Chapter I.
Narrative - Assault Force "O"
From: Commander Assault Force "O", (Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force). The assault on the VIERVILLE-COLLEVILE Sector of the NORMANDY Beaches was part of a joint British-American operation, the purpose of which was to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which to develop further offensive operations. This in turn, was a part of a large strategic plan to bring about the total defeat of Germany by means of assaults upon German-occupied Europe from the UNITED KINGDOM, the MEDITERRANEAN, and RUSSIA. The joint attack was launched in two adjacent areas in the BAY OF THE SEINE. Simultaneous assaults were made by the Eastern Naval Task Force (British and Canadian), composed of Assault Forces "S", "J", and "G", and follow-up Force "L"; and by the Western Naval Task Force (U.S.), composed of Assault Forces "0", and "U", and follow-up Force "B". The boundary line between the British and U.S. Forces started at the root of PORT EN BESSIN Western Breakwater, thence 025° true to Meridian 0° 40' West, thence northward along this meridian to latitude 49° 40' North. Assault Force "0" attacked enemy beaches in the VIERVILLE-COLLEVILLE Area while Assault Force "U" attacked beaches in the MADELEINE Area. Force "B", landed over the same beaches as Force "0" under the direction of the Commander, Force "0".
The entire operation was commanded by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, General D. D. EISENHOWER, U.S.A. Under him were three officers, each acting as the Commander-in-Chief of his respective arm. Their command was exercised jointly. They were:
Naval -- Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force -- Admiral Sir Bertram H. RAMSEY, RN.
Army -- Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group -- General Sir Bernard L. MONTGOMERY, RA.
Air -- Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force -- Sir Trafford LEIGH-MALLORY, RAF.
Under the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief were the Commanders of the Eastern Naval Task Force, and the Western Naval Task Force, respectively. The Western Naval Task Force was commanded by Rear Admiral KIRK, USN, under whom were Assault Force "0" commanded by Rear Admiral HALL, USN; Assault Force "U" by Rear Admiral MOON, USN; and follow-up Force "B" by Commodore EDGAR, USN.
INVASION OF NORTHERN FRANCE Location of Landing Beaches used by Western Task Force.
The task of Assault Force "0" was to land assigned elements of the V Corps, U. S. Army, in the VIERVILLE-COLLEVILLE Sector of the coast of NORMANDY, and to support the landing and subsequent Army operations by Naval gunfire, by establishing and operating a Ferry Service to unload ships and craft of follow-up convoys, by coordinating the siting and construction of port facilities off the beaches, and by exploiting the facilities of small ports in the CARENTAN Estuary.
To accomplish this task, the Commander Assault Force "0" had under his command the following ships and craft:
Transports Bombardment
ShipsLanding Craft 4 APA 2 BB 24 LST 3 XAP 3 CL 91 LCT(6) 2 LSI(L) 40 LCT(5) 3 LSI(S) 2 LCT(4) 3 LSI(H) 33 LCI(L) 4 LCH 5 LCC Gunfire
Support CraftEscort Craft Minesweepers 5 LCG(L) 9 DD 16 MS 7 LCF 3 Hunt DD 4 ML 9 LCT(R) 1 DE 6 Danlayers 34 LCP(L) 2 ODD 8 BYMS 8 LCT(A) 2 Frigates 8 MMS 6 LCT(HE) 6 SGB 9 PC 5 970-ML 7 ML 2 HDML 6 SC 3 A/S Trawlers Far Shore Service Ships 1 Accommodation Ship 1 ARL 12 LCM(CRU) Ferry Craft: *86 LCT(5&6), 20 RHF, 119 LCM(3), 72 LBV(2). Service Craft: 9 Fueling Trawlers, 16 LBE, 20 LBO, 5 LBW, 2 LBK, 1 Pontoon Drydock. * After the LCT(5&6)s completed their mission, they became part of the Far Shore Ferry Service in both the U.S. and British sectors. These LCT(5&6)s were included in the Landing Craft listed above.
Miscellaneous Craft 1 AGC (Flagship) 1 DD (Relief Flagship) 1 LSD 15 USCG Rescue Craft 9 Dispatch Boats 1 PT (Dispatch Boat - Flag) The ships and craft together with the Army forces assigned to Assault Force "0" were organized into the following Task Groups:
(a) Landing Force (124.1) (b) Shore Party (124.2) (c) Assault Group 0-1 (124.3) (d) Assault Group 0-2 (124.4) (e) Assault Group 0-3 (124.5) (f) Assault Group 0-4 (124.6) (g) Escorts (124.7) (h) Gunfire Support Craft (124.8) (i) Bombardment Group (124.9) (j) Sweeper Group (124.10) (k) Far Shore Service Group OMAHA (124.11) (l) Dispatch Boats (124.12) (m) Rescue Vessels (124.13) The Landing Force was composed of elements of the V Corps, U.S. Army and included the First U.S. Infantry Division, Reinforced, less the 26th Regimental Combat Team, plus the 116th Regimental Combat Team, the 115th Regimental Combat Team, and the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions. This Force was supported by a Shore Party consisting of 2/3rds of the 5th Engineer Special Brigade, 1/3rd of the 6th Engineer Special Brigade, and the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group Commander and Staff. Also included in the Shore Party were 2/3rds of the 6th Naval Beach Battalion and 1/3rd of the 7th Naval Beach Battalion, The remainder of the V Corps, and the remainder of the Engineer Special Brigade Group, and of the 6th and 7th Naval Beach Battalions comprised the Landing Force and Shore Party of Force "B" which landed on the same beach as Force "0".
The Landing Attack Plan was as follows: The 16th RCT attacked on the left on Beaches FOX GREEN and EASY RED with two battalions in assault and one following. The 116th RCT attacked on the right with two battalions in assault and one following, on Beaches EASY GREEN, DOG RED, DOG WHITE, and DOG GREEN. One assault battalion of the 116th RCT landed three companies abreast on Beaches EASY GREEN, DOG RED and DOG WHITE; the other landed three companies in column on Beach DOG
GREEN, Nine of the twelve companies of the 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions landed on Beach DOG GREEN while the remaining three Ranger companies landed on the POINTS DU HOE in Sector CHARLIE to capture an enemy battery located there which threatened the Transport Area. The 18th RCT landed immediately after the 16th RCT on the same beaches. The Rifle Companies of the 115th embarked in LCI(L)s were to land on call on the same beaches as the 116th unless otherwise directed. The Landing was preceded by a forty minute naval bombardment at previously designated targets. A bombing attack was scheduled for delivery between H-30 minutes and H hour. This, however, failed to materialize. In addition to the bombardment by naval gunfire from supporting ships and craft, tanks embarked in LCT(A)s fired on targets of opportunity during the last 3000 yards of their approach to the beach and 105 mm SP artillery embarked in LCTs likewise fired during their passage through the boat lanes. LCT(R)s and LCS(S)s were scheduled to deliver a full discharge of rockets immediately prior to the "touchdown" of the infantry. The fire of the gunfire support craft and of the destroyers close inshore where they could observe the actual landing was to continue until such time as the advancing troops were actually endangered by it instead of being lifted at a pre-arranged clock time. In general, no equipment or troops were scheduled to land between the arrival of the demolition parties at H+3 minutes and H+30 minutes. The whole plan of assault, therefore, might be described as follows: To destroy enemy defenses and cover the shoreward progress of the leading assault waves by naval and air bombardment; to land a wave of infantry preceded and supported by tanks to storm the enemy beach defenses, and cover the operations of the combat demolition parties while the latter were engaged in clearing lanes through the obstacles in the tidal area; and as soon as the lanes were open, to follow through with successive waves of infantry, artillery, motorized equipment, and stores, in order to reduce the remaining enemy defenses and seize the beachhead.
In summary form, the material casualties were as follows:
Ships Lost 1 Damaged 1
LST'sLost 4 Damaged 3
LCI(L)'sLost 5 Damaged 17
LCT(5&6)'sLost 13 Damaged 78
Small Craft LostLCM's 23 LCVP's 130
Miscellaneous Craft DamagedSCs 3 USCG Rescue Vessel 2 LCGs 4
View off OMAHA Beach on D plus 3 - 9 June 1944.
Narrative - Assault Force "U"
From: Commander Assault Force "U". The primary mission of Force "U" was to successfully place a large volume of tank supported infantry on the enemy beach within a few hours. This required, (1) positive clearance of mines in the approaches to, and in, the assault area, (2) adequate and positive naval gunfire support, and (3) clearance of underwater obstacles near the beaches.
The composition and timing of the assault waves was determined by the army representatives in concurrence with Navy wishes. The mass of infantry required to be landed in the first few waves necessitated short interval spacing between waves with each wave containing many craft. Air cover played a major role in affording complete protection from air and submarine attack.
As the naval gunfire plan for covering the enemy known, dangerous targets was developed, the scheme of mine sweeping became extremely complex because of limited sweeping facilities and the element of time. The transport area was located 22,500 yards to seaward to avoid fire from the extensive system of hostile long range artillery. To insure positive timing of the waves, special control measures had to be provided. Early occupation of the Iles de San Marcouf was considered necessary.
With few deviations the assault went according to plan. In spite of the complexities of the mine sweeping schema, the channels were successfully opened on time. To maintain security from mines, constant sweeping was continued after the assault. Naval gunfire was so successfully placed on targets threatening the landing only a few craft were lost from hostile shelling. Active enemy batteries were destroyed or neutralized by effective naval gunfire which was later controlled by observers who landed with the early assault waves. The drenching fire of the rockets of the LCT(R)s and the fire of LCGs and LCS effectively played their part in the initial landings. This force was very fortunate in that no opposition was encountered on the Iles de San Marcouf which due to their position could have greatly handicapped the landing had they been hotly defended.
The task of the Army and Naval demolition parties was successfully carried out. The landing was made at a time when the tide left all
obstacles dry and they were cleared off before they interfered with the landings.
Due to the early loss of the Red primary and secondary control vessels, the landing was made about 1000 yards to the southeast of the scheduled landing place. This proved to be fortuitous. The obstacles found were less formidable than those farther to the north. Nor were the hostile shore defenses as strong as those opposite the intended landing beaches. The waves had been trained to expect the possible lose of control vessels. Consequently the landings on Red beach carried on even though the control vessels were not functioning. The landings on Green beach were orderly and according to schedule. Re-control of despatching was reestablished on Red beach by the despatch of a new control vessel about the time of landing of the eighth wave, losses of men and material on UTAH beach were small during the initial landings primarily due to the overwhelming fire power on the beach prior to landings.
Nearly all of the DD tanks were discharged and landed successfully. These supported the infantry with marked success.
It is considered that the landing on UTAH beach was extremely successful from every tactical aspect. Good fortune played a large part. But careful and thorough planning, meticulous briefing, and the sincere efforts of all concerned to make the operation the success that it was.
Force "U"s part in operation - - - - - involved the assembly and sortie of over 865 ships and craft from various ports in the Plymouth - Torquay Area. This Force was transported to the Far Shore in twelve separate convoys, the first to leave departing on D-2 day. This movement was complicated by three factors.
(a) Force "U" was the last Force to be formed. The craft assigned it were the last to arrive in England. Arrivals from the Mediterranean, United States, and other parts of the U.K. continued up to within a day or two of loading day. In many cases these craft had practically no training.
(b) The lack of a large port necessitated the use of nine (9) different loading and sortie points. Most of the 12 Force "U" convoys contained 3 or 4 sections which sortied from different ports and had to make precise sea rendezvous. Separating the craft into many small groups made loading more difficult, and required some craft to be moved after loading to different ports for sortie. It was necessary for most escorts to sortie from ports different from that of the convoys. Since the final disposition of all convoys was by beaches in order of hitting the beach, satisfactory cruising dispositions were accomplished only by careful craft assignment and re-arrangement of craft at the
various rendezvous.
(c) Force "U" was required to steam considerably farther from sortie ports to the Assault Area, than other Assault Forces. This required early loading of troops with attendant fatigue factor.
The postponement of D-day found several Force "U" convoys at sea because of the early sorties required. This necessitated back tracking for 12 hours for some convoys, and the seeking of shelter in Weymouth Bay for 247 gunfire support craft, LCTs and LCMs and other small craft. Both crews and embarked troops were thus exposed to the rough seas for an extended period. The sea conditions were so adverse that an LCT was swamped before taking shelter. The convoys which went into Weymouth Bay for shelter arrived there about 1700 to 2100 of the new D-2 day. It was not until about 2300 of new D-2 that definite word of new D-day was received. As a result, the re-sailing of these convoys of hundreds of craft from Weymouth Bay 4 hours later in the dark anchored over a ten mile area was a most difficult undertaking. That they were properly re-grouped and arrived on less than an hour behind schedule reflects great credit on the Commanding Officers and men of these craft and the Convoy Commanders, and was close to a miracle. It is worthy of note that fifty LCMs were involved, 42 steaming under their own power from Dartmouth, a distance of about 140 miles, Despite the turn back and re-start, not one LCM failed to arrive on schedule. Because of stress of weather however, seven (7) LCPL smokers swamped under tow, one LCT capsized, and some others had to return to Weymouth and missed the assault.
LSTs, LCIs and virtually all escort craft had to be employed continually during the ten days prior to sortie and for the assault, in towing and escorting to assembly ports a great number of barges and other tows needed in the assault and in escorting craft to loading ports. Despite this additional burden and the late arrival of craft, only two British LCTs of all the craft assigned Force "U" were unable to load and sail. This is a remarkable record of operation and maintenance for which Commander Service Force, Task Force 127, deserves great credit. The assigned craft were in their proper ports correctly loaded and ready for sea.
CONVOY
NUMBERCOMPOSITION ASSEMBLY PORT SORTIE SPEED ARRIVED OFF
UTAH BEACHU-1A 1 BB, 3 CA
2 CL, 4 DDBelfast H - 44
1030
3 June12 kts 0229
5 June1 APA, 1 PT
1 DDPlymouth H - 20
0930
5 June12 kts 0229
5 June
CONVOY
NUMBERCOMPOSITION ASSEMBLY PORT SORTIE SPEED ARRIVED OFF
UTAH BEACHU-1A
(cont'd)2 LCH
2 PCDartmouth H - 17
1230
5 June12 kts 0229
5 June2 APA, 1 LSI
2 DDTor Bay H - 17
1230
5 June12 kts 0229
5 June1 DM
1 DDWeymouth Bay H - 13
1730
5 June12 kts 0229
5 June2 USCGC Poole H - 13
1730
5 June12 kts 0229
5 JuneU-1B 14 LCI(L)
2 YMS, 1 DDPlymouth 1500
5 June11 kts 0730
6 June17 LCI(L)
1 SCSalcombe 1635
5 June11 kts 0730
6 June5 LCI(L) Torquay 1815
5 June11 kts 0730
6 June4 USCGC Poole 2055
5 June11 kts 0730
6 JuneU-2A(1) 1 LCI(L), 4 LCF
4 LCT(R), 4 LCG
8 LCT(A), 3 ML
16 LCP(L)Salcombe 1653
3 June5 kts 0230
6 June16 LCT, 4 LCC
50 LCM, 2 PC
1 SCDartmouth 1743
3 June5 kts 0230
6 June3 LCM
(Salvage)Portland 0430
4 June5 kts 0230
6 June1 DD Plymouth 1700
3 June5 kts 0230
6 June
CONVOY
NUMBERCOMPOSITION ASSEMBLY PORT SORTIE SPEED ARRIVED OFF
UTAH BEACHU-2A(2) 1 LCI(L), 1 PC
85 LCT, 1 SCDartmouth 2058
3 June5 kts 0330
6 June51 LCT, 2 PC
1 SCBrixham 1833
3 June5 kts 0330
6 June1 PG, 2 DD
5 YMS, 1 ATPlymouth 1515
3 June5 kts 0330
6 JuneU-2B 2 DD, 1 AT
1 ATRPlymouth 1430
3 June5 kts 0200
6 June5 LST, 5 RHF Dartmouth 1543
3 June5 kts 0730
6 JuneU-3 2 SC Salcombe 0605
5 June5 kts 1430
6 June5 LST, 5 RHF Dartmouth 0830
5 June5 kts 1430
6 June11 LST, 1 RHF
1 DD, 4 USCGC
2 Corvettes
2 A/S TrawlersTor Bay At Pt. D
1004
5 June5 kts 1430
6 June4 USCGC Poole At Pt. F
5 June5 kts 1430
6 JuneU-4 9 LST Salcombe 1930
5 June5 kts 0900
7 June8 Pontoon
CausewaysSalcombe 1930
5 June5 kts 0900
7 June8 Blisters Salcombe 1930
5 June5 kts 0900
7 June1 Repair Barge Salcombe 1930
5 June5 kts 0900
7 June3 A/S Trawlers Plymouth 1630
5 June5 kts 0900
7 June
CONVOY
NUMBERCOMPOSITION ASSEMBLY PORT SORTIE SPEED ARRIVED OFF
UTAH BEACHU-5 18 LBV Yarmouth 1630
5 June4 kts 1630
6 June20 LBO, 4 LBE Poole 1630
5 June4 kts 1630
6 June3 LBW, 20 LCM Poole 1630
5 June4 kts 1630
6 June5 Fueling
TrawlersPortland 1630
5 June4 kts 1630
6 June2 M/L's Poole 1430
5 June4 kts 1630
6 JuneU-6 18 LBV, ML 190 Yarmouth 0530
5 June4 kts 1030
7 June4 LBE, 2 LBK
2 MLPoole 0500
5 June4 kts 1030
7 JuneUM-1 11 YMS, 8 MMS Plymouth 2400
4 June8 kts 0330
6 June11 AM Tor Bay 0632
5 June8 kts 0040
6 June6 PT Portland 0400
5 June8 kts 0330
6 JuneUM-2 4 ML, 8 FM Plymouth 1715
4 June8 kts 0015
6 June4 Dan Layers
7 HDMLPlymouth 1715
4 June8 kts 0015
6 June3 PT's Portland 0400
5 June8 kts 0015
6 June
CONVOY
NUMBERCOMPOSITION ASSEMBLY PORT SORTIE SPEED ARRIVED OFF
UTAH BEACHUM-3 4 ML, 8 FM Plymouth 2300
4 June8 kts 2130
5 June3 PT's Portland 1000
5 June8 kts 2130
5 June
KNOWN CASUALTIES AND LOSSES
TYPE DATE CASUALTY PROBABLE CAUSE CORRY (DD) 6 June Sunk Enemy shellfire, or mined GLENNON (DD) 8 June Sunk Mined MEREDITH (DD) 8 June Sunk Mined, or possible glider bomb JEFFERS (DD) 7 June Slight Damage Enemy shellfire RICH (DE) 8 June Sunk Mined LCT 967 13 June Sunk Mined LCT 362 6 June Sunk Cause undetermined (probably mined) LCT 597 6 June Sunk Cause undetermined (probably mined) LCT 777 6 June Sunk Cause undetermined (probably mined) LCT 486 7 June Sunk Mined LCT 458 7 June Sunk Mined LCT 447 15 June Damaged Near miss shellfire while beached LCT(A) 2310 7 June Damaged Shellfire (Utah area) AM 56* (OSPREY) 5 June Sunk Mine or torpedo enroute AM 125 (TIDE) 7 June Sunk Mined PC 1261 6 June Sunk Enemy shellfire or mined LST 496 11 June Sunk Probably mined LST 499 8 June Sunk Mined LST 381 14 June Damaged Ran aground causeway LST 292 17 June Damaged Damaged hull while beaching MMS 297 17 June Damaged Acoustic mine MMS 229 13 June Sunk Mined YMS 377 17 June Damaged Near mine explosion SS GLENROY (LSI-L) 17 June Damaged Near mine explosion LCI 232 7 June Sunk Cause undetermined (probably mined) LCI(L) 219* 11 June Sunk Bombed enroute Utah area LCF 31 6 June Sunk Cause undetermined (probably mined) HMS MINISTER 8 June Sunk Mined SUSAN B. ANTHONY 7 June Sunk Mined enroute Utah area SS CHARLES MORGAN 10 June Sunk Bombed
* NOT IN ASSAULT AREA
PLANS AND PLANNING
From: Naval Commander Western Task Force (Commander Task Force 122). Task Force ONE TWO TWO was established by directives from Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Commander TWELFTH Fleet, All U.S. Naval Forces assigned to Operation - - - - - were placed in this force, and the Task Force Commander reported to the Supreme Commander, for duty under the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief. For administration and logistical support the Task Force Commander operated under Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, while on other matters he was authorized direct communication with Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
When the Allied Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary Force, prepared the Naval Outline Plan, representatives of Task Force ONE TWO TWO collaborated by attendance at numerous committee meetings and by direct consultation between opposite numbers of the American and British Naval Staffs.
With the increase from three to five assault forces, the Allied Naval Commander in Chief provided for both Eastern and Western Area Commands; and a British Naval Officer, as a counterpart of Commander Task Force ONE TWO TWO, was appointed to the Eastern Task Force Command.
There exist two fundamental differences between the U.S. and British methods of planning which had a considerable effect on the U.S. planning. These differences are:
- The British, in higher echelon prescribe details which in normal U.S. practices are left to responsible commanders in the lower echelons.
- The British do not use a standard order form.
When details beyond those required for coordination, are prescribed by higher echelons, the higher echelon is often then put in the position of relying on the lower echelon for information and data, which only the lower echelon can supply. This results in delay and a lack of firmness in planning, which in turn greatly complicates the planning of lower echelons employing the U.S. systems. In addition the freedom
of action of the responsible lower commander is curtailed, as details of his plan become directives from higher authority.
The U.S. naval order form effectively fulfills its purpose. It is especially effective in showing the relationship between tasks and the means for their accomplishment, in the form of definite task forces. There is also an advantage in having a specific place to look for certain types of instruction. When the plans and orders of a higher echelon contain the details of execution by a lower echelon, the lower commander is forced to copy a great deal into his own plans and orders if there is doubt about the extent of distribution of the plans and orders of the higher commander; or it may force a wide distribution of higher echelon plans and orders, with unnecessary dissemination of secret matters, not required by many or all of the lower echelons to whom distributed.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Planning relations with the FIRST U.S. Army were smooth and effective, helped no doubt by previous close association of the same two staffs in the Sicilian campaign. The fluctuation in lift to be made available kept loading plans in a state of fluctuation until a late date.
The volume of plans and orders received by commanders of small warships and landing craft, must have appalled those Commanding Officers who were allowed to open them some seven days before the landing was to take place. At that late date there were numerous corrections to be entered by these small commands.
From: Commander Assault Force "O", (Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force). The necessity for close liaison between the Staff of the Naval Task Force Commander and the Staff of the Landing Force Commander becomes more evident with each amphibious assault. Close physical proximity between the two staffs to facilitate mutual consultation is desirable during the planning, training, and rehearsal stages. Prior to Operation - - - - a planning group with representatives from all the Army Commands associated with Force "O" was established in PLYMOUTH where the Flagship of the Assault Force Commander was based, thereby affording the opportunity for the close coordination mentioned above. A noteworthy fact, and one most pleasing to the Force Commander, was the early participation by the Air Force in this Joint planning. This close association and mutual understanding with its consequent appreciation of the problems of the other services involved, endured throughout the whole period of preparation for the assault. The same close cooperation was present in the planning of all joint training exercises, and after each large scale exercise, critiques by each service were attended by representatives of the other. It is considered that the opportunity thus provided to exchange views, and discuss frankly all phases of the operation was most valuable.
Plans for the assault from higher echelons of command were received in ample time. However, voluminous changes were also soon received - many of them after the operation order of this force had been completed and was in process of printing and assembling. This inevitably required changes in the operation order which had to be published practically simultaneously with it. By the time the operation order was ready for distribution, the ships and craft of the assault force were being assembled, and the difficulties of distribution were accentuated by their movements and by the fact that they were now arranged in task groups rather than in their normal administrative units. It is appreciated that in so extensive an operation changes in plan are inevitable. But the very complexity of the operation suggests that every effort be made to reduce the number of changes to a minimum.
This command considered that in some respects the orders from higher echelons were in such detail as to restrict the decision and freedom of action of the Assault Force Commander; by the same token, comments from subordinates within this Force indicate a similar feeling on their part, not only in regard to the orders of echelons above the Assault Force Commander, but also in regard to the Force Commander's operation Order itself. It is impossible to state exactly what constitutes too much or too little detail in an operation plan or operation order. The decision in each case must be based upon the necessity for ensuring absolute coordination. Paradoxical as it may seem, the larger and more complex the operation, the more detail is necessary in the Supreme Commander's plan in order to ensure that coordination. This is especially true in an amphibious operation which is restricted by its nature from the flexibility possible in an operation conducted entirely at sea or entirely ashore. It is believed, however, that the aim in the preparation of all operation plans or orders should be to reduce detailed directives to the minimum and to allow the subordinate the maximum latitude as to the way in which he may accomplish his task.
In order to effect a proper and timely distribution of an operation order numerous factors must be weighed and balanced. Of paramount importance in this assault was the need for security. The information contained in Operation Order BB-44 was such that no risk of compromise could be accepted; on the other hand, it was necessary to make an early distribution of the order to the task group commanders, especially the assault group commanders responsible for the preparation of detailed landing plans, in order that their own operation orders could be prepared. This was accomplished by bringing the Assault Group Commanders and their Deputy Commanders aboard the Flagship while the - Force Commander's order was still being written so that they might assist by suggestion and criticism, and at the same time become thoroughly familiar with the Force Commander's intention*. The order in finished form was distributed to them ten days before the assault. At the same time distribution to the balance of the Force was commenced. For reasons of security, holders of the order other than task group commanders
and flotilla commanders were directed to open the sealed envelope containing the order only on signal. This signal was sent when all ships of the Force were sealed on 31 May, six days before the assault.
The Assault Force Commander's order was distributed to all unit, ship, and craft commanders, down to and including LCTs. In the light of the experience gained, it is doubted whether such wide distribution was either necessary or advisable. In large part, the commanding officers of the smaller craft such as LCTs and the units such as LCM and LCP(L) Flotillas had neither the time nor the opportunity to digest the entire order. It is believed that it might have been better to limit the distribution and to leave to task group commanders the dissemination to the commanding officers of the small craft of information necessary to enable them to perform their allotted tasks. This is, of course, closely related to the subject of how much detail to put into the operation order and how much to leave to subordinates. In the present instance, the Assault Force Commander was on the third echelon from the top in the Naval chain of command, and by the time he had received the orders of higher authority and prepared his own, there was very little time left for his subordinates. Hence it was felt that the assault force order must be in such detail as to eliminate the necessity for all but the briefest orders on the part of the task group commanders. This was partially achieved but not to an entirely satisfactory degree.
Recommendations.
That plans and orders of each echelon be stated in the most general terms possible consonant with clear understanding and adequate provision for coordination between subordinates, in order that the plans may be completed and promulgated at the earliest possible date and to allow maximum latitude to subordinates.
That once plans are completed and promulgated, changes be kept to a minimum and restricted to those which are basic and fundamental. Plans for an operation as complex as the invasion of the Continent can not be changed to meet a very minor change of circumstances. Whatever is gained in improvement in the plan is frequently more than lost by the inability of lower echelons to provide their units with complete orders governing the assault well in advance of the operation.
That the necessity for complete information as to the whole operation on the part of the officers to whom the order is distributed be carefully weighed and the number of those who need to know restricted to the minimum.
From: Commanding Officer USS DOROTHEA DIX. (APA) The planning for this operation was so thorough and realistic in all respects, insofar at least as transport participation was concerned,
that accomplishment of this ship's mission was well within its material and personnel capabilities. Arrangements for unloading provided a heavy margin for contingencies. The wisdom of this foresight was well demonstrated by the outcome - - even without scheduled LCI(L)'s, LCA's, and some LCVP's which were delayed by weather and their own operations, sufficient boat and landing craft capacity became available to unload both troops and vehicles from this vessel, in sufficient time to meet the army's requirements.
HOWEVER, THERE WERE OTHER POINTS OF VIEW ON PLANNING.
From: Commander Gunfire Support Craft Eleventh Amphibious Force. Late delivery of Operation Plans and Orders.
The complexities and difficulties in planning an operation of this magnitude and the importance of security are fully realized. There is no question but what the operation was brilliantly conceived and beautifully planned. But there was a very definite gap between the "planners" and the "doers". Practically everything was "somewhere" in "some" plan. But the mechanics of accomplishing many of the planned matters left much to be desired, especially when plans containing much to be done before sortie were received only a day or so prior to sortie. This was particularly true of certain logistic requirements. - - - - - - - -
From: Naval Commander Western Task Force (Commander Task Force 122). On December 17, 1943, a directive for amphibious training was issued directing the ELEVENTH Amphibious Force to arrange for the amphibious training of Naval Forces and such Army divisions as were to be assigned by the Commanding General of the FIRST U.S. Army.
Amphibious training for the assigned divisions was carried out generally along the Southern Coast of England and particularly in the SLAPTON SANDS Area: Training exercises were first scheduled for battalions and Regimental Combat Teams: Finally full division and Corps rehearsals were held with all supporting elements, which included Engineer Special Brigades. Sea and air support units were exercised in conjunction.
Every effort was made to simulate conditions that would obtain in the assault area. An important factor was the training of landing craft in beaching and retracting on flat beaches with large tidal range. It is felt that this training paid big dividends. Another noteworthy feature was the training of landing craft in keeping the narrow swept channels with current running up to 3 knots.
Full scale rehearsals were held during periods 24 to 28 April for Force "U" and 3 to 8 May for Force "0", These rehearsals involved a
movement to sea of combat loaded transports, LSTs, LCI(L)s, escorts and gunfire support ships, as well as build-up forces. Shuttle and ferry control were exercised also. Due to the proximity of enemy aircraft, submarines, and E-boats, these operations were undertaken at considerable risk. During Exercise "Tiger" German E-boats caused the loss of 2 LSTs and badly damaged another.
It is considered that these operations were well-planned and efficiently executed. With the exception of beach and underwater obstacles and the absence of a number of the gunfire support ships, the rehearsals simulated as nearly as possible the actual assault. It is extremely difficult in this type rehearsal to create the critical situation that occurs on every assault, i.e., of beaches heaped with supplies, boats disabled and the Army supply system in danger of a breakdown. A full-scale unloading was exercised in these training operations and served to acquaint the beach organizations with the real problems involved and permitted many corrective measures to be taken.
From: Commander Assault Force "O", (Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force.) Recommendations.
That whenever practicable the Naval Forces including Transports, Landing Ships, Landing Craft, Control Vessels, and Beach Parties be well trained and proficient before joint training is undertaken. It is a psychological fact that because the soldier is definitely out of his natural element in an amphibious operation and because the operation has to do with water, ships and craft, he automatically assumes that the sailor knows all about it - at least, the Naval end of it, and he naturally looks to the sailor for instruction and guidance. If he finds that the sailor too is ignorant of what he is supposed to do and uncertain and confused, the soldier is dismayed and often disgusted. He feels that the Navy is letting him down, and his confidence is shaken. A Force which commences joint training with experienced and capable Naval elements can be developed into an efficient effective amphibious force in a fraction of the time that it takes to develop a force where both the Naval element and the Army element have to learn their jobs together.
That in training Army personnel for amphibious operations the initial phase be undertaken with units not larger than a battalion. That as those units attain proficiency, the size and scope of the landing exercises be increased to Regimental, then to Division landings, with appropriate attached and supporting arms in each case, that every effort be made to see that the Naval and Army personnel teamed together in these exercises be the same ones who will work together in future operations against the enemy.
That every effort be made to simulate the conditions anticipated in the assault area including the character of the beach, beach obstacles, simulated enemy defenses, terrain features, and where practicable, enemy opposition. Gunfire support and air support should be included in all exercises which include tactical training and are not limited to drill in the mechanics of loading and landing.
That the final exercise be insofar as possible a full scale rehearsal of the anticipated assault in which all forces to be included in the assault participate.
WEATHER
From: Naval Commander Western Task Force (Commander Task Force 122). During the naval planning, the meteorological factors given particular attention were:
- The expected conditions immediately following the assault, particularly with respect to the likelihood of a quiet period.
- The expected conditions of wind and sea during the approach, particularly with respect to the effect upon smaller landing craft, heavy tows, etc.
- The expected wind and surf conditions on the assault beaches at H-hour.
- Conditions for laying smoke.
- Visibility, especially in its relationship to directing and spotting gunfire.
- Flying conditions, especially with respect to precision air bombardment and air spot of gunfire.
- Likelihood of strong onshore winds and dangerous surf.
D-day was initially set for 5 June on considerations of light and tide conditions. It was apparent from the synoptic situation on 3 June, that unfavorable weather conditions were developing, and, early on 4 June, orders for a postponement of twenty-four hours were broadcast by the Allied Naval Commander. By the evening of 4 June, much improved conditions were forecast for the morning of 6 June, although only a low order of confidence could be ascribed to the likelihood of moderate or quiet conditions for the following, several days. Due to the tide and light conditions as well as other considerations of importance, the uncertainty of the weather conditions immediately following D-day was accepted, and at 2159 on 4 June, the Allied Naval Commander broadcast a
confirmation of 6 June as D-day. These decisions were made by the Supreme Allied Commander - - - - - - - - - - -.
From: Commander Assault Force "0", (Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force). The ENGLISH CHANNEL is well known for the unpredictable nature of its weather and, on at least two occasions during the period covered by this report, it lived up to its reputation. The first time was when bad weather, accompanied by strong winds and rough seas, made it necessary to postpone D day for twenty-four hours even though many of the slower convoys had already started for the Assault Area and had to turn back. The second, was the three-day period commencing D + 13 during which an unseasonable storm of near-gale force played havoc with the artificial port and the ferry craft in the Force "0" Assault Area.
In the initial planning one of the factors deemed necessary to the successful conduct of the assault was a minimum of four days good weather. This included light winds, calm or near calm seas, and freedom from fog, It was understood that unfavorable weather would require a postponement of D day, Because of the aforementioned uncertainty of the weather in this area and the inability of Aerologists to forecast it with any degree of accuracy from more than a day or two in advance, it was also realized that the decision to carry out the operation or to postpone it would have to be a last minute one. Unfortunately the speed of the slow convoys was such that they had to get underway about H-28 hours in order to arrive in the Assault Area on time.
Recommendations.
That careful consideration be given to the weather forecast before actually commencing the landing in an amphibious operation lest bad weather maroon the handing Force ashore, and by depriving it of the support of the forces afloat, render it an easy prey to the defenders.
From: Naval Commander Western Task Force (Commander Task Force 122). COVERING FORCES
Cover for the operation was provided, according to plan, by the British Home Commands of Plymouth, Portsmouth and Dover. These commands had at their disposal DDs, MTBs, and other coastal craft and aircraft with which they provided cover against sorties of enemy DDs, E-boats, U-boats and W-boats in the channel outside the Assault Area.
Cover against sorties by major enemy units was provided by the Home Fleet basing at Scapa and the Clyde, but it was not required.
The Assault Area initially was limited to the Bay of the Seine south of latitude 49-9:0. Outside this area the Home Commands maintained anti U-boat air patrol by day and destroyers and MTBs on patrol at night. In addition there were some coastal aircraft equipped with Leigh lights on patrol during darkness across lanes of probable enemy sorties.
The disposition of the channel covering forces varied from night to night. Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, issued a daily despatch giving the stations for these forces for the ensuing dark period, identifying the stations by sectors on special channel overprinted charts issued for the operation.
Generally the channel covering forces consisted of the following:
- Plymouth Command - four to six DDs and six to eight MTBs.
- Portsmouth Command - four DDs and four to six MTBs.
- Dover Command - four DDs and eight to ten MTBs.
The Plymouth covering forces, assisted by radar stations in the United Kingdom, repulsed an enemy destroyer sortie of three (3) Narviks and one (1) Elbing in the early morning of 9 June, destroying one (1) enemy DD and forcing another to beach. Except for that one sortie, their enemy contacts on the Western flank were all with E-boats or W-boats.
The strength of the covering forces was not adequate to provide impenetrable cover for the cross channel routes, but it kept enemy activity to a minimum.
When forces of the Home Commands were stationed near the Assault Area boundary, the danger of conflict with units of WNTF Area Screen was a difficulty which was overcome by prohibiting either of these allied forces from crossing the Assault Area boundary. Direct communication between the screening and covering forces was impractical due to their limited equipment.
When the Assault Area was extended to include the entrances to Cherbourg, a measure of cooperation between screening and covering forces was provided by having DDs of each force guard the radio frequency of the other force.
From the viewpoint of NCWTF the lack of direct communications with units of the covering force was a source of anxiety. There was considerable time lag between the origin of action reports of the covering forces and the time of their receipt in the flagship. There was also considerable time lag in the receipt of the channel disposition despatches. This made coordination of tactical effort between the Home Commands and the NCWTF generally impracticable.
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