

United States Naval Administration in World War II

XXVI

History of Office of Naval Intelligence
in World War II

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UNITED STATES NAVAL ADMINISTRATION

IN WORLD WAR II

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



DECLASSIFIED

OP09B+ 8/3/74

10 July 1946

MEMORANDUM

From: Op-23C1 (Lt. Comdr. J. W. Ducibella, USNR).
To: Chief of Naval Intelligence.
Via: Op-23B.
Op-23C. ~~SECRET~~

Subject: Office of Naval Intelligence in World War II,
History of.

References: (a) DNH ltr., Serial 101, dated 23 Nov. 1944.
(b) DNH ltr., Serial CL-162, dated 19 Feb. 1945.
(c) DNH ltr., Serial CL-429, dated 10 Aug. 1945.
(d) DNI Secret memo, (SC) A12-1/EN3-10, Serial
00461216, dated 21 Feb. 1945.
(e) DCNI Secret memo, (SC) A12-1/EN3-10,
Serial 00226P23, dated 14 Jan. 1946.

Enclosure: (A) First draft narrative of History of ONI in
World War II, with three carbon copies of
same.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information and
approval.

2. According to references (a) and (b) "the official
histories...are intended to serve three main purposes of official
utility...:

1. To enable officials who will have corresponding
responsibilities in the future, and those of the Government
in general, to take advantage of the successes of the current
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2. To meet the needs of naval education in the
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3. To serve for future historical reference.

The documentation is the major historical function
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Reference (b) further indicated that "in the compilation of administrative history the objective is a written, documented record so complete as to be a source of definite information and valuable as a future guide." Reference (d) stated that "this history shall not be a mere log book record of administrative changes but a vital document which will be of value to the Department in peacetime organization and to the National Defense." To this end the Director of Naval Intelligence directed compliance with the purposes of staff histories as outlined in reference (a).

3. Subject History has been prepared by Op-23C1 (formerly Op-16-P-4) for the Office of Naval History in accordance with the above and further instructions set forth in references (a) through (e).

4. It is respectfully suggested that the original and first carbon copy of Enclosure (A) be forwarded to the Office of Naval History in accordance with reference (c); and that another carbon copy be made available to Op-23X, Plans Branch.

5. It is anticipated that the Supplement to subject History will be completed in several weeks and forwarded. This Supplement comprises only the Appendices to the various Parts of subject History, i. e., copies of documents not readily available but highly significant in the substantiation or explanation of some points in the text of the ONI History.

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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(In separate volumes)

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PART I

ONI POLICY 1882 - 1939

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PART I

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POLICY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

(First Draft)

To trace the history of the Division of Naval Intelligence as it developed in World War II one needs to review from its beginnings the policy behind this branch of the Department. Unfortunately, there are few orders, directives or other documents which treat specifically or in much detail of the mission or purpose of Naval Intelligence. Neither do there exist materials concerning the formative ideas underlying its policies. What sources of information we do possess lie in the General Order of 1882 establishing the Division (then called "Office"), the Navy's statements of "Information Policy" set down in directives of the General Board from 1922 to 1940, the Basic War Plans, formulated in 1924 and amended to 1941, and the annual "Estimate of the Situation and Base Development Program," prepared by the Director of the War Plans Division and submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations from 1922 to 1939. Additional scraps of factual statement reflecting policy are to be found in miscellaneous directives, letters, and memoranda in the files of the Planning Office of the Division of Naval Intelligence and in its file room.

There are at least two factors which account for the dearth of positive statement on the purpose of the Division of Naval Intelligence. First, the very nature of intelligence or "evaluated information" being what it is -- for the most part, classified material -- it is placed in a position often removed from definition and discussion. Second, the flexible nature of the organization itself, especially in peacetime,

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tends to a lack of positive controls and rigid statements of policy. That this idea has been admitted by reliable authority is indicated in a letter from the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, directed to Commandants of all naval districts, dated 5 September 1942, which says in regard to the Naval Intelligence Service as a whole, "Decentralization has been carried out in the past. A minimum of positive directives and control has been exerted by the Office of Naval Intelligence. However, actual experience under war conditions has demonstrated that these policies have not fulfilled the purpose of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations."¹

When the Office of Naval Intelligence was established on 23 March 1882, the General Order creating it explained that its purpose was "collecting and recording such naval information as may be useful to the Department in time of war as well as peace."²

It was at this time that the principal navies were changing from wooden ships to those of modern construction and technical information was needed from abroad. Similarly, a series of circumstances brought about a move for reform in the organization of the Navy of the United States. It was realized that when our foreign policy was requiring greater support on account of international complexities, the Navy became increasingly important in maintaining our prestige and safeguarding the future. In connection with the reconstruction of the Navy it became expedient to create a number of new agencies within the

1. VCNO Conf. Serial 01815916 of 5 Sept. 1942.

2. General Order No. 292 of Navy Dept. of 23 Mar. 1882, quoted in Black, Rear Admiral A.P. "The Office of Naval Intelligence: History and Aims," Washington, 1920.

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Department to assist in its proper function and development. One of these was the Office of Naval Intelligence.³

The creation of the system of Naval Attaches accredited to European capitals took place a few months after the opening of the new office and the sending of the first U.S. Naval Attache to London to represent our interests in Great Britain was an event of the first importance in the history of our Naval Intelligence Service. In speaking of the need for this new branch of the Navy, the Office of Naval Intelligence, an officer associated with its early activities, writes: "The necessity was apparent as it (the Navy Department) had no system for information nor any idea of how to preserve it, even if there had been any scattered about in the independent and jealous bureaus."⁴ From that time approximately to the period of the Spanish-American War, emphasis was placed on endeavors in the field of positive intelligence as apart from counter-intelligence activities. Also, more attention was devoted to the acquisition of technical information on such subjects as ship construction, ordnance and the like rather than on facts concerning the movements, disposition and probable intentions of the enemy. However, the published "War Notes" and "War Information" series kept the Service informed on important incidents of foreign naval strategy. During the Spanish-American War the Office carried on secret service activities and furnished intelligence on the Spanish Navy, enemy defenses and on the moves of enemy agents.

3. Beers, Henry P. "The Development of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations," 1942.

4. Berry, A.G. "The Beginning of the Office of Naval Intelligence." Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan. 1937, p. 102.

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The only important developments in connection with the Office of Naval Intelligence in the time intervening between 1898 and the outbreak of the First World War was in the matter of the jurisdiction under which the Office functioned within the organization of the Navy Department. In 1882 when the Office started it was placed under the supervision of the Bureau of Navigation and continued in that status until 1890. In the latter year on 3 October it was transferred to the Secretary of the Navy and on 17 October to the Assistant Secretary. At the time of the outbreak of the Spanish-American War the responsibility for the direction of the Office was again shifted, this time to the Bureau of Navigation where it had been originally organized. Under the reorganization of the internal structure of the Navy Department, effected by Executive Order of Secretary Meyer in 1909, the Office of Naval Intelligence came under the cognizance of the Aide for Operations, one of the four Aides established. The present disposition of the Office was made in March 1915 with the creation of the post of Chief of Naval Operations. The Office of Naval Intelligence became one of the nine sub-divisions under the Chief of Naval Operations. This arrangement is today authorized by Navy Regulations.⁵

As previously mentioned, the Information Policy of the Navy as set down in the directives on general naval policy, is one of the principal expressions of authoritative doctrine on the mission and purpose of the Division of Naval Intelligence. These directives are

5. Navy Regulations, 1920 (Revised 1941). Chapter 7, Section I, Article 433.

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Issued from time to time by the General Board and are approved by the Secretary of the Navy. Five such statements of information or intelligence policy have been promulgated in 23 years. The first of these statements, dated 29 March 1922, contains 15 objectives but not all of the latter concern intelligence. Those sentences which bear directly on intelligence are:

"To acquire accurate information pertaining to the political, military, naval, economic and industrial policies of our own and foreign countries.

"To select, analyze, arrange, classify, summarize and make available all information acquired for the purpose of reference and dissemination.

"To disseminate appropriate information systematically throughout the naval service.

"To preserve for ready reference and for historical purposes information collected and arranged systematically.

"To issue analytical studies of important historical incidents with a view to indoctrination.

"To cooperate closely with other departments of the government in the collection, preservation and dissemination of information.

"To link up information so closely with communication and operations that in time of war intelligent, continuous, coordinated and efficient effort will result.

"To provide for protection against foreign espionage and propaganda.

"To acquire and disseminate appropriate information of the enemy in time of war."⁶

In the second statement of Naval Policy, issued on 6 October 1928 by the General Board the Information Policy remains essentially the same except that extraneous matter not referring to naval intelligence had been deleted. But the policy as quoted above remains intact. However, in the third statement promulgated on 7 May 1931, a few changes appear. Especially to be noted as an addition is the reference to

6. U.S. Naval Policy, issued by the General Board G.B. No. 420-2, Serial No. 1108, dated 29 March 1922.

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"cooperation with other departments of the government."⁷

When the fourth revision of Naval Policy appeared in 1933, with the exception of minor changes in the uses of words, there were few alterations in the Information Policy. The sentence concerning espionage and sabotage is changed to read: "To provide protection against subversive activities inimical to the national defense in cooperation with other departments and agencies." There has been added as a further objective: "To keep the public informed of the activities of the Navy in so far as compatible with military security."⁸

Finally, when the last change in Naval Policy was promulgated in 1940, the entire Information Policy was compressed into the following statement:

"To acquire information concerning the political, military, naval, economic and industrial policies and activities of all countries.

"To analyze and preserve information for ready reference and for historical purposes.

"To disseminate useful information systematically through the naval service and to other government departments and agencies.

"To provide protection against espionage and sabotage in cooperation with other departments and agencies.

"To keep the public informed of the activities of the Navy as compatible with military security."⁹

It will be noted that Naval Policy as given in detail above, does not make the distinction between peace and wartime policy for the

7. U.S. Naval Policy, issued by the General Board G.B. No. 420-2, Serial No. 1509, dated 7 May 1931.
8. U.S. Naval Policy, issued by the General Board G.B. No. 420-2, Serial No. 1569, dated 27 April 1932. Approved by the Secretary of the Navy 10 May 1933.
9. U.S. Naval Policy, issued by the General Board G.B. No. 420-2, Serial No. 1997, dated 8 July 1940. Approved by the Secretary of the Navy 23 July 1940.

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Division of Naval Intelligence. However, the demarcation has been defined in two other documents. In one of these it is explained that Naval Intelligence is used to determine the "war-making" abilities and activities of foreign nations, the chances of war being declared and the supposed intentions of the potential enemy or enemies.¹⁰ This interpretation of the mission of Naval Intelligence is conveyed more clearly in the "Training Manual on General Intelligence for Reserve Officers" and is stated as follows:

"In time of peace the broad purpose of ONI is to collect and provide to proper officials of the Navy and other United States Government departments, all information concerning domestic and foreign situations and circumstances of interest and importance to the function of the U.S. Navy; in time of war, to collect and provide all available information from domestic and foreign sources."¹¹

Another approach to a study of the policy governing the Division of Naval Intelligence as it performed its functions during World War II is to present a brief history of events and accomplishments leading up to the outbreak of that war as reflecting the objectives sought. This approach will be developed in two parts. First, the organization and functions of the Office of Naval Intelligence in the First World War will be sketched and a summary of the lessons learned from its activities during that time presented. Second, the story of the peacetime developments of Naval Intelligence in the period between the two wars will be narrated in the light of the general viewpoint of the

10. Naval Intelligence Manual ONI-19 Article 105.

11. "Training Manual on General Intelligence for Reserve Officers" ONI-T-16. Original edition, 1941.

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Navy toward changing world conditions. During that period, 1919 - 1939, Naval Intelligence policy was chiefly determined by these global political events, development of foreign military and naval strengths and ambitions and the trends of our own general naval policy as affected by them. The establishment of Basic War Plans in 1924 was highly significant in setting up a goal for war preparation, which, with revisions, was consistently followed through the years. Special attention will be given a summary of Naval Intelligence plans as revealed in the "Estimates of the Situation" from 1924 to 1939. Finally, the actual conditions of the intelligence organization, its staff, functions and state of readiness from 1931 to 1939 will be traced as indicating the general scene on the eve of the declaration of a state of limited emergency on 8 September 1939.

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DURING WORLD WAR I

To judge from the organization and function of the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1914 at the beginning of the First World War, its policy was to gather technical information with emphasis on improvements for the Fleet rather than the gathering of intelligence of an operational nature. The office organization comprised an arrangement of desks with an officer in charge of each to cover such subjects as Ships, Ordnance, Personnel and Engineering. Altogether there were eight officers and 10 civilians employed in the office. Seventy-five per cent of the time of this staff was devoted to the reading of daily newspapers and the clipping and filing of pertinent newspaper articles. This work largely duplicated that performed by the various Navy Department bureaus, some of which already possessed their own means of gathering this intelligence.¹²

It was realized by those responsible for the policies of the office that its services were inadequate for an effective war program. Accordingly, in October 1915 a War Information Service was established and a General Plan prepared. This plan took into consideration the gathering of full information on the state of preparation of possible enemy navies, securing facts on the movements of enemy forces and the selection of reliable secret agents, preparing a complete system of secret service and establishing cipher codes, listing merchant vessels,

12. Ltr. from Col. J.H. Russell, USMC to DNI, 7 Aug. 1919 on Historical Data Relating to the Office of Naval Intelligence, in Naval Records Division of National Archives.

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ascertaining orders and shipments of munitions for the enemy and finally, making such other plans and arrangements as would reduce paper work and investigation to a minimum on the eve of war. When war occurred it was planned to keep the Department informed of all movements of enemy vessels and munitions of war.¹³

Meanwhile, a plan of internal reorganization of the Office of Naval Intelligence was prepared by John H. Russell (now Major general retired) of the Marine Corps and Dudley W. Knox (now Captain, USN, retired) and submitted by the Director of Naval Intelligence to the Secretary of the Navy. This plan which was finally approved by the Secretary and put into effect on 1 October 1916 divided Naval Intelligence into four sections. These branches were designated: (A) Organization and Control of Agencies for the Collection of Information, (B) Coding and Re-coding, (C) Collating all Information for Statistical Study and, finally, (D) the Disseminating and Archives Section. At the same time, a bill for appropriations, approved 26 August 1916, made the reorganization effective. According to a statement of one of the authors of the plan, "This reorganization placed the Office of Naval Intelligence in a position to do work that would be of particular benefit to the service, establishing as it did a confidential communication and intelligence service, eliminating duplication of work and enormous waste labor occasioned by the reading of all papers and periodicals received in the office by every officer attached thereto."¹⁴

13. Cocks, H.C. "Brief History of the Office of Naval Intelligence," 1930. Typescript in ONI Library.

14. Russell Loc. Cit.

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In the new organization great emphasis was placed on domestic intelligence and there was established under Division A, (the Organization and Control of Agencies section) a counter-espionage and secret service activity in the United States. This counter-espionage became the greatest activity of the Office of Naval Intelligence. It was carried out by two forms of representation in the field. First, there were the "Aides for Information" who acted as direct representatives of the commandants of each naval district and second, there were the branch offices, operating immediately under the Director of Naval Intelligence and set up in each of the large manufacturing centers and seaports. These branch offices, the first of which was organized in the fall of 1916 and served as a model for others later established, supervised many of the secret agents. It was the branches which carried the brunt of the large volume of domestic intelligence; including surveillance of plants with Navy contracts, sabotage, shipping, radio, and censorship activities and investigations of civilian and naval personnel.¹⁵

Complementing the picture at home were the situations in Allied and neutral countries. There the offices of the naval attaches since before the war served as the eyes and ears of the Navy. In London our Naval Attache, Rear Admiral William S. Sims, not only covered intelligence with a large staff but was Commander-in-Chief of naval forces in European waters.

15. "Training Manual for Persons Assigned to Investigations Section of Naval Intelligence Service" (ONI-T-8-10 RESTRICTED), Washington, 1941, Section I, Historical.

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Other important centers were the attache offices in Paris, Rome, Madrid, the Hague and Stockholm in which the officer was also accredited to the other Scandinavian countries. There were in addition, attaches in Mexico, Havana and in the more important South American capitals. Besides intelligence activities these offices had jurisdiction over the investigation of officers, crews and passengers of ships bound for and coming from America; the senders and receivers of cablegrams, inspections of cargoes and shipments and investigations of firms suspected of trading with the enemy. Under the naval attaches, too, the coasts were closely watched for enemy vessels and persons who might be giving aid or information to them.

A Naval Intelligence officer who wrote as a historian of these activities said:

"No better work was done in the war than that conducted and covered by the offices of some of our naval attaches. Their work, primarily, of course, was to acquire purely naval information; secondarily, military and economic and political news that could be of benefit to America or her associates in the war. Affiliations were established with influential men in the country -- men in government positions or in business and their sympathy for the Entente and America encouraged, and, in some cases enlisted."¹⁶

Despite the foregoing laudatory estimate of the part played by our naval attaches, persons qualified to judge were critical of the lack of foresightedness of the Navy Department in failing to procure more adequate intelligence in Europe prior to the war. In his testimony before the Sub-committee of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the U.S.

Sanley, Capt. Edward, Jr., USN, "U.S. Naval Intelligence Before and During the War," 1920. Typescript in Naval Records and Library, National Archives.

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Senate in 1920, Admiral William S. Sims stated that on his arrival in England in 1917 the Admiralty explained to him the critical shipping situation due to submarine depredations. "This explanation," said Sims, "showed that the Navy Department did not understand the seriousness of the submarine situation, that its information was very incomplete and inaccurate. This was due to the inefficient scope of its intelligence service, very few naval officers having been sent to Europe for information before we entered the war."¹⁷

Experience of the First World War taught the Navy Department certain realities about the needs and services of a division of naval intelligence in wartime. Briefly, these are presented in the following summary. In the first place, it was apparent that since the Allies had such an efficient service for collecting "war information," e.g. information on enemy strength, disposition and probable intentions, it was not necessary to create a large organization to do this work. However, the United States naval attaches did employ secret agents both professional and volunteer who were of immense value but emphasis was not placed on this activity. On the other hand, counter-intelligence or efforts to prevent the enemy from obtaining information and hampering our war functions, was the major activity of the Office of Naval Intelligence. In this connection in the field of domestic intelligence an evaluation showed that overlapping in the organization caused some friction and disagreement. This condition resulted from the fact that

¹⁷ [redacted], Admiral W. S. quoted in Naval Investigation. Hearings Before Subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the U.S. Senate 66th Congress, Washington, 1921 Vol I, p. 2.

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the district aides for intelligence operated under the district commanders while the branch offices were under the direction of the Washington office. Also there were inadequate laws to cover counter-espionage. The Navy Department because of this situation could not always take measures adequate to govern the movements of merchant vessels or to protect them from enemy activities. In respect to our foreign sources of information it was agreed that the most successful foreign intelligence was secured through the personal relations of our attaches. On the other hand, the naval attaches were limited in functioning as secret operatives by their official diplomatic connections but were aided by the professional and civilian contacts they had made.

In regard to the question of operational intelligence it was agreed that the organization should be decentralized as much as possible. The Naval Attache in London, Admiral Sims, recommended that, as the intelligence service as a whole had the twofold purpose of serving the Department and likewise all of the individual forces in all areas, the service be divided into groups based on the disposition of forces. "Each group should be under the immediate command of the senior commanding officer of the forces in the area and should have an intelligence officer with an adequate intelligence staff at its own headquarters, whether afloat or ashore. The Department's control would be exercised through the various force commanders."¹⁸

18. See Rear Admiral William S. quoted in Cocke, Capt. H.C.
History of the Office of Naval Intelligence, 1930.

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Other suggestions of Admiral Sims, some of which were put into effect in connection with the Second World War and are important for us to consider in this light, were the preparation of lists of civilians who could be enrolled at short notice, and a system to be prepared in advance to determine the credibility of information.

POLICY OF OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN
STATUS BETWEEN THE WARS, 1919 - 1939

With the start of the peacetime period in 1919 the activities of the Office of Naval Intelligence naturally diminished but its essential policy did not change. Emphasis was placed on preparation for war during the years of peace. Official statements explained that such a task was all-important because in seeking to determine the war-making capacities of the enemy this branch of the Navy was acting for the service as a whole. In searching the possibilities of the nation's becoming involved in war and in anticipating the moves of the enemy's naval forces and its national psychology, the Office of Naval Intelligence was dealing "primarily with strategic subjects and to a less extent with tactics and logistics."¹⁹ Such strategical intelligence was needed to prepare the annual reports submitted by the Director of War Plans to the Chief of Naval Operations and known as the "Estimate of the Situation and Base Development Plans." These important reports were not only needed for estimating the budget requirements for the Navy but from them the Basic War Plans were derived. They were submitted each year, generally in March or April and provided for naval

¹⁹. "Naval Intelligence Manual," ONI 19, Art. 105.

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requirements two years in advance of that date. From the two sections, entitled "Political Situation," which reflected on world conditions and "Information" which summarized the needs of the naval intelligence service, the trends of naval intelligence policy will be traced from 1922 to 1939.

Before exploring the aims of naval intelligence policy in the "Estimates of the Situation" it will be helpful to examine the accepted attitude of naval authorities toward intelligence policy at the beginning of the period now under consideration. A reflection of that attitude is found in a statement written in 1920 by Rear Admiral A.P. Niblack who at that time was Director of Naval Intelligence.

In contrasting the intelligence situation of the Navy with that of the Army in peacetime he explained the policy of the former and wrote:

"...The Navy is always ready for war on a tentative footing with some trained reserves to draw upon. It is a comparatively simple matter to pass from a peace to a war footing....It is the duty of the Navy to hold the enemy in check while the Army mobilizes and deploys....Information is...the groundwork upon which all plans are constructed. Let us outline what information it is important to ascertain. We should know in time of peace the policies of the various governments and the dangers which may arise from the antagonism of our policies with theirs. We should study their forms of government and the national characteristics. We should ascertain their military, naval and financial resources, and the strength, disposition, state of preparation and efficiency of their naval forces....When war breaks we have to know as much as possible of the enemy's plans of operation, the composition, disposition of the naval forces he has available...finally the actual movements of his forces."20

20. Niblack, Ibid.

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Summary of ONI Policy and Development, 1922 - 1939

In 1922 the Navy feared two world conditions then existent. First, were the political and economic chaos apparent in Russia together with the confused aims of the Allied nations arising from their enforcement of the German indemnity. It was believed possible because of these conditions that a European war might soon again develop. Second, the parity of the navies of Great Britain and Japan with that of the United States gave cause for fear of future disputed control of the seas. As some causes for friction did exist among the United States and these two nations it was believed that either of them might commence hostilities. However, there was a more severe conflict of policy with Japan than with Great Britain.

The foregoing circumstances had their effect but it was especially the fear that a combination of two or more treaty powers or a combination of one treaty power and one non-treaty power might upset the terms of the Washington Naval Armament Conference which induced the Office of Naval Intelligence to suggest "that full and complete information should be obtained of naval and political development of all powers."²¹ Furthermore, it requested provision of funds and authorization for pursuing the required program. Also mentioned, was the need for reliable charts of all probable operating areas with particular emphasis on the western Pacific.

The World situation in relation to the United States Navy during 1923 and 1924 continued in much the same course it had followed in 1922.

21. "Budget 1924-"Estimate of the Situation and Base Development, General Plan" from Director of War Plans to CNO, 7 June 1922. Original in CNO papers of Office of Naval Records and Library deposited in the National Archives.

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In the summary of needs for the Naval Intelligence Division, reviewed in the "Estimate of the Situation for 1926" and dated 17 March 1924, it was explained that the Basic War Plans, first issued a few months previously, had indicated the scope of information desired. These Basic War Plans had stated in effect that the general task of the Naval Intelligence Service for a major war was to obtain from all sources and to distribute to the proper recipients, as appropriate, information pertaining to the enemy, to his agents and to sympathizers with the enemy cause so that the organization of the Navy might be safeguarded and the Basic War Plans put into effect. Furthermore, it appeared at the time (1924) information for a Japanese War was the most critical need. In view of this situation the following sentence included in the report further reflects the current intelligence policy: "During the last year the light cruisers have added very materially to our supply of important information by their cruises in the Marshalls and Caroline Islands. There are practically no charts of the Aleutian Islands, published by the U.S. government, although it is believed that the Japanese have made good surveys of these islands. These deficiencies should be corrected as soon as possible."²²

In 1926 it became apparent that the conflict of policy between the United States and Japan had become more acute and priority in attention was given to the possibility of war with that power, partly because of the legislation which had been enacted stopping immigration

²² "Budget 1926 "Estimate of the Situation and Base Development, General Plans for" from Director of War Plans to CNO, 17 Mar. 1924.

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of Japanese nationals. However, in the next year it became apparent that a Japanese War was less probable. On the other hand, during 1927 the spirit of unrest throughout the world was observed to be increasing. The reports for the years 1925 and 1926, recommending plans for the intelligence service, show no change in policy over that set down in 1924. By 1927 the objectives, although slightly restated, were not greatly changed. The Naval Intelligence policy was thus expressed: "All preparation for war and operations in war must be premised upon the best available information. This information is of three general classes, (a) information concerning our own forces, numbers, conditions, rate of mobilization, (b) similar information of enemy forces, (c) information regarding probable theatres of operation. The Office of Naval Intelligence is the principal agency of the Department in the gathering and dissemination of information in regard to the forces of possible enemy navies....This office should receive ample appropriations to continue its present activities."²³

An important event from the point of view of the navies of the larger powers was the Geneva Three Power Conference in 1927. In the ensuing year, the "Estimate of the Situation" stated that the effect of this parley had been to make British and American relations less cordial than they had been before. It was plain that Britain was unwilling to give up her supremacy of the seas. After several years of alarm concerning the possibilities of the Mexican situation, the report said

23. "Budget 1929--"Estimate of the Situation and Base Development Program" From Director of War Plans, Division to Chief of Naval Operations, dated 19 Apr. 1927.

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relations had greatly improved. It was also pointed out that the Havana Conference had strengthened United States ties with the neighboring nations of the Western Hemisphere. In the same year, namely, 1928, the Chief of Naval Operations in submitting an account of needs to the Secretary of the Navy for determining the budget included an appeal to secure more detailed intelligence on fleet bases which might be constructed between the Hawaiian Islands and Eastern Asia.

Although there was no change in the policy and objectives of the Office of Naval Intelligence in the "Estimate of the Situation" for 1931, submitted in 1929, it was explained that there seemed to be no possibility of war in the near future and that the United States was becoming more isolated in her position in world affairs. The following year it was reported that there were indications Japan desired to inaugurate the defense of her possessions far from her bases. As regards the place of the United States in global affairs at this time (1930) it was declared "this country is not regarded with overmuch favor by the other nations of the world." To account for this state of affairs the following reasons were listed: United States' insistence on debt payments, refusal to join in agreements for settling disputes, the U.S. tariff, expansion of this country's foreign trade and absorption of markets and sources of raw materials, and the development of the U.S. merchant marine.

By 1931 it was noted that the new ratio for naval ships to be possessed by this country and rival nations as established by the London Conference of 1929 would cause revision of the plan previously

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formulated for a Pacific War as the United States would no longer have a 25 per cent superiority over the probable opponent. At this date war debts still caused European nations to regard the United States with a critical attitude and furthermore, the world-wide economic depression had caused intense commercial rivalry. Another development for the first time brought to attention was the growth of air routes between South and Central America and North America radiating from the Canal Zone.

Much more emphasis was attached to the recommendation for the intelligence branch in the 1931 report and considerable space devoted to a restatement of its scope. The report explained that new weapons and better means of communication had radically changed the methods of securing, evaluating and distributing intelligence and had increased its value in conducting naval operations. This situation led to the following declaration:

"The importance of providing ample funds and adequate personnel for the efficient functioning of information agencies of the Navy Department can hardly be over-emphasized. Any curtailment of their needs in this direction will adversely affect the preparation of the Navy for national defense and hence the value of the Navy in providing its share towards the national security. During the period covered by the estimate (1933), due to probable extensive readjustments, it is particularly important that constant and intimate contact be maintained with trends of thought and events throughout the world as regards naval forces. This adds to the peacetime activities of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and is of vital importance in the consideration of our own estimates and plans."²⁴

²⁴. Estimate of the Situation for 1933. From Director of War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 27. Apr. 1931.

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Policy for intelligence remained unmodified in the reports made in 1932 and 1933. In terms of the Navy and world affairs, however, changing conditions brought about revisions in attitude and planning. Superiority of United States naval vessels had declined in their former advantage over Japan. Modernization of battleships became an urgent need. In regard to Oriental affairs anxiety was expressed over the Manchurian situation. During these years the paramount European concern to this country was the question of post-war debts and trade-rivalry. Although it was believed Japan officially did not wish a war with the United States if she could avoid it, there existed a war-fever among the people of that nation which made relations with the United States extremely tense. On the home front the national depression had led to government economies which were focused on the Army and Navy. The Estimate for 1936, written in 1934, showed that it was clear that as the world's political situation was becoming increasingly serious at an alarming rate, this condition emphasized the need for an expansion of the Division of Naval Intelligence.

Warnings were again sounded in the account of 1935, especially as regarded Germany's plans to free herself from the Versailles' Treaty terms. Japan's increasing moves to secure dominance in the western Pacific caused concern. The continuation of a fortified U.S. naval base in the Philippines was considered vital if the country expected to hold its trade and to fulfill its political aims.

Much attention was given at this time to an explanation of the urgency for expanded intelligence activities. That the Washington

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Naval Treaty would expire in 1936 due to Japanese renunciation of its terms meant that lack of agreement would make it difficult to obtain information on the expansion of foreign navies. To secure technical knowledge for the naval building program would place an extra load on intelligence facilities.

New trends in the policy of this office were forthcoming because of certain recent developments. A serious threat to morale and efficiency of U.S. naval personnel came from the subversive efforts of radical groups. It was essential to uncover these sources of harm and seek means to counteract them. Another situation arose from the activities of foreign secret agents both in the United States and in neighboring countries. This condition was so grave that it threatened the safety of the Fleet and the naval shore establishment. In the light of these conditions the report pointed out the great need for funds and adequate personnel for the various intelligence agencies, stating "These agencies are now inadequate to accomplish their mission. Their building up is deemed vital to our national security."²⁵ Specific mention was made of the need for an increase in clerical personnel for the proper evaluation and dissemination of information and in order to administer more effectively the field service of both foreign and domestic intelligence. Also mentioned was the plan to strengthen fleet intelligence and to provide measures for combating foreign agents and subversive organizations in the United States.

25. "Estimate of the Situation for 1937." From Director of War Plans Division to Chief of Naval Operations, dated 30 Mar. 1935.

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Two years later (1937) the review of world events from the viewpoint of Naval Intelligence showed conditions among the leading nations to be as serious and unstable as they had ever been. Rapidly changing political and military situations had resulted in a marked increase in international espionage. Particular emphasis was placed on the need for counter-intelligence which would prevent damage to the Fleet and to naval shore installations and industrial plants. The war, it was feared, could be precipitated by Japan or it might arise from European or even domestic origins. A foreboding of future events which proved to be unusually accurate lay in the following declaration:

"...if war occurs between the United States and Japan, it will be initiated by Japan. History shows that Japan strikes without warning. Under existing conditions and limitations of the Naval Intelligence Service our Fleet is exposed to surprise attack even in our own waters and our naval shore establishments to sabotage."²⁶

It was further plain that Japan had established an effective organization in the United States and Oahu; and it was believed that the Japanese Navy expended a total of \$600,000 for espionage in 1935. In contrast to this amount the allotment for the United States Navy's entire Intelligence program in the same year, including the foreign and domestic operations, was a little more than one sixth of that amount or \$104,204. The report deplored the fact that although United States Naval Intelligence was aware of the situation, its lack of appropriations prevented the undertaking of active counter-measures. Purely defensive activities were not sufficient to meet

26. "Estimate of the Situation for 1939." From Director of War Plans Division to Chief of Naval Operations, dated 16 Apr. 1937.

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the situation. Another point made clear was that in strengthening all branches of the Intelligence Service the process should be gradual so that only the most reliable persons would be selected and that expansion would not become suddenly apparent and thus widely revealed.

From this time forward a more concise appraisal of intelligence preparation for the war which was now considered inevitable can be found in the plans for the Naval Intelligence Service in connection with the Budget Estimates. These documents contained more detailed information than did the Estimates of the Situation which have previously been quoted. However, their recommendations were incorporated in the latter. The plan for 1940, dated 25 May 1938, proposed to maintain all activities of the service, made possible by the 1939 appropriation, a sum amounting to \$343,310. Gradual expansion was advocated in foreign countries, particularly in the Far East, Central America and the Pacific area. An attache office was to be established in Moscow to study Russia as a liaison point between Europe and Far East political events and also to obtain information about Russia's naval progress and plans. Great importance was placed on increases in domestic intelligence with attention to counter-espionage and security measures against the Japanese and other subversive elements. Need was expressed for more clerical assistance both in the districts and at the Washington headquarters.²⁷

²⁷ [redacted] for the development of the Naval Intelligence Service in connection with the Budget estimates for the fiscal year 1940." From the Director of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 25 May 1938.

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Plans for 1941, made in 1939, in their broad aspects were identical with those for the previous year but there were additional requests for an attache office in Madrid and a provision for an extra appropriation of \$11,511 to collect information abroad. More funds were stipulated as needed for expansion and improvement of the district offices and for the Potomac Division as well as the Training Division, located in Washington. For the entire program for 1941 the amount of \$450,000 was requested. In July 1940 an addendum was submitted recommending attache offices to be established in Stockholm and in Bangkok with an assistant attache to be assigned from the Hague for residence in the Netherlands East Indies.²⁸

History of Naval Intelligence on the Eve of War

It will be seen from the foregoing that the Naval Intelligence Service had gradually been preparing for its functions on a war basis ever since Basic War Plans had been formulated in 1924. Each year, watch had been kept on the changing current of world political, economic, military and naval trends so that planning was shaped to meet these fluctuating conditions. To determine the effects of that planning on the organization as a reflection of general policy it will be well to glance at the Division at a time midway between the establishment of War Plans and the date when the Limited National Emergency was declared on 8 September 1939.

If the early 1930's is selected as a suitable half-way point, there will be found existing at that time a small but well-organized

²⁸. Ibid for 1941, dated 1 July 1939.

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Administrative unit. By then the required adjustments had been nearly completed in order to bring the peacetime organization into harmony with the projected wartime establishment. The peacetime skeleton organization comprised four principal sections. These were: (a) Administrative including Naval Reserve for intelligence duties, mail and translating, (b) Intelligence, proper, divided into Domestic and Foreign Intelligence, (c) Public Relations, (d) Historical, Library and Archives. Chief emphasis was placed on the collection of all classes of information, but particularly that affecting naval and maritime matters, the evaluation of such information and its dissemination.²⁹ Considerable attention was devoted to the compilation of the extensive monographs or information files but because of the large amount of material available the scope of these monographs had to be limited to the naval, political and economic sections which had the highest priority. It was at this period that the naval attaches abroad were especially instructed to collect special items of intelligence which included information on U.S. overseas commercial interests, overseas commercial interests of foreign countries, combat intelligence material, data for limitation of armament studies and for congressional hearings and advances in technical naval science in foreign countries.³⁰ The headquarters of the Division in Washington also

29. "Organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence." Memo from Director of Naval Intelligence to Capt. Stark, dated 16 Jan. 1931.

30. Ltr. from Director of Naval Intelligence to All Attaches. Subject "Office of Naval Intelligence Activities," dated 11 Mar. 1931. (In ONI file room)

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Maintained liaison between the Navy Department and the investigating services of other government departments, exercised censorship as required by Naval Regulations and through its Public Relations Section acted for the Navy Department in matters of public information and service to the press. The total personnel in Washington in 1931 of the Office of Naval Intelligence comprised 18 officers, 38 civilians and a small number of enlisted men. Interestingly enough, on the eve of war eight years later when the Limited Emergency was set on 8 September 1939, there were only 25 officers, and the same number of civilians.³¹ Up to 1939, although each of the sections of the Office were planned to handle activities in the event of war, the respective war sub-sections were inactive at the time. These sub-sections were the Legal and Photographic divisions of the Administrative Section, the Ship Inspection, Plant Protection and Espionage divisions of Domestic Intelligence and the Propaganda division of Public Relations and finally, the Censorship Branch.

Starting in 1935 and continuing progressively each year the need for expanding intelligence activities was called for in the "Estimates of the Situation," previously quoted. By 1937 the activities of the U.S. Naval Intelligence Service had increased substantially. This growth is reflected in the appropriations which in 1937 amounted to \$249,000 as against \$144,000 in 1931.

In 1938, a year before the Limited Emergency began, although the nucleus structure of the Office in its headquarters in Washington was

31. Cox, Lt. Comdr. T.G. "History of the Division of Naval Intelligence, 1 July 1939 to 31 October 1943" (SECRET).

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so organized that it could expand at short notice and fulfill its war-time functions, somewhat of a contrasting picture was presented by the existing situation of the Naval Intelligence Reserve. A survey made in August 1938 showed among other things that ineffective organization in ONI and the districts would drastically limit the effectiveness of those officers and men. It was pointed out "peacetime psychology dominates the idea of reserve power."³² Furthermore, the morale of the reserve itself and that of the district intelligence officers was low. War plans were in a backward state. Numerous outlying stations had not yet established intelligence sections. The enrollment of reserve officers had been underestimated in view of the geographical needs. There were some strategic areas which lacked trained and experienced personnel. Means for improving the situation was included in the conclusion of the report. As War Plans had as its mission the provision for implementing the service for the various states of pre-war preparation, War Plans should have control of all agencies under it.³³ (See Appendix A.)

Fortunately, improvements were soon evident in the national picture of Naval Intelligence which may in part have resulted from the survey and report quoted above. In April 1939 a composite directive upon which all intelligence activities were to base their organization

32. Lt. Comdr. Hamilton Bryan to Director of Naval Intelligence. Subject: "Report of contacts with Intelligence Activities, July, August 1938" (Original in Planning Division of ONI). See Appendix A.

33. Ibid.

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was sent to all activities.³⁴ With organizational and personnel needs carefully outlined this directive enabled the responsible commander in each instance to perform the assigned task without recourse to Detailed War Plans. The new plan was described as "a yardstick for measurement of all subsequent policies." By June 1939 approximately two-thirds of the naval districts had acted upon this directive and completed their organization and personnel needs. For war mobilization the approved complement of the entire intelligence service was 150 regular (retired) naval officers, 2,023 reserve officers, 505 warrant officers and 3,934 enlisted personnel. Eighty per cent of this total were authorized for peacetime procurement. Field service for enlisted men was designated as plant protection (to act as informants in their civilian jobs), commerce and travel, including sub-inspectors for security against sabotage, investigation (for case solution, naval investigation and espionage (planted agents)). Meanwhile in January 1939 reserve intelligence officers in Washington were divided up and assigned to boards covering the above field plus censorship, foreign intelligence, foreign espionage, administration and public relations. In June certain intelligence offices in the districts were still deficient, these being the First, Fifth, Eighth and Twelfth, whereas the Third, Sixth, Ninth, Eleventh and Thirteenth had shown outstanding progress. Here the chief problem lay in adequate inspection and recommendation to relieve officers who had been passed

34. Secret, Serial No. 1114, referred to in Serial 1644, Subj. "Progress of Naval Intelligence Reserve Activities," from Hamilton V. Bryan to DNI, dated 10 June 1939. See Appendix B.

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over. It was recommended that strong means be taken to put these measures into effect. (See Appendix B.)

Finally, a review of the whole problem of readiness was made on the last day of August 1939. This survey stated: "Generally speaking, the Naval Intelligence Service is approaching adequacy as deficiencies in funds and personnel are being remedied. The need of additional personnel and facilities increases with deteriorating world conditions. Additional civilian personnel will require additional funds."³⁵ By this date in respect to the domestic field the reserves then enrolled were more than half of those required with the exception of allocations for sponsorship duties. It was believed emergency re-enrollment would be more rapid. In respect to foreign intelligence the report declared, "The network of information is good as far as it goes, but the information obtained consists primarily of that which foreign countries are willing to release. More adequate coverage in the foreign field is considered essential, especially under cover."³⁶ Mention was made of the securing of information on subversive groups by ONI in cooperation with Military Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation which had been provided for in a Presidential Directive of June 1939. In summarizing the general situation the survey explained that in general the operating plans of the Division were considered sufficient and effective both at home and abroad to carry out the task which Basic War Plans assigned. If the requirements listed were satisfied, the Naval

35. Serial No. 1868. "Are We Ready." From Chairman of General Board to Secretary of the Navy," dated 31 Aug. 1939. See Appendix C.

36. Ibid.

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Intelligence Organization would be considered to be in readiness on May Day for its task. However, at the moment there was need for additional officer and civilian personnel in the type of expert analysts, statisticians and librarians, together with additional office space and funds. Eventually, these needs were met.

On 8 September 1939 a Limited National Emergency was proclaimed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. On the same day the Chief of Naval Operations promulgated the Naval Intelligence Mobilization Organization and Personnel Needs. This directive indicated the general form of organization desired in the districts and ordered them to proceed at once with the final enrollments needed and to instruct and train the new personnel in the duties assigned them. Specific provisions were made for the selection of district intelligence officers by the Bureau of Navigation who were to be Captains or Commanders. Authorization was given for establishing outlying offices by the district intelligence officer. The foregoing represented no change in policy but merely pointed up and implemented the program as laid down in Basic War Plans.³⁷

37. CNO C [redacted] Op-16-XOO/EN3-10(Mob)(SC)A16/EN3-10 Serial No. 2020, dated [redacted] 1939. See Part II Appendix K for full text of this directive.

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PART II

ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1935 - 1943

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PART II

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GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE FROM 1935 TO 1943

A. PROCUREMENT AND MOBILIZATION OF PERSONNEL FOR INTELLIGENCE

From the beginning of the pre-war period which may be dated from the time War Plans were formulated in 1924, the procurement of personnel and the preparation for mobilization of the Division of Naval Intelligence were major problems. There were three conditions which complicated the situation: first, the high specialization, great range of intelligence and geographical distribution of naval intelligence operations; second, the necessity on M-Day for immediate and very rapid expansion of personnel at a very rapid rate; and third, the fact that the majority of this personnel were reserves — individuals who had been engaged in a great variety of specialized civilian pursuits.

The Class I-V(S) USNR, or Intelligence, Volunteer (Specialized) was created by the Naval Reserve Act of 28 February 1925. In view of the general governmental policy which reflected the pacifist trend of public opinion in those years, no intensive efforts were made to procure intelligence reserve officers. Conditions changed in the mid-thirties when it was seen that an international conflict was approaching. By 1935 the situation was of sufficient urgency to find expression in the "Estimate of the Situation" which thereafter stressed the necessity for expanding intelligence duties and personnel.¹

1. See Part I, ONI Policy 1882 - 1939, p. 28.

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Early Procurement Efforts.

In November 1935 the Bureau of Navigation issued a directive which was relayed by the Chief of Naval Operations to all its divisions requesting that the war needs of naval personnel for the bureaus and offices of the Department be estimated so that requirements could be revised to meet existing plans.² The Division of Naval Intelligence complied with this directive in February 1936.³ Difficulties were encountered early in finding persons equipped with the necessary language and additional qualifications to serve abroad as naval attaches and assistant attaches. On 16 March 1937 the Chief of Naval Operations advised all commandants of naval districts that there were vacancies for posts in 38 cities throughout the world. Commandants were requested to make a survey of their districts and to recommend suitable personnel, either already in the naval reserve or responsible civilians with special qualifications.⁴

Quotas.

It should be remembered that intelligence mobilization quotas were established by the document known as WPDNI (War Plans - Division of Naval Intelligence first promulgated in 1930). Tables of organization for assignment of naval reserve officers were issued by the Bureau of Navigation on 30 July 1937.⁵ However, as these tables did not assign a quota of E-V(S) officers, the Chief of Naval Operations on 11 November

2. CNO Secretltr., Serial 16, dated 4 Feb. 1936 (Op-13-A-jc). See Appendix D.

3. Ibid.

4. CNO Conf. ltr., Serial 1223, dated 16 Mar. 1937 (Op-16-A(SC)OO/EN3-10 (Mob.)) See Appendix E.

5. BuNav Res. ltr., Nav-164-MTU, QR6(771) dated 30 July 1937.

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1937 requested a quota of 324 officers of the above class. Simultaneously, in early November and again on 4 December the Director of Naval Intelligence submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations a list of reserve officers, slated for duty in the intelligence division, a list of reserve officers to be ordered first to the intelligence division for indoctrination, then to offices abroad as attaches, a list of reserve officers to be ordered to attaché offices immediately, and a list of reserve officers unassigned.⁶ By this time (8 December) the bureau had allotted to be assigned to duty directly under the Office of Naval Intelligence 158 officers of the total 324 required. The balance were to be procured from those so recommended by the Chief of Naval Operations in passing upon new applicants or, if desired, by changing from naval districts to the Office of Naval Intelligence the mobilization orders of officers already enrolled.⁷

Tables of estimates of additional naval personnel needed for the varied purposes of the Washington office and for the offices abroad under the requirements of WPDNI-1 were submitted on 14 March 1938 by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.⁸

About this time the planning division gave consideration to the mobilization of retired officers whose knowledge of naval administrative practices would be essential in expediting the expansion of intelligence

6. CNO Secret ltr., (Op-16-A 00/EN3-10 (Mob.) (1-27), dated 6 Nov. and same of 4 Dec. 1937.

7. BuNav Secret ltr., (Nav-167-RF QR/P16-1(67), dated 8 Dec. 1937, Appendix F).

8. CNO Secret ltr., Serial 1242 (Op-16-X(SC) A16-EN3-10, dated 14 Mar. 1938.

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Activities in the districts. At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations,⁹ district commandants estimated their need for such officers and forwarded their reports to the Department during the period December 1938 - February 1939.

Important Report on Mobilization.

Although plans were progressing reasonably well for mobilization of the Division on a war basis, in some quarters apprehension was expressed as to the real state of readiness. As a result of this situation, in June 1938 a comprehensive and thorough report was submitted to the Director of Naval Intelligence by Captain Walter K. Kilpatrick, USN, then on temporary duty in Washington. Despite the fact that this report was headed "Training of Personnel in the Naval Intelligence Service"¹⁰ it was actually a treatise on mobilization, the state of readiness of the Division and recommendations for correcting deficiencies.

It was stated that the general task confronting naval intelligence on mobilization was to expand the peacetime service in the shortest period possible. There were on the date of the report approximately 60 officers and 100 enlisted men and civilian personnel on duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, 20 officers at schools abroad including foreign language officers, 70 retired officers assigned to Naval Intelligence in personnel mobilization plans, 40 officers and 40 enlisted men of the Coast Guard slated for intelligence, and approximately

9. CNO Conf. Ltr., Serial 1301 (Op-16-X 00/EN3-10 (Mob.), dated 31 Mar. 1938. Appendix G.

10. CNO Conf. Serial 1301 (Op-16-X 00/EN3-10 (Mob.), dated 31 Mar. 1938. Appendix G.

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630 officers of the I-V(S) Reserve. This situation meant that 800 officers and 150 enlisted and civilian personnel would be available immediately on mobilization. However, 2,000 officers and 7,000 enlisted men would eventually be required, so that there was a deficiency of 1,200 officers and 6,800 others.¹¹

In regard to the various available sources of personnel, the author of the report made a number of pertinent comments. He remarked that it was not contemplated that more officers of the active list be used than were already assigned to the intelligence service on mobilization. Although 70 officers of the retired list were slated for duty, no enlisted men were known to be assigned. "However," he wrote, "some of the most valuable personnel in Naval Intelligence might be found in this group. There are approximately 2,000 chief and 1st class P.O.'s under 55 years of age in ratings useful to Naval Intelligence, all of whom are for assignment by the commandants of the various naval districts."¹² It was pointed out that if fleet reserve and retired chief petty officers were used, they would prove of great value as a nucleus of personnel experienced in naval matters in a force composed predominately of reservists. In the matter of education and training in intelligence it was observed that hardly any time was devoted to this subject at the Naval Academy, Post Graduate School, Naval War College or at non-service institutions where officers might be ordered for post-graduate

11. Memo from Capt. W.K. Kilpatrick, USN to DNI (A16/CNO), dated 15 June 1938, Appendix H.

12. Ibid. p. 5.

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struction. Furthermore, correspondence courses in intelligence were in general unknown and unavailable to officers of the regular Navy."¹³

In the case of the Coast Guard, it was found that there were more officers and men experienced in the practical conduct of operations in fields of naval intelligence than there were in the naval service. In addition to those specifically assigned to intelligence, a great number of both officers and men in the Coast Guard had background in ship inspection, control of illicit harbor traffic, coastal lookout, regulation of harbor craft and similar activities.

The report stressed the fact that as the great majority of personnel to be used in naval intelligence would come from the civilian population, the districts should conduct surveys to show the extent of available civilian technical experts. It was also indicated that because many large financial and business organizations possessed virtual commercial intelligence services, many of them in foreign fields, these sources might be tapped. Material procurement plans were also presented including estimates on the requirements for space, special equipment, subsistence, quarters and medical care for Naval Intelligence personnel.

Finally, in his conclusions to the report, Captain Kilpatrick stated that the plans for procurement had to be detailed and specific as they were far more complicated than corresponding plans for other services of the Navy. Explanation for this state of affairs lay in the following facts: There had been no previous experience under the conditions which were expected to prevail when war developed, a varied

13. Ibid. p. 5.

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array of specialists was required, maximum operating efficiency would have to be maintained during mobilization, despite the fact that a large percentage of the personnel would lack previous service.

Recommendations of Mobilization.

Most important was the course of action recommended by the report. It was suggested that the Bureau of Navigation be requested to assign in advance from the list of unassigned retired officers all those who were physically and temperamentally suited to intelligence duty. I-V(S) officers conversant with the intelligence part of the work were to be allotted as understudies to the retired officers. Other important recommendations included the use in intelligence of considerable numbers and in a wide variety of ratings of retired chief petty officers, the assignment of an officer graduate of the Post Graduate School to each naval district for intelligence instruction in the year following the completion of the general line course, the provision of a lecture course in naval intelligence in the Post Graduate School and the inclusion of an intelligence section in the Staff Naval War College. Stress was laid on a search to be carried out by the district intelligence offices within the bounds of each district, for talent which might be available in and outside of the ranks of the Navy. These surveys were to comprise studies of Coast Guard and enlisted personnel to determine those individuals qualified for secret investigation, ship inspection, travel control, coastal lookout, cryptanalysis and plant protection. Other government branches to be examined for intelligence specialists were the Lighthouse Service, Navy Nurse Corps, Medical Reserve Corps, and finally the legal

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profession and the large detective agencies.

Filling Mobilization Billets.

In early 1939 efforts were concentrated on filling mobilization billets for I-V(S) officers under the Chief of Naval Operations. On 17 April 1939 CNO issued a directive to all commandants of naval districts showing 171 unfilled officer billets in posts in the United States and abroad, representing a shortage of 72 per cent. The directive also mentioned that a joint plan was about to be concluded with the government agencies charged with the peace-time responsibilities of Commerce and Travel. It was anticipated that the Commerce and Travel section of Naval Intelligence would aid these agencies. In addition, key men of the agencies would be enrolled as naval intelligence representatives in all districts. An appeal was being made to the Civil Aeronautics Authority and the American Underwriters Association to recommend applicants. Such persons would be slated for mobilization billets under either the Chief of Naval Operations or the districts.¹⁴

Restatement of Requirements for Intelligence Mobilization in Districts.

Perhaps one of the most important developments in mobilization was the promulgation on 24 April 1939 by CNO of a letter directed to the commandants of all naval districts.¹⁵ This letter was a restatement of the basic requirements for organizing and manning Naval Intelligence in the districts and outlying naval stations. Reference was made to the

14. CNO Conf. ltr., Serial 1450 (Op-16-X(SC) 00/EN3-10) dated 17 Apr. 1939. Subj. "Procurement of I-V(S) officers for Mobilization billets under CNO." Appendix I.
15. CNO Secret ltr., Serial 1114, (Op-16-X A-16-00/EN3-10), dated 24 Apr. 1939. Appendix J.

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"Annual Estimate of the Situation for the Fiscal Year ending 30 June 1940" which gave the state of readiness desired for the Division.¹⁶

Such a state of readiness as was desired did not exist in April 1939 partly because the districts had delayed in sending to ONI detailed directions on plant protection, commerce and travel, coastal intelligence, etc.

An all-purpose organization was outlined in the letter, an organization sufficiently flexible to meet the requirements of operations during peace, neutrality, strained relations or national emergency. Operations during the various stages of readiness just mentioned were defined. Any member of the naval reserve might be ordered to active duty by the Secretary of the Navy at any time or when in the opinion of the President a national emergency existed. The Bureau of Navigation advised that, in general, no additional regular personnel would be supplied except to districts then in an inactive status, that it was not the intention to disturb existing shore establishments until after completion of the war organization. Furthermore, the Bureau determined reserve officer quotas on the basis of enrolling in peacetime 80 per cent of the personnel estimated to be needed on mobilization and for the first 120 days thereafter. It was noted that procurement, assignment, promotion and retirement had to be harmonized with the total mobilization billets. Enlisted men were to be used to reduce the number of officers needed and to spread the intelligence organization through all levels of the community. Whenever practicable, retired enlisted men should be favored for billets.

16. See Part I, p. 25.

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Districts were to use the letter as a guide for developing their respective organizations. On the basis of the requirements shown all personnel then on the rolls were to be assigned according to the policy of the Bureau of Navigation. Also, each naval district was urged to concentrate on completing its organization and personnel requirements. A working agreement was to be made at once with the Coast Guard to establish close collaboration with the naval intelligence coastal organization. The districts were required to submit various reports, including one on the completion of the organization plan, one on number of officers required in each grade, another on completion of assignment to mobilization billets for district intelligence duty, and one on operatives required for investigation purposes. Also, it was hoped that the letter would result in an analysis of the situation, completion of the organization and an estimate of officer requirements at the earliest possible date. All officers on district rolls were to be assigned to specific billets. Finally, the directive announced that the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was preparing for distribution to the districts a series of training monographs on the various sections of naval intelligence including administration, public relations, general intelligence and the diverse categories of domestic intelligence. Replies to this letter of 24 April 1939 in the form of district mobilization plans started coming in from the districts in late June and continued through the fall of that year.

Mobilization plans for the Naval Intelligence Service of the districts were further revamped as the result of field conferences and a

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Study of the situation made in June 1939. At that time a general directive from CNO to commandants of all naval districts explained that a new mobilization plan had been submitted to the Bureau of Navigation and approved. The Bureau had also sanctioned the separation of the procurement quota for personnel assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations from the procurement quota of the districts.¹⁷

Although the letter of the 24th of April, 1939, referred to above, gave the basic requirements for mobilization, these were in the nature of preliminary plans. At the time of the Presidential Proclamation of a Limited Emergency in September, CNO issued another directive superseding the former and indicating the general lines of the organization desired, but more particularly directing the districts to complete enrollments, fill mobilization assignments and ordering them to instruct officers enrolled and train them in assigned duties.¹⁸ However, this plan was still tentative -- as will be seen, it was outmoded by the basic and principal War Plans which were being revised. In commenting on the theoretical diagram of the organization which was attached as an enclosure, the letter stated that a high degree of decentralization was essential. The district intelligence officer was given authority to deviate from the theoretical organization. Instructions were given for setting up outlying offices and also for establishing within the district

17. CNO Conf. ltr., Serial 1642 (Op-16-X 00/EN3-10), dated 9 June 1939, Subj. "Naval Reserve Mobilization Requirements," I-V(S).
18. CNO Conf. ltr., Serial 2020 (Op-16-X 00/EN3-10 (Mob) (SC) A16-EN3-10), Subj. "Naval Intelligence Mobilization Organization and Personnel Needs," Appendix K.

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Intelligence organization the various branches including Branch A, Administrative, Branch B (1-8) and Branches C and D.

Reference was made above to the conference held in the districts in June and the new mobilization assignments submitted to the Bureau of Navigation. On 12 September 1939 the Bureau issued a plan outlining the use of retired officers, reserve officers and fleet reservists, during the Limited Emergency.¹⁹ Retired officers would be ordered to active duty preferably on a voluntary basis and in small numbers. Mobilization plans determined these assignments. It was stated that no retired officer would be placed on active duty except on written request, indicating that need for his services was justified. In the case of reserve officers, only a small number would be used during the Limited Emergency period and none without individual request as well as the written request of a responsible official under whose jurisdiction he was to serve. Orders were to be issued by commandants on directives from the Bureau of Navigation. As for fleet reservists, the members of the 16 and 20 year classes of this group could be recalled to duty preferably on a voluntary basis so that men of the regular Navy on shore duty could be released for service afloat, or given special duty either ashore or afloat. Finally, the mobilization assignments of I-V(S) officers included in the quota of the Chief of Naval Operations was promulgated on 25 October 1939. Officers listed were to be "impressed with the confidential nature of these assignments. It is not desired that they have knowledge of the assignments of the other officers of the Chief of Naval Operations quota, or of

19. BuNav. Res. ltr., Nav dated 12 Sept. 1939. Subj. "Active Duty Employment of retired officers and members of the U.S. Naval Reserve." Appendix L.

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the general mobilization plan."

Procurement and Mobilization under Revised War Plans.

Meanwhile, basic and principal War Plans were being revised. Fundamental directives for operating the Naval Intelligence Service were contained in the plan, the full title of which was "Principal Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plan (General)"-WPDNI-8. This publication was issued 22 April 1940 with a covering letter.²⁰ In respect to procurement of personnel for intelligence, the plan stated that the reserve section was to handle such procurement including the processing of all I-V(S) officers and enlisted men. Assignments were to be made of I-V(S) officers and Class V-4 enlisted personnel, based on quotas and requests received through Op-16-A-2. Through a directive to all district commanders, issued by CNO on 24 April 1940, it was explained that when "Standards of Readiness" (WPL-1), "System of War Planning" (WPL-8), "Navy Basic War Planning (Orange)" (WPL-13), "BuNav Navy Personnel Plan (Orange)" (WPL-3) and WPDNI-8, just mentioned, had been issued, the CNO letter of 8 September 1939 "Naval Intelligence Mobilization Organization and Personnel Needs" was to be considered no longer effective.²¹

New Plans for Intelligence.

New estimates for the Naval Intelligence Service were made in June 1940 after detailed research and a series of conferences with District

20. DNI Conf. ltr., Serial 054216 (Op-16-X(SC)A16/EN3-10,00/EN3-10 Mobilization) dated 22 Apr. 1940. Subj. "Principal Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plan (General)."
21. CNO Conf. ltr., Serial 060116 (Op-16-X(SC)A16/EN3-10, 00/EN3-10 Mobilization) dated 24 Apr. 1940. Subj. "Naval Intelligence Mobilization Organization and Personnel Needs."

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Intelligence officers. These new quotas represented recommendations for 252 more commissioned officers in the intelligence reserve than previously included in the complement. In respect to the estimates, the accompanying letter explained that "Of particular importance in this survey is the warrant grade. By using this grade it has been possible to insure an adequate personnel without taking in essential warrant types as commissioned officers. The survey has included all enlisted ratings found necessary, a factor not hitherto brought into the calculations."²² A number of factors were considered in preparing these new estimates, among them were the projects proposed by the Hepburn Board, the necessity of establishing a Naval Intelligence Investigative Service which heretofore had been overlooked and the establishment of the Potomac Area Command. In addition, were considered the coordination of intelligence activities abroad, in the Caribbean and in the South Pacific, the establishment of foreign espionage independent of foreign intelligence, and the coordination of the civil agencies concerned with Commerce and Travel of the Treasury Department, Labor Department and Commerce Department with the corresponding sections of Naval Intelligence. It was recommended that the personnel requirements shown under the Chief of Naval Operations be completely divorced from the district procurement quotas.

Status of Readiness of Intelligence, June 1940.

From this date, June 1940, until the declaration of war on 7 December, 1941, interest was concentrated on an over-all appraisal of Naval

22. CN [redacted] ltr., Serial 1636, Op-16-X 00/EN3-10, dated 6 June 1940. Subject: Mobilization Requirements-War Plans-Naval Intelligence Reserve Personnel." Appendix M.

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Intelligence mobilization and procurement as well as smoothing out rough spots. It will be recalled that in August 1939 a review of the problem of readiness was made by the Chairman of the General Board.²³ At that time it was reported that the Service was approaching adequacy as deficiencies in funds and personnel were being remedied. Now, almost a year later, 6 June 1940, a secret memorandum on the "Readiness of the Naval Establishment to meet a serious Emergency" was prepared by the Planning Division and submitted by the Director of Naval Intelligence to the Division of War Plans of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.²⁴

The report showed that, although "District Orange 8" plans were not in accordance with the new "System of War Planning" WPL-8, and with WEDNI-8, district plans were being revised and would necessitate little change in district organizations and requirements. Providing that requirements for personnel and material needed for M-Day, previously submitted to the procurement bureaus concerned were met, the intelligence organization would be sufficient and effective. However, additional officer and civilian personnel were needed for the office in Washington. The revised quota for reserve and retired officers, 2,128, was considered generous. On the date of this memorandum, 807 I-V(S) officers had been enrolled and 120 applications were pending. Enrollment was proceeding at the rate of 25 per month. This rate, it was observed, could be accelerated to perhaps 175 per month if conditions warranted. In respect to security

23. See Part I, p. 31.

24. DNI Secret Memo (Op-16-X(SC)A16-1) dated 21 May 1940. Subj. "Readiness of the Naval Establishment to Meet a Serious Emergency" with enclosures. Appendix N.

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against subversive activities, Naval Intelligence was cooperating with the various units of the Navy and with other government agencies, especially with the Military Intelligence and the F.B.I. In general, it was concluded that the Division's operating plans were considered sufficient and effective to execute the task assigned in Basic War Plans. In commenting on this report on 10 June 1940, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral W.S. Anderson, said:

"Given the personnel and material required for M-Day, we can carry on. The present personnel situation in the districts is favorable and satisfactory. Additional personnel and funds are required here in ONI now and I believe these will be forthcoming shortly. We have at present no intelligence network abroad other than Naval Attaches. When and if the need for 'agents' appears, I believe we can handle the situation. Our plan and organization for combating espionage and subversive activities at home are progressing continuously. We are constantly considering new 'fields' and methods for 'tightening up'."25

It will be seen that at this relatively early date, a year and one half before hostilities actually commenced, ONI felt itself to be in a fair state of readiness. The acute problem was the question of procurement of suitable personnel which would be of a sufficiently high type to meet the needs. How this challenge was met will be presently shown.

Qualifications for Naval Reserve Intelligence Officers.

Qualifications for naval reserve officers, and more especially, standards for those special service officers assigned to intelligence duties and designated as Class I-V(S) were first promulgated in the "Bureau of

25. DNI Conf. Memo for Admiral King (Op-16-X) dated 10 June 1940. Subj. "Are we Ready-state of readiness of ONI." Appendix O.

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Navigation Manual" in 1925. The manual was corrected from time to time and a revised edition issued in 1940. It is now known as the "Bureau of Personnel Manual." According to the regulations in their latest form only persons who were male citizens of 17 or over were eligible for duty in the naval reserve. If accepted, they were obligated to serve in the Navy in time of war or in the event of a national emergency.²⁶

In the case of the volunteer reserve (Special Service), which included those assigned to intelligence, candidates were required to hold a professional or scientific degree from a recognized institution, or to have had a minimum of two years college credits, or to have had professional experience in lieu of a degree and were those who had gained sufficient professional prominence to be considered especially qualified for a specific mobilization assignment.²⁷

Certain other character qualifications were required of intelligence officer candidates in view of the highly confidential nature of the material with which they were obliged to deal. These qualifications included broadness of outlook, familiarity with public events and international affairs, social understanding, imagination, reliability, tact, force, enterprise, perseverance and loyalty. In addition, the candidate was required to have intellectual background suitable to Service requirements, versatility, adaptability, clean-cut Americanism, professional ability, sobriety under strain, and, lastly, an unimpeachable record.²⁸

26. Bureau of Navigation Manual, Article H-2101.

27. Bureau of Navigation Manual, Article H-2301.

28. Bureau of Navigation Manual, Article H-2308.

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Besides these standards of character and general ability, candidates were obliged to possess types of experience which would fit them for one of four or more main classifications which would determine their specific service within the Naval Intelligence Division. These four fields and the background in addition to the general Reserve requirements were as follows:

Administration (within Naval Intelligence): College degree, having specialized economics, business administration, or a straight bachelor of arts or science degree. Business experience as an executive, junior executive, or administrative assistant with some Federal Government agency or large recognized private business organization. Experience as a personnel or assistant personnel officer.

Domestic Intelligence: College degree, having specialized in law, bachelor of science or arts degree. Business experience as an investigator with such Federal Government agencies as Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Treasury, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Immigration or Naturalization Service, and Bureau of Steamboat Inspection of Department of Commerce. Experience as an insurance investigator or claims adjuster.

Foreign Intelligence: College degree, having specialized in foreign service, economics or history. Business experience in shipping and steamship operation, United States Diplomatic or Consular Service, Foreign and Domestic Commerce of United States State Department, importing and exporting business, foreign representatives of American business firms. In addition, it is desirable that applicants for this particular branch of

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the Naval Intelligence Service possess linguistic ability in at least one foreign language and a good knowledge of various foreign countries, acquired by actual residence abroad.

Fleet Intelligence: College degree, having specialized in journalism, law or history. Business experience in journalism, the practice of law, or as a college preparatory school professor. An elementary knowledge of plotting and the use of charts is also desirable.

Age requirements for I-V(S) officers differed from those in the general Reserve.²⁹ In the beginning, the age bracket was from 21 years to 44 years. However, on 1 September 1942 these limits were modified to be from 28 to 44 years. The directive stated that "Candidates under 28 years of age who are not physically qualified for sea duty may be recommended by the Director and will be given consideration provided their disqualifying defect is waived by the Bureau of Naval Personnel."³⁰ In December 1942 another change in age was effected so that candidates between the ages of 28 and 30 years were to be accepted only if the individual was particularly well qualified.³¹

Method of Procuring Intelligence Reserve Officers.

The task of intelligence officer procurement had been placed from the beginning in the hands of the commandants of the naval districts with applications and processing of commissions under the more immediate jurisdiction of the district intelligence officers. Revised minimum quotas

29. ~~Naval~~ Naval Officer Procurement Circular ltr., No. 8-42, dated 18 Mar. 1942.

30. ~~Naval~~ Pers Procurement Directive No. 29-42, Pers-364-WDJ ON 23(52), dated 1 Sept. 1942.

31. Procurement Directive No. 98-42, Pers-363-bcl. ON 23(127), dated 23 Dec. 1942.

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for naval reserve procurement in the districts in all classes including I-V(S) were set by the Bureau of Navigation in 1940.³² Because of approaching conditions of readiness on 18 July 1941 commandants were directed to effect the minimum procurement of officers in Class I-V(S) in the district quotas as promptly as possible. At the same time it was stated that top priority would be given the handling of these applications.³³ Quotas were established for the Office of Naval Intelligence as well as for the districts. In December 1941 the Bureau of Navigation announced that commandants of naval districts were to forward all reserve officer applications to Washington without regard for district mobilization billets or previously assigned district quotas.³⁴

At this time the many reserve officers needed made it evident that the manner of procurement was unwieldy in the face of the new conditions which prevailed. Although immediately after the declaration of war, there were large numbers of applicants for intelligence commissions, many of those who applied lacked the desired qualifications. In January 1942 the Chief of Naval Operations issued a letter, prepared by the Personnel Section of ONI, stressing the urgent requirements of the Intelligence Service for well-qualified officers.³⁵ However, in some naval districts there was such a mass of intelligence applications pending that persons were discouraged from applying. The Senate Committee on Naval Affairs in a public document explained that there were no openings for commissions

32. Par. 2 Naval Reserve Multiple Address Letter 9-40, dated Feb. 1940.

33. BuNav Conf. ltr., Nav-131-CT, dated 18 July 1941.

34. Naval Reserve Multiple Address Letter, No. 124-41, dated 24 Dec. 1941.

35. CNO ltr., Op-16-A-2b, QR/EN3-11, Serial No. 0313416, dated 30 Jan. 1942.

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in the Intelligence Service.³⁶ Contrasting with this opinion is the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations dated February 19th concerning the following statement: that persons applying at district personnel offices had been informed that no more applications were being accepted for I-V(S) appointments. CNO declared..."It is requested that no such statements be made to any applicants, no matter if the particular candidate is undesirable....It is desired to maintain civilian interest in applying for commissions in I-V(S) at all times to permit the selection of the best qualified candidates to fill the many remaining war billets."³⁷

The general question of reserve officer procurement became so acute that a new system had to be devised so that the mechanics of prospecting, selecting and processing applications could be speeded up and made more efficient. For this reason, on 17 February 1942, the Secretary of the Navy directed that there be established as soon as possible in each continental naval district under the direct supervision of the Bureau of Navigation and separate from the naval district headquarters, one or more officers charged with the paramount duty of the procurement of naval officers; that an officer having the title of "Officer of Naval Officer Procurement" be detailed to each main office to assume the duties, responsibilities and authority formerly exercised by the commandants of the districts.³⁸

With reference to the special methods used in locating prospects and selecting applicants for intelligence reserve commissions it is pertinent

36. Committee on Naval Affairs - U.S. Senate, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, Jan. 19, 1942, No. 2.

37. CNO ltr., QR3/ND, Serial No. 592516, dated Feb. 19, 1942.

38. Bureau of Navigation Circular ltr., No. 28-42, dated 18 Feb. 1942.

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to describe the practices used for all reserve officers as outlined by an important directive issued in March 1942.³⁹ In large communities the naval officer procurement officer contacted local civilian committees and received from them lists of prospects. Approaches were also made to commercial clubs and fraternal organizations, colleges, as well as to universities and industries. With these initial contacts, a follow-up procedure of correspondence was pursued by means of individual letters to likely prospects. Another advantage of the new system was the opportunity presented for a direct channel to procurement offices when bureaus or offices had needs for a specific type of officer. Requests could be sent to the Bureau of Navigation who notified district procurement offices at once by teletype concerning these special needs.

When an applicant for an intelligence commission appeared at the procurement office, he filled out a preliminary form, and was then processed by an interviewer who could tell immediately whether he was a potential officer. The next step was a preliminary physical examination. When the candidate had reached that stage, he was given a formal application and told to get a complete physical examination. If this proved that the applicant was satisfactory, he filled out an extensive questionnaire (known as ONI 1-F). One of these was forwarded to the district intelligence officer who directed a complete investigation of the candidate which might require a month or more. Meanwhile, a duplicate copy of the form ONI 1-F was sent to the Bureau of Personnel via the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

39. BuNav Naval Officer Procurement Circular Letter No. 8-42, dated 18 Mar. 1942.

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Frequently in the early days of this system complaints were made that applications for intelligence commissions required an unusually long time to be approved. Two improvements were made which considerably accelerated the process. In May 1942 the Chief of Naval Operations directed that an intelligence officer be detailed to each of the officer procurement offices to assist in interviewing and determining the qualifications of I-V(S) applicants.⁴⁰ A month later a special intelligence officer, already charged with the duty of passing on the qualifications of applicants for intelligence appointments in the Division of Naval Intelligence, was assigned for duty in BuPers to process these applications. This officer was given additional duties as liaison officer with the Division of Naval Intelligence in connection with the planning for procurement of Class I-V(S) personnel.⁴¹

Procurement of Intelligence Officers.

It was early anticipated that the high standard of qualifications for intelligence officers would make this classification a difficult one to fill. Despite this fact, throughout 1940 and 1941 enrollment of Class I-V(S) officers continued at a steady rate. By 7 December 1941, there were 1,835 intelligence officers on active duty. Although this number was short of the rather generous quota of 2,128 officers specified by War Plans for the over-all ONI organization for that date, it was sufficient to meet the requirements of the moment. Enrollment continued but was especially accelerated in March 1942, so that for a time 300 to 400

40. BuPers ltr., Pers 36-LG, QR/Pl4-2(1495), dated May 19, 1942.
41. VCNO ltr., Op-16-A-6, OO/EN3-10(Mob) Serial 2723016, dated 26 June 1942.

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Appointments were effected each month. This acceleration, as will be presently noted, soon came to an end. At the same time, physically qualified I-V(S) officers were being released for sea duty. Fortunately, because of the previous close scrutiny to which I-V(S) candidates had been submitted, it was necessary to discharge or release only less than 1/2 of 1 per cent.⁴²

On 1 September 1942 the Chief of Naval Personnel announced that during the fiscal year 900 men were needed for domestic intelligence duties and that it was desirable that these men have investigating experience in some government agency. In lieu of the latter, experience as an insurance investigator or claim adjuster in a private firm was desirable. Persons within the age bracket of 28 to 44 were desired, although officers not physically qualified for sea duty were given consideration provided their disqualifying defect was waived by BuPers.⁴³ By this time (the fall of 1942), the commencement of the Wave officer and enlisted program was beginning somewhat to reduce the shortage.⁴⁴

Discontinuance of ONI Procurement.

It was now evident that the quotas for intelligence personnel both in the districts and in ONI proper were being filled, although simultaneously officers were being detached from intelligence for various reasons. In this connection, the Director of Naval Intelligence, acting through the Chief of Naval Operations, registered a protest to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation against this practice of detaching Class I-V(S)

42. Cox, Lt. Comdr. T.G., Jr. Secret "History of the Division of Naval Intelligence," 1944, p. 53.

43. BuPers Procurement Directive No. 29-42, Pers-364-WDJ ON23 (52), dated 1 Sept. 1942.

44. Cox Ibid. p. 53.

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officers and assigning them to other offices or bureaus entirely outside the scope of their training. It was pointed out that procurement for these officers was such an extended process that when finally appointed, the Intelligence Organization should be permitted to retain them as long as their services were desired.⁴⁵

Early in March 1943 steps were taken by the Commander-in-Chief to conserve military manpower, and in so doing cut down in any further expansion in certain branches of the Navy. This decision took the form of a letter from Admiral King to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 8 March 1943, explaining that, "...I have come to the conclusion that certain military activities are now adequately manned to meet all essential requirements and that we should not expand these activities beyond their present strength, both officer and enlisted." He further stated in more specific terms that expansion of personnel would be stopped in Naval Intelligence, Public Relations, and Photography (except that required for combat units).⁴⁶ This recommendation was concurred in by the Secretary of the Navy who noted that he thoroughly approved and continued "...From now on, there should be no increase permitted in the personnel employed in the three departments named. Wherever possible, a reduction should be made."⁴⁷ The decision was reiterated on 13 March by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations who explained that there would be no further increase in personnel employed in any division or other activity

45. CNO ltr., (Op-16-A-2-b, QR3/EN3-10). Serial 538716, dated 18 Feb. 1942.

46. Cominch ltr., FF 1/P16-1/LL Serial 1429, dated 8 Mar. 1943.

47. SecNav. dated 9 Mar. 1943.

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of CNO except under circumstances involving an urgent need.⁴⁸

More detailed information on the matter of the discontinuance of intelligence procurement was contained in a directive from the Director of Naval Intelligence. This directive called attention to an order from the Bureau of Personnel asking that it be notified where reductions in officer and enlisted personnel could be effected. Furthermore, it was requested that ONI be allowed to procure I-V(S) personnel on a limited scale for the specific purpose of replacement. Such replacements would be for the young officers released for sea duty and for those transferred or lost to the Intelligence Service for other reasons. On the other hand, districts were to expect no future expansion with the exception of officers attending schools. Also, it was pointed out that all intelligence officers under 30; fit for sea duty, would be released except for those with linguistic talents or unusual qualifications of another type. In order to reallocate personnel, district intelligence officers were requested to make a survey of their organizations and to comment regarding the reduction of personnel.⁴⁹

On 9 April 1943 the Bureau of Personnel announced that no action could be taken on the Vice Chief of Naval Operations' request to allow a limited amount of I-V(S) procurement until the survey on reduction was completed and pending the "current" investigation looking into the structure of Naval Intelligence Organization.⁵⁰ Finally, not only was

48. VCNO Ltr., Op-10-B-Md Serial 22710, dated 13 Mar. 1943.

49. DNI Conf. Memo Op-16-A-6 P16-3/00/EN3-10, dated 25 Mar. 1943.
Serial No. 0694416.

50. BuPers ltr., Pers-3-HC, dated 9 Apr. 1943.

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the procurement of intelligence personnel stopped but on 30 April 1943, ONI was directed to make a reduction within its organization whereby personnel in Domestic Intelligence would be decreased by 41 per cent and the over-all personnel by 20 per cent. In accordance with this reduction, the Intelligence Organization was to be manned by the following number of officers and enlisted personnel:⁵¹

<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Personnel</u>
2,859	3,276

In order to show the trends in intelligence officer procurement at the beginning of the Declaration of Limited Emergency on 8 September 1939, again at the time of the Unlimited Emergency on 27 May 1941, on the Declaration of War and from that time to several months after the cessation of procurement in March 1943 the following figures are given:

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. Officers Enrolled</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>No. Officers Enrolled</u>
September 1939	736	December 1942	3,269
May 1941	1,173	January 1943	3,285
December 1941	1,835	March 1943	3,528
January 1942	2,073	April 1943	3,440
July 1942	2,319	July 1943	3,278
October 1942	2,870	November 1943	2,645

Summary of Procurement Problems of ONI Personnel.

Meanwhile, there had been outside criticism of the type of officer selected for the intelligence classification. In late December 1941 occasional articles appeared in the newspapers protesting that civilians chosen for intelligence commissions were selected for their social and business connections. In January 1942 the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs issued a pamphlet on "Information Regarding Personnel of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard" which explained that "Allegations to the

⁵¹. Cox Ibid. p. 53.

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effect that only applicants of wealth and fine social or scholastic backgrounds, and in a position to command influence, are given commissions, especially in the Intelligence Unit, are in the opinion of the Committee unfounded. The belief that favoritism exists in certain cases in obtaining commissions and sometimes, in obtaining waivers is, in our opinion due to the publicity that has been given a few isolated cases."⁵² Later, in May, the Office of Public Relations prepared a form letter which was sent by the Bureau of Personnel answering persons who criticized the Navy's methods of procurement.⁵³

It will be seen that there were a variety of problems involved in the procuring of intelligence officers. In planning in the pre-war years it was realized that the peculiar qualifications necessary for this type of officer and the large number of billets needed to be filled in a short time would lead to difficulties. In the report on ONI mobilization made in 1938 by Captain W.H. Kilpatrick previously mentioned, it was recommended that enlisted men, especially CPO's and warrants be used as extensively as possible in the Intelligence Division to relieve able-bodied officers eligible for sea duty. It was apparent that this was not generally done. The standards for officer classification were of such a high type that it was difficult to fill the billets. Another criticism made was that in procuring officers the naval districts too frequently set their own standards. Another point of view was that the value of officers was often determined on their fitting particular billets. These views are well summarized in the opinion of a regular Navy officer with

⁵² Committee on Naval Affairs. Ibid.

⁵³ Director, Office of Public Relations, ltr. 004-7(1937), dated 15 May 1942.

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long experience in the Naval Intelligence Service who wrote:

"...Instead of being measured by the standard of the 'good of the service as a whole,' too many candidates were measured by the yardstick of whether they would be congenial to the officer who by the mobilization plan would be their immediate superior. Another factor that caused trouble was a tendency on the part of districts to select new officers on the basis of political, social or club, or fraternity organizations. This tended to pervert loyalties from the service to leading individuals and cliques...

"...It is felt that in the pre-war days, too much emphasis was placed on determining the value of an officer for a specific billet in a specific area. It is submitted that an intelligence officer well grounded in his work and in the Navy, can perform his duties well anywhere his services may be required."⁵⁴

B. FINAL WAR READINESS OF OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

As explained in the foregoing section, Naval Intelligence devoted special efforts to completing various phases of mobilization during 1938. It will be recalled that the next important step was the promulgation by the Chief of Naval Operations on the 24th of April 1939 of the basic requirements for organizing and manning Naval Intelligence in the districts and outlying naval stations (See p. 40). As far as the headquarters organization of ONI was concerned, the Office was in a partial state of readiness with most sections in operation. The exceptions were Censorship (Op-16-D), Commerce and Travel (Op-16-B-5) and Plant Protection (Op-16-B-6), which were purposely maintained in an inactive state during peacetime.

54. Memo from Capt. W.S. Wharton, Op-16-B-7 to Deputy Director of ONI, dated 27 Dec. 1943.

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When the President declared a Limited National Emergency to exist on 8 September 1939, the Chief of Naval Operations defined what the overall Naval Intelligence organization and personnel would be on complete mobilization. The purpose of this directive was to submit an organizational diagram for the intelligence establishments of the naval districts and to instruct the districts to proceed promptly with the final enrollments of personnel. District intelligence officers were given authorization to establish outlying or zone offices.⁵⁵ Another move indicative of the state of preparedness at this time was the establishment of a Washington office for the intelligence officer of the Potomac and Severn River Naval Command.

Even more significant was the development which came six months later. For it was on 17 March 1941 that the Chief of Naval Operations called for an advanced state of readiness for the naval districts. Commandants were ordered "to give this question immediate consideration with respect to the Naval Intelligence Service, submitting requests for additional officers, enlisted and civilian personnel." Also, requests for authority were to be submitted for establishing zone offices.⁵⁶

The action of March was followed by a further call to prepare. This took the form of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy on 19 May 1941, directed to all district commandants. It stated that should mobilization be declared, it might be the signal for a widespread outbreak of sabotage as well as for an acceleration in the efforts of subversive and

55. GNO Conf. ltr., Op-16-X 00/EN3/10(mob)(SC) A16/EN3-10, Serial 2020, dated 8 Sept. 1939.

56. GNO Conf. ltr., Op-16-B A3X/ND, Serial 0177616, dated 17 Mar. 1941.

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espionage groups. In view of such a likelihood, Naval Intelligence mobilization should occur in advance of mobilization for the whole naval establishment. For that reason, the expansion of the Naval Intelligence Service was to proceed in a "progressive and orderly manner, with the exception of the Censorship Branch, until a state of readiness equal to that of mobilization is reached."⁵⁷ The President declared an Unlimited Emergency on 27 May 1941. On the same day the head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch issued a directive to the branch, referring to the previous directive of 19 May on readiness and explaining that the expansion of the district intelligence organizations would result in an increased work load for the Domestic Intelligence Branch and that it would be necessary to keep pace with this district expansion by a similar expansion of the Domestic Intelligence Branch. In order that the branch might be better prepared for increased activity more enlisted and civilian personnel were requested.⁵⁸

Further apprehension of a swift and unexpected move on the part of subversive forces was shown in a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations sent to naval district commandants on 1 April 1941. This dispatch ordered naval intelligence personnel to maintain special watches on Saturdays and Sundays and on the national holidays of the Axis powers as those nations had in the past begun activities on those days.⁵⁹

Between the declaration of the Unlimited Emergency on 27 May 1941

SecNav Conf. ltr., Op-16-1(SC) A3-1/ND Serial 0329116, dated 19 May 1941.

58. Op-16-B Conf. ltr., Serial 0385816, dated 27 May 1941.

59. OpNav Conf. Dispatch 012358 of Apr. 1941

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and the Declaration of War on 7 December a number of important organizational developments took place in the Division of Naval Intelligence including the opening of the three sections, Commerce and Travel, Plant Protection, and Censorship, which had remained inactive heretofore. On 1 June, ONI assumed responsibility for surveys of private plants engaged in naval classified contracts. At the same time, the Plant Inspection Section (B-6), was expanded and civilian agents hired and trained for the work. A month later the Secretary of the Navy ordered ONI to participate in the activities of the Interdepartmental Visa Committees and B-5 personnel were assigned for the purpose. About this time the Japanese Language School was established at Boulder, Colorado. In October, personnel security was expanded to cover all employees of private plants engaged in naval classified contracts.⁶⁰ In October, also, the Special Intelligence Section, 16-F-9, and the corresponding Division in the Military Intelligence Division were made responsible for the interrogation and handling of prisoners of war.

By this time the over-all organization of the Division of Naval Intelligence was in such an active state of preparedness that when the Declaration of War was promulgated on 7 December no further changes had to be made to conform to existing conditions. However, two developments took place a few days thereafter. On 16 December, Plant Security (B-6) was transferred from CNI to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and on the following day all Public Relations matters were shifted from the jurisdiction of CNO to the Secretary of the Navy under a Director of Public Relations.⁶¹

60. Cox Ibid.
61. Cox Ibid.

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Status of Division of Naval Intelligence.

With the Navy functioning under wartime conditions, the Division of Naval Intelligence faced its first real performance test. In the months succeeding 7 December 1941, although no radical changes were yet made in the organization, the tide of events brought forth new problems with which it had to cope. As the need arose, new sections were created. A few of the more significant ones are mentioned here. In January 1942 the Identification and Characteristics Section was established with its purpose to collate data on appearances and characteristics of U.S. and foreign naval and merchant vessels and to disseminate such identification material. Another more important development at this time (12 January 1942) was the formation of the Fleet Intelligence Branch (Op-16-C) which included the Intelligence Center and the Information Center. Later, in June 1942, the designation was changed to Combat Intelligence Branch and 16-C-2 became the Publications Section.

In response to the demand for attention to the increasing numbers of foreign military and naval officials visiting the Navy Department and to help in handling matters of protocol for the Director, the Protocol and Reception Center, 16-F-12, was set up on 10 February 1942. In addition, this section had general supervision of United States naval officers preparing for intelligence duty abroad. Shortly thereafter, a number of internal changes took place in the Administrative Branch. On 29 May 1942 the sub-section (a-2b) which had been previously created to handle naval reserve enlisted personnel became Section A-6. On 5 August the Special Intelligence Section was removed from the Foreign

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Intelligence Branch, and established as the Special Activities Branch (16-Z) without change in its functions. Its functions included the obtaining, training and administering secret agents. In June this Section had assumed responsibility for information on captured enemy naval equipment. In connection with its work of developing a secret undercover intelligence service, it maintained liaison with the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and subsequently with the Office of Strategic Services when the former was absorbed by the latter. Another important function was added to ONI, when on 7 October 1942 the Special Warfare Branch (Op-16-W) was established with control over psychological warfare and bacteriological warfare. Among its tasks was the processing of naval intelligence for the confidential guidance of the Psychological Warfare Planning Board of the Overseas Branch of OWI, and the supplying of naval information to the Overseas Branch.

C. DELIMITATION OF ACTIVITIES AMONG GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

It was early realized that the complex functions of Naval Intelligence would bring it into close relationship with other branches of the government but more particularly with the Military Intelligence Division of the Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Strategic Services (formerly the Office of the Coordinator of Information). Of less importance were the intelligence and investigative agencies of the State Department, Treasury Department and Department of Commerce. In this connection, it is to be remembered, that the mission of ONI specifically states that information is to be collected, evaluated,

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and disseminated "utilizing to the maximum extent practicable the services of other agencies of the Government."⁶²

In the pre-war period thought had been given to plans for a unified government intelligence service. On 8 April 1929, Glenn Howell (Comdr.), then district intelligence officer of the Third Naval District, in a letter to the Director of Naval Intelligence mentioned such a plan for a unified service and explained that the idea had been initiated by a Mr. Gade of the F.B.I. The letter mentioned that the scheme "proposes that the various intelligence units of the government be left intact exactly as they are now but that they may be considered as spokes of a wheel, the hub of which is a Central Intelligence. Into this Central Intelligence pours all information from the various spokes — Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Secret Service, Department of Justice, Department of Commerce. This is roughly the British system as he understands it..."⁶³

While preparations for war were reaching their final stages, the question of overlapping functions and conflicting jurisdiction arose among the various government investigative agencies. The first official action taken on this situation was a confidential memorandum from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, dated 26 June 1939 and addressed to the Secretaries of the State, Treasury, War, Navy, Commerce and the Attorney General and the Postmaster General, declaring that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters was to be

62. [redacted] ltr., to CNO June 1945. Subject: Division of Naval Intelligence, Organization and Function of. (Prepared by Op-16-A-8)
63. Conf. ltr. from DIO, Third N.D. to Director Naval Intelligence dated 8 Apr, 1929 in War Plans File (Op-16-X).

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controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies were to function as a committee to coordinate their activities. Furthermore, the letter stated that no investigations were to be conducted by any investigative agency into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counter-espionage or sabotage except by the three branches mentioned above.⁶⁴

Supplementing this Presidential memorandum, was a directive from J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to all law enforcement officers and dated 6 September 1939, quoting a formal statement from the President to the effect that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was to handle investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations. In order that the task might be conducted in a comprehensive and effective manner on a national basis, all law enforcement officers were requested to turn over promptly to the nearest FBI representative all information on the above fields.⁶⁵

The first formal agreement delimiting the counter-intelligence functions of Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was titled "Proposal for Coordination" and was signed by the heads of these agencies on 5 June 1940.⁶⁶ In connection

64. Memo from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, dated 26 June 1939. See Appendix P.

65. Ltr. from J. Edgar Hoover to All Law Enforcement Officers dated 6 Sept. 1939. Appendix Q.

66. Conf. Memo "Proposal For Coordination of FBI, ONI and MID" signed by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson and John Edgar Hoover, dated 5 June 1940. Appendix R.

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with the statement on spheres of responsibility, it explained that the responsible agency was not alone interested or would not necessarily work alone in that field. "Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity," it was stated. Briefly expressed, FBI was to be responsible for all investigations of espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage involving civilians in the United States and in territories with certain exceptions. This agency was to act as the coordinating head of all civilian organizations furnishing information relating to subversive movements. Furthermore, FBI was to assume responsibility for the investigation of all cases in the above categories directed from foreign countries when the State, War and Navy Departments specifically requested investigation. The Military Intelligence Division of the Army was to handle investigation of cases in the military establishment, including civilians employed on military reservations or under military control. It was also expected to assume responsibility for the investigation of cases involving citizens in the Canal Zones, the Republic of Panama and the Philippine Islands. The Office of ONI was to investigate and dispose of cases in the naval establishment including civilians under naval employ or control and all civilians in Guam and American Samoa. Also, FBI was to keep the other two agencies informed of developments affecting plants engaged in Army or Navy contracts, developments affecting important utilities, developments affecting critical points of transportation or communication systems, cases of actual or strongly presumptive espionage or sabotage.⁶⁷

⁶⁷. Conf. Memo "Proposal for Coordination", ibid.

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There were no changes in the agreement described above for almost two years which represented a critical and important period for the organizations involved. However, on 9 February 1942 a revision of the original delimitation agreement was made. This revision was promulgated throughout the Navy with a covering letter signed by Vice Admiral F.J. Horne, Acting Chief of Naval Operations on 18 February 1942.⁶⁸ General terms of the spheres of responsibility for each of the agencies remained the same except for the addition of conditions for operation under Periods of Martial Law, Periods of Predominant Military Interest Not Involving Martial Law, and Periods of Normal Conditions. This document was the authoritative one for the remainder of the war period, determining areas of control of the three major intelligence agencies as they are now organized and conducted.

FBI and DNI relations.

Despite these agreements, friction arose between ONI officers and representatives of the other war intelligence agencies but especially with FBI agents in the field. On 9 December 1942 the heads of MIS, ONI and FBI issued a joint letter to "Directors of Intelligence Service Commands, District Intelligence Officers, and Special Agents in Charge" calling attention to instances of friction between the three services and stating "It is the desire of the Directors of the three intelligence agencies that a mutual feeling of cooperation exist among the individual representatives in the field." Reference was made to the delimitation

68. [redacted] Ltr., CNO(SC)A8-5, Op-16-B-1, A3-1/A8-5, Serial 0364716, Subj. Delimitation Agreement Revised Feb. 9, 1942, dated 18 Feb. 1942. See Appendix S.

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agreement as a working agreement intended to be of benefit to each of the subscribing agencies and devised to eliminate friction. It was urged that representatives apply its terms locally in a sensible manner to each situation. Representatives were warned that any attitude other than a cooperative one would not be tolerated.⁶⁹

After the promulgation of the letter just described, field relations between ONI and FBI improved. On the other hand, from the very beginning, relations between the Washington headquarters of both these agencies had been cordial and mutually productive. Close contact was maintained between the Investigation Section (B-3) of ONI and the corresponding division of FBI. Particularly helpful to the Navy were the technical services of the latter including its fingerprint and identification sections, criminological detection laboratories and other facilities. Over the entire period a representative of FBI made daily visits to the Investigation Section of ONI and channeled requests for help and inquiries through the head of that section to other sections of ONI as well as to other bureaus and offices of the Navy.⁷⁰

Relations Between ONI and MID.

The first official liaison between the respective counter-intelligence sections of ONI and MID were established early in December 1942. Three Army officers were detailed from MID for regular duty in the following sections of ONI's Domestic Intelligence Branch: Investigations (B-3), Commerce and Travel (B-5) and Sabotage, Espionage and Counter-intelligence

69. ~~Ref.~~ "Joint Letter" from Directors of MIS, ONI, FBI, dated 9 Dec. 1942.

70. Conversation with Comdr. Rhea Whitley, Head B-3, 15 Aug. 1945.

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(B-7). Simultaneously three naval officers from those sections were detailed to the counterparts of those sections in the Military Intelligence Service.⁷¹ Although the B-7 liaison was discontinued in early 1944 and the one with B-5 in March 1944, the liaison with B-3 existed till the end of the war, with a naval representative on duty in MID.

Of necessity the over-all relationships between the Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff, G-2, and the Division of Naval Intelligence were close, since the tasks of these two great services were so nearly parallel in the course of the war. In addition to the counter-intelligence liaison described above, there was maintained a general liaison between the two organizations. Although there had been much informal contact, the first official relations were established on 19 April 1942 when Rear Admiral Neil B. Nichols, USN(R) was named by the Division of Naval Intelligence as its liaison officer with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. His office was set up in the Munitions Building where MID was then located. Due to his ill health Admiral Nichols served in that capacity for only one month.⁷² On 1 July 1942 Captain Robert Henderson, USN(R), then on duty in the Industrial Incentive Section of the Navy's Office of Public Relations, was transferred to the vacant post.⁷³ Some months after this appointment, the title was changed from "ONI Liaison Officer" to "Representative of ONI with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2."

71. [redacted] Biographical report "Conference of Commerce and Travel Section Heads, Navy Dept. Washington, D.C., Dec. 14-19, 1942."

72. [redacted] Personal Jacket of Rear Admiral Neil B. Nichols, USN(R) ONI file room.

73. [redacted] Personal Jacket of Capt. Robert Henderson, USN(R) ONI file room.

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Fundamentally, this liaison office, first located in the Munitions Building as mentioned and later moved to the Pentagon Building on 28 September 1942, acted as an information bureau, maintaining a file of naval publications and answering questions received from the Army on naval activities. In November 1942 the personnel of the office was augmented by the addition of Ensign Frederick Holdsworth, Jr., who among his other duties was charged with the handling of secret dispatches routed from MIS to the Navy. One of the most important functions of the office was assisting officers in ONI or MID to reach the appropriate persons in the corresponding sections of each agency and perfecting the cooperation and collaboration between the two organizations. It was also responsible for arranging two other cooperative services.

The first of these was the assignment of an ONI officer, Ensign J.W. Woodburn, USNR, detailed from ONI's Intelligence Plot (then Op-16-C, later Op-16-FT), to make a daily submarine report at the morning situation presentation in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Second was the arrangement whereby another officer, Lt. (jg) Robert T. Bates, USNR, was detailed from ONI to serve on permanent duty with the Army's Order of Battle Section to represent the naval part of this activity. Another form of cooperation achieved by the ONI representative in MID was a series of lectures on naval strategy by top-ranking officers of the Navy before groups of G-2 officers. General aid was also rendered in effecting cooperation between the Domestic Intelligence Branch of ONI and its equivalent in MID, previously mentioned, and the liaison between the Foreign Intelligence sections of ONI and the Dissemination

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Unit of MID which will be described hereafter.⁷⁴

Despite its usefulness, the Office of the Representative of ONI was discontinued on 10 February 1944. The reason given for abolishing the post was the man power shortage, mentioned in a directive from the Director of Naval Intelligence.⁷⁵ On 24 February 1944 Captain Henderson assumed duties as Head of the Protocol and Liaison Section (Op-16-L), of the Division of Naval Intelligence.⁷⁶ In evaluating the work of this ONI representative, it should be pointed out that the Army used the services offered more frequently than did the Navy. One important accomplishment of the office was the bringing together of Army and Navy Intelligence officers. Up to this time ONI officers had not met their opposite numbers in MID. Another significant achievement was the aid consistently given the move to amalgamate the naval and military intelligence services which will be discussed later in this history. Especially helpful in this connection was the close relationship maintained between Captain Henderson and Maj. Gen. Strong, Head of G-2.⁷⁷

After the elimination of the functions performed by the ONI representative in MID, there was no over-all liaison between the two organizations with the exception of that carried on by the counter-intelligence and foreign intelligence sections (the latter to be mentioned later). However, after a few months, the Army, sensing the need for continued relationships between the two divisions, arranged through its Service

74. Conf. Memo from Liaison Officer to DNI, Subj. "Progress Report of Liaison Activities" dated 5 Jan. 1945. File of Op-16-L.

75. DNI ltr., Op-16-A-2 OR Henderson, R. A3-1/EN3-10, Serial 481316 dated 10 Feb. 1944.

76. Memo Asst. Dir. Services Group, Op-16-1-A OR/Henderson R. Serial 419416.

77. Conversation with Lt. Frederick Holdsworth, Jr. 16 Aug. 1945.

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Control Section of MID to provide a liaison officer who would spend a major portion of his time in ONI. In June 1944 Lt. Col. Cranwell, AUS, was chosen for this work, and was still active in it September 1945. His principal duties were to procure from the Navy Department information needed by the Army which would not come through the ordinary channels, to expedite important requests and to straighten out occasional difficulties. He rendered important service in establishing ONI's Technical Intelligence Center (Op-16-PT), and continued to maintain contact with that section. In addition to his specific assignment to ONI, this officer acted as general liaison in all Army and Navy matters.

This liaison did not always function smoothly, as is indicated by a memorandum from the Chief of the Washington Liaison Branch of MIS, Col. H.H. Mole, addressed to the Director of Naval Intelligence explaining that several instances had recently arisen in which officers of the Military Intelligence Division had requested information from ONI without clearing with the naval liaison officer, Lt. Col. Cranwell.⁷⁸ It was requested that in the future in order to prevent further similar occurrences ONI officers should not deal with MIS representatives who had not cleared with Lt. Col. Cranwell. In reply to this memorandum, the Deputy Director of ONI explained that the requested procedure was satisfactory for casual requests for specific items of information, but that as many desks and offices in ONI had enjoyed close and profitable working relationships with MIS such contacts should continue. Capt. Heard stated further that Lt. Col. Cranwell's services as expeditor and liaison for

78. [redacted] from Chief, Washington Liaison Branch, MIS MID 350.05 dated 7 Dec. 1944.

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new contacts and policy matters were entirely satisfactory; and concluded by asserting: "It is considered neither necessary nor desirable that liaison officers should serve as mandatory channels for normal traffic between parallel service activities."⁷⁹

Simultaneously with the general liaison there developed a special liaison between the Report Center of the Dissemination Unit of MID with the Foreign Intelligence Branch of ONI. The first officer assigned to this duty from ONI was Lt. (jg) William T. Lowry, USNR. His duties were to confer on the daily panel reviewing reports and information in order that a proper selection of such items of interest to the Navy could be made. He was to "determine not only what reports are of interest but the number needed for the proper dissemination within the Navy Department. He will maintain close and constant liaison with all bureaus and divisions of the Navy in order that a prompt and efficient service be maintained to the best interest of the war effort."⁸⁰

In June 1944 the MID Report Center, referred to above, became known as the "Reading Panel." At that time Lt. Col. Harry L. Smith, Chief of the Dissemination Unit of MID, wrote to the Director of Naval Intelligence, stating, "The reorganization of the functions of the Report Center, Dissemination Unit, into another activity affords an occasion to comment upon the cooperative way in which Lt. Lowry has performed his part-time daily liaison between ONI and MID. Lt. Lowry has served

79. [redacted] from Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence Op-16-1, A3-1/EN3-10/EN3-1, Serial 3720716, dated 22 Dec. 1944.

80. Enclosure (A) to Conf. Memo 16-1-F, Serial 62116, dated 31 Dec. 1943.

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for a period of nearly six months and has demonstrated valuable qualities as an intermediary."⁸¹

This important and mutually profitable liaison activity was assumed on 31 July 1944 by Lt. Harry M. Stanfield, USNR, when he relieved Lt. Lowry. In addition to his task of screening all reports reaching MID and determining the number of copies which should be prepared for distribution throughout the Division of Naval Intelligence, Lt. Stanfield also visited the various sections of ONI and kept them apprized of material which was of Navy interest.

D. MOVEMENTS FOR COORDINATION OF WAR INTELLIGENCE AMONG GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Apart from the important task of delimitation of activities among the principal counter-intelligence agencies and the liaison activities described, World War II brought forth several movements to coordinate the collection, evaluation and dissemination of all information for military and naval use. Attention will be focused in the following pages on the two chief movements started to clarify the intelligence situation. First, were the arrangements initiated to pool information of mutual interest which led eventually to the formation of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Although the latter organization was an entity, separate from the military and naval intelligence agencies, its policies were in part determined by them and its personnel derived from those sources. Second to be considered, were the steps taken to bring about

81 [redacted] from Lt. Col. Smith to DNI, MID 201, dated 7 June 1944.

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a merger of MIS, ONI and the Office of Strategic Services. In this case serious consideration was given to the amalgamation of these three agencies with the view to eliminate complications, reduce overlaps and improve the efficiency of the principal war intelligence groups. Although the actual merger never took place, a number of important developments have resulted. Among these were the various committees formed for liaison and mutual cooperation. In view of the fact that a final unification of ONI and MIS might be effected in the future, it is believed that the history of the negotiations leading toward it will prove useful.

Formation of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

During the spring of 1941 it was evident that much important intelligence was coming to the government through various channels but was not necessarily reaching the interested departments and bureaus upon which it often had an indirect but significant bearing. Concern over this situation was expressed in a letter from the Secretary of War, dated 15 April 1941 and addressed to the Secretary of the Navy as well as to the Secretaries of State and Commerce, the Liaison Officer for Emergency Management, the Administrator of Export Control, the Director General of the Office of Production Management and the Chairman of the Maritime Commission. This letter stressed the need for assuring that all such information reach the departments involved as promptly as possible. He suggested that a study be made for the purpose of drafting instructions to guarantee the prompt dissemination of this information. Each agency was asked to designate a representative to confer

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on the subject with the head of Military Intelligence, Brig. Gen.

Sherman Miles.⁸² In reply, the Secretary of the Navy through the Director of Naval Intelligence appointed Capt. C.A. Rood, Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, to represent the Navy and participate in discussions.

As the outcome of this initial action, a series of conferences were held. These resulted in a report of the various representatives submitted on 7 July.⁸³ It stated that the various policy-making agencies of the government should receive promptly such information as they required in the execution of their functions and that its security be safeguarded. Furthermore, it was recommended that existing channels of inter-agency liaison remain unchanged, that each agency be responsible for the dissemination and safeguarding of information within its own organization and that each agency assume the responsibility in determining what information would be disseminated to other agencies. In addition, the Departments of the Treasury, War, Navy, Agriculture and the Administrator of Export Control agreed to establish or designate within its own agency a single office for the exchange of information which bore upon or influenced governmental policy. The office would disseminate information to corresponding offices of other agencies concerned under proper safeguards and also within its organization.

82. Memo of the Secretary of War, WD 350.05(3-27-41)M-B, dated Apr. 15, 1941.

83. Conf. Memo of SecNav (SC) A8-1(A&N) Op-16-1 QC/Joint Intelligence Committee (4-15) Serial 0283916, dated 24 Apr. 1941.

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The Secretary of the Navy approved this recommendation, known as "The Joint Intelligence Committee Report" on 29 August 1941.⁸⁴ Shortly thereafter, the Division of Naval Intelligence was named as the Navy Department office for the exchange of information.⁸⁵

Paralleling the action described above was another development closely related to the events mentioned. On 14 July 1941 the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recommended the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Committee to serve the Joint Board.⁸⁶ This proposal, having been received and deliberated upon by the Joint Planning Committee, resulted in a report dated 10 September 1941, the recommendations of which were put into effect with the establishment shortly thereafter of the Joint Intelligence Committee. As outlined in the report, the status of the organization was to be co-equal with the Joint Planning Committee and its principal task was the preparation of daily summaries of military and related intelligence for the use of the President, the Secretaries of War and Navy and certain other high officials. In addition, it was to prepare such special information and intelligence studies as might be required.⁸⁷ Seven officers comprised the Committee's membership including four from MID and three from ONI, with the senior member acting as chairman. Five members served full time and one of these acted as secretary.

84. Encl. (A) to Conf. ltr., SecNav to CNO Op-16-1(SC)A8-1(A&N)QC Joint Intell. Com. Serial 059916, dated 29 Aug. 1941.

85. Conf. ltr., Acting Director, Naval Intelligence to Acting Chief of Staff, G-2, Op-16-1(SC)A8-1(A&N), dated 8 Sept. 1941.

86. Res. Memo Joint Intelligence Committee "Memorandum for Information No. 173" Evaluation of the JIC Charter, dated 17 Aug. 1945.

87. Joint Board No. 329, Serial 710, dated 10 Sept. 1941.

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It should be pointed out that the JIC was not a function of the Office of Naval Intelligence, though closely correlated with it. Shortly after its establishment, the offices of the Committee were set up in the main Navy Department building, adjacent to the offices occupied by ONI, and the short title, Op-16-J assigned to the unit. In a letter sent to all branch heads the Director of Naval Intelligence on 10 December 1941 explained that the new Committee would be largely dependent upon the Office of Naval Intelligence for information of naval origin. For that reason, the branch heads were asked to cooperate with the members of the Committee to provide whatever information they might request.⁸⁸

ONI Liaison with OSS.

In response to the need for a general agency of the government to collect and analyze strategic information as well as to carry on "Special Intelligence" activities, the Office of the Coordinator of Information was established by Presidential Order on 11 July, 1941. This order directed that the departments and agencies of the government should make available to the Coordinator of Information information relating to the national security. It was noted that nothing in the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator should interfere with the duties and responsibilities of the regular military and naval advisers of the President.⁸⁹

88. Ltr., Op-16-J QC/Joint Intelligence Committee A3-1/EN3-10 Serial 3309116, 10 Dec. 1941.

89. Memo from Acting Director of ONI, Op-16-1 EEL/Coordinator of Information, Serial 1933416, dated 16 July 1941.

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Immediately, the question of ONI cooperation and liaison with the Office of the Coordinator came into prominence. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Capt. A.G. Kirk, on 14 July 1941 submitted a series of recommendations on this problem to the Chief of Naval Operations. First, he pointed out that as the Office of the Coordinator was to be used by the Army and Navy and coordinated with their functions, the same methods of procedure should be used. It was important, he declared, that "the War and Navy Departments integrate their intelligence services so closely into the organization of the highest military advisory body, the Joint Board, that that body will be as well served in military intelligence as is the Coordinator." He recommended that the heads of Naval and Military Intelligence be the primary contacts for achieving liaison with the Coordinator, that certain officers of MID and ONI be assigned for special committee work or otherwise, that the Directors of MID and ONI be placed on the Joint Board, and finally that the intelligence services be represented on the Joint Planning Committee, or that otherwise a Joint Intelligence Committee be formed.⁹⁰ Eventually, the latter suggestion became a reality.

Shortly after Capt. Kirk's recommendations were submitted, Commander R.E. Webb, USN was appointed as ONI administrative liaison officer with the Office of the Coordinator of Information. All requests for information or data were to be sent through him, although it was desired that direct contact also be maintained between personnel in ONI

90. [redacted] Memo DNI to CNO. Subj: "Coordinator of Information, Liaison with."

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and those in the Office of the Coordinator.⁹¹ A month later, Lt. Comdr. A.D. Chandler became liaison officer. By October, 11 naval and two Marine Corps officers had been detailed by ONI to serve in the Coordinator's office.⁹² An indication of the importance attached by ONI to its liaison with the Coordinator is shown in a letter concerning the replacement of Lt. Comdr. Chandler as liaison officer by Lt. Comdr. J.L. Riheldaffer, USN(R) which stated that the duties of the liaison group were constantly increasing.⁹³

Special instructions were given ONI officers at this time regarding information provided to representatives of the Coordinator, urging the former to insure that "the Navy Department's evaluation and interpretation of the data is made clear...so that the compilation of similar data, and the preparation of the Coordinator's report, may not suffer from a lack of full appreciation of the Navy Department's evaluation."⁹⁴

In February 1942 the Director of Naval Intelligence saw fit to reissue instructions to his division concerning the functions of the liaison officer with the Office of the Coordinator. On 16 June 1942 the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a letter declaring that by Presidential directive, the Office of Strategic Services had been created to carry on all the functions of the Office of the Coordinator of Information, with the exception of the Coordinator's propaganda activities

91. [redacted] ltr., Op-16-A-EEL/Coordinator of Information, Serial 2104916, dated 19 Aug. 1941.

92. Administrative Liaison Officer with Office of Coordinator of Information, Op-16-A-a EEL/Coordinator of Information, Serial 2648416, dated 6 Oct. 1941.

93. Op-16-A ltr., from S.N. Moore to DNI, Op-16-A OR Riheldaffer, J.L. OO/Chandler, A.D., Serial 2832616, dated 17 Oct. 1941.

94. DNI ltr. to All Branch and Section Heads, Op-16 EEL/Coordinator of Information, Serial 2726116, dated 30 Oct. 1941.

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(Foreign Service Information) which were transferred to the Office of War Information.⁹⁵ The liaison relations with ONI remained as they had been established originally. By 1 February 1943 there were 56 naval and marine officers assigned to duty at OSS.

In a memorandum of 9 February 1943, the head of ONI's Special Activities Section (Op-16-Z), Cmdr. Riheldaffer, who was also liaison officer with OSS, made a resume of ONI relations with the former organization. He explained that every possible assistance had been given in providing OSS with the information it desired. However, there were three types which were withheld, namely (a) operational information, (b) reports, originated by non-naval activities unless with the permission of the originating agency and (c) reports, the reproduction of which is impossible due to limitations of facilities. He pointed out that "A lack of altogether clear definition of functions for OSS has complicated the handling of liaison....Moreover, even within OSS there has appeared, at times, a duplication of effort. The Research and Analysis Branch and the Special Activities Branch have each maintained a complete set of geographic desks with little or no interchange of information between them....Under the circumstances, it has been difficult for ONI to understand at times why they should have to go to the trouble of furnishing the same information to two or three people of the same agency....Finally, the difficulties have been caused where OSS is found to be engaged in activities that have been delegated to, and

⁹⁵ ONI Rest. Ltr., Op-16-F-9 A3-1/EN3-10 EEL/COI-OSS, Serial 2137116, dated 16 June 1942.

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are being carried on by other agencies, for here again the advisability of furnishing information already given parties normally responsible for action thereon comes into question."⁹⁶

Meanwhile, there existed a controversy concerning the jurisdiction and function of the Office of Strategic Services in which both the Army and Navy were involved. On 24 October 1942 the Chief of Staff, USA had issued to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (composed of military and naval representatives with the Director of OSS as chairman) a directive "to initiate a study and submit recommendations to the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff which will clearly define the functions of the several branches of the Office of Strategic Services."⁹⁷ The response to this took the form of a report which explained that a difference of opinion existed between a majority of the Committee and the chairman of the Committee.

A majority of the Committee believed that the Office of Strategic Services should be an organization on a comparable level with other agencies such as the Military Intelligence Service, Office of Naval Intelligence, Board of Economic Warfare, Federal Bureau of Investigation and other groups, heading up for intelligence matters pertinent to the military effort under the Joint Intelligence Committee, and heading up for other matters such as special operations and certain subsidiary activities under the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee. On the other hand, the chairman, Col. William J. Donovan, believed the Office of Strategic Services should be under the sole control and

96. [redacted] Memo Op-16-Z EE16/OSS, dated 9 Feb. 1943.
97. Secret J.P.W.C. 45/2 dated 17 Nov. 1942.

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Direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and whose operations, both in psychological warfare and intelligence should be conducted along the lines indicated in J.P.W.C. 50.⁹⁸

Briefly stated, Col. Donovan believed that the processing of OSS material through the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and through the Joint Intelligence Committee on the way to the Joint Chiefs of Staff was too cumbersome and slow and for that reason he considered that OSS should work directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He proposed to eliminate the J.P.W.C. and in its place set up within the OSS a Planning Group for supervising and coordinating as a joint medium joint intelligence, counter-intelligence and psychological warfare.⁹⁹

Two opinions of high-ranking naval officers were undoubtedly partly responsible for the final outcome of this heated controversy, namely the over-ruling of Col. Donovan's recommendation for a Planning Group within his organization. The Assistant Chief for Plans for the Navy, Rear Admiral C.W. Cooke, Jr. expressed his views in the form of a secret letter to Admiral Ernest J. King, dated 21 November 1942. This statement was highly important in its interpretation of the problem and, especially in its recommendations. In it Admiral Cooke wrote "At the present time there appears to be considerable over-lapping of the intelligence work of ONI, MIS and OSS. The thought has been expressed that duplication of intelligence work is desirable in that one service will complement and corroborate the information of the other. I believe,

98. Secret J.P.W.C. 45/2, dated 17 Nov. 1942.

99. Secret Memo from Admiral Train to Vice Admiral Willson, dated 23 Nov. 1942.

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however, that much of the duplication is unprofitable and undesirable....

I recommend that ONI, MIS and OSS be brought together in the Office of War Intelligence which will include Army officers, naval officers and civilians."¹⁰⁰

Rear Admiral Harold C. Train in a letter of 23 November 1942 to Vice Admiral Russell Willson expressed another view on the same problem when, in writing on the subject of the proposed Planning Group within the Office of Strategic Services, he commented that it seemed basically unsound that such a group, composed of scholars, assemble, analyze, and present all available information necessary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to formulate their decisions on military matters.¹⁰¹ "I feel that 'the tools used by soldiers should be made by them'", he wrote. Furthermore, in regard to the strategic intelligence service under the directions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which it was proposed that the OSS establish, Admiral Train believed the organization ill-equipped to perform that function. If the scheme was adopted, it would make the intelligence services of the Army and Navy adjuncts of the OSS. In conclusion, he stated that it was essential to have a check on the Office of Strategic Services. It would be better, he suggested, that the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee or the Joint Intelligence Committee be organizations for channeling activities, rather than that the OSS have recourse direct to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners.

~~Secret~~ Memo from Rear Admiral C.M.Cooke, Jr., to Admiral King, dated 21 Nov. 1942.

101. Secret ltr., Op-16 Rear Admiral H.C. Train to Vice Admiral Russell Willson, dated 23 Nov. 1942.

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Steps Toward a Merger of ONI and MID.

Undoubtedly, the recommendation of Rear Admiral Cooke referred to above was the major factor in starting the first official step to provide a unified war intelligence service. This move took the form of a memorandum from Admiral King to General Marshall proposing that each of them issue identical directives to the heads of their intelligence services requesting surveys on "ways and means" of merging intelligence activities so that duplications could be eliminated and that headway might be made toward a unified intelligence agency. He stated further that in the beginning stages of the move, "it would be well for agreement to be reached whereby ONI and MIS each undertake certain functions on behalf of both activities. I would expect this survey to lead in the direction of a unified intelligence agency which could be called Joint Intelligence Agency."¹⁰²

General Marshall replied on 25 November 1942 that he agreed "wholeheartedly" with the suggestion for a survey and a report, declaring that "an intelligent approach to this problem should produce a plan which will eliminate duplication and secure more effective results." He added that Maj. Gen. Strong (Head of G-2) had been chosen to represent the Army in the survey and that he had been directed to consult with the Head of ONI as the Navy's representative.¹⁰³

Two working committees were at once appointed, one by MIS and the other by ONI to make plans for the merger. These committees were as follows:

102. [redacted] Cominch to General Marshall, dated 22 Nov. 1942.

103. [redacted] Str., from Chief of Staff, USA to Admiral King, dated 25 Nov. 1942.

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MTS

ONI

Col. R. S. Bratton, Chairman
Col. Thos. J. Betts
Col. Thos. E. Roderick
Col. John T. Bissell
Col. Richard C. Jacobs
Maj. John M. Kemper, Secretary

Capt. A.V.S. Pickhardt, Chairman
Capt. V.E. Korn
Comdr. N.M. Pigman
Capt. J.B.W. Waller
Comdr. E.A. Hayes
Lt. Comdr. T.G. Cox, Secretary

Special Members

Col. Carter W. Clarke (SIS)
Col. Chas. Y. Banfill (Mil.
(Intel. Tr.)

Lt. Comdr. Kramer
Lt. Comdr. Coggins
Lt. Comdr. Condon¹⁰⁴

As a result of several meetings held by the committees listed above, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Director of Naval Intelligence on 6 December 1942 submitted to General Marshall and Admiral King a joint memorandum incorporating preliminary recommendations for a Joint Intelligence Agency. It suggested that such an agency comprise all intelligence activities of the Army and Navy and of other intelligence agencies at that time under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This would include the Office of Strategic Services with the exception of its secret intelligence activities necessary for the discharge of its special operations. It also recommended that the merged organizations be housed under one roof.¹⁰⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 December 1942 agreed that these recommendations be approved as constituting an ultimate objective but that the attainment of this objective should be accomplished gradually. Furthermore, the heads of the two intelligence divisions were to submit a detailed directive covering the organization and functions of

104. Memo for Capt. Korn from Lt. T.G. Cox, Jr. (Op-16-X) dated 26 Nov. 1942.

105. Secret Memo from Gen. Strong and Rear Admiral Train, dated 6 Dec. 1942. Subj: Joint Intelligence Agency. Later this document became J.C.S. 163.

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the Joint Intelligence Agency.¹⁰⁶

On 15 March 1943, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Director of Naval Intelligence presented a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlining what had already been accomplished toward merging the two intelligence services. These results were as follows:

(1) close cooperation between geographical sections of ONI and MIS through personal contacts, (2) a drawing together of mapping and photographic activities, (3) interchange of information on the production of monographs, (4) completed plans for the issuing of a "Joint Army-Navy Daily Intelligence Report", and finally, (5) a permanent interchange of officers between the counter-intelligence groups of the two services.¹⁰⁷ In addition, the memorandum enclosed the draft of a directive for establishing a Joint Intelligence Agency. This proposed the merging and placing under the control of the Joint Intelligence Agency the following:

- (a) Prisoner of war interrogation
- (b) Military and naval attaches and observers and Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies
- (c) Mapping and photographic activities
- (d) Liaison and other government agencies
- (e) Preparation and dissemination of publications
- (f) Preparations of monographs and surveys.¹⁰⁸

The result of this action was a recommendation from Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff and Maj. Gen. George E. Strappmeyer, Chief of Air Staff, dated 30 March 1943 for a different

106. ~~Secret~~ Memo from Joint Chiefs of Staff to Assistant Chief, G-2, and Director of Naval Intelligence.

107. Enclosure (A) to J.C.S. 163/1, dated 16 Mar. 1943.

108. Enclosure (B) to J.C.S. 163/1, dated 16 Mar. 1943

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means of attaining the objective. These means were: (1) to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the activities of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military and Air Intelligence Services; (2) to establish immediately an Army-Navy American Intelligence Service with headquarters at Miami Beach, Florida, such headquarters to be under the operational control of the War Department; and (3) to establish under the Joint Intelligence Committee a full time working committee of the Army, Air and Naval Officers to plan for the early establishment of an Army-Navy Far Eastern Intelligence Service to be under the operational control of the Navy Department, and an Army-Navy Atlantic and Middle Eastern Intelligence Service to be under the operational control of the War Department.¹⁰⁹

Shortly thereafter, Rear Admiral Train commented on these proposals to the effect that he agreed with the proposal for the elimination of unnecessary duplication but said that an Army-Navy Intelligence Service at Miami Beach under control of the Army would take away the Navy's close control and personal contact, which could be maintained only in Washington. Besides, he believed that to place the intelligence services, charged with specific parts of the world, under either the Army or Navy would risk excluding the other service from proper participation and would build up a bulkhead. His conclusion was that the ultimate decision on these proposals be deferred pending the receipt of reports of surveys which were being conducted at the time by Mr.

¹⁰⁹. Enclosure (A) to Secret Memo for the Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deputy Chief of Staff, USA and Chief of Air Staff, USA, dated 30 Mar. 1943.

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Rawleigh Warner and by Mr. Booz's organization.

It would seem that Admiral Train's opinion against the proposals of the Army together with his reaction to the Rawleigh Warner Report, shortly to be described, were important factors preventing a true amalgamation of the Military and Naval Intelligence Services as had been originally planned.

The Rawleigh Warner Report was the result of a survey made by "Rawleigh Warner and Associates," a civilian organization specializing in administrative analysis and employed by the Navy at the request of Admiral King for the purpose of analyzing the function of the Naval Intelligence organization and making recommendations. The final study, classified as "secret" and entitled "Summary Report of Intelligence Functions," was submitted on 29 April 1943 to Admiral King. On 5 May it was sent by the latter with a covering letter to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Director of Naval Intelligence, inviting their comment. Briefly summarized, the report made the following recommendations:

- "1. Create on the staff of the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet a Combat Intelligence Branch, unifying therewith the product of communications intelligence, and including therein the best men available from the viewpoint of their analytical and evaluating ability and familiarity with the war theaters.
- "2. Assign to FBI all or substantially all of the investigative work now being done by the Washington office of ONI and the district intelligence offices, retaining in the Navy Department only a limited number of trained investigators for the purpose of conducting those investigations of service personnel in which the services of naval officers are necessary.

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- "3. Combine the foreign intelligence functions (with the exception of certain functions mentioned later) of ONI and MIS, including the files and all personnel engaged in the monographing and strategic survey processes, with the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS.
- "4. Create a new Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and working with the Joint Staff Planners."110

In commenting upon the report, Rear Admiral H.C. Train, Director of Naval Intelligence pointed out that if the four recommendations given above were carried out, the effect would be the virtual abolishment of the Office of Naval Intelligence. At the same time, no safeguards would be provided against the hampering effect upon the planning of military operations. He believed that the war period was a bad time to make such a radical change and that the alterations recommended would have "a seriously disruptive effect upon the war effort." He also indicated that as information had to be procured for proper decisions in the post-war period, such information needed naval and military material as its foundation as well as that of a social and economic type. When he wrote, "There can be no assurance that these military requirements can be fulfilled by a non-military agency," he undoubtedly referred to the Office of Strategic Services, with whose Research and Analysis Branch, the Rawleigh Warner Report suggested that the Office of Naval Intelligence be amalgamated. Admiral Train concluded by saying it would be disadvantageous to the

110 ~~Secret~~ "Summary Report on Intelligence Functions" by Rawleigh Warner, to Admiral King, dated 29 Apr. 1943.

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war effort to carry out any of the suggestions of the report except the first, and possibly part of the second.¹¹¹

Additional commentary was made on the Rawleigh Warner Report by the Military Intelligence Division, conveyed to Admiral King in the form of a letter from Maj. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Acting Chief of Staff, dated 26 May 1943. The first two recommendations of the Report, namely for a Combat Intelligence Unit and for the FBI to handle investigative work then done by the Navy were approved by MID. However, the latter was strongly opposed to the proposal to combine the Foreign Intelligence functions of ONI and MIS with the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS. It was stressed that the responsibility to interpret and evaluate intelligence is a military function which cannot be delegated. Also the letter opposed the recommendation to create a new Joint Intelligence Committee because it would abolish an agency then functioning and only vaguely indicated what would be substituted for it. The letter explained that an integration of Army and naval intelligence activities in an independent agency on the Joint Chiefs of Staff level should await the establishment of an Operations Division under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Until such a step could be taken it was urged that the Army and Navy intelligence organizations be merged as suggested in the Army letter of 30 March, referred to previously.¹¹²

111. Secret Memo from DNI to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, dated 15 May 1943.

112. Secret ltr., from Acting Chief of Staff to Admiral King, dated 26 May 1943.

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In a secret memorandum for the Commander-in-Chief the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral F.J. Horne, on 12 June 1943 commented generally on the two opinions regarding the Rawleigh Warner Report, namely those of the Army and those of Rear Admiral Train, representing the Navy.¹¹³ Admiral Horne concurred in large part with those of the latter, adding that "it is felt that all War Department Intelligence Activities should be centered directly under the Military Intelligence Service." He also explained that it was impractical to divide the world into theaters for intelligence purposes between the Army and Navy for exclusive supervision. He concluded by writing that there was no danger of Operational Intelligence taking over Operations.

Admiral King advised the Vice Chief of Naval Operations on 26 June 1943 that a Combat Intelligence Division was being established in the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. This action was an answer to the recommendation of the Rawleigh Warner Report. Further in the memorandum he expressed the desire that efforts to coordinate the work of CNI, MIS and OSS continue, and that the formation of Joint Intelligence collection agencies and the joint production of field monographs continue.¹¹⁴

After this, little was accomplished to bring about the actual merger of the two intelligence services as originally planned. However, certain cooperative functions, known as joint agencies, were undertaken

¹¹³ ~~Secret~~ Memo from Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Op-16) to Commander-in-Chief, dated 12 June 1943.

¹¹⁴ ~~Secret~~ Memo from Cominch-FF1/A8, Serial 001275, dated 26 June 1943.

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by the Army and Navy. Subsequently, several reports were made on these joint committees. An attempt will be made to sketch these developments, starting with the reorganization of the Division of Naval Intelligence which was accomplished in March 1943.

Perhaps the most immediate result of the original efforts of the working committees studying the ONI-MIS merger were the reorganizations effected within each of these services, carried out in order to bring the two divisions into closer accord with one another. On 25 January 1943 the War Department announced the regrouping of the personnel and units of its Military Intelligence Service so that five groups were formed.¹¹⁵ Effective 1 February 1943 the Intelligence Group, one of these five, was reorganized so that it comprised a number of units and branches.¹¹⁶ Notable among them was the Evaluation and Dissemination Staff, functioning under the Chief, Intelligence Group, and charged with reviewing and evaluating all projects completed in MIS. In addition, there were set up the Collection Branch, the North American Unit, the Air Unit, Eur-African Unit, the Latin-American Unit, the Technical Branch and the Dissemination Branch.

Shortly after the change described above, the Division of Naval Intelligence was reorganized to conform as much as possible with the existing structure of MIS. This reorganization took place on 19 March 1943.¹¹⁷ In the first place, the former Assistant Director was

¹¹⁵. Rest. Memo No. 18 from Chief, MIS, dated 25 Jan. 1943.

¹¹⁶. Rest. Memo from Chief, Intelligence Group, dated 29 Jan. 1943.

¹¹⁷. Rest. ltr. DNI (Op-16-X, A3-1/ENB-10), Serial 0600816, dated 19 Mar. 1943.

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designated as Deputy Director. Second, the organization as a whole was divided into three main groups, each under charge of an Assistant Director. These were Services Group, Intelligence Group and Counter-Intelligence Group. The Administrative Branch (Op-16-A) and the Training Branch (Op-16-T) were classed under the Services Group. In the Intelligence Group were placed the Intelligence Branch (Op-16-F) and the Special Activities Branch (Op-16-Z), and a newly constituted Publications and Distribution Branch (Op-16-P). Special Warfare (Op-16-W), Naval Records and Library (Op-16-E) were to continue to function as branches under the direct supervision of the Deputy Director. Also reporting to the Deputy Director was Protocol and Liaison, formerly designated as Op-16-F-12. A departure was made in the formation of two new groups. The first of these, Planning (Op-16-X) was to formulate plans for the efficient functioning of ONI. It was composed of the Deputy Director and three Assistant Directors with a permanent secretariat. The latter was to have charge of War Plans for ONI. The second unit established was the Evaluation and Dissemination Group (Op-16-ED). It functioned as the Navy component of the Joint Evaluation and Dissemination Staff of the Joint Intelligence Agency. The group was composed of the theater commanders of branch F, the head of Commerce and Travel (Op-16-B-5), the head of section Op-16-B-7 (Counter-Intelligence), and the head of Special Warfare (Op-16-W). As a further part of the reorganization, the Intelligence Branch was delimited into four geographical theaters, Eur-African, Far Eastern,

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American Republics and North American together with three sections, Operational (Op-16-FC), Foreign Trade Section (Op-16-FT) and Intelligence Plot Section (Op-16-FP).

Reference was made above to the joint agencies established by ONI and MIS as a means of effecting a merger between the two organizations. By 7 July 1943 seven of these joint agencies had been established and others were subsequently added.¹¹⁸ Among the most important of these cooperative ventures were the Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies, known as JICAs. Their function was to eliminate duplication in the collection, swift transmission and reception of intelligence sent to Washington, and to procure intelligence from Washington and sources within the theater and disseminate it to theater activities. The first JICA was established in Algiers by an agreement with Gen. Eisenhower, dated 26 January 1943 and with the approval of the Chiefs of Staff, acting jointly. OSS was included as a collaborating member. Other JICAs were set up in Cairo, and later in New Delhi, India. In connection with these posts was the Joint Intelligence Agency Reception Center, in Washington, staffed by officers from the Army and Navy. It transmitted intelligence received from Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies to a panel of Army, naval and OSS officers.

In order to furnish supplies, funds and equipment to the Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies, a Joint Intelligence Property Office was formed in March 1943.

~~SECRET~~ Memo for VCNO from DNI (Op-16-X-1 (SC) A8-2). Serial 133916, dated 7 July 1943.

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Two other important media for exchanges of information were the Joint Army and Navy Daily Reports, begun on 29 March 1943 and the Joint Army and Navy Monthly Intelligence Reports started 2 May 1943.

Another significant joint endeavor were the monographs covering topography, geography, politics, economics, etc., of designated world areas known as the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS). Commenced in 1943 as a bilateral undertaking of G-2 and ONI, they were later put under the Joint Topographical Subcommittee of the JIC and in turn under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. OSS also had an important part in these studies.

An additional combined publication were the studies known as JAN No. 1 (Joint Army and Navy Publication-Uniform and Insignias).

The Joint Prisoner of War Interrogation work represented an amalgamation of the work of the Army and Navy in this field. Arranged by a joint agreement signed by the Directors of MIS and ONI on 5 May 1943, the interrogation of prisoners by the Navy was conducted at centers maintained by the Army.

Still another form of cooperation was the Joint Cooperation by Naval and Military Attaches in Central America and the Caribbean area. An outcome of this cooperative action were the Joint Intelligence Reports from military and naval attaches.

During 1944 other joint committees came into being. One of these was a committee of intelligence agency representatives to coordinate activities in Japanese aviation intelligence. As a result of an agreement by the members of this group the various phases of Japanese air

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Intelligence were allocated to the different groups. The Army handled intelligence from prisoner of war interrogation and captured documents but naval personnel participated. ONI had prime responsibility for Technical Air Intelligence. The Navy also coordinated in the matter of relief and terrain models. Not all of these units evolved at once. The Joint Target Analysis Group which later became the Joint Target Group with members of A-2 and ONI as well as FEA and OSS came into existence in September 1944.

Meanwhile, in April 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned to the Navy Department prime responsibility for the collection of all graphic and photographic material for the Pacific Ocean areas. About this time the Navy set up a photographic review panel for its use as well as for G-2, A-2 and other interested activities. Also, in the same month ONI established liaison with the Captured Personnel and Material Branch. Under this branch information was shared on Escape and Evasion Activities for allied personnel.

In order to meet a demand for a central agency which would treat technical intelligence as a functional subject, the Technical Intelligence Center (Op-16-PT) was set up in ONI. As one of its purposes was to prevent duplication on the part of the two services, close liaison was maintained with the Army.

The year 1945 saw the birth of three new joint agencies. The first of these was the central agency for the handling of captured Japanese documents. Known as the Washington Document Center it was put under

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the direction of the Director of Naval Intelligence and staffed with both Army and naval officer and enlisted personnel. In March on the basis of a directive from the Joint Intelligence Committee, there was established a group of representatives of MIS, ONI, and A-2, designated as the Joint Committee for Assessment of the Japanese Oil Position. In addition to assessing the oil supply of Japan this committee, which carried on duties formerly performed by the Enemy Oil Committee, furnished information to interested departmental agencies.

Another type of joint intelligence, which originated in July 1945, was the Army-Navy Flak Intelligence Group (ANFLAK). Among the many functions of this committee was the collection and evaluation of information on all types of anti-aircraft artillery, developing new methods of analysis, determining requirements for special research problems, and maintaining liaison with other agencies, etc.

Finally, there was one committee, which although not originating as an outgrowth of the proposal for a merger, nonetheless, is listed in various joint committees. This group, known as the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (J.A.N.A.C.), was created in January 1943. Its objective was to resolve conflicting claims made by our forces as to the damage inflicted on enemy shipping and to provide a sound basis for over-all estimates of enemy attrition.

Several reports were submitted by the Directors of Naval Intelligence to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations at various times on the steps taken toward merging and coordinating ONI and MIS. However, these were lists of the joint committees and agencies mentioned

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above. The first of these was sent on 7 July 1943 to the VCMC by Rear Admiral Train. Rear Admiral R.E. Schuirmann directed another such list on 20 November 1943. In response to an inquiry to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral King on 29 November 1944 sent a secret memorandum to the Under-Secretary of the Navy concerning the outcome of recommendations of the Rawleigh Warner Report.¹¹⁹ This was a restatement of the information conveyed by Admiral King to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations on 26 June that a Combat Intelligence Division had been established in COMINCH, that investigative work to be done by ONI had been confined to necessary counter-intelligence investigations and to those in which the subjects were under naval jurisdiction. In connection with the third recommendation of the Report, he explained that it was not practical to transfer certain foreign intelligence functions of ONI and MIS to OSS, but that every effort had been made to coordinate the activities of these three services through the creation of the joint agencies previously mentioned. He added that little could be gained by following the fourth suggestion and creating a new Joint Intelligence Committee. He concluded that as a result of coordination of activities, ONI officer personnel abroad and in the naval districts had been reduced a total of 1,688 or 49 per cent.¹²⁰

Secret Memo Cominch to Under Secretary of Navy FF1/A8, Serial 003402, dated 29 Nov. 1944.
120. Report on Army-Navy Joint Committees prepared by Op-16-X, dated Sept. 1945.

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Admin. Hist. # 26-D PART 12 APPENDIX D

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OFFICERS ATTACHED TO OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

June 1882 - December 1941

Officers in Charge

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Attached</u>	<u>Detached</u>
Soley, J. R. ¹	Professor, USN	June 1882	Oct. 1889
Wise, F. M.	Lt. Comdr. USN	Oct. 1889 ³	May 1893
Rush, Richard	Lt. Comdr. USN	May 1893	Mar. 1897
Rawson, E. K.	Professor, USN	Mar. 1897	1902
Stewart, Charles ²	Chief Clerk	1902	1917
Kimball, W. W.	Rear Admiral, USN, (Ret.)	Aug. 1918	1919
Marsh, C. C.	Captain, USN, (Ret.)	1919	May 1920
MacDougal, W. D.	Captain, USN	May 1920	Aug. 1921
Knox, D. W.	Commodore, USN, (Ret.)	Aug. 1921	—

1. Appointed Assistant Secretary of Navy. Oct. 1889.
2. Appointed Acting Superintendent, Naval War Records, by Secretary of Navy Moody. 1902.
3. Officer in Charge of Naval War Records office; also designated Superintendent, Naval War Records. B. F. Tracy. Oct. 31, 1889.

OFFICERS ATTACHED TO OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

June 1882 - December 1941

Superintendents of the Library

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Attached</u>	<u>Detached</u>
White, H. K.	Colonel, USMC, (Ret.)	July 1921	Dec. 1922
Sypher, J. H.	Commander, USN, (Ret.)	Mar. 1923	Nov. 1925
Wainwright, Richard, Jr.	Lt. Comdr., USN, (Ret.)	Nov. 1925	Jan. 1929
Cocke, H. C.	Captain, USN	Feb. 1929	June 1931

World War, Pictorial, and Publications Sections

Knut, S. P.	Ensign, USNRF	Nov. 1918	June 1922
Breck, Edward	Lt. Comdr., USNRF	Feb. 1919	June 1922
Clephane, Lewis P.	Lt. Comdr. USNRF	Feb. 1919	Nov. 1920
Whelpley, P. B.	Lt. (jg), USNRF	Feb. 1919	June 1922
Payne, Samuel S., -	Lt. Comdr., USN	Jan. 1923	Dec. 1924
Robertson, R. S., Jr.	Lieutenant, USN, (Ret.)	Dec. 1924	Aug. 1928
Doughty, Leonard, Jr.	Lt. Comdr., USN	Aug. 1928	Feb. 1930

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APPENDIX D (Cont'd)

OFFICERS ATTACHED TO OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

June 1882 - December 1941

World War, Pictorial, and Publications Section (Cont'd)

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Name	Rank	Attached	Detached
Moore, C. G.	Lieutenant, USN	Feb. 1930	Apr. 1931
McVay, Charles B., 3rd.	Lieutenant, USN	Apr. 1931	May 1933
Lawton, Andrew P.	Lieutenant, USN	June 1933	May 1935
Dunn, Lucius C.	Commander, USN	Aug. 1934	May 1935
Lademan, Joseph U.	Lieutenant, USN	May 1935	Dec. 1936
Taylor, C. E.	Lt. Comdr., USN	July 1936	Jan. 1938
Bartman, Russel C.	Lt. Comdr., USN	June 1937	Sept. 1937
Vensel, Frank E.	Lt. Comdr., USN	Sept. 1937	May 1939
Robertson, R. S., Jr.	Lt. Comdr., USN, (Ret.)	Oct. 1939	Dec. 1940
Dibrell, S. T.	Lieutenant, USNRF	Feb. 1941	

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APPENDIX D (Cont'd)

1 January 1942

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OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

SECTIONAL ROSTER

Op-No.	Duty	Location	Name	Rank
Op-16-E	Officer-in-Charge	Arlington Annex	D. W. Knox	Captain, USN, (RET.)
		Arlington Annex	Edward Stewart	(Mr.) Civil Service
	Chief Clerk	Arlington Annex	Florence Sharswood	(Miss) Civil Service
		Arlington Annex	Virginia Tapp	(Miss) Civil Service
		Arlington Annex	Lamar E. Bailey	(Mr.) Civil Service
Op-16-E-1	Messenger	Arlington Annex		
	Library	The Navy Building	Constance Lathrop	(Mrs.) Civil Service
	Library	The Navy Building	Judy Maxwell	(Miss) Civil Service
	Library (Messenger)	The Navy Building	Lathan H. Jones	(Mr.) Civil Service
	Library	The Navy Building	Frederick Meigs	(Mr.) Civil Service
Op-16-E-2	Library	The Navy Building	Clarence Gardiner	(Mr.) Civil Service
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	Alma Lawrence	(Mrs.) Civil Service
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	Faye King	(Mrs.) Civil Service
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	Clara R. Collins	(Mrs.) Civil Service
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	Mary E. Jones	(Mrs.) Civil Service
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	Mary M. McHale	(Miss) Civil Service
Op-16-E-3	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	Georgia Munroe	(Miss) Civil Service
	Graphic Section ⁴	The Navy Building	S. T. Dibrell	Lieutenant, USNR
Op-16-E-4	Publications Section	Arlington Annex	Loretta I. MacCrindle	(Miss) Civil Service
	Publications Section	Arlington Annex	Catherine M. MacDonnell	(Miss) Civil Service
	Publications Section	Arlington Annex	Georgia Freese	(Miss) Civil Service

4. Lieut. S. T. Dibrell, USNR, supervised the work of three enlisted and two civilian workers assigned by Office of Naval Intelligence. Later this branch became the ONI's Strategic Photographs Section.

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1 January 1943

OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

SECTIONAL ROSTER

SECRET

Op-No.	Duty	Location	Name	Rank	Date Attached
Op-16-E	Officer-in-Charge	Arlington Annex	D. W. Knox	Capt., USN, (Ret.)	Aug. 1921
	Chief Clerk	Arlington Annex	Edward Stewart	(Mr.) Civil Serv.	- -
Op-16-E-1	Library	The Navy Building	C. D. Lathrop	(Mrs.) Civ. Serv.	- -
Op-16-E-2	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	P. T. Wright	Comdr., USN, (Ret.)	July 1942
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	J. H. Kemble	Lieut., USNR	Feb. 1942
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	M. V. Brewington	Lieut., USNR	Sept. 1942
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	W. M. Whitehill	Lieut., USNR	Nov. 1942
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	N. M. Blake	Lieut., USNR	Nov. 1942
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	G. B. Porter	Lieut., USNR	Dec. 1942
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	R. C. Haskett	Ensign, USNR	Dec. 1942
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	R. W. Leopold	Ensign, USNR	Dec. 1942
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	R. C. Newbold	Boatswain, USNR	Dec. 1942
	Manuscript Section	National Archives	A. R. Lawrence	(Mrs.) Civ. Serv.	- -
Op-16-E-3	Graphic Section ⁵	Navy "L" Bldg.	S. T. Dibrell	Lt. Comdr., USNR	Feb. 1941
	Graphic Section	Navy "L" Bldg.	F. R. Breen	Ensign, USNR	- -
	Graphic Section	Navy "L" Bldg.	D. H. Patton	Ensign, USNR	- -
	Graphic Section	Navy "L" Bldg.	J. M. Gallagher	Lt. (jg), USN	- -
	Graphic Section	Navy "L" Bldg.	H. D. Johnson	Ensign, USNR	- -
Op-16-E-4	Publications Section	National Archives	L. I. MacCrindle	(Miss) Civ. Serv.	- -

5. Formerly Pictorial Section. At recommendation of Office of Naval Records and Library (in memo of 7 May 1942) name changed to Strategic Photograph Section. Personnel supervised by ONI.

NOTE: Roster does not show enlisted and includes only key civil service personnel. Civilian Staff listed on Page 5 (1 Jan. 1942) has remained practically unchanged to date.

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APPENDIX B (Cont'd)

1 January 1944

OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

SECTIONAL ROSTER

SECRET

Op-No.	Duty	Location	Name	Rank
Op-16-E	Officer-in-Charge	Arlington Annex	D. W. Knox	Captain, USN, (Ret.)
	Chief Clerk	Arlington Annex	Edward Stewart	(Mr.) Civil Service
Op-16-E-1	Library	Arlington Annex	Constance Lathrop	(Mrs.) Civil Service
Op-16-E-2	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	P. T. Wright	Commander, USN, (Ret.)
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	M. V. Brewington	Lieutenant, USNR
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	W. M. Whitehill	Lieutenant, USNR
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	N. M. Blake	Lieutenant, USNR
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	G. B. Porter	Lieutenant, USNR
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	D. B. Tyler	Lieutenant, USNR
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	E. W. Small	Lt. (jg), USNR
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	R. W. Leopold	Ensign, USNR
	Manuscript Section	National Archives	Alma R. Lawrence	(Mrs.) Civil Service
Op-16-E-4	Publications Section	National Archives	Loretta I. MacCrindle	(Miss) Civil Service

NOTE: Roster does not show enlisted and includes only key civil service personnel. Other changes from previous roster: KIMBLE, BASKETT and NEWBOLD detached; five officers of Graphic Section now directly under ONI in Strategic Photographs Section.

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APPENDIX B (Cont'd)

1 January 1945

OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

SECTIONAL ROSTER

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Op-No.	Duty	Location	Name	Rank
Op-16-E	Officer-in-Charge	Arlington Annex	D. W. Knox	Captain, USN, (Ret.)
	Chief Clerk	Arlington Annex	W. M. Whitehill	Lieutenant, USNR
		Arlington Annex	Edward Stewart	(Mr.) Civil Service
Op-16-E-1	Library	Arlington Annex	Constance Lathrop	(Mrs.) Civil Service
Op-16-E-2	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	P. T. Wright	Captain, USN (Ret.)
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	N. M. Blake	Lieutenant, USNR
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	G. B. Porter	Lieutenant, USNR
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	E. W. Small	Lieutenant, USNR
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	R. W. Leopold	Lt. (jg), USNR
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	R. M. Grime	Lt. (jg), W-NR
	Manuscript Section	Arlington Annex	R. E. Delano	Lt. (jg), W-NR
	Manuscript Section	National Archives	Alma R. Lawrence	(Mrs.) Civil Service
Op-16-E-4	Publications	Arlington Annex	M. V. Brewington	Lieutenant, USNR
	Publications	National Archives	Loretta I. MacGrindle	(Miss) Civil Service

NOTE: Roster does not show enlisted and includes only key civil service personnel. Other changes from previous roster: none detached; GRIME and DELANO attached.

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OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

SECTIONAL ROSTER

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Op-No.	Duty	Location	Name	Rank
Op-23-E	Officer-in-Charge	The Navy Building	D. W. Knox	Commodore, USN, (Ret.)
	Chief Clerk	The Navy Building	Edward Stewart	(Mr.) Civil Service
Op-23-E-1	Library Division	The Navy Building	M. V. Brewington	Lt. Comdr., USNR
	Book Issue	The Navy Building	Constance Lathrop	(Mrs.) Civil Service
Op-23-E-2	Records Division	The Navy Building	W. M. Whitehill	Commander, USNR
	Assistant	The Navy Building	R. W. Leopold	Lieutenant, USNR
		The Navy Building	R. E. Delano	Lt. (jg), W-NR
		The Navy Building	B. A. Gilmore	Ensign, W-NR
		The Navy Building	H. F. Kuhns	Ensign, W-NR
		The Navy Building	Loretta I. MacGrindle	(Miss) Civil Service
		National Archives	N. M. Blake	Lt. Comdr., USNR
		National Archives	Alma R. Lawrence	(Mrs.) Civil Service
Op-23-E-2a	Microfilm Library	The Navy Building	Cleveland McCauley	Captain, USN, (Ret.)
Op-23-E-3	Sound Records Division	The Navy Building	J. S. Phillips	Captain, USN
		The Navy Building	G. B. Porter	Lt. Comdr., USNR

NOTE: Roster does not show enlisted and includes only key civil service personnel. Other changes from previous roster: TYLER, SMALL and GRIME detached; KUHNS, GILMORE, McCAULEY and PHILLIPS attached. Latter two Captains in charge of Microfilm Library and Sound Recordings respectively.

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SCOPE, FACILITIES AND SIZE OF THE LIBRARY OF THE U. S.
NAVY DEPARTMENT, IN THE OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND
LIBRARY.

The Navy Department Library was established by Act of Congress in 1882 under the direction of the Bureau of Navigation in which it was closely allied with the then new Office of Intelligence. In 1889 the Library was transferred to the Secretary of the Navy whose office retained jurisdiction over it for thirty years. In 1919 by general order, the Library was restored to the Intelligence Section in the Office of Naval Operations where it has since remained.

To the time of Pearl Harbor in 1941 from the date of its establishment, the collections in the Navy Department Library have developed from a few hundred volumes to the number of about 89,484 and 182 periodicals. In addition, there were collections of approximately 40,588 photographs, and 1,037 charts and maps, and also 5,000 pamphlets. Nearly two million manuscript records dating from before the organization of the Navy Department in 1798 through World War I were located in the official archives cared for by this office. Commodore D. W. Knox (retired) has been the Officer-in-Charge since August 1921.

The Library is maintained principally for the use of the Navy Department and other government agencies, as well as for writers and researchers in naval history, naval technical, and professional questions. Under necessary restrictions the library and bibliographic services were available for the use of college and research students. Authority has been granted

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by Public Document No. 12 - 75th Congress to the Secretary of the Navy to accept gifts and bequests for the benefit of the Office of Naval Records and Library.

The Office of Naval Records and Library was located in the Navy Department on Constitution Avenue at 18th Street. The Office was the main library for the Navy Department and comprised a manuscript division which had on file naval records dating from the Revolutionary War through the World War, and a photographic division. The library shelved 89,484 books and approximately 5,000 pamphlets.

The collection embraces the following subjects:

Biography	Naval Science
Engineering	Sociology
Fine Arts	Reference Books
History	Science
Law	Technology
Literature	Voyages
Military Science	Naval and Military History

Rare Book Section. There are 3,752 books in the rare collection, many of early dates. They are printed in the following languages: English, Greek, Latin, Italian, French, Dutch, Persian, German, Spanish, Japanese and Swedish.

The main subjects covered in the collection are: Biography, Piracy, History-general, Engineering, Military and Naval Law, Navigation, Naval Ordnance, Naval Strategy and Tactics, Merchant Marine, Voyages, Shipwrecks, Naval and Military History and Scientific Expeditions.

Engineering. The Engineering Section contains 2,061 volumes which are divided under the main headings of Aeronautics, Civil Engineering,

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Canals, Waterways, Electrical Engineering, Refrigeration, Mechanical Engineering, Hydraulic, Sanitary, Marine, Steam, Mining and Military Engineering.

The group contains surveys of the Nicaraguan Canal routes, the Isthmus of Darien, the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and the Panama Canal. The material on salvaging while not extensive is of authoritative value. Marine Engineering is a strong section containing copies of all text books used by the Navy.

Naval and Military History. The Navy Department Library has 3,849 volumes of naval and military history, which embrace all countries. Special emphasis has been placed on volumes dealing with American history. The Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and World War are well covered. The World War section contains 1,519 volumes. Naval official histories of all countries participating are in the World War collection, as well as the British Official Military History. Pictorial histories of all wars are well represented in the collection and these are supplemented by an excellent file of photographic reproductions in the Photographic Division of this office.

Biography. The subject of biography is classified in three main divisions; Naval, Military and Civil, with special emphasis on naval biography. There are 3,455 volumes in the whole collection, which embraces all countries. The naval section, comprising 870 volumes, is strongest in American, English and French biographical material. There are available in this group 47 items on the life of John Paul Jones.

Law. About 5,948 volumes are classified in this section, which is mainly composed of the following subdivisions; International Law, Maritime

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Law, Prize Law, Neutrality, International Relations and Naval and Military Trials. All standard works on international law may be found, as well as a complete set of the publications of the Naval War College entitled "International Law Situations." Treaties and conventions are well represented. Complete sets of Foreign Relations of the United States and British State Papers are available in the International Relations group. The section treating with naval and military trials is small but contains several outstanding volumes as the "Somers Mutiny," "Trial of Commodore James Barron," "The Schley Court of Inquiry," and the "Inquiry on the Loss of the U.S.S. JEANNETTE."

Naval Science. There are 5,783 volumes treating with naval science in the Library. The main divisions in this group are Naval Architecture, Navigation, Signals, Strategy and Tactics. The section on naval architecture shelves 571 volumes, principally of the history of naval architecture. In the section treating with naval strategy and tactics, which comprises 555 volumes, a complete set of the writings of Admiral Mahan are available.

The history of navigation is well covered by 1,020 volumes which includes a complete set of Bowditch's Practical Navigator, pilots and port directories for all areas. The subject of seamanship is well covered by American and English authorities.

The Naval Ordnance Group is comprised of 840 volumes by American, English, French and German authors, and covers the history of naval ordnance from earliest times.

The Naval Science group also includes general information on the navies of the principal powers and is covered by a group of 542 volumes with special emphasis on the navies of the United States and Great Britain.

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The pamphlet file of the Navy Department Library contains 5,000 pamphlets; 1,792 of which are applicable to national defense. The main subject headings of this file are:

Accidents to ships	Neutrality
Aeronautics	Nicaragua
Alaska	Nicaraguan Canal
Army, U. S.	Naval Academy, U. S.
Azores	Naval Policy, U. S.
Battles	Naval Reserve, U. S.
Biographies, naval	Naval War College
Camouflage	Navy, U. S.
Canals	Navy Department, U. S.
Casualties	Navy Yards
Coast Guard	Ordnance
Commerce	Pacifists, Pacifism
Communications	Panama Canal
Defense	Personnel, U. S. Navy
Diplomacy	Philippines
Discipline, organization	Puerto Rico
Economics	Press Releases, State Dept.
Education, military & naval	Propaganda
Engineering	Radio
Espionage	Russia, Soviet
Foreign policies of U. S.	Safety of life at sea
Foreign relations	Salvage operations
Foreign service	Samoa
Freedom of the seas	Sea power
Fuel	Shipping
German Navy	Ships, various
Guam	Ships, U. S. Navy (Histories)
Hawaii	Ships, foreign
Hitler	South America
Industrial mobilization	Spain
Insular America	Spratly Island
International Hydrographic Bureau	State Department Bulletins
International Law	Strategy and tactics
Italy (foreign policy)	Submarines
Japan	Trade
Jutland, Battle of	Treaties
Leadership	Uniforms
Mandates	Virgin Islands
Marine Corps, U. S.	Warfare
Merchant Marine	Washington, D. C.
Military Science	West Indies
Monroe Doctrine	World War
Navies, various - strength	
Navigation	
Navy, Great Britain	

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~~SECRET~~Engineering Library:

Contains about 4,250 covering such subjects as Steam and Mechanical Engineering, Electricity and allied material.

Hydrographic Office Library:

Has approximately 4,000 volumes on nautical subjects, sailing directions and other technical works.

Law Library:

In the Judge Advocate General's Office: contains over 7,000 books on all branches of law.

Navy Department Library:

Has a total of 81,840 volumes. The subjects covered are in the main: Biography, History, Military and Naval Science, Sociology, Science, Technology and Naval and Military History. There is shelved a complete file of Public Documents. The Manuscript Division contains letter books of officers, histories of ships and personnel, and miscellaneous naval documents up to 1910. The World War Historical Section has the records of that war.

Yards and Docks:

Has a technical library of about 3,000 volumes covering all engineering subjects.

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The Navy Department Library's lawful mission to serve as the Departmental Library was considerably hampered after the proclamation of a state of national emergency, by space limitations in the main Navy Building, which necessitated three major moves to new locations, and the scattering of books and manuscripts between the National Archives, Library of Congress and the Arlington Annex.

Despite these handicaps the Library continued to perform its function as the general reference library of the Department and its facilities were especially valuable to ComInCh and CNO offices in planning and furnishing information during the war.

Meanwhile physical expansion and scattering of the various bureaus and offices resulted in many of these latter offices building up their individual libraries. The decentralization was neither as deplorable or inefficient as feared inasmuch as the main Navy Library continued to be the central reference Library while the "branch" libraries were for the most part sources of "technical" rather than general reference for their respective bureaus. A description of the scope and size of a few of these branch libraries follows:

U. S. Naval Observatory Library:

Over 3,600 books, 6,000 pamphlets and 80 technical magazines. The major subjects covered are Astronomy, Mathematics and Physics.

The Naval Medical School Library:

Has a collection of over 22,000 volumes which cover all branches of Medicine and Surgery.

Aeronautics Library:

Has approximately 2,000 books on Aeronautics.

Construction and Repair:

Has a library of over 3,000 books and pamphlets on such subjects as Naval Architecture, strength of materials and technical government reports.

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PART XII

NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY (E BRANCH)

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PART XII

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NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

Introduction.

This historical narrative¹ is based principally on printed and manuscript records in the files of the Office of Naval Records and Library, the most important of which were the day to day War Diary and Progress Reports maintained during World War II by officers of the staff. Personal recollections of these officers frequently "spliced out" such official sources and provided considerable additional and valuable material.

Although the basic Naval History directive called for an appraisal of activities from 1919 to date, it was believed convenient to review the entire history of the Office of Naval Records and Library from its inception in 1882. Such additional information, it is believed, will be useful in providing a background of pre-war functions and purposes for those not familiar with its earlier existence, as well as for planning and appraising the place of the Office of Naval Records and Library in the post-war naval establishment.

1. For the original of this PART see the files of Naval Records and Library, Op-23E. Copies of same with covering memorandum of transmittal in Op-23C1 files.

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A. Period from 1882 to 1917

The Naval Library was established as a departmental institution and became recognized as such through an Act of Congress in 1882, which directed each head of the department to ascertain and report at the beginning of the next session of Congress "...the conditions of the several libraries in his department, number of volumes in each, and plan for consolidation of the same so that there should be but one library in each department."² By a general order of 23 March³ in the same year, "to collect and record information of value in war or peace," an Office of Naval Intelligence had been created in the Bureau of Navigation, where to facilitate its establishment and carry out its purposes, the new intelligence branch was combined with the existing bureau library.

The departmental library, like other offices of the Navy, at this time had only recently moved into new quarters in the State, War and Navy Building.

On 9 June 1882 Professor James Russell Soley, USN, was assigned to duty in the Bureau of Navigation as officer-in-charge of the newly consolidated departmental library. The appointment proved to be an extremely fortunate one from every point of view, for not only was

2. Public Act No. 217 of 7 Aug. 1882. In response on 15 Nov. 1882, Captain John Grimes Walker, USN, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, reported to the Secretary of the Navy that there were approximately 7,000 books on hand in the departmental library, mostly relics of old ships' libraries, and further stated that these were of comparatively little value.
3. General Order No. 292 of 23 Mar. 1882. In 1889 the Office of Intelligence was transferred to the Secretary's Office, where it remained until the outbreak of the Spanish American War, when it was again transferred to the Bureau of Navigation. The Library was left under the Secretary until 1919.

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Professor Soley exceptionally well-qualified and enthusiastic for the work but, more important, continued his sympathetic interest in the library after 1889 when he was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He at once began formulating plans to salvage and collect the few rare books still scattered through the different bureaus; to gather up old prints and photographs of naval battles and American or foreign war vessels; to subscribe for all historical, professional and scientific periodicals; to classify and catalogue this material; and generally to lay the foundation of the present-day naval library.

Meanwhile, the first legislative appropriation for books for the departmental library was made and became available on 1 July 1883.⁴ In addition to an appropriation of \$2,500 for the purchase of technical books and magazines, this Act of 5 August 1882 also made provision for one clerk and one assistant messenger to be carried on the Secretary's office appropriation for the care of the library. After this original grant, however, Congressional generosity towards the new library waned.⁵

Within a few years of the date of its establishment, the Naval Library was located in permanent quarters designed for the purpose in the new State, War and Navy Building; provided for in materiel and funds by Congressional Acts; staffed with an authorized complement of civilian employees; and supervised and directed by an exceptionally

4. Public Act of 5 Aug. 1882.

5. Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1885, Vol. I. The report in part: "...There is certainly no object for which money may be expended more productive of direct benefit than the formation and maintenance of the collection of books of professional reference for the Navy Department, and the crippling of this important work cannot be compensated by a saving to the Government of \$1500..."

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qualified naval officer.

Naval Records

Early naval records like those in most other departments of the Government were considered the property of the various bureaus, offices, or even officials themselves, and usually remained in the haphazard custody of their respective originators. The Act of 1798⁶ which separated naval from military functions by creating a department of the Navy, provided under Section 3, that the new Secretary of the Navy was authorized and empowered to take possession of all the records, books, and documents relevant to naval matters, then deposited in the office of the Secretary of War.

The nature of the duties and activities of the new Bureau of Navigation proved to be most varied and widespread and as a consequence, this branch inherited many more records from the Secretary's and Commissioners' offices than did any of the other newly created bureaus. It was not until 1881, however, that serious thought was given to any plan for the Navy Department itself to collect and publish some of the source materials in the bureaus' files.⁷

When Captain John Grimes Walker, USN, was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Navigation in 1881, the first departmental project of such a

6. Public Act of 30 Apr. 1798, Sec. 1.

7. Act of 26 Aug. 1842, for instance, about the time of reorganization of the Navy Department, authorized and directed a Congressional Joint Committee on the Library to supervise the publishing of "an account of the discoveries made by the exploring expedition under the command of Lieutenant Wilkes of the U. S. Navy." Another Congressional Act on 20 Feb. 1845, again without direct Navy participation or representation, decided that Lieutenant Wilkes' completed report would be distributed by the Library of Congress.

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nature was undertaken when he began the task of collecting records of Union and Confederate naval operations during the war between the states with a view to eventual publication of the material. The work was carried on under his direction for three years until the value of the Bureau of Navigation's efforts to prepare its civil war records for publication was recognized in July 1884 and legislation enacted similar to that which provided funds and personnel for the departmental library in 1882. This latest Act carried the first appropriation for collecting, compiling and arranging the naval records of the war of the Rebellion,⁸ whereby a sum of \$2,640 was provided for the services of one clerk and two copyists to perform work on naval records as distinct from another fund of \$1,800 for one clerk and messenger in the library.

In October 1889, Lieutenant Commander F. M. Wise, USN, succeeded Professor Soley as librarian and "in charge of War Records," when the latter was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy. By fortunate coincidence, the Office of Library and Naval War Records was at this time transferred from the Bureau of Navigation and placed under the Secretary's Office. Further evidence of the change in opinion as to the importance of the work of the "records office" likewise is indicated in a circular letter to the Chiefs of the Bureaus, over the signature of B. F. Tracy, the Secretary of the Navy, which directed that "...the officer-in-charge of the Naval War Records Office will hereafter be designated, Superintendent, Naval War Records."⁹

⁸. Act of 7 July 1884.

⁹. B. F. Tracy, Secretary of the Navy, Circular Ltr., 31 Oct. 1889.

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Through the efforts of the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy, additional personnel were authorized next year and the two staffs assigned to the Library and Naval War Records were increased to three and fourteen clerks respectively. At this figure, office personnel remained practically constant for the next 28 years until the influx of World War I records in 1918 necessitated further expansion of the office force.

In 1894 the sum of \$15,000 was authorized for printing the official records of the Union and Confederate navies in the War of the Rebellion, the first in a long series of Congressional appropriations provided annually until 1915.¹⁰ Five volumes of Civil War material were printed during 1895, 1896 and 1897 under the direction of Captain Richard Rush, who had succeeded Wise in 1893, and one volume followed each year thereafter during the incumbency of Professor E. K. Rawson, USN, as Superintendent, Naval War Records until 20 September 1902.¹¹ Seventeen additional volumes were published between the year 1902 and World War I, during a period in which Mr. Charles Stewart, formerly Chief Clerk of the office, was acting Superintendent of War Records. "...The Naval War Records furnish the best data for the study of the naval history of the Civil War and the methods by which a legal blockade was maintained along nearly 4,000 miles of coast line...The operations of the Confederate Navy are completely presented here for the first time in history. These records, including the construction, equipment, and

10. See Appendix A in Supplement, PART XII for data on "Annual appropriations, for Personnel, and Printing for the Library and Naval War Records, 1884-1946."

11. E. K. Rawson, Report of the Superintendent of Library and Naval War Records, 31 July 1901, in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1901.

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performances of ironclads, cruisers, torpedoes, and torpedo boats, stand as a monument to the energy, skill, and daring of Confederate naval officers and sailors...The compilers of these records have endeavored to make these volumes compact in material, and in addition to general operations, have relegated to a second series the reports, orders and correspondence..." 12

Meanwhile, the comparatively neglected earlier records of the Navy Department were beginning to receive attention as result of separate legislative acts passed by Congress in 1904 and 1906.¹³ Congress was being awakened to a belated realization that many official records of the period of the Revolution were scattered throughout Archives of several states, historical societies, libraries and private collectors, and a third piece of legislation in 1913¹⁴ authorized the collection of military and naval records of the Revolutionary War with a view to their publication, and appropriated for the purpose \$25,000 for the War Department and \$7,000 for the Navy Department. "...The Commission which started this work very soon decided that their funds would limit effort to a few states and decided to concentrate on Massachusetts, Virginia and North Carolina. Even in this restricted field, it was further impossible to be thorough, For example, all that could be done in Massachusetts was to photostat from the State Archives, the Massachusetts Board of War matters, orders and letters (2,914 documents) and from the Harvard University Library, Hamilton's Journal of the Vincennes

12. Charles Stewart. Report of the Superintendent of Library and Naval War Records, 29 Sept. 1903, in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1903.

13. Public Acts Nos. 189 and 336 of 27 Apr. 1904 and 29 June 1906 - respectively.

14. Public Act No. 402 of 2 Mar. 1913.

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Expedition (77 documents). The Commission ceased its work in 1914 on account of exhaustion of funds..." 15

On 4 March 1915 the Legislative Act consolidated the two appropriations heretofore made for the Library and the Office of Naval Records into one lump sum and the office received the title of "Office of Naval Records and Library."

B. Period 1917-1921 (World War I)

World War I may be said to begin the transition in the Office of Naval Records and Library, between an era of custodianship and primary concern with records of the past and a period of active selection, collection and classification of data on current naval operations.

In 1917 with the publication of Volume 27, the Office of Naval Records and Library suspended further work on the Civil War records project and shifted its emphasis to matters of contemporary historical importance, such activities of the Office having increased considerably. All during the war the Library was the mecca for news correspondents and others utilizing its reference facilities, and in addition, a great many ranking naval officers, allied officials and members of the government were frequent visitors.¹⁶

Prior to 1917 it was generally accepted that the principal function of the section was to take charge of the Navy Department's earliest

15. D. W. Knox, "Our Vanishing History and Traditions," USN Institute Proceedings, January 1926.

16. Snow's, "Historical Sketch." Based on personal recollections of those who served in the Library. One recalled that while Theodore Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he took active interest in Library matters and later as President, telephoned the Librarian from the White House on one occasion "that the shades were drawn unevenly" and another that "growing plants should not be placed in the Library windows."

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books, manuscripts, historical material and old records; no plan to collect and to make current records available for contemporary and future historical or official purposes apparently had ever been contemplated by the Office of Naval Records. The idea that such a project should be undertaken by the Navy seems to have originated as a result of an announcement on 3 June 1918 that the War Department was beginning work on and proposed to "...publish a history of the War of 1917..." In a letter soliciting active cooperation, Secretary Newton D. Baker informed the Secretary of the Navy that the Army, in its War History, tentatively planned to include one volume treating of naval operations.¹⁷ Instead of appointing a naval officer to serve as liaison with the Historical Branch in the War Department for that purpose however, the Navy decided to initiate a similar work and produce a separate story of naval operations during the war.

Within a few weeks, Admiral Sims commanding United States Naval Forces operating in European Waters, who had been instructed on 25 June 1918 to ascertain what was being done in the matter of collecting historical data on English, French or Italian naval operations by the respective allied powers,¹⁸ reported after a comprehensive survey that Great Britain already had a large staff of experts organized under the War Cabinet compiling and arranging material for its naval, military and air force histories. The naval section under Sir Julian Corbett, comprising four officers and twelve civilians especially qualified for the duty, had been granted access to all records, reports, dispatches

17. Secretary of War, ltr. 3 June 1918.

18. OpNav Dispatch to Admiral Sims, 22 June 1918.

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and ships' logs in custody of the Admiralty. Sims proposed¹⁹ that a similar arrangement be instituted at his headquarters and that the American staff be authorized to visit other naval bases for the purpose of gathering data of historical value.

On 18 August 1918, shortly after this recommendation, the Secretary of the Navy issued a Circular Notice²⁰ stating that "...a History Section has been established under the direction of the Chief of Operations..." and directing that the collecting of historical material be carried on until the end of the war. The circular emphasized that no hampering or interference with the war effort should be permitted to occur in obtaining information. Recognition of the importance of the historical aspects of naval operations and the growing volume of current war records resulted in the appointment of Rear Admiral W. W. Kimball, USN (Ret.) as head of the new section.

In London, in compliance with the Secretary's order, Admiral Sims in October 1918 created an Historical Section in the staff of the U. S. Naval Forces operating in European Waters. In an exchange of dispatches and correspondence with OpNav, about this time, Admiral Sims stressed the importance of adding trained historians to his staff, but before properly qualified officers could be selected for the historical project

19. Sims, Cablegram to OpNav, 30 June 1918. Lieut. Tracy Barrett Kittredge, U.S.N.R.F., one of Sims' officers, undertook this study. From this and subsequent experience acquired in World War I, Kittredge, who returned to active duty in April 1942, prepared and submitted such an excellent and thorough analysis of the "Problems Involved In Systematic Collection And Classification Of War Documentation; Office of Naval Records," that it has since become the standard and basis for archival activities in the Office of Naval Records and Library. See Appendix C, in Supplement, PART XII.

20. Secretary of Navy, Circular letter, 18 Aug. 1918. In Washington, History Section headquarters was located in close proximity to the principal offices of the Department in the Navy Building.

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and sent to London, the Armistice was declared. Though the cessation of hostilities on 11 November 1918 precluded sending a history section abroad, it released many of the Admiral's staff whose services could be utilized for the collection of source materials for the proposed naval history. By early 1919, Commodore (then Captain) Dudley W. Knox, USN, previously of the Plans Section, who had been designated head of the project in London, had a staff of approximately 20 officers and 50 enlisted men engaged in the task of collecting documents of historical value in connection with the proposed history of naval operations in the war against the Central Powers.

Briefly the system, based somewhat on the experience of the Admiralty's Historical Section, comprised four general archival divisions of operational material:

- I. War Diaries, Log Books, etc.
- II. Telegrams, by chronology within geographical areas.
- III. General correspondence, similarly filed.
- IV. Subject files - documents whose bulk, scope or nature made them inappropriate for chronological files.

Telegrams were eventually merged with the chronological correspondence file--the two forming an area file, geographically subdivided. The collection of historical data on naval operations in European waters was completed by the London staff and forwarded to the Navy Department in August 1919.

Meanwhile in Washington the Historical Section, established in August 1918 under the direction of the Chief of Operations, had partly

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lost its autonomous identity. Recognizing their common interests, and considering the younger as a lusty "offshoot" of the old Office of Naval Records and Library, the Secretary of the Navy on 1 July 1919 ordered the Historical Section "...and the Library be incorporated in the Office of Naval Intelligence under the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Chief of Operations."²¹

The Secretary's order coincided with passage of the first legislative appropriation²² "for collecting World War Records;" a sum of \$20,000 being earmarked for the latter purpose in addition to the usual annual amount of \$21,000 set aside for the Office of Naval Records and Library.

The order of 1 July 1919 incorporating the Departmental Library and the Historical Section in the Office of Naval Intelligence was timely inasmuch as several previous directives had so expanded activities of the Historical Section that overlapping with Office of Naval Records and Library functions seemed inevitable. Since both activities, at this time were fortunately under a single head, the demarcation between "old" and "current" records was recognized and accepted as marking the respective spheres of the original Office of Naval Records and the newer Historical Section. A few years later as World War I records outgrew their original secret or confidential classifications, this distinction gradually became less and both interpretation and scope of the work of the Office of Naval Records were broadened to include

21. Secretary of the Navy, Order of 1 July 1919. This restored the Library to the Office of Naval Intelligence with which it was originally established in 1882. In 1889 it had passed into the jurisdiction of the Secretary's Office.

22. Legislative Act of 1 July 1919.

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all operational records regardless of date of origin.

There was nothing inconsistent with this earlier policy and a directive from the Secretary of the Navy to all bureaus, naval districts, Commander U. S. Naval Forces in Europe and Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic, Pacific and U. S. Fleets²³ which read:

"1. It is proposed to make the Historical Section of the Office of Naval Operations the depository for all files and all other material that will contribute to the writing of the History of the Navy in the War with the Central Powers.

"2. Therefore, it is directed that, as each unit or activity is closed, the files of that unit, together with the file cases shall be immediately shipped to the Chief of Operations, and marked for the Historical Section, Room 1736, Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

"3. Many of the minor units, both in the United States and abroad, have already been closed and their files should be shipped at once. Such are certain naval districts, many training camps, schools, minor aviation stations, etc. The same principle shall be applied when dealing with the files of the various headquarters, as soon as Peace has been declared and their activities, so far as pertains to war, have ceased."

The first expansion of the activities of the Historical Section had been the establishment on 1 January 1919 of a Pictorial Branch whose purpose was to collect and file under proper references photographs illustrating activities of U. S. and foreign navies. A follow up in the form of an ALNAV²⁴ on 14 March requested that copies of photographs and motion pictures of naval activities, ships, bases, personnel, and incidents taken during the war be forwarded to the Historical Section.²⁵ Subsequently a letter over the signature of the Secretary of

23. Secretary of the Navy. Circular Ltr. 13 June 1919. Ultimately the Office of Naval Records and Library, as the logical depository for all operational records, inherited this material.

24. ALNAV 86, 14 Mar. 1919.

25. H. F. Lunenburg. Chronological History of Office of Naval Records and Library. 15 July 1931.

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the Navy addressed to all bureaus stated:

"A photographic Division of the Historical Section has been established, in which will be gathered and filed all the photographs of historic interest taken of Naval activities during the war. As the issuance of a Pictorial History of the War is contemplated, it is desirable for the Historical Section to have copies of all Navy photographs of interest; and it is requested that each Bureau furnish to the Historical Section, Room 1732, Navy Department, two copies of all such photographs it has, and that each contractor who was engaged in Navy work be requested to furnish such photographs."

How closely related during the post-war period were the functions of the original Office of Naval Records and Library and the Historical Section (which in theory at least had been combined under the Director of Naval Intelligence) may likewise be seen in the following extracts from the Secretary's Annual Report in 1920:²⁶

"...The Historical Section is specifically charged with the collection, copying, and classification, with a view to publication, of the naval records of the war, and the acquirement of books, periodicals, photographs, maps, and other publications, documents, and pictorial records of the Navy relating to the war. This work has been efficiently carried on with the limited funds and personnel provided.

"The large consignment of material received from United States Naval Headquarters in London, comprising copies of records, reports, dispatches, and orders concerning the operations of our forces in Europe, has been indexed and filed, and is available for use and reference. From the files of the departmental bureaus quantities of reports, dispatches, and other material have been obtained and placed in the historical files. A vast number of papers from ships and stations which have gone out of commission have been received.

"Thousands of photographs, maps, and posters have been collected and mounted for preservation and use.

26. Secretary of the Navy Annual Report, 15 Nov. 1920.

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"A large war map, showing various naval activities during the war, has been made and is a graphic representation of the scope of the Navy's operations...."

There are various striking parallels between conditions prevailing in the Office of Naval Records and Library after World War I and the present post-World War II period. There was then, (a) an expressed fear of delay in obtaining vital increases in personnel to collect and compile comparatively recent operational records; (b) a hope for establishment of a suitable berth in the Department to attract a qualified civilian librarian; and (c) the need of establishing a proper naval museum.

"...The records of the great war form a body of historical material of incalculable value, and their collection and preservation is too important to be neglected. The material on hand and in sight is so large that to handle it the force of the Historical Section must be increased. This work can be done now with less difficulty and at lower cost than if it is deferred.

"We should not, as was the case following the Civil War, allow a generation to elapse before these records are compiled. The people are entitled to this information within a reasonable period; and while it may be years before a comprehensive and authoritative history of the World War is written, we can and should provide for the preparation and publication of accounts of all important naval activities, written while they are fresh in the minds of those who took part in them...."²⁷

Similarly as a result of wartime expansion of activities and space considerations, the departmental library was forced to move three times during World War II, and the need of skilled supervision and coordination today is as great as when the Secretary wrote in 1920:

27. Ibid.

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"...The Naval Library, which contains more than 50,000 volumes and many rare manuscripts, could be made of much greater value if a competent librarian were secured. The law at present provides for a chief clerk, and for years the work was conducted under the direction of that official, but the position has remained long vacant, owing to the small compensation offered, \$2,000, and the impossibility of securing, at that salary, a competent and experienced man.

"Unifying the working forces of the Naval Library and the Historical Section, both of which are now under the same general supervision, would result in economy and the utilization of all the force to the best advantage.

"Organized under a competent librarian, the library would be able to furnish officials of the department and others engaged in naval work or research, complete references on any subject desired. These references should extend to books in other libraries on technical or naval matters. There is increasing demand from many sources for information of this character, and the Naval Library should be able to furnish it, and could easily do so if an experienced man who possesses a knowledge of naval history and affairs as well as of library methods is secured..." 28

Incidentally, twenty-five years ago, there was also the same urgency in the arguments and requests that a Naval Museum be established:

"...The need of a naval museum in Washington in which can be gathered the historic relics of the Navy in all our various wars, representing notable incidents in the service, where can be displayed models of our various types of ships, specimens of typical aircraft like the NC-4 which made the first flight across the Atlantic; examples of naval ordnance and other implements of war, showing the progress made from time to time; and providing a place where naval officers and others may deposit their trophies for permanent preservation. I would suggest that the Naval Affairs Committees of Congress direct the department to prepare plans for such an institution to be ready when the time is propitious for the appropriation of sufficient funds for its construction. A considerable collection of articles of naval interest has already been gathered and placed in the National Museum.

28. Ibid.

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"The preservation in graphic form of historical events is so important that I would urge that Congress make appropriations for the painting of subjects illustrating naval activities and naval encounters and naval contribution to victory in the World War...."²⁹

Between 1917 and 1921 — a period coinciding roughly with the duration of World War I and its active post-war era — there were two major organic changes in the Office of Naval Records and Library. First, restoration of the Library to the Office of Naval Intelligence from the jurisdiction of the Secretary's Office, and second, revival of its earlier historical functions which had by that time, almost ceased to exist.

About 1900, when the Office of Intelligence was restored to the Bureau of Navigation, the Office of Naval Records and Library was retained under the direction of the Secretary's Office. As a direct result, work of both the Navy Library and Intelligence Sections suffered; the latter because lack of its own sources created delays and uneconomical answering of requests for data; the former, because accessioning of new materials practically ceased and its valuable collections of historical manuscripts and printed documents were seldom consulted or used.

To remedy this situation, the Office of Naval Intelligence made repeated and urgent requests that the Library be returned to its cognizance. It was argued that the primary function of the Library was closely related to "intelligence," and in addition, many administrative handicaps were cited, such as the fact that a considerable number of

29. Ibid.

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requests for information, whether from the General Board, Plans Division, other offices or bureaus of the Navy Department, or from members of Congress, involved search both in the archives of ONI and the printed sources in the Navy Library. Finally, by order of the Secretary of the Navy on 1 July 1919, the Library was again brought into the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The revival of the historical function of the Library is likewise attributable to World War I. Under the date of 9 April 1928, Commo. D.W. Knox, then as now, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Naval Records and Library wrote:

"...Until that time there was almost no effort made to follow the general practice of our Army and all foreign Navies and Armies in preserving historical records. The documentary collection of the Office of Naval Records practically stopped with the year 1885. Many records of much historical value between that date and the World War as well as others antedating 1885, have been destroyed by the various bureaus and offices when their administrative value had lapsed and filing space became crowded. The work of filling in the gap of historical records between about 1885 and the World War is yet to be done — preliminary to the completion of the new federal Archive Building.

"In 1918 Congress provided for the collecting and archiving, preliminary to publication, of the World War records of the Navy, which work is actively in progress and will be completed in two or three years. When it is finished there will remain the need of continuing the function of safeguarding records of more recent naval operations against loss, by archiving them from time to time, after they have ceased to be of current administrative value. This work is closely related to the Library function because of the many requests for information, a part of which may be found in printed sources and the remainder in the manuscript collection.

"While the Library supplements the Office of Naval Intelligence principally in matters pertaining to the past, it is also useful in current subjects on account of the technical

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and other periodicals regularly subscribed to by the Library, which legal restrictions prevent the various bureaus from purchasing under their own appropriations. Experience since the moving of the Library to space adjacent to the Office of Naval Intelligence and placing it under the organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence has amply justified the changes which are now in effect....³⁰

C. Era Between World Wars.

In the twenty odd years before the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the Office of Naval Records and Library developed from a comparatively little-known departmental activity to one of national repute in the field of naval archives and history.³¹ This transition was accomplished despite a steady reduction in personnel and in the face of such further handicaps as the fact that the Library itself did not move to and merge with the other activities until 1923; that the historical function operated on a quasi-independent basis until 1927; and that funds for actual publication were not authorized until 1934.³²

30. D.W. Knox, Commo., USN (Ret.). "Memo on organization of Office of Naval Records and Library," 9 Apr. 1928.

31. Its broadened policy and widened field may be observed in Commo. Knox's memo for Director of Naval Intelligence, dated 18 Dec. 1928, which succinctly stated that the mission of Office of Naval Records and Library was: "To acquire, systematically arrange, and preserve, manuscript, pictorial and technical Naval information; and to make such information readily available to the Naval service and the public." (In the files of Office of Naval Records and Library.)

32. D.W. Knox, in a ltr. to Committee on Naval Affairs, dated 7 Feb. 1929 stated: "It seems pertinent for me to add that the number of clerical employees attached to this office has been steadily reduced, from a peak of 32 in 1922, when 17 were employed jointly on Old Naval Records and in the Library, while 15 were engaged on World War work. The present number is 22....This notwithstanding a substantial increase in work of the Library and Old Records."

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When Captain D. W. Knox, USN, (Ret.), was assigned to duty as Officer-in-Charge on 1 August 1921, the Office of Naval Records and Library consisted of the Library, the Old Records Section, and the World War Section.

The Library proper was not only the central source of books, magazines and reference for the administration of the entire Navy Department, but, as has been shown, its facilities were frequently utilized by Members of Congress and other departments of the government. Acting Superintendent of the Library (since 1890), Mr. Charles Stewart, civilian Chief Clerk of the Office, was relieved in 1921 by Lt. Col. N. K. White, USMC, (Ret.), who was the first in a succession of officers assigned as librarians during the next ten years. Comdr. J. H. Sypher, USN (Ret.), served as Superintendent of the Library from March 1923 until November 1925; Lt. Comdr. Richard Wainwright, Jr., USN (Ret.), followed from November 1925 until January 1929; and Capt. H. C. Cocke, USN, from the latter date until June 1931 when, as an economy measure, the Superintendent's position was consolidated with that of the Officer-in-Charge, and Commo. Knox took on this additional duty.

The Old Records Section, which formerly had been mere custodian of an unorganized mass of old papers and documents, under the immediate supervision of Commo. Knox during this period, gradually evolved into the most valuable and principal original source of naval history in the country. Containing more than a million old documents and manuscripts dating from the beginning of the Navy to the late 1880's, these records were frequently consulted by civilians as well as technical

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historians and researchers. In 1923, when the Manuscript Collection and Library were moved from the State, War and Navy Building, there was discovered a considerable amount of the old records which had never been properly archived, but remained boxed or otherwise unarranged and in bulk. As a consequence, data were not available except by an expenditure of considerable time and effort and many inquiries involving pensions, claims and other matters had not been answered.³³

In the process of archiving these papers, a great amount of additional source material which had been lost, misplaced or forgotten in other departments was found and added to the collection.

The World War Section, established in 1919 by an Act of Congress and charged with "the collection or copying and classification, with a view to publication, of the Naval Records of the World War, etc.," likewise had been able to accomplish very little toward preparing material for publication. The collection received from London was the only group of papers properly and thoroughly archived, while virtually all other World War naval files still remained to be classified and

33. D.W. Knox, ltr. dated 7 Feb. 1929: "After coming to duty here it was necessary for me to give considerable study to the question of an appropriate scheme of archives into which all of the heterogeneous matter could be permanently incorporated systematically. This was obviously necessary to avoid tremendous future losses of time in accomplishing the immediate task which Congress had set us as well as in all future research work. The most eminent archivists in the city were consulted and a comprehensive plan adopted which was appropriate for the old records as well as the new."

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archived into the general system.³⁴

The three reserve officers who had originally been assigned to the Office for the purpose of preparing war records for publication, were released to inactive duty in June 1922. The work thenceforth was carried on by a succession of regular officers in accordance with the usual naval rotation policy.³⁵ These officers concurrently supervised the activities of the Pictorial Section, and after 1934 when funds for printing were authorized, the Publications Section.

Related Activities

In addition to the work of its three main branches, the Office carried on some minor historical writing projects, printing seven monographs on various subjects³⁶ connected with naval operations (with about fifteen others in preparation) before a joint Congressional Committee on Printing, in June 1922, forbade further publications of World War I historical material.³⁷

34. When, for the purpose of making a single appropriation after 1927, both of these sections were consolidated, a memo to Capt. William Baggaley, USN, in Chief of Naval Operations, dated 12 Aug. 1932, suggested that the distinction still be observed between two types of materials and activities in the Office of Naval Records and Library: "World War Records" Section, then under Lieut. Charles B. McVay, III, USN; and the older, original section, designated "Old Records" under direct supervision of the Officer-in-Charge. (In the files of Office of Naval Records and Library).

35. See Appendix D in Supplement, PART XII, for Rosters of officers and other personnel assigned to Office of Naval Records and Library.

36. See Appendix B in Supplement, PART XII, for list of publications of the Office of Naval Records and Library.

37. The early casual relationship between the Historical Section and the Office of Naval Records and Library before their actual consolidation in 1927, is indicated by a single sentence in Secretary Danby's Report for 1921, which summarized their activities as follows: "The activities of the Historical Section and the Library and Naval War Records Section continue with a view to the eventual publication of the Naval records of the World War."

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The best overall picture of its functions, and most comprehensive description of its accomplishments, despite inadequate funds and insufficient personnel which handicapped the work of the Office of Naval Records and Library between the two World Wars are those paragraphs from the Annual Report made by the Secretary of the Navy in 1923:

"...Historical Section and Library.

"1. The following report of the activities of the historical section and library is submitted for the year ending June 30, 1923.

"2. The principal activity of the historical section has been the continuation of the work of collecting, arranging, and filing documents pertaining to the Navy's activities in the late war. This work has been done in accordance with the general policy approved by the Secretary of the Navy during the preceding fiscal year. The office force has been so organized and the work so systematized that greater progress has been made in archive building than in any previous year.

"3. However, the small office force still prevents a reasonably early completion. Estimates of the time needed to complete the work are necessarily very inaccurate, but probably 10 years will be required on the present basis. In submitting the last estimates to the Budget Officer it was pointed out that probably five years could be saved by about doubling the subordinate clerical force, without increasing the supervisory force. The latter is at a minimum, needed to carry on the work at all, yet this minimum is capable of supervising a greater subordinate force. The speeding up of the work through increasing the number of lower-paid employees should therefore result in a saving of overhead costs for about five years, amounting in the aggregate to a saving of about \$100,000.

"4. The historical value of the archives is constantly increasing with the addition of new matter. The archives are also valuable in furnishing ready reference on World War matters. Many inquiries are received and answered daily from officials of various departments of the Government, historical societies, and other public and private persons. Foremost among these is the Veterans' Bureau, which requires verification of circumstances surrounding the deaths of naval personnel during the World War in the establishment of claims against that bureau.

"5. During the year approximately 35,000 documents were

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added to the archives. About 9,000 pounds of rejected material, from which papers possessing historical value have been extracted, were stored at Bellevue. A number of photographs and charts have been added to the pictorial collection.

"6. Preparation of monographs to cover some of the Navy's principal activities during the World War has continued but publication of them has been stopped by the action of the Committee on Printing. By special authority one monograph, in the hands of the public printer at the time when the ban was placed upon further printing, will be completed and issued at an early date. A pamphlet summarizing casualties to both naval and merchant vessels during the war has been printed and issued. Twenty monographs have reached such an advanced state of preparation as to be practically ready to be placed in the hands of the Public Printer.

"7. On June 30, 1922, congressional provision for three reserve officers for the section expired. It should be renewed and made permanent, or else provision should be made for the employment of professional historians in a civil status. It is the deliberate opinion of many eminent scholars and naval officers who have studied the question that the professional historian must participate in the preparation of naval history of merit. Historical writing is a profession in itself, in which naval officers can rarely hope to become proficient. Both professions must collaborate in the work. The reserve officer positions may be filled with duly qualified historians as the work progresses and as suitable persons can be found.

"8. Work upon the compilation of the general index to the 'Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion' has continued, though progress has been slow owing to the need of periodic diversion of the limited personnel available to other pressing work. The general index can not be completed in less than one year.

"9. Early in 1923 the Navy Department library was moved from its original quarters in the old building to the present Navy Department building. An immediate and great increase in its activities ensued, and its value to the department resumed the position it was intended to have. The new location permits a greater economy in expenditures for magazines and books of a technical nature for the various bureaus and offices of the department.

"10. The library includes the Office of Naval Records, in which is filed a great number of old original manuscripts of much historical and traditional value. Efforts are being made to add to this collection and also to the collection of pictures

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pertaining to the 'Old Navy,' with a view to making the library a center of naval tradition.

"11. The Office of Naval Records is frequently called upon to furnish old naval historical data, not only by the Pension and other Government offices but also by numerous historical and patriotic societies, as well as by individuals. This function has been given careful attention in an effort to meet the demands of the country at large for information of the past deeds of its Navy..." 38

Naval Museum

Another collateral duty of the Office of Naval Records and Library, the long-discussed naval museum, finally received some slight but hopeful impetus when on 28 April 1930, in an order originating in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Commo. Knox was appointed Curator for the Navy Department.³⁹ This secondary function logically was placed under the Naval Records Branch in view of the close relationship between written and printed sources on the one hand, and graphic records, objects and pictures on the other. The Curator was responsible for the collection and preservation of objects, trophies, and relics of historical or inspirational value to the Navy, except those permanently assigned to the Naval Academy and other naval stations, and had cognizance over matters connected with the proposed Naval Museum at Washington, D. C. From thenceforth, pending construction of a new Navy Department building with suitable space and museum facilities, relics and pictures of past naval eras have been stored or recorded as to custody elsewhere.

38. SECNAV's Report 1923, pp. 160, 162--Edwin Denby.

39. Secretary James Forrestal, in a ltr. to all ships and stations, dated 28 Apr. 1945 (15 years later) stated: "...The functions of the Curator for the Navy Department are hereby placed under the cognizance of the Chief of Naval Operations who will promulgate such instructions with respect thereto as may be deemed necessary..."

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Publications

In 1922 as the printing of Civil War Documents (a work which had begun in 1894) neared completion, a Congressional Committee on Printing forbade further expenditures for this purpose. Finally, in 1934 through the President's interest in naval matters, an appropriation was obtained from Congress for the printing of documents pertaining to the Quasi-War with France and the Barbary Wars. The publications section's work on these volumes commenced in April 1934 and carried on until seven volumes of Naval Documents, Quasi-War with France and six volumes Naval Documents, United States Wars with the Barbary Powers eventually were brought out.⁴⁰

President Roosevelt was much impressed with the first of these volumes and highly complimented Commodore Knox.⁴¹ To make this personal communication a matter of official record, on 28 December 1938 Commodore Knox sent a copy, via Director of Naval Intelligence, to Chief of Naval Personnel stating:

"1. I enclose a copy of a letter received today from President Roosevelt and request that it be filed with my record.

"2. The matter referred to is the project for printing early naval manuscript records of which the first series of seven volumes relating to the Quasi-War with France has been completed. The first volume of the documents pertaining to the Barbary Wars is now on the press, and this series will also run approximately seven volumes. In his foreword to the Barbary volumes the President says, 'It is my earnest hope that the printing of naval manuscripts relating to the War of 1812 and other phases of our national life, may follow'.

"3. Inasmuch as the printed volumes are sold at cost to

40. See Appendix E in Supplement, PART XII, for a complete list of these and other works published by the Office of Naval Records and Library.

41. F. D. Roosevelt, ltr. dated 27 Dec. 1938 (beginning typically "My dear Dudley.")

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the public, the project is intended to be self-liquidating and the probability of obtaining appropriations from Congress over an extended period of years, therefore, seems to be good."

Public Relations

In their methods of conducting routine business between the two World Wars, Commodore Knox and his staff made many friends for the Navy Department in general and the Office of Naval Records and Library in particular. On 15 November 1931, a feature article in the magazine section of the Washington Sunday Star, describing some of the important Governmental Libraries in various agencies in the District of Columbia, included the following:

"...In the large, well arranged Library of the Navy Department in the Navy Building are more than 77,572 volumes, records and documents on Navy Science, reference, biographies, and history. Here are Admiral Dewey's original papers and also those of Admiral Farragut and Admiral Porter...(The Navy Library) also has a file of 35,000 photographs pertaining to ships, personnel and other Navy subjects...Its most ancient original documents are copies of the instructions given to the Navy commanders to capture British boats, signed by Henry Laurens, President Continental Congress, April 3, 1776..."

On 1 April 1935, a few years later, in the Los Angeles Times, Mr. Harry Carr who conducted a popular newspaper column "The Lancer," contrasting his treatment as a civilian in the Navy and War Departments wrote:

"...The Chair Warmers. The fault is with the officers of the General Staff in Washington. Brethren they are just plain snooty. I cite two incidents.

I wanted to get the Army records of Fort Tejon near Bakersfield. After a long delay the War Department labored and brought forth the date of its founding and abandonment--which could have been found in any school library.

With some trepidation, I went to the Navy Department and asked to see some records. They gave me a desk in the Bureau of Records, a special library assistant, the use of a stenographer, sent a car for me every morning and dug up so many

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old log books and records that I lived for two weeks in a lather of excitement..."

In the Washington Post of 22 November 1931, another magazine story gave considerable space to an article on the Pictorial Section of the Office of Naval Records and History. Under the caption "THE U. S. NAVY'S FAMILY ALBUM" it declared that "If the 70,000 Pictures Comprising the Gallery Tucked Away in Room 3629 of the Navy Building Were Ever Mounted in Albums, a New Building Would be Needed to House Them. They Embrace History of the Navy and Allied Subjects... And Still Serve a Valuable Purpose." The collection consisted mostly, it was said, of actual photographs of officers and men, ships and crews, guns and armament, sea chases and battles, and of naval subjects of all kinds, as well as reproductions of drawings, sketches and paintings of historical events from the days before the invention of photography.

As its pictorial branch and other facilities became more widely known through such media, an increased interest in the records of the Navy's part in the historical development of the nation reflected itself in numerous requests from the general public.⁴²

42. D. W. Knox in a Circular, dated 15 Apr. 1936, authorized one of the office employees on his own time and with his own materials "...to supply photographs for other than official purposes..." "...In order to meet the frequent demands for such service and as a convenience to the public..."

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among "family papers," the article not only evoked widespread interest but caused the editors to print a special notice inviting attention to the subject.⁴⁴

Peacetime Plans for Additional Publications

In mid-summer 1939, just before the second World War broke out in Europe, the Office of Naval Records and Library having practically completed bringing out its volumes of early historical documents pertaining to the Quasi-War with France and the naval records of the Barbary Wars, was looking forward to similarly printing a collection of the more important documents pertaining to naval operations during the War of 1812 and during 1917 and 1918.

The President's active interest in naval history promised well for carrying on such a program of publishing naval war records, but after a state of limited emergency had been declared on 8 September 1939, and war clouds were seen to be gathering on the horizon, priority for such a project dropped rapidly. For the duration therefore all plans for the job were suspended, contemplated requests that civilian and officer staffs be restored⁴⁵ to former size were postponed and Commodore Knox again carried on alone as Librarian, Archivist, Curator, Historian and representative of the Navy Department in the National Archives Council.

44. Plans ultimately resulted in establishment of the Naval Historical Foundation. This non-profit organization accepts gifts of documents, relics, etc., and retains them in custody for the Office of Naval Records and Library thus eliminating necessity for Congressional action were they presented to Navy or other Governmental departments.

45. Since 1919 the clerical force had been reduced from 32 civilian employees to 21, and the officer complement from 5 to a single naval officer assigned to duty in the Office of Naval Records and Library, in addition to the officer-in-charge.

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D. World War II

Location and Relocation

Foreseeing that operational activities would expand after the declaration of a limited emergency on 8 September 1939, the Office accepted the fact that it might soon have to relinquish space in the main Navy Building to other branches, for more important and current business of the department.

On 19 June 1940, Captain Knox prophetically published the following order for the guidance of the several sections should a "state of greater emergency than exists at present" arise:

"...(a) The Library proper will continue to function substantially as at present, giving priority to information for Navy Department use.

"(b) The Publications Section will stop sending material to the printer, but will complete preparation of typed material of Barbary Wars, for future publication.

"(c) The World War Section will minimize work not connected with research for the Navy or other Government Departments. It will prepare to move to other quarters and keep in a state of readiness to do this. It will be prepared to archive war diaries and other documents related to the current emergency.

"(d) The Old Records Section will minimize research work not connected with Navy or other Government Departments. Most outside inquiries can be answered by a circular stating that such work has been suspended until after the emergency. Continue transfer of papers from Bureau of Navigation files, but be prepared to stop it. Organize in readiness for moving to other quarters should the necessity arise.

"(e) The Picture Section will undertake 'to receive, record, classify and distribute as necessary photographs of current or potential strategic or historical interest.' The distribution will include appropriate bureaus and offices of the entire Navy Department, as well as outside naval agencies..."

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It was hoped that the completion of the Navy Annex, then under construction in Arlington, Virginia, would take care of the office requirements of expanding departmental activities, but long before the Annex was ready for occupancy, space problems in the main building became so acute that arrangements were made with the National Archives to provide temporary quarters for the Office of Naval Records and Library. In March 1941 there began the first in a series of relocations, when all personnel, equipment and activities of the Office of Naval Records (excepting those of a small reference library and the pictorial section) were moved to the National Archives.

The second major move was to Arlington after a period of about six months tenancy in the National Archives. Although a state of unlimited emergency had been declared in May 1941, no change in plans for "final" location of the Office in the Annex was felt necessary, and in October of that year when the third wing was ready, its personnel and materials were shipped across the river. The civilian staff involved at that time totalled only fifteen. The quarters in the Arlington Annex were most commodious and agreeable, and though the Office was separated from the rest of Naval Operations, the inconvenience of frequent bus trips across the Potomac was compensated for by the convenience of working in new, clean and well arranged offices.

Organization at Outbreak of War

At the outbreak of war, the only officer beside Commodore Knox on duty in the Office of Naval Records and Library was Lieutenant

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(later Commander) S. T. Dibrell, USNR--a graduate of the Naval Academy, who had resigned from the service and later returned as a Reserve officer.

The Library (Op-16-E1) was in the charge of Mrs. Constance D. Lathrop, who, with a small reference collection and the library catalogue, remained in two rooms in the main building on Constitution Avenue. The main collection of books was housed in the Arlington Annex.⁴⁶

The Manuscript Section (Op-16-E2), which had been formed by the amalgamation of the Old Records Section and the World War Section, was in the charge of Mrs. Alma R. Lawrence, and was housed entirely in the Arlington Annex.

The Graphic Section (Op-16-E3), although originally concerned with photographs of purely historical interest, had had strategic photographs grafted onto it in 1941. This section, to which Lieutenant Dibrell devoted himself with great energy, was located in third floor, eighth wing of the main building. With the approach of war, the strategic photographs were increasing rapidly, and were becoming a tail that wagged the dog.⁴⁷

The Publications Section (Op-16-E4) was, under the direction of Miss Loretta I. MacCrindle, engaged in preparing for publication

46. In Apr. 1941 the reference library moved to Room 3635; in Nov. 1942 to 3830; in Aug. 1943 to 3641 and in Feb. 1944 to 3642.

47. As a matter of wartime necessity, this section operated after Pearl Harbor in a semi-autonomous capacity, and as it had grown out of a logical relationship with the rest of the Office it was, with Commodore Knox's concurrence, transferred to the P branch of O.N.I. in the reorganization of Mar. 1943. For details of the Graphic Section see 16-P-5 section in preceding PART X of this History.

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naval documents of the Barbary Wars. It was located in the Arlington Annex, in close proximity to the Manuscript Section, from which its documents were drawn.

General Mission and Objectives

Although non-military activities practically ceased and departmental functions increased, the basic mission of the Office of Naval Records and Library during the war did not change. Established for the purpose of making information available to the Navy Department and to the general public from its constantly growing reservoir of operational records, the necessity of planning for and archiving data on the current war became so paramount that its other activities, including those of utility to the public, were necessarily reduced for the duration.

The three immediate objectives of the Office, after Pearl Harbor, were:

- (a) To procure and commission the most skilled personnel that could be obtained in the field of naval archives and history;
- (b) to survey the entire field of operational records with a view to determining which, in addition to war diaries, would be most valuable to the war effort;
- (c) to arrange and classify documents received so that pertinent operational data contained in them would be readily accessible to those authorized to know.

These objectives chiefly concerned the work of The Manuscript Section (Op-16-E2). Beyond greatly increased demands for books and

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information, which had to be furnished at greater speed than in peacetime, there was no change in the activities of the Library Section (Op-16-E1) during the war.

War Diaries

One of the duties of the Office of Naval Records and Library in the pre-war mobilization plan was the preparation of a letter of instruction to cover the preparation of War Diaries in the event of war.⁴⁸ On 29 April 1941, Commodore Knox sent a memorandum to the Director of Naval Intelligence with a draft of the proposed letter which was to be sent out in the event of mobilization. This letter was submitted for signature immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, but met with opposition from various quarters in Naval Operations. They felt that the keeping of War Diaries imposed an undue additional load of paper work. In view of this opposition, considerable time was lost. Commodore Knox pointed out in a memorandum of 16 January 1942, to the Director, that "the original draft represented a substantial simplification of the same order actually carried out during the last war." The letter was in due course submitted to COMINCH, who wished to know more about the keeping of Diaries in World War I.

On 30 January 1942, a memorandum from Commodore Knox to COMINCH with a copy of the World War I directive enclosed, stated, "A similar order was prepared by this office several years ago for inclusion in the war plans. After the outbreak of the present war it came to my attention that the order covering War Diaries incorporated in the war

⁴⁸. Much of the material on the preliminary activities and selection of officer personnel during the early months of World War II was taken from an unpublished monograph prepared in 1943 by Commander W. M. Whitehill, USNR, who reported for duty in the Manuscript Section in November 1942, and served as Officer-in-Charge of the Section from March 1945 to June 1946.

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plan had not been issued and that further simplification was desired."

The letter of instructions was subsequently rewritten and was issued on 22 February 1942, signed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Even before this directive was issued, certain ships and task forces, particularly in the Pacific, had been keeping War Diaries on their own initiative, which when submitted proved to be of very considerable value. As the War Diaries began to be received in Washington, the attitude toward them changed almost immediately and their high value as a source of current operational information and guidance was very soon recognized.

The establishment of the Microfilm Library in the Readiness Section of the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, to facilitate the dissemination among bureaus and interested offices of the Navy Department of the information contained in the War Diaries,⁴⁹ took place less than two months after the appearance of the 22 February 1942 directive, and was a proof of the usefulness of the Diaries.

Estimate of Situation.

At the outbreak of the War, Commodore Knox, feeling that the business of fighting should not be impeded in any way, and anticipating that the influx of World War II records would not occur in great

49. All War Diaries, Submarine Patrol Reports, Action Reports and many personal narratives were microfilmed immediately after they were received in headquarters. Each bureau and office concerned designated a representative "reader" who was enabled to have immediate access to the film of the original report. In 1942, Commander Cleveland McCauley was placed in charge of the Reading Room which shortly thereafter was officially designated as the Microfilm Library. A detailed account of the personnel, operation and accomplishments of the Microfilm Library may be found in the history of the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief. After the dissolution of CominCh in October 1945, activities of the Microfilm Library were turned over to the Office of Naval Records and Library.

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volume until demobilization, decided on a long range policy of slow and careful selection of officer personnel, as the method least interfering with more urgent activities.

On 7 December 1941 there was not a single naval officer specifically assigned to the staff of the Manuscript Section of the Office of Naval Records and Library (Op-16-E2). Its civilian personnel, however, were all of long experience. Various other civilians who had had relations with the office in peacetime wrote offering their services in any capacity in which they might be useful. Among those was Mr. Tracy Barrett Kittredge, who had during the last war been a Lieutenant, USNRF, attached to the staff of Admiral Sims in London, and had worked very closely with Commodore Knox in organizing the historical section of World War I. On 13 December 1941, Mr. Kittredge wrote to Commodore Knox, to the Administrative Officer of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and to Admiral Stark, offering his services. Commodore Knox in replying on 15 December, stated, "The day you called, we discussed the problem of taking over current historical documents for our historical collection and I understand that we were in agreement that nothing should be done until the period of demobilization sets in. Nevertheless, I have the problem of studying this matter, preparing plans for doing the job when the war is over, and I would very much like to have you on duty here in that connection."

This plan of making a study of the archival problem of World War II in advance of the actual end was one which occupied the attention of the office for a number of months to come.

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Preliminary Study and Basic Memorandum

Lieutenant T. B. Kittredge applied himself to the problems involved in the systematic collection of war documentation with great energy and insight and in an extremely short time prepared a memorandum for Commodore Knox which has become the basis and point of departure for the subsequent activities of the office. He prepared a second memorandum on 20 April, entitled "Procedures suggested for examination and disposition of plans for activities of the Office of Naval Records in the centralization classification and filing of documentation relative to the Naval operations during the war."⁵⁰

These memoranda of Lieutenant Kittredge involved proposals for preliminary surveys by officers attached to the Office of Naval Records of existing files relating to naval operations, and the laying of plans for the establishment of a future operational archive in the Office of Naval Records. Lieutenant Kittredge suggested the extensive use of microfilm as a solution of the space problem, and as a means of reconciling the desire of the Archivist of the United States for records to be filed by provenance, and the practice of the Office of Naval Records in arranging its files similar to the methodized system already in use.

Lieutenant Kittredge's suggestion for possible staff requirements for the Office of Naval Records were as follows:

One officer to make a survey of Navy Department files and archives;

One officer, with perhaps one or more assistants, to make

50. See APPENDIX C in Supplement, PART XII for complete copies of these two basic memoranda.

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a survey of present methods for analysis and synthesis of information available; this officer was to be personal assistant to Commodore Knox;

One officer to be responsible for the organization and maintenance of a microfilm archive, with one or more assistants to do any classification and indexing of microfilm prints;

One officer to be responsible for the planning, installation and maintenance of the files of War Diaries and other special collections relating to naval operations;

One officer to assist Commodore Knox in working out cooperative arrangements with government agencies concerned with war activities and with the National Archives.

On 25 April, Commodore Knox submitted a memorandum to the Director of Naval Intelligence, outlining this program and requesting the assignment of an appropriate number of officers to undertake it.

Personnel.

At this time, the only officer specifically requested was Ensign John Haskell Kemble, USNR, who was to undertake the survey of Navy Department's files and archives. Ensign Kemble, in civilian life, was a member of the History Department of Pomona College, Claremont, California.

Commodore Knox's memorandum to the Director was lost, and no action was consequently taken until a duplicate copy was submitted on 26 May. It was on that date, "approved for planning and arrangement" with the added notation by the Director, "believe it is too

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early yet, however, to consider transfer of any files to Archival state."

A few days after Commodore Knox's memorandum of 25 April had been submitted to the Director, Ensign Kemble was instructed to ascertain at Princeton University the possibilities of securing suitable personnel for carrying out the project. Dr. R. G. Albion of Princeton and Professor S. E. Morison of Harvard University were recommended for this purpose.

Consequently, Commodore Knox on 6 May 1942 wrote Dr. Robert Greenhalgh Albion, Professor of History and Assistant Dean of the Faculty of Princeton University, sending him a copy of the 25 April memorandum and requesting his services. "In part, the task I had in mind for you is outlined in paragraph 7. Your administrative experience and general background, however, qualify you further for the position of my principal assistant in the whole project dealing with the current war. I should be delighted to have you in this dual capacity." But Dr. Albion at this time was unable to relinquish entirely his duties at Princeton University.

On the same day, Commodore Knox wrote to Marion Vernon Brewington, Jr., of Philadelphia, and suggested that Mr. Brewington might be interested in fitting into some of the aspects of the plan either as a Lieutenant, USNR, or as a civilian employee with equal pay. Mr. Brewington, although in civilian life a trust officer of the Pennsylvania Company in Philadelphia, had for many years devoted himself to the study of Naval and Maritime History with great distinction, and had, in the course of his work, been in constant contact with

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Commodore Knox and the office staff.

On 22 May, Commodore Knox wrote to Professor Samuel Eliot Morison, professor of history at Harvard University, offering him the post of "Naval Reserve Officer in charge of this project."

Professor Morison had on 9 December 1941 written to Captain J. A. Gade, USNR, in the Office of Naval Intelligence, concerning his possible enrollment in the Naval Reserve. Captain Gade had referred this inquiry to Commodore Knox, who had, in a memorandum of 24 December, said, "there is no plan at present for a history of naval operations to be prepared after the war;" and that "the function of this office is mainly archiving." Professor Morison, in reply (letter of 7 January 1942) had suggested the desirability of getting "history hot off the griddle, written as the operations progressed, and then laid away for publication after the war or whenever it can be told." Commodore Knox at that time, felt that such a proposal did not fall within the scope of this office.

Professor Morison in the intervening months had followed his proposal through other channels and when Commodore Knox wrote him on 22 May, he had recently been commissioned Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

On 29 May, he wrote Commodore Knox as follows: "After giving your flattering offer very careful consideration, I decided that it would be better for my historical work if I devoted my entire time and energy to keeping abreast of current history. That alone is a stupendous job; much bigger than anything I have heretofore tackled, and if I undertake to make a collection of source material it would consume all of my time."

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Dr. Walter Muir Whitehill, Assistant Director of the Peabody Museum and Editor of The American Neptune was next contacted concerning the possibility of his joining the staff to take over the duties originally contemplated for Professor Albion. On 16 November 1942 Lieutenant (later Commander) Whitehill, USNR, reported for duty.

By the end of June, it appeared desirable that Ensign Kemble should be transferred from Foreign Intelligence Records and begin to devote his time to the duties which were contemplated for him in Lieutenant Kittredge's memorandum. Hence he was transferred to Op-16-E on 12 July.

On 2 July 1942, Commander (later Captain) Percy T. Wright, USN (Ret.), reported for duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence and was assigned to Op-16-E. Commander Wright had had a distinguished career as a submarine officer in World War I; had subsequently served as Navigating Officer of the West Virginia and as the Commanding Officer of the Canopus on the China Station. Commander Wright spent some days familiarizing himself with the work of the various branches of Op-16E and was given the choice of assignment to any one in which he saw the greatest possibility for useful service. His choice was Op-16-E-2 and consequently Commodore Knox asked him to become head of that section.

At the end of July, Dr. Whitehill recommended that only two additional officers would be necessary to carry out the program proposed in the Kittredge Memorandum. He nominated Dr. Richard W. Leopold, Instructor in History and Head Tutor of Adams House, Harvard

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University (a diplomatic historian with a wide knowledge of Anglo-American relations and considerable interest in naval history) and Mr. Edwin W. Small, who was in charge of the National Park Service at Salem, Massachusetts, and had worked somewhat in the field of maritime history. Dr. Leopold was commissioned Ensign, USNR, and reported for duty on 24 December 1942, after having been drafted and having served several months as a private in the Army Air Force. Mr. Small did not appear in the uniform of a Lieutenant (jg) until 9 March 1943.

Mr. Brewington was engaged as a civilian agent, and turned up in Washington for duty in early September 1942, although it was mid-December before he formally reported as a Lieutenant.

Dr. Nelson M. Blake, Chief of the Navy Department Archives, The National Archives, had offered his services to Commodore Knox. He was instructed to apply for a commission, and so eventually reported as Lieutenant, USNR, on 15 December 1942.

Genesis of Recording Project.

The selection of Dr. Blake completed the personnel considered necessary for carrying out the provisions of the Kittredge Memorandum. In anticipation of their reporting for duty, Commander Wright and Lieutenant Kemble in August and September 1942 made calls upon various offices in Naval Operations and Public Relations to lay the groundwork for the survey of operational records that was to be undertaken in the future. At that moment there was naturally a greater concern with fighting the war than keeping records, and the operational reports that were submitted were maintained in high

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security classifications in the files of COMINCH Headquarters. The war diaries (which were being received regularly in the Office of Naval Records and Library) were not an entirely adequate record, and Commander Wright therefore became greatly concerned over the necessity of obtaining supplementary information from the actual theaters of operations. He had also become much impressed with the potentialities of a new type of voice recording gear--known as the Recordgraph--in which sound tracks are impressed upon 35 mm. micro-film. He therefore laid plans for an extensive field staff, equipped with Recordgraphs, to collect personal narratives of action from forces in the forward areas and at strategic points within the continental limits of the United States.

The field staff would consist of thirteen units of one commissioned officer and one stenographic yeoman (equipped with voice recording machines), assigned to duty at sea frontiers and centers of naval importance overseas. These units would be concerned with the collection of significant operational records not available in Washington, by obtaining recorded narratives from those who had taken a prominent part in operations. Narratives of this sort had already been recorded experimentally by this section, but experience had demonstrated the desirability of getting them immediately after the action.

In addition, these officers would be familiar with the procedure for the disposal of excess files as they accumulate on board ship and ashore. It was expected that field units would be of great assistance to operating forces in aiding them in the reduction of burdensome files.

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In this capacity they would work in close cooperation with the Office of Records Administration, looking to the destruction of useless material and the forwarding to Washington of important records.

In view of the slowness of procurement processes, Commander Wright set about obtaining qualified personnel for this field project, even though it had not yet been planned in detail, and the survey of operational records in Washington had not been begun. In his view, time was of the essence. He therefore sought personnel energetically, and, in fact, devoted most of his efforts from September 1942 to January 1943 to this end. In some cases he requested the commissioning of civilians with historical, archival or journalistic experience, such as Elting E. Morison (the biographer of Admiral Sims), David B. Tyler (author of "Steam Conquers the Atlantic"), Charles G. Summersell of the University of Alabama, M. R. Dickson (The National Archives), Cecil K. Byrd (University of Indiana), Alexander R. Preston (The Washington Star); in other instances he counted on utilizing the services of officers who were available, such as Lieutenant E. R. Shopen, Ensign Richard C. Haskett and Boatswain Richard C. Newbold. Commander Wright also sought the commissioning of George B. Porter, of the staff of The Washington Star, to serve as liaison officer between the Office of Naval Records and Library and the Office of Public Information. Enlisted personnel, both for the field staff and for duty in Washington, were also sought energetically. Though yeomen reported throughout the fall in satisfactory numbers, the majority of the officers did not report until the early months of 1943.

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The Third Relocation

In October 1942, while Commander Wright was wrestling with personnel problems, Vice Admiral Henry V. Butler, Administrative Officer of the Navy Department, indicated that expansion of the Bureau of Naval Personnel's activities would presently require the Arlington Annex space into which the Office had moved in October 1941. It was proposed that the Office as a whole move to quarters in the old Smithsonian Institution building, which would be reconditioned for the housing of books and manuscripts. Commander Wright strongly opposed this plan (which would have kept the Office activities together in one place), and in consequence an alternative was developed, which involved scattering the sections widely, though retaining a foothold in the Arlington Annex.

The Librarian of Congress offered the use of a stack area on Deck 12 South of the Library of Congress Annex, to which the Library's books (and those of The National Historical Foundation) were transferred about the middle of November 1942. Clarence I. Gardiner, stack attendant, accompanied them, and has ever since made his headquarters there to answer calls for books.

All pictures, trophies and historical relics, of which there were 107 large cases, were inventoried for the first time, photographed, securely packed and stored in the Navy Warehouse, South Court House Road, Arlington.

In October 1942 negotiations were begun to transfer records in the Manuscript Section antedating 1910 to the legal custody of The National Archives. After interdepartmental legal and technical

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formalities had been completed through the Office of Records Administration, The National Archives in a letter on 10 November 1942 stated that the Archivist would take into his permanent legal custody, all records contained in the Office of Naval Records and Library collection which date prior to 1911 and already had delivered his requisition therefor. He was also willing to provide storage space for the duration of the war for the remaining records of the Office dating subsequent to 1910, with the understanding that this material would remain in the legal custody of the Navy Department.

The Archivist agreed to provide office space permanently for the Civil Service naval personnel attached to those records, and had no objection to naval personnel completing the work then in progress of assembling the recently acquired Spanish-American War records. He further provided space for the personnel of the Publications Section and the manuscript collections and the Naval Historical Foundation.

As insurance against loss by enemy bombing or sabotage, all the more valuable manuscripts (except those already printed relating to the Quasi-War, Barbary Wars and Civil War) were microfilmed. One copy was retained in the Office of Naval Records and Library, one sent to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, one to the bomb-proof in Indiana and the negative to the National Archives.

Four rooms on the front corridor of the Arlington Annex (3022, 3024, 3026, 3028) and two and a half rooms opposite were retained for the use of Commodore Knox, his administrative office, and the World War II portion of Op-16-E2. This was considered a temporary arrangement, for

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at that time the theory of a Navy Department move to the Pentagon was under discussion, but in the end this space was retained until August 1945. Originally intended only for office use, it became more and more overcrowded as current records poured in, and additional filing cases jostled personnel.

Completion of Shakedown Period

In the course of November and December 1942 Lieutenants Whitehill, Brewington and Blake reported for duty, as well as two officers (Lieutenants Dickson and Shopen) who were intended for the field staff. The commotion of moving, as well as efforts to expedite the procurement of personnel, made consistent and orderly work difficult. Nevertheless, by the end of the year Lieutenants Whitehill, Brewington and Kemble were attacking the survey of operational records. Ensign Leopold, who reported on Christmas Eve, was placed in charge of setting up classification and filing systems, while Boatswain Newbold directed the enlisted force engaged in this work. Lieutenant Blake was performing liaison work with the Office of Records Administration and the National Archives, and Lieutenant Porter (who reported in early January 1943) was soon to develop similar duties with the Office of Public Relations.

Under the date of 22 January 1943, Commodore Knox in a memorandum to the Director of Naval Intelligence was able to state that the situation in Op-16-E2 had then reached a point where a more specific report could be made on the duties and functions of the officer personnel.

He found that it had become increasingly clear that the function

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of his staff should be to make the operational records of the present war of immediate use in its conduct, and believed that, if this task was accomplished satisfactorily, these materials would form the basis for the preparation of a staff history immediately after the war, should that be deemed advisable. "...Such a project was decided upon by the Secretary of the Navy and by Admiral Sims in 1918, but was not carried through in its entirety due to the close of the war. This resulted in the loss to a large extent of the naval lessons of World War I, and it therefore seemed imperative to undertake this work for World War II at the earliest possible time..."

One administrative officer and four other officers of the Washington staff were concerned with the collection of significant operational records.⁵¹ War diaries were automatically received for permanent retention, but it was necessary also to maintain constant contact with offices of the Navy Department and related governmental agencies to locate and earmark for reference, future microfilming, and possible future transfer of pertinent supplementary documents which were essential to complete the operational record.

51. In this memo Commo. Knox reported: "...The duties of the Washington staff also include the indexing and filing of the records received in order to make the information contained instantly available. The present flow of documents is only a fractional part of the files that will be received as the war progresses and nears its end. Microfilming is being used to the utmost to minimize the space problem. One officer devotes his full time to general problems of planning this classification. This officer, with the assistance of the officers described in paragraph 4, maintains a high degree of familiarity with the information in the materials received, in order to insure its fullest usefulness. The mechanical work of indexing and cross-indexing these papers is carried out by a staff of yeomen under the direction of a warrant officer. This staff is at present large, but as the back accumulation of war diaries is processed, this work can be kept up by fewer men..."

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Disapproval of Recording Project.

To the intense chagrin and disappointment of Comdr. Wright, its principal sponsor, and after considerable time and care had been consumed in the selection of proper equipment and personnel for the sound recording program, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, in a memorandum to Commo. Knox dated 4 February 1943⁵² stated:

"In view of the desire of our Commanders in the theatres of operations to remain unhampered, insofar as possible, by persons or activities not essential to the business of fighting, I regret that I cannot permit sending personnel into the field for the purposes specified in your memorandum dated January 29, 1943."

This decision left the Office with an embarrassing richness of personnel and Recordgraph machines, but during the late winter and early spring of 1943 -- while the Washington staff were at work on activities that will presently be discussed -- arrangements were made for the disposition of the field officers and machines which proved to be of considerable historical utility. Lt. (jg) E. E. Morison was ordered to the Eastern Sea Frontier as assistant historian;⁵³ Ensign Alexander Preston to the Western Sea Frontier as war diary officer; Lt. (jg) Charles G. Summersell to the staff of Commander

52. Later on, this view was modified by COMINCH ltr. Serial 2770, dated 1 May 1943 which "...approves the assignment of two recordgraphs, with operating personnel, to the Pacific Fleet, for the purpose of recording action narratives of Fleet personnel...." with the understanding that one machine would be used at Pearl Harbor and the other at discretion of Commander Third Fleet. All recordings to be sent to COMINCH for censorship and disposition.

53. He subsequently, in 1944, returned to Washington as historical officer for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

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Submarines, Pacific Fleet, as historical officer;⁵⁴ while Lieutenant J. H. Kemble⁵⁵ and Boatswain R. C. Newbold were ordered to the Pacific Fleet and South Pacific Force, respectively, with Recordgraph machines.⁵⁶ These officers, although detached from the Office of Naval Records and Library, were of considerable assistance to the Office in their respective commands throughout the war.

Lieutenant Porter remained in Washington, where he quietly and efficiently used the Recordgraph machine to obtain a considerable number of recordings from officers and men who had returned from combat zones.⁵⁷

Survey of Operational Records

During the early months of 1943, considerable progress was made in the survey of operational records. Lieutenants Whitehill and Brewington (and later Lieutenant Tyler) spent considerable time in

54. Lieut. Summersell, after two years of duty in the Pacific--partly on the staff of ComSubsPac and partly in the Analytical Section of CinCPac's Headquarters, returned to the Office of Naval Records and Library in May 1945 and served until the following December, when he was ordered to inactive duty.
55. Lieut. (later Lt. Comdr.) Kemble was, shortly after his arrival at Pearl Harbor, ordered to the Analytical Section of CinCPac's headquarters, and later had additional duty as Assistant Historical Officer of the Pacific Fleet.
56. Lieut. D. B. Tyler remained in Washington to fill the vacancy caused by Lieut. Kemble's assignment to Pearl Harbor. Lieut. M. R. Dickson became officer in charge of Foreign Intelligence Records in O.N.I. Lieut. E. R. Shopen and Ens. C. K. Byrd qualified themselves as operational intelligence officers, while Ens. R. C. Haskett went to sea.
57. Comdr. (later Capt.) Wright maintained a very active interest in sound recording activities throughout the war. In Mar. 1945 he was relieved by Lt. Comdr. Whitehill as officer in charge of the Manuscript Section (Op-16-E2), so that he might be free to give his full time to them.

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the COMINCH Microfilm Library (analyzing the types of documents filmed there and the sources from which they were received) and investigating other files in COMINCH Headquarters and in Naval Operations. Lieutenant Blake (assisted by Lieutenant Dickson) worked in close relationship with the Office of Records Administration, and studied various obsolete ship and command files which had been turned over to that Office for storage. Lieutenant Kemble visited the headquarters of various Sea Frontiers and shore establishments, while Lieutenant Porter kept a close eye upon material in the Office of Public Relations and the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

It soon became apparent that the documents in which the Office of Naval Records and Library was chiefly interested were concentrated in the files of COMINCH Headquarters, and so from the late spring of 1943 onwards most survey activities were concerned with those files. Lieutenant Whitehill kept in touch with the Microfilm Library, the Indoctrination Section, and Tactical Analysis Section of the Readiness Division, as well as the File Rooms (which were under the direction of the Flag Secretary), and from this there developed frequent transfers of documents that were no longer required for current use in Headquarters. In May 1943 a considerable number of photostatic copies of action reports were turned over to the Office of Naval Records and Library by the Tactical Analysis Section. In July 1943 the Secret File Room began the transfer of original action reports, and in March 1944 a system was set up by which not only original action reports but operation plans and orders would be regularly sent to the Office of Naval Records and Library when six months old. By

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order of the Director of Naval Intelligence, these documents, which were still considered to be part of the COMINCH files, were accessible only to personnel attached to, or authorized by, COMINCH Headquarters. ⁵⁸

Thus what had begun as a survey (with the intention of earmarking files for post-war transfer) ended in a working arrangement by which documents were currently transferred throughout the war. The reason, however, is obvious; the work of classifying, indexing and binding these documents for future historical reference made the information contained therein more readily accessible for current use in COMINCH Headquarters.

Handling of Incoming Operational Records.

During 1942 the war diaries (which were the only class of current records then received) were filed by Mrs. Lawrence, with the assistance of the enlisted men, who began to report from August onwards. Ensign R.W. Leopold was placed in charge of the files in January 1943, and continued in that duty until his detachment in March 1946. The orderly condition of the current files of the Office is almost entirely due to his careful and foresighted planning, and ability to cope with vast quantities of records with inadequate space and equipment. As there was no satisfactory precedent for handling this material, Ensign Leopold devised classification systems and procedures whereby incoming documents were routed to various

58. Consequently during the remainder of the war historical officers wishing to work in the Office of Naval Records and Library were required to make written application to Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Authorizations were prepared (after thorough investigation) by the COMINCH Security Control Officer (F-24) and signed by Admiral R.S. Edwards.

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officers for reading and the preparation of index cards (involving briefs of contents), and then bound and filed. As the war progressed, the trickle of records became a torrent, yet, by skillful utilization of both the personnel and space available, Leopold's systems resulted in rapid accessioning, orderly filing and ready availability of information.⁵⁹

The several types of records and reports tabulated embrace most of the operational archives of naval action during the war and include:

- (a) Operation Plans and Orders.
- (b) Action Reports.
- (c) War Diaries.
- (d) Patrol Reports--submarines and aircraft.

Original Operation Plans and Orders (master set) are filed under administrative titles of originators; while duplicate copies (if any were received) are filed in the Class III material (area) file under pertinent operation.

Action Reports which are the second largest collection of operational records now on hand, have been acquired through four different channels: the chain-of-command copy, the photostat of the original document, the advance copy and very often an extra copy appended to a war diary.

The most complete chain-of-command copy together with endorsements, received from the COMINCH file room is considered the master

⁵⁹. Appendix F in Supplement PART XII, gives a week by week tabulation of the documents accessioned, indexed and bound from Apr. 1943 until after V-J day.

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copy. The photostat distributed by the Readiness Division very often was the first to appear for accessioning. The advance copy and those appended to the war diaries likewise were acquired from COMINCH file room.

All action reports are filed by originators. However, it is intended in the near future to incorporate the photostat copies into the Class III area file under the pertinent operation. Any gaps found to exist in the photostat collection will be filled in by utilizing one of the extra copies on hand.

Separate cabinets of guide cards (3x5) (duplicates) enable searchers to locate action reports either by origination or operation. The "A" file indicates "author" and the "B" file similarly indicates "battle." Each card contains a very brief summary of the content of the reports including type command, task group, date, battle, etc.

War Diaries comprise the largest bulk of the naval operational archives of World War II. These are filed by originators and recorded on a Kardex visible index file. Those submitted during early months of the war (when the war diary was part of the ship's log) are of log sheet size, while others prepared in conformance with later revised instructions are of letter size. Except for symbol craft such as LCI's, all war diaries from ships are filed alphabetically; command war diaries sometimes included operation plans or action reports. The 5x8 card file for war diaries also includes microfilm serial numbers.

Patrol Reports (submarine and aircraft) are filed by originators

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and indexed on a 3x5 card system.

As the bulk of incoming documents increased, additional personnel became necessary. In June 1944 the Office's first WAVE officer, Ensign (later Lieutenant) Ruth E. Delano, reported, who proved so indispensable that she was presently followed in February 1945 by Ensign (later Lieutenant, (jg)) Helen F. Kuhns and in August 1945 by Ensign (later Lieutenant, (jg)) Barbara A. Gilmore. These officers gave their entire time to accessioning.

Collateral Contributions

In addition to its main function of handling current operational records, other useful contributions to the overall war effort were made possible through recourse to the older collections in the Office of Naval Records and Library. At various times during the first years of the war, several departmental offices and bureaus, the Secretary of the Navy and even the President himself solicited the aid of its research staff.

The small group of civilian workers of the peacetime Manuscript Section carried on these activities, first in the main Navy Building, then at the Arlington Annex when the records were moved across the Potomac in March 1941, and finally in The National Archives to which agency the collection was legally transferred in November 1942. In a memorandum dated 11 December 1944 Mrs. A. R. Lawrence, who directed the group, outlined a chronological resume of some of these searches as follows:

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1941 - Research for the President of the United States for data on neutrality precedents where U. S. Vessels were instructed to attack hostile forces. Many precedents found for 'shoot on sight' order.

1942 - Research for Dr. A. C. Davidonis for the preparation of 'The American Naval Mission in the Adriatic, 1918-1921,' 'A study of occupation of foreign territory.'

1943 - Research for preparation of an article by Division of Naval Intelligence on 'U. S. Naval Activity in connection with the Armistice of 1918 and The Peace Conference of 1919.'

1943 - Research for Commander Charles E. Peterson (CEC) on U. S. Bases at home and abroad in the past, for the training program by Yards and Docks.

1943 - Research for a study of demobilization at conclusion of World War I by Ensign T. H. Hamilton, Bureau of Naval Personnel.

1943 - Research for material on occupation of Cuba, Vera Cruz, Haiti, Santo Domingo and mandated German Islands in the Pacific for the use of U. S. Naval Reserve Midshipmen's School, 431 West 117 Street, N. Y. C., to train men for government of occupied territory in Europe.

1944 - Research for data for a magazine article by Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, to show the fallacy of reducing naval forces drastically at the end of every war.

1944 - Research for Clifford M. Drury, Chaplain, U. S. Navy, in preparation of a history of the Chaplain Corps.

1944 - Research for data relative to U. S. vessels in European waters during the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, for Commander F. A. Brook, COMINCH.

1944 - Research on American Naval Occupation and Government of Guam, 1898-1902, by Dr. Henry P. Beers. Much of the material for his study was secured in this office.

1944 - Research for data on cruise of USS Milwaukee to Truk and other mandated islands in the Pacific, 1923.

In 1945 that portion of the Manuscript Section servicing old records in the legal custody of the National Archives tabulated its activities in a memorandum report which showed that: 196 letters of

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inquiry had been answered by recourse to the old records; 226 authorized military and civilian visitors had performed research of various kinds; 73 searches had been undertaken on behalf of the National Archives; and 356 searches had been carried on for the Office of Naval Records and Library.

In addition to research activities, the section continued archival work in the operational naval files of World War I and in the pre-war CNO records which were accessioned from time to time during the recent war. These latter records are eventually to be moved and consolidated with World War II files now in custody of the Office of Naval Records and Library in the main Navy Building.

In June 1943 Lieutenant (later Lieutenant Commander) M. V. Brewington was put in charge of the Publications Section (Op-16-E3). In July 1944 he was transferred from the Manuscript Section and placed in charge of the Library (Op-16-E1) and the Old Manuscript Section where his outstanding knowledge of early naval history and technology was of great utility. In November 1943 he was elected Curator of the Naval Historical Foundation.

Relationship with Other Agencies

From late 1943 onwards, a close relationship was maintained between the COMINCH Flag Secretary's office and the Office of Naval Records and Library, chiefly as the latter had been designated as an extension of the former's File Rooms. In addition, Lieutenant (later Commander) W. M. Whitehill had additional duty with the Flag Secretary during 1944 and 1945, first in the matter of operation and engagement stars and other awards, and later in connection with

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the drafting of Fleet Admiral King's second and third reports to the Secretary of the Navy.⁶⁰ Consequently the Office was frequently called upon to prepare operational summaries of various kinds and to furnish historical material needed for current business in Headquarters. As has been indicated previously, close liaison was also maintained with the Readiness Division.⁶¹

As the Office of Naval Records and Library receives the secret and confidential files of the Chief of Naval Operations when they are three years old, a close relationship was maintained with that file room.⁶²

The Office of Records Administration, under the Secretary, with which cooperation and close liaison were maintained, proved of some value in the early months of the war. Charged with the general overall problem of proper disposition of obsolete naval records, it intended, had the proposed field staff been permitted in the forward combat areas for the purpose of obtaining sound recorded personal narratives, to indoctrinate these officers in the fundamentals of streamlining current records in files afloat or in the advanced areas, by disposal of worthless material. It also arranged, when

60. In July 1944, upon Admiral King's approval of the Flag Secretary's proposal to prepare documentation upon the history of CominCh Headquarters, Whitehill was made available for this additional duty by Commo. Knox, and is now (May 1946) completing the writing of this history.
61. With the dissolution of COMINCH Headquarters in October 1945, its Microfilm Library was (because of the close association of interests) transferred to the Office of Naval Records and Library.
62. For want of space in the Arlington Annex, the CNO files were maintained in the National Archives (in offices made available by the Archivist) under the supervision of Lieut. (later Lt. Comdr.) N. M. Blake.

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contraction of space at the Navy Annex became necessary, for the National Archives to accept legal custody of the bulk of the older manuscript collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library to reduce its office requirements and to make room for an expected deluge of World War II records.

In December 1942 Lieutenant Commander (later Captain) Samuel Eliot Morison, who had been designated as Historian of Naval Operations by the Secretary of the Navy, was offered desk space in the Office of Naval Records and Library, and afforded whatever facilities were available until August 1945, when he obtained quarters of his own in the vicinity. The Office similarly served as an informal center and clearing house for various historical projects until July 1944, when Admiral E. C. Kalbfus, USN (Ret.) was appointed Director of Naval History and formally charged with such duties by the Secretary of the Navy. Admiral Kalbfus's first act upon assuming his new duties was to appoint Commodore Knox as his Deputy. As the Admiral was concurrently a member of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, and had little time to give to historical matters until Court business was completed, Commodore Knox, as Deputy Director of Naval History, and Lieutenant Whitehill⁶³ devoted considerable time during the autumn of 1944 to the affairs of the new activity until an adequate staff could be assembled by Admiral Kalbfus. The Office of Naval Records and Library files are used extensively by personnel of the Office of Naval History, and are also the future repository of

63. Whitehill had been relieved of his duties in the Manuscript Section for the purpose of assisting Commo. Knox in matters concerning the Office of Naval History.

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monographs prepared by the latter Office, though the only direct official connection between the two is in the person of Commodore Knox.

Since 1927 Commodore Knox, as Officer in Charge, Office of Naval Records and Library, had exercised the function of Curator for the Navy Department, and in that capacity had been responsible for the safe preservation of objects of historical interest, trophies and relics. In 1945, when it became apparent that these duties with regard to the present war would soon assume large proportions, the functions of the Curator were established directly under the Chief of Naval Operations, with the designation of Op-50-H.⁶⁴ No separate office space was provided, however, and Commodore Knox continued to operate physically as before, though with a separate chain-of-command for curatorial duties. In these he was assisted by Lieutenant Commander Brewington.

The Sound Recording Project, under Captain Wright and Lieutenant Commander Porter, developed numerous ties with the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Office of Public Relations, and on occasion furnished sound recording gear and operators for use in conferences--including the United Nations Conference at San Francisco in 1945.

Demobilization Period

In the summer of 1945 when the last units of the Bureau of Yards and Docks had moved to new quarters across the Potomac and vacated the Navy Building, space in the latter location was obtained

⁶⁴. In the Oct. 1945 reorganization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Curator was redesignated Op-213, without change of functions.

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for use of Office of Naval Records and Library.

Ten days after the Japanese capitulation, Commodore Knox, together with his expanded wartime staff and manuscript material, augmented by accessions of air and submarine patrol reports, war diaries, action reports and operation plans, were moved into present quarters in the "E" Building, a small brick structure located between the fourth and fifth wings of the main Navy Building.

Less than one month after the Office of Naval Records and Library had moved to the main Navy Building, COMINCH recommended that "the activities of the Microfilm Library be transferred to the Office of Naval Records and Library (Op-16-E2) their ultimate destination."

During the period of hostilities, the safeguarding of the contents of the Microfilm Library was necessary for strategic purposes but with the surrender of Japan it was felt that these films could be handled according to their security classification.

Commodore Knox concurred in the recommendation on the assumption that the Office of Naval Records and Library would also obtain the space, equipment, and personnel of the Microfilm Library.⁶⁵

With the disestablishment of COMINCH Headquarters in October 1945, the entire files of that activity were transferred to the Office of Naval Records and Library, and set up in two rooms in the fourth wing, adjacent to the "E" Building.

In October Captain R. E. Krause was ordered to duty in the Office for the purpose of organizing the microfilming of captured

⁶⁵. The Microfilm Library, redesignated Op-23-E2a, remained in charge of Captain Cleveland McCauley, USN (Ret.), who directed its operations during the war. Upon his return to inactive duty in June 1946, it will be merged with the other activities of Op-23-E2.

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German documents (in the possession of the British Admiralty) that would be necessary for the completion of the Office's World War II archives. Captain Krause, having accomplished this mission during a three month stay in London, returned to Washington in January 1946, to arrange for translating parts of the documents microfilmed.

Through the willingness of both officers and enlisted personnel to remain on duty beyond the dates when they became eligible for demobilization, the wartime machine continued to operate at normal speed until the end of 1945. With the disestablishment of the Publications Section (Op-23-E4) in October 1945, Miss L. I. MacGrindle and two civilian clerks of many years experience in the Office became available to take over certain of the duties in connection with World War II records that had been handled by naval personnel throughout the war. Since January 1946 many officer and enlisted personnel have been separated, replaced only by some male seamen. Progress has necessarily been somewhat slower than during the war.

In January 1946 Captain John W. McElroy, USNR, who had been at sea throughout the war, reported as prospective relief for Commander Whitehill in charge of the manuscript records. Provision has been made in the budget for the coming fiscal year for two professional grade Civil Service posts as Principal Archivist and Superintendent of the Library, and it is hoped that Captain McElroy and Lieutenant Commander Brewington will remain permanently in the Office in these capacities.

Conclusion

In retrospect, the chief accomplishment of the war period seems

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to be the current assembling and processing of operational documents. At the conclusion of hostilities a set of archives for World War II was in a more advanced state than those of World War I had been in the early nineteen twenties. Much remains to be, and will be, added in the future, but during this war a great deal was completed that only began in the demobilization period of World War I. The staff that was assembled in 1942 (to survey the situation and plan for intense activity during the demobilization period) was able currently to assemble many thousands of documents of permanent value.

By contrast, the reference functions of the Library and the normal peacetime duties of the Office were impeded by the physical scattering of sections all over the District of Columbia which took place in the fall of 1942. Everything accomplished in that direction was in spite of great handicaps of space and time.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

During its sixty-four years of existence, the last thirty of which encompassed two world wars, the Office of Naval Records and Library has not only accessioned a great physical quantity of archival materials but at the same time accumulated considerable valuable experience in the field of naval history. The most important lesson learned is that in planning for the future of the service, whether in war or peace, cognizance must be taken of and recognition accorded to the operational records of the past. The principal missions of the Office of Naval Records and Library are: (1) to arrange and classify such records and to make available to the Navy Department information in them, of current utility in the conduct of its

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business; and (2) to provide promptly all published works necessary for research. To carry out these missions with most effectiveness the following recommendations are presented:

1. Provide suitable permanent space and facilities. The office during the recent war was forced to move three times partly through failure to recognize the current utility of source materials in its custody. At the present time the microfilm library, the reference library, the World War II records and administrative offices are in different locations in the main Navy Building; about 100,000 of its books are shelved in borrowed space in the Congressional Library; World War I records are housed in borrowed space in the National Archives; and thousands of pictures and photographs comprising its historical collection are still under ONI cognizance in the Steuart Building. Reasons for consolidating these widespread facilities or activities in one central location are too obvious to enumerate. Space should be readily accessible to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, whose non-current files already are in the custody of the Office of Naval Records and Library.

2. Carry on the accessioning and archiving of war records. In view of the great scope and revolutionary technical developments that have characterized the war, the accumulation of operational archives of the Navy's part therein is a task of very high importance. Properly arranged and serviced, those records will be a reservoir of valuable source material for professional education, utility in future planning, and all varieties of historical treatment, as well

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as for meeting the inevitable needs of reference in the future. Some of the wartime functions of the office also should be continued and developed. During the war the Office was called on by COMINCH Headquarters to assume certain important responsibilities for the care and processing of documents which obviously were of historical as well as current utility. The accessioning and servicing of Chief of Naval Operations non-current files at stated intervals is a function which should be maintained, with a view to resumption of the same relationship in any future war.

3. Resume peacetime practice of publishing early naval documents. The publication of naval documents of both the past and present will be of inestimable value in presenting the naval viewpoint to the general public. Similar source materials printed in the State Department's Foreign Relations Series and Treaty Series have been found invaluable for libraries, scholars, and the general public. The naval series thus far issued by this office includes some 30 volumes of the operational records of the Civil War, 7 volumes of Quasi-War with France and 7 volumes of the Barbary Wars. To complete this series, documents of the War of 1812 and those for World War I (the latter already prepared but not printed due to lack of funds), should likewise be published.

4. Provide for expansion and development of the Curator function. The Office of Naval Records and Library should have suitable permanent exhibit space available either in a naval museum ashore or by the utilization of historical vessels converted for that specific purpose. There are already in existence a considerable quantity of relics and

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pictures of the past (stored or recorded as to custody elsewhere); and before many of those of the current era are destroyed or lost, some provision should be made for their safe preservation. This function may be assumed by the Curator for the Navy Department (Op-213); if so, all objects in the custody of Op-23-E should be transferred.

5. Consolidate the Office of the Curator and the Office of Naval History with the Office of Naval Records and Library. Combined curatorial, historical and records-library activities should then be carried on under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Administration), rather than under the Secretary's office, CNO, and ONI as at present. In the recent war (as in World War I) the Office of Naval History got off to a belated start, primarily because historical activities had been allowed to lapse in the 20's. The mistake of making the historical section a temporary wartime office would not be repeated were its functions and activities coordinated and consolidated with Office of Naval Records and Library--the whole section in peacetime carried on under the direction of three civilians of professional status qualified in the fields of History, Archives and Library respectively. The writing of naval history should be fostered and perpetuated rather than allowed to lapse as was the case after World War I.

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To facilitate and expedite making suitable replies, the filing system of the Pictorial Section was overhauled and in the interest of accuracy, many corrections made in the nomenclature. Lt. Comdr. C. E. Taylor, USN, on duty from 1936 to 1938 in the Office of Naval Records and Library reported that:

"Certain shore establishments were filed under several different names. These were changed to the title of the shore station appearing in the Navy Directory of the year of the picture.

"Many ship's pictures were obtained from the Press and filed under the title given them in the press,--destroyers called battleships, battleships called cruisers, cruisers called transports, etc. In addition, all the British transports were marked 'U.S.S.' The ship titles were changed to the correct nomenclature as listed in the Ships Data Book of the year the photograph was taken.

"The German and Austrian pictures were filed under 'Enemy ships.' These were changed to German and Austrian respectively."

From time to time other articles concerning the Office of Naval Records and Library were published. One appearing in the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings for January 1926, describing the rapidly diminishing source materials of the Navy's history and traditions, pleaded the cause of preserving these vanishing naval archives.⁴³ The author stressed the importance of recovering records of the Navy's origins and early history both as a means of understanding the past and as a guide to planning for the future of the nation. Appealing especially to former officers of the service (and their descendants or families) to make available any documents discovered

43. D. W. Knox. "Our Vanishing History and Traditions," in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1926.

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