Appendix B
Documentary Exhibits

W-21

No. 94
December 22, 1941
6 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Permit me respectfully to submit the following:

I have not been advised of the particular proposals our government is to make for consideration as a joint strategic plan for the winning of the war. I fear, however that there may be no suggestion that an integral and vital part of such plan would be the preparation and conditioning of those people and those territories where the issue is to be fought.

Based on my observations of wars during the past five years, I believe it would be a serious error to ignore or neglect such preparation and such conditioning.

On the offensive, this kind of operation is necessary in order to disintegrate the resistance. On the defensive, it is necessary in order to harass the enemy as local conditions may permit.

We can consider this under two types of guerrilla warfare:

  1. Setting up of small groups working as bands under definite leaders.

  2. The establishment of guerrilla forces military in nature, in order to secure cohesion and successfully carry out a plan of campaign.

It is unnecessary to stress that modern large-sized armies are greatly dependent on roads, railways, and signal communications, and the creation of supply and munitions dumps, to keep themselves supplied with food, munitions, and gasoline--without which they cannot operate. These communications constitute a desirable target both of the military and sabotage type.

The principle laid down is that the whole art of guerrilla warfare lies in striking the enemy where he least expects it and yet where he is most vulnerable.

Specifically, I suggest the following:

1. That as an essential part of any strategic plan,there be recognized the need of sewing the dragon's teeth in those territories form which we must withdraw and in which the enemy will place his army; for example, the Azores or North Africa. That the aid of native chiefs be obtained, the loyalty of the inhabitants be cultivated. Fifth columnists organized and placed, demolition material cached; and guerilla bands of bold and daring men organized and installed.

2. That there be organized now, in the United States, a guerrilla corps independent and separate from the Army and Navy, and imbued with a maximum of the offensive and imaginative spirit. This force should, of course, be created along disciplined military lines, analogous to the British Commando principle, a statement of which I sent you recently.

--236--

COMINCH FILE
A16-3/(0012)
UNITED STATES FLEET
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
 

January 8,1942

MEMORANDUM:--

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: Major General Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
Subject: Use of "Commandoes" in Pacific Fleet Area.

1. The Secretary told me that the President is much interested in the development and use of the equivalent of British "commandos".

2. The Secretary told the President that you have such groups in training.

3. The President proposed the use of "commandos" as essential parts of raiding expeditions which attack (destroy) enemy advanced (seaplane) bases in the Pacific Fleet area.

4. Please let me have your views - and proposals -- as to such use.

/signed/
E.J. KING.

--237--

11/30-chb OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND JOINT TRAINING FORCE
Camp Elliott, San Diego, Calif.
 

13 January, 1942.

From: Captain James Roosevelt, USMCR.
To: The Major General Commandant, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.
Via: The Commanding General, Second Joint Training Force.
 
Subject: Development within the Marine Corps of a unit for purposes similar to the British Commandos and the Chinese Guerrillas.
 
Enclosures: (A) Proposed organization.
(B) Notes on proposed training and character of employment.
(C) Newspaper clipping "The Commandos".

1. The complete domination in force of the Western coasts of continental Europe has resulted in the formation by the British of a force popularly known as "The Commandos". The purpose of this group of especially trained and equipped fighters is to inflict on the enemy surprise and swiftly moving blows. The tactic is similar to the jab in boxing, the aim being to destroy confidence, disrupt well laid plans, create panic, fear and uncertainty, destroy or demolish key concentrations, and in general impede the enemy's attack and prepare the way for your own offensive action. These Commandos have proven of great value in situations such as have existed in Europe, Egypt and Africa, where the British could not go on the offensive. Similarly the Eighth Route Army in China has proven an invaluable obstacle to any continued Japanese offensive in the North China, or Border District. The Japanese have not found it possible to withstand for any long period the pressure placed by these groups as soon as the Japanese line of supply became extended. Similar successful action is reported now being used in Northern Malaya and Indo-China.

2. It is submitted that the position of our forces in the Pacific would be greatly aided by similar action on Japanese positions in the Mandated Islands, and perhaps later the Philippines, by units based to the South; even more devastating action frontally by landing on Japan proper from Mito north to Aomori would certainly demoralize the enemy.

--238--

Subject: Development within the Marine Corps of a unit for purposes similar to the British Commandos and the Chinese Guerrillas.

Transportation by submarine, and landings by rubber boats, would seem practicable. No discussion is made here of similar Atlantic situations which, however, do or will exist.

3. A review of Marine Corps history indicates that our country does not need to go outside of this organization for a body of men capable of executing such missions. There are many officers and men with experience in Nicaragua who have had similar experience. A study of modern British experience would, of course, be helpful. This is now available in written form in the Office of the Coordinator of Information. For purposes of discussion there are attached hereto Appendices A and B showing proposed table of organization, requirements of men and materiel and type of training. It is especially important that each unit down to, and including, the squad should be able to operate independently of the higher units.

4. The matter is especially urged as it is believed it fits the entire tradition of action and boldness held by the Marine COrps, and there is reason to believe that the other branches of the armed forces are considering doing the job.

/signed/
JAMES ROOSEVELT


13/25-rpb 0024 1st Endorsement January 14, 1942.
HQ,   2d Joint Training Force,       Camp Elliot,       San Diego, Calif.
From: The Commanding General.
To: The Major General Commandant.

1. Forwarded.

2. The thought expressed in the basic letter is concurred in, insofar as the value of such an organization is concerned. It is believed, however, that the Marine Divisions should complete their organization and train units now authorized prior to the formation of any such new organizations.

/signed/
CLAYTON B. VOGEL.


--239--

Appendix "A"

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF MOBILE COLUMNS (COMMANDOS).
(To be called "Rangers" or some other appropriate name.)

Introduction: In order to be effective these units must be highly mobile, well integrated,and yet possessing flexibility. The psychological attitude of the members is extremely important for success will depend on harmony of action, keen judgement and unhesitating willingness to sacrifice themselves to the accomplishment of the task. The appeal of adventure or the hope for glory are inadequate stimuli. The men must be indoctrinated with the conviction that their efforts and sacrifices are providing a vital contribution to the preservation of freedom in all its forms. Hence the desirability for leadership that is essentially psychological; hence, also, the need for a higher percentage of leaders to the number of fighters, and for a closer relationship between leaders and fighters than is customary in orthodox military organizations.
ORGANIZATION:
COLUMN (approximately a battalion); 4 companies.
COMPANY: 3 sections.
SECTION: 2 squads.
SQUAD: 10 men (1 leader and 9 others).
 
For simplification members of the column will be known as either LEADERS or FIGHTERS, the leader of the column being entitled Commander.
 
COMMAND and STAFF:
COLUMN: 1 Leader
  1 Asst. Leader
  3 Staff Leaders
      1 to perform functions of Adjutant, Operations and Intelligence.
      1 for supply.
      1 for communications.
  2 Medical Officers
  4 Radio Operators
  1 Clerk
  3 Cooks
  3 Others
  2 Corpsmen
    Total: 20 C&S

--240--

 
COMPANY:  
  1 Leader
  1 Asst Leader
  2 Radio Operators
  1 Medical Officer
  2 Corpsmen
  3 Others
    Total: 10
SECTION: 1 Leader
  1 Asst Leader
  1 Radio Operator
  1 Corpsman
  3 Others
    Total: 7 C&S
SQUAD: 1 Leader
  1 Asst Leader
    Total: 2
RECAPITULATION:           
  Squad Section
(2 squads)
Company
(3 Sec)
Column
(4 Cos)
Leaders 2 6 20 82
Staff       3
Fighters 8 16 48 192
Medical Officers     1 6
Corpsmen   1 5 22
Radiomen   1 5 24
Cooks       3
Clerk       1
Others          3  12    51
Total 10 27 91 384
EQUIPMENT
Haversack
Canteen
Belt, pistol*
Belt, rifle*
Belt, TSMG*
Carrier, grenade
Compass, prismatic
Wire cutters
Thompson SMG*
Demolitions*
  Small radio, walkie-talkie type (1 per Squad)
Map case
D-hydrated rations*
Boots, lace, three-quarter length, moccasin toe, composition (non-slip) sole
Pistol, .45 cal., automatic*
Rifle, Springfield or Garand*
*Character of mission to determine which of these items will be carried.

--241--

APPENDIX "B"

NOTES ON TRAINING, TYPES OF MISSIONS, and
QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL.

MISSIONS:

It is believed that training should be designed to prepare men to execute the following missions:

  1. Landing on foreign shore for the destruction of munitions plants, magazines,aircraft centers, shipping,industrial plants, or other vital production or transportation installations.

  2. Landing on foreign shore for the purpose infiltrating into the rear of enemy positions and operating in conjunction with landings in force at other points.

  3. Landing on foreign shore for purpose of conducting ground reconnaissance and.or gathering information (capturing personnel and documents).

  4. Employment on land as foot scouting patrols for secret penetration of the enemy position.

TRAINING:

--242--

QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL:

--243--

APPENDIX "C"

  • The Commandos

    NOTHING IS MORE terrifying than a fear of the unknown and unseen enemy strikes without warning and were least expected. The British seem to understand this fear and they have acted to spread it with devastating effect in widely separated parts of the world against their axis enemies.

    Last week they were in Norway, raiding and destroying German bases and fortifications. So swiftly and silently did they move that their enemies were unaware of their presence until too late to resist them. This week they have struck again, this time in Malaya, far back of the Japanese lines. So swiftly and so efficiently did they strike here that a convoy was destroyed and a column demoralized before the surprised Japs realized what was taking place.

    Such incidents will not, of course, win a war. But they help. Repeated often enough they can create an uneasiness and a terror in the minds and hearts of the enemy that much of their self-assurance can be destroyed. Once an army becomes jittery and fearful of an enemy it cannot see and whose presence it cannot detect, its usefulness is impaired. Soldiers, no matter how brave or foolhardy they may be in the face of danger they know exists and which they can locate precisely, have no less fear of the unknown, the unseen surprise attack than anyone else.

    The Commandos, if they continue their blows, will be accomplishing far more than the size of their operations may indicate. They constitute a secret, surprise weapon that the Germans, the Italians and the Japs haven't been able to match.

  • San Diego Union, 6 Jan 1942

    --244--

    IN REPLYING ADDRESS
    THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT
    AND REFER TO No.

    AO-111-hem
    (08B1442)

    HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS
    WASHINGTON

    14 January 1942.

    From: The Major General Commandant.
    To: Major General H.M. Smith, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia.
    Subject: Appointment of Colonel William J. Donovan as Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

    1. Suggestion has been made that Colonel William J.Donovan be appointed to the Marine Corps Reserve and promoted immediately to the rank of Brigadier General for the purpose of taking charge of the "Commando Project".

    2. It will be recalled that Colonel Donovan served with distinction in the 27th Division during World War I. He has since than observed practically all wars that have taken place; and in particular has specialized in Commando Operations (amphibious raids).

    3. A frank expression of opinion is requested from you as to the advisability of accepting this suggestion. Replies will be Confidential and will be forwarded as promptly as possible direct to the Major General Commandant by air mail where appropriate.

    /signed/
    T. HOLCOMB

    --245--

    Op-22-A2a
    A16-3(4)
    Serial (0025)

    From: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet
    To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
     
    Subject: Commando training, U.S. Marine Corps.
     
    Reference: (a) Spenavo, London, Secret Des. 091421 of January 1942.
    (b) MGC Secret ltr. Serial 202942 of January 10, 1942 to Cominch.

    1. Reference (a) proposed that a troop of 7 officers and 100 enlisted men, U.S. Marine Corps, be assigned to temporary duty with British Commandos for training at the British Commando Special Training Center and that this troop participate with the British Commandos in combined operations against enemy shores. Training similar, in part, to Commando training is now being given to the Destroyer Transport Battalion of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, and to parachute troops. It is believed that no further separate units should be organized for training as Commandos until all organizations of the Marine Divisions are filled to full strength. To carry out the suggestion of reference (a) would require the separation of trained personnel from the First Marine Division which would be inadvisable at this time.

    2. In lieu of the suggestion contained in Reference (a), it is recommended, as proposed by the Major General Commandant in Reference (b), that a small group of selected officers and non-commissioned officers be sent to England for a [period of about one month for Commando training, such personnel to be used as instructors in the Fleet Marine Force on return to the United States. It is further recommended that the participation in active operations of the U.S. Marine Corps group sent for Commando training be not approved.

    E.J. King

    CC: Major Gen'l Comdt.

    --246--

    C O N F I D E N T I A L
    CFPB-fcr.
    Serial 01008.

    Camp Elliott, San Diego, California.

    16 January, 1942.

    From: Major General Charles F.B. Price, Marine Corps.
    To: The Major General Commandant.
     
    Subject: Appointment of Colonel William J. Donovan as Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.
     
    Reference: (a) MGC ltr to Maj-Gen. Price, 14Jan42, AO-111-hem (O8D1442) CONFIDENTIAL.

    1. The undersigned knows COlonel William J. Donovan only slightly and principally by reputation and not from personal observation and contact. Within these limitations,m the undersigned is inclined to judge that Colonel Donovan is well qualified by natural bent and experience for the assignment contemplated and probably more so than any General officer of the regular Marine Corps at present available for such assignment.

    2. If consideration of the point at issue is expanded to include the advisability of the Marine Corps assuming the execution of the "Commando Project" in addition to the mission to which it is already committed in its normal function in support of the Fleet, then additional angles of the problem become of vital importance and should be soberly considered.

    3. The tremendous expansion of the Corps compared to its former peace-time strength in personnel has resulted in spreading very thinly the limited number of officers and noncommissioned officers available who are qualified by professional study, training and experience to fill the essential command and staff positions in the increasing number of higher tactical units required to meet the war-time demands on our Fleet Marine Force. Regardless of the excellence of the human material which is joining the Corps at this time, their deficiencies in training and experience cannot be quickly overcome and they will not be ready to advance into these responsibilities until they have been seasoned by considerable experience. If they can gain this experience under reasonably competent leadership there is every reason to expect that their progress will be steady and not too costly

    --247--

    C O N F I D E N T I A L: Serial 01008

    Subject: Appointment of Colonel William J. Donovan as Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.


    in the normal consequence of the trial and error method. A careful husbanding of our resources in trained personnel therefore becomes of paramount importance at this time.

    4. If the personnel to conduct this new activity can be recruited almost entirely from new resources it would be the judgment of the undersigned that the entire spirit and plan of employment of the Commando Groups is directly in line with the aggressive spirit and tradition of the Marine Corps, that it will add immeasurably to the fame and prestige of the Corps and must inevitably attract to our ranks the most adventurous and able spirits of America's manhood.

    5. If, on the other hand, our very limited resources in trained officers must be further dispersed and if the best of the adventurous spirits and "go-getters" among our men must be diverted from the Fleet Marine Force in meeting the requirements of this additional activity, (Commando Project) then the undersigned would recommend seriously against assuming this additional commitment.

    CHAS. F.B. PRICE.

    --248--

    IN REPLYING
    REFER TO No.

    CFBP-fcr.
    PERSONAL

    UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
    OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
    SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE
    Camp Elliott, San Diego, California.

    16 January 1942.

    Dear Tom:

    I have sent my formal reply to the question of commissioning General Donovan and I realize that the additional paragraphs which I added were probably foreign to the issue inasmuch as I was not requested to express an opinion in that respect, but I could not forego recording my misgivings at the prospect of taking on anything more for the Corps until we have brought some degree of order out of the confusion which exists with respect to our normal activities here.

    There is another thing in this connection which I could not very well put in my other letter and that is the grave danger that this sort of thing will develop into a tail which will wag the dog eventually. I know in what quarters the idea of foisting this scheme upon the Marines originated and I opine that if it is developed along the lines of a hobby in the hands of personnel other than regular Marine officers it could very easily get far out of hand and out of control as well.

    It appears pretty clear to me that you are in a position of having to comply and that nothing can be done about it so please accept my sympathy.

    After talking with Joe Fegan I am inclined to agree with him that Bierman would probably be a good man to head this service, or at least to hold a responsible position. The only man in my own acquaintance who I believe would have outstanding qualities for this type of leadership is Pelham D. Glassford, former Brigadier General, U.S. Army, now retired. You will probably remember him as Director of Public Safety in Washington, D.C., at the time of the Bonus Army trouble.

    --249--

    As a matter of fact,if this Commando Service could be directly recruited in the realm of football players and other athletes and from the memberships of sports clubs throughout the country, a very effective unit would probably be formed. My only misgiving is that our own house is not sufficiently in order at this moment to undertake this, moreover, our resources in trained personnel are already strained to a dangerous point.

    The activities of our recruit depot here in Camp Elliott are progressing nicely. By tomorrow night we will have 2,500 men under instruction here and additional ones will come along in weekly details. The activities involved in adjusting ourselves to this plan are in themselves an excellent experience for my young men and I anticipate great benefit to the trainers as well as those being trained.

    There is a little matter of personal interest to me which I would like to bring to your benevolent attention. Betty's husband, Captain john B. Hendry, was picked up on his annual physical with symptoms of diabetes. he has been for nearly four months now, undergoing the depressing routine of our senseless medical service; kept in solitary confinement most of the time, frequently on starvation diets, subjected to all kinds of witless experimentations, kept in ignorance of his true condition and threatened with ultimate retirement involving semi-starvation for himself and his family. The boy was in a pretty low state of morale even before the war broke; since then, of course, he is desolated at the prospect of being ineffective at a time when every good citizen is doing his bit. he is before the retiring board this week and the report of his board will go forward with his request for retention on active duty if practicable, or return to limited active duty at once if the report of the board results in his retirement. Rupertus is very anxious to have him here at the Base, especially now that he has been directed to reopen the sea school. Captain Hendry has just returned from a tour of duty at sea on the U.S.S. Houston in the Asiatic Fleet. He is also a graduate of Sill and a field artillery expert and should be very useful in that capacity. I suggest no special favor in this case but I would ask for the most benevolent action which is consistent with the las and the best interests of the Corps.

    --250--

    Dolly and I are both well and enjoying San Diego a lot. She joins me in best wishes to Beatrice and to you.

    Sincerely yours,
    /signed/
    CHAS. F.B. PRICE,
    Major General, U.S. Marines.

    Major General Thomas Holcomb, U.S. Marines,
    The Major General Commandant,
    U.S. Marine Corps,
    Washington, D.C.

    --251--

    01/101

    HEADQUARTERS, AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET,
    MARINE BARRACKS, QUANTICO, VIRGINIA.

    C O N F I D E N T I A L

    16 January, 1942.

    From: Major General H.M. Smith, USMC.
    To: The Major General Commandant.
     
    Subject: Appointment of Colonel William J. Donovan as Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.
     
    Reference: (a) Your letter AO-111-hem (08B1442), 14 Jan 42.

    1. As requested in reference, the following opinions are expressed.

    - 1 -

    --252--


    Subject: Appointment of Colonel William J. Donovan as Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

    H.M. SMITH.

    --253--

    TH-ptl

    Mr. Samuel W. Meek
        420 Lexington Avenue
            New York, N.Y.
    19 January 1942

    Dear Sam:

    I am writing with further reference to a proposed article in LIFE about Earl Ellis.I resent Mr Palmer's attitude as expressed in his letter to Admiral Stark, a copy of which I enclose, and in his letter to Mr. Luce. I can see nothing whatever to be gained by the publication of this article and I can see a great deal of harm. As for publicity, the Marine Corps has fine, clean, honorable publicity and feels that for the time being at least it needs no more. Mr. Palmer wishes publicity for the Navy. Let him get it at their expense, not ours. I hope that Mr.Luce will be willing to suppress this story and that if this "bird" goes elsewhere with his stuff that I will hear about it.

    It was fine to have you both to dinner the other night. Mrs. Holcomb and I both thoroughly enjoyed meeting Mr. Luce. He is certainly one of the most interesting men I have met and I must thank you for the opportunity of seeing him. I hope that you can bring him to the house again soon and that I may have the pleasure of seeing him often.

    Again let me say that the MARCH OF TIME on Wake was the best job of its kind I have ever seen. It am writing officially to the corporation about it.

    The DOnovan affair is still uppermost in my mind. I am terrified that I may be forced to take this man. I feel that it will be the worst slap in the face the Marine COrps ever was given because it involves bringing an outsider into the Marine Corps as a leader in our own specialty that is, amphibious operations. Because commander [sic] work is simply one form of amphibious operation. It will be bitterly resented by our personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, and I am afraid that it may serve to materially reduce my usefulness in this office, if any, because I am expected and properly so to protect the Marine Corps from intrusions of this kind.

    Always sincerely
     
    T. Holcomb.

    Enc.

    --254--

    Cincpac File No.
    A3/
    A16-3(1)/(86)

    Serial 019 W

    UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
    U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
     

    S-E-C-R-E-T

    From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
    To: Commanding General, Second Joint Training Force.
     
    Subject: Organization of "Commando" Units.
     
    Reference: (a) Cominch despatch 230140 of January 1942.

    1. Reference (a) is quoted for information:

    DEVELOP ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF MARINES AND NAVAL UNITS OF "COMMANDO" TYPE FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH EXPEDITIONS OF RAID CHARACTER FOR DEMOLITION AND OTHER DESTRUCTION OF SHORE INSTALLATIONS IN ENEMY HELD ISLANDS AND BASES X EMPLOYMENT OF SOME SMALL UNITS EMBARKED IN SUBMARINES APPEARS PRACTICABLE BY USE OF RUBBER BOATS.

    2. In order to carry out the foregoing directive, it is desired that immediate steps be taken to organize and train four "Commando" type units in hour force. Details of organization, development, and training are left to your discretion, subject to the following:

    --255--

    Cincpac File No.
    A3/
    A16-3(1)/(86)

    Serial 019 W

    UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
    U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
     

    Subject: Organization of "Commando" Units.


    3. The Commanding General, Second Joint Training Force is authorized and directed to request the services of any personnel who may be familiar with training, organization, and methods of foreign Commando units.

    4. Please keep the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet informed of the progress made pursuant to this directive.

    5. Transmission via U.S. registered air mail is hereby authorized.

    C.W. NIMITZ

    Copy to:
        Cominch
        Opnav
        Maj.Gen.Comdt.
        Comscofor

    --256--

    3050-50
    5/18-cvs
    00010

    OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
    HEADQUARTERS, SECOND JOINT TRAINING FORCE
    Camp Elliott, San Diego, California.

    4 February 1942.

    SECRET:

    From: The Commanding General.
    To: The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division.
     
    Subject: Organization of "Commando" Units.
     
    Reference: (a) CinCPac secret ltr A3/A16-3(1)/86 serial 091W, dated 24Jan42.

    1. In compliance with reference (a) the 2d Marine Division is hereby directed to organize immediately and train four "Commando" type units.

    2. The specific missions contemplated for these units are as follows:

    3. The following details of organization are specified:

    1. Each unit should be organized so that it can be transported in one (1) APD, considering also that elements of units may operate from submarines.

    2. The four units will be administered and trained as a battalion.

    3. The four units will be trained to act singly or as a battalion.

    4. The battalion will not be considered as part of any combat team of the 2d Marine Division.

    5. The personnel will be volunteers having high physical qualifications.

    4. Training of units will include the following but the development and special training of the units is left to your discretion:

    1. Demolition and destruction.
    2. Day and night scouting and patrolling.
    3. Combat intelligence.

    -1-

    --257--

    3050-50
    5/18-cvs
    SECRET:
    0010
    Subject:
    Organization of "Commando" Units.

    5. The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division, is directed to request, via this headquarters, the services of any personnel who may be familiar with training,organization and methods of foreign Commando units or whose services in any other manner are desired.

    6. Please keep the Commanding General, 2d Joint Training Force, informed of the progress made, by reports separate from reports of state of training of T/O units.

    CLAYTON B.VOGEL.


    Copy to: Cincpac,
                 Comdt., USMC

    --258--

    IN REPLYING ADDRESS
    THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT
    AND REFER TO No.
    AO-283-njp
    (03A3442)
     

    HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS
    WASHINGTON

    S E C R E T

    Feb 4 1942

    MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES FLEET:

    Subject: Training of Amphibious Raiding Units of "Commando" Type.
     
    References: (a) COMINCH Dispatch 231940 January 1942.
    (b) CINCPAC Serial 019 to CG 2d JTF, dated 24 January 1942.

    1. In connection with the references, it is understood that three APD's have been ordered from the Atlantic Coast to the Pacific Coast in order to provide vessels for training special duty units in the Second Marine Division.

    2. Pending return of the Sixth Marines from Indigo [Iceland], the Second Marine Division has only one regiment (Second Marines) as a basis for absorbing the 5,000 recruits to be assigned that Division during the month of February. The assignment of one battalion of that regiment to special duty at this time would interfere seriously with the reorganization now in progress.

    3. The First Separate Battalion, or APD Battalion, attached to the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, has been in existence for years and has been undergoing intensive training in the execution of small-scale amphibious raids and surprise landings for the past year.

    4. In view of the above, it si proposed to issue orders increasing the strength of the First Separate Battalion by sufficient personnel to permit the transfer by rail to the West Coast of one experienced Infantry COmpany, Machine Gun Platoon, and 81mm Mortar Section, to serve as a nucleus for the organization of the Second Separate Battalion in the Second Joint Training Force, which may be used for the purpose indicated in references (a) and (b).

    --259--

    (003A3442) S E C R E T
    Subject: Training of Amphibious Raiding Units of "Commando" Type.

    5. The above is the most rapid and efficient method, under present conditions, of carrying out the provisions of references (a) and (b) and, at the same time, leaver a similar unit on the East Coast.

    6. Approval of this plan is requested.

    /signed/
    T. HOLCOMB


    Approved: /signed/ E.J. King 4 Feb 42          
    Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.

    --260--

    AO-134-hem

    February 4, 1942.

    Subsequent to receipt of the attached Memorandum by Colonel Peck, he and I had several telephone conversations relative to modification thereof. The following dispatch proposed by me was the one finally accepted as bet fitted for the purpose. Colonel Peck proposes to submit this dispatch to COMINCH tomorrow, February 5, for transmission if approved.

    TRANSFER DETACHMENT SEVEN OFFICERS AND APPROXIMATELY 200 ENLISTED FROM FIRST SEPARATE BATTALION AF AF TO COMMANDANT MARCORPS FOR FURTHER TRANSFER OVERLAND WEST COAST AS NUCLEUS APD BATTALION BEING ORGANIZED THERE FOR USE IN AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS X ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF DETACHMENT AS MAY BE DIRECTED BY COMMANDANT MARCORPS TO COMGEN AF AF X REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL SHORTAGE FIRST SEPARATE BATTALION BE EFFECTED SOON.

    [?OHJ?]

    --261--

    COMINCH FILE
    FF1/ P11-1/(0062)
    Serial (0062)
    UNITED STATES FLEET
    OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
    NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
     

    February 5, 1942

    S E C R E T

    From: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
    To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
    The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
     
    Subject: Commando Training of U.S. Marine Corps personnel in England.
    Reference: (a) Spenavo London Secret despatch 021301 of February, 1942.
    (b) OpNav Secret Despatch 191737 of January, 1942.

    1. The Commander-in-Chief approves the arrangements proposed in reference (a) for a detachment of two (2) officers and twenty (20) enlisted men to proceed to England for a two-month period of Commando training beginning April 1, 1942.

    2. The Chief of Naval Operations is requested to make the necessary administrative arrangements, and to notify the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, of the date on which it is desired that this detachment report to the Chief of Naval Operations. Arrival of the detachment in England at least one week prior to April 1, 1942 is desired.

    3. The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, is requested to form and equip this detachment and to issue the necessary orders in conformity with the instructions of the Chief of Naval Operations.

    E.J. King.

    GEORGE C. DYER,
    Flag Secretary.

    --262--

    In reply refer to Initials
    and No.

    (SC)P11-1/KK
    Op-16-A-2-a
    Serial 0130816
    NAVY DEPARTMENT
    OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
    WASHINGTON
     

    S E C R E T

    FEB 9 1942

    From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
    To: Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
     
    Subject: Commando Training of U.S. Marine Corps personnel in England.
     
    Reference: (a) Secret ltr. from COMINCH, FF1/P11-1, Serial 0062, dated February 5, 1942.

    1. In accordance with paragraph two of reference (a), it is recommended that the proposed detachment of twenty men and two officers be formed and equipped a the Marine barracks, Washington, D.C., in such time that departure may be effected not later than March 1, 1942.

    2. It is not considered essential that the officers and men be ordered to report to the Chief of Naval Operations, but it is requested that the officers be given verbal instructions to report to the Intelligence Division of this office not later than February 16, 1942 for necessary procedures involved in designation as Special Naval Observers.

    3. The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, is further requested to submit a complete roster of this detachment to the Chief of Naval Operations as soon as practicable.

    4. It is assumed that the Quartermaster, U.S. Marine Corps will arrange transportation to the United Kingdom by surface vessel scheduled to depart not later than March 1, 1942.

    5. The enlisted men will travel as troops without passports.

    /signed/
    T.S. WILKINSON
    By Direction

    --263--

    OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
    UNITED STATES FLEET

    MEMORANDUM

    9 February 1942.

    From: Admiral King

    To: Lt. Gen. Holcomb

    KING

    --264--

    AO-134-hem
    (09A4142)

    CONFIDENTIAL

    February 10, 1942.

    Dear Barney:

    On 14 January I wrote you a letter advising that a suggestion had been made that Colonel William J. Donovan be appointed to the Marine Corps Reserve and promoted immediately to the rank of Brigadier General for the purpose of taking charge of the "Commando Project". For obvious reasons, I didn't mention in my letter that this suggestion was made by very high authority, and that my reaction was one of complete disapproval of the idea. I purposely refrained from giving you any of the background or my reaction; this, in order that I might get a frank expression of opinion from you relative to the suggestion. I called on several other General officers of the Marine Corps for their opinions also.

    I expressed to higher authority my utter disapproval of the Donovan angle and the question died down. It turned up again today, but indications are that it has again been quieted. I fear, however, that the idea is too strongly imbedded to remain dormant very long unless we move promptly to broaden our amphibious training in such way as to head off any outside interference. In this connection I quote a memorandum, dated 9 February, just received from COMINCH, which affords us the opportunity desired:

    From: Admiral King
    To: Lt. Gen. Holcomb

    Will you please have your people follow up - and follow through - on the equipment and ammunition (for training) of "Commando" troops - with first priority for the units of the West Coast (Pacific Fleet). By equipment is meant everything needed to make the "Commando" units effective - to include, for instance, demolition, portable radio, rubber boats, special weapons, etc.

    /s/ King

    --265--

    Before stating the action we must take in this matter I shall give you an outline of my reasons for objecting to the appointment of Donovan.

    From a morale standpoint alone, the introduction of a separate special corps within the Marine Corps would be most undesirable. Moreover, the assignment of an outside officer over and above a large number of regular, professional officers. who by reason of long and continuous active service and experience are better qualified, would be considered by the latter as a reflection on their ability, experience, training, and courage.

    I have great respect for Colonel Donovan's World War record, for his accomplishments since the World War, and for his fine personality; I have no reason to question his qualities as a leader. However, the vital facts are that he has not had the amphibious experience which most Marine officers have had. If it is borne in mind that the Marine Corps throughout its history has specialized in bush warfare and amphibious operations; that particularly since World War I, it has conducted uninterrupted research in the history of this type of warfare; that it has developed a special technique, both in its schools and during annual maneuvers of its forces; that it is, so far as known, the only organization in the world which specializes in all phases of amphibious warfare; then it must be realized that were an officer brought into the Corps to supervise "Commando" work it would be a complete repudiation of our officer personnel, and would be so regarded. I know this temper, and the feelings, and the ideals of our officer and enlisted personnel. I take into consideration the fine record Marine Corps units made in World War I; the fine work they have done in our small wars since that date; and the creditable start which has been made in the present war. It is my considered opinion, and that of all the officers with whom I have discussed the question in hand, that to appoint Colonel Donovan an officer of the Marine Corps, regardless of the rank gien him, to take charge of "Commando" work would be a severe blow to the morale of our Corps, and therefore a blow to National Defense.

    --266--

    Although the infantry units of our Amphibious Forces are essentially "Commando" units, the disruption of organizations in their formative period has precluded, to a very large extent, the organization, equipment, and training desired for this purpose. Now, in view of COMINCH's memorandum, herein quoted, and as a means of forestalling the Donovan case, we must act and act quickly. We must prepare ourselves particularly for one of our important missions, viz: the execution of amphibious raids.

    In compliance with CinCpac's directive, you have directed the organization of four "Commando" units, to be administered and trained as a battalion (your letter 3050-50 over 5/18-cvs over 00010, r February 1942, just received). Since that was written, you have received instructions from me to organize the 2d Separate Battalion; this, I assume, will comprise the units you already started in accordance with above directive plus the reinforced company which we are sending to you from the 1st Separate Battalion from Quantico. The organization, equipment and training of this battalion is of first priority. We must go beyond this, which will be second priority, viz: the preparation of an infantry regiment for amphibious operations. In other words, we must get one battalion ready at the earliest practicable date, followed as soon as possible by one regiment, even at some sacrifice for the time being of the other units in the matter of experienced personnel and equipment.

    I want to emphasize that I consider the so-called "Commando Operations" only one feature of normal Marine Corps work. In fact, the later orations of the British Commandos indicate that they are following more and more our normal doctrine on landings. They have reprinted our FTP-167.

    However, in view of the situation now facing us, it is imperative that we get underway at once with greater emphasis on training in night operations ashore and afloat, patrolling beaches from the sea, air infantry, rubber boats, raids from cruisers and destroyers, patrolling from submarines and possibly some additional attention to individual combat.

    Similar directives are being issued to the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet.

    I am having prepared tables of special equipment considered essential for (1) 2d Separate Battalion and (2) battalions of the infantry regiments. I [3? illegible words] you a copy of the proposed organization of the 1st Separate battalion, now being prepared by Amphibious Force, Atlantic

    --267--

    Fleet. It has been proposed that we include in the Separate Battalion a platoon of parachutists; your radio comment on this proposal is requested.

    According to the records in this office you now have on hand 10 rubber boats; 40 will be shipped to you from Akron, Ohio, this week,40 the week following, and 20 the week following that.

    From this long letter I am sure you and all others concerned will appreciate the importance of getting this project underway immediately. It is really a matter of grave concern to me, as it may have a very important influence on our future.

    Please treat this subject, as regards personalities, as strictly Confidential. Also please keep me fully and frequently informed as to the progress you are making in the organization, equipment, and training of the units in question, as well as for the remainder of the Force. Incidentally, I don't like the term "Commando"; we are looking for a better term - one more fitting for the Marines. Have you any suggestions?

    With all good wishes.

    Sincerely,

    T. HOLCOMB.

    P.S. If you desire his services and feel that eh would be of material assistance in furthering this project, I will give favorable consideration to ordering Lt.Col. Edson out to you for duty as Commanding Officer of the 2d Separate Battalion.

    As I have already told Price, Colonel L.C. Shepherd will be sent to you for duty as Commanding Officer of an infantry regiment upon the return of Colonel Wharton from INDIGO [Iceland].

    Major General Clayton B. Vogel, U.S.M.C.,
    Marine Corps Base,
    San Diego, California.

    --268--

    AO-283-njp
    (O3A4242)

    11 Feb42

    CONFIDENTIAL

    Dear Holland:

    On 14 January 1 wrote you a letter advising that a suggestion had been made that Colonel William J. Donovan be appointed to the Marine Corps Reserve and promoted immediately to the rank of Brigadier General for the purpose of taking charge of the "Commando Project". For obvious reasons, I didn't mention in my letter that this suggestion was made by very high authority, and that my reaction was one of complete disapproval of the idea. I purposely refrained from giving you any of the background or my reaction; this, in order that I might get a frank expression of opinion from you relative to the suggestion. I called on several other General officers of the Marine Corps for their opinions also.

    I expressed to higher authority my utter disapproval of the Donovan angle and the question died down. It turned up again yesterday, but indications are that is has again been quieted. I fear, however, that the idea is too strongly imbedded to remain dormant very long unless we move promptly to broaden our amphibious training in such way as to head off any outside interference. In this connection I quote a memorandum, dated 9 February, just received from COMINCH, which affords us the opportunity desired.

    From: Admiral King
    To: Lt. Gen. Holcomb

    Will you please have your people follow up--and follow through--on the equipment and ammunition (for training) of "Commando" troops--with first priority for the units on the West Coast (Pacific Fleet). By equipment is meant everything needed to make the "Commando" units effective--to include, for instance, demolition, portable radio, rubber boats, special weapons, etc.

    /s/ King

    Before stating the action we must take in this regard I shall give you an outline of my reasons for objecting to the appointment of Donovan.

    --269--

    (O3A4242) CONFIDENTIAL  

    From a morale standpoint alone, the introduction of a separate special corps within the Marine Corps would be most undesirable. Moreover, the assignment of an outside officer over and above a large number of regular, professional officers, who by reason of long and continuous active service and experience are better qualified, would be considered by the latter as a reflection on their ability, experience, training, and courage.

    I have great respect for Colonel Donovan's World War record, for his accomplishments since the World War, and for his fine qualities as a leader. However, the vital facts are that he has had no Marine Corps experience whatever, that he does not have the indoctrination and background which makes the Marine what he is, and that he has not had the amphibious experience which most Marine officers have had. If it is borne in mind that the Marine Corps throughout its history has specialized in bush warfare and amphibious operations; that particularly since World War I, it has conducted uninterrupted research in the history of this type of warfare; that it has developed a special technique, both in its schools and during annual maneuvers of its forces; that it is, so far as known, the only organization in the world which specializes in all phases of amphibious warfare; then it must be realized that were an officer brought into the Corps to supervise "Commando" work it would be a complete repudiation of our officer personnel, and would be so regarded. I know the temper, the feelings, and the ideals of our officer and enlisted personnel. I take into consideration the fine record Marine Corps units made in World War I; the fine work they have done in our small wars since that date; and the creditable start which has been made in the present war. It is my considered opinion, and that of all the officers with whom I have discussed the question in hand, that to appoint COlonel Donovan an officer of the Marine Corps, regardless of the rank given him, to take charge of "Commando" work would be a severe blow to the morale of our Corps, and therefore a blow to National Defense.

    --270--

    (O3A4242) CONFIDENTIAL  

    Although the infantry units of our Amphibious Forces are essentially "Commando" units, the disruption of organizations in their formative period has precluded, to a very large extent, the organization, equipment, and training desired for this purpose. Now, in view of COMINCH's memorandum herein quoted, and as a means of forestalling the Donovan case, we must act and act quickly. We must prepare ourselves particularly for one of our important missions, viz.: the execution of amphibious raids.

    You have the First Separate Battalion, which has been trained along the general lines required for so called "Commando" duty. It was necessary to detach approximately one-third of this unit to the Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, in order to comply with a directive from CINCPAC that four companies be organized to immediately on the West Coast. The reorganization of this reinforced company in the First Separate Battalion should be given the highest priority.

    However, we must go beyond this, which will be a second priority, viz.: the preparation of an infantry regiment for amphibious operations of this type. In other words, we must get one battalion ready at the earliest practicable date, followed as soon as practicable by one regiment, even at some sacrifice for the time being of the other units in the matter of experienced personnel and equipment.

    I want to emphasize that I consider the so called "Commando Operations" only one feature of normal Marine Corps work. In fact, the later operations of the British Commandoes indicate that they are following more and more our normal doctrine on landings. they have reprinted our FTP-167.

    However, in view of the situation now facing us, it is imperative that we intensify this type of training with particular emphasis on night operations ashore and afloat, patrolling beaches from the sea, air infantry, rubber boats, raids from cruisers and destroyers, patrolling by units landed from submarines, and possibly some additional attention to individual combat, in order that a unit of any size can be made ready on the shortest possible notice for any special task. Such units should be trained and equipped to conduct demolitions, sabotage, and intelligence missions.

    --271--

    (O3A4242) CONFIDENTIAL  

    The normal training of parachute units should also fit them for such special missions. There will undoubtedly arise many situations in active operations in which it is not feasible to land parachute troops as such, and in such situations they should be available for employment in surface ships in the execution of tasks for which they are specially qualified.

    A similar directive has been issued to the Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet.

    The Tables of Organization for the Separate Battalion prepared by Edson are under study, and they will be approved with minor modifications. It is considered desirable to include an 81mm Mortar Platoon in order that the Battalion as a whole may be available for employment in the landing attack if no appropriate special mission can be found. A copy of the letter transmitted with the proposed Table was sent to San Diego by officer messenger last night.

    The next 90 rubber boats to be delivered are being sent to San Diego to equip the Second Separate Battalion. Steps are being taken to procure additional rubber boats as soon as practicable for use at New River. In the meantime, it is suggested a few might be sent to New River from the 90 available at Quantico. In this connection, also, an order is being placed for several hundred 7-man rubber boats as it will be difficult to embark the 10-man boats in normal transport planes or gliders.

    Please treat this subject, as regards personalities, as strictly Confidential. Also please keep me fully and frequently informed as to the progress you are making in the organization, equipment, and training of the units in question, as well as for the remainder of the force. Incidentally, I don't like the term "Commando"; we are looking for a better term--one more fitting for the Marines. Have you any suggestions?

    With all good wishes.

    Sincerely,

    T. HOLCOMB.

    Major General Holland M. Smith, U.S.M.C.,
        Commanding General,
            Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet.

    --272--

    2385
    02/106
    061
    1st Endorsement.
    Headquarters, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet,
    Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va.
    February 9, 1942.
     
    From: The Commanding General.
    To: The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
     
    Subject: Recommended organization for a battalion embarked on destroyer transport.

    1. Forwarded, concurring with the recommendations set forth in the basic letter, with the following modifications:

    1. That all pistols listed in the enclosed tables be replaced by semi-automatic carbines as soon as this weapon becomes available.

    2. That the designation of this battalion be changed to the "1st Shock Battalion."

    2. The organization and equipment recommended in the basic letter are considered to be particularly well suited for amphibious operations in Atlantic Ocean theaters. It will be noted that this battalion requires six (6) APDs and a small amount of space on one (1) AK for complete embarkation. The organization recommended permits the embarkation of one (1) rifle company on each of four APDs. In event that an APD is not available or is employed on a separate mission, it is still possible to employ the remainder of the battalion as a unit without rearrangement of the embarked troops.

    3. Studies which have been made of various possible operating theaters in the Atlantic Ocean have invariably indicated the desirability of employing a highly trained shock units from light, fast transports as a part of the Amphibious Force in conjunction with any main landing which might be made. These studies have also indicated that this battalion, in order not to limit its usefulness, should be provided with a small amount of motor transportation. This transportation, with rear echelon personnel, can be embarked on an AK and join the battalion upon arrival of the main force.

    4. It will also be noted that 60-mm mortars have been included in the weapons company, instead of 81-mm mortars, with a view to increasing the mobility of that company. This substitution is considered to be necessary in order to permit the battalion to advance a reasonable distance inland. In situations which may be encountered on small islands in the Pacific, or elsewhere,wherein a deep advance is not required, it is thought that the weapons company should be equipped with 81-mm mortars instead of 60-mm mortars.

    -1-

    --273--

    2385 02/106 061 1st Endorsement (Cont.) February 9, 1942.
    Subject: Recommended organization for a battalion embarked on destroyer transport.

    5. The designation, "1st Shock Battalion," is suggested since it is believed that the term is more descriptive of the unit's probable type of operations than "1st Separate Battalion" or "1st Destroyer Battalion."

    H.M. SMITH


    Copy to:     2d JTF

    --274--

    COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

    WASHINGTON, D.C.

    February 16, 1942

    Major General Thomas Holcomb,
    Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters,
    Room 2004, Arlington Annex,
    Arlington, Va.

    My Dear General Holcomb:

    Admiral Wilkinson has forwarded to me a copy of a letter of January 31, 1942 from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Washington, asking for a survey of officer personnel available for duty at sea.

    I am sending Admiral Wilkinson the data on our officers today, listing as available for sea duty six of our Navy and Marine Corps officers, if and when their reliefs are supplied.

    As to these reliefs, I hope very much that careful effort will be made to select the right men, and that I will have an opportunity to examine the record of any man before he is assigned here.

    The type of work required here calls for a special type of officer, one with a scholastic approach to problems of war, tempered by practical experience in the field. Those who might make the best officers commanding men, or commanding ships, might not be the best men for our purposes.

    Much of our work is, as you know, done for the direct

    --275--

    General Thomas Holcomb -2- Feb. 16, 1942

    use of the naval and military commanders of the United States, and I am particularly anxious to have the attitude of the Navy and Marine Corps properly represented in the preparation and consummation of any such work.

    For that purpose not many officers are required, but those that are must be men of the highest intelligence, experience, breadth of mind, and technical skill. A random selection of Reserve or retired officers would, I am sure, fall far short of our needs. It occurs to me that some men of the type we need might be found among those who, regardless of the proficiency as officers, have been retired for physical reasons.

    I know you will understand why, from the point of view of being as useful as possible to the Navy and Marine Corps, I am anxious to secure the best men possible for assignment to this office as replacements for any who may be detached.

    Very truly yours,

    /signed/
    William J. Donovan

    --276--

    9 March 1942

    Dear Joe:

    I thought the D case was all settled but have just learned that another memorandum has gone to the Big Boss in the matter. He is still trying to get the job that we thought we had headed off. Is there anything that you can do? Your letter came too late to stop Updike's commission as I had finally approved it. He is in much better shape that he was and seems to have been doing useful work.

    I left on a southern trip last Tuesday in my plane and got back yesterday. Visited Dunedin and saw the amphibian tractors, Miami, and Parris Island. Was much impressed by the work they are doing at the latter place. The Greybeard Platoons are working hard and I think the plan will be a big success. I certainly hope so. I was also tremendously interested in the glider training at P.I. and had a ride in one. It was really delightful.

    I am going off on another trip to New River toward the end of the month and sometime early in April will try to get to the West Coast. If I go Beatrice will be with me and we would be most pleased to accept your invitation to stay with you if you really have room. Beatrice came back from Miami, leaving there the same day I did. She is very much better but had a bad cold from all the rain and cold weather they have been having there. You see, she put the California climate on the bum last year and I had to go out and straighten it out. I took the sunshine to Miami but it was too late and she insisted oncoming home. She is going down to stay with Hazel Hunt and later with edit Hill at New River about the 19th of March.

    Best regards,

    T. HOLCOMB.

    Brigadier General J.C. Fegan,USMC
        Marine Corps Base
            San Diego, Calif.

    --277--

    C O P Y

    22nd July, 1942.

    Dear Admiral:

    I am enclosing a copy of a report made by the Commandant of the Commando Depot on the United States Marine Corps detachment which recently completed a course at the depot.

    It is a great pleasure to read such a report, and I would like, personally, to offer my congratulations to the officers and men concerned.

    Yours sincerely,

    /s/ Louis Mountbatten.

    Admiral H.R. Stark,
    United States Navy,
    20, Grosvenor Square,
    London, W.1.

    --278--

    REPORT ON UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.

    Length of Course - 8th June 1942 to 29th June 1942.

    Programme of Work - Already submitted.

    GENERAL REPORT.

    The whole of the detachment were a credit to the United States Marine Corps, from the start they were all keen and entered into an arduous training with enthusiasm and cheerfulness.

    They have undergone an arduous Commando training with an exceptionally unconquerable spirit which never wavered during the course.

    I am sure that they have very much benefitted by the course and are fit to take their place in a Commando.

    Captain Roy J. Batterton proved himself to be a fearless and efficient leader of his men. he would make an excellent Troop Leader in a Commando.

    Staff Sergeant George V. Clarke, Sergeant Way Holland, Sergeant George J. Huddock and Sergeant Curtis A. Tatum proved themselves excellent N.C.Os. and possess exceptionally fine leadership qualities and could control their men under very difficult conditions.

    It was a pleasure to be associated with such an excellent detachment.

    /s/ L.E. Vaughan,
    Lieut.-Colonel,
    Commandant,
    Commando Depot.

    Achnacarry,
    Spean Bridge,
    Inverness-shire.
    29th June, 1942.

    --279--

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