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JOINT/COMBINED COMMANDS CINCLANT OCT. 21, 1941 BOX 1, OA

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET

SERIAL 01086

7 OCTOBER 1941

UNDERWAY TRAINING

REPORT OF DEFICIENCIES IN PERSONNEL,
MATERIAL, ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES
DEVELOPED DURING FIRST JOINT TRAINING
FORCE AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES AT NEW RIVER,
NORTH CAROLINA.

#### UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET U. S. S. AUGUSTA, Flagship

A16-3/(01086)

Care Postmaster New York, N. Y.

DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR 5200.9

October 7, 1941.

From:

DATE 21 Aug -70 Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet. The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject:

To:

Summary of deficiencies in Personnel, Material, Organization and Procedure developed during First Joint Training Force Landing Exercises at New River, North Carolina; 4 - 12 August, 1941.

- References: (a) ComTrain's Report, Serial 0-323 of September 13, 1941.
  - (b)-ComGenLantFhibFor Final Report, CSN 55-41, 1975-40, 02/120 of September 9, 1941, with endorsement thereon.
  - (c) ComGen LantPhibFor Ltr. (Gunfire) CSN 58-41, 1975-40, Oll/110 of September 9, 1941, with endorsement thereon.
  - (d) ComGenLantPhibFor Report (Reorg of Task Forces) SSN 13-41, 1975-70, 02/120 of September 8, 1941, with endorsement thereon.

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Op File No. (SC) A 16-3(22 Doc. No.

Copy No.

of September 6, 1941, with endorsement thereon. (f) ComGenLantPhibFor Preliminary Report, CSN 48-41, 1975-40, 02/106 of August 27, 1941, with endorse--)ment thereon.

port unloading), CEN 54-41, 1975-30, 012/119,

ComConLantPhibFor Report (Shore Party and Trans-

g) ComTaskFor 17 (ComTrain) Preliminary Report. Serial 0-264 of August 14, 1941.

(h) ComGenLantPhibFor Ltr. 2295 CSN 62-41, 08/120 of September-11, 1941.

ComTrain Serial 0-328 of September 16, 1941. CE 22 (32) (j)-CinCLant Serial 0981 of September 14, 1941. (k) CinCLant Serial 00197 of September 21, 1941

(2nd Endorsement of reference (d)).

(1) ComGonLantPhibFor Ltr. 2515 08/120 SSN 24-41 of September 16, 1941.

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(m) CinCLant Scrial 00198 of September 21, 1941 (1st Endorsoment to reference (1)).

(n) CinCLant Serial 2086 of September 9, 1941.

(o) ComGonLantPhibFor Ltr. 2455-130 CSN 71-40 014/107 of September 22, 1941.

(p) ComGenLantPhibFor Ltr. 2455-130 CSN 70-41 014/119 of September 22, 1941.

Enclosures: (A) Action and/or Recommendations as to Material Deficiencies in Transports and Associated Equipment.

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Subject:

First Joint Training Force Landing Exercises at New River, North Carolina; 4 - 12 August, 1941 -Deficiencies in Personnel, Material, Organization and Procedure.

#### Enclosures: (cont'd)

(B) Action and/or Recommendations as to Material Deficiencies in Ecuipment of Troops.

(C) Action and/or Recommendations as to Deficiencies in Personnel, Organization, Tactics and Operational Procedure of Ships.

(D) Action and/or Recommendations as to Deficiencies in Personnel, Organization, Tactics and Opera-

tional Procedure of Troops (Marine and Army) and Aircraft.

(E) Action and/or Recommendations as to Deficiencies in Communication Procedure and Material.

(F) Action and/or Pecormendations as to Laval Gunfire Support and Procedure (reference (c)).

(G) Copy of reference (j).

- l. Reference (j) contains my action and/or recommendations as to the several deficiencies reported in the preliminary report (reference (f)) of the Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force, regarding the mass landing-in-force exercises held during the period 4 12 August in the New River Area.
- 2. References (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g) and (h) are further reports on the subject exercises. Essential recommendations flowing therefrom, including action previously taken by reference (j), are briefed in the enclosure together with my further action and/or recommendations.
- 3: In commenting (in reference (k)) on reference (d) as to the recommendations of the Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force, concerning the composition of an expeditionary force of two infantry divisions, I stated that the organization of the Marine Amphibious Force as recommended in reference (d) is regarded as an acceptable goal toward which to direct further study and development.
- The usual delays have operated to prevent the assembly of the First Marine Division and associated troops in the New River Area and by so much have postponed the training of that division. The First Marine Air Wing which participated in the September exercises of the Army in Louisiana requires rest, gunnery training, and refresher qualifications in carrier landings. The forced delay in the schedule for another full-scale amphibious exercise now to be held in December should enable all Marine elements of the Atlantic Amphibious Force to attain to a reasonable degree of proficiency in basic military training.

#### A16-3/(01086)

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Subject:

First Joint Training Force Landing Exercises at New River, North Carolina; 4 - 12 August, 1941 --Deficiencies in Personnel, Material, Organization and Procedure.

- 5. Where, in the enclosures, officers of the Atlantic Fleet are directed to take action, such action shall be expedited in every practicable way to the end that deficiencies material, administrative, personnel shall be corrected at the earliest possible time. The Chief of Naval Operations and/or the Major General Commandant are requested to exercise similar expedition in cases requiring Departmental action.
- 6. In order that all references may be available to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Major General Commandant, by copy of this letter, officers listed below are directed to forward copies of references as indicated:

Officer	Reference	То
ComTrain ComGenLantPhibFor ComGenLantPhibFor	(a) (c) (e)	OpNav; MajGenComdt USMC OpNav OpNav
ComTrain ComGenLantPhibFor	(g) (h)	OpNav; MajGenComdt USMC OpNav
ComTrain ComGenLantPhibFor ComGenLantPhibFor ComGenLantPhibFor	(i) (1) (o) (p)	OpNav; MajGenComdt USMC OpNav OpNav OpNav
		J. KING.

Copy to:

MajGenComdt USMC ComTaskForces 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 ComCruLant ComDesLant ChBuAero CONFIDENTIALE

#### ACTION AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES IN TRANSPORTS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT-

1. That stronger and better boat handling gear be installed in ships of Transport Division NINE. (Reference (a), paragraph 1 2)

Unnecessary as all landing boats are being removed as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations serial 0142323 of September 15, 1941.

2. That sufficient landing boats and tank lighters be provided - 20 Higgins Eureka 36' per reenforced battalion, 20 Higgins 36' ramp bow boats per reenforced battalion. (Reference (b); paragraphs 1 (c)(4), 1(d)(8), 3(2)(f),(g),(o); reference (f), paragraphs 4(p), (q); reference (j), paragraph 2).

Combat transports are being fitted with 23 to 25 36' landing boats and 2 to 3 45' tank lighters as material and ships become available.

- 3. That high sill and weak ramp on early models of Higgins tank lighters require modification to make lighters satisfactory. (Reference (b), paragraphs 1(d)(5) and 2 (i)).
  - Action now being taken.
- 4. That no more Bureau type tank lighters be furnished until present defects are remedied. (Reference (b), paragraphs 1(d) (6), 2(j)).
  - Replacement of early Bureau tank lighters with ones of late type should be expedited.
- 5. That all gasoline powered landing boats be shielded to permit use of radio during ship to shore movement. (Reference (b), paragraphs 1(d)(7), 2(h)).
  - Commander Train is directed to initiate corrective action.
- 6. That transports be equipped with adequate berthing facilities, sufficient forced ventilation, adequate messing facilities, adequate sanitary facilities, adequate water equipment and adequate laundry equipment. (Reference (b), paragraph 2(d)).
  - This is obvious and must be accomplished within the limitations of existing ships.
- 7. That each transport designated for combat unit loading provide at least 85 officer spaces, 1300 troop spaces, about 150,000 cubic feet of general cargo space, about 7,500 cubic feet of magazine space, boat stowage for about twenty-five (25) thirty-six (36') foot boats, two (2) tank lighters and twenty (20) rubber boats. (Reference (b), paragraph 2 (e)).

The Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force, is directed to make such additional modifications in combat team organizations as will enable the combat teams to be accommodated by available transports. Comment as to boats and tank lighters is given in paragraph 2 above.

8. That motor transportation be provided for the Beachmaster. (Reference (g), paragraph 8(d)).

The Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force, is directed to recommend to the Department motor transportation required.

9. No satisfactory means has been devised to hoist on board Army litters in multiple loads. (Reference (a), paragraph VIII 2 c).

Commander Train is directed to submit specific recommendations.

10. That an AP be added to each transport division; that tank carriers be developed and provided for reenforcing tanks. (Reference (f), paragraph 4 (n)(p)(q); reference (j), paragraph 2).

Additional AP's are not in prospect. The Commanding General has made recommendations in reference (o).

#### ACTION AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES IN EQUIPMENT OF TROOPS

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That adequate mechanized equipment be provided. (Reference (b), paragraph 1(c)(5)).

Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force, is directed to make suitable recommendations to the Major General Commandant who is requested to effect joint action with the Army.

2. That adequate motor transportation be provided. (Reference (b), paragraph 1(d)(9)).

Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force, expedite separate recommendations to Major General Commandant.

3. That sufficient suitable water carrying equipment be provided. (Reference (b), paragraph 1(d)(10)).

Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force, expedite separate recommendations to Major General Commandant.

4. That only two types of gasoline - high test for tanks and unleaded for all other purposes - be provided. (Reference (b), paragraphs 1(d)(11), 2(k)).

Commander Train is directed to initiate corrective action.

5. That adequate motor transportation, gasoline trucks, and bomb loading equipment and accessories be provided for Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN. (Reference (b), paragraph 1(c)(6)).

The Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force, submit specific recommendations to the Department via Commander Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet.

6. That adequate facilities for rationing of troops from parent ships be provided. (Reference (b), paragraph 1(d)(12)).

The Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious  $\overline{F}$  orce, expedite definite recommendations via Commander Train as stated in reference (b).

7. That adequate tentage be provided for medical equipment and casualties. (Reference (a), paragraph VIII 2(c)).

The Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force is directed to procure adequate tentage.

8. That at least ten (10) units of fire for all weapons be set aside for delivery on call, in event of sudden orders for

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actual operations. (Reference (f), paragraph 4(i)).

The Major General Commandant is requested to take necessary action.

9. The Stokes stretcher would be impracticable in large scale operations. (Reference (a); paragraph VIII 2(c)).

The Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force is directed to make recommendations for the provision of stretchers adequate in design and in numbers.

10. That steps be taken to provide, or designate, sufficient aircraft suitable for transporting and simultaneous dropping of all available paratroops. (Reference (b), paragraph 2(q)).

Concur.

11. That steps be taken to develop and provide armed armored support boats and that delivery of alligator and rubber boats be expedited. (Reference (f), paragraph 4 (o)(r); reference (j), paragraph 2).

The Commanding General has made recommendations in reference (p).

# ACTION AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO DEFICIENCIES IN PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATION, TACTICS AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE OF SHIPS

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1. That transport divisions be given intensive tactical training. (Reference (a), paragraph I, 1)

Commander Train make provisions for such training as practicable.

2. That separate transport division commanders and staffs be assigned. (Reference (a), paragraph I, 1)

The assignment of separate transport division commanders and of two naval officers of suitable rank and experience and of one Marine Officer as the staff thereof was recommended in reference (n).

3. That submarines be used as markers to assist AP's to find transport area. (Reference (a), paragraph II, 1).

While submarines have been used in such operations and may in certain circumstances be valuable when so employed, the recommendation of the Commander Train is, in general, considered to provide a satisfactory solution.

4. That ships not engaged in landing operations keep clear of transport area and of beaches. (Reference (a), paragraph II, 2).

The officer in charge of the operation is responsible for such arrangements.

5. That actual experience is essential before night bombardment in support of evacuating troops can be ordered with any assurance of the results. (Reference (a), paragraph IV(3)(c)).

The officer who is designated as commander attack force for the next landing exercises is directed to conduct the preliminary indoctrination of fire control personnel in this respect.

6. That adequate air support be provided. (Reference (a), paragraph V, 1, 2).

The necessity for adequate air support in an actual operation is recognized. In maneuvers, all air strength that can be made available, having regard to other committments, has and will be furnished.

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7. That transport areas be swept by small sweeps and not by DES's (Reference (a), paragraph VI, 2)

It is expected that sweeping will be accomplished by those vessels which are available and most adaptable to the existing conditions.

8. That arrangements for delivery of mail to embarked troops be adequate. (Reference (b), paragraph 1(a)).

It is the responsibility of the officer in charge of landing exercises to make appropriate arrangements for the delivery of mail to the entire force.

9. That means be provided to permit identification of boat groups and of individual transports by guide planes. (Reference (b), paragraphs 1 (c)(7), 2(p)).

Commander Train, Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force and Commander Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet, collaborate to the end that boots may be appropriately marked and that pilots may be adequately trained.

10. That transports be loaded in a manner which favors execution of the tactical scheme of maneuver at the point of debarkation. (Reference (b), paragraph 1 (d) (4)).

It is the function of Commender Transports to ensure that transports are loaded in accordance with the requirements of the scheme of maneuver ashore as specified by the landing force commander, as consistent with the requirements of safe loading.

11. That an adequate number of transports suitable for combat unit loading of war strength units be procured. (Reference (b), paragraph 2 (c)).

There can be no question as to the necessity of providing sufficient transports to embark units of strength commensurate with the accomplishment of the assigned task. This representation has been repeatedly made and is well undertood by all concerned. It is again emphasized, however, that a prime function of the amphibious Force is to perfect itself to the extent possible with the means presently and prospectively available.

12. That 7 days gas supply be carried in each AP for the embarked units and that an additional supply be carried in drums in AK's with a bulk supply in AOG's. (Reference (b), paragraph 2(1)).

It is noted that Commender Train concurs in this recommendation and will issue necessary instructions.

That regulations be promulgated which will permit motor vehicles to be carried aboard transports, with filled gas tanks, filled reserve cans and ammunition. (Reference (b), paragraph 2 (m)).

It is noted that Commander Train concurs in this recommendation and will direct Commander Train Squadron THREE to issue the necessary instructions. I Approve. Comtrain insure that appropriate safety precautions are issued.

14. That cooked rations be not furnished to troops on shore and that regulations be promulgated that will relieve accountable officers, Navy and Marine, in cases of over issue incident to the situation. (Reference (b), paragraph 2 (n)).

It is noted that Commander Train concurs in this recommendation and will direct Commander Train Squadron THREE to issue the necessary instructions. I approve.

15. That a board of Army, Navy and Marine Corps officers propere transport regulations. (Reference (b), paragraph 2 (t)).

Commander Train will direct Commander Train Squadron THREE to revise transport regulations and submit them for comment prior to approval and issue. I approve this action and concur with Commander Train that a board is not necessary.

16. That the beach party be composed of naval personnel under the direct control of the beachmaster, who will be under the orders of Commander Transports. (Reference (e), third endorsement, paragraph 2(a); reference (f), paragraph 4(j)).

It is noted that there exists considerable differences of opinion on this important point. In paragraph 2 of reference (j) I prescribed that basic orders provide for consolidation of beach and shore porties under the command of the Landing Force. On completion of the November exercises Commander Train and Commanding General submit further recommendations in the premises.

17. That the beach party be responsible for matters pertaining to the movement, handling, and salvaging of boats. (Reference (a), third endorsement, paragraph 2 (b)).

Concur.

18. Doctrine for destroyers should provide for screening missions until about H-45 minutes at which time they execute fire support mission. After fire support missions are completed, the destroyers can again be given screening missions until another phase begins or as otherwise directed. (Reference (a), paragraph IV 3 B).

This is permissible within the limitations of current doctrine.

# ACTION LND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO DEFICIENCIES IN PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATION, TACTIOS, LND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE OF TROOPS

1. For planning purposes thirty days notice of future exercises should be given. (Reference (f), paragraph 4 (a); reference (j) paragraph 2).

This will be done when practicable but it is essential that the amphibious Force Type Plans provide for movement on 10 days notice.

2. That if it is planned to employ the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Division (Army) as a joint force, complete reorganization be made; involving changes in types and numbers of ships. (Reference (f), paragraph 4 (d); reference (j), paragraph 2).

That the force be reorganized in three echelons; that the delay between the arrival in the transport area and "H" hour be reduced. (Reference (f), paragraph 4 (e); reference (j), paragraph 2).

That the additional angineer troops, light tanks, artillery and special service (labor) troops be assigned as force troops. (Reference (f), paragraph 4(g); reference (j), paragraph 2).

The recommendations made in the three foregoing paragraphs approach the problem on the premise that additional transports, suitable for combat loading, can be made available on short notice. This is not the case.

The Commanding General, Amphibious Force, is directed to make specific recommendations for reorganization embodying the three cohelon principle but employing only those transports that it is known will be available in early Documber. In this connection, The Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Flest, has just received copy of reference (b) and assumes that the organization recommended will be patterned thereon.

The Amphibious Force must be organized now with a clear understanding that active operations may have to be undertaken with forces actually in hand. The Commander-in-Chief is fully aware of the existing deficiencies but these must be accepted and overcome insofar as may be.

As to reduction in time between arrival in the transport area and "H" hour, this is a matter wholly in the hands of the Naval Officer commanding the operation and the officer commanding the landing force and can only be reduced by close study and repeated practice.

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3. That aircraft assigned missions in support of the landing force be placed under command of the landing force commander. (Reference (f), paragraph 4(1); reference (j), paragraph 2).

The next landing force directive issued will be so phrased as to accomplish the desired result.

4. Reorganization of Marine Aircraft Group II must provide personnel for an adequate intelligence section, certain ground defense personnel, additional limison and communication personnel. (Reference (b), paragraph 1(c)(6)).

Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force submit specific recommendations to Major General Commandant.

5. That all future landing exercises be conducted with full simulation of actual combat conditions in war strength and include adequate representation of the enemy, complete umpire central, adequate naval strength, simulation of press control and consorship and government of occupied territories. (Reference (b), paragraph 2(b); reference (f), paragraph 4(b); reference (j), paragraph 2).

Landing exercises cannot whit until war strength is attained but must be held with troops in hand and with naval strength that can be made available at the time. I concur in the need for simulation of press control censorship, and government of occupied countries as appropriate.

6. That the shore party be composed of landing force personnel under the direct central of the commander of the landing force. (Reference (e), paragraph 2; reference (f), paragraph 4(j); reference (j), paragraph 2).

Comment under item 16, Enclosure (C), applies.

7. That the unlocaing of boats and tank lighters be the responsibility of the shore party. (Reference (e), third endorsement, paragraph 2(d)).

Concur.

8. That the beach medical personnel be attached to the shore party. (Reference (e), third endorsement, paragraph 2(d)).

Comment under item 16, Enclosure (C), applics.

9. That a force headquarters be organized and maintained in a state of relainess. (Reference (f), paragraph 4(f); reference (j), paragraph 2).

Now in effect.

#### ACTION AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO DEFICIENCIES IN COMMUNICATION PROCEDURE AND MATERIAL

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1. That ships engaged in landing operations be provided with full allowance of radio operating personnel. (Reference (a), paragraph III, 6 B).

Commander Train is directed to take appropriate action consistent with the needs of the Fleet as a whole.

2. That a survey be made to determine the minimum number of registered publications that are necessary for amphibious operations,
and that every effort be made to eliminate publications which
may compromise codes or jeopardize national security in event of
their capture. (Reference (b), paragraph 2(S)).

Concur. The early issue of a device similar to CSP 488 is urged.

3. That sufficient portable radio equipment be provided. (Reference (a), paragraph III, 2).

Concur.

4. Install full allowances of radio equipment in ships of the Train. (Reference (a), paragraph III 6 A(b)).

Early procurement and installation of equipment by the Bureau of Ships is urged.

5. That adequate transmitting equipment be furnished Marine Air Groups. (Reference (a), paragraph III 6 A(b).

The Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force, is directed to investigate this deficiency and to submit specific recommendations.

6. That shore observation parties (gunfire) be supplied with adequate communication equipment. (Reference (b), paragraph 1 (c) (9); reference (c), paragraph 1 (b)(3)(d)).

To be furnished by Commander Transports as directed by Commander Train.

7. That a board be ordered to determine the most feasible communication procedure and suitable communication equipment for amphibious operations; that the determined equipment be procured at once; and that training be commenced without delay in the determined procedure. (Reference (b), paragraph 2(r); reference (f), paragraph 4(m); reference (j), paragraph 2).

Strongly concur.

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8. That means be provided for visual communication between beach and ships. (Reference (a), paragraph III, 1).

The provision of portable signal searchlights should be expedited.

9. That loud speakers for control of debarkation control by installation in AP's. (Reference (a), paragraph III 2).

Concur.

10. That sufficient communication facilities be made available in ships embarking the landing force commanders, division commanders and regimental commanders. (Reference (f), paragraph 4(m); reference (j), paragraph 2).

The Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force, will make specific recommendations via Commander Train.

#### ACTION AND/OR RECOMMENDATION AS TO

#### NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT AND PROCEDURE

1. That training of ship's aviators in control of counter-battery and deep supporting fires be undertaken at once in order to secure effectiveness of this type of fire. (Reference (c) paragraph 1 (a)(2)).

Commander Battleships and Commander Cruisers are directed to arrange with the Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force for training of ships' aviators in recognition of ground targets and in bringing them under effective fire; duration of training to be approximately two weeks while ship is undergoing navy yard overhaul.

2. (a) That the twelve (12) naval liaison officers be detached from transports and assigned to Headquarters, Atlantic Amphibious Force (Reference (c) paragraph 1 (b)(3)(a)).

Commander Train is arranging this transfer.

(b) That, when not engaged in field exercises, these officers be assigned to temporary duty in Cruiser Divisions 7 and 8. (Reference (c) paragraph 1 b (3)(b)).

Commander Train is directed to distribute these officers to all types of combatant vessels for training.

3. (a) That combat unit loaded transports be relieved of the responsibility of providing the communication detail and that this responsibility be assigned to the Atlantic Amphibious Force (Reference (c) paragraph 1 b (3)(c)).

Concur.

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(b) That the portable radio equipment (TBO or TBX's) required for these communication details be furnished the Atlantic Amphibious Force by the Atlantic Fleet. (Reference (c) paragraph 1 b (3)(d)).

Equipment being furnished by Commander Transports, as directed by Commander Train.

4. That artillery officers from duly assigned Army troops be assembled, on the basis of two (2) officers per light artillery battalions, be assembled for indoctrination and instructions in the technique of spotting naval gunfire (Reference (c) paragraph 1 b (3)(e)).

Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force is directed to arrange direct with commanding officer of duly assigned Army troops.

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5. That appropriate shore bombardment practices be fired in the New River Area by Battleship Divisions 3 and 5, Cruiser Divisions 7 and 8, and the squadron of destroyers which may be assigned a gunfire support mission in actual operations. (Reference (c) paragraph 1 c (3); reference (f) paragraph 4 (k); reference (j) paragraph 2).

Due to exigencies of the present situation, diversion of such numbers of combatant ships as would be required is not practicable. If firings by a single battleship will suffice, it may be possible to assign IDAHO this task as part of extensive firings to be conducted prior next overhaul. Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force, submit further recommendations in this regard.

- 6. That steps be taken to prepare New River Area for shore bombardment practices (Reference (c) paragraph 3 d(2))by:
  - (a) Establishment of accurately located markers for firing of position of ships. (Reference (c) paragraph 3 d (1)(a)).
  - (b) Establishment of accurately located ranges (Reference (c) paragraph 3 d (1)(b)).
  - (c) Construction of not less than two (2) concrete observation posts (Reference (c) paragraph 3 1 (c)).

Chief of Naval Operations and Major General Commandant are requested to initiate action to provide the minimum facilities consistent with safety.

7. "Gunfire doctrine as prescribed in CinCLant serial O180 of March 10, 1941, does not permit full use of the fire power of battleship groups. They are so positioned that their secondary batteries cannot effectively range. Doctrine should permit these groups to close the beach to effective secondary battery ranges as the counter battery fire lessens and security permits". (Reference (a), paragraph IV 3A).

My serial 0180 of March 10, 1941, specifically provides for "making adjustments as necessary to suit conditions". It is wholly within the province of Commander Support Group ONE to so position vessels of that group to secure maximum fire power.

#### UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET U. S. S. AUGUSTA, Flagship

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Care Postmaster New York, N. Y. . September 14, 1941

#### OCCUPATION STATES

From: To:

Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

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The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject:

Preliminary report on 1st Joint Training Force Landing Exercises at New River, North Carolina,

4 - 12 August, 1941.

Reference:

(a) ComGen conf. serial CSN 48-41 1975 02/106 of 27 August 1941.

(b) ComGen ltr. 1975-70 SSN 13-41 02/120 of September 8, 1941.

- l. In order that the essential recommendations made by the Commanding General of the Atlantic Amphibious Force as a result of the subject exercises may be dealt with in their entirety and as soon as may be, the action and/or recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, on the reference are hereinafter indicated immediately below briefs of corresponding paragraphs of reference (a).
- 2. Paragraph 4 (a) for planning purposes thirty days notice of future exercises should be given.

This will be done when practicable but it is essential that the amphibious Force Type Plans provide for movement on 10 days notice.

Paragraph 4 (b) - that in all future exercises the enemy be represented by troops on the ground.

The desirability of this procedure is recognized. Whenever practicable it is directed that the Commanding General amphibious Force include suitable provisions in plans for future exercises.

Paragraph 4 (c) - that no further amphibious training be undertaken before 1 November 1941. Both the First Marine Division and the First army Division require time for reorganization and re-equipment and time in which to remedy defects in

ENCLOSURE (G)(1)

#### DECLASSIFIED

Subject:

Preliminary report on 1st Joint Training Force Landing Exercises at New River, North Carolina, 4 - 12 August, 1941.

technique developed by the recent exercises.

The Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force will, immediately after consultation with the Commander Train, Atlantic Fleet, make recommendations to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet as to locale and type of another amphibious exercise to be conducted early in November 1941.

Paragraph 4 (d) - that if it is planned to employ the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Division (Army) as a joint force, complete reorganization be made: involving changes in types and numbers of ships.

Paragraph 4 (e) - that the force be reorganized in three echelons; that the delay between the arrival in the transport area and "H" hour be reduced.

Paragraph 4 (g) - that the additional engineer troops, light tanks, artillery and special service (labor) troops be assigned as force troops.

The recommendations made in the three foregoing paragraphs approach the problem on the premise that additional transports, suitable for combat loading, can be made available on short notice. This is not the case.

The Commanding General, Amphibious Force is directed to make specific recommendations for reorganization embodying the three echelon. principle but employing only those transports that it is known will be available in early November. In this connection, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, has just received copy of reference (b) and assumes that the organization recommended will be patterned thereon.

The amphibious Force must be organized now with a clear understanding that active operations may have to be undertaken with forces actually in

# A16-3/( 0981 )

Subject:

Preliminary report on 1st Joint Training Force Landing Exercises at New River, North Carolina, 4 - 12 August, 1941.

hand. The Commander-in-Chief is fully aware of the existing deficiencies but these must be accepted - and overcome insofar as may be.

as to reduction in time between arrival in the transport area and "H" hour, this is a matter wholly in the hands of the Naval Officer commanding the operation and the officer commanding the landing force and can only be reduced by close study and repeated practice.

Paragraph 4 (f) - that a force headquarters be organized and maintained in a state of readiness.

Now in effect.

Paragraph 4 (h) - that the First Marine Division be brought up to strength at once and fully equipped for services.

This is now in hand. The Major General Commandant is requested to expedite as may be practicable.

Paragraph 4 (i) - that at least ten (10) units of fire for all weapons be set aside for delivery on call, in event of sudden orders for actual operations.

The Major General Commandant is requested to take necessary action.

Paragraph 4 (j) - that the beach and shore parties be consolidated under one unit (a shore party) under command of the landing force.

It is directed that in future exercises (and in case of an actual landing) the basic orders

Subject:

Preliminary report on 1st Joint Training Foree Landing Exercises at New River, North Carolina, 4 - 12 August, 1941.

provide for the consolidation recommended.

Paragraph 4 (k) - that combat ships that may be assigned to support the landing force fire practices on shore targets and that the officers now trained for shore observation be made available to control the fire of these ships.

Every effort will be made to conduct practices as recommended. In anticipation of the conduct of such practices (or to increase familiarity with the problem in the event it is impracticable to do so) Commander Battleships, Commander Cruisers, and Commander Destroyers are directed to provide for drill in this problem by ships of their respective types.

It is already required that officers now trained for shore observation be made available to control the fire of supporting ships.

Paragraph 4 (1) - that aircraft assigned missions in support of the landing force be placed under command of the landing force commander.

The next landing force directive issued will be so phrased as to accomplish the desired result.

Paragraph 4 (m) - that sufficient communication facilities be made available in ships embarking the landing force commanders, division commanders, and regimental commanders.

The Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force will make specific recommendations through the Commander Train, Atlantic Fleet.