|USS WEST VIRGINIA||BB 48|
|SERIAL 0538||1 NOVEMBER 1944|
|COVERS NIGHT ACTION IN LOWER LEYTE GULF FOLLOWING INITIAL LANDINGS ON 20 OCTOBER 1944, IN TASK GROUP 77.1, REPORT COVERS 24-25 OCTOBER 1944.|
|File NO. BB48/A16-3
|U.S.S. West Virginia (BB48)
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
|1 November 1944.|
|To:||Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.|
|Via:||(1) Commander Battleship Division FOUR.|
(2) Commander Battleship Division THREE (Commander Battle Line).
(3) Commander Cruiser Division FOUR (Officer in Tactical Command) (Commander Task Group 77.2).
(4) Commander Seventh Fleet. (5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
|Subject:||Action in Battle of Surigao Straits 25 October 1944 U.S.S. West Virginia -- Report of.|
|References:||(a) Article 712, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.|
(b) CincPac Letter 2CL-44.
|Enclosures:||(A) CTF 77 message of 24 October paraphrase..|
(B) CTF 77.2 message of 24 October paraphrase
(C) Track Diagrams. (C-1 Battle C-2 Navigation).
(D) TBS log extracts.
(E) Report of Casualties to Mk 1 Mod 0 Shell hoist Drive Gear in Turret I.
(F) Report of Casualty to the right Mk 1 Mod 0 Shell Hoist in Turret III.
Shortly thereafter, CTG 77.2 message, enclosure (B), giving his battle plan, was received. The crew was mustered and informed of the situation and all preparations were made for a night surface engagement. The ship's planes were launched and directed to secure at the landing beach. The battle line of six ships was formed about 1800 and at 1948 started patrolling east and west across the northern part of Surigao Strait. The crew was sent to general quarters at 1940 and then put in readiness condition one easy.
|Left Flank||Center||Right Flank|
|9 DD - Desron 56
At 2000, our position was Latitude 10° 33' 30" N, Longitude 125° 14' 45" E, course east. From then on until after the battle we pursued generally easterly and westerly courses, each course change being made as a ship turn maneuver. This kept our broadside trained in the direction of Southern Surigao Straits.
CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTION (All times Zone Minus 9 (Item))
|24 October 1944.|
|1708||-||Underway upon signal in San Pedro Bay.|
|1745||-||Catapulted planes in order to clear turrets arc of fire, and sent them to secure on beach.|
|1830||-||(about) BB's formed column. Proceeding to position in Leyte Gulf.|
|1948||-||Went to General Quarters and set readiness condition one easy.|
|2329||-||Received message to set condition one easy.|
|25 October 1944.|
|0001||-||On course 090 in battle disposition, this vessel leading the battle line.|
|0026||-||Received report from MTB 127 that 3 enemy DD's 2 large ships were ten miles off the southeast tip of Bobol heading north. That position is 200° 89 miles from us. Search radars were focused on southern part of straits with negative results.|
|0041||-||Received contact report ten miles 310° from Camiguin Island which is 85 miles away.|
|0108||-||Flares or starshells were reported by MTB 53 18 miles SW of Panoan Island.|
|0130||-||Saw three starshells to NW of us, perhaps over land and fired in connection with troops operation. Wished they would stop as light might silhouette us.|
|0144||-||DesRon 54 reported contact 10 miles SW of Panoan Island.|
|0152||-||Ships right to 270° True.|
|0204||-||MTB 134 reported contact abeam PANOAN Island.|
|0205||-||Received report enemy large ships under attack by our PT boats -- results undetermined. Saw a light over horizon to southwest.|
|0206||-||Saw starshells to southeast far distant|
|0208||-||Gunfire sighted bearing 180° True.|
|0210||-||PT boats report target they are attacking is trying to drive them off with gunfire.|
|0232||-||Went to General Quarters upon signal.|
|0239||-||Starshells to N.W. Probably same as 0130 note.|
|0241||-||Surface contact reported 184° True 18 miles.|
|0246||-||DD reported surface contacts 4 in column 184° distance 15 miles.|
|0301||-||DD's report they had fired torpedoes at enemy.|
|0303||-||Saw gunfire to south.|
|0304||-||Enemy appeared on scopes of SG-1 RPPI -- 20 mile scale. The pip was visible at extreme edges of the tube on bearing 164° range 44,000 yards. Several groups of friendly pips appeared on the scopes as our DD's closed to attack from east and west. Two DD's patrolling to north of Dinagat and our cruisers a few thousand yards southwest were showing on the scopes. However, in the dark, and from CIC reports only it was difficult for the Captain to be certain just where our forces were.|
|0305||-||Changed course to 090 by turn movement.|
|0307||-||Destroyers report two large and one small enemy. Enemy is straddling them.|
|0310||-||Main battery plot reported Spot 2's Mark 8 radar had the target. (It never lost it until after cease firing).|
|0311||-||Saw gunfire to south.|
|0313||-||Surface contacts 2 large 2 small were in strait heading north speed 20.|
|0314||-||DD reported 5 targets 2 may be hit slowing down and dropping behind some.|
|0315||-||CIC reported two groups about 39,000 yards, one of 3 small pips, the other of a large and medium pip preceded by several smaller pips.|
|0322||-||DD report enemy 2 BB 2 cruisers and 1 DD.|
|0330||-||CIC reports 1 group 174° 36,00 other group a little closer by about 4000 yards.|
|0331||-||Notified all stations of fighting light code.|
|0332||-||Received orders from Commander Battle Line to commence firing at 26,000 yards.|
|0332||-||DD's report they have attacked.|
|0333||-||4000 yards to go. Gunnery officer reports range 30,000 and has solution with a large target.|
|0345||-||Saw explosion in target area. Talked with gunnery officer to be sure our target was not among our own DD's. Fire control stated he had been on target for some time. CIC stated our DD's were clear.|
|0349||-||Starshells in target area. Can't tell if our DD or enemy is firing them. Our range 24,000. Am hesitating to fire until certain target is enemy. ComBatDiv 4 directed open fire.|
|0351||-||Our cruisers on our right flank opened fire. Our gunnery officer says he has had same big target for a long time and it is enemy. Commanding Officer ordered commence firing.|
|0352||-||Notified Commander Battle Line we were opening fire.|
|0352-10||-||First salvo 8 guns range 22,800 yards AP projectiles.|
|0353||-||Could hear gunnery officer chuckle and announce hit first salvo. Watched the second salvo through glasses and saw explosions when it landed. [Note: target later identified as Yamashiro.]|
|0354||-||Salvos very regular about 40 seconds interval. Other BB's opened after our second or third salvo.|
|0356||-||See explosions in target.|
|0358||-||Gunnery officer reports target is stopped and pip is getting small.|
|0402||-||BB turn 15 on signal. Ordered cease fire. Have to think about small amount of ammunition on board. (110 AP left). CIC reports targets turned left and reversed course.|
|0405||-||CIC reports target speed 0.|
|0411||-||Pip reported to "bloom" and then fade.|
|0412||-||Target disappeared. Can see ships burning -- one is a big fire.|
Performance of own Ordnance Material and Equipment.
(a) (2) Fire was opened with full radar control, with after radar, director 2, rangekeeper 2, and Stable Vertical 2 controlling. All spotting was by radar. Turrets were in full automatic. Rapid salvo fire was used after the second salvo. Computed ballistic plus arbitrary of UP 100 and UP 100 cold gun correction was used. After the 1st salvo the cold gun correction was removed. Opening gun range was 22,400 yards. Average gun range was 20,880 yards.
|Radar Spot||Spot Applied|
There were no errors in deflection observed on the MK 8 screen. Because of the known possible error in bearing of the MK 8 Mod 2 radar the 7th, 9th, 11, and 13th salvos were "rocked" in deflection. Range patterns were noted to average about 300 yards. Average salvo interval for the first 13 salvos was 41 seconds.
(a) (3) Previous instruction from Commander Battle Line were that H.C. projectiles were to be used against cruisers, carriers, or any unarmored vessel; A.P. projectiles against battleships and armored vessels.
To be prepared for either type of firing, two H.C. projectiles were arranged on each side of shell table in the gun chamber, with the space between the cradle and ramming tray left empty. Also the shell hoists were empty. A.P. and H.C. projectiles were arranged on each shell deck so as to permit loading of either type. Orders to load the shell hoist and shell tables were not given until it was definitely established that heavy ships were included in the enemy force. This was not known in time for the turrets to rearrange projectiles on the shell deck, therefore, all turrets experienced difficulties in projectile supply after the 12th salvo. Due to the angle of train of the turret and the H.C. projectiles on the shell deck, the A.P. projectiles in the pockets were inaccessible.
(a) (4) As in previous firings, ventilation of the lower handling rooms and magazines again proved entirely inadequate. The ship had been in Condition I Easy from 1940 the previous evening and ventilation was maintained up until the time for breaking out powder. With the men lying down and resting as much as possible they were exhausted due to the extreme heat and lack of air and would not have been able to continue the ammunition supply without reliefs many more minutes. When the ammunition train is filled and all ventilation is shut off the situation is greatly aggravated. A more adequate ventilation system is essential. An additional supply blower in the wing pockets, venting to the lower rooms seems feasible. This plan was suggested by the USS Maryland's letter to ComInch BB46/S38-1/S72 (of 90) (0147) of 18 July 1944. Also additional supply ducts to the magazines are required.
(b) A total of 89 A.P. and 4 H.C. projectiles were fired, all with service charges. Due to shell hoist casualties in turrets 1 and 3 and the lack of supply in turret 4, the Gun Captains loaded H.C. projectiles, which were available on the table, when there were no A.P. available. Turret 3 fired one H.C. on the 6th salvo. Turret 1 fired one H.C. on each of the 9th and 10th salvos. Turret 4 fired one H.C. on the 15th salvo. Turret 2 was slow on loading after the 12th salvo and missed the 13th salvo. Turret 4 had two projectiles rammed at cease firing and was ordered to continue the load. The left gun misfired on the 15th salvo necessitating a 16th salvo.
(c) The gun fire from this vessel was very effective. There were possible and probable hits in all salvos. Three pronounced flareups were observed on the target at the splash time of our 1st, 2nd, and 6th salvos. The 4th salvo seemed to be particularly concentrated on the target. The MK 8 radar operators had no difficulty in identifying or spotting our salvos. Splashes from other ships were observed but did not interfere except on the 5th salvo. It was possible to distinguish between our own and other ship's salvos by the size of the individual splashes.
At the time of the splash of our 6th salvo when a distinct flare up was seen there were three officers and three enlisted men who saw the silhouette as a Japanese battleship by the characteristic construction of its foremast but could not definitely determine her class. Due to the fact that she was heavily pounded with 16 inch projectiles and that she disappeared from all radar screens at 0412, it is certain she was sunk. Later reports verified the sinking of one or more battleships.
(b) (1) Fire Control Radar. The range and bearing of the enemy was given to the after MK 8 Mod 2 radar at 44,000 yards. This radar picked up enemy and started tracking at 41,000 yards. As at this time, the forward MK 8 was out of tune due to variable voltage. It was adjusted and was back in operation at 27,000 yards and could have been used. As the pip was large and clear and rangekeeper solution was good on the after MK 8, a shift to the forward radar was not made. Both worked satisfactorily and were not affected by the shock of gunfire. In fact neither has ever gone out to gunfire.
(b) (2) The Mk 27 Mod 0 radar installed in turret 3 as experimental installation performed well. Neither the antenna or set was affected by gunfire. Using precision, targets were tracked in with antennas set in deflection, as indicated by Plot on the deflection indicator. Targets were picked up at 36,000 yards. Splashes were spotted at the firing range with no difficulty, splashes being one fourth the size of the target pips. Considerable interference was experienced at times on the scope but no indications of jamming. Pips of DD's faded at 20,000 yards. Projectiles which crossed the antenna beam appeared on the scope.
(b) (3) The Mk 2 radars on the sky directors were able to pick up the enemy at 31,000 yards and track but were not used for control of fire in this action.
(b) (4) Search radars consisted of 2 SG-1's and one SK. The antenna of all search radars were kept rotating continuously; plotting (both Short Range Summary and DRT) being done from R.P.P.I.'s. The forward SAG-1 was set on the 75,000 yard scale for long range search, and the after SG-1 on the 15,000 yard scale for short range search.
(b) (5) Three R.P.P.I.'s in C.I.C. were set on the following scales on the sets indicated:
(c) (1) There were no air operations, either own or enemy, observed during this action. Our planes were sent ashore the preceding evening.
(d) (1) Tactics. The enemy had been fighting through day air attacks and night destroyers and MTB attacks but kept doggedly on. He appeared to be in two groups in column, 3,000 to 4,000 yards apart zig zaging. heavy ships appeared to be in each group. Speed was about seventeen knots, course north. Searchlights were used briefly several times and firing was rapid and brief. Apparently the enemy had no information of the fleet interposed in his path. our f was spread nearly across the straits in a crescent shaped disposition crossing the T. The plan was to open fire on the battle line at about 20,000 yards, and the battle line commander ordered opening fire at 26,000. When 26,000 yards was passed without being sure of the target, the CO felt no compunction about delaying, as such action agreed with the plan. In fact, with our preponderous of force, even if the enemy opened fire first the range would soon be enough to assure blowing him out of the water quickly. Also we were short of ammunition and wanted every shot to count.
(e) No attempt was made to use smoke camouflage or deception as none was considered necessary.
(f) (a) C.I.C. went to general quarters at 1940 on the night of 24 October. All search gear had been tuned and calibrated and was in optimum operation condition. BK was not on. No difficulty with land echoes despite the proximity of land, on the scopes of the SK was experienced. it is felt that the SK-2 did away successfully with such echoes. Procedures for search radars was as follows: (1) Radar I: "A" Scope 75 miles; "PPI" 220 miles; continuous sweep. BL energized but not keyed. no air contacts were made immediately prior to or during actions.
(b) Radar II (SG-1-1): Continuous sweep on 75,000 yard scale.
(c) Radar III (SG-1-2): Continuous sweep on 15,000 yard scale. Every effort was made top the antenna of the SG-1's in continuous rotation. When it became necessary to use BN's (which were energized but not keyed except when actually challenging) the antenna of Radar III was stopped momentarily for target identification, if the target appeared on its scopes. Only when Radar III was unable to challenge, would the antenna of Radar II be stopped for challenging.
(f) (2) There are 3 (VC-1) R.P.P.I.'s located in C.I.C. Of the three, two have been converted and have 12-inch scopes. These three R.P.P.I.'s were found invaluable, and were set on the following scales:
Each RPPI has a sound power phone selector switch and each was manned by a radar operator. Plotting, both DRT (enemy force) and short range summary (own forces -- station keeping), was done from the RPPI's, without stopping the sweep, thus not interrupting the continuous search. RPPI Sound Power selector switched phones were turned to the same circuit as the master PPI from which the RPPI was operating.
(f) (3) Intelligence was excellent. The Division Commander, Commanding Officer, and the Gunnery Officer were kept fully informed at all times on which were friendly and which were enemy pips, even when light forces were in comparatively close to target making their attacks. Evaluator, Assistant Evaluator, and C.I.C. watch officers had been provided with copies of all despatches and intercepted despatches; thus they had an excellent idea of the tactical situation. The Division Commander was kept fully cognizant of the location of all forces at all times.
Enough cannot be said regarding the sterling performance and behavior of the officers and crew before and during the action. Only a short three months ago the ship left the Navy Yard -- new equipment, newofficers, and new crew. The greater percentage of officers and men had never been to sea before. Only twelve enlisted men had ever had previous et expereince. Two of the turret officers had never been to sea before, the third came from submarine duty, and the fourth from small craft. yet, in a short three months, these ad gone through a gruelling shakedown period and had joined the fleet as a fighting unit. Their first assignment was the bombardment of Leyte Island. Several air attacks were successfully participated in. Then shortly afterwards they were in action against heavy surface units of the Japanese fleet. Their conduct was exemplary. They lifted themselves by their "bootstraps" to be competent and battle tried veterans, cool and calm under fire and extrtemely efficient.
cc: Cominch US Fleet (advance)
Paraphrase of message from CTF 77:
BE READY FOR NIGHT ATTACK X 16 ENEMY INCLUDING BB's CA CL ANDAPPROACHING FROM SULU SEA EXPECTED IN LEYTE GULF DURING DARKNESS X 2 CRUISERS DETAILED TO STRENGTHEN 77.2 X NAVY PT BOATS STATIONED AT SOUTH END OF STRAITS X
Paraphrase of message from CTF 77.2 on October 24, 1944.
GENERAL: THE ENEMY FORCES TO THE WESTWARD OF LEYTE APPEAR TO BE THREATENING UGITH WITH 2 BB's CA 4 CLL AND TEN DESTROYERS X PLAN DESTROY BY GUNFIRE AND TORPEDOES ANY ENEMY ATTEMPTING TO ENTER SURIGAO STRAITS X BATTLE LINE OF 6 BB's PLUS ASSIGNED DD DESTROY OR REPEL JAPANESE BATTLELINE WITH GUNS BY QUICKLY GAINING MODERATE RANGES AROUND 20,000 YARDS X LEFT FLANK FIVE CRUISERS AND DD ASSIGNED PROTECT OWN BATTLESHIPS AND ATTACK ENEMY BATTLESHIPS X RIGHT FLANK GHREE CRUISERS AND DD DEFEND OWN BIG SHIPS AND SINK ENEMY BATTLESHIPS X USE DISPOSITION SIMILAR USF 10-A OPERATING EAST AND WEST LINE X BEAR MIND OWN AND ENEMY DESTROYER ATTACKS, ETC.
Extracts from the TBS Log during the period from 2000, 24 October to 0538, 25 October 1944, minus nine time.
|1952||CTG 77.2||CTG 79.11||In case of surface action to stbd I plan to make immediate attack with fish then retire to clear you. 19501.|
|1957||TG 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||285 Turn|
|2010||CTG 79.11||CTG 77.2||Your 19501 approved x retire to cover of Dinagat Island and pass between Hibuson and Dinagat x Bojangles x inform me if enemy is in more than 1 group and composition if possible.|
|CTG 77.2||CTG 79.11||R x My plan would be to attack from 2 sides 1 of two and 1 of 3 that would leave 1 group well to westward and 1 to eastward for retirement.|
|2014||TG 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||075 Turn|
|2015||CTG 79.11||CTG 77.2||Affirmative your last Trans x Keep close to shore and keep info CTG 77.3 who has left flank x Bojangles as usual 20161|
|CTG 79.11||If surface attack is made to stbd CDS 54 will form two attack groups, western group CDD 108, McDermuts and Monssen eastern group C take spd 30 knots X McNair and Mertz will remain off station 1 and 2 x will use individual target plan intermed spd plan X . . . . . . . . . . and then to northward near coastline. 2020L.|
|2021||CTG 77.2||CBD 3||Designating Battleships Affirm Post.|
|2130||TG 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||Turn 1 ans.|
|2150||TG 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||Upon receipt heavy cruisers and light cruisers form 18 on Louisville in natural order x Destroyers take station for battle position. 21501.|
|2151||DesRon 56||CDR 56||Rendezvous 2000 yds north of CA's and CL's on guides north and south.|
|2158||Battleships||CBD 3||9 turn.|
|2205||BB's||CBD 3||Speed 2|
|8 turn speed 1.|
|2228||TG 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||9 turn.|
|2243||TG 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||urn.|
|2244||CTG 77.2||Columbia||Skunks brg 178, dist 21|
|Columbia||CTG 77.2||Believe you have geography check for motion.|
|CTG 79.11||Post attack rendezvous point western group at western and station 7 eastern group at western and screening station 3.|
|2320||DS 56||CDS 56||Post attack rendezvous point 3 miles north of Hibuson Island.|
|2321||CBD 3||CTG 77.2||INT Corpen.|
|2321||CTG 77.2||CBD 3||M corpen 280 M form 270|
|2329||TG 77.2||CTG 77.2||All ships set condition 1-E.|
|2338||BB's||CBD 3||turn 17.|
|0009||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||turn 18.|
|---------||Contact relay from PT 127 thru quote contact with enemy DD's and 2 large unidentified ships at 2300. 23 miles off SE tip BOHOL Island headed north.|
|0026||CTG 77.2||CTG 79.11||Contact repetition made by PT 127 and relayed x Contact with 3 enemy DD's and 2 large units ships at 23101 10 miles off SE tip of BOHOL is heading north.|
|0028||Battleships||CBD 3||1 turn|
|0031||CTG 79.11||McGowan||Skunks several 193 dist 8 time 00301.|
|0032||CDD 108||CTG 79.11||Form your group in vicinity station 6 and await further orders.|
|0041||CTG 77.2||CTG 79.11||Contact report from PT 127 x 2 contacts Bearing 310 true 10 miles from Camiguin Island now closing in.|
|0050||CTG 79.11||McGowan||Skunks 178 7 miles (faded) (believed friendly) Confirmed 0104|
|0100||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||070 turn.|
|0143||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||050 turn.|
|0147||CTG 77.2||CTG 79.11||Contact Brg 140 dist 18 from Taancan Pint was made 01231.|
|CBD 3||16 turn.|
|0200||CTG 77.2||CTG 77.3||PT 134 reports an undetermined target proceeding up the strait abeam of S point of Panaon Island about 4 min ago.|
|0207||CTG 77.2||CTG 77.3||PT 134 now reports very large ship and that he has taken him under attack with undetermined results.|
|0210||CTG 77.2||CTG 77.3||The target being attacked by PT boats is trying to drive them off with gun fire.|
|0212||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||Speed 2.|
|0215||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||280 turn.|
|0222||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||Speed 1.|
|0229||CTG 77.2||CTG 77.3||PT 134 reports he hit a heavy object with his screw in deep water he thought it was a submarine coming up the channel with what targets may be with them.|
|0232||BB's||CBD 3||General Quarters.|
|0234||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||270 turn. (cruisers)|
|0235||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||Set Condition of readiness One.|
|0237||BB's||CBD 3||1 turn.|
|0242||BB's||CBD 3||Speed 2.|
|0243||CTG 79.11||McGowan||Now see 3 more skunk in column 184 range 15 course 000.|
|0244||DesRon 54||CTG 79.11||Speed 4. 25 knots.|
|0255||Denver||Just saw blue flash toward target.|
|Monssen||CBD 108||Captain McDermut is taking first target you take the one farthest north.|
|0256||-----||CTG 79.11||Make smoke.|
|-----||CTG 79.11||We are coming full left now.|
|0258||CDR 24||CTG 77.3||Proceed to attack x follow down with the shore line follow other group in x then with others x make smoke.|
|0302||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||Turn 18 Speed 2|
|0304||BB's||CBD 3||Turn 18|
|0307||CTG 77.2||CTG 79.11||1 group 2 large 1 small we are being straddled now.|
|0309||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||Speed 1.|
|0313||CTG 77.2||CTG 79.11||Spot 5 Targets 2 may have been hit slowing down and dropping behind some.|
|0318||CTG 77.2||CTG 79.11||Will try to get a check think there were 2 BB.|
|CTG 77.2||CDR. 108||Just scored a big flare on 1 of them.|
|0322||CTG 77.2||CTG 79.11||General consensus of opinion 2 BB 2 cruisers and 1 DD X we saw definitely 2 hit.|
|CBD 3||Speed 3|
|0330||CTG 77.2||CTG 77.3||The group firing are retiring the other group are getting ready to fire and will report when fish are away.|
|0331||BB's||CBD 3||Open fire at 26,000 yds.|
|0332||CTG 77.2||CTG 77.3||Fish away from my western group X reports enemy appears to be retiring.|
|0334||CDR 56||CTG 77.2||Launch attack hit big boys.|
|0340||CBD 3||CTG 77.2||Enemy seems to be retiring close battleline (this transmission cancelled)|
|0343||CBD 3||CTG 77.2||Do not close battleline.|
|0345||CTG 77.2||CCD 2||PT 525 reports 5 DD and 1 large ship passing up strait heading north X one of enemy appear to be dead in water has been hitting them with 5 inch fire.|
|0347||CTG 77.2||CBD 3||I have a of small ones followed by a group of large ones when the large ones reach twenty-six thousand yds. I will open fire.|
|0349||TU 77.2||CTG 77.2||About to open fire.|
|Cruisers||CTG 77.3||Open fire.|
|0350||-----||CTG 77.3||Be those 3 little ones in front are friendly trying to get to shore line.|
|0352||CBD 3||West Virginia||Ready to fire.|
|0355||BB's||CBD 3||Turn 3.|
|0354||CTG 77.3||CTG 77.2||Open fire.|
|DesDiv 112||-----||Make smoke.|
|Emergency 000 turn X turn for the beach.|
|0359||CTG 77.2||Edwards||Third Section Torpedos away.|
|0402||BB's||CBD 3||Turn 15.|
|0403||Section 1||CDD 56||Get ready to fire torpedoes, fire when ready and retire with smoke.|
|0405||CTG 77.2||CCD 2||Splash dead ahead and stbd beam of Denver.|
|0407||ALL SHIPS||CTG 77.2||Look out for California she apparently did not hear turn signal.|
|0406||-----||CDD 56||You are firing at DesRon 56.|
|0410||ALL SHIPS||CTG 77.2||All Ships cease fire.|
|0412||BB's||CB 3||All BB's having hot loaded guns may fire at enemy and unload.|
|0413||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||18 turn.|
|0414||BB's||CBD 2||Tennessee is going ahead to take station on Pennsylvania X take station astern of Tennessee.|
|0417||BatDiv 4||CBD 3||Turn 9|
|0421||CTG 77.2||Denver||Large target has disappeared from sight target referred to Bearing 205 distance 11.|
|0424||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||Open fire when you have solution.|
|0424||CTG 77.2||CCD 2||Four additional targets at 184 14 to 17 miles.|
|0425||BatDiv 4||CBD 3||9 turn.|
|0428||BatDiv 2||CBD 2||00 turn.|
|0429||TG 77.2||CTG 77.2||Grant is hit and lying dead in the water X all ships take special precaution.|
|0430||DesDiv||CTG 77.2||Proceed south intercept enemy.|
|0433||Cruisers||CTG 77.2||Turn 190.|
|0434||CTG 77.2||CCD 2||3 enemy ships 190 near ship 12 miles 270 turn Speed 2.|
|0437||CBD 3||CBD 2||BatDiv 2 on course 270 at speed 10 X ships Pennsylvania, Tennessee, California.|
|0450||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||Execute on receipt 183.|
|0455||BB's||CBD 3||18 turn.|
|0534||TU 77.2.2||CTG 77.2||Corpen 192.|
|0524||CTG 77.2||Minneapolis||Report from PT X 3 large targets east of Tamona island 2 heading north 1 heading south.|
|0525||CTG 77.2||CTG 77.2||Open fire when target bears.|
|0526||CBD 3||Tennessee||Skunk few 129 Dist 17 apparently on reverse course.|
|0538||TG 77.2||CTG 77.2||Cease firing.|
|BB48/S72||U.S.S. West Virginia
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
|To:||Chief, Bureau of Ordnance.|
|Via:||(1) Commander Battleship Division 4.|
(2) Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet (FMO).
|Subject:||Casualties to the Mark 1 Mod 0 Shell Hoist Drive Gear in Turret I during shore bombardment of Leyte Island, and the Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 20 and 25th, respectively -- report of and recommendations concerning.|
In view of the above, it is recommended that full automatic equipment, similar to Turret II, be installed in Turrets I, III, and IV.
|BB48/S72||U.S.S. West Virginia
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
2 November 1944.
|To:||Chief, Bureau of Ordnance.|
|Via:||(1) Commander Battleship Division 4.|
|Subject:||Casualty to Right Mark 1 Mod 0 Shell Hoist in Turret III during Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25, 1944 -- report of.|