

INTELLIGENCE HANDBOOK



BASIC OPERATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE

SEC VI
I-1

NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING UNIT
PACIFIC FLEET
CORONADO, CALIFORNIA

460 TYPES OF DIRECTIVES

Types of naval directives in common use today include warning order letters of instruction, operation plans and orders, and campaign and outline plans.

461 WARNING ORDER

A warning order may be issued when it is desired to alert subordinate commands of impending operations. The warning order is a preliminary notice of an order or an action which is to follow. It is designed to give subordinates time to make necessary preliminary plans and preparations and follows generally the form of a letter of instructions described in the next paragraph.

462 LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS

A letter of instructions or letter directive is suitable as a directive to major commanders of participating forces, principally for planning. It may be distributed to other interested commands for information. Normally: it states the concept, mission, command relationships, and area of operations; gives special instructions such as communication requirements; assigns forces; sets forth planning responsibilities; and states reports required.

463 OPERATION PLANS AND ORDERS

Operation plans and operation orders are suitable as specific directives to any military or naval force. Operation plans become effective at the time or under the conditions specified therein and may be based on stated assumptions. Operation orders, on the other hand, deal with known situations. They contain no assumptions and, unless otherwise stated, are effective upon receipt. Figure 4-2 shows the characteristics of such plans and orders.

a. The Operation Plan is the normal method used by a commander to translate his concept into action and usually extends over considerable space and time. It may cover a single operation or a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or successively. The plan is the form of directive employed by higher echelons in order to permit subordinate commanders enough time to prepare their supporting plans and orders. This preparatory period extends from the hour the commander issued his complete directive until the hour that the directive becomes effective.

b. An Operation Order is a directive for specific operation in the immediate or very near future. While it is normally as detailed as the plan, it is seldom used when a plan has already been issued. There is, however, one exception. When all the details of the operation have become final, a commander may replace a plan already in effect with an operation order. It is most commonly used as a directive for a supplemental operation made necessary or desirable by strategic or tactical developments.

When it is necessary to issue operation plans and orders by radio, which is often the case in wartime, the operation plan or order in dispatch form (shown in Appendix 1) is used.

464 CAMPAIGN AND OUTLINE PLANS

a. A Campaign Plan is a device used by major commands to express a commander's decision in terms of specific operations, projected as far into the future as practicable. It is the next step after a long-range or strategic estimate of the situation wherein the commander has made his decision as to the lines of action to be followed. Its purpose is to express an orderly schedule of the strategic decisions made by the commander in order to allow sufficient time to procure and provide the means to secure desired or assigned objectives.

b. An Outline Plan is a preliminary sketch of a plan, drawn up prior to the detailed planning. It sets forth the plan's salient features, such as a statement of the general plan, concept of the operation, forces to be employed and general requirements. It is of valuable assistance to the commander in determining that he has the means necessary for the successful conduct of a specific operation. It results from the commander's decision upon completion of his Estimate of the Situation to conduct that particular operation. Examples of the application of the "outline" feature are: outline campaign plan outline operation plan, outline base development plan.

Characteristics of campaign outline and operation plans are shown in Figure 4-2.

465 SUBJECT MATTER OF DIRECTIVES

The subject matter of planning directives normally concerns forces and their action to achieve a physical objective. However, a commander may feel that the attainment of an abstract objective such as readiness or morale, is of such importance that the coordinated effort of his command is necessary. In such a situation, the use of a planning directive for effectiveness is appropriate but the decision to use it should be made with care. If used for abstract objectives other than those of major importance, the effectiveness of planning directives as a whole will be weakened.

FOREWORD

This handbook is a compilation of all printed materials issued in the Basic Operational Intelligence (Amphibious) Course I-1. Included are an amphibious intelligence problem and its solution which are designed to show the application of the basic techniques and processes brought out in the course.

This book has been issued in this way in order that the student officer may have these materials in convenient and logical form for his future reference.

The materials contained herein are intended only as a guide for the amphibious intelligence officer.

To quote the PRINCIPLES OF NAVAL STAFF ORGANIZATION (U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE):

"There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials."

J. M. ROBERTSON
Commander, U. S. Navy
Officer in Charge

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SECTION 1

GENERAL

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SYLLABUS

COURSE: BASIC OPREATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (AMPHIBIOUS) (I-1)

MISSION: Provide a basic course in the principles and techniques of intelligence in an amphibious operation.

PURPOSE: To indoctrinate officers of the armed forces in the fundamental characteristics of amphibious warfare and the role of intelligence in amphibious operations.

<u>SCOPE:</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
	Basic considerations and techniques of Amphibious Operations.	15
	Intelligence in Amphibious Operations	45
	Miscellaneous and Administration.	
	Total	<u>10</u> 70

LENGTH: Two weeks

QUOTA: Maximum: Thirty-five (35) students
Minimum: Five (5) students

A. GENERAL

1. a. Definition. An amphibious operation is a landing made from ships or craft to achieve an objective on land. The forces involved depend primarily upon waterborne means for transport to the objective area, for initial tactical and logistical support, and for special equipment and techniques used in debarking.

b. Nature of an amphibious operation. An amphibious operation includes preparation of the objective for the landing, and operations of the forces involved in overwater movements, assault, and support. It is a joint operation when the assigned forces are composed of a significant elements of more than one service of the Department of Defense. An amphibious operation usually involves the following:

- (1) The preparation of plans and the training of attack force units for the particular operation.
- (2) The movement of forces to the objective and their protection and support by naval and air operations.
- (3) The preparation of the objective for the landing.
- (4) Landing troops, equipment and supplies over a beach and seizure of the objective.
- (5) Support of the landing and operations ashore by naval gunfire and air bombardment.
- (6) Landing and build-up of additional supplies, equipment and troops as required for logistical support and further operations.

2. The purpose of amphibious operations. Amphibious operations will have one or more of the following purposes:

a. Invasion. An invasion is a large scale operation to seize and secure a beachhead from which to launch and support a major land offensive such as the Normandy and Southern France operations of World War II.

b. Occupation. An occupation is a limited objective operation to seize and secure a land area for use as an air, naval or logistical base to support further operation or to deny use of the area to the enemy. Examples include the Admiralty Islands, Bougainville and Iwo Jima operations in World War II.

c. Raid. A raid is an operation, usually small scale, involving the temporary seizure of a limited objective or a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, to confuse the enemy or to destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. Examples include the Dieppe, Narvik, and Makin Island operations of World War II.

d. Demonstrations. A demonstration is an operation designed to confuse the enemy, to delay or reduce the effectiveness of his dispositions and to cause him to commit his reserves against the demonstrating force. When the demonstrating force is capable of

landing in enough strength to exploit a favorable situation, this operation is termed a demonstration in force, otherwise the landing force conceals its real strength to produce the desired effect.

3. Types of Movements. Amphibious operations are classified as either ship-to-shore, shore-to-shore or a combination of both.

a. The term ship-to-shore describes any operation requiring the transfer of troops, supplies and equipment from the transport or other ocean-going vessels into smaller landing craft or landing vehicles for movement to the beaches.

b. The term shore-to-shore describes the movement of the landing force element directly from the embarkation area to the landing beaches without transfer at sea. Amphibious shore-to shore technique may also be used for special operations on navigable rivers and lakes. These operations may or may not have naval support.

4. Characteristics of Amphibious Operations. An Amphibious operation has a great shock effect on an enemy. The attacker exploits this initial paralyzing effect to land a force and accomplish his assigned mission.

a. An amphibious operation is offensive in character. The initiative is with the attacker. His choice of objectives and lines of approach are limited by his commander's directive, his mission, the enemy, the weather, terrain and sea approaches, and the supporting capabilities of naval counter-intelligence measures. Mobile floating reserves permit him to exploit rapidly his successes ashore.

b. The attacker also considers the unfavorable characteristics of amphibious operations which are:

- (1) The number and type of vessels to transport his force are limited. This affects the strength, composition, supplies and equipment taken in with the assault.
- (2) While aboard vessels troops are particularly vulnerable to enemy air, sea and shore weapons.
- (3) Suitable landing beaches may be limited and the attacker may have to select unfavorable beaches where obstacles and enemy defenses exist.
- (4) During the initial assault the attacker must depend mainly on naval gunfire and air support.
- (5) The troops land and fight over unfamiliar terrain where information of the enemy defenses is often meager.
- (6) Ships carrying essential troops and cargoes may be lost because of enemy action.
- (7) Unfavorable weather, heavy surf or tides may prevent landing or cause serious delays in the schedule.

- (8) Initially, supporting arms and services may be able to function only in a limited manner, increasing the difficulties of control, supply and communication.
- (9) Supply of the landing force in the objective area is limited by the ability to keep sea and air lanes open.

5. Organization. Ground units are organized to make the initial assault, to aid in the debarkation of combat units, to provide maximum fire power until normal artillery support is available, to provide mobility of the initial assault units ashore and to provide the continuous logistical support of landed units. Similarly naval units are organized to embark, convey and debark ground forces and to provide effective naval gunfire support until artillery units are established ashore. Air force units are organized to give adequate air protection, reconnaissance and offensive action during the operation.

6. Phases of Amphibious Operations. An amphibious operation is divided into four general phases. The phases are preparatory, movement, assault and final.

a. Preparatory Phase. The preparatory phase includes all planning, training, rehearsals, mounting, embarkation and such "softening up" action as may be taken in connection with the operation.

b. Movement Phase. The movement phase begins with the completion of embarkation of the amphibious forces and ends with the beginning of the assault.

c. Assault Phase. The assault phase begins when the naval or air components of the joint force are in a position to support the ground assault forces and ends with the establishment of the force beachhead.

d. Final Phase. The final phase of the joint amphibious operation begins with the end of the assault phase. It ends when the normal logistical services of the ground and air forces are established ashore. This phase includes seizure of the objective unless it is included within the beachhead and logistical operations involved in the consolidation of the objective.

7. Patterns of Amphibious Operations. Amphibious operations against defended shores resemble the following patterns:

a. Prelanding Operations.

- (1) Air and naval reconnaissance of the objective area including visual, sonic, photographic, and electronic reconnaissance.
- (2) Preliminary naval and air bombardment of the objective area.
- (3) Mine sweeping and underwater demolition operations in the landing area by naval forces supported by air and naval gunfire.
- (4) Prelanding naval gunfire and air bombardment of the objective area immediately before the landing.

- (5) Seizure of Outlying islands before D-Day for use as logistic, air or seaplane bases, radar warning stations or position areas for supporting artillery where assistance gained by such action will outweigh tactical surprise lost.

b. Landing.

- (1) Arrival of the attack force in the landing area.
- (2) Intense pre-H-hour naval gunfire and air bombardment on the objective area.
- (3) Debarkation of troops from ships into landing craft and landing vehicles, their formation into waves and movement across the line of departure to the beach. Naval and air bombardment of shore targets continues until the last stage of this movement.
- (4) As the leading wave nears the beach, naval gunfire lifts to flanking and inland targets. Air units make final strafing runs on beach defenses and supporting craft take over close supporting fire missions.
- (5) The assault waves land; breach beach obstacles, overrun beach defenses and destroy local enemy forces and installations. Mobile reserves are kept afloat.
- (6) The force ashore is rapidly built up by committing reserves to exploit success where the advance is most rapid.
- (7) The assault companies quickly reorganize, repulse local counter-attacks and seize initial objectives. Close support by air and naval gunfire begins when artillery forward observer parties and tactical air parties land and establish communication.
- (8) The initial equipment and supplies are landed and shore organization begins.
- (9) When the initial assault tasks are accomplished the advance continues to secure the beach from enemy direct and indirect ground observed fires. Shore organization continues.

c. Consolidation.

- (1) Assault battalion beachhead lines are secured, additional troops, supplies and equipment are landed, organized counterattacks are driven off and battalion beachheads are consolidated.
- (2) Battalion beachheads are expanded to seize regimental objectives and to prevent observed artillery fire from being placed on the beach. Regimental reserves are landed and shore installations are consolidated.
- (3) Regimental beachheads are expanded and division objectives are seized.
- (4) The shore installations are consolidated by the division shore party as more equipment and supplies are landed.
- (5) If continuing land offensive follows, port and beach developments begin. Additional reinforcements arrive, base installations and air fields are established and the land offensive resembles a normal land campaign. Naval gunfire continues throughout and until the land offensive goes beyond their range. Air support continues, initially by long range and carrier based aircraft and later by planes operating from fields prepared in the objective area.

8. General Doctrine

a. Amphibious operations are conducted according to the principles described in USF-6 and FM 100-5. The following general doctrine is particularly applicable to amphibious operations:

- (1) Unity of command is mandatory.
- (2) Accurate, timely and comprehensive intelligence is the basis for planning amphibious operations.
- (3) Superiority of force, including air and naval superiority, at the time and place of landing is mandatory.
- (4) Each amphibious task force is organized, equipped, trained and rehearsed specifically for the task it is to perform.
- (5) Surprise is continually sought.
- (6) Plans and orders are complete, flexible and detailed.
- (7) Administrative and tactical plans are developed concurrently by all commanders. The overall administrative plan adequately supports the tactical plan.
- (8) All ships in the assault echelon are combat loaded.
- (9) Effective control and communication are secured and maintained.

9. Operational Principles. The primary purpose of a joint task force in an amphibious operation is to land, support and supply an effective fighting force so that it may accomplish its assigned mission. In this type operation the following tested operational principles apply in attaining maximum results with minimum losses.

a. Every assault force element is assigned specific missions.

b. The overall operation is built around assault battalion landing teams.

c. Landing beaches are chosen after joint consideration of sea approaches, beach gradient, general beach and inland terrain, beach defenses, beach exits, surf and tidal conditions and the future use to which the beaches will be put.

d. The time of landing is carefully considered.

e. The assault battalion landing teams are reinforced with adequate supporting weapons, supplies and services to seize initial objectives.

f. Supporting weapons and units land as early as possible to strengthen the fire power ashore.

g. Successive assault waves are mutually supporting and are timed to prevent congestion of troops or defeat in detail on the beach.

h. Each boat team is organized as a small task force with enough combat strength to fight to its objective without regrouping.

i. Specially equipped and trained units are used to organize and operate the beach support areas.

j. Adequate quantities of ammunition and other supplies are made available to support the landing plan.

k. When the assault landing precedes a major land offensive, plans provide for adequate vehicles, fuel and supplies to exploit initial success.

l. Detailed alternate plans are prepared before sailing.

B. ORGANIZATION

1. Ground Organization for Amphibious Operations.

a. The reinforced infantry division is the basic large army unit which can be especially trained and equipped for amphibious operations. It usually lands as part of a reinforced corps. Attachments to support the infantry division include shore parties, one or more anti-aircraft artillery groups, field artillery groups, combat engineer battalions, amphibious engineer battalions, amphibious tractor battalions, amphibious truck companies.

b. The reinforced division is organized in three regimental combat teams (RCT's) each is supported by part of the reinforced arms and services including a regimental shore party which is attached to or directly supports each RCT.

c. Each RCT is further divided into three battalion landing teams (BLT's). Each is supported by or has attached to it a limited part of the reinforcing arms and service.

2. BLT Organization.

a. The BLT is the basic assault unit of a landing force. It consists of a standard infantry battalion reinforced with elements from regiment and higher echelons. The BLT may be embarked on an assault transport (APA), on landing ships, or on a combination of vessels depending on its composition and mission.

b. The BLT is a small task force that functions independently during the first part of the landing. The ultimate success of any landing operation depends largely on the success of the assault BLT's. The BLT is organized to land, overrun beach defenses and secure terrain objectives.

c. Since initial fire support is primarily obtained from supporting ships and aircraft the BLT must have additional fire support attachments to assist in accomplishing its mission. Not only combat units but also logistical elements are attached to provide essential supplies until normal supply installations are established ashore.

C. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

1. General

a. In amphibious operations emphasis is placed on the production and use of certain items of intelligence. Many of these items are

not required in other types of operations and often are obtained by special means. The commanding officer of a regiment operating as a part of a larger force normally has no choice as to his time and place of landing, but he needs the intelligence on which these decisions are based.

b. The production of intelligence begins far enough ahead of the operation to provide all lower staff sections and units with the intelligence they need for planning. The intelligence initially available is included in the directive for the operation. Most of the intelligence produced later is procured for regiment by the division headquarters.

2. Intelligence Requirements. Detailed intelligence concerning the following items is needed for the proper planning and execution of an amphibious operation:

a. Enemy: Composition of enemy forces in the objective area (ground, naval, and air); identification of units, strength, equipment, location, nature, and extent of beach and inland defenses.

b. Hydrography: Information on surf and swell conditions, tides, currents, depths of water, water temperature, and nature of bottom reefs, rocks, and shoals.

c. Meteorology: Temperature, precipitation, wind, visibility, frequency and nature of storms, flying conditions, and natural phenomena.

d. Beaches: Exact location, length, width, gradient, physical consistency, exits, and underwater and beach obstacles.

e. Terrain: Configuration of the shoreline, relief, compartmentation, vegetation, critical terrain features, observation and fields of fire, obstacles (natural and artificial), cover and concealment, avenues of approach, landmarks for the identification of the landing beaches from the sea, drop zones for airborne troops, emergency landing sites for aircraft, and areas suitable for command post sites, storage, vehicles parks, and artillery.

f. Ports: Location in relation to the landing beaches, hydrography, berthing facilities, storage, and port facilities to include piers and jetties for unloading supplies.

g. Local population: Including density, religion, health, politics, economy, attitude, and suitability for use as militia or guerilla forces.

h. Communication and transportation: Characteristics, construction, capacities, and condition of telephone, telegraph, radio, roads, railroads, airfields, rivers, and canals.

i. Civic development: Location, construction, and characteristics of towns, villages, farm houses, and other buildings.

j. Miscellaneous: Water supply, public utilities, sanitation, dangerous fauna or flora, natural resources of military value, and local construction materials.

3. Sources of Information. Information and intelligence for use in the planning and execution of an amphibious operation may be obtained from:

a. Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. (Being replaced by National Intelligence Surveys).

b. Strategic engineering studies.

c. Coast Pilots (sailing directions) issued by U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey and U. S. Hydrographic Office.

d. Files of the National Geographic Society.

e. Files of business concerns operating in the objective area.

g. Civilian travelers.

f. Former residents of the objective area.

h. Theater terrain studies, guides, and handbooks.

i. Civil affairs handbooks.

j. Reports of visual air reconnaissance and aerial photographs.

k. Reports of visual amphibious reconnaissance and photographs.

l. Prisoners of war.

m. Captured documents and material.

n. Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence reports.

o. Travelers, students, and scientists.

4. Agencies.

a. With the agencies organic to it, a regiment operating as a part of a larger unit is seldom able to produce the intelligence it requires for an amphibious operation. The following agencies provide the bulk of the intelligence used during the planning phase of the operation:

- (1) Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Navy.
- (2) Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
- (3) Directorate of Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.
- (4) U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey.
- (5) Higher headquarters including Theater Headquarters.
- (6) U. S. Naval and Air Forces.
- (7) Amphibious Patrols.
- (8) Secret Agents.

b. After the landing, information is obtained and intelligence produced and used as in any other land operation.

5. Security.

a. The ultimate success of an amphibious operation depends greatly on attaining surprise. Surprise is gained only if we are successful in concealing from the enemy our true plans and intentions. Required security measures include:

- (1) Controlled dissemination. Required intelligence is never withheld from a headquarters, but unnecessary dissemination is prevented.
- (2) Code names. For added security in planning, amphibious operations are given code names. The name used has no relation in itself to anything connected with the operation. The code name of the operation and the actual geographic name of the objective area are not included in the same document. In addition, outstanding terrain features may be given code names.
- (3) Secret planning rooms. All planning work is conducted in designated rooms that are kept under guard at all times. No documents, maps, charts, or material of any kind used in planning are removed from the room, and only authorized personnel are permitted to enter.
- (4) Precautionary measures. These measures are: Establishment of rigid censorship regulations and strict enforcement of them; supervision of all press releases, including photographs and materials for broadcasts; counter-reconnaissance and counter-espionage measures; and enforcement of communication security.

b. Personnel already briefed on the plan are not permitted to accompany amphibious patrols or to fly over enemy territory, since they may be exposed to capture. Amphibious reconnaissance patrols are given only the information required for the accomplishment of their mission.

c. In preparing for an amphibious operation it is assumed that the enemy will obtain some information that indicates to him that such an operation is being mounted. Steps may be taken to deceive the enemy concerning our true intentions and plans. The intelligence officer submits recommendations and assists in planning tactical deception measures, including:

- (1) Demonstrations
- (2) Ruses and feints
- (3) Radio and traffic deception

D. OPERATION PLANNING

1. As soon as practicable after commencement of planning, an outline plan covering the operation should be prepared and issued to key subordinates. The detail of this initial plan will depend upon the amount of information available and the degree of development of plans of higher headquarters.

Some commanders prefer to impart this initial plan by informal briefings. Other Commanders prefer a combination of written plans and informal briefings. In any case, it is desirable that a tentative plan be formulated early to enable subordinate commanders to conduct concurrent planning and carry out objective, realistic, training.

2. The sequence of operational planning for an amphibious operation is characterized by being in reverse order of eventual execution, backward planning. The general plan of attack consists of the scheme of maneuver ashore, the landing plan, and the plan of supporting fires. After a thorough study of the enemy situation, the terrain, the hydrography, and the available units, the scheme of maneuver ashore is prepared to accomplish the assigned mission. In accordance with the restrictions of available shipping and landing craft, a landing plan is then prepared to support the scheme of maneuver ashore. The plans for supporting fires must then support the scheme of maneuver and the landing plan. Actually all of these plans are inter-dependent and require simultaneous consideration since the limitations of one may affect the others. If compromises are required, they are made to insure the tactical success of the scheme of maneuver ashore. The other supporting plans including the detailed plans for the participation of air and naval components are then prepared to support the general plan of attack. Much of the detailed planning, particularly supply, communication, and air support must wait on the tactical plan.

3. The division operation plan usually prescribes combat team missions, landing formations for RCT's the number of BLTs to be used in the assault, exact beaches on which landings are to be made, use of available landing craft, time of initial landing, regimental beachhead line(s), ultimate shore party organization, manner of employment of the RCT reserve, and the details of supporting air and naval gunfire. Similarly, the RCT plan will dictate these details to the BLTs.

4. Planning for the operation is a continuing process. As additional information and decisions are made the initial plan will undergo a series of changes to the point where a firm plan can be published. This final plan then becomes the operation order just prior to embarkation.

5. Following is the standard operation plan form as applies to an amphibious operation: Modification will be made in this form as required at the RCT and BLT level. The principal modifications will be the elimination of certain annexes which will not apply at the level of regiment and battalion.

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters

Operation Plan No. _____

Location

Date and Time

Maps:

Task Organization: Annex _____ Task Organization.

1. GENERAL SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. Annex _____ Intelligence.

b. Friendly forces. Annex _____ Operation Overlay.
Annex _____ Naval Gunfire Plan.
Annex _____ Air Support Plan.
Annex _____ Air Defense Plan.

c. Assumptions

(1) Friendly

(2) Enemy

2. MISSION

Annex _____ Operation Overlay

Annex _____ Landing Plan

3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS

Annex _____ Artillery.

Annex _____ Engineer.

Annex _____ Shore Party Plan.

Paragraph 3.x.

Annex _____ Fire Support Coordination.

Annex _____ Smoke Plan

Annex _____ Alternate Plans.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS.

Annex _____ Logistical Plan.

Annex _____ Personnel Plan.

Annex _____ Mounting Plan.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL MATTERS

Annex _____ Signal.

Commander

Annexes:

Distribution: Annex _____ Distribution

Authentication:

6. The Plan developed by the Regimental Combat Team and, to a lesser extent by the Battalion Landing Team for an amphibious operation, will generally cover these points:

- a. Details of the division order that affect the BLTs.
- b. Organization of BLTs and the attachment of additional elements.
- c. The RCT scheme of maneuver ashore.
- d. Regimental and battalion beachhead lines.
- e. Battalion boundaries.
- f. Means of regaining control of the combat team after landing.
- g. Plans for landing and employment of the assault BLT's and supporting units.
- h. Plans for landing and employment of the RCT reserve.
- i. Plans for naval gunfire, air and artillery support.
- j. Plans for using landing craft and amphibious vehicles.
- k. The landing schedule.
- l. The consolidated landing diagram.
- m. Quantities and types of supplies, vehicles, and equipment to accompany troops.

**U.S. NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS
TERMS**

11ND P-285 (Rev. 4-55)



**NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS
TRAINING UNIT**


**U.S. NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS BASE
CORONADO, CALIFORNIA**



July 1956

FOREWORD

1. These Amphibious Terms have been compiled to provide a ready reference to enable you to become acquainted with many terms with which you may not now be familiar. During your course of instruction many of these terms will be discussed and elaborated on; many may not be mentioned. However, in any future tour of duty involving amphibious operations, a need may arise for refreshing yourself on terms which you have heard here, or to familiarize yourself with any which may not have been discussed during your instruction here at Naval Amphibious Training Unit.
2. You are encouraged to retain this pamphlet. However, if you do not desire to keep it, upon the completion of your instruction please return it to one of the enlisted assistants of your course of instruction.


F. O. IFFRIG
Captain, U. S. Navy
Commanding Officer

advance force -- A temporary organization within the Amphibious Task Force that precedes the remainder of the Amphibious Task Force to the objective. Its main task is to prepare the objective for assault by conducting mine-sweeping, reconnaissance, preliminary naval gunfire, air bombardment, and underwater demolition operations. The Advance Force normally dissolves on D-Day and is redistributed to other parts of the Amphibious Task Force.

advanced base -- A general term designating a base located in or near forward areas outside the zone of the interior; the primary mission of which is to support wartime operations. Such bases are deployed after declaration of an emergency or upon mobilization in direct support of combatant units, and are usually of temporary wartime construction.

AGC -- The symbol for an Amphibious Force Flagship. (See Amphibious Flagship).

air defense controller -- Air or ground personnel charged with the responsibility of controlling aircraft or air elements engaged in active air defense area.

amphibious assault -- The phase of an amphibious operation commencing with the arrival of the Amphibious Task Force in the landing area and terminating when the landing forces have established a firm beachhead ashore.

amphibious flagship -- See AGC (May be provided for the following commands: 1. Amphibious Task Force Commander who will be accompanied by Amphibious Troops Commander and members of their staffs, 2. Advance Force Commander, 3. Attack Force Commander, 4. Support Force Commander, 5. Demonstration Force Commander, 6. Transport Group Commander, 7. Reserve Force Commander, 8. Screening Group Commander, 9. Administrative Group Commander).

amphibious force -- 1. A general term used to describe the ground, sea, and air forces equipped and trained for amphibious operations. 2. A permanent naval organization established for the purpose of planning, training, and preparing for, and conducting landing operations.

amphibious operation -- 1. An attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces involving a landing on a hostile shore for the purpose of--(a) obtaining a lodgment area from which to carry out further combat operations ashore; (b) obtaining an advanced air or naval base area; (c) denying the use of seized position to the enemy. 2. A tactical withdrawal of troops from land, effected by naval forces, either for the purpose of redeployment or for evacuation of the objective area.

amphibious squadron -- An administrative organization of amphibious ships including landing ships approximating the lift for a RLT.

amphibious task force -- An amphibious task force is an organization of amphibious troops, and the naval components which transport, land, and support them and which is assigned the task of seizing an objective area by amphibious assault.

amphibious troops -- All the troops assigned to an Amphibious Task Force for the amphibious assault of an objective area.

assault minesweeping -- Assault minesweeping includes all mine countermeasures operations conducted, preceding, during, and subsequent to an amphibious landing, for the purpose of locating and clearing mines from those waters which will be used by vessels engaged in the assault operation.

attack force -- A subdivision of an amphibious task force consisting of assault shipping and embarked landing force, and supporting naval units, operating to establish the embarked landing force on shore and support its operation thereafter.

annex -- A document appended to an operation order or other document to make it clearer or to give further details.

- B -

base -- A locality from which operations are projected or supported; may be preceded by a descriptive word such as "Air" or "Submarine", which indicates a primary purpose.

base development -- The setting up of facilities (the nature and extent of which are dictated by the mission) for the primary purpose of supporting the operations of air, sea, and/or land forces. Such facilities range from lone radio or radar stations to a very large base with complete ship repair facilities for the Navy and huge cantonment facilities for the training and staging of several divisions of troops.

battalion landing team -- In an amphibious operation, an infantry battalion specially reinforced by combat and service elements as required for a specific landing; the basic unit for planning an assault landing. Abbrev: BLT.

beach (tactical) -- That portion of the shore line normally required for the landing of a force approximating one battalion landing team. It may be, however, a portion of the shore line constituting a tactical locality, such as a bay, to which may be assigned a force larger or smaller than a battalion. (Technical) -- (or Shore) The zone extending from the low water mark to the base of a cliff, dune, or the landward limit of effective storm wave action (ONI).

beach capacity -- An estimate, expressed in terms of measurement or weight tons, of the cargo that may be unloaded on a strip of shore per day from landing craft, ships, or lighters. The estimate is based on an evaluation of the physical characteristics of the shore in relation to sea, tides, and weather expectancy. The estimate is without reference to clearance capacity or to the storage capacity behind the beach area.

beach dump -- An area adjacent to a beach utilized by a shore party for the temporary stowage of supplies.

beach exit -- A route for land movement of personnel and material from a landing beach. This term includes entrances to the beach used by returning vehicles.

beach flag -- A flag with colored background and vertical stripes. The background indicates the color designating the beach; the stripes indicate the number of the beach. It is not suitable as a beach marker. It is usually used on control and other craft that serve a designated area.

beachhead -- A designated area on a hostile shore which, when seized and held, insures the continuous landing of troops and material and provides maneuver space required for the projected operations ashore. It is normally the physical objective of the amphibious part of an operation. It corresponds to a bridgehead in land operations.

beachhead line (BHL) -- A line fixing the limits of a beachhead; a tentative main line of resistance based, if practicable, on terrain features which can be defended against enemy counterattack prior to advance out of the beachhead.

beach support area -- The area ashore, behind a landing force, which is established and operated by shore party units. It contains the facilities for the unloading of troops and material, the support and maintenance of the forces ashore, and the evacuation of wounded, prisoners, and other personnel. It includes beach dumps.

beach marker -- A sign or device used to identify a beach or certain activities thereon for incoming waterborne traffic. Markers may be panels, lights, or buoys with electronic devices.

beachmaster -- The officer in charge of the naval component of the shore party assigned to each (colored) assault beach.

beach party -- The naval element of a shore party which provides beaching control of landing craft and larger landing ships; regulates water traffic near the beach; surveys and marks channels and obstructions near the beach; salvages and repairs landing craft on the beach; and assists in the evacuation of the wounded.

beach matting -- A fabricated material placed on soft ground or sand surfaces to improve traction of wheeled vehicles.

beach organization -- 1. In an amphibious operation, the act, by the shore party, of taking the measures necessary to effect movement, supply, and evacuation across the beaches and in the beach area for logistical support of a landing force; 2. The planned arrangement of personnel and facilities to effect No. 1 above.

BLT -- The symbol for a battalion landing team. See battalion landing team.

boat -- Navy term used to describe any small craft capable of being carried aboard a ship.

boat, assault -- A boat used to carry assault troops, either in a river crossing or an amphibious operation.

boat assembly area -- Water area adjacent to a ship (on the beam, astern, or on the quarter) in which boats assemble prior to being called alongside the ship for loading.

boat assignment table -- A table showing the assignment of all troop personnel and material to boats for the ship-to-shore movement.

boat diagram -- A diagram showing the positions of individuals and equipment in each boat in the assault phase of the amphibious operation.

boat group -- Usually the landing craft organization for landing a battalion landing team. It also denotes the landing craft carried by an attack transport.

boat pool -- 1. Additional boats available to transport aid or replace boats which become inoperative prior to and during an amphibious operation; 2. A group of naval personnel who operate and maintain all small boats and barges at an advanced base, including landing craft retained at the base. 3. A pool of boats and landing craft established in order to provide for harbor needs for personnel and the unloading of follow up shipping.

boat space -- The space and weight factor used to determine the capacity of landing craft. It is based upon the requirements of one man with his individual equipment assumed to weigh a total of 224 pounds, and occupying 13.5 cubic feet of space.

boat team -- A subdivision of troops and their equipment which are loaded into a single boat or amphibious vehicle. A boat team functions as a unit during debarkation and movement to the beach.

boat team leader -- The senior troop commissioned officer or non-commissioned officer of the boat team.

boat wave -- The landing craft within a boat group which transport the troops that are to land simultaneously on a designated beach.

boat flotilla -- A landing craft organization of two or more boat groups.

bombardment, shore -- See shore bombardment.

bowser boat -- A craft equipped to refuel amphibious vehicles or other craft.

breaker height -- The vertical distance from the crest of a wave to the preceding trough. The breaker height depends on the height of the deep water waves and on the topography of the sea floor.

breaker, plunging -- With reference to surf, a breaker in which a long portion of the crest peaks up and the water at the top of the crest rushes forward and crashes violently into the preceding trough. The break occurs swiftly and takes place over a short distance.

breaker, spilling -- With reference to surf, a breaker in which isolated patches of white water appear at the crest and the wave gradually spills over. This break, takes place slowly and over a considerable distance.

breakers, period of -- The time interval between two successive wave crests passing a fixed point.

breakers, significant height of -- The average height of the highest one-third of all breakers in a ten minute period.

breaking, depth of -- The still water depth at the point where waves break. The depth of breaking on an evenly sloping beach is 1.3 times the breaker height. However, when a bar is present it may cause waves to break in water up to 1.7 times the breaker height.

build-up -- The process of attaining prescribed strengths of units and levels of supply; also may be applied to the means of accomplishing this process.

- C -

call for fire -- A message from a naval gunfire spotter containing data necessary for obtaining naval gunfire on a target.

close covering group -- A task designation for a group of naval vessels formed to protect ships and shore installations in an objective area against enemy surface attack.

combat loading -- The loading of assault troops units, with their essential combat equipment and initial combat supplies, in the same ship or craft and in a manner permitting immediate and rapid debarkation in a desired priority for a landing attack.

combined operation -- An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

combined force -- A military force composed of elements of two or more Allied Nations.

command -- 1. An order given by a commander, that is, the will of the commander expressed in a definite form for the purpose of bringing about a particular action in a specific way. 2. A unit or units, or an area, under the command of one individual.

commercial loading -- The loading of troops and/or equipment and supplies in a vessel for maximum utilization of personnel and cargo space.

concept (of an operation) -- A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions and intent with regard to an operation or a series of operations.

control -- 1. Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations.
2. (Geographic) A system or network of points of fixed geodetic positions, with latitude, longitude and elevation determined with surveying instruments.

controller -- Ship, Ground, or Air personnel charged with the responsibility of controlling naval, ground, or air units in the defense area.

control vessel -- In an amphibious operation, a vessel to guide, and to act as a headquarters for the control of waterborne traffic to and from a beach.

control officer -- A naval officer designated by the attack force commander and charged with overall supervision of the ship-to-shore movement.

convoy -- A group of ships, or train of vehicles organized for the purpose of control and orderly movement with or without escort protection.

convoy unit loading -- The loading of troop units, with their equipment and supplies, on vessels of the same convoy but not necessarily on the same vessel.

counterintelligence -- That phase of intelligence covering all activity devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, personnel against subversion and installations or material against sabotage.

covering force -- 1. A force operating apart from the main force for the purpose of intercepting, engaging, delaying, disorganizing and deceiving the enemy before he can attack the force covered. 2. Any body or detachment of troops which provides security for a larger force by observation, reconnaissance, attack or defense, or by any combination of these methods.

cusp -- One of a succession of nearly semi-circular cutouts occurring near the high water line on the beach.

- D -

D-Day -- The term used to designate the unnamed day on which an initial assault landing, or phase of operations is to begin. "D-Day" is the most common term used in this regard; however, any other letter designation may be used.

damage assessment -- The appraisal of effect of attacks on targets.

day of supply -- The estimated average expenditure or consumption of the various items of supply per day, expressed in quantities of specific items per applicable basis, such as rounds per weapon or pounds per man per day.

debarkation -- The unloading of troops, equipment, or supplies from a ship or aircraft.

debarkation net -- A specially prepared cargo net used for the debarkation of troops over the side of a ship.

debarkation schedule -- A form indicating the time at which each boat team will reach its debarkation station and debark, the type of craft in which the team is to be embarked, and other related information.

debarkation station -- A location definitely established at the rail of a ship where troops and material load into boats for movement ashore.

decision (in an estimate of the situation) -- A clear and concise statement of the line of action intended to be followed by the commander as the one most favorable to the successful accomplishment of his mission.

demonstration -- 1. An attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the object of deceiving the enemy. 2. In an amphibic operation, an exhibition of force, or movement, indicating an attack.

diagram, beach -- A graphical representation showing the areas to be landed on by various landing teams. Such areas are usually named by colors as Beach Red, Yellow, Blue.

diagram, deployment -- In the assault phase of an amphibious operation, a diagram which shows the organization of the boat group for landing; showing the waves, number and type of boats or vehicles in each, the interval between waves expressed in minutes, and the formation and distance between boats expressed in yards.

diagram, refraction -- With reference to surf, a diagram showing the pattern of wave crests as they approach a shore, and revealing the regions where the crests are squeezed (and wave height is increased) or stretched (and wave height is diminished).

diagram, stowage -- A scaled drawing of each hatch level showing storage space for cargo and must include overall dimensions, indicate boom capacities, stanchions, and minimum clearance.

distance -- 1. The space between adjacent individual ships or boats measured in any direction between foremasts. 2. The space between adjacent men, animals, vehicles, or units in a formation measured from front to rear. See INTERVAL.

dump -- A temporary stock of supplies or a place of stowage established in the field, where military supplies are temporarily stacked. When supplies are issued from dumps, the latter become distributing points.

dunnage -- Any material, such as boards, mats, planks, blocks, bamboo, etc., which is used in transportation and stowage to support and secure supplies to protect them from damage, or for convenience in handling.

echelon -- 1. The subdivision of a headquarters, i.e., the Forward Echelon, the Rear Echelon, etc. 2. Level of command compared to Regiment, Division is a higher echelon while a Battalion is a lower echelon. 3. The different fractions of a command in the direction of depth, to each of which a principal combat mission is assigned, such as; Attack Echelon, Support Echelon, Reserve Echelon, etc. 4. A formation in which the sub-divisions are placed one behind the other extending beyond and wholly or partly unmasking each other.

echelonment of shipping -- The timing of the arrival of shipping so that increments of personnel and material arrive at their destination when, and at the rate, desired.

embarkation -- The loading of troops with their supplies and equipment into vessels and/or aircraft.

embarkation area -- In an amphibious operation, an area including a group of embarkation points, in which final preparations are completed and through which craft and shiploads are called forward to embark.

embarkation group -- All personnel with supplies and equipment embarked or to be embarked (combat loaded) aboard the ships of one transport unit.

embarkation unit -- All personnel with supplies and equipment embarked or to be embarked (combat loaded) aboard one ship.

estimate of the situation -- A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken in order to accomplish his mission.

evacuation -- 1. The process of moving casualties from a battlefield, and subsequently of moving them along the chain of evacuation as necessary. 2. The clearance of personnel, arrivals, or material for the purpose of evacuating.

evacuation policy -- A command decision, indicating the length in days of the maximum period of non-effectiveness that patients may be held within the command for treatment. Patients who in the opinion of responsible medical officers, cannot be returned to duty status within the period prescribed are evacuated by the first available means, provided the travel involved will not aggravate their disabilities.

- F -

facility -- 1. A physical plant, such as real estate and improvements thereto, including buildings and equipment, which provides the means for assisting or making easier the performance of a function. Example: base, arsenal, factory. 2. Any part or adjunct of a physical plant, or any item of equipment which is operating entirely and which contributes or can contribute to the execution

of a function by providing some specific type of physical assistance. Examples: railroad, railroad rolling stock, vehicles, access road, railroad spur, ships, pier, etc.

fire support coordination -- The coordinated planning and conduct of fire support so that targets are adequately attacked by appropriate means or weapons available.

fire support coordination center (FSCC) -- A single location in which all communication facilities incident to the troop coordination of fire support of the artillery, air, and naval gunfire are centralized.

fire support coordinator -- Amphibious troop representative in charge of coordinating the operations of the fire support coordination center (FSCC).

fleet marine force -- A force of combined arms comprising land, air, and service elements of the United States Marine Corps which is integral with the U. S. Fleet. It has the status of a type command.

fly catcher operations -- Operations against enemy small boats in an amphibious objective area.

floating (or off shore) dump -- A stock of critical supplies held on boats, barges, or amphibious vehicles established early in an amphibious operation in the vicinity of a control vessel for quick delivery to assault troops ashore.

follow-up echelons -- Those echelons of shipping, carrying the follow-up force(s), which are scheduled to arrive in the objective area after the assault echelon.

follow-up force -- Those units landed over beaches, already seized by the assault forces, and constituting the forces which either supplement the assault units to permit exploitation of the lodgement area, or the troops required for the protection and initial establishment of the lodgement area as a base for further operations. They are normally combat-loaded and may be transported either in assault or commercial shipping.

functional component -- For naval usage an organization of personnel and material designed to perform one of the specific tasks of an advanced base.

FSCC -- See fire support coordination center.

- G -

garrison (base) forces -- All units assigned to a base for defense, development operations, and maintenance of facilities. Units operating from the base normally included for logistical purposes.

gunfire support -- Naval gunfire, including rockets and other missiles, delivered on targets so intimately related to friendly operations as to require detailed integration of each fire mission with the fire or movement of ground forces or of minor naval forces operating close inshore.

- H -

H-Hour -- 1. The term customarily used to designate the unnamed hour for an attack to be launched, for an assault wave to land, or for a movement to begin. 2. In amphibious operations, the clock time designated for the first wave to land on the designated beach. Other letters may be used, such as FOXTROT, GOLF, etc. H/2 means H-Hour plus 2 hours. Minutes are indicated by, "H/120 minutes."

harbor defense -- Defense of a harbor anchorage or the limited coastal area, principally against air or sea attack. An administrative and tactical organization to accomplish this defense.

harbor master -- The officer in charge, under the port director, of piloting, berthing and traffic movements in a harbor. He is also responsible for navigational aids; for keeping and disseminating the latest navigational approaches and hydrographic information concerning the harbor area and its approaches.

helicopter assault force (HAF) -- A task organization under amphibious troops for an assigned mission involving the movement of assault troops by helicopter. It consists of two basic elements: (1) helicopter units and (2) helicopter-borne troops units. The commander of the helicopter assault force, who may be either a Marine ground officer or aviator, is designated by the amphibious troops commander.

helicopter assault plan -- The over-all plan by which the helicopter assault force accomplishes its mission. It includes route diagrams, landing and retirement schedules, and other detailed instructions, usually as appendixes.

helicopter breakup point -- In helicopter assault operations, an air control point at which helicopters returning from a landing zone break formation and are released to return to base or are dispatched for other employment.

helicopter departure point -- In helicopter assault operations, an air control point near the landing zone, from which helicopters are coordinated and dispatched on the final legs of the approach to the initial point.

helicopter direction center -- A subordinate agency of the tactical air control center (TACC) established for the purpose of coordination and control of helicopters with other air activities for amphibious operations. It will normally use the existing facilities of helicopter carrier transports (CIC).

helicopter emergency orbit points -- Air control points near a landing zone at which helicopters which have left the initial point but have not yet landed can safely orbit and await instructions in the event the landing zone becomes untenable or obstructed (foul) from a crash.

helicopter pathfinders -- Helicopters with experienced personnel that precede formation to a landing zone and establish and operate signal and communication devices for the purpose of guiding helicopters to the landing zone.

helicopter route of approach -- The track or series of tracks (relative to the earth's surface) on which helicopters move from a specified departure point to a specified helicopter landing site or zone. The width of the route of approach is normally 1000 yards and clear of all supporting fires.

helicopter route of retirement -- The track or series of tracks (relative to the earth's surface) over which helicopters move from a specified helicopter landing zone or site to the breakup point. The width of the route of retirement is normally 1000 yards and clear of all supporting fires.

helicopter team (heliteam) -- The troops and their equipment which are carried by one helicopter on one flight.

helicopter transport area -- A sea area in the objective area to the seaward and on the flanks of the outer transport and landing ships area, but preferably inside the area screen, to which helicopter transports proceed and launch or recover helicopters (in case of sea echelon modified).

helicopter wave rendezvous -- An air control point at which a helicopter wave is assembled prior to executing a mission.

horned scully -- An underwater obstacle designed to tear holes in the bottoms of landing boats, consisting of a tapered block of concrete with steel rails, usually pointed, projecting at angles from the top.

- I -

intelligence, operational -- Operational intelligence is the processed information about the enemy and the objective area which is used by commanders in planning and execution of assigned tasks.

intelligence, strategic -- Strategic intelligence consists of the knowledge of capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of nations.

intelligence, annex -- An annex to an order or plan containing details of intelligence and instructions for intelligence activities.

interior communications -- Rapid communication facilities, electrical, acoustical, or mechanical, interconnecting the various operational spaces of a naval vessel, aircraft, or other activities.

interval -- 1. The space between adjacent groups of ships or boats measured in any direction between the corresponding ships or boats in each group. 2. The space between adjacent individuals, vehicles, or units in a formation that are placed side by side, measured abreast. See DISTANCE.

jeheemy -- A large, pneumatic-tired, wheeled salvage-rig fitted with falls and used to lift and move landing craft up to the size of LCVP.

joint -- Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one Service of the National Military Establishment participate.

joint communication center -- A communication center established for the joint use of the Armed Forces.

joint amphibious task force -- A joint force organized to undertake an amphibious operation.

joint force -- A general term applied to a force which is composed of significant elements of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, or of any two of these services operating under a single commander authorized to exercise unified command or operations control over such a joint force.

joint operation -- An operation requiring tactical coordination of more than one Service of the Armed Services.

joint staff -- 1. A joint staff is the staff of a commander of a joint force which includes member from the several services comprising the force. The members should be assigned in such a manner as to insure an understanding by the commander, of the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Officers from each service comprising the force should hold key positions of responsibility in the staff. 2. The staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization as provided for under the National Security Act of 1947 as amended.

landing area -- That part of the objective area within which are included the landing operations of an attack force. It includes the beach, the approaches to the beach, the transport area, the fire support areas, the air occupied by close supporting aircraft, and the land included in the advance inland to the initial objective.

landing craft -- A craft which is specially designed for beaching, unloading on the beach, and retracting itself without aid from other sources.

landing field, advanced -- In Air Force usage, a hastily constructed temporary airfield near the front. Usually it has one landing strip, minimum dispersal and the barest essentials for servicing aircraft. As occupancy continues, it may be improved progressively into an airfield. Also called advance landing ground.

landing force -- A task organization of especially equipped and trained troops, subordinate to amphibious troops assigned to carry out amphibious operations against a position or group of positions so located as to permit their seizure by troops operating under a single tactical command. Some of its elements may be transported by air.

landing ship -- A large type assault ship, generally over 200 feet in length which is designed for long sea voyages and for rapid unloading over or onto a beach.

landing ship group -- A group of landing ships in an amphibious operation.

landing vehicle, tracked -- A tracked amphibious vehicle capable of operation under its own power both on land and water. (Also called Vehicle Amphibian, Amphibious Tractor).

liaison team, naval gunfire -- That part of a shore fire control party which consists of the naval gunfire liaison officer with assigned communication personnel and equipment.

lift, amphibious -- The total capacity of assault type shipping utilized in an amphibious operation, expressed in terms of personnel, vehicles, and measurement (or weight) tons of supplies. Also called a lift or assault lift.

line of departure -- A line designated to coordinate to the departure of attack or scouting elements, a jump-off line.

line of communication -- All the routes, land, water, and air, which connect an operating military force with its base of operations, and along which its supplies and reinforcement move.

loading -- The placement of troops, equipment, and supplies into the vessels and/or aircraft. This is accomplished during the embarkation phase of an amphibious operation.

loading, combat -- See combat loading.

loading point -- Any point and/or location at which trains, trucks, aircraft, ships, etc., are loaded with personnel, supplies, and equipment.

local naval defense -- The defense of a landing area, the water areas of a naval district, of the local water areas of a base, by those naval forces charged with the conduct of naval operations against enemy surface or submarine attack.

lodgement area -- That area, resulting from a consolidation of one or more beachheads and which provides the initial base of operations required for support of extended operations overland.

logistics -- In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: (1) Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of material; (2) movement, evacuation and hospitalization of personnel; (3) acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and (4) acquisition or furnishing of services. It comprises both planning, including determination of requirements, and implementation.

marker vessel -- A vessel stationed between the transport area and the line of departure in order to guide boats to the line of departure and to check on their accomplishment of the approach schedule.

mission, call -- A type of air support mission starting with a standard number of planes on ground or carrier alert, armed with a standard load in position ready to take-off as soon as the air crews have been briefed.

movement, ship-to-shore -- The act of debarking troops, their armament, equipment and supplies from assault shipping as required, into landing craft, landing ships, and amphibian vehicles, and the movement from the launching or transport area to the assigned landing area.

- N -

naval beach group -- A permanent naval organization consisting of three commissioned units, the Beachmaster unit, the Boat unit, and the Amphibious Construction Battalion, designed to provide the personnel and equipment for; (1) The Beach Party (2) Supplementary boating for the ship-to-shore movement, (3) Operation of pontoon lighterage, transfer barges and the installation of pontoon causeways.

naval gunfire officer -- An officer on the staff of division or higher landing force unit whose duties pertain to the planning of naval gunfire support of amphibious operations, training of shore fire control parties, and the coordination under the artillery officer of naval gunfire support with artillery and air support.

night landing (amphibious) -- A landing attack in which the ship-to-shore movement is accomplished and the initial objective is seized or expected to be seized under the cover of darkness.

- O -

operation, shore-to-shore -- An amphibious operation which the troops with supplies and equipment are waterborne from an advanced shore base or beachhead directly to a landing beach without transshipment.

objective -- 1. An end in view to be attained by the employment of the Armed Forces. 2. A locality or geographical feature(s) to be captured or reached in the course of an attack or during a movement.

objective area -- A definite geographical area within which is located the objective to be captured or reached by the military forces. This area is defined by the theatre commander or other competent authority for the purposes of command and control.

open circular screen -- One that is not completely closed, i.e., one in which there is certain unassigned screening stations, usually in the rear of the disposition.

operation order -- A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

operation plan -- A plan for operations extending over considerable space and time, and usually based on stated assumptions. It may cover a single operation or a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously, or in succession. It is the form of directive employed by high echelons of command in order to permit subordinate commanders to prepare their supporting plans or orders.

operational control -- Control exercised over the combat or service operation of subordinate or other organizations.

operational reserve -- An emergency reserve of men and/or material established for the support of a specific operation.

operation -- A military action, or the carrying out of a military mission, strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative; the process of carrying on combat on land, on sea, or in the air, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

- P -

pallet -- A portable platform used in the landing, loading, stowage, and unloading of materials.

palletize -- To pack and secure supplies on a pallet.

phase (amphibious operation) -- A step in the operation, at the end of which a reorganization of forces may be required and another action initiated. Although certain phases may overlap in point of time, they usually occur in the following order:

planning -- The preparation and coordination of plans for the operation.

training and rehearsal -- The concentration of forces selected for the operation, their organization into an integrated task force, and their joint training.

mounting -- The assembly of troops, equipment, supplies, and vessels at places of embarkation and the actual embarkation of the landing force in vessels.

movement to the objective -- The sea journey from points of embarkation to the landing area.

prelanding operations -- Reconnaissance, minesweeping, bombardment, bombing, underwater demolitions, and destruction of beach obstacles.

attack and capture of the objective -- The assault against the hostile shore, including the completion of tactical operations to secure the force objective.

consolidation -- Tactical organization and consolidation of beachheads.

base development -- Establishment of facilities and development of the area for the purpose of supporting projected operations.

pontoon -- A light boat or float used as one of the floating supports for a temporary military bridge, or as a raft for conveying overwater.

pontoon, N.L. -- A navy lightened pontoon; a cubed-shaped, sheet-steel, airtight cell from which pontoon barges and pontoon causeways are assembled in the field.

port commander -- The officer responsible for and having authority over all activities at the port, and commanding all personnel assigned to the port and its component parts.

port director -- The naval officer who, under an island commander and/or commander naval shore activity, controls the operation of a port. His responsibilities include movement orders, harbor movements, routing, boarding, berthing, piloting, supervision of loading, discharging and fueling; and inspection of merchant ship communication facilities.

- R -

RCT -- The symbol for Regimental Combat Team. See Regimental Combat Team.

RLT -- The symbol for a regimental landing team. In Marine Corps usage, a task organization for landing, comprised of an infantry regiment reinforced by those elements required for initiation of its combat function ashore.

reserve, floating -- In an amphibious operation, reserve troops which remain embarked until needed.

regimental combat team -- A reinforced infantry regiment, operating as a balanced unit of essential arms and the normal ground force ratio is one regiment of infantry, one battalion of artillery, one company of engineers and one company of tanks. This ratio, however, is not fixed and may be varied to meet the demand of the tactical situation. Abbreviation -- RCT.

rendezvous area -- An area for purpose of rendezvous or assembly. In landing operations, an area located in reference to some fixed point in the vicinity of the transport area to which loaded landing craft proceed for purposes of organization and control prior to leaving for the line of departure. It is thus distinguished from a boat assembly area for unloaded boats waiting to be called to debarkation stations for loading.

SACC -- See supporting arms coordination center.

schedule, debarkation (in an amphibious operation) -- A form indicating the time at which each boat team will reach its debarkation station and debark, the type of craft in which the team is to be embarked, and other related information.

schedule, landing (in an amphibious operation) -- A schedule which shows the beach, hour, and priorities of landing of assault units, and which coordinates the movements of landing craft from the transports to the beach in order to execute the planned scheme of maneuver ashore.

schedule, operations -- A schedule prescribing the sequence of various events of an operation and the hour of their execution.

screen center -- The center of the circle on which the screen of a disposition is stationed. It usually coincides with the disposition center, but may be displaced from that center in the direction of advance.

screen sector origin -- A line passing through the screen center, expressed as a true bearing and used as a reference line for the location of screening stations around the circle. It is usually placed on true North.

sea echelon -- That portion of the assault shipping of the Amphibious Task Force stationed well to seaward of the transport areas and its screen.

sector dispatching vessel -- A vessel stationed in each sector of the transport area for the purpose of dispatching landing craft to the line of departure.

serial -- One of the subdivisions into which personnel, and/or equipment is arranged for movement by march, or by land, water, or air transport. A serial consists of one unit, or of several units or parts of units, placed under a single commander for movement. In amphibious operations a serial includes those troops and their equipment which proceed from a single ship and land on a single colored numbered beach at the same time.

selective loading -- Loading of supplies and equipment in cargo vessels in such a manner that specific items can be discharged on call.

shipping designator -- A four-letter code word assigned to a particular overseas theatre, base, port, or area, for specific use as an address on shipments to the overseas location concerned. It can be coupled with two or more numerals to indicate the addressee at the theatre, base or port area.

ship-to-shore movement -- The act of debarking troops, their armament, equipment and supplies from assault shipping as required into landing craft, landing ships, and amphibian vehicles, and the movement from the rendezvous of transport area to the assigned landing area.

sortie -- To depart from a port or anchorage, with an implication of departure for operations or maneuver.

shore fire control party -- A specially trained unit for control of Naval Gunfire in support of troops ashore, consisting of a spotting team to adjust fire and a Naval Gunfire liaison team to perform liaison functions for the supported battalion commander.

shore party -- A troop task organization formed for the purpose of providing logistic support within the beach area to troop units during the early phases of an amphibious operation. Its basic mission is to unload supplies and equipment; provide services and facilities ashore; to receive, segregate and safeguard this material; maintain security of the beach area; evacuate casualties and prisoners of war, and reembark other personnel as directed.

shore bombardment -- Naval gunfire, including rockets and other missiles delivered against shore targets in situations which do not require detailed integration with the fire and movement of ground forces or minor naval elements operating close inshore and in which the system of supporting arms coordination need not be employed. It includes, but is not limited to, the employment of naval gunfire as a diversion, raid, psychological expedient, cover for minesweeping or minelaying operations when troops are not ashore, or as a military target destructive measure.

shot -- A message from ship to the observer indicating that the unit has fired.

staging -- To process in a specified area, troops which are in transit from one locality to another. Staging may include provision of shelter, inspection to determine fitness of troops and adequacy of supplies and equipment, issue of supplies to make up shortage, rehearsal, and issuance of final instructions relative to movement.

standing operating procedure -- A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless prescribed otherwise in a particular case, thus the flexibility necessary in special situations is retained. Abbreviation -- "SOP".

stevedore -- One who works at, or one who is responsible for, loading or unloading of a vessel in port.

stores -- In naval usage, this term is sometimes used instead of the term supplies to denote any article or commodity used by a naval ship or station, such as equipage, consumable supplies, clothing, petroleum products, medical supplies, ammunition, etc. See supplies.

strategic concentration -- The assembly of designated forces in areas from which it is intended that operations of the assembled force shall begin so that they are best disposed to initiate the plan of campaign.

strategy, military -- The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.

supplies -- All items necessary for the equipment, maintenance, and operation of a military command, including food, clothing, equipment, arms, ammunition, fuel, forage, materials, and machinery of all kinds. See stores.

supporting arms coordinator -- Representative of Amphibious task force commander who coordinates the operations of the SACC.

supporting arms coordination center -- (SACC) A single location on board an amphibious force flag ship (AGC) in which all naval personnel and naval communications facilities and certain troop personnel incident to the coordination of fire support are centralized.

support craft -- Naval craft designed for the employment of rockets, mortars, and automatic weapons at close range from seaward, both in support of an assault against enemy-held beaches and in the continuation of the attack.

support, naval gunfire -- See gunfire support.

support group -- A task designation for a group of naval vessels supporting an amphibious assault. Prior to the actual landing(s) the support group includes naval gunfire ships and craft, minesweepers and underwater demolition teams, while during and after the landing(s), the support group is composed only of naval gunfire ships and craft.

- T -

table, boat availability -- A table used to tabulate the numbers of the various types of landing boats available among vessels of the transport group preparatory to working out their assignment to embark and transport the troops of the assault waves. Boats available only for naval use are indicated.

table, consolidated vehicle -- A summary of all vehicles loaded on a ship, listed by types, and showing the units to which they belong.

table, embarkation and tonnage -- A consolidated table showing personnel and cargo, by troop unit, loaded aboard a combat loaded vessel. Similar tables are employed to show the loading of troop units or naval transport units of any size.

table, landing craft and amphibious assignment -- A table showing the assignment of personnel and material to each landing craft and amphibious vehicle and the assignment of the landing craft and amphibious vehicles to waves for the Ship-to-Shore movement.

table, landing craft availability -- A tabulation of the numbers of the various types of landing craft among vessels of the transport group available for troop use in the ship-to-shore movement and for naval use and spares.

tactical -- Pertaining to the employment of units in combat.

tactical air command -- In Air Force Usage; 1. a general term applied to an air organization designed to conduct offensive and defensive air operations in conjunction with land or sea forces; 2. a designation of one of the subordinate commands of the Air Force.

tactical air control center -- The principal air operations installation (land or ship-based) from which all aircraft and air warning functions of tactical air operations are controlled.

tactical air control group -- 1 (Land-based) a flexible administrative and tactical component of a tactical air organization which provides aircraft control and warning functions ashore for offensive and defensive missions within the tactical air zone of responsibility. 2. (Ship-based) an administrative and tactical component (naval) of an amphibious force which provides aircraft control and warning facilities afloat for offensive and defensive missions within the tactical air command area of responsibility.

tactical air control party -- A subordinate operational component of the land-based tactical air control group designed for the control of aircraft from forward observation posts. The tactical air control party operates at division, regiment, or battalion levels. In Marine Corps organization it is organic to divisions, regiments, and battalions.

tactical air control squadron -- 1. (Land-based) A flexible administrative and tactical component of a tactical air control group which provides the control mechanism for a land-based tactical air control center, or a tactical air direction center, or tactical air control parties. 2. (Ship-based) An administrative and tactical component of the tactical air control group (naval) which provides the control mechanism for the ship-based tactical air direction center or the ship-based tactical air control center.

tactical air controller -- The officer in charge of all operations of the tactical control center. He is responsible to the tactical air commander for the control of all aircraft and air warning facilities within his area of responsibility.

tactical air coordinator (airborne) -- An air officer who coordinates, from an airplane, the action of combat aircraft engaged in close support of ground or sea forces.

target analysis -- The examination of potential targets to determine their military importance, their relative priority for attack, and the capabilities of available weapons for attack.

target date -- The date on which it is desired that an action be accomplished or initiated.

target information center -- An intelligence center set up afloat or ashore in landing force artillery sections for assembly, evaluation, dissemination, and coordination of target information for supporting weapons; as artillery, naval gunfire, and air. Abbreviation -- "TIC".

task element -- A subdivision of a task unit organized by the commander of the task unit for the accomplishment of a specific task related to the main task.

task force -- 1. A temporary grouping of units under one commander and formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. 2. A permanent organization of units under one commander for the purpose of carrying out a continuous specific task. 3. A major subdivision of a fleet or of any independent body organized for the accomplishment of a specific task.

task group -- A subdivision of a naval task force organized by the commander of the task force for the accomplishment of a specific task related to the main task.

task organization -- 1. In naval usage, an organization which assigns to responsible commanders the means with which to accomplish their assigned tasks in any planned action. 2. An organization table pertaining to a specific naval directive.

task unit -- A subdivision of a task group organized by the commander of the task group for the accomplishment of a specific task related to the operations of a task group.

theater of operations -- A term used to designate that portion of a theater of war necessary for military operations, either offensive or defensive, pursuant to an assigned mission and for the administration incident to such military operations.

theatre of war -- That area of land, sea, and air which is, or may become, involved directly in the operation of war.

ton -- A unit of measurement of weight of the following classifications:
1. Units of weight: (a) short ton -- 2000 pounds. (b) long ton -- (Weight ton) 2240 pounds. (c) Metric Ton -- 2205 pounds (1,000 kilograms).
2. Units of Volume: (a) measurement ton (ship ton) -- 40 cubic feet. (b) register ton -- 100 cubic feet.

tonnage -- An expression of cubature or weight used variously to indicate the aggregate of tons shipped, carried, handled, mined, etc., also to indicate a ship's weight, size, or carrying capacity as --

gross registered tonnage -- The entire internal cubic capacity of the ship expressed in register tons (100 cubic feet to the ton); except certain spaces which are exempt such as: peak and other tanks of water ballast, open forecabin, bridge and poop, hatchway access, certain light and air spaces, domes, the skylights, condenser, anchor gear, steering gear, wheel house, galley cabins for passengers, and some other spaces specified by law. The synonymous term GROSS TONNAGE is sometimes used.

net register tonnage -- The tonnage of a ship remaining after certain deductions have been made from the gross tonnage, expressed in register tons (100 cubic feet to the ton). Among the deductions are master's cabin, crew

spaces, navigation spaces, shaft trunks, donkey engine, boiler, propelling power space, and other spaces specified by law. Synonymous term NET TONNAGE is sometimes used.

displacement tonnage, light -- The weight of the ship expressed in long tons (2240 pounds), excluding the weight of the cargo, passengers, fuel, water, stores, dunnage, and such other items as are necessary for use on a voyage.

displacement tonnage, loaded -- The weight of the ship including those items excluded in determining displacement tonnage light.

deadweight tonnage -- The carrying capacity of the ship expressed in long tons. It is the difference between displacement tonnage loaded and displacement tonnage light.

deadweight cargo tonnage -- The cargo carrying capacity, expressed in long tons (2240 pounds per ton). It is that part of the deadweight tonnage of the vessel which remains after deducting the weight of fuel, water, stores, dunnage, and other items necessary for the voyage. Also known as CARGO CAPACITY TONNAGE.

grain cubic capacity -- The maximum space available for cargo, measured in cubic feet, the measurement being taken to the inside of the shell plating of the ship or to the outside of the frames and to the top of the beams or underside of deck plating.

bale cubic capacity -- The space available for cargo, measured in cubic feet, to the inside of the cargo battens, on the frames, and to the underside of the beams.

traffic control -- The physical control exercised over the movement of traffic on lines of communication.

transfer area -- In a landing operation, the water area in which the transfer of troops and supplies from landing boats to amphibian vehicles is effected.

transport area -- The sea area designated as the station area for transports debarking troops during the assault phase of a landing operation.

transport division (TRANSDIV) -- An administrative command of an amphibious force, normally consisting of attack transports and attack cargo ships in approximately the numbers required to combat load the personnel, supplies and equipment of one reinforced regiment. The transport division is the nucleus for the formation of a naval task component to lift one regimental combat team in amphibious operations.

transport group -- A subdivision of an amphibious task force, composed primarily of transports.

transport squadron (TRANSRON) -- An administrative command of an amphibious force consisting of two or more transport divisions. The transport squadron is the nucleus for the formation of a naval task component which will combat

load the personnel, supplies, and equipment of one reinforced infantry division.

type organization -- A subdivision of a fleet or force comprising all ships of the same type attached to such fleet or force, together with such flagships, tenders, and aircraft as may be assigned.

- U -

underwater demolition team -- A naval unit organized and equipped to perform beach reconnaissance and underwater demolition missions in an amphibious operation. Two or more UDT comprise an Underwater Demolition Unit.

unified command -- That command organization in which a unified force composed of significant elements of two or more services operates under an officer specifically assigned to the command thereof by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the commander of a unified command established by the Joint Chief of Staff.

unit -- 1. Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority such as a table of organization; specifically, part of a larger military organization. 2. An organization title of a subdivision of a group in a task force. 3. A standard or basic quantity in which an item of supply is divided, issued, or used.

unit of fire -- In Marine Corps usage a unit of measure for ammunition supply used for tactical and logistical planning. It is figured in rounds or tons per weapon or per organization. The unit of fire is usually the amount of ammunition which experience indicates is an approximation of what one weapon or organization will use in one day. This was formerly called day of fire. Unit of fire may be prescribed by the theatre commander for the theatre.

- V -

vehicle, amphibious -- A wheeled or track-laying vehicle capable of operating on both land and water.

vertical loading -- A type of loading whereby items of like character are loaded in a vertical layer through the hold(s) of a ship, so that selected items are available at any stage of the unloading.

- W -

wave, landing -- See boat wave.

wing -- 1. In Air Force usage, an air unit composed normally of one primary mission group and the necessary supporting groups; i.e., Maintenance and Supply Group and Hospital Groups. (Primary mission group may be functional, such as combat, training, transport or service). 2. In Navy usage (Fleet Air Wing) the basic organizational and administrative unit for naval land and tender-based aviation. The wings are mobile units to which are assigned aircraft squadrons and tenders for administrative control. 3. In Marine usage, an air unit composed of two or more air groups with or without supporting air units. 4. One of the major lifting and supporting surfaces, or airfoils, of an airplane. 5. A flank unit; that part of a military force to the right or left of the main body.

- 2 -

zone, joint -- An area in which surface, air (both Air Force and Navy), and sub-surface craft may operate simultaneously (such as one in which submarines are performing lifeguard services).

LIST OF NAVAL VESSELS--BY TYPES AND ABBREVIATED DESIGNATION

Battleships_ _ _ _ _ BB

Cruisers:

Heavy_ _ _ _ _ CA
Guided Missile Heavy_ _ _ _ _ CAG
Large_ _ _ _ _ CB
Light_ _ _ _ _ CL
Anti-aircraft Light_ _ _ _ _ CLAA
Guided Missile Light_ _ _ _ _ CLG

Command Ships:

Large Tactical_ _ _ _ _ CBC
Tactical_ _ _ _ _ CLC

Aircraft Carriers:

Attack_ _ _ _ _ CVA
Support_ _ _ _ _ CVS
Escort_ _ _ _ _ CVE
Assault Helicopter_ _ _ _ _ CVHA

Destroyers:

Destroyer_ _ _ _ _ DD
Escort_ _ _ _ _ DDE
Radar Picket_ _ _ _ _ DDR
Frigate_ _ _ _ _ DL

Submarines:

Submarine_ _ _ _ _ SS
Guided Missile_ _ _ _ _ SSG
Anti-Submarine_ _ _ _ _ SSK
Nuclear Power_ _ _ _ _ SSN
Radar Picket_ _ _ _ _ SSR
Target and Training_ _ _ _ _ SST

Amphibious Vessels:

Amphibious Force Flagship_ _ _ _ _ AGC
Attack Cargo Ship_ _ _ _ _ AKA
Attack Transport_ _ _ _ _ APA
High Speed Transport_ _ _ _ _ APD
Cargo Submarine_ _ _ _ _ ASSA
Transport Submarine_ _ _ _ _ ASSP
Control Escort Vessel_ _ _ _ _ DEC
Inshore Fire Support Ship_ _ _ _ _ IFS
Helicopter Carrier_ _ _ _ _ LPH*
Flotilla Flagship Landing Ship_ _ _ _ _ LSFF
_ _ _ _ _ LSD
Dock Landing Ship_ _ _ _ _ LSD
Medium Landing Ship_ _ _ _ _ LSM
Medium Landing Ship (Rocket)_ _ _ _ _ LSMR
Tank Landing Ship_ _ _ _ _ LST
Vehicle Landing Ship_ _ _ _ _ LSV

Control Submarine Chaser (173')_ _ _ _ _ PCC
Control Escort (180')_ _ _ _ _ PCEC
Control Submarine Chaser (136')_ _ _ _ _ PCSC
Control Submarine Chaser (110')_ _ _ _ _ SCC
* Designation which might be used in lieu of CVHA.

Mine Vessels:

Mine Sweeper, Coastal (non-magnetic)_ _ _ _ _ MSC
_ _ _ _ _ MSC
Mine Warfare Command and Support Ship_ _ _ _ _ MCS
Mine Hunter, Coastal_ _ _ _ _ MHC
Mine Sweeper, Coastal (old)_ _ _ _ _ MSC(O)
Mine Layer, Fleet_ _ _ _ _ MM
Mine Layer, Coastal_ _ _ _ _ MMC
Mine Layer, Destroyer_ _ _ _ _ DM
Mine Sweeper, Destroyer_ _ _ _ _ DMS

Patrol Vessels:

Escort Vessel_ _ _ _ _ DE
Radar Picket Escort Vessel_ _ _ _ _ DER
Submarine Chaser (173')_ _ _ _ _ PC
Escort (180')_ _ _ _ _ PCE
Rescue Escort (180')_ _ _ _ _ PCER
Submarine Chaser (136')_ _ _ _ _ PCS
Frigate_ _ _ _ _ PF
Motor Gunboat_ _ _ _ _ PGM
River Gunboat_ _ _ _ _ PR
Yacht_ _ _ _ _ PY
Submarine Chaser (110')_ _ _ _ _ SC

Auxiliary Vessels:

Destroyer Tender_ _ _ _ _ AD
Degaussing Vessel_ _ _ _ _ ADG
Ammunition Ship_ _ _ _ _ AE
Store Ship_ _ _ _ _ AF
Large Auxiliary Floating Dry Dock_ _ _ _ _ AFDB
Small Auxiliary Floating Dry Dock_ _ _ _ _ AFDL
Medium Auxiliary Floating Dry Dock_ _ _ _ _ AFDM
Miscellaneous_ _ _ _ _ AG
Icebreaker_ _ _ _ _ AGB
Motor Torpedo Boat Tender_ _ _ _ _ AGP
Surveying Ship_ _ _ _ _ AGS
Coastal Surveying Ship_ _ _ _ _ AGSC
Auxiliary Submarine_ _ _ _ _ AG(SS)
Hospital Ship_ _ _ _ _ AH
Cargo Ship_ _ _ _ _ AK

Light Cargo Ship	AKL
Net Cargo Ship	AKN
Oiler	AO
Gasoline Tanker	AOG
Replenishment Fleet Tanker	AOR
Transport	AP
Self-Propelled Barracks Ship	APB
Small Coastal Transport	APC
Repair Ship	AR
Battle Damage Repair Ship	ARB
Cable Repairing or Laying Ship	AFC
Floating Dry Dock	ARD
Internal Combustion Engine	
Repair Ship	ARG
Heavy-Hull Repair Ship	ARH
Landing Craft Repair Ship	ARL
Salvage Vessel	ARS
Salvage Lifting Vessel	ARSD
Salvage Craft Tender	ARST
Aircraft Repair Ship	ARV
Aircraft Repair Ship (Aircraft)	
	ARVA
Aircraft Repair Ship (Engine)	ARVE
Submarine Tender	AS
Submarine Rescue Vessel	ASR
Auxiliary Ocean Tug	ATA
Fleet Ocean Tug	ATF
Rescue Ocean Tug	ATR
Seaplane Tender	AV
Guided Missile Ship	AVM
Small Seaplane Tender	AVP
Aviation Supply Ship	AVS
Distilling Ship	AW
Unclassified Miscellaneous	IX

Service Craft:

Crane Ship	AB
Barracks Ship (non-self-propelled)	
	APL
Large Catapult Lighter	AVC
Utility Landing Craft	LCU
Mine Sweeping Boat	MSB
Motor Torpedo Boat	PT
Coastal Yacht	PYC
Submersible Craft	X
Sweeper Device	XMAP
Miscellaneous Auxiliary	YAG
Open Lighter	YC
Car Float	YCF
Open Cargo Lighter	YCK
Aircraft Transportation Lighter	YCV
Floating Derrick	YD
Diving Tender	YDT

Covered Lighter (self-propelled)	YF
Ferry Boat or Launch	YFB
Floating Dry Dock	YFD
Covered Lighter	
(non-self-propelled)	YFN
Large Covered Lighter	YFNB
Covered Lighter	
(for use with dry docks)	YFND
Covered Lighter	
(special purpose)	YFNG
Lighter (special purpose)	YFNX
Floating Power Barge	YFP
Refrigerated Covered Lighter	
(self-propelled)	YFR
Refrigerated Covered Lighter	
(non-self-propelled)	YFRN
Torpedo Transportation Lighter	YFT
Garbage Lighter (self-propelled)	YG
Garbage Lighter	
(non-self-propelled)	YGN
House Boat	YHB
Dredge	YM
Motor Mine Planter	YMP
Auxiliary Motor Mine Sweeper	YMS
Gate Vessel	YNG
Fuel Oil Barge (self-propelled)	YON
Gasoline Barge (self-propelled)	YOG
Gasoline Barge	
(non-self-propelled)	YOGN
Fuel Oil Barge	
(non-self-propelled)	YON
Oil Storage Barge	YOS
Patrol Vessel	YP
Floating Workshop	YR
Submarine Repair and	
Berthing Barge	YRB
Floating Dry Dock Workshop	
(Hull)	YRDH
Floating Dry Dock Workshop	
(Mach)	YRDM
Covered Lighter (Repair)	YRL
Seaplane Wrecking Derrick	YSD
Sludge Removal Barge	YSR
Large Harbor Tug	YTB
Small Harbor Tug	YTL
Medium Harbor Tug	YTM
Torpedo Testing Barge	YTT
Catapult Lighter	YVC
Water Barge (self-propelled)	YW
Water Barge	
(non-self-propelled)	YWN

Model Designation of Naval Aircraft

Heavier-than-Air (Fixed wing) (V)

Airplanes:

VF_ _ _ _ _ Fighter
 VA_ _ _ _ _ Attack
 VP (HL) Patrol (Four-engine land)
 VP (ML) Patrol (Two-engine land)
 VP (MS) Patrol_ _ _ (Two-engine
 seaplane)
 VO_ _ _ _ _ Observation
 VR (HL)_ _ _ Transport (four-engine
 land)
 VR (ML)_ _ _ Transport (Two-engine
 land)
 VR (HS)_ _ _ Transport (Two-engine
 seaplane)
 VS_ _ _ _ _ Air Anti-Submarine
 VU_ _ _ _ _ Utility
 VT_ _ _ _ _ Training

Heavier-than-Air (Rotary wing) (H)

Helicopters:

HO_ _ _ _ _ Observation
 HT_ _ _ _ _ Training
 HR_ _ _ _ _ Transport
 HU_ _ _ _ _ Utility

Pilotless Aircraft (K)

Aerial Targets:

KD_ _ _ For use as target aircraft

Guided Missiles (M)

Test Vehicles (TV)

C_ _ _ _ _ Control guidance
 L_ _ _ _ _ Launching
 P_ _ _ _ _ Propulsion
 R_ _ _ _ _ Research

Lighter-than-Air (Z)

Airships:

ZP_ _ _ _ _ Patrol Escort
 ZT_ _ _ _ _ Training


List of Naval Craft--All Vessels of the Navy of the Following Types

Landing Craft Utility_ _ _ _ _ LCU Landing Craft Personnel Light_ _ _ LCP(L)
 Landing Craft Mechanized_ _ _ _ _ LCM Landing Craft Personnel Ramp_ _ _ LCP(R)
 Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel_ _ _ LCV Landing Craft Rubber_ _ _ _ _ LCR

List of Military Vehicles--All Vehicles of the Military Services of the Following Types

Landing Vehicle Tracked Armor_ _ _ LVT(A) Landing Vehicle, Tracked,
 Landing Vehicle Tracked_ _ _ _ _ LVT Personnel Carrier_ _ _ _ _ LVTP-5
 Dual Utility Cargo Landing Vehicle, Tracked,
 Waterborne Truck_ _ _ _ _ DUKW Howitzer Carriage_ _ _ _ _ LVTH-6

PACIFIC FLEET ORGANIZATION



MAP READINGINTRODUCTION TO MAP READING

A map is a line drawing, to scale, of an area of the earth's surface. It shows objects and features by conventional signs. Although drawn to scale, it is not absolutely accurate because it is flat, while the earth's surface is curved. A map, then, is a picture of the land and things people have built on the land.

TYPES OF MAPS1. Maps compiled from existing maps.

Oftentimes, when hostilities break out in some locality where detailed maps are not available, the troops are furnished some type of map which is made up from whatever is available at the time.

2. Map Substitutes.

This is a term used to indicate maps that can be produced in a few hours. They are usually made up from aerial photographs and tracings of existing maps and photos.

3. Battle Maps.

This is the official map used by all commands in the same area. Generally prepared from aerial photograph and existing maps of the area with up to date corrections. Scale is usually about 1:25,000.

MAP CLASSIFICATION:

1. Small--(1:1,000,000 to 1:7,000,000) used for general planning and strategical studies by commanders of large units.
2. Intermediate--(1:125,000 and larger) used for planning operations including movements and concentrations of troops and supplies.
3. Medium and large--(1:125,000 and larger) used for tactical, technical and administrative needs of field units. As the scale becomes larger more detail is shown and the area covered by a given sheet is smaller. Thus, 1:1,000,000 is a small scale map and 1:25,000 is a large scale map.

RELIABILITY

There is nothing so good as a good map and, of course, nothing so misleading as a poor map. You may as well have no map as to have a poor one. A map is only as good as the structure upon which it is built--in other words, how good is the basic control and when was it made. Also who made the map? If made by reputable map making organization, then the map should be good. Take a look at the drafting--careful drafting is usually indicative of a good map, but of course a little care or judgment must be used. Accuracy with simplicity is the keynote

of a good map. Since all maps are flat representations of a curved surface of the earth there will be some error--so it is necessary to observe how much of the earth's surface is represented.

MARGINAL INFORMATION

All military maps and other maps show additional information along their margins. This information is a great help in determining the accuracy of the map, some of its uses and limitations. Your sheet I(M)-2 shows a picture of typical marginal information to be found on most maps. You are cautioned that the information may not always be in the same location on all maps.

A LIST OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

The following is a list of basic intelligence requirements necessary during the planning and/or later phases of an amphibious operation.

1. Military Geography
 - a. Maps, charts, and photographs
 - b. Vital areas and installations
 - c. Climatology
 - d. General military geography
 - 1) Terrain
 - 2) Coast, adjacent islands, and landing beaches
 - 3) Oceanography
 3. Beach terrain, beach approaches, and inland terrain
2. Ports and Harbors
 - a. Approaches and anchorages
 - b. Repair facilities
 - c. Utilities
 - d. Transportation and communication
3. Air Facilities
 - a. Expansibility
 - b. Repair facilities
 - c. Navigation stations
 - d. Medical facilities
 - e. Utilities
4. Politics
5. Economies
 - a. Economic Structure
 - b. Building materials
 - c. Fuels and agriculture
 - d. General public service facilities
 - e. Transportation
 - f. Telecommunication
 - g. Vulnerability
6. Sociology
 - a. Population, language, and religion
 - b. Health and sanitation
 - c. Labor
 - d. Public opinion and morale
 - e. Public order and safety
7. Armed Forces
 - a. Strength and disposition
 - b. Weapons and equipment
 - c. Defensive installations
 - d. Tactics and strategy
 - e. Intelligence
 - f. Recognition material
 - g. Logistics
 - h. Communications

SECTION 2

INTELLIGENCE IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

The Intelligence Cycle

Intelligence in Amphibious Operations

Factors of a Beach Study

INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

References: ONI-Y-1 Operational Intelligence (Navy)
FM30-5 Combat Intelligence (Army)

The Four Fundamental Phases

1. The direction of the collection effort.
2. The collection of information.
3. Processing of the collected information to produce intelligence.
4. Use and dissemination of the resulting intelligence.

The four fundamental features or phases listed are the lowest common denominator of the operational cycle. For instruction purposes only, the direction of the collection effort is listed first. Actually all phases function simultaneously and each is dependent on the one preceding it in the cycle.

1. The Direction of the Collection Effort.
 - a. Determination of the essential elements of information (EEI) result from a lack of explicit intelligence concerning the enemy or the characteristics of the area of operations.
 - b. Collection Plan.
 - (1) Analysis of EEI into Indications.
 - (2) Collection Scheme.
 - (a) Agencies to be used.
 - (b) Specific orders or requests.
 - (c) Hour and destination at which information is to be reported
 - c. Specific Directives and Requests.
 - (1) Fragmentary orders or requests.
 - (2) Intelligence Annex, reconnaissance and observation missions.
2. The Collection of Information.
 - a. Strategic sources and higher headquarters.
 - b. Reconnaissance agencies.
 - c. Non-reconnaissance sources.

3. Processing of the Collection Information to Produce Intelligence.

a. Collation.

- (1) Journal
- (2) Work Sheet
- (3) Enemy Situation Map
- (4) Intelligence Files

b. Evaluation.

c. Interpretation.

4. Use and Dissemination of the Resulting Intelligence.

a. Use.

- (1) By Intelligence Officer - Intelligence Estimate.
- (2) By Commander - Commander's Estimate.

b. Dissemination or Distribution.

- (1) Means - messages, conferences, intelligence documents.
- (2) To whom:

- (a) Other staff members.
- (b) Other headquarters, higher, lower, or adjacent.


TITLE: INTELLIGENCE IN THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

To present a general introduction to amphibious intelligence.

INTRODUCTION: The planning and execution of a successful amphibious operation must be based on adequate and accurate intelligence. Since every officer coming into the Amphibious Force will at one time or another be involved in either planning or executing a landing, he should be familiar with the information required and how to obtain it. He should also be familiar with the type and amount of material available from an Intelligence Section, and with the material he may be asked to furnish to the Section.

- SUBJECT MATTER:**
1. Definition of Intelligence
 - a. The product resulting from the collecting and processing of information concerning actual or potential situations and conditions relating to foreign activities or enemy-held areas. There is no difference in the Service or Type intelligence, only in how the material is used.
 - (1) Strategic - Used in long range planning.
 - (2) Operational - Used to plan specific operations.
 - (3) Counterintelligence - A part of both strategic and operational. Used to safeguard own plans, preparations and movements.

b. Intelligence Cycle (continuous)



2. History
 - a. Establishment of Amphibious Reconnaissance Patrol was about only concrete progress made prior to World War II.
 - b. Requirements learned and techniques developed during WW II.
3. Organization
 - a. Higher Echelons

Joint Intelligence Committee, Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence Division (Army), Air Force Intelligence Division (A-2)

b. Theater Intelligence Center

c. Operating Forces Intelligence Sections

Com Task Fleet	Com Gen Area
Com JATF	Com Gen Amphibious
Attack Force	Landing Force Troops

4. Sources and Agencies

a. Definitions

- (1) Source is the primary object from which information is obtained as book, file, prisoner of war, photography.
- (2) Agency is the means used to collect the information as underwater demolition team, interrogator, photo interpreter.

b. Background Sources

- (1) Departmental.
- (2) Higher Headquarters.

c. Reconnaissance Agencies

- (1) Aerial.
- (2) Submarine.
- (3) Underwater Demolition Teams.
- (4) Amphibious Reconnaissance Patrols.
- (5) Support Ships and Units in Contact.

d. Sources of Opportunity.

- (1) Clandestine Agents.
- (2) Prisoners of War.
- (3) Captured Documents.
- (4) Coast-watchers.
- (5) Communications.
- (6) Civilian Population.

5. Special Intelligence Requirements in Amphibious Operations.

a. Hydrography.

- (1) Surf and Swell.
- (2) Tides.
- (3) Currents.
- (4) Depths of water.
- (5) Water Temperatures.
- (6) Obstacles.

b. Meteorology.

- (1) Temperature.
- (2) Precipitation.
- (3) Force and direction of winds.
- (4) Frequency of storms.
- (5) Visibility.
- (6) Special phenomena.
- (7) Astronomical data.

c. Beaches.

- (1) Location.
- (2) Length.
- (3) Width.
- (4) Physical consistency.
- (5) Approaches.
- (6) Exits.
- (7) Gradient.
- (8) Nature of bottom.

d. Terrain.

- (1) Fields of fire.
- (2) Observation points.
- (3) Obstacles.
- (4) Cover and concealment.
- (5) Characteristics which affect the handling of traffic from assault and supply.

e. Enemy.

- (1) Location.
- (2) Strength.
- (3) Disposition.
- (4) Equipment.
- (5) Morale.
- (6) Order of battle.
- (7) Defenses.

f. Political and economic.

- (1) Civilian population.
- (2) Distribution.
- (3) Organization.
- (4) Attitude.
- (5) Morale.
- (6) Local of transportation.
- (7) Routes of transportation.
- (8) Civic developments.

SECTION 3

COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

Collection of Information

Departmental Sources

Underwater Demolition Teams

Amphibious Reconnaissance Patrols

Submarine Reconnaissance

Metereological Information

Aerial Reconnaissance

Aerial Photographic Interpretation

COLLECTION

a. Significance - The commander must be assured of continuing reliable information as to the dispositions, strength, composition, and movement of hostile forces, as well as information on terrain and weather. He must use every means at his disposal to gain information of the enemy forces in his area, and of enemy forces in other areas, which may affect the preparation and execution of his plans. A failure to exploit every source of information may deny important information of hostile dispositions, movements, and operations, and consequent decisive exploitation of enemy weaknesses. Because his primary function is to keep the commander and others informed of the enemy situation and capabilities and the area of operations, the intelligence officer is faced with the continuing problem of employing efficiently all available collecting agencies to gather this necessary information.

b. Difficulties - The difficulties involved in obtaining adequate information and in arriving at reliable conclusions based thereon are many. These difficulties are due principally to the fact that the interests of the enemy demand that he shall make every possible effort to foil our attempts to gain information. He will conceal his movements by every means possible; he will make use of ground, cover, darkness, and weather conditions to conceal his movements, and will supplement natural cover with camouflage; he will resort to any tactical measures that offer a reasonable chance of obtaining secrecy or surprise; he will enforce a strict censorship and enforce cryptographic security measures to prevent leaks of information; he may distribute false information and institute measures to deceive our collecting agencies; and he will sometimes adopt a course of action that may appear illogical. The opposition of the enemy's interest to our own, as well as the independence of his will, must necessarily make him more or less an unknown factor in every situation. To a lesser degree, the area not under our control and weather conditions also are unknown factors.

FACTORS OF A BEACH STUDY; PART I - TERRAIN APPRECIATION

- I. References: PIC - Report 4; Phib-7; Phib-9
- II. Purpose of this period: To present the detailed factors which must be considered in the selection of a landing beach.
- III. Beach Terminology. (See attached sketch).
- IV. Terrain Appreciation.
 - A. Beach Terrain
 1. Location of beach
 2. Type of beach
 - (a) Concave
 - (b) Straight
 - (c) Convex
 3. Width and length of beach
 4. Composition and gradient
 5. Obstacles on beach
 - (a) Natural
 - (b) Artificial
 6. Routes of exit
 - (a) Existing
 - (b) Requiring preparation
 7. Military aspect of beach and hinterland
 - (a) Terrain analysis
 - (1) Natural avenues of approach
 - (2) Natural defensive features
 - (3) Cover and concealment
 - (4) Observation
 - (b) Effect of terrain on supporting arms
 - (1) Naval Gunfire
 - a. Masked or reverse slope targets
 - b. Rising ground or flat plain
 - (2) Close Air Support
 - a. Direction of attacks
 - b. Effect of concealment

7. Military aspect of beach and hinterland (Continued).

- (c) Adaptability of defense
 - (1) Concave, best beach physically but easily defended
 - (2) Convex, usually poor beach, but favors attacker
 - (3) Straight
- (d) Beach selected by joint decision after weighing all considerations.
- (e) Effect of location on scheme of maneuver; Example: Tinian.

FACTORS OF A BEACH STUDY; PART II - HYDROGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONSI. Physical Location of Proposed Landing Site.

- A. Bay or cove, promontory or point, or straight stretch.

II. Physical Location of the Landing Site Plus Enemy Situation Will Greatly Influence Choice Position of Approach Area.

- A. Approach Area extends about 18,000 yards seaward of the Line of Departure and should be protected from high winds, swift currents and large waves; consideration must be given to obstructions and it should contain good holding ground for anchorage, since Approach Area contains anchorage for ships, fire support areas, and the boat lanes to the beach.

III. Shoreward of the Approach Area, From the Line of Departure to the Beach (approximately 4,000 yards) are the Principal Hydrographic Factors which Influence Selection of Landing Sites. In General These are:

Gradient	Surf	Current
Tide	Natural Obstacles	Nature of Bottom

IV. Gradient.

- A. Slope of sea bottom off beach and generally expressed as a ratio of depth to horizontal distance.
- B. Gradient determines how far offshore craft will beach.
- C. Steep gradient generally most desirable from BEACH standpoint.
- D. Gradient effects:
 - 1. Beaching craft
 - 2. Underwater obstacles
 - 3. Surf

V. Surf.

- A. Surf Zone: Area extending from outermost breaker line to limit of uprush of water on beach.

- B. Breakers Height: Vertical distance from crest to trough of preceeding wave.
- C. Significant Breakers Height: Average height of highest one-third of breakers taken over a ten minute period.
- D. Breaker Period: Time between crests. (Seconds).
- E. Wave Length: Distance between crests. (feet).
- F. Breaking Surf is principally caused by long low swell from a distant generating area moving in towards shore and being affected by offshore bottom.
- G. Two principal types of breakers:
 - 1. Pluggingin: Steep vertical face, wave crest peaks up and crashes violently, breaking immediately and expending its energy in a short area.
 - 2. Spilling: Flat face, wave slowly spills down over its forward slope; it may require a considerable time to complete its breaking and so expends its energy over a fairly wide area.
 - 3. Landing craft can negotiate 50% higher spilling than plunging breakers.
- H. After Oscillatory Wave completes breaking, released energy forms a wave of Translation which pushes water onto the beach in the form of uprush.
- I. Surf conditions are very important because of their effect on beach structure, beaching craft, and natural and artificial obstacles.
- J. Waves are primarily formed by the action of wind upon water surface.
 - 1. Initial size of waves depends on velocity and duration of generating wind, and the size of the area over which the generating wind blows.
- K. Surf forecasting.
 - 1. Utilizing a consecutive series of synoptic weather maps, and considering local physical conditions, it is possible to make relatively accurate forecasts of the height, velocity, and wave length of surf which will strike on a specific shoreline.

VI. Currents.

- A. Two main types:
 - 1. Ocean: "Permanent" type (Gulf Stream) have no appreciable effect on landing operation.
 - 2. Coastal
 - (a) Offshore: Outside surf zone but affects Line of Departure and Approach Area. Primarily of tidal origin.

(b) Inshore (inside surf zone)

- (1) Longshore: Caused by waves striking beach at an angle, current runs parallel to beach.
- (2) Rip: Either a longshore current deflected seaward, or backrush running out in small irregularities in bottom.

B. Effect of currents on amphibious operations.

1. Strong longshore and poor visibility can cause vehicles and craft to beach some distance from selected landing site.
2. Adverse currents and wind conditions may impede boats, disrupt boat wave formations, make landing and retraction difficult.
3. Longshore currents may be strong enough to cause broaching of craft.
4. Rip currents may make UDT operations difficult, alter underwater features, and effect landing vehicles and craft.

VII. Tides.

A. Importance in amphibious operations.

1. Both a vertical and horizontal change.
 - (a) Small vertical change may make a large horizontal change on a flat or gently sloping beach.
2. Influences time of landing.
 - (a) Generally preferable to land on flooding tide.

VIII. Natural Obstacles

A. Sand Bars

1. May cause craft to ground before reaching beach, or create a breaker line some distance offshore which will threaten small craft.
2. Frequently change position, build-up, or disappear as a result of any strong storm action.

B. Reefs.

1. Hamper, preclude, or channelize movement of personnel, amphibious vehicles or craft.
2. May set up a dangerous breaker line as bars.
3. Determine type of landing vehicles and craft to be used.

C. Rocks

1. In quantity limit inshore approaches, may make beach unsuitable for landing force.

D. Sea Weed.

1. Important only when in quantity sufficient to foul screws, tracks, and injection systems.

E. Ice.

1. Similiar effect as rocks, may require use of new or alternate techniques.

IX. Nature of the Bottom.

- A. Unfavorable effect of mud, potheles, soft sands, rocks, coral etc upon personnel, equipment, landing vehicles and craft will increase in direct proportion to the gentleness of the gradient.

X. Summary.

DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCEINTRODUCTION

- ▲. 75% of information obtained from overt sources.
- 15% obtained by clandestine methods.
- 5% by deduction.
- 75% as complete as possible.
- Last 5% only exists in mind of leaders.

COLLECTIONA. Peace

1. Liaison with friendly powers.
2. Governmental departments (other than Defense, i.e., State, Justice, Commerce, etc.).
3. Military attache' system.
4. Foreign press and radio.
5. American press (New York Times, Christian Science Monitor).
6. American Travellers from foreign countries.
7. American commercial firms.
8. Former residents of foreign countries.
9. Operating forces.
10. Various special missions (i.e., ECA, Military missions, UN Commissions, etc.).
11. Clandestine agencies.

B. War.

(Same sources are generally available; however, operating forces contribute an amount vastly greater than in peace time. In addition, the amount of information directly from enemy nations is greatly reduced. Neutral powers become more important.)

USESA. Peace.

1. Planning foreign policy on national levels.
2. Basis for military policy as an instrument of foreign policy in measures short of war.
3. Planning and preparing for possible war.
4. Building up backlog of available information for military forces in event of war.

B. War

1. Planning conduct of war and international policy at high levels.
2. Providing basic background information for operating forces.

IV. PRODUCTS USEFUL IN AMPHIBIOUS INTELLIGENCE

A. Primary.

1. National Intelligence Survey.
2. Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (being superceded by NIS)
3. Strategic Engineering Studies.
4. Port Studies.
5. Terrain Studies.
6. Theater Studies.
7. Handbooks of Enemy Armed Forces.

B. Secondary.

1. Monographs.
2. Maps.
3. Climatological Files.
4. Hydrographic Publications, such as:
 - a. Charts
 - b. Sailing directions
 - c. Tide and current tables
 - d. Nautical almanacs
 - e. Oceanographic studies
5. Atlases and gazeteers.
6. Photographs.
7. Special studies of all types.

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OF INFORMATION

I. INTRODUCTION.

- A. Collecting agencies are the means employed to gather information. Collecting agencies may be individuals, instrumentalities, or units that gather information by research, observation or survey, or by interrogation of a source.
- B. The source is the actual origin from which the information is obtained. The source may be an agency, person, thing, or action from which information is received.
- C. Collection can best be carried on in time of peace. During a war the number of available sources are greatly reduced. In general, the following is a breakdown of information coverage:
 - 75% of information is obtained from overt sources.
 - 15% is obtained from clandestine methods, and
 - 5% by deduction.
 - 95% is as complete as possible. The last
 - 5% exists in the mind of the leaders.

II. AMPHIBIOUS INTELLIGENCE IS OBTAINED FROM THREE TYPES OF SOURCES:

- A. Departmental--various established naval, military, and government agencies.
 - 1. Central Intelligence Agency - established to coordinate the governmental intelligence effort.
 - 2. Liaison with friendly powers.
 - 3. Governmental departments (other than Defense, i.e., State, Justice, Commerce, etc.)
 - 4. Mapping services.
 - 5. Foreign press and radio.
 - 6. American press (New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, National Geographic Magazine, etc.)
 - 7. American commercial firms (banks, insurance, oil, etc).
 - 8. Former residents of foreign countries.
 - 9. Operating forces.
 - 10. Various special missions (i.e., ECA, Military missions, UN commissions, etc.).
 - 11. Clandestine agencies.
 - 12. Department of Defense.
- B. Reconnaissance--physical sources.
 - 1. Aircraft - visual or photographic, for hydrography and terrain information.

2. Surface and subsurface vessels - visual and photographic, for hydrography, meteorology, general shore and off-shore conditions.
 3. Underwater demolition teams - hydrography and beach information.
 4. Amphibious reconnaissance patrols - terrain information, enemy strength, defense installations.
- C. Non-reconnaissance sources--sources of opportunity.
1. Prisoners of war.
 2. Captured documents and material--e.g., order of battle, etc.
 3. Civilian and refugee groups--corroboratory information.
 4. Communications intelligence units--analyze volume of traffic, codes.
 5. Coast watchers--ship and air traffic, enemy movements.
 6. Agents--all types of information, behind enemy lines.
 7. Technical teams and specialists--mine experts, engineers.
 8. Theater meteorological units--air, surface, subsurface.
 9. Hostile or neutral press and/or radio--must be corroborated by or in corroboration of other sources.
 10. YOU - "intelligence consciousness" of overt collection.

III. USES OF INTELLIGENCE.

A. Peace

1. Planning foreign policy on national levels.
2. Basis for military policy as an instrument of foreign policy in measures short of war.
3. Planning and preparing for possible war.
4. Building up backlog of available information for military forces in event of war.

B. War.

1. Strategic-planning conduct of war, and international policy at high levels.
2. Operational - basic background information for planning.

IV. PRODUCTS USEFUL IN AMPHIBIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

A. Primary.

1. National Intelligence Surveys.
2. Coast and Landing Beach Reports.
3. Strategic Engineering Studies
4. Port Studies.
5. Terrain Studies.
6. Theater Studies.
7. Handbook of Enemy Armed Forces.
8. Intelligence Periodicals.
9. Objective Folder Programs.

B. Secondary.

1. Monographs.
2. Maps.
3. Climatological Files.
4. Hydrographic Publications, such as:
 - a. Charts.
 - b. Sailing Directions.
 - c. Tide and Current tables.
 - d. Nautical almanacs.
 - e. Oceanographic Studies.
5. Atlases and gazeteers.
6. Photographs.
7. Special studies of all types.

AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE PATROLSGENERAL

In amphibious operations, as in conventional land warfare, it is necessary to utilize every possible agency to collect information needed by the commander. Lack of contact with the enemy during the planning phase of an operation necessarily limits positive means of obtaining information. Within the Joint Amphibious Task Force such positive means are limited to aerial or naval (surface and sub-surface), visual and photographic reconnaissance, and amphibious reconnaissance patrolling. The effectiveness of the former is sometimes greatly reduced because of poor weather conditions and/or thick vegetation in the objective area. Because of this enforced lack of information, it is sometimes necessary to rely almost entirely upon amphibious reconnaissance patrols for positive information.

HISTORICAL

In the early history of amphibious warfare, the amphibious reconnaissance patrol, as an aid to tactical planning for a contested landing was not widely employed. Brief mention has been made on our histories of attempts to gain knowledge of the enemy and terrain by means of such patrols, even as far back as Caesar's expeditions against the Britons. However, the extensive and successful use of the amphibious reconnaissance patrol awaited the advent of World War II. The technological development of the submarine, the rubber boat, radio communication, and radar, together with high-speed transports capable of covering great distances during the hours of darkness, made the physical reconnaissance of a defended shore a practical and necessary source of information for the amphibious operation. One of the first examples of a modern amphibious reconnaissance patrol was conducted in February 1940, during the annual Atlantic Fleet maneuvers. A patrol of four men was transported to the island of Vieques by submarine, went ashore and returned in a rubber boat. During the course of the patrol, they successfully located the defenses of the landing area without being detected by the defending forces.

For the purpose of studying and developing the technique of amphibious patrolling, the Observer Group, Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, was organized in January 1942. In September 1942, this group was transferred to the West Coast as an organic part of the Pacific Fleet and was organized into a three platoon reconnaissance company. In the course of further experiments and training in California, this unit not only perfected its technique but produced a training film (part of which you will see today) and trained two Army companies in amphibious patrolling. These two Army companies later performed successful missions in the Aleutians and led subsequent Army development in the field.

Initially, the Reconnaissance Company was regarded as a top-level instrument to be employed as a medium for obtaining intelligence information for the Pacific Fleet. However, it was soon discovered that the usefulness of this type of reconnaissance was such as to make almost continual employment of the unit desirable. As a result, the level of command was altered, expansion

followed, with the result that each of the two amphibious corps in the Pacific contained Reconnaissance Battalions, while each Marine division had its organic reconnaissance company, particularly trained for amphibious patrolling as well as for normal land warfare missions.

Such is the present organization of reconnaissance units within the Marine Corps, with the exception that the Reconnaissance Battalion is an integral part of and functions directly under the Fleet Marine Force Headquarters.

Within the Army, each infantry regiment contains an I & R (Intelligence and Reconnaissance) Platoon. This platoon is designed primarily for terrestrial reconnaissance on foot and by motor. However, it is also trained for amphibious landings so that it may be landed ahead of the main force to reconnoiter routes inland from the beachhead area and obtain such other information as is required.

Amphibious Reconnaissance Patrols were used fairly extensively during the past war, especially in the Pacific. During the Solomons campaign, the First Marine Amphibious Corps employed them with excellent results. In 1943, patrols were sent into New Georgia, Choiseul, Treasury, Shortland, and Bougainville Islands. In each case, the patrols returned with valuable information, having accomplished their mission without the loss of a single man. The First Marine Division used patrols during the Cape Gloucester campaign. The 5th Amphibious Corps employed them at Tinian, and the 3rd Corps at Okinawa.

These operations proved conclusively that when properly employed, the amphibious patrol can secure information of the enemy and terrain not otherwise available to the commander.

CONSIDERATIONS:

Experience has shown that the patrolling of small heavily garrisoned areas does not as a rule warrant the risk involved. By risk is meant that their detection may jeopardize the chance for strategic or tactical surprise in the prospective amphibious operation. In normal land warfare, patrol activity is expected, and only heavy or concentrated patrolling will tend to alert an enemy. In the conditions prevailing before an amphibious assault, the activity of one patrol, if detected, will alert the enemy. Therefore it follows that a patrol should only be given a mission where a reasonable chance of success exists. In small, heavily defended objective such as some of the Pacific Atolls, it would be practically impossible for the patrol to land, reconnoiter, and withdraw undetected.

Before the landing force is committed to action, amphibious patrols operate under attack force control. They must be transported to their target by special shipping (APD, ASSP, DD, DE), put ashore, and withdrawn, all under conditions requiring the greatest possible secrecy. Much detailed planning and training by both the naval element and the patrol is required to get the exact timing and coordination needed. In addition, the patrol will operate in an area completely strange to them. This will require considerable briefing and study of maps and photos or orient them, for they must find their way around at night in an area they have never seen, and still remain undetected.

The size of the patrol should be limited to the minimum number of men and boats capable of executing the mission. The patrol may include technical experts to obtain specific technical information; or possibly civilians or natives who are familiar with the area to act as guides. Only very highly trained men will be selected for an amphibious reconnaissance unit. Not only must all be highly trained scouts, but they must have the necessary technical training required to handle whatever special equipment selected for the operation. They must be in good physical condition and have the ability to handle themselves with ease in the water. Finally, and perhaps most important, members of an amphibious reconnaissance patrol must have sufficient military background and training to appreciate and comprehend the military significance of what they observe.

Their equipment will be basically that of a regular infantry night reconnaissance patrol, in other words, the minimum necessary, and nothing that shines or rattles. The mission may call for special equipment such as measuring instruments (anemometers, stadia rods, levels, chip logs, lead drags), cameras, communication equipment (radio, visual, infra-red, pyrotechnic, panels), weapons (carbines, pistols, knives, grenades, garrotes, saps, explosives, etc.). The equipment that can be taken is limited by their method of transportation to the beach, and the conditions under which they will operate.

MISSIONS

A. Amphibious Reconnaissance Patrols are landed on hostile shores prior to the main landing in order to accomplish any of the following missions:

1. Gather hydrographic data.
2. Study meteorological conditions.
3. Examine terrain.
4. Locate enemy installations.
5. Determine enemy strength.
6. Capture enemy prisoners.
7. Make demonstrations.

1. Gather Hydrographic Data.

- a. Depth of water along shoreline - Sketches to show one fathom line at different stages of the tide along approaches to the beach, and the distance from the water edge at which boats varying in draft would ground.
- b. Nature of the bottom - To a depth of one fathom at lowest water.
- c. Presence of underwater obstacles - Both natural and artificial, noting type and construction.
- d. Sea and surf conditions - Significant breaker height, wave length, breaker period, angle at which waves strike the beach; strength, speed, direction of currents and undertows; number of lines and type of breakers.

2. Study Meteorological Conditions.

- a. Direction of prevailing winds, prevalence of clouds, fog, mist, range of temperatures.

3. Examine Terrain.

a. Landing Beach.

- (1) Location, including geographic coordinates of beach, azimuth bearings and distances from beach to tactical objectives and major geographic features in the vicinity.
- (2) Landmarks which serve to identify the landing area with azimuths and distances.
- (3) Physical description of the Beach.
 - (a) Width and length at mean low water and mean high water at various places along the beach in yards.
 - (b) Portions of beach not suitable for landing operations.
 - (c) Nature of surface, stating soil composition, and practicality of traversing by infantry and vehicles.
 - (d) Possible use of beach for aircraft landing strip.
 - (e) Vegetation.
 - (f) Location, type, and extent of natural and artificial obstacles.
 - (g) Location of structural facilities available, particularly piers and jetties for unloading supplies.
 - (h) Routes of egress from the beach.

b. Immediate and adjacent beach terrain.

- (1) Cover and concealment - Direction and distance from water line to nearest point where cover and/or concealment can be obtained from hostile fire and observation.
- (2) Vegetation - Seasonal colors and type.
- (3) Landmarks - Identifying features with elevations and contours
- (4) Transport communications - Types, width, carrying capacity, drainage, and an analysis of ground surface in area adjacent to roads and trails.
- (5) Location of structural facilities available.
- (6) Location, type and extent of natural and artificial obstacles.

4. Locate Enemy Installations

- a. Obstacles in water or on shore.
- b. Beach defenses - Infantry weapons, artillery, AA, trenches, pillboxes, searchlights, underground shelters, troop concentrations.

5. Determine Enemy Strength

- a. Location, composition, disposition of enemy troops, aviation, naval strength.

6. Capture Enemy Prisoners.

7. Make Demonstrations.

a. To mae enemy disclose his strength and dispositons or carry out a deception.

SUBMARINE RECONNAISSANCE

1. Features of submarines, favoring reconnaissance missions.
 - a. Ability to submerge and therefore approach hostile territory undetected.
 - b. Seakeeping qualities, can ride out severe storms.
 - c. Extremely long cruising range.
2. Submarine Reconnaissance Missions.
 - a. Visual Reconnaissance
 - (1) Observation through periscope.
 - (2) Comments of observer are recorded.
 - b. Photographic Reconnaissance
 - (1) Still or movie shots.
 - c. Reconnaissance by landing party
 - (1) Landing and withdrawal of patrol.
 - (2) Land or pick up agents.
 - (3) Recover or rescue personnel.
 - d. Minefield Reconnaissance
 - (1) Detection, of mines and minefields by Sonar.
 - e. Radar Reconnaissance
 - (1) Detection, interception, location of enemy radar.
 - f. Weather Reconnaissance
 - (1) With meteorological personnel and equipment, subs can obtain meteorological data from critical points in enemy water.
 - g. Hydrographic Reconnaissance
 - (1) Locate and describe aids to navigation.
 - (2) Determine current and tide conditions.
 - (3) Discover errors in hydrographic charts.
 - (4) Determine thermal gradients offshore.
 - (5) Investigate and locate underwater obstacles (when UDT personnel accompany missions).
 - h. Scouting
 - (1) To detect and trail enemy fleet movements.

COMPHIBGROUPSIX - USS ELDORADO

URGENT

302115Z/87

2252KC-SECRET

FROM: USS SPEARFISH
TO: CTF 51

DRIL X THIS IS TOP SECRET X REPORT OF RECONNAISSANCE
NORTHWEST HARBOR SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND PAREN POSITION
THIRTY THREE DASH FOUR NORTH ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN
DASH THIRTY SEVEN WEST PAREN X SWELL FROM WEST X
HEIGHT EIGHTEEN INCHES X WAVE LENGTH SEVEN HUNDRED
FEET X PERIOD TWELVE SECONDS X WIND WESTERLY X FORCE
THREE X NO MINES OR MAN MADE OBSTACLES OBSERVED X
APPROACH AREA CLEAR X LOW FLAT ISLET RIGHT FLANK
BEACH X EXTENSIVE KELP HAZARDOUS TO DEEP DRAFT
VESSELS TO TWELVE FATHOM LINE X BOTTOM SANDY X
GOOD HOLDING GROUND X BEACH FLANK MARKED BY ROCK
CLIFFS X ROCK SCARP EXTENDS ACROSS BEACH X TWO
BREAKS IN CENTER X PHOTOGRAPHS TO BE FORWARDED
X DRILL X

TOR: 1134Z/26 AUG 49

302115Z/87

ACTION: INTELLIGENCE

WEATHER INFORMATIONI. INTRODUCTION

Weather affects every phase of modern warfare.

A. Unfavorable weather conditions may

1. Prevent an operation accomplishment
2. Reduce its effectiveness
3. Cause disorder

II. DEFINITIONS

A. Meteorological Information - Broad term used to designate the data required and the knowledge developed by a meteorological service for military purposes.

B. Aerology - Science of weather pertaining mainly to meteorological phenomena of the upper air. Term used in modern navy, however, to refer to the science of weather for any portion of military establishment.

C. Aerological Personnel (Aerologists - Aerographers Mates)

III. SOURCES OF WEATHER INFORMATION

- A. Aerological Units (Navy)
- B. Air Weather Service (Air Force)
- C. U. S. Weather Bureau
- D. Foreign civilian and military meteorological services
- E. International meteorological organizations

IV. METHODS OF GAINING WEATHER INFORMATION

A. Climatology - Analyzing by statistical methods data on a specific locality collected over a period of time to determine weather conditions during a given season, month or other period.

Climatological Study

Clouds	Temperatures	Flying Conditions
Precipitation	Tropical Storms	Tactical Consider-
Humidity	Sea & Swell Conditions	ations
Visibility	Surf	
Winds	Currents	

B. Synoptic Meteorology - Plotting simultaneous observations on weather maps, analyzing movements of pressure centers and frontal systems on these maps and arriving at day by day forecasts.

V. CAPABILITIES

- A. Climatology - Furnishes information as to means and extremes of weather on which to base military plans.
- B. Synoptic - Conditions significant to military operations may be forecasted for 24 to 36 hours in advance.

VI. AMPHIBIOUS AEROLOGY ORGANIZATION

- A. Part of the Intelligence Section for security reasons.
- B. Disseminates weather analysis thru Intelligence Annex to Operation Order.

VII. SUMMARY

V. CAPABILITIES

- A. Climatology - Furnishes information as to means and extremes of weather on which to base military plans.
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VII. SUMMARY

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

I-1

22 April 1952

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: WEATHER SUMMARY FOR MAY

1. Frontal passages are both rare and weak, and fog formation is at a minimum for the year. However, there is an increase in the incidence of low stratus clouds.
2. The stratus clouds normally occur in a rather definite cycle, with a period of morning and evening cloudiness followed by several days of clear skies and good flying weather. Occasionally low clouds or heavy haze will persist throughout the day, although usual dissipation time is within a few hours after sunrise.
3. Any given year may deviate from normal, but the attached analysis of conditions during the past 25 years should prove valuable for planning purposes.
4. SUMMARIZED WEATHER ELEMENTS FOR MAY:

PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.12
PRECIPITATION (% OF HRS)	1.9
AVG. AIR TEMPERATURE (F)	61.2
AVG. MAX TEMPERATURE (F)	66.1
AVG. MIN TEMPERATURE (F)	57.5
HIGHEST TEMPERATURE ON RECORD	88.0
LOWEST TEMPERATURE ON RECORD	48.0
RELATIVE HUMIDITY (%).....	63.7
PREVAILING WIND DIRECTION.....	WNW
AVG. WIND VELOCITY.....	7.3
FOG (DAYS OBSERVED).....	1.8
VISIBILITY LESS THAN 1100 YDS. (% OF TIME).....	1.0
VISIBILITY LESS THAN 2 ½ MILES (%).....	2.1
VISIBILITY 2 ½ TO 6 MILES (%).....	12.7
VISIBILITY 6 MILES OR MORE (%).....	84.2
CLEAR (% OF HRS).....	20.3
PARTLY CLOUDY (% OF HRS).....	20.9
CLOUDY (% OF HRS).....	58.8
CEILING 0-1000 FEET (% OF HRS).....	10.1
CEILING 1000-5000 FEET (% OF HRS).....	49.8
CEILING 5000-10000 % OF HRS).....	0.6
CEILING OVER 10000 FEET (% OF HRS).....	39.5
VFR FLYING CONDITIONS.....	91.7

BEACH INTELLIGENCE COURSE I-3

AEROLOGY IN THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

A. DEFINITIONS:

1. Aerology: The science pertaining to the meteorological phenomena of the upper atmosphere.
2. Meteorology: The study of the atmospheric phenomena and the changes that occur in the lower layers of the atmosphere.
3. Aerological Personnel: Those personnel specifically trained to observe, analyze and forecast the fluctuations or changes of weather elements and the state of the atmosphere.
 - a.
 - b.

B. ROLE OF AEROLOGIST:

1. Aerological Information

a. Climatology

- (1) information collected over a period of years
- (2) analyzed by statistical methods
- (3) summarized in various ways
 - (a)
 - (b)
 - (c)
 - (d)
- (4) useful for general planning
- (5) Studies require sufficient time to compile
- (6) sources of climatological information
 - (a)
 - (b)
 - (c)
 - (d)

b. Synoptic Meteorology

- (1) collection of reports
- (2) widespread network of reporting stations
- (3) regularly by rapid means
 - (a)
 - (b)
- (4) used for day to day forecasts.

C. WEATHER REPORTING AGENCIES

1. Naval Aerological Units
2. All commissioned Navy ships
3. USAF Air Weather Service
4. U. S. Weather Bureau
5. Foreign Civilian and Military Weather services
6. International Meteorological Organization
7. U. S. Coast Guard Ocean Station Vessels

D. CAPABILITIES OF AN AEROLOGIST

1. Reliable forecasts
 - a. surface and upper air
(1) 24 to 36 hours in advance
 - b. Oceanographic
(1) 48 to 60 hours in advance
2. Ballistic data
3. Radar Refraction Index data

E. LIMITATIONS

1. Accuracy, completeness and frequency of individual reports
 - a.
 - b.
 - c.
2. Availability of sufficient reports
 - a.
 - b.
 - c.
3. Individuals experience in the areas of interest
 - a.
 - b.

INTRODUCTION TO PHOTO INTERPRETATION

I. Introduction

- A. Sources of Intelligence
- B. Aerial Reconnaissance
 - 1. Photographic
 - 2. Visual
 - 3. Electronic
- C. Value of Photo Interpretation
 - 1. Bette example.

II. Basic Types of Aerial Photos

- A. Vertical
- B. High Oblique
- C. Low Oblique
- D. Sonne - Continuous strip
- E. Stereo - pair
 - 1. Stereoscope and 3 - dimensions

III. Use of Aerial Photos

- A. Make new maps
- B. Correct old maps
- C. Make MOSAICS
 - 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.
- D. Commercial applications
- E. Photographic interpretation

IV. Film: Navy Photography in Intelligence (20 min)

HISTORY OF PHOTO INTERPRETATION

- I. General Von Fritsch, Chief of the German General Staff,
(1938)
- II. P.I. relation to aerial photography
- III. History
 - A. France 1858
 - B. Civil War
 - C. Germany 1870
 - D. Germany 1911
 - E. World War 1
 - F. Between Wars
 - G. World War II
 - 1. Movie: Photo Interpretation Techniques
 - H. Korea.

BASIC OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE

Reference: PI Handbook

IDENTIFICATION OF OBJECTS

- I. Difficulties involved in identifying objects on Aerial Photographs.
 - A. Vertical View
 - B. Color
 - C. Scale
- II. Methods of Identifying objects on aerial photographs
 - A. Shape and Pattern
 - B. Relation to surrounding objects
 - C. Shadow
 - D. Size
 - E. Relative Tone

STEREOVISION

I. Introduction

II. Vertical Exaggeration

III. Stereovision Instruments

A. Unaided eyes.

B. Pocket stereoscope

C. Desk type stereoscope

D. Stereocomparagraph

E. Stereoplanigraph

STEREO VISION EXERCISE

Instructions: Identify the objects or terrain features numbered on the photos. Place a check mark in the space next to the correct answer.

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. ☒ Sloping field.
☐ Ridge top.
☒ Level valley bottom. | 12. ☒ Loose Consturction material.
☐ Garden.
☐ Auto park. |
| 2. ☐ Rangefinder.
☐ Lumber pile.
☒ Turntable. | 13. ☒ Cultivated field.
☐ Playfield or drill ground.
☐ Auto park. |
| 3. ☒ Lifeboats.
☐ LCVP's
☐ LCI's | 14. ☐ Valley.
☒ Ravine.
☐ Ridgetop. |
| 4. ☐ Breakwater.
☐ Pier.
☒ Low auto bridge. | 15. ☐ Dry river bed.
☒ Small pond or lake.
☒ River. |
| 5. ☐ Pontoons.
☐ Steel Beams.
☒ Lumber piles. | 16. ☐ Barn.
☐ Quonset hut.
☒ Hay stack. |
| 6. ☒ Probable fuel storage.
☐ Silo
☒ Probable water tower. | 17. ☐ Hanger.
☒ Farm.
☐ Military Camp. |
| 7. ☐ Radio Tower.
☒ Water Tower
☐ Prison guard lookout. | 18. ☐ RR intersection.
☒ Road bridging ravine.
☐ Stream crossing road. |
| 8. ☐ Flagpole.
☒ Radio tower.
☐ Telephone pole. | 19. ☐ Mud flats.
☒ Harvested field.
☒ Sand Dunes. |
| 9. ☒ Road intersection.
☐ Road-railroad intersection.
☐ River. | 20. ☒ Rifle range.
☐ Burned shelters.
☐ Reviewing stand. |
| 10. ☐ Ridgetop.
☐ Valley bottom.
☒ Flat land. | 21. ☐ Personnel bomb shelter.
☐ Buried fuel tank
☒ Probable ammunition storage. |
| 11. ☒ PT boat.
☐ LCM.
☐ PCE. | 22. ☒ Dune being leveled.
☐ Vehicle parking Zone
☐ Sand Pit. |

METHODS OF DETERMINING SCALES OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS

There are three important and simplified methods of determining scales of aerial photographs to be used successfully in photographic interpretation.

Many things such as lens distortion, unknown variations in altitude of the aircraft, tip and tilt of the aircraft, and dull poorly processed prints add to the difficulties in determining the scale of the photographs. However, these difficulties can be successfully overcome by simple methods which give accurate enough results in this work.

Method Number 1

The relation between the altitude of the aircraft and the focal length of the camera gives a ratio of the legs of similar triangles to determine a photographic scale.

Assuming the aircraft is flying at an accurately determined altitude and parallel to the earth's surface taking pictures with a camera of known focal length, a relation can be set up as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Scale of the Photo} &= \frac{\text{Focal length of the camera in inches}}{\text{Altitude of the aircraft in inches}} \\ &= \frac{\text{Focal length of the camera in inches}}{\text{Altitude of the aircraft in inches}} \\ &= \frac{12''}{21000 \times 12}\end{aligned}$$


Note: Now divide the numerator and the denominator by (12") to reduce the fraction to a ratio of simplest proportions.

$$\text{Scale of the Photo} = \frac{1}{21,000}$$

$$\text{Formula: } S = \frac{F. L.}{A \times 12}$$

Explanation of Scale:

1/21,000 means one unit of measurement on the photograph, map or chart is equal to 21,000 units of measurement on the ground.



Method Number 2

The second method is to use objects of known dimensions for a comparative method in determining the scale of photograph.

Such objects as football fields, baseball diamonds, tennis courts, railroad tracks, etc., can be used when their exact measurements are known. Following is a partial list which may be of assistance.

Football field (Collegiate)	360'	from goal to goal
(Professional)	300'	from goal to goal
Baseball diamond	90'	between bases
	62'	from pitcher's mound to plate
Tennis court	78'	from base to base
	36'	wide (doubles)
Railroad tracks (American ...)	4' 8"	
Cocconut trees	Usually 10 meters	between trees
	(390" or 32.5')	

Example:

Take a baseball diamond as an object of known dimensions. From ground information we know that the distance between bases is 90' and that the distance from the pitcher's mound to home plate is 62'.

$$\text{Scale of the Photo} = \frac{\text{Photo Distance}}{\text{Ground Distance}}$$

On the photo the distance between the mound and the plate is approximately .008'. By dividing 62 by 3 we arrive at a value for .001' of 20,666. By converting .001 to unity (1) we arrive at a scale of 1/20,666.

Whenever possible, however, it is advisable to use as long an object as possible (said object to appear on a single photo) as the accuracy of this method is limited by the accuracy with which the scale can be read in making a measurement.

Method Number 3

The third method and probably the most accurate, if you have a reliable map of the area, is the comparison of distances on the map to corresponding distances on the photograph.

Example:

Use the photograph and chart furnished you. Using the following formula, compute the scale of the photo.

$$\text{Scale of photo} = \frac{\text{Distance on photo} \times \text{Scale of map}}{\text{Distance on map}}$$

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF VARIOUS METHODS OF SCALE DETERMINATION

I. Method #1 ($S = F.L./A \times 12$)

A. Advantages

1. Speed in determination where measurement need not be to accurate.
2. Simple to compute.

B. Disadvantages

1. Variation in height of aircraft during flight.
 - (a) The aircraft may vary as much as several hundred feet and the entire sortie will be recorded as one continuous altitude.
2. Tip and tilt of the aircraft during a flight causes distortion.
 - (a) Tip is the variation of the long axis of the fuselage of the aircraft with the horizontal.
 - (b) Tilt is the variation of the short axis of the fuselage of the aircraft with the horizontal.

II. Method #2 (Ratio of Photo Distance to Ground Distance)

A. Advantages:

1. Useful when no other information is available to determine scale; and to check method #1

B. Disadvantages:

1. Distortion of the photographic causes inaccuracy in measurement. The nearer the center the object is, the more accurate the measurement will be.

III. Method #3 (Computing scale by ratio of a measured distance on a reliable chart to a measured distance on the Photo)

A. Advantages:

1. Very accurate method where the map or chart that is used is reliable and fairly recent.

B. Disadvantages:

1. Maps or charts of the same area on the photograph must be available.
2. Maps and charts of the area should be recent and accurate as possible.
3. Shorelines change with time and man made features are not permanent.

DISTORION CAUSED BY HEIGHT OF AIRCRAFT
TILT, AND MECHANICAL DIFFICULTIES

I. Variation of Heights

Maps and charts show the positions of objects as projected vertically upon a known datum, usually mean sea level.

A photograph shows the positions projected through a single point, namely, the lens. Since it rarely happens that perfectly level ground is encountered, it is evident that the effect of perspective will be present in aerial photographs due to ground relief. Thus elevations above a datum plane will be photographed on a larger scale and displaced radically away from the center.

II. Tilt

Tilt must be kept to an absolute minimum, especially in photographs of rough areas. There is a means of correcting for tilt that is used in aerial surveying and mapping work. This process is quite tedious and requires a VILD (pronounced VILT) machine or a multiplex projector type mechanism in determining accurate scales, distance, heights, and in contouring topography in tilted photographs.

Not only is this process tedious, but it is very expensive and the instruments are too large and bulky to be moved successfully from place to place.

Tilt of photographs can be kept to a minimum by the pilot, not to exceed 3 or 4 degrees. Therefore, in aerial photographic interpretation with no more degree of error than this, satisfactory results can be obtained for interpretation purposes.

III. Photographic and Mechanical Errors.

The errors caused by motion in the lens system and the irregular distortions of film and paper are minute and can be ignored in ordinary photographic interpretation work.

AMPHIBIOUS INTELLIGENCE COURSE (BASIC)

SCALE DETERMINATION (Practical Work)

1. The scale of a photograph is the ratio of _____ distance to _____ distance.
2. You have a group of photographs with the following factors known. Fill in the blanks.

<u>Focal length</u>	<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Scale</u>
12"	13,000'	_____
6"	_____	1:40,000
40"	20,000	_____
18"	_____	1:12,000

3. A MATORI Class Cruiser (535' long) photographed by a camera with a 6" Focal length measures .321" long on the photo. What is the scale of the photo and the altitude of the plane?
4. On a flight of photography over San Diego a professional baseball diamond is identified. The distance measured on the photograph between bases is .006'. What is the scale of photography?
5. You have been issued a vertical aerial photo and a map which covers the area photographed. What is the scale of the photograph?
6. The ground distance between points A and B on the photograph is arbitrarily established as 5000 yds. What is the scale of the photograph?
7. In the space provided, construct a graphic scale representing 5000' with 1000' divisions at a scale of 1/16,000.

CAPABILITIES OF PHOTO INTERPRETATION

I. Airfields.

- A. Type of airfield.
- B. Extent of use.
- C. Number and length of runways.
- D. Defensive installation.

II. Beach Studies.

- A. Dimensions and gradient.
- B. Physical consistency.
- C. Inland exits.
- D. Swell and surf conditions.

III. Depth Determination.

- A. Importance.
- B. Methods.
 - 1. Waterline.
 - 2. Color sounding.
 - 3. Shadow sounding.
 - 4. Stereoscopic methods.
 - 5. Wave methods.

IV. Flank Analysis.

- A. Number and size.
- B. Spacing and layout.
- C. Flight planning.

V. Military Defenses.

- A. Coast Defense.
 - 1. Obstacles.
 - 2. Gun batteries.
 - 3. Pillboxes.
- B. Field Artillery.
 - 1. Location.
 - 2. Size.
- C. Other Defenses.

VI. Military Maps.

- A. Photogrammetry.

VII. Industrial Studies.

1. Type of plant and product.
2. Power facilities.
3. Analysis of plant.
4. Production estimate.

VIII. Urban Analysis.

1. Residential areas.
2. Industrial areas.
3. Commercial areas.
4. Transportation facilities.
5. Military installations.

IX. Damage Assessment.

1. Per cent damage.
2. Effect on production.
3. Repairs.

X. Electronics.

1. Radio.
2. Radar.
3. D. F. and navigational aids.

XI. Naval and Merchant Shipping.

1. Identification.
2. Location.
3. Arrivals and departures.
4. New types.

XII. Ports.

- A. Ship building and repair facilities.
- B. Cargo handling.

XIII. Transportation.

- A. Railroads.
- B. Highways.
- C. Canals.

SECTION 4

DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

Introduction to Operation "AROP"

Historical Background

General Situation

Special Situation

Essential Elements of Information

First Requirement (EEI)

Solution to First Requirement

Second Requirement (Indications)

Solution to Second Requirement

Third Requirement (Specific Orders
and Requests)

Solution to Third Requirement

Summary

AGGRESSOR REPUBLIC PROBLEM (AROP)A. INTRODUCTION:

1. Operation "AROP" is an instructional vehicle used by the Intelligence School of the Naval Amphibious Training Unit to carry the instruction presented in the Basic Intelligence Course (I-1). The Tactical situation portrayed in this operation is purely fictitious and follows no pattern either historical or projected.

2. It is now the year 1960. The United States has been at war for about two years. Operation "AROP" concerns an amphibious-airborne assault against Southern France in an effort to destroy the Enemy in his homeland.

3. The enemy in Operation "AROP" is the Aggressor Republic. FM 30-101, FM 30-102, and FM 30-103 are the handbooks on the Aggressor Military Forces.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF OPERATION "AROP":

1. At the close of World War II in 1945, the chaotic conditions in Western Europe resulted in the rise of a new nation, the Aggressor Republic. This nation had its origin in Spain and very quickly established a firm grip on that country, as well as on Spanish Morocco, and started to infiltrate the north and east. A well planned propaganda program soon won them control over Southern France, Bavaria, and the Tyrol. Aggressor entered upon a well balanced and carefully controlled period of development and organization of all phases of national life and resources. The immediate goal of national unity and self sufficiency was attained.

2. The Armed Forces were rapidly expanded along sound lines. Disbanded troops of many nations flocked to the Aggressor Republic and formed the cadre for a large, well balanced, professional fighting force. Conscription was inaugurated to build up a large trained reserve.

3. In 1958, without a formal declaration of war, Aggressor sent armies into France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and Germany, occupying these countries within a period of two months after military operations commenced. Following these successful operations, Aggressor subjugated Italy, the Western Mediterranean Islands, and the Eastern Mediterranean nations, including Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece. Expansion of Aggressor's possessions in North Africa took place and Algeria, Tunisia, and French Morocco fell to her control. Aggressor built guided missile bases in North-Western France soon after its occupation and has been utilizing them to attack key areas in the United Kingdom. So effective were these attacks that the use of the UK area as a base for large scale counter-operations was, and continues to be, inadvisable.

4. The United States was drawn into the war shortly after Aggressor initiated military operations two years ago. Our forces are operating as a part of a United Nations effort against the Aggressor Republic.

5. Within sixteen months after entry into the war, United Nations Forces had secured and garrisoned strategic locations from which to launch

strikes at Aggressor from the air and over the water. Following these preliminary operations, an amphibious-airborne assault was made against the Iberian Peninsula, resulting in the establishment of the United Nations Forces along the lines of the Pyrenees in Northern Spain. Subsequent large scale operations opened up the Mediterranean except for the extreme eastern portion. These operations coupled with repeated bombings by Strategic Air Forces against key industrial and transportation facilities opened the way for an all out effort against Aggressor in Southern France, with a mission of destroying his Armed Forces and creating a democratic form of government.

C. GENERAL SITUATION:

1. The United Nations is at war with the Aggressor Republic. United Nations Forces have gained control of the Iberian Peninsula, North Africa, the Mediterranean Islands, and most of Italy. At the present time friendly forces are established along the line of the Pyrenees in Northern Spain and the Tiber River in Italy.

2. Aggressor remains in control of the European continent with the exception of Spain, Portugal, and most of Italy. Friendly bombings and underground activities are increasing and Aggressor is forced to employ large military formations throughout the area in order to prevent internal revolt. Aggressor does, however, have large ground forces on the continent and almost unlimited personnel replacements for his units. The efficiency of these units is somewhat retarded by equipment and fuel shortages, and by lack of mobility.

3. The United Nations Mediterranean Air Force and naval air of the United Nations Naval Forces, Mediterranean have attained air superiority, but Aggressor is capable of small scale air effort against selected targets.

4. The United Nations Joint Chiefs of Staff (UN-JCS) have directed COM UN FORCES to undertake the invasion of the Aggressor-held continent of Europe and the subsequent conduct of operations to destroy the Aggressor's Armed Forces.

5. The concept of the Commander, United Nations Forces, Mediterranean Theater provides for an amphibious-airborne assault in the St. Tropez-Frejus area of Southern France. D-day is tentatively set for 1 August 1960.

a. Fifth Fleet, from which all transports and supporting vessels are to be drawn, is composed of units from several of the United Nations. It consists of five battleships, six attack carriers, four heavy cruisers, ten light cruisers, 60 destroyers, and 16 submarines, as well as numerous auxiliaries.

6. The Theater Commander has made elements of the United States Fifth Fleet and the entire United States Seventh Corps available for the operation. For the airborne phase of the operation the United States 1st Airborne Division and the 62nd Troop Carrier Group, USAF have been designated as under JATF 51.

7. From the forces which have been made available, the Commander, Joint Amphibious Task Force 51 has decided to employ one Task Force for the amphibious phase and one Task Force for the airborne phase. The scheme of maneuver calls for the landing of the 2nd Infantry Division, followed by two additional Infantry Divisions and an Armored Division, when possible. The Amphibious Troops Reserve consists of the two additional Infantry Divisions. The Operation Plan of the Commander, JATF 51, assigns certain responsibilities to these forces under his command. The following are extracted from his directive.

* * *
"c. Amphibious Troops - At H-Hour, D-Day, by amphibious assault, land on designated beaches in St. Tropez-Frejus area in Southern France; seize Force Beach Head Line; clear enemy resistance in beach head; contact Airborne Task Force; and be prepared to continue attack to the north."

* * *
"e. Attack Force - Land and support the assault on Southern France on D-Day; Organize and conduct the overseas movement as directed in Annex (D), Movement Plan (Omitted); Control the landing of the Amphibious Force Reserve."

* * *
"g. Airborne Task Force - Land by parachute early morning of D-Day in LeMUY area; cut rail and highway communications; establish a defensive position and secure the airhead until juncture with Amphibious Forces; at time of linkup, control of Airborne Task Forces passes to Commanding General Seventh Corps."

* * *
h. All Troops of JATF 51 are located in the vicinity of Valencia Spain. Consequently the Commander Joint Amphibious Task Force has established his headquarters there. His staff, which includes officers from the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, has been functioning for the past two months. J-2 has prepared and issued his initial Estimate of the Enemy Situation to the staff for planning purposes. A copy of that Estimate dated 1 May 1960 has been issued to you.

BASIC OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (AMPHIBIOUS)

DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

References; (a) Intelligence Manual Command and General Staff College
 (b) ~~(ONLY-1)~~

I. INTRODUCTION

Direction is accomplished by:

- A. Determination of the EEI's
- B. Formulation of Collection Plan
- C. Issuance of Specific Directives and requests.

II. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- A. Definition
- B. Purpose
- C. Formation
 - 1. Responsibility of Commander
 - 2. Recommended by I.D.
- D. Form - question or directive
- E. Content

Generally refer to;

- 1. Enemy Capabilities
- 2.
- 3. Reinforcement of the Enemy
- 4.
- 5.
- 6. Natural or Artificial Obstacles
- 7. Answers to EEI's - Systematic search search for facts (Collection Plan)

III. COLLECTION PLAN

- A. Introduction
- B. Form
 - 1. EEI's
 - 2. Indications (Column 2)
 - a. Area of Operations
 - b. Enemy

IV. SPECIAL DIRECTIVES AND REQUESTS

- A. Column 3
- B. Column 4
- C. Column 5

PREPARATION OF THE COLLECTION PLAN

1. Purpose of Collection Planning - The essential elements of information having been announced, it is necessary that definite and precise instructions for obtaining the required information be given to the collecting agencies or that higher or adjacent headquarters be requested to furnish it. When definite items of information are required, it is necessary to plan systematically for their collection. To avoid any possibility of omission or conflict, the intelligence officer must follow a logical, orderly mental process in analyzing and transforming the essential elements of information into missions, in allotting the missions to collecting agencies, and in designating the time and place where the information is to be reported. This logical process constitutes intelligence planning. Such systematic planning insures that essential missions will not be overlooked and that conflicts and unnecessary duplications will be avoided.
2. Nature of the Collection Plan - The intelligence plan is prepared by working out a separate section for each essential element of information. Using a process of inductive logic, the intelligence officer begins each section by assuming that the enemy capability implied in the essential element considered therein has become an enemy course of action. He then visualizes the specific and detailed activities which the enemy would pursue if he were adopting that course of action. Each of these activities, if begun by the enemy, would provide the intelligence officer with "indications" that the enemy actually was adopting this course of action. These indications are specific items of positive or negative information which, taken as a group, answer or tend to answer the question implied by the essential element under consideration. Once the essential elements are thus broken down into groups of specific items of information, it is feasible to allot the tasks of searching for each item to appropriate collecting agencies. As an example, consider a situation in which our troops are occupying a defensive position, an enemy force is known to be in bivouac twenty-five miles to our front, and one of the essential elements relates to the enemy capability of enveloping our left flank. The envelopment of the left flank is taken as the result of a possible enemy course of action. The specific actions leading to such a result might be the forming of enemy columns on certain roads, the movement of such bodies toward suitable assembly areas or lines of departure off our left flank, detrucking the deployment of troops as such areas are approached, appropriate positioning of artillery establishment of a counterreconnaissance screen, and generally increased activity in the area. Search is accordingly instituted for these specific facts or "indications." If sufficient positive, or negative, information as to these individual indications is obtained, it will be known if the enemy can envelop our left flank. Thus the enemy capabilities are narrowed down.
3. Form of the Collection Plan - A standard form for use in intelligence planning, showing the steps necessary in the preparation of the plan, is attached. However, only under exceptional circumstances will the intelligence officer prepare a complete, detailed written plan. The press of time may demand that the plan be considered piecemeal or that only the salient steps be written.

4. Scope of Collection Plan - The scope of the intelligence plan depends upon the sphere of action of the commander for whom it is drawn. It will be subsequently modified to conform to new decisions made by the commander during the development of the situation. Planning is a continuous process. New items of information become essential. Changes occur in the indications of the line of action the enemy has adopted or is capable of adopting. Missions to collecting agencies and the time and place they are to report must be revised.

The intelligence officer may have to limit his intelligence plan to a rapid mental study. When time permits, he may jot down fragmentary notes, prepare an abbreviated plan or, rarely, write out a complete and detailed plan. However, either in one of the written forms or mentally, the intelligence officer must follow the logical thought processes of planning.

5. Steps in Preparing a Collection Plan - The plan should be devised for a specific phase of the operation or for a particular time interval. The period should not be so long as to require drastic changes in the essential elements of information before the termination, nor so short that numerous missions must be reassigned. The phase or period decided upon is entered at the top of the form.
- a. Essential Elements of Information - The next step is to enter in column 1 the essential elements of information, including those designated by higher headquarters, that are to govern in the projected operation or situation.
- b. Analysis of Essential Elements of Information for "Indications" - Next, each of the essential elements must be analyzed and broken down into the specific items of information which when obtained will furnish answers to questions involved in the essential element to which each relates. Certain essential elements will require very little analysis by the intelligence officer in order to transform them into suitable reconnaissance missions. If the information to be obtained gives a direct answer to the inquiry implied in an essential element, analysis is unnecessary. Others, however, must be subjected to careful analysis in order to determine what indications must be sought to answer the inquiries contained therein. For example, if an essential element relates to the capacity of a given bridge in enemy territory to support the passage of our own motor transport, analysis of the essential element is probably not required; all that is necessary is that those given this mission be familiar with the characteristics of our vehicles and with the applicable engineering principles. However, if the essential element relates to the ability of the enemy to hold his present defensive position, and if so, his possible dispositions; appropriate analysis might result in a more extensive list of indications, somewhat as follows:

- (1) Additional intrenching on present position or extension toward a named terrain feature.
- (2) Echelonment of artillery in depth behind position.

- (3) Strong occupation along present front.
- (4) Activity in a named area considered vital.
- (5) Persistent gas and demolitions on flanks.
- (6) Strength and location of reserves and tanks.
- (7) Enemy air activity; location of landing fields.
- (8) Location of hostile AA guns, searchlights, and areas especially protected.

The indications thus formulated should be written in column 2 opposite the essential element of which they refer.

All analysis of essential elements for indications must be made in the light of (1) an appreciation of the terrain and the use made of it by the opposing forces, including the enemy's probable knowledge of the organization and tactical and logistical methods of the enemy. Only thus can the resulting list of indications be a true reflector of enemy capabilities.

It is not practicable to make a list of indications which will apply to every essential element of information of a given type without modification. The details of how the enemy may carry out his capabilities will be different in each situation. For instructional purposes, however, it is possible to make a list of indications which will point out in a general way that the enemy may attack, defend, be reinforced, withdraw, etc. Precis I-1/36 is a list of such indications. It is not suitable even as a guide under campaign conditions unless the intelligence officer further determines which of the basic indications apply to the situation with which he is dealing, what other important indications exist, and the extent of revision necessitated by differences in enemy methods.

- c. Designation of Collecting agencies - Knowing what detailed information is required, the intelligence officer must now plan how he will collect it. He therefore considers the capabilities and limitations of the reconnaissance agencies available and tentatively assigns specific unit to search for specific items of information concerning each indication. Some information can best be obtained by units in contact with the enemy; some by observation posts; some by intelligence personnel detail to accompany reconnaissance or security detachments, patrols, or raiding parties; some can be obtained only by aviation or other agencies of higher headquarters. When practicable, more than one agency should be assigned a mission relating to the same indication, thus assuring verification of reports and positive information even though circumstances, such as enemy action, prevent one agency from obtaining the desired information. Each agency may be assigned more than one item upon which to collect information. To utilize properly the available collecting agencies, the intelligence officer must be thoroughly conversant with their characteristics, their methods of operation, other assignments given them, etc. Close cooperation with the operations officer is necessary in this respect. Assignment of tasks must be reasonable; no agency should be assigned missions in excess of its means. The selections and assignments of agencies, including those on which requests are made, are placed in column 3 opposite each indication to which they refer.

- d. Specific Orders or Requests - Having analyzed the essential elements of information, recorded the indications, and determined which agencies are to search for which items of information, the intelligence officer next sets down in column 4 opposite the agency to which they refer as listed in the previous column, the basis for these specific orders for the collecting agencies and the request to be made on higher or adjacent units. Each is given specific and definite missions in accordance with its characteristics and limitations. It is frequently the case that several agencies may be utilized in establishing one definite fact bearing on an essential element.

The finished will specify what information the agency is to get and where to get it. If the intelligence officer considers that raids, patrols, or reconnaissance by subordinate units is necessary, he so recommends to his commander through the operations officer. If his recommendations are approved, he prepares or assists in preparing the necessary orders. Information not obtainable by agencies under local command may frequently be obtained from higher headquarters. The intelligence officer formulates requests for such information, specifying the exact information wanted.

- e. Hour and Destination of Information - Indicate in column 5 for each order or request the time it is desired that information obtained be turned in, and the method or channels by which it is to be transmitted. In the case of continuing reconnaissance missions, the time intervals of reporting should be stated.

The intelligence officer must so arrange his plan of collecting information that it will arrive when needed. From a knowledge of the plan of operations gained by close cooperation with the operations officer, he can determine when and where essential information must be reported in order to be of use to the commander. The intelligence officer is guided by the principle that information arriving too late is of no value, and information arriving in advance of its actual need is likely to be inaccurate at the time projected operations are undertaken. It must be emphasized that the crucial time for which information is to be gathered is the time at which our own operations are to be executed, not the time at which operations are planned. A commander's plan must be based upon what may be true at the time that plan is to be executed. It is nevertheless true that information must be available early enough to be considered in planning. These factors, exerting influences in opposite directions, make necessary keen judgment by the intelligence officer in timing the collection of information and point to the need for a constant flow of information, thus emphasizing the continuous nature of the cycle of the development of combat intelligence.

Requirements by the intelligence officer as to time and method of reporting must be adjusted to the nature of the assigned mission, number of men or mechanical devices available for dispatching of reports, and other circumstances bearing upon the capacity of the collecting agency to submit prompt reports. Care must be exercised in assigning missions to insure that sufficient time is allowed for the proper performance of the mission. Special restraint must be exercised in demanding periodic reports of combat units.

6. Issuing Instructions to Collecting Agencies - When completed, the collection plan forms the basis for instructions to all collecting agencies. The intelligence officer combines in one communication to each agency all missions assigned to it. Each mission should be specific as to what information is wanted, where it is to be sought, and when, where, and how it is to be reported back. The "when" is necessary so that information will be reported in time to be of value. "Where" is necessary in the event that the command post is moved, or if a report is to be made in an appropriate situation, to a subordinate commander. An example would be to notify the commander of the covering force concerning the approach of enemy forces toward his position. Instructions to collecting agencies are prepared in the name of the commander, approved by his representative, and their transmission follows normal command channels. In urgent cases, however, both the instructions and the report of information in response thereto may be sent direct. Though missions are to be assigned clearly and definitely, the intelligence officer should not, in the ordinary situation, tell the subordinate agency how to accomplish the mission.

(For study by students prior to class)

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

(Outline)

1. SCOPE. Definitions; discussion of the formulation and content of the essential elements of information.
2. INTRODUCTION. a. The essential elements of information (EEI) consist of that information of an enemy force, of the terrain not under our control, or of meteorological conditions which a commander needs in order to make a sound decision, conduct a maneuver, avoid surprise, or formulate details of a plan operations.

b. The essential elements of information (EEI) are the basis for assigning missions and requests to collecting agencies, and constitute the authority in the unit for engaging in a specific intelligence activity.
3. GENERAL. a. In order to formulate an intelligence estimate including a statement of the enemy capabilities in a situation, the intelligence officer directs his efforts towards collecting the necessary information. After such an estimate is made, he may seek further information as to the relative probability of adoption of these capabilities. Therefore, the EEI will include considerations of:
 - (1) The enemy capabilities in detail which will affect our operations; to include the general capabilities of attack, defense, withdrawal and reinforcement, with the factors of time, place and strength.
 - (a) Strength, equipment, location, disposition, organization and movements of the enemy forces.
 - (b) Tactics, logistics, habits, and general nature of the enemy forces.
 - (2) Terrain. (a) Any of the factors of terrain that affect military operations; fields of fire, lines of communication, cover and concealment, natural and artificial obstacles, and observation.
 - (b) General conformation of the ground; compartmentation defiles, and critical terrain features.
 - (c) Surface conditions.
 - (3) Weather.
 - (4) Information desired by lower, higher, or adjacent units.
b. The questions or statements which make up the EEI, stimulate a search for information which, if found, will answer them. This information will then provide the factors which were unknown at the time the original estimate was made.
4. RESPONSIBILITY. a. Since the commander is responsible for the establishment of his intelligence system, he is responsible for the designation of the essential elements of information which guide, direct, and provide authority for the collection of information.

- b. The intelligence officer assists the commander in the determination of EEI.
- c. The intelligence officer should be prepared at all times to recommend EEI to the commander and to give the important considerations as to the reasons for their selection.
- d. As the operation progresses, different information or more detailed information on the same subjects may be desired. These requirements are expressed in new EEI. Each new intelligence estimate will in turn call for a reconsideration of EEI as a part of the continuous intelligence process.

5. DISSEMINATION. EEI may be announced as questions or statements.

- a. In the intelligence annex to the operation order.
- b. In paragraph 3x of the operation order.

Examples: Will the enemy attack? If so, where, when, and in what strength? or; Determine if the enemy will attack, when where, and in what strength.

- c. As informal questions or statements which may be suggested or asked in conference with the commander or others concerned. Example:
"Say, G-2, I'd like to know if YAMAMOTO is going to give us a banzai across the SAN JUAN River tonight."

6. OTHER ENEMY INFORMATION. Collecting agencies will transmit all enemy information which is acquired in addition to that which is collected under the guidance of the essential elements of information. The announced EEI do not act to limit the scope of collecting agencies. Standing operating procedures may include long range essential elements of information of wide scope.

7. DOMESTIC SITUATIONS. a. In domestic situations, when dealing with subversive elements, the information required is similar to that needed in combat operations, but differs in the manner of approach. The capabilities of any opposing force will be considered. The following additional types of information may be required:

- (1) Information as to organization, strength, nature and objectives of subversive elements.
- (2) Information regarding agents, key personalities, operatives, sympathizers, and innocent assistants, and methods of operation of subversive elements capable of acts inimical to the interests of the United States.
- (3) Information regarding installations, headquarters, "drops", Communications systems, supply systems.
- (4) Information regarding the nature and trend of propaganda activities.
- (5) Information concerning the attitude of the civil population.

b. In domestic situations, when dealing with disturbances, the required information may be both that concerning combat situations and that concerning subversion. The possibility that a subversive element is the causative agent in a domestic disturbance must always be considered.

c. The combat nature of riots and insurrections indicates that EEI dealing with combat intelligence are appropriate.

8. CONCLUSION. The essential elements of information are designated for the purpose of focusing the attention and activities of all collecting agencies on the information which is necessary at a particular time, and providing authority for the collection of this information,

9. REFERENCES. a. FM 30-5, pars 16b, 17, 18.

b. Periodicals. "The Essential Elements of Information and the Intelligence Plan", Colonel H. D. Kehm, Military Review, June 1946.

I-1/
I-2/

THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION AND THE
INTELLIGENCE PLAN

COLONEL H. D. KEHM, Field Artillery
Instructor, Command and General Staff School

(Taken from "Military Review", June 1946)

"Many commanders and staff officers who participated in long and arduous campaigns and never saw essential elements of information (EEI) or an intelligence plan as outlined in our field manuals are quite skeptical when yards of EEI and reams of intelligence plan* are found regularly in schools and unit training.

Since this feeling is more or less widespread we should re-examine our doctrines and their application to see if something has deteriorated.

First, we should inquire why we have EEI and an intelligence plan.* (The only reason for their existence is to produce intelligence instructions or missions which should supply the information needed without any unnecessary duplication of effort. The EEI state the intelligence needs in broad general terms. The intelligence plan* is the process by which these needs are analyzed and converted into specific information-gathering jobs or missions.

If this is true why don't we see EEI more frequently? The answer is based on the fundamental nature of intelligence activity. It is a constantly developing moving picture in which blanks must be filled while the scene is changing. By frequent, at least daily, contact with G-2 and with subordinate and higher commanders and through his own observations the commander maintains a running picture of the capabilities of his enemy. Furthermore, a good commander and G-2 are always fighting the battle or phase ahead of the one in progress or about to get underway. For these two reasons, novelties or variations in intelligence requirements are constantly arising.) As they came up, G-2 promptly transforms them into missions, often without asking the commander to authorize any formal announcement of EEI.

If new intelligence missions are continuously being given it is clear that they must replace, supplement, or modify those previously assigned. The intelligence plan unlike most other plans, is not a set piece that is started and played out like a tactical operation such as an assault on a hostile shore or an air attack on an enemy airdrome. The intelligence plan results in instructions to various agencies to do specific things. These are usually physically independent of each other. Some are completed quickly, others take considerable time. Hence, as the operation progresses, certain of these missions are no longer possible, certain others can no longer yield valuable information, and still others are fully accomplished. At the same time new missions arise because new enemy capabilities (or modifications of former ones) have arisen.

(The intelligence picture develops continuously to meet the needs of new phases of the operation. There is seldom the need for preparing a complete new plan at any particular time. Intelligence presents a moving picture - not a series of "stills".)

(If this is true, why don't we scrap the plan conception? There are two good reasons for keeping it. First, it outlines a logical process through which one

must go if he wishes to insure the greatest chance that all possible indications of prospective enemy action will be sought. Second, it is the best insurance against issuing conflicting and duplicating instructions which will "harass the troops". This process of analyzing intelligence requirements to produce logical missions should be followed whether a single EEI or a dozen are under consideration. The process does not have to take place on paper. That always helps. However, a skillful and experienced G-2 can do the process mentally and put only the results on paper.)

Our training is often misleading too because it cannot present what constitutes SOP. We usually ask the Nth Infantry to report any change in the enemy strength on its front. Yet we know that if the Nth Infantry had enough training to get to the battle field they will report such a fact as a matter of routine. Units ordinarily report certain classes of information, e.g., any strengthening of the enemy facing them, without specific orders. Just what these are is difficult to portray in most exercises and problems. This does work itself out in operations, but even then in no two cases does it work out exactly the same way. Our training, quite properly, is on the conservative side.

We note that our doctrine in respect to EEI and the intelligence plan* is sound. It needs more thoughtful application.

Our training and instruction can assist this "more thoughtful application" by placing more emphasis on the following:

First, by frequent - usually informal - conferences the commander and G-2 are continuously determining new EEI or modifying existing ones.

Second, an alert intelligence section by formal or informal action quickly transforms EEI into new intelligence missions or modifications of existing ones. These new or modified instructions are disseminated formally or informally as soon as they are prepared. The original intelligence plan* is therefore usually patched and altered so that it gradually grows into a new one instead of being replaced in its entirety.

Third, the formal announcement of EEI and the resulting working out of a detailed intelligence plan* is the safest procedure when a complete change in nature or scene of action takes place. This occurs when, for example, a unit moves from one front to another or, when it passes from the static defense to the offensive or when it is earmarked for a special operation such as a landing on a distant hostile shore. In the "normal" progressive operation, the gradual evolution described above is more appropriate.

How can we train in these points?

First, we can train in informal briefings and conferences, a subject in which our training has been weak generally - not only so far as concerns intelligence. We can do this by presenting situations such as: You are G-2 you know what has happened since the last formal report. The Commanding General has just returned from a visit to one of the subordinate commands. You have a chance to speak with him for a few minutes. Required: the topics you will discuss.

Tell him what you've learned. Suggest any new EEI or intelligence missions and get his views on them.

Situations of this general nature readily suggest themselves. Conversations can and should frequently be staged in training.

Second, each unit should set up a limited number of specific items of intelligence and information which are always reported when discovered. Similarly, lists of standard information always sought by intelligence agencies, such as PI (Photo Interpretation), IPW (Interrogation of Prisoners of War), and documents personnel should be prepared. These might very well be included in the SOP of the unit. They should be kept to such a minimum that they can be memorized easily and used without reference to any paper. Such a list will result in reducing the work in preparing an intelligence plan* and will decrease the number of instructions which need to be issued. What is more important, it will serve as a device for focusing effort and attention on basic intelligence essentials.

Third, we should put less time in working out complete intelligence plans* and more on practice in modifying and developing an existing one by the introduction of new or modified EEI in accordance with a developing situation. Such training will put an intelligence section on the alert and will emphasize the need for anticipatory planning. It will also drive home the conception that intelligence missions are something that must be constantly reviewed to keep them in harmony with events and needs.

Fourth, as training progresses there should be frequent practice in which the step is directly from new enemy capability to intelligence instructions."

Note: * The term Intelligence Plan as used here is synonymous with Collection Plan which has been adopted as a more descriptive term to describe the functions of the plan.)

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

CLASSIFIED (Problem only)

1200 Hours, 1 May 1960
 Fifth Fleet
 Joint Amphibious Task Force 51
 Valencia, Spain

CHARTS AND MAPS:

EASTERN FRANCE 1:50,000, Shts XXXV-44; XXXV-45; XXXIV-44; XXIV-45

SPECIAL MAP, EUROPE, 1:1,000,000

1. MISSION:

This force will seize by amphibious-airborne assault a beachhead in the ST. TROPEZ-FREJUS area of SOUTHERN FRANCE at H-Hour, on D-Day in order to provide a base for future land operations against AGGRESSOR.

2. GENERAL SITUATION:

a. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATION

(1) METEOROLOGY

(a) Rainfall. Generally dry, however showers fall occasionally. Average precipitation near the coast is an inch for each of the summer months. Thunderstorms accompanied by hail may occur between 1200 and 2000 hours occasionally. Altitude temperature decrease at the rate of 3°F per 1,000 feet of rise. The general temperature for most of the mid-summer is 73° to 75°F. Night temperatures are about 60° F near the coast and 55° inland. Visibility of approximately 7 miles will prevail 9 out of 10 days during the summer. Haze due to dry season dust does not cut down visibility, but does blur outlines. Winds are primarily the northwesterly "Mistral" and southeasterly "Marin". East of TOULON the winds have a slightly greater east-west trend. The RHONE VALLEY funnels wind into a north-south wind. The dry Mistral wind, which blows on an average of 1 day in 10 during July and August, brings cool weather and raises clouds of dust; it has an average velocity of 23mph. The Marin wind is warm and moist and usually causes heavy dew during periods of clear weather.

(b) Tactical effect on enemy capabilities. The generally good visibility, dry weather, and moderate temperatures will afford both the enemy and the attack force good observation, excellent cross-country trafficability, and full use of aircraft. The Mistral winds, which are sometimes encountered, will sharply decrease observation. It will also cause the attack force difficulty in landing small craft during the assault phase.

CLASSIFIED (Problem only)

(2) HYDROGRAPHIC, OCEANOGRAPHY, AND AIDS TO NAVIGATION

(a) Hydrography

- i. The tidal range is one foot and currents are negligible.
- ii. The hydrography of the area has no significant affect on enemy capabilities.
- iii. Tidal range of one foot and negligible currents will favor our assault on the beaches.

(b) Beaches

The beaches appear to be regular approximately 100 to 200 yards wide and sufficiently long for our assault. Much more information is needed before an evaluation of the beaches can be made.

(3) TOPOGRAPHY

- (a) The southern coast of France consists of low mountains, generally of hard rock or stony soil. The ST. RAPHAEL corridor on the right portion of the landing area is the notable exception. This land is flat and consists of sandy soil. The area is generally under cultivation for early spring vegetables and vineyards. The road net is adequate for both forces.
- (b) Terrain now held by Aggressor favors defense in his present position.
- (c) The terrain does not favor our attack initially. We will be fighting up hill with Aggressor holding superior observation.

(4) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION

- (a) The road and rail network is well developed and facilitates movement by ground troops of the Force which has control over them.
- (b) Initially this advantage will favor the defence until such time as the attackers seize and organize the FBHL for defense.

(5) SOCIOLOGY - See Appendix #1 (Omitted)

(6) POLITICS - See Appendix #2 (Omitted)

(7) ECONOMICS - See Appendix #3 (Omitted)

(8) MEDICAL - See Appendix #4 (Omitted)

(9) OTHER ITEMS AS APPLICABLE - See Appendix #5 (Omitted)

ENEMY SITUATION:

(1) LOCATION, (2) STRENGTH, (3) COMPOSITION, and (4) DISPOSITION or DEPLOYMENT.

(a) Sea Forces

- i. Large Operational Units - Aggressor Naval Forces have been badly beaten and practically eliminated. A small Aggressor surface force consisting of 1 BB, 2 CV's, 3 CA's, 20 DD's, exists in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is based in SALONIKA, GREECE, and to date has not operated west of CRETE.
- ii. Small Surface Units - The ports of MARSEILLE and FREJUS may be bases for motor torpedo boats equipped with atomic torpedos.
- iii. Sub Surface Units - An estimated 30 submarines of the short-range coastal type are based in Aggressor held ports in the Western Mediterranean.

(b) Air Forces

The airfield at FREJUS has one fighter regiment. A bomber division is located at BOURGES. Fighters have been active in the vicinity of key industrial areas in Aggressor Republic and G/A aircraft is used frequently in the battle lines of the PYRENEES and in ITALY.

(c) Ground Forces

The SAN TROPEZ-FREJUS area of SOUTHERN FRANCE is defended by an estimated infantry regiment, supported by an artillery battalion, a 40mm AA battery, a detachment of Limited Service personnel manning each pillbox and miscellaneous Service Troops. The location of known defensive installations is indicated on Annex A (Situation Overlay). There are no known reinforcements locally available to the defender. The quartels at Milan are at present occupied by the XII Armored Corps. This corps is presently composed of the 22nd Mechanized, the 42nd and 50th Tank Division, supported by the 33rd Airforce ground attack division.

(5) COMBAT EFFICIENCY

a. Sea Forces

Unknown

b. Air Forces

Unknown

c. Ground Forces

Unknown

(6) CURRENT OPERATIONS

a. Sea Forces

Enemy heavy surface units have not as yet ventured west of the Island of CRETE, while light surface units are engaged in training activity in the area of the objective. Submarines have not as yet been particularly active.

b. Air Forces

The Aggressor Air Force to date has been training, maintenance, and air defense activities in the SOUTHERN FRANCE AREA.

c. Ground Forces

Enemy units in the objective area are engaged in the construction of field fortification and of permanent works

(7) LOGISTICS

Unknown

(8) REINFORCEMENTS

Unknown

(9) TIME AND DISTANCE FACTORS - (Omitted)

(10) STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS FACTORS - (See subparagraph 3(b))

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

(a) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) Attack this force, enroute to, or while in the objective area, with as many as 30 submarines.
- (2) Attack this force with a force of motor torpedo boats when within 100 miles of the objective; or with a carrier striking force composed of 2 CV's and necessary supporting vessels at any time during the operation.

- (3) Attack this force with an unknown number of medium bombers at any time and with 42 jet fighters when within 300 miles of the objective or any time after that.
 - (4) Attack this force with atomic bombs, torpedoes or artillery when within range of aircraft, submarines, torpedo boats and artillery respectively.
 - (5) Mine the approaches to the landing beaches at any time before D-Day.
 - (6) Defend beaches with forces initially available, retaining unengaged forces for defense of their present areas.
 - (7) Defend beaches with forces initially available and reinforce with troops presently defending the remainder of the coast.
 - (8) Reinforce present beach defenses with troops from Milan or the battle lines of ITALY or the PYRENEES.
- (b) ANALYSIS OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION (In order of probable adoption).
- (1) Sub Attack - this is almost a certainty. The enemy is known to have 30 submarines in the area and is sure to employ them to the utmost in the last ditch defense of the homeland. While it is believed that it will be difficult for Aggressor to keep all 30 subs operational, a minimum of 20 can be expected to be used.
 - (2) Surface Attack - The use of motor torpedo boats has been anticipated for some time. There is no accurate estimate of the number available, however. Aggressor is known to be building these boats at MARSEILLE and FREJUS for a last ditch stand. The remnants of Aggressor's naval force based at Salonika, has not been used west of CRETE; however, the capability exists and every effort should be made to maintain constant reconnaissance on this force.
 - (3) Air Attack - It is considered certain that the enemy will attack this force with all available aircraft. The operations of Fast Carrier Forces and the USAF against his known airfields should be a positive deterrent and should considerably reduce the number of planes available to him.
 - (4) Atomic Attack - The enemy is known to have these weapons available and the possibility of their use is great inasmuch as Martin BORMANN, member of the Trinity, has indicated that all measures would be used to defend the homeland.
 - (5) Mines - There is a definite possibility that atomic as well as conventional mines will be used where possible. The coastline of SOUTHERN FRANCE is known to be sown with deliberate minefields and the use of air and submarine forces to plant mines can be expected.

- (6) This capability seems likely until the enemy determines the extent of our initial landing at which time he will undoubtedly adopt another capability.
- (7) This capability will probably be adopted after the enemy definitely locates the landing area; however, he may retain a majority of his forces in position since he cannot be sure that another landing will be made.
- (8) This capability will undoubtedly be adopted when the extent of our landing is known. The XII Armored Corps is highly mobile and could be moved rapidly; however, our air should be able to effectively block any movement via GRENABLE and air and naval forces combined could prevent movement along the coast from GENOA. Movement of troops from the battle lines of the PYRENEES or ITALY is improbable.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

(a) Capabilities in order of relative probability of adoption.

- (1) Submarine Attack
- (2) Surface Attack
- (3) Air Attack
- (4) Atomic Attack
- (5) Mine Approaches
- (6) Defend Beaches with forces in position
- (7) Defend beaches with forces initially available and reinforce with remainder of coastal defence forces.
- (8) Reinforce defenses with troops from outside combat zone.

(b) Effect of Enemy courses of action on our mission.

- (1) A submarine attack may interfere with but will not prevent the accomplishment of our mission.
- (2) A surface attack will delay and possibly prevent the accomplishment of our mission if the enemy chooses to employ all available forces in a desperation attempt to stop our movement.
- (3) An air attack will interfere with but will not prevent the accomplishment of our mission.
- (4) An atomic attack will delay and possibly prevent the accomplishment of our mission.
- (5) Mining the approaches and routes to the objective area will interfere with but not prevent the accomplishment of our mission.
- (6) A defense with forces available only will favor accomplishment of our mission.
- (7) A defense with forces available and a reinforcement with troops defending the remainder of the coast will interfere with but will not prevent the accomplishment of our mission.
- (8) Reinforcement of defending forces with troops from the hinterland will interfere with and possibly prevent the accomplishment of our mission.

D. PRACTICAL WORK

1. FIRST REQUIREMENT:

SPECIAL SITUATION - a. It is now 3 May 1960. You have been assigned to the J-2 section of the Staff, Commander, Joint Amphibious Task Force 51.

2. Based on the Estimate of the Enemy Situation, write the Essential Elements of Information for submission to the Commander, JATF 51.

3. SECOND REQUIREMENT:

Analyze the EEI for Indications. (Use Solution to First Requirement as a basis from which to work).

4. AGENCIES AVAILABLE

The following is a list of the agencies available to the Intelligence Section of the Commander, JATF:

a. ORGANIC

- (1) Underwater Demolition Teams, ^{PATROL}
- (2) Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, FMF
- (3) Covering Force
- (4) Advance Force
- (5) Attack Force
- (6) Demonstration Force
- (7) Landing Force

Each division of the landing force has the following agencies organically assigned. These teams would be utilized to the utmost; however, they are not capable of given much information in the planning phase.

- (a) Photo Interpreter Teams
- (b) Order of Battle Teams
- (c) Military Interpreter Teams
- (d) Translator Teams

b. NON-ORGANIC

- (1) N-2 Fifth Fleet (N-2 TNP)
- (2) Fleet Weather Control, ORAN
- (3) Patrol Wing Mediterranean
- (4) XII Tactical Air Force
- (5) Commander Submarines Mediterranean

c. DEPARTMENTAL

(Through N-2, Fifth Fleet)

Available through command channels, except for those items of such a general nature as to be issued by the Departments as a matter of routine.

- (1) Office of Naval Intelligence
- (2) Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
- (3) Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-2

5. THIRD REQUIREMENT:

Write the Basis for Specific Orders and/or Requests that you intend to send to the various Collection Agencies. (Use Solution to the Second Requirement as the material upon which to base work).

SECTION 5

PROCESSING INFORMATION INTO INTELLIGENCE

Recording of Information

Fourth Requirement (Recording)

Solution to Fourth Requirement

Evaluation

Fifth Requirement (Evaluation)

Solution to Fifth Requirement

Interpretation

Sixth Requirement (Interpretation)

Solution to Sixth Requirement

Seventh Requirement (Recording, Evaluation,
Interpretation)

Solution to Seventh Requirement

Summary

RECORDING

GENERAL.-a. Incoming information is examined by the intelligence officer on duty for items of immediate tactical importance before any recording is done. On these items he takes the necessary action promptly by appropriate means, after which the information must be systematically arranged, sorted, grouped, and listed by subjects, so that items of the same kind may be kept together for convenience of comparison, study, and reporting. From the standpoint of operational intelligence, there are four general devices by means of which the mechanics of recording are accomplished:

- (1) Intelligence Journal.
- (2) Enemy Situation Map.
- (3) Intelligence Work Sheet.
- (4) Intelligence Files.

These devices are necessary in the preparation of intelligence reports and serve as a convenient means of reference for the commander and for members of his staff. However, the intelligence officer of every unit must adapt procedure to the needs of his unit. Simplification of method will be necessary in all units of the more mobile arms. An intelligence officer must not allow himself to be engulfed in a mass of paper work. In all situations the maintenance of records must be subordinate to the mission of assembling and interpreting information and producing and utilizing intelligence. That is, a system of processing should be as simple as possible. Action comes first; records are of secondary importance.

INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL.-a. The intelligence journal is the daybook of the intelligence section. It is kept by the intelligence section of each unit. The journal contains briefs of important written and oral messages received and sent, as well as notations of periodic reports, orders, records of important conferences, and similar matters pertaining directly to the intelligence section. The journal is an official permanent record of activities. It should be looked upon as the primary record of operations of the intelligence section of the headquarters.

b. After examination by the intelligence officer on duty for any items of information of immediate tactical importance, and subsequent action, all incoming items of information are next recorded in the journal. The original entry should not be altered, but may be supplemented by subsequent entries. If the item is received or issued in oral form, it should be summarized in written form and handled as a regular

message. If the item is in documentary form, the entry may consist of a reference and brief synopsis of contents. The journal is closed daily or at the end of a phase or period as directed. One copy is submitted to the chief of staff for consolidation with the other journals of the headquarters. The journal is supported by the journal file and is eventually forwarded to higher headquarters with after-action reports.

ENEMY SITUATION MAP.- a. General - The enemy situation map is kept by the intelligence officer of each unit. Upon it is recorded graphically all available information of the enemy for reference and study. The situation map supplements (but does not take the place of) the work sheet.

b. Scale - The map used for this purpose should be of appropriate scale. This will depend upon the size and mission of the unit. Generally, the smaller the unit, the larger the scale required. Higher headquarters should have on hand copies of all maps used by subordinate units, so that there will be no danger of reports or messages referring to places not shown on maps available at the higher headquarters. Each major unit should prescribe the operation map for use in its own and next subordinate headquarters. This standardization will reduce chances for error. When reporting in reference to a map other than the prescribed operation map, the map used must be identified.

c. Scope - The area covered should include that in possession of our own forces as well as that held by the enemy. Information of the enemy that is of importance to the command is placed on the map by means of symbols or conventional signs. Care must be taken to prevent the map from becoming too cluttered. The information posted will vary with the size of the unit; the smaller the unit, the more detailed will be the information recorded. To be useful, the situation map must be kept constantly up to date.

d. Cooperation with operations officer - All information concerning the enemy is furnished to the operations officer. By mutual agreement between the intelligence officer and the operations officer, draftsmen of one section may enter pertinent information on the situation map of the other section. In order that the intelligence officer may estimate enemy capabilities that may affect our future plans, he must be kept abreast of operational planning. He should therefore receive copies of the operation overlays and plans prepared by the operations officer.

e. Timeliness - The situation map is kept constantly up to date, new sheets being used when necessary. A tracing or copy of the information on this map, showing the situation as known at the close of the period, accompanies the periodic intelligence report.

f. Joint situation maps - In some headquarters, particularly in those of smaller units, a single situation map may be kept jointly for all staff sections under the supervision of a designated officer. However, at higher levels, it is advisable for the intelligence and operations sections to maintain separate situation maps in order not to interfere with each other.


g. Materials - The current situation is preferably posted on a transparent substance, such as overlay paper or acetate. This method preserves maps; and the overlay paper provides simplicity in transcription of map data. The transparent material is placed on top of the map and the desired information is traced or posted on the tracing paper. This is known as an "overlay". In fluid situations, data may be posted on the original map itself. In more stable situations, it is not desirable to do so because of map shortage, and because the map soon becomes cluttered with symbols. Where photographic facilities are available, prints of the situation map may accompany the periodic intelligence report.

h. Symbols - An overlay should be kept as simple as possible. Military signs and symbols are used. If a specific symbol is not shown in the manual, an improvised one may be used, provided that it is readily recognizable; otherwise, it is better to make a written notation on the map itself. (See FM 21-30.)

i. Clarity - Neatness and clarity are essentials to a good situation map. All symbols and signs must be posted clearly and accurately. Symbols should be sufficiently large to be seen from a reasonable distance, so as to allow several persons to study the map at the same time. So far as possible, symbols should be posted horizontally, that is, so that they may be read without turning the map or overlay. In some cases this is not possible; for example, the symbols for trenches and barbed wire must conform to their actual position on the ground.

j. Colors - Enemy information is posted in red; friendly information is posted in blue. (Symbols for mine fields, demolitions, road blocks, and other engineer obstacles activities, when installed by our own forces are posted in green.)

k. Time - (1) The time a unit was reported or identified is posted below the symbol. For example:




This is very important when the information concerns a moving unit such as a column of troops.


(2) Information must be posted immediately on receipt. Delay may cause incomplete or late dissemination.

1. Keeping map up to date - All obsolete information must be removed, usually after an overlay of it has been made. Only current information should appear on the situation map. Before removing information from the map, however, make sure that it is of no further value, or, if it is of value for report purposes, that it has been properly recorded.

m. Posting unconfirmed information and unknown details - It is desirable to use a consistent method for posting unconfirmed information and unknown details. One method is to show unconfirmed information by means of broken lines or question marks, and simply to omit posting symbols for any details that are unknown. Examples are as follows:




Presence of unit unconfirmed.



Unit is known to be present, but size and type are unknown.



Infantry unit confirmed, size unknown.



Infantry battalion confirmed, identification unknown.



26?

Infantry battalion confirmed; reported (but not confirmed) to be element of 26th Inf Regt; identification of battalion unknown.



2

26

2d Bn, 26th Inf Regt.

n. Enemy order of battle - An identification list kept along the top margin of the situation map is helpful in learning at a glance which enemy units are facing our own. This list is known as an order of battle list or chart. Use of such a list may not be necessary if an order of battle section is available.

o. Crowding of map - Every effort should be made to avoid the crowding of symbols on the situation map. When the situation map becomes too cluttered with symbols it should be revised and identified units consolidated where possible. The use of a supplemental situation map of a different scale will be of value.

INTELLIGENCE WORK SHEET.-a. Purpose - The purpose of the work sheet is to facilitate systematic arrangement of information received by the intelligence section, so that all items bearing on a particular subject will be grouped together for ready reference and comparison. In this respect, the work sheet differs from the journal, wherein information is entered chronologically. The work sheet is of value as an aid in the preparation of summaries and reports. It is a convenient memorandum for the intelligence officer and is not a permanent document. It should always be kept up to date-obsolete items should be lined out or withdrawn. Whenever an intelligence officer has need for a personal memorandum to assist him in keeping up with a changing situation, the work sheet is a useful device.

b. Form - No specific form is designed for a work sheet. Regardless of form used, items of information are extracted from incoming messages and reports and are placed in the proper page of the work sheet, so they may be subsequently studied. For convenience, the work sheet may consist of pages that are indexed along the side with the headings used in the periodic intelligence report. All items (messages) bearing upon the same subject are entered on the same page of the work sheet. Some messages may relate to more than one subject and therefore provide entries for more than one work sheet page. In using the form, enter the serial number of the message (same number as entered in the journal), the time the activity occurred, the source and the information, and an extract of the message itself.

INTELLIGENCE FILES.-a. The information file is a suitably indexed file of all information that may be of future value. It should include supplementary situation maps or overlays taken from the situation map. For instance, during a period of stabilization or inactivity, much information will be collected that is of no immediate interest, but which may become invaluable when an attack is ordered. If this information is published solely in periodic reports as it comes in, it may be disregarded and forgotten, and may not be available when vitally needed by the unit. It should therefore be placed in a file, where it will be available for immediate check against new information. Such information will cover hostile defenses, condition of roads, railways, and bridges, location and contents of supply establishments, location of hostile reserves, and other similar items.

b. The order of battle files consist of:

(1) Order of battle map.- This is a work map for plotting the location and movements of enemy units as well as the probable location of boundaries.

(2) Order of battle card file.- This file consists of forms for the recording of enemy unit identifications and other details of enemy units. Data are recorded on the sources of identification, the time and location; on the branch, weapons, transport, and history of the unit; on the grade, name, and personality of the commander; on the code names and numbers; and on other details. As additional information is reported, it is entered on appropriate cards with a view to determining what portion of an enemy is engaged or may be engaged in combat, as well as its total strength in personnel, weapons, and equipment.

(3) Order of battle report.- Order of battle reports may be made to the intelligence officer by the order of battle personnel of an intelligence section daily, weekly, or as required. Information of immediate importance is reported as it is received.

6. FOURTH REQUIREMENT:

Record the Messages, Dispatches, and Reports which will be issued. Recording should include use of Journal, Situation Plot (Map), Worksheet, and Message File. (This collected information is theoretically the result of Collection Agencies' action on Orders or Requests which were given them as a result of the Collection Plan, which forms the Solution to the Third Requirement).

EVALUATION

Evaluation is the analysis of an item of information in order to determine its pertinence, the credibility of its source and agency and its accuracy.

a. Pertinence of information - Immediately after its receipt by the intelligence section, information is examined in order to determine the degree in which it is relevant and its possible value--that is, its pertinence. This involves a consideration of points such as the following:

- (1) Is it information of the enemy or of the characteristics of the area of operation?
- (2) Is it information needed immediately and, if so, by whom?
- (3) Is it information of future value?
- (4) Is it information of value to this unit or to higher, lower, or adjacent units?

b. Credibility of source and agency - The credibility--that is, the worthiness of belief--of the source and collecting agency must be also determined before the intelligence officer can arrive at an evaluation. The following are some of the important points that should be considered:

- (1) To what extent is the source accurate and reliable?
- (2) Has the collecting agency sufficient training, experience, could the information have been obtained?
- (3) Under conditions existing at the time (time and space, means employed, visibility, etc), could the information have been obtained?

c. Accuracy of information - The accuracy or truth of the information itself must be determined separately from the credibility of the source and agency. This is facilitated by a consideration of the following points:

- (1) Is the purported fact or event at all possible?
- (2) Is it confirmed or corroborated by other information from a different source?
- (3) In what respects does it agree or disagree with available information covering the same point, particularly that known to be correct?
- (4) If it is at variance with information from another source and agency, and the conflicting items cannot be reconciled, which information is more likely to be correct?

d. Rating the source and agency and the information - (1)
The credibility of the source and agency is rated according to the following system:

- A - Completely reliable.
- B - Usually reliable.
- C - Fairly reliable.
- D - Not usually reliable.
- E - Unreliable.
- F - Reliability cannot be judged.

An "A" rating should be given only under the most unusual circumstances; when, for example, the informant is an intelligence officer of long experience and wide background. A "B" rating indicates an informant of known integrity; "C", "D", and "E" ratings indicated a proportionately decreasing degree of reliability. An "F" rating is assigned when nothing is known concerning the background or reliability of the informant.

(2) The accuracy of an item of information is indicated by the use of numerals, as follows:

- 1 - Report confirmed by other sources.
- 2 - Report probably true.
- 3 - Report possibly true.
- 4 - Report doubtfully true.
- 5 - Improbable report.
- 6 - Truth cannot be judged.

(3) It is important to remember that the numerical ratings listed here are independent and distinct from the lettered ratings outlined above. When these ratings are used together, the number "1" need not necessarily accompany the letter "A"; number "2" the letter "B"; and so on. A reliable source may submit an improbable report, or an unreliable source may submit a report which is probably true or confirmed by other sources. Further more, with regard to "1 - Report confirmed by other sources," it should be noted that the sources must be independent. For example, two prisoners simultaneously questioned by the same interrogator are not independent sources. However, prisoners captured by different units and questioned by different interrogators are likely to be independent sources.

7. FIFTH REQUIREMENT:

Evaluate the first five entries (J1-J5) made in the Worksheet in the Fourth Requirement. (Use Evaluation and Interpretation Worksheets issued).

INTREPRETATION

NATURE OF INTERPRETATION - a. General - Up to this point, the intelligence officer is concerned with assembling, cataloguing, and evaluating information. He is now faced with the problem of analyzing the evaluated information to determine its significance with respect to information or intelligence already at hand. The process of critical analysis is known as interpretation.

b. Significance of information - Interpretation of evaluated information requires determination, first, of its conformity or nonconformity with existing information and secondly, its effect upon the existing estimate of the situation. Some of the pertinent considerations are:

- (1) What does this information mean in connection with what is already known?
- (2) Does it alter, confirm, refute, or add significance to information previously received?
- (3) Does it tend to confirm or refute the existing estimate of the enemy situation?

Correct interpretation will lead to accurate conclusions concerning the enemy's capabilities and his probable courses of action.

c. Bearing on current intelligence estimate - As each new item of information is processed, the interpretation placed upon it affects in some way the current intelligence estimate. The conclusions already drawn are altered or confirmed; new capabilities are discovered, old ones are discarded; the relative probability of adoption of the enemy's capabilities become clearer. The estimate must be continuously revised and kept up to date in the light of new intelligence.

8. SIXTH REQUIREMENT.

Interpret the information contained in the dispatches (J1-J5) which has been previously recorded and evaluated. (Use the Interpretation portion of the worksheet used in the Fifth Requirement).

8. SIXTH REQUIREMENT.

Interpret the information contained in the dispatches (J1-J5) which has been previously recorded and evaluated. (Use the Interpretation portion of the worksheet used in the Fifth Requirement).

9. SEVENTH REQUIREMENT:

Record, Evaluate, and Interpret the additional messages which will be issued.

10. SITUATION CONTINUED:

The Commander Joint Amphibious Task Force requires that all staff officers be prepared on five (5) minutes notice to present a briefing, or in the case of Intelligence Officers, an Estimate of the Enemy Situation.

EIGHT REQUIREMENT:

Present an oral Estimate of the Enemy Situation to the Commander, JATF 51 (To be represented by a member of the staff of the Intelligence School).

11. NINTH REQUIREMENT:

Prepare a complete written Estimate of the Enemy Situation dated 1200 hours, 1 July 1960, based on the Initial Estimate and the information recorded, evaluated, and interpreted to this moment. The Estimate format should where possible conform to that found in NWP 11.

SECTION 6

USE OF INTELLIGENCE

Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Eighth Requirement (Oral Estimate)

Ninth Requirement (Complete Written Estimate)

Summary

DISCUSSION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

All of the work of the intelligence section of a staff is culminated in the Intelligence Annex to an operational plan. This annex is an integral part of the plan, and may be regarded as the intelligence needed to support it.

The material contained in the annex falls into two broad categories: the known data concerning the enemy and the area of operations, which is of immediate concern to all units of the force, and plans and directives for the conduct of the intelligence activities.

Therefore it can be recognized that the annex has two prime functions: to disseminate information and to direct the obtaining of other information. Annexes, being a part of the operational plan or order, is essentially a directive, therefore are directive in nature.

An annex is devoted to the delineation of details too voluminous for insertion in para 3. x of the operational plan; similarly, appendices to annexes may be used for further details, and appendices may be supplemented by tabs for the most specific information.

The form of the Annex:

1. THE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY is the sum of information, at the time of the issuance of the operation order. It represents the latest pertinent information up to the time of the promulgation of the plan or order.

Enemy capabilities are listed here in their relative order of probability and are succinct statements telling how, where, when, and in what strength. These statements should contain only matter which the operating units will need to know in carrying out their assigned tasks. If possible the effect of enemy capabilities on our own courses of action should be disclosed. In determining capabilities the intelligence officer should give the enemy the benefit of the doubt.

Characteristics of the Area of operations will, when presented, be the same as those listed in the estimate, plus the additional information gathered prior to the promulgation.

2. INTELLIGENCE MISSION AND COLLECTION PLAN may contain a brief recapitulation of the original collection schedule, but this will be slanted towards collection efforts after the promulgation of the operation plan.

Essential Elements of Information are questions which are posed to the recipients of the annex, and which, when answered will fill the gaps in the intelligence information. EEI are precise and are joined by indications. Indications are those occurrences that, when reported to the intelligence section, will answer the questions posed by the EEI. EEI should list what must be known, and the exact means (indications) for fulfilling this need.

The Collection Plan states these indications and provides definite and precise orders or requests to the collecting agencies for collection, as well as the schedule within which these agencies must report the information. This schedule to the collecting agencies should specify when, where, how, and to whom reports will be made.

3. SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS contains the detailed operational procedure by which intelligence within the command is to be supplied and maintained. Standing operating procedures will generally cover a large percentage of the contingencies that might be anticipated in any given operation, and in such cases, a reference to the appropriate SOP will suffice. In cases where special collection techniques require departure from the SOP, new orders should be issued. It should be noted that it is not necessary for all operations to utilize all paragraphs in this section.

APPENDICES AND TABS may be used for the elaboration of information as previously stated. No new or vital facts should be placed in an appendix without mention in the body of the annex. Frequently the use of charts, diagrams, and overlays will save many words in the text.

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

MAP OR CHART REFERENCES:

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. ENEMY SITUATION:
 - (a) GENERAL SITUATION
 - (b) ENEMY CAPABILITIES
 - (c) SPECIFIC SITUATION
 - (1) COMPOSITION (O.B.)
 - (2) NUMERICAL STRENGTH
 - (3) COMBAT EFFICIENCY
 - (4) WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
 - (5) DISPOSITION
 - (6) SUPPLY
 - (7) TIME AND DISTANCE FACTORS
 - (8) STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS FACTORS
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE MISSION AND COLLECTION PLAN

3. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION (AS APPLIED TO THE PARTICULAR OPERATION)
4. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION
5. COLLECTION PLAN
 - (a) SUBORDINATE AND ATTACHED UNITS
 - (1) AGENCY
 - (2) TASK
 - (3) SCHEDULE
 - (b) HIGHER ECHELONS
 - (c) FRIENDLY FORCES

SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS

6. CAPTURED MATERIAL, DOCUMENTS, AND PERSONNEL
7. MAPS, CHARTS, TERRAIN MODELS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS
 - (a) PROCUREMENT
 - (b) DISTRIBUTION
8. INTERPRETERS, TRANSLATORS, AND SPECIALIST TEAMS
9. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
 - (a) CENSORSHIP
 - (b) CAMOUFLAGE
 - (c) OTHER
10. TARGET LIST
11. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS
 - (a) ROUTINE REPORTS, INCLUDING PERIOD COVERED
 - (b) SPECIAL REPORTS
 - (c) INTELLIGENCE LIAISON
 - (d) COMMUNICATIONS
 - (1) ROUTINE
 - (2) SPECIAL

APPENDIXES AND TABS:

1. DETAILED SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION, INCLUDING LATEST INTELLIGENCE
2. METEOROLOGY
3. OCEANOGRAPHY
4. HYDROGRAPHY
5. TOPOGRAPHY
6. ENEMY DEFENSES
7. ENEMY LOGISTICS
8. ENEMY EQUIPMENT
9. COMMUNICATIONS IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA
10. TRANSPORTATION
11. POLITICS
12. ECONOMICS
13. SOCIOLOGY
14. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
15. MEDICAL

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

CLASSIFICATION

DATE/TIME
ORGANIZATION
PLACE

CHARTS AND MAPS:

LIST THOSE REQUIRED FOR UNDERSTANDING AND USE IN CONNECTION WITH THE OPERATION

1. MISSION:

THE COMMANDER'S MISSION, TASK AND PURPOSE, AS RECEIVED FROM HIGHER ECHELON OR DERIVED FROM THE SITUATION, WITH PRIORITIES NOTED AS NECESSARY.

2. GENERAL SITUATION:

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE MILITARY SITUATION; CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION AND OUR MISSION; THOSE FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS.

- (1) METEOROLOGY-EXISTING CONDITIONS, TACTICAL EFFECT ON ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
- (2) HYDROGRAPHY, OCEANOGRAPHY, AND AIDS TO NAVIGATION
- (3) TOPOGRAPHY
- (4) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION
- (5) SOCIOLOGY
- (6) POLITICS
- (7) ECONOMICS
- (8) MEDICAL
- (9) OTHER ITEMS AS APPLICABLE

b. ENEMY SITUATION:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| (1) LOCATION | (6) CURRENT OPERATIONS |
| (2) STRENGTH | (7) LOGISTICS |
| (3) COMPOSITION | (8) REINFORCEMENTS |
| (4) DISPOSITION OR DEPLOYMENT | (9) TIME AND DISTANCE FACTORS |
| (5) COMBAT EFFICIENCY | (10) STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS FACTORS |

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

- a. IDENTIFY ALL POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION OF WHICH THE ENEMY IS PHYSICALLY CAPABLE AND WHICH CAN AFFECT THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OUR MISSION.
- b. DISCUSS THE FACTORS THAT MIGHT LEAD THE ENEMY TO CHOOSE ONE COURSE OF ACTION (CAPABILITY) OVER ANOTHER.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. RELIST ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN RELATIVE ORDER OF PROBABILITY.

- b. STATE THE EFFECT OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION ON OUR MISSION (THE USE OF ANY ASSUMPTIONS SHOULD BE PLAINLY NOTED; THE ENEMY SHOULD BE GIVEN THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT WHEN THERE IS ANY QUESTION AS TO THE DEGREE OF THE EFFECT; STATE REASONS).

DISCUSSION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The Intelligence Estimate is a description and evaluation of the enemy and of the area of operations, prepared on the basis of information obtained from all available sources and from the viewpoint of the mission objectives and planning needs. This estimate should present a picture of the enemy in the particular area of operations, and compute his capabilities as they might influence the mission.

An Intelligence Estimate is an ever changing thing depending upon the receipt of current data which will effect the analysis of the situation. It therefore, forms the basis for any further collecting that the Intelligence Staff might do.

ANALYSIS OF THE FORM:

1. MISSION: Once the mission is known, the information on hand plus other obtainable information is analyzed for its relationship to the objectives of the mission, and is then assembled into the Intelligence Estimate.
2. THE GENERAL SITUATION: This paragraph states the general situation as it affects possible enemy courses of action. By "possible enemy courses of action" are meant those which the enemy commander may adopt for the coming battle; the enemy must be physically capable of undertaking them, and they must suit his apparent mission. Enemy capabilities, on the other hand, are envisioned as those capabilities which the enemy can physically undertake which, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission. Because of the characteristics of the area and his own situation, many possible courses of action may be open to the enemy--but they are termed capabilities - only when they can interfere with or favor our own course of action.

a. Characteristics of the area - To determine enemy capabilities and courses of action it is necessary for the intelligence officer as well as the commander to know certain factors of the area of operations. Such as the weather, hydrography, terrain of the area in question, etc. These factors are known as the characteristics of the area of operations and are stated concisely. Conclusions are drawn as to the tactical effect on enemy operations and our own mission.

b. Enemy Situation - The second part of paragraph 2 deals with a summary of the enemy situation.

- (1) ENEMY COMBAT STRENGTH - is stated in terms of number of men, ships, and equipment; that is, a statement of the

existing order of battle within an area which will enable the enemy to affect the commander's mission in any way. Emphasis's should be placed upon those units which are most capable of seriously interfering with our mission.

- (2) COMPOSITION OF ENEMY FORCES - must be taken into account; the organization; ship types; equipment; materials; weapons types, and calibers; air, sea, and ground structures; the makeup of the entire force, but especially the force with the greatest capability. Graphic or tabular presentation is preferred.
- (3) ENEMY COMBAT EFFICIENCY - is a natural complement to strength and disposition, and is discussed here with reference to tactical discipline, known effectiveness of training, and condition of readiness.
- (4) ENEMY DISPOSITIONS - involve the tactical arrangement of the enemy force. This may be combined graphically with location, strength and composition.
- (5) ENEMY CURRENT OPERATIONS - are summarized in order to develop further his capabilities and intentions. Any offensive or defensive action that might bear on our mission, or might indicate the force, method or intention of future operations is carefully outlined, with particular emphasis on the significant enemy operational characteristics.
- (6) ENEMY LOGISTICS - must be studied to determine supply vulnerabilities, and with reference to effectiveness of logistic support of coming operations. Information on enemy bases, port facilities, dumps and supply routes should be developed and stated in as accurate detail as possible.
- (7) ENEMY REINFORCEMENT - should be carefully noted, especially those which are capable of moving to the objective area.
- (8) TIME AND SPACE FACTORS - are important because they indicate the restrictions placed upon the enemy's forces. The times required for the enemy's air, sea and land forces to travel from estimated locations to the combat scene should be tabulated.
- (9) STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS FACTORS - those elements which affect the combat power of the enemy, must be analysed for conclusions concerning his fighting ability. Since strength factors for one side are not necessarily weakness factors for the other, the intelligence officer should be extremely careful to consider the enemy force objectively, giving a true picture of its action and potential power, rather than appraise it in a relation to its own force.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES - The term capability refers not only to the general course of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, reinforce, or withdraw, but also to the very particular courses of action possible under each general course of action (such as air strikes; guided missile attacks; naval bombardment; offensive sweeps; offensive mining; submarine and smaller

attacks; and amphibious, airborne, or overland assaults). Capability is stated in positive terms of enemy action----how, where, when, and in what strength.

SYMBOLS FOR ACTIVITIES AND INSTALLATIONS

AIR ACTIVITIES

Aircraft



Aircraft, damaged



Aircraft, dummy



Air Base



Air Field



Helicopter



Helicopter landing area.



Seaplane anchorage,
refueling facilities



Seaplane anchorage,
no facilities



Seaplane base, complete
facilities




BOUNDARIES AND DELIMITED AREAS


Front Lines




Line of departure




Main line of resistance



Objective



Outpost line



Outpost line of resistance



Patrols



Barrage, 81mm mortar (barrage
no. inside)



81 Mortar

Concentration, 240 mm howitzer
(Unit designation inside)



240 How

Unit area, battalion



Unit area, regiment




COAST AND HARBOR DEFENSE

Antisubmarine net
(with gate)



Harbor defense boundary.



Torpedo net (with gate).



COMMAND, COMMUNICATION, AND SIGNAL

Radio station



Radar station



Theater Headquarters



Theater Air Force Head-
quarters



Theater Army Headquarters.



Theater Navy Headquarters



FORTIFICATIONS

Fort, general



Foxholes and emplacements.



Light howitzer in emplace-
ment



Pillbox or casemate



Dugout or underground shelter:


Occupied-



Unoccupied-
shelter



Strong point.



Trenches

OBSTACLES The color green is used to designate mine fields, demolitions, road blocks and other engineer obstacle activities of both friendly and enemy forces.

Barbed wire, general XXXXXXXX

Concertina, multiple

Concertina, single

Double apron fence XXXXXX

Double fence XX XX

Single fence X X

LANDING CRAFT AND SHIPS

Landing craft or ship . . .

Landing vehicle, tracked (LVT)

Landing vehicle, tracked, armored (LVTA)

Submarine

Vessel, merchant

Vessel, naval

OBSTACLES

General Symbols: Road block

Completed,

Prepared but passable.

Proposed

Specific Symbols:

Antitank ditch

Obstacle, fixed

Obstacle, movable

Tank barrier

Mine field, anti-personnel

Mine field, antitank

Single string of antitank mines.

Antipersonnel mine

Booby trap.

Minefield gap

SPECIAL INSTALLATIONS

Buildings, general.

Building or structure, buried

Building or structure, dug in

Building or structure, revetted

Cemetery

Prisoner of war collecting point

Dispensary + Disp

Hospital +

Observation Post

Prisoner of war enclosure.

Searchlights

SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS




Occupied

Proposed




Engineer Supply installation.

Water point (W)
 Depot (Dep)
 Ammunition Supply point (ASP)
 Distributing point (Distr Pt)
 Dump (Dp)
 Railhead (Rhd)
 Storage tank 
 Storage tank, buried 
 Wells (annotate type)  Crude

TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORTATION

Bridge 
 Main supply road MSR 
 Railroad beneath road 
 Railroad grade crossing 
 Railroad over road 

Railroads: (gauge can be indicated)

Single track 
 Double track 
 Tunnel 

WEAPONS AND VEHICLES

Basic infantry weapon 
 Basic artillery 

High trajectory (placed on base of weapon symbol) 

Antiaircraft (surrounding weapon symbol) 

Self-propelled (surrounding weapon symbol) (tracked and half-tracked vehicles only) 

Self-propelled (wheeled vehicles only) 

Antitank and rocket projector (placed on base of weapon symbol) 

Examples of weapon symbols:

Light machine gun, automatic rifle 

Heavy machine gun (cal. .30) 

Machine gun (cal. .50) 

Antiaircraft machine gun, heavy 

Antiaircraft machine gun, heavy, quadruple mount 

Rocket launcher or recoilless rifle 

Rocket launcher, 2.36 inch 

Rocket launcher, 3.5 inch 

Recoilless rifle, 57mm 

Recoilless rifle, 75mm 

Rocket projector (artillery) 

Rocket projector, 4.5 inch 4.5
24 tube 24 TUBE

Mortar, light (60mm) 60

Mortar, medium, (4.2 inch) 4.2

Mortar, Heavy (155mm) 155

Howitzer, light (105mm) 105

Howitzer, medium (155mm) 155

Howitzer, Heavy (240mm) 240

Howitzer battery (Show no. pieces) 4

Gun, light

Gun, medium

Gun, heavy (155mm) 155

Gun, battery of 4 guns 4

Gun, medium in antitank role

Self-propelled gun, medium tracked

Antiaircraft gun, medium

Sector of fire, heavy machine gun (Heavy portion of solid line indicates danger zone when fire is placed on final protective line).

Unconfirmed or doubtful weapon.

Destroyed weapon

Guided missile

Guided missile launching site:

Surface to surface missile

Surface to air missile

The basic guided missile designation is two letter combination followed by the letter "M" (missile). The first letter indicates the origin of the missile and the second letter indicates the objective.

Basic letters:

Air	A
Surface	S
Underwater	U

Examples:

Air to air missile	AAM
Air to surface	ASM
Surface to Underwater	SUM
Underwater to air	UAM

Tank, light

Tank, medium

Tank, heavy

Armored car or light reconnaissance vehicle

COLORS

When colors are used, military symbols representing friendly forces and activities are shown in blue, and those representing enemy forces and activities are shown in red. When colors are not available, friendly forces are single and enemy double black lines. Symbols for minefields, demolitions, roadblocks, and other engineer obstacles, both friendly and enemy, are shown in green. The only exceptions are the following:

a. Symbols for areas to be covered by friendly fire, although generally located in enemy territory, are shown in blue.

b. Symbols for contaminated areas, wherever located, always are shown in yellow.

A. THE MILITARY GRID REFERENCE SYSTEM

- a. For general use the Military Grid Reference System is used in place of the complete numerical coordinates. The reference system has the following advantages:
 - (1) Simple
 - (2) Universal.
 - (3) Unique. A given reference locates only one point; a given point has only one reference.
 - (4) Capable of abbreviation.
 - (5) Easily encoded, decoded, and transmitted.
- b. The military Grid Reference System has been designed for the common use of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force in joint operations on maps of scale 1/250,000 and larger.
- c. General description. The Military Grid Reference System is designed for use with UTM and UPS Grids. For convenience, the world is divided into large, regularly shaped geographic areas, each of which is given a unique identification, called the Grid Zone Designation. These areas are subdivided into 100,000-meter squares, based on the grid covering the area. Each square is identified by two ~~patterns~~ patterns called the 100,000 meter square identification. This identification is unique within the area covered by the Grid Zone Designation. Numerical reference within the 100,000-meter square are given to the desired accuracy in terms of the easting(E) and northing (N) grid coordinates for the point.
- d. The Grid Zone Designation.
 - (1) The area of the globe between 80° North and 80° South is divided into rectangles 6° east-west by 8° north-south. The columns (6° wide) are identified by the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) zone numbers; i.e., starting at the 1800 meridian and proceeding easterly the columns are numbered 1 through 60 consecutively. The rows (8° northerly to 80° north, the rows are lettered consecutively C through X with the letters I and O omitted. The designation - called the grid zone designation - any 6° east-west by 8° north-south rectangle is determined by reading (right-up) first the column designation (as 14) and second the row designation (as S); as 14S. (Point out.)
 - (2) The north polar area is divided into two parts by the 180° and 0° meridians. The west half is given grid zone designation Y; the east half, Z. Similarly, in the south polar area the west half is given grid zone designation A; the east half, B.

e. 100,000 meter squares. Between 80° north and 80° south, each 6° by 8° rectangle is divided into 100,000 meter squares based on the UTM grid for the zone. Every column of squares is identified by a letter; likewise, every row of squares is identified by a letter (with I and O being omitted). The identification of a 100,000 meter square is determined by reading (right-up) first its column letter (as N) and second its row letter (as P).

f. The grid reference.

(1) A reference consists of a group of letters and numbers which indicate (1) the grid zone designation, (2) the 100,000 meter square identification, and (3) the rectangular coordinates of the point expressed to the desired accuracy. A reference is written as a continuous number without spaces, parentheses, dashes, or decimal points.

(a) 145 (Indicates a Grid Zone (6°X 8° rectangle))

(b) 14SNP (Locating a 100,000 meter square.)

(c) 14SNP5437 (Locating a point within a 10,000 meter square.)

(d) 14SNP544373 (Locating a point within 100 meters.)

(2) To satisfy the needs of artillery and any other needs, a reference can be given to the nearest 10 meters and the nearest 1 meter as:

14SNP54433725 (Locating a point within 10 meters.)

14SNP5443237254 (Locating a point within 1 meter.)

(3) Normally, all elements of a grid reference will not be used. Those to be omitted will depend upon the size of the area of activities and upon the interval of the grid lines.

(a) The grid zone designations (as 14S) usually will be omitted. Under these conditions a reference to the closest hundred meters will read: NP544372.

(b) Under certain circumstances, in addition to omitting grid zone designation, the 100,000 meter square identification will also be omitted from references referred to a 1,000 meter grid (on maps at scales larger than 1: 100,000.)

1. If reporting from a 1,000 meter grid is confined to an area not exceeding 100,000 meters east-west by 100,000 meters north-south (not necessarily a square bounded by 100,000 meter grid lines) and if the area does not fall within 25 miles of a grid of spherical junction, the 100,000 meter square identification (as NP) will normally be omitted. This is the usual case for references on maps used by the field artillery. The point will be referenced only by numbers. Thus, in such an area, a reference to the closest 100 meters will read 544378; to the nearest 1000 meters will read: 5437; to the nearest meter will read 5443237254.

2. If more than one major grid or an overlapping grid appears on a sheet, the 100,000 meter square identification must never be omitted.

- a. Major grid. Within a grid zone the grid based on the origin for the zone is the major grid. Within the grid zone the major grid zone is printed in full, black lines.
- b. Overlapping grid. The major grid of the next adjacent zone. Normally indicated by blue tick marks around the edge of the map if the area covered is within 25 miles of a zone junction.

B. THE GRID REFERENCE BOX. A grid reference box will appear in the margin of each sheet after revision to the Military Grid Reference System. It contains instructions for giving a reference on the sheet including a step by step example. Instructions indicate whether or not the grid zone designation and the 100,000 meter square are required as part of the reference. The grid zone and 100,000 meter square are shown by a miniature representation of the sheet. The 100,000 meter grid lines are labeled with their values in abbreviated form in the same color as the value of the map.

C. THE TAD GRID REFERENCE

1. USE OF THE TAD GRID REFERENCE The TAD (Target Area Designator) Grid Reference is standard on the 1/50,000 Approach and 1/25,000 Bombardment Charts used by the U. S. Navy. The system is also designed for the common use of two or more of the Services in certain joint operations. Its use is specified by the Joint Force Commander. An example of the TAD grid is shown in Figure 4.

2. BASIC GRID AND UNIT OF MEASURE.

- a. The TAD Grid Reference is based on the grid prescribed for the area.
- b. The unit of measure is either meters or yards, depending upon which is used with the basic grid.
- c. Instead of continuing with a point designation, the TAD designates an area within the 1,000 meter (or yard) grid. Each 1,000 unit grid is divided into 200-unit squares. They are lettered from left to right and from top to bottom as,

A B C D E

F G H I J


K L M N O

P Q R S T

U V W X Y

3. THE REFERENCE

- a. A TAD reference is normally determined by reading in order; (1) the identification of the 100,000-unit square in which the point of reference lies, (2) a four-digit number identifying the 1,000-unit square in which the point of reference lies, and (3) a letter, identifying the 200-unit square in which the point lies. Example: UT9109X.
- b. The 100,000-unit square identification is omitted in many cases. It is retained only when reporting more than 100,000 units away or where the area of reference lies within approximately 25 miles or a grid junction.
- c. Where the area of an independent operation is confined to a single large scale map or wherever it is certain no ambiguity will result, it is the prerogative of the Commander to order the omission of the 100,000-unit square identifications from TAD references regardless of the rules outlined above.
- d. If a further breakdown of the lettered squares is required, each 200 unit square may be subdivided by the following method:
 - (1) Subdivide the 200 unit letter square into four 100 unit squares and number them from left to right beginning at the top. A location given as 9109 Roger 1 (omitting the 100,000 unit square identification) is taken to mean the center of the upper left 100 unit squares located at 9109R. A location given as 9109 Roger 5 is the center of the 200 yard square.



- e. Instructions for giving a TAD reference are contained in a TAD reference box which usually appears in the margin of each sheet bearing such a grid.

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

CLASSIFICATION

DATE/TIME
ORGANIZATION
PLACE

CHARTS AND MAPS:

LIST THOSE REQUIRED FOR UNDERSTANDING AND USE IN CONNECTION WITH THE OPERATION

1. MISSION:

THE COMMANDER'S MISSION, TASK AND PURPOSE, AS RECEIVED FROM HIGHER ECHELON OR DERIVED FROM THE SITUATION, WITH PRIORITIES NOTED AS NECESSARY.

2. GENERAL SITUATION:

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE MILITARY SITUATION; CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION AND OUR MISSION; THOSE FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS.

- (1) METEOROLOGY-EXISTING CONDITIONS, TACTICAL EFFECT ON ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
- (2) HYDROGRAPHY, OCEANOGRAPHY, AND AIDS TO NAVIGATION
- (3) TOPOGRAPHY
- (4) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION
- (5) SOCIOLOGY
- (6) POLITICS
- (7) ECONOMICS
- (8) MEDICAL
- (9) OTHER ITEMS AS APPLICABLE

b. ENEMY SITUATION:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| (1) LOCATION | (6) CURRENT OPERATIONS |
| (2) STRENGTH | (7) LOGISTICS |
| (3) COMPOSITION | (8) REINFORCEMENTS |
| (4) DISPOSITION OR DEPLOYMENT | (9) TIME AND DISTANCE FACTORS |
| (5) COMBAT EFFICIENCY | (10) STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS FACTORS |

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

- a. IDENTIFY ALL POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION OF WHICH THE ENEMY IS PHYSICALLY CAPABLE AND WHICH CAN AFFECT THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OUR MISSION.
- b. DISCUSS THE FACTORS THAT MIGHT LEAD THE ENEMY TO CHOOSE ONE COURSE OF ACTION (CAPABILITY) OVER ANOTHER.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. RELIST ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN RELATIVE ORDER OF PROBABILITY.

- b. STATE THE EFFECT OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION ON OUR MISSION (THE USE OF ANY ASSUMPTIONS SHOULD BE PLAINLY NOTED; THE ENEMY SHOULD BE GIVEN THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT WHEN THERE IS ANY QUESTION AS TO THE DEGREE OF THE EFFECT; STATE REASONS).

DISCUSSION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The Intelligence Estimate is a description and evaluation of the enemy and of the area of operations, prepared on the basis of information obtained from all available sources and from the viewpoint of the mission objectives and planning needs. This estimate should present a picture of the enemy in the particular area of operations, and compute his capabilities as they might influence the mission.

An Intelligence Estimate is an ever changing thing depending upon the receipt of current data which will effect the analysis of the situation. It therefore, forms the basis for any further collecting that the Intelligence Staff might do.

ANALYSIS OF THE FORM:

1. MISSION: Once the mission is known, the information on hand plus other obtainable information is analyzed for its relationship to the objectives of the mission, and is then assembled into the Intelligence Estimate.
2. THE GENERAL SITUATION: This paragraph states the general situation as it affects possible enemy courses of action. By "possible enemy courses of action" are meant those which the enemy commander may adopt for the coming battle; the enemy must be physically capable of undertaking them, and they must suit his apparent mission. Enemy capabilities, on the other hand, are envisioned as those capabilities which the enemy can physically undertake which, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission. Because of the characteristics of the area and his own situation, many possible courses of action may be open to the enemy---but they are termed capabilities - only when they can interfere with or favor our own course of action.
 - a. Characteristics of the Area - To determine enemy capabilities and courses of action it is necessary for the intelligence officer as well as the commander to know certain factors of the area of operations. Such as the weather, hydrography, terrain of the area in question, etc. These factors are known as the characteristics of the area of operations and are stated concisely. Conclusions are drawn as to the tactical effect on enemy operations and our own mission.
 - b. Enemy Situation - The second part of paragraph 2 deals with a summary of the enemy situation.
 - (1) ENEMY COMBAT STRENGTH - is stated in terms of number of men, ships, and equipment; that is, a statement of the

existing order of battle within an area which will enable the enemy to affect the commander's mission in any way. Emphasis's should be placed upon those units which are most capable of seriously interfering with our mission.

- (2) COMPOSITION OF ENEMY FORCES - must be taken into account; the organization; ship types; equipment; materials; weapons types, and calibers; air, sea, and ground structures; the makeup of the entire force, but especially the force with the greatest capability. Graphic or tabular presentation is preferred.
- (3) ENEMY COMBAT EFFICIENCY - is a natural complement to strength and disposition, and is discussed here with reference to tactical discipline, known effectiveness of training, and condition of readiness.
- (4) ENEMY DISPOSITIONS - involve the tactical arrangement of the enemy force. This may be combined graphically with location, strength and composition.
- (5) ENEMY CURRENT OPERATIONS - are summarized in order to develop further his capabilities and intentions. Any offensive or defensive action that might bear on our mission, or might indicate the force, method or intention of future operations is carefully outlined, with particular emphasis on the significant enemy operational characteristics.
- (6) ENEMY LOGISTICS - must be studied to determine supply vulnerabilities, and with reference to effectiveness of logistic support of coming operations. Information on enemy bases, port facilities, dumps and supply routes should be developed and stated in as accurate detail as possible.
- (7) ENEMY REINFORCEMENT - should be carefully noted, especially those which are capable of moving to the objective area.
- (8) TIME AND SPACE FACTORS - are important because they indicate the restrictions placed upon the enemy's forces. The times required for the enemy's air, sea and land forces to travel from estimated locations to the combat scene should be tabulated.
- (9) STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS FACTORS - those elements which affect the combat power of the enemy, must be analysed for conclusions concerning his fighting ability. Since strength factors for one side are not necessarily weakness factors for the other, the intelligence officer should be extremely careful to consider the enemy force objectively, giving a true picture of its action and potential power, rather than appraise it in a relation to its own force.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES - The term capability refers not only to the general course of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, reinforce, or withdraw, but also to the very particular courses of action possible under each general course of action (such as air strikes; guided missile, attacks; naval bombardment; offensive sweeps; offensive mining; submarine and smaller

attacks; and amphibious, airborne, or overland assaults). Capability is stated in positive terms of enemy action---how, where, when, and in what strength.

SECTION 7

MISCELLANEOUS AND SEMINAR

BRIEFING TECHNIQUES

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

SEMINAR

BRIEFING

I. INTRODUCTION. Briefing is a concise orderly presentation of intelligence (or information). Briefing is the responsibility of the Intelligence Officer. In order to properly perform this duty it is essential that he be thoroughly familiar with the ways and means by which he can most effectively present his material. The quality and quantity of his material provides the criteria of the officer. Constantly he must be on the look out and continually collect up-to-date information in order to be prepared at any time to give a briefing. It has been found by experience that an Intelligence Officer is asked many questions inside and also a way to left field of his speciality. Therefore he must be familiar with all available source material, and insofar as his ingenuity and initiative permit he must become a reliable, even through self-styled, authority.

II. TYPES OF BRIEFS. Briefs vary as to slant, amount of detail, and sometimes as to methods of presentation according to the purpose of the brief and the audience for which it is intended. In general, the types of briefs can be grouped within one of the following headings.

a. Current Events: This would usually include small amounts of information on widely varied topics. If a single topic is used over several briefings and to the same audience then the brief usually presumes previous knowledge of some of the facts and presents only the latest information. Examples of these would be the daily or weekly CNO or Admiral briefings.

b. National Background: This is usually presented only once to an audience, covers several topics (as economic, transportation, people etc), and is based on research with plenty of time to prepare. Examples would include high level strategic briefing, and also lower level passing the word by the ship's officer prior to the ship entering an uncommon foreign port.

c. Training. Self explanatory.

d. Strategic: The difference in these two being only in the level and scope of the subject matter. For example the

e. Tactical: enemy forces to CNO would be in terms of armies, and to an Attack Force Commander perhaps in terms of regiments.

f. Operational: This would usually be limited to a single mission and, if to a small enough unit, might be in great detail.

g. Interrogation or De-Briefing. This heading should also be listed since many of the same techniques are present in this situation. Careful preparation and organization of questions are necessary in order to fulfill the purpose of the debriefing and to obtain all possible information. Many of the same type graphics and visual aids may be used.

III. GENERAL RULES. Usually a brief is oral. Always it is concise. It is tailored to the audience both in choice of words and in degree of detail. The purpose of the brief must be clearly understood by the briefer and so indicated in his presentation. If possible the brief should be illustrated. Charts; maps; transparencies, opaques, strip and motion films used with projector may all be used according to the time and material available. If handouts are to be employed they should be issued prior to or during the briefing. This allows for questions to be answered when they occur in the minds of the audience. The audience must all be cleared for the full material. Your responsibility as an intelligence officer also includes security duties. If certain material is too highly classified for the whole group, and therefore not needed by the entire audience, either use that material in a separate briefing, or divide your audience and include the material in only one brief.

IV. PREPARATION. The preparation may be hasty or it may involve much research. In either case though and care must be exercised in the organization of the material. Since the spoken word is fleeting, it does not allow the mind of the listener to retrace what has been said and organize for itself. This means that the officer who presents the material should lead his audience step by step toward the point being developed. An example would be in briefing on the radar sites in Korea. It might be presented by first giving an overall location chart followed by smaller sections and then individual sites. Another way would be to start by describing a single site and building up to the whole picture. In neither case is it desirable to shuffle your information or references.

The amount of notes to be used varies with the detail and exactness of the information, the familiarity of the briefer (and sometimes with the desires or orders of the audience). The use of notes is usually allowable and several techniques can be employed as aids to the briefer. 3 X 5 cards are good for key words and statistical information. Posters, charts, graphics can, in themselves, provide the key words or outline to be used in the presentation.

Visual Aids should be used whenever possible to provide another means by which the audience can receive the information. Visual presentation often shows relationships much clearer than words could ever do. Visual aids speed understanding and makes for more lasting retention of the material. If well done, it also helps to keep your audience awake.

Whenever possible it is most important to have a Dry Run rehearsal.

V. PRESENTATION. The first rule is to BE NATURAL, and therefore to be at ease. Greet the audience. Be as informal and friendly as circumstances will permit. Introduce yourself to the group if necessary. Introduce your subject and explain the purpose of the briefing. Prepare the audience for what is to follow. Define any special terms and establish a frame of reference. Gain the attention of the group and their willingness to follow throughout the presentation.

The subject matter of the brief should contain the important points in a logical manner. Again, it is well to point out that the choice of words, amount of detail, and the slant of the brief is tailored to fit the audience. Restatement of the most important facts is desirable throughout the brief. A summary and/or conclusions is necessary.

Personal qualities of a good briefer, besides that of being (or appearing to) be natural and at ease are some of the following. He must be sincere in what he is saying. Humor may be used, but moderately and within the personality range of the speaker. He must always speak with authority and have control of the situation. This does not mean that he is to affirm anything he does not know. Questions may be asked to which he does not have the answer. If he is fortunate he will have an assistant in the room who has the correct answer, or a helper auditing from behind the scenes who can make a quick check. Unfortunately, most of us find ourselves without either help and can only reply that we do not know but will check. This is a good time for an intelligence officer to show forethought by stating what action has been taken to obtain the information. The use of illustrations, anecdotes, and references to the familiar all aid repetition and restatement.

A little should be mentioned about distractions, but less than what is usually said about them. The briefer is not a paid lecturer and therefore is not expected to do all things perfectly. However, since he is most desirous of getting his information across to his listeners he would normally run a check to prevent unnecessary distractions. Outside avoidable noises, too warm a room, and vivid graphics on display but not in use are some of the more obvious annoyances. Some personal mannerisms might be watched. Walking about the room during a briefing is usually permissible, but pacing is unwise. Juggling coins in a pocket or tossing chalk in the air usually causes the audience to be more interested in how much money is in the pocket or just which time the chalk will be dropped. If the briefer really is at ease he will seldom employ such nervous mannerisms.

A few rules in using graphics should be followed. If possible, display the graphic only when it is being used during the brief. This also applies when using the blackboard, a form of graphic. Material should be erased after it has served its purpose. Check to be sure that all in the audience have a clear view. When indicating a point on the graphic use a pointer rather than the hand, and hold the pointer in the hand nearest the reference. Face the audience and talk to the audience, not the graphic.

A brief does not have to be boring to the briefer or the audience. At times, especially when daily briefs are given, as with the order of battle, a little ingenuity is both permissible and needed. On one staff in Korea the N-2, as the enemy, enacted scenes showing what information the enemy had on its own and our forces. N-3 countered with brief-skits of our interpretation of the facts. Each presented the required information, but in a novel way. By all reports, they certainly competed to outdo each other every day and enlivened the briefings.

VI. SUMMARY. Briefing is the concise orderly presentation of intelligence (or information). It is tailored to the audience both in choice of words and in degree of detail. The purpose of the brief must be clearly understood by the briefer and so indicated in his presentation. Thorough care must be exercised in the organization of the material in order to lead the audience step by step in the development of the point. Visual aids speed understanding and make for more lasting retention of the material. Whenever possible rehearse the brief. Be natural in presenting the brief. Greet the audience, introduce yourself, define special terms. Be sincere in presenting the material, and restate important points. Answer questions as they occur. Always make a summary. Prevent avoidable distractions. Use ingenuity to allow both briefer and audience to enjoy the brief.

GRAPHICS

I. "Graphics is a visual presentation of material, usually in addition to an oral or written presentation. It is said that a good picture is worth, 1000 words, when explained by TWO. Why? - because it simplifies statistics, shows relationships, shortens audience learning time, keeps the interest of the audience, and often may be used as notes by a briefer or instructor.

II. Types

- A. Maps (and overlays): flat, raised (photolith, photo, rubber).
- B. Charts, transparencies or opaques, flip chart.

- 1. Pictorial representation
- 2. Photographs
- 3. Diagrams (organizations, wiring, communications and command hookups)

- C. Graphs (mathematically based).

- 1. Line or curve.
- 2. Bar or column.
- 3. Circle (sectional or % age).

III. Training Aids

- A. Recordings (record, wire, and tape).
- B. Actual equipment, scale models, and mockups.
- C. Projectors - motion, slides, strip film.
- D. Flock board.

IV. Available equipment, more or less available according to one's station, include the following:

A. Minimum

- 1. Ruler, compass, scales, and protractor.
- 2. Colored pencils, crayons, and or inks.
- 3. Colored Scotch tape.
- 4. Adhesive, knife/scissors.
- 5. Poster board, graph paper.
- 6. Drafting set.
- 7. Leroy lettering set.
- 8. Blackboard, chalk, etc.

B. Available ship or station

1. Drafting materials.
2. Photographic.
3. Bulletin Boards.
4. Projectors.

- a. Baloptical
- b. Slide
- c. Overhead
- d. Motion Picture

- V. The methods, both in preparation and in use of Graphics, depend on the text and the purpose of the material to be presented. For instance an order-of-battle briefing would probably include only various scale maps and overlays. A beach selection briefing might include maps, photographs, sketches of gradient, obstacles, trafficability. A brief of foreign equipment might include pictures, models, or mockups for the subject.

The preparation of a graphic should follow four rules. The result should be SIMPLE in detail, the SIZE clearly visible to the whole audience, and a CONTRAST in shape and size together with a contrast in COLOR should produce a vivid impression on the audience.

A graphic should be used when it is directly applicable to the main points of the presentation. It should be displayed only when in use since, if it is really vivid, it may prove distraction when other material is introduced.

- VI. Graphics aid in the presentation of any material. The range of their effectiveness is in direct relationship (not to the artist skill but to the ingenuity, imagination, and observation of the briefer.).

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

(Precis)

I. DEFINITION

- (a) Measures undertaken to destroy the effectiveness of an enemy or potential enemy's intelligence system.
- (b) Intelligence upon which such measures are based.

II. MEANS AVAILABLE

- 1. Secrecy discipline.
- 2. Concealment of movements by cover or counter-reconnaissance.
- 3. Deception.
- 4. Safe guarding documents and communications.
- 5. Regulation and control of civilian communications and movement.
- 6. Censorship.
- 7. Control of news releases.
- 8. Counter-espionage activities and related efforts in:
 - (a) Counter-sabotage.
 - (b) Counter-subversion.
 - (c) Counter-propaganda.

III. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE IN AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

1. Planning Phase.

- (a) Secret - well guarded planning rooms - specially designated personnel only.
- (b) Limit dissemination in strict compliance with classification - use code names.
- (c) If possible, concentrate all participating planning echelons in an area - expedites business less danger of compromise of information by long mail or radio communication - closer control of information and personnel.
- (d) Complete plan handled by fewest possible - other planning to the compartmented.
- (e) Reconnaissance personnel to be isolated from planning and given only necessary information.

2. Staging and rehearsal.

- (a) Conduct staging and rehearsal at point which will not disclose objective - and not under observation by uncontrolled civilians.
- (b) Do not disclose actual objectives - except to those who need to know.
- (c) Make movement to objective begin as soon as possible after this to allow less opportunity for leaks and less time for transfer of information if there have been leaks.

- (d) Careful observation and control of neutral and/ or commercial shipping in vicinity.

3. Movement to Objective.

- (a) Strict compliance with conditions of radio and radar silence.
- (b) Consider use of deceptive routing, feints, demonstrations, communications, electronics, etc.
- (c) Set up counter-reconnaissance in form of CAP and AEW plus long range ASW effort.

4. In objective area.

- (a) Continue counter-reconnaissance effort.
- (b) Carefully control news releases.

Troops

- (a) Set up counter-reconnaissance.
- (b) Make maximum use of cover and concealment (camouflage, etc).
- (c) Use deceptive feints, etc., as desired.
- (d) (Passwords).
- (e) Control and screen civil populations (use local authorities as necessary).
- (f) Take control of all civilian communications and transportation.
- (g) Send all refugees, line crossers, etc., through intelligence.

5. General - all phases.

- (a) Censorship.
- (b) Security indoctrination of all personnel.
- (c) Instructions regarding capture for all hands.
- (d) Careful observation by intelligence and command for possibility of subversion of espionage - thorough investigation.
- (e) Provide adequate guard and sentry system for control of sabotage.
- (f) Ensure proper communication security by proper classification and use of codes and cyphers.