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The supply component of the Chinese Communist 7th Artillery
Division in central Korea reported in a 28 March message that
"...there is a large segment of the civilian population which
is without food." The message urged that Chinese Communist units
should make some contributions "to alleviate some of these distressing cases." The sender suggested that Chinese rice might
be exchanged for Korean straw for roof thatching. (SUEDE 501st
Comm Recon Grp Korea, M-1908, 28 Mar 52)

Comment: Civilian food shortages, already critical, are probably being accentuated by the traditional "spring hunger"—the period following consumption of the fall rice harvest and the maturing of the summer grains in June.

All indications, however, point to a continued adequate level of supply for both Chinese Communist and North Korean military units.

Morth Korean aircraft fly from Yenchi to Sinuiju: A 3 April message sent from Yenchi, Manchuria, to Mukden reported "... will take off on 5 April ... from Yenchi via Changchun and Shenyang (Mukden) to Sinuiju. Mission: transport and deliver ... "The field reporting unit observes that Yenchi is the headquarters for the North Korean Air Force's training command and that all types of conventional aircraft, except light bombers, are stationed there. A previous movement from Yenchi occurred when YAK-18 trainers flew to Fengcheng, north of Antung. (SUEDE 6920 Security Grp, Johnson AB Japan, No. 284, 4 Apr 52)

Comment: This message is too fragmentary to evaluate properly. It is worth noting, however, that recent messages have indicated that trainer aircraft are being stored at certain airfields in North Korea.

7. Security Ministry in North Korea restricts troop tobacco ration: On 31 March a message, passed between two unidentified North Korean units, stated that "according to the Military Orders . . . and the order of the Racial (Social?) Security Ministry, . . . investigate the members who do not smoke, and from 1 March except them from cigarette supply." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-I-7, 2 Apr 52)

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Comment: This message is unique because it suggests the degree of authority exercised by the state security organ of North Korea. Since tobacco is essentially a morale booster, its supply would properly be a function of the Security Ministry.

8. Supply depot for North Korean combat corps moves from western sector: A recently available 11 January communication from the North Korean IV Corps supply chief to the 23rd Brigade reported that "since the I Corps is moving all of the materials from its present location . . . (in western Korea) . . . , you are to organize . . . " (SUEDE ASAPAC Japan Spot No. 3309A, 4 Apr 52)

Comment: The North Korean I Corps, currently in combat in eastern Korea, made a trans-peninsular move from the west-ern sector in November 1951. This message suggests that the corps supply installation followed a month or so later.

9. North Korean military personnel ordered to help civiliar farmers: A North Korean message of 4 April from the East Coast Defense Headquarters at Songhyon-ni orders every man of an unidentified naval unit at Songjin to "assist the farmers for seven days." (501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/10072, 6 Apr 52)

Comment: Other recent Communist messages from Korea have indicated that the enemy is taking advantage of the static military situation to improve the food situation in North Korea.

Communications suggest presence of another Chinese Communist Army Group in Korea: The Far East Command reports that a 21 March Chinese Communist message mentioned the 505th, 508th, and 524th Regiments. The first two are organic to the 57th Chinese Communist Army, while the latter is subordinate to the 59th Army. The net over which these units were mentioned was in the Pyongyang Singye area of western Korea. A 24 February Chinese Communist message spoke of the 174th Division of the 58th Chinese Communist Army.

FECOM adds that the 57th Army is carried just north of the Yalu river, the 58th in Nanyang in east central China, and the 59th in the Taiyuan area of north China.


No conclusions can be drawn from these isolated messages and the presence of this new force in Korea cannot be accepted. (SUEDE CINCFE SIB 475, 5 Apr 52)

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Comment: The rise in Chinese Communist unit identifications made through communications intelligence during 1952 may be caused by the San-Fan traffic making comparative references to units not in Korea.



Chinese guard against plague threat from Korea: The Chinese Communists are restricting the return from Korea of personnel without an inoculation record and a "no-plague" certificate. An intercept from the Chinese military net in Korea says that only some 500 of the more than 800 persons entering the border city of Antung on 25 March had their records with them. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-1949, 1 Apr 52)

Comment: The numerous reports of plague in Manchuria are unconfirmed, although several Chinese Communist messages have emphasized epidemic control. Communist precautions are understandable in view of the fact that plague is endemic to the area. They also serve to emphasize the biological warfare charges.

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