


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VOL I

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY **DECLASSIFIED**
OFFICE OF NAVAL HISTORY
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UNITED STATES FLEET
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE
20 GROSVENOR SQUARE
LONDON, W.L.

Please refer
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11 June 1946

Serial 0266

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From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.
To : Director of Naval History.

Subj: Administrative History, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Ref: (a) Cominch serial 772 of 14 February 1945 -
Naval History of the Current War.
(b) DirNavHist serial CL-162 of 19 February 1945 -
Considerations governing the preparation of
Naval History.

Encl: (A) HISTORICAL NARRATIVE: Administrative History
of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946.

1. There is forwarded herewith Enclosure (A) - an historical narrative prepared in compliance with Reference (a) and in accordance with Reference (b). Enclosure (A) is a documented record of the U.S. Naval Forces in Europe during World War II that came under the administrative command of the Special Naval Observer, London, the Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, and the Commander TWELFTH Fleet whose headquarters were located in London, England. The Special Naval Observer London, and later the Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, represented the Navy Department in the United Kingdom and the European Theater of Operations.

2. In the development of U.S. Naval representation in the United Kingdom to deal with the wartime problems and which resulted in the close collaboration between the British and the United States Navies, a unified U.S. Naval Establishment was achieved by combining the functions of the Naval Attache within those of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

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3. As Commander T ELFTH Fleet, the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe exercised administrative command and was responsible for the logistics support of the task forces assigned to Operation OVERLORD and to the supporting operations in France and Germany. This Administrative History is concerned primarily with headquarters administrations and its relationships with subordinate task forces, groups and units. It is not intended to review the administration of subordinate commands. Separate narratives will be submitted dealing with each of these.

4. This documentation, developed for use in the preparation of the History of the U.S. Navy during the War, is meant to be supplemented by and integrated with other narratives and monographs prepared in the Historical Section of this Headquarters and by Subordinate Commands in accordance with Reference (b).

H. KENT HEWITT
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

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ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES

IN EUROPE 1940 - 1946

UNITED STATES FLEET
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INTRODUCTION

The United States Navy has long been proud of its traditions of having officers who could handle delicate international situations in far corners of the world as well as they demonstrated their skill in gunnery and navigation. During the period 1917 - 1919, United States naval forces operating in European waters under command of Admiral William S. Sims, USN, laid down a precedent for friendly cooperation between the U.S. and Royal Navies both at headquarters and in the fleet. When war loomed again twenty years later the administrative pattern for coordinating the planning and operating of the two navies lay in the experiences of the previous war. Lessons and practices of that time were much quoted as we dealt with the problems arising in 1939 and the war years following. The President had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1917. Commander Harold R. Stark, USN, flag secretary to Admiral Sims in that earlier period, had become Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, in 1939.

While the United States remained officially neutral during the first two years of the war, it became increasingly clear that our interests lay close to those of the British Commonwealth of Nations, that our naval interests could be served best by cooperation with the Royal Navy.

At the start of the war our naval representation at the Admiralty in London was solely that of the Naval Attache at the American Embassy.

Our naval representation underwent at least three major changes as the mission increased in importance and the personnel increased in number. In 1940 the Navy Department sent a senior flag officer, Rear Admiral R.L. Ghormley with a small staff composed of Lt. Comdr. B.L. Austin and Lt. Donald MacDonald, to carry on discussions with higher British officials. This officer was designated "Special Naval Observer", and was under orders to report to the United States Ambassador.

After the United States entered the war, we established a larger naval headquarters organization under Commander, Naval Forces in Europe. Because in Whitehall was centered the control of the one major navy allied with us in the war, the mission of the admiral commanding the United States Naval Forces was primarily a diplomatic one. He was the representative of the Navy Department to the Admiralty, although at no time did he have the authority to commit the Navy to policies without reference to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy.

When the United States committed naval craft to the forces planned for the Normandy invasion, the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe became also the Commander of the Twelfth Fleet. The principles adopted for the supreme command of the Allied forces engaging in this operation OVERLORD accorded operational control of all naval forces to an admiral of the Royal Navy who acted as the deputy of the Supreme Commander. The Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe retained administrative command and was responsible for the logistic support of the American naval units.

One of the large administrative tasks of the Commander, Naval Forces in Europe, was in meeting the various problems connected with building bases on the soil of an Allied nation. In 1941 the Navy built destroyer and seaplane bases in northern Ireland and in Scotland under Lend-Lease, that we might be prepared to defend our sea lanes. In 1943 we built bases in southern England for use by our landing craft employed in the invasion of France. In 1944 we built bases on the western coast of France to serve the U.S. forces operating in the interior driving back the German forces.

The complexities of combined operations made the administrative interests and duties of COMNAVEU, as the Commander Naval Forces in Europe came to be known, numerous and complicated. Coordination and liaison

were administrative terms used with much meaning at COMNAVEU headquarters. At the higher level, the Commander Naval Forces Europe personally met with the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces, the naval deputy of SCAEF, the commanding generals of the American armies and air forces in the United Kingdom, as well as with the appropriate officials, civilian and military, in the British government. At lower levels, liaison with U.S. army organization, with the Admiralty, and with other British administrations was a daily function. Combined and joint committees such as the London Munitions Assignment Board, the Psychological Warfare Committee required the constant attendance of officers representing COMNAVEU. The gathering of intelligence data, technical, operational, political, general, was a function whose importance never diminished.

Over a year before the German forces capitulated, Allied machinery to implement the surrender and disarmament of the German navy, army and air forces began to function. The Commander Naval Forces in Europe became the naval advisor to the U.S. member of the European Advisory Commission, the body charged with recommending the policy of surrender terms, disarmament and related problems. On the administrative side, COMNAVEU had the task of setting

up, training, supplying and directing task forces sent in to disarm and demobilize German naval units, to seize and operate naval equipment in the American zone of occupation.

Shortly before the surrender of Germany all American naval forces in the European areas were joined under one command with headquarters in London. Operations in the Mediterranean had closed with the successful assault landings in Southern France. In April 1945 the Eighth Fleet was merged with the Twelfth Fleet.

With the completion of the war missions of Naval Forces in Europe the big administrative task became that of rolling up the bases, disposing of equipment, and moving men and ships back to the United States. The diplomatic tasks of representing the Navy Department to the Admiralty and to the various organizations involved in the occupation of Germany and determining the peace remained.

Three names are prominently identified with the history of U.S. Naval Forces Europe between 1940 and 1945. Captain (later Vice Admiral) Alan G. Kirk, USN, was first on the scene as Naval Attache in London. When he returned to Washington in 1941 to become Director of Naval Intelligence, he continued to play an important role in naval affairs looking towards Europe. In May 1942 he returned to London

in the dual capacity of chief of staff to COMNAVEU and as Naval Attache. From this he went to command of Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet and returned again in November 1943 to be Commander of Task Force ONE TWO TWO of the Twelfth Fleet. In this capacity he commanded all the American naval forces engaged in the Normandy invasion in the OVERLORD Operation. His next assignment, in September 1944, was Commander of a renewed Task Force 122 and Commander U.S. Naval Forces, France. From headquarters in France he handled relations with the French Navy and directed naval operations against German forces on the Bay of Biscay coast, and in the crossing of the Rhine.

Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) Robert L. Ghormley, USN, came to London in August 1940 as Special Naval Observer and conducted the early negotiations with the British involving Anglo-American cooperation. After a short period in Washington as senior U.S. naval member in the U.S. - British staff discussions, he returned to London and set up the nucleus of the American naval organization. When the President and the Secretary of the Navy appointed a Commander Naval Forces in Europe, Vice Admiral Ghormley was appointed to that command. Admiral Stark arrived to assume command of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe in April 1942. Admiral Ghormley was appointed Commander U.S. Naval Forces in the South Pacific but returned to Europe in December 1944 to head Task Force

ONE TWO FOUR and to be Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany. In the latter capacity he was naval deputy to the U.S. member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, became Chief of Naval Operations in 1939 and in that capacity was responsible for building up the Fleet and preparing our defenses. The outbreak of the war in Europe made it apparent that our first consideration for defense lay in that direction. In staff discussions with Canadian representatives and with the British, Admiral Stark worked closely with the British Empire forces. When the necessities of high policy dictated that a very senior flag officer should go to London to head American naval forces in Europe, President Roosevelt and Secretary of Navy Knox chose Admiral Stark. As COMNAVEU he worked on close personal terms with Mr. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty; Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord; and other high ranking British officials. The same close cooperation existed between Admiral Stark and General of the Army Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, and Admiral Sir Bertrams Ramsey, Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force.

Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, who had commanded the Western Task Force in the brilliantly conducted North

African landing operations and then as Commander of the U.S. Eighth Fleet had directed all American naval operations in the Mediterranean, relieved Admiral Stark on 16 August 1945 as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, and Commander of the Twelfth Fleet.

PART I

U.S. NAVAL REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

- CHAPTER I Special Naval Observer in London.
- CHAPTER II The Prospective Commander, U.S.
Naval Forces in North Europe.

CHAPTER I

SPECIAL NAVAL OBSERVER IN LONDON

Early in 1940 President Roosevelt and the British Ambassador in Washington discussed the possibility of beginning secret staff talks between the military services of the two countries.¹ As a result of these discussions, Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, USN, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and who had served as Director of War Plans, was sent to London to meet members of the Admiralty and other British officials.² He and his aides, Lt. Comdr. (later Commodore) B.L. Austin, USN, and Lt. (later Commander) D.J. MacDonald, USN, arrived on 16 August 1940. Arriving at the same time were Major General Delos C. Emmons, Air Corps, U.S.A., and Brigadier General George

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¹Referred to in Report of Admiral Bailey's Committee to the First Sea Lord (British Most Secret), M(J)0075/40, dated 11 September 1940. (This Committee was titled: "Committee on Naval Cooperation with the United States Navy in the event of the United States of America entering the war"). Also reported verbally by Admiral Stark, Vice Admirals Ghormley and Kirk and officers serving on their personal staffs in 1940.

These discussions are considered more fully in Historical Monograph, "U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, 1940-1945", Section II, Part A, prepared by Commander T.B. Kittredge, USNR, Fleet Historian, TWELFTH Fleet.

²Historical Study (Secret), "Anglo-American Planning for Naval Cooperation", prepared for Historical Section, Commander Naval Forces in Europe.

A. Strong, U.S.A., Director of War Plans of the General Staff of the War Department, who also came as observers. These officers did not constitute a joint delegation. They were individual offices representing their own arms of the service, sent to observe the situation in England, and to talk to the higher echelons in the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force in regard to the situation and disposition of those services, and what they might desire from us in case we entered the war.³

The administrative title for Rear Admiral Ghormley and his aides was a matter of some discussion.⁴ In discussions with the British Ambassador, the President had agreed in April 1940 to send a senior naval officer to London for informal discussions with the Admiralty. The orders first issued in July 1940 provided that Admiral Ghormley should serve as Naval Attache, with his aides as assistant naval attaches. However, in view of the fact that this was to be a special assignment it was decided that the Admiral should be styled "Special Observer", to be attached to the Embassy, but directly accredited to the

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³Ibid., page 2; also Memorandum by Lt. Comdr. B.L. Austin, USN, for Historical Section (Confidential) dated 1 Dec. 1941.

⁴Alusna London to OPNAV despatch (Confidential) 101045 of August 1940.

Admiralty. Orders were rewritten accordingly.⁵

Admiral Ghormley found that the Admiralty had been studying for some time the matter of implementing Anglo-American naval cooperation in the event the United States entered the war. On 15 June 1940, a committee had been set up under the direction of Admiral Sir Sidney Bailey, R.N., K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.⁶

This Committee, however, had gone on with its work without informing the American Naval authorities of the details of their proposals.⁷ When Admiral Ghormley called upon Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, on 2 September he was shown a copy of the report made by the Bailey Committee.⁸

⁵OPNAV to Alusna London despatch (Confidential) 091950 of August 1940. The accounts and living expenses of these three officers were handled by the Naval Attache office.

⁶Report of the Bailey Committee, op.cit.
The membership of this Committee consisted of:

Admiral Sir Sidney Bailey, R.N.
Rear Admiral W.S. Chalmers, R.N.
Captain L.C. St. J. Curzon-Howe, R.N.
Paymaster Commander R.H. Pearce, R.N.
(Secretary of the Committee).

Others attending part of the time were:
Captain R.P. Selby, R.N.
Commander M.C. Goodenough, R.N.
Commander F.B. Tours, R.N.
Commander A.C. Stanford, R.N.
Lieutenant Commander G.H.G. Ormsby, R.N.

⁷Alusna despatch (Secret) 271615 of May 1940, had informed of the appointment of the Bailey Committee.

⁸Alusna despatch (secret) 021907 of September 1940, to Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations. See Historical Monograph, "U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, 1940-1945" Section II, Part A. Proposals submitted by the Bailey Committee are discussed in detail in Section II, Part B of this Monograph.

Admiral Bailey submitted a revised draft of his committee's deliberations to Admiral Pound on 11 September, and it was arranged that Admiral Ghormley meet with the Committee to discuss the details of their proposals, with a view to forwarding them to Washington. Between 17 September and 16 October 1940, fourteen joint meetings were held, the majority being devoted to a detailed discussion of the recommendations made in the report. Admiral Ghormley was accompanied to all these meetings by his aide, Lieut. Comdr. Austin. Members of the Naval Attache's staff were invited to attend when sections of the Report pertaining to their specialties were under discussion.

After these discussions, the Committee prepared a second draft which Admiral Ghormley forwarded with a personal letter to Admiral Stark. While Admiral Ghormley was engaged in talks with the Bailey Committee, similar talks were going on in Washington. Captain L.W. Clarke, R.N., Assistant Naval Attache in Washington, had been sent as advisor for these discussions.

These talks led to a discussion of the Joint Army - Navy War Plan (known as RAINBOW III) and to the "Estimate of the World Situation" prepared by the Chief of Naval Operations on 12 November 1940 for consideration by the Secretary of the Navy and the President. This report specifically recommended early American-British staff con-

versations.⁹

Admiral Ghormley continued to hold discussions with Admiral Bailey through the autumn of 1940, exploring various questions of Anglo-American naval cooperation in the event the United States entered the war. Captain Alan G. Kirk, USN, the U.S. Naval Attache to London, attended a number of these later discussions.

Admiral Ghormley and the Bailey Committee had available to them studies of the staff arrangements for American - British naval cooperation in 1917 and 1918. Lt. Comdr. Austin and Lt. MacDonald had spent some time in studying the 1917-1918 procedures and methods before leaving Washington for London.

Therefore, of particular interest from the administrative point of view was the section of the Committee Report dealing with Liaison. The Committee recommended that in the event the United States intervened in the war, a Naval

⁹OPNAV despatches 022331 and 022334 of December 1940; Admiral Ghormley to CNO despatch 041400 of December; Admiral Ghormley to Admiral Bailey, serial 66, dated 4 December 1940; CNO to Admiral Ghormley despatch 071905 of December 1940.

Naval Attache Office Order No. 12 dated 9 September 1940 stated that the Committee under Sir Sidney Bailey had been designated by the Admiralty to receive all requests from U.S. Naval Attache for technical information. However, N.I.D. Section V would remain liaison channel between the U.S. Naval Attache and the Admiralty.

Between 12 September 1940 and 2 July 1941, the office of the U.S. Naval Attache issued 395 memoranda for the Committee.

Mission headed by a senior flag officer should be established in London. Following the 1917-1918 precedent, it was recommended that the Head of the U.S. Mission should also be appointed to command all U.S. Naval Forces that might operate in British home waters. The committee particularly urged that the U.S. send a strong staff of specialist officers. It proposed that accommodations be found for the Head of the Mission, together with his Operational and Intelligence Staff in the Admiralty buildings. Technical and Administrative staff might well be housed elsewhere, however.¹⁰ Admiral Chornley discussed these proposals with Admiral Bailey at the meeting of 19 September and made comments relative to them but made no commitments.

In the mean time studies of American defense policies had proceeded. The Joint Army - Navy Board presented a paper defining possible British - American fields of co-operation under various headings as suggested by CNO in his memorandum of 12 November.¹¹ These headings included:

- (a) American-British naval cooperation in the Pacific if both countries found themselves at war with Japan.

¹⁰Bailey Committee. Report (British Most Secret)
11 September 1940, op.cit.

¹¹Joint Army-Navy Board paper No. 325, serial 674
dated 14 December 1940.

- (b) Coordination between U.S. hemisphere defense programs.
- (c) Aid to Britain in resisting the Nazi invasion of the United Kingdom, and in maintaining trans-Atlantic supply routes.
- (d) Tentative plans, based on a common strategic concept, for cooperation should the U.S. enter the war against Germany.

Early in the British - American naval discussions it was realized that if and when mutual support should be necessary, it was highly essential to be able to communicate with one another, whether it was ship to ship or ship to shore and shore to ship. The scope of this work was very extensive. It not only required a system not previously held by either side but also one which could be understood by both sides. There were mutual recognition signals, mutual operating procedure, and last but not least, the material required and the distribution of it. Lieutenant MacDonald was designated by Admiral Ghormley to work with the British officers at the Admiralty in accomplishing the above. Lt. Comdr. Ammon, the communication officer on the Naval Attache staff, assisted as necessary. Upon the arrival of Comdr. John Leppert, USN, for communication duties, he assumed responsibilities of the communication work. At that time everything was well under way, even to the extent of distributing the necessary communications publications for

joint communications.¹²

U.S. - British Staff Conversations.

Staff discussions between representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, and representatives of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff of the Army began in Washington on 29 January 1941. A statement of the United States' position and policies, approved by the President in December 1940, was submitted by Admiral Stark and General Marshall at the opening session of the conference by direction of the Secretaries of Navy and War.¹³

Admiral Ghormley was ordered back from the discussions in London to head the naval committee.¹⁴ Captain A.G.Kirk,

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¹²See Historical Monograph "U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, 1940-1945" Section II, Part B, paragraph 25.

¹³British - U.S. Staff Conversations. Record of the Joint Meetings between the United Kingdom delegation and the United States Staff Committee. U.S. serial 0011512-3, dated 29 January 1941.

¹⁴Letter, CNO to Rear Admiral Ghormley (Secret) serial 09212, dated 24 January 1941, appointed "Naval Committee to conduct Staff Conversations with British."

Captain Kirk had been ordered to temporary duty with OPNAV in Washington, arriving 23 December 1940. (BuNav despatch to Alusna London, 102048 of October 1940). On 3 January 1941, he had been appointed Director of Naval Intelligence.

who had been Naval Attache in London from 1939 until 23 December 1940 and had been appointed Director of Naval Intelligence three weeks before the staff conversations opened, was a member. Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, head of War Plans in the Office of Naval Operations, Captain DeWitt C. Ramsey, USN, and Lieut.Colonel O.T.Pfeiffer, USMC, completed the naval committee. Captain C.M. Cook, jr., USN, served for a short time. Commander I.R. McDowell was appointed naval member of the Secretariat. The U.S. Army representatives were: Major General S.D. Embick, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, Brigadier General L.T. Gerow, and Colonel J.T. McNarney. The British Representatives were: Rear Admiral R.M. Bellairs, Rear Admiral V.H. Donckwerts, Major General E.L. Morris, Air Commodore J.C. Slessor, and Captain A.W. Clarke, R.N.

The subject of Military Missions was one of the administrative topics in the exchange of ideas and plans. The Bailey Committee had recommended that the U.S. Mission sent to London should be largely a naval one since it was supposed at that time that any forces that the United States might send to operate from the United Kingdom would be largely naval. The Washington discussions, however, explored not only cooperation between naval forces, but between land and air forces as well. The Final Report of the staff conversations, known as A.B.C.-1, recommended that

a Military Mission be sent to London composed of a flag officer of the Navy and a general officer of the Army together with their staffs. As an immediate step a nucleus mission composed of nine naval officers and fourteen army officers was suggested. The proposed mission was to work out the details of policies and plans agreed upon at the Washington meeting. As these proposals, at a fairly high level, were sufficiently similar to the trend of thinking prevailing in London earlier, the U.S. Naval group was prepared to implement them immediately.

Nucleus Staff in London.

Tentative plans for the establishment of a nucleus London Headquarters organization had been under consideration by the Special Naval Observer before the staff conversations were held in Washington.¹⁵ Consideration was given in this early planning to paralleling existing British organization where possible. For example, a proposed Ships Movement Section of the Operations Division would work opposite the Trade Section of the Admiralty. Particular emphasis was placed upon establishing a Technical Developments Section to maintain and develop liaison with British technical organizations. Estimates submitted to Admiral

¹⁵ Staff Memorandum from Lieut. Comdr. B.L. Austin to Rear Admiral Ghormley, dated 9 January 1941.

Ghormley by Lt. Comdr. Austin and Lt. MacDonald early in January 1941 called for a staff of 91 line officers, 13 medical officers, 2 dental officers, 7 supply officers, 19 warrant officers, 5 marine corps officers, 5 nurses, 13 civilian scientists. Enlisted personnel asked for amounted to 85 navy and 60 marine personnel. The total number on duty in London with the Special Naval Observer and the Naval Attache at that time comprised 39 officers and men.

As the staff conversations in Washington drew to a close, with agreement among the conferees on the question of a Military Mission, the Chief of Naval Operations directed

"that a nucleus mission be formed immediately in order to establish contacts, complete organization, and be ready in all respects for immediate expansion in case the United States entered the war."¹⁶

It was planned that the flag officer sent to London as naval member of the Mission, which would be established in case the United States went to war, would also be Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces in Northern European Waters.¹⁷ In this latter capacity the officer would have administrative command of all U.S. naval forces operating in these waters.

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Letter from Rear Admiral R.L. Ghormley to Bureau of Navigation via CNO, (Secret) no serial, dated 25 March 1941. See Organization Chart on the following page, submitted as Annex A to the above letter.

¹⁷Ibid.

Admiral Ghormley promptly submitted to the Bureau of Navigation an outline organization plan with personnel estimates.¹⁸ To establish the nucleus Naval Section of the Military Mission there would be needed immediately an Assistant Chief of Staff, a Planning Officer, one Operations Officer, one Intelligence Officer, one Shipping Control Officer, two Anti-Submarine Officers, three Material officers, and one secretary. The Assistant Naval Attache for Air was already on duty in London and would be used as Air Officer. The Communications Officer for the Naval Attache would serve in similar capacity to the Mission staff. He urged also that a captain or senior commander of the medical corps, and similar rank of the supply corps be sent to London immediately to report to the Naval Attache to make necessary arrangements for arrival of other personnel. These two officers would not be attached to the Mission, but would be attached to the Commander in Chief's staff at a later time.

In planning the future organization Admiral Ghormley visualized three units: (1) a joint Army-Navy planning committee for the Mission, (2) a naval staff for the Mission, and (3) the staff of the Commander in Chief of Naval

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¹⁸ Ibid., also letter (Secret) from Rear Admiral Ghormley to Bureau of Navigation, no serial, dated 27 March 1941; also Alusna London despatch (Confidential), 261630 of March 1941.

ANNEX "A" to Secret Letter dated 25 March 1940
Rear Admiral Ghormley to Bureau of Navigation.

Forces. He emphasized in estimates of officer personnel, however, that the heads of sections and other key personnel would serve on both staffs. The naval element of the Joint Planning Staff or committee was estimated as one captain and three other officers. The captain would head the Planning Section of the other two staffs. A chief of staff and an assistant chief of staff would function on both staffs too. The organization plan showed the following sections contemplated:

- Operations
- Planning
- Aviation
- Intelligence
- Shipping Control
- Anti-Submarine
- Communications
- Material
- Secretarial

Great emphasis was placed upon picking officers who would be discreet and cooperative in working with British civilians, military and naval personnel. Again attention was invited to the importance of a Technical Developments Section:

"New methods of warfare are constantly being tried out and unless we are in close touch with the developments in England, we ourselves will not be able to efficiently add our part toward the joint technical development."

Estimates for the Staff of Commander in Chief, United States forces in Northern European Waters set forth in brief were:

	<u>No. Re-</u> <u>quired</u>	<u>No. add.</u> <u>Duty with</u> <u>Mil. Mission</u>	<u>Avail-</u> <u>able in</u> <u>London</u>	<u>Additional</u> <u>required for</u> <u>Staff Cinc</u>
Line Officers	82	16	3	63
Medical Corps	5	0	2	3
Dental Corps	1	0	0	1
Supply Corps	4	0	1	3
CEC Corps	2	0	1	1
Marine Corps	5	0	0	5
Warrant Officers	<u>14</u> 113	<u>0</u> 16	<u>0</u> 7	<u>14</u> 90

The Bureau of Navigation met this request by establishing two separate complements: one of 25 commissioned officers for the Naval Staff of the U.S. Military Mission, one of 45 commissioned officers and 2 warrant officers for the Staff of Cinc, U.S. Forces. Pressure upon the Bureau to distribute qualified officers, particularly of senior grades, among our expanding naval establishments accounted for the reduction of allowances. Reserve officers were offered as a possibility for some of the junior ranks.¹⁹

In the mean time, while requests for personnel were being weighed, Rear Admiral Ghormley had returned to London and resumed his duties as Special Naval Observer. He

¹⁹

Letter from Chief of Bureau of Navigation to Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley via CNC, (Secret), dated 10 June 1941, no serial.

returned on 19 April in company with Mr. James V. Forrestall, then Under Secretary of the Navy, who came to the United Kingdom for discussions with British naval authorities and to inspect the sites proposed for bases that might be constructed in Northern Ireland and in Scotland for use by U.S. destroyers and naval planes in protecting convoys.

In December 1940, a special task force of the Atlantic Fleet, designated as the "Support Force", and composed of destroyer and submarine squadrons, had been established by the Navy War Plan (RAINBOW III) for later action in British waters. Captain (later Vice Admiral) L.E. Denfield, USN, was then Chief of Staff of this Support Force of the Atlantic Fleet. He with two officers, Commander (now Captain) K.B. Bragg, (CEC), USN, and Lt.Comdr. (later Rear Admiral) S.H. Ingersoll, USN, had come to the United Kingdom in March to discuss arrangements for basing this force in Iceland and in North Ireland or Scotland.²⁰

Admiral Ghormley now had written instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations that expanded and sharpened the mission he was expected to accomplish.²¹ In the first

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See pages 38-47 following for further discussion of this visit and the building of the bases.

21

Letter from CNO to Rear Admiral R.L. Ghormley, (Secret), no serial, dated 5 April 1941.

place, the Special Naval Observer was to be responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations rather than to the Ambassador, although complete cooperation with the latter was naturally to be continued. Communications regarding matters that would logically lead to CNO action, i.e. those pertaining to material or operations, were to be sent directly to CNO. Communications pertaining to technical matters would continue to be sent through the Naval Attache. A first effort was made to deal with the problems of designating personnel being sent over for duty under these new policies. Officers assigned for duty other than as assistant attaches were to be designated "Assistant Naval Observer" and were to report to the Special Naval Observer (short administrative title: SPENAVO).

SPENAVO's functions, as defined in these instructions, were (a) to conduct negotiations with the British Chiefs of Staff regarding military matters involving U.S.-British co-operation within British areas of responsibility, and (b) to expedite construction of surface, air, and submarine bases for U.S. naval forces in Europe. In performing these functions, Admiral Ghormley was directed to cooperate with the Army member of the Mission. SPENAVO was authorized to make military commitments subject to the approval of CNO, but was to avoid political commitments. Certain guiding strategic policies were set forth as policy matters to be urged upon

the British.

Discussions and negotiations over the proposed Mission in London were advanced considerably during the months of April and May. On 26 April, Admiral Ghormley was able to inform the Admiralty that President Roosevelt had approved the arrangements agreed to at the Joint Staff Discussions in Washington.²² Shortly thereafter a decision had to be made regarding headquarters arrangements for the American naval staff. The Admiralty, in accordance with their earlier proposals and as provided in the ABC-1 report, offered to make accommodations available in the Admiralty for Admiral Ghormley and a portion of his staff. Admiral Ghormley counselled holding this matter in abeyance because the Admiralty was hard pressed to accommodate its own officers. Communications between the American offices and the Admiralty were good and it appeared that to move into quarters already cramped would hinder rather than aid liaison.²³ Although the matter was allowed to rest on a basis of "if and when the United States enters the war", it was never found practical to follow out this proposal of locating American naval headquarters physically under the same

22

Letter from Rear Admiral Ghormley to Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, (Secret), serial 0042, dated 26 April 1941.

23

Letter from Rear Admiral Ghormley to Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, (Secret), serial 0053, dated 5 May 1941.

roof with the British.

On the basis of ABC-1, the War and Navy Departments prepared the Joint Army - Navy Basic War Plan (RAINBOW 5) which became the basis of the Navy War Plan, WPL 46, both of which were approved in May 1941. In London, the Special Naval Observer and the Military observer set up what was then called a Joint Planning Committee. This held its first meeting on 27 May 1941, with Admiral Ghormley and officers of his staff attending.

Although the Special Naval Observer and his staff were engaged in building up a nucleus naval staff for the Military Mission and a staff for the Commander in Chief of Naval Forces in Northern European Waters, those organizations would come into being only if the United States entered the war. These were secret titles to be used for planning purposes only. The operating title of the organization that did exist was "Special Naval Observer". In fact the Navy preferred to have little publicity for its preparations in the United Kingdom.²⁴ In response to an inquiry from the Ambassador in London, the Secretary of the Navy stated that he preferred no release of informa-

24

Alusna London, despatch to OPNAV (Restricted) 041722 of July 1941; SecNav to Alusna London, (Restricted) 072100 of July 1941; SecNav to Alusna London, (Restricted) 102140 of July 1941.

tion regarding the number of naval observers on duty.

In May, key personnel that Admiral Ghormley had asked for while in Washington in March began to arrive. Commander (later Captain) W.H. Anderson, (MC), USN, arrived on 10 May to act as senior medical officer. He was followed shortly by Commander (later Captain) C.A. Baker, USN, who became Operations Officer for SPENAVO, and Captain C.L. Austin (SC) USN, acting as senior supply officer. Commander (later Captain) R.J. Townsend, USN, reported to the Naval Attache to be his executive officer and Lt. Comdr. (now Commodore) K.M. McManes, USN, reported for duties with the secretariat of the Mission.²⁵

The next step in the construction of the U.S. Naval organization in London coincided with the next significant move by the United States government to protect American interests. On 27 May, President Roosevelt proclaimed that a state of unlimited emergency existed and directed our military forces to take active measures. On the same day arrangements were completed for a working amalgamation of the Naval Attache staff with that of the Special Naval Observer.

Captain (later Vice Admiral) Charles A. Lockwood, Jr., became Chief of Staff to Rear Admiral Ghormley, but retain-

25

A record of dates of officers reporting for duty during this period is to be found in a report of the Director of Naval Intelligence to CNO, dated 10 March 1941, (Restricted), serial 496616.

ed his primary designation as Naval Attache and continued to perform the duties of that office. The two organizations, SPENAVO staff and the Attache office, continued to exist side by side but were coordinated by Captain Lockwood. This was not a merger into one command organization. As will be seen in the officer orders setting forth this new organizational arrangement, certain officers held positions in both organizations.²⁶ Nevertheless, there were still two organizations in fact, each with their own lines of responsibility and reporting. This new move was useful in making use of all available personnel and in preventing a large amount of duplication.

The Naval Attache and SPENAVO.

The Naval Attache, normally the senior naval member of the American diplomatic mission headed by the Ambassador, was the customary channel for information exchanged between the Navy Department and the Admiralty. Naval matters as they related to the British Empire came through the Attache's office and information flowed back to the Navy Department through the Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence.

²⁶ Special Naval Observer Office Order No. 25-41, dated 27 May 1941. Naval Attache Office Order No. 5-41 (3rd Revision) dated 28 May 1941.

During 1940 particularly, as has been noted previously, the various bureaus were anxious to send officers for short periods of time to observe British methods and tactics and to study those inventions and articles of equipment that the British made available for study. In accordance with precedent these were designated assistant Naval Attaches and made a part of the diplomatic mission. In the summer of 1940, Captain A.G. Kirk, the Naval Attache, obtained permission to send a small number of officers to ships of the Royal Navy to be "observers". The title came to be used in the orders of these officers. These officers, nominated by various Bureaus and Divisions of the Navy Department, were expected to cover subjects of interest to their Bureau.²⁷ Nevertheless they came under the control of the Naval Attache in London even though they might be serving at Cairo or in other parts of the world.

The arrival of the Special Naval Observer, Rear Admiral Ghormley, at the Embassy did not affect the administrative set-up of the Attache's office. Captain Kirk and his assistants at No. 1 Grosvenor Square continued to perform the same tasks in the same administrative setting. The attache's staff continued to grow, however. On 22 October

²⁷Letter, CNO to all Bureaus (Confidential) serial 747716 dated 17 September 1940.

1940, there were 32 officers with designation of Assistant Naval Attache on duty. During the autumn, Captain Kirk requested that a junior captain or commander be sent over to act as his executive officer.²⁸ However, it was not until May that an officer specifically designated for that position arrived and in the meantime the organizational program in London had taken a different turn.²⁹

a. Office of Naval Attache, Organization.

When Captain Kirk was called to Washington in December, 1940, Commander Norman R. Hitchcock, USN, was named Acting Naval Attache and Naval Attache for Air. The CNO despatch ordering Captain Kirk to Washington indicated that he would return to London after a short period, therefore administrative changes in the Attache's office made in his absence were those intended to fit into the plans he had made.³⁰ On 1 January 1941 the administrative organization of the Naval Attache's office comprised four sections. Lt. Comdr. William B. Ammon, USN, headed the Communications and Administration Section. The Aviation Section came under Commander N.R. Hitchcock. An Operations Section was a general organization. The

28

Alusne London to OPNAV despatch (Confidential) 111515 of November 1940.

29

Commander R.J. Townsend reported 14 May 1941. Naval Attache Office Order No. 5-41 dated 28 May 1941 assigned him duties as head of Administrative and Security Section.

30

BuNav to Alusne London despatch, 102048 of October 1940.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHE
LONDON, ENGLAND

27 May 1941

OFFICE ORDER NO. 25-41.

Subject: Organization of Staff of Special Naval Observer.

1. The following named Observers and Assistant Naval Attaches will perform duties on the Staff of the Special Naval Observer as outlined below:-

- (a) Captain Lockwood - - - - - Chief of Staff
- (b) Captain Wentworth - - - - - Chief of Planning Section
- (c) Commander Baker - - - - - Operations Officer
- (d) Commander Ofstie - - - - - Aviation & Ship Movements
- (e) Commander Lee - - - - - Maintenance Officer
- (f) Commander Townsend - - - - - Intelligence, Operations
& Executive Officer for
the Office of the Naval
Attache
- (g) Lt. Comdr. Leppert - - - - - Communications
- (h) Lt. Comdr. McManes - - - - - Officer in Charge of
Secretariat
- (i) Lt. Comdr. B.L. Austin - - - - - Flag Secretary
- (j) Lt. Comdr. Headden - - - - - Submarines & A/S Warfare
- (k) Lt. Maginnis - - - - - Hydro & Aerological Officer
- (l) Lt. MacDonald - - - - - Flag Lieutenant
- (m) Capt. Duncan (CEC) - - - - - Dockyards, Buildings and
Grounds
- (n) Comdr. Anderson (MC) - - - - - Medical Officer
- (o) Comdr. Austin (SC) - - - - - Supply and Transportation
Officer.

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.,
Captain, U.S. Navy.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHE
LONDON, ENGLAND

CAL-Ye-(O)

28 May 1941

OFFICE ORDER No. 5-41
(3rd Revision)

Subject: Office Organization.

1. Effective from this date the Naval Attache's Office will be divided into Sections as follows:-

- (a) Administration)
Security } Commander Townsend
- (b) Communications - Lieut.Comdr. Leppert
- (c) Supply & Disbursing - Commander Justin
- (d) Operations - Commander Bailey
- (e) Fleet Observers
- (f) Technical - Commander Lee
- (g) Aviation - Commander Oistie
(f-1) Aviation Observers.

2. The attached diagram shows the tentative general organization and responsibilities of the various sections listed in paragraph 1. It is realized that under present conditions the organization of the Naval Attache's Office cannot be a hard and fast one nor can the duties of various sections be precisely outlined, consequently the attached diagram will be used as a general guide for the coordination of the work of the various sections and will be altered as new requirements arise.

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Naval Attache.

fourth section, Technical, was organized on 1 January 1941 under Commander Paul F. Lee, USN, "for the primary purpose of collecting technical information, except that dealing with aviation, that might be of interest to the Navy Department."³¹ This technical section became the nucleus around which a significant organization was built. After some months it was combined with the material section of the SPENAVO staff and enjoyed an unbroken existence in later organizations.

As the amount of naval organization in London increased, the despatch and communication traffic naturally increased. From time to time the Naval Communication organization served other agencies, notable examples being the Harriman Lend-Lease Mission and the National Defense Research Council.³² As noted previously, an extremely important task had been the establishment of a joint communications program with the Royal Navy. The communications section of the Attache's office worked closely with the Special Naval Observer. Lieutenant MacDonald, aide to Admiral Chormley and Lt. Comdr. Ammon worked together in handling communications and in surveying the needs for

31

Naval Attache, London, Semi-Annual Report to the Office of Naval Intelligence, dated 28 January 1941 (Confidential).

32

Ibid.

additional communication facilities that arose when it was proposed to set up U.S. naval activities outside London. When Lt. Comdr. Ammon was detached on 19 May 1941 and Lt. Comdr. J. H. Leppert took over, it was decided to make Communications a separate section. Commander Townsend, as executive and administrative officer took charge of matters pertaining to personnel, travel orders, records and reports and similar matters.

After Captain Lockwood became Chief of Staff to the Special Naval Observer as well as Naval Attache, key personnel operated as members of both staffs. At the same time the increase in the number of officers assigned exclusively to the Naval Attache made it necessary to try to clarify that organization further. On 28 May 1941, Captain Lockwood issued an organization order allocating the routine work of the Attache's office among seven divisions, qualified by the following observation:-

"While it is realized that under present conditions the organization of the Naval Attache's Office cannot be a hard and fast one nor can the duties of various sections be precisely outlined, consequently the attached diagram will be used as a general guide for the coordination of the work of the various sections and will be altered as new requirements arise."33

Administration and Security was responsible for general office routine, clerical personnel, general intelligence

33

Naval Attache, London. Office Order 5-41 (3rd Revision) dated 28 May 1941. SPENAVO Office Order No. 25.

liaison, and security. Communications dealt with despatches, secret mail and registered publications. Operations was to concern itself with merchant ship losses, naval operations and losses. Two sections were created for administering the work of the Observers assigned to the Attache, one for Fleet observers, one for Aviation Observers. The Technical and Aviation sections continued very much as before. A Supply and Disbursing Section was new. It was the supply and disbursing unit to serve both the Attache staff and the Special Naval Observer organization.

Upon the arrival of Commander Anderson (MC) a medical section began, although it did not formally appear in the organization plan until later. A small naval dispensary was set up at 18 Grosvenor Square early in June 1941.³⁴ Because the total number of American personnel to be served was still comparatively small it was decided to avoid duplication of facilities and from 1 September the Naval Medical Officers served army personnel and American civilians attached to the Embassy staff as well as naval personnel on duty in London. In addition to personnel assigned to

³⁴SPENAVO to OPNAV despatch (Confidential) 100915 of June 1941.

this activity, additional medical officers came in 1941 to observe at British hospitals and research centers.

b. The Naval Attache for Air.

A significant administrative move was made in July 1941 when the Navy Department relieved the Naval Attache of responsibilities for air intelligence and raised the position of the Assistant Naval Attache for Air to full attache status. Broad policy considerations had gone into the discussions preceding this move. The recommendation urging this type of organization originated with the Attache in London in February 1941. The Navy Department in denying the request expressed fear that such a move would be interpreted as a wedge towards divorcing naval air activities from naval control. It instructed the attache to emphasize to the British that we regarded air power as an important adjunct to sea power.³⁵ The Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy were engaged in a struggle for the control of aircraft operating in conjunction with naval forces.

When Admiral Ghormley returned from the Washington meeting he reconsidered the matter from the standpoint of conditions existing in London. He found that the

35

OPNAV to Alusna London despatch (Confidential) 192230 of February 1941.

British continued to misinterpret our policies and that because the U.S. Army had a larger air representation in its attache staff, the British often looked upon the Army as the spokesman for American air policy. He threw his support to the proposal to create a separate post of Naval Attache for Air with a senior naval aviator as "Naval Air Attache and Assistant Naval Attache." He emphasized that this proposal was mainly to strengthen the position of U.S. naval aviation in dealing with the United Kingdom.³⁶ On 25 July 1941 the Navy Department accepted the recommendation and designated Commander (later Rear Admiral) Ralph A. Ofstie, USN, senior naval aviation officer in London at the time, to the post. This office remained unique as being the only separate Naval Air Attache accredited to an American Embassy. At the same time the Naval Air Attache was Air Officer on the Staff of SPENAVO and in that capacity responsible to the Chief of Staff and Naval Attache.

c. Defining Functions.

The relations between SPENAVO organization and the Alusna organization were traceable, it would appear, to the problems arising from relationships with the Bureaus in Washington. The normal machinery of the Naval

36

SPENAVO to OPNAV despatch (Confidential) 251146 of June 1941.

Attache had functioned through the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Ships were very much concerned, however, with the work being done by the Technical Section. The Bureau of Aeronautics was interested in the work of the Naval Air Attache. The Bureau of Yards and Docks was concerned with the building of the bases then under way in the United Kingdom. SPEN.VO was preparing an operational organization, Alusna London continued to perform the traditional staff functions in intelligence.

The Chief of Naval Operations attempted to outline a workable distinction between the functions of SPEN.VO and those of the Alusna organization by giving the heads of offices and bureaus in the Navy Department directions governing their communications with the London organizations.³⁷ Washington offices were to communicate directly with SPEN.VO in all matters concerning establishment, supply, and operation of bases and naval forces in northern Europe. These subjects included (a) strategic operations, (b) operations of patrols and convoys, (c) recognition signals, (d) radio communications, (e) codes and ciphers, (f) visual communications, (g) radio equipment, (h) direction finding equipment, (i) establishment, construction,

37

OPNAV to SPEN.VO despatch (Confidential) 072152 of July 1941.

material, labor, equipment for and operations from various bases. All matters that might be deemed intelligence matters were to be referred to Alusna London. The latter point left the Office of Naval Intelligence a most important channel of communications between the London organization and Washington. This was pointed out by the Naval Air Attache, Commander Ofstie, at a slightly later time when the CNO arrangement had had an opportunity to show itself in practice.³⁸ In practice many offices outside CNO had inquiries regarding matters that did not properly fall under the heading of intelligence, particularly with respect to material. As Admiral Ghormley and others had emphasized on several occasions, our work with British agencies in the field of material was a most important and productive one. Under the existing practice the offices in Washington were required to write to the Office of Naval Intelligence, which in turn endorsed or recopied and forwarded the request. Replies by SPENAVO or Alusna followed the same route. The Naval Attache for Air, the Naval Attache, and SPENAVO joined in recommending the following division of duties:

38

Letter SPENAVO to CNO (Restricted), serial 28, dated 28 January 1942. 2nd End. to Letter Naval Air Attache to CNO, dated 23 January 1942.

- (a) "Matters affecting bases and the operation of U.S. Naval Forces would be handled in London by the Special Naval Observer;
- (b) those affecting material, by the Naval Attache and the Naval Air Attache. The only routine communications that the latter two officers would then have with the Office of Naval Intelligence would be those composed of and pertaining to standard Intelligence Reports (Form 96)."

Both matters would be handled by direct communication between interested offices in Washington and in London. CNO did not agree with this view, however.³⁹ Correspondence between the Bureau in Washington and Naval Attaches on any subject continued to be routed by way of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

d. Number of Ass't. Naval Attaches Reduced.

Further definition of the administrative organization of SPENAVO was made when the designation of the majority of assistant naval attaches was changed to "Special Naval Observer" or "Naval Observer".⁴⁰ The Naval Attache had been concerned for over a year with the number of officers he was forced to put on the diplomatic list as

39

Ltr. CNO to Naval Air Attache, London (Confidential) serial 0825216 dated 31 March 1942.

40

Ltr. Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Bureau of Personnel, (Confidential) serial 0551916 dated 26 July 1941.
Ltr., Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State, dated 19 August 1941.

assistant naval attaches, a title that carried an established meaning. He felt that there might be objections to having so many officers enjoying the diplomatic immunities and privileges that went with that designation. When a number of "Naval Observers" had been sent over Captain Kirk had obtained permission to remove from the published diplomatic lists names of assistant naval attaches whose paramount duty was as observers.⁴¹

In spite of that, however, the number of assistant naval attaches had increased to 103 in September 1941 when the change of designation was ordered. Under the new arrangement, those ordered to duty as "assistant naval attache" were judged to be performing duties most associated with the normal work of the Office of Naval Attache. Those assigned as "Special Naval Observers" were to serve primarily on Admiral Ghormley's staff. The designation "Naval Observer" was used to show those officers were for wartime operations and were to be retained on duty as long as necessary to indoctrinate them in the acti-

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⁴¹ OPNAV to Alusno London (Confidential) Jesp tch 092110 of August 1940.

vities of their particular specialty after which they would return to the United States.⁴²

e. Maintenance Allowances.

The problems of (a) designating assistant naval observers and assistant naval attaches, and (b) setting the maintenance allowance to meet the cost of living in London have always been related. During World War I all officers on duty in London were carried as assistant naval attaches and therefore received the maintenance allowances as such. In 1941 disbursing rules allowed the Naval Attache a monthly allowance of \$350 and the assistant naval attaches \$150 from an appropriation under the Division of Naval Intelligence. These funds were regarded as expense allowances for entertaining and other necessary payments connected with diplomatic work. Each officer was required to submit an accounting each month for the expenses and the maximum was not paid unless that amount was spent and claimed.

42

Office of Naval Attache, London, Annual Report, 1942 (pp. 2-4, Summary of Years 1939-1942). The change of titles was accomplished on 16 September 1941.

Letter, Director of Naval Intelligence to SPENAVO (Confidential) serial 0659416 dated 15 August 1941 set forth the Nomenclature in detail.

When Rear Admiral Ghormley submitted his plans to the Bureau of Navigation for a nucleus organization in 1941 he did not raise the question of designation of his officers, but he did recommend that a sum of \$200 per month be granted each officer on duty in London for living expenses.⁴³ This recommendation was based upon the point that the assistant naval attache allowance was not sufficient to meet the cost of living in London. Captain Lockwood, the Naval Attache, soon followed this request with one of his own, asking that the allowance be increased 50%. He contended that the cost of living had risen 53 per cent since the outbreak of the war.⁴⁴

The first response to these requests for increased allowances was to raise those for the Special Naval Observer and the Naval Attache \$50 per month. For the officers assigned to Admiral Ghormley's staff to receive an allowance, it was necessary to designate them assistant naval attaches as well as special naval observers. Officers traveling were authorized to receive \$6.00 per day in lieu of subsistence but this

43

Ltr., Rear Admiral R.L. Ghormley to Chief, Bureau of Navigation via CNO, (Secret) P-16-1EF13, dated 25 March 1941.

44

Alusno London ltr., serial 664, dated 23 April 1941. Resume of problem also in: Office of Naval Attache London, Annual Report, serial 253, dated 21 January 1942.

did not apply when they were stationed in London.⁴⁵

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The situation with respect to payment of allowances at that time was summed up in a letter from the Chief of Naval Personnel to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation in July 1941:

"Officers now detailed abroad for special duties such as those performed by the Special Naval Observer and his staff are now designated as "Assistant Naval Attaches" and receive a maintenance allowance as such chargeable to an appropriation under the Division of Naval Intelligence. In the event of war, these officers will not perform duties under the cognizance or direction of the Division of Naval Intelligence; therefore, it is suggested that the following policy in substance be considered for adoption:

- (a) officers detailed abroad will be given the proper designated titles in accordance with the duties they are to perform according to the Task Groups or organizations to which they are attached;
- (b) all administrative functions in connection with such officers will be conducted through the usual chains of command within the organization or the Task Groups to which they are attached;
- (c) they will receive pay-adjustments to compensate for the cost of providing themselves with quarters ashore and the difference between the cost of subsistence in an officers' mess afloat or a corresponding officers' mess ashore in the United States."

The Navy Department was prepared to make allowances to Admiral Ghormley's staff, but correspondence throughout the next four months was in terms of fixing the amounts that should be allowed and the manner in which the funds should be administered.

Admiral Ghormley then wrote a strong letter to CNO., supported by a cost of living study made by the Embassy.⁴⁶ In that he recommended: (a) The Special Naval Observer, the Attache, and the Attache for Air, should each be allowed \$350 per month, (b) other officers should receive \$225 per month, (c) enlisted men's allowance should be increased from \$4.00 per day to \$4.50. Because of the danger from air raids in London three "refuge" houses had been rented at government expense in the country and twenty-two officers spent a portion of their time at those quarters. The Admiralty had been following a similar procedure. However, it was necessary for officers to have quarters in town, since commuting every day was not practical.

The Department's reply to these proposals was to urge consideration of some scheme of "controlled, consolidated housing and messing".⁴⁷ Regulations governing maintenance allowances would permit increases only to cover entertaining.

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46

Letter SPENAVO to CNO (Restricted) serial 12, dated 19 August 1941.

47

Letter CNO to SPENAVO, (Confidential) serial C841516, dated 23 September 1941.

Admiral Ghormley replied that special conditions existing in England made consolidated housing and messing undesirable.⁴⁸ In regard to housing:

- (a) "The ever present possibility of bombing attacks in the London area and the serious consequences likely to arise in the organization should a consolidated personnel quarters be hit, emphasize the military necessity for a wide dispersion of the personnel during their 'off duty' hours."
- (b) "The officers and men by living in various hotels, boarding houses, and apartments are able to maintain closer and more frequent contact with the British services than would be possible if the U.S. personnel were to be housed in one or two buildings. The importance of this contact cannot be overlooked."

The chief objections to a consolidated mess would be in regard to its maintenance:

- (a) Bombing in the neighborhood of Grosvenor Square made it problematical if suitable space could be obtained.
- (b) Labor shortage made it difficult to obtain servants. Labor would have to be brought from the States.
- (c) Equipment would have to be brought from the States; war conditions made all such equipment difficult to obtain in England.
- (d) Supply of food was most harassing. "In the interest of amicable relationships we should abide by the rationing laws of this country, as we do at present."

In conclusion, Admiral Ghormley revised previous estimates and offered a formula for allowances: an amount should be

48

Letter SPENAVO to CNO (Confidential) serial 00510, dated 4 November 1941.

allowed which would be the difference between what an officer of comparable rank would have to pay for mess bill aboard a U.S. ship and the increased cost of living in London. This would range from \$180 per month for Ensigns and Warrant Officers to \$275 for Captains. No increase was requested for the Special Naval Observer or the two Attaches. Relief from the detailed accounting procedures required for maintenance allowances was strongly urged.

The Navy was spreading its organization ashore into several countries at this time, therefore it was feeling its way towards an equitable policy towards living expense allowances for all these stations. In October, Admiral Stark expressed himself as approving the payment of compensation to Special Naval Observers for the additional expense of maintenance and that it should be based upon a study of the relative price indices between the United States and the various stations.⁴⁹ He saw no reason why a special account should not be set up to take care of this. All the offices involved, Naval Operations, Personnel, Intelligence, Supplies and Accounts were about to reach agreement.

49

Ltr. Chief of Naval Operations to Judge Advocate General (Confidential) serial 067916 dated 3 October 1941. Admiral Stark proposed that the special fund be set up under the Secretary of the Navy and should be independent of the fund administered by the Director of Naval Intelligence for the Attaches' accounts.

On 1 December 1941 the Department raised the allowances for assistant naval attaches, naval observers, and the special naval observers on SPENAVO Staff to \$180 per month.⁵⁰ Warrant officers were raised to \$155.42. These allowances were administered by the Director of Naval Intelligence signing, by direction of the Secretary of the Navy, a form letter for each officer assigned to duty with SPENAVO in London authorizing the payment of a maintenance allowance. The disbursing office of the Naval Attache then could make payment.

f. Disbursing Office.

Disbursing was another function that remained always a connecting thread between the Office of the Naval Attache and SPENAVO. Increase in the disbursing work due to the influx of personnel had caused the Attache to set up a Disbursing Section in his office in May 1941. Disbursing and management of the Navy's fiscal accounts in the United Kingdom remained a function of this office throughout. The functions of a supply officer came under the staff supply officer of SPENAVO, disbursing under the Office of the Naval Attache.

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OPNAV to ALUSNA London, despatch (Restricted) 242136 of November 1941.

CHAPTER II

THE PROSPECTIVE COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN NORTH EUROPE

1. Building the Bases.

In 1940 President Roosevelt had arranged to exchange fifty over-age destroyers for rights to establish naval bases in British possessions in the Western Hemispheres. The first move to extend this to the United Kingdom was made in February 1941. Based upon our experience in World War I, when Admiral Sims brilliantly advocated the convoy system, the United States was convinced of the wisdom of the policy of convoying merchant ships. If the United States went to war with Germany we would need bases in the United Kingdom from which our convoy escort vessels could operate.

In December 1940, the Navy had created the Support Force of the Atlantic Fleet which was to operate over the Northwest convoy route. The ABC-1 Agreement had provided for a Northwest Escort Group and for U.S. submarines to operate from Gibraltar. The Navy Basic War Plan (RAINBOW 5) gave the detailed directions for deployment of forces to their stations if the United States entered the war against Germany. The Special Naval Observer in London was designated the prospective Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in North

Europe. The Commander, Support Force, and the Commander of Submarines, Atlantic Fleet were directed to work with the prospective Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in North European Waters to work out the necessary operation plans and to see that facilities were ready to carry out responsibilities laid down in the agreements and plans mentioned above.

On 20 February, the Chief of Naval Operations announced that Captain Louis E. Denfield, Chief of Staff of the Atlantic Fleet Support Force, with Commander Kendall E. Bragg (CEC USN, and Lt. Comdr. S.H. Ingersoll, USN, were being sent to inspect existing bases and suitable sites in northern Ireland and western Scotland for use by U.S. surface ships and patrol planes which might be assigned at a future date to escort convoys.¹ This was followed immediately by a directive to obtain information about possibility of two temporary shore bases for submarines in southern England and one at Gibraltar.² The British Chiefs of Staff Committee had recommended that U.S. submarines be used in the Bay of Biscay and in the Mediterranean.

Commander Hitchcock, acting Naval Attache, and Lt. Commander Austin, aide to Admiral Ghormley, met with a British

¹ OPNAV to Alusna London (Secret) despatch 192130 of Feb. 1941

² OPNAV to Alusna London (Secret) despatch 211950 of Feb. 1941

committee presided over by the First Sea Lord the following week to receive suggestions as to possible sites.³

The Chief of Naval Operations had set certain stipulations that controlled the choice of sites:

- (a) U.S. naval surface and air forces were to operate under U.S. commanders and would not be incorporated by small units with Royal Navy or R.A.F.
- (b) Twenty-seven destroyers and forty-eight VPBs would be operated at first, but tentative plans would be made for a larger force.
- (c) Eventually the U.S. Army would provide anti-aircraft protection to separate U.S. naval and air bases, but at first the U.S. forces would have to operate from tenders at British bases.⁴

With these points in mind, the British staff committee recommended that Londonderry be made available for a destroyer base, with Belfast or the Clyde area as a base for a tender. Sites for naval aircraft bases were Lough Erne, Lough Foyle, in Northern Ireland, and Oban in Scotland.⁵

3 Memorandum (undated, no classification) by Lt. Comdr. Austin; supported by Alusna to CPNAV (Secret) despatch 261008 of February, 1941. British representatives at the conference were: CinC Coastal Command, CinC Western Approaches, Admiral Submarines, Vice Chief Naval Staff, Ass't. Chief Naval Staff, Representative of Chief of Air Staff, CinC Plymouth, Operations Officer of Home Fleet, representatives of all Admiralty Divisions.

4 CPNAV to Alusna London (Secret) 192130 of February 1941.

5 Alusna to CPNAV (Secret) 261026 of February 1941.

After inspecting Portsmouth and Devonport, (Plymouth) as possible sites for submarine bases, the American staff recommended that neither be considered because of the extreme danger from German dive-bombing attacks. Mining of the approaches of these harbors by German planes also had made them of limited use for submarines. The British operated their Bay of Biscay patrols from the Clyde area.⁶ Later the United States decided to develop a submarine base at Gareloch in the Clyde area of Scotland.⁷

Captain Denfield and his party of officers completed their inspection trip and returned to the United States on the 20th of March to make their report and recommendations. CNO sent a despatch to Alusna London saying that he was prepared to arrange immediately for construction of an air base at Lough Erne large enough for four squadrons, providing assurances could be obtained from the Eire government that British and U.S. planes would be allowed to fly to Donegal Bay by way of the lowland near Ballyshannon.⁸ The British government obtained a verbal commitment from the Eire

6

Alusna London to OPNAV (Secret) 031310, 071615, 241114, all of March 1941.

7

Alusna London to OPNAV (Secret) 131530 of April 1941;
OPNAV to Alusna London (Secret) 141805 of April 1941.

8

OPNAV to Alusna London (Secret) 201627 of March 1941.

government to permit these operations.⁹ This was satisfactory to CNO and plans proceeded on that basis.¹⁰

When Admiral Ghormley returned from Washington he informed the Admiralty and the Air Ministry of our plans:

- (a) "On commencement of operations overseas Commander Support Force proposes to operate destroyers from Londonderry and Belfast in North Ireland and Patrol Planes from Lough Erne and Lough Foyle in North Ireland; and from Oban in Scotland."
- (b) "It is proposed to commence construction immediately of two advanced air bases, one at Lough Erne and the other at Loch Ryan (Stranrear); and on two destroyer bases, one at Londonderry and the other at Gareloch, Scotland."

Material and equipment was being gathered in the United States, and it was hoped to let contracts soon and commence construction.¹¹

Discussions got under way immediately to work out the details. On April 24 Admiral Ghormley met with Vice Admiral Philips, R.N., the Vice Chief of Naval Staff, and other

⁹Memorandum from Plans Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty to Lt. Comdr. Austin, USN (British Most Secret) dated 25 March 1941; forwarded by Alusna to OPNAV (Secret) 261230 of March 1941.

¹⁰OPNAV to Alusna London (Secret) 312130 of March 1941.

¹¹SPENAVO to the First Sea Lord (Secret) serial 0023, dated 21 April 1941; SPENAVO to Air Chief Marshal Portal, Air Ministry (Secret) serial 0024, 21 April 1941.

officers. Lt.Comdr. Austin, who had participated in all the inspections of sites and had represented SPEN.VO in the preliminaries in the United Kingdom, accompanied Admiral Ghormley. The British already had facilities at Londonderry and others under construction at the time. The principal matter there involved extensions and conversion of facilities to meet the American plans. The problem at Gareloch was different. No base then existed there, and the Admiralty wished to know the exact location proposed and the extent of the base contemplated. However, on the same day, April 24, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound answered for the Admiralty that that office concurred "in the general plan outlined".¹²

Very shortly the Air Ministry responded by appointing Air Marshal Sir Cristopher Courtney, Air Member for Supply and Organization, to discuss the proposed air bases with Admiral Ghormley.¹³ The R.A.F. was constructing air bases at both Loch Ryan and Lough Erne, hence there were numerous problems relating to defenses, supply of fuel, food and materials, and questions of control of operations

12

Admiral Pound to Admiral Ghormley (no classification, no serial) dated 21 April 1941; SPEN.VO to Air Chief Marshal Portal, Air Ministry (Secret) serial 0024 of 21 April 1941.

13

Air Marshal Portal to Admiral Ghormley (Secret) dated 25 April 1941.

from these bases that had to be discussed.¹⁴ On 14 May Air Marshal Portal expressed himself as follows, "the plans and proposals which you make are entirely acceptable to the Air Ministry, but two of the proposals may present some difficulty."¹⁵ These difficulties were in regard to the number of flying boats that the United States proposed to operate from the limited facilities available. However, these points were resolved.

Plans for the U.S. part in the construction were prepared in Washington and materials were assembled at Quonset Point, Rhode Island, for advance base construction.¹⁶ On 27 May, Commander K.E. Bragg, (CEC), USN., arrived in the United Kingdom with instructions from CNO and the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and with plans for the projects. He had been designated by the Bureau of Yards and Docks as Officer-in-Charge of the project.

The Bureau of Yards and Docks had made arrangements with the British Supply Council in North America and the British Purchasing Mission for shipping materials and for transportation of labor. Labor supply had been one of the problems most often raised in preliminary discussions in

14

Letter from Air Marshal Courtney to Rear Admiral Ghormley (Secret) dated 3 May 1941.

15

Ltr. from Air Marshal Portal to Rear Admiral Ghormley (Secret) dated 14 May 1941.

16

Letter SECNAV to Bureaus (Secret) dated 21 May 1941 (SCNA/EF13).

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the United Kingdom. The United States proposed to supply 400 skilled laborers and to furnish the necessary material.¹⁷ Unskilled labor would be recruited near the projects.

On 13 June contracts were signed in Washington by the Bureau of Yards and Docks for the Navy Department, and by the George A. Fuller Co., and the Merritt-Chapman and Scot Co., for construction work under the Lend-Lease Act. The British Government had paid over a sum of \$6,000,000 to the United States and agreed to make available the equivalent of \$1,500,000 to the contractors in the United Kingdom. The four bases, designated as Base I (Londonderry), Base II (Gareloch), Base A (Loch Erne) and Base B (Loch Ryan) were involved in this contract.¹⁸ Within the next few days ships departed from the United States with materials, and construction began. Commander Bragg, as Officer-in-Charge, was responsible for supervising the work undertaken by the contractor companies. He also continued discussions with the Admiralty and Air Ministry representatives on the multitude of details that arose. Captain Groer A. Duncan, (CEC), USN., who had been in the United Kingdom since 6 March 1941 as an Observer, represented SPENVO in

17

CNO to Rear Admiral Ghormley (Secret) serial 075323 dated 13 June 1941.

18

Contracts NOY-4850, enclosed with letter, Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks to Alusna London (Secret) YD serial 257 dated 16 June 1941.

most of the meetings with the British.

SPENVO headquarters and the construction forces were faced by two uncertainties which might be summarized as being caused by (a) uncertainties of time - all the planning was done with the thought that the U.S. might be drawn into the war before the bases were completed and therefore facilities would have to be improvised, (b) uncertainties due to changing strategic needs. In August, CNO approved a request by Rear Admiral R.S. Edwards, Commander Submarines, Atlantic Fleet, and Rear Admiral A.L. Bristol, Commander Support Force, Atlantic Fleet, that priority be given to constructing the submarine base at Gareloch, Scotland.¹⁹ Operational plans called for the despatch of submarines to that base immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. A tender and an accommodation ship would service the submarines until the base was completed. It was felt desirable to have personnel quarters available ashore as soon as possible so that the tender and accommodation ship could be released for other commitments. Priorities established by the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks for the U.K. bases thereafter were:

19

Letter, Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks to SPENVO
(Secret) serial YD 314, dated 6 September 1941, enclosing
CNO serial 0124923 (Secret) dated 16 August 1941.

First - Londonderry and Lough Erne
Second - Submarine Base, Gareloch
Third - Loch Ryan
Fourth - Destroyer Base, Gareloch.²⁰

Changing strategical needs likewise influenced the next two problems that emerged. In September, the Admiralty asked for information regarding the size of shops, storage facilities, etc., under construction at Gareloch and at Londonderry, and the estimated time of completion of the work. These inquiries were based upon the pressure that "the Admiralty have also to

visualize that these bases may be required for British forces before they are required by the United States. The existing facilities at Londonderry are in fact being used by British forces and it may be necessary for us to increase these forces in the near future."²¹

A fortnight later Admiral Ghormley informed the Admiralty that, while Londonderry and Lough Erne were approaching a stage of completion when machine tools were needed:

"The present strategical and political situation creates uncertainties as to the time these bases may be used by United States forces, and as to the initial strengths of these forces. Because of this and the need for spare parts, ammunition, and other technical materials and consumable stores in the Western Atlantic, these items (special materials of use to American forces) will not be sent to the United Kingdom

20.

Memo. from Comdr. K.E. Bragg to SPENAVO (Secret) 18 Dec. 1941.

21

Ltr. H.V. Markham to Rear Admiral Ghormley (British Secret) serial M.010649/41 dated 29 September 1941.

at the present time."²²

Nevertheless, the Chief of Naval Operations was willing that the British make the maximum possible use of all our bases, subject to the understanding that they would vacate in time to permit us to use the facilities. Construction would continue unabated and without interference from these operations.²³

Further changes in construction plans were made after the United States went to war. In January 1942, CNO proposed to modify the program as follows:²⁴

- (a) Londonderry: Ordnance storage to be limited to 14 buildings, 20 storage buildings and 1 administration building.
- (b) Lough Erne: No change.
- (c) Gareloch: Eliminate the destroyer base. Only half the original number of shops, etc., to be built, The hospital to be limited to 200 beds, and personnel housing limited to 3000. The oil pipeline between Loch Long and Gareloch was to be completed.
- (d) Loch Ryan: Station to be limited to size

22

Ltr.SPENAVO to First Sea Lord (Secret) serial 00409, dated 14 October 1941.

23

OPNAV to SPENAVO despatch (Secret) 171509 of October 1941; Ltr.SPENAVO to CNO (Secret) serial 00481, dated 14 November, 1941; Ltr. CominCh to SPENAVO (Secret) serial 0028 dated 18 January 1942.

24

Ltr. SPENAVO to Chiefs of Staff Committee (Secret) serial 00070 dated 29 January 1942. Ltr. Air Ministry to Admiral Ghormley (Secret) S.75299/5.9 dated 8 February 1942.

necessary for two squadrons.
The 200 bed hospital would be
completed.

The final episode in this chapter of the bases came
in February 1942 when Admiral E.J. King, Commander in
Chief, United States Fleet, released all but Londonderry:

"The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, does not
intend to employ the facilities of the bases
constructed in the United Kingdom for the sup-
port of units of the United States Fleet, ex-
cept those facilities at the Naval Operating
Base, Londonderry, North Ireland."

"It is recommended that the personnel, equip-
ment, stores, etc., which have been assembled
for the following bases be released for such
other uses as may be determined by the Chief
of Naval Operations: Base Affirm, Base Baker,
Base Two, Base S-Three (submarine base)." 25

Upon receipt of this advice Admiral Ghormley offered Base
Two, and B to the British.²⁶ The United States Army, which
had already made arrangements to use the hospital at Base A
moved to take over that base.²⁷ The British Chiefs of Staff
readily accepted the offer of the bases and worked out with
Commander Bragg and Commander Needham plans for completing

25

Ltr., CominCh to CNC (Secret) serial 00135, dated
25 February 1942.

26

Ltr., SPENAVO to Chiefs of Staff Committee (Secret)
serial 00175, dated 6 March 1942.

27

Ibid., also ltr., Major General J.E. Cheney, USA, to
Admiral Ghormley (Secret) AG-045.9, dated 6 February
1942.

the work, particularly at Gareloch according to the plans on which the Americans had started construction.²⁸ This work continued through the year 1942.²⁹ Base Two at Gareloch was to return to American use at later times, but the turn of operations plans in 1942 closed this first period.

2. N.O.B. Londonderry.

Londonderry, often referred to as Base I, became our first base in the United Kingdom. Before the United States entered the war Iceland had been our most advanced base. However, on 5 February 1942, Londonderry was placed in commission as a Naval Operating Base as part of the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet.³⁰

28

Ltr., Admiral Pound to Admiral Ghormley (British Secret) M.03112/42, dated 13 March 1942; also ltr. SPENAVO to CNO (Confidential) serial 00267, dated 26 March 1942.

A letter from General Cheney dated 23 March 1942 definitely requested permanent use of all facilities at Lough Erne. SPENAVO to Chiefs of Staff Committee (Secret) serial 00282 dated 2 April 1942, stated that CNO had approved the transfer to the U.S. Army although the British were to be allowed certain uses of the facilities.

29

Memorandum (Secret) Head of Dockyards, Buildings and Grounds Section to ComNavEu, dated 18 April 1942. The further story of the Bases can be found in the Report of the Public Works Division, Commander Naval Forces in Europe to the Bureau of Yards and Docks "Construction Battalion Activities in the E.T.O." (1946)

30

SECNAV to all Bureaus and Officers (Confidential) (SC)NB/EF13-1, dated 3 February 1942.

The base organization included all U.S. naval shore activities, U.S. Naval local defense forces and district craft in Londonderry. Captain W.J. Larson, USN., became the first commanding officer of the base.

Captain Larson and twelve other officers had been assigned to SPENAVO in August 1941 to assist in laying out the bases and had been earmarked for administrative posts in these bases when they were completed.³¹ Change in plans had made them all available for the Londonderry base and CNO directed SPENAVO to issue orders to Captain Larson as Com NOB Londonderry and Commander U.S. Destroyer Base. Commander Clyde Lovelace, USN, was named executive officer, destroyer base; Lt.Comdr. E.R. Sperry, USN, to be repair officer, destroyer base, and Captain B.P. Davis (MC) USN, was ordered to Londonderry as Medical Officer.³²

Immediately that NOB Londonderry was commissioned convoy escort control units were moved in to operate from that base. The Commander of Task Group 4.6 was moved from Iceland to Londonderry and ordered to set up escort control for

31

Ltr., CNO to SPENAVO (Secret) serial 0116623 dated 12 August 1941. Captain Larson was designated potential commander Base II; Comdr. J.P. Compton, potential commander submarine base; Comdr. E.W. Litch, potential commander Base A; Comdr. Lovelace, to be Executive Base I; Lt. Comdr. Sperry, repair officer Base II; Captain J.L. Schwartz, (MC), medical officer hospital Base II.

32

OPNAV to SPENAVO despatch (Confidential) 071407 of February 1942.

U.S. and Canadian units.³³ As a task group commander the officer's designation was to be ComTG 4.7. On 15 February he reported to SPENAVO as directed.³⁴ As commander of the U.S. Escort Control, U.K., this officer operated under the strategic direction of CinC, Western Approaches, in matters pertaining to escort-of-convoy operations.³⁵

3. Defense of the Bases.

As soon as plans for construction of the bases were well under way, SPENAVO and the Special Army Observer began discussing plans for their defense. These plans may be grouped in two categories (a) those concerning defense of the general area against invasion and against aerial attack, (b) those concerning the internal security and static defense of the bases. On 2 July, Commander Bragg of SPENAVO, Major Good and Captain Hemphill of the Special Army Observer's office attended a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff sub-committee for allocation of air defenses. Plans evolved at that meeting for anti-aircraft defenses to be provided by the British services were approved by the Chiefs of Staff.³⁶ This defense included fighter protection, an

³³ ComTaskFor 4 to ComTG 4.6 (Secret) 301741 of Jan. 1942; and ComTaskFor 4 to ComTG 4.6 (Secret) 051747 of Feb. 1942.

³⁴ ComNOB Londonderry to SPENAVO (Secret) 2256A/14 of Feb. 1942.

³⁵ U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Task Force 4, Operation Plan 2-42, serial 0070, dated 20 Feb., 1942.

³⁶ Ltr. Offices of the War Cabinet to SPENAVO (British Most Secret) dated 9 July 1941, quoted and forwarded by SPENAVO and Special Army Observer to CNO and Chief of Staff (Secret) serial 00193, dated 15 July 1941.

air raid reporting system and an anti-aircraft gun defense. However, plans were under way for the American forces to provide protection. Where the United States had the responsibility for operations, such as at Lough Erne, American forces would provide the protection. Where the British had an operational interest, as in the Clyde area, base defenses would have to be coordinated with those of the British.

The U.S. Army Observer recommended to the War Department that the Army provide 33,421 personnel for the ground defense of occupied bases and the air defense of the general area of Northern Ireland. A force of 13,700 was considered adequate for southwestern Scotland. These forces would provide anti-aircraft defense, barrage balloons, close defense of army air bases and mobile defenses of the area.³⁷

Upon recommendation of Lt.Col. (later Brigadier General) Hart, USMC, a member of his staff, Admiral Ghormley proposed to CNO that three battalions of marines be provided for internal security and close defense of the four navy bases.³⁸ CNO, however, replied that only one battalion was available and a second would be sent when available. All personnel assigned to these bases would be given instruction

37

Letter, SPENAVO to CNO (Secret) serial 00310, dated 10 September 1941. This was reinforced by SPENAVO to CNO (Secret) serial 00506, dated 26 November 1941.

38

Ltr.SPENAVO to CNO (Secret) serial 00220 dated 2 August 1941.

and armed to take part in close defense, in case the bases were attacked by invading forces.³⁹ Obviously planning for defenses was in a fluid state at that time.

As plans for providing forces developed, CNO directed SPENAVO, as the Prospective Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces in North Europe, to take up with the Special Army Observer the question of method of command within the U.S. forces for the defense of the bases.⁴⁰ The first principles of unity of command between U.S. Army and Navy forces had been promulgated in Washington. Application of these to the specific area was the problem now. After several exchanges of views, Admiral Ghormley and Brigadier General McNarney forwarded to Washington a plan for command relations. There were two basic factors controlling:-

- (a) Administrative command of all army land and air units would be exercised by the Commander, U.S. Army Forces in Great Britain, under the strategic direction of the British Government.
- (b) Under the Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW 5, the bases were to be defended by U.S. Army troops, and anti-aircraft artillery units especially would be located within the base areas.

39

Letter, CNO to SPENAVO (Secret) serial 092412 dated 21 August 1941.

40

Letter, CNO to SPENAVO (Secret) serial 0106412, dated 17 September 1941.

Existing legislation and precedents of the services did not give a great amount of enlightenment to the problem at hand. In the plan, however, the two Observers suggested that:

"Within the defense organization, the base commanders should be responsible for the defense of their respective bases, including operational control, for the planning and conduct of the ground defense, of Army forces stationed within the area of the bases."

On one other matter they proposed to delegate to the naval command authority over the troops, at least indirectly:

"For matters pertaining to the every-day house-keeping of the Army elements at the naval base, such as sanitation, fatigue details, utilities, certain supply matters, traffic and transportation, fire and air raid precautions, police recreation, and similar activities, the Army elements should be directed to conform to the instructions and orders of the naval base commander, who would then exercise a certain degree of administrative control over them."⁴¹

In January 1942 the first contingent of U.S. Army troops arrived in Northern Ireland to perform defense duties.⁴² It was not until April, however, that marines could be sent for internal security. A force of 382 marines and 12 officers were assigned for duty at NOB Londonderry.⁴³

⁴¹Letter SPEN:VO to CNC, concurred in by Brigadier General McNarney (Secret) serial 00477, dated 13 November 1941.

⁴²Report of Washington War Conference, Dec.1941-Jan.1942
(Secret) U.S.Serial ABC-4/7, 11 Jan.1942. See particularly Annex VII.

⁴³Letter, ComNavEu to ComNOB Londonderry (Secret) serial 00297, dated 7 April 1942.

Logistic Support for Forces in North European Waters.

Organization and procedure for logistical support of the bases in the United Kingdom and for the proposed forces that would operate from those bases was the subject of lengthy correspondence during the latter half of 1941. The Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW 5 provided for the transfer of task forces from the command of Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to the command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Northern Europe. Planning the logistical support of these task forces became the concern of Rear Admiral A.L. Bristol, Commander Support Force, Atlantic Fleet, as well as of Rear Admiral Ghormley. In May 1941, Admiral Bristol proposed a system of logistic liaison agencies to CNO, based upon plans outlined in RAINBOW 5 for other fleet commanders.⁴⁴ His proposed system involved:

- (a) "A liaison agency in the office of the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier, with representatives at key procurement assembly and shipping points for the purpose of receiving all requests for replacements from U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe, and arranging for inspecting, preparing for shipment, arranging for shipment, and the rendition of accounting for such replacements.
-

⁴⁴ Letter, Com Support Force, Atlantic Fleet to CNO (Secret) A16-3 (0035) dated 29 May 1941.

- (b) An Advance Base Detachment at Quonset Point to act for the Liaison agency, to determine the completeness and adequacy of base equipment being assembled there, and to arrange for the priority of shipment of this material.
- (c) Two Advance Base Supply Units, in the Third Naval District, to act under the Liaison Agency to determine the initial stock requirements of material and supplies for advanced bases, and to initiate action for the assembly and preparation of this material for shipment."

The Department believed, however, that no liaison agency was needed at that time. The Support Force Commander was to place his requirements before the Bureaus, who would be responsible for procurement, assembly and shipment of materials at the time and to the place designated by the Commander, Naval Forces, North Europe. The Mobile Repair Units already under control of the Commander, Support Force, were to act as the Advanced Base Detachment recommended in paragraph (b) above. Solution to the third problem was to order the supply officers that would become supply officers for the four bases in the United Kingdom to duty in connection with the preparation of the stocks for these bases.⁴⁵ CNO did propose, however, to place a member of the staff of Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces, North Europe, in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations when it seemed that military opera-

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⁴⁵ Letter, CNO to Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet, (Secret) serial 064102, dated 9 June 1941.

tions would begin in Europe. This officer would "have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and the transportation of logistic requirements, including personnel, for the U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe."

By August 1941, two officers had been assigned duties implementing the flow of supplies to the bases in the U.K. An officer of the Civil Engineer Corps was at Quonset Point assembling, sorting, storing and shipping material needed in the construction work. Another, a line officer, was stationed in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations to provide liaison between the Navy Department and the Commander, Support Force.⁴⁶ Admiral Chormley proposed that the organization be expanded. He recommended an office in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations "for logistic liaison between the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe, the Commander Northwest Escort Force and the several Bureaus and offices of the Navy Department." This office would:

- (a) "Initiate and submit requests for replacement of material for the U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe."
- (b) Conduct "liaison duties with respect to purchase, procurement, delivery, storage and shipment of material, for U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe."

46

Letter, SPENAVO (Prospective Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe) to CNO (Secret) serial 00262, dated 21 August 1941.

Sub-offices would be set up at Quonset Point, at the Naval Supply Depot, Hampton Roads, at the Submarine Base, New London, at Naval District Headquarters, New York and Boston, to "assemble, sort, store and ship material for the U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe" under direction of the liaison officer.

The Chief of Naval Operations approved the formation of a Special Naval Liaison Unit in the Office of Fleet Maintenance, a part of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. This Unit was to be headed by a line captain who was to be assigned to the staff of the Special Naval Observer, London, but would be ordered to report to CNO for liaison duties. A Supply Corps officer and a reserve line officer were also to be ordered to this Unit. CNO disagreed with the second point recommended by SPENAVO, holding that the functions of the proposed sub-offices were duties of the Shore Establishment.⁴⁷

The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts proceeded on a program of assembling general supplies, provisions and clothing for the European Forces at Bayonne, New Jersey. The Commanding Officers of the four bases in the U.K. when established, were to submit requisitions directly to this depot at Bayonne. Admiral Chormley was impressed with the

47

Ltr., CNO to SPENAVO (Prospective CinC, U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe) (Secret) serial 0103412, dated 26 September 1941. In ltr. SPENAVO to CNO (Secret) serial 00408 dated 14 October 1941, SPENAVO replied that the organization proposed was satisfactory.

difficulty of getting letters and requisitions through at that time, and urged that the Liaison Unit in the Office of Naval Operations be given responsibility for liaison in matters pertaining to storage and shipment of provisions, clothing and general supplies to the European forces, in addition to previous duties.⁴⁸ He also wished to see a greater proportion of supplies sent on an automatic replacement table basis. The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts raised objections to the latter proposal, but agreed to expand their table of replacements to cover "a limited number of items for which there is a constant demand and in which there is always a large turnover." Items in this list would be shipped whenever space was available, regardless of whether requisitions were in hand for them.⁴⁹ The Bureau pointed out that a desirable organization from their standpoint would be to send the Supply Officer on duty with the Liaison Unit to the Third Naval District to "co-ordinate matters of procurement, assembly, and shipments of materials to Naval Forces, North Europe." This would be done in close liaison with the Unit in Washington. This Supply

⁴⁸ Letter, SPENAVO to CNO (Secret) serial 00437, dated 23 October 1941.

⁴⁹ Letter, CNO to SPENAVO (Secret) serial 0153312, dated 1 January 1942, with 2nd Endorsement by BuSanda, dated 23 December 1941 enclosed.

Officer would "perform no purchase nor accounting functions, but ... his entire attention would be devoted to the receipt of requests for material from the Naval Forces, North Europe, and the follow through of such requests to insure expeditious shipment."

When it was finally settled that the United States would operate only Base I at Londonderry, the logistic policy for the forces in the United Kingdom was announced. When in October 1941, Admiral Ghormley had requested the Office of Naval Operations to state such a policy, Rear Admiral (later Admiral) F.J. Horne, Acting CNO, replied that it was "considered unnecessary and undesirable (to do so) because a sudden change in the strategical or the tactical situation might, with equal suddenness, make such a policy impracticable."⁵⁰

In March 1942, Admiral Horne set forth the following policy:

- (a) Fuel to be obtained from British and United States sources.
- (b) Personnel, technical supplies, ammunition and subsistence supplies from United States sources, either direct or by arrangements with the U.S. Army Forces in North Ireland.

50

Letter, CNO to SPENAVO (Secret) serial 0153312, dated 1 January 1942.

- (c) Repair and upkeep facilities were to come from the Base facilities already set up, supplemented by use of available British facilities.
- (d) Sea transportation for the continued support from United States sources would be arranged by the Director Naval Transport Service by employing vessels operated by the NTS; vessels allocated by the Administrator of War Shipping; by employing space in vessels of the Army Transport Service made available to the Navy; and space in vessels made available by the British Ministry of War Transport.⁵¹

SPENAVO was to arrange for the logistic support required from British sources and coordinate all logistic matters between the U.S. Army and Naval forces in the U.K. and between the U.S. Naval forces and British agencies. In the United States, the Liaison Unit in CNO became a member of the staff of the Commander of Task Force 4, Atlantic Fleet, commanding the convoy escorts in the North Atlantic. This office continued to have "liaison duties with respect to the quantities and the transportation of logistic requirements for the Naval Operating Base, Londonderry." The arrangement set forth in this directive continued to operate until the plans for the Normandy invasion were laid down.

51

Letter, CNO to SPENAVO and others (Secret) serial 012712, no date, (probably March 1942).

SPENAVO Organization.

Increase of staff necessary to handle the various duties assigned SPENAVO necessitated new office quarters. The Embassy establishment had increased also. Therefore it was mutually important that the Special Observers Group, Army and Navy, leave the Embassy building at No. 1 Grosvenor Square. Admiral Ghormley and Brigadier General Lee made a survey of buildings in the neighborhood of the Embassy, and in a memorandum to the Ambassador on 8 May they requested that the Embassy arrange to take over the two buildings known as No. 18-20 Grosvenor Square. The Observers planned to occupy the two buildings jointly.

The State Department agreed that, to get immediate action, the Embassy should conduct the negotiations and make the financial arrangements for the buildings. Arrangements were made with the Ministry of Works and Buildings who requisitioned the desired buildings from the owners. The establishment was licenced to the Embassy for an agreed annual rental of 28,850 pounds. Approximately forty employees required for maintenance of the buildings were carried on the Embassy payroll. Financial contributions by the Army and Navy towards the cost of the buildings were made in Washington by the War and Navy Departments to the State Department.

On 12 July 1941, the naval group moved out of the Embassy, leaving only a naval intelligence mail and file room, and an office to be occupied part-time by the Naval Attache. Communications remained in the Embassy until 7 September, when it was moved into No. 20. Supply and Disbursing occupied No. 18, the larger part of SPENAVO staff being in No. 20.

In January 1942 the Army and Navy Observers took over joint management of the buildings, relieving the Embassy of financial and management responsibilities.⁵² The Ministry of Works licence was transferred to them and a joint plan of operation worked out. Maintenance of the building was placed with a British civilian who had served the owners and she managed the civilian staff of building workers. The two Observers appointed a joint board from their staff to superintend and determine policy. It was agreed that the Army would provide the guards for the building, although each service would be responsible for the security of their offices. Telephone and switchboard and garage facilities were pooled and operated jointly. Office space was assigned by the joint board.

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Letter, SPENAVO to the Ambassador, serial 37, dated 30 January 1942, signed by Admiral Ghormley and Major General J.E. Chaney, Special Army Observer. Also: Letter, SPENAVO to SecNav via CNO, serial 40, dated 31 January 1942 (forward copies of agreements for Bureau of Yards and Docks).

By the time the SPENAVO staff had settled in the new offices, all the key personnel asked for to head sections of the staff had arrived. The nucleus of the organizational pattern was now complete. In outline form the organization and key personnel of SPENAVO was as follows:

Vice Admiral Ghormley	SPENAVO
Lt.Comdr. (later Commodore) B.L.Austin	Flag Sec.
Lieut. (later Commander) D. MacDonald	Flag Lieut.

Secretariat

Lt.Comdr. (later Commodore) K.H. McManes, USN.

Plans

Captain R.S. Wentworth, USN.
Comdr. (later Captain) I.E. Kelly, USN.
Lt.Col. (later Brig.Gen.) F.A. Hart, USMC.

Operations

Comdr. (later Captain) C.A. Baker, USN.

Aviation

Comdr. (later Rear Admiral) R.A. Ofstie, USN.

Shipping

Comdr. (later Rear Admiral) W.H. Flanigan, USN (Act).
Comdr. (later Captain) V. Bailey, USN.

Submarine and Anti-Submarine Warfare

Lt.Comdr. (later Captain) F.P. Watkins, USN, replaced by
Comdr. (later Captain) J.P. Compton, USN, in November 1941.
Lt.Comdr. (later Commander) P.L. Hammond, USNR.

Operational Intelligence

Lt.Comdr. (later Captain) A.D. Clark, USN.

Maintenance and Material

Commander, (later Rear Admiral) T.A. Solberg, USN.

Marines

Major (later Colonel) W.I. Jordan, USMC.

* * * * *

Naval Attache and Chief of Staff

Captain (later Vice Admiral) C.A. Lockwood, USN.

Executive to Naval Attache
and
Head of Intelligence Section

Comdr. (later Captain) R.J. Townsend, USN.

Technical Section

Comdr. (later Captain) P.F. Lee, USN.

Communications

Lt. Comdr. (later Captain) J.H. Leppert, USN.

Medical

Comdr. (later Captain) W.H. Anderson, (I.C), USN.

Supply

Comdr. (later Captain) C.L. Austin, (SC), USN.

Buildings, Yards and Docks

Captain G. A. Juncan, (CEC), USN.

The officer in charge of the Secretariat supervised and had custody of correspondence and records of the Naval Staff of the nucleus Military Mission in London. In doing this work he carried out liaison with the British War Cabinet Secretariat also. As a collateral duty this officer also advised SPENAVO on legal matters and kept historical records of the staff. In November 1941, Commander Leslie

J. McNemar, USNR., arrived to set up a Legal Office, and Lieut. (later Commander) Peter Van der Poel, USNR., to establish a Historical Section.

The Plans Section was modeled on that of Admiral Sim's staff in the last war. Officers assigned to it had no administrative duties, but advised SPENAVO on matters of naval or joint strategy. They maintained liaison with the planners on the Army Observers staff and with the Plans Division of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Because construction of the bases was one of the major projects under SPENAVO jurisdiction at that time, the lengthy title of "Officer in Charge Dockyards, Buildings and Grounds" was given to Captain Duncan (OEC) who performed the duties usually reserved for a "Public Works Officer". This officer's function was to advise SPENAVO on all matters under cognizance of the Bureau of Yards and Docks. He maintained liaison with the Civil Engineer of the Admiralty and of the Air Ministry, and the Army Engineer of the Army Observer's staff. He was the principal liaison officer between the main base and the Army Engineer's staff in the Army.

The historical section of the SPENAVO staff and the Technical Section of the Naval Historical Section were formed during November 1941 and continued service until the end of the time. Upon Commander Lee's detachment, Commander Solberg was placed

in charge of both units. The title of the section changed from time to time, ultimately became Technical Intelligence. Officers assigned to this section received a large number of liaison assignments dealing with material and technical intelligence matters. One of the more important assignments pertaining to material came from CNO's direction to SPENLVO in March 1942 to designate a suitable officer to represent the U.S. Navy on the London Munitions Assignment Board.⁵³

This organization was being set up to parallel the Munitions Assignment Board in Washington and to assign war materials produced in the United Kingdom for Allied use. The London board became particularly interested in Lend-Lease material and its assignment to forces serving under British strategic direction. Commander Solberg was appointed the first Naval representative to the London board.

In September 1942, the Navy Department gave recognition to the unpaid work of the staff in London and to the work being done by the staff. Admiral Solberg was promoted to Rear Admiral.⁵⁴

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1. CNO to CMC, 14 March 1942 (Confidential) (CNO 14 March 1942).
2. CMC to CNO, 14 March 1942 (Confidential) (CMC 14 March 1942).
3. CNO to CMC, 14 March 1942 (Confidential) (CNO 14 March 1942).
4. CMC to CNO, 14 March 1942 (Confidential) (CMC 14 March 1942).

56

1. CNO to CMC, 14 March 1942 (Confidential) (CNO 14 March 1942).

In November, when the outlines of the organizational picture were largely complete, the staff numbered 124 officers, including all Special Naval Observers, Naval Attache and Assistant Naval Attaches.⁵⁵ Not all of these were in London. Twenty-four were civil engineer corps officers with Commander Bragg superintending the construction of the bases. Four medical corps officers were assigned as commanding officers of base hospitals under construction. Six line officers and one supply officer were earmarked as staff of the bases and were working on the base work. In March 1942, at the close of the SPENAVO period, the personnel picture was much the same. The roster listed a total of 100 officers as Special Naval Observer staff, including 20 construction officers, 6 electricians, 1 medical officer, 1 supply officer and 8 line officers primarily concerned with administration and construction at the bases.

Naval Organization after War Declared.

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the understandings arrived at in ABC-1 had to be revised. Strategic interests then changed the function of the Naval staff in London. For a few days after 7 December, SPENAVO and staff were involved in the heavy work of transmitting information between the Admiralty and the Navy Department. On 18 Decem-

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This figure does not include officers designated Naval Observer, who were under the Naval Attache for temporary duty. This problem was discussed previously.

ber, it was understood that the U.S. naval forces that had been planned for "Naval Forces, North Europe" had had to be diverted to the Pacific and to convoy operations in the Western Atlantic.⁵⁶ Then, early in January, Admiral Ghormley raised with the Navy Department the question: Was the nucleus mission organized by the Observers to become actually a Mission as contemplated in ABC-1?⁵⁷ At the same time he sought to discover what forces the Navy Department would be sending to operate from the Bases built in the United Kingdom.⁵⁸

The latter question was answered almost immediately, in a manner that illustrated the great change in strategic needs of the Navy:⁵⁹

- (a) No aviation units were to be sent to Base B (Stanraer).
- (b) No aviation units would be sent for the present to Base A (Lough Erne).
- (c) No submarines would be based in the United Kingdom.
- (d) Destroyers would not be based at Base Two (Cardock).
- (e) No Marines were available for the internal security at Base I; the Army to be requested to supply guards.

56

British Admiralty Delegation in Washington to Admiralty despatch 182114/16 December.

57

SPENAVO to OPNAV despatch (Plain) 051323 of January 1942.

58

SPENAVO to OPNAV despatch (Secret) 051211 of January 1942.

59

COMINCH to SPENAVO despatch (Secret) 052115 of January 1942.

Organization Chart of SPENLVO as
approved by Vice Admiral Ghormley
on 25 February 1942.

(This to be photolithographed and
included in final printed copy)

The fundamental questions, of which SPENLVO's two questions were a part, were in discussion in Washington at a high level. In February, the answer to the question regarding the Mission was ready. Back came a despatch signed by Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations; Admiral King, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, saying that the Combined Chiefs of Staff then established in Washington would implement the collaboration between the United Nations.⁶⁰ No Mission in the sense of ABC-1 would be set up. SPENLVO would continue as the representative of CNO, and also now of CominCh; Spobsa would continue as representative of the Chief of Staff. Londonderry, the sole base operating in the United Kingdom, had been placed under Commander, Atlantic Fleet.

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CNO, CoS, CominCh to SPENLVO and Spobsa (Secret) 151036 of February 1942.

The Military Observer had received instructions from the War Department on 8 January 1942 that "by direction of the President and effective immediately he was designated Army Member of the United States Military Mission and Commander of the United States Army Forces in the British Isles...."

Other correspondence had led him to believe that the Military Mission had been authorized. Memorandum by Brigadier General Charles E. Bolte to Vice Admiral Ghormley, dated 27 January 1942.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, JUN 1940 - APRIL 1942.

12 July 1940

Rear Admiral R. L. Ghormley, USN, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and former CNO selected to go to London as Senior U.S. Naval representative.

10 August

EuNav rewrote orders for Admiral Ghormley and two aides to designate them Special Observers at the Embassy, rather than as Naval Attache and Assistant Naval Attaches.

16 August

Admiral Ghormley and aides arrived in London. Major General D.C. Emmons, Air Corps, and Brigadier General G.A. Strong, of War Plans Division of the General Staff, arrived at the same time for military observation. Admiral Ghormley met with Admiralty and other British officials.

17 September

Admiral Ghormley held first meeting with Bailey Committee. This Committee, formed by the Admiralty under Admiral Sir Sydney Bailey had functioned since 20 June 1940. Admiral Ghormley met this committee 14 times between 17 September and 16 October.

November

Arrangements were made for British-U.S. discussions in Washington on military problems.

23 December

Captain Alan G. Kirk, USN., Naval Attache at London, was ordered to Washington for temporary duty. Commander Norman R. Hitchcock made Acting Naval Attache.

1 January 1941

Organization of Naval Attache Office reorganized to form four sections: Communications and Organization, Technical, Aviation, Operations.

9 January

Preliminary plans drawn for Nucleus Organization for the London headquarters in event the U.S. entered the war.

23 January

Captain Kirk appointed Director, Naval Intelligence.

24 January

CNO appointed Rear Admiral Ghormley to conduct staff conversations with British in Washington. Rear Admiral Ghormley arrived to act as Senior U.S. Naval Representative at these staff talks.

29 January

British-U.S. Staff Conversations begun. They continued until 27 March.

6 March

Captain L.E. Benfield, USN., Chief of Staff of Support Force, Atlantic Fleet; Comdr. Bragg (CEC) USN., and Lt. Comdr. Ingersoll arrived in U.K. for survey of sites for proposed destroyer and naval air bases.

Captain Charles A. Lockwood, Jr., U.S.N., arrived to assume duties as Naval Attache and Naval Attache for Air.

11 March

President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Bill.

25 March

Rear Admiral Ghormley submitted personnel estimates for Naval Staff, U.S. Military Mission in London, and Staff of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces in Northern European Waters, to Bureau of Navigation.

CNO had designated the Special Naval Observer in London "Prospective Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces in North European Waters."

19 April

Mr. James V. Forrestal, Under Secretary of the Navy, arrived in U.K. to inspect base sites and meet British officials. Rear Admiral Ghormley returned with instructions to set up nucleus staff for proposed Military Mission and for proposed Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in North Europe. Operating title of organization was to be Special Naval Observer (short title SPENAVO).

21 April

Rear Admiral Ghormley informed the Admiralty and Air Ministry of Navy Department's plans for destroyer and air bases in U.K.

26 April

SPENAVO informed Admiralty that President Roosevelt had approved the arrangements agreed to in ABC-1 (British-U.S. Staff Discussions).

4 May

Admiral Gormley transferred his headquarters to the Admiralty; the British Staff moved to the Admiralty and portion of his staff in accordance with ABC-1. SPENLVO requested this move be held in abeyance.

10 May

Comdr. W.H. Anderson (MC) arrived and reported as Medical Observer. He became staff medical officer.

13-18 May

Captain C.A. Baker arrived, assigned as Operations Officer for SPENLVO. Comdr. R.J. Townsend reported as Executive Officer to the Naval Attache; Lt. Comdr. K.M. McInnes, Secretariat of proposed Military Mission. Captain C.L. Austin (SG) arrived, became senior supply officer.

15 May

Organization of Naval Attache office rearranged to form seven sections: Administration and Security, Communications, Operations, Fleet Observers, Technical, Aviation and Aviation Observers, Supply and Disbursing.

27 May

President Roosevelt declared a state of unlimited emergency.

Naval Attache, Captain Lockwood, became Chief of Staff to SPENLVO, Rear Admiral Gormley. Office of Naval Attache continued to function.

7 June

Captain R.S. Wentworth reported, became Planning Officer for SPENLVO.

10 June

Bureau of Navigation established officer complements for Naval Staff, U.S. Military Mission in London, and Staff of Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces, North Europe.

12 June

Bureau of Yards and Docks negotiated contract with the George A. Fuller Co., for construction of Bases I, II, A, and B.

26 June

Comdr. T.A. Solberg arrived to become Material Officer; Comdr. H.A. Flinnigan (USN Ret), to be Shipping Control Officer and Lt. Col. F.A. Hart, USMC, assigned to Planning.

30 June

Two marine corps officers and 49 enlisted men arrived to form a marine guard at the Embassy.

12 July

SPEN.VO moved offices from Embassy at 1 Grosvenor Square to buildings at 18 and 20 Grosvenor Square, occupied jointly with the Army Staff of proposed Military Mission.

25 July

Office of Naval Attache for Air made separate office. Comdr. R.A. Orstie, who had been Assistant Naval Attache for Air appointed. He also served as Air Officer for SPEN.VO.

28 July

Thirteen officers, headed by Captain W.J. Larson, ordered to U.K. for duty with advanced bases. (OpNav. ltr. to BUNAV, serial 0105023 dated 28 July 1941; CNO ltr. to SPEN.VO serial 0116623, dated 12 August 1941).

7 August

Rear Admiral Ghormley recommended to Bureau of Navigation that complements established 10 June be combined into one complement; Office of Special Naval Observer, London.

30 August

Naval Dispensary set up at 18 Grosvenor Square to serve Embassy, Navy and Army personnel on duty in London.

7 September

Naval Communication Section moved from Embassy to No. 20 Grosvenor Square.

16 September

Titles of most Assistant Naval Attaches changed to Special Naval Observer. Small number primarily performing duties associated with the Naval Attache's office continued as Assistant Attaches.

19 September

Rear Admiral Ghormley raised to Vice Admiral, continued as Special Naval Observer.

17 October

CNO authorized use of U.S. Bases in Ireland and Scotland by the British temporarily, pending arrival of U.S. forces.

8 December

United States entered the war.

18 December

Word received in London that forces originally assigned to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in North Europe, directed to the Pacific.

21 December

Captain T.A. Solberg became head of Technical Section, Naval Attache Office, and Maintenance Officer for SPENVO.

29 January 1942

Plans for bases modified: Destroyer Base at Careloch dropped, air base at Loch Ryan to be smaller than originally planned.

3 February

SecNav established HOB Londonderry, under command of Commander, Atlantic Fleet.

15 February

CNO notified Admiral Ghormley that Military Mission to England will not be established. Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington will function instead of organizations planned previously. Admiral Ghormley to continue as SPENVO.

25 February

Cominch (Admiral King) notifies CNO that Bases II, A, and B will not be required for support of fleet units. Londonderry only base to be used.

6 March

British notified that CNO consents to turning over Bases II, A, and B for permanent use by the British.

17 March

Admiral H.R. Stark detached as CNO and assigned as Commander, Naval Forces in Europe, with additional duty as Special Naval Observer, with rank of Admiral. Vice Admiral Ghormley received despatch orders assigning him ComNavEu and SPENVO.

18 March

Cominch issued despatch orders directing Task Force 39 to proceed to the U.K., to be under operational orders of CinC, British Home Fleet, and under administrative command of ComNavEu.

21 March

SPENVO directed to assign an officer to represent the Navy on the London Migrations Assignment Board. Captain Solberg appointed.

4 April

Task Force 39 arrived at Scapa Flow; in command of Rear Admiral R.C. Giffen. This Force operated with the British Home Fleet.

6 April

Vice Admiral Chormley ordered to proceed to Washington and report to CominCh. He departed 12 April.

10 April

Logistics plan for Task Force 39 (renamed Task Force 99) agreed upon and approved by CominCh.

20 April

CominCh transferred command of NOB Londonderry from Com Atlantic Fleet to ComNavEa.

30 April

Admiral Stark assumed command of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

PART II

THE COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE Headquarters Organization, 1942-1943

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Chapter III Organization and Personnel.
Chapter IV Intelligence and Naval Attaches.
Chapter V The Planning Organization.

CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

Anglo-American discussions in Washington in February 1942 decided the policy control structure for the Allied powers in the common struggle against Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, to be located in Washington, would determine the world-wide military strategy of the United States, the British Empire and all associated powers, except Russia. The British Chiefs of Staff would send their representatives to Washington to sit in conference with the United States Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, it was necessary that the United States have high ranking and well informed naval and military officers in London to represent the United States.

Vice Admiral Ghormley had been in London for a year and a half as Special Naval Observer and for almost a year had directed preparations for operations in British Home Waters as Prospective Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Northern European Waters. However, the main emphasis in U.S. naval operations had shifted to the Pacific. Admiral Ghormley soon was sent to an operational command in the Southwest Pacific.

President Roosevelt and Secretary of the Navy Knox selected Admiral Harold R. Stark to be the Naval Representative of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in London. As Chief of Naval Operations since 1939 none was more conversant with the United States military and foreign policies. He had taken the initiative in bringing about the military staff conversations between the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff in 1941. Admiral Ernest J. King had been brought in as the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and in this capacity directed the operations at sea of the U.S. naval forces. It was agreed that Admiral Stark was a logical selection for the important diplomatic and administrative post at London.

Considerable attention was given to the example of Admiral Sims' command in Europe during 1917-1919 in the thinking that went into the creation of the post in 1942. Admiral Sims had been "Commander, United States Naval Forces Operating in European Waters." All U.S. Naval activities in England and in France had been concentrated under Admiral Sims' command. In 1942 it was determined that Admiral Stark would be more than an observer or the head of a mission, he would be in command of forces also. On 17 March 1942, orders were issued detaching him as Chief of Naval Operations and designating him to relieve Vice Admiral Ghormley as Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, with additional duty as Special

Naval Observer. This was confirmed by an Executive Order, signed by President Roosevelt that directed that Admiral Stark retain the rank of Admiral in this assignment.¹

The Secretary of the Navy granted Admiral Stark a month leave of absence to take care of personal affairs before taking up his new duties. Vice Admiral Ghormley was assigned duty as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe and Special Naval Observer, to remain in London until relieved.² On 6 April 1942, Admiral Ghormley received orders detaching him from duty in London and directing him to report to Commander in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, in Washington.³

In March 1942, there was considerable uncertainty about how extensive naval forces could be assigned to the European waters. In the Atlantic, U.S. Naval forces were fighting the German submarine forces in American waters. The British - U.S. Routing Agreement governed the convoy systems and escorting of convoys, but U.S. operational con-

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The Executive Order was dated 18 March 1942. It confirmed that Admiral Stark would retain the rank of Admiral. At that time the rank of Admiral was usually associated only with the positions of Chief of Naval Operations, and of Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

2

SECNAV to SPENAVO despatch 172019 of March 1942.

3

Bureau of Navigation to ComNavEu despatch (Confidential) 062310 of April 1942. He left from Bristol, England on 12 April. After a short interval in Washington, he was sent to the South Pacific, with operational headquarters in New Zealand.

trol passed to the Royal Navy in mid-ocean. However, the day following the announcement that a Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe had been appointed, CominCh set in motion operations to send to the United Kingdom the first of the task units that would comprise "Naval Forces in Europe." The Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet was directed to send a task force composed of one battleship, two cruisers, one carrier, and six destroyers to report to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, to be used under the operational control of the Commander British Home Fleet.⁴ Task Force 39, commanded by Rear Admiral J.W. Wilcox, and comprising the WASHINGTON, WICHITA, TUSCALOOSA, WASP, WAINWRIGHT, WILSON, PLUNKETT, LANG, STERRETT, and MADISON set out on 23 March.⁵

In March the U.S. Navy had committed itself to construct a large number of landing craft to be used to carry Army forces in the invasion of Europe in an operation then being discussed under the code name of ROUNDUP. The British had proposed two major plans; an operation against the continent (ROUNDUP) and an operation in North Africa, known as GYMIST. These were being discussed as alternative plans for offensive

4

CominCh to Cinclant despatch (Secret) 181440 of March 1942.

5

Cinclant to ComCrudiv 7, etc., despatch (Secret) 201920 of March 1942.

operations to be mounted as soon as men could be trained and equipment manufactured and transported to the staging areas.

During March and early April considerable planning was done in Washington and in London relative to defining the program for Admiral Stark, shaping the organization that he would command, and defining its functions. Captain Alan G. Kirk was selected as Chief of Staff and he reported to Admiral Stark in Washington. Plans prepared by the General Board about the scheduled London headquarters were made available to him. Lt. (later Commander) T.B. Kittredge, USNR, who had served on Admiral Sims' staff, in the Office of Naval Records and Library outlining the prepared memoranda organization that Admiral Sims had used and problems discovered by that staff, reported for duty with Admiral Stark.

Among problems that were discussed and conclusions reached was, who should perform the function of naval attache? In 1917, Admiral Sims ultimately had asked to be designated naval attache himself. All activities had been concentrated under his command and all correspondence of any nature concerning U.S. naval subjects in Europe had been addressed to his headquarters in London.⁶ Admiral Stark's view was that while the

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Letter, Admiral Sims to the Secretary of the Admiralty, cited in a memorandum for Admiral Stark by Captain Wilkinson in March 1942.

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe should not be a member of the Ambassador's diplomatic mission and as naval attache a member of the Ambassador's staff, all U.S. naval activities in the United Kingdom should be unified under the Commander. He was content to have his Chief of Staff serve as naval attache, and this arrangement was agreeable to the Director of Naval Intelligence as well. Captain Kirk, of course, was acquainted with the problems involved, from his previous experience as Naval Attache at London and as the Director of Naval Intelligence.

Admiral Ghormley had made a series of recommendations regarding personnel and organization necessary for the U.S. naval headquarters in London. These were presented in final form on 28 March 1942, after he had been designated Commander Naval Forces in Europe. He requested that key officers be ordered to report to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe. They were then serving under orders to report to Special Nav Observer. Other officers, assistants in various divisions and sections, would be ordered to communications, operations and intelligence as needed.⁷ The latter assumption was based upon authority given by the Bureau of Navigation in December 1941. At that time, just before Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz

7
Letter, Commander, Naval Forces in Europe to Chief of Bureau of Navigation (Secret) serial 00263 dated 25 March 1942.

(then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation) had written to Admiral Ghormley that, with certain specified exceptions, officers ordered to Europe for duty would generally be ordered to SPEN.VO, who in turn could assign them as he saw fit.⁸

Admiral Ghormley proposed the following list of key officers and their designations:

Captain Ralph S. Wentworth,	Aide and Chief of Staff
Commander K.M. McKanes,	Aide and Flag Secretary
Lieut. A.C. Veasey,	Aide and Flag Lieutenant
Captain Charles A. Baker,	Operations Officer
Captain T.A. Solberg,	Repair and Maintenance
Captain H.A. Flanigan,	Shipping and Shipping
	Liaison
Captain W.H. Anderson,	Medical Officer
Captain C.A. Austin,	Supply Officer
Captain G.A. Duncan,	Maintenance and Construc-
	tion of Bases
Col. F.A. Hart, USMC	Combined Operations
Commander J.P. Compton,	Submarine Officer
Commander L.E. Kelly,	Intelligence Officer
Commander R.J. Townsend,	Personnel Officer
Commander E.B. Strauss,	Plans Officer
Lt. Comdr. P.L. Hammond,	Anti-Submarine Officer
Lt. Thomas H. Morton,	Assistant Gunnery Officer
Lt.(jg) J.C. Bray, jr.,	Registered Publications
Commander F.M. Litch,	Additional duty on ComNavEu
staff; permanent duty as Naval Attache for Air	
Commander R.J. Leppert,	duty on ComNavEu staff as
Communication Officer; with additional duty as	
Assistant Naval Attache.	

This plan for the administrative organization for the naval headquarters at London, as drawn up by Vice Admiral

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Letter, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to Vice Admiral Ghormley (Secret) dated 4 December 1941.

Ghormley and as received by Admiral Stark and Captain Kirk in Washington followed the pattern already established in London, except that a few changes in personnel were made. The accompanying organization chart and table of functional duties were drawn up in Washington for study by Admiral Stark and Captain Kirk before their departure.

Before leaving Washington, Admiral Stark had an interview with President Roosevelt in which they discussed over-all world strategy rather than specific directions. Admiral Stark had no letter of instructions. His experience as Chief of Naval Operations made him familiar with the problems and policy of the United States Government. Further instructions for his conduct of the post in London would have to be worked out as the strategic policies of the British and United States governments evolved. The remainder of 1942 and the first quarter of 1943 was a period of definition, growth and improvizing, so far as U.S. Naval Forces in Europe was concerned. For a time, especially when it was decided that North Africa should be invaded before the Continent of Europe and when it was decided that the American effort should be mounted largely from the United States rather than from the British Isles, it seemed that the main theater of the war was shifting elsewhere.

In the spring of 1942 the plans called for a blow at Germany by a cross-channel invasion. One of the earliest missions of Commander, Naval Forces in Europe was to prepare for the basing of landing craft, training of amphibious forces, and to provide for repairs and supplies of spare parts for landing craft. When the strategy was adopted for a landing in North Africa, prior to any cross-channel operation, much of the planning for that operation (known as TOR) was conducted in England as well as in Washington. Admiral Stark and General Eisenhower were closely associated in the work of preparing for that operation. The U.S. Naval Forces in Europe were stripped of officers and of much material to supply the Base Force for the Central Task Force which was organized in England, under the command of Rear Admiral Andrew C. Bennett, USN. ComNavEu communications staff and facilities played an important role in U.S. Navy communications in that operation.

In February 1943, attention could be turned again to the planning, training and build-up for the cross-channel invasion. This operation was favored by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the American planners on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. One of Admiral Stark's functions was to support the program presented by General Marshall and by General Eisenhower and to help convince the British that such an operation could succeed. From March onwards,

much effort was spent in preparing facilities for amphibious training. At the Casa Blanca Conference in January 1943, it had been decided to establish a Combined planning organization, Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Commander (CROSSAC) under British General Morgan, to prepare the preliminary plans for the cross-channel operation. Admiral Stark and the ComNavEu Staff were active in this work. The first year of ComNavEu in the British Isles was an active one, even though sufficient personnel was never available to perform all the tasks required, and though operations seemed to be shaping elsewhere. Such important functions as reporting intelligence data to the Navy Department from the headquarters of Allied intelligence organizations in London went on regularly. ComNavEu maintained the U.S. bases in the United Kingdom, opened numerous liaison channels with the British and with the Governments in Exile, planned and prepared for the big job of the invasion of France.

Personnel and Organization, 1942-1943.

Admiral Stark arrived in London and assumed command of the U.S. Naval Forces in Europe on 30 April 1942. Immediately he plunged into a round of calls and conferences with leading British officials. Relations with the highest persons in the British hierarchy were soon on a close personal basis.

An indication of the cooperation shown by the Admiralty particularly is shown in the arrangements for liaison between Admiral Stark's headquarters and the Admiralty. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, arranged to send his long-standing personal friend, Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Blake, to be Flag Officer Liaison United States (short title commonly referred to: FOLUS). Relations between Admirals Pound, Stark, and Blake always remained on the most cordial personal basis, and FOLUS and his staff were exceedingly helpful in providing information, signals, advice and all helpful undertakings for the smooth conduct of combined staff work. Admiral Blake had ready access to Admiral Stark's office to brief the latter on Admiralty information and policies.

The Chief of Staff of ComNavEu, Rear Admiral Kirk, arrived in London on 12 May to take up his duties. Captain Wentworth, who had been acting as Chief of Staff, was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. In spite of previous efforts at planning for the staff and organization of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, the detailed expansion of activities required additional development of the Naval Headquarters in London. The transition from the Special Naval Observer organization to the more fully developed organization then required a considerable amount of adjustment. Questions

as to orders to personnel, jurisdiction to issue travel orders, responsibility for courts martial and discipline were among those that arose almost immediately.

A survey of the situation with respect to the U.S. naval forces in the United Kingdom when Admiral Stark assumed command showed the following divisions of authority over naval personnel:

- (a) Personnel and forces assigned to NOB Londonderry and to Task Force 99 reported to and were under the administrative supervision of Admiral Stark as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.
- (b) The majority had been officers serving at headquarters in London ordered to report to the Special Naval Observer. For simplicity and in order to allow the Special Naval Observer freedom to order officers to specific duty where their services were most needed, the Bureau of Navigation and the Marine Corps had ordered officers assigned to duty in North Europe to report to SPENAVO.
- (c) Orders to the Naval Attache for Air placed him primarily under the Ambassador, head of the diplomatic mission. He received naval orders from CNO. The naval aviators who were assigned as assistant naval attaches for air had been directed by the Attache for Air to report to ComNavEu in turn.
- (d) The Officer in Charge of construction of the Naval Bases was primarily under

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Letter, Chief of Bureau of Navigation to Vice Admiral Ghormley (Secret) dated 4 December 1941.

the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and his assistants reported to him.

- (e) The U.S. Naval Liaison Officers appointed to the ports in the United Kingdom were under the Bureau of Navigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence.¹⁰
- (f) Control of the Convoy Escorts coming into Londonderry was exercised by an Atlantic Task Unit Commander.

After surveying the situation, Admiral Stark asked the Bureau of Personnel by despatch for permission to order all officers in the United Kingdom originally designated as Special Naval Observers or as Naval Observers to report to ComNavEu. This was done immediately.

The outline of organization and staff assignments at headquarters shown at the end of this chapter, indicates how, at this stage, most officers were performing more than one assignment. Organizational plans shifted in detail with great rapidity. During the first year, Admiral Stark insisted that ComNavEu headquarters operate on what he termed "a personnel shoestring". During that time the functions of ComNavEu were largely diplomatic and administrative.

The first plans called for an organization under the Chief of Staff with two Assistant Chiefs of Staff, one to direct an Operations and Plans Division, the other to direct

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Memorandum for Special Naval Observer by Comdr. Leslie C. McNemarr, USNR, Legal Officer; dated 14 May 1942.

the Readiness and Services Division. Admiral Stark asked the Bureau of Personnel to supply him a captain with qualifications to head the Readiness and Services Division, Captain Wentworth having been designated ACOS to head the Plans and Operations.¹¹

The Bureau of Personnel was unable to provide a Captain as requested to fill the position of Assistant Chief of Staff for Readiness and Services, and in August Captain Wentworth went to Washington in connection with the planning for the TORCH operation. Therefore, in September the administrative structure was redrawn eliminating both assistant Chiefs of Staff. Plans, Operations, and Intelligence were placed under a Plans and Operations Division. Captain Jerauld Wright was designated Plans Officer on 17 September 1942, and as such was in charge of the Division. However, he was away much of the time in connection with planning for the operation TORCH and was later assigned to General Eisenhower's staff. Captain Howard A. Flanigan had been Operations Officer, but was at this time in Washington on temporary duty with ComNAVSTA on shipping and petroleum matters. Personnel, Technical, Medical Supply, Public Works, Marine Detachment, Public Relations,

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Letter, ComNavSta to Bureau of Personnel, (Restricted) Serial 488 dated 6 June 1942.

Communications, Legal and the Security sections reported directly to the Chief of Staff. (See accompanying Organization Chart, approved by Admiral Stark on 14 September 1942.)

In December, after Captain Flanigan had returned from duty in the United States, he was assigned the duty of Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Shipping Control and Operations.¹² Shipping Control then was regarded as one of the most important activities of the ComNavEu headquarter staff and Captain Flanigan was regarded as specially qualified for this work. In this arrangement, Convoy Plans and Schedules, Shipping Logistics, Marine Security, Port Liaison Organization and the Port Liaison Offices, as well as the administration of Armed Guard matters came under Captain Flanigan's supervision. All matters concerning Merchant Shipping and port liaison came through this division. Early in the autumn an Armed Guard pool had been established at NOB Londonderry. It had been determined that ComNavEu would have jurisdiction over Armed Guard personnel while in United Kingdom ports for purposes of discipline and administration.¹³

- - - - -
12

ComNavEu Office Order No. 24, dated 28 December 1942.

13

Letter, SecNav to ComNavEu dated 3 September 1942.

Commander M.C. Jackson, USNR, had been requested and had arrived to take the assignment of Shipping Control Officer. Lieut.Comdr. A.E. Stanford, USNR, who had been assigned duty as a shipping intelligence officer in liaison with the Admiralty, the U.S. Board of Economic Warfare and the Ministry of Economic Warfare, was now transferred for duty with Captain Flanigan, and became Executive Officer.

Oil supply and tanker control became one of the important problems for the Merchant Shipping Section under Captain Flanigan. In Washington the needs of the U.S. Services were dealt with by the Joint Army-Navy Petroleum Board, created by joint action on 14 July 1942, as the agency of the armed forces for all petroleum matters. Necessities of supplying the TORCH operation and of keeping the flow of petroleum supplies to the British Isles up, brought out the necessity for an agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to deal with the world picture and the operation of British and American tanker fleets.

In October, CominCh designated Captain H.F. Carter, USNR, to be Petroleum Coordinator for the Navy, with an organization in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. The organization in ComNavEu to work with Captain Carter's organization came under Captain Flanigan. The services of Mr. Peter T. Lamont, an American business man in England, were requested and it was arranged to commission him in the Naval Reserve and to

assign him as Tanker Control Officer for ComNavEu. When Captain Flanigan was called to Washington in the autumn of 1942 for temporary duty in the Office of Naval Operations, one of his principal duties was in connection with tanker and petroleum matters. Both Captain Flanigan and Admiral Stark were concerned with the setting up of a petroleum organization in connection with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.¹⁴ When Admiral Stark came to Washington in December and January, he urged Admiral King to support it, pointing out that owing to existing conditions in the tanker policy England was facing a serious deterioration in her petroleum supplies.

In January 1943, the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff approved a proposal that the Army-Navy Petroleum Board be made an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁵ A few days later the Board was given a directive governing the supply of petroleum products to the North African theater.¹⁶ This provided for an Area Petroleum Officer who would operate Theater petr

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Memorandum for Admiral Stark from Captain Flanigan on "Administration of British and American Petroleum Matters" dated 18 December 1942.

15

Letter, CominCh to several addressees, serial 261 dated 20 January 1943. Admiral Horne represented the Navy on the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff.

leum pools and keep the Army-Navy Petroleum Board informed of needs.

Personnel Administration.

From 14 May to 16 September 1941, Commander R.J. Townsends USN, was Assistant Naval Attache in charge of the Administrative and Security Section. On 28 May 1941, Commander Townsends became Personnel Officer for both the Naval Attache Office and SPENAVO. In September, his designation was changed from Assistant Naval Attache to Special Naval Observer; intelligence and security duties of his section were transferred to other sections. Part of the duties of his office resulted from his being Executive Officer for the Naval Attache and partly from being Assistant Chief of Staff to SPENAVO.¹⁷ These duties included: Functioning as Personnel Officer for both staffs, as Welfare Officer; assignment of office space; control of the

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Letter, CominCh to ComNavEu and Cinclant, serial 00162 (Sent dated 27 January 1943).

Control of petroleum supplies in the United Kingdom was supervised by a British Oil Control Board, composed of Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd, Chairman and Parliamentary Secretary for Petroleum; Admiral Cunningham, Fourth Sea Lord; Air Marshal Courtney; General Neville; Sir Andrew Agnew; Sir F. Godbe. American members included Major General Lee, U.S. Army; Captain Flanigan, U.S. Navy; Mr. George Waldron, Petroleum Attache at the Embassy; Mr. Harriman for the Supply Mission.

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Draft Historical Narrative submitted to the Historical Section, ComNavEu by the Personnel Section, December 1944.

portation both by air and sea to and from the United States; officer travel within the United Kingdom; employment of civilian personnel including clerical force and drivers. The latter group were administered by Mr. Henry C. Hider, Chief Clerk under Commander Townsend's direction.

In August 1942, the Personnel Officer became a recruiting officer as well, the Chief of Naval Personnel having authorized ComNavEu to enroll U.S. citizens who were then serving with British Forces. This was an active program between August 1942 and May 1943.

The functions of the Personnel Office had changed somewhat in other respects also. They were listed as:

- (a) Preparation of a roster of officers,
- (b) Issuance of British ration books to personnel for food and clothing, by arrangement with the Admiralty,
- (c) Issuance of identity cards and passes, and obtaining Admiralty passes when required,
- (d) Processing of fitness reports and leave requests,
- (e) Acting as a housing officer to obtain living quarters for personnel attached to this command,
- (f) Arrangement for transportation to and from the United States.

Administration of civilian personnel was transferred entirely to the chief clerk of the Attache's office.

Commander Townsend was promoted to Captain on 29 September 1942 and thereafter was relieved by Lieutenant James Strong as Personnel Officer. Lieutenant William J. Leckie, U.S.N.

succeeded Lieutenant Strong in November. Staff instructions dated 18 December 1942 placed the Personnel Office under the Administrative Section, a general section grouped under the Chief of Staff. This administrative set-up was continued until August 1943, when Lieutenant Leckie was assigned to duties involving personnel logistics, building up the naval forces for the invasion of France. Licut.Comdr. Paul B. Hartenstein, USNR., relieved Lieutenant Leckie as Personnel Officer on 23 August 1943.

From November 1942 ComNavEu required all units under his command to report the number of officers and enlisted personnel attached to their establishments.¹⁸ At first these reports were made weekly, later they were made on a monthly basis. Beginning with 1 January 1943, ComNavEu reported personnel estimates to the Bureau of Personnel each month for logistic planning purposes.¹⁹ The total personnel assigned to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe rose slowly from 331 officers and 2,009 enlisted men on 23 November 1942 to 432 officers and 3,602 enlisted personnel on 1 August 1943. After this date the totals rose rapidly.

18

Letter, ComNavEu to all units, Serial 1400 dated 7 November 1942. This was an appropriate time to begin personnel reporting because the Force under command of Rear Admiral A.C. Bennett had just left for North Africa. The personnel remaining were more or less permanently assigned to ComNavEu.

19

Bureau of Personnel to ComNavEu despatch 272210 of December 1942.

**UNITED STATES FLIGHT
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE
NO ORIGINATOR NUMBER
LONDON, U.K.**

INTRODUCTION:

Office designation numbers of officers doing duty in the Headquarters of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, are published for information. These numbers became effective 1 July 1942.

Confidence

Index

N-0	COM. U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE	Admiral H.R. Clark
N-00	Chief of Staff and Naval Attache	R.Adm. A.C. High
N-01	ASST(P). Operations and Plans Division	Capt. A.S. Wentworth
N-02	Flag Secretary	Lt. Col. A.C. Young
N-03	Joint Secretary	Lt. J.E. Hooton, USNR
N-015	Flag Lieutenant	* Maj. J. G. Williams, USNR
N-009	Secretary to Chief of Staff	Cdr. L.C. McManer, USNR
N-006	Assistant to Chief of Staff	Capt. E.U. Litch
N-05	Naval Attache for Air	
N-01	ASST(P) OPERATIONS AND PLANS DIVISION	Capt. A.S. Wentworth
N-1	PLANS SECTION	Col. F.A. Hart, USMC
N-11	INTELLIGENCE	Cdr. L.S. Kelly
N-111	United Nations, Enemy-Neutral- Allied Nations	Cdr. L.S. Kelly
	Enemy-Neutral	Lt. A.F. Courtney, USNR
N-112	Air	Lt. V.A. Anticek, USNR
N-113	Joint Intelligence Committee	Lt. A.F. Courtney, USNR
N-114	Naval Warfare	Lt. Col. R.J. Odenhall
N-115	Political Warfare	Cdr. L.S. Kelly
N-116	Public Relations	Lt. Col. L.S. Kitcher, USNR
N-117	Research	Lt. Col. F.B. Kittredge, USNR
N-118	War Plans	Lt. Col. R.E. Vining, USNR
N-119	Historical	Lt. (jg) A.C. Kope, USNR
N-1191	Library	Lt. F.O. Van der Pool, USNR
N-12	PLANS	Lt. F.O. Van der Pool, USNR
N-121	Force Plans	Col. F.A. Hart, USMC
N-122	Joint Plans	Capt. J. Wright
		Capt. J. Wright

[illegible]

Name: _____
 Address: _____
 City: _____
 State: _____
 Zip: _____

第一輯

1. Name	Mr. J. H. Jones
2. Address	123 Main St.
3. City	New York
4. State	New York
5. Zip	10001
6. Telephone	NY 1-2345
7. Occupation	Engineer
8. Education	High School
9. Marital Status	Married
10. Number of Children	2
11. Annual Income	\$10,000
12. Other Information	

Address: 10000 1st Avenue, Suite 100
City: San Francisco, CA 94133
Phone: (415) 774-1111
Fax: (415) 774-1112

Mr. Tolson	Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols	Mr. Belmont
Mr. DeLoach	Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper	Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan	Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt	Mr. Gale
Mr. Gandy	Mr. Rosen
Mr. Harbo	Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Hendon	Mr. Tavel
Mr. Jones	Mr. Trotter
Mr. Ladd	Tele. Room
Mr. McGuire	Mr. Nease
Mr. Mumford	Miss Holmes
Mr. Parker	Miss Gandy
Mr. Quinn	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

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Station and Departure

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2-253 Special Bulletin
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Wayback

100

1. The first group of people who are not in the labor force are those who are not in the labor force because they are not in the labor force.

Mr. J. F. Thompson
 Mr. J. F. Thompson
 Mr. J. F. Thompson
 Mr. J. F. Thompson

1. 姓名: 李德全
2. 性别: 男
3. 年龄: 45
4. 职业: 教师
5. 籍贯: 湖南长沙
6. 民族: 汉族
7. 婚姻状况: 已婚
8. 子女情况: 一子一女
9. 健康状况: 良好
10. 兴趣爱好: 读书、运动

Capt. C.M. Anderson
 Capt. W.R. Anderson
 W. R. A. S. Anderson
 Capt. C.M. Anderson
 W. R. A. S. Anderson (M)
 Capt. C.M. Anderson
 Capt. W.R. Anderson
 Capt. C.M. Anderson
 Capt. W.R. Anderson

Capt. G. J. Austin (10)
 Lt. Col. J. B. Wilson (2)
 Lt. J. B. Howard (30)
 Capt. G. J. Austin (10)
 Capt. G. J. Austin (10)
 Lt. Col. J. B. Wilson (2)
 Capt. G. J. Austin (10)
 Lt. J. B. Howard (30)
 Capt. G. J. Austin (10)

Capt. R.A. Hansen (C20)
 Lt. R.B. Egan (C40)
 Capt. R.A. Hansen (41)
 Lt. R.B. Egan (400)
 Capt. R.A. Hansen (41)
 Lt. R.B. Egan (410)
 Capt. R.A. Hansen (41)
 Lt. R.B. Egan (430)
 Capt. R.A. Hansen (41)
 Lt. R.B. Egan (430)
 Capt. R.A. Hansen (41)
 Lt. R.B. Egan (430)

Mr. J. E. Brown (Cm)
Mr. H. E. Montgomery (C)
Mr. F. E. Hubbard (C)
Mr. H. E. Jenkins (C)
Mr. L. E. Curtis (C)
Mr. J. E. McFarlane
Mr. L. E. Johnson (C)

<u>Convoy No</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NAME</u>
<u>N-27</u> <u>N-271</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	Lt. Col. W.S. Jordan, USN Lt. Col. R.E. Jordan, USN Major J.S. H.L. USN Capt. W.F. Lupton, USN Capt. R.J. Dwyer, USN Capt. R.J. Robertson, USN Lt. Col. J.E. Verman, USN
N-272	Security	
<u>N-3</u>	<u>OPERATIONS SECTION</u>	Capt. E.A. Flanigan
<u>N-31</u>	<u>NAVAL AND AIR OPERATIONS</u>	
N-311	Naval	Cdr. E.M. Roberts
N-312	Air	Cdr. E.M. Roberts
N-313	Joint	Cdr. E.M. Roberts
N-314	Combined	Cdr. E.M. Roberts
N-315	Submarine	Lt. Col. J.A. Hillman
N-316	Anti-submarine	Lt. Col. F.L. Bennett, USN
N-317	Operations Intelligence Officer	Lt. J.G. Lupton
N-318	Air Operations Intelligence	Cdr. E.M. Roberts
N-319	Surface Operations - Intelligence	Lt. Col. J.C. Campbell
<u>N-32</u>	<u>CONVOY AND SHIP COVER</u>	Lt. E.A. Greville
N-321	R.N.M.S. and Armed Guards	Cdr. E.M. Roberts
N-322	U.S.N.M.S.	Lt. Col. J.A. Hillman
	Australia	Lt. E.A. Greville
	Glyde	Lt. Col. J.A. Hillman
	Liverpool	Lt. Col. J.A. Hillman
	Belfast	Lt. Col. J.A. Hillman
N-323	Port Liaison	Lt. Col. J.A. Hillman
N-324	Fuel and Water Control	Lt. Col. J.A. Hillman
N-325	U.S. and R.N. Convoys	Lt. Col. J.A. Hillman
N-326	Russian and Italian Open Convoys	Lt. Col. J.A. Hillman
N-327	Merchant Ship Groups	Lt. Col. J.A. Hillman
<u>N-4</u>	<u>COMMUNICATIONS</u>	Cdr. J.M. Lupton
<u>N-41</u>	<u>U.S. MAIL</u>	Lt. (jg) W.F. Richard, USN
<u>N-42</u>	<u>COMMUNICATIONS GROUP</u>	Lt. Col. R.A. Greville, USN
N-421	Radio, Telephone, Cable, Telegraph	Lt. Col. R.A. Greville, USN
	Teleprinters, Code Book	Lt. Col. R.A. Greville, USN
N-422	Radio	Lt. Col. R.A. Greville, USN
N-423	Telephones	Lt. Col. R.A. Greville, USN
N-424	Cable and Telegraph	Lt. Col. R.A. Greville, USN
N-425	Teleprinters	Lt. Col. R.A. Greville, USN

<u>Grade</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>NAME</u>
<u>1-15</u>	<u>Code Room</u>	
		Lt. V.E. Houghton, USNR
		Lt. S.L. Griggs, USNR
		Lt. (jg) J.M. Tupper, USNR
		Lt. (jg) S.M. Kinnick, USNR
		Lt. (jg) S.F. Tupper, USNR
		Lt. (jg) J.G. McManley, USNR
		Lt. (jg) S.L. Gannon, USNR
		Lt. (jg) S.M. Devaney, USNR
		Lt. (jg) A.M. Gale, USNR
		Ens. S.M. Miller, USNR
		Ens. S.V. Harper, USNR
		Ens. J.M. London, USNR
		Ens. V.F. Swatch, USNR
		Ens. L.F. Harris, USNR
		Ens. M. Farry, USNR
		RM A.B. Farley, USNR
<u>1-16</u>	<u>COMMUNICATIONS SECTION</u>	
<u>1-17</u>	<u>Code, Cipher, Call Signs, Identification</u>	Cdr. J.H. Lippert
<u>1-18</u>	<u>Signals, and Procedures</u>	Cdr. J.H. Lippert
<u>1-19</u>	<u>Radio and Wighers</u>	Lt. Cdr. H.V. Wells, USNR
<u>1-20</u>	<u>Call Signs</u>	Lt. Cdr. H.V. Wells, USNR
<u>1-21</u>	<u>Identification Signals</u>	Cdr. J.H. Lippert
<u>1-22</u>	<u>Procedures</u>	Cdr. J.H. Lippert
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<u>1-25</u>	<u>2 - Release</u>	

A. G. KIRK,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff.

CHAPTER IV

INTELLIGENCE AND NAVAL ATTACHES

The unification of Naval Intelligence reporting from London had been envisaged by the designation of the Naval Attaches as Chief of Staff to the Special Naval Observer on May 27, 1941.¹ The Office of Naval Attache served as the channel for supplying intelligence of enemy organization, operations and plans. In cooperation with the Naval Mission, an increasing volume of technical information was obtained from British and Allied forces with respect to material and operations. Operational intelligence became increasingly a function of the staff of the Special Naval Observer.

This arrangement was continued after the establishment of the command of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe. Operations Intelligence reporting became a function of the Operations Division. Technical Intelligence items, concerning Allied as well as enemy material and weapons, were transmitted by the Technical Section of the Naval Attache's Staff through Naval Attache channels but independently of the Intelligence Division. Admiral Kirk as Naval Attache, allowed Captain Solberg as head of the Material Section full authority in preparing reports.

¹ A fuller study of the problems dealt with in this chapter is to be found in the report prepared by the Historical Section, ComNavEu, "Office of the U.S. Naval Attache, American Embassy London, England, 1939-1946", forwarded by ComNavEu serial 0184 (Confidential) dated 1 April 1946.

A Plans and Operations Division was established under the Assistant Chief of Staff (Captain Wentworth) by an Office Order in May 1942. The Intelligence Section was a part of this Division. The greater part of the information from British or Allied sources required for the planning in Washington was, however, transmitted by the Plans and Operations Division or by the Material Section of ComNavEu staff.

The activities of the Intelligence Section at that time were primarily devoted to the transmission of items of intelligence concerning enemy resources and forces which were available in London. Direct liaison was maintained not only with the Admiralty but with other British and Allied Intelligence Services in London. Commander H.B. Butcher, USNR., Acting Head of Intelligence Section, (in his report for the Naval Attache for the year 1942-1943) described the duties and activities of the Section as follows:

"Activities increased under the supervision of Commander L.E. Kelly, USN., to include generally the collection of data and the preparation of intelligence reports for ONI. The subjects of these reports have ordinarily been in fields not specifically assigned to other Divisions of the Naval Attache's office. The Intelligence Officer attends the British Joint Intelligence Committee (J.I.C.) meetings held weekly at the War Cabinet.

"Close and cordial liaison was maintained with the Naval Intelligence Division (N.I.D.), Admiralty for all matters not purely technical nor of such importance as to be specially dealt with by the Naval Attache personally. The more specialized inquiries have been made by the Technical Section, the Submarine Section, the Personnel

Officer, or other officers more specifically concerned. Until 8 November 1942, a flow of information came from Captain A.C. Sabalot, USN, the Naval Attache, Vichy. Most of this information was transmitted to the Admiralty.

"The ComNavEu Intelligence Section is specially concerned with facts relating to the enemy potential, political or psychological warfare, enemy shipbuilding and port activities observed chiefly from photographic reconnaissance, and particular inquiries referred to the Intelligence Section. These assignments make up the regular routine of the work of the Intelligence Section.

"Close contact was maintained with the Ministry of Economic Warfare and with the Economic Warfare Division, U.S. Embassy. Regular contact was also maintained with other U.S. services such as the O.S.S., O.W.I., the Maritime Commission, the Offices of the Petroleum Attache, and Federal Communication Commission.

"Close contact was also maintained with the G-2 Section of the Staff and the Commanding General, U.S. Army, ETO, and particular responsibility was assigned to the Intelligence Section to provide all naval intelligence items that might be required by G-2, ETOUSA."2

In December 1942, the Plans and Intelligence Sections were removed from the Operations Division and placed directly under the Chief of Staff. In view of the administrative, logistic and policy functions and duties of ComNavEu staff the functions assigned the Intelligence Section were not concerned directly with current operations. The major

2 Naval Attache, London. Report, serial 611, dated 22 January 1943.

responsibility of the Section continued to be the transmission to ONI of intelligence data concerning enemy forces, dispositions and plans, obtained from British and Allied Intelligence Services in London. A second function was that of providing ComNavEu and the heads of the different sections of ComNavEu staff with any information that might be required in their current activities. Special tasks and responsibilities developed from time to time which were assigned to the Intelligence Section. Such tasks related to:

- (a) The general shipping position,
- (b) Economic Warfare,
- (c) Political and Psychological Warfare,
- (d) Counter-intelligence and Security,
- (e) Press, cable and Correspondence censorship,
- (f) Liaison with Allied services,
- (g) Public Relations,
- (h) War Diary and History.

On 3 September 1942, Commander Kelly was detached and Commander H. B. Butcher became acting head of the Section.

The duality of organization between the Naval Attache's Office and the ComNavEu staff reappeared in another problem in November 1942. It was called to Admiral Stark's attention that the basic orders for Captain Frederick B. Kauffman, USN, Naval Attache of Air; Commander William R. Millis, USN,

³ Captain Kauffman assumed duty as Naval Attache for Air on 7 August 1942.

Assistant Naval Attache; Lieutenant Commander Ligon B. Ard, USNR, Assistant Naval Attache; and Lieutenant Commander W. Hostetter, USN, Assistant Naval Attache and Disbursing Officer, did not order them to report to ComNavEu for additional duty. However, orders subsequently issued to Captain H.L. Thomson, USN, Lieutenant Commander Munson, USN, and Lieutenant C.G. Mayer, USNR, all Assistant Naval Attaches, had ordered them to report to ComNavEu for additional duty. Also the Civilian Scientists, who were either Contract Employees or Civil Service Technical Research Employees of the Navy Department, reported to the Naval Attache under orders from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Orders for these Scientists to travel about the United Kingdom had to be signed by the Naval Attache.

Admiral Stark, in consultation with his Chief of Staff and Naval Attache, requested the Bureau of Personnel to order Naval Attaches, Assistant Naval Attaches, and civilian personnel employed by the Navy Department, who were assigned duty in the United Kingdom to report to ComNavEu with additional duty in accordance with their original orders. Permanent civil service employees under the Naval Attache would retain their status under the Attache but would report for additional duty under ComNavEu.⁴

⁴ Letter, ComNavEu to Bureau of Personnel, serial 1461 dated 13 November 1942.

This request was discussed further in Washington during Admiral Stark's visit to the Navy Department during January 1943. The Office of Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Office of Naval Intelligence were concerned lest this plan interfere with their ability to communicate directly with London officers concerned with intelligence and liaison duties.⁵ The Attache and Assistant Attaches were directed to report to ComNavEu when it was agreed that the arrangement would not prevent these officers from acting as the direct representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence.⁶

In December, CominCh had suggested that Captain Paul Bastedo, USN, be sent to England as Naval Attache, regardless if he relieved Rear Admiral Kirk as Chief of Staff. Admiral Kirk was scheduled for a sea command as soon as a relief could be selected. While in Washington, Admiral Stark agreed that Captain Bastedo should serve as Naval Attache, although the designation of a new Chief of Staff remained under discussion for some time afterwards. On 9 February 1943, Captain Bastedo relieved Admiral Kirk as

⁵ Ltr., Vice CNO to Bureau of Personnel, (Confidential) dated 16 December 1942, disapproved ComNavEu recommendation on the grounds: (a) it curtailed the Ambassador's authority over naval attaches on his diplomatic staff, (b) it reduced VCNO's authority to communicate directly with liaison offices in England.

⁶ DNI Memorandum (Confidential) to Alusna London, dated 9 January 1943.

Attache and was designated Acting Chief of Staff. Later it was arranged that Captain George B. Wilson, *USN, would be sent to London as Chief of Staff, with the rank of Rear Admiral.⁷ Captain Bastedo was to remain as Naval Attache. Thus for the first time since May 1941, the functions of Chief of Staff and Naval Attache were separated. However, it was decided to group a number of intelligence functions and some others under an Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Captain Bastedo was assigned that position.

The organization chart for Naval Forces in Europe, approved by Admiral Stark on 11 May 1943, grouped Censorship, Travel Control, Security, Combat Intelligence Political Warfare, Prisoners of War, Shipping Statistics, and Historical offices under the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, who was also Naval Attache. The Technical Section,⁸ however, reported directly to the Chief of Staff. (See Chart).

In March 1942, the U.S. Navy and Army in the European Theater had begun discussions relative to joint collection, analysis, transmission and dissemination of intelligence data. However, 6 March 1943, representatives from ETOUSA, U.S.A.A.

⁷ Admiral Wilson became Chief of Staff on 25 May 1943.

⁸ The title "Material Section" had been changed to "Technical Section."

ComNavEu, the Military and Naval Attaches, Office of Special Services and Office of War Information met under the chairmanship of Brigadier General Krøner, from G-2 of the War Department, to consider pooling and centralizing intelligence data from the various American agencies in London.⁹ Captain Bastedo and Colonel Clement made several recommendations for working out a joint intelligence organization pooling the resources of American agencies in the United Kingdom. Additional staff were required for ComNavEu to carry out the naval share in the program. Commander Kitteredge, of the ComNavEu Intelligence Staff, discussed these matters with the Office of Naval Intelligence during a trip to Washington in July 1943.

A program of recruiting and training a mobile group for liaison and administrative duties was visualized at this time also. Lessons of the operation TORCH brought out the great need for a reserve of officers capable of doing liaison and administrative duties. ComNavEu had been called upon to provide many such officers for Admiral Bennett's organization. ComNavEu requested in May that ten or twelve officers, trained at the Naval School of Military Government and Administration at Columbia University and having language qualifications,

⁹ Confidential Memorandum for Admiral Stark by Lt. Comdr. T.B. Kittredge, dated 6 March 1943.

be assigned to provide such a mobile reserve. Preliminary estimates for added intelligence personnel were submitted at the same time with this statement:

"In connection with possible future continental operations, this need is certain to arise again, and ComNavEu is not now in position to supply them; rather is there need of officers for essential needs of his command; i.e., intelligence and liaison duties."¹⁰

In June 1943, Admiral Stark felt that it was time to complete the unification of organization and of intelligence reporting for the Navy. Preparations for the invasion of France were taking definite shape and more than ever it appeared necessary that the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe should have control over the intelligence work going on in the area of his jurisdiction.

He recommended to the Bureau of Personnel that the titles of the eight Assistant Naval Attaches be dropped and that the officers be assigned to ComNavEu. The Naval Attache and Naval Attache for Air were to be continued, but each would be ordered to ComNavEu for primary duty. In explaining this recommendation Admiral Stark wrote:¹¹

¹⁰ Letter, ComNavEu to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, (Confidential) serial 0920 dated 8 May 1943.

¹¹ Letter, ComNavEu to Bureau of Personnel, serial 1244 dated 15 June 1943.

"When, due to the national emergency, the naval forces in the United Kingdom were expanded, officers were ordered to this area as Naval Observers, Special Naval Observers, and Assistant Naval Attaches, and were given these titles for administrative reasons, to provide diplomatic immunity in a belligerent country and in order that they might legally be entitled to allowances to cover the additional cost of living in the area. Administratively, these officers now function under Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, and additional allowances are provided."¹²

"There is, therefore no reason for the continuance of the above mentioned titles; in fact the continuance tends to confuse administration in that an implication of dual organization exists whereas all activities function under this command."

A few days after this recommendation was sent to Washington, ComNavEu directed that all intelligence reports be submitted as official correspondence from Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe rather than from the Naval Attache, Naval Attache for Air, or the Technical Section. These reports were to be routed via the Intelligence Section for signature by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence "by direction" Reports were submitted on forms prescribed by O.N.I., but when a report presented information of urgent interest to an activity such as ComInCh or the Bureau of Ordnance, copies were to be sent to those activities.¹³ Previously, all information relat

¹² SECNAV Ltr., of 30 April 1942 had set a scale of per diem allowances for Naval personnel stationed at various overseas posts. London was placed in Class V of this allowance list.

¹³ Memorandum by Rear Admiral Wilson, Chief of Staff, to all Section Heads, dated 19 June 1943. Naval Attache, London. Report, NNI-96, serial 1847 dated 15 May 1944.

directly to planning and conduct of operations had been handled through the operations section and sent to CominCh where it was transmitted to the office of Vice Chief of Naval Operations, O.N.I. and the Bureaus. Intelligence reporting was made to the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and then transmitted to the Bureaus. Frequently reports on the same problem but originating with different officers and carrying different interpretations and recommendations, were transmitted by these two channels. Hence, the action taken in July 1943, was to make sure of unit of interpretation and recommendations on all reports from the U.S. Naval services in London.

An exchange of correspondence between ComNavEu and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations followed the recommendations of 11 June that can best be set forth by quoting. The two points of view are succinctly set down. Admiral Stark had maintained from the beginning that as Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, he was responsible for relations between the U.S. Navy in the United Kingdom and other American agencies and with the British organization. He was the channel for communications with the Ambassador. For matters other than policy, a senior officer of his staff could be designated as naval attache to the Ambassador. Ultimately, in August 1943, the Navy Department accepted this point of view. However in June considerable misunderstanding existed in Washington regarding the way in which the London command was

organized and the problems it faced. This is shown in Admiral Horne's letter expressing the following:

"Assistant Naval attaches at present in the United Kingdom have been assigned by the Secretary of the Navy and designated by the Secretary of State as the personal naval staffs of the Ambassadors. Their paramount duty is that of naval intelligence in the performance of which they are a part of the Division of Naval Intelligence and are under the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

"Referring to paragraph 2, this dual organization should not exist. The Navy Department has repeatedly laid down the principle that a CinC on his own account cannot issue an order to a naval attache.... Where permanent U.S. Naval Forces are maintained in foreign waters, the naval attaches of the countries concerned are required to forward direct to the Commander of such forces copies of intelligence reports. It is essential that the Navy Department be officially represented at all times by a Naval Attache and Assistants at a large post such as London. Any reduction of the present staff and organization set up by the Office of Naval Intelligence will materially affect the efficiency of such staffs in the collection of intelligence information.

"The Vice Chief of Naval Operations wishes to retain the Naval Attache offices as separate entities, under his supervision and separate from the organization of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe. Therefore, it is regretted that the recommendation in paragraph 4 cannot be approved, as it will establish a precedent which is not in conformity with the policies governing the establishment and administration of naval attache posts.

"It is agreed that the titles of Naval Observer and Special Naval Observer are no longer necessary in the United Kingdom....Therefore, by copy of this letter, the Chief of Naval Personnel is requested to cancel these Observer designations and to merely order the officers concerned for duty with the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe."¹⁴

¹⁴ Ltr., VCNO to ComNavEu serial 116516 dated 28 June

Admiral Stark's ideas on the matter are well set forth as follows:

"There are at present twenty-nine officers in my Intelligence Section. Of this number only Captain Bastedo has the status of an Attache. ... ComNavEu is the liaison for naval matters with the Ambassador."

"The necessarily close cooperation of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army in this theater makes it practically mandatory that the Naval Intelligence Organization parallel G-2. This cannot be done by a Naval Intelligence Organization set up under the diplomatic office of the U.S. Ambassador.... In order to coordinate U.S. Navy activities in this theater I have brought them all under my command. In furtherance of this natural development, the Naval Attache at his own request was made Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence on my staff.

... "Assistant Naval Attaches do not perform duty on the personnel naval staff of the Ambassador to Great Britain. For example, Captain H.L. Thompson is my communication officer. To remove him from under my direct command and to direct that I could not issue my own communication officer orders but had to deal with him on the basis of cooperation on the assumption that his first responsibility is to ONI - or the Ambassador - would create an utterly impossible situation.

"Commander Millis is another example, operates directly under my orders through the Head of the Technical Section, Captain T.W. Solberg, to which section Millis is attached. Yet, Solberg himself is not an Assistant Naval Attache Lt. Comdr. Mayer is also in the Technical Section and his status is similar to that of Commander Millis.

"Commander Ard, another Assistant Naval Attache, is in the Operations Section, under Captain Flanigan. The duties he is performing can, by no stretch of the imagination, be classed as those of an Attache's.

"Regarding Lieutenant Hostetter, the situation is somewhat different, but he is, and must remain, directly under my command. It will be recalled that I sent a despatch cancelling my request ... that his designation as Assistant Naval Attache be removed. My reasons for this were that he does handle the Naval Attache's accounts, though this is a minor part of his duties. However, to avoid any possible legal or technical mixup, it is better that his designation as Assistant Naval Attache should be continued in his case. He does not one whit of work directly for the Ambassador. He does carry the accounts for all the officers and enlisted men at these headquarters."

The Naval Attache for Air headed the Aviation Section of ComNavEu staff. He should continue as Attache: "it will make the step back to peace time organization easier. But he must remain responsible to ComNavEu." The Air Priorities Section, which exercised ComNavEu's control over Pan American Airways and American Export Lines, was placed under the Aviation Section because the activities were closely allied. Finally, Admiral Stark replied that the scheme proposed:

"violates the principle of unity of command and suggests the creation of an Intelligence Section divorced from the commander in the field in wartime who may be dependant on it for vital information. It also places an important Repair Officer, the Communication Officer, and the Disbursing Officer of this command under a subordinate who would be primarily responsible to an office in Washington."¹⁵

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¹⁵ Letter, ComNavEu to VCNO (Restricted) serial 1552 dated 27 July 1943.

Both matters, the unification of the Naval Attache staff under Commander Naval Forces in Europe and the expansion of the intelligence program, came to a head in the latter part of July. Commander T.B. Kittredge, USNR, of the ComNavEu Intelligence Section and who had been on temporary duty in Washington, reported to Admiral Stark after participating in a series of discussions with Admiral Horne, Rear Admiral Train, Captains Zacharies, Golbraith, Pickhardt, Struble and others that:

"Letter will be sent ComNavEu submitting suggestions as to organization of U.S. Naval Intelligence Services in the United Kingdom, and as to supply of additional reserve officers trained in intelligence duties to assure such services It was agreed that a more extensive reporting organization in London along lines proposed by Captain Bastado and Colonel Clement is highly desirable. This organization must function with G-2, ETOUSA staff, with other U.S. Intelligence Services in London, with the Admiralty and other British services, and with other Allied organizations and services. These points will be covered shortly in a letter to be sent to ComNavEu by the Director of Naval Intelligence through the Vice Chief of Naval Operations."¹⁶

The letter mentioned was made in reply to ComNavEu's request of 8 May for officers for liaison and administrative duties. In this the Vice Chief of Naval Operations indicated a desire to establish a Joint Intelligence Collection

¹⁶ Confidential Memorandum for ComNavEu, "Organization of U Naval Intelligence Services in European Theater", July 194

Agency that would work with the U.S. Army and that would:

- (a) Secure economic and political information for planning agencies of the Navy Department and operating forces,
- (b) Secure operational intelligence for task force commanders and the Navy Department,
- (c) Maintain liaison to secure counter-intelligence information,
- (d) Secure and disseminate information about occupied areas,
- (e) Secure information obtained from interrogation of Prisoners of war,
- (f) Secure air combat intelligence information,
- (g) Secure merchant shipping and port security information.

The Navy Department proposed to send to ComNavEu a number of qualified naval officers to enable the Intelligence Section to provide these services. However, VCNO requested that the officers sent should be assigned no collateral duties which would interfere with their primary duties as intelligence officers, and also requested permission for the Office of Naval Intelligence to communicate directly with the officer in charge of intelligence at ComNavEu "concerning purely routine intelligence matters."¹⁷ Admiral Stark replied that everything was "in the clear" on these matters.¹⁸

On 8 August the Bureau of Personnel indicated by despatch that orders would be issued to the Naval Attache,

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¹⁷ Letter, Vice Chief of Naval Operations to ComNavEu (Confidential) serial 01565516 dated 30 July 1943.

¹⁸ Letter, ComNavEu to Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Confidential) serial 02201 dated 23 August 1943.

the Assistant Naval Attaches and Naval Attache for Air as Admiral Stark had requested earlier. Unity of intelligence reporting was thereby firmly established and the definitions of responsibility confirmed.

One point regarding the channeling of reports remained to be cleared up from the VCNO letter of 30 July. ComNavEu suggested that reports on operational matters be referred to CominCh and that anti-submarine warfare matters be referred to Commander Tenth Fleet.²⁰ The Office of Naval Intelligence agreed that

"controversial operational Intelligence matter should be submitted directly and solely to the policy making authority concerned However, it is expected that the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe will feel entirely free to depart from this or any other general procedure when his judgement so dictates."²¹

During the summer of 1943 the personnel organization for the Intelligence Section of ComNavEu was completed. Eight officers were selected by O.N.I. in August to constitute the nucleus of the expanded organization.²² These included officers qualified to set up and operate a joint situation plot, others with backgrounds in various European languages. Counter intelligence officers, and commerce and travel

19 Bureau of Personnel despatch to ComNavEu 0811 09 of August 1943; BuPers despatch 141339 of August directed Captain Bastedo to report to the American Ambassador at Alusna London and to ComNavEu for additional duty.

20 See footnote 17 (page 123)

21 Letter, Vice Chief of Naval Operations to ComNavEu (Confidential) serial 02463016 dated 28 September 1943.

22 Letter, O.N.I. to Alusna London (Confidential) dated 2 September 1943; ComNavEu despatch (Confidential) 041526 August 1943.

officers had already been requested and were being drawn from various offices in the United States.²³ Additional officers were requested for liaison duties with the Admiralty; Specially qualified and selected yeomen were sent from the United States. Two officers were placed at Oxford to work with the Inter-Service Topographical Division, a joint Army-Navy, U.S. - British organization engaged in map and intelligence work. In September, ComNavEu requested that an officer with rank of Commander be sent to fill the billet of executive officer of the Intelligence Section. The organization was well established by this time.

Technical Intelligence.

On 28 April 1942 the Technical Section of the Office of Naval Attache and Maintenance Division of the Naval Forces in Europe were consolidated into one section, known as the Material Division of ComNavEu.²⁵ Captain T.A. Solberg remained the head of the division. The General Engineering and Naval Construction Sub-Section, headed by Commander William R. Milli USN, maintained liaison with the Director of Naval Construction.

²³ ComNavEu despatch (Confidential) 131622 of July 1943.

²⁴ ComNavEu despatch (Confidential) 121106 of August 1943; answered by VCNO to ComNavEu despatch 132053 of August 1943.

²⁵ See chapter I, page 23 for the creation of this Division in 1941; and chapter II, page 62 for later organization.

Engineer-in-Chief, and the Director of Scientific Research, in connection with Admiralty investigations and research. It worked with the British Combined Operations in connection with vessels and small craft used for combined operations. Two officers from the sub-section were detailed to committees dealing with this matter.

During the year 1942, nine officers attending British minesweeping schools and ten U.S. officers were given instruction in rendering mines safe. Approximately fifty reserve officers completed training in radar at the Admiralty Signal Establishment.

The Scientific Observers Group, working under the head of the Ordnance sub-section, consisted mostly of civilian scientists and engineers, who worked under the cognizance of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. A Naval Ordnance Laboratory Mission visited England in October 1942 and as a result U.S. mine development program was changed. Research and development and standardization of new signal devices was a subject of much interest.

The missions of this Section have been outlined as:

- (a) Standardization of new weapons so as to insure that these could be used by both countries.
- (b) Adaptation of existing weapons as far as possible so that both countries could use the product of either. Largely as a result of this work, a British group of officers

and technicians were sent to the U.S. to study and devise means of adapting depth charges, mines, torpedoes, etc.

- (c) Standardizing and adapting shipborne and airborne radar equipment for universal use.
- (d) Prevention of duplication of effort in scientific research, in development and in production. This resulted in a saving of manpower that was so desperately needed, especially in the United Kingdom.
- (e) Arranging for visits by scientific personnel between the two countries. These visits served to speed up research and development and helped in preventing duplication of effort.
- (f) Liaison with other U.S. agencies in the United Kingdom, such as the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the Military Attache, the Eighth Army Air Force, the Harriman Mission and various short-term visiting agencies.²⁶

Naval Attache to the Governments in Exile.

In all the discussions regarding unifying the Naval Attache personnel under Commander Naval Forces in Europe the position of the Naval Attache to the Governments in Exile had been considered separately. Originally, liaison between the Governments in Exile and ComNavEu had been maintained by the Intelligence division. From January to May 1942, Lt. G.F. Courtney, USNR, performed this and from May to September, Lt. Comdr. T.B. Kittredge conducted the work.

²⁶ Draft Historical Narrative: Readiness Division, ComNavEu. forwarded by ComNavEu serial 001650, (Secret) dated 27 December 1945. This narrative gives the full account of the work and the organization of this Division. See also Historical Narrative, "Office of the U.S. Naval Attache", op.cit.

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In June 1942, Admiral Stark recommended that a Naval Attache be appointed to assist Ambassador Biddle in the diplomatic missions to the Governments in Exile of Norway, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Poland, Holland, Czechoslovakia, and Greece. All these governments were then in London. It was pointed out that these governments had exceptionally good sources of military and political information and that all but one of the countries had naval forces and several had Naval Attaches in Washington.²⁷ Captain John L. Callan, USNR, was appointed and arrived in London in September, setting up his offices at 40 Berkeley Square in the Embassy Annex with Ambassador Biddle's group. Captain Callan reported to ComNavEu but Admiral Stark directed that he work primarily with Ambassador Biddle.

²⁷ Letter, ComNavEu to CominCh and CNO (Secret) serial 00468 dated 17 June 1942.

CHAPTER V

THE PLANNING ORGANIZATION

A Planning staff was organized as a separate section in the early days of SPENAVO, Captain R.A. Wentworth, USN, and Lt. Col. F.L. Hart, USMC, having been sent over as planning officers to participate in British planning. Lt. Comdr. K. M. McManes, and later Commander E.B. Strauss, was sent to be U.S. Secretaries with the British Joint Staff Planners. (See Part I, Chapter I; Pages 12, 13; Chapter II, pages 60 - 62). This planning group carried on functions in much the same way under Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe as under SPENAVO.

In the fluid state of organization in 1942, planning staffs were necessary in clearing the way for the numerous operations that were under consideration and for working out the details of arrangements for joint and combined administrative organization that required setting up. The Plans Section of ComNavEu was composed of a small number of senior officers who could be called upon by the Admiral for various types of assignments, including inspecting sites for bases, advising regarding personnel requirements, studying training needs, studying operations then being conducted by British forces, planning the coordination of Royal Navy with U.S. naval force

Intelligence functions were often combined with planning work, the officers being called upon from time to time to prepare reports upon British methods and tactics that they had observed. Much of the planning had to do with amphibious warfare and combined operations. Hence care was taken to include Marine Corps officers in the Plans Section personnel. Logistical planning, which became a major function of ComNavEu from 1943 onwards, will be discussed in a later chapter in regard to preparations for the operation OVERLORD.

Because there was always a shortage of experienced, senior officers, Admiral Stark found it necessary continuously to use his planning officers for other duties. Consequently the personnel shifted constantly. From March to June 1942, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Franklin A. Hart, USMC, and Captain Ralph A. Wentworth, USN, made up the plans Division.¹ In June, Captain Wentworth was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. Colonel Hart continued in the division and was joined by Lt. Col. Walter A. Wachteler, USMC, and Captain Jerould Wright, USN, in August. On 17 September, Admiral Stark designated Captain Wright as Plans Officer. Colonel Hart had asked to be reassigned to command of troops, and although

¹ SPENAVO Office Order No. 17, dated 13 March 1942.

Admiral Stark at first had demurred to his withdrawal because he was engaged in important work in England, it was agreed in September that Colonel Hart should be relieved by Colonel William T. Clement, USMC. Colonel Harold D. Campbell, USMC, came at approximately the same time and stayed until April 1943.

After Captain Wright was assigned to permanent duty with General Eisenhower's staff, Colonel Clement became Plans Officer for ComNavEu. Captain James A. Logan, USN, was with the Plans Division for a short time, but in March 1943 Admiral Stark had to call upon Captain Logan to take command at the NOB in Londonderry. Captain Harold J. Wright, USN, was brought from the United States to fill the vacancy left by Captain Logan. In April 1943, Captain Wright became Plans Officer.

Operational Planning became an important function at about that time, as work began in earnest for the cross-channel invasion. In January, CominCh had advised ComNavEu to conduct liaison with Admiral Ramsey's planners at Norfolk House as necessary until a directive came from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, when special liaison would be

arranged.² Future operations in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean were being considered by the Combined Chiefs. Commander Strauss was sent to fill this assignment.⁴ In February, the Combined Chiefs directed the British General Morgan to organize a staff under the title Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (short title COSSAC) and proceed to plan for the cross-channel invasion. British and American naval staffs were recruited, Captain H.G. Wright heading the U.S. organization temporarily, with the designation of Naval Chief of Staff (U.S.). Comdr. Strauss was titled Plans and Operations Officer, and Captain C.L. Austin (SC) was Supply Plans Officer.⁵ On 4 May, Admiral Stark requested that Navy Department send a Rear Admiral, a Lt. Comdr. and one Lieutenant to augment the U.S. Navy staff at Norfolk House. Because of his knowledge and experience

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² The Casa Blanca Conference in January 1943 had authorized the British Chiefs of Staff to set up a combined planning staff (COSSAC) to plan for the cross-channel operation against the Continent of Europe. See chapter on "Organizing for Operation OVERLORD".

³ CominCh to ComNavEu despatch of 6 January 1943.

⁴ Letter, Sir Henry V. Markham to Admiral Stark (Secret) M/P.D.(Q) 0753/43 of 19 February; Memorandum (Secret) from Captain Bastedo to Sir Henry V. Markham, Secretary to the Board of Admiralty, 22 February.

⁵ Memorandum by the Naval Chief of Staff (U.S.) at Norfolk House, dated 22 May 1943.

⁶ Personal letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral King, (Secret) dated 4 May 1943.

the subjects involved, Captain Gordon Hutchins, USN, was sent instead of a flag officer.⁷ Lt. Comdr. James Reed, and Lt. Col. Bare, USMC, were sent also in response to Admiral Stark's request. Commander Strauss was withdrawn from combined operations to devote his time to planning and during the summer additional staff, including Captain L.A. Thackerey, USN, and Lieutenants J.M. Schiff, J.H. Humphries, G. Hoegue, Jr., and E.F. Russell (all USNR) were assigned.⁸ These officers were carried on ComNavEu's roster under the heading "Combined Planning," but worked at COSSAC naval headquarters at Norfolk House.

Later in June 1943, a planning conference, attended by representatives of all British and U.S. services in the U.K. under the code name of RATTLE, was held at the Combined Operations headquarters on H.M.S. WARREN. At this conference the preliminary appreciation of the OVERLORD operation was examined. The revision which came out of that conference was used as the basis for the report being prepared by COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Allied Commander) for submission to the Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference in August 1943. U.S. naval officers who attended all or parts of this conference were Rear Admiral George B. Wilson, Chief of Staff to ComNavEu, Captain Hutchins and Lt. Col. Bare of the U.S. Naval

7 CominCh to ComNavEu despatch (Secret) 091840 of June 1943.
ComNavEu to CominCh despatch (Secret) 151621 of July 1943.

8 Ltr., ComNavEu to Bureau of Personnel, serial 2002 dated 16 September 1943.

element on the COSSAC staff, and Commander M.C. Jackson, Shipping Officer on the ComNavEu staff.

During the summer of 1943, Commander in Chief Plymouth, together with the American Army V Corps, planned and staged a deception manoeuvre under the code names of WADHAM and COCKADE. Captain Bastedo was loaned by ComNavEu to assist in the planning and to act as liaison between naval forces under CinC Plymouth and the V Corps at Bristol.⁹

TWELFTH Fleet Planning Organization.

Planning organization in U.S. Naval Forces was revised in November 1943, after the task forces had been created for the OVERLORD and NEPTUNE operations and administrative duties assigned. (See chapter on "Organizing for OVERLORD").

ComNavEu Plans Division comprised then two sections: an Operational Plans Section, under Captain Hutchins, and a Future Plans Section under Captain Wright. During the next month, however, Future Plans was redesignated Logistical Plans. Captain Hutchins returned to the United States. Captain Thackeray and the group of officers listed above functioned thereafter on the staff of Admiral Ramsey, who had been named Allied Naval Commander of A.N.C.X.F.

Logistical Plans was that section of the ComNavEu staff

⁹ Letter, ComNavEu to CinC Plymouth (Secret) serial 00274, dated 21 July 1943.

charged with responsibility for planning the logistical support of the U.S. naval forces assigned to the invasion - one of the major functions assigned the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe in preparing for the invasion. Captain Neil K. Dietrich, USN, headed the Logistical Plans Section. Captain Wright was redesignated as Head of the Operational Plans Section, a title he held until he returned to the U.S. in February 1944. Both sections constituted the Plans and Support Division which will be dealt with at a later point in the narrative because it continued planning the major ComNavEu function - Logistical support.¹⁰

Operational planning lay in the province of Task Force 122, created in November 1943 under Rear Admiral Kirk to direct the U.S. naval forces in the OVERLORD-NEPTUNE Operation, and of A.N.C.X.F. Captain E.A. Mitchell, USN, who had been a member of the TORCH planning committee in 1942, headed the task force Plan section. Included on the staff were Col. R.H. Jeske, USMC, Lt. Comdr. R.H. Solier, USN, Lt. Comdr. Roger Putnam, USNR, Lt. (jg) J.A. VanOrsdel, USNR. Captain L.A. Thackery and E.B. Strauss who worked with the A.N.C.X.F. Staff at Norfolk House ultimately were attached to Task Force 122 and represented that group.

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¹⁰ See chapter 8.

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