Chapter VI
Army Deployment and the War Against Japan
December 1941-March 1942

During the ARCADIA Conference Japanese forces took Hong Kong (which surrendered on 25 December) and Manila (2 January), began heavy air raids on Rangoon, compelled the troops covering the southernmost part of 'Malaya to withdraw south of Kuala Lumpur, landed at several points in Borneo and tire Celebes, and made their first air attacks on Rabaul. The Japanese had for the time so little to fear on other fronts, and their lines of communication from their southern front to their advance bases in the South China Sea and from there northward to Japan were so short, that they could concentrate forces more quickly than the Allies at any given point. They presumably intended not to pause until they had seized Singapore and Rangoon and the northern approaches to Australia.

An attempt to meet them on equal terms at these points would require Great Britain and the United States, handicapped by lack of a concerted plan and subject to conflicting and urgent demands from other quarters, to expend far more in this area than anyone in Washington or London had proposed before Pearl Harbor. In terms of planes, ships, and escort vessels, Great Britain and the United States would have to exert an effort several times greater than that of which the Japanese were capable. Only then could the Allies counterbalance the advantages that the Japanese had by virtue of their head start, superiority in aircraft carriers, and relatively short interior lines of communication from their production centers to the fronts and between sectors. But the ARCADIA Conference did not take up the proposition, the force of which was more evident with every day that passed, that the Allied position was greatly overextended.

Allied Strategy Against Japan

During the conference, the one general statement on the war against Japan was that introduced by the British Chiefs in their opening statement on American-British strategy. As one of the steps to be taken in 1942 to put the grand strategy into effect, they listed "the safeguarding of vital interests in the Eastern theatre," with the following elaboration

The security of Australia. New Zealand. and India must be maintained, and the Chinese war effort supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be secured.


Our immediate object must therefore be to hold

a. Hawaii and Dutch Harbour [Alaska].

b. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier, and the Philippines.

c. Rangoon and the route to China.1

The British statement entirely omitted one point that remained of interest to the President and the American staff--the future role of the Soviet Union in Far Eastern strategy. Both had acknowledged the fact that the Soviet Government intended to avoid hostilities with Japan and recognized that it was logical for the Soviet Government not to enter into any arrangements with the United States that ,might have the effect of hastening Soviet involvement.2 Nevertheless, it was American policy to lay the basis for American air operations against Japan from Siberian bases,3 and for this use the Army Air Forces proposed to allocate one group of heavy bombers.4 The project did not come up during the conference, presumably because the British Government had dissociated itself from the attempt to encourage Soviet collaboration in the Far East.5 The President and the Chiefs of Staff did mention the possibilities that in the spring Japan might attack or the Soviet Union might intervene.6 The American representatives made two additions to the British statement of Far Eastern strategy, both of which indicated that American views still comprehended future collaboration with the Soviet Union against Japan. To the above-listed three strategic positions to he held in the Far East, the American Chiefs added "the 'Maritime Provinces of Russia." At the instance of the U. S. Army Air Forces, the Chiefs also incorporated in the paper a supplement listing air routes to be established and maintained throughout the world, including a route via Alaska to Vladivostok. This was the extent of ARCADIA discussions of the role of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan.7


After listing the positions that the United States and Great Britain must make it their "immediate object" to hold, the British Chiefs had concluded that the "minimum forces required to hold the above" would have to be "a matter of mutual discussion." This declaration stood in the final version adopted by the British and American Chiefs.8 But the Chiefs did not proceed to a "mutual discussion" of the dispositions of their forces. They evidently considered it to be contrary to current policy to acknowledge that the United States and Great Britain must write off any of their "vital interests in the Eastern theatre," or to reckon what it might cost to "safeguard" the others.

For the Southwest Pacific and southeast Asia, the British and American planners did compile tables showing "the estimated strength of forces initially in the Area, and the reinforcements ordered or planned to be sent."9 The planners compiled these tables to accompany recommendations drawn up for the Chiefs of Staff, at their direction, on the disposition of forces in the area or due to arrive during January. As directed, the planners considered the alternative assumptions that the Philippines and Singapore would both hold; that Singapore and the Netherlands Indies, but not the Philippines, would hold; and that neither Singapore nor the Philippines would hold. For the interim guidance of the various commands concerned they drew up a resolution adopting all the standing national objectives in the region, without distinction, as Allied strategy. With slight modifications, the Chiefs approved the resolution:

(a) To hold the Malay Barrier . . . as the basic defensive position in that Far East theatre, and to operate sea, land, and air fours in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

(b) To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the theatre. and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

(c) To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

(d) To maintain essential communications within the theatre.10

There was little else they could do. It was the policy of the British Government to assert that Singapore could and would be held, and to conduct on this basis its relations not only with the American Government but also with the Australian Government and the Netherlands Government-in-exile.11


The policy of the United States was analogous, for it was desirable from the American point of view not to concede in advance the loss of the Philippines or Burma. It was American policy to support the position of General MacArthur in the Philippines as long as possible. It was also convenient to assumed that the British, with Chinese help. might hold Burma and thus postpone the difficult decisions that would have to be made, in case Burma were lost, with reference to the American program for the support of China.

The ABDA Command

By the time the planners were at work on their study for the Chiefs, the ARCADIA Conference had taken under consideration a proposal for establishing "unified command" in the Southwest Pacific and southeast Asia.12 The conference finally adopted this proposal, setting up the Australian-British-Dutch-American (ABDA) Command, whose jurisdiction comprehended the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Burma. The allied commander in the ABDA theater, Lt. Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, received for guidance the same comprehensive declaration of Allied aims that the Chiefs had approved, together with an even more hopeful statement of the strategic concept:

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is not only in the immediate future to maintain as many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations for the offensive.13

The act of setting lip the ABDA Command--though not the definition of strategy nor the listing of forces, which remained unchanged--represented an adjustment to the actual military situation. In agreeing to create the command and present the accomplished fact to the Australian Government, the Netherlands Government-in exile, and the Chinese Nationalist Government (whose interests were also affected;, the conference demonstrated that the British and American Governments were ready and willing to take bilateral action in the field of military affairs, in spite of differences in national policy and notwithstanding the embarrassments they might incur in the fields of domestic and foreign policy.

The proposal to establish "unified command" in the Southwest Pacific and southeast Asia originated with General Marshall, who declared, in introducing it, that its


adoption would solve nine tenths of the problems of British-American military collaboration.14 As he explained during the debate that followed, his immediate aim was to place on a single officer responsibility for initiating action to be taken in Washington and London with reference to strategic deployment to and within the area.15 According to 'Marshall, Wavell was the "logical man," since he knew India, was "used to moving troops," and had "been engaged in active operations which included both a successful operation and a setback." What was no less important, the choice of Wavell served to overcome the fear of the Prime Minister that British forces might be diverted from the defense of Singapore and "wasted" on the Philippines or Borneo.16

Besides fixing responsibility in the theater for getting Washington and London to act, the ARCADIA Conference fixed responsibility in Washington and London, by providing that General Wavell should report to a new British-American military committee that was to be established in Washington. This committee consisted of the senior American officers that had dealt with the British Chiefs during the conference and senior representatives that the British Chiefs would leave behind them. The committee was called the Combined Chiefs of Staffs (CCS).17

Doubts and misunderstandings greeted both the proposal to set up the ABDA Command and the proposal to place it under the CCS. To General Marshall's declaration that the whole area from northwest Australia to Burma constituted a "single natural theater," the Prime Minister objected that a single commander could not control the scattered operations in the vast area. Besides having this objection, he and his Chiefs of Staff were apparently reluctant to place on a British commander the onus of defeat and a burden of recriminations from the various other Allied nations concerned. However, with the help of Mr. Hopkins and Ford Beaverbrook and the agreement of the President, General Marshall won the Prime Minister's assent to the proposal to establish the ABDA theater with General Wavell as its commander.18

It was as natural for the British to misunderstand General Marshall's proposal when he first made it as it was for them to accept it when they understood it. He proposed that the Allied commander would have no authority to move ground forces from one territory to another within the theater. During the period of "initial reinforcements" he could move only those air forces that the governments concerned chose to put at his disposal. He would have no power to relieve national commanders


or their subordinates, to interfere in the tactical organization and disposition of their forces, to commandeer their supplies, or to control their communications with their respective governments. Marshall agreed that the limitations were drastic, but pointed out that what he proposed was all that could then be done, and declared that "if the supreme commander ceded up with no more authority than to tell Washington what he wanted, such a situation was better than nothing, and an improvement over the present situation."19 It was this restricted authority that General Wavell was given over the vast ABDA Command.20

When it came to providing for the "higher direction" of the ABDA Command, General Marshall found himself in agreement, not in disagreement, with the British Chiefs of Staff, and it was not the Prime Minister, but the President, who hesitated lest the automatic interposition of professional views on deployment of British and American forces should make it harder rather than easier to reach politically acceptable strategic decisions. When the question of the "higher direction" of the ABDA Command first came up, the President turned for advice to Admiral King, who recommended setting up a special body in Washington to deal only with strategy in the Southwest Pacific, on which the Australian Government and the Netherlands Government-in-exile, as well as the American and British Governments, would be represented.21 The President was himself inclined toward this solution.22 The British Government, on the other hand, meant so far as possible to settle questions of strategic policy in the Southwest Pacific directly with Australian and Netherlands officials in London, and did not want Australian and Netherlands representatives in Washington to take part in British-American deliberations there, although they would, of course, be consulted by American officials and the American military staff in Washington. The British Chiefs of Staff accordingly proposed to put the ABDA commander under the British-American Chiefs of Staff committee in Washington.23 Admirals Stark and King agreed with Marshall to recommend this solution to the President.24 The President replied with a "re-draft" of their proposal, in which he reverted to the procedure originally recommended by Admiral King, with the difference that the Washington committee would include representatives not only of the Netherlands and Australia but also of New Zealand.25


The Chiefs of Staff stuck to their original proposal, modifying it in form but not in essence. They explained their adherence to it partly on the ground that it would be quicker and less confusing not to duplicate in Washington the machinery already in use in London for consulting the Dominions and Netherlands Governments. They also believed that the British-American Chiefs of Staff committee in Washington was peculiarly qualified to make recommendations on the questions that must be brought before the President and the Prime Minister--the provision of additional reinforcements, major changes in policy, and departures from the basic directive to the ABDA Supreme Commander. Sir Dudley Pound, they added, had just talked to the Prime Minister and had come away with the impression that he would accept this solution.26 The President, after talking it over with the Prime Minister, announced that he, too, would accept it.27

Meanwhile, the British had arranged for General Wavell to go to Java to assume command as soon as possible. On 10 January he set up temporary headquarters at Batavia.28 On the same day the British Chiefs proposed and the American Chiefs agreed that the British Government should ask the Australian and Netherlands Governments to authorize General Wavell to take command of their forces in the area even though those governments were not satisfied with the idea of making him responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, a body on which they were not represented.29 General Wavell assumed command on 15 January although he was "not yet" in, a position to establish office or exercise sector operational control."30

Loss of Malaya, Fall of Singapore, and Ground Force Dispositions

Within a month after the ARCADIA Conference, as the Japanese offensive continued all along the extended "front" of the ABDA Command, it became evident that the British and American programs of reinforcement for the Far Fast must be reconsidered. The development that first called for decision was the collapse of the British position in 'Malaya. After the capture of Kuala Lumpur, new Japanese landings in the rear of British positions, continued Japanese infiltration along the


front, and brave Japanese pressure at weak pointy quickly undid successive attempts to hold a lute across the peninsula in Johore Province. By the end of January the main body of the defending troops had been evacuated to the island of Singapore. A weak later the Japanese, strongly supported by planes and artillery established a beachhead oil the island. Thereafter, they rapidly repaired the: causeway, drove into the town of Singapore, and, finally, on 14 February gained complete control of the water reservoirs of the island. On 13 February the British garrison surrendered.

The retreat from the mainland to the island of Singapore at the end of January resulted in changes in plans for disposing ground forces assigned to the ABDA Command. It was too late to do anything about the 18th British Division, one brigade of which had arrived at Singapore on 13 January and the other at the end of the month, or about the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade, which had also arrived at the end of the month. But there were still large forces being diverted from the Middle Fast to whose disposition was to be considered--the British 7th Armoured Brigade, due to arrive in February, the 7th Australian Division, due at the end of February, and the 6th Australian Division, due in March. The destination of these troops was changed to the Netherlands Indies. The 7th Armoured Brigade was to proceed to Java; with the agreement of the Australian Government, the 7th Australian Division was to proceed to Sumatra and the 6th to Java.

When the fall of Singapore became imminent, it was obvious that further changes must be made. The first sign was a report sent by General Wavell on 7 February, after his return front Burma, that he was trying to divert "all or part" of the 7th Armoured Brigade to Burma, since he had been impressed with the need for armored troops there at that season, when the rice fields were dry.31] On 12 February Washington learned that he had ordered this

change.32 There remained the question of the two Australian divisions (and a possible question of the disposition of a third Australian division, the 9th. which was also due to be returned from the Middle East). On 13 February, in anticipation of the early fall of Singapore and in view of the movement of an escorted Japanese convoy toward southern Sumatra, General Wavell cautiously opened the question of conceding the loss of Sumatra and, in turn, of Java, and diverting one or both of the Australian divisions to Burma or Australia. He remarked that this course would be advantageous "from purely strategic aspects," but would "obviously have the most serious moral and political repercussions." In conclusion, he declared, "We shall continue with present plans until situation enforces changes. This message gives warning of serious change in situation which may shortly arise necessitating complete reorientation of plans.33

On 16 February Wavell sent to London a long report oil the situation, in which he presented the case for accepting the loss of Java.

To sum up, Burma and Australia are absolutely vital for war against Japan. Loss of Java, though severe blow from every point


of view, would not be fatal. Efforts should not therefore be made to reinforce Jaw which might compromise defense of Burma or Australia.

He continued:

Immediate problem is destination of Australian Corps. If there seemed good chance of establishing Corps in island and fighting Japanese on favorable term's I should unhesitatingly recommend risk should be taken as I did in matter of aid to Greece year ago. I thought then that we had good fighting chance of checking German invasion and in spite results still consider risk was justifiable. In present instance I must recommend that I consider risk unjustifiable from tactical and strategical point of view. I fully recognize political considerations involved.

Wavell then recommended that the 7th Australian Division, which was approaching Ceylon, and also, if possible, the 6th, should be diverted to Burma rather than to Australia, on the following ground:

Presence of this force in Burma threatening invasion of Thailand and Indo-China must have very great effect on Japanese strategy and heartening effect on China and India. It is only theatre in which offensive land operations against Japan [are] possible in near future. It should be possible for American troops to provide reinforcement of Australia if required.34

The Decision To Send the 41st Division to Australia

Sending American ground forces to Australia, as General Wavell suggested, would serve much the same purpose as sending American ground forces to the British Isles. The arrival of the first American ground forces in Australia, as in the British Isle, would be reassuring, and would have the same practical effect of releasing Imperial ground forces for combat or police duty in the Middle East and India, to which it was inexpedient to assign American ground forces.

The policy of the War Department, during arid after the ARCADIA Conference, had been to postpone decisions on the commitment of Army ground forces to Australia. The planners, trying to anticipate the disposition of Army divisions during 1942, had concluded that two infantry divisions would probably be sent to the Southwest Pacific.35 But in the opinion of the senior plain and operations officer for the area, General Eisenhower, this development would be contrary to War Department Policy:

The War Department concept of present and future Army participation in the ABDA Theater involves an Air Corps operation, exclusively. All other types of forces, auxiliary services and supplies dispatched to the area have as their sole purpose the support of the Air contingent. We should resist any expansion of this concept, regardless of the size the air operation may eventually assume or of the number and types of supporting troops.36

The only American ground force then present in the ABDA Command was a partly equipped brigade of field artillery, on its way to the Philippines, that had arrived at


Brisbane on 22 December with the Pensacola convoy. The brigade had gone no farther than Port Darwin, where it had been broken up. One of its regiments, the 147th Field Artillery, was assigned to the defense of Port Darwin, which had been made part of the ABDA Command. The 2d Battalion of the 131st Field Artillery Regiment, part of the Texas National Guard, had been moved to Java. The remaining battalion and headquarters of the 148th Field Artillery Regiment were under orders to defend Kupang, on the island of Timor.37 The War Department also kept in mind the possibility that General Patch's task force, aboard the large convoy that sailed from New York on 22 January, might on its arrival in Australia be assigned to Australia or in the ABDA area, in case of emergency, instead of being transshipped to New Caledonia.38

On 14 February, the day after Wavell's warning message, came an abrupt change in War Department policy--a decision to send reinforcements of ground and service troops to Australia. The original troop list, presented by General Eisenhower and orally approved by General Marshall, called for one reinforced infantry brigade and 10,000 service troops.39 The staff soon revised the list and proposed, instead, to send to Australia 8,000 service troops, one tank destroyer battalion of 800 men, and one triangular division (15,000 troops).40 General Marshall agreed, and selected the 41st Division, under Maj. Gen. Horace H. Fuller. The first movement orders were issued at once.41

To get the ships for the movement General Marshall appealed to the White House. He telephoned Hopkins on 14 February that the Army was short of troop shipping for 19,000 men and the "necessary complement of cargo ships. Mr. Hopkins answered that he "would work on it."42 After a conference at the White House, Rear Adm. Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator, undertook to furnish the additional ships over and above what the Army and Navy "could scrape together." General Somervell, in reporting the result of the conference, announced that he expected to have arrangements completed by 16 February.43 By that date shipping had been found for 20,000 troops, enough for


all the troops that the War Department wanted to send, except for one regiment of the 41st Division. By 19 February, shipping for this regiment, too, had been made available, and the staff directed it to be shipped.44

British and American political and military authorities had meanwhile been considering General Wavell's recommendations. It was evidently necessary to concede at once the loss of south Sumatra, the Japanese having already established themselves at Palembang. and to establish a new line of defense across the Indian Ocean Australia, Ceylon, and Burma. Authorities in Washington and London both urged that the Australian Government should consent to the temporary diversion to Burma of the 7th Australian Division, on the understanding that the 6th and 9th Divisions would be returned to Australia.45

The Australian Government refused, in spite of the appeals of the President and the British Prime Minister. The prospects in Burma were most uncertain. The Japanese had crossed the Salwecn River, and the British command in Burma had just given the order on 19 February; to abandon the line of the Bilin River and fall back across the Sittang, which, although more defensible, was also the last barrier before Rangoon. The Australian Prime Minister, after summarizing for Churchill what Australia had already done to support the ABDA Command. recapitulating the agreements with reference to returning Australian divisions, and referring to the dangers then facing Australia, stated the reasons of the Australian Government for refusing to divert the 7th Division to Burma:

Notwithstanding your statement that you do not agree with the request to send the other two divisions of the A.I.F. Corps to Burma, our adviser, arc concerned with Wavell's request for the corps and Dill's statement that the destination of the Sixth and Ninth Australian Divisions should be left open as more troops might he badly needed in Burma. Once one Division became engaged it could not be left unsupported and inferences arc that the whole corps might become committed to this region or there might be a recurrence of the experiences of Creek and Malayan campaigns. Finally in view of superior Japanese sea power and air power it would appear to be a matter of some doubt as to whether this division can be landed in Burma and a matter for greater doubt whether it can be brought out as promised. With the fall of Singapore, Penang and Martaban. the Bay of Bengal is vitally vulnerable to what must be considered the superior sea and air power of Japan in that area. The movement of our forces to this theatre, therefore, is not considered a reasonable hazard of war, having regard to what has gone before and its adverse results would have gravest consequences on morale of Australian people. The Government, therefore, must adhere to its decision.46

The doubts of the Australian Government, which the British Chiefs of Staff had


come to share, were soon borne out by the disastrous Battle of Sittang Bridge (on 22 23 February, which was followed by the evacuation of Rangoon and the retreat northward of the defending armies.47

The action then taken by the United States, though it did not affect the immediate issue in Burma, established a policy that had a much wider application: that of American intervention, based on American aid, is settling the future disposition of Australian and New Zealand; ground forces in the Middle East and India. Roosevelt, in appealing for Curtin's agreement on the specific issue, clearly set a precedent. In explanation of the American decision "to send, in addition to all troops and forces now en route, another force of over 27,000 men to Australia." the President declared that the Allies must "fight to the limit" for the two flanks, "one based on Australia and the other on Burma, India and China." and continued:

Because of our geographical position we Americans can better handle the reinforcement of Australia and the right flank.

I say this to you so that you may have every confidence, that we are going to reinforce your position with all possible speed. Moreover, the operations which the United States Navy have begun and have in view will in a measure constitute a protection to the coast of Australia and New Zealand.

The President also inserted a statement of the belief that, given the Allied forces in the area and en route, the "vital centers" of Australia were not in immediate danger, notwithstanding the speed with which the Japanese were moving. This message established in its simplest form the view of strategy embodied in the decision to send the 41st Division to Australia.48

The Isolation of Java and Air Force Dispositions

During the first three weeks of February, while the Japanese took Singapore and occupied southern Sumatra, they also undertook, with complete success, an air offensive to isolate Java. Given the extent of the island of Java, the only chance of defending it lay in the possibility that Allied naval and Air action north of Java might gain time to allow the development of an Allied fighter air force in Java strong enough to control the air over the island and the approaches thereto. This aim achieved, Allied reinforcements could continue to move north from Australia, and Allied bombers could prevent the Japanese from landing and supporting large ground forces in Java.

Attempt to Move Pursuit Planes to Java

The development of a fighter command in Java, around the nucleus of the small, ill-equipped Netherlands Air Force, which had sought but had not received modern equipment from the United States and Great Britain, depended on the early arrival of reinforcements. The defense of 'and of Singapore and the approaches thereto claimed all British fighter reinforcements. The only hope was that the American pilots and the crated P-40's that arrived in Australia could be moved, by one means or another, to Java. The attempt to move these planes to Java took


precedence over the fulfillment of the urgent needs of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), which was quite inadequate to defend Port Darwin and the northeastern approaches to Australia.49

By early February about 300 P-40's had arrived in the Southwest Pacific.50 The program under which these planes had been shipped, initiated before the ARCADIA Conference on the assumption that they would be transshipped or flown to the Philippines, had been increased early in the conference to provide about 330 P-40's.51 During January. this program had been further increased to , provide, all told, about 640 pursuit planes, most of the increase being P-39's (including P-400's, an early inferior variant of the P-39 designed for export).52 The P-39's and the balance of the P-40's were due to be shipped during the next few weeks.53

The immediate problem was not the lack of planes in Australia, but the want of preparations for getting them into Java. It would take so long to make these preparations that there was no choice but to try to move the planes to the front a few at a time, in violation of every principle laid down in Air Corps doctrine, and notwithstanding the statement of policy hopefully incorporated in General Wavell's directive:

The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the: employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized.54

The American command in Australia attempted to assemble the pursuit planes at Brisbane, where there were as yet neither the trained men nor the tools and spare parts for this task, and to ferry them to Java by way of undefended, unfamiliar fields no less ill-equipped to service them--Port Darwin, Kupang (Timor) , and Waingapu (Sumba). On 25 January the first thirteen


planes arrived at Surabaja.55 By the end of January, before any others had even set out from Brisbane, Wavell warned that the Japanese might soon interdict this route and asked whether in that event he might have a carrier to move planes to Java.56 The reality of the danger was borne home by daily ,reports of enemy air attacks over Java, Bali, and Timor, one of which (on Bali, 5 February) destroyed the greater part of a second flight of P-40's en route to Java.57

Besides these first two (lights, three others took off from Port Darwin. The third, which left on 9 February, met bad weather conditions, and all the P-40's crashed en route. The fourth, leaving on 11 February, got through to Java to join the survivors of the first and second flights. The fifth took off from Port Darwin on 19 February and turned back because of bad weather, conditions. All but one of its planes were shot down in the overwhelming air attack on Port Darwin in that day. Several planes on the ground and six ships in the harbor were also destroyed, eight other ships damaged, and base and port facilities wrecked. This attack closed the last route for fixing pursuit planes to Java.58

The CCS had ruled out Wavell's request for an aircraft carrier to bring planes within fling distance of Java, with the possible exception of the British carrier Indomitable, which was due in the theater at the end of the month with a load of Hurricanes.59 The attack of Port Darwin conclusively disposed of the alternative of shipping planes from northern Australia. The one way left of getting pursuit planes to Java (at least before the arrival of the Indomitable) was to ship them from Western Australia to southern Java (Tjilatjap). On 9 February Wavell had announced that by this route the British ship Athene would take in crated planes, and the American seaplane tender Langley would carry in assembled planes.60

By 19 February ABDA headquarters was prepared to acknowledge that the situation in Java was irretrievable. Even before receiving news of the raid on Port Darwin of that day, Wavell discounted the possibility of getting reinforcements from Port Darwin, in view of enemy landings in Bali (begun on 17 February), which commanded tire ferry route. To offset the increasingly high attrition to be expected as the allied force in Java dwindled were the prospects of supply by the Langley, which was admittedly "hazardous," and of supply by the British carrier Indomitable, which seemed "doubtful and late." Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, the ABDA air chief, estimated


that at the "present scale of fighting" the Allied fighter force in Java would ..not remain effective beyond next two weeks."61

What to do in this situation the CCS left up to General Wavell to the extent of giving him "discretion to augment defence of Java with available naval force and with U.S. aircraft now at your disposal assembling in Australia." ,The same message also contained instructions governing Allied troops then in Java:

JAVA should be defended with the utmost resolution by all combatant troops at present in the Island for whom arms are available. Every day gained is of importance. There should be no withdrawal of troops or air forces of any nationality and no surrender. Amendments to these instructions caused by emergency changes in the situation should be referred to Washington, and if this is not possible will be decided by you on the spot.62

The purpose of this paragraph of instructions way to settle policy on evacuation, but Wavell adopted it as a basis for deciding on 22 February to send the Langley to Java.63 This decision came somewhat unexpectedly, since he had acknowledged the day before that as a result of the heavy loses in the fighting of 20 February the air forces left in Java--which he estimated as fewer than forty fighters, about thirty medium and dive bombers, and ten heavy bombers--could "only hope to fight for few more days at most." He had apparently given up hope of getting in any more planes, unless by the Langley.64 His decision of 22 February to send the Langley to Java, he announced with the following explanation:

This may enable us to keep going until arrival aircraft from INDOMITABLE but in absence of continual and increasing flow of fighters and bombers this is likely only to gain certain tune but is in accordance with your instructions that every day is of value.65

Later on during the day Wavell sent a longer explanation to the same effect:

To carry out instructions in your D.B.A. 19, it is essential that we should have fighter and bomber reinforcements. I have accordingly


ordered LANGLEY to proceed Java as soon as possible to disembark fighters and BRETT is ordering few bomber aircraft immediately available from Australia to proceed. Hope also that aircraft from INDOMITABLE will be sent if still in time. With these reinforcements valuable time may be gained by defence JAVA and blows inflicted on enemy naval and air forces. Otherwise our air force will practically disappear within very short period.66

The real meaning of the decision came out in a third message of 22 February, which reported the conference Wavell and Brett had had with the governor general of the Netherlands Indies, with reference to the liquidation of Wavell's headquarters. In this report. Wavell declared: "It should be made quite clear to Dutch that withdrawal of ABDA HQ will NOT repeat NOT mean stoppage of warlike supplies to JAVA and public announcement to this effect should be made."67 About the only "warlike supplies" of any consequence that were immediately available for movement were American planes. Wavell announced that he was sending Brett to Australia the next day to "hasten despatch of air reinforcements from Australia."68 The War Department for a few days continued to avoid making the decision between the desperate hopefulness of the Netherlands command and the evident hopelessness of the situation in Java. On 23 February command in the ABDA area passed to the Dutch. On 25 February, in answer to a question from Lt. Gen. George H. Brett, who had thereupon taken command of American forces in Australia, the War Department replied:

The purpose of the War Department to support the defense by every practicable means has not repeat not been changed. The event to which pursuit planes should be transferred to Java must be determined by you in accordance with the desires of the ABDA Commander, the availability of shipping, and the practicability of landing these planes in Java and operating them effectively therefrom .69

The "practicability of landing these planes in Java and operating them effectively therefrom" was soon thereafter decided. The Langley, with its thirty-two P-40's, went down off Java on 27 February as a result of several direct hits by enemy bombers. The pilots were picked up by two other ships, neither of which arrived in port. The Sea Witch, one of four ships from Melbourne that had made a rendezvous with the Langley at Fremantle, had also been ordered to Java, rather than to Burma, its original destination. The Sea Witch got through with its cargo of twenty-seven crated P-40's, all of which had to be thrown into the sea during the evacuation of Java, in order to prevent their falling into the hands of the Japanese. The War Department then finally agreed with General Brett


that no more pursuit planes should be shipped to Java unless there were a change in the situation that promised "greater safety in transit."70 Thus ended the attempt to build up a fighter command in Java, an attempt that all told had cost perhaps half of the American pursuit planes and a great many of the pilots that had by then arrived in Australia, and that had put into action for about a fortnight one steadily dwindling provisional squadron in Java.71

Transfer of Air Units to Burma and India

Even while the attempt to send fighter reinforcements to Java was beginning ABDA headquarters, the CCS, and the War Department began to prepare against the probability that it would fail. On 7 February General Brett, repeating and confirming General Wavell's report of the desperate situation of the fighter command in Java, went on to outline the problem of air operations in the area for consideration by the War Department "in connection with future operation." He understood that "every effort must be made to retain and maintain a strong defensive force in Java." But he warned the War Department:

To protect our air striking force it may become necessary to readjust our idea of the method of hopping the Barrier and eventually taking up the offensive. . . . It may be necessary to work from the flanks.

Brett's plan was to base air striking forces, with adequate protection by pursuit planes, in India and Burma and at Port Darwin. On operations based in India and Burma he observed

Burma can be occupied in depth with India as bases from which fighters can easily be flow to fields in North Burma and even into China. Airfreight transport would be more usable. Water transport might be difficult. The Burma Road and other supply lines leading north from Rangoon would require energetic American action. The air operations would have tendency to (one) relieve pressure on Singapore by action on Bangkok and Saigon (two) give a direct line of action toward Formosa, Shanghai and eventually Japan.72

ABDA headquarters was especially interested in the development of an American bomber force based on Burma. To prepare for the reception of such a force, as part of the American Volunteer Group, was the mission that had originally taken General Brett to the Far East.73 These preparations the ABDA Command had resumed. General Wavell had announced on returning from Rangoon on 26 January that he proposed to send a squadron of long-range bombers to operate from Burma, where they would have "excellent targets."74 On 7 February, returning from a second visit to Burma, Wavell announced that he had taken with him and had left in Burma an American officer, Col. Francis M. Brady, to "go into questions of operation [of] heavy bombers from


Burma and China." As indicated by Wavell's announcement, made at the same time, that he intended to divert the 7th Armoured Brigade from Java to Burma, the immediate concern of ABDA headquarters was then with the reinforcement of Burma.75

The War Department fell in with the idea of transferring heavy bombers from Australia to Burma and suggested, "in view of the urgency of this situation and the necessity for earliest possible action," that Wavell also transfer from Australia the necessary ground crews and supply troops, rather than wait six weeks or more for them to come from the United States. The ABDA Command already had personnel for two groups (the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups) and could expect another (the 43d), soon to sail from the United States. The War Department proposed he should send the 19th Group to Burma. There it could be built up with bombers being flown via the South Atlantic and central Africa, of which thirty-three were then en route. The War Department left it to him to decide whether the depleted American Volunteer Group (operating in Burma under agreement with Chiang Kai-shek) could provide the necessary fighter protection until the arrival of replacements then on the way (a shipment of fifty P-40's due to have arrived at Takoradi, Gold Coast, where they would be assembled and flown to the Far East, and another shipment of thirty pursuit planes that had just sailed for Karachi) or whether the War Department in addition should reassign to Burma "one of the four pursuit groups you have or will have in Australia.76

In spite of this general agreement, plans in the theater waited on events and on decisions from Washington. On 16 February, following the fall of Singapore, General Brett announced, in response to the proposal of the War Department, that he was planning to send Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton to Burma "to prepare for any force which you may organize to meet situation there" and that he would "make effort to send maintenance crews to India and Burma to assist in preparation for possible arrival of combat equipment."77

Brett's plan was to send to Burma or to Calcutta most of the ground units of the 7th Bombardment Group, those of the 51st Pursuit Group (less one squadron) together with Headquarters Squadron of the 35th Pursuit Group, and air base units, all of which he had ordered moved from Melbourne to Fremantle in a convoy of four ships. Besides these units, all told nearly 3,000 troops, the heavy convoy also carried bombs, ammunition, and thirty-seven crated P-40's. This convoy he expected to arrive about the middle of March. He was also making tentative plans to divert to Akyab both the B-17's en route from the United States and those committed to Java, having heard from Colonel Brady in Burma that a squadron of B-17's could operate for a short while from Akyab with British supplies and munitions, maintenance crews, and fighter and antiaircraft protection.78

The convoy finally sailed from Australia on 22 February, but for neither Rangoon


nor Calcutta. It went, instead, to Karachi, on the northwest coast of India, to avoid the rapidly growing danger from Japanese operations in the Bay of Bengal. The unit left behind much of their equipment, and the convoy carried only ten pursuit planes. The Sea Witch with its twenty-seven planes had been diverted to Java, along with the Langley, which Brett had apparently hoped to send to Burma.79

Circumstances also modified the plan for diverting heavy bombers to Burma. Brett's original plan was part of the plan of ABDA headquarters, following the fall of Singapore, to shift major forces from the defense of Java to the defense of Burma.80 The unwillingness of the Australian Government to divert the 7th Australian Division to Burma, the Battle of Sittang Bridge, and, thereafter, the insistence in turn of General Wavell and of the War Department on continued support of Java, cut the ground out from under this plan.81 Brett did send Brereton to India (via Ceylon) on 25 February with two heavy bombers. Four others, salvaged from the final collapse of the air defenses of Java, followed a few days later. These six bombers, together with two others of the thirty-three mentioned by the War Department as en route from the United States via Africa, arrived in time to serve as air transports during the evacuation of southern Burma in early March.82

Air Commitments in Asia

Concurrent with the abortive planning in the theater for the diversion of American air forces to Burma, went the resumption and acceleration of planning in the War Department for building up an air force on the Asiatic mainland with the ultimate objective of bombing Japan. The plans made in 1941 in connection with the American Volunteer Croup had called for one pursuit group and one bomber group. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor the pursuit group of the AVG was already established in Burma. Crews for the bomber group were in Australia, and General Brett was en route to Burma to make preliminary arrangements for the reception of the force.83 after 7 December these commitments had continued to figure in the plans of the Army Air Forces.84 The War Department had undertaken to bring the pursuit group of the AVG to full strength as a unit of the U.S. Army (the 23d Pursuit Group).85 In January the War Department had acted on this commitment by sending out two shipments of pursuit planes, one to Takoradi and the other to Karachi, for the 23d Pursuit


Group.86 The War Department had also begun preparations for bombing Japan. It was premature to plan for achievement of this objective on a continuous basis with a prospect of operational results proportionate to the expense.87 But for the sake of the tonic effect on the American public and the unsettling effect on Japanese plans and dispositions, the Army Air Forces had set up two missions, without provision for replacement, to achieve this feat of arms. One of these was the Halverson Project (HALPRO), a force of twenty-three B-24's, to be sent out late in the spring under Col. Harry A. Halverson, which was to operate from advance bases in China.88 The other project was the Doolittle mission, three squadrons of B-25's under Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle, with the objective of carrying out a carrier-based raid on Tokyo.89

By mid-February it had become very uncertain whether American bombers could operate from China in the near future. The limiting factor was air transport, by which all lend-lease for China was to move, at least for several months.90 After mid-February the conditions under which bombers could operate elsewhere in Asia were rapidly determined. The loss of Singapore disposed of the possibility that an American bomber force operating from Burma might be incorporated under a single Allied command with the air forces in the Southwest Pacific. Within the next week, as it became evident that the loss of Rangoon in turn was but a question of time, the other possibility--that the force might become part of an Allied command in Burma--also disappeared. An air force in Asia would have to operate from India under an American commander directly responsible to the War Department, and it would have to be decided in Washington, rather than in the theater, which of its now entirely distinct missions the force should carry out-the support of Chinese or British operations.

The American commander that was to provide the connecting link between American air operations based on India and those based on China was Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, who was then being sent to China to assume his dual role as commander


of U.S. Army forces in China, Burma, and India, and as chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in his capacity as supreme Allied commander in China. Stilwell's appointment to serve in this dual role, following a month of negotiation, had been formally announced to Chiang Kai-shek on 1 February, and Stilwell's instructions (drafted by himself) had been issued the next day.91

Superficially considered, General Stilwell appeared a natural choice for such an assignment, since he knew the military situation in China better than any other American general. Considered more closely, he appeared to be ill-chosen to represent the Arm, in a zone in which air forces were to be the principal ! and probably the only; American forces engaged and ,strategic bombing was to be the ultimate American military objective, since he was especially suited by experience and inclination to train and command ground forces. His choice also appeared singularly unfortunate in that he would have to deal constantly with matters of high American, Chinese, and British policy and with the men that made high policy, though he himself disliked to do so and--what way more--was unfavorably disposed toward the particular policies and political leaders with whom he would have the most to do. Considered still more closely, however, Stilwell's great knowledge of the Chinese and Japanese armies and his exceptional fitness for training and commanding ground forces gave him unique qualifications to carry out American strategy on the mainland of Asia, since the successful use of Chinese ground forces was the main condition of putting American air forces in position to conduct strategic bombing operations against Japan. There was, moreover, a great advantage, from the point of view of the War Department, in Stilwell's disinclination to be a "political general," since it was an expression of his complementary determination to be a "military general," whose main aim would be to serve rather than to influence the purposes of General Marshall.92

The War Department's plan for establishing an air striking force in India was distinct from the project of diverting bombers from the Southwest Pacific to Burma, but it incorporated the ground crews and service troops that Brett was preparing to send from Australia. On 20 February General Arnold informed General Brett that the War Department intended to utilize these troops in establishing an air force at Bombay that was to consist of one heavy bomber group and one pursuit group. He stated that these units were to be used in Burma only after they had been completely organized. The force would be available to General Stilwell for use in China, and its ultimate objective was long-range bombing of Japan from bases in China.93

Soon thereafter the War Department decided to send General Brereton to India to


command the new force.94 It was designated the Tenth Air Force, with headquarters at Karachi. It would at first be made up of the bomber group and the pursuit group, for which most of the ground personnel were being sent from Australia; the air depot group and miscellaneous service units, which also were to be sent from Australia; and an air force headquarters and headquarters squadron and an air depot group, to be sent from the United States.95 The War Department sent word of the decision to Chungking on 27 February and followed on 28 February with a summary statement of the forces assigned.96 On 2 March the War Department received word from General Brereton by way of Cairo that he had assumed command of the American air force in India then assigned to General Stilwell, and that he would establish his headquarters at Delhi, so as to be near the British authorities on whose cooperation he must so largely depend.97

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Tenth Air Force, and the 3d Air Depot Group embarked on 19 March from Charleston, S. C. along with other units for General Stilwell--the ground echelon of the 23d Pursuit Group, personnel for the 1st Ferrying Group, and miscellaneous service units--all told over 4,000 officers and men.98 A few days later Col. Caleb V. Haynes left with an advance detachment of planes--one B-24, four B-17's, and six C-47's. Besides the five bombers of this flight, the War Department counted on getting to General Brereton twelve B-17's that were out of commission along the air ferry route across Africa and in India. To make up the complement of fifty bombers for the Tenth Air Force, thirty-three other were to be sent "as soon as practicable." There were no pursuit planes scheduled for the Tenth Air Force, aide from the ten that had arrived with the convoy from Fremantle.99

The employment of American air combat forces in Asia--the 23d Pursuit Group, HALPRO, the Doolittle mission, and the Tenth Air Force--was only one part of the program of the A AF, which had three other projects that concerned General 5tilwell and the Chinese. One was the establishment of an air route into China from northeast India, the only means of getting lend-lease aid to China ,and of supporting American bomber operations in China) for several months to come, even on the supposition that northern Burma would be held and the Burma Road reopened. For this purpose the A AF planned to allocate a hundred transports as fast as then became available. A second project was to fly thirty-three A-29's to China, under the command of Lt. Col. Leo H. Dawson. The AA):' hoped to have the planes for the Dawson mission ready to move by the end of March. On arrival in China ,the pilots were to be assigned either to the Tenth Air Force or the 23d Pursuit Group. A third project was the shipment to China of some 250 obsolescent pursuit planes (P-66's and P-43's); 72 had already been


shipped out since January, and another 50 were due for early shipment.100

The program as a whole was insubstantial, involving a far wider dispersion of effort, a much heavier overhead investment, and correspondingly greater initial waste in proportion to the operational results to be achieved than the original program of 1941. The original program of 1941 had envisaged an initial concentration of American air power and supply in Burma, supporting at once British and Chinese operations. American efforts were now to be dispersed across the entire subcontinent of India and could be linked with American effort in China only at a great expense of time, men, and materiel. The War Department was aware of the existence of the difficulty, if not yet of its proportions. On 20 February, when the new program was taking shape, Col. Clayton L. Bissell, who handled it in the General Staff, and who was !o become the senior officer for air operations on General Stilwell's staff, sent the Army Air Forces the following estimate of possible developments

A. Most of above aircraft pills others may be used in India rather than in China. Plan accordingly.

B. Available air Transport may be incapable of supporting China with absolute essentials and may be incapable of maintaining more than a token air force in China until rail and road can carry supplies through.

C. A new India-Burma Theatre may be formed with which the above may be amalgamated or at least integrated.101

The Siberia Project

The one part of the Air Forces' planning for the Far East of which nothing at all came during the early part of 1942 was the planning that had to I do with American air operations in Siberia. The United States Government tried to open negotiations, in the face of the declared Soviet neutrality in the Far East and the dissociation of the British Government from the whole project, by asking the Soviet Government for in formation on air facilities in Siberia, in order to make plans for the delivery of lend lease planes via Alaska.102 The ,War Department had been seeking this information ever since the first discussions, in the summer of 1941, of sending aid to the Soviet Union.103 During the fall of 1941, in planning for early deliveries under the First Moscow Protocol, the Arm has accepted the necessity of shipping planes to overseas delivery points--Basra, Murmansk, and Archangel--from which they would be flown by Soviet flyers to the Soviet fronts or elsewhere.104 But the Army had persisted


in attempts to get information on facilities for air delivery via Alaska and Siberia, through the Harriman mission, through a courier sent from London by General Chaney, and finally, through the State Department, which had instructed the American ambassador, Admiral William H. Standley. to do what he could.105

The failure of these attempts and the affirmation of Soviet neutrality in the war against Japan, made in December 1941, had left it to American officers to adopt any of several views on the matter of future negotiations. One view, presented by Colonel Faymonville, the senior military representative of the Lend-Lease Administration in the Soviet Union, was that a general agreement on strategy was prerequisite to any progress on negotiations over the Alaska-Siberia route.106 Another view, twice presented by the AAF, was that negotiations should be reopened with the proposal to commit an American bomber force to operations against Japan from advance bases in the area of Vladivostok. The AAF first made this proposal just after the ARCADIA Conference, in compliance with a request originating in the State Department for comments on the course to be followed in future negotiations with the Soviet Government.107 The only result at the time was that Mr. Stimson apparently took the matter up with the President informally.108 The Air staff again submitted the proposal in March during the course of a general review initiated by the President "in regard to the position of Great Britain and the United States" in the event of Soviet involvement in the war against Japan.109 As in January, the AAF assumed that the Soviet Union would co-operate as soon as the United States should commit itself to sending a force of long-range bombers to Siberia. In anticipation of favorable Soviet response, the A AF recommended that air units assigned to other theaters should be tentatively reassigned to provide the force.110

General Marshall's plans and operations staff considered the project impracticable in itself and inconsistent with American strategy. A full analysis was written for submission to Marshall and transmission to the joint Staff Planners JPS, to show that of all lines of action open to the United States to help the Soviet Union against Japan:

The most valuable assistance which can be rendered to Russia is to contain Japanese forces, mainly her air force, in the South


Pacific and the sooner our action clearly indicates to Russia that Že shall do this the greater advantage she can gain from that assistance.111

Another study listed the various reasons for considering study AAF project impracticable:

The logistical difficulties, personnel and material losses that would be incurred, lack of adequate facilities in Siberia, inability of Russia to supply vital necessities upon arrival and during operation, and lack of sufficient U.S. shipping facilities available for this purpose preclude the possibility of sending supplies, reinforcements and airplanes to Siberia for combat purposes in the event of war between Japan and Russia.

This study, too, held that "diverting action in the South Pacific" was a "more logical approach to giving aid to Russia" and added that "an offensive against Germany" was "the most logical approach to giving aid to Russia.112

When the joint planning committees (the Joint U.S. Strategic Committee (JUSSC), and the Joint Staff Planners) took up the question, they did riot pass judgment either on the strategic value or on the practicability of the AAF project, but simply pointed, out that a great deal more would have to be known about the Soviet position and facilities in Siberia, and thus reverted to the unanswered primary question of how to get the Soviet Government to give any information or permit an American survey party to gather it.113 On this question, as on the related question of the value and practicability of American operations in Siberia, there was a disagreement between the Air staff, hopeful of Soviet receptiveness, and Marshall's plans and operations officers, who were skeptical of the success of negotiations, at least under existing circumstances. Marshall's advisers were willing to meet with Soviet staff officers and explain to them how, in practice, Soviet distrust must limit the scale and effectiveness of American aid of any kind. But that was all they expected to accomplish, and they were doubtful that the Soviet Government would be receptive to a proposal to hold staff conversations.114

The Army planners believed in any event that the Soviet Government had no incentive


to enter into formal negotiations and also that it would be unwise for the American Government to do so. The, observed that it was not "practicable" to couple lend-lease questions with strategic questions, and that it would be "impossible to restrict the discussions of our own plans to those matters with respect to which we would be willing to disclose Our intentions."115 They expected that any agreement; reached with the Soviet Government in the field of military operations would be on the basis of quid pro quo, and recognized that the United States had not yet tried to deal--and was actually not ready to deal--on this basis with the Soviet Union:

The fact is that it is we who want the information [about Siberian airfields], yet we cannot trade supplies for it. Russia is most anxious to avoid belligerency in eastern Siberia; but it is this sera which interests us. Until we have some concrete offer with which to trade, Stalin is unlikely to talk with us--he is suspicious of our motives and unimpressed by our military effectiveness.116

Colonel Handy made the same point when the question came before the joint Staff' Planners. The Joint U.S. Strategic Committee had suggested that the United States might propose to establish a commercial airline between Alaska and Siberia "for the purpose of carrying supplies and gaining information on the air fields in Siberia."117 This proposal (which had previously been under consideration in the State Department) Colonel Handy brushed aside, characterizing it as "a subterfuge which would not deceive the Russians.' He went on to observe, "we might as well be frank about what we want."118 The JPS concluded that the only way to get information on air facilities in Siberia "would be through a direct agreement between the highest United States and Soviet political authorities." The JPS, therefore, recommended that the JCS request the President "to initiate steps on the political level looking toward a more complete military collaboration between the United States and the U.S.S.R." In case he should succeed, a survey of facilities in Siberia could be made, conversations begun on the staff level, arid "realistic plans" developed.119 On 30 March the JCS sent a memorandum to this effect to the President, who read and returned it without comment.120 Plans and negotiations remained suspended on this note until the late spring of 1942.121

The inconclusive end of these studies could not have been so very unexpected to the Air Forces, and it was obviously welcome to the Army planners. As it was, U.S. forces, in particular U.S. Army Air Forces, had evidently undertaken to do a great deal more than they could carry out


for a long time to come. The belated disorganized movements of U.S. Army forces into the Pacific and the Far East had as yet almost no effect on Japanese operations, but they had already called into question the extent to which the United States would be able and willing to fulfill prior commitments to help the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union against Germany. The War Department planners were dismayed lest the United States, in starting to do everything at once, fail to accomplish even the most necessary tasks, and they had already set themselves to answer the question which, if any, operations against Japan were now to be numbered among the essential missions of the U.S. Army. They were quite sure that it was no longer possible to evade or defer the question and that U.S. Army deployment in the Pacific must he controlled by the requirements of grand strategy.


Table of Contents
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1. Memo, Br CsofS, 22 Dec 41, sub: Amer-Br Strategy, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 2. This is the first version of WW-1, which in the revised form accepted by the American Chiefs (but not submitted to the President and the Prime Minister for approval) acquired the American serial number ABC-4/CS-1.

2. (1) Min, JB mtg, 13 Dec 41, G-3 Regd Does. (2) Memo, CofS for Admiral Stark, 18 Dec 41, no sub, Tab Misc, Book 1, Exec 8. (3) Notes by G.C.M. [Marshall], 23 Dec 41, sub: Notes of Mtg at White House with President and Br Prime Minister Presiding, WPD 4402-136. For the statement of the Soviet Government's position, see above, p. 86.

3. For the War Department's interest in this subject, from Pearl Harbor through the ARCADIA Conference, see: (1) WPD draft memo [SW for President], 13 Dec 41, sub: Aid to Russia, WPD 4557-29; (2) memo for rcd, Maj Gailey, 24 Dec 41, WPD 4557-29: (3) memo, G-2 for WPD, 1 Jan 42, no sub, WPD 4557-10 (the memorandum discusses British conferences with Marshal Stalin and Foreign Commissar Molotov and a speech made, off the record, by Ambassador Litvinov); (4) memo, Ridgway for Marshall (through Gen Gerow), 8 Jan 42, sub: Conf with Vice President, Tab Misc, Book 2, Exec 8; and (5) memo, Col Bissell for Col Handy, 10 Jan 42, no sub, WPD 4557-43.

4. Memo, Gen Arnold for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Airplane Reqmts for AAF, Tab Misc, Book 1, Exec 8.

5. See for example, memo, G-2 for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Russian Present Attitude in the War, WPD 4557-35. This memorandum includes a paraphrase of a message from the American ambassador in London, giving remarks made by Sir Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after a conference with Marshal Stalin. The memorandum stated: "His [Stalin's] attitude about the Far East is perfectly loyal, and he thought he would be able to help there in the Spring. However, at the moment he doesn't want to provoke Japan. Therefore Eden thought it would be very unwise to speak to him about air bases for the United States in Siberia."

6. (1) Notes cited n. 2 (3). (2) Min, 1st mtg CsofS Conf, 24 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1.

7. See various drafts of WW.-1 (ABC-4/CS-1) under Tab K, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 2.

8. Ibid.

9. Annexes to ABC:-4/3, 28 Dec 41, title: Supporting Measures for SW Pacific (Far East and Adjacent Regions), ABC: 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1. This report from the joint Planning Committee was adopted by the Chiefs on 31 December. As presented, it born the British serial WW (JPC) 3; as adopted, the serial WW-4.

10. ABC- 4/3, 31 Dec 41. The principal changes made in the planners' draft resolution contained in ABC-4/3, 28 Dec 41 ) were the addition of "land" forces to paragraph (a) on defense of the Malay Barrier, and of "and to the defense of India" to paragraph (b).

11. For the declaration of British policy at the conference, see: (1) notes cited n. 2 (3); (2) conf in Stark's Off, 27 Dec 41, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs; (1-28-42) (SS); and (3) min cited n. 6 (2).

Cf. Churchill, Grand Alliance. He has omitted (p. 668) the remarks dealing with Singapore in his original paper for the President on the war against Japan. The volume includes (p. 668) a reprint of a message of 25 December 1941 to Prime Minister Curtin of Australia, expressing Churchill's hope and determination to hold Singapore for scene time. In his concluding estimate of 10 January for his Chiefs of Staff (p. 703) he indicated that hr still hoped that Singapore would hold out longer than any other Allied position north of Australia. In a later volume Churchill explains that, assuming Singapore Island had been fortified against attack from the mainland, he expected a siege to last at least two months. (Hinge of Fate, pp. 47 ff.) This is entirely credible, though at some damage to American illusions about the close, effective liaison between British political leaders and their military staffs.

12. The directive to the planners began with the qualification: "Until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area is solved. . . . The planners made their recommendations on dispositions, and the Chiefs adopted them, subject to this qualification. (See ABC-4/3, 31 Dec 41.)

13. (1) "ABDACOM Directive to Supreme Comdr, dated 3 January 1942, App A to "ABDACOM--An Official Account of Events in the South-West Pacific Command, January-February 1942 (New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1942). (2) ABC-4/5, 10 Jan 42, title: Directive to Supreme Comdr in ABDA Area, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1. The 10 January version of the directive is identical with the one of a January, except for modifications with respect to the manner in which the Allied governments involved would exercise "higher direction" over the ABDA Command.

14. For Marshall's introduction of the proposal, see: (1) min, 2d mtg CsofS Conf, 25 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1; and (2) memo for file, Eisenhower, 28 Dec 41, sub: Notes Taken at Jt Conf of CsofS on Afternoon, Dec 25, in envelope (Data and memos on mtg at White House . . .), with WPD 4402-136.

15. Min, 4th mtg CsofS Conf, 27 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41) 1.

16. The remarks on Wavell appear in conference cited in n. 11 (2), on the choice of Wavell, compare the remark of Hopkins to the Prime Minister: "Don't be in a hurry to turn down the proposal the President is going to make to you before you know who is the man we have mind." (Churchill, Grand Alliance, n. 673.)

17. Annex 2, title: Higher Direction of War in ABDA Area, to ABC-4/5, cited n. 13 (2). It was agreed that thereafter the term "Combined" would be used to refer to British-American collaboration.

18. For these transactions, see: (1) min and memo for file cited n. 14; (2) conf at White House, 1630, 26 Dec 41, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs (1-28-42) (SS): and (3) conf cited n. 11 (2). See also Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 439-78, and Churchill, Grand Alliance, pp. 644-706.

19. Min cited n. 15. The draft proposed by Marshall is appended as Annex I (U.S. ser ABC-4/C/S USA). Eisenhower drafted the proposed letter of instructions. A draft with corrections in his hand and the hand of Marshall is among those filed with Tab ABDACOM, Book 1 Exec 8.

20. Marshall did press and, over Churchill's initial objection, won the point that Wavell should control naval dispositions, and thus gave meaning to Wavell's very limited authority over the disposition of reinforcements. (See conf at White House, 1145, 28 Dec 41, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs (1-28-42) (SS).) For a statement of the responsibilities and limitations on Wavell's authority as contained in his directive, see ABC-4/5, cited n. 13 (2).

21. Admiral King summarized and explained his proposal to British and American colleagues at their meeting of 29 December. (Min, 5th mtg CsofS Conf, 29 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41)).

22. Informal memo, G.C.M. [Marshall] for Gerow, 29 Dec 41, Tab Collab, Book 1, Exec 8.

23. Annex I to min cited n. 21.

24. (1) Min cited n. 21. (2) Their memorandum to the President to this effect is in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 468.

25. Paper, sub: Proposed Method of Handling Matters Concerning SW Pacific Theatre, incl with note, Hopkins to Betty [Stark], 30 Dec 41. Copies of the note and the inclosed draft were circulated as Annex I to min, 6th mtg CsofS Conf, 30 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1. The original redraft, with the President's corrections in his hand, is reproduced in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 468.

26. Memo, CofS, CNO, COMINCH, and CAAF for President, 30 Dec 41, sub: Higher Direction of War in ABDA Area, Annex I, Part II, min cited n. 25. An unsigned note in pencil on the bottom of a copy (filed under Tab F, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 2), states that the memorandum was signed and sent to the President on the afternoon of 31 December. The modified proposal of the Chiefs of Staff was circulated as Annex I, Part II, min cited n. 25.

27. (1) Min, 7th mtg CsofS Conf, 31 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1. (2) Rcd of mtg at White House, 1830, 1 Jan 42, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs (1 -28-42) (SS).

In its final approval form--not yet accepted by the Netherlands and Australian Government--the provision for "higher direction" of the ABDA Command was printed and circulated on 10 January. (See n. 13, above).

28. Part 1 of msg, Wavell for Br CsofS [ABDACOM to WO], 11 Jan 42, ABDACOM 9, Vol I, Item 1i, Exec 2. Wavell's permanent headquarters was to be set up at Lembang (Java) .

29. ABC-4/CS-3. 10 Jan 42, title: Assumption of Comd by Gen Wavell, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1.

30. Msg, Wavell to . . . Br Army Stf, Washington, for CsofS . . . , 14 Jan 42, ABDACOM 48, WPD 4639-19. For brief accounts of how the establishment of the ABDA Command affected the Philippines and Burma, see: (1) Morton Fall of the Philippines, and (2) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. II.

31. Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsofS, 7 Feb 42, ABDA 00884, A.W. 7, OPD file of msgs to and from ABDA (hereafter cited as OPD ABDA Msg File).

32. Msg WO to Br Army Stf, Washington, 12 Feb 42, 72057, OPD ABDA Msg File.

33. Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsofS, 13 Feb 42, ABDACOM 01156, CCOS 7, OPD ABDA Msg File.

34. Msg, Wavell to CIGS and Prime Minister, 16 Feb 42, ABDA 01288, OPD ABDA Msg File. Part of Wavell's message is quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 140-41.

35. (1) Memo W PD for CofS, 11 Jan 42 no sub, Tab Misc, Book 2, Exec 8. (2) Memo, WPD for Hoard of Economic Warfare, 17 Jan 42, sub: Australia as Base of Supplies and Opns, WPD 4630-41.

36. Draft memo, D.E. [Eisenhower] for CofS, n.d., sub: WD Contl of Australian Opns, Item 27, Exec 10. This penciled draft, in General Eisenhower's hand, was written some tune in late January or early February 1942. It is filed with an extremely interesting personal letter to Eisenhower and strategic estimate for WPD from Lt. Col. Willard G. Wyman, and copies of later papers of Eisenhower on grand strategy.

37. See msg, Gen Wavell to Lt Gen V.A.H. Sturdee (Chief, Australian Army Gen Stf), 31 Jan 42, ABDACOM 00576, OPD ABDA Msg File, for plans to send the 148th Field Artillery Regiment (minus one battalion) to Timor. The convoy with reinforcements for Timor, escorted by the U.S. cruiser Houston and the destroyer Peary, finally set out on 15 February, but had to turn back because of heavy air attacks. (Msg, Wavell to Marshall, 16 Feb 42, ABDACOM 01308, OPD ABDA Msg File.)

Wavell assigned the 147th Field Artillery Regiment to Port Darwin and requested that it should be left there, even though it involved a change in the plans of the War Department, which had intended to use one of the regiments in General Patch's task force. The War Department agreed to do so. ((1) Msg, Wavell to Marshall, 14 Feb 42, ABDA 0 1173, Vol I, Item 1i, Exec 2. (2) Msg, Marshall to Wavell, 14 Feb 42, . 130, WPD Msg File 9, 890.)

38. (1) Ltr, CofS to Admiral King, 20 Jan 42, sub: Loading of Transports, WPD 3718-19. (2) Unused memo, WPD for TAG, 19 Jan 42, sub: Def of New Caledonia, WPD 3718-14. (3) Memo, CofS for Dill [11 Feb 42), no sub, WPD 3718-25.

39. Memo for rcd, Gen Crawford, 14 Feb 42, WPD 4630-66.

40. Unused memo, WPD for CofS [14] Feb 42, sub: Reinforcements for "X" WPD 4630-66. The proposed shipment also included two battalions of light artillery for New Caledonia, so as to leave General Wavell both field artillery regiments in Australia.

41. Memo, G-3 for TAG, 15 Feb 42, sub: Mvmt Orders, Shipments 4656 and 6924, AG 370.5 (2-1542), 1. See memo for rcd on original.

42. Informal memo, G.C.M. [Marshall] for Eisenhower, 14 Feb 42, WPD 4630-64.

43. Memo, G-4 for CofS, 14 Feb 42, no sub, WPD 4630-65.

44. (1) Min, War Council, 16 Feb 42, WDCSA, SW Confs. (2) Memo, WPD for G-3, 17 Feb 42, sub: Mvmt of Trs to SUMAC, WPD 4630-66. (3) D/F, WPD for G-3, 19 Feb 42, same sub, WPD 4630-70.

45. (1) Msg, Br Admiralty to CCS, 18 Feb 42, COS (W) 58. This message contained the recommendations of the Pacific War Council that had been set up in London. (2) Msg, CCS to Wavell, 20 Feb 42, DBA 19. Both in OPD ABDA Msg File. According to Churchill (Hinge of Fate, p. 157), the United States had suggested that the 6th and 9th Australian Divisions also be diverted to Burma. From what follows in the present text, it would appear that the suggestion came rather from Wavell and Dill. It is clear that as Churchill says, he himself did not endorse the suggestion.

46. Msg, Australian Prime Minister to Br Prime Minister, 21 Feb 42, incl with msg, Australian Prime Minister to President, 21 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File. The message to the President was in answer to one from him to the Australian Prime Minister of 20 February 42, cited below, n. 48.

47. For views of Br Chiefs, see msg, Br CsofS to Jt Stf Miss, 21 Feb 42, COS (W) 70, OPD ABDA Msg File.

48. Msg, President to Curtin, 20 Feb 42, No. 330, OPD ABDA Msg File.

49. For War Department policy on allocations of aircraft between ABDA Command and the RAAF in early February, see: (1) msg, Marshall to Wavell for Brett, 5 Feb 42, 10. 77, Tab ABDA, Book 3, Exec 8: (2) memo WPD for TAG, 6 Feb 42, sub: Far Eastern Sit !this contained msg for Maj Gen Julian F. Barnes; and (3) memo WPD for TAG, 6 Feb 42, same sub (this contained a paraphrase for General Wavell of the message sent to Barnes. Last two in Tab ABDA, U.S. Reps, Book 3,Exec 8.

50. Memo [WPD] for CofS, 6 Feb 42, sub: Subs for Possible Discussion Other Than Those Mentioned by You on Tel, Tab Misc, Book 3, Exec 8. This figure corresponds to the following breakdown by shipments:

Number     Ship
18   Bloemfontein (Pensacola convoy)
55   Polk
67   Mormacsum
50   Coolidge and Mariposa (12 Jan convoy)
111   Hammondsport

The AAF history gives a lower figure, which apparently includes only planes unloaded in Western Australia during January. (Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 374.)

51. For the program initiated in mid-December, see above, Ch. IV. For the totals allocated by the end of December, see: (1) Annex I, min, 2d mtg CsofS Conf, 25 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1; (2) memo, Col Edgar P. Sorensen (for CofAS ) for ACofS W PD, 27 Dec 41, sub: Sum of Aircraft Currently Assigned to or Destined for "X," WPD 4630-6 : and (3) table annexed to ABC-4/3, 31 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1.

52. For the totals allocated during January and February, see WPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).

53. On 3 February the AAF announced projected shipments during the month, including 19 P-40's and 212 P-39's (which presumably included P-400's). (WPD Daily Sum, 3-4 Feb entry, copy in Exec 7.) The shipments announced by AAF on 23 February as then en route actually exceeded these totals. They included 259 P-39's and 48 P-40's. (WPD Daily Sum, 23-24 Feb entry.)

54. ABC-4/5, 10 Jan 42, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1.

55. For this enterprise, see Craven and Cate, AAF 1, pp. 384-86.

56. Msg, Wavell to CCS, 30 Jan 42, ABDA 00522, OPD ABDA Msg File.

57. (1) Msg, ABDACOM Info 8, 31 Jan 42, ABDA 00606. (2) Msg, ABDACOM Info 9, 1 Feb 42, ABDA 00654. (3) Msg, ABDACOM Info 11, 3 Feb 42. All in Vol I, Item 1i, Exec 2. (4) Msg, Wavell to Br CsofS and CCS, 3 Feb 42, ABDA 00717. (5) Msg, ABDACOM Info 12, 4 Feb 42, ABDA 00757. (6) Msg, ABDACOM Info 13, 5 Feb 42, ABDA 00799. Last three in OPD ABDA Msg File. The message of 5 February reports the attack mentioned in the text. For an account of the attack on Bali, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 386-87.

58. For a documented, detailed account, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 387-88, 393.

59. Msg, CCS to Wavell, 4 Feb 42, DBA 9, OPD ABDA Msg File. Owing, apparently, to an error in transmission, Wavell understood that the United States would furnish a carrier, and the CCS had to send a second message to correct the mistake. See: (1) msg, Wavell to CCS, 9 Feb 42, ABDA 00945: (2) msg, CCS to Wavell, 12 Feb 42, DBA 15; and (3) msg, Wavell to CCS, 16 Feb 42, ABDA 01316. All three in OPD ABDA Msg File.

60. Msg cited n. 59 (1) .

61. Msg, Wavell to CCS, 19 Feb 42, ABDA 01679, repeated as 01987, CCOS 15, OPD ABDA Msg File.

For an exchange of messages concerning supply by the Indomitable, see: (1) msg, Br CsofS to CCS, 18 Feb 42, COS (W) 58; (2) msg, Wavell to Br CsofS and CCS, 18 Feb 42, ABDA 01581, CCOS 13: and (3) msg, Br CsofS to Wavell (SWP) 23, repeated to Br Jt Stf Miss in Washington, 19 Feb 42. All three in OPD ABDA Msg File.

62. Msg, CCS to Wavell, 20 Feb 42, DBA 19, OPD ABDA Msg File.

63. Both this paragraph of instructions (paragraph 1 of the above cited message) and the quoted authorization to commit naval forces and American planes to Java (paragraph 2 of the above cited message) were adopted from a message from London containing the recommendations of the Pacific War Council. (See msg cited n. 61 (1).)

The CCS soon liberalized the instructions and made their application even clearer. See: (1) msg, CCS to Wavell, 21 Feb 42, DBA 20; (2) msg, Br, Jt Stf Miss to Br CsofS, 21 Feb 42, JSM 58; and (3) msg, CCS to Wavell, 22 Feb 42, DBA 22. All three in OPD ABDA Msg File.

64. Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsofS, 21 Feb 42, ABDA 01864, COOS 16, OPD ABDA Msg File. He stated: "No more fighters can reach from east and consignment from INDOMITABLE cannot arrive in time. Reinforcements of heavy American bombers from India has been stopped from Washington and would in any case have been insufficient."

65. Msg, Wavell to CCS, 22 Feb 42, ABDA 01996, CCOS 17, OPD ABDA Msg File. The Langley sailed the same day.

It was unfortunate that the wording of the paragraph of instructions in DBA 19 (cited n. 62), was slightly changed from the recommendation on which it was modeled, drawn up by the Pacific War Council (in COS (W) 58, cited n. 61(1)). The recommendations of the Pacific War Council were repeated to Wavell (as 71398 MO 1), in spite of the attempt of the CCS to forestall this action. Wavell may haw inferred from the changes in wording that the instructions of the CCS did not apply simply to the problem of evacuating forces from Java.

66. Msg, Wavell to Br CsofS and CCS, 22 Feb 42, ABDA 02047, A.W. 12, OPD ABDA Msg File.

67. Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsofS 22 Feb 42, ABDA 02076, CCOS 19, OPD ABDA Msg File.

68. Ibid. This and other messages indicate how great the pressure was on Wavell to do something to placate authorities in the Netherlands Indies, including Dr. H. J. van Mook, the lieutenant governor, who had just returned from the United Stags. They continued to insist that the situation in Java was not irretrievable. See, for example: (1) msg, Lt Gov van Mook to Gen Marshall, 22 Feb 42, no number; (2) msg, Dutch CinC Java to Netherlands Govt in London, quoted in full in msg, Br CofS to Jt Stf Miss, 24 Feb 42, W. 83; (3) msg, Br CsofS to Jt Stf Miss, 25 Feb 42, COS (W) 82: and (4) msg, Lt Gen H. ter Poorten to Gen Marshall, 28 Feb 42, no number. All four in OPD ABDA Msg File.

69. (1) Msg, Marshall to Brett [as CG USAFIA], 25 Feb 42, No. 424, AG 381 (11-27-41), 2-C. (2) Memo, WPD for TAG [23] Feb 42, sub: Asgmt of Gen Brett to Comd U.S. Trs in Australia, Tab ABDA U.S. Reps, Book 4, Exec 8. Notation on this memo states msg was sent from Marshall to Brett on 23 Feb, as No. 196.

70. Msg, Marshall to Brett, 1 Mar 42, . 478, WPD Msg File 10, 31. On 28 February Brett replied to the War Department message of 25 February (No 424) that he considered further shipments of pursuit planes "unwarranted wastage." For Brett's message of the 28th; (No. 391) to which the War Department referred in the message of 1 March, see OPD ABDA Msg File. The British ship Athene, also under orders to take planes to Java, was recalled to Melbourne. (Msg, Brett to TAG, 4 Mar 42, No. 498, WPD Msg File 10, 310.)

71. See Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 387-92, 397-99, 411.

72. Msg, Brett to Marshall, 7 Feb 42, ABDA 231, Tab ABDA, U.S. Reps, Book 3, Exec 8.

73. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. II.

74. Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsofS, 26 Jan 42, ABDA 00357, OPD ABDA Msg File.

75. Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsofS, 7 Feb 42, ABDA 00884, A.W. 7, OPD ABDA Msg File.

76. Msg, Marshall to Wavell, 1 I Feb 42, No. 116, AG 381 (11-27-41), 2-B. The message was specifically in response to messages from Brett of 29 January (ABDA 108) and 7 February (ABDA 231).

77. Msg, Brett to Marshall, 16 Feb 42, ABDA 372, AGWAR 17, OPD ABDA Msg File. Brett referred to the message of 11 February (No 116, cited n. 76) from the War Department and the earlier messages from him referred to therein.

78. Msg, Brett to WD, 18 Feb 42, ABDA 448A. Vol IA, Item 1i, Exec 2.

79. For the component parts of the convoy, see msg, Butt to Arnold, 2 Feb 42, No. 339, Vol IA, Item 1i, Exec 2.

80. See (1) msg, Wavell to CIGS and Prime Minister, 16 Feb 42, ABDA 01288, OPD ABDA Msg File, and (2) msg cited n, 78.

81. Msg, AMMISCA (Chungking) to TAG, 23 Feb 42, No.307, Vol IA, Item 1i, Exec 2. This transmitted the report from Brady, who was thin in Calcutta, that Brett had directed "no definite plans be made to employ B-17 planes in Burma or China in immediate future because of military situation in Java."

82. Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 395-96, 493.

83. For detailed memoirs of the story of the AVG through 7 December 1941, see Claire L. Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), Chs. VII, IX.

84. Memo, Gen Arnold for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Airplane Reqmts for AAF, Tab Misc, Book 1, Exec 8.

85. (1) WD msgs to Gen Magruder under Tab China, Book 2, Exec 8. (2) Memo [U.S. CsofS] for Br CsofS, 8 Jan 42, sub: Immediate Assistance to China, ABC 4/CS 2, Tab J, ABC: 337 ARCADIA 124 Dec 41), 2.

86. These are the shipments mentioned above in the message to Wavell of 11 February (cited n. 76). The date on which action was initiated was 9 January, and it was then decided that AAF would "furnish air support to the Chinese Government in the China Theater." (See WPD Daily Sum, 9 Jan entry, copy in Exec 7.)

87. During the ARCADIA Conference the Chiefs mentioned once, vaguely and briefly, the project of sending heavy bombers-General Arnold declared that it would not be worth sending less than fifty to bomb the Japanese home islands from advance bases in China. ((1) Min, 1st mtg CsofS Conf, 24 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1. (2) "Notes on China" [Jan 42], Item 17, Exec 10.)

88. For a brief history of HALPRO, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 341-42.

89. (1) The Doolittle raid answered the long-held wishes of the President. See the President's directive to the Navy, as reported in memo, CofS for Gen Gerow, 17 Jan 41, sub: White House Conf, Thursday Jan 16, 1941, WPD 4175-18. (2) The execution of such a raid was also recommended by the Pacific War Council in London after the fall of Singapore. See msg, Br CsofS to CCS, 18 Feb 42, COS (W) 58, OPD ABDA Msg File.

For the history of the Doolittle mission, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 438-44, and Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 389-98. Both rely heavily on a manuscript history of the raid by S.L.A. Marshall in OCMH Files.
[Additional reports and histories are available on HyperWar.]

90. (1) Directive memo, Col John Y. York, Jr. (by direction of CofAS) for AAF, 11 Feb 42, sub: Experiments with Gasoline for China Theater, Tab 10. (2) Memo, Col Clayton L. Bissell for CAAF (Alto Maj Gen Millard F. Harmony, 18 Feb 42, sub: Chinese Project, Tab 4. (3) Memo, Col. Nathan F. Twining (for CofAS) for Col Howard A. Craig (Plans Div), 1 Apr 42, sub: HALPRO, Tab 11. All three in OPD China Green Book, OCMH Files. This file was compiled by Lt. Col. Thomas S. Timberman of OPD.

91. (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Magruder for Generalissimo, 1 Feb 42, 10. 167. (2) Ltr of instns, CofS to Gen Stilwell [2 Feb 42], sub: Instns as U.S. Army Rep in China. Both in WPD 4389-64. For a full account of the negotiations, which began at the end of December 1941, see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. II.

92. Some such review of Stilwell's qualifications seems to have gone on during the ARCADIA Conference, when the War Department was starting to make plans and to negotiate with the Chinese Government for the appointment of a senior American officer to go to China. (See Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. II.)

93. Msg, Arnold to Brett, 20 Feb 42, No. 178, WPD Msg File, 1.

94. (1) Msg, Brett to TAG, 21 Feb 42, ABDA 492. (2) Msg, Arnold to Brett, 24 Feb 42, . 409. Both in AG 381 (11-27-41), 2C.

95. Memo, AAF [Col Harold L. George for Gen Arnold] for CofS, 24 Feb 42, sub: Estab of an Amer Air Force in India, OPD China Green Book, OCMH Files.

96. (1) Msg, Marshall to AMMISCA, 25 Feb 42, . 228, AG 381(11-27-41, 2C;. (2) Msg, Marshall to Stilwell (AMMISCA) 28 Feb 42, No. 239, WPD Msg File 10, 40.

97. Msg, Brereton to Arnold, 2 Mar 42, AMSEG 516, WPD Msg File 10, 375.

98. Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 494.

99. Msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 20 Mar 42, No. 308, WPD Msg File 14, 2217.

100. For the program as a whole, see: (1) memo, Col Bissell for CAAF (Attn Gen Harmon), 18 Feb 42, sub: Chinese Project, Tab 3: (2) chart, title: China Aviation Project, forwarded with memo, Col Bissell for Gen Arnold, 20 Feb 42, no sub, Tab 3: (3) memo [Col Bissell] for Gen Harmon, n.d., sub: Chinese Project (this memo refers to and modifies memo of 18 Feb cited above), Tab 3; and (4) memo, Col Twining (for CofAS) for Dir War Orgn and Movmts, 14 Mar 42, sub: Pilot Replacements for China Theater, Tab 1. All four in OPD China Green Book, OCMH Files.

101. Chart cited n. 100 (2), copy filed Tab 3, OPD China Green Book, OCMH Files.

102. For the Soviet declaration of neutrality, see above, Ch. IV. See also memo, AAF [Asst SAS] for CofS, 16 Jan 42, sub: Siberian Air Bases, WPD 4557-43.

103. Soviet representatives then rejected the proposal as impracticable. See memo, Lt Col George C. MacDonald for Robert A. Lovett [ASW for Air], 5 Aug 41, no sub, WPD 4557-1.

104. See (1) Extract of Rpt of Sp Miss to USSR on Allocation of Aircraft from U.K. and U.S. Pdn, WPD 4557-18; (2) study, 2 Nov 41, OCAC, sub: Plan for Delivery of Airplanes to Russia, Air AG 452.1 Russia (45); and (3) ltr, SW to Secy State [22 Nov 41], no sub, WPD 4557-26.

105. (1) Memo, AAF [SAS] for WPD, 28 Oct 41, sub: Airport Info, Nome-Moscow. (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 29 Oct 41, sub: Airport Info, Russia. (3) Ltr, SW to Secy State, 31 Oct 41, no sub. (4) Memo, WPD for CofS, 8 Nov 41, sub: Airport Info, Russia. All four in WPD 4557-15.

106. Memo, G-2 for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Russian Present Attitude in War, WPD 4557-35. This included a paraphrase of a message from Faymonville.

107. Memo, AAF for CofS, 17 Jan 42, sub: Siberian Air Bases, and ltr [SW for President], 14 Jan 42, both in WPD 4557-43. For the whole transaction, see: (1) memo, Col Ridgway for Chief of Plans Gp, WPD, 9 Jan 42,sub: Proposed Air Serv to Siberia via Alaska, and (2) memo, WPD for Orme Wilson [Ln Off, State Dept], 27 Jan 42, sub: Air Route to Siberia via Alaska, both in WPD 4557-43.

108. See memo cited n. 107 (2).

109. For initiation of this review, see: (1) memo, President for Stark and Marshall, 4 Mar 42 (circulated as JCS 16, 6 Mar 42, title: U.N. Action in Case of War Between Russia and Japan), and (2) memo, CofS for President, 5 Mar 42, sub: War Between Russia and Japan, both in OPD 380.3, 2.)

110. Memo, CofAS for WPD, 8 Mar 42, sub: Assistance to Russia in Event of Russian-Japanese Hostilities, OPD 380.3, 2. To encourage co-operation the AAF also suggested that military relations with the Soviet Union should be put on the same basis as military relations with Great Britain. (This memo was submitted in response to memo, WPD for CAAF, 7 Mar 42, same sub, OPD 380.3, 2.)

111. WPD study, 8 Mar 42, sub: An Analysis of Lines of Action Open to U.S. for Rendition of Assistance to Russia in Event of Hostilities Between Russia and Japan in Spring of 1942, incl with memo, WPD for CofS [8 Mar 42], sub cited n. 110. There is no indication that the study left the Strategy Section, where it was prepared, although there is a forwarding memo, Lt Col R.H. Givens, Jr., for ACofS WPD [7] Mar 42, sub cited n. 110. Both items with JCS 16 in ABC 381 (1-23-42).

112. Memo, Capt John H. Caughey for Gen Eisenhower, 11 Mar 42, sub cited n. 111, with JPS 19/D in ABC 381 (1-23-42). Caughey was a member of the Combined Subjects Section, S&P Group, WPD.

113. The JCS referred the problem to the JPS (see min, 5th mtg JCS, 9 Mar 42) in JPS 19/D, 10 Mar 42. The JPS referred it to the JUSSC (see min, 4th mtg JPS, 11 Mar 42), in JPS 19/1D, 12 Mar 42. The JUSSC study is JPS 19; 2, 20 Mar 42, title cited n. 109(1). The JPS discussed this paper in their 7th meeting (21 March) and their 8th meeting (25 March), and at the latter meeting Admiral Turner was directed to draw up a paper for the JCS. The paper, as drafted by Turner, is incl with memo, Turner for JPS, 28 Mar 42, sub: U.N. Action in Case of War Between Russia and Japan, with JPS 19/D in ABC 381 (1-23-42). (The paper, as circulated to the JCS, is JCS 16/1, 29 Mar 42.)

114. The question of staff conversations was raised by G-2. See memo, G-2 for CofS (through WPD), 16 Feb 42, sub: Stf Confs with Soviet Mil Authorities, OPD 400.3295 Russia, 1. For an alternative proposal, see memo, Brig Gen Henry S. Aurand for Gen Eisenhower, 2 Mar 42, sub: G-2 Study . . ., OPD 400.3295 Russia, 1. The WPD response is given in: (1) memo, no sig, 25 Mar 42, no sub, OPD 400.3295 Russia, 1; (2) notes, H. [Col Handy] for Gen Crawford, n.d., atchd to above cited memo; and (3) min, 7th mtg JPs, 21 Mar 42.

115. Memo, OPD for G- 2, 25 Mar 42, sub: G-2 Study on Stf Confs with Soviet Mil Authorities, OPD 400.3295 Russia, 1.

116. Memo cited n. 114 (1).

117. JPS 192 cited n. 113.

118. (1) Min cited n. 114 (3). (2) See D/F, WPD for CofAAF, 23 Feb 42, sub: Air Route Between U.S. and Soviet Union by Way of Alaska, WPD 457-43. This D/F transmitted a letter from the Assistant Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, 18 February 1942, asking for suggestions on a memorandum then being drafted for transmission to the Soviet Government with reference to the establishment of a commercial airline between Alaska and Siberia. (See also memo for rcd on D/F. No copy of the letter itself is in this file.)

119. JCS 16/1, 29 Mar 42, title: U. N. Action . . .

120. Files consulted do not contain a copy of the memorandum. Its tenor is clear from a summary given in JCS 16/2, 19 Jun 42, title: U.S. Aid to Russia in Case of Attack by Japan.

121. The JCS 16 series remained on the JCS agenda during the rest of 1942 and was taken up again in December. See ruin, 44th mfg JCS, 1 Dec 42. For the negotiations and plans during the second half of 1942, see below, Ch. XV.

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