Chapter VII
Army Deployment in the Pacific and Grand Stratetgy
January-March 1942

The collapse of the ABDA Command and the continued movement of American troops into the South and southwest Pacific raised in acute form the great question of strategy that had been deferred by the ARCADIA Conference--the relation between plans for U.S. Army deployment in the Pacific and plans for U.S. Army deployment in the Atlantic. Of some 132,000 Army troops that embarked for overseas destinations front the beginning of 1942 through the middle of March, only about 20,000 sailed for Iceland and Northern Ireland. During the same period over 90,000 left for stations along the "line" Hawaii--Australia.1 Still other commitments to the Pacific remained to be fulfilled. To set a limit to future movements of Army forces into the Pacific and find a basis for increasing the rate at which Army forces would he moved across the Atlantic became, during February and March, the chief concern of General, Marshall and his adviser on the War Department staff, and the focus of their discussion of future plans with the, Army Air Forces and the Navy.

Army Deployment in the Atlantic
January-February 1942

During the weeks following the ARCADIA Conference the movement of U.S. Army forces in the Atlantic went forward very slowly. As agreed at the conference, the first convoys for Northern Ireland and Iceland were reduced, only 4,500 troops of the 34th Division being in the first contingent that sailed for Northern Ireland on 15 January. At the same time, 1,900 troops embarked for Iceland.2

The next convoy for Northern Ireland was to sail about 10 February with approximately


15,000 troops in six: British returning liners, their equipment in fifteen cargo ships. The search for ships for these convoys began almost in immediately after the first contingent of troops for Northern Ireland had left the United States. In the latter part of January 1942, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of staff (CCS) discussed a proposal for using U.S. combat-loaded ships and accompanying cargo vessels for one movement of Army troops to MAGNET in early February.3 By 25 January it had become evident that it would be impossible to provide sufficient cargo ships for thin move from either the American or British sources. The planers therefore proposed that instead of British liners, which had little or no cargo capacity. U.S. Navy combat-loaded transports and accompanying cargo vessels allocated to the U.S. amphibious force be employed for one trip. The planners recognized that this proposal had certain military disadvantages. Since the ships would be gone for five weeks, this plan would delay possible U.S. participation in a North African operation until 1 April; it would prevent the U.S. amphibious force from being employed on any other landing operation during that period; and it would mean the temporary suspension of amphibious training. It would be politically unwise, however, to suspend further movements to Northern Ireland during February, and for this reason planners recommended using the Navy combat-loaded ships in spite of the military disadvantages.4

This plan was approved by the President and Prime Minister and arrangements were made for its execution.5 At the same time the Chief of Staff stated that he wished the planned movement of 4,179 men to Iceland to be carried out and 800 additional men to be sent there in a combat-loaded ship in the same convoy, provided housing was available.6 The delay caused by the lack of British escort vessels postponed the sailing of the second INDIGO-MAGNET convoy from 10 February to 18 February, when 5,200 troops sailed for Iceland and 9,000 for Northern Ireland.7

Deployment to the smaller Atlantic bases was largely neglected during this period. The Army began ordering contingents of no more than a few hundred men at a time to islands in the Caribbean, to Bermuda, and to Newfoundland. At the same time detachment, of the Marine Corps were sent to guard air bases in northeast Brazil.8

Deployment Hawaii--Australia
January-March 1942

The main body of Army troops moved from January through March went to the Pacific, most of them to Australia and New Caledonia. During January two convoys and the Navy seatrain Hammondsport sailed for the Southwest Pacific from San


Francisco, and one large convoy sailed from New York. In mid-February the Queen Mary sailed from Boston and the Monterey and Matsonia from San Francisco. Early in March another large convoy sailed from New York, followed a week later by the Queen Elizabeth sailing from San Francisco and, after the middle of the month, by a convoy from San Francisco. These shipments to the Southwest Pacific amounted to about 79,000 troops, nearly four times the number of American troop, that left during the same period to make the much shorter voyage across the North Atlantic.9

Of these 79,000, about 57,000 were for Australia, 24,500 of whom were still en route at the end of March. Of those that had reached Australia by that time--altogether about 37,000, including those that had embarked in December aboard the Pensacola convoy and the Poll; as many as 2,000 were dead or missing (including the 2d Battalion, 131st Field Artillery Regiment, lost in Java), and some 3,000 had been sent to the Tenth Air Force, leaving the strength then present in Australia at about 32,000.10

Except for the third and last contingent of the 41st Division and a tank destroyer battalion--some 8,000 men--these shipments completed the movements to Australia and New, Caledonia that the War Department had planned during January and February. The air combat units that the War Department meant to send to Australia were two heavy bombardment groups, two medium bombardment groups, one light bombardment group, and three pursuit groups.11 By the latter part of March the last of these units, and of the aviation units allocated to support them, had arrived, and filler replacements were on the way.12 The ground units present in


Australia were the 147th Field Artillery Regiment, the 148th Field Artillery Regiment (less one battalion). and the equivalent of two regiments of antiaircraft Artillery. About 4,000 service troops (including a regiment of engineers and a quartermaster battalion) had arrived about 12,000 more were on the way, along with about half the 41st Division and one of the two tank destroyer battalion assigned to Australia.13

In New Caledonia there was at garrison of about 17,000--the task force (code name Poppy) that had made up the greater part of the shipment from New York on 22 January. The convoy had landed in the latter part of February at Melbourne, and the Poppy force was there hurriedly reloaded for New Caledonia with part of its supplies and equipment, which had been sent separately from the west coast and had not all arrived. It sailed on

March and arrived at Noumea on 12 March.14 The force consisted of a brigade of infantry two regiments, a regiment of Artillery (155-mm. howitzers), a battalion of light tanks, an antiaircraft regiment, and a battalion of coast Artillery. It also contained a pursuit squadron, which arrived a few days later from Australia.15

Reinforcements for New Caledonia numbering about 5,000 left the United States during March. The original instructions issued to General Patch, the commander of the New Caledonia force, were to plan "on the assumption that additional forces will not be immediately available."16 But the original plan lead assumed that a regiment of light Artillery, to be taken from the brigade already in Australia, would there be incorporated in the force. The War Department, having acceded to General Wavell's request to leave the entire brigade committed to the ABDA Command and having recognized, moreover, the need to strengthen the ground defenses of Australia, was obliged to send another regiment of artillery from the United States to New Caledonia.17 This regiment (72d Field Artillery, 105-mm. howitzers) sailed on 3 March with the first contingent of the 41st Division to bring the force up to the planned strength of a triangular division, reinforced. The War Department also added a third regiment of infantry (the 164th) and a battalion of pack Artillery (75-mm. howitzers), which sailed later in the month with the second contingent of the 41st Division.18


The Army garrisons along the South Pacific line of communications represented a much smaller commitment. To the Fiji Islands (code name Fantan), the link between New Caledonia and Samoa, the United States was to send only a pursuit squadron, leaving it to New Zealand to reinforce the ground garrison. The 70th Pursuit Squadron which with services amounted to 725 men was put under orders early in January and arrived at Suva at the end of that month.19 The Army garrison for Borabora (code name BOBCAT) in the Society Islands, which was to serve as a refueling station for convoys from the west coast to Australia, left on 27 January from Charleston, S.C. This garrison numbered about 3,900 men, including the 102d Infantry (less one battalion) and an antiaircraft regiment (the 198th).20 The Army garrisons for Christmas (code name BIRCH) and Canton (code name HOLLY) sailed from San Francisco on 31 January. The BIRCH garrison, aboard the President Johnson, numbered nearly 2,000 men, including the 12th Pursuit Squadron, a battalion of infantry, and two battalions of coast Artillery. The HOLLY garrison of about 1,100 men, aboard the President Taylor, included two companies of infantry and two battalions of coast Artillery, but no pursuit squadron (although one was assigned to the island.)21

In March one other large shipment to the Pacific was undertaken the movement to Hawaii of most of the 27th Division. The 27th was a square division the only square division sent overseas. On 7 March two battalions of infantry (from the 165th Infantry and the 108th Infantry) left San Francisco aboard the Grant. On 10 March the Lurline and the Aquitania (lent by the British along with the Queen Mary and the Queen Elizabeth), left with the 106th Infantry and a battalion of the 105th, two batteries of field Artillery, and headquarters and medical troop. On 29 March the Aquitania made a second trip, with most of the remaining troops of the 165th Infantry, two regiments of field Artillery (105th and 106th), and a regiment each of engineer and quartermaster troops.22

The Shortage Along the Line Hawaii--Australia

These shipments to the Pacific did not constitute a completed program. In the first place, they did not fill the demand for ground forces. In the latter part of February and again in early March, Admiral ping proposed that the Army should garrison additional islands in the South Pacific--Tongatabu (Tonga Island group) and Efate (New Hebrides).23 There were also new requirements for troops in the Southwest Pacific (in addition to the remainder of the 41st Division). After the


return of the two Australian divisions ordered home from the Middle East (one of which was already on its way), one Australian and one New Zealand division would still remain in the Middle East. Early in March, upon the opening of a new campaign in the North African desert, the British Prime Minister requested the President to send two additional divisions to the Southwest Pacific so that these Dominion troops might remain in the Middle East.24

Besides these new demands, the War Department had still to send to Hawaii the ground troops it had promised to the new Army commander in Hawaii, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons. From the close of the Arcadia Conference until the end of February, the shipment of men to Hawaii had been entirely suspended (except for a small movement aboard the Republic, including the advance party of the 27th Division), in favor of the immediate execution of planned movements to the South and Southwest Pacific.25 This delay, of which the War Department had warned General Emmons on 12 January, left to be moved some 15,000 of the 100,000 ground troops allocated to his command, and the movement of the greater part of the 27th Division in March left over 40,000 still to be shipped.26

There was, moreover, a deficit to be met in service troops for the forces recently sent (and any new forces to be sent) to the South and Southwest Pacific. The amount of the deficit was as vet undetermined, it being uncertain how far locally available labor would supply the needs for unloading and warehousing cargo, construction of facilities, laving out of roads and airfields, and other services. But in any event the movement of over 40.000 additional ground troops to Hawaii, two new garrisons (perhaps 10,000 men) to the South Pacific, and two more divisions (about 30,000 men) and the remainder of the 41st Division (about 7,500 men) to the Southwest Pacific--together with the movement of service units to meet existing deficits and those created by new movements would certainly involve the continued use throughout the spring of most of the troop shipping available in the Pacific. It would, moreover, involve continued heavy pressure on cargo shipping. The scheduled movement of munitions and other supplies and equipment had not as vet caught up with the troop movements already initiated, and supplementary shipments of supplies and equipment, as of service troops, would have to be scheduled as the limitations on what was locally available became established.

Another measure of existing deficits and prospective demands in the Pacific was the number of airplanes needed to meet the requirements of commands there. Beginning in the latter part of December, most of tire Army planes dispatched from the United States had been destined--as most of the Army troops had been destined--for Australia, with the object of creating a


"balanced" American air force in the Southwest Pacific. By mid-March most of the air and ground crews and air service units assigned had arrived.27 But delays, losses, and diversions had left too few medium and heavy bombers on hand in Australia for operations of any kind. In mid March the force had twenty-six B-17's. Of these, twelve were then in shape to operate, as against an assigned strength (for two heavy bomber groups,) of eighty operational planes plus reserves. There were only one or two B-25's, not in commission, as against an assigned strength (for two medium bomber groups) of 140 operational planes plus reserves. Light bombers and pursuits were more nearly up to strength. There were forty-three A-24's and one or two A-20's in Australia, of which twenty-seven were operational, as against an assigned strength (for one light bomber group) of fifty-seven plus reserves. There were about 350 pursuit planes (P-40's, P-400's, and P-39's), of which half were operational and the rest to be repaired or assembled, as against an assigned strength (for three pursuit groups) of 240 operational planes plus reserves.28

There was a like shortage of planes, especially of heavy and medium bombers, throughout the I Pacific. The other major air force in the Pacific, the Hawaiian Air Force, had received no reinforcements since the emergency shipments of December 1941. From January through March there remained a great gap between the number of planes authorized and the number present. As in Australia, the status of pursuit planes was relatively satisfactory. The number on hand (a good many of them obsolete or obsolescent) fell from about 200 at the beginning of January to about 180, as compared with 225 authorized. The number of light and medium bombers was about twenty-five, and the allocation of these was decreased from thirty-nine to correspond to this actual strength. Ninety-six heavy bombers were allocated to Hawaii, but the number present dropped from forty-three in January to thirty-one in mid-February.29

The drop in the number of heavy bombers present was the result of the diversion of a squadron of B-17's to the South Pacific, to support a naval task force (the ANZAC Force) that had been set up to operate in the increasingly exposed zone east and northeast of Australia. These were the only


bombers operating between Hawaii and Australia in February and March. The Army pursuit squadrons assigned to New Caledonia, the Fijis, and Christmas; but not those assigned to Canton and Palmyra) were present with their planes. But the one bombardment unit assigned to the South Pacific--a squadron of medium bombers for New Caledonia--was due to be diverted from Australia only late in the spring, when the flight crews should arrive from the United States, and only over the objections of the Army Air Forces.30 Of all the deficiencies in the planned deployment of Army forces on the main Pacific "line" Hawaii Australia (as also in Alaska), the shortage of bombers, and particularly the lack of bombers in the South Pacific, had become and was to remain the focus of the most persistent criticism from the Navy Department and from both Army and commanders in the Pacific. And it was the point at which the War Department was least willing to revise and expand the planned deployment of Army forces in the Pacific.

The Question of Additional Commitments

The emergence of the deployment of Army forces--and especially bomber units--in the Pacific as a critical question of American strategy dated from mid February. The entry for 17 February, in the private notes kept by General Eisenhower during his tour of duty on the General Staff, gives an idea how strongly he and his associates felt about the issue:

The Navy wants to take all the islands in the Pacific--have there held by Army troops, to become bawl for Arm. pursuit and bombers. Then! the will have a safe place to sail us vessels. Rut they will not go farther forward than our air (Army) can assure superiority.

The amount of air required for this slow, laborious and indecisive type of warfare is going to be something that will keep us from going to Russia's aid in time!!31

The occasion for this declaration was Admiral King's proposal, formally addressed to General Marshall the following day, to garrison additional islands, in particular the island of Efate, in the South Pacific. The formal reply (drafted by Eisenhower or one of his assistants and revised by Marshall) described the proposal as "a joint project with rather far-reaching implications." Marshall declared that he wanted to do anything reasonable" that would make "offensive action by the fleet practicable," but asked for an explanation of these questions:

a. What is the general scheme or concept of operations that the occupation of these additional islands is designed to advance? Are the measures taken purely for protection of a line of communications ~or is a step-by-step general advance contemplated?

b. What islands will be involved?

c. What Army troops, particularly Air, will your proposal eventually involve? I feel that a definite statement on this point is necessary. Requirements for troops, especially Air Forces, for operations and for training and expansion are such that I must know definitely the extent of each commitment.

d. Your proposal contemplates the employment of Army forces as occupational troops. Has the question of the availability of the Marines been fully explored? Ground troops, less AA, are available for garrisons, but continuation of the practice of detailing "detachments" for garrisons will result in destruction of the combat effectiveness of the trained


Divisional teams from which these troops would have to be taken.32

Marshall went on to state that American operations in the Southwest Pacific (in which he included the South Pacific) must "for several reasons be limited to the strategic defensive" so far as air and ground forces were concerned. The first reason was the "geography and communications of Australia" taken together with "enemy advantages in the layout of air fields and other communications facing Australia." The second reason was the limiting effect of the tonnage. required for the long voyage to the far Pacific, which restricted commitments of ground forces. The third reason was the limiting effect of demands on the Army air force. throughout the world:

. . . the requirements for U.S. air units in other theaters (Burma--China, Alaska, Hawaii, Panama--Caribbean, Great Britain for German bombing, now the Near East, a possible African expedition, and the U.S. Coastal regions) would seem definitely to limit for some time to come the extent to which we can provide for a further expansion in the Pacific--Australian theatre.

General Marshall acknowledged that the Navy might he able, in case some land based air cover were provided, to "carry, on an offensive campaign against the Japanese flank in the Southwest Pacific theatre." He then concluded:

I, therefore, feel that if a change in basic strategy, as already approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is involved, the entire situation must be reconsidered before we become involved more seriously in the build-up of Army ground and air garrisons in the Pacific islands.33

When Admiral King repeated his proposal early in March, he requested ground garrisons,for only two islands--Efate and Tongatabu--and to this proposal the War Department quickly acceded.34 In determining the composition of the task force for Tongatabu (code name BLEACHER), which was to he a base of naval operations, the planners assumed that it would probably not be attacked by major forces so long as the Allies held Samoa, the Fijis, and New Caledonia. They provided a force to deal with raids and to,deny the Tonga Islands to any Japanese force moving from the south against the Fijis or Samoa. This force, under the command of Brig. Gen. Benjamin C. Lockwood, Jr., was similar to the one provided for Borabora--a regiment of antiaircraft, a regiment of infantry (reinforced) less one battalion, and a pursuit squadron the 68th which was to be sent from Australia--all told, about 7,200 men.35 The


plan for garrisoning Efate assumed the probability of a Japanese assault before attacking either New Caledonia or the Fijis. The Navy agreed to provide for air defense with a Marine defense battalion and a Marine fighter squadron. The Army agreed to send a force to Efate (code name Roses) of about 4,900 men, consisting of a reinforced regiment of infantry (the 24th Infantry). The force commander, Brig. Gen. Harry D. Chamberlin, was to exercise unity of command over the joint forces.36

The Eisenhower Studies

The joint agreement to send these two additional garrison forces into the South Pacific did not indicate agreement between the War and Navy Departments on the question of Army deployment in the Pacific. The leader in formulating the Army view was General Eisenhower. As chief War Department operations officer for the Pacific, had recognized and had in fact insisted that the movement of reinforcements to the ABDA area should take precedence over "everything else--MAGNET, GYMNAST, replacements in Ireland."37 But he also considered this policy as necessarily temporary.

On 19 February he listed priorities for use of American shipping in the war effort. The first priority was: "Maintenance of existing garrisons. Defense aid to Russia. Essential supplies to UK and critical items, only, to China." Second priority was for approved reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific, this to include approved new garrisons not adjacent to the lines of communication, and possible items of lend-lease for the Netherlands Indies. Third, came approved units and material reinforcements for Hawaii; fourth, for Panama and Alaska. British lend-lease had fifth priority (so far as use of American shipping was required); approved reinforcements for the Caribbean area (less Panama), sixth; continuation of Northern Ireland and Iceland movements, seventh. Finally, Eisenhower mentioned filler replacements for Hawaii. The above listing, Eisenhower noted, represented the degree of urgency in actual or projected operations at the time the memorandum was prepared.38

A few weeks earlier, on 22 January, General Eisenhower had described in his personal notes the existing disagreement over strategy and his own solution:

The struggle to secure the adoption by all concerned of a common concept of Strategical objectives is wearing me down. Everybody is too much engaged with small things of his own.

We've got to go to Europe and fight--and we've got to quit wasting resources all over the world--and still worse--wasting time. If we're to keep Russia in, save the Middle East, India and Burma; we've got to begin slugging with air at West Europe; to be followed by a land attack as soon as possible.39


The idea took more definite form in February, immediately after the fall of Singapore, when Eisenhower had become head of the Army plans and operations staff. He wrote: "We've got to go on a harassing defensive west of Hawaii; hold India and Ceylon: build up air and land forces in England, and when we're strong enough, go after Germany's vitals.40 Again, three days later: "We've got to keep Russia in the war and hold India!! Then we can get ready to crack Germany through England."41

On 28 February, Eisenhower prepared a formal study setting forth his conclusions and recommendations on world strategy as well as on Pacific deployment.42 The study presented an outline of world-wide strategic objectives and their application to the Southwest Pacific. it defined ire three main propositions what had remained indeterminate in Army, joint, and combined plans since the ABC-1 conversations:

[1] . . . in the event of a war involving both oceans, the U.S. should adopt the strategic defensive in the Pacific and devote its major offensive effort across the Atlantic.

[2] . . . we must differentiate sharply and definitely between those things whose current accomplishment in the several theaters over the world is necessary to the ultimate defeat of the Axis Powers, as opposed to those which are merely desirable because of their effect in facilitating such defeat.

[3] The United States interest in maintaining contact with Australia and in preventing further Japanese expansion to the Southeastward is apparent. . . . but . . . they are not immediately vital to the successful outcome of the war. The problem is one of determining what we can spare for the effort in that region. without seriously impairing performance of our mandatory tasks.

In dealing with the first of these three points, the memorandum applied the "strategic axiom" that the commander should first attack and defeat the weaker force of a divided enemy. Eisenhower reasoned that although Germany and its satellites were stronger in total combat power than Japan, Japan was still "relatively stronger" since it was not at war with the Soviet Union and much less accessible to attack by the main forces of the other Allied powers. Moreover, it took three to four times as many ships to transport and maintain a given American force in the Pacific as in the Atlantic. Therefore, Eisenhower concluded, "logistic reasons, as well as strategic axiom, substantiate the soundness of the decision to concentrate against the European Axis.

The memorandum recognized, however, that agreement upon a theater of primary interest did not provide a detailed guide for immediate operations, and that, even though it was correct to concentrate against the enemy in Europe, the immediate problems of the Pacific theater remained to be faced. "The significance of the current strategic and tactical situation in the Southwest Pacific is important," said Eisenhower, "both psychologically and materially, and we must be as careful to avoid unwarranted weakness as to abstain from unnecessary commitments." He continued:

Over-simplification of the Japanese problem, because our primary objective lips elsewhere. is likely to discount the enormous advantages that will accrue to our enemies through conquest of India, the domination of the Indian Ocean, the severing of all lines of


British communications to the Near and Middle East and the physical junction of our two principal enemies. Important, but less critical, advantages will accrue to thorn, also. through conquest of Australia and the islands immediately to the east thereof.

Having asserted the second main postulate, the doctrine of the "necessary" as distinguished from the "desirable," Eisenhower listed three objectives in the first category--always assuming that the "continental United States and Hawaii, the Caribbean area, and South America north of Natal were secure:

a. Maintenance of the United Kingdom, which involves relative security of the North Atlantic sea lanes.

b. Retention of Russia in the war as an active enemy of Germany.

c. Maintenance of a Volition in the India Middle East Area which will prevent physical junction of the two principal enemies, and will probably keep China in the war.

On the other hand he named as "things . . . highly desirable," even approaching the necessary:

a. Security of Alaska.

b. Holding of bases west and southwest of Hawaii.

c. Security of Burma, particularly because of its influence on future Chinese action.

d. Security of South America south of Natal.

e. Security of Australia.

f. Security of bases on Vest African coast and trans-African air route.

g. Other areas and haws useful in limiting hostile operations and facilitating our own.

When he came to deal in detail with the Southwest Pacific--the area to which by far the most Army forces had been committed since Pearl Harbor--he acknowledged the interest of the United States in maintaining contact with Australia and in containing Japanese expansion to the southeastward. But he went on to point out that the collapse of the Malayan defenses and loss of portions of the Netherlands Indies erased one of the original reasons for deciding to support the Southwest Pacific--to deny to the Japanese the natural resources in those areas. By 28 February, Japan controlled ample sources of oil and tin, and practically the entire rubber resources of the world. Eisenhower therefore listed present objectives, with the reservation that they were not vital to the winning of the war:

a. To maintain a reasonably sale line of communications to Australia

b. To maintain the most advanced bases possible for eventual offensives against the Japanese Empire.

c. To create diversions in favor of the vitally important India-Burma area.

d. To deny the enemy free access to the Southeastern Pacific and its natural resources. . . .

e. To support the battle in the N.E.I. as long as possible, . . .

After a summary of the ground and air forces in the Southwest Pacific and a review of the military situation, Eisenhower proposed that (1) New Caledonia be garrisoned with the heavily reinforced triangular division originally scheduled for use there; (2) the 41st Division and at least five battalions of antiaircraft Artillery be assembled in Australia as reserve and for occupation of island bases; (3) an amphibious force be organized, in co-operation with the Navy, for seizing island bases considered essential to the furthering of the ,general plan in the Southwest Pacific; (4) the American air forces in Australia be utilized in support of Java and in covering northern Australia; (5) if resistance in Java ceased, U.S. air forces be used in support of island bases; and (6) one medium group, one pursuit group,


and one light squadron be retained temporarily in Australia and, as additional material became available, be withdraw to Hawaii to provide a mobile reserve for employment to the southwest.

Eisenhower then introduced a specific recommendation for offensive action, a proposal that followed logically from his vices of the military situation as a whole and that explained his other recommendations. In elaborating on what was meant by "task of keeping Russia in the war," he urged "immediate and definite action," first "by direct aid through lend-lease," and second "through the early initiation of operations that will draw off from the Russian front sizeable portions of the German Army, both air and ground." More specifically:

We should at once develop, in conjunction with the British, a definite plan for operations against Northwest Europe. It should be drawn up at once, in detail, and it should be sufficiently extensive in scale as to engage from the' middle of May onward, an increasing portion of the German Air Force, and by late summer an increasing amount of his ground forces.

The choice of northwestern Europe as the invasion point followed from the fact that another of the three essential objectives--protecting the United Kingdom and the North Atlantic sea lanes--could be achieved concurrently with building up resources in the British Isles for a cross-Channel assault. Greater shipping economy thus could be effected than if another "'first priority' convoying" problem were created by establishing a "large force at any location other than the Northeast Atlantic." Indeed, asserted Eisenhower, "The United Kingdom is not only our principal partner in this war; it offers the only point from which effective land and air,operations against Germany May be attempted."

Joint Study of Priorities for Deployment

The whole subject of scheduled movements overseas and long-run strategy had meanwhile come under study for the JCS and the CCS.43 On 11 February the Joint U.S. Strategic Committee, since it was already studying American aspects of the problem, was directed to satisfy a CCS request for recommendations for over-all deployment by the United Nations in the Pacific areas.44

The initial JUSSC papers comprised majority and minority reports.45 Although the papers were devoted chiefly to a discussion of the Pacific areas, they had something to say about the general strategic situation in the world, especially as it affected the special situation in the Japanese theater of war. Both the majority and the minority reports dwelt on the need to sustain the Soviet war effort and to defeat Germany first, and concluded that the European situation indicated "the compelling necessity for economy


of force in other theaters in order to permit concentration of effort against the principal objective." The minority report placed even greater emphasis on the ideas that Germany was the principal enemy and that it was necessary to guard against any diversion of strength from the main objective, the defeat of Germany. Both the reports stated:

The availability of shipping controls all decisions concerning overseas movements during 1942. The total capacity available to the United Nations in 1942, even if the building program is accomplished, will not exceed the capacity available in 1941. The shipping situation is so critical as to necessitate effective pooling of shipping and restriction of non-military use to an absolute minimum. The remainder must then be used on the shortest runs practicable in the manner which will contribute most to the early defeat of Germany.

The principal point of difference between the majority and minority reports related to the capacity of the United States and Great Britain to provide adequate air forces and chipping in the Pacific while conducting air operations in Europe to gain superiority over Germany in 1942 and support an invasion of the Continent. Although the reports agreed that "the courses of action to be taken in the Japanese theater must be such as to reduce to a minimum the diversion of forces that might be effectively employed against Germany," the minority report stated:

The effective defense of the Western Pacific, including the defense of all the important islands desired as bases there, would require a large proportion of our available forces, and would jeopardize the success of the offensive against Germany. Consequently. it must be accepted that we are unable to establish a system of bases and forces, so disposed as to give depth to the defense of the line between Hawaii and Australia.

Thus the minority--presumably the AAF member--recommended virtual abandonment of the Southwest Pacific region--including Australia and the island base chain protecting the approach to Australia from Hawaii. The majority report declared that Australia should he held, and that sea and air communications with Australia must be made secure if Australia were to be supported and remain available as a base for further operations:

Since communications from Australia to the westward are now liable to constant interruption, due to the fall of Singapore, the importance of the Anzac area has been greatly increased. On the security of the Anzac area depends the maintenance of communications between Australia and the United States. Not only must New Caledonia. Fiji and other important shore positions in the area be garrisoned. There must also be provided a mobile air force of long range aircraft to operate with the mobile naval surface forces.46

The minority felt that Australia should be held by minimum forces and that the defense of Australia and New Zealand should be a British responsibility. It indicated that, with the' fall of Singapore, the importance of the Anzac area had been somewhat reduced (rather than greatly increased), since it was too distant from Japan for the waging of a decisive offensive against Japan. The minority paper insisted that the United States and Great Britain must accept the fact that they might be forced to relinquish the lines of communication from the United States to Australia if its defense should jeopardize the success of the offensive against Germany. The lines of communication, it contended, should be secured with the forces already provided.


The result of the planners' study was a significant change in alignment. The minority member acquiesced in the view that the United States could and should hold the line Hawaii-Australia, with the minimum force necessary and at the same time prepare for a maximum offensive across the Atlantic. Thereupon the argument among the planners shifted to the question of what the minimum necessary forces in the Pacific would be--a question on which the Navy planners, rather than the Air planners, found themselves in the minority, insisting that more Army forces, especially air forces, would be needed to hold the Japanese.47

JCS Decision on Deployment Policy

The Joint Staff Planners unanimously recommended "that the JCS at once decide on a clear course of action, and execute this decision with the utmost vigor.48

They reported irreconcilable differences among themselves and presented three possible courses of action which different members of their committee supported. A middle-of-the-road course--which echoed Eisenhower's 28 February study--was listed as the third alternative. The three alternatives were:

(A) Ensure the security of the military position in the Pacific Theater by strong reinforcements . . . at the expense of executing a vigorous offensive against Germany with United States Forces. Contain Japanese forms in the southern portion of the Pacific Theater: inflict attrition; and exert economic pressure by the destruction of vessels. . . .

(B) While Russia is still an effective ally, concentrate the mass of our forces for a vigorous offensive, initially from bases in England, with the objective of defeating Germany. Until Germany has been defeated, accept the possibility that the Southwest Pacific may be lost.

(C) Provide the additional forces in the South Pacific Area considered by the Joint Strategic Committee as the minimum required for the defensive position and simultaneously begin to build up in the United Kingdom forces intended for offense at the earliest practicable tune. This course of action contemplates that the British would provide the bulk of the forces for any offensive undertaken in 1992 from the United Kingdom.49

Thus squarely presented was the issue of where the. United States and Great Britain should make their first great offensive effort. Implicit in any decision in favor of the third alternative was acceptance of the United Kingdom as the major offensive base. With very little recorded discussion the JCS agreed, on 16 March 1942, that "of the courses of action available," it was "preferable" for the United States "to begin to build up forces in the United Kingdom" and to restrict Pacific forces to the number allotted in "current commitments."50

Concurrently the JCS considered a paper in which the War Department carefully reviewed


the related question of defense forces for Hawaii.51 This paper, approved by General Arnold and Marshall, maintained that In providing rapidly for adequate defense of the Hawaiian Islands it was essential to avoid over defense, since troops and armament assigned there were being contained by Japan without any drain oil it: own military resources, and the amount of shipping available for other purposes was unnecessarily reduced. The Army planers estimated that so long as the United States could keep reasonable naval strength in the Hawaiian area and were engaging the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific, attacks on Hawaii would be limited to naval and air raids. The study concluded that the ground and air forces, projected by the Army, combined with the local naval defenses would "assure retention of the island, prevent serious damage to installations . . . and permit freedom of action to the Pacific Fleet." It recommended that Army forces should be increased to authorized levels as soon as possible after commitments of higher priority had been filled. Although the Hawaiian Department had requested substantial reinforcements in addition to those authorized is January, the JCS accepted this recommendation on 13 March and the President approved their decision on 13 March.52

Strategic Deployment in the Pacific

Soon after these decisions were reached, a number of changes had to be made in War Department troop commitments, all of them making it even harder to carry out the compromise policy of holding the line in the Pacific while, preparing for an offensive across the Atlantic. Early in March the Prime Minister had asked,that the United Buttes send one division to New Zealand and one to Australia in addition to the U.S. Army forces already allocated to Australia. 'The Dominions could on that basis consent to leave one New Zealand and one Australian division in the then critical Middle East battle none. The Prime Minister suggested that "shipping would be saved and safety gained by the American reinforcement of Australia and Zealand rather than by a move across the oceans of these divisions from the Middle East.53 The Army planners recommended that the United States agree to send the additional divisions for w hick the Prime Minister had asked, provided oil that Australia and New Zealand definitely agreed to retain an equivalent number of troops in the Indian Ocean area. It was not perfectly clear from the Prime Minister's message whether or not he knew of the assignment of the 41st Division to Australia nor, therefore, whether his proposal would require sending two divisions or only one to the Southwest Pacific in addition to the forces already there.54 In


its reply, which Roosevelt forwarded to Churchill, the CGS recognized the importance of the area of the Indian Ocean and the Middle East and agreed that the Australian and:dew Zealand divisions now in that area should remain and that the United States would dispatch one division to New Zealand and one to Australia as replacement for their forces as follows:

The 41st Division is leaving the U.S. by the eighteenth of this month reaching Australia about April 10. The next convoy of half a division could leave about April 15 and the remainder about May 15. If the total number of New Zealand and Australian troops retained for fighting in the Middle Fast, India or Ceylon are in excess of these two divisions, a third U.S. division can leave for the Southwest Pacific about May 15.

These movements would require that some twenty-five cargo ships be withdrawn from lend-lease service to the Red Sea and China.55

The United States also agreed to furnish shipping to move two British divisions (40.000 men) with their equipment from the United Kingdom to the Middle East and India in April and May. This movement would require the withdrawal of eleven lend-lease ships from railings for Burma and the Red Sea, and was contingent on a number of important matters, namely, that during that period a North African operation not be undertaken, the movement to Northern Ireland be limited to those troops which the two convoys planned for the Middle East could bring over from the United States, and movements to Iceland be stopped. This movement would also have the effect, the U.S. joint planners estimated, of seriously curtailing American contribution to an air offensive and virtually eliminating American contribution to a land offensive against Germany in 1942.56 The joint planners found that under the new commitments the available of troop transports would become the limiting factor during the second and third quarters of 1942, after which the availability of cargo shipping would again control.57 Although the tentative commitments might possibly haw some effect on transportation of troops to the United Kingdom, all Pacific troop movements were expected to be carried out as indicated in the previous schedules.58 The planners suggested that should the British not be willing to launch an offensive in the European theater in 1942, the agreed strategic concept should be reevaluated and the possibility of concentrating American offensive effort in the Pacific considered.

One other change occurred in the JCS 23 deployment schedules when the 27th Division, previously authorized by the War Department for Hawaii, replaced a Marine amphibious division which the JUSSC; had recommended he sent to Hawaii.59 With the addition of these three Army divisions, Army forces allocated to Hawaii, Australia, and the lines of communication for 1942


amounted to over 275,000--about 35 percent of the total projected overseas deployment of the U.S. Army and about half of the projected Army deployment outside the Western Hemisphere.60 (See Chart 2.)

Strategic Responsibility and Command in the Pacific

The debate over Army commitments in the Pacific was accompanied, and its outcome was very largely determined, by a clarification of American responsibilities for military operations in the Southwest Pacific, following on the collapse of the ABDA Command. Within the week after the fall of Singapore the GCS accepted as virtually certain the loss of Sumatra and Java.61 On 23 February they ordered General Wavell to dissolve his headquarters at Batavia, permitting command to pass to the Dutch, whose forces were still engaged, with some Allied aid, in fighting a delaying action in Java.62 Although this transfer of authority technically placed the United States forces in the Philippines under Netherlands command, MacArthur was to "continue to communicate directly with the War Department."63 The two senior U.S. Army officers in the Batavia headquarters were ordered, upon release by Wavell, to proceed to the two flanks of the disintegrating ABDA area--General Brereton to India, to become Commanding General, Tenth U.S. Air Force, with headquarters at Karachi, and General Brett to resume command of all U.S. forces in Australia.64 These interim readjustments marked the end of the first short-lived experiment in international unified command for World War II.


MacArthur Ordered to Australia

A far more important readjustment in command had meanwhile come under consideration the transfer of General MacArthur from the Philippines to Australia.65 The War Department had opened the question of his transfer early in February with a message to MacArthur, which stated that in the event of the loss of Bataan peninsula there might be a greater need for hire elsewhere, and which assured him that any order for him to give up the "immediate leadership" of his forces in the Philippines would come directly from the President.66 On 22 February the President decided to order MacArthur to Australia to assume command of American forces there, with the intention of getting the Australian and British Governments to accept him "as commander of the reconstituted ABDA Area.67 MacArthur himself had the choice of the exact moment and manner of his departure. He notified the War Department that he expected to leave the Philippines for Australia about 15 March.68

Division of World Into Areas of Strategic Responsibility

While these readjustments in command were being made, the President and the Prime Minister entered into negotiations to allocate strategic responsibility as between Great Britain and the United States. The President first introduced the subject of a division of responsibility among theaters by the two countries on 18 February in a communication to the Prime Minister. He wrote:

It seems to me that the United States is able because of our geographical position to reinforce the right flank Australia and New Zealand much better than you can and I think that the U.S. should take the primary responsibility for that immediate reinforcement and maintenance. using Australia as the main base . . . Britain is better prepared to reinforce Burma and India and I visualize that you would take responsibility for that theater. We would supplement you in any May we could. just as you would supplement our efforts on the right flank.69


A few days later the British Chiefs of Staff indicated that they were thinking along similar lines.70

On 7 March the President proposed that the world be divided into three general areas for the prosecution of the war against the Axis: (1) the Pacific area, (2) the Middle and Far East area, and (3) the European and Atlantic area. The first region would be an American responsibility, the second British, and the third combined American and British.71 On the new day General Marshall discussed the issue at the White House.72

General Eisenhower meanwhile prepared a study along the lines of the President's proposal., Eisenhower defined the three areas of strategic responsibility as follows:(1) The Pacific area, which included the American continents, China. Australia, New Zealand. and Japan, but excluded Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, was to be an area of American responsibility. (2) The Indian Ocean and Middle East area--the Indian Ocean and all land areas contiguous thereto west of Singapore, and the Middle and near East was designated an area of British responsibility, with American assistance limited to material aid from surplus production. It was stipulated that the United States should have access to bases in India and routes to China within this area. (3) Europe and the Atlantic, in which the major effort against Germany was to be made, was to be an area of British-American joint responsibility.

Eisenhower further proposed, following the sense of the 7 March White House meeting, that the CCS exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategy and the allocation of war material m all areas, in addition to direct supervision of all strategic and operational matters in the European and Atlantic area. In the Indian Ocean and Middle East area the British Chiefs of Staff were to exercise jurisdiction: in the Pacific area the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were to exercise jurisdiction.73

On 9 March the President sent a personal message to the Prime Minister asking him, in view, of the developments in the Southwest Pacific area since the ARCADIA Conference, to consider the operational simplification that had been proposed in Washington. The operational responsibility for the Pacific area would rest on the United States, with decisions for the area being made in Washington by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in consultation with an advisory council representing Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands Indies, China, and possibly Canada. The supreme command in the Pacific area would be American. The middle area--extending from Singapore to and including India, the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Libya, and the Mediterranean would be a British responsibility, but the United States would continue to allocate to it all possible munitions and vessel assignments. The third area Europe and the Atlantic would be a joint British-American responsibility and would include definite plans for establishment of a new front on the European Continent. "I am becoming more and more interested in the establishment of


Left to right: Col. St. Clair Streett; General Eisenhower, Chief; Col. A.S. Nevins; Brig. Gen. R.W. Crawford;
Col. C.A. Russell; and Col. H.A. Barber, Jr.

this new front this summer," the President added.74

The Prime Minister replied on 18 March, generally concurring in the President's proposals and stating that he and the British Chiefs of Staff saw "great merits in simplification resulting from American control over Pacific sphere and British control over Indian sphere and indeed there is no other way." The Prime Minister implicitly accepted the postponement of a combined North African operation and movements of American troops to the United Kingdom as necessary corollary to the use of shipping few deployment to the Southwest Pacific and movement of British troop, to the Middle East. With the undemanding that British and American efforts everywhere could be directed by "machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee acting directly under you and nit'," the Prince Minister also approved the President's proposals for "executive conduct" of the war.

In regard to the Pacific: theater, Churchill wrote:

On supreme and general outlook in Pacific we are both agreed on the paramount importance of regaining the initiative against Japan. . . . We assume that any large-scale


methods of achieving this would be capable of being discussed by combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. . . .

And in summing up:

. . . I feel that your proposals as I have ventured to elaborate and interpret them will achieve double purpose namely (a) integrity of executive and operational action and (b) opportunity of reasonable consultation for those whose fortunes are involved.75

Creation of SWPA and POA

While the President and the Prime Minister were reaching agreement on the worldwide division of strategic responsibility, the JCS were considering the subdivision of the Pacific theater, which they assumed would become a responsibility of the United States. The Navy was primarily concerned with the "threat to the line of communications between the Americas and Australia-New Zealand," and Admiral King had made the first formal proposal for revision of command arrangements in the Southwest Pacific immediately after the fall of Singapore.76 The War Department planners considered various alternatives suggested by Admiral King.77 At the same time the War Department informally told Brett of its agreement with the principle expressed by the New Zealand and Australian authorities meeting in Melbourne that operations in the South and Southwest Pacific based on Australia should be under unified command.78

The JCS, after studying the recommendations of the Australian and New Zealand Governments, adopted instead the law's vices that New Zealand belonged with the line of communication, and proposed the establishment of a new "Australian area" that would include only "the Australian continent and the direct enemy approaches thereto, a strategic entity appropriate for unified command"79 Eisenhower pointed out that since Australia had to serve as a base for all military operations in the Southwest Pacific: there were obvious disadvantages in setting up an Australian area which would not include New Zealand, New Caledonia, and the Philippines. Accordingly the War Department recommended extending the area to include these islands and proposed giving the area, so extended, the "more descriptive designation" of "the Southwest Pacific Area."80 General Marshall proposed to the joint Chiefs that


the "Southwest Pacific Area" be established as a Subarea command in the Pacific theater "to comprise all land areas in the Pacific for which the U.S. is made responsible, southwest of the line Philippines, Samoa (both inclusive), thence south along the meridian of 170° W." The participating governments--Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands Indies, and the United States--would select a supreme commander whose directive would be prepared by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in collaboration with representatives of these governments. The sea and island areas in the Pacific Ocean northeast of the Southwest Pacific: Area would be known as the North Pacific Area and "placed under the command of a U.S. Navy officer.81

The JCS acting "in anticipation of final approval of the division of the world into three major theaters," thereupon modified their proposal by extending the boundary of the area northward to include the Philippines and renaming the area the Southwest Pacific Area. But they retained the separation of Australia from New Zealand and Mew Caledonia, ruling that the defense of these islands, as the Navy insisted, was essentially a part of the defense of the lines of communication from the United States.82

On this basis the JCS proceeded to set up commands in the Pacific theater, in effect making the Army responsible for operations in Australia and to the north and northeast, to and including the Philippines--the Southwest Pacific Area--and making the Navy responsible for operations in the rest of the Pacific theatre--the Pacific Ocean Area--except for a small Southeast Pacific area (for which no command was established).83 (See Chart 2.) General MacArthur was to be Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who was in command of the Pacific Fleet, was to become Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (POA), directly controlling the South Pacific subarea through a deputy whom he would designate.84

Organization of SWPA

On 10 March, in anticipation of General MacArthur's arrival in Australia, the War Department had sent to General Brett the following instructions, as approved by the President:

Within the hour [of General MacArthur's arrival in Australia] you will call upon the Prime Minister or other appropriate governmental official of Australia, stating that your


call is made by direction of the President. You are to notify the Prime Minister that General MacArthur has landed in Australia and has assumed command of all U.S. Army forces therein. You will propose that the Australian Government nominate General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, and will recommend that the nomination be submitted as soon a, possible to London and Washington simultaneously.85

On 11 March MacArthur and his party left Corregidor for Mindanao, from which planes were still able to operate. When he arrived in Australia six days later, the War Department announced that he would be supreme commander in that region, including the Philippines, "in accordance with the request of the Australian Government.86 On the same day Roosevelt sent a personal message to Churchill telling him of MacArthur's arrival in Australia and explaining that both the Australian and New Zealand Governments had suggested appointment of an American supreme commander in the Southwest Pacific. "This action," the President stated, "will in no way interfere with procedure of determining strategic areas and spheres of responsibility through established channels."87

On 18 March the War Department sent MacArthur a long summary of the plans for command arrangements as of that date, telling him drat the President had approved his assumption of "Supreme Command in Australia and region to north, including the Philippine," and that upon completion of British-American negotiations he probably would be appointed formally as commander of the Southwest Pacific Area.88

The first tank facing MacArthur after his arrival in Australia was to consolidate the organization of the land, sea, and air forces of the United States and Australia that had been put under his command. General Arthur had been instructed to take over from General Brett the command of L. S. Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA) but the day after his arrival the War Department rescinded these instructions, explaining that as supreme commander of an international command he would not be "eligible to retain direct command of any national force." The War Department informed him that Brett, therefore, should "temporarily resume his position as Commanding General of USAFIA," indicating further that, upon the reorganization of commands in the Pacific, Brett should command Allied air forces in Australia, an Australian officer should command Allied ground forces, and Vice Admiral Herbert F. Leary should command Allied naval forces.89


By agreement between MacArthur and the Australian Government, Brett was at once put in command of combined air forces, and MacArthur soon thereafter relieved him of responsibilities for USAFIA90 These responsibilities, primarily for the operation of American base facilities in Australia, reverted to Maj. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, who in fact had had a fluctuating and uncertain share of these responsibilities ever since his arrival with the first American troop convoy in Australia in December. 1lacArthur proposed that they should continue to include command of American grounds forces in Australia.91 But the War Department continued to insist on the need for a combined ground command, under an Australian officer, in line with the precedent of the ABDA Command. The War Department emphasized the importance of following that precedent, noting that it had been developed "after much difficulty," and explained shat it had been set to avert a situation where the supreme commander of ABDA area (Wavell) might have personally become "to intimately involved in defense of Singapore and Burma and not sufficiently detached in point of view to lake care of interests of Philippines and Netherlands fast Indies." The War Department concluded: "This basis for Supreme Commander has been accepted as the policy to guide in future combined operations of United Nations . . .92

MacArthur at once fell in with the policy outlined by the War Department for command of combined air, ground, and naval forces and proposed that Barnes' command be set up as an American service command, with purely administrative and supply functions, separate from Australian administration and supply, which would continue to be under the Australian Government.93

Directive to MacArthur

The formal directive naming MacArthur as Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, and Admiral Nimitz as Commander in (chief, Pacific Ocean Area, was issued by the JCS on 30 March and promptly approved by the President. The two first and most important points in the mission as-


signed to MacArthur were to "hold the key military regions of Australia as bases for future offensive action against Japan, and in order to check the Japanese conquest of the Southwest Pacific Area" and to "check the enemy advance toward Australia and its essential lines of communication . . .94 Although his directive included the provision that he should "prepare to take the offensive," the mission assigned him was primarily defensive, in accordance with the strategy in the Pacific. that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had developed in March. He was to maintain the American position in the Philippines and protect communications and route shipping within the Southwest Pacific Area. He was directed to exert economic pressure on the enemy by destroying his transport vessels and to support the operations of friendly forces in the Pacific Ocean and Indian theaters.

There were certain broad limitations on MacArthur's authority. As supreme commander, he was authorized "to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials," but was declared ineligible to command directly any national force and was not responsible for the internal administration of the respective forces under his command.

The JCS reserved to themselves the exercise of jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy, with the Army Chief of Staff acting as agent for the JCS. General jurisdiction over grand strategic policy and related factors including the allocation of forces and war materials was given to the CCS.

Finally, and most tellingly, the scope of General MacArthur's operations was restricted not by his directive but by the policy that the War Department had meanwhile adopted to govern the deployment of Army forces in the Pacific. The War Department undertook to bring to full strength the air units already assigned to Australia--two heavy bomber groups, two medium bomber groups, one light bomber group, and three pursuit groups--and to send to Australia the 41st and 32d Divisions. As soon as MacArthur arrived in Australia, the War Department informed him that Army commitments to the Southwest Pacific Area would he limited to these units, the limits being "fixed by shortages in shipping, which is of the utmost seriousness, and by critical situations elsewhere."95 The implications of the War Department's policy were quite as important as the explicit limitation on authorized strength. The rate at which the War Department met its commitments to the Southwest Pacific Area and the state of training of the troops that were sent might also be cut for the same reason that the authorized strength itself was limited in order to meet other commitments. Under its adopted policy, moreover, the War Department was not likely to demand, and still less likely to obtain, the commitment of sufficient naval reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific to enable General MacArthur to conduct any offensive operations, even


when his air units should be reorganized and equipped and his divisions adequately trained for combat operations. The forces at his disposal were only a small fraction of those he would need only make good the pledge he had given the Philippine nation and to avenge the defeat and imminent surrender of the remnants, hungry and bitter, of the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.96


Table of Contents
Previous Chapter (6) * Next Chapter (8)


1. The remainder of the 132,000 went mainly to the Caribbean, with small numbers going to Alaska, the Atlantic bases, and India. (1) For a contemporary summary by periods, see memo, Lt Col Marcus B. Stokes, Jr., Chief, Plng Sec, Transportation Br, G-4, for Gen Marshall, 15 Mar 42, sub: Tr and Cargo Mvmts Since Dec 7, 1941, File CofS, GS (1) Mar-Jun 42, in Hq File, ASF. (2) For general breakdown by areas, see OPD (WPD) Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).

2. For the ARCADIA decision, see above, Ch. V. For the sailings, see: (1) ltr, TAG to Gen Chaney, London, 16 Jan 42, sub: Duties and Responsibilities of CG USAFBI (England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales), WPD 4497-29; (2) paper, U.S. JPS to CPS, 25 Jan 42, sub: Mvmt of U.S. Trs to N Ireland, with CPS 4 in ABC 370.5 N Ireland (1-22-42); (3) Sum of Hist Events and Statistics, NY POE 1942, p. 10, OCT HB NYPE (this summary lists 4,000 troops as sailing).

3. Notes of discussion by U.S. CsofS, 21 Jan 42, submitted to CCS, with CCS 5/1 in ABC 381 GYMNAST (1-15-42).

4. Paper cited n. 2 (2).

5. Min, 3d mtg CCS, 3 Feb 42.

6. Memo, Gen Gerow for Maj Gen Brehon B. Somervell, 6 Feb 42, sub: Feb Mvmt to Ireland and Iceland, Book 3, Exec 8.

7. Memo, Col Gross for Gen Somervell (G-4), 19 Feb 42, sub: Sailings, WPD 4497-37. On 2 March General Chaney informed General Marshall that troops for Northern Ireland had arrived. Msg, Chaney to CG Field Forces [Marshall], 2 Mar 42, USFOR 10. 112, WPD-GHQ 311.23, Incoming Radiogram USAFBI.

8. For the shipments ordered, see: (1) incls to weekly memos, G-3 for CofS or CG Field Forces, sub: Tr Mvmts for Week Ending . . . , WPD 4624-5; and (2) OPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).

9. Detailed information on the shipments is found in a variety of sources and tabulated in Strategic Plans Unit Study I, in OCMH Files. The source for shipments from New York (except far breakdown by destination) is a report entitled: Summary of Historical Events and Statistics, POE 1942 (of which a copy is filed in OCT HB NYPE). There is no such comprehensive Transportation Corps report for the San Francisco port. There does exist a source for shipments from San Francisco in January and February (except by the Hammondsport) in the form of a report entitled: Shipping Situation at SFPE Following Pearl Harbor (OCT HB SFPE). Other data can be found in War Department messages of the time. For a more detailed breakdown of shipping--cargo as well as troop--see Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-42.

10. (1) OPD Weekly Status Map, 2 Apr 42, AG 061 (4 Sep 45). This is the first weekly status map to give separate figures for troops en route and troops present overseas. The March shipments still en route to the Southwest Pacific are given there as totaling 30,000 (including 5,500 for New Caledonia). The total present in Australia (without final correction for losses) is given as 34,000. (2) List entitled: USAF in SW and S Pacific: Apr 6, 1942, Tab Misc, Book 4, Exec 8. This list gives a breakdown (except for small miscellaneous service units; of all troops present in and en route to Australia, but the strength of some units present is given as authorized rather than as actually present. Totals in this list show 23,500 en route and about 38,000 present. (3) AG Strength Rpt, 320.2 (3-31- 42) MR.-M, lists 31,645 present in Australia.

11. See (1) msg, Marshall to Brett, 28 Feb 42, No. 479, AG 381 (11- 27- 41), 2-C, and (2) memo, WPD for TAG, 10 Mar 42, sub: Est of Sit, Anzac Area, ABC 381 SWPA (1-12-42).

12. The heavy bomber groups were the 19th (which had absorbed the remnants of the squadron of the 7th from Java) and the 43d. The medium bomber groups were the 22d and 38th. The light bomber group was the 3d (which absorbed the personnel of the 27th). The three pursuit groups were the 49th, the 35th, and the 8th. They are all given as present in the 6 April list cited above, along with two transport (troop carrier) squadrons (the 21st and 22d) and three separate pursuit squadrons (the 21st and 34th, which had been transferred without personnel or equipment from the Philippines, and the 68th, which had been allocated first to New Caledonia and then to Canton Island and was actually to be sent to Tongatabu). (For an account of the actual status of the air units present in Australia, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 411-14.)

13. See 6 April list cited n. 10 (2).

14. Great confusion attended the transshipment. See especially (1) msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Barnes, 12 Feb 42, . 321, WPD Msg File 9, 893; (2) msg (originator WPD), same to same, 18 Feb 42, No 351, WPD msg File 9, 1201; (3) msg (originator WPD), same to same, 21 Feb 42, No. 382, WPD), msg File 9A, 1480; (4) memo, CofS for President, 23 Feb 42, no sub, ACC 370.5 (2-15-42), 1; (5) notes on War Council, 2 Mar 42, WDCSA, SW Confs, Vol II; (6), msg, Brett to TAG, 8 Mar 42, 10. 540, WPD Ready Ref File of Msgs, Australia, Sec 2; (7) memo for rcd, 18 Mar 42, OPD 381 New Caledonia, 20; (8) papers filed with WPD 3718-17; (9) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 430-31; and (10) see above, Ch. VI.

15. See 6 April list cited n. 10 (2). The combat units were as follows: 51st Infantry Brigade: 200th Field Artillery; 754th Tank Battalion (L); 70th Coast Artillery (AA); 3d Battalion, 244th Coast Artillery; and 67th Pursuit Squadron. In addition there were some 4,000 ground service troops and two battalions of aviation engineers.

16. Memo, WPD for TAG, 22 Jan 42, sub: Def of New Caledonia, WPD 3718-17.

17. For the agreement to leave the entire brigade of field Artillery committed to the ABDA Command, see Ch. VI, above.

18. (1) See 6 April list, cited n. 10(2). (2) For the additions, see also OPD 381 New Caledonia, 2, 6.

19. (1) Memo, G-3 for CofS, 5 Jan 42, sub: Tr Mvmts for Week Ending Midnight, Jan 3-4, 1942, V' PD 4624-5. (2) Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 431.

20. Charleston POE rcds, filed OCT HB CPE. For this force, see 6 April list, cited n. 10(2), and papers filed WPD 4571-24.

21. See 6 April list cited n. 10 (2), and rpt cited n. 9 (2).

22. The remaining combat elements sailed during the first work in April. For the movement of the 27th Division, see: (1) AG 370.5 (12 26-41) Sec 1, and (2) Capt Edmund G. Love, The 27th Infantry Division in World War II (Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1949), p. 18.

23. (1) The only record found of the earlier request (18 February is a copy of the reply sent by General Marshall. Memo, CofS for COMINCH, 24 Feb 42, sub: Estab of U.S. Garrison in Efate, New Hebrides . . . , Tab Misc, Book 4, Exec 8. (2) The latter proposal is contained in memo, Admiral King for JCS, 2 Mar 42, sub: Occupation for Def of Tonga Tabu and Efate, ABC: 381 (3-2-42).

24. Msg, Prime Minister to President, 4 Mar 42, No. 37, circulated as CCS 56.

25. For the one shipment to Hawaii between mid-January and the end of February, see rpt cited n. 9 (2).

26. For the allocation of ground forces to Hawaii and the breakdown by types of unit, see: (1) msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Emmons, 11 Jan 42, No. 956, WPD Msg File 5, 618; (2) msg, Ft. Shafter to TAG, 13 Jan 42, 1677, WPD Msg File 6, 734; and (3) msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Emmons, 19 Jan 42, No. 1047, WPD Msg File 6, 1048. For the strength present in Hawaii, see WPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45),

For War Department warning of the delay in shipments to Hawaii with explanation, see D/F, WPD for TAG, 12 Jan 42, sub: Tr Mvmt, Pacific Bases and Hawaii, WPD 3444-19, and msg, Marshall to Emmons, 16 Jan 42, no sub. No. 1013, WPD File 6. 875.

27. (1) Chart, 15 Mar 42, title: Trs in Australia and New Caledonia. This chart gave as present about 20,000 (including air service personnel), with about 2,000 en route and no others under orders or projected. (2) Memo, no sig, for Col Handy, 26 Mar 42, sub: Status Air Squadrons in Australia. Both with CPS 24 in ABC: 381 Australia (1-23-42). (3) WPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).

These figures changed very little through the rest of the spring. Cf. memo, Col William L. Ritchie [Actg Chief SWP Sec] for ACofS OPD and Chief Theater Gp, 1 Jun 42, sub: Info on Forces in S W Pacific Theater, Tab Allied Comd, Vol V, Item li, Exec 2.

28. (1) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 411-13. (2) Cf. figures in WPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 06 (4 Sep 45). (3) Figures on plane strength are also given in WPD brief, Notes on . . . CPS 9th mtg, 19 Mar 42, with CPS 24 in ABC 381 Australia (1-23- 42).

29. Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 452. For figures on aircraft strength in Hawaii during January, February, and March, see WPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45). The number of planes in Hawaii was reported by General Emmons to Assistant Secretary McCloy on his visit there to be " . . . 33 first class 4-engine heavy bombers; 15 second class 4-engine bombers: 17 medium bombers; 9 light bombers; 152 first class pursuit planes; 31 Second class pursuit planes." These figures were apparently given to McCloy sometime after 26 February. (See McCloy's statement in Votes on War Council, Monday, Mar 23, 1942, WDCSA, SW Confs, Vol II.)

30. Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 430-33.

31. Notations by Eisenhower, 17 Feb 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.

32. Memo, CofS for Admiral King, 24 Feb 42, sub: Estab of U.S. Garrison in Efate, New Hebrides islands (Memo, CinC U.S. Fleet, Feb 18, 1942) Tab Wise, Book 4, Exec 8. The file contains the original draft drawn up for Marshall's signature with two editorial improvements in his hand, of the passage quoted above), a suggested substitute for the second paragraph (quoted below in the text that Marshall sent back to WPD with the draft, and the corrected copy (incorporating his changes) as sent.

33. Memo cited n. 32.

34. (1) Memo, Admiral King for JCS, 2 liar 42, sub: occupation for Def of Tonga Tabu and Efate, ABC 381 (3-2-42). (2) Min, 6th mtg JCS, 16 Mar 42.

35. Most of the ground troops, except for antiaircraft, came from the 37th Division, later sent to the Fijis. The force also included a naval construction battalion. (1) For the plan, see Jt Bsc Plan for Occupation and Def of Tonga Tabu. (2) For the directive to order the force moved to the York port for shipment early in April, see memo, WPD for AAF, AGF, and SOS, 15 afar 42, sub: Jt Bu Plan for Occupation and Def of Tonga Tabu. Both in OPD 381 Tonga Tabu, 1. (3) For the order to ship the 68th Pursuit Squadron from Australia, to join the force on arrival, see msg, Marshall to Brett, 16 Mar 42, No. 717, WPD Msg File 13, 1763.

By 14 May the Bleacher force had arrived and established itself. See ltr, Gen Lockwood to CofS, 14 May 42, sub: Increase of means-Force 0015, OPD 381 Tonga Tabu, 6.

36. (1) Jt Bsc Plan for Occupation and Def of Efate, New Hebrides, 20 Mar 42, OPD 381 Efate, New Hebrides, 8. (2) Memo, AGF for TAG, 20 Mar 42, sub: Orgn and Mvmt Orders, Shipt 9156, AG 370.5 (3-20-42) 1.

The ROSES Force reached Efate on 4 May 1942. Ltr, TAG to CG WDC, 5 May 42, sub: Info re Destinations of Secret Tr Mvmts, AG. 370.5 (3-20-42), 1. Meanwhile a small Army force had been sent from New Caledonia to garrison Efate pending the arrival of the ROSES Force. See memo, WPD for TAG, 8 Mar 42, sub: Dispatch of Adv Det from Poppy Force to Efate, OPD 381 Efate, New Hebrides, 7, and msg (originator TANGIER), Patch to CINCPAC: for Marshall, 19 Mar 42, Tab Misc, Book 4, Exec 8.

37. Notations by Eisenhower, 17 Jan 42 entry, Item , OPD Hist Unit File.

38. Memo, Eisenhower for Somervell, 19 Feb 42, no sub, WPD 2789-32.

39. Notations by Eisenhower, 22 Jan 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.

40. Ibid., 19 Feb 42 entry.

41. Ibid., 22 Feb 42 entry.

42. Memo, WPD for CofS, 28 Feb 92, sub: Strategic Conceptions and their Application to SW Pacific, Env 35, Exec 4. This paper was prepared as one of a series of studies on defensive deployment in the Pacific then being undertaken by the joint and combined staffs as well as in the War Department.

43. (1) JPS Directive 1 to JUSSC, 28 Jan 42. This directive, the first of JPS to its working subcommittee, JUSSC, was forwarded as JPS 2, 30 Jan 42, title: (Directive No. 1) Strategic Deployment of Land, Sea and Air Forces of the U.S. (2) CCS 34, 9 Feb 42, title: Economical Employment of Air Forces against Japan. The title later was changed to "The Economical Employment of Armed Forces Against Japan."

44. (1) Min, 4th mtg CCS, 10 Feb 42. (2) Min, 13th mtg CPS, 11 Feb 42. (3) JPS 2/l, 11 Feb 42, title: Directive to JUSSC.

45. These reports on "Review of the Strategic Situation in the Japanese Theater of War" were submitted to the JPS on 18 February 1942. The majority report was JPS 2/2, originally JPS 12/1. The minority report was JPS 2/2-A, formerly JPS 12/1-A. Both are filed in ABC 370 (1-28-42). The minority report was the work of one member of the committee and was not signed, but it was undoubtedly the work of the Air Forces representative.

46. The Anzac area covered the eastern and northeastern approaches to Australia and New Zealand, including the ocean reaches between them and New Caledonia.

47. (1) JPS 2/4 (D), 24 Feb 42, title: Strategic Deployment of Land, Sea and Air Forces of U.S. (2) JPS 2/5, 6 Mar 42, same title. (3) JPS 2/6, 6 Mar 42, same title. The combined JUSSC: report (inclosed in JPS 2/5) entitled "Review of the Strategic Situation in the Japanese Theater of War," plus the supplementary study (JPS 2/6) containing statistical estimates of forces were submitted to the JPS on 6 March 1942.

48. The amalgamated paper comprising the JUSSC; studies and JPS conclusions reached the JCS on 14 lurch 1942 as JCS 23, entitled, "Strategic Deployment of Land, Sea, and Air Forces of the United States." It consisted of (1) a basic paper identical with JPS 2/5 except that JPS conclusions had been added; (2) Appendix I, identical with JPS 2/6; and (3) Appendix II, a new study modifying the numerical estimates in JPS 2/6 in light of subsequent commitments.

49. JPS "Conclusions" to JCS 23, 14 Mar 42, title cited n. 47 (1).

50. Min, 6th mtg JCS, 16 Mar 42.

51. See (1) JCS 11, 12 Feb 42, title; Hawaiian Def Forces, and (2) other papers filed with JCS 11 and JCS 11/1 in ABC 381 Hawaii (2-12-42).

52. (1) For Gen Emmons' request, see memo, Col L.S. Gerow for Gen Eisenhower, 20 Feb 42, sub: Reinforcements for Hawaii, WPD 3144-19. Emmons requested one square division, one armored regiment, and an increase in air strength to give him 200 heavy bombers, 50 light and medium bombers, 326 pursuit planes, and 300 observation planes. (2) For JCS approval of JCS 11, see min, 3d mtg JCS, 2 Mar 42. (3) For presidential approval, see memo, Brig Gen Walter Bedell Smith for Marshall, 14 Mar 42, no sub, with JCS 11/1 in ABC 381 Hawaii (2-12-42).

53. See msg, Prime Minister to President, 4 Mar 42, No 37, circulated as CCS 56.

54. Memo, WPD for CofS, 5 Mar 42, sub: Proposed answer to Prime Minister, Book 4, Exec 8. WPD had concluded that, with the return of Australian forces from the fear Fast, the Employment of two American divisions in the Southwest Pacific would leave the over-all distribution as originally contemplated.

55. CCS 56/1, 6 Mar 42, title; Msg from Prime Minister on Current Sit.

56. Appendix II of JCS 23 listed another circumstance affecting the earlier deployment recommendations, namely that the War;end Navy Departments, the Munitions Allocation Committee, the Maritime Commission, and With certain reservations, the War Shipping Administration had agreed on a proposed allocation of American cargo ships (over 5,000 tons deadweight) for the year 1942. This appendix is a supplementary report by the JUSSC prepared in accordance with JPS directive. (See min, 4th mtg JPS, 11 Mar 42).

57. App II, JCS 23.

58. For effect on troop movements to the United Kingdom, see below, Ch. VIII.

59. See (1) Addendum to WPD Notes on JCS 23 in ABC 370 (1-28-42); and (2) JPS 21 /7, 18 Apr 42, title; Def for Island Bases along Lines of Communication between Hawaii and Australia.

60. The total forces "on shore in overseas positions" in the Pacific recommended in JPS 2/6 and incorporated in JCS 23 were (in round numbers) 416,000, of whom 225,000 were then present in the areas or en route. (JCS 23, Annex A, title; Forces Req to Secure SW Pacific.) The breakdown (in round numbers, including projected ground and air strength for 1942) was as follows:

Navy 18,000
Marine Corps 48,000
Army (Alaska) 42,000
Army (Panama) 79,000
Army (Central, South, and Southwest Pacific) 229,000
Total 416,000

The figure of over 275,000 given in the text for the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific represents the 229,000 in JCS 23, with allowance of over 45,000 for forces, including the 27th, 32d, and 37th Divisions, not included in JCS 23. The figure 275,000 corresponds roughly with the calculation made at the time by WPD. (See Addendum cited n. 59(1).)

Projected Army commitments to the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific rose steadily during the spring. (See OPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).) As of 2 April commitments were about 260,000; for 23 April, about 276,000; for 4 June, about 290,000.

61. Their first action was to readjust British command relations by returning Burma to the "operational command" of India. (Min, 7th mtg CCS, 21 Feb 42.) Sir John Dill had recommended that this measure should take precedence over any general reconsideration of the boundaries of the ABDA area. (Min, 5th mtg CCS, 17 Feb 42.)

62. (1) Min, 8th mtg CCS, 23 Feb 42. (2) Msg, Marshall to Brett, 23 Feb 42, ABDA 196. For text of msg, see WPD 4639-54.

63. Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 24 Feb 42, No. 1083, AG 381 (l1-27-41), 2-C.

64. (1) Msg, Marshall to Brett, 21 Feb 42, No. 185, AG 381 (11-27-41), 2-C. The message confirmed instructions telephoned to Brett by Arnold but did not specify what would be Brett's assignment on arrival in Australia. (2) Memo Eisenhower for Arnold, 21 Feb 42, no sub, WPD 4639-48. (3) See memo, WPD for TAG, 23 Feb 42, sub: Asgmt of Gen Brett to Comd U.S. forces in Australia, WPD 4639-54, for the order to Brett to assume command of U.S. forces in Australia. Notation states that the text was sent to General Brett (ABDACOM, Batavia) as radiogram No. 196. For the reassignment of Brereton, see above, Ch. VI.

65. For a detailed account of this transaction, see Morton, Fall of the Philippines.

66. (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 4 Feb 42, Item la, Exec 10. (2) There was no further correspondence on the matter until 21 February, when the War Department requested MacArthur's views. Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 21 Feb 42, Item la, Exec 10. Copy also in WDCSA 370.05 Phil (3-17- 42) (SS). (3) These messages were both sent with the utmost secrecy. Memos, Eisenhower for Off in Charge of Code Room, 4 Feb and 21 Feb 42, atchd to above cited copies of draft msgs in Item la, Exec 10.

67. (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 22 Feb 42,. 1078, WDCSA; 370.05 Phil (3-17-42) SS. This message was sent by Eisenhower, received in the Philippines 2257, 22 February 1942, and delivered to MacArthur in person at midnight 22-23 February (both Washington time). (2) Ltr, SW to Honorable Earl Warren, Attorney General, State of California, 14 Apr 12. with atchd certificate by Eisenhower and memo for red by Col Charles K. Gailey, Jr., Exec OPD, OPD 210.3, 53. Churchill on 20 February had already "surmised" that if MacArthur were evacuated from Corregidor he would "look after the Australian side." (See Hinge of Fate, p. 143.)

68. Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 26 Feb 42,. 373, WDCSA 370.05 Phil (3-17- 42) (SS). For correspondence on the manner of departure, se (1) msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 24 Feb 42, 358, and (2) msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 25 Feb 42, No. 1087, both in WDCSA 170.05 Phil (3-17-42) (3-17-42) (SS); and (3) memo, WPD for TAG, 26 Feb 42, sub: Mar Eastern Sit, Item 10, Exec 10.

69. Msg, President to Prime Minister, 18 Feb 42,. 106, with JPS 11 in ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42), 1-A.

70. Msg, CsofS to Jt Stf Mis, 23 Feb 42, W. 76, with CPS 19,13 in ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42), 1-A.

71. Sum of conf at White House on "Strategic Responsibility of United Kingdom and United States," 7 Mar 42, circulated by JCS on 9 Mar 42 as JCS 19.

72. Min, 5th mtg JCS, 9 Mar 42.

73. Memo, Gen Eisenhower for JCS, 8 Mar 42, sub: Strategic Responsibility of the U.K. and the U.S., Env 36, Exec 4. This paper, presented to the JCS by General Marshall, was circulated as JCS 19/1, 9 March 1942, with the omission of one politically controversial sentence about moving the advisory Pacific Council from London to Washington.

74. Msg, President to Prime Minister, 9 Mar 42, No. 115, copy filed with CCS 56/1 in ABC 311.5 (1-30-42). The President declared that all possible aid to Russia would be continued and noted that the grand strategy of actual operations in the three areas would remain the subject of study and decisions be the combined staffs and the joint committees on shipping raw materials, and munitions.

75. Msg, Prime Minister to President, 18 Mar 42, No. 46, with JCS 19/1 in ABC 371 (3-5-42).

76. Memo, Admiral King for JCS, 16 Feb 42, sub: Changes in ABDA and/or Anzac Areas Evolving from Developments in Far East, with min, 5th mtg CCS, 17 Feb 42, in ABC 381 SWPA (1-12-42). King also proposed in this memorandum that Burma be separated from the ABDA Command and transferred to a new India-Burma-China Theater.

77. (1) WPD brief, Notes on . . . CPS 19/D, with CPS 19/D. (2) WPD brief, Notes on . . . CCS 9th mtg, 3 Mar 42, Demarcation of New Strategic Areas in Japanese War Zone, with CCS 53. Both in ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42), 1-A.

78. For exchange of information with Brett, see: (1) msg, Brett (Melbourne) to TAG (for Marshall), 27 Feb 42,. 87, (2) msg, same to same, 28 Feb 42, No. 390, and (3) msg, Brett (sans origine) to same, 3 Mar 42, No. 467, all three in Tab ABD.4-U.S. Reps, Book 4, Exec 8; (4), msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Brett, 5 Mar 42, No. 543, WPD Msg File 10, 401; (5) msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Brett, 8 Mar 42, WPD Msg File 11, 726; and (6) memo, OPD for Actg CofS [Maj Gen Joseph T. McNarney], 16 Apr 42, sub: Comd in SWPA, Tab Misc, Book 4, Exec 8. Final recommendations of the governments of Australia and New Zealand, which envisaged a supreme Allied command containing Australia, New Zealand, and the remnants of the ABDA area, were circulated as CCS 57, 7 Mar 42, title; Governmental and Strategical Contls and Comds in Anzac Area.

79. JCS 18, 8 Mar 42, title cited n. 78. This paper was drafted by the Navy.

80. OPD brief, Notes on . . . JCS 18, with JCS 18 in ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42), 1-A.

81. Memo, CofS for JCS [9 Mar 42], sub: Creation of SWPA, Tab Collab, Book 4, Exec 8. This memorandum, prepared by General Eisenhower, was circulated as JCS 18/2.

82. (1) Min, 5th mtg JCS, 9 Apr 42. (2) For Admiral King's restatement of the point at issue, see memo, King for President, 5 Apr 42, with CCS 57/2 in ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42), 2.

83. In May, when Admiral Nimitz took command of the Pacific Ocean Area, Lt. Gen. Frank hi. Andrews, Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command (CDC), asked what would be the effect of the new division of the Pacific theater, so far as his command was concerned. The War Department informed him: "Pacific Ocean Areas placed under CINCPAC do not include Southeast Pacific Area. Consequently there is no change in command status, Pacific Sector, Panama Sea Frontier." (Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Andrews, 9 May 42, CM-OUT 1941.)

84. (1) Min, 6th mtg JCS, 16 Mar 42. (2) Memo, CNO for CofS, 19 Mar 42, sub: Comd Areas in Pacific Theater, with JCS 18/2 in ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42), 2. (3) Min, 7th mtg JCS, 23 Mar 42. The boundary between the Indian and Pacific theaters was definitely fixed on 24 March 1942. The CCS also agreed at the meeting of that day that the directive to the Supreme Commander, SWPA, would be issued by the United States Government "in direct consultation as necessary with the Australian Government." (Min, 13th mtg CCS, 24 Mar 42.)

85. (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 10 Mar 42, sub: Far Eastern Sit. This memorandum had notation that this message from Marshall to Brett was No. 613. (2) For Presidential "OK-FDR, see memo, SGS for Hopkins, 10 Mar 42, no sub. Both in Item 10, Exec 10.

86. (1) WD press release, 17 Mar 42, copy in Item 10, Exec 10. (2) For MacArthur's trip to Australia, see Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. XX.

87. Msg, President to Prime Minister, 17 Mar 42, Item 10, Exec 10. The President noted that he had authorized a press release in order to forestall enemy propaganda to the effect that the United States was abandoning the Philippines.

88. Msg (originator WPM, Marshall to MacArthur (CG USAFFE, Melbourne), 18 Mar 42, No. 739, WPD msg File 13, 1885.

The directive setting up SWPA did not receive approval "through established channels" by all the governments concerned till mid-April. In the meantime, as Eisenhower pointed out, "for all practical purposes" MacArthur was the "Supreme Commander in the Southwest Pacific. "He formally assumed command on 18 April and soon thereafter adopted the title, by which he was subsequently known, of Commander in Chief, SWPA. (Memo, WPD for Actg CofS, 16 Apr 42, sub: Comd in SWPA, Tab Misc-, Book 4, Exec 8.)

89. (1) cited n. 88. (2) The final directive to MacArthur also provided specifically that he was ineligible to "command directly any National force. "Msg (originator OPD, Marshall to MacArthur, 3 Apr 42, CM-OUT 0482.

90. (1) Msg, Brett to Marshall, 21 Mar 42, No. 792, WPD Msg File 14, 2180. Brett reported bring informed of his appointment by the Australian Government. (2) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 21 Mar 42, No, 791, WPD Msg File 14, 2201. The War Department approved, providing the appointment were satisfactory to MacArthur. (3) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 21 Mar 42, No.3, WPD Msg File 14, 2234. MacArthur stated that, since his air forces were "in a most disorganized condition," it was "most essential as a fundamental and primary step" to put Brett in charge of air forces, relieving him of his other duties.

91. Msg cited n. 90 (3). MacArthur added that "coordination with Australian Forces for the present in accordance with your radio will be scoured through cooperation." He requested "immediate approval" of his proposal "as a fundamental step in order to bring some order into what is at present a most uncoordinated and ineffective system which is a menace to the safety of the country."

92. Memo, WPD for TAG, 22 Mar 42, sub: Instns to Gen MacArthur as Supreme Comdr, Item 7, Exec 10. The text was sent to General MacArthur at Melbourne as radiogram No. 810.

93. Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 24 Mar 42, No. 19, Vol V, Item li, Exec. 2. It was on this basis that MacArthur set up the SWPA Command in April; Allied air forces to be under General Brett; Allied land forces under an Australian officer, General Sir Thomas Blarney; Allied navel forces under Admiral Leary; U.S. Forces in the Philippines under Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright; and USAFIA under General Barnes. MacArthur characterized USAFIA as a "Service Command," though it actually retained additional functions. (See msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 20 Apr 42, CM-IN 5422.)

94. (1) Min, 8th mtg JCS, 30 Mar 42. (2) Memo. S. Secy CCS for Marshall, 1 Apr 42, with CCS 57/2 in ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42), 2. (3) Memo, CofS and COMINCH for President 30 Mar 42, no sub, and incl directives for CINCPOA and Supreme Comdr, SWPA, Photostats in ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42), 1-B and OPD 384 PTO, 4. (4) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 3 Apr 42, CM-OUT 0482. This message is quoted from the directive to the Supreme Commander, SWPA, 30 March 1942.

95. Msg cited n. 88.

96. The War Department continued its helpless preoccupation with the Philippines to the end of the Philippine Island Campaign. For the detailed story of the close of that campaign, see Morton, Fall of the Philippines.

Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation