HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

UNITED KINGDOM MILITARY SERIES

Edited by J. R. M. Butler

Grand Strategy

Volume I
Rearmament Policy

By N.H. Gibbs

London
Her Majesty's Stationery Office


Contents

  Page
Editor's Preface xix
Author's Preface xx
Introduction xxiii
Sources: xxvi
Part I. The Disarmament Years
Chapter I. Naval Disarmament, 1919-30 3
1. The Origin of the Ten Year Rule, 1919 3
2. The Problem of Naval Defence: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1919-June 1921 6
3. The Washington Conference, July 1921-February 1922 19
4. The Geneva Naval Conference, 1927 24
5. The London Naval Conference, 1930 27
Sources: 32
Chapter II. Locarno: The Operation of the Ten Year Rule, 1920-28 35
1. The Locarno Pact, 1925 35
2. Service Programmes and the Ten Year Rule, 1920-28 44
3. The Ten Year Rule in its Final Form, 1928 55
Sources: 65
Chapter III. The Cancellation of the Ten Year Rule, 1929-32 69
1. The Ten Year Rule in Doubt 69
2. The Economic Crisis 1929-31: Germany and the Far East 71
3. The Cancellation of the Ten Year Rule, 1932 77
Sources: 88
 
Part II. The Deficiency Programmes 1933-36 91
Chapter IV. The First Deficiency Programme, 1933-34 93
1. The First Report of the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, November 1933-February 1934 93
2. The Last Stages of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, November 1933-May 1934 99
3. The Cabinet and the first D.R.C. Report, May-July 1934 102
    (a)The Air Force 102
    (b) The Army 110
    (c) The Navy 117
Sources: 128
Chapter V. German Rearmament, the Stresa Front and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, November 1934-July 1935 133
1. German Rearmament, 1934-35 133
2. The Stresa Front, January-April 1935 144
3. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, June 1935 155
4. The First Defence White Paper, March 1935: Air Expansion, Scheme C 170
5. The Second Defence Requirements Sub-Committee Report, July 1935 177
Sources: 181
Chapter VI. The Italo-Abyssinian War, 1935-36 187
1. Origins of the Dispute 187
2. British Defence Plans and Preparations before the War, August-September 1935 189
3. The League and Sanctions, September-October 1935 198
4. Military Co-operation and Staff Talks, September 19395-January 1936 202
5. British Defence Plans and Preparations during the War 212
6. The Final Stage: Oil Sanctions, November 1935-March 1936 217
Sources: 223
Chapter VII. The Rhineland Crisis and the Third Report of the Defense Requirements Sub-Committee, 1935-36 227
1. British Policy and the Demilitarized Zone before the Crisis, November 1935-March 1936 227
2. German Policy and the Demilitarized Zone, May 1935-March 1936 235
3. The Reaction of the Powers to German Military re-occupation of the Zone, March-April 1936 239
4. The Third Report of the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, November 1935-March 1936 258
    The Royal Navy 258
    The Army 261
    The Air Force 264
Sources: 269
 
Part III. Rearmament: Service Programmes, 1936-39
  Introduction 275
Sources: 278
Chapter VIII. The Limits on Rearmament, 1937-39 279
1. Financial Limits and Treasury Control, February 1937-April 1938 279
2. Financial Limits and Treasury Control, Munich to the Outbreak of war, October 1938-September 1939 296
3. Production and Labour Limits: 'Business as Usual' 301
Sources: 320
Chapter IX. Naval Rearmament, 1935-39 323
1. The London Naval Conference, 1935-36 323
2. The D.R.C. Standard, 1936 332
3. Proposals for a New Two-Power Navy Standard, 1936-37 336
4. The New Standard of Naval Strength and Financial Limitations 1937-39 345
5. Naval Rearmament and Production Problems, 1938-39 357
6. The Fleet Air Arm 362
Sources:
Chapter X. Naval Strategy: The Political Background, 1936-39 375
1. The Basic Problem of a Three-Front War 375
2. The Mediterranean: Anglo-Italian Relations, 1936-37 380
3. The Mediterranean: Anglo-Italian Relations, 1938-39 386
4. The Far East: Accommodation with Japan 393
Sources: 405
Chapter XI. Naval Strategy: Plans, 1936-39 409
1. Strategic Priorities, 1936-39 409
2. Strategic Priorities: Munich to the Outbreak of War 420
3. Home Waters and the Protection of Sea-borne Trade, 1938-39 431
Sources: 439
Chapter XII. The Role of the Army: Limited Liability, 1936-38 441
1. The Regular Army and the Territorial Forces: The Problem of Reinforcement, 1936-37 441
2. The Army and the Air Defence of Great Britain, 1936-38 460
3. Limited Liability: No Major Continental Commitment, 1937-38 465
4. The Army and the Defence of Egypt 483
Sources: 487
Chapter XIII. The Army: The Acceptance of a Continental Commitment, 1939 491
  Introductory Note 491
1. Pressure from the French: Winter 1938-39 492
2. Cabinet Debate on the Rôle of the Army, Winter 1938-39 502
3. The Territorial Army Doubled; and Conscription, Spring 1939 516
Sources: 527
Chapter XIV. The Royal Air Force: The Framework of Expansion, 1936-39 531
  Introductory Note 531
1. The Priority of Air Rearmament 532
2. The Principle of Parity 539
3. The Concept of Deterrence 553
Sources: 556
Chapter XV. The Royal Air Force: Expansion Programmes, 1936-39 559
  Introductory Note 559
1. Programmes 'A' to 'F', 1934-36 559
2. Financial Stringency: Schemes 'H' and 'J', 1936-37 565
3. Schemes 'K' and 'L', 1938 574
4. Munich to September 1939: Scheme 'M' 583
5. Bombing Policy 589
6. Radar 594
7. Readiness for War, 1938-39 597
Sources: 601
 
Part IV. Strategy for an Alliance 605
Chapter XVI. Anglo-French Staff Talks, 1936-38 607
1. The Rhineland Crisis and Staff Talks, 1936 607
2. Negotiations for a Five-Power Conference, 1936 611
3. The Problem of Belgian Neutrality, 1936 616
4. Demand for, and Opposition to Further Staff Talks, December 1937-April 1938 622
5. Anglo-French Staff Talks, 1938 636
6. The Problem of Czechoslovakia, 1938 642
Sources: 649
Chapter XVII. Anglo-French Staff Talks, 1939 653
1. Pressure for New Talks: Winter, 1938-39 653
2. The Chiefs of Staff European Appreciation for 1939-40 657
3. Anglo-French Staff Talks  
    (a) Plans for the Main Theatres 667
    (b) Economic Warfare 677
    (c) Allied Supreme Control and Higher Command in War 679
4. Final Pre-War Preparations 681
Sources: 685
Chapter XVIII. The Alliance and Eastern Europe 689
1. The British Guarantee to Poland, March 1939 689
2. The British and French Guarantees to Greece and Roumania, 13th April 1939 707
Sources: 715
Chapter XIX. Negotiations with the Soviet Union, 1939 719
1. Initial Overtures: M. Litvinov's Proposals to the Western Powers, April 1939 719
2. Molotov's Proposals, May 1939 725
3. Proposals and Counter-Proposals for an Alliance, May-June 1939 730
4. Revised Terms for a Political Agreement, June-July 1939 737
5. The British and French Military Missions to Moscow, August 1939 748
Sources: 761
Chapter XX. Defence and the Machinery of Government 767
1. The Committee of Imperial Defence 767
2. The Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence: The Chiefs of Staff Committee 771
3. The Principal Supply Officers Committee: Ministry of Supply 776
4. Defence Policy and the Dominions 782
Sources: 790
Chapter XXI. Conclusion 793
Sources: 812
INDEX 845

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Appendices

I. The return to Eire of the Treaty Ports 817
  Sources: 823
II. The Defence of India 824
  Sources: 835
III. List of Administrations from 1919-39 837
IV. Chiefs of Staff Appointments, 1918-39 844
V. Chronological Chart of the Principal Events, 1921-39 facing 844

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Maps

1. Front End Papers. Europe and North Africa, 1933  
2. Rhineland Demilitarized Zone 227
3. Singapore Defences, 1937 410
4. Far Eastern Theatre, 1939 430
5. Hitler's Acquisitions, 1936-39 689
6. Rear End Paper. The Mediterranean and Middle East Theatre of War, 1939  

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Statistical Tables

*N.B.: The headings of Tables here provided are for convenience of reference only and are not in most cases quoted from the documents from which the statistics are extracted.

Page
(1) Estimate of Forces Available for the three Armed Services, March 1936 247-49
(2) Comparison of Naval, Army and Air Forces of Britain, France and Germany, April 1936 251
(3) Comparative Cost of Defence Programmes, 1934, 1936 and 1937 280
(4) Revised Forecasts of Defence Costs, February 1937 290
(5) Sample Estimated Deficiencies in Production of Guns for the Army, April 1939 308
(6) Forecasts of Completed Ships for Britain, Japan and Germany at 31st March 1935 335
(7) Estimated Strengths in the Principal Types of Ships for a New Standard Navy, April 1937 340
(8) Forecast of costs of D.R.C. Fleet and New Standard Fleet, 1937-41 347
(9) New Naval Shipbuilding, 1936-39 (tonnage totals) 358
(10) Estimate of Aircraft and Personnel Requirements for the Fleet Air Arm up to 1942 369
(11) Estimate of Fleet Strengths, April 1939, comparing Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan 432
(12) Probable British Naval Dispositions, April 1939 436-38
(13) Distribution of the Army at Home and Overseas at the End of 1937 450
(14) Comparison of Annual Expenditure on the Three Services, 1933-39 532
(15) Operational Allocation of British Aircraft, Spring 1938 541
(16) Summary of Planned Expansion Programmes of R.A.F., 1934-36 563
(17) Aircraft Totals--Comparing Schemes 'F' and 'J', October 1937 568
(18) First Line Strength of Metropolitan Aircraft--Schemes 'F', 'J' and 'K' in 1938 575
(19) Estimates of Future Aircraft Strengths:  
  I. Aircraft Totals (including Ship-borne Aircraft): Comparison between Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia-in-Europe: April 1939-April 1940 } 584-585
  II. Situation at 1st April 1940, by Classes of Aircraft: Comparison of Major European Powers
  III. Estimated Monthly Output of Military Aircraft: Comparison of Major European Powers
(20) Current and Planned R..F. Bomber Types--Comparative Performances: Mobilisable Estimated R.A.F. Aircraft and Reserves at 1st October 1938 and 1st August 1939 598
(21) Comparative Totals of Aircraft and Reserves, September 1939, for Britain, France and Germany 599
(22) Estimates of Armed Strengths--European Powers and Japan, Summer 1939 758-60

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Key to Document References

Documents Typical Reference P.R.O. Class
CABINET: Minutes of Meetings    
  'A' Minutes, 1917-19, (Minutes of special secrecy). War Cab. 606A Cab. 23
  Cabinet Conclusions (year shown in brackets) November 1919-December 1922 and January 1923 to September 1939. Cab. Cons. 37(27)10 Cab. 23
  War (Cabinet) Minutes, 1939-45. W.M. (39)57 Cab. 65
  Memoranda and Papers    
  'G' Series of Cabinet Memoranda in World War I, 1-266, 1915-20. G. 257 Cab. 24
  'G.T.' Series of Cabinet Papers, Nos. 1-8472, 1917-19. G.T. 7643 Cab. 24
  Cabinet Papers, Nos. 1-4739, 1919-22. C.P. 2176 Cab. 24
  Cabinet Papers, 1923-45 (from January 1923, the year is shown in brackets and the numbers start again at 1 at the beginning of each year). C.P. 269(38) Cab. 24
  War (Cabinet) Papers, 1939-45 (the years shown in brackets, but the numbers placed after the brackets (cf. Cab. Cons). W.P. (39)6 Cab. 24
  Cabinet Committees    
  Air Expansion (for Home Defence) 1935. A.E. (25) Cab. 27
  Disarmament Conference (Ministerial):    
        Meeting 1-65, 1932-35. D.C.(M) (32) 6th Mtg. Cab. 27
        Memoranda 1-145, 1932-35. D.C.(M) 143 Cab, 27
  Finance Committee, Meetings 1-40, 1919-22. F.C. 2nd Mtg. Cab. 27
  Finance Committee, Memoranda 1-80, 1919-21. F.C. 42 Cab. 27
  Foreign Policy Committee--Mtgs. 1-61, 1936-39. F.P. 6th Mtg. Cab. 27
  Foreign Policy Committee-Memoranda, 1-104, 1936-39. F.P. (36)38 Cab. 27
  Fighting Services Committee, 1929-30. F.S. (29)14 Cab. 27
  German (Committee on) 1934. G. (36)3 Cab. 27
  Irish Situation Committee, May 1936. I.S.C. Cab. 27

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Documents Typical Reference P.R.O. Class
  Locarno Powers (London) Meeting, 1936. L.P.(L) Cab. 27
  Military Representatives (at Anglo-French Liaison Committee (1939). M.R. (39)
  Naval Programme Committee, 1925. N.P. (25) Cab. 27
C.I.D.: Minutes of Meetings, 1-374, 1902-39. C.I.D. 215th Mtg. Cab. 2
  Memoranda A. (Home) 1-330, 1901-39. C.I.D. 205-A Cab. 3
  Memoranda B. (Misc.) 1-1585, 1901-39. C.I.D. 1082-B Cab. 4
  Memoranda C. (Colonies), 1-54, 1901-39. --- Cab. 5
  Memoranda D. (Defence of India) 1-200, 1901-39. C.I.D. 162-D
C.I.D. SUB-COMMITTEES    
  Chiefs of Staff Meetings 1-317, 1923-39. C.O.S. 114th Mtg. Cab. 53
  Chiefs of Staff Memoranda 1-973, 1923-39. C.O.S. 426 Cab. 53
  Deputy Chiefs of Staff Meetings 1-54, 1932-39. D.C.O.S. 44th Mtg. Cab. 53
  Deputy Chiefs of Staff Memoranda 1-190, 1932-39. D.C.O.S. 127 Cab. 53
  Disarmament Committee (Three-Party) 1931. D.C.(P) Cab. 16
  Defence Plans (Policy) Meetings 1-4, 1937. D.P.(P) 3rd Mtg. Cab. 16
  Defence Plans (Policy) Memoranda 1-72, 937-39. D.P.(P) 66 Cab. 16
  Defence Policy & Requirements (This sub-committee temporarily superseded the C.I.D.):    
        Meetings 1-144, 1935-39. D.P.R. 2nd Mtg. Cab. 16
        Memoranda 1-329, 1935-39. D.P.R. 77 Cab. 16
  Defence Requirements Committee, Mtgs. 1933-35. D.R.C. 12th Mtg. Cab. 16
  Fleet Air Arm Enquiry, 1936. F.A.A. (and C.F.A.A.) Cab. 16
  Principal Supply Officers' Committee (Board of Trade) P.S.O.(BT) 403 Cab. 27
  Strategic Appreciation (Sub-Committee):    
        Meetings 1-6, 1939. S.A.C. 5th Mtg. Cab. 16
        Reports 1-16, 1939.   Cab. 16
CONFERENCE REPORTS AND NOTES    
        Meetings 1-6, March-August 1939. A.F.C.(J) 14th Mtg. Cab. 29
  Anglo-French Staff Conversations:    

--xvii--

Documents Typical Reference P.R.O. Class
        Memoranda 1-39, March-November 1939. A.F.C. 7 Cab. 29
  British Empire Delegation (Peace Conf.):    
        Meetings 1-80, 1919-22. B.E.D. 55th Mtg. Cab. 29
  Empire (Imperial) Conferences, 1921-37. E. 19th Mtg. Cab. 32
  Empire (Principal Delegates), 1937. E. (PD)(37) 3rd Mtg. Cab. 32
  London Naval Conference (Experts):    
        Meetings 1-9, 1930. L.N.C.(E) 3rd Mtg. Cab. 29
  Naval Conferences (German), January-August 1935. (London) N.C.(G)(35) Cab. 29
  Naval Conference (Ministerial):    
        Meetings 1-4, 1934-35. N.C.(M) (35) 11th Mtg. Cab. 29
        Memoranda 1-86, 1934-36. N.C.(M) 56 Cab. 29
  Prime Ministers (Commonwealth) Mtgs. 1-4, 1935. P.M. 2nd Mtg. Cab. 32
OTHER OFFICIAL REFERENCES    
  Cabinet Office Histories Cab. HIST./A
Cab.HIST./N
Cab.HIST.
  Air Ministry Documents Air Ministry Air/2
  Documents ex Cabinet Office Archives. A.L. 1441 ---
  Foreign Office (unpublished) documents.

These documents all bear a letter followed by three numbers. The letters (e.g. C, F, A, N, E, S, W etc.) indicate the Department of the Foreign Office issuing the documents. It is essential to state the year of issue when applying for a Foreign Office document.

F.O. C3942/29/17 371/
  Foreign Office (published) documents referred to in this History are in 'Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), the Series, Volume and Paper nos. being quoted in each case. D.B.F.P., Third S. Vol. V:167  
  India Office Documents. IOR/L/WS/1/180  
  India Office Library Documents IOL/MSS/Eor.E.240  
  'Command' Papers of the House of Commons (held at the Treasury Library). Cmd. 4880  
  War Office Library documents. W.O.  
Cabinet Office, Historical Section, 16th November 1972.

--xviii--

Editor's Preface

The present volume on the Rearmament Policy of the British Government between the wars was planned as an introduction to the series on Grand Strategy in the official United Kingdom military histories of the war of 1939-45. The other volumes of the series have all now been published, and the Editor regrets the delay in the appearance of Volume I.

The delay has, however, made it possible, owing to a relaxation of official policy, to assign to individuals by name the views expressed by them in Cabinet and other secret discussions and also to give specific references to sources which in all but the last of the previous volumes were confined to confidential editions.

The Editor would like ot take this opportunity to offer his thanks to all those distinguished officers who have successively been members of his Advisory Panel during the preparation of this volume--most recently Admiral Sir Charles Daniel, the late General Sir William Stirling, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Ralph Cochrane along with Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Jacob who has served continuously on the Panel from its earliest days; also to Mr. Clifton Child and his predecessors and the staff of the Cabinet Office Historical Section for their invaluable help.

I should like also to record the debt of gratitude owed by the historians to Lord Trend, who as head of the Cabinet Office has presided over the production of the military histories, for the unfailing interest and support which they have received from him.

 

J.R.M.B.

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Preface

This volume differs in some ways from the other volumes in the Grand Strategy series to which it provides and introduction. In the first place, it is concerned solely with the years of peace and contains no account of any military operations. This has two consequences. Planning lacked that point of reference which actual and immediately prospective military operations provide. Further, although pre-war plans forecast fairly accurately the early months of the war in North Western Europe and some subsequent operations in North Africa, they were totally unrelated to such major developments as the German conquest of the whole of Western Europe and most of Western Russia, and to Japan's advance across South-east Asia and wide areas of the Pacific. Further, and as one would expect in a period of purely peace-time planning, the significance of political calculation was greater than was the case after war began. Of course, such a comparison is only relatively true. The 'phoney war' period of the winter of 1939-40 was marked by a slow transition to wartime conditions, and the first part of Volume II in the series has much in common, in this respect, with the present volume. Something of the same kind is true in the final volume when it deals with the political problems of approaching peace. Indeed, all the volumes are concerned, at times, with events in which political calculation was, even if only temporarily, of greater importance than military action. Nonetheless, the difference suggested is a valid one.

In the second place, the story told in this volume covers, mainly, a period of six years and, though to a lesser degree, the whole of the inter-war period. The events recounted cannot, therefore, be dealt with on the scale which is possible for the years of war. Treatment is necessarily more selective. My awareness of this limitation is made all the more acute by the publication of a growing number of specialised works on particular aspects of the history of the period and by the detailed research of some of my own graduate students in recent years. It is, however, important for the student of the period to be able to identify the main course of central policy-making and action; and this the present volume seeks to do. There is an advantage in providing an outline of the evolution of that policy which is not burdened with discussion of the day-to-day reactions to events within individual Departments.

British grand strategy is therefore described from the point of view of the Cabinet and of those major committees which were responsible for providing Ministers, collectively, with military information and advice. Departmental views and policies are seen, for the most part, only in an extra-Departmental setting and at a point when Departmental policy had already been decided upon. What went on behind the scenes inside Departments is not described here; that is not a part of the story which normally appears in the records of the Cabinet or, indeed, of its major committees. It is not difficult, for example, to follow the Ministerial debate of the winter of 1937-38 which ended in a decision to restrict the Army to a 'limited liability' or general purposes role. What is not clear, even from the accompanying memoranda of the Secretary of State for War, is what debate went on inside the War Office and whether Cabinet policy did nor did not meet with much criticism there. Again, the operation of Treasury control on decisions inside the Cabinet can be traced fairly easily. But what then went on inside Departments, and after global sums for the three Services had been agreed upon, does not emerge in any detail from the Cabinet records. It would be dangerous to assume that, once a Cabinet decision was made, Departments were then able to

--xx--

spend whatever had been allocated to them free from further Treasury participation in translating decisions into action. The Departmental story is one which can and, no doubt, will be told. But the records of Departments could lead the historian into recording discussions and recommendations which, as often as not, might eventually be ignored in final decisions at Cabinet level. A composite story of Treasury control based on Departmental papers needs in any case to be preceded by a series of detailed studies well beyond the scope of this volume.

Now that most official records remain classified for a period of only thirty years it is possible to alter some of the practices followed in the first editions of all but one of the other volumes in the series. Full references are given to the records used, and the personal views of Ministers, and in many cases of officials, are made clear. References are given both in the titles and numbers of the original Cabinet and Committee series, together with a cross reference table to the Public Record Office code. This has been done partly because the original titles and numbers sometimes indicate more fully the nature of the sources used and could thus be of greater help to other students.

While there are still differences of view about the way in which the war was fought, differences are probably even greater about the events which preceded the outbreak of war. In this volume I have tried to put forward three, for me, basic views about those events, none of them new, but which I have attempted to spell out in some detail. First, that appeasement was the product of a national attitude towards domestic and international events. It is a distortion of the truth to blame the policies of appeasement upon the supposed laziness of one Prime Minister and the supposed dictatorial obstinacy of another. The official records certainly suggest that Mr. Baldwin was less influential in defence affairs than his most recent biographies suggest and that partly because of that, Mr. Chamberlain impressed his own views on defence policy sooner than might have been expected even from a Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is, moreover, true that both men were typical of their times in these matters and saw no need to think or act differently. Nonetheless neither Mr. Baldwin nor Mr. Chamberlain duped or bullied the Cabinet, Parliament or the nation as a whole into adopting policies to which there was strong and consistent opposition. Both men swam with a very strong tide. Whether they should or could have done otherwise is a different matter.*

Second, the appeasement policies of the Baldwin and Chamberlain administrations were substantially supported by the Chiefs of Staff. There were differences on matters of detail and sometimes on broader issues of policy and there were occasions when it looked as though the military advice offered to Ministers promised something radically different. But in the end, and certainly during the critical period of Mr. Chamberlain's administration, the views on grand strategy of Ministers and Chiefs of Staff were very similar.

Third, the grand strategy which evolved from these circumstances, at any rate until the last few months before the war began, was essentially one of isolation from rather than commitment to continental Europe. Put in that way it may seem as though I am looking at the history of the nineteen-thirties through the eyes f a generation later. That is to some extent unavoidable. But it still remains true that Britain's strategic problems have been posed in this way for a very long time; and what may sometimes appear as no more than differences of view about methods


* Since this volume is concerned with official policy and military strategy it does not touch more than very occasionally, and then only briefly, on those wider issues of the 'interplay between British character and British circumstance' which are dealt with in detail by Correlli Barnett in his most recent work, The Collapse of British Power (London, 1872).

--xxi--

has been in fact, as I believe it was in the nineteen-thirties, representative of a far deeper division.†

Too many people have helped me in the preparation of this volume for me to be able to thank all of them. But there are some to whom I owe a special debt. Of those who were active participants in the events of the period the last late Lord Chatfield, the late Lord Swinton, and Lord Avon gave generously of their time in reading drafts and commenting on them. The late Lord Bridges helped both by originally making it possible for me to see the papers of Neville Chamberlain while they were still in private hands, and also by reminiscing at leisure on the events of the last year or two before the war, on more than one occasion while walking round Christ Church meadow after college meetings.

Next, it is a pleasure to adcnowledge my debt to the late Mrs. Neville Chamberlain, and to the late Miss Hilda Chamberlain for allowing me to work on the private papers in their possession and also for their generous hospitality. Visits to Miss Chamberlain's home at Odham, a home Neville Chamberlain knew well, gave me the opportunity to read his long letters to his two sisters and also his diary, the latter a document which, unfortunately does not record the events of the whole of his three years as Prime Minister. At her home in London Mrs. Chamberlain made available to me many of the letters to her husband dealing with his public life, including those which her received in the immediate aftermath of Munich; and her thoughtful hospitality made it possible for me to meet and talk with some of Mr. Chamberlain's contemporaries whom otherwise I would have been reluctant to impose upon.

Finally, within the Cabinet Office I have received constant help,m again from so many that they cannot all be named. In common with the other contributors to the series, I owe much to the Editor, the late Sir James Butler and to the members of the Advisory Panel. The late Mr. Brian Melland, formerly head of the Enemy Documents Section, gave freely of his time as did more than one member of his staff. Three others, at different periods, gave me help the value of which I cannot over-estimate--Miss Eve Streatfeild, Mrs. Jean Hamilton and Mr. W. Todhunter. To the last named I owe an especial debt not only for his meticulous care in helping to prepare the volume for and through the press, but also for frank, although always courteous criticism. It hardly needs emphasising that, even when all those acknowledgments are made, I am alone responsible for any views expressed in the book.


† For a recent analysis of British strategic thought and tradition in the twentieth century see Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment. The Dilemma of British Defense Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars. (Temple Smith, London, 1972).

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Introduction

THIS VOLUME is designed to provide a background to the later volumes in the Grand Strategy series which deal with the conduct of operations once the Second World War began. Its main emphasis is on the years from 1933 to 1939. In November 1933, Mr. MacDonald's National Government set up a high-level Committee to enquire into the state of Britain's armed forces and their adequacy for the broad strategic purposes for which they were designed. This was essentially an enquiry into deficiencies. In other words, its purpose was to make recommendations which would, if accepted, render possible the completion of plans for all three Services originally drawn up during the nineteen-twenties and still, in 1933, incomplete partly because of the impact of the Ten Year Rule, partly because of foreign policy assumptions which had made the Rule acceptable, and partly because of the inevitable financial stringency of the post war period intensified by the Great Depression.

From the beginning the deficiency approach proved inadequate. This was largely because the still incomplete Service programmes, and the grand strategy to which they were related, were products of the hopeful period of the nineteen-twenties during which they originated. The first attempt seriously to complete these programmes was now being made, ten years later, because of an already changing international scene, and that change itself made the original programmes, even if completed, out of date from the start. This soon became evident from an examination of the still deficient 52 squadron scheme for the Royal Air Force, and from a consideration of the relevance of the One-Power naval standard, accepted in the Washington Treaty of 1922, to the very different circumstances of the early nineteen-thirties. It should have been obvious that an adequate grand strategy for national and imperial defence could not be planned on the basis of already outdated programmes, but this Ministers unfortunately found it difficult to admit, since all the basic conditions for adequate programmes were repugnant to them. Nor until late July 1935 was that admission made. Only then were the Cabinet's professional advisers instructed to abandon the deficiency approach and to recommend 'programmes on the assumption that by the end of the financial year 19838-39 each Service should have advanced its state of readiness to the widest necessary extent in relation to the military needs of national defence and within the limits of practicability'. The resulting recommendations were submitted to Ministers in November 1935, and formally embodied in policy decisions in the early spring of 1936. The process of rearmament expressly designed for the steadily deteriorating international scene of the nineteen-thirties had at last begun and, withy it, the development of detailed plans for the use of the country's resources and the deployment of its armed Services if a second world war should unhappily break out.

Part II of this volume deals with the deficiency programmes of 1934-35 and with the investigations for, and the terms of, that third report of the Defence Requirements Committee in the winter of 1935-36 which marks the transition from completing old programmes to the development of new ones. It was a transition, not a sudden break, despite the fact that it happened to coincide with what many have argued to be the real dividing line in the international events of these years, Germany's military reoccupation of the Rhineland zone. Part III is concerned with the details of the rearmament programmes of the three Services, with the financial and production limits within which they were carried out, and with the

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strategic plans which, within those limits, determined the pattern of rearmament. Part IV tells the story of how, during the last year before war broke out, these plans were fitted into and also changed by broader plans for an allied, mainly Anglo-French strategy for war against a combination of Germany, Italy and Japan.

None of these events, however, neither the deficiency nor the rearmament plans, nor the plans for a joint strategy can be fully understood unless seen against the background of events in the precious decade. Views on national and imperial defence in Britain did not change suddenly when Hitler came to power in Germany in January 1933, any more than they had done so when the Japanese army invaded Manchuria in September 1931. What most British people thought of war and of Britain's possible part in a major war in the early nineteen-thirties was roughly what they had thought as far back as Locarno and even earlier. And what the country could offer as its contribution to the waging of a major war in 1933 and the immediately succeeding years, arising either as a result of obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations or otherwise, was a product of agreements and decisions, both domestic and international, made during the previous decade.

This study, therefore, begins with a brief survey of British defence policy between 1919 and 1933. It is necessarily selective, dealing only with major decisions recorded in international agreements or in internal official policy statements, how and why they were made, and how and why they--or at any rate some of them--were called in question as the world moved into and out of the Great Depression in the early nineteen-thirties.

The international prospect in 1919-20 seemed hopeful. Germany had been defeated and, as a consequence, her attempt at the domination of Europe--if that is what she really had looked for in 1914. It seemed reasonable for governments, following the undeniable wishes of their people, to turn their backs on fighting and to concentrate on domestic matters and the pursuit of peace.

But appearances were deceptive. Germany had been defeated and had forfeited territory in the west and in the east, in Alsace Lorraine and in the Polish corridor. But she remained potentially the most powerful nation in Europe. Indeed, she had been left potentially more powerful than she had been in 1914. To the east, Russia had been not only defeated in war but had suffered the further, if only temporary, weakening effects of revolution. To the west, France had spent her strength in war every bit as much as Germany, with less potential for recovery. Britain had suffered less than France or Germany but emerged from a great war, for the first time, relatively weaker than she had entered it. Finally, and whatever the harshness of the terms imposed upon her at Versailles, Germany had in principle been treated as an equal of the victor nations. What all this amounted to was the prospect, at any rate in the long term, of an imbalance of power in Europe, a condition which while certainly not bound to lead to war could well do so even without the growth of Fascist movements and dictatorships. With them the likelihood would be much increased.1

French governments in the nineteen-twenties were not unaware of this danger and tried to build into the peace terms some provisions for, as far as possible, the long term control of the danger of German resurgence. But their most radical proposals were blocked by Britain and America. Thereafter, French fear of a reviving Germany showed itself, if not continuously then certainly at intervals down to and including the Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1932-34 and the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935.

With Britain it was different. The violent anti-German emotions of the latter part of the war evaporated quickly and, with them, fear of Germany as a possible future threat to Britain's own security. Once the Treaty of Versailles was signed every British government in the nineteen-twenties showed itself anxious to bring

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Germany back into the European family of nations, not merely in theory but also in practice, on equal terms; and that, every bit as much as an assurance to the French in their search for security, was the explanation of the attitude of Britain towards Locarno. With the attitude there went a readiness to accept revision of the Treaty terms which showed itself quite clearly at the Disarmament Conference and persisted down to the summer of 1938. Of course there was growing apprehension from the advent of Hitler to power onwards. But the change did not show itself immediately and older attitudes died slowly; it took the British a long time to be convinced that Hitler planned not merely to revise the peace terms but to go further.

While these matters are relevant to an attempt to analyse the general causes of the Second World War, what is important here is their relevance to British defence policy between the wars and to planning for the war which began in September 1939. British attitudes twoards Germany as they have just been described sprang just as much from instinctive aversion from the events of 1914-18 as fromany love or respect for Germany and her people or even from a detached assessment of the wisest policies to follow in Britain's own interest. The First World War was, in fact, a major step in bringing Britain into that closer association with continental Europe which is still being debated in the early 1970's. But in 1920 the war was either not seen in that perspective or, if it was so seen, the perspective wasx denied beccause uof the nature of the war itself. It is essential to an understanding of the story told in this volume to realise that the war of 1914-18 was regarded as justifiable in Britain only if it could genuinely be regarded as a war to end war. Such bloodshed and misery could not be accepted again. Therefore there was no need to reason how they had come about and whether or not they might recur. Peace had returned, and the ways and causes of war were put aside; and, as part of the process, the British became more inward-looking, more concerned with themselves and less with the ways in which their fortunes and their securityi were, unavoidably, linked with those of other nations. War had involved commitment andwar had been hhorrible. Therefore the commitment itself had been wrong.

In all this most Ministers and the public at large were ofone mind. As a result, when the danger of war loomed up again, some simply turned their backs on it while others tried to thrust aside a spectre they hated tocontemplate by halfphearted measures which, they hardly dared admit, might fail. Policy became an inconclusive mixture of careful analysis and reluctance to accept its hardest implications; of facing forward to the increasing danger of war and looking back over the shouler at what hope of peace could still not relinquish. There was steadiness of purupose of a kind--loathing of the ways in which nations had fought each other on the bloody fields ofnorthern France and Belgium in 1914-18. But the loathing, however understandable, too often obscured the broad strategic reasons why Britain had fought in the First World War at all thus, in turn, obscuring why and how she might have to fight again. It is arguable that indecision did not finally disappear until the evacuation from Dunkirk and the Battle ofritain. For the purposes of this volume it disappeared, at any rate to a considerable extent, in the spring of 1939, when Mr. Chamberlain's Government at last decided openlky to face not merely war but, the kind of wat it least wanted Britain to fight, and at last entered into detailed and comprehensive discussions with the French Government on how best to fight it.

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Source

1. See A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London 19691) and F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge 1963).

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Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation