Introduction 1.
1 . Introduction
The Salvage Officer confronted with the task of retrieving
a sunken or stranded submarine will need to draw heavily
upon previous submarine salvage operations. Most likely he
will not have had personal experience in this field, and will
therefore need background information which will prepare him
for his particular salvage problem and provide a basis for a
modus operandi.
Every submarine salvage operation has different circumstances,
depending upon the size of the submarine, its position,
flooded condition and depth, and the type of bottom on which
it rests. The review of past submarine salvage operations
given in the Appendices to this manual, may assist the
Salvage Officer in estimating the requirements for his job
and in anticipating some of the problems that may arise.
There have been approximately twenty three submarine lasses of
non-combatant nature in the US NAl/Y. Of these, ten occurred
in such deep water that salvage could not be attempted. Out
of the remaining eleven, six were in shallow water or under
conditions that made salvage relatively simple; however, of
the other five submarine salvage attempts in deep water, four
were successful.
The first operation was the raising of USS F-4 off Honolulu
harbor in 1915. The submarine had to be brought up from a
depth of 305 feet; to date, the deepest salvage ever com¬
pleted. Divers had to work at depths far exceeding the
limits which had been reached in that day. However, in
comparison with later salvage operations, it must be
remembered that F-4 was small, displacing only 400 tons, and
considerably easier to handle than S-51 at 876 tons and
SQUALUS at 1450 tons.
The submarine service was not prepared for such disasters as
F-4. The deepest a diver had gone was 274 feet and little
was known about the effects of decompression sickness or
other physiological aspects of diving. There were no rescue
or salvage vessels fitted out for recovering crews or
submarines.
F-4's salvage force consisted of chartered tugs, two decked-
over scows with improvised windlasses for lifting, and a
diving lighter with a recompression chamber. The method of
bringing the submarine into shallower water was by sweeping
wire cables and chain slings under the hull, lifting with
the scows, and then towing until the submarine grounded.
A second purchase would then be taken on the hoisting cables
and the process repeated.
1-1
1-2
1-3
The operation was attended by all of the adverse elements
normally associated with underwater salvage; failure of
equipment, accidents, and bad weather conditions slowed the
job considerably. After weeks of lifting and towing, the
wreck was finally hauled into shallow wgter, at which time
a sudden onset'of heavy swells carried away all of the lifting
slings and severely damaged the submarine. The action of the
sea had sawed the cables and chain slings nearly through the
hull, making further lift by the scows impracticable. It
was feared that the hull would be cut entirely in two, or
that the bow section would sag out of the slings and ground
in the harbor. The first submersible pontoons were designed
and built to suit the condition of F-4, and to bring her to
the surface without further damage.
Perhaps the most significant salvage of a submarine was that
of S-51 . Prior to this achievement by the NAVY, an
unsuccessful attempt had been made to salve S-5.
The salvage problems in these two cases were quite similar
as to depth of water, size of the submarine, character of
the bottom, availability of qualified divers, and the
availability of a suitable salvage vessel and other salvage
equipment. S-51 was completely flooded, whereas S-5 had only
one main compartment flooded with little if any water in
the other compartments. S-5 was rigged for dive, all
compartments were intact, and all bulkheads secured. S-51
was rigged for surface, the hull had been opened by collision,
and none of the bulkheads was watertight. Both sites were
exposed to the open sea, and although S-51 had somewhat
better protection from winds than S-5, this difference in
exposure was not great insofar as its effect on salvage
operations was concerned.
The salvage of S-5 was undertaken with a preconceived notion
that the submersible pontoons, which were available in
sufficient quantity, could not be used in the open sea.
This assumption apparently extended to any form of external
lifting force and led to a salvage plan which included only
self-lift and required removal of the water from all com¬
partments and large tanks. There were no air salvage
connections, so it was necessary to provide spill pipes and
air connections for the compartments that were to be
dewatered. In preparing the compartments for blowing down,
explosives, which were used for cutting and for removal of
hatches, caused damage that eventually led to abandonment of
the salvage attempt. Utilizing hindsight, it seems clear
that the decision to attempt the salvage without any external
lift was responsible for failure to recover the submarine.
UJhen the salvage began, S-5 was in the most favorable
condition of any of the five deepwater salvages that the
US NAVY has undertaken. In the other four cases, external
1-4
1-5
lift was included in the salvage plan and greatly reduced
the amount of work required. External lift may have been
the factor that made the difference between success and
failure in these attempts.
The S-51 salvage operation is of gre„at interest because:
1. There was a we11-conceived salvage plan.
2. Problems encountered were diagnosed and
overcome as they occurred.
3. The salvage plan was adjusted as better
information became available, and as
difficulties were encountered.
4. An excellent technical report was prepared
covering all features of the operation, with
particular emphasis on the difficulties.
5. The salvage force was at all times confident
of success even though many things seemed to
be going wrong. This confidence is present
in all successful salvage operations, and
even the most discouraging catastrophies do
not affect it. This confidence or determination
to succeed is the essential part of any salvage
plan .
By contrast, the raising of S-51 proved to be a valuable,
experience to the US NAVY. Tunneling under the submarine,
using water jets supplied by a 2-l/2-inch firehose, created
problems for the divers. These centered about the handling
of the hose and nozzle when subjected to pressure sufficient
to cut and wash away the soil on the bottom. This brought
about the development of a balanced washing nozzle that
speeded the tunneling required for rigging of slings.
During the winter, when salvage was suspended, a new under¬
water cutting torch was developed, as well as a more efficient
underwater light.
For the first time, actual experience was gained in
calculating the suction effect of the bottom, and determin¬
ing breakout force needed to overcome it. The big 80-ton
pontoons were found to be extremely difficult to control when
placed alongside S-51, and again, when they were on the
surface knocking about in rough seas. This experience,
described in the S-51 salvage report, proved valuable later
when S-4 salvors prepared for their job. The pontoons were
modified to make them easier to handle, based primarily on
the S-51 report.
A little more than eighteen months after S-51 was salved, on
17 December 1927, another submarine disaster struck the US
NAVY .
1-6
S-4 sank off Provincetown, Cape Cod, after colliding with a
Coast Guard destroyer. The NAVY decided to salve the
submarine even though the salvors were faced with the prospect
of conducting diving operations in midwinter. The rescue
vessel FALCON and many of the divers who had worked on 5-51
were on hand for the job, and, consequently, the salvage work
proceeded at a good rate. In the beginning, the divers had
problems with air lines freezing, which caused particles of
ice and snow to fly about in their helmets. This was
corrected by the invention and installation of an air
conditioning plant that heated the divers's air.
In many respects the raising of S-4 was similar to that of
5-51. Both submarines had been sunk through collision which
opened the pressure hull and flooded compartments that could
not be sealed. In both cases tunneling was required to
permit reeving chain slings, and the raising was done by
dewatering compartments and using submersible pontoons.
However, aside from the weather, the S-4 operation was easier.
The excellent salvage report of S-51 and the availability of
the same salvage ships, officers, crew, and divers speeded
the work. The water was shallower and protected from the
open sea; the new washing nozzle cut tunneling time from days
to hours; the sea floor was soft and porous, and, con¬
sequently, the suction effect was negligible when breaking
the wreck free of the bottom. The submersible pontoons were
modified to the condition described in Chapter 5. This is
the only salvage of a US submarine which was so meticulously
planned that nothing serious seems to have gone wrong. It is
an excellent example of the value of detailed knowledge of
previous salvage operations.
The S-4 disaster occasioned a serious review by the NAVY of
problems concerning submarine safety and personnel rescue.
There resulted many innovations, mostly in the field of
rescue devices. The tragedy of not being able to rescue
trapped men at the shallow depth of 102 feet spurred the
development of the Tflomsen escape lung and the (YlcCann rescue
chamber. This latter device was to save thirty three men of
USS SQUALUS, trapped in 240 feet of water. Also, salvage
air connections were installed on all compartments, main
ballast tanks, and fuel oil tanks.
Other maritime nations were not without their submarine
accidents as is illustrated in Table 1-1. At the time of
the S-4 sinking, Britain listed fourteen submarines sunk,
while France had suffered eight losses. The worst attrition
rate for submarines occurred during a 24-day period in
1939. First, USS SQUALUS sank on 23 (flay; eight days later,
HITS THETIS went down followed by the French submarine
PHENIX.
\
Unlike S-51 and S-4, SQIJALIJS iuas raised in three stages, the
first tiuo of which were accomplished without any attempt to
remove water from the flooded compartments. All lifting
forces were supplied by pontoons, and ballast tanks were
blown through salvage air fittings. For the third and final
lift, water was removed from the main compartments and the
number of pontoons reduced.
The interesting features of this operation were:
1. The salvage was accomplished in three stages.
2. Control pontoons were used to limit the distance
the ship was lifted.
3. l\lo water was removed from the main compartments
while the submarine was in deep water.
4. When SQIJALIJS was brought to shallow water (9 □
feet), and the main air induction valve closed by external
gagging, the compartments were pumped down. To assist the
pumps against a 90-foot head of water, air pressure equal
to the sea pressure was applied to the compartments. In
this way, much work which had been done on the previous
salvage operations to make the compartments tight against
internal pressure was avoided.
5. The salvage plan adopted for SQIJALUS was to
minimize divers's time on the bottom in the initial deep
site. Of particular interest is the fact that the sub¬
marine was rigged with pontoons and actually raised off the
bottom after only 31 man-hours of diving. Although this
attempt failed because of lack of control, the additional
time that would have obviated this deficiency would not
have exceeded one man-hour.
6. Only two locations were used for pontoon slings
while the submarine was in deep water. Since the hull of
SQUALUS was clear of the bottom at one of these locations,
it was necessary to provide only one passage for slings
through the mud. For this passage a lance was devised
which was safer and required much less work by the diver
than the previou's tunneling method.
In the Appendices are two reports of British submarine
salvage operations which reflect a different approach for
recovering a wreck. These reports describe the techniques
for lifting by a specially designed "lift ship" which
literally hauls the submarine up from the bottom by cables
at the surface.
1-8
HMS THETIS was salved employing a lift method not previously
used and it required finding a suitable vessel to accomplish
the task .
In almost all cases of submarine salvage, specialized
equipment and material were designed specifically for the job
A notable exception was the work on S-4 which was undertaken
very shortly after the salvage of S-51. Generally, after each
major undertaking, the salvage force was disbanded and the
specialized equipment put in storage. It has been found to
be too costly to maintain a large manned force in anticipation
of a submarine salvage job. In salvage, time is rarely of
the utmost importance; the rescue aspects in such an event
have normally been concluded before the salvage force moves in.
It is difficult to forecast submarine accidents, as it is
with any other disaster. The time between the sinking of S-4
and SQUALUS was twelve years. During World War II, some
fifty two submarines failed to return from patrols; possibly
some small portion of these were due to accidents and not
through enemy action. However, if such wartime accidents did
occur, they must be few in number judging from the evidence
available since the war. Of the four US NAVY submarine
losses fallowing World War II, it is interesting to note that
all went down in water too deep for salvage. USS COCHINO
sank in 840 feet of water, USS STICKLEBACK was sunk in 9000
feet of water. USS THRESHER was lost in 8400 feet of water,
and USS SCORPION in 10,000 feet of water.
What can be anticipated in water depths for a submarine
salvage operation? The majority of submarine accidents occur
in or near congested water routes to ports. If failure of
equipment is involved, the casualty will usually occur during
the first few hours underway or during the initial trim dive.
These conditions tend to make the locale of a submarine
casualty coincide with the shallower ocean areas.
The limiting depth from which a submarine can be salved can
only be expressed in terms of the latest operational tech¬
niques in diving by men, or submersibles, and the operational
availability of a lifting force to be applied to the sub¬
marine. Pontoons, lifting slings, or a water-blowing system
must be attached or applied to the submarine in some manner
or combination, if it is to be raised. As the depth of the
sunken submarine increases, the feasibility of surface-
supported diving or lifting with cables decreases. At the
present time, divers still must be used to seal up
compartments and to cut tunnels for necessary pontoon slings.
Deep sea diving, supported from a surface salvage vessel,
is the only method there is at this time for performing
underwater work in salvage operations.
1-9
1-10
The current experimentation and research in advanced diving
systems employing pressurized habitats, lock-out saturated
diving techniques, submersibles with diver lock-out
capabilities, and the various combinations possible for deep
diving will initiate some radical changes in future oper¬
ations. The Salvage Officer will, pf course, employ the
latest operational techniques available to him.
The deep sea diver today depends directly on the surface
ship to supply his breathing gas, communications and under¬
water tools. He is limited in depth to about 250 feet if
breathing air, or 3S0 feet if he is on a helium-oxygen
mixture. The new technique of saturation diving using the
Personnel Transfer Capsule is extending diver depths to 600
feet and more. There are other limitations in diving, other
than the physiological ones. Currents, even moderate ones,
can drag a diver off his feet if he is in deep water, with
the long scope of his life line and air hose being affected
by this force. The weather conditions on the surface may
prohibit diving because of the danger of the tending ship
dragging anchor, or the surging of the vessel causing lines
to become fouled. Divers working in deep water will have
their time on the bottom shortened and will have to undergo
extended decompression periods. This will necessitate a
large manning requirement in order to rotate divers safely
so as to keep the operation going and take advantage of good
weather.
A Salvage Officer can begin to appreciate the involvement of
personnel and time in performing an underwater salvage job
by reviewing the operations discussed in the Appendices.
Apply these experiences to a different salvage problem, such
as one in 350 feet of water with a hard clay and rock bottom.
How long would a diver be able to work with a lance in
washing a tunnel? UJhat are the risks involved when divers
enter compartments to seal them? UJhat is available to
commence such a salvage job under these conditions? The
purpose of this submarine salvage manual is to provide
answers to some of these questions and to help the Salvage
Officer in estimating his job and planning for the successful
recovery of a submarine.
1-11
TABLE 1-1
ACCIDENTAL SUBMARINE SINKINGS SINCE 1904
1-12
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Depth (Ft) |
Men Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
March 18, |
U.K. |
A -1 |
42 |
11 |
yes |
Collision; rammed at periscope depth |
June 20, |
Russia |
DELFIN |
* |
26 |
yes |
Flooded via open hatch while |
1905 |
France |
ANGUILLE |
* |
none |
yes |
Gasoline explosion. |
Dune 8, |
U.K . |
A - 8 |
180 |
14 |
yes |
Flooded via open hatch while making |
July 6, |
F ranee |
FARFADET |
100 |
all |
yes |
Elooded via open hatch while diving |
Oct. 16, |
U.K. |
A-4 |
* |
* |
n o |
Rammed off Plymouth, England. |
Aug. 13, |
France |
ESTURGEON |
* |
none |
yes |
Sunk at dock at Saigon. |
Oct. 16, |
France |
LUTIN |
110 |
13 |
yes |
Flooded via leaky hull plates, |
Oan. 11, |
France |
ALGER IEN |
40 |
none |
yes |
Sunk during absence of crew because |
April 26, |
Italy |
EOCA |
* |
13 |
yes |
Flooded after internal explosion. |
June 12, |
Russia |
KA1Y1BALA |
* |
20 |
n o |
Rammed by battleship RESTISLAU |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cant)
1-13
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Depth (Ft) |
fYlen Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
July 14, |
U.K. |
C-ll |
* |
13 |
n o |
Sunk in collision with SS EDDISTONE |
April 15, |
Japan |
No. 6 |
* |
14 |
no |
Flooded via open ventilation valve |
lYlay 26, |
France |
PLUl/IOSE |
* |
26 |
* |
Collided with mail steamer PAS DE |
June 1, |
Russia |
FOREL |
* |
* |
yes |
Sunk while being towed. |
Oan . 17, |
Germany |
U-3 |
30 |
3 |
yes |
Flooded while at mooring in Kiel docks. Lifted by crane. |
Feb. 2, |
U.K . |
A-3 |
66 |
14 |
yes |
Rammed by gun boat HAZARD off Isle |
June 8, |
France |
Y/ENDEIY1I- AIRE |
350 |
24 |
n o |
Broke surface ahead of battleship |
Oct. 4, |
U.K. |
B-2 |
* |
15 |
n o |
lilhile running on surface at night |
1913 |
Russia |
1Y1IN0GA |
* |
none |
yes |
123-ton. Sunk near Libau in the |
June 8, |
U.K . |
E-5 |
* |
3 |
* |
Flooded following internal explosion; |
Dec. 10, |
U.K . |
C-14 |
* |
none |
yes |
Running on surface in Squadron. |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-14
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Depth (Ft) |
Men Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
1914 |
Nether¬ lands |
0-5 |
* |
1 |
yes |
Sunk at Scheldt Quay, Nether¬ |
Jan . 16, |
U.K. |
A-7 |
150 |
11 |
no |
Failed to come to the surface |
July 8, |
F ranee |
CALYPSO |
500 |
3 |
no |
Collision with submarine CIRCE |
S ep t.14, |
Australia |
A E-1 |
* |
all |
no |
Failed to return from training |
lYlarch 25 , |
U.S. |
F-4 |
306 |
22 |
yes |
Flooded; failure of hull plates |
A ug.8, |
U.K. |
E - 4 |
66 |
all |
no |
Collision with the E-41 off |
Aug . 8 , |
U.K . |
E - 41 |
60 |
none |
yes |
Collision with the E-4. |
□ ct. 10, |
Denmark |
DYKKEREN |
28 |
1 |
yes |
Sunk off Copenhagen after colli¬ |
Ban.29, |
U.K. |
K-1 3 |
55 |
49 |
yes- and recom¬ |
Flooded; boiler room ventilators |
March 19, |
Germany |
UB-25 |
* |
16 |
yes |
Rammed and sunk with DDV-26. |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-15
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Depth (Ft) |
lYlen Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
Sept.14, |
U.S. |
D-2 |
30 |
none |
yes |
Flooded at dockside via "slow |
S ept.17 , |
G ermany |
UC-45 |
* |
* |
yes- |
Foundered in North Sea as result |
Nov.18, |
U.K. |
K-1 |
* |
none |
* |
Sank in North Sea after colli¬ |
Dec.6, |
G ermany |
UC-69 |
* |
11 |
* |
Sank in English Channel after |
Dec.7 , |
Germany |
UB- 84 |
* |
19 |
yes- |
Sunk in Baltic Sea following |
Dec.17, |
U.S. |
F-l |
6 □ □ |
19 |
n o |
Collision; port side abaft the |
1917 |
U.K. |
H-5 |
* |
all |
no |
Collision; rammed by British |
Ban.31, |
U.K. |
K-17 |
* |
42 |
no |
Sunk by collision with British |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-16
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Depth (Ft) |
Men Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
Jan.31 , |
U.K. |
K-4 |
* |
50 |
no |
Sunk by collision with British |
Feb . 18 , |
Russia |
IGOR |
* |
* |
* |
Foundered in the ice off Revel, |
March 15, |
Germany |
UB-106 |
* |
35 |
yes- |
Sunk in Baltic Sea through mate¬ |
April 29, |
France |
PRA IRIAL |
* |
* |
* |
Sunk by collision with merchant¬ |
A ug.2, |
France |
FLOREAL |
* |
* |
* |
Sunk by collision off Saloniki, |
Sept. 5, |
G ermany |
UC-91 |
* |
* |
yes- |
Sunk by collision with German |
Oct.21, |
G ermany |
UB-89 |
* |
7 |
yes- surren¬ dered after armistice |
Sunk by collision with German |
July 3D, |
U.S. |
G-2 |
80 |
3 |
yes |
Flooded via leaky hatch cover in |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-17
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
(Ft) |
Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
March 12 , |
U . S . |
H-l |
50 |
4 |
no |
Grounded during storm near Point |
S ep t.1, |
U.S. |
S-5 |
194 |
none |
no |
During dive, flooded via open |
Jan.2 0, |
U.K. |
K-5 |
* |
57 |
n o |
Cause unknown; 120 miles S. LU. of |
Sept.26 , |
U.S. |
R-6 |
32 |
2 |
yes |
Flooded via tube; failure of |
Oct. 1921 |
Nether¬ lands |
0-8 |
* |
none |
yes |
After section filled with water |
Dec.7, |
U.S . |
S- 48 |
67 |
none |
yes |
Flooded via manhole cover from |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-18
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
(Ft) |
Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
March 23, |
U.K. |
H-42 |
3000 |
26 |
n o |
Collision with destroyer; was |
Duly 17, |
u.s. |
S - 3 8 |
102 |
none |
yes |
In Anchorage Bay, Alaska; sank |
A ug.21 , |
Bapan |
R 0-31 |
* |
all |
yes |
Flooded; premature opening of |
Oct.29, |
U.S. |
0-5 |
42 |
3 |
yes |
Collided with United Fruit steam¬ |
Ban.10, 1924 |
U.K . |
L - 2 4 |
180 |
41 |
n o |
During mimic attack on the |
March 19, |
Bapan |
RO-25 (ex-#43) |
156 |
all |
no |
Collision with cruiser TATSUTA |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-19
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
(Ft) |
Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
A ug.26, |
Italy |
SEBASTIANO l/ENIERO |
300 |
all |
no |
CoTILision off Cape Passero, |
Sept. 25 , |
U.S . |
S-51 |
132 |
33 |
yes |
Collision with SS CITY OF ROfYlE |
Oct.29, |
Oapan |
RO-52 (ex-#26) |
48 |
none |
yes |
Flooded via tube during repairs, |
Nov/. 12, |
U.K . |
(Y1-1 |
* |
all |
no |
Collision with Swedish steamer, |
A ug.9 , |
U.K. |
H-29 |
32 |
6 |
yes |
Flooded at dockside while trim¬ |
Dec.17 , |
U.S. |
S-4 |
102 |
all |
yes |
Collision with U5CG destroyer |
A ug.6 , |
Italy |
F -14 |
* |
31 |
yes |
Collision off Pela in Adriatic |
Oct.3, |
France |
ONDINE |
* |
43 |
no |
Collision off l/igo, Spain, with |
July 8, |
U.K. |
H-47 |
* |
20 |
no |
Collision with the British sub¬ |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-2Q
Date |
Country |
S ubmar in e |
Depth (Ft) |
Men Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
lYlay 26, |
Russia |
B-9 (ex-RABOCHY) |
* |
"heavy" |
* |
Cause unknown; lost during |
3 un e 9 , |
U.K. |
POSE IDIN |
130 |
21 |
n o |
ColT'ision with steamer TUTA off |
Oct.24, |
Russia |
L- 55 (ex-British L-55) |
* |
all (50) |
n o |
Sunk by unknown causes in the |
3an.26, |
U.K . |
nfi-2 |
106 |
all |
n o |
Flooded during plane launching |
Feb . 25, |
U.K . |
H-42 |
* |
all |
no |
Sunk by unknown causes off |
Duly 7, |
F ranee |
PROMETHEE |
150 |
63 |
no |
Flooded via failure of hydraulic |
3uly 25 , |
Russia |
B-3 |
* |
55 |
yes |
Collision with battleship (Y1ARAT |
l\lov. 20, |
Germany |
U-l 8 |
* |
8 |
yes- |
Sunk by collision with German |
Dec. 12, |
Spain |
unidenti¬ fied |
* |
45 |
no |
Sunk by internal explosion off |
F eb.2 , |
3apan |
1-63 |
* |
all |
n o |
Collision; lost in Bungo Channel. |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-21
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Depth (Ft) |
Men Lost |
Sal v/ed |
Geographical Location and Cause | |
May 23, |
U.S. |
SQUALUS |
240 |
26 |
yes |
Flooded, mechanical failure of | |
]une 1, |
U.K . |
THETIS |
120 |
99 |
yes |
Flooded via torpedo tube off | |
June 16, |
France |
PHENIX |
390 |
all |
no |
Cause unknown; lost off Point | |
July 24, |
Russia |
SHCH-424 |
* |
* |
no |
Sunk by collision with a fishing | |
Jan.30, |
Germany |
U-15 |
* |
* |
* |
Sunk by collision with German | |
March 6, |
Nether¬ lands |
0-11 |
30 |
3 |
yes |
Collision; rammed by Naval tug | |
April 29, |
U.K. |
UNITY |
* |
4 |
* |
Sunk by collision with steamer | |
A ug.29, |
Japan |
1-67 |
* |
* |
* |
Sunk during maneuvers in | |
Nov. 1940 |
Russia |
D-l |
* |
* |
no |
Sunk by diving accident in |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-22
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Depth (Ft) |
men Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause | |
June 20, |
U.S. |
0-9 |
440 |
all (33) |
no |
Flooded; crushed hull while ex¬ | |
July 19, |
U.K. |
UIYIPIRE |
65 |
15 |
n o |
Collision; rammed forward by | |
Oct. 1941 |
Germany |
U-579 |
* |
* |
yes- recommis¬ sioned |
Sunk by collision in Baltic Sea. | |
Oct. 3, |
Japan |
1-61 |
* |
all |
yes |
Cause unknown; lost off Kyushu, | |
Nov.11, |
Germany |
U-580 |
* |
12 |
* |
Sunk by collision off (Ylemel, E. | |
Nov.15, |
Germany |
U-583 |
* |
45 |
* |
Sunk by collision in Danzig Bay, | |
Jan.24, |
U.S. |
S-26 |
300 |
46 |
n o |
Collision with PC 460 while on | |
may 2, |
Poland |
JASTRZAB (ex-US S-2 |
* 5) |
* |
•x- |
Sunk by collision with British | |
may 1942 |
Russia |
SHCH-212 |
* |
-x- |
no |
Lost near Sevastopol on the Black | |
June 21, |
U.K. |
P-514 |
* |
all |
no |
Cause unknown; reported as |
* Unknoujn
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-23
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Depth (Ft) |
Men Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
July 14, |
Turkey |
ATILAY |
* |
* |
* |
Lost by accident u/hile on trials |
A ug.6 , |
G ermany |
U-612 |
* |
* |
yes- |
Sunk off UJarnemuende, Baltic Sea |
Se p t.2, |
G ermany |
U-222 |
* |
42 |
* |
Sunk by collision off Pillau, |
5 e p t. 4 , |
Sweden |
SJOEBDRREN |
* |
* |
yes- recom¬ missioned |
Lost by collision in the Baltic Sea. |
Se p t.27, |
Japan |
1-33 |
* |
* |
yes- recom¬ missioned |
Accidentally foundered at TRUK |
Nov.4, |
U-K . |
X-3 |
114 |
3 |
yes |
Flooded via leaky sea valve in |
Nov . 12, |
Germany |
U-272 |
* |
28 |
* |
Lost by collision off Hela |
Feb.24, |
Germany |
U- 649 |
* |
35 |
* |
Lost by collision in the Baltic |
Feb .24, |
U.K. |
VANDAL |
* |
* |
* |
Sank in the Firth of Forth due |
March 19 |
Germany |
U-5 |
* |
21 |
* |
Lost in Danzig Bay due to |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-24
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Depth (Ft) |
Men Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
(Ylay 30, |
U.K . |
UNTAMED |
160 |
all |
yes- |
Flooded off Campbeltown, |
June 12, |
u.s. |
R-12 |
600 |
42 |
no |
Flooded via forward torpedo tube |
1943 |
Norway |
WELLMAN X |
186 |
none |
no |
Cause - accident. |
July 14, |
Japan |
1-179 |
* |
* |
* |
Accidental sinking, Inland Sea. |
A ug.5 , |
G erman y |
U-34 |
* |
4 |
* |
Sunk by collision off Memel, |
A ug.12, |
Sweden |
ILLERN |
* |
* |
yes |
Sunk by collision with a steamer |
A ug.20, |
Germany |
U-670 |
* |
21 |
* |
Sunk by collision with target |
Sept. |
Russia |
m-60 |
* |
* |
no |
Failed to surface after diving |
Sept.20, |
Germany |
U-346 |
* |
37 |
* |
Accidental sinking in the Baltic Sea. |
Nov.18, |
Germany |
U-718 q |
* |
43 |
* |
Sunk by collision with U-476 |
Nov.20, |
Germany |
U-768 |
* |
* |
* |
Lost by collision, Baltic Sea. |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-25
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Dept (Ft) |
men Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
F eb . 14, |
Germany |
U-738 |
* |
9 |
* |
Lost by collision with steamer |
Feb .18 , |
Germany |
U-7 |
* |
26 |
* |
Diving failure in Danzig Bay, |
1944 |
Germany |
U-1013 |
* |
25 |
* |
Lost by collision with U-286 |
April 8, |
Germany |
U-2 |
* |
27 |
yes |
Lost by collision with fishing |
lYlay 14, |
Germany |
U-1234 |
* |
13 |
yes- recom¬ missioned |
Lost by collision with a tug off |
lYlay 19, |
Germany |
U-1015 |
* |
36 |
* |
Sunk by collision with U-1014 |
Dune 13, |
Dapan |
1-33 |
* |
* |
* |
Lost in Inland Sea by material |
Duly 4, |
U.S. |
S-28 |
8400 |
50 |
n o |
Cause unknown; material casualty; |
Duly 22, |
Germany |
U-1166 |
* |
* |
raised- scrapped |
Sunk in Eckern Fjord, Baltic |
Duly 27, |
Russia |
M-1 (ex Brit |
* |
* |
no |
Sunk by mistake by British air¬ |
Sept. 21, |
Russia |
SHCH-402 |
* |
* |
n o |
Sunk by mistake by Soviet air¬ |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1- 26
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Depth (Ft) |
Hflen Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
Sept. |
Germany |
U-703 |
* |
54 |
* |
Foundered east of Greenland |
Oc t. 10 , |
Germany |
U-2331 |
* |
15 |
* |
Sunk off Hela Peninsula, Baltic |
N ov.28, |
Germany |
U-80 |
* |
* |
* |
material casualty, Baltic Sea. |
Dec . 12, |
Germany |
U-416 |
* |
36 |
* |
Rammed and sunk by German mine¬ |
Dec . 30, |
Germany |
U-382 |
* |
* |
* |
Sunk by collision in Danzig Bay, |
F eb . 1 8 , |
Germany |
U-2344 |
* |
7 |
* |
Sunk by collision off |
Pflarch 6, |
U.K. |
XE-11 |
204 |
2 |
no |
Collision while running sub¬ |
(flay 12, |
France |
U-2326 |
* |
* |
* |
Lost by material casualty off |
June 1946 |
Spain |
C-4 |
* |
* |
* |
Sunk by collision with the |
Nov.21, 1947 |
U.K. |
P-511 |
* |
all |
yes- raised- scrapped |
Cause unknown; reported as lost |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-27
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Depth (Ft) |
Men Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
Aug.26, |
U.S. |
CDCHINO |
840 |
one civi¬ lian tech¬ nician |
no |
Flooded following hydrogen ex¬ 100 miles north of Hammerfest, |
Ban . 12 , |
U.K . |
TRUCULENT |
66 |
61 |
yes |
Collision with Swedish tanker |
April 17, |
U.K. |
AFFRAY |
198 |
75 |
no |
Flooded due to failure of snorkel |
Sept.24, |
F ranee |
LA SIBYLLE |
3000 |
70 |
no |
Flooded in unknown manner, near |
April 4, |
Turkey |
DU1Y1LUP INAR |
228 |
all |
n o |
Collided with Swedish NAB0LAND, |
Bune 16, |
U.K. |
SIDON |
36 |
13 |
yes |
Flooded, internal casualty in |
HOay 30, |
U.S. |
STICKLE¬ BACK |
9000 |
none |
n o |
Collision during maneuvers with |
1959 |
Chile |
O'BRIEN |
30 |
none |
no |
Slow flooding overnight while |
* Unknown
TABLE 1-1 (Cont)
1-28
Date |
Country |
Submarine |
Depth (Et) |
Men Lost |
Salved |
Geographical Location and Cause |
April ID, |
U.S. |
THRESHER |
8400 |
129 |
no |
Cause unknown; off New England |
Oct. 1963 |
Russia |
PUCHINA |
* |
* |
yes |
Sunk in collision with merchant- |
Sept.15, |
UJest Germany |
HA I |
145 |
19 |
yes |
Flooded during North Sea Gale. |
Jan . 2 6 |
Israel |
DAKAR |
* |
69 |
n o |
East Mediterranean |
Jan. 27 |
F ranee |
MINERVE |
* |
52 |
no |
Western Mediterranean |
May 27 |
U.S. |
SCORPION |
12000 |
99 |
no |
Atlantic, South-UJest of the |
May 15 |
U.S. |
GUITARRO |
35 |
0 |
yes |
Mare Island Naval Shipyard, |
March 2 |
France |
EURVDICE |
* |
45 |
no |
Mediterranean |