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	GENERAL
1.	Britain wants general conference on Korea after armistice:
	Britain believes strongly that the powers
	directly concerned in the Korean hostilities should
	hold a conference to work out a political settle-
	ment if an armistice is arranged, according to
	the chief Australian delegate to the UN General Assembly. These powers
	would include the United States, Britain, Communist China, the Soviet Union, France, India, Australia, and perhaps Thailand and Turkey.
	Trance, muta, Austratia, and perhaps mariand and furkey.
	Comment: This is the first information on recent
	British thinking regarding the procedure for achieving a Korean political
	settlement, which the United Kingdom has long maintained must precede any
	general stabilization of the Far Eastern situation.
	FAR EAST
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2.	Stalin's message appeals to discontented Japanese elements:
Г	Stolin's maggage to the Tananaga manula cought
14	Stalin's message to the Japanese people caught both government and public by complete surprise,
ł	according to the US Political Adviser in Tokyo.
	Japanese non-Communist editorial comment
	ranged from utter skepticism to the influential Yomiuri's interpretation that
	Japan should not fear this new peace offensive and should conclude a bi-
	lateral peace with the Soviet union.
	The Political Adviser believes that those
	business and industrial groups interested in trade with the Soviet Union and
	Communist China will be heartened, as will left-wing elements opposed to
	the peace and security treaties, rearmament and the stationing of US forces
	in Japan. He concludes that while most Japanese will be inclined to examine
	carefully any Soviet offers of friendship, the message has been well-timed to coincide with the growing uneasiness over the future US position in Japan.
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Comment: The San Francisco treaty encourages Japan to conclude a bilateral peace treaty with any state which adhered to the UN declaration of 1 January 1942 and which is at war with Japan, on the same or substantially the same terms.

Yomiuri has the third largest newspaper circulation in Japan and is generally said to have an independent viewpoint.

3. Comment on Communist policy concerning South Korean prisoners:

Two authoritative Communist spokesmen recently explained the great discrepancy between the 11,000 South Korean soldiers listed by the Communists as prisoners of war and the 90,000 that the UN lists as missing in action. Wilfred Burchett, correspondent for a French Communist newspaper, stated that the Communists released "almost all South Koreans when captured, allowing them to return to their homes or follow their own inclinations."

The Communist cease-fire delegate, General Lee Sang Cho, elaborated this theme by noting: "There is not a single man to be found on our side who has been forced into the war. True, in our ranks there are those personnel from your side who . . . revolted and came over to our side We have never classified them as prisoners of war and we will never turn over these patriots of Korea to you . . . "

from recaptured South Koreans

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In commenting on the Nuncio's report of the lack of mutual trust between French and US officials and the stubborn French belief that the US desires a controlling interest in Indochina, the Consul states that the Nuncio's opinions are a 'fair assessment."

Comment: The Nuncio is reported to have studied the situation quite carefully during a visit to Indochina in December and, upon his return to the Philippines, expressed himself as "gravely perturbed" by the weaknesses of the Vietnam Government, by French distrust of American motives, and by the failure of the French to promise full independence to Vietnam.

5.	Amer ican	aid	program	in	Burma	reported	in	jeopardy:
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25X1 <i>A</i>	The US Embassy in Rangoon reports that Burmese officials are balking at the requirements in the
	Battle and Mutual Security Acts which must be
	satisfied before Burma receives further US
	assistance. The Burmese apparently regard these requirements as contrary
	to their concept of a "neutral" for eign policy and as an impairment of their sovereignty. They also fear antagonizing Communist China and the Soviet
	Union.

The Embassy considers the situation "critical" and believes the United States may have to suspend aid if the Burmese do not themselves terminate the existing bilateral ECA agreement.

Government has always been sensitive to Communist criticism and there have been recent indications of a growing aversion to ECA -- a prime target of Communist propaganda. On the other hand, the rapidly developing aid program in Burma has been well received and appreciated by the Burmese people and was expected to further Burmese cooperation with the West.

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	EASTERN EUROPE				
6.	Weak propaganda since fliers' release indicates Hungarian indecision:				
25X1A	According to the US Legation in Budapest, weak propaganda coverage on the released American fliers reflects a continued lack of Hungarian or Soviet policy directives and marks a propaganda				
•	low point. The unusual reticence of the press since the fliers' release on 28 December suggests that editors are waiting for new government action of an official view of the situation following the retaliatory action of the United States.				
	Comment: The vacillations of Foreign Ministry officials during negotiations for the fliers' release and the sharp disparity between the charges of espionage and the actual trial for border violation tend to confirm that an over-all policy for the case has not been developed.				
	WESTERN EUROPE				
7.	Comment on Communist efforts to delay West German rearmament:				
	The Communists are intensifying their efforts to delay West German rearmament and integration into Western Europe an are enjoying some success in using West Germans to promote these objectives. Pastor Niemoeller is now in Moscow to "strengthen the cause of peace through church channels" and to discuss the release of German was prisoners. If he were to secure the release of prisoners of war now classified as "war criminals" or contract employees, his views in favor of rapprochement would become more popular in West Germany, where they now have little support.				
	The East German Government has announced a draft all-German election law which requires the approval of East and West Germans in consultation. The Communists thus may hope to entice the West Germans into protracted discussions and draw attention away from negotiations with the West and delay integration.				
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There is no indication, however, that Moscow is contemplating an eleventh-hour genuine offer for the democratic unification of Germany.

	LATIN AMERICA	
8.	Possible change of government in Panama:	
25X1A	Harmodio Arias of Panama has alerted his newspaper for a possible early change of government. Neither President Arosemena nor the police chief appears to have definite knowledge that a coup is scheduled, but the police have been alerted,	25X1
	Comment: The bitter political campaign between the forces of former police chief Remon and the nationalist, Communist-aided forces of Harmodio Arias in connection with the presidential elections next May has intensified chronic Panamanian instability. A well-organized uprising to preclude the possibility of Remon's election would have urban support and, despite Remon's ties with the police, could be successful.	
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