The Nature of the Target
The Philippine Islands, the largest island group in the Malay Archipelago, were discovered by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521. They became a Spanish possession in 1565 and remained so until 10 December 1898 when they were ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris as a result of the Spanish-American war. In the spring of 1942 Japan secured military domination over the Islands.
The Philippine Archipelago lay in the geographical heart of the Far Eastern theater of war. As a pivotal point of control the Islands were centrally placed in relation to Japan, China, Burma, French Indochina, Thailand, British Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies. Being the most northerly part of the Malay Archipelago, the Philippines were also close to the vital areas of Japan and the Chinese-held areas of the Asiatic mainland. Located southeast of the continent, they occupy much the same position with respect to the mainland of Asia that the West Indies do with respect to North America.
The Islands are among the remnants of a great continent that once extended over the space now occupied by the entire East Indies. There are some 7,100 islands and islets in the Philippine Archipelago, which has a land area of 114,830 square miles. Of these, about 460 have an area of one square mile or more and 2,773 are named. The Philippine Islands are divided into three main groups--Luzon and adjacent islands in the northern sector; the Visayan Islands in the central portion, comprising Samar, Leyte, and numerous others; and finally, in the southern part, Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The Philippines had a prewar population of about 16,000,000, of whom 14,550,000 were Christians, 678,000 were Mohammedans, 626,000 were pagans, and about 64,000 were Buddhists and Shintoists.1
Geography of Leyte
The northeastern Visayan group, which consists mainly of Leyte and Samar, was selected as the point of entrance into the Philippines. Leyte had the higher potential military value. The air distance from the capital city of Tacloban to Manila is 295 miles. Leyte is a natural gateway to the rest of the Philippines, and its possession would greatly facilitate and support further operations to the north as well as expedite control over the remaining islands in the Visayan group.2
Leyte roughly resembles a molar tooth with its crown toward Samar and its roots pointing to Mindanao. The eighth largest island in the Philippines, with an area of 2,785 square miles, it runs generally from north to south, with an approximate length of 115 miles and a width of 15 to 45 miles. It is situated on one of the principal submerged shelves of the Philippine Archipelago, and the waters over the shelf have an average depth of 22 fathoms.
The island is mainly volcanic in origin. A range of mountains, the topographical backbone of the island, extends southeast from Biliran Strait in the north to Cabalian Bay in the south and separates the Leyte and Ormoc Valleys. All of southern Leyte is mountainous and, militarily speaking, of little importance. The northwest coast is also rugged, and except for the port of Palompon has little tactical significance. The heavily forested central mountain range is composed of numerous knifelike ridges and spurs and deep ravines and serves as an effective natural barrier between the island's eastern and western coastal areas. It is a major obstacle to the rapid movement of troops and can be utilized very effectively in defending the island.
Leyte Valley, a broad and fertile plain, stretches across the northeastern part of the island from Leyte Gulf to Carigara Bay. More than twenty-five miles wide along the shore of the gulf, it is gradually narrowed by the mountain ranges to the north and south to less than ten miles as it reaches Carigara Bay. Most of the island's population live in this valley, and here too are most of the principal cities and airfields.
The main road net of the island runs through Leyte Valley, a great number of streams interlacing it. The numerous rice paddies, centuries old, disrupt the natural drainage of the valley. Rarely is the water level more than a few inches below the surface. Even in the drier months, vehicular movement is limited to the existing roads. In 1944 these were poor, inadequate, and ill suited for heavy military traffic. The best of them had only a light bituminous surface and were neither wide enough nor strong enough for two-way military traffic.3 It was hoped that Leyte Valley could be developed into a large air and logistical base to support further operations, but it was not well suited for this purpose.
The shore line of Leyte Valley along Leyte Gulf and San Pedro Bay affords the best landing beaches on the island. This coast is dangerous for beach landings during northeast monsoon periods, when heavy surf, high winds, and torrential rains imperil men, equipment, and shipping. July, August, and September are the best months for landing. In general there are good firm sand beaches, onto which landing craft can go directly. A road parallels the shore line, but there are few exit roads from the beach to this road and beyond. In many places close to the shore there are swamps and rice paddies which prevent rapid egress from the beach. There are other good landing beaches on the east coast of Ormoc Bay, but they are crossed by innumerable creeks and streams.
Leyte Gulf is large and open, offering an excellent anchorage for a considerable number of vessels, including those of largest size. Carigara Bay, to the north of the island, is
twenty miles wide, but shallow waters, swamps, and the hilly terrain of its eastern and western sides restrict its value for military operations. A narrow neck of the central mountain range separates the bay from the northern end of Ormoc Valley. San Juanico Strait, which separates Leyte from Samar in the north, connects Carigara Bay and San Pedro Bay, the latter being a northern extension of Leyte Gulf. The strait is thirteen and a half miles long with an average width of a quarter to a half mile. Small landing craft can navigate the channel, but there are strong tidal currents which cause violent rips and swirls at many points.
Wedged in between the central mountain range and the hill mass of the northwest coast of Leyte, the Ormoc Valley, about five miles wide in its largest part, extends from Ormoc Bay to the north for fifteen miles where a narrow neck of the central ridge separates it from Carigara Bay. Through the valley runs a narrow road, its northern portion marked by steep grades and sharp curves. Halfway along, a branch road zigzags its course to Port Palompon on the west coast. Although most of the southern part of the valley is under cultivation, there are large patches of forest, scrub growth, and cogon grass in the north.4
The largest city on the island, the provincial capital, is Tacloban, which lies at the head of San Pedro Bay. As the only sizable port in the area, it handles most of the outbound shipping, mainly from Leyte and Samar. Its prewar population was about 31,000. Other important towns are Carigara and Barugo on the north coast; Baybay and Ormoc, the leading ports on the west coast; and Palo, Tanauan, and Abuyog along the east coast. All the more significant towns are situated on the main road system of the island, and the larger coastal barrios (villages) have roads of a sort.
The road system is divided into a northern and a southern coastal road net. The former, which is the better, was designed for the transportation of agricultural produce from the northern interior areas to Tacloban. The latter is composed of narrow, roundabout roads that are constantly in need of repair. The two systems are joined by a road, scarcely better than a trail, which runs west of Abuyog and corkscrews its way through heavily forested mountains to Baybay. Another road, long, narrow, and broken in parts, goes north from Baybay to Ormoc and thence through the Ormoc Valley to Carigara.
The Tacloban airstrip, the principal airfield on the island, was located on the Cataisan Peninsula, which lies just southeast of Tacloban. The Japanese had constructed another airfield, known as the Dulag airstrip, two miles west of Dulag; three others--the Buri, Bayug, and San Pablo airstrips--near Burauen, five miles west of Dulag; and still another at Valencia in the Ormoc Valley, eight miles north of Ormoc.
Control of the island of Leyte is dependent upon control of the Leyte and Ormoc Valleys and their adjacent hills and mountains. Thus, before a successful movement into Leyte Valley could be assured, control of the high ground in the vicinity of Palo would be essential. Continued dominance over the valley is dependent upon control of the high ground at its northwestern end in the vicinity of Pinamopoan on Carigara Bay, possession of which would preclude infiltration from Ormoc Valley. The control of Ormoc Valley and use of the excellent anchorage and harbor facilities of Ormoc Bay is dependent upon control of the lowland
in the vicinity of Ormoc city and the commanding hills to the east.
In 1939 the total population of Leyte was 915,853, of whom more than 912,000 were native Visayans of Malaysian stock. The largest other group consisted of 3,076 Chinese, half of whom were engaged in retail trade. There was a sprinkling of other national groups--40 Spaniards, 20 Germans, 81 from other European countries, 56 Americans, and 73 Japanese.
Because of their insular position and somewhat primitive culture, the inhabitants are primarily an agricultural and fishing people. The principal crops are rice, sugar cane, corn, and copra. Judged by Occidental standards, the mode of farming is backward and shows little tendency to progress. The Filipinos who have been exposed to industrial life, however, have been able to adapt themselves to employment in the limited trade crafts and manufacturing on the island.
According to his own standards, the Filipino lives well enough. His chief foods are rice or corn, fish, camotes (sweet potatoes), and occasionally chicken or other meat. The men's clothing is simple; the average man has several changes of cheap cotton shirts and pants made of imported cotton cloth or, in the more remote districts, from homespun material.
Most of the dwelling houses are made of bamboo and sheathed with palm leaves on roof and sides. The material is gathered locally and tied with rattan. The houses rarely consist of more than two rooms, and many are raised on piling, with space for the family pig and chickens underneath. In one of the rooms, or outdoors, is an open fireplace with a mud and stone hearth for cooking. There is little furniture, and in three out of four families the personal possessions would not be worth more than ten dollars.
Less than 5 percent of the people have a rising standard of living. This higher standard is exemplified by a better type of habitation, which ranges from a three-room house to a dwelling similar to that of the American middle class. The diet of more prosperous Filipinos is basically the same as that of the poorer class, but it offers a greater variety. Clothing follows the Occidental fashion. The wealthiest people and those with foreign education or contacts, who make up less than 1 percent of the population, dress and live in the same manner as Occidentals.
The Japanese, during their occupation, governed through the old administrative organization of the province. They and their puppet officials also set up larger governing bodies that exercised superior jurisdiction. On 6 February 1944 the puppet president of the Philippine Republic, José Laurel, appointed a commissioner who held supervisory power over the local governments in the Visayan Provinces.
The governor of the province of Leyte, who previously had been an elected official, was appointed by the president. He was the chief operative and administrative head of the province and on all provincial administrative matters his decision was final. The treasurer of the province, who reported directly to the governor, was its chief financial officer and tax assessor. He collected all taxes and license fees, national and local, and prepared financial statements for the governor but he had no say in administrative matters. The law officer of the province was
legal adviser to the governor and to the municipal authorities. He could advise only on administrative matters.
The Japanese Military Administration maintained liaison between the Japanese Army and the civil government. The military police collected military intelligence and information and disseminated propaganda. The Japanese allowed only one political party on the Islands--the Kalibapi--to which all government officials were required to belong. This party was one of the principal propaganda agencies, being the prime mover of the pacification programs in the province, and exercised general supervision over the local neighborhood associations. The latter helped in maintaining law and order, assisted the constabulary, and aided in the distribution of scarce commodities.
It should be emphasized that during most of the occupation there were few Japanese on Leyte. Southern Leyte in general maintained the same Filipino institutions and officials as in the prewar years. The heel of the Japanese conqueror pressed but lightly on most of the people of Leyte. Beginning in early 1944, however, the Japanese Army forces on the island were reinforced. From that time forward the Filipinos had their crops appropriated and in other ways were subjected to the will of the Japanese. Misery, hunger, and poverty became commonplace and a resistance movement grew.
The Resistance Movement on Leyte
The Organizing of Guerrilla Bands
A period of uncertainty and confusion followed the surrender of the American and Filipino forces in the Philippines in the spring of 1942. Civilians and members of the armed forces who did not surrender to the Japanese Army fled into the hills. Some went because they wanted to continue the fight, others because they felt that the chaotic conditions on the Islands would afford unequaled opportunities for looting and pillaging.
Once in the hills, the men formed themselves into guerrilla bands.5 At first all of the bands, because of their lack of money and supplies, freely raided farms and storehouses for food and equipment whenever they had the opportunity. Moreover, there were real bandit groups who frequently and wantonly raped the countryside. For a time all of the groups were discredited by the people. Gradually, however, strong men emerged who formed the guerrilla bands into semi-military organizations. The leader of each band, who was generally an ex-member of the armed forces, gave himself a "bamboo commission," usually considerably higher than the one he had hitherto possessed.
The following oath of allegiance taken by the members of one of the bands is probably typical:
I do solemnly swear that I shall obey orders from my superior officer; that I shall fight the enemy of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the United States of America whosoever and wherever he maybe [sic] in the territory of the Philippines; that I shall never allow myself nor any arm or ammunition to be caught by the
GUERRILLAS PREPARE FOR INSPECTION AT CONSUEGRA
enemy; that I shall never turn traitor to my country nor the United States of America; and muchless [sic] reveal to the enemy any secret of the Army to which I honorably belong; that I shall never abandon a wounded brother in arms; that I join the United Forces in the Philippines without personal or party interest, but with the determination to sacrifice myself and all that is mine for FREEDOM and DEMOCRACY; that I shall protect the lives and property of all loyal Filipinos everywhere.
I make this LOYALTY OATH without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.6
For some time the various guerrilla bands on Leyte operated separately, and there was little or no co-operation between them. They were united, however, in their hatred of the Japanese. Jealousy and strife between groups were rampant, but circumstances gradually compelled the smaller bands to submit to absorption, either by force or persuasion, into the larger and more powerful groups. The fact that there were few Japanese on the island enabled the guerrillas and loyal provincial officials to organize the governments of most of the barrios.
All of the guerrillas declared that their primary purpose was to aid the civilians, maintain peace and order, and keep the Japanese from abusing the people. They also assumed control over various phases of public activities--the allotment of food supplies, the issue of emergency currency, and the punishment of criminals. The guerrillas in northern Leyte depended upon voluntary contributions to support them, while those in southern Leyte levied a loyalty tax. Hard money having been driven out of circulation, the guerrilla units tried to issue paper, which was acceptable only in those regions where
the particular unit was active. There was no widespread circulation or acceptance of any of the guerrilla money.
The most important of the guerrilla leaders on Leyte were Lt. Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon and Brig. Gen. Blas E. Miranda. Colonel Kangleon had served for twenty-seven years in the Philippine Army and was a graduate of the Philippine Academy and General Service School. General Miranda,7 a former member of the Philippine Constabulary, was very hostile to the Japanese and to anyone who surrendered to them. He killed many former prisoners, whom the Japanese had released, on the pretext that they were enemy spies. Miranda was especially bitter toward Kangleon, a former prisoner of the enemy.
Official recognition from General MacArthur's headquarters was slow in reaching the guerrillas on Leyte, a fact that brought about misunderstandings. General MacArthur had early established contact with Col. Macario Peralta on Panay and Col. Wendell Fertig on Mindanao. In the middle of February 1943 MacArthur sent Lt. Comdr. Charles Parsons, USNR, to the Islands by submarine. Before his departure, General Headquarters had established the policies to be followed. The prewar military districts, as of December 1940, were to be revived.8 Since General MacArthur had received information that Colonel Fertig had successfully created an effective guerrilla organization on Mindanao and Colonel Peralta one on Panay, he recognized them as commanders of the 10th and 6th Military Districts, respectively. Radio communication from MacArthur's headquarters informed Peralta and Fertig of the appointments on 21 February 1943. Commander Parsons also carried formal letters, dated 13 February 1943, making these appointments.
Parsons safely reached the Philippines in early March and established friendly relations with Colonel Fertig. While on Mindanao he made several local trips, one to southern Leyte where he heard of Colonel Kangleon who had escaped from the Butuan prison camp and returned to his home. Parsons visited Kangleon with the promise that he would be made commander of the 9th Military District (Leyte and Samar), and succeeded in persuading him to join the guerrilla movement on Leyte.9
Until area commanders could be selected for the 7th, 8th, and 9th (Leyte) Districts, Peralta and Fertig had been authorized by MacArthur's headquarters, through Parsons, to organize the guerrillas on neighboring islands, as well as on their own. Each thought he was to organize the guerrillas on Leyte. Peralta made contact with General Miranda on northwestern Leyte; Fertig got in touch with Colonel Kangleon. Both Peralta and Fertig told their contacts to organize Leyte with the official sanction of General MacArthur's headquarters. Consequently, Kangleon and Miranda each thought the other to be a usurper.10
Miranda was adamant in his refusal to treat with Kangleon. Colonel Kangleon thought that Miranda should be ordered to "forget his established kingdom," but if this failed, he declared, the 92d Division,
commanded by himself, would "force . . . Miranda to join us."11
The situation became extremely tense, since both Kangleon and Miranda felt much bitterness. In August 1943 Kangleon sent a force against Miranda and during a clash between the two parties some of the men were killed. Miranda was routed and many of his followers joined Kangleon.12 The power of Miranda was broken. Kangleon incorporated the other guerrillas on the island into the 92d Division, and Leyte was then unified under his command.
On 21 October 1943 General MacArthur recognized Colonel Kangleon as the Leyte Area Commander, and in a letter accompanying the appointment he told Kangleon what he expected of him. "I desire that you establish and maintain direct communication with this headquarters at your earliest opportunity and thereafter you keep me informed of major developments involving enemy movement, dispositions and other activity within your area and observation."13
Japanese Punitive Expeditions
In the latter part of 1943 the Japanese military authorities tried to conciliate the guerrillas, offering, in return for their surrender, not only freedom from punishment but also jobs and the opportunity to resume their normal family life. A great many guerrillas took advantage of this offer of amnesty and surrendered.14 Among the guerrilla units that surrendered to the Japanese were those of Maj. Marcos G. Soliman and other subordinates of General Miranda's command.15 They gave themselves up in January 1944, but General Miranda himself refused to surrender and left for either Cebu or Bohol.
After their attempts at pacification, the Japanese launched more frequent and intensive patrols against the guerrillas. The garrison troops that had been stationed on Leyte were reinforced. Southern Leyte, which had known few Japanese, was "reinvolved" on 8 December 1943. The guerrillas withdrew and hid in the interior. It was thought that after a month the troops would leave and be replaced by constabulary officers. But after two weeks the Japanese turned their attention to the civilians. Some they arrested and imprisoned for days without food and water, others they tortured and executed. Houses were broken into, property was looted, and food was stolen. Spies were brought in from neighboring islands to locate the guerrilla hideouts.
Since the people begged for action, Colonel Kangleon held a meeting of his unit commanders on 24 January 1944. With his officers in unanimous accord, he issued an order to fight, commencing on 1 February 1944. All officers and enlisted men of his command signed a loyalty oath that they
would not allow either themselves or their weapons to be captured.
From 1 February until 12 June, according to Colonel Kangleon, the guerrillas in southern Leyte had only 10 casualties. In a report dated 18 May 1944, the Japanese casualties were listed as 434 killed, of whom 4 were officers, and 205 wounded.
The Japanese commander in Leyte made quite a different report. He stated that from 1 January to 31 August his forces had taken part in 561 engagements with the guerrillas. They had seized 7 vehicles; 7 generators; 37 radios and other items of wireless equipment; 1,556 weapons, including rifles, bayonets, and homemade shotguns; and 55,348 rounds of ammunition, as well as sticks of dynamite. The Japanese declared that they had taken 2,300 prisoners of war, including 3 Americans; that 6 Americans and 23,077 Filipinos had surrendered; 1,984 guerrillas had been killed; and that the Japanese casualties amounted to 7 officers and 208 enlisted men killed, and 11 officers and 147 men wounded.16
In the month of October 1944 General MacArthur's Military Intelligence Section estimated that the strength of the guerrilla 92d Division was as follows: Headquarters, Leyte Area Command, 23 officers and 107 enlisted men; 94th Regiment, 71 officers and 1,210 enlisted men; 95th Regiment, 78 officers and 954 enlisted men; 96th Regiment, 37 officers and 710 enlisted men; total strength, 209 officers and 2,981 enlisted men.17
Colonel Kangleon stated that as a result of guerrilla activities the Japanese sent out fewer patrols, staying mainly in the towns. The civilians, he claimed, were therefore able to plant and harvest their crops. Despite these brave words the guerrillas were definitely on the defensive, since Japanese intelligence had accurate information on their movements and strength. Nevertheless, the Japanese also knew that the guerrillas had established communication with General MacArthur in Australia and that they were sending important information to General Headquarters. This service the Japanese were unable to cut off.
Liaison Between Leyte and Australia
After his arrival in Australia in March 1942, General MacArthur had maintained radio contact with Corregidor until 6 May, but because of conditions in the Philippines radio communication with other parts of the Islands was all but impossible.18 Before its fall, Corregidor maintained radio contact with military commanders on the other islands. Afterward, a few men escaped and made their way to Australia. The sum of information they brought was not large, but it included the welcome news that guerrilla units were in existence all over the Islands. In the summer of 1942 General Headquarters began to receive messages from the guerrillas in the Philippines, though at first General MacArthur was not sure that the messages actually came from the guerrillas.
In August 1942 MacArthur decided to get in touch with the members of the resistance movement in the Philippines, and for this purpose he enlisted the services of Maj.
Jesus Antonio Villamor, who had escaped from the Islands and who volunteered to return.19 From August to December methods were devised and plans were made for sending an intelligence party to the Philippines.20 On 27 December 1942 Major Villamor received orders to return secretly to the Islands by submarine with three other Filipino officers and two enlisted men.21 They were instructed to establish an intelligence and secret service network throughout the Philippines; develop a chain of communications within the Philippines and to Australia, together with an escape route from the Islands for the evacuation of important personages; build up an organization for subversive activities, propaganda, limited resistance, and sabotage; and make an intelligence survey to obtain information on Japanese political, military, and civil intentions as well as the strength and disposition of Japanese military, naval, and air forces.22
Armed with these instructions, Major Villamor returned to the Philippine Islands. Slowly but carefully, from December 1942 to November 1943, he established an intelligence network that covered Luzon and the Visayan Islands. His story is told in part as follows:
I established this network principally with the idea that this net would be entirely independent of all intelligence nets previously established by the guerrillas, believing that in all probability you [General MacArthur] could rely more on guerrilla intelligence activities for the present. I wanted to establish something that would really be underground and as secret as possible. For that reason, I took my time about it. I took as much as two months to train each individual man. I tried to impress on each man that after he left my place, he would be on his own and that no matter what happened to me or to the rest of the net, he would carry on. I assured him that both GHQ and I would have faith in him.23
Kangleon was largely responsible for the Leyte radio network. This intelligence network did not cover the entire island but only those positions over which he had control. General MacArthur did not furnish any considerable supplies for this net until shortly before his return in October 1944.24 On 3 July 1944 Kangleon received seventy tons of supplies; an additional shipment of supplies and men followed on 20 July.25 This allotment was in addition to money sent him. The funds available to Kangleon consisted of $50,000 in prewar currency ("only a few hundred" of which were spent by him), $225,000 in "bogus Japanese" currency, and $479,198 in emergency currency printed in the Islands and used for "army" purposes.26
Several clandestine radio stations were in operation on or near Leyte in June 1944. These were primarily contact stations established originally to integrate more closely the activities of the various guerrilla units with the directives of Colonel Kangleon's headquarters, which was in touch with General Headquarters. After the Leyte Area Command was recognized by General MacArthur, the first radio was sent to Leyte, but the Japanese captured it early in 1944 before
it could be put to use. Kangleon received a new set from Mindanao. There were two coastwatcher stations in operation--one in southern Leyte and the other on Dinagat Island. These furnished MacArthur information on the activities of the Japanese in the area. Colonel Kangleon also used the radio set in southern Leyte to maintain contact with Colonel Fertig on Mindanao.27
As a result of information received from the intelligence network, on Leyte and in other areas, together with information from other sources, General MacArthur's intelligence officers were able to piece together a reasonably accurate picture of the Japanese units on Leyte, their strength, dispositions, and fortifications.
Kangleon's network, however, was not as active as most of the others in the Philippines that were operated by coastwatchers and guerrillas. From March 1944, when Kangleon's network was established, to October 1944, when the American forces returned, the monthly totals of messages received by General Headquarters from Leyte were as follows: March, 6; April, 7; May, 7; June, 12; July, 13; August, 13; September, 17; and October, 26.28
The guerrillas of the Philippine Islands made far-reaching contributions to the war effort. They were an extremely valuable source of intelligence; their activities forced the Japanese to retain in the Philippines comparatively large forces which would otherwise have been sent south; it is estimated that they killed from eight thousand to ten thousand Japanese troops; and, finally, they bolstered the morale, spirit, and loyalty of the Filipino people.29 They kept alive the hope and belief that the forces of the United States would return and redeem the Islands.
Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (1) * Next Chapter (3)
1. MI Sec, WDGS, Survey of the Philippines, 3 vols., 15 Feb 43; Div of Naval Intel, Office, Chief of Naval Opns, ONI 93, Field Monograph of the Philippines, Jan 44; Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA, Terrain Study 84, Leyte Province, 17 Aug 44; ASF Manual M365-1, Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, 25 Apr 44.
2. Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. Unless otherwise stated the material on terrain is based upon this report, pages 5-7.
3. S.D. Sturgis, Jr., Brigadier General, U.S. Army Air Engineer, USAF, Engineer Operations in the Leyte Campaign, reprinted from The Military Engineer, November and December, 1947, and January, 1948, p. 4.
4. Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA, Terrain Study 84, Leyte Province, 17 Aug 44, p. 43.
5. Unless otherwise stated, material on the guerrillas is based upon the Guerrilla Papers, a collection of disorganized, miscellaneous records by and about the guerrillas in the Philippine Islands. It is located in the Documents Files Section, G-2, Department of the Army.
The records of the Leyte guerrillas are incomplete, inadequate, and controversial. Some of the guerrilla bands had no records, and all that is known of others is from violently prejudiced sources. Consequently, the full story of the guerrillas can probably never be told.
6. 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 22 Oct 44.
7. Miranda's rank is obscure. At various times he is referred to as lieutenant, major, colonel, and brigadier general.
8. MI Sec, GHQ AFPAC, Intelligence Series, Vol. II, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation (hereafter cited as Intelligence Activities in the Philippines), App. 7.
9. Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 56.
10. Ibid., pp. 16-18.
11. Memo, Col Kangleon for K-50-OCTOPUS (probably for MacArthur), 23 May 43, Guerrilla Papers.
12. The estimates on the number of deaths vary considerably. In a letter to President Manuel Quezon by Senator Carlos Garcia, dated 16 October 1943, the deaths are mentioned as "several"; a manuscript by Mrs. Charlotte Martin, who was on Leyte, says "many lives were lost"; and 1st Lt. Jack Hawkins, USMC, a guerrilla, stated in December 1943 that "over three hundred casualties were suffered by the contesting sides." Guerrilla Papers.
13. GHQ FEC, MI Sec, GS, Messages in the Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, Kangleon 201 File, DRB AGO.
14. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Br, Rpt, Guerrilla Resistance in the Philippines, 21 Jul 44, Guerrilla Papers.
15. ATIS, GHQ SWPA, Current Translations, 148, 6 Feb 45.
16. ATIS, SWPA, Enemy Publications 359, Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines, 2 parts, 28 Apr 45, passim, DRB AGO. Any resemblance between the Japanese figures and those in Kangleon's reports is purely coincidental.
17. MI Sec, GHQ SWPA, G-2 Info Bull, The Resistance Movement on Leyte Island, 7 Oct 44, Doc Files Sec, G-2, Dept of Army.
18. Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 5.
19. Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton considered Villamor "the most daring of the Filipino pilots." Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York, 1946), p. 58.
20. Interv with Maj Villamor, 12 Oct 50.
21. The party consisted of Major Villamor, 1st Lt. R. C. Ignacio, 2d Lt. D. C. Yuhico, 2d Lt. E. F. Quinto, Sgt. P. Jorge, and Sgt. D. Malie.
22. AIB, GHQ SWPA, Instructions to Maj Villamor, 27 Dec 42, Guerrilla Papers.
23. Villamor Rpt on Intel Net in Philippines, Guerrilla Papers.
24. Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 77.
25. Ibid., App. 2. The number of men and the amount and kinds of supplies are not given.
26. Ibid., App. 1.
27. Ibid., passim.
28. GHQ FEC, MI Sec, GS, A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ SWPA, and Affiliated Units, Plate 10, facing p. 32, copy in OCMH.
29. Office, Chief of Naval Opns, Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines, 14 Sep 44, file OP-16 FE.