquidated". This included three Supreme Commanders of the Naval forces, the Commanders-in-Chief of three fleets and their chiefs of staff, the commanding officer of the flagship "Marat", the superintendent of the Naval Academy, and many others. The photograph on the page following shows the Naval High Command of 1936: all of these men with the exception of Admiral Galler were eventually executed or disappeared. This purge probably, because of its far-reaching results, and because it followed so closely on the heels of the purge of the Red Army, was not officially announced until August, 1938.

The first steps taken to build up the Soviet Navy were to reconstruct existing shipbuilding yards and to build new ones. Progress along these lines were found to be far from satisfactory, and so in July, 1938, M. I. Kalinin, President of the U.S.S.R., made a speech at the Ordzhonikidze Shipbuilding Yard at Leningrad, and blamed this state of affairs not only on "the work of traitors" but also on the inefficiency of the workers themselves.

In order to give high-ranking naval officers more freedom of action, the first Commissariat of the Navy was organized in December, 1937; prior to that time, the navy was administered as a part of the Commissariat of Defense, along with the army and air forces.

In an attempt to help along this building program, Vice Admiral Isakoff, Vice Commissar of the Navy, was sent to the United States in January, 1939, as chief of a naval mission for the purpose of placing an order for the construction of one or two capital ships in this country: due to various reasons, this mission failed.

In March, 1939, at the XVIII Communist Party Congress, three new men appeared, who have since played a large role in the formation of naval policy: the first of these was Rear Admiral N. G. Kuznetsoff, then Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, who shortly afterward became People's Commissar of the Navy at the age of 37, which position he still holds to the present day. The second was P. Tevosyan, People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry, and third was Captain I. D. Papanin, Chief of the Northern Sea Route Administration. The first two stated that the building program according to the dictates of the third Five-Year Plan was well on its way and would be met, if not exceeded. Captain Papanin declared that because of the success attained in opening the Northern Sea Route and because of the Stalin Canal, the Baltic, Northern, and Pacific Fleets could now be considered as one.

Because of the outbreak of the war in June, 1941, ship construction did not follow according to plan; however, at the time of the German attack, there were either built or building: 2 or 3 44,000-ton battleships building, 5 8,000-ton cruisers built, and

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Left to right: (sitting) Fleet Flagman of the first rank (Admiral of the Fleet) M. V. Victorov; Fleet Flagman of the first rank (Admiral of the Fleet) V. M. Orlov, Chief of the Naval Forces of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army; Fleet Flagman of the first rank (Admiral of the Fleet) I. K. Kozhanov; (standing) Fleet Flagman of the second rank (Admiral) K. I. Dushenov; Fleet Flagman of the second rank (Admiral) L. M. Galler - 7 -



5 more building, as well as a large number of smaller craft.

C. Post War Construction

(I) Submarines. The first submarines built were those of the "D" (Dekabrist) Class; the first of these were commissioned in 1927. They have an overall length of about 240 feet and a beam of 24 feet. Their normal surface displacement is 920 tons, submerged 1150 tons. They were designed to have a surface full speed of 15 knots and submerged speed of 8 knots. They have 6-21" torpedo tubes forward and 2 aft and carry a total of only 10 torpedoes.

These were not a very popular type of submarine, so they gave way to the "L" (Linenaya Lodka) class. These are similar to the "D" class except that they are slightly larger (1300 tons normal surface displacement, 1500 submerged 266 feet long overall) and that they were fitted for minelaying, carrying 20 contact moored mines. Their torpedo tubes were placed similar to those of the "D" class, but they carried twice as many torpedoes. As these two types of submarines were not considered to be entirely satisfactory, construction on them was stopped on the "D" class in 1934 and on the "L" class in 1937.

In 1934, the first "SCHCH" (SCHCHUKA) class submarine was completed. It turned out to be highly satisfactory as a type of medium-sized boat and was still, at the outbreak of the war in June, 1941, being constructed with but few variations; it is possible that boats of this type are still being built. They have a normal surface displacement of 660 tons, submerged 820 tons, and an overall length of 200-225 feet; they have a full surface speed of 14 knots and are designed to have a full submerged speed of 8 1/2 knots; on the surface, they have a cruising radius of 5000 miles at 10 knots and submerged an 80-mile cruising radius at 5 knots. They have a total of 6 torpedo tubes, 4 forward and 2 aft, and carry a total of 10 torpedoes. It has been reported that some of these boats are fitted for minelaying, but there is no confirmation of this fact. The main difficulty appears to be that only 2 of the forward torpedo tubes can be fired simultaneously; perhaps this has been altered on newer models. These boats are generally popular, are easy to handle even in a rough sea, but are apt to be a "little lively" on the surface.

Obviously seeing the need for a smaller type of submarine, which could patrol the Russian coasts near the shore, construction was started on the "M" (Malodka) class at about the same time that the "Schch" class were being built; the first of these boats were commissioned in 1935. They have a standard surface displacement of 185-204 tons and a submerged displacement of up to 256 tons; they are about 140 feet long and have a beam of 10-11 feet. They have 2 18" or 21" torpedo tubes and carry 2 torpedoes. These boats present a rather strange silhouette, with a disproportionately large conning tower taking up about 1/5 of the entire visible length of the hull.

During this period, the Russians were also constructing larger submarines. In 1935, the first "P" (PRAVDA) class boat was completed; these boats, because of their being not entirely satisfactory, were replaced by the "K" (improved Pravda) class in 1938. Little is known about these classes, but from their external appearances, their design shows Italian influence. It is believed that they have a standard surface displacement of 1500 tons, submerged 1800 tons; they are about 280 feet long and have a beam of about

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22 feet. They have a full surface speed of 18 knots and have a cruising radius of 7000 miles at 9 knots; submerged they have a full speed of 8 1/2 knots and a cruising radius of 125 miles at 5 knots. They have a total of 8 torpedo tubes, but the number of torpedoes carried is not known; they may be fitted for minelaying. These are the largest submarines yet designed and constructed under the Soviet Regime. The chief difference between the "P" and "K" classes appears to be in the shape of the conning tower; there are possibly other variations in dimensions and armament. The tonnage of the "K" class may be slightly more than that of the "P" class. They are said to be quite successful boats, capable of rapid diving.

The latest type of submarine to be constructed under the Soviet Regime is the "S" (Stalinets) class; they may have been intended to take the place of the "D" class. They have a normal surface displacement of 750 tons, submerged 1000 tons. They have a full surface speed of 22 knots, and have a cruising radius of 9000 miles at 11 1/2 knots; submerged they have a maximum radius of 108 miles at 9 knots. They have 4 torpedo tubes forward and 2 aft and carry a total of 12 torpedoes; these boats are not equipped for minelaying. They have simple, easily understood operational characteristics and are fully capable of keeping the sea and are well fitted out. The bridge and conning tower are very small and the decks very free from obstruction; the overall silhouette is considered excellent.

(II) Surface Craft. The first construction on surface craft of any importance undertaken by the U.S.S.R. was on the SHTORM class torpedo boats; the first of these craft was completed in 1932. They have a normal displacement of 800 tons and an overall length of 251 feet; their beam is 24 feet. They have a designed full speed of 25 knots, and had a mean speed on trials of 21 knots. They carry 2 4" guns and 3 3" high altitude guns with a maximum range of 27,000 yards; they have 3 18" broadside torpedo tubes in a single turret. They carry 50 mines and 4 D.C.T. These boats are excessively armed for their size; they are reported as being poorly constructed and roll heavily, owing to excessive top hampers.

The Leningrad class destroyer leader represents the first attempt of the U.S.S.R. in larger ship construction; the first unit of this class was completed in 1935. They had a standard displacement of 2900 tons, a length of 400 feet, and their beam was 38 1/2 feet. They have 5 5.1 inch guns and 2 3 inch anti-aircraft guns and 2 1.46 anti-aircraft guns. Their construction is said to have been supervised and influenced by French technical experts and are quite unsatisfactory; they are reported to be poor seaboats, very wet forward. Despite this fact, however, additional units are still probably being built.

In 1936 an order was placed by the U.S.S.R. at the Odero-Terni-Orlando Yards, in Leghorn (Italy) for a destroyer leader. All subsequent types of Soviet destroyers reflect this design. The first destroyers built by the U.S.S.R. were the Gordi Class, which were first laid down in 1937. They have a standard displacement of 1600 tons, a length of 375 feet, and a beam of 33 1/2 feet. Their armament is similar to that placed on the Leningrad Class. More recently, probably not before 1938, an improved type of these destroyers was laid down. They are slightly larger, and have a standard displacement of about 1800 tons. Their main difference in silhouette is that they have two separate raking, squat, flat-sided stacks instead of one. They are indicative of the latest turn in Soviet destroyer construction.

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In 1935, construction was first begun on cruisers, namely, the KIROV class. 5 units of this class have already been completed and construction on 5 more was started before the outbreak of the war, but it is doubtful whether any progress can be made on them at the present time. These ships have a standard displacement of about 8,000 tons and a length of 613 1/2 feet. Their beam is 58 feet. They have 9 7.1 inch guns in triple turrets, 6 3.9 inch guns and 4 1.46 inch anti-aircraft guns. They normally carry 3 aircraft which are launched by means of a catapult. Depth charges are released by means of 2 depth charge rails. They have a designed full speed of 34 knots. The design and technical advisor of the construction of these units is said to have been furnished by ANSALDO. They are lightly built, but well laid out.

Although considering the possibility, no action was taken on the possible construction of battleships until fairly recently. After the ORLOV theory had more or less been accepted, plans were laid for the construction of large units. To this end in 1937 one battleship (and perhaps a second) was laid down at Leningrad, and in 1938 another one at Nikolaev. These units were to have a displacement of 44,190 tons, to be 794', overall length, 119' in beam, and to have a mean draft of 29'10"; they were to carry 9 16" guns, 12 5.9" guns and 12 3.9" guns. By the time that the Germans captured Nikolaev the battleship under construction there was about 40% completed. Since the outbreak of the war, further construction at Leningrad has been impossible.

### Chapter III

#### PERSONNEL

##### A. Efficiency

The general efficiency of the Soviet naval forces is rather below that of the navies of the western capitalist powers.

As a result of the "purge", the Navy suffers from a surfeit of youth and inexperience. The average age of Commanders-in-Chief of Fleets is 40, while commanding officers of the larger units are rarely more than 35, destroyers in many cases being commanded by lieutenants of only three or four years seniority. The officers, on the whole, are a poor lot; they are drawn from all grades of society and enter the Naval Schools with an indifferent education. They appear, however, to learn much by experience when they are afloat.

Ratings are generally extremely well set up, well-disciplined and exceptionally tough. Petty Officers exert considerable authority, and are given every encouragement to improve their education.

Although the personal appearance of Red sailors is far below the standard of other western navies, it is much cleaner and neater than that of the soldiers of the Red Army.

Individual ship efficiency is generally good. Vessels are always well kept and, considering the inexperience of the officers, quite well handled. Organization and staff work are generally on a very low level. Little is known of Fleet and Squadron efficiency, but it is probably very backward. Reports indicate that this is particularly so with destroyer flotilla work, and submarine attacks on battle fleets. The whole Navy is maintained on a full commission basis, much sea time is put in and everyone is kept hard at work, often on useless tasks. The strain on the whole organization is very great, dockyards fail to carry out refitting programs, and individual ships very often do not

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complete their own annual practices. Thus, although there are a large number of units fully commissioned, it is unlikely that such a large proportion is suitable for active service as in case of other European Powers.

The submarine service, on the other hand, is not only strong numerically, but, in quality, has attained a fairly high standard. It is considered as the "Corps d'elite" of the Soviet Navy. Although, as stated above, it is unlikely that flotilla work is particularly efficient, there is no question that submarines individually are efficiently handled.

To sum up, given good organization and experienced leaders, much could be made of the Soviet Navy, and a considerable improvement may be expected now that political control has once more been relegated to the background.

## B. Psychology and Beliefs

The present Russians, especially those in positions of authority, are above all, Soviet Russians. This connotes that they are products of the Revolution. The extreme youth of Soviet naval officers means that they have all grown to manhood since the Revolution. None of them have any more than the faintest recollection of conditions under the Tsarist regime. Therefore, they attribute all the advancement and the technical development of their country to Soviet rule. It should be borne in mind that, while they have never experienced the food, the luxuries, and the broad education of western countries, they hardly know this because they have no past experience on which to compare their present standard of living. Among sailors, there is the stolidity of character that is attributable to peasant birth. Among the officers who have seen western navies with all their technical developments and the civilization behind those developments, it is evident a kind of an inferiority complex has arisen from the feeling that perhaps their things are not as good as those of the outside world. This has resulted in a fundamental feeling of suspicion, which the Russians have toward foreigners. It is perhaps explicable by the fact that the Soviet Russians have to have something to cover up for this kind of inferiority feeling. Consequently, foreigners are very much distrusted by the Soviet Russians, because Soviet Russians have been taught that outside nations are all imperialist powers which have no real sympathy for the Soviet Union. This teaching adds fuel to the fire of suspicion which the Russians have towards foreigners.

It should be kept in mind that the rapid development of the Soviet Union to its present economic and political form was accompanied by drastic methods. Soviet citizens are supposed not at any time nor in any circumstance to forget the rigid rules for which punishment is severe and far reaching. A rule is in effect prohibiting the acceptance of foreign decorations by Soviet citizens in general, but it has been released on occasions as the recent rewarding of U. S. Navy Crosses and Distinguished Service Medals to outstanding officers and men of the Soviet Navy. It is obvious that the Soviet Russians will be reserved in what they say or do. It is a mistake to persuade them to weaken from their position, much as we are not in agreement with it, or to draw them into conversation on subjects which they are endeavoring to avoid. Political and religious matters should be avoided in discussion. In fact, the Soviet Russian is more likely to listen than to speak; he has a thirst for knowledge of his profession.

It should be kept in mind that in the early days of the Soviet Union, it was deemed essential by the Bolsheviks to secure the political safety of the state. Men were chosen for positions of responsibility on the basis of their adherence to the official political program rather than for their particular training or capabilities. The curriculum of

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all educational establishments was drastically curtailed by the Bolsheviks and only subjects pertaining to the professions were included in such abbreviated courses as there existed. The lack of training as distinguished from education in the case of many was feverishly made good in order that these people could be used in building up the industry of the Soviet Union and preserve its existence from what the Soviets regarded as the hostile reactionary world.

As a result of this pattern, the Soviet citizen is lacking in general knowledge and conscious understanding of the finer subjects, and gives the impression that he is coarse and not intellectual. This impression is one which all American and British officers experience in their contacts with Soviet officers. The fact that the average Soviet naval officer does not present himself as possessing outward refinement, or what we associate with being educated in the ways of the world, does not mean that the Soviet officer lacks interest in the finer things of life. Nevertheless, the material side of life in the U.S.S.R. takes precedence and is reflected in the appearance and conduct of the Soviet Russian of today. Russian naval personnel are specialists in the "technical type", that is, their training resembles more a technical rather than an educational course. This is particularly evident in the curriculum of the Soviet Naval Academy, which emphasizes very practical subjects and offers no "cultural" courses, as distinguished from the curriculum of the U. S. Naval Academy which has both practical and cultural subjects in its curriculum.

There have been a few cases where U. S. naval officers have actually been on Soviet men of war for periods of several weeks as liaison officers. These U. S. naval officers have reported their observations of the problems of joint operations. The Soviet Russian seems to have a one-track mind which is slow to act and its coordination is delayed. This is explainable by the fact that he has learned only one mechanical or technical routine.

First hand experience with Soviet Russian naval officers by U. S. naval officers has shown that the Soviet Russians in general are heavy-handed and inept to tools. They have two speeds, "full speed and stop". Their generalized mechanical sense is much inferior to that of U. S. personnel. They are not deliberately careless about cleaning, oiling, painting, and protecting from corrosion, for example, the many precision instruments on board a modern warship. They simply do not know any better.

In general, their operations seem to be "hit or miss" affairs. They like very much to make elaborate prearranged plans which they never follow. This is due perhaps to the fact that the Bolshevik indoctrination is filled with making plans for the future. Their literature, in almost every field of knowledge, emphasizes plans.

It should be pointed out, however, that in spite of the many weaknesses and inefficiencies of the Soviet Navy in its operations, it should be kept in mind that the fighting spirit of the officers has been found to be strong. Although there is good discipline and morale prevailing among both officers and men, extreme measures are sometimes taken to insure the execution of orders at critical times. It is possible that this happens more in the Army than in the Navy. It has been rumored that, in order to guarantee the holding of the front when demanded by the tactical situation, N.K.V.D. troops have been stationed at the rear. While the Commissar system has been abolished in the Navy as well as the Army, naval personnel are constantly aware of the "secret police" which is every alert to report on their actions.

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Even in spite of this, the propaganda system has been very successful in indoctrinating ideas of patriotism and invincibility in the minds of military and naval personnel. It is becoming more apparent that the fighting personnel is so imbued with these beliefs, that they go into the most daring operations with almost a spirit of recklessness.

#### C. Morale, Discipline, Customs and Practises

One of the most striking features of the Soviet military organization today is the current revival of old imperialistic traditions. In 1940, special Bolshevistic designations of rank were abolished, and ranks were made to conform with those of other navies; the main changes were in the designations of flag rank. Also, the titles of Engineer Lieutenant through Engineer Admiral, as existed in the Imperial Navy, were reintroduced. Military titles of Major General and Colonel General of Coast Defense were also introduced. The dirk for all officers other than commissars was reintroduced in 1940, and at the same time full dress uniforms similar to those of preRevolutionary days were authorized for Soviet flag officers.

In 1942, an old naval custom was resurrected by restoring to the Navy the honor of naming "Ships of the Guards"; "Guards Regiments" were recreated in the Army. Perhaps one of the most coveted marks of honor is the Guards badge, which is worn by all officers and men who belong to a Guards ship or regiment. This badge is in the form of a small silver clasp, in which is threaded the black and yellow ribbon of the former Imperial Order of St. George. The wearing of these Imperial colors for valor is, no doubt, especially appreciated, since in generations gone by, black and yellow ribbons were to be seen on the sword hilts of officers who have been decorated for valor in the field.

On the whole, officer and enlisted personnel are fairly smartly turned out. In the early part of 1943, Army and Navy officers were authorized to wear, as insignia of their rank, shoulder marks strikingly similar to those worn under the Tsarist regime. Great fanfare was made by the press over the revival of epaulets and the improvement in discipline expected through this change. In this connection, the omission of the N.K.V.D. troops in the restoration of epaulets is perhaps significant of a desire to minimize their importance in the eyes of the Soviet public and of other nations. At the time, "Red Star", official Army newspaper sounded the new note in military discipline: "The introduction of epaulettes must help to improve discipline in the army. Neatness and cleanliness in clothing, discipline and politeness must become the everyday qualities of a Red Army man. Everything in the Red Army man must show the culture of the Red Army, the strength of their traditions. After the changeover to epaulettes a man in military service is not allowed to appear in public places, theaters, movies, etc., in a wrinkled and dirty uniform, in felt boots, or unshaven. Excluding railway stations, army men are not allowed to carry anything but a small neatly wrapped package in the left hand. They are not allowed to appear in uniform in markets or bazaars, forbidden to stand on the steps of a tramcar or bus. In cars of city transport, a Red Army man is not allowed to sit down in the presence of a senior. Not only in the rear areas, but also at the front, the wearing of shoulder marks must improve the looks and the behavior of men in the army. Every man at the front must understand that his duty is to achieve, as much as possible, a clean and decent appearance even under war conditions."

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On August 10, 1943, the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. issued an edict reestablishing an officers' corps in the Russian Navy; at the same time, ratings were divided into two classes--enlisted men and petty officers. The same thing had been done for the Red Army less than a month before, so its coming was not entirely unexpected. Naval officers were divided into three classes: junior officers (junior lieutenant through captain lieutenant), senior officers (captains 3rd, 2nd, and 1st ranks), and high officers (Rear Admiral, Vice Admiral, Admiral, and Admiral of the Fleet). Of special interest in this decree is the fact that a class of flag officers, equal to that of general officers, was not established, although it would have been comparatively easy to have done so. Prior to the Russian Revolution, the social position of generals was always regarded higher than that of Admirals, and it appears as if this distinction has been continued under the Soviet regime.

Soviet Admirals are allowed a young officer on their staffs, known as "the Adjutant", who combines the duty of secretary and Flag Lieutenant. At the present time, these personal adjutants are not distinguishable as being part of the personal staff of Admirals, since they do not wear anything resembling aiguilletes, but, no doubt, the white corded aiguillette of Tsarist days will be restored to them before the war ends.

On August 11, 1943, the day following the establishment of the Naval Officers' Corps, an article appeared in "Red Fleet" official organ of the Soviet Navy stating in part ".....This act has a profound meaning and significance. The designation officer raises still higher the authority and dignity of our military leaders. It is a proof of their military maturity and ability. It emphasizes their membership in their glorious and honorable class of military professionals...."

Pre-Revolutionary concepts of discipline have gradually been re-established in the Soviet Navy. Rank and prerogative of rank are jealously upheld. At the Baku Naval Academy, for instance, discipline in all ranks and ratings was observed to be considerably less free and informal than in the U. S. Navy. There was no fraternization or social contact between officers and men. A general snap, dash, and accuracy were noticed, rarely found in Soviet civilian officials and in the general run of the Soviet population. All persons encountered sought free criticism of their methods and were eager for comparison of their system with the American.

Although rank is perhaps excessively worshipped in the Soviet system, cases often occur in which an officer senior in rank may have as his commanding officer one who is junior to him - a paradox explained by the fact that innumerable officers were rushed through Naval School and commissioned directly with the rank of Commander and Lieutenant Commander, although poorly qualified to command a vessel. At the same time, ex-enlisted men and Merchant Marine officers were given berths as commanding officers of ships because of their superior experience but compelled to remain in a junior rank under the regulations requiring three years' service in each rank. Others of high rank whose experience has not fitted them for command are former political commissars.

Very few officers seem to have been promoted from the lower deck. It is estimated that the proportion of officers who have risen from the enlisted personnel is not more than five percent.

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The high standards of appearance officially ordered are not always adhered to. Aboard a Soviet submarine in November, 1942, the officers and men were not neat in their persons or in their dress, the former often appearing at mess unshaven and with dirty hands. The messman wore a very dirty white jacket, although some discipline was indicated by his demeanor and by the manner in which seamen asked permission to pass officers when in close quarters. Uniforms were of poor quality and ill-fitting. The generally untidy condition of the vessel indicated either an unwillingness to order work done or a reluctance to detail men to do anything in addition to serving the vessel.

The commanding officer of one submarine took great pride in the smart appearance of his ship and crew, especially when they were about to reach port, but by way of contrast took no steps to exterminate the rats which infested his ship. Engines and all working parts, however, were kept spotlessly clean and in perfect condition.

Naval personnel on duty in the U. S. practiced extended drills, to briskly shouted commands. At meals, an officer junior in rank asked permission from the senior officer present before leaving the table. The old Tsarist custom of enlisted men shouting out greetings in unison, while in formation, persisted. Although a junior officer might address a senior officer as "Tovarish Capitan" (Comrade Captain) he stood at faultless attention, and, when dismissed, saluted with a smart about-face, and marched out. The same behavior held between an enlisted man and officer except that officers are evidently not addressed by enlisted personnel as "Comrade Lieutenant".

Medical officers aboard ship are charged with responsibility for the menu and are expected to satisfy themselves that all food is of good quality, as well as to allocate food properly. The latter duty is not always handled with competence, as preferred foods are sometimes quickly exhausted and a meager, monotonous diet then extended for long periods. A low opinion of Soviet naval medical service has been heard expressed by other officers.

#### D. Pay and Allowances

Officers in the Soviet Navy are paid according to the position which they occupy and not according to rank. Every commanding officer of a submarine, whatever his rank, receives 2,350 roubles a month (purchasing power about \$188). The divisional mechanic or flotilla engineer gets the same pay. The assistant commanding officer and the chief mechanic receive 1,900 roubles each month, the navigator 1,600 roubles, and the junior mechanic 1,200 roubles.

The commanding officer of the heavy cruiser Voroshilov receives 2,000 roubles a month. A man during his first year of compulsory military service receives only 57 roubles a month (purchasing power of about \$4.56) and 250 roubles a month on completion of five year term. The free supply of clothing and cigarettes is quite adequate. No marriage allowance is paid, but upon a rating's death, a pension is paid to all children under 18 years of age and to their mother. This pension ceases as soon as the children reach an age at which they can earn their own living.

As is to be expected, all branches of the Soviet armed forces enjoy more liberal rations than any other section of the population, but still greatly inferior to those allowed our own services. Every attempt, however, is made to avoid envious comparison on the part of Soviet personnel.

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E. Strength

The numerical strength of the Soviet Navy at the present time is not known; however, at the time of the outbreak of the Russo-German War in June, 1941, it was estimated at 8,000 officers and 67,000 men and 45,000 - 50,000 trained reserves.

F. Procurement

During peacetime, all male citizens of the U.S.S.R., at the age of 19, are subject to compulsory military service in the armed forces; a portion of these are allocated to the Navy. Voluntary enlistment is also possible. A volunteer may be accepted at the age of 16; however, a special authorization for waiver of age is required. The term of compulsory service in the line and in naval engineering is five years, in coast defense, four years, and in naval aviation, three years; this applies whether the rating is a volunteer or draftee. Health, training, and preference of draftees are considered in selection and placement into the various armed services. The healthiest go into the Navy and into the Air Force. Men with many dependents are usually discouraged from these services. An enlisted man may advance from one rating to another, similar to that in the U. S. Navy; promotions are granted on the basis of study and experience. Enlisted men, who have not had the basic ten years of school, are encouraged to take special "night courses", which, when completed, are equivalent to a "ten year school" education.

In order to become a commissioned officer, it is necessary for either a civilian or enlisted man to graduate from a naval school; the course for officers of the line is four years, for naval engineering, five years.

An enlisted man has certain advantages over a civilian when entering a naval school; he may enter up to 27 years of age, whereas the age limit for civilians is 20. While at school, he receives his regular navy pay, which is considerably higher than that of a midshipman.

G. Training

1. In General. The chief difference between the U. S. Naval Academy and the Soviet Naval School at Baku is that while the U. S. Naval Academy turns out officers well-grounded in all the aspects of naval science and ready to receive, during the next two years, the practical experience necessary to make them useful officers, the Soviet Naval School at Baku produces deck officers who will immediately be able to carry their own weight in one of the small ships, of which the U.S.S.R. Navy is largely composed. In order to do this, they avoid much of the mass of general information and understanding of the many skills involved in maintaining a warship, which midshipmen of the U. S. Naval Academy receive. Great emphasis is placed on practical experience. Rear Admiral Ramishvili, Director of Naval Education, substantiated this fact when he stated in an article in "Red Fleet", organ of the Soviet Navy, that "The aim of the naval schools is to organize practical study in order that the Fleet can receive well-trained officers, ready for action, who not only know and understand the theory, but can also use their knowledge in practise".

Although there are a large number of naval schools in the U.S.S.R., it is believed that the one at Baku is the only one which produces naval officers in the sense that the U. S. Naval Academy does. This institution is called Naval School, in that Academy,

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in the U.S.S.R., denotes an institution of higher learning, such as the U. S. Naval War College or the Army Staff College.

Little information is available on the present-day activities of other naval schools. Post-graduate schools, to which officers are sent two years after graduation from the Naval School, give special courses in engineering, ordnance, torpedoes, aerology, radio, etc. There is also a Staff Academy for the training of higher officers in strategy and tactics. In addition, Naval High Schools exist at least in Baku and Moscow, and perhaps in other cities, which are definitely official in character. Students who intend to go into the Navy, ordinarily choose high schools which include preliminary naval subjects in their curriculum.

Prior to the outbreak of the Russo-German War in June, 1941, it was believed that the following Naval Schools existed:

- (1) Four Naval Schools open to all citizens between the ages of 17 to 22; the School for the Baltic Fleet (probably the chief one) was located at Leningrad, for the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol, for the Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok, and for the Caspian Sea Fleet at Baku.
- (2) The Naval Academy (similar to the U. S. Naval War College) at Leningrad, was open to naval officers up to 35 years of age and command, aviation command, hydrography, and engineering were taught.
- (3) The Supreme Naval Hydrographic School in Leningrad, for all citizens between the ages of 17 and 22; course four years.
- (4) The Naval School of Coast Defense in Sevastopol, for all citizens between the ages of 17 and 22; course three years; number of students - 600.
- (5) The Naval School of Communications in Leningrad, for all citizens between the ages of 17 and 22; course three years; number of students - 600.
- (6) The Supreme Naval Engineering School in Leningrad, for all citizens between the ages of 17 and 22; course five years; number of students - 600.
- (7) The Supreme Naval Construction-Engineering School in Leningrad, for all citizens between the ages of 17 and 22, course five years.
- (8) The Naval Faculty of the 1st Leningrad Medical Institute, for all citizens between the ages of 17 and 22; course five yrs.
- (9) The Naval Medical School of the Commissariat of the Navy in Kronstadt, for all citizens between the ages of 17 and 22; course two years.
- (10) The Naval Economic School of the Commissariat of the Navy in Peterhof (near Leningrad), for all citizens between the ages of 17 and 22; course two years.
- (11) The Naval Air School in Nikolaev, for all citizens between the ages of 17 and 22; course two years; number of students - 200. Graduates get title of Voyentechnic of 2nd rank.

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(12) The Naval Air School (Stalin) in Eisk, for all citizens between the ages of 17 and 22; course two years; number of students - 200. Graduates get title of Voyentechnic of 2nd rank.

(13) The Naval Technical Air School in Perm, for all citizens between the ages of 17 and 22; course two years; number of students - 200. Graduates get title of Voyentechnic of 2nd rank.

(14) The Training Flotilla for Submarine Sailing, either in Leningrad or Kronstadt, is more likely an independent school but possibly is attached to the Supreme Naval School.

(15) The Navy Faculty of the Military Political Academy in Moscow, for naval officers up to 35 years of age.

(16) The Naval Political School in Leningrad, for Party members only; entrance age from 18 to 25; course two years.

(17) The 1st (Baltic) Naval Political School, for naval personnel; course one year.

(18) The 2nd (Pacific) Naval Political School, for naval personnel; course one year.

(19) The 3rd (Black Sea) Naval Political School, for naval personnel; course one year

(20) In addition to the afore mentioned schools, during the fall of 1940, 7 new special secondary schools were opened for the primary training of young naval men. They closely resembled our High School Naval ROTC units and, during the summer, students spent some time in camps or aboard training ships. These schools were located at Moscow, Leningrad, Vladivostok, Gorki, Kiev, Odessa, and Baku.

There are two types of schools in USSR--the "7-year school" and the "10-year school". The first is comparable to our primary school. The "10-year school" is a combination of our primary grammar, and high schools. Its graduates are eligible for entrance into institutions of higher learning, i.e., universities, the Naval School, etc.

To become a Naval officer, it is necessary to have a "10-year" education before entering a Naval school. For army officer candidates, however, the requirements are not so high--only a "7-year" education is required.

Men eligible for Naval officer training must take a competitive examination. Candidates for entrance to the Naval School are selected from those passing the competitive examination with the highest grades. Enlisted men in the Navy are subject to the same competitive examination in selection for officer-training as are civilians.

On graduating, the cadet is commissioned either as Ensign (Junior Lieutenant, USSR Navy) or Lieut., Junior grade (Lieutenant, USSR Navy), depending upon his class standing. Upon graduation as a line officer, the officer selects the type of duty that pleases him most, i.e., gunnery, navigation, communications, mining, etc., and he is ordered to duty with the fleet. After a minimum of five years service as an officer, he is eligible for post graduate courses to further specialize in some field of particular interest to him.

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II. Baku Naval School. The school is located about 7 miles north of Baku, in an isolated position on the sloping shores of the Caspian Sea. It was transferred here from Leningrad 2 years ago, where it had been functioning in permanent installation in one form or another, since the time of Peter the Great. All buildings at the new site are of permanent gray masonry construction. There are four barracks, 4 stories high, housing 600 students, plus administrative offices. Classrooms are housed in two buildings similar to those housing the barracks. The messhall is housed in a one-story building; it seats all students simultaneously. It also contains the kitchens, scullery, and an officers' mess for those of the officer personnel who do not dine in their own apartments. Officers' quarters are in two buildings similar to those housing the barracks, containing apartments for families and for officers without families. All officers live on the reservation because of the distance to Baku and the lack of transportation. The entire installation is apparently of recent construction and is said to have been built for some purpose other than the present one. Efforts are being made to beautify the area by planting trees and flower beds, but the general aspect is rather stark and bare. The majority of the area about the buildings is covered with asphalt paving, including a large central square between the classroom and barrack buildings, which is used for mass exercises and drill. The dimensions of the reservation are estimated at 700 x 1,000 yards.

The surrounding country is dry and barren unless it is well irrigated. In nearly all respects, it is a perfect picture of south Texas, except that it is more hilly. Violent and sudden winds are common, although they are predictable 24 or more hours in advance. "Baku", in local dialect means "windy city." Winters are cool to cold, windy and very dusty. Summers are dry and exceedingly hot, necessitating a revised schedule to ease the burden of the hot afternoons. Temperatures are as follows: Jan. 38°, Feb. 39°, Mar. 43°, Apr. 50°, May 63°, Jun. 71°, Jul. 77°, Aug. 78°, Sept. 70°, Oct. 62°, Nov. 51°, Dec. 44°. The above summer temperatures are deceptive in that the nights are quite cool, lowering the daily average considerably. Maximum summer day temperatures in the shade frequently reach 100°.

Classrooms are exceptionally clean, well-illuminated by natural light through large windows on one side. There is a separate desk and chair for each student and large blackboard space. Laboratories are very well-equipped, radio laboratories having a large variety of modern receivers and small transmitters. Torpedoes are exceptionally well demonstrated. There are many sections of parts and mechanisms plus individual parts and assemblies working under compressed air for demonstration. Ordnance material covers various types of projectiles and propellants. There are several light (about 2 inch) dual purpose guns and one 5 inch gun. Guns are mounted inside with no apparent facilities for gun or loading drills but merely for exhibition. The mine room has several types of moored mines, but little of the detail seen in the torpedo room. The optics room covers all types from spotting glasses to 5 meter range finders. Large windows permit ranging practice on a distant island. All gear appears to be first class and in excellent working condition. It is said that all is Soviet made. Engineering material is limited, with the piece de resistance being a model high pressure boiler sliced through the middle, with gear to swing two halves apart to show the interior. There is no evidence of any instruction in practical work in machine, wood, foundry, boiler or sheet metal shops.

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Practical navigation receives special attention, judging from the facilities provided. One room contains about 30 magnetic compasses mounted in conventional pinnacles and on a rotating platform, for exercises in compass compensation. In another room, students are seated at long tables. Between each two students are mounted a gyro repeater, engine room counter and clock. The instructor changes the course and speed from a control station, simulating tracking or dead reckoning exercises at high speed in close waters. Each student plots the track on his chart, taking into account the currents and winds. Fifty hours of this and related instruction is given during the course. The seamanship "P" work room contains rigged models of small boats, ground tackle, deck gear, diving apparatus, and samples of knots and splices. Buoys and lights are demonstrated in a room full of all types, full size when possible, otherwise models, complete with illuminating gear and all operating as they would in use. The gyro compass laboratory contains two Soviet-made gyros complete and a large number of component parts and assemblies broken down for demonstration. The electrical "P" work room is very similar to that in the U. S. Naval Academy, with lines of motors, lamp banks, boards for plug-in leads and meters. There are displays in showcases and on the corridor walls throughout the buildings, showing the evolution of warships, models and section of foreign and Soviet ships, plans of ships (including USS WASHINGTON), maps of the various war fronts throughout the world, with pins showing positions of the troops, signal flags, slogans, and famous sayings of contemporary and past Russian naval commanders, portraits of famous Russian admirals, and innumerable bad likenesses of Admiral Kuznetsov, always in full dress uniform.

Small boats are used for rowing, sailing practice, and sailing drills in which the boats maneuver, tack, turn, and come alongside by use of sails alone and with the rudder unshipped. Two 2-masted 60-foot schooners are manned for periods of several weeks at a time by junior classmen for practical work in deck seamanship and in the use of the sextant. Power boats are manned by regular Red Navy personnel, with occasional midshipmen acting as bowhooks.

Students are selected from the country at large and from the ranks of the navy, candidates usually having had an education comparable to that of a graduate of a U. S. high school. The Superintendent informs the military chiefs of the various districts of USSR how many candidates will be acceptable from that region so that representation may be maintained equally from the country at large. Candidates are sent to Baku, where they are examined mentally and physically. If they fail mentally and are acceptable physically, they are sent to the ranks of the fleet to work out their term of compulsory military service; they may choose the army instead, however, which is sometimes more desired in that the term of army compulsory service is only two years, while in the navy it is five. Candidates are received from ranks of the navy on the same basis as above, but indications are that the number is very small. The age limit for civilians is 16 - 20 and from the ranks, up to 27. Failures during the course of instruction are sent to the fleet as seamen to finish their terms of compulsory military service. An average of 30% fail during the four year course, of which the great majority fail the first year and probably not more than two or three the final year.

The Director of Naval Education, under whom this school takes jurisdiction, is Rear Admiral Ramishvili, a Georgian born in Astrakhan. He is very alert, friendly, short, round and fat, and somewhat conceited; he speaks passable French. The Superintendent of the Naval School at Baku is Captain First Rank Suhiashvili, a Georgian by birth and in appearance; he is a heavy drinker. Until recently, he commanded a brigade of naval landing force troops in the Black Sea area. He is super-tough with a shaven head, hook

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nose, powerful physique, and much personal charm. He is about 41 years old. Assistant to the Superintendent is Engineer Captain First Rank Relobrov, a professorial looking man with pince nez, born and raised in Tallinn, Estonia, and with all the inborn graciousness and hospitality of that mellow old city. His chief interest seems to be hydrography. He speaks some English. Rear Admiral Dmitriev, a real gentleman of the old school, ex Imperial Navy, is stationed here; he has travelled over most of the world. He has taught navigation to practically every present day Soviet naval officer, and is 67 years old. He fought in the Russo-Jap War.

Principal subjects in order of their importance are: navigation, seamanship, ordnance, communications, and engineering. Classroom work consists largely of lectures and explanation by instructors (all naval officers). There is very little questioning of or recitation by students, who busily take copious notes during these periods. It is believed that blackboards are little used by students and are mostly for demonstration and explanation by instructors. Examinations are held semiannually and wholly determine the marks and standing of the students. Those students not quite passing may be given a re-exam, turned back into the next lower class, or sent to ranks of the navy. Various subjects have different weights in computing the final multiple. Examinations are not especially long. Honor students, consisting of about ten percent of the class, have their photographs posted on the bulletin board in the recreation room, until they are displaced in class standing by others. After graduation and two years in the fleet, the top students at the Naval School are generally those selected for post-graduate and specialist training, if their military capabilities have turned out to be commensurate with their scholastic ability. Practical work, in practically all subjects, carries much weight.

The schedule in summer is:

0400 Reveille  
0445 Morning tea  
0530) Four 40-minute recitation periods in classroom.  
0900  
1000 Breakfast  
1030) Three periods, usually practical work.  
1300  
1300) Independent study in the library or such classroom  
1500) as the individual desires. The instructor is present in each such available classroom to advise and answer questions of individuals.  
1500 Dinner  
1530) Enforced rest in bunks.  
1600  
1600) Recreation on the grounds or study, as the individual desires; occasionally there are seamanship drills.  
2000  
2000) Recreation on grounds or study, as the individual desires.  
2200  
2200 Lights out.

Liberty is granted on Sunday for the junior class and on Saturday afternoon and Sunday for other classes. Leave in time of peace was one month annually, but since the outbreak of the war, it has been completely cut out.

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Practice cruises are made on board combatant ships of all types. While on board ship, students of the first three classes exercise no authority over Red Navy men. Those of the senior class have nominal authority in certain cases, such as in command of ship's boats, but generally exercise authority only among groups of students on board. The usual period of sea duty (cruise) is: 1st year 4 months, 2nd year 4 months, 3rd year 5 months, 4th year 6 months.

Interior discipline is directly in the hands of naval officer in command of each company of students. Under him, are the usual company, platoon and squad petty officers chosen from the ranks of that course, and who assist him in military functions and in maintaining discipline. Students of different classes are not mixed at drill or in the messhall. Petty officers of each class are furnished from that class and exercise authority only over members of that class, except when on watch, when they may exercise such authority over any student as the fulfillment of their duty demands. Student petty officers are usually chosen for a period of a full year, on the basis of military and scholastic qualities. They may be removed for disciplinary reasons or for poor performance of duty, but this occasion rarely occurs. Punishments are based on the fact that the act was committed and not the degree of the act itself. The same punishment is given for being one minute over liberty as for one hour or one day. Minor offenses are punished by lowering the military aptitude mark; more serious offenses are punished by confinement.

Barracks house units of each class in large bunk rooms and accommodate about 100 students. Iron beds are very close together. Hanging space and small lockers are in separate rooms. Arms, including rifles, light and heavy machine guns, tommy guns, all with ready ammunition, are kept in ready racks in the bunk rooms. Each student has his own heavy, dull edged sword of plain appearance. Toilet and bath facilities appear inadequate and have characteristic gamey odor of such places in the USSR, but they are superficially, at any rate, quite clean. Messing takes place in a large bright screened hall accommodating the entire student body. Tables seating about twenty are presided over by student petty officers of the same class as those seated at the table. There are white table cloths and backless benches. Students march in, stand at attention alongside the tables, and seat themselves on command of the duty officer. The galley is large, airy and well-screened with much the same appearance on small scale as the U. S. Naval Academy galley. The menu is based on weights of food per day in each category, as is the practice in the Red Navy. Calory count per diem is added up and appears to be the item of chief interest on the weekly menu; it averages close to 2,980 calories total per day. Alcoholic drinks are forbidden to students at any time, and drunkenness is punished by confinement of from three to ten days, with repeated offenses being transfer to the ranks of the Red Navy.

Uniforms are those of the Red Navy, with the exception of the cap ribbon and shoulder marks. Ex-sailors who have served at the front wear a cap instead of a flat hat. The usual summer uniform is black trousers, black shoes, white jumper, and white flat hat. Shoulder straps are black with a two inch fouled anchor in gilt. Petty officers have the usual Red Navy petty officer marks on the shoulder straps, in addition to the above mentioned anchor. The hair of students is close cropped. They have no beards or moustaches.

The appearance of the students, in general, is good. They are on the average smaller in stature than American midshipmen, as is the average Russian considerably smaller than the average American.

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Physically, they appear well enough fed and show no exterior evidence of any deficiencies in diet, such as is general among the civilian population of the country as a whole. Most of them are beautifully sunburned from seamanship drill with no jumpers on. Their military carriage and marching while enroute to the messhall is not up to the standard of the U. S. Naval Academy.

There are indications that individual discipline is of the Prussian type and considerably more strict and machinelike than American. This has been quite evident in observing relations between Red Navy officers, where in spite of "Comrade Captain" and so forth, the distinctions between ranks and the subservience of the junior is infinitely greater than in either the U.S., French, Italian, or British Navies.

For recreation, each company has a "play room" something on the order of the Smoke Hall at the U.S. Naval Academy, with a piano, magazines and newspapers, and games. The walls are covered by slogans, wall newspapers (occasionally in English or French for the increase of interest in foreign languages), photographs, pictures of Stalin and Lenin, and a large portrait of Admiral Kuznetsov. The chief effort in the latter is usually concentrated on the grand effect of the full dress uniform. Very few of them actually resemble the Commissar of the Navy. There are no facilities for sports other than the cutters, which may be used for sailing in spare time. Motion picture exhibitions and plays are given weekly.

III. Training of Ratings, in General. In the Red Navy, as in the British, greater dependence is placed in "enlisted" men in the supervision and maintenance of special equipment. Red Navy petty officers are sent to shore schools for considerable periods to master below-decks specialties - in the case of radio, as long as two years. The officers, in general, apparently function more exclusively in the capacity of administrators than in the U. S. Navy and bend most of their efforts to keeping the ship off the rocks, while the petty officers keep the engines and radio functioning.

IV. The Polyarnoe Anti-Submarine School. This school was visited in May, 1942. Its instructional apparatus, which was under the command of Engineer Captain Aronov, was contained in four rooms on the ground floor of a large building as follows: room 1 was a large classroom in which a destroyer was installed. The installation had been well carried out in accordance with the drawings, the bridge hut, instrument cupboards and directing gear being clearly separated, so that classes under instruction could get a good idea of the general layout of the set. The dome was filled with water, and the set could be operated. Room 2 contained the mass-procedure teacher. This installation was not, at that time, complete and the signal injector had not arrived; the apparatus was, however, in operation. Room 3 contained the anti-submarine attack teacher. This room was divided by a partition, and this apparatus was also in working order. Room 4 contained a trawler. This set was well mounted, together with a clear idea of the general layout, but work had not been completed by May, 1942.

Three classes of ratings and one of anti-submarine control officers were under training. The three ratings classes were seen under instruction and averaged about 12 men in each class. For the most part, the ratings seemed to be very young. It appeared that the best ratings of the first classes were, themselves, in charge of subsequent classes.

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No officers were present at the attack teacher when it was visited, and the duty of the anti-submarine commanding officer was being performed by a rating.

In general, the installations were very well carried out, and instruction appeared to be well organized. Captain Aronov said that the ratings showed great interest in their training. He appeared to be a capable instructor and showed a good understanding of his subject.

It was understood that arrangements would shortly be made for Soviet ratings to gain sea experience in vessels of the First Minesweeping Flotilla, and that a Soviet submarine would be made available for training purposes.

The school was well organized, and appeared to be making good progress, although training was possibly handicapped by the lack of higher ratings for instructional purposes.

V. Fleet Training. Little information is available on fleet training, but it does not appear to be extensive. During the latter part of 1941, there appeared to be little training going on in the Black Sea. All submarines were employed operationally, and did not exercise with surface craft, chiefly because anti-submarine measures were non-existent, nor did they practice attacks. A submarine commander stated at that time that it was not necessary to do any training then, since all submarines had completed their annual program before the war started. He did admit, however, that the question of attacks for commanding officers would require consideration. Newly built submarines, and those completing refits, got their training by going to easy and peaceful patrol positions.

#### H. Comparative Ranks

##### I. Naval Ranks in the Soviet Navy

<u>RUSSIAN</u>	<u>TRANSLATION</u>	<u>U.S. EQUIVALENT</u>
Admiral Flota	Admiral of the Fleet	Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral	Admiral	Admiral
Vitse Admiral	Vice Admiral	Vice Admiral
Kontr Admiral	Rear Admiral	Rear Admiral
Kapitan Pervovo Ranga	Captain of the First Rank	Senior Captain
Kapitan Vtorovo Ranga	Captain of the Second Rank	Captain
Kapitan Tret'evy Ranga	Captain of the Third Rank	Commander
Kapitan-Leitenant	Captain Lieutenant	Lieutenant Commander
Starshi Leitenant	Senior Lieutenant	Lieutenant
Leitenant	Lieutenant	Lieutenant, Junior Grade
Mladshi Leitenant	Junior Lieutenant	Ensign
Michman	Warrant Officer	Warrant Officer
Kursant	Midshipman	Midshipman
Glavni Starshina	Chief Petty Officer	Chief Petty Officer
Starshina Pervovo Stat'i	Petty Officer First Class	Petty Officer First Class
Starshina Vtorovo Stat'i	Petty Officer Second Class	Petty Officer Second Class
Starshi Krasnoflotets	Senior Red Navy Man	Seaman First Class
Krasnoflotets	Red Navy Man	Seaman Second Class

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II. Army Ranks in the Soviet Navy

<u>RUSSIAN</u>	<u>TRANSLATION</u>	<u>U. S. EQUIVALENT</u>
General Polkovnik	Colonel General	Lieutenant General
General Leitenant	Lieutenant General	Major General
General Maior	Major General	Brigadier General
Polkovnik	Colonel	Colonel
Podpolkovnik	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel
Maior	Major	Major
Kapitan	Captain	Captain
Starshi Leitenant	Senior Lieutenant	Senior 1st Lieutenant
Leitenant	Lieutenant	1st Lieutenant
Mladshi Leitenant	Junior Lieutenant	2nd Lieutenant

It is probable that non commissioned ranks and enlisted men carry the same titles in other branches of the Soviet Navy as they do in the line and naval engineering corps.

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I. UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIA

On February 15, 1943, gold and silver shoulder marks were reinstituted in the Russian Navy by edict of the Praesidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., following a similar edict made for the Army a month earlier; it made insignia of rank conform with those worn prior to the Russian Revolution.

Stripes which had previously been worn by Soviet naval personnel and which were very similar to those worn by the U. S. Navy, were abolished, except that they continued to be worn on service dress blue uniforms of officers of the line and naval engineering in addition to the new shoulder marks. These stripes are identical to those worn in the U. S. Navy with the following exceptions:

- (a) The stripes and stars are placed farther up the arm than in the U. S. Navy.
- (b) The narrow stripe for captain lieutenant (lieutenant commander) is placed between the second normal stripe and the star.
- (c) The 5-pointed star is so placed that two of its points and not one are pointed toward the stripes.
- (d) Broad stripes, worn by captains first rank (senior captains) and flag officers, are narrower than those worn by U. S. officers, being only 1.26 inches in width.

Shoulder marks as adopted by the Soviet Navy are either gold or silver in color, to denote the service to which the wearer belongs. A system of stars and stripes on them denotes rank. The color of the stripes and of the piping further denotes the branch of service.

Services of the Soviet Navy are divided into major and minor branches; the shoulder marks worn by officers belonging to a major branch are wider than to those belonging to a minor branch. Major branches consist of the line, naval engineering, coast defense, coast defense engineering, aviation, aviation engineering, supply, and medical corps officers with special military medical education. Minor branches are the medical corps (for officers without special military medical education) veterinarians, and the legal and administrative corps.

Gold embroidered shoulder marks are used by officers of the line, naval engineering, coast defense, and naval aviation; those of all other branches of the service wear silver. Piping and stripes are black for officers of the line, naval engineering, and coast defense engineering --they are red for members of the coast defense, veterinarians, legal, and administrative officers--they are light blue for naval aviation and aviation engineering--they are crimson for officers belonging to the supply corps. Shoulder marks of medical officers have green stripes and red piping. Shoulder marks are 5.5 to 6.3 inches long and 2.56 inches wide for major branches, and 1.77 inches wide for minor branches.

The gold or silver braid for flag officers is of a special herringbone design; there are no stripes on these shoulder marks. Stars are superimposed in a straight line on the shoulder marks to denote rank (1 star for a Rear Admiral, 2 stars for a Vice Admiral, 3 stars for an Admiral, 4 stars for an Admiral of the Fleet). Stars for flag officers

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
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of the line and of the naval engineering corps, are gold with tufts of black rays protruding from underneath; a red pentagon, upon which is inscribed a black anchor, is superimposed on the center of the star. Stars on the shoulder boards of all other flag officers are plain silver or gold. The metal buttons on the shoulder boards correspond in color to that of the braid. For flag officers belonging to one of the major branches, they bear a State seal (hammer and sickle) superimposed on two crossed anchors. Those for flag officers belonging to minor branches are the same as those for all other officers of the Soviet Navy--they bear only an anchor.


Shoulder marks of senior officers (captains of the first, second, and third ranks) have two stripes; those of junior officers (captain lieutenant to and including junior lieutenant) have one stripe. These stripes run lengthwise. The stars for senior officers are  $\frac{4}{5}$  of an inch between their points, while those for junior officers are only  $\frac{1}{2}$  of an inch. The metal buttons correspond in color to that of the braid, and bear an anchor.

Anchors, stripes, and buttons on the shoulder boards of warrant officers, midshipmen, and ratings are gold for the line and naval engineering corps, and silver for all other branches. They are of two sizes: the larger size, which is the same as those for commissioned officers, is worn on great-coats, peacoats, and single-breasted naval jackets; the smaller ones, which are 2 inches long and 2.36 inches wide, are worn on flannel shirts and jumpers. Shoulder marks of warrant officers, of midshipmen, and of ratings are black in color. Warrant officers have a broad stripe running lengthwise. Midshipmen have a metal anchor on their shoulder boards. If a midshipman has served in the Soviet Navy prior to his being accepted by the academy, his shoulder marks bear his rating as well as the anchor. Chief petty officers have one wide gold stripe running widthwise, petty officers first class have three narrow stripes running widthwise, petty officers second class have two stripes, seamen first class have one stripe, and seamen second class have no stripes. In addition to the stripe, yellow letters indicating the fleet to which the wearer's ship or unit belongs are stencilled on the larger shoulder marks as well; they are stencilled on the small shoulder boards of seamen second class only.


#### FLAG OFFICERS




ADMIRAL OF THE  
FLEET (LINE)



ADMIRAL  
(LINE)



COL. GENERAL  
MEDICAL CORPS  
(WITH SPECIAL  
MILITARY MEDICAL  
EDUCATION)




COL. GENERAL  
LEGAL CORPS


DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

FLAG OFFICERS




ENGINEER VICE-ADMIRAL




ENGINEER LT. GENERAL




LT. GENERAL  
VETERINARY  
CORPS



REAR ADMIRAL  
(LINE)



MAJOR GENERAL  
COAST DEFENSE




MAJOR GENERAL  
MEDICAL CORPS  
(WITHOUT SPECIAL  
MILITARY MEDICAL  
EDUCATION)


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
SENIOR AND JUNIOR OFFICERS




COLONEL  
MEDICAL CORPS  
(WITH SPECIAL  
MILITARY MEDICAL  
EDUCATION)




COLONEL  
LEGAL CORPS




ENGINEER CAPTAIN  
2ND RANK



LT. COLONEL  
ADMINISTRATION  
CORPS



CAPTAIN  
3RD-RANK  
(LINE)




MAJOR  
MEDICAL CORPS  
(WITHOUT SPECIAL  
MILITARY MEDICAL  
EDUCATION)


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
SENIOR AND JUNIOR OFFICERS




CAPTAIN  
LIEUTENANT  
(LINE)




CAPTAIN  
LEGAL CORPS




SENIOR LIEUT.  
MEDICAL CORPS  
(WITH SPECIAL  
MILITARY MEDICAL  
EDUCATION)




SENIOR LIEUT.  
ADMINISTRATION  
CORPS




ENGINEER  
LIEUTENANT



LIEUTENANT  
VETERINARY  
CORPS



JUNIOR  
LIEUTENANT  
SUPPLY CORPS




JUNIOR LIEUT.  
MEDICAL CORPS  
(WITHOUT SPECIAL  
MILITARY MEDICAL  
EDUCATION)


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
WARRANT OFFICERS, MIDSHIPMEN AND RATINGS




WARRANT OFFICER




MIDSHIPMAN  
FORMER  
WARRANT OFFICER




MIDSHIPMAN  
FORMER  
CHIEF PETTY  
OFFICER




MIDSHIPMAN



MIDSHIPMAN



PETTY OFFICER  
1ST CLASS



CHIEF PETTY  
OFFICER  
(ATTACHED TO  
NO SPECIFIC  
FLEET)





PETTY OFFICER  
1ST CLASS  
(ATTACHED TO  
FAR EASTERN  
FLEET)

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SECRET

WARRANT OFFICERS, MIDSHIPMEN, AND RATINGS



PETTY OFFICER  
2ND CLASS



PETTY OFFICER  
2ND CLASS  
(ATTACHED TO  
NORTHERN FLEET)

SEAMAN  
FIRST CLASS

SEAMAN  
FIRST CLASS  
(ATTACHED TO  
BLACK SEA)

SEAMAN  
2ND CLASS  
(ATTACHED TO  
BALTIC FLEET)



REAR ADMIRAL DUNCAN, U.S.N., U. S. NAVAL ATTACHE, MOSCOW,  
DECORATING A PETTY OFFICER, FIRST CLASS, WITH THE DISTIN-  
GUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

DECLASSIFIED




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J. High Ranking Naval Officers

I. The Commissariat.

(a) Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov was appointed People's Commissar of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations on May Day, 1939, at the early age of 37. He is an exceptionally able and ruthless administrator, and enjoys the reputation of being a most efficient organizer; in March, 1939, he was made a full member of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party. He was born in 1902, and started life as an errand boy. In 1917, he served as a volunteer in the North Dvina River Flotilla. He was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1926, and was appointed to the cruiser CHERVONNAYA UKRAINA (since sunk) in the Black Sea. He served for four years as executive officer, and two years as commanding officer of Black Sea cruisers. For 17 months, prior to his appointment as commissar, he was Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, with the rank of Rear Admiral. He speaks excellent French, and it is quite obvious that he does not come of peasant stock.



ADMIRAL N. G. KUZNETSOV,  
Peoples Commissar of the Navy

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Admiral L. M. Galler,  
Vice Commissar of the Navy.



Admiral I. S. Isakov,  
Chief of the Naval Staff.

(b) Admiral L. M. Galler is People's Vice Commissar of the Navy. He is the son of an engineer officer in the Imperial Navy. He was commissioned in the Imperial Navy in 1905, and by 1917 was a commander and executive officer of a Baltic Fleet Battleship. He joined the Bolsheviks during the revolution and helped seize the Kronstadt Naval Base. Nearly all of his active service has been spent in the Baltic Sea, where he commanded various ships and was Chief of Staff of the Fleet prior to 1935. He has also served as Chief of the Naval Staff. At the time of the purge (1937) he was already a full admiral, and was practically the only flag officer who survived this purge. He is a good type Tsarist officer and very highly thought of in his own service.

(c) Admiral I. S. Isakov is the Chief of the Naval Staff. He was born in 1898, and graduated from the Imperial Naval Academy at St. Petersburg. He is a good type Tsarist officer, although only a young lieutenant in 1917. During the Civil War, he served in the Northern Fleet and Volga River and Caspian Sea Flotillas. He has never been closely associated with the Communist Party. He has spent most of his active duty in the Baltic Sea; in 1937, he was Chief of Staff of the Baltic Fleet. Prior to that time, he taught at the Soviet Naval Military Academy. In 1939, he was elected a deputy of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., and during the same year, he headed an unofficial naval mission to the U.S. for the purpose of arranging for ship construction in this country. He was appointed to his present position in 1941. For the past year, he has been absent from his post, presumably being on active duty with the fleet.

(d) Vice Admiral V. I. Levchenko is a People's Vice Commissar of the Navy; he is 46 years old.

(e) Rear Admiral S. P. Ignatiev is a People's Vice Commissar of the Navy; he is a former "politico".

(f) Rear Admiral N. K. Smirnov is a People's Vice Commissar of the Navy; he is a former "politico".

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- (g) Lieutenant General S. F. Zhavoronkov is Chief of Naval Aviation.
- (h) Lieutenant General S. I. Vorobyev is head of the Supply Department.
- (i) Lieutenant General I. S. Mushnov is head of Armaments and Munitions.

## II. Baltic Fleet

(a) Admiral V. F. Tributs, Commander-in-Chief since May, 1939, was born in 1900, and originally served in the Imperial Navy as a sick bay steward, and after that as a private in the Red Army. He entered the Naval Academy in 1923 and was commissioned in 1926. He graduated from the Naval War College in 1932. He has been Executive Officer of the second line battleship MARAT, and after that Chief of Staff of the Baltic Fleet. He is a member of the Central Auditing Committee of the Bolshevik Party. He was promoted to the rank of admiral in June, 1943.

## III. Black Sea Fleet

(a) Vice Admiral V. A. Vladimirski was appointed Commander-in-Chief in June, 1943; he is 40 years old. He appears to be very energetic and outspoken, an able officer and well liked by his officers and men. Prior to his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, he was in command of a destroyer flotilla in the Black Sea.



Vice Admiral Vladimirski, Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet, inspecting the DD SOOBRAZATELNI.

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(b) Vice Admiral N. E. Basisty is Commander, Cruisers, Black Sea Fleet. He is rather older than Vice Admiral Vladimirski.

(c) Lieutenant-General Kumanin is Commander of Coast Defense of the Caucasus coast from Sukhum to Batum.

#### IV. Pacific Fleet

(a) Admiral I. S. Yumashev, Commander-in-Chief, was born in 1895, the son of a railway employee. He served as a Petty Officer in the Imperial Navy. In 1918, he became a member of the Communist Party and in 1941, he was appointed a candidate member of the Central Executive Committee of the Bolshevik Party. He has commanded a cruiser squadron and has been Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet. Although he possesses limited intelligence, he is extremely tough and a hard character. He was promoted to the rank of admiral in June, 1943.

(b) Rear Admiral V. A. Alafuzov was appointed Chief of Staff in March, 1943; he is about 45 years of age. Prior to this appointment, he was Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff at Moscow. He is considered to be keen, alert, and forceful, and one of the most capable of all Soviet Flag Officers.

#### V. Northern Fleet

(a) Vice Admiral A. G. Golovko was appointed Commander-in-Chief in July, 1940 at the age of 32. He has a strong character, is keen, alert, aggressive, courteous, and willing to give assistance. He is the son of a veterinary surgeon. He has been in command of the Caspian Sea and Amur River Flotillas; during the Spanish Civil War he was Soviet Assistant Naval Attache at Madrid. He is a good administrator, but has had limited sea-going experience because of his youth.



Vice Admiral A. G. Golovko, Commander-in-Chief, Northern Fleet, with Rear Admiral Duncan, U.S.N., U.S. Naval Attache.

(b) Rear Admiral S. G. Kucherov was appointed Commander of the White Sea Flotilla in March, 1943. Prior to this appointment, he was Chief of Staff, Northern Fleet, and in 1942, he was Chief of Staff to Admiral Kuznetsoff.

#### VI. Caspian Sea Flotilla

(a) Rear Admiral F. S. Sedelnikov has been Commander of this flotilla since before 1940.

#### VII. Amur River Flotilla

(a) Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrski was appointed Commander of the Flotilla in June, 1943, a position which he held several years ago. His naval career was started as a stoker; later he became a mechanic. He was sent to the Naval Military Academy in 1925. Later he commanded a flotilla of Motor Torpedo boats in the Pacific. He is a member of the Central Auditing Committee of the Communist Party, and

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is said to be very popular within Party circles. In 1938, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet, which position he held until June, 1943. His recent transfer is not readily understandable.



Vice Admiral Oktyabrski, Commander-in-Chief of the Amur River Flotilla, while still Commander-in-Chief Black Sea Fleet.

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