PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THEREETO

PART 8
JANUARY 30 AND 31 AND FEBRUARY 1, 2, 4, 5, AND 6, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
Hearings
Before the
Joint Committee on the Investigation
Of the Pearl Harbor Attack
Congress of the United States
Seventy-Ninth Congress
Second Session
Pursuant to
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)
A Concurrent Resolution Authorizing an
Investigation of the Attack on Pearl
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Events and Circumstances
Relating Thereto

PART 8
January 30 and 31 and February 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman

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### Names of Witnesses in All Proceedings Regarding the Pearl Harbor Attack—Continued

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1 Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

President: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P.
Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[9108] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I believe the committee had not finished with Admiral Smith.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, yesterday I was questioning Admiral
Smith. It was the understanding that he would be here this morning
at 10 o'clock. He is not here.

Yesterday the statement was made by Mr. Richardson of counsel
that it would be desirable if possible to hold the testimony to 10 min-
utes, because of the urgency of finishing with the testimony of Cap-
tain or Admiral McCollum.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain McCollum.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain McCollum.

Now, then I have spent considerable time on the previous testimony
of Admiral Smith, and I find, Mr. Chairman, that there is a vast
amount of very important material in the previous testimony of Ad-
miral Smith as to why they didn't use the Army planes, as to basing
the fleet at Pearl Harbor, as to the propriety of it, as to the efficiency
of the fleet at the time of December 7, as well as one more important
thing, that when Admiral Kimmel was on the stand I asked at that
time if he consulted his air man, Admiral Bellinger, and he said "no,"
that he consulted Captain Davis.

[9110] Mr. KEFFE. Admiral Smith is here now.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to show by this witness on the stand that
Captain Davis was never consulted either.

For those reasons, I cannot agree to restricting myself to 10 min-
utes, and if Captain McCollum—I ask that this testimony of Admiral
Smith be put over until later.

I think the testimony too important not to be developed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may make this suggestion:
There isn't the slightest necessity of the Congressman or any other

1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

79716—46—pt. 8 — 2
member of the committee curtailing his examination of Admiral Smith. My suggestion is that the Admiral be permitted to step aside, so that we can present the testimony of Captain McCollum and Admiral Bellinger, who are under very imperative orders, and when they are through, there is no reason why Admiral Smith can't be examined to the limit.

And I want to make this statement to the committee:

There has never been any idea in our minds that Admiral Smith might not be able to give material testimony. The point that we make, and which has been in my mind, is that he has testified two or three times. There will be in the record a very full statement. I have an apprehension that all of the testimony that will be brought from the Admiral [9/11] here may be just cumulative to that testimony.

If, of course, there are new facts to be elicited, not only with Admiral Smith but with any other witness, there should be further examination.

But now I would ask the chairman to permit the admiral to pause in his testimony to get rid of these other two witnesses, and then take up the testimony. I have been advised, too, by Captain Zacharias that he desires to offer some further remarks in connection with the matter.

The Chairman. Admiral Smith may step aside then, and these other witnesses will be called.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman——

The Chairman. The Chair would like to call attention to an article that appears in this morning's Washington Post, with the headline, "Pearl Harbor Report to Hit Army, Navy—Congress to be told High Command, as well as Kimmel and Short, 'Muffed Ball.'"

The article goes on to say:

The joint congressional committee investigating Pearl Harbor will report to Congress that the War and Navy Departments in Washington share the responsibility for the disaster with Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and Major General Walter C. Short, 1941 Hawaiian Commanders, The Washington Post learned exclusively yesterday.

[9/12] The Committee, which is now at work on its report to Congress has tentatively decided, a member disclosed that the High Command here, as well as Kimmel and Short "muffed the ball" and gave the Japs the chance to inflict this nation's greatest naval disaster.

And the article goes on further.

The Chair wishes to say that the committee has not met, nor discussed its report, even informally, or casually. It has been the Chair's understanding, and I think that of the committee, that the committee will not make up its mind on its report until the evidence is in, and it has met and gone over the situation, and agreed on its report.

There isn't any basis for any article in any newspaper that this committee is now writing its report, or that anybody on the committee knows what its report will be.

I think it is a distinct disservice to this committee to be predicting and prognosticating a report when the committee has not met or discussed its report.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I want to say as a member of the committee that I certainly have never heard of any member of the committee having an idea as to what the report should be, and that
I personally have not commented upon the evidence or made up my mind in any way in relation to what the report should be.

[9113] My sole purpose has been and will be during the hearings to get the facts and then I know the committee as a whole will consider those facts and make a report.

The Chairman. I appreciate the member’s comment. If there is any member of the committee that has any other view or objective, I don’t know who it is, but I do feel the committee ought not in advance to be put in the position of having made up its mind, when we haven’t even concluded the evidence, and when we will in all likelihood want to take a little time when we have concluded the evidence to consider it, and probably reread some of it in order to get the picture appropriately before the committee before we attempt to write a report.

I felt in justice to the committee that that comment ought to be made.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman—

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. I want to thank the chairman for making that statement. I had intended to make a similar statement when the chairman very graciously called attention to the article which appeared in this morning’s Washington Post.

I agree with the chairman that I think a disservice has been done the committee and the country by the speculation that is contained in this article, but perhaps it may have been prompted by the fact that it has been suggested that we have been indulging somewhat in clairvoyance in some of the evidence that has been given here. Maybe that is what tended to influence this particular writer. I don’t know.

The Chairman. I appreciate that.

Mr. Keefe. So far as I am concerned, I have never met with the committee to discuss that matter; I don’t know of any committee meeting, and if there has been any such agreement by any group on the committee, I know nothing about it.

The Chairman. I want to say there has been no meeting, so far as the Chair knows, of any group, and so far as the Chair’s intention is concerned there would be no meeting called of the committee to consider the evidence and consider its report until all of the evidence is in; and while it may be that there has been some clairvoyance indulged in here, at least the Chair hopes it will not become contagious.

That is all.

Mr. Kaufman. May we then present Captain McCollum?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Kaufman. Captain McCollum.

[9115] The Chairman. Captain, will you be sworn?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ARTHUR HOWARD MCCOLLUM, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

The Chairman. All right, you may proceed.

Mr. Kaufman. Captain, where were you born?

Captain McCollum. I was born in Nagasaki, Japan.

Mr. Kaufman. And how long have you been in the Navy?
Captain McCollum. I have been in the Navy for 28 years continuously.

Mr. Kaufman. Will you tell us briefly your experience in the Navy?

Captain McCollum. I was appointed to the Naval Academy in 1917 by the late Senator Bankhead, of Alabama. I was graduated in 1921, in June.

I served for 6 months on the battleship Arkansas and for 2 months on the destroyer Argonne en route to the Orient. I arrived in Japan, in Tokyo, in March of 1922 for the purpose of studying the Japanese language. I remained, I think it was, until 1925.

During that period, for 4 months I served with the destroyers of the Asiatic Fleet who were at that time serving in conjunction with Japanese destroyers assisting the Army planes flying around the world in 1924. Most of that service was in the Kurile Islands, where I spent nearly 6 weeks at that time.

I returned to the United States in June of 1925, went to submarine school, finished there and in June 1926 I was assigned to duty on board the U. S. S. O-7, a submarine operating out of the Canal Zone. I served in that submarine for 2½ years, the last of which I was in command of it. I shifted from the U. S. S. O-7 to executive officer of a larger submarine, the S-11, returned to the United States in that ship in June of 1928 and was ordered to duty as assistant naval attaché at the American Embassy in Tokyo. I arrived in Tokyo in about October of 1928 and served on that up until June of 1930.

I returned then to the United States and served for 3 years on the battleship West Virginia. In 1933, I returned to the Navy Department as head of the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence. In February of 1935 I was detached from that duty and ordered to San Pedro, Calif., to set up a special Intelligence Office to work in conjunction with the staff of the commander in chief of the fleet, at that time, Admiral Reeves, to make an effort to stop the Japanese espionage attack on the vessels of our fleet.

I completed that duty in 1936 and was assigned as assistant operations officer and fleet intelligence officer on the staff of the commander in chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral A. J. Hepburn. I continued in that duty until about February 1, 1938. The last 7 months of that duty I was acting operations officer of the fleet, having no senior in that billing.

I spent then 2 months on temporary duty here in the Navy Department in connection with the installing of a new system for keeping check of the movements of vessels of the fleet; was assigned to the command of the destroyer Jacob Jones. In the course of that cruise I was detached from the command of the Jacob Jones in the latter part of September of 1939, returned to the United States, and was assigned to duty in the Division of Naval Intelligence, where I was detailed as officer in charge of the far eastern section.

I was relieved from that duty in October of 1942, was ordered as operations officer on the staff of the commander of the Southwest Pacific force, which was later called the Seventh Fleet, which was that part of the Navy serving under General MacArthur's orders, his over-all command. Upon arrival I was directed by the admiral to assume duty as intelligence officer of that fleet and served and developed an intelligence organization for him.
I served as intelligence officer of that fleet until about May 1 of 1945, when I returned to this country. I am now [9118] assigned as commanding officer of the heavy cruiser Helena.

Mr. Kaufman. During the months of October and November 1941 what was your assignment?

Captain McCollum. I was head of the far eastern section of the Division of Naval Intelligence. I might add that from the 25th of August until about the 14th of October I was absent from the United States.

Mr. Kaufman. You returned here around the 14th of October 1941?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And you continued as chief of the far eastern section until October of 1942?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And who was the counterpart of your particular position in the Army?

Captain McCollum. Colonel Bratton.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, as part of your duties as chief of the far eastern section was it part of your duties to keep track of the fleet movements, of the Japanese fleet movements, and will you explain to the committee the manner in which that was done?

Captain McCollum. It was. I had a special section in my office who were charged with that particular duty. We had a large chart spread on the wall with the ocean divided up into [9119] certain zones to which we had given names. All sorts of information concerning the movements of any Japanese man-of-war were entered on a card and that card index was kept together and daily or more often as necessary pins representing the various ships of the fleet were moved around on this chart, and for my own purposes there was a sheet summarizing the situation.

Mr. Kaufman. Did the time come in November 1941 when you determined that the Intelligence Office in Washington had lost track of part of the Japanese fleet?

Captain McCollum. By the time you speak of, we were almost wholly dependent on one form of radio intelligence for information concerning the Japanese fleet which was not on the China coast. That form is known as traffic analysis, whereby inferences are drawn from such things as the volume of radio traffic and call signs and so on.

Those inferences were drawn and were made based largely on radio intelligence by that particular section of the Communications Intelligence organization. Their conclusions were then submitted to my office.

Radio intelligence, of course, has very definite limitations. If the man you are trying to find out about does not use the radio, radio falls down. After a fleet has been in port a certain length of time, in the absence of other information [9120] that is, information other than radio intelligence, such as sight contact or some other report from an observer, unless the call signs of those ships are heard very definitely and plotted in by compass a doubt arises as to whether those ships are where radio intelligence thinks they are. That situation existed, to my mind, from about the middle of November on.

Mr. Kaufman. And as a result of that doubt did you dispatch to the commander of the Asiatic Fleet a dispatch which is dated No-
ember 24, 1941, part of exhibit 37 [handing document to witness]?  

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, I drafted that dispatch and it was released by my chief, Admiral Wilkinson.

Mr. Kaufman. And in reply to that dispatch did you get communications from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet which are referred to on page 7610 of the record before this committee, pages 7610 and 7611 [handing transcript to witness]?  

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. On or about December 1, 1941, did you cause to be prepared a memorandum showing the disposition or location of the Japanese fleet?

Captain McCollum. May I just see it, sir? I think I know what you mean, Mr. Counsel, but I would just like to refresh my mind, sir. [9121] (The document referred to was handed to the witness.)

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; this is a routine report on this particular subject and under the office orders that existed at the time, while that is dated December 1, the information and the time, the dead line for preparing this report was about 2 days before that, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And in that memorandum that you prepared you indicated that part of the Japanese fleet was in Japanese home waters?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. That is in Exhibit 85 before this committee.

On or about December 6 did you prepare another memorandum as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet [handing document to witness]?  

Captain McCollum. December 6?

Mr. Kaufman. December 1.

Captain McCollum. No, sir. This memorandum that you have shown me here on December 1 is a memorandum which I personally prepared covering the development of the entire situation, the general location on the idea of the Japanese fleet and it is only one part of it. This summarizes the situation and is an attempt to show what to my mind was the very critical situation that had been brought about step by step [9122].

Mr. Kaufman. And was that communicated to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain McCollum. So far as I know it was not, sir. This thing was actually drafted by me on the Friday and Saturday preceding.

If I remember correctly, December 1 was Monday. I polished it up in some aspects and took it to my chief, Admiral Wilkinson, early Monday morning in finished form. He read this document over, directed me to wait in his office and disappeared. He came back in about 10 minutes and said:

You be ready to go to the office of Admiral Stark with me between 11 and 11:30 this morning, and make a number of copies of this thing that you have given me.

I did that and at the time stated I appeared in Admiral Stark's office. Present in that office at the time were Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Turner, the Director of War Plans, of course my chief, Admiral Wilkinson, and one or two other flag officers—I believe Admirals Brainard and Noyes.
At the direction of Admiral Wilkinson copies of this memorandum were passed to each of the flag officers present. I then read the memorandum personally and engaged a discussion at that time and pointed out that in my opinion war or [9123] rupture of diplomatic relations was imminent, and I requested information as to whether or not the fleets in the Pacific had been adequately alerted.

I was given a categorical assurance by both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner that dispatches fully alerting the fleets and placing them on a war basis had been sent. I had seen no such dispatches at that time.

Mr. Kaufman. Were you informed at that time of the war message sent by Admiral Stark to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet under date of November 27?

Captain McCollum. Not except in the form of the assurance that adequate information in alerting the fleet had been sent.

Mr. Kaufman. In connection with the preparation of the memorandum to which you have just referred did you rely to any extent on the traffic analysis reports received by you from Admiral Kimmel?

Captain McCollum. Oh, yes. I might point out that the best stations for traffic analysis were at Corregidor, the radio intelligence center there, and at Hawaii on Oahu. We were dependent on those places for our information here.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, Captain, we will go to another subject. You are familiar with the intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic code regarding the setting up of the so-called [9124] winds code?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. I had first heard it called the winds code upon my return to Washington last May, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. But you are familiar with the two intercepts that are part of Exhibit 1?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. On pages 154 and 155 of Exhibit 1.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; I am familiar with these.

Mr. Kaufman. And they are dated when, sir?

Captain McCollum. The first one is dated from Tokyo to Washington November 19, 1941, translated apparently in the Navy Department on November 28, 1941. The second one is also dated Tokyo to Washington November 19, 1941, translated in the Navy Department on November 26, 1941.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, after those two messages were called to your attention what did you do to insure receipt of any execute message in furtherance of that code?

Captain McCollum. At my recommendation my chief, Admiral Wilkinson, went to the director of communications, Admiral Noyes, and asked him to set up everything he possibly could to intercept the execute of these dispatches, and it is my understanding that that was done. That would be done by that technical service.

[9125] Mr. Kaufman. And any reports with respect to the execute of the winds code would normally come to you?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir—should have.

Mr. Kaufman. Did you, up to November 7, get any information that an execute message of the winds code had come through?

Captain McCollum. About the middle of the week I was told—I had heard that an execute which would have meant relations with
Russia in danger had been received. In checking back on the Japanese original, or in trying to run down the Japanese original of that particular dispatch, we checked it very carefully, and we came to the conclusion that it was not an execute whatsoever; that it was merely a part of an ordinary weather broadcast.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the only one that was called to your attention was that relations with Russia had been broken.

Captain MCCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It did not relate to relations with the United States or with Britain?

Captain MCCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And it did not relate to war with either one?

Captain MCCOLLUM. None of these related to war; sir; that is, being exact about it. The translations all used the euphemism of strained relations, or what have you, sir.

[9126] Mr. KAUFMAN. Would you explain the Japanese language relating to the setting up of those codes?

Captain MCCOLLUM. I presume either one of them will do, will it, sir?

Mr. KAUFMAN. I think so.

Captain MCCOLLUM. In the first one here the dispatch says:

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.
That means “east wind rain.”

(2) Japan-U.S. S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.
That is “north wind cloudy.”

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KASE HARE.
That means “west wind clear.”

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. [9127] This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

I would like to point out that the value of this thing as a code is wholly dependent upon the use of particular and precise Japanese words, used in a precise position within a broadcast. Any departure from that order must necessarily cause the code to be in doubt.

For instance, one might say “east wind rain” in a number of different ways in Japanese. Here it is in the rather emphatic and brief form “Higashi No Kazeame.” We might as well say “Kaze Higashi Ame,” which means exactly the same thing in another form.

So I may point out the translation will not suffice. It must be the particular Japanese words used in a particular sequence in a dispatch. They deal with weather matters here and they could so easily be confused that the value of this thing as a code would be nil.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Exactitude is necessary?

Captain MCCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And if other words were used meaning the same thing then you would not regard that as being an execute of the code?

Captain MCCOLLUM. No, sir; not in this type of thing.
Mr. Kaufman. I asked you just a few moments ago as to [9128] when your attention was called to a break in Russian relations. Do you recall when and where that information came to you?

Captain McCollum. That came to me from Captain Kramer, who is, I think—I cannot be certain on this, but I heard later—excuse me, I am wandering. I heard later that Admiral Noyes, Director of Communications, set up a special system for warning me and the officers in the Naval Plans about the arrival of any of these winds messages, or winds information. That I did not know about at the time.

I heard one morning somewhere about the middle of the week of December 1 to 7 that such a dispatch had been received, and I sent for Kramer and we went over it in detail and came to the conclusion that it was not the real thing, and I am fairly certain that Colonel Bratton of the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Service also worked on it with his experts and came to the same conclusion, and we continued to check back and forward with each other.

Mr. Kaufman. Captain McCollum. I direct your attention to a communication from the FCC, Federal Communications Commission, which is part of Exhibit 142, and ask you whether that is the information that you got to which you just referred?

Captain McCollum. I cannot be certain that it was this [9129] particular one, but it was one of this same general connotation, because we went back, or tried to go back, to the original Japanese on this thing.

Mr. Kaufman. Will you look at the one on the next page and see whether that refreshes your recollection?

Captain McCollum. I am sorry, Mr. Counsellor, I cannot identify any one of these as the exact one I saw. It might have been either one of them.

Mr. Kaufman. The two papers to which I just referred are items 3-B and 3-C of Exhibit 142.

Aside from the suggestion that there may have been an execute of that portion of the code as related to Russia, you had no other information?

Captain McCollum. Not until after the war had started, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. I am talking about up to and including December 7.

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. After December 7, the day after Pearl Harbor, did a message come in in execution of the winds code?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; one that we thought was an execute, and that either came in late on the afternoon of the 7th or sometime on the 8th. The code, as translated, if you can use that term, would have indicated strained [9130] relations between England and Japan.

Mr. Kaufman. You refer now to item 3-B of Exhibit 142?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Captain Safford has testified that a winds execute message was received in the Navy Department on December 3 or 4. Did any such information come to you?

Captain McCollum. I saw nothing of that sort, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Captain Safford testified in substance that, predicated on information that an execute message had been received, you prepared a dispatch to go to the various outposts. Did you prepare any such dispatch?
Captain McCollum. I did prepare such dispatch, but it was not
predicated on the winds execute, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. What dispatch are you referring to now?
Captain McCollum. After submitting my memorandum to Ad-
miral Wilkinson and through him to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions—
Mr. Kaufman. You are referring now to exhibit what? Exhibit
81?
Captain McCollum. The December 1, 1941. [Continuing:] I was
put in the rather difficult position of not personally knowing what had
been sent out to the fleet. Possibly it was none of my business. As I
pointed out to you, the basis of this memorandum—the information it
was based on—was actually as of about the 28th of
November. As time went on we had sent out dispatches to our naval
attachés in Tokyo, Pieping, Bangkok, and Shanghai to destroy all
of their codes, and to report by the use of a code word, and those codes
were destroyed.

We were getting reports from our observers of the Japa-
nese task force which was moving down the Kra Peninsula. Our
planes were sighting forces moving; our submarines were trailing
them. We had some little information in addition. I still did not
know what had been sent to the fleet.

I drafted a rather brief dispatch, outlining the information pretty
much as is in this memorandum, but greatly condensed. I went further
and stated that we felt everything pointed to an imminent outbreak of
hostilities between Japan and the United States. That dispatch was
taken by me to my Chief, Captain Hard, and together we went in to
see Admiral Wilkinson. We did it in view of the fact that the function
of evaluation of Intelligence, that is, the drawing of inferences there-
from, had been transferred over to be a function of the War Plans
Division.

I was directed to take that dispatch and present it for the considera-
tion of Admiral Turner, the Director of the War Plans Division, which I did.

Admiral Turner read the dispatch over. He then made a number of
corrections in it, striking out all except the information parts of it,
more or less, and then showed me for the first time the dispatch which
he had sent on the 27th, which I believe is referred to as the "war
warning" dispatch, and the one which was sent, I believe, on the 24th—wasn't it?
Mr. Kaufman. That is right.

Captain McCollum (continuing). Which precede that dispatch,
and said not I think that was enough. I said, "Well, good gosh,
you put in the words 'war warning.' I do not know what could be
plainer than that, but, nevertheless, I would like to see mine go too."

He said, "Well, if you want to send it, you either send it the way I
corrected it, or take it back to Wilkinson and we will argue about it"—
or words to that effect.

I cannot presume to remember precisely.

I took it back to Admiral Wilkinson and discussed it with him, and
he said, "Leave it here with me for a while," and that is all.

Now, I would like it understood that merely because this was pre-
pared on a dispatch blank in no sense means it was an official dispatch.
It was merely my recommendation to my seniors which they were privileged to throw in the wastebasket, I imagine. It was in no sense a part of the official file. It is nothing other than a recommendation for the dispatch officer. I have written dozens of dispatches for the admiral, and he could either throw them away, or use them. There was no record kept of that sort of thing.

Mr. Kaufman. That dispatch, or that memorandum that you prepared had no relation or no reference at all, to the winds execute message?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And if Captain Safford says that the dispatch or memorandum that you prepared had relation to the winds execute message, what is your version of it?

Captain McCollum. I think Safford would be misinformed in that. He has judged my intentions in what motivated me, sir, and I believe I am a better judge of that than he is, although I do not impugn his motives whatsoever. He may sincerely believe that to be true, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Captain Safford testified at one place that the last paragraph of your memorandum or dispatch had particular reference to the winds execute message, and a suggestion by you that you wanted to avoid another Port Arthur.

Captain McCollum. No, sir; I could not have done anything like that, Mr. Counsellor, when I did not have the winds execute message.

Mr. Keefe. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman? Am I correct in the understanding that this purported message drawn by Captain McCollum is not in evidence, and is not in existence?

Captain McCollum. As I explained, sir, this sort of thing was merely my recommendation on a dispatch blank, drafted in dispatch form.

Mr. Keefe. But it is not in existence?

Captain McCollum. No, sir, it is not in existence, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You are testifying from recollection?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. As to what was written in it?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The document itself is not available?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And is not before the committee?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I just wanted to be sure of that.

Senator Lucas. May I make an inquiry at this point?

As I understand you, sir, Admiral Wilkinson did not act on your recommendation.

Captain McCollum. That, Senator, I do not know, sir. I do not know what further Admiral Wilkinson did with it. He may have gone up with it to higher authority, and it was turned down, or he may have decided not to go further with it, sir.

[9136] Senator Lucas. As far as the evidence is concerned, there is no evidence in the record that any dispatch of this character was ever sent?

Captain McCollum. There is no evidence that any dispatch of this character was ever sent.

Senator Lucas. By the Chief of Naval Operations?
Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir; no dispatch was ever sent.

Mr. Keefe. Does the evidence disclose the date of this alleged conversation, or the writing of this dispatch?

Captain McCollum. These things are entirely memory on my part, sir. There is no record of this thing at all. As I explained to you, this was drawn up and written on the dispatch form. When the dispatch does not go, you wind it up, and throw it in the waste basket. That is what happened probably in this case.

Mr. Keefe. Do you recall the date that this took place?

Captain McCollum. It was either the 4th or 5th, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Of December?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That would be on a Saturday or a Friday?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. It was about that time.

[9137] The Chairman. The 7th was Sunday, the 6th was Saturday, and the 5th would be Friday.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And the 4th would be Thursday.

The Chairman. The 4th would be Thursday.

Captain McCollum. Yes.

The Chairman. And so on, backward.

Senator Ferguson. Let the record show that I asked the question thinking it might refresh his memory if he knew what day of the week it was.

I know just as well as the other members of the committee what day these dates fall on.

The Chairman. The Chair recognizes that.

[9138] Mr. Kaufman. We will go now, Captain, to another item. I direct your attention to a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24, which is part of Exhibit 2, and being on page 12 of Exhibit 2.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, I have seen this dispatch since coming to Washington this time, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Did you see it at or about the time it was translated on October 9?

Captain McCollum. No, sir; I was not in Washington at that time, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. You arrived in Washington about the 16th?

Captain McCollum. I arrived in Washington about the 11th, sir, but that was Friday and I had certain notes and reports that I made. I had been to Europe and I had to knock some of my notes in shape, and I called in at the office and then went home where I got my notes in shape, and actually went down to the office on Monday, sir, and it was probably 2 or 3 days after that before I got myself into the saddle again, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Do you recall whether that particular memorandum, or that particular dispatch, which has been referred to here as plotting a chart of Pearl Harbor, whether that came to your attention at any time after you came back and before December 7?

[9139] Captain McCollum. Mr. Counselor, I cannot be certain. If it did not it should have been called to my attention as Chief of that Division, sir. I have heard it in the testimony before this committee, that I have read, sir, I have heard it referred to as the
bomining plan. All I can say about that, sir, is, if I saw it, it did not make much impression on my mind, nor did it make much impression on the minds of any of the considerable number of what were supposed to be quite capable officers who saw this dispatch at that time, sir.

The first time I ever heard it referred to as being any definite bombing arrangement was when I believe the former counsel advanced that hypothesis before this committee, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And what interpretation, if you saw it, did you put on it, or what interpretation do you put on that chart now?

Captain McCOLLUM. The situation in regard to the Japanese obtaining intelligence in this country was this:

Back in 1935 the Japanese Navy was apparently not satisfied with the type of intelligence forwarded to them by their consular agents in this country and undertook the setting up, on the west coast of the United States, of an observation net of their own. We knew about it in 1935 and broke it up by 1936. We purposely let a certain portion of it run along so that we had an insight into the organization on this coast, on the west coast of the United States.

During all of this time it was my feeling then, and it is my feeling now, that the Japanese had been unable to put naval observers into the consulate general at Honolulu. In 1941 they had them at Seattle, San Francisco, the Los Angeles-San Diego area, and Panama. Panama was serviced from the Japanese naval attache's office in Peru. These officers, you will remember—we were able to run two of them out. One was arrested I think in Los Angeles in about June of 1941. Okada, lieutenant commander, and son of the former Premier of Japan, was chased out of the country about the same time. He had been operating in Seattle.

As we estimated it, the consul general at Honolulu was receiving, through the Foreign Office at the instance of the Japanese Naval Department, explicit directions of the type of intelligence that was needed, much more in detail than any of the other key consulates on the west coast, because he did not have the benefit of the services of a Japanese Naval Intelligence officer within his consulate.

Therefore this thing here, if I saw it, I am quite certain I would have felt it was just another move to get explicit information, to cut down the frequently voluble type of reports made by consular officials which the Jap Navy did not like.

More than that, sir, I cannot say.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You do not now regard it as a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not necessarily, sir, not unless I had known that Pearl Harbor had been bombed, and then I could say this certainly looks like it might be such a plan, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now we will go to the last item, Captain, and that is the 14-part message, part of which arrived on Saturday, December 6.

Were you on duty at that time?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When did you first receive the 13 parts of that message?
Captain McCollum. I was receiving parts of that message as they came in. I was down in my office until late Saturday night, sir. They called me up at my home in the middle of the night and told me that the rest of it had come in, but they did not have the last part, there was one still to come. I inquired right away what steps had been taken to deliver it and to whom. I was informed it had been [9142] delivered by Captain Kramer to the Director of Naval Intelligence. Fortunately the naval aide for the President happened to be at his house, as was, I believe, the Director of Military Intelligence, General Miles, who had all seen it at that time, and that steps had been taken to deliver it to others of the high command in the Navy Department and presumably to the White House, because our channel there was with the aide to the President, Admiral Beardsall.

Mr. Kaufman. What time, to your recollection, did this message begin to come in on Saturday?

Captain McCollum. I cannot say, sir. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon was the first time that I heard about it, sir, that it was coming in. It might have come in before that.

Mr. Kaufman. Did you stay on duty until that entire message had been received?

Captain McCollum. No, sir; my office was on a 24-hour basis by early November, sir. I had a total of six officers, including myself and including Kramer, who was excluded because of his special relationship there. Early in November, I take it, the three senior officers, that is, from experience, either myself, Captain Watts, or Colonel Boone were on duty in my office, together with adequate assistants such as we had on a 24-hour basis, sir. I took over the watch on Sunday morning sometime between 7:30 and 8, and about 9 [9143] o'clock I went home to get some sleep so I could be bright eyed the next morning, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. What time did the 14th part of that message come in on Sunday morning?

Captain McCollum. I received it I think about 9 o'clock, sir. My recollections, as to the exact time, I might add are not precise. I know I was on duty and relieved Watts in my office in the Navy Department on Sunday morning prior to 8 o'clock, probably about 7:45.

This was brought to me. I think, when I was in the outer office of Admiral Stark's office. That would be about 9 or 9:30, would be my guess, sir, on Sunday morning. Now I say again, sir, my time refers back to the time I came on duty, sir. I do not remember the times precisely.

Mr. Kaufman. Was Admiral Stark there when this message was brought to you in his outer office?

Captain McCollum. The sequence of events on Sunday morning was something like this, if you are interested—

Mr. Kaufman. I know the committee is very much interested in this particular phase of it.

Captain McCollum. I went over the situation with Watts when I arrived and was trying to digest the 13 parts of this thing when I received word that Admiral Wilkinson, my chief, [9144] had arrived and desired to see me. I went up to Admiral Wilkinson's office and we entered into a discussion of the first 13 parts of this dispatch. I should say that would be 9 o'clock or maybe a little later.
While we were talking an orderly or someone came in and said Admiral Stark had come into his office, and Admiral Wilkinson said, "Well, come on, let's go and see the Chief." We went down the passageway and went into Admiral Stark's office. At that time there was no one in Admiral Stark's office except himself. None of his aides were present in the outer office. We went in and discussed this thing with Admiral Stark and then came on out. That was the 13 parts.

[9145] Shortly after that, the 14th part was delivered to me. I took it up with Admiral Wilkinson, and pointed out to him the difference in the tenor of the language of the 14th part from that of the other. We immediately took it to Admiral Stark and pointed out to him the virulence and tenor of the language of the 14th part of it.

Mr. Kaufman. What time would you say it was that you and Admiral Stark discussed it?

Captain McCollum. Certainly before 10 o'clock, sir, 9:30, or 10. I cannot be exact, Mr. Counselor. I am trying to do the best I can, sir, but I just did not have the time to check the time precisely, sir.

At that time, the suggestion was made that it looked right there that that was enough to indicate that we could expect war. That term was used. That was an inference. I mean there was nothing about war in this dispatch at all, and possibly was loose language, unquestionably was loose language, but we were all rather thinking in those terms.

The suggestion was then made that an additional warning be sent to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Keefe. By whom? Who made the suggestion?

Captain McCollum. Admiral Wilkinson, sir. Some little discussion went on, and, as far as I know nothing was done [9146] at that time.

About a half-hour later—I was still in Admiral Stark's office—when word was sent in that one of my officers wished to see me, and I stepped out, and Kramer was standing there with the time part of the dispatch; that is, an additional dispatch which directed the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington to deliver this note at 1 o'clock Washington time.

Mr. Kaufman. That was the 14th part of the message, was it not?

Captain McCollum. I am not certain without referring to it. I thought it was a separate message, that was my impression, sir, and that the 14th part in it, the last thing, was rather a Philippic thing against the United States. It followed the usual procedure, and this procedure was used as an emphasis. There was nothing unusual about that.

The Chairman. You are either too close or too far from the microphone. Some of the members have difficulty hearing you. Will you raise your voice a little?

Captain McCollum. Is this better, sir?

The Chairman. That is better.

Captain McCollum. The time zone is set up as a routine procedure in my office, and in order to keep track of what [9147] time of day it was there, whether it was sunset or sunrise, or moonset, we had a standard procedure that when any dispatch of which time was an element came in, we immediately converted that time to not only our own time but usually set up Washington time, West Coast time, Hono-
lulu time, Manila time, and Tokyo time. That was all set forth, because the Japanese operate entirely on Tokyo time; that is, all of their time business in the Japanese Navy is run on Tokyo time.

So that a consideration of these times is necessary to get a view as to what is understandable in relation to sunrise and sunset, and other phenomena that have a rather important effect on naval operations.

Senator Lucas. You mean the Navy was run on Tokyo time?

Captain McCollum. The Japanese navy was run on Tokyo time; that is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. I am sorry I interrupted you.

Captain McCollum. Thank you sir.

As a result of that, Kramer had worked out these times and those times were shown just on a rough sheet of paper as they appeared to Admiral Stark. The suggestion was made at that time that this indicated that if anything was going to occur, it would probably start about that time.

[9148] As I remember it, Admiral Stark picked up the receiver of his telephone and attempted to contact someone over the telephone. It was my impression at the time that he had tried to get the Chief of Staff of the Army, and had been unsuccessful in getting through.

By this time, a good many of the senior officers of the Division of Operations had come in. They were in and out of Admiral Stark's office. Various times of the morning, Admiral Turner was there, Admiral Ingersoll was there, Admiral Brainard, I am certain Admiral Noyes was there, and of course, my chief, Admiral Wilkinson.

Later on, about 11 o'clock or maybe later in the morning, I was given to understand that it had been decided to send a warning to Pearl Harbor—I wish to stand corrected there, to the forces in Hawaii, including the fleet, and that the warning dispatch was to be handled by the Chief of Staff of the Army and it would be in a form which would be sent to General Short who would be instructed to transmit the substance of that dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of our fleet, Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Kaufman. One further question, Captain.

An examination of Exhibits 1 and 2, and some of the other intercepts, indicates delays in transmission. Will you tell us whether anything was done about that?

[9149] Captain McCollum. As to that part of it, there are officers of the technical service that are probably better qualified to answer that than I am. However, I would venture this general explanation:

These dispatches were intercepted at a great many intercept or pick-up stations located in various parts of the world.

One they were picked up, the pick-up station had no personnel qualified to either decode or translate any of this material. They only had operators who were skilled in taking the Japanese equivalent of our Morse code. Those dispatches, therefore, from any given pick-up station, when received, were sent to a center, depending on who was the control center—either Washington, Pearl Harbor, or Corregidor.

They might have sent it either by radio, teletype, or by mail.

Radio and teletype facilities were not always available.

When sent by mail to one of the decryption and translational centers, as soon as they arrived, there was an office procedure for taking through the dispatch, and an attempt was made to decrypt the code.
It is my understanding that priorities were first given on the basis of the code classification. In other words, the higher the code classification, probably the more important the information was.

There was also the precedence of the dispatch, that is the urgency with which it was sent. Those were obtained from the normal procedure signs at the head of the dispatch.

Then an attempt was made to decrypt them together, if we had the particular code table in which that code was sent.

We did not always have it. Sometimes these codes would be received and we did not have the method or means of decrypting them until sometime afterwards.

Once it was decrypted, or sufficiently decrypted to indicate some importance, it was handed to one of the translators who took a look at it to determine whether he thought it should be completely broken down for further decryption. That had to be done because of the limited number of people capable of translating the language, and to make the very best use of the people we had.

When we were working full blast, the way we were, oh, for the month immediately preceding the attack on our fleet, great effort was made to get the stuff out on these negotiations right away, just as quickly as we possibly could.

Now, that was dependent on the time of arrival at the decoding center, which was not of necessity directly related to the time of transmission from Tokyo, whether the code to decode it was available or not, and dependent upon the relative importance of it as determined prior to reading any of the contents.

Now, when you come then to a slack period, that is, when we weren't getting so many messages, they would go back and work on the old ones. The effort was to decode everything but to try to decode the most important ones first.

Mr. Kaufman. Captain, you said a moment ago that Pearl Harbor was a central point for decryption. What type messages were decrypted at Pearl Harbor, if you know?

Captain McCollum. Going back somewhat here, sir, the Navy Communications Intelligence organization was set up first with headquarters in Washington. Then we put an organization out in the Asiatic sphere with headquarters in Cavite first, and later at Corregidor. We originally had pick-up stations in Pekin, Shanghai, Guam, and I think at one time one almost in Japan, some years ago.

Until the early 30's very little had been done so far as Honolulu was concerned. We didn't have very many people. The first idea was that they would be a mobile movement, that would move with the commander in chief of the fleet. I had such a movement when I was Fleet Intelligence Officer. That was found unworkable. They couldn't get the sets. As a result of that, a route of entry was set up in Honolulu with the hope that that could be built up.

Until about early 1941, we had only, it is my understanding, a very rudimentary organization in Honolulu. At that time we were very fortunate in having become available the services of Captain Rochefort, who is the only officer in our Navy who is a top-flight cryptographer and radio man, and who also has a thorough knowledge of the Japanese language. He was obtained from the staff of
Vice Admiral Andrews, and put in charge at Honolulu with instructions to build up his organization as rapidly as he could.

He did not get very much help, I believe, from Washington. We didn't have the people, and he was in the process of building up that organization with the primary job of making an effort to break Japanese naval codes and ciphers when the war occurred.

It is my understanding that they did not have the complete codes to enable them to read the Japanese diplomatic messages, nor is it my understanding that they were expected to; that their principal effort was to be directed on an attack on Japanese naval codes.

Mr. Kaufman. Do you know whether Admiral Turner thought that the organization in Hawaii could decode Japanese diplomatic codes?

[9154] Captain McCollum. This is hearsay, Mr. Counsellor. I heard him say before this committee that he thought so, sir.

I wish to clarify one point. This organization at Honolulu, by dropping everything else that they were doing and using some of the standard books that they had, and by exercising cryptographic efforts, in other words, a direct attack with some of the very clever officers they then had out there, were able to read the gist of some of the low-grade stuff in the Japanese diplomatic ciphers.

In other words, it was a major cryptographic effort on each code; that was my understanding, but they couldn't read it right straight through.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, coming back to the meeting at Admiral Stark's office on Sunday morning after you had the 1 o'clock delivery date for the message, did any officer at that meeting suggest Pearl Harbor was a possible point of attack?

Captain McCollum. Pearl Harbor as such was never mentioned. The feeling that I had, and I think the feeling that most officers there had, was that at or near the outbreak of war with Japan, we could expect a surprise attack on the fleet.

When I was acting fleet-operations officer of the fleet [9155] right in our standard fleet operating plans of war was the major assumption that upon the outbreak of war with Japan, or the near outbreak of war with Japan, we could expect a surprise attack, or an attempted surprise attack, on the fleet.

I recollect, by way of illustration, if I may, at Christmas, 1937, we went on an all-out alert on the battleships and fleet based on the west coast, and that went on for some time.

Mr. Kaufman. If it was the assumption of all of the officers there that there would be an attempted surprise attack on the fleet, did not that mean Pearl Harbor because the fleet was at Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCollum. That is correct; but if the fleet had not been at Pearl Harbor it would mean wherever the fleet was.

[9156] Mr. Kaufman. But it was never suggested that Pearl Harbor better go on an all-out alert immediately?

Captain McCollum. I think the thinking was in terms of the fleet, Mr. Counselor, that the fleet should have been alerted all the way through.

Mr. Kaufman. Did the officers there assume that Pearl Harbor was on an all-out alert, both Army and Navy?

Captain McCollum. I had been given to understand that they had been thoroughly alerted, sir, and on their toes.
Mr. Kaufman. No further questions, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Just one or two questions, Captain.

Did you state what date it was in December that this message came through that seemed to refer to Russia but which you did not regard as an execute?

Captain McCollum. I think, Senator, that it is right here, sir, if I may refer to it.

The Chairman. Yes.

Captain McCollum. One of them here is on the 5th of December and I think there is one preceding that. Here is one on the 4th of December, sir.

The Chairman. If any execute message, in view of your position, which could have been regarded as an execute message, predicated upon this winds forecast, had come to the Navy Department, would you have seen it?

[9157] Captain McCollum. I should have seen it; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Was there any reason, if it did come, why you wouldn't have seen it?

Captain McCollum. Oh, occasionally, I believe it has been testified here before, there was a special arrangement made here by the director of communications, Admiral Noyes, to get this information promptly higher up in the chain than I was, Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, and so on; under those conditions it would be possible that they would overlook me, but in the normal chain I should have seen that first, sir.

The Chairman. If such a message or a similar message came through, in what office would a record of it be kept?

Captain McCollum. That should be kept down in the communications intelligence office.

The Chairman. It would have come there first?

Captain McCollum. That is correct.

The Chairman. They would have kept a record or a copy of it and sent it up to the next order?

Captain McCollum. They would have gone through their office-filing procedure, Senator, on that, and Kramer or one of his assistants would have brought me that instantly.

The Chairman. When it got to you, would there be a record of it in your office?

[9158] Captain McCollum. No, sir.

The Chairman. You passed it on upstairs. You kept no record then?

Captain McCollum. I took those messages in my office, Senator, and filed them in a file and kept them for a period of about 2 weeks, when they were then returned to the Communications Intelligence Section, where those messages were destroyed, sir.

The Chairman. In case such a message went up to Admiral Wilkinson and thence up to Admiral Stark, so that all of them saw it, would there be any record in each of those offices that the message had been received?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

The Chairman. Would not?
Captain McCollum. No, sir. It was carried by an officer by hand to these people and every effort made to get a copy and return it to the communications intelligence center, who then kept the master file.

The Chairman. So that the only office in which there would be a written record of the receipt of this message would be in the office where it was received?

Captain McCollum. That is right.

The Chairman. Who was in charge of that?

Captain McCollum. Captain Safford would be the head [9159] of that office.

The Chairman. Now, the intercept that was received indicated that if certain things happened, if they got this weather forecast from Tokyo, east-wind rain, and so forth, it was based upon an assumption that an emergency came into being, and then then they spell out what the emergency is in their mind by saying “breaking off relations”.

Captain McCollum. That parenthesis is a translator’s explanation, Senator. In other words, the translator has given you the exact Japanese translation and then he in parentheses gives you the full force and meaning of the Japanese, sir, which is not always possible in a direct translation.

The Chairman. In other words, what is in the parentheses is his interpretation.

Captain McCollum. Is the translator’s interpretation and explanation of his use of the words.

The Chairman. And the other part is as to the breaking of communications. They are two separate things.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Diplomatic relations might be broken between the two Governments.

Captain McCollum. That is correct.

The Chairman. But without any breaking of diplomatic [9160] relations, communications might be cut off?

Captain McCollum. That is right.

The Chairman. Even private communications, telegraph or radio?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. In case those things happened and they got this broadcast about the weather they would understand.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. So that the basis upon which the execute message would be sent was never in existence. There was no diplomatic break of relations and no breaking of communications between Japan and the United States or between the communications systems, public or private, prior to the attack?

Captain McCollum. That is right.

The Chairman. So the basis upon which they were predicting that such an execute message might come through never transpired?

Captain McCollum. That is correct.

The Chairman. If such a message had come through it would have been in a sense premature because conditions for forecasting it did not take place?

Captain McCollum. That is right; unless they wished to use this and forecast the action which they expected to [9161] occur some hours later, but as you pointed out, that did not occur.

The Chairman. That is all.
Congressman Cooper.

The Vice Chairman. Captain, why was not priority given to the decoding, decrypting, and translating of these Japanese messages?

In other words, what I am trying to ascertain is this, I got the impression that these intercepted Japanese messages were handled more or less in a routine manner. I was wondering why the highest type of priority was not given for the immediate decoding, decrypting, and translating of these messages intercepted from Japanese sources.

Captain McCollum. Oh, but they were, sir. If the impression was given that the thing was routine, that is a wrong impression, sir. Everyone was working tooth and nail to get these things out as quickly as they possibly could, sir.

The Vice Chairman. To the exclusion of others?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. In other words, the people working on the Japanese, the major effort was put on the Japanese and all other things that had relations to it were dropped completely out of the picture. Every effort of that organization was bent on this thing, the decrypting of these dispatches.

[9162] The Vice Chairman. My recollection is that the evidence presented here during the appearance of General Miles, who was G-2 of the General Staff of the Army, as you know, it was called to his attention that all the way from two to twenty-odd days of time elapsed from the time the Japanese message was sent before it was decoded and translated.

Now, did anything of that kind happen with the Navy?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; I have tried to explain that, sir. In other words, if I may take a hypothetical case, assume that a Japanese diplomatic dispatch was picked up in one of the pick-up stations in Alaska. I, again, do not know the physical means they had but there were such stations that the only communication they had was by mail. Assume, again, that that was the only station that picked up that particular dispatch. That would come in to us here in Washington we will say by mail. As much as a week might elapse from the time it was actually received at the pick-up station until it was received in the decoding center in Washington. The minute that thing then came in it would be looked at to see if we had the code that would permit us to decode it, sir. If we had that code it would be decoded in part, handed to a translator, who would translate part of it to ascertain whether, as far as he had gone, whether it merited complete breakdown, particularly if there [9163] was more code work to be done on it.

Then if it didn’t look important it would be set aside in favor of things that looked to be more important and pressing, sir.

Those things were done first. Then when you came to a slack time everything that you hadn’t done before would be decoded. The set-up was to try to decode what appeared to be the most important things first and get them out just as quickly as we could, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, can you tell by review of these messages that have been presented here in evidence that the most important messages were handled more promptly than the less important messages?

Captain McCollum. I think so, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You think that is the true situation?
Captain McCollum. I think that is the true situation looking at it all over, sir. I think the most important ones went out first.

The Vice Chairman. Of course, you are an expert in this and I am not.

Captain McCollum. No, sir, I am not an expert. As I said before, sir, I am not an expert in that field and I believe there will be an officer here, Captain Safford, and perhaps others, who are much better qualified to explain [9164] in detail on those points than I am, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, at least you have had much more experience with it than I have; that is a fair statement, isn’t it?

Captain McCollum. Thank you, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Of course, there is a definite physical problem involved in this type of work.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. Not only that, I might add, Mr. Congressman, but there is a mental problem involved.

Senator Lucas. A what?

Captain McCollum. A mental problem. This type of work is one of the most trying mental exercises that you have.

The Vice Chairman. I can appreciate that.

Captain McCollum. We have had a number of our officers and a number of our civil people break down rather badly under continual punching on this sort of thing and it is a continual concern of officers who handle those people to keep them from coming to a mental breakdown on this type of work.

The Vice Chairman. I can readily appreciate that it is a difficult task. That would certainly be my idea about it.

I want to see if you can clear me up on this point. The records presented here, these exhibits of the messages, [9165] rather indicate that some relatively unimportant messages were decoded and translated more promptly than some other messages here which were much more important. Now, can you help me some on that?

Captain McCollum. That may be because on the more important messages they weren’t able to break them at the time they arrived. They might not have arrived until after the unimportant ones were here. On the more important messages we couldn’t use all of our translators. We had to use only the few top-flight ones. We only had six or seven. We had increased our number 100 percent, sir, but it was still six or seven when we got through with that in 1941.

And, if I may be pardoned for going back to this, the so-called translator in this type of stuff almost has to be a cryptographer himself. You understand that these things come out in the form of syllables, and it is how you group your syllables that you make your words. There is no punctuation.

Now, without the Chinese ideograph to read from, it is most difficult to group these things together. That is, any two sounds grouped together to make a word may mean a variety of things. For instance, "Ba," may mean horses or fields, old women, or my hand, all depending on the ideographs with which it is written. On the so-called [9166] translator is forced the job of taking from unrelated syllables and grouping them into what looks to him to be intelligible words, substituting then such of the Chinese ideographs necessary to pin it down, and then going ahead with the translation, which is a much more difficult job than simple translation, sir,
For that reason all of the people, however qualified they might be in the Japanese language, had to have considerable experience in this particular field before they could be trusted to come through with a correct interpretation of the dispatch.

The Vice Chairman. I can understand those difficulties. Is it true that many words in the Japanese language can be given a variety of meanings, as you have indicated by this one word you have used here?

Captain McCollum. It depends on the Chinese ideograph. The reason is this: The Japanese language is an uninflected language. It is straight out. They borrowed and applied to the Japanese the Chinese characters. The Chinese indicate a difference between the characters by a difference of inflection. Therefore the Chinese, when he talks, sounds like he is singing. The Japanese, not being able to sing, when he says "Ba," we will say, he doesn't know whether it is one of a half a dozen different things that he means. It [9167] is not uncommon to see two Japanese in discussion who get out of tune and one of them has to write the character down to show the other what he is talking about.

The Vice Chairman. In ordinary conversation?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, I might take a second to state that I had the experience one time when I was in school of meeting a Chinese student, and he said, "So many words in your language mean such a different thing." He said, "You talk about a horse running fast and then you talk about a man being tied hard and fast." He said, "One is going, and the other can't move at all. What do you mean?"

I can understand some of the difficulties. Let me ask, if I may—assume that one of our stations somewhere picked up a Japanese message. It is then rushed by the fastest available means of communication to a center where the decoding, decrypting, and translating is done. Is that correct?

[9168] Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Then there is somebody there who has to make an appraisal on the value of the information contained in that message?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; that is correct, but that appraisal in the first instance is done without the benefit of reading any of it.

The Vice Chairman. Just by looking at it?

Captain McCollum. By judging from the—as I say, I may be contradicted later on because I am not exact on this, but you have at least two methods of judgment of that. One is the urgency of the dispatch, in other words, whether it is priority, triple priority, or so on.

The Vice Chairman. The Japanese—do they use terms for that?

Captain McCollum. Not those terms, but I mean they use a similar system. They have to in practically all of these systems.

The Vice Chairman. I see.

Captain McCollum. Then by looking at it they could tell whether it was in one of the highest security codes or a code of less security or what kind of code, and the presumption was that the higher the security of the code the more important was the information contained in that, sir.

[9169] The Vice Chairman. And then after that appraisal was made—
Captain McCollum. Then, after that, you would look to see where it came from, whether it was the Embassy in Washington, the Foreign Office in Tokyo talking, or something that concerned us more directly.

The Vice Chairman. And after that appraisal was made, why, then—

Captain McCollum. After that they would then see whether it was a code they could read themselves or whether some cryptographic work was required, how much of it we had, how much could be decrypted of that, if it could all be decrypted or not. It would be decrypted, or parts of it would be, and then handed to a translator if it looked urgent. All these factors were considered in there; and it was then sent to a man who then said—from virtually looking at the Japanese syllables—said: "I think that they ought to work full blast on this one or spend more time on that one and get it out."

The Vice Chairman. Then your explanation of the details of getting at these messages is to explain, apparently, the delay in the decoding, decrypting, and translating of some of them?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. We tried to run time after time what we called, technically, time studies in there; [9170] that is, to see how fast we could get them out.

The Vice Chairman. As I recall, we also received information that one difficulty was the lack of trained, qualified personnel.

Captain McCollum. Oh, yes, sir; that was all the way through. I might add on that, sir, that from 1907 until the outbreak of the war in 1941 the Navy had exposed to Japanese language instruction a total of about 50 officers. By 1941 about 43 of those were available, either active or retired. All but 8 of those people were on specialty jobs when the war commenced.

In October of 1941 the Navy started schools for the instruction of college men in the Japanese language, and those schools opened on October 1, 1941, I think, with about 40 selected students, one at Harvard and the other at the University of California out in Berkeley. They were subsequently combined at Boulder in Colorado, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, Captain, to invite your attention to what I have been trying to inquire about, on page 245 of Exhibit 1, in the middle of the page, there appears a brief message there from Tokyo to Washington. It apparently was sent December 6, 1941, and is shown to have been translated the same day. That would not be a very important message, would it?

[9171] Captain McCollum. No, sir; but on this thing, this might have cleared right away as it came in. In other words, the code might have been immediately available. It was a simple matter to put it into Japanese, and it was simple, and it was translated almost by looking at it.

The Vice Chairman. But you would not regard this as an important message, the opening words there, "There is really no need to tell you this?"

Captain McCollum. No, sir; that is correct.

The Vice Chairman. But that was translated the same day it was sent.

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, I invite your attention to page 29 of Exhibit 2. Do you have it there?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. A message from Honolulu to Tokyo sent December 6, 1941, not translated until the 8th, December 8, 1941. That was 2 days later. That would be—

Captain McCollum. That is an important message.
The Vice Chairman. That would be an important message, wouldn't it?

Captain McCollum. That is an important message.
The Vice Chairman. What I am trying to get at is—two messages sent on December 6th, one of them of practically no importance translated that day; another message sent on December the 6th that was important, not translated for 2 days later.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; that is correct. As I have said before, sir, I cannot answer that directly because it would depend so much, sir, on where the pick-up station was located that got this thing and how fast they got it in to Washington, sir. There is nothing in this dispatch to indicate when it was received in the decryption centers here, sir.
The Vice Chairman. But it is an important message—

Captain McCollum. It is.
The Vice Chairman (continuing). Because they were inquiring about our air reconnaissance.

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And things there in Hawaii.

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, Captain, did you state that the best decoding, decrypting, and translating officer in the United States Navy was at Pearl Harbor? You gave the name of some man.

Captain McCollum. That was my impression, Mr. Cooper. I have known Rochefort a good many years.
The Vice Chairman. What is the name?

Captain McCollum. Rochefort, sir; R-o-c-h-e-f-o-r-t.

[9173] The Vice Chairman. What was his rank?

Captain McCollum. He was then a commander, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Commander Rochefort?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. As early as 1925, Mr. Cooper, he was looked on as being one of the outstanding cryptographers and radio officers in the service, and because of those special qualifications he was sent to Japan to acquire a knowledge of the Japanese language, which he did, and to my mind he is the only officer in the entire naval service that in this particular field is preeminent because of his training in both the language and the decryption, together with my evaluation of his ability. I rate him as one of the ablest officers in the service, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And he was on duty there in Hawaii on December 7?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And had been for some time prior thereto?

Captain McCollum. In May, I believe it was, of 1941 he took over that job.
The Vice Chairman. He went to Hawaii in May 1941 and continued there until after December 7, 1941?

Captain McCollum. And he stayed there until the Battle of Midway, sir.
[9174] Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield for a question on that point?

The Vice Chairman. Yes, I yield, Senator.

Senator Lucas. What equipment did he have compared with what you had in the center here at Washington for decrypting, decoding, and translating?

Captain McCollum. As I have indicated, Senator, he was in the process of getting things organized. His job was to make an attack on the naval codes. I am not informed as to the details of the equipment, sir. I believe that Captain Safford, who was the head of that section, can give you that information in detail, sir, and anything I might say might merely becloud the issue, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Is that all?

Senator Lucas. Thank you, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Then this Commander Rochefort, you say, had been engaged in this type of work from 1925?

Captain McCollum. It was my understanding, sir—well, Mr. Congressman, the first time I had ever heard of this sort of thing was in 1925, when I worked for a brief period here in the Navy Department, sir. At that time Safford was in that section, and I understood that he and Rochefort more or less alternated in that job. Safford, I believe, was a lieutenant then, and Rochefort was a lieutenant, junior grade; and when I [9175] was assistant naval attaché in Tokyo this fellow Rochefort was up there with a wife and a child, and I sent a dispatch to the Navy Department protesting the sending of a married naval officer out there because living conditions were most difficult; and our general rule was that an officer that studied Japanese was unmarried, largely because of the difficulty of supporting a family and keeping his wife and children happy while he buried himself in this language business; and I was told that they had special reasons for overlooking the normal incumbrance of a wife and a child—that this fellow was going to stay anyway; so it was only after I got back to Washington and talked to him about it later, in 1980, that I commenced to realize why they had sent this individual out there.

The Vice Chairman. It was because of his ability in that field?

Captain McCollum. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. When was that that he arrived in Japan?

Captain McCollum. That, I believe, was in 1929, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, did you state that these intercepted Japanese messages were sent to Pearl Harbor by the stations that picked up the message?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; they had a pick-up method. Whether Pearl Harbor merely passed them on to the decryption [9176] center here or not, I do not know, sir. I think each one of these centers—the idea was that each one of these centers controlled a certain pick-up station. Those pick-up stations flowed—the information went from the pick-up station to the center, and then anything that center could not do they sent on to another center that could handle it.

For instance, these diplomatic messages of the Pearl Harbor net—or the Hawaii net—might well be flown into the—might well have moved first into the center at Hawaii and then been transmitted by radio or cable direct to Washington, because they were not working on this particular type of stuff out there, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Well, now, Honolulu was a center——
Captain McCollum. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman (continuing). For those intercepted Japanese
messages to be sent to?
Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And they had the best man in the Navy in
Hawaii at the time qualified to do this type of work?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; that is my opinion as to his ability, sir. Someone else might differ with me on that.
The Vice Chairman. You certainly ought to know more about
that than I do.
Now, on that question, Captain, of this message that you referred to as the bomb plotting message, dividing up of Pearl Har-
bor into five sectors.
Captain McCollum. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Now, did you ever in all of your wide expe-
rience in the Navy know of any request for such detailed information
about the location of our fleet as was called for in that message?
Captain McCollum. No, sir. Might I elaborate on it a bit, sir?
The Vice Chairman. Yes; I would be glad for you to.
Captain McCollum. The anchorage there at Pearl Harbor is
chopped up into a number of more or less independent locks there.
When we moved the fleet in and out of that place where the ships were
moored in there, whether they were pointing in or pointing out,
whether they were double banked or whether they were in the east
lock or west lock or wherever they might be, was indicative of the fa-
cility with which the ships could move out. The channel going in
is fairly shallow and a ship the size of a battleship has to move at
relatively reduced speeds.
I am speaking, if I may say so, from my experience as operations
officer on Admiral Hepburn’s flag when we moved the fleet in and out
of that place two or three times.
The Vice Chairman. Did you serve at one time as opera-
tions officer of the fleet?
Captain McCollum. I was assistant operations officer of the fleet
and acting operations officer of the United States Fleet for about 7
months, sir. I served as assistant operations officer for about 18
months.
The Vice Chairman. While the fleet was based at Pearl Harbor?
Captain McCollum. Well, sir, we were not based there but we went
there.
The Vice Chairman. You went there?
Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead.
Captain McCollum. So that those questions relating to how the
ships were anchored and where they were anchored in there might
be interpreted to indicate the facility with which that fleet was
prepared to move.
To give a general statement of where the ships were, the stuff
they are requiring here, would require a rather long-winded dis-
patch, where the same device, such as breaking it up into areas A,
B, and C, such a simple device could be used. With this area dis-
covered a rather simple and short dispatch would suffice to give
the essential information as to the location of the fleet and also an
indication of their readiness for sortie. I would suggest that that is a reasonable, tenable hypothesis as to why they wished information, apparently, in this detail.

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, one other question, if I may, please, Captain. Did you ever know of a fleet commander taking the position that all information received by the Navy Department in Washington should be sent to him for his evaluation?

Captain McCollum. Well, sir, I have not served intimately with any large number of fleet commanders, but certainly neither the fleet commander, Admiral Hepburn, that I served with, nor the fleet commander, Admiral Kincaid, that I recently served with, took that attitude, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Hasn’t it always been generally recognized that the Navy Department is supposed to make certain evaluations and give appropriate information and instructions to fleet commanders?

Captain McCollum. That was the basis on which I understood that we were operating here in Washington, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, hasn’t that been the traditional policy of the United States Navy?

Captain McCollum. So far as I am aware; yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right, thank you. Senator George, of Georgia, may inquire.

Senator George. I never heard the direct, Mr. Chairman, so I will pass. I did not hear his direct.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark had to go to a meeting of the Rules Committee. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, is recognized at this time. It is now about 3 minutes to 12, Senator. Would you like to start after lunch?

Senator Lucas. I will start after lunch.

The Vice Chairman. As this point the committee will take a recess until 2 o’clock, please, Captain. Be back at that time.

(Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., January 30, 1946, a recess was taken until 2 p.m. of the same day.)

Afternoon Session—2 P. M.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

Come forward, please, Captain.

Testimony of Capt. Arthur Howard McCollum, United States Navy—Resumed

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything at this time before examination is resumed?

Mr. Richardson. No.

The Vice Chairman. Captain, do you have anything you want to bring to the attention of the committee before your examination is resumed?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will now inquire.

Senator Lucas. Captain, I am not sure just the route that one of these messages takes from the time it is intercepted until it finally gets into the high command. With the hope of avoiding repetition I
should like to have you take, for instance, the so-called pilot message—which, as I understand, you saw and were familiar with?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, where was that intercepted, if you remember? [9182] Captain McCollum. Senator, I do not know where it was intercepted, sir.

Senator Lucas. I see. Where was it analyzed, decrypted, and decoded, or whatever term you use?

Captain McCollum. My impression is that that was done here in Washington.

Senator Lucas. Where is that station located?

Captain McCollum. The center for doing that work was right in the Navy Department at that time.

Senator Lucas. In the Navy Department?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Who would be in charge of that work in December 1941?

Captain McCollum. Captain Safford was the officer in charge of that section, sir.

Senator Lucas. Captain Safford was the officer in charge?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did he possess all of the necessary knowledge in order to properly decrypt, translate, decode these messages?

Captain McCollum. Not in his person, but within his organization; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. He did not have that peculiar information within himself?

[9183] Captain McCollum. He is one of the best cryptographers and experts on the radio aspects of this thing in the Navy. That is his reputation, sir. He is not a Japanese language man, sir.

Senator Lucas. I understand. So you would have to rely upon the Japanese language men for proper translation?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And when he would translate it he would then transmit it to—what is the name, Captain Safford?

Captain McCollum. No, sir. When translated that came directly to me, sir.

Senator Lucas. Where did Captain Safford get in on it?

Captain McCollum. Captain Safford was the administrative head and the director of the whole organization. Then that organization is broken down into certain parts, one of which you might call the translation-distribution center whose people were actually attached to my office but worked under Safford and were headed up by Kramer.

Senator Lucas. Do I understand Safford then saw all of the messages?

Captain McCollum. Ordinarily he would see them all, either as a check-up or as they went through office procedure, but occasionally, if something hot came in Kramer could come directly with it to me or higher authority.

Senator Lucas. After the Japanese language student [9184] translated the messages they were presumed to go to Captain Safford?

Captain McCollum. I didn't quite understand.
Senator Lucas. I say, after they were translated by the Japanese language student these messages were presumed at least to go to Safford?

Captain McCollum. Captain Safford would see them sooner or later, but not necessarily immediately.

Senator Lucas. You saw them all, is that correct?

Captain McCollum. That was the idea; yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Is that an answer to your question, Senator?

Senator Lucas. He said that was the idea.

Captain McCollum. If I haven't answered your question I will try to do so.

Senator Lucas. I said, was it your duty as a result of the position you held at that time to examine each and every one of the messages that came from the language student?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. After you examined one of these messages what did you do with it?

Captain McCollum. I then indicated the distribution within the Navy Department, sir, and made sure that my opposite numbers in the War Department had it, sir.

Senator Lucas. That was ordinarily a standard distribution?

[9185] Captain McCollum. If that distribution within the Navy Department needed additional ones, I added that, for if the ones I considered important had not been so marked I added those marks to them.

Senator Lucas. Who delivered the so-called pilot message, what did you do with it, if you remember?

Captain McCollum. That pilot message was distributed on the standard distribution in the Navy Department.

Senator Lucas. Who did that?

Captain McCollum. Captain Kramer.

Senator Lucas. Captain Kramer was the individual who was held responsible?

[9186] Captain McCollum. He actually carried it around and delivered it to the various officers who should have received it, sir, including mine.

Senator Lucas. That helps me just a little, Captain. One further question. You have repeatedly said that at no time did you ever see an implementing winds message after you had the original pilot message.

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. That is prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator Lucas. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I want to examine you just briefly upon the so-called pilot message with which you are familiar.

I call your attention to that message which is No. 2353, and then I also direct your attention to the message sent from Tokyo to Washington on that same day, November 19, 1941. known as Circular No. 2354:

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts.

And at the bottom of that it says:

The above will be repeated five times and included at the beginning and end.
Will you explain that to me, what that means?

Captain McCollum. This, I take it, sir, is an additional word code to the one we had before. As you notice, the word “HIGASHI” up there means “east” and this is an additional word code to be used in either the voice broadcasts or possibly in the news broadcasts sent out in Morse and would be repeated five times at the start of the message and five times at the end of the message, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you consider that this message identified as 2354 has anything to do with 2353?

Captain McCollum. It is the same sort of thing, sir. It brings out the same—it is an attempt to convey the same information.

Senator Lucas. Well, that was the way I construed it from my limited knowledge of the type of message that was sent. I admit that I have no particular powers of analyzation of a message of this kind but as a layman in reading these two messages I could not help but read one unless I read the other and then attempt to construe both of them as really one message. Am I correct about that?

Captain McCollum. They are not one message.

Senator Lucas. No; they are not one message.

Captain McCollum. But they are attempting to convey the same information. The Japanese at that time were trying, as I remember—were most anxious to convey this information and they apparently rigged up an additional word—two additional word codes, that is, hidden word codes here to accomplish that purpose, sir.

Senator Lucas. Counsel seems to think, after giving these two messages some study, that they set up both of these types of message, one to go to the general public and one to go more or less to the diplomatic representatives, but they both mean the same thing.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, I was just wondering whether or not any message, any purported implementing message, was ever received, or it is contended was received, whereby they repeated the particular word five times including it at the beginning and the end? Have you ever heard that discussed?

Captain McCollum. I never saw such an information message.

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this: If an implementing message of any kind came from the result of the information contained in Circular 2353 or Circular 2354 wouldn’t it be necessary in order that the people receiving it, the Japs receiving that message in this country, would thoroughly understand what it means, to have the names repeated five times and included at the beginning and end?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. That is, regardless of what message whether it was based upon 2353 or 2354?

Captain McCollum. I believe, sir, that there are two separate systems: that it could be either this system, 2354, or the system set forth in 2353, sir, not to go in the one message.

Senator Lucas. You were testifying this morning upon a question that I want to raise. Do you recall that the Navy Department here in Washington at one time did send to Admiral Kimmel some of these intercepts?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Do you know why they discontinued that practice?

Captain McCollum. I do not know that it was ever a practice. When the Japanese fleet would start an aggressive move, when the movement was actually going, there were times when we were unable to keep up with the evaluation process and at that time certain selected things were sent in a special code system breakable only by the Communication Intelligence organization attached to the staff of the admiral and was sent for that purpose and it is my recollection that that series of dispatches along, I believe, in July of 1941 will coincide, sir, very closely with Japanese movements into French Indochina.

Senator Lucas. Well, as I understood from the previous [9190] testimony, there was a while there that they sent these intercepts direct to Admiral Kimmel in the Pacific.

Captain McCollum. Not all of them by any means, sir.

Senator Lucas. Who determined what should be sent at that particular time?

Captain McCollum. We had that in my office, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, did you get any orders from the higher command to cease and desist sending those messages to Kimmel?

Captain McCollum. No, sir; no such orders, except that there were constant reminders to reduce the sending of these verbatim translations of these dispatches to the ultimate degree, sir, and the matter of the security of the information that we were able to break these codes was continually and repeatedly stressed. Where it was possible to draw an evaluation from this material and to send the substance of that evaluation out in the form of orders to the fleet commander or as an evaluated Intelligence message it was so sent.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, returning to the exhibit that contains the message from Tokyo to Honolulu with respect to getting information and dividing the harbor up into five sectors. You are familiar with that message?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Whose definite responsibility was it to [9191] analyze and evaluate that particular message along with the rest that came in from time to time?

Captain McCollum. That would have been the responsibility of the Intelligence Division and then to pass that information, together with their evaluation, to the Plans Division, who would direct any dissemination to any outfit other than the Plans Division of the Navy Department.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, in your Intelligence Division, who initiated the original analysis of a message of that kind?

Captain McCollum. My office.

Senator Lucas. Your what?

Captain McCollum. My office.

Senator Lucas. Your office?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Your office was responsible for analyzing any message from time to time and then whatever evaluation you placed upon that message you sent it on to Admiral Wilkinson?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lucas. Did Admiral Wilkinson have the experience and inside knowledge of the Intelligence work that you and your staff had?

Captain McCollum. Admiral Wilkinson had not previously [9192] ly served in Intelligence, sir. He is by reputation one of our most brilliant officers. It is my opinion he has a magnificent mind. He accepted my recommendations almost in toto.

One of the reasons that Captain Kramer carried these messages around is that Captain Kramer had served in an analytical capacity in my office, was completely aware of all of the ramifications, and in addition to any written evaluation could in person add a verbal evaluation that might be necessary or send for me in case of necessity, sir.

Senator Lucas. One other question, Captain. After the so-called pilot winds message was received did you continue to look there-after for this implementing message that might come in?

Captain McCollum. So far as I am aware, we were continuing to look for that after the bombs had started falling on the fleet, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did Captain Safford ever discuss this question with you at any time after the pilot message came in?

Captain McCollum. Not that I remember, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, was there any particular reason why in view of your position that you held at that time that you should not have received this implementing winds message if such a one had come in?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

[9193] Senator Lucas. Do you know of any other message of importance whereby you were passed up completely and the Communications officer sent it direct over your head to the higher command?

Captain McCollum. There might have been one or two instances in which they did go directly over my head to the higher command, but in almost every instance I would know about it shortly there-after, sir.

Senator Lucas. As I understand, Captain Safford says that he took this message direct to you and handed it to you.

Captain McCollum. I have no recollection of that, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, an important message of that kind certainly would have made an impression upon you?

Captain McCollum. Very definitely, sir. We were all looking for it, Senator; everybody.

Senator Lucas. You were all looking for it?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And you would have remembered it, I take it, if such a message had been brought to you?

Captain McCollum. I feel quite certain I would have, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you have an opportunity to look at the message that was prepared by Admiral Turner and finally sent through by Admiral Stark, known as the war warning mes- [9194] sage?

Captain McCollum. I first saw that message about the 4th or 5th of December, sir. I saw no messages prepared by Admiral Turner of that nature, either that one or any of the others that preceded it, before they were sent, sir.
Senator Lucas. Well, you are an officer with a wide range of experience in the Intelligence Department and as such you have had an opportunity from time to time to construe messages of all types and character, have you not?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. You had an opportunity to analyze and construe the message that was sent by Admiral Stark on November the 27th to Admiral Kimmel, known as the war warning message?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; I have read it repeatedly lately.

Senator Lucas. What would that message mean to you if you had been out in the Pacific and had received it?

Captain McCollum. Well, sir, the outstanding part of that message is that it says, "This is a war warning." It does not come in the life of most naval officers to receive or see a message containing such words and my personal feeling is that a message containing the information, "This is a war warning", indicated clearly that the Department expected a war to break out there at any moment from then on, sir.

Senator Lucas. I think that is all.

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The Chairman. Congressman Cooper.

The Vice Chairman. Captain, I would like to clear up on point in connection with some questions I asked you this morning, and some just now asked you by Senator Lucas.

With respect to the so-called bomb plot message, was that before you assumed your duties or after?

Captain McCollum. No, sir. I was on duty there, but I left Washington on the 25th of August and I returned to the Navy Department about—I got back to Washington on the 11th of October and I did not really commence to function in my office down here until about the 15th, sir. The 11th I believe was Friday and it was a week end and I had notes and so on to prepare, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, was that bomb plot message received during that interval when you were away?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. It has a note here. It says that it was translated on the 9th of October 1941, sir, so it must have been distributed about that time very closely.

The Vice Chairman. And that was before you resumed your work after you came back?

[9196] Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Captain McCollum, as I understand it you stated as an explanation of the bomb plot, so called, on page 12 of Exhibit No. 2, the fact that they had no naval men at the consulate in Honolulu and the fact that Pearl Harbor was an unusually complicated condition. Do you know whether or not those two factors were known to others in Naval Intelligence?

Captain McCollum. I think that was the general feeling, sir, of the Intelligence officers who were working there.

Mr. Murphy. And in your judgment would that have minimized the importance of that rather than have it as an outstanding message that would indicate an air raid on Pearl Harbor?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, as I understand it, you did testify as to page 154 in Exhibit 1. Will you hand that to the Captain, please? Page 154.

Captain McCollum. I have it, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, that message, if it were not sent by way of an implementing message to the winds code, if it were sent by the Japanese, what were the people to do who received it?

[9197] Captain McCollum. It says in this message here, "When this is heard, please destroy all code papers," and so forth, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Right. Now, the fact is that the Navy did receive messages from Japan through the consulates telling them to destroy the codes?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And the very reason why the winds code, so-called, was set up was that if they did send an implementing message that way, to destroy the codes; isn't that right?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Actually there were messages sent spelling out exactly what to do to destroy the codes, isn't that right?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, after that message was received or, rather, intercepted in Washington, who was it who prepared the messages to CINCPAC by way of information and by way of authority as to code destruction at Guam and also informing CINCPAC that the codes were being destroyed at different points throughout the world by the Japanese?

I direct your attention to your testimony, Captain, along that line at page 21 of the Hewitt testimony. That reads as follows:

Subsequent to this the situation further deteriorated [9198] and I recommended to Admiral Wilkinson and we did send dispatches out to our naval attaches and various naval agencies throughout the Far East directing that they destroy all their codes and ciphers, and so on, and so forth, and to affirmatively report when these had been destroyed. That dispatch was sent so that the fleet commanders on the chain going out and coming back would have the information that the order had been issued. Some time after the first, possibly around the fourth, I prepared this.

Now, was it you who prepared that message to the islands to take steps about destroying their particular codes, our own naval codes?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

[9199] Mr. Murphy. What was it?

Captain McCollum. That would be Captain Safford who prepared that sort of thing, and his division, sir, in our own islands. The instruction that actually had been given was this, sir: The naval attaches, the people whose codes could be seized by the Japanese, were our responsibility. The general destruction of codes in their outlying areas was the responsibility of the communications division. I conferred with Captain Safford, and in view of the fact that it involved codes I asked him to draw up the appropriate thing to send to the naval attaches, so there would be no misunderstanding about which ones they were to destroy.

Mr. Murphy. Now why was it sent out?

Captain McCollum. He drafted this despatch. I had expected that he would bring it to me. I wished to add something more to
it at the time. In his hurry he did not and got it released directly, which was quite all right with me. I had some discussion with Admiral Wilkinson as to whether we should send another one direct to these fellows to destroy other things in addition to codes.

Mr. Murphy. What was the purpose of sending the message?

Captain McCollum. The purpose of sending the message was to insure that none of our cryptographic systems should fall into the hands of the enemy should war ensue.

[9200] Mr. Murphy. And at that time was the reason for sending it the fact that you thought war was imminent?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You have been in Naval Intelligence for a good many years. What is the significance in the Navy of a message stating that an expected enemy is destroying his codes, all the different systems?

Captain McCollum. I would interpret that to mean that the enemy expects to be at war with us in the immediate future, sir.

Mr. Murphy. On page 359 of the Hart testimony Captain Safford testified:

Q. Was any of the foregoing information, under dates of November and December, 1941, disseminated by the main Washington unit direct to the corresponding unit in the 14th Naval District?

A. (Captain Safford.) No, sir. That was not permitted by a written order then in force.

Was there ever any such order by anybody prohibiting that?

Captain McCollum. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you ever hear of it?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. If there was such an order, don’t you think [9207] it should have come to your attention?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention to page 359, to Captain Safford’s testimony. Do you have a copy of it available? If not, I will read it to you.

After speaking about the order in question Captain Safford said:

— but there was one exception. On the 3rd of December, I prepared OPNAV Secret Dispatch 061855, which was released by Captain Redman, the Assistant Director of Naval Communications.

Was that the one you spoke of, which he prepared without taking it up with you?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I will go on then—we will come back to that.

A similar dispatch was released by Admiral Wilkinson and filed at 031850. Admiral Wilkinson’s message is referred to in the Roberts Report. Before drafting my message, I called Commander McCollum on the telephone and asked him “Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet”, and McCollum replied, “We are doing everything we can to get the news out to the Fleet.” McCollum emphasized both “we’s”. In sending this [9202] Information, I was over-stepping the bounds as established by approved war plans and joint agreement between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence, but I did it because I thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released.

Do you recall such phone call from Captain Safford?

Captain McCollum. I remember talking to Safford on this subject about that time, sir. The specific things that I said I do not
remember, sir. I drafted the dispatch which ONI sent out about the same time. That starts out, I think, "Categorical and specific instructions herein."

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you remember Safford did call you?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you agree with him, that it was your function and his function to send messages out to the fleet?

Captain McCollum. I felt that messages should have gone to the fleet, sir. The effort was to get it out there. Now you will notice, sir, Safford's message here, or the one that you refer to, is sent in this system to his communication intelligence organizations out there. That would probably be in a code only very closely held by his immediate, you might say, subordinates.

Mr. Murphy. He speaks in his testimony of sending a message to Hawaii, that only one man in Hawaii would understand what was in it. Why would it be sent that way? He says the only man at Hawaii who would understand it was Lieutenant Coleman. Do you have a copy of that message, do you know?

Captain McCollum. I do not know, sir, unless he had some private arrangement of wording with Coleman, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I am referring to the Navy liaison officer, to page 359, in which Captain Safford said, at page 360:

OPNAV 031855 was addressed to CINCAF and COMSIXTEEN for action but was routed to CINCPAC and COMFOURTEEN for information. It was written in highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant H. M. Coleman, on CINCPAC's staff, could have explained its significance.

I suppose the "late Lieutenant Coleman" means that he is dead, the man who could understand it. There is a message that only a dead man could understand at Hawaii. I wonder if we have somebody here with that message?

Captain McCollum. Mr. Congressman, is that the dispatch which says:

Circular 244. From Tokyo. 1 December. Order London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy machine—

Is that what you are referring to?

Mr. Murphy. I don't know. All it says is "OPNAV 031855 was addressed to CINCAF", and so forth. He says it was in highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant Coleman, on CINCPAC's staff, could have explained its significance. Is there anything about that that everybody cannot understand?

Captain McCollum. Not that I see, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Do you know why only one person at Hawaii could explain that?

Captain McCollum. No, sir. There might be some minor details in there that might not be entirely clear.

Mr. Murphy. He says it is highly technical language, that only one officer present at Pearl Harbor could have explained. Surely it was not in that highly technical language so that Admiral Kimmel would not get the significance of it. I mean he did not put much stock in the code-instruction messages.
Captain McCollum. No, sir. I think the entire effort was to try to see that he got the information.

Mr. Murphy. I would think so.

Now, then, you did testify at page 30 of the Hewitt report as follows:

About the middle of the week 1–7 December, the Federal Communications Commission reported the occurrence of one of the words in a Japanese news broadcast from Tokyo which indicated war with Russia. In studying the message [9205] at the time, it did not appear that this was a bona fide warning in the terms as set forth. It did not appear in the proper sequence and proper number of times in the broadcast, as I remember it, and it was thought at the time that this was a bona fide weather report which happened to use the code word for Russia. I know of no message received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December which indicated that diplomatic relations with the United States would be ruptured.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor had been made, either late afternoon of the 7th, Washington time, or sometime on the 8th, a dispatch was translated which indicated war with England. I think you have got some exhibits on that point there.

That testimony was accurate, was it?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; except for the word "war," sir. That was loose language, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Murphy. The language, so far as you understood, was "ruptured in relations;" is that right?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now Captain Safford testified at page 362 of the Hart testimony:

The following officers knew by hearsay that the "winds message" has been intercepted but did not actually see it [9206] themselves—and then he gives the following officers who had some recollection of the winds message, and among them he lists Captain McCollum.

So far as you know, is the one which is referred to in this testimony which I have just read the only winds intercept that you had heard of up to December 7, 1941?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, the particular message that you referred to on page 41, dated December 3, 1941, should have on the second line after "destroy" the word "purple," and on the fourth line after "destroy" the word "purple." That had been left out because at one time there was greater effort being made to protect this code than subsequently.

No other questions.

[9207] The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster would be next.

He is not here.

Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. Gearhart. No questions.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will now inquire, Captain.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you testified just recently in your testimony that the message destroying the code meant war between the countries?

Captain McCollum. That would be my interpretation, that it not necessarily meant war, but that they expected war to break out, and it was a step looking to safeguard their systems, to prevent them from being compromised in case war eventuated as expected.
Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, it did not mean to you immediate war?

Captain McCollum. Pretty close to it.

Senator Ferguson. Then, when you sent to our Embassy, military attaché and naval attaché in Tokyo, on the 5th, a message to destroy our codes and code machines, did it mean that we were going to war? You were familiar with the fact that a message was sent to Tokyo to destroy our codes, were you not?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. That message, I believe, [9208] was sent on the 4th.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; on the 4th.

Captain McCollum. It was sent on the 4th with the idea that we felt war might break out any time, sir, and we did not want our codes and other papers compromised, and the safe thing to do in that dangerous situation was to destroy them.

If war did not develop, then we could always replace them, but the situation was so acute that we felt that they had to be destroyed at once.

Senator Ferguson. So you anticipated war immediately?

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you, on the 27th of November anticipate war immediately, and if you did, why did you not send messages to destroy our codes on the 27th?

Captain McCollum. It was merely a matter of how you judged it at the time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were in the Intelligence Branch?

Captain McCollum. I judged that it was time to send the message on the 4th, Senator, and that is all I can say now, sir.

Why I did not do it on the 27th or why I did not wait until the 5th, sir, I am sorry I cannot reconstruct, but on the 4th, I was convinced that the situation was so acute that [9209] we might have war at once.

Senator Ferguson. Well, was there a change sometime between the 27th of November and the 4th of December which brought you to the conclusion, as the head of the Intelligence Branch, that war was imminent on the 4th, and was not so imminent on the 27th?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; I think so, sir. We had watched the Japanese task force moving, and up until about the 4th their exact intentions were presumed. They became much clearer after the 4th.

Senator Ferguson. Then there was in the War Department, as I understand, owing to the coordination between the War and Navy Departments, there was a message from General Short to the Commander in Chief, or to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, that he was only alerted to sabotage.

Now, that being true, and you being in charge of the Intelligence Branch, and having access to it all, don't you think that some other steps should have been taken on the 4th?

Captain McCollum. I did not see the message from General Short, Senator. I am not sure that it was well known all around, sir—that is, to me, anyway.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact, if there was coordination between the two branches of [9210] Intelligence, that it did not reach you as to how they were alerted?
Captain McCollum. I cannot account for it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would you let me see, Counsel, the message that was sent on the 5th, and finally sent on the 7th to Panama?

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield just to make a request?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. While Counsel are looking for the message from General Miles to Panama, I would like to have the Army produce another message sent from Miles to Honolulu, from G-2 in Washington to G-2 in Honolulu.

Senator Lucas. What date?

Mr. Murphy. It was sent subsequent to November 27, in which it speaks of being alerted against sabotage, and in addition to sabotage, it expected hostilities to ensue.¹

Senator Ferguson. I will come back to that a little later, as soon as we get that message.

You testified before how many boards, or commissions?

Captain McCollum. Only one before this one, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that was before the Hewitt Board?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

[9211] Senator Ferguson. They have found this Miles message now, so I will go back to that.

Did you know that a message, about on the 27th or a day later, similar to the one that was sent to General Short, to be distributed to Admiral Kimmel, had been sent to Panama?

Captain McCollum. I do not remember precisely, Senator. I may have known it.

Senator Ferguson. If war was much nearer, and I assume it was from your answers, on the 4th than it was on the 27th, how would you account for this message, being dated the 5th, not marked “priority” and on its face showing it was sent on the 7th to the Panama Canal Department, which states:

U.S.-Japanese relations strained stop Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent. “Signed Miles.”

Captain McCollum. General Miles, as Director of Military Intelligence, was privileged to make his own evaluation, sir, and that presumably reflects his views.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know anything in the two Intelligence branches that would warrant such a change of heart, or change of message?

Captain McCollum. No, sir. I might add, Senator, that [9212] the head of the Far Eastern section of the Military Intelligence Service was Colonel Bratton at the time. I had known Colonel Bratton and worked with him since 1923.

There were not only the closest possible official relations between us, but we have also maintained exceedingly close personal relations.

Every effort was made by me to see that my views were explained in detail to Colonel Bratton, and I am satisfied that that was reciprocated in full, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were in a different department than Captain Safford? He was in Communications, and you were in Intelligence?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. He would get the winds message if it came prior to the time it would come to you?

¹ Included in Exhibit No. 32.
Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know of any slip-up, any failure to deliver to one and not to another in the Navy?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. Those things are human, sir. Slips are bound to occur. I have known of slips, sir. I do not recollect any important slips in this respect, on this particular magic stuff, sir. It was guarded very closely, with check-up systems all the way through, sir, both up and down.

Senator Ferguson. How did they check whether a man got the message or not?

Captain McCollum. It was delivered in person to that man, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But what if a man failed to make delivery, there was not any check-up, was there? What if Kramer happened to miss one, was there any way of checking it?

Captain McCollum. No, sir; not any mechanical way, or to say that Kramer had failed to show it to Admiral Stark or something like that.

Senator Ferguson. Not failed, but just made a mistake?

Captain McCollum. Had overlooked doing it; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to know whether you can explain how Admiral Ingersoll could see the winds message, and he being in the Navy and on the list just the same as you, if he did see it. I am going to read you his testimony. This is question No. 69 before the Hart board.

[9214] The Vice Chairman. Which record, sir?

Senator Ferguson. The Hart record. It is question No. 68:

Question. During November or December 1941, were you cognizant of a special code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform their nationals concerning against what nations they would make aggressive movements by means of a partial weather report?

Answer. Yes, I do recall such a message.

Would you take that to be an answer that that was the original setting up of a code of east wind, west wind, and south wind?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now the next question, No. 69.

Question. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4th of December, the broadcast directive thus given indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States?

Now that question would ask for an implementing message, would it not?

Captain McCollum. That is the way it would appear, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is the way it would appear?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the answer is "yes."

[9215] To show that he had that in mind I would read question No. 70 and the answer:

Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the commander in chief, Pacific?

Answer. I do not know, except it was probably supposed that the intercept station in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. However, it may have been because of a message sent in regards to the destruction of the Japanese codes that had been sent to London and Washington which indicated that war with the United States and with Great Britain was imminent.

Those would be two logical answers, would they not?

Captain McCollum. Those would be logical answers.
Senator Ferguson. One was that we thought here in Washington that Hawaii knew about it because they had a code machine and they had the means of getting it, and the other was, as you have testified and indicated, as I understand it, in your testimony, that the destruction of the codes and code machines meant the same thing. Is that correct.

Captain McCollum. Not from the Japanese point of view, sir, that is our order for code destruction. We would then draw the inference that the Japanese would start war, but the Japanese had not affirmatively used that code, sir.

[9216] Senator Ferguson. And that gives the same date and it is indicated by some at least that the code was in.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have any way of accounting for the fact that Ingersoll, who was Deputy to Admiral Stark, saw the code, the winds code, the implementing message and you do not recall seeing it, and you did not see it, you say?

Captain McCollum. I am quite certain if there was such a message, sir, that I would have seen it. It is my suggestion at this time that Admiral Ingersoll might have been referring to the false message relating to Russia, which I believe he was called up in the middle of the night about, and in his testimony confused that with the one that was the real implementation, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But he said here it was the third or fourth, and he said the United States and Great Britain. When did the one with Russia come in?

Captain McCollum. About the same time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that as important a thing as that was, that you could get confused on war with Russia instead of war with the United States?

Captain McCollum. Knowing Admiral Ingersoll, sir, I believe he would have taken positive steps had it been the definite one that called for war with the United States, or [9217] called for rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States, sir. The very fact he did not do so would indicate that his testimony there is based on memory, which did not serve him too well, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now reading from the Navy testimony, so that we get all of this, on page 825, the fortieth question is—I better read the question before, question No. 39:

On or prior to the 7th of December did you receive any information as to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy Department which would put in effect the action contemplated by the so-called winds message?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you state the circumstances?

A. I recall that sometime I did see the messages which were supposed to put the winds message translated on the 28th into effect. I do not recall whether I saw that prior to December 7 or afterward. If I saw that prior to December 7 I am quite sure that that would have been considered confirmation of the information which had previously been received and which had been sent to the Fleet on December 3 or 4 regarding the destruction of the codes at London, Washington, Manila, and elsewhere, which indicated definitely that war was imminent.

Whether he saw it before or after, it would indicate [9218] that the message had come in, would it?

Captain McCollum. No, sir; not afterward, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Why not?

Captain McCollum. The message did come in afterward, sir. The war with England, or rupture of diplomatic relations with England, we received on the 8th, I believe.

Senator Ferguson. And with the United States?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But he was specific that he saw a message showing a break, the war break or diplomatic break between the United States and Japan, and Britain and Japan.

Captain McCollum. Well, Senator, all I can say is I saw no such dispatch, sir.

Senator Ferguson. On page 204 of Exhibit 1 there is a message from Tokyo to Berlin, November 30, 1941, in three parts, that indicates part 1 of 3. It is:

Re my circular #2387.

Have you got that?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now I want to ask you whether you noticed, when you got that message, that you did not get part 2, whether you recall that. Have you read those?

Captain McCollum. Those are the messages, Senator, starting towards the top of page 204 and running over to [9219] page 205, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, No. 985, and No. 985 at the bottom of the page.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; I saw those, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When those came through your hands did you notice that part 2 was not there?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was not that a very significant thing?

Captain McCollum. No, sir; not necessarily, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Not necessarily?

Captain McCollum. No, sir. Part 2 might have been received.

Senator Ferguson. Let us read the last sentence of part 1 and the first sentence of part 3:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. He was talking to Von Ribbontrop and Hitler?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

[9220] Senator Ferguson. Part 3, but missing part 2, reads:

If when you tell them this, the German and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July.

Does not that indicate that there is a missing part also?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; there is a missing part.

Senator Ferguson. There is a missing number?

Captain McCollum. There is a missing number here.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you get in touch with the British to see whether or not they got that No. 2?
Captain McCollum. No, sir. That exchange was run between the Communications and Intelligence Service, as to the check-up of these things, sir; not by me, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you miss it at the time? Do you remember this?

Captain McCollum. Yes, we frequently would pick up one part of a dispatch. In other words, this was one transmission and then the other part would be sent in another transmission, and not infrequently you would pick up one part sent as one transmission and not get the other part sent as another transmission, sir.

Senator Ferguson. We had the same kind of station in [9221] the Philippines that we had in Washington, to get the secret messages?

Captain McCollum. Not precisely the same, sir, but they were merely technical differences. They were substantially the same, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether you ever took it up, to try to find this second part?

Captain McCollum. There was a regular exchange between all of the stations and Washington, and vice versa, sir. Everything that we got, they had a system of checking up on, to see whether they got it, and possibly they did have the fill-in, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then we should find some message if we inquire from the Philippines about this second part, should we not?

Captain McCollum. They can check through the numbers to see whether they have it or not; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. The Army has No. 2, and we are going to get it.

Mr. Masten. Mr. Murphy—

Mr. Murphy. The Army has been working on it. They reported it to us.

[9222] Mr. Masten. Mr. Murphy, Senator Ferguson asked for that second part, as I recall it, and we have delivered to him certificates by both the Army and Navy—I think I am correct—

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Masten. To the effect that they have no record in either department of this part 2 ever having been received.

Mr. Murphy. That is before you had the material from Tokyo. They have the movies down there now, and they are transcribing those messages.

Mr. Masten. That may be, but the point is it had not been received prior to December 7, 1941.

Mr. Murphy. I know, but this business I am talking about will be available from the movies.

Mr. Masten. If it is in the reels. I think it would be well to read into the record at this point the two certificates that Mr. Ferguson has that were received from the Army and Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have that?

Mr. Masten. We will get them and give them to the reporter.

Senator Ferguson. Put them in at this place.

The Vice Chairman. They will be inserted in the record at this point. Please supply them to the reporter.
Memorandum for Senator Ferguson:

With reference to your request for additional information regarding the Japanese intercepts appearing on pages 195 and 204 of exhibit 1, I enclose copies of memoranda received from Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe and Lt. Comdr. Baecher in this connection.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Room 4D757, The Pentagon

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell:

1. SIS No. 25445 (p. 195 Exhibit 1) was intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, Washington, at 1149 GMT, 28 November 1941 (6:49 a.m., 28 November, Washington time). No information has been found in the records concerning the time the message was received by the Navy from Station S, or by Army SIS from the Navy.

2. A thorough search of the Signal Intelligence Service records discloses no evidence that Part 2 of Tokyo-to-Berlin [9224] message No. 585 (Parts 1 and 3 of which appear on p. 204 of Exhibit 1) was ever intercepted.

(Sgd) Harmon Duncombe,
BB
HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Col., GSC.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 5 January 1946.

1083A
R#94

Memorandum
To: Mr. William D. Mitchell

1. Mr. John Masten of your staff in a telephone conversation on 28 December 1945, requested that the Navy Department institute a search to ascertain whether there existed in the records of the Navy Department part 2 of the Japanese intercept, identified as Message 985 from Tokyo to Berlin and contained in Exhibit #1 at page 204.

2. You are informed that after an extensive search of pertinent files in the Navy Department and Archives, it has been determined that part 2 of Message 985 is not contained in the files and there is no evidence that part 2 [9225] of Message 985 was ever intercepted and decoded.

(Sgd) John Ford Baecher,
J ohn Ford Baecher,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

Memorandum for Senator Ferguson

With reference to your further request of January 8, 1946, regarding Part 2 of Message 985 appearing at page 204 of Exhibit 1, I enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum dated January 16, 1946, from Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe, together with a copy of the certificate enclosed therewith.

It is our understanding that all of the information regarding receipt of this message would be found in the Signal Intelligence Service records and that further inquiry of the radio stations would not throw any further light on the matter.

We have forwarded a copy of your request to the Navy Department and will advise you of their reply.

Seth W. Richardson.
MEMORANDUM

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Room 4D761, The Pentagon

16 JANUARY 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Pursuant to Senator Ferguson's request, there is inclosed a certificate relating to Tokyo-to-Berlin Message No. 985 (Parts 1 and 3 of which are printed at page 204 of Committee Exhibit No. 1).

Incl.

16 JANUARY 1946.

I, Harold G. Hayes, Colonel, Signal Corps, hereby certify:

(1) That the Signal Intelligence Service records, which are now in my custody, disclose the following information on Parts 1 and 3 of Tokyo-to-Berlin message No. 985 (which are printed at Page 204 of Committee Exhibit 1):

Translated by Navy Radio:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part 1</th>
<th>Part 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:06 A. M.</td>
<td>10:06 A. M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>305 P. M.</td>
<td>3:59 P. M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Dec</td>
<td>1 Dec</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Dec</td>
<td>1 Dec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) That a thorough search of the Signal Intelligence Service records discloses no evidence that Part 2 of the message was ever intercepted.

Harold G. Hayes,
Colonel, Signal Corps.

Senator Ferguson. To complete the record on the question of Admiral Ingersoll on this subject, I would like to insert another question and another answer.

Would counsel have any objection to that?

Mr. Richardson. No, no.

Senator Ferguson. Question No. 41. I did not read far enough back. I want to put this in:

Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941, any action was taken in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, as the result of the information contained in this execution of the winds code, which you state you saw?

As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, whether it was on or before or prior to December 7, or whether it was after December 7.

If it was after December 7 there was no purpose in sending it out. If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent out because we considered that the dispatch sent to all fleets regarding the destruction of codes was ample warning that war was imminent, or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be broken off, and that this dispatch was only confirmatory.

That would be speaking about the United States, would it not? Talking about our fleet?

Captain McCollum. That is what he is talking about, I judge, sir.

[9229] Senator Ferguson. Now, when you testified before the Hewitt Board—I want to go over some of your testimony there with relation to that. You were asked the question and made this answer—

Mr. Murphy. What page?

Senator Ferguson. I do not have it here. You will probably be able to find it. It is about in the center of his testimony:

That was the night of the 6th and 7th?

Yes, sir. By late Saturday night we had, if I remember correctly, 13 of the parts.

You are referring there to the 14-part message?
Captain McCollum. That is the final Japanese note; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other occasions where you ever delivered any intercept to the White House at night?

Captain McCollum. I did not make the deliveries, sir. Those deliveries were made by Captain Kramer, and I believe there were occasions when they were delivered to the naval aide to the President at night.

[9230] Senator Ferguson. At night?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of those occasions? What they were?

Captain McCollum. I do not specifically at this distance, sir, but it was common practice to make those deliveries at night, and report things to the people that had to know, including the Director of Intelligence, Chief of Operations, Director of War Plans, and the naval aide to the President.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the hours of the naval aide were at the White House?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Admiral Beardall, who was the regular naval aide, was at the White House on the night of the 6th?

Captain McCollum. I understand he was at dinner with Admiral Wilkinson on that night.

Senator Ferguson. Then, there would be an assistant, would there not, to the aide?

Captain McCollum. It would be delivered at the homes of these people wherever they were in town.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the copy for the President was delivered to Admiral Beardall [9231] at Admiral Wilkinson’s home?

Captain McCollum. It is my understanding that he saw it at Admiral Wilkinson’s home on the night of the 6th.

Senator Ferguson. Did you understand then that if the aide of the President read the message that that was all that was required? It didn’t go to the President personally?

Captain McCollum. That the aide would take it to the President.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I wanted to know, whether or not you have any knowledge of whether the aide took the message to the President; that is, Admiral Beardall when he saw it at Admiral Wilkinson’s home, whether he took it that night to the President?

Captain McCollum. I have no knowledge of that, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Keeffe. My understanding of the testimony is that it will clearly show that Captain Kramer delivered this message to the White House and left it with the under aide, if you may call him such, to Admiral Beardall, Admiral Beardall not being present, and when he got to Admiral Wilkinson’s home he found Admiral Beardall there along with General Miles. It was actually delivered to the White [9232] House that night.

Captain McCollum. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I think that the aide on duty that night will be able to explain that it was delivered that night. I think his name is Schultz.

Now, going on with your testimony:

They were transmitted, almost as soon as received, to the Secretary of State, to the President, to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to people over here in the War Department.

Would you say that that was a correct statement?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what time you went home on the evening of the 6th?
Captain McCollum. No, sir. Sometime between 9 and 10 o'clock, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the 13 parts were in when you went home?
Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Not all of them?
Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How many were in?
Captain McCollum. I don't remember exactly how many. Probably six or seven.

[9233] Senator Ferguson. Had you left any instructions?
Captain McCollum. They called me when they were all in, and told me they had been delivered to the correct people. Both Kramer and Watts called me probably between 11 and 12 that night.

Senator Ferguson. Between 11 and 12 you received the call showing they were all in and delivered?
Captain McCollum. Thirteen parts, and they were looking for the 14th.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, on the day of the 6th, your office was fully alerted to the seriousness of this whole situation?
Captain McCollum. We thought so, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And did you know whether the Army was fully alerted to the seriousness of the situation?
Captain McCollum. That was my impression, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next part of your testimony—have you found it?

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I find it, but I find there are two errors in the rest of his sentence. He says the White House, but he also says it went to Admiral Stark, but it didn't, as I understand it. At the top of page 33. [9234]

Senator Ferguson. Let me have it.

Mr. Richardson. If I may interject, I think you have to remember that this witness's testimony on delivery is purely hearsay.

Mr. Murphy. Of course it is.

Mr. Richardson. Of course he cannot be held accountable for whether it was delivered to Stark or not.

Senator Ferguson. I read it just as it is.

Mr. Murphy. You said it went to the White House but you didn't read the rest to show it went to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to the War Department?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I have the identical language.
Mr. Murphy. You read the whole sentence? All right.

Senator Ferguson. I will read it from the original.

Mr. Murphy. I am not sure. I don’t want to say that you misread it.

Senator Ferguson. We don’t want to misquote the witness.

Captain McCollum. That was the night of the 6th-7th, yes, sir. By late Saturday night, we had, if I remember correctly, 13 of the parts. They were transmitted almost as soon as received, to the Secretary of State, to the President, to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to the people over here in the War Department.

[9235] And your reason for making that answer, as I understand it, was you got a call from Kramer and Watts?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Between 11 and 12 o’clock that night, that they had done that very thing?

Captain McCollum. That they had made the proper deliveries. They did not go into detail, and that is possibly wrong in detail as brought out later.

I have only reported that it had been delivered to the proper people.

Senator Ferguson. Among the proper people, was the Secretary of State, the President, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the War Department?

Captain McCollum. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. My only reason in raising it was that I didn’t want to have the captain up here to be saying that he knew of his own knowledge that it went to Admiral Stark because all the testimony is that it didn’t, as I understand it.

Captain McCollum. As counsel said, what I am giving is hearsay, and it is based on reports. It is my impression at the time. It is undoubtedly wrong in minor detail.

[9236] Senator Ferguson. But it was an official report from one of the men working with you or under you?

Captain McCollum. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And you explained what kind of hearsay it was?

Captain McCollum. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. Going on with your answer:

Early Sunday morning, when I arrived to take over the duty in my office, where we had a special watch set up since early November, the 14th part was coming in; and while Admiral Wilkinson and I were discussing the situation about nine o’clock Sunday morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30 with Admiral Stark—

You recall that testimony?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

Captain McCollum. The times may be off, Senator, as I explained before. In other words, my basis of judging time is the time that I arrived at the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson. And that was your best judgment when you gave this testimony?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson.

—the instruction which directed the delivery of the note to the Secretary of State, was brought in, shown [9237] to Admiral Stark, who immediately called the White House on the telephone, and the draft was taken over to the Secretary of State and to the White House.
Captain McCollum. That is my understanding.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that testimony?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now:

At the time, the possible significance of the time of delivery was pointed out to all hands.

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us who "all hands" were?
Captain McCollum. Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and possibly Captain Schurmann, who I think was in Admiral Stark’s office at that time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The next question is by Admiral Hewitt:

You are referring to the one p. m. delivery time?

And you answered:

Yes, sir. In other words, it was pointed out that one p. m. Washington time would mean about 8 o’clock in the morning Honolulu time.
Admiral Hewitt. 7:30.
Captain McCollum. 7:30, yes, sir——

You remember that?

[9238] Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is correct?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Going on with your answer after the words "7:30, yes, sir":

And very early in the morning out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines and those places; and that we didn’t know what this signified, but that if an attack were coming, it looked like the timing was such that it was timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii at the time. We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the Ambassadors——

There is where you were referring to an intercepted note!
Captain McCollum. No; still time of delivery, 1 o’clock.

[9239] Senator Ferguson. But it had been in a message that we intercepted to the Jap Ambassadors!
Captain McCollum. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Reading on:

we felt that there were important things which would move at that time, and that was pointed out not only to Admiral Stark, but I know it was pointed out to the Secretary of State.

Captain McCollum. I will have to amend my former testimony on that latter point. I do not know of that of my own knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. Did somebody tell you?
Captain McCollum. Kramer went over with instructions to point out the time business to the Secretary, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So officially Kramer was told?
Captain McCollum. I told him.
Senator Ferguson. Or ordered to tell and point this out to the Secretary of State?

Captain McCollum. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. That is the reason you have put in “but I know it was pointed out to the Secretary of State”? 

Captain McCollum. I should not have said it in that categorical language because I do not know that of my own knowledge.
[9240] Senator Ferguson. But you had every reason to believe that because you instructed Kramer to do it?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

I was present and assisted in pointing it out to Admiral Stark and it was taken over, with instructions to point that out, to the Secretary of State.

So you do explain it.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

I was not present at that. I do not know. I would add, however, that the Secretary of State was not available at the time that the Japanese Ambassadors desired to deliver their note, and it is my recollection in the discussion at the time with the Chief of Naval Operations—

That is Admiral Stark, is it not?

Captain McCollum. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

and his admirals in there that that was a deliberate move on our part.

Captain McCollum. That was my impression at that time, sir; it may have been wrong.

Senator Ferguson. You had a discussion with Admiral Stark and his admirals that he had deliberately moved so that the Secretary of State would not be present at 1 o'clock for the delivery?

Captain McCollum. That was the impression I was under, sir.

Senator Ferguson. From the conversation that took place?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, to go on:

Admiral Hewitt. Do you remember who it was delivered the message to the Secretary of State and the White House?

He is talking there about the fourteenth part, is he not, and the 1 o'clock message?

Captain McCollum. I am not sure which.

Senator Ferguson. I will go on:

Captain McCollum. No, sir, I do not, but it was probably Lieutenant Commander, now Captain Kramer. I can't say that for sure because some of these things Admiral Turner himself would run over to see the Secretary, or Captain Schuirmann would run over. The normal routine would have been for Kramer to have delivered it.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then you would be talking about the fourteenth part and the 1 o'clock message?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall who was present when—

[9242] Captain McCollum. Yes. May I elaborate a little?

Admiral Hewitt. Yes.

Captain McCollum. By mid-November the situation in the Far East had appeared so acute that in addition to the usual duty watches in the Division of Naval Intelligence, one of the three regular officers assigned to the Far East Section—that is, Commander Watts, Colonel Boone and myself—was constantly on duty in our offices, with adequate office help, on a 24-hour basis.
Do you recall that?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is accurate?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I just have it in the back of my head that there is some testimony that for sometime before the 7th, there was a division between the Army and Navy where the Army was to cover the State Department and the Navy the White House.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct, but it was changed. There was a change made.

Mr. Murphy. You mean the Navy then covered both of them?

[9243] Senator Ferguson. Yes. As I understand, that is correct. Isn’t it, Captain?

Captain McCollum. No, sir. Normally the Navy covered the White House, and the War Department covered the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Captain McCollum. This dispatch was considered so important that rather than wait for it to go to the War Department to be picked up by Colonel Bratton, and taken over to the State Department, we cut short and delivered direct telling Colonel Bratton what we had done.

Mr. Murphy. That explains it.

Senator Ferguson. So this was an unusual situation and you were making delivery to the State Department even though that was the Army’s job?

Captain McCollum. It was a situation that we believe required the quickest possible delivery and the quickest possible was for us to deliver rather than pass it on to the Army and then have them pass it further, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the danger wasn’t in Washington. There wasn’t danger in Washington because of which you were delivering this message out of the ordinary rules to the Secretary of State. The danger was on our fronts, was it not, and our outposts?

[9244] Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. You mean the danger of actual physical damage?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you say anything about getting it to them where the danger was?

Captain McCollum. Senator, I have already said that that suggestion was definitely made, that a dispatch be sent to the fleet pointing out that something could be expected to happen at the time.

Senator Ferguson. That was before it was sent to the State Department?

Captain McCollum. About that same time, sir. We continued to discuss this thing. Whether it was before or immediately after, I can’t say at this time, sir. But the situation was very definitely discussed and in my recollection Admiral Stark made an effort to get in touch with General Marshall by the telephone and couldn’t.

Now, I can’t say who he tried to get in touch with. That is my impression at the time.
Senator Ferguson. Have you finished?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Going on:

I arrived at the Navy Department about 7:30 or a quarter [9245] of 8, December 7—

What was your regular time to get there? Did you have a watch on certain hours?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. That was the normal time to shift the watch, quarter to 8. That left the other fellow time to get home for breakfast.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

—to take over the watch from Commander Watts. Shortly after my arrival in the Navy Department, Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Intelligence, arrived and sent for me and we had a discussion concerning the situation in the Far East.

Do you recall that?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. About how long had you been on your post that morning until Wilkinson called you, or came in—sent for you?

Captain McCollum. It is hard to estimate the time, Senator, but I hadn't completed reading carefully the 13 parts of the dispatch note at that time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Hadn't you had the night before to read it?

Captain McCollum. I had had part of it. Not all of it.

Senator Ferguson. They didn't then deliver it to you [9246] the night before?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But they talked to you on the telephone?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

After 15 or 20 minutes of the discussion, we received word that Admiral Stark had arrived in the Navy Department and both Admiral Wilkinson and myself went down to talk to Admiral Stark.

Do you recall that?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

At that time he was alone. While were in there discussing the situation with Admiral Stark, various officers of the Division of Operations came into the office. I believe Admiral Ingersoll was present, Admiral Brainard, Admiral Noyes, Admiral Turner, and possibly Captain Schuerman. There may have been others; I don't know. Certainly Admiral Turner and Admiral Ingersoll were present. Whether they were present all the time, I do not know. There was considerable going in and out at that time.

Admiral Turner was head of the War Plans?

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir.

[9247] Senator Ferguson. Under the rule that had been laid down, he received the messages in the raw and did not get your interpretation of them?

Captain McCollum. He got both. He received them in the raw, and I was careful to give him my interpretation of it. That was my duty.

Senator Ferguson. Is that what you were doing there that morning on the 7th, giving these men your interpretation, as head of the Intelligence?
Captain McCollum. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. So you were carrying out your function at that time.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, continuing:

About 9 o'clock, or a little earlier, I received word from the outside room that one of my officers wished to see me urgently, and I stepped outside and received the last part of the message, concerning the final note to be delivered on the United States by the Japanese Ambassadors.

That would be the fourteenth part that you received while you were discussing the 13 parts?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, that would seem to be so. I am not certain from what you have read, whether that is the fourteenth part, or whether I am referring now to the time [9248] there, sir.

Possibly reading further will clear that up.

Senator Ferguson. I will go on.

Admiral Hewitt. The last part of the long message?

Captain McCollum. The long message, and the dispatch directing its presentation on the Secretary of State at one o'clock, Washington time.

So there were both?

Captain McCollum. That was my recollection at the time, sir. I had not had opportunity to read over very much. I would like to amend that to this degree:

I think that the times that I gave there are erroneous. They are probably off by as much as an hour there, sir. The fourteenth part came in separately and was brought up by Admiral Wilkinson and myself to Admiral Stark after we had talked to him about the 13 parts. While we were discussing the fourteenth part, and its language, then this word came in that an officer wanted to see me outside. It was Kramer with the time-delivery dispatch, which was separate from the other dispatch.

Senator Ferguson. But the fourteenth part was in English, this message all came in in English, didn't it?

Captain McCollum. That I don't know. It may have; I don't know.

[9249] Senator Ferguson. Didn't we have both the cipher and the code so that we could read this 14-part message?

Captain McCollum. Apparently so, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that made it quite easy to read, if we had both the cipher and the code?

Captain McCollum. I don't know about that aspect. I would like to answer that question, but I am simply not technically qualified to answer it. I don't know those technical details.

Mr. Murphy. Don't we have an exhibit showing exactly that? I mean showing what the times were, and when they got each one. Isn't it in evidence?

Senator Ferguson. We have.

Mr. Murphy. It might help in your examination.

Senator Ferguson. I may not have read all of your answer. I will go back:

Captain McCollum. The long message, and the dispatch directing its presentation on the Secretary of State at one o'clock Washington time. I held a short discussion with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to the significance at the
time, and he it was who pointed out the time at Honolulu at 7:30 and in the Far East as dawn, and so on.

Admiral Hewitt. Before dawn. Wouldn't that be before dawn?

[9250] Captain McCollum. Before dawn, yes, sir. That would be about 2 o'clock in the morning out there.

So, you corrected yourself there, did you not?

Captain McCollum. You have to take those time zones and add them up. It is difficult to add under discussion, and I may be erroneous in the addition. But they can be added out.

Senator Ferguson. I read on.

I took that in to Admiral Stark and pointed out the possible significance of the time in conjunction with the note, and it was also pointed out to other officers of the Division of Operations who were present at the time.

The Division of Operations was War Plans, was it not?

Captain McCollum. No, sir. The Division of Operations consisted of the staff, you might say, of the Chief of Naval Operations. War Plans was one of the divisions of Operations.

Senator Ferguson. Who were you talking about when you said the "officers of the Division of Operations"?

Captain McCollum. I was talking about War Plans, Intelligence, Communications, Ship Movements, the Central Division, and so on, sir.

[9251] Senator Ferguson. Then, going on:

Admiral Stark talked over the telephone, I think, with the Chief of Staff of the Army, who presently came over with Colonel Bratton.

Now, you testified there that General Marshall came over with Colonel Bratton. Is that correct?

Captain McCollum. I testified to that effect, but I am in error on that, Senator. I did not have the privilege of reading over the testimony that I gave before Admiral Hewitt, and amend it at that time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, how could you be mistaken on such an important thing as the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, coming over with Bratton?

Captain McCollum. He was over that afternoon, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I didn't catch your answer.

Captain McCollum. I say, the general was over in Admiral Stark's office that afternoon.

Senator Ferguson. But you were talking about the morning.

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir, and I was confused when I gave that testimony as to time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then, you said:

I was not there the whole time, and later on I came in and by ten o'clock that morning we were given to understand that a warning message had been sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, via Army channels.

Captain McCollum. As I told you, sir, the time is off. I believe that that message was sent out sometime between 11 and noon, sir.

The only basis on which I have discussed the time was the time I got there first in the morning. I was extremely busy, as I am sure you will understand, in moving in and out, and those statements I made at the time are probably not accurate.

[9252] Senator Ferguson. Well, if you were an hour off, it would only be 11 o'clock. You said "by 10 o'clock."
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

In other words, the warning was to go to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with instructions to transmit it to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Captain McCollum. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that the Navy did not consider this any more important than to send it to the Army and then have them look up the commander in chief in the Pacific and give him a copy of it? Is that how you treated it?

Captain McCollum. That was not my decision, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Whose decision was that?

Captain McCollum. That decision was made by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral Hewitt said:

Now, go back to the winds code message—and then he changes the subject so we are no longer on that subject. Is that correct?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Will you yield, Senator, so that I may ask him a question?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; certainly.

Senator Lucas. May I ask you, Captain, when it was you gave the testimony that Senator Ferguson has been reading from?

Captain McCollum. That was in May of this year, sir.

The Chairman. Last year, you mean.

Captain McCollum. Or last year; I beg your pardon. May of 1945, sir.

Senator Lucas. Is that the first time you testified?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. I might add, by way of explanation, sir, that unfortunately every time they would get ready to hold one of these previous inquiries we would be in the midst of an operation against the Japs at the time, and my admiral asked that I not appear at that time, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you discuss this matter with anyone from December 7 on to the time that Admiral Hewitt took your testimony?

Captain McCollum. Not in detail, Senator. I may have discussed it with various people shortly after that time here in Washington and around that I saw, but certainly not since October or November of 1942, sir.

Senator Lucas. In other words, you were giving your best recollection at the time with respect to dates and times, and so forth and so on?

[9255] Captain McCollum. That is right; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Did you state in your testimony or before that it was a fact that you had made an analysis of the situation in the Pacific and that you and Wilkinson—that is, Admiral Wilkinson—that had a discussion with Admiral Stark and urged a warning be sent to the fleet? That was around about December the Ist.

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that the one you described this morning?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us what the nature of the warning is that you wanted sent about the 1st of December?

Captain McCollum. The situation, Senator, was this—that this information, not only from this source but from all other information sources we had, was coming in, was being sent to the War Plans Division with evaluation as to the credibility of the information as it came in. I had several discussions with Admiral Turner, as we always did during the days going on, and by 1 December I had personally not seen anything going out to anybody warning people outside that there was danger.

[9256] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that we had sent a message or delivered a message to Japan from the Secretary of State on the 26th?

Captain McCollum. Most of my information as to what we had delivered to the Japanese, sir, came from my reading of the intercepts of the outgoing Japanese dispatches.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that was a fact?

Captain McCollum. I knew it from reading the break-down—I am not certain on that point, sir. I probably knew it from reading the decode of the outgoing dispatch here from the Japanese Ambassador.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, the State Department did not convey that to you?

Captain McCollum. Not to me, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were trying to evaluate what you had without knowing what the State Department was doing on December the 1st, when you had this conversation with Admiral Wilkinson?

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know at that time about the message of the dead line of the 25th and then being shifted to the 29th?

Captain McCollum. Those were Japanese dispatches. Yes, sir; I saw that.

[9257] Senator Ferguson. Were those significant to you?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It has been discussed here in other testimony about your drafting a long message. Was that the one of December the 1st?

Captain McCollum. No, sir. I drafted no message on December the 1st. There is a memorandum that I drafted here on December the 1st, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And is that the one that you discussed with Admiral Stark?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you draft a long—it is described as a long message?

Captain McCollum. About the middle of the week of 1 to 7 December I drafted a dispatch which contained certain items of information, drawing deductions from it, which covered about, I should say, a half of a page of this size. That would be a normal dispatch blank.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you give us the—you said this morning that that is not existent; that it has been destroyed.

Captain McCollum. No, sir; that type of thing, Senator, would be purely indicative of my recommendations and to be submitted in
final form to my chiefs, who normally, if they [9258] did not elect to send it out, would destroy it, and there would be no record of it anywhere, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, that would require us to try to get from you as nearly as possible the contents of that instrument. Would you give it to us?

Captain McCollum. It has been a long time ago, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I realize that.

Captain McCollum. I don’t know that I can give it with any exactitude at all, sir. The message, I believe, Senator—all the major points contained in this memorandum of mine of the 1st of December were secured out of bits of what I considered to be significant information and drew from that the conclusion that the Japanese were definitely bent on war and that we could expect the opening of hostilities almost at any time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, hostilities against us?

Captain McCollum. Sir?

Senator Ferguson. Hostilities against America?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you surprised when the Japanese attacked on Sunday morning at Hawaii?

Captain McCollum. I was not surprised at the Japanese attack, sir. I was astonished at the success attained by that attack, sir.

[9259] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, there is a difference between that and the question I asked you. Were you surprised that we were attacked at Hawaii on Sunday morning?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were not?

Captain McCollum. I do not mean by that statement to imply that I had any knowledge that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor, and I wish to state categorically that there was no bit of intelligence that I had at my disposal that definitely to my mind indicated that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor, but I had——

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the——

The Chairman. Let him finish that answer.

Mr. Murphy. This is important. He was right in the midst of a sentence.

Senator Ferguson. I will let him complete it. Read the last part of it.

Mr. Murphy. He said, “But I had”—and then you interrupted him.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read his answer so that he gets the exact point? I don’t want to cut him off.

(Answer read.)

Captain McCollum (continuing). For many years felt that in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between the [9260] United States and Japan that the Japanese would make a very definite attempt to strike the fleet at or near the commencement time of those hostilities.

Senator Ferguson. Did not any of the messages in Exhibit 2 give you information that they would strike, or intended to strike, at Pearl Harbor?
Captain McCollum. Not to my mind, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you knew that war was very imminent in the middle of the week. You expected an attack, and you were not surprised at the attack, and you thought that they would attack our fleet wherever it was.

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then why were you surprised that they attacked Pearl Harbor? Didn't you have information that they would attack Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCollum. I did not know that the fleet was in Pearl Harbor exactly, sir. I knew that they were operating in that area, but I presumed that the attack would be made on the fleet wherever it was, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that if you would have known that the fleet was in Pearl Harbor, at least six battleships, eight battleships and, outside of the task forces, were sitting like ducks in Pearl Harbor, you would have anticipated an attack upon that fleet in Pearl Harbor? [9261]

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. If it had been in San Pedro I would have anticipated the attack there, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is right. So that it was because you did not know where the fleet was that you made this explanation?

Captain McCollum. I do not quite follow you.

Senator Ferguson. You made an explanation after your answer that you were not surprised. Then you made an explanation. Do you remember that?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And it was because you did not know where the fleet was that you made that explanation?

Captain McCollum. No, sir. I meant to make the explanation to try to make it clear that at no time did I predict a definite Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, nor was there any intelligence at my disposal that I considered conclusively showed that the Japanese intended to attack Pearl Harbor. I felt that the fact that the Japanese intended to go to war carried with it the possibility of an attack on the fleet wherever it might be, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now of course, in Intelligence you do not always deal upon absolute certainties, do you?

Captain McCollum. As near as possible, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; but you have to evaluate certain things to determine what you anticipate from the enemy? [9262]

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And it is a matter of estimate, is it not?

Captain McCollum. Judgment; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And that you talked to Admiral Stark and showed him the significance of the 9 o'clock message being 7:30 at Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that you did then and there—

Captain McCollum. That was not a significant time, Senator, at Pearl Harbor. I have explained that it was standard practice for use to check up times at the major points that we had throughout the Pacific so that we could get a clear view of what the daylight and dark status, and so on, was at the time, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But it was your estimate that a message should go to the Admiral of the Fleet no matter where it was; that is what you were figuring on?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And to go immediately because you expected something to happen at 1 o'clock.

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did that message that you drew up, that [9263] you indicated was about a half a page—that is just for description—did it have any so-called orders in it?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Or was it only information?

Captain McCollum. It was information and conclusions drawn therefrom, sir. In other words, it was a broad-gaged estimate of the intent of the Japanese, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the substance of that estimate was that we were going to war with Japan?

Captain McCollum. That Japan would strike.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; would strike. Now, you knew of the movement to the south, to the Kra Peninsula?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. I estimated on the 1st of December that they would strike the Kra Peninsula in force.

Senator Ferguson. Did that mean anything to you in evaluating the evidence, that they would strike both America and the British at the same?

Captain McCollum. I felt that they were definitely capable of it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, was that your estimate, that if they struck the one they would strike the other?

Captain McCollum. I cannot answer that precisely at this time, sir. I felt that if the Japanese were convinced that we would strike if they went down to the Kra Peninsula, then [9264] they would strike us at the same time.

Senator Ferguson. You say if they were convinced that we would strike?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. In other words, if the Japanese high command became convinced that we would interpret their move against the Kra Peninsula as a warlike move against us and would go to war with them, then they would strike us.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar then with the message of the 17th of August 1941? It is in that book, volume II here. I will show you the message.

The Chairman. The Chair would like to say to the committee that counsel has indicated that Captain McCollum is compelled to leave for his command tonight.

Mr. Kaufman. That is correct.

The Chairman. And, therefore, I hope the committee will be willing to sit a little longer so that we may conclude his testimony.

Senator Ferguson. I will do everything I can. I will hurry right along.

I wish to show you now an exhibits in the case. It is the Foreign Relations, volume II. And will you state the page, Mr. Masten?

Mr. Masten. Page 556.
Senator Ferguson. Page 556. Now, it is the last paragraph [9265] at the bottom of the page and runs over onto the top of the next page. I wish that you would read it.

Captain McCollum (reading):

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know about that?

Captain McCollum. Through reading the intercepts I may have, sir. I did not know about these notes as they were delivered, nor did I see any of the notes as they were delivered.

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't that be notice to the Japanese that we were interested in a matter as vital to our country as the question of going into the southwest?

Captain McCollum. The impression was that we were going to safeguard the interests of the United States and the safety of our nationals. That is what it says here, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And did you know of the various messages [9266] from Great Britain, the message from Winant to the Secretary of State being, in effect, from Mr. Churchill to the Secretary of State, at 10:40 on the morning of the 6th?

Captain McCollum. Saying what, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Saying that the ships were going into the Kra Peninsula and that they were 14 hours away.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; I saw that, but we already had it from our own source, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You already had it from your own source?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. That was merely passing on information along to us that we already had, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you have any knowledge about the question of what we would do in case they went into the southwest?

Captain McCollum. No, sir. That was a matter of Government policy. That was way over my head, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you did not get Government policy?

Captain McCollum. No, sir; not of that level, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then I will ask you how you could evaluate Intelligence if you did not get all of the Government policy?

Captain McCollum. All I can say to that, Senator, is that I did the best I could with what I had, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You did the best you could with what [9267] you had. Now I will ask you about a meeting or a conference on the morning of the 6th; that is Saturday.

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you go into that with Miles, or was there a conference of Miles and Bratton and Wilkinson and McCollum and probably Heinmarsh?

Captain McCollum. There may have been, Senator. We frequently saw each other either in one office or another. We ran backward and forward all the time, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, do you recall anything being considered Saturday morning, that being a very important day, was it not? It stood out to you?

Captain McCollum. Not much more than the days preceding and immediately following, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you had the pilot message on the morning of Saturday morning which indicated that they were going to deliver a message in reply to the message of the 26th. You had the Tokyo to Berlin saying that war would come quicker than some people thought?

Captain McCollum. Might I just offer one suggestion on the interpretation of that Tokyo to Berlin dispatch if I may, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir; that is what I would like to have you do. [9268] Captain McCollum. Berlin up until that time had been pressing the Japanese to go to war with the Russians, they had been doing everything they could to kick the Japanese into jumping on the backs of the Russians, and the first time I read that dispatch it impressed me as being a Japanese excuse to the Germans not to jump on the Russians.

Senator Ferguson. But a message that they were going to jump both on the United States and Britain?

Captain McCollum. They frequently at other times sent messages that they were going to do things in other areas and we were fairly certain that they were driving to the south then.

Senator Ferguson. And is that the reason that you discounted that message that they were not going to jump on us, because they were only using it as an excuse?

Captain McCollum. I discounted anything which showed that they were not going to jump on us. Everything I tried to say is that I felt that they were going to jump on us, that I was convinced that the situation between us and Japan was intensely acute. Had I not felt that way I certainly should not have put my office on a 24 hour basis early in November.

As a matter of fact, if the Senator will indulge me, my wife remonstrated with me as to how hard I was working my people at that time, sir. In other words, I felt that the situation between us and Japan was extremely explosive and would [9269] erupt at any time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, getting back to the morning of the 6th. I only raised that point to see whether or not you could recall a conference on that particular morning.

Captain McCollum. Yes: I appreciate that.

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember such a conference that morning in relation to trying to get a message out to the so-called outposts?

Captain McCollum. Senator, I am afraid I would be confusing if I said I did.

Senator Ferguson. I certainly to do want you to do that.

Captain McCollum. I cannot answer that directly. There may have been such a conference. It does not stand out in my memory at this time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But you were, as a Director of Intelligence, greatly concerned that there be sufficient messages go from time to time as the situation increased in danger to the front?
Captain McCollum. That is correct, yes, sir; very much so.

Senator Ferguson. And you had taken it up with your superior officers, that is correct?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you had considered it with your lower officers, is that correct?

[9270] Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, was it unusual to send out information from the War Plans which you did not know about?

Captain McCollum. That apparently was the practice, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You did not know it until recently, is that it?

You say it apparently was the practice.

Captain McCollum. Well, you hear some of these things by rumors in a place like the Navy Department, sir.

Senator Ferguson. They do have rumors, then, in the Navy Department?

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir. They are pretty human down there after all, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The Rochefort that you described this morning was a very efficient officer?

Captain McCollum. In my opinion, he is one of the most efficient officers in the Navy, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted about a message to him from Miles about the wind code message?

Captain McCollum. From General Miles to Commander Rochefort?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain McCollum. I cannot conceive of a message of that sort being sent except through me or through Captain Safford.

Senator Ferguson. Well, from their G–2 to get in touch [9271] with Rochefort?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; I knew that their G–2 had been told to get in touch—I don't know whether the term “Rochefort” was mentioned or not, but that was the intention, sir.

Senator Ferguson. There was a rather iron-clad rule that you never got in touch with an Army man, a Navy man would never directly get in touch from your department with the Army?

Captain McCollum. Oh, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well you said before it would be unusual to have one sent—

Captain McCollum. No. What I said was, it would be unusual for General Miles to send a dispatch to Rochefort to get in touch with someone. That is what I understood you to say, Senator. In other words, he would have normally come to me and asked me to send a dispatch to Rochefort from the Navy here; merely a matter of technique, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted with about getting in touch with Rochefort in Hawaii in relation to the weather message, the wind core?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you understand then that they would get the interpretation of the message?
Captain McCollum. I understood that G-2 was very anxious for their G-2 in Hawaii to have direct access with Commander Rochefort, who had the only agency capable of intercepting the winds message in Hawaii, sir. The Army, as I understand it, had no parallel set-up in Hawaii at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with plan WPL-46?

Captain McCollum. In a general way, sir. I read it at the time. I haven't read it since, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that it considered or it required certain action upon the part of Admiral Kimmel to take action in the Marshalls and places such as that?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Could a war warning have meant that?

Captain McCollum. No, sir; not a war warning. The commander in chief of the fleet would not have been authorized to undertake hostilities on the basis of a war warning. What you are suggesting, as I understand it, sir, is that Admiral Kimmel would undertake immediately to start war. I did not so interpret that message of the 27th of November.

Senator Ferguson. Well, there was a way to put the War Plan into effect, wasn't there?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, but when that War Plan went into effect, that was war, sir. The War Plan called for active operations, and when we got to operate under WPL-46 you can bet we started shooting, Senator.

[9273] Senator Ferguson. Well, if you wanted to alert Admiral Kimmel to an air attack upon Hawaii, there would be very simple words that you could do that in, wouldn't there?

Captain McCollum. Probably so, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, only probably so?

Captain McCollum. Well, sir, how would you suggest it?

Senator Ferguson. If you wanted no misunderstanding, what words would you use as an Intelligence officer? That was your duty, was it not, to help to draw up these alerts?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That was not your duty?

Captain McCollum. No, sir. That duty was taken away from us in about February 1941, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In February of 1941 that duty was taken away from you?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And it was placed where?

Captain McCollum. Placed in the Division of War Plans of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just clear up three matters briefly. It won't take long.

The Chairman. Proceed.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, there was a dead line of the 25th of November; you recall that?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. On the day immediately preceding that there was a message sent by the Navy that hostilities may commence in any direction, is that right? Do you remember that?
Captain McCollum. That is my understanding now, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the second dead line was the 29th of November and 2 days previously to that there was a war-warning message sent to Hawaii?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, the other thing that you testified about was that the significance of the 1 p.m. message was pointed out to different people. As I understand it, you did not talk to anyone except to Turner, Ingersoll, and Admiral Stark, is that right?

Captain McCollum. And Admiral Wilkinson, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And Admiral Wilkinson.

Captain McCollum. And there may have been others. Admiral Ingersoll may have been there, there may have been others in Admiral Stark's office there.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate you have definite knowledge of the facts as to what occurred there because you were present.

Captain McCollum. I was there.

Mr. Murphy. And you did point out the significance of the 1 o'clock p.m. to them, did you?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, what did you say the significance was?

Captain McCollum. I felt that if the Japanese intended to have war with us they would strike at or near 1 o'clock Washington time, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you say you felt that they would commence at 1 o'clock at Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You felt that they would commence hostilities against us at 1 o'clock?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And you always felt that if the Japs were going to strike with her fleets the place to start was by attacking our fleet?

Captain McCollum. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. The place they would start would be by attacking the fleet.

Captain McCollum. They not only would do that, but that there was historical precedent, if the Japanese wished to start a war with us. Their war with China in 1895 was started that way; their war with Russia in 1907 was started that way; their war against Germany in Tsingtao in 1914 [9276] was started in that way.

Mr. Murphy. Well, the starting of their war with the Chinese and starting war with anyone else was by attacking their fleet?

Captain McCollum. Attacking their fleet and timing a declaration of war on presentation of the final notes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. No other questions.

[9277] Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, the time has finally arrived, as usual, when my questions start at the end of the day's hearing.

Mr. Murphy. I did not mean to take up any part of your time. Mr. Keeffe. Nobody ever intends to mean anything, except it places me in an unfortunate position as to time, being compelled to forgo asking as many questions as I would like.
The Chairman. The Chair indicated we would sit longer in order to conclude with Captain McCollum. We do not intend to shorten the examination of any member of the committee.

Mr. Keefe. I have a desire, the same as everybody else, to get through here.

Captain, did you have any information, obtained as the result of your position, prior to the receipt of the 1 o'clock message on the morning of December 7, 1941, from which you concluded that the Japs would strike at Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCollum. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question before the witness leaves?

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Senator Lucas. Captain, through what instrumentalities did you receive your intelligence?

[9278] Captain McCollum. The Communications Division of the Navy Department, sir.

Senator Lucas. I would like to have the different methods that were used.

Captain McCollum. The different methods, sir?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Captain McCollum. Some came in by mail. We got regular mail reports sent to us. Other things were sent by telegraph. Some came by Western Union. When people traveled over those countries they frequently came in to see me and talk about it. Business firms and other interested Americans here who had contacts out there would let us know any news they received through those contacts. Our press associations were most cooperative in giving us their sidelines, the benefit of their views. It was that sort of thing, Senator.

Senator Lucas. All of that information was directed to your department?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. It would come in to the Navy Department; it would be sent to the Intelligence Division, and there it was blocked out by the strategic sphere, sir, and if it concerned the Far East it came to my section, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did that include diplomatic messages or diplomatic intercepts that came from Japan?

[9279] Captain McCollum. Intercepts, sir? You mean this magic business?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Captain McCollum. That magic business was a special set-up in the Navy Department and that was received by that special organization and that product came to us as a source of intelligence, sir.

Senator Lucas. You were the one who first saw all those diplomatic messages that came through magic?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. So you had in your office all of the intelligence information that came from any source?

Captain McCollum. That was the design; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. That is what the office was designed for?

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lucas. And you tell the committee that, with all of the information that you had, at no time did you ever receive any message that indicated that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7 with a surprise move?

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir. That is my opinion, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I just want to show—

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe.

[9280] Mr. Keefe. May I check my notes just long enough, sir, to see whether I have another question?

The Chairman. I suppose no one has any objection to that. You have been very modest in your questions.

Mr. Keefe. I want to clear up one thing in my mind, Captain.

I understood you to say in response to many questions that were asked in reference to it, that at sometime between the 1st and 7th of December, at a date which you did not definitely fix, you did consider it necessary to send some additional warning to the fleet and prepared a draft of the message which you thought ought to be sent; is that correct?

Captain McCollum. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. I understood you to say that you took that message to your superior and discussed it and then went to Admiral Stark.

Captain McCollum. No, sir; Admiral Turner, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, at the time you drafted that message, am I correct in assuming that you had not had previous knowledge of the contents of the message sent to Admiral Kimmel on the 27th of November?

Captain McCollum. I had no knowledge of that other than the statement made to me on the 1st by both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, that the fleet had received adequate and catego-—[9281]rical warning, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, on the day that you discussed the message that you proposed sending did you see this message, the so-called war-warning message?

Captain McCollum. That message was then shown to me by Admiral Turner, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Is that the first time you had actually seen the contents of that message?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I understood you to say, when asked a question as an expert naval officer, that the language in that message of the 27th, which you saw for the first time when it was shown to you by Admiral Turner, containing the words “This is a war warning,” would have been sufficient notice to you, as an officer with the fleet, to put you on notice that war was about to break out.

Captain McCollum. That would have been my reaction, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, if you read the entire message, and I assume you did, that day, was there anything in that message that would lead you, as an experienced naval officer, assuming you had received it, to assume that war was going to break out at Pearl Harbor or any other specific place?

Captain McCollum. I think that a commander to whom such a message as that is addressed must assume that war is going to
break out over his forces and take the steps necessary to cover it, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. The contention has been made repeatedly and repeatedly here, by almost every officer that has testified, with the exception of Admiral Turner and I believe the testimony which you have given this afternoon, that everyone was surprised that this attack took place at Pearl Harbor; no one expected the attack to take place there. You have heard that testimony?

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. I think I have elaborated on mine, sir. I had no intention to show myself as a clairvoyant at all. I was not surprised that war was started by an attack on the fleet. The fleet was at Pearl Harbor, and therefore the fact that the war was started by an attack on the fleet was not a surprise.

Mr. Keeffe. I think I understand you. That is all.

Captain McCollum. In other words, I had no preknowledge, or made no preestimate, that the Japanese would attack at Pearl Harbor, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman—

The Chairman. The Chair recognizes Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. On page 22 of Exhibit 2, do you remember seeing that message on the 6th? As I understand it, the testimony shows that it was translated in the rough.

Captain McCollum. No, sir. I saw nothing of this sort until about the 11th or 12th, sir, that is, that I now recollect. I might have seen that before. A great many of these things were coming in, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did not these fleet movements mean anything to you in the Intelligence Branch? Were not they considered the same as the diplomatic messages?

Captain McCollum. Senator, this is translated on the 11th.

Senator Ferguson. Mrs. Edgers testified before one of the boards that she made it in the rough.

Captain McCollum. Let me make one explanation in regard to Mrs. Edgers: I was instrumental in employing Mrs. Edgers. She is an extremely able translator. She has a magnificent Japanese and a magnificent English education.

At the time of which you are now speaking, she was not a reliable translator. She was not able at that time to accurately transfer from the Japanese into English, and vice versa, sir. I had to check a number of her translations, sir. I just offer that by way of background, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Notwithstanding that, if it was translated in the rough, would it not be significant to show that on the 3d of December they were inquiring, particularly on the second page, about the lights?

Captain McCollum. Senator, I did not see this, that I recollect, at the time you indicate, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you treat these messages in relation to ship movements on the same basis as you did the diplomatic, or did you translate the diplomatic prior to the ship movements?

Captain McCollum. As the the priority, I tried to explain how that was done before, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to know which had priority between them.
Captain McCollum. At this particular time, top priority, as I remember it, was given to trying to listen for the war-warning messages out of the code, and to be sure that we did not miss any part of the interchange of Japanese notes between this Government and the Government of Japan.

[9285] Senator Ferguson. But you had two questions, didn’t you? That was when war would start. These may indicate and did indicate where war would start. Was there any difference between the two?

Captain McCollum. No, sir; these merely indicated the setting up of a signal system out of Honolulu.

Senator Ferguson. Wasn’t that significant?

Captain McCollum. Not necessarily, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then, you didn’t treat these on the same basis as you did the diplomatic messages?

Captain McCollum. We treated them all alike.

Senator Ferguson. Well, were you familiar with the other messages that came in, page 27—

Captain McCollum. I must have been familiar with all. I said that I read them all or thought I was reading them all.

Senator Ferguson. And page 29.

Captain McCollum. I have.

Senator Ferguson. Where it says:

It appears no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

And is from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6.

Captain McCollum. What time was it translated?

Senator Ferguson. Translated 12/8. What I am trying to get at is, if we were fully alerted, we had a pilot message, why we didn’t put every effort on translating these messages that now appear so significant showing that there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Captain McCollum. I think the effort was there, but I believe at the time it was considered the first word would come through diplomatic interchange and the primary service of the Government was given to learning what the Japanese Ambassador was talking about and what instructions he was receiving.

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn’t that only relate to when the war would start? Where the war would start would be where our fleet was.

Captain McCollum. Once we knew when the war would start and the fleet was told when it would start, we were under the impression they were able to handle the situation from there on, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. I wanted to ask who the next witness will be to-morrow.

Mr. Richardson. Admiral Bellinger.

Senator Lucas. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Captain, with all of the knowledge that you had as an Intelligence officer, and in view of the top position that you held in Intelligence at that time, do you know of anyone in your branch of the service or any other department of the Navy who
attempted to trick or maneuver the Japs into attacking the United States on December 7, 1941?
   Captain McCollum. No, sir.
   Senator Lucas. That is all.
   The CHAIRMAN. Captain, was your immediate superior Admiral Turner?
   Captain McCollum. No, sir; my immediate superior was Admiral Wilkinson.
   The CHAIRMAN. So that this draft of the message that you suggested was sent or taken by you to Admiral Wilkinson?
   Captain McCollum. Senator, I carried it personally to Captain Hurd, who was my immediate chief. We walked in together with it to Admiral Wilkinson, and I carried it to Admiral Turner.
   The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you know whether it ever got beyond him?
   Captain McCollum. I brought it back with me to Admiral Wilkinson after it had been amended and corrected.
   The CHAIRMAN. And if that message had been sent under whose name would it have been sent?
   Captain McCollum. All messages from the Navy Department, Senator, go out from one major office. It would have gone out as by the Chief of Naval Operations.
   [288] The CHAIRMAN. In other words, Admiral Stark?
   Captain McCollum. It would have gone out under the blanket number. We don't use names, as you know.
   The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether that contemplated message was ever taken to him?
   Captain McCollum. No, sir; I do not.
   The CHAIRMAN. Whether he passed upon it or not?
   Captain McCollum. No, sir; I do not know that, sir.
   The CHAIRMAN. Well, Captain, the committee thanks you very much for your cooperation in trying to reveal the facts here. The Chair would like to ask you if there is any other information you have that is pertinent to this inquiry that has not been brought out by the questions asked?
   Captain McCollum. No, sir; I don't think so, Senator.
   The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
   Captain McCollum. I appreciate the indulgence of the committee.
   The CHAIRMAN. You are excused, Captain.
   (The witness was excused.)
   The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
   (Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., January 30, 1946, a recess was taken until 10 a.m., Thursday, January 31, 1946.)
[9289] PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[9290] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

The Chair understands counsel has some documents to file before proceeding with Admiral Bellinger.

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have distributed to the committee a number of additional documents which we would like to add to the exhibits which have been previously introduced.

The first, which we would like to add to Exhibit 113 as Exhibit 113-C, is a document which on the cover bears the heading, "I. Revised employment schedule of Task Force Nine, for remainder of second quarter of fiscal year 1942." We would like to offer that as 113-C.

I call your attention to the fact that on page 4-J of that exhibit there is a letter signed by Admiral Bellinger, transmitting the proposed employment schedule to the commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel.

This exhibit shows on the two or three pages following 6-J, down at the bottom of the page, the proposed employment schedules of Patrol Wing 2 and the various other patrol squadrons of fleet aviation.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113-C.")

As Exhibit 115-A, we would like to offer the document entitled, "Communication Intelligence Summaries of 9 and 10 December 1941," showing assumed composition of Japanese striking force.

On the first page of that exhibit under the paragraph entitled, "First Fleet" you will see the expression in the ninth line, "Blue Pacific." We understand from the Navy that that is an area of the Pacific which was regarded as a United States area.

We have previously introduced Communication Intelligence Summaries through December 6th, and this adds to those exhibits the Intelligence Summaries for December 9 and 10. It is our understanding that no summaries were prepared for December 7 and 8.
The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 115-A."

Finally, as Exhibit 115-B, we would like to offer the document entitled, "Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41," which bears the date of November 27, 1941.

Reference was made to this at the time the other Intelligence Bulletins were introduced and it has only now been duplicated and we are making it available to the committee as promptly as possible.

In this connection I would say that the Navy has furnished us and we have examined Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 44-41, which is dated November 10, 1941, as well as Intelligence Bulletin No. 46-41, which is dated December the 6th, 1941. We had not had these duplicated as they do not appear to us to be relevant in this connection. If any of the committee members wish to examine them, we have them here.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 115-B.")

The CHAIRMAN. These various documents will be filed under the numbers indicated.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, in connection with Admiral Bellinger's testimony, he has presented and we have distributed to the committee a short statement which he desires to make. Now, we just got it this morning and we have no desire to infringe on the committee's announcement that each member should be furnished these a day ahead.

Whether the committee accepts this statement and permits it to be read or not is immaterial to us. I have gone over it. I think it is pretty largely facts which are well grouped in the statement and I would recommend that you permit it to be read by him. It has only been placed before you this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to that?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. If not, it will be done.

Will you be sworn, Admiral?

[9293] TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. PATRICK NEISON LYNCH BELLINGER, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, will you state your name, your age, and the length of time you have been in the Navy?

Admiral Bellinger. Patrick Neison Lynch Bellinger. Age 60. Date of birth, October the 8, 1885. I entered the Naval Academy in June 1903.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that there has been distributed to each member of the committee the detailed history of Admiral Bellinger and his service in the Navy I will not encumber the record with an examination of that from him on direct.

Admiral, have you prepared a statement which you would like to read to the committee?

Admiral Bellinger. I have.

Mr. Richardson. Will you proceed and read that?

Admiral Bellinger. I have been in some doubt about whether to prepare a statement for the committee in advance. I thought I might save the committee's time by simply presenting myself for question-
ing. However, I feel that my command relationship at Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack might be more readily grasped by the committee if I first describe it to you.

On December 6, 1941, and, for several months prior thereto, my duties were as follows:

(1) Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and commander, Patrol Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2.

(2) Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 and 2 with attending surface craft plus such other units as might be assigned by commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

(3) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities of this function included administrative authority in local matters over all aircraft actually based on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, but did not include operational authority.

(4) Liaison with commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, for aviation development within the district, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands.

(5) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

In connection with these duties, I functioned under the following seniors:

(a) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as type commander for patrol wings, was based at San Diego.

(b) Commander Scouting Force, the force command of which Patrol Wings 1 and 2 were a part.

(c) Directly under commander in chief, Pacific Fleet in my capacity as commander, Task Force 9.

(d) Commanders of Task Forces 1, 2, and 3 for operation of patrol planes assigned those forces for specific operations.

(e) Under commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as commander, Naval Base Defense Force when I was performing duties as commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.

Shortly after my taking command of Patrol Wing 2 on November 1, 1940, Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, arrived to take command of the Hawaiian Air Force. He and I almost at once arranged to conduct joint training operations for the purpose of preparing our personnel to work together and to utilize opportunities to prepare ourselves for war. This was an arrangement entirely between General Martin and myself, although the commander, Scouting Force, was informed by me of this arrangement. Whenever patrol planes were scheduled for wing tactics, the Army Air Command also took part if it was practical for them to do so. These arrangements were over and above the regularly scheduled joint Army and Navy tactical exercises. Upon completion of patrol wing and Army air groups joint exercises, I held a critique in the auditorium of the air station, Pearl Harbor, on that operation and I remember stating at the first critique, at which Army personnel were present, that the Army Air and Navy Air should learn to work so close together that it would be difficult to tell us apart, that in order to perfect our technique we must be able to criticize one another without fear of giving offense, that this was all necessary in the preparation for war. The relationship between the Hawaiian Air Force and the Navy patrol wings was very close and cooperative.
About March 1, 1941, the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, directed me to report to the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in connection with the preparation of an air-defense plan in conjunction with the commanding general, Hawaiian Air Force. I so reported and proceeded with the assigned task, working directly with General Martin.

[9297] It was agreed by General Martin and myself that the first action to be taken was the preparation of an estimate of the situation, and from this estimate would be evolved a joint air-operation plan followed by detailed contributory plans, these latter to be prepared by General Martin for Army Air and by me for Navy Air.

This was done. The estimate of the situation was signed jointly by General Martin and myself. The detailed contributory plans were prepared and signed by General Martin for Army Air and by me for Navy Air.

The estimate and plans were officially forwarded through the respective echelons of command. The commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (commander, Naval Base Defense Force), was my immediate superior in connection with naval base defense, and to him were delivered the joint estimate of the situation and the plans for Naval Air.

Based upon this estimate and plans was the organization that was termed the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, became one of my duties.

The term "commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force" might be considered a misnomer, as it was not an actual command until the Naval Base Defense Force Organization was placed in a functioning status. It was even more of [9298] a misnomer as it implied authority over operating units to a degree which did not exist. My authority, even after the naval base defense plan took effect, extended only over the search and attack groups of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and was nonexistent concerning Army pursuit aviation and Navy fighter aviation which were to function under the Army Air Command.

The Naval Base Defense Air Force was a paper organization; it did not exist, in fact, as an entity unto itself. It was not an organization specifically manned and equipped to perform a definite job. It existed only when called into being by proper authority—and under the circumstances this necessarily required joint Army-Navy action—or it could be brought into being by an actual emergency that was apparent to those concerned. Its composition was variable, depending entirely upon the availability of aircraft and personnel that might happen to be on Oahu at the time it was called into being.

As commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, I did not have the authority to place that organization in a functioning status, except in the case of an actual emergency. After the start of the attack on December 7, 1941, the Naval Base Defense Air Force did assume a functioning status immediately without orders from higher authority.

[9299] A message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor X This is no drill" was ordered broadcast at 0758 that morning and orders to planes in the air were sent and received by 0805.

The composition of the Naval Base Defense Air Force varied from day to day with the number of aircraft made "available" to it by
the various air commands of both Army and Navy. The determining factor in this technical availability was the daily employment schedule of aircraft belonging to the various air units. Aircraft reported available were classified as available in the prevailing category of readiness for the search and attack group (commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force) or for the air combat group (commander, Hawaiian Air Force), depending on their types.

The normal procedure for vitalizing the Naval Base Defense Air Force for drills was for the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to send a dispatch reading, “Drill, Danger of an air raid on Pearl Harbor exists, Drill”. This placed the Naval Base Defense Force in a functioning status. Upon receipt of this message, as commander of the search and attack group, I immediately sent a message to the air units assigned to this group, to place all available aircraft in the highest degree of readiness. My staff officers assumed the duties involved in the operational control of the search and attack group. Search operations were immediately ordered. Those patrol planes that were initially in the highest degree of readiness were assigned the northwest sector, which were considered the most vital.

This was because the prevailing winds were from the northeast, and enemy carriers could thus recover their planes while retiring from the Oahu area.

These were supplemented by other patrol planes as they were made ready for flight, covering other sections in accordance with their relative importance until 360° was covered or all available planes had been employed.

Available bombing planes of the Army comprising the attack group were placed in the highest degree of readiness and were maintained in a stand-by condition awaiting instructions to attack the enemy when located.

When Navy patrol planes were insufficient to search the necessary sectors and Army bomber planes were available for this purpose, the bombers were assigned sectors for search.

As I have said, Task Force Nine, which I commanded, normally included patrol planes of Patrol Wings One and Two with attending surface craft.

The primary missions of Task Force Nine, as stated in Pacific Fleet confidential letter 14CL-41 were:

1. To organize, train and concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient long-range air scouting and air striking force for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

2. To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet in order to improve security of fleet units and bases.

During the period immediately preceding the Japanese attack, the squadrons of Patrol Wings One and Two were carrying out those missions, operating on regular employment schedules approved by the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

Both the Army and the Navy were in the process of receiving replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18's were being replaced by the more modern B-17's and in Patrol Wings One and Two PBY-1's, 2's, and 3's were being replaced by PBY-5's.
There were 5 squadrons of patrol planes with operating complement of 12 planes each and 1 squadron with operating complement of 6 patrol planes based on Oahu and 1 squadron with 12 planes based on Midway. In addition, there were 3 spare patrol planes, making a total of 81 patrol planes in the Pacific Fleet within the Hawaiian area.

Of the Patrol planes, 27 were of the PBY-3 type, an older model, and 54 were of the PBY-5 type, the latest model. Twelve of the PBY-3 air planes had returned on December 5 after extended operations at Midway and Wake with inadequate facilities for normal upkeep and repair. Ten of them were due for overhaul. The 54 PBY-5 planes had recently arrived in Oahu from the Pacific coast for replacement of obsolescent planes in increments as follows: 18 planes on October 28, 1941; 12 planes on November 8, 1941; 24 planes on November 23, 1941. Attention is invited to the dates of their arrival. The PBY-5 planes were [9303] experiencing the usual shake-down difficulties of new planes and their maintenance was hampered by an almost complete absence of spare parts.

Of the 81 patrol planes listed above, 12 were conducting operations at Midway, 3 planes armed with gun and depth charges were engaged in the morning security patrol of fleet operating areas, 4 planes were conducting intertype tactics with submarines. Of the remaining 62 planes, 2 were on 15-minute notice, 8 were on 30-minute notice for operations, 9 were undergoing repairs, 43 were on 4-hour notice.

For a commander to be reasonably sure that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detection, would have required an effective daily search through 360° to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 25-mile radius of visibility this would have required a daily 16½-hour flight of 50 PBY-5 planes. This, in turn, would have necessitated a force of not less than 150 patrol planes, adequate spare parts and ample well-trained personnel. We had 81 patrol planes in the whole Hawaiian area, including Midway.

The major effort of Patrol Wings One and Two during 1941 prior to December 7 was expansion training, operational training, security operations, development and equipping of [9304] air facilities—all in preparation for war. Aviation training facilities and output of trained personnel in the Navy at that time was considerably behind the contemplated increase in the number of squadrons. Particular stress was placed, therefore, on the need for expansion training. Each squadron was required not only to train additional combat crews for their own aircraft, but also to form nuclei for new squadrons being commissioned back on the mainland.

Despite this continuing emphasis on training, every effort was being made to increase the local readiness for war. Squadron and patrol plane commanders were indoctrinated with the necessity of keeping their planes so equipped and their crews so trained that at any time during a flight they could be converted from their peacetime objectives to combat missions.

It was a definite policy that all planes on all operations be equipped with full allowance of machine guns and ammunition. On special missions connected with the security, such as in searching operating areas, planes were also equipped with depth charges. This was justi-
fied when planes in the air on December 7 were diverted immediately from their peacetime duties to war missions.

Vitalizing the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization would have necessitated a substantial cessation of [9305] training activities and a concentration on defense. The dispatching of planes on distant search operations would not have caused more work, it merely would have changed the type of employment of the patrol planes and of course would have caused a reduction in their training effort and thereby affected their readiness for war. As pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger estimate, the problem of when to place the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a functioning status resolved itself into one of timing with respect to the current status of our relations with Japan, and required specific information as to the probability of an air attack within rather narrow time limits.

In the absence of such information, the patrol planes available were carrying out their regularly assigned schedules when the Japanese struck.

I had no knowledge of any of the warning messages emanating from the Navy and War Departments during October, November, and December. I never knew of any warning dispatches until a few days after the attack—on the evening of about December 10. I think it was—when I was told by one of my officers that he had just heard that there had been a warning dispatch received in the district Naval Intelligence Office and that the local Intelligence officer of the naval air station knew about it. I immediately [9306] sent for the Intelligence officer and he confirmed this information. Several days after that, when I was working on some papers with Admiral Kimmel, I first saw one of the warning dispatches.

During October, November, and December my only information concerning our relation with Japan and the imminence of war came from the Honolulu newspapers. These newspapers described a tense situation, but this had not been the first time during the year that such situations were indicated between the United States and Japan. Also, there were Japanese envoys in Washington who, according to the papers, were endeavoring to bring about a peaceful settlement. The information available to me—limited and unofficial as it was—did not indicate that I should recommend to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, that distant patrol plane search for the security of Pearl Harbor be undertaken at that time.

[9307] Mr. Richardson. Admiral, how many planes of all kinds did the Navy have at Oahu on December 6, approximately?

Admiral Bellinger. In accordance with the plans and directives, each command—

Mr. Richardson (interposing). Just give me the numbers of all the planes, without all this explanation.

Admiral Bellinger. Well, I cannot do it. I have the number of planes that were reported to me as available for the Naval Base Advance Air Force.

Mr. Richardson. Well, how many?

Admiral Bellinger. The marines reported 18 scout bombers—3 ready in 2 hours, 15 ready in 4 hours.

Mr. Richardson. Never mind the "readiness," just give me the number.
Admiral Bellinger. Seven fighters. The Army reported 8 B-17, 21 B-18, 6 A-20, and I reported to the commander, Hawaiian Air Force, which was in accordance with our agreement, 7 fighters, which were the marines, and 9 scouts, which were also the marines.

Mr. Richardson. Can you give me the total number of planes available for long-distance reconnaissance on December 6, 1941, the gross number of the Navy?

Admiral Bellinger. In accordance with my figures there were 48 patrol planes. There were no other planes that were [9308] considered available for long-distance search. The Army B-17's reported to be were for bombardment. They did not report any for long-distance search.

Mr. Richardson. The marine planes were not suitable for long-distance search?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Whatever B-17's the Army had were available, or were planes that could be used for long-distance search?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. How many Army B-17's were reported to you as being available on December 6?

Admiral Bellinger. Eight.

Mr. Richardson. Then that would make a total of planes that you had, and Army B-17's, of 54?

Admiral Bellinger. Fifty-seven.

Mr. Richardson. Now where were those planes located, the 57?

Admiral Bellinger. At Pearl Harbor; Kaneohe, and Army fields, I think Hickam.

[9309] Mr. Richardson. Now, the fighter planes that would be available for use in event of an air attack were Army planes?

Admiral Bellinger. Army planes and such Navy fighter planes as were available to be assigned to the Army.

Mr. Richardson. Did you have any fighter planes of the Navy that were in condition for use as fighters on December 6?

Admiral Bellinger. Seven fighters were reported as available to the Army.

Mr. Richardson. And how many Army fighters were reported as available?

Admiral Bellinger. That I don't know. I was not in control of that.

Mr. Richardson. And you have no information about it?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. You made no inquiry concerning it at the time?

Admiral Bellinger. Not any specific inquiry. I was cognizant of about 140 being available.

Mr. Richardson. That was your understanding?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And it was your understanding that they were all in shape to go up and fight on proper notice?


Mr. Richardson. How many were available to get up in the air and fight, do you know?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Did you ever make inquiry as to that?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. So far as you are concerned, if an attack came you had no information as to how many fighters you would have to use in that attack from the Army?

Admiral Bellinger. It was the Army's——

Mr. Richardson. Leave the Army's job out. I am asking about your information as to what you knew. Did you know?

Admiral Bellinger. I did not know.

Mr. Richardson. Now, what is the length of a long-distance patrol suitable for guarding a post such as Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Bellinger. Eight hundred miles is what we try to get. With some planes we could get only 700, even with what are considered long-range planes.

Mr. Richardson. Did you make any request at any time prior to the attack on December 7 for the use of the Army B-17's for distance patrol?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And you yourself with the planes [9311] available to you, were making no distance patrol prior to December 7?

Admiral Bellinger. Not for security purposes, no.

Mr. Richardson. For any purpose?

Admiral Bellinger. On December 7, 2, 3, 4, and 5, we had what we termed wing tactical exercise.

Mr. Richardson. How far?

Admiral Bellinger. Three hundred miles.

Mr. Richardson. Then it wasn't a long-distance patrol?

Admiral Bellinger. No.

Mr. Richardson. I asked whether you were conducting any long-distance patrol.

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Before December 7. And the answer is no?

Admiral Bellinger. I am forgetting one thing. The squadrons that went to Wake and Midway and that area covered an area in scouting en route.

Mr. Richardson. That was not undertaken for the purpose of furnishing a defense to Pearl Harbor, was it? Didn't you so testify?

Admiral Bellinger. The only reason they were sent out in this spread-out fashion was to get information that was supposed to be vital.

[9312] Mr. Richardson. The patrol that you are talking about——

Admiral Bellinger. Negative or positive.

Mr. Richardson. The patrol that you are talking about is the patrol that was carried on by the task forces as they proceeded on their mission?

Admiral Bellinger. No. I am talking about the patrol plane squadrons.

Mr. Richardson. Where? Where based?

Admiral Bellinger. Those that went from Pearl to Midway and from Midway to Pearl on the 5th of December, and from Midway to Wake.

Mr. Richardson. Do you intend to testify, Admiral, that there was any 700-mile long-distance patrol operating out of either Midway or Wake at any time?
Admiral Bellinger. If a plane is out at sea—
Mr. Richardson. Will you please answer my question?
Admiral Bellinger. If you are speaking about solely for long distance patrol, that is one thing, but you have got to realize that if a plane goes on a passage from one place to another, and its job in that passage is to look and see and report, why, that is accomplishment.
Mr. Richardson. Admiral, you know just as well as I do, I think, that those task forces were going to Midway [9313] and Wake for purposes that were connected with Midway and Wake.
Admiral Bellinger. Certainly.
Mr. Richardson. They were not going for the purpose of conducting a distance patrol for the protection of Pearl Harbor, were they?
Admiral Bellinger. Not in protection of Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Richardson. That is what I am talking about now—the protection of Pearl Harbor. Was there any long-distance patrol on December 6 out of Pearl Harbor for the protection of Pearl Harbor that you know of?
Admiral Bellinger. In spite of the fact that it may not have been specifically for the protection of Pearl Harbor, undoubtedly it furnished information which had a bearing on the protection of Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Richardson. As the fleet task forces proceeded to Midway and Wake, their planes would be out scouting their path?
Admiral Bellinger. The carrier planes; yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. How far would they go from the ship on that scouting?
Admiral Bellinger. About 200, 250 miles.
Mr. Richardson. What additional scouting was being done by the task forces as they proceeded to Midway and Wake except that form of scouting?
Admiral Bellinger. I am not speaking—
Mr. Richardson. Will you please answer my question, Admiral?
Admiral Bellinger. I don't know what they did. I was at Pearl Harbor. They were out at sea.
Mr. Richardson. How many patrol planes were based on Midway on December 6? Do you know that?
Admiral Bellinger. Twelve.
Mr. Richardson. How many at Wake?
Admiral Bellinger. None.
Mr. Richardson. Well, then, there wasn't any distance patrol out of Wake, was there?
Admiral Bellinger. Not on December 6.
Mr. Richardson. Do you know anything about there being a distant patrol out of Midway on the 6th?
If you don't know, tell me. I am asking your understanding.
Admiral Bellinger. I have got to refresh my memory and check definitely whether it was the 6th or the 7th. I think it was the 6th and the 7th.
Mr. Richardson. Keep in mind we are referring to what you have defined as the long-distance patrol being a 700-mile sweep with patrol planes, and I am asking whether there was any such patrol as that conducted from Midway.
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; not 700 miles; no, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, the patrol planes that the Navy had at Oahu were necessary for the use of the fleet if the fleet should initiate an offensive operation out of the Pearl Harbor base, were they not.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. They were there primarily for the fleet use.

Mr. Richardson. And you are familiar with WPL-46?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And you knew that in connection with that immediately upon a declaration of hostilities, it was planned that a raiding expedition would be conducted toward the Mandates?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. If that raiding operation was to be conducted, it would be necessary for the fleet to have long-distance reconnaissance planes cooperating with them?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, upon such a raid as that where would those patrol planes be based?

Admiral Bellinger. First at Wake supported by planes from Midway.

Mr. Richardson. How many squadrons of planes was Wake in a position to take care of on the week prior to December 7?

Admiral Bellinger. Two squadrons could have operated from there for a short time.

Mr. Richardson. What do you mean by a short time?

Admiral Bellinger. About 2 weeks.

Mr. Richardson. And the length of time would be dictated by what?

Admiral Bellinger. By lack of adequate facilities for maintenance.

Mr. Richardson. Fueling?

Admiral Bellinger. Fueling could be done.

Mr. Richardson. How many planes are there in a squadron?

Admiral Bellinger. Twelve.

Mr. Richardson. Then the most that Wake could take care of would be 24 planes?

Admiral Bellinger. Practically, yes.

Mr. Richardson. On a raiding expedition to the Mandates, Wake would be the suitable basing point for long distance reconnaissance planes?

Admiral Bellinger. On account of its strategic location with reference to those mandated islands.

Mr. Richardson. And that would be the place where the long distance patrol planes would be based to aid that raiding expedition?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, that would leave you, subtracting 24 from 57, with 33 planes at Pearl Harbor suitable for long-distance patrol? You stated there were 57 in all. Deducing 24, that, under my arithmetic, would be 33, including the Army planes?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, all you had to do to get the Army planes was to ask for them, wasn’t it?

Admiral Bellinger. I never found it exactly that way.

Mr. Richardson. Did you ever ask for them and not get them?

Admiral Bellinger. In connection with drills, yes.
Mr. Richardson. Have you any doubt today, Admiral, that if you had asked for those 8 B-17's to use in long-distance reconnaissance out of Pearl Harbor you would have had any difficulty in getting them?

Admiral Bellinger. If I asked for them entirely from information I had which was not concurred in by the Army, I would not have gotten them. It had to be a mutual approval and a recognition of a situation that demanded that sort of action.

Mr. Richardson. In other words, if you concluded that you wanted to initiate a long-distance patrol out of Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 6, you would first have had to persuade the Army that you were exercising good judgment in planning that patrol, and if they agreed with you, then they would let you have the planes?

Admiral Bellinger. If they had them, yes.

Mr. Richardson. Well, they did have them?

Admiral Bellinger. They reported eight as available for this work.

Mr. Richardson. You had no doubt they were telling the truth?

Admiral Bellinger. They said for bombardment.

Mr. Richardson. They were suitable for long-distance patrol, weren't they? Why fence with this? Did you ask for those planes?

Admiral Bellinger. There is no fencing. You have got to be clear. You have got to come out so that people know what you are talking about.

Mr. Richardson. Did you ask for those planes?

Admiral Bellinger. I did not.

Mr. Richardson. For any purpose?

Admiral Bellinger. I did not.

Mr. Richardson. You don't know whether you could have gotten them if you had asked for them?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. All right. That is what I asked.

Admiral Bellinger. But I doubt seriously. I know what they were doing.

Mr. Richardson. Do you know they were doing anything with their long-distance B-17's?

Admiral Bellinger. I know they were trying their best training pilots to fly the B-17 planes. Now, when you talk about long-distance reconnaissance, you have got to have qualified people to fly these planes, because they have got to come back to the island from the long-distance. You can't just say that because the plane is available that a crew can do it.

Mr. Richardson. Have you ever contended in any of your former testimony, Admiral, that there was not available pilots that could operate the B-17's in long-distance reconnaissance on December 6?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Have you ever made such a contention?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; but that is speaking for the Army, and I don't want to speak for the Army, but you are asking me questions I have to answer.

Mr. Richardson. You knew on December 6 about the general task missions of the task forces that were operating to Johnston to Midway and Wake?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And as an experienced air officer familiar with long-distance reconnaissance, in your opinion the presence of those task forces in the area south of Midway, the Midway sector, and as far south as Johnston, was being adequately protected by those task missions?

Admiral Bellinger. Not necessarily adequately, no.

Mr. Richardson. Well, you have told me they were running long-distance reconnaissance out of Midway and there were three task forces.

Admiral Bellinger. I didn't say long-distance.

Mr. Richardson. Four hundred miles.

Admiral Bellinger. Four hundred and fifty.

Mr. Richardson. They were sending out these task forces with their protecting planes a couple of hundred miles away from the course of the fleet?

Admiral Bellinger. That was on one day with reference to the transfer of those planes.

Mr. Richardson. What do you mean? Didn't those planes scout the course of the fleet after it left Pearl Harbor until it got to Midway and Wake?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir: I think we are a little confused on this.

Mr. Richardson. Let me go back. I am a little confused. What more could you have had in the southwest sector, what more could you have had by way of protective airplane search than was conducted by the three task fleets, by the planes they had on the carriers, and by the planes out of Midway? What more could you ask for?

Admiral Bellinger. For instance, during the daylight you were covering a circular area of about 400 miles diameter with the carrier as the center. That is what you are covering. As the carrier moves the circular area moves with it.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, anything that crosses that circular area would be pretty apt to be seen?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. As you proceeded from Oahu to Midway the line of the fleet as it moved to Midway would cover a space 200 miles to the north of that line, wouldn't it?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And 200 miles south?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. Then as the task force moved between Oahu and Wake that would cover the area still further to the south?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. As the task force moved from Oahu to Johnston that would cover the bottom of the arc?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. I ask you again whether the entire area west from Oahu and south to Wake and Midway and south to Johnston wasn't being adequately searched in effect by the task forces that were moving there, the 4th, 5th and 6th?

Admiral Bellinger. That is a question. You have got to consider the time that a certain area is searched. I have had a lot to do with searching operations and the only way you can search is by searching and you have got to make sure that the area is covered and covered in a timely way in accordance with the schedule to make sure that nothing gets through.
Mr. Richardson. Let's see—

Admiral Bellinger. Now, I quite agree with you that that sounds very well but the question is the timing. For instance, a force moving and searching leaves something behind, something may come behind, something may go ahead [9323] of it before it gets there. It is covering only, say, a 400-mile circular area.

Mr. Richardson. I can't see any reason why something couldn't come behind your planes if they came from Oahu.

Admiral Bellinger. It could but the plane is coming back again.

Mr. Richardson. Suppose it wasn't there when it came back then it would miss it?

Admiral Bellinger. There is a possibility.

Mr. Richardson. I grant you, Admiral, the possibility that a search may not be 100 percent successful, but I am asking you what more, if you wanted to make a search of the area between Oahu and Midway, Wake and Johnston, what more you could have done than was being done by the operations of the task forces and their planes and the scouting planes at Midway than was being done on the 5th and the 6th of December?

Admiral Bellinger. Oh, planes flying long-distance reconnaissance from those islands, I would say an adequate number would have furnished a better search.

Mr. Richardson. But from Oahu?

Admiral Bellinger. From Oahu, from Midway, or from Wake.

Mr. Richardson. How far is it from Oahu to Midway?

Admiral Bellinger. About 1,200—well, 1,140 miles.

[9324] Mr. Richardson. Then your long-distance patrols wouldn't get within 400 miles of Midway?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; but I was speaking about from Midway also.

Mr. Richardson. I grant you if you had patrol planes flying out from Wake and from Midway and flying out from Johnston it would help.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. But you didn't have any patrol planes flying out from any of them, did you?

Admiral Bellinger. On what date?

Mr. Richardson. On the 5th or 6th.

Admiral Bellinger. They were flying out from Midway on the 6th and I think on the 7th. I mean, I think on the 6th.

Mr. Richardson. There weren't any planes or any ships that you knew of in the north or northwest area from Oahu, were there?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. So that if you were then going to put on an additional search it would have occurred to you to make it in that sector, wouldn't it?

Admiral Bellinger. Normally speaking, as far as our plans were concerned, the northwest sector was the first sector [9325] covered when planes were available.

Mr. Richardson. And a northwest sector would be what we call—

Admiral Bellinger. A north by west.

Mr. Richardson. How many degrees would that cover?

Admiral Bellinger. Ninety.
Mr. Richardson. How many degrees will a patrol plane ordinarily in your charting cover?
Admiral Bellinger. Eight degrees, 700 miles.
Mr. Richardson. All right.
You had left, according to my figures, in Oahu 33 patrol planes that could have been used with the Army planes for long-distance patrol.
Admiral Bellinger. That 33—I presume that is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Page 6.
Admiral Bellinger. I have a statement written down here which was done by looking over figures and trying to get the best answer and it says this:

If no other operations had been scheduled for December 7, 1941 there could have been considered to be a total of 48 patrol planes that could have been made available for long-distance reconnaissance.

Mr. Richardson. What ones of those 48 planes were you using for any other mission on the 6th day of December?

Admiral Bellinger. The exercises carried on in connection with the schedule were in progress.
Mr. Richardson. Were you using long-distance patrols for those?
Admiral Bellinger. Not long-distance patrols.
Mr. Richardson. I am talking about the 48 long-distance patrol planes. What other mission were they operating on on December 6?
Admiral Bellinger. You are talking about planes—
Mr. Richardson. That is exactly what I am talking about.
Admiral Bellinger. It is a question of what the schedule was. I have it here somewhere if you would like me to read it.
Mr. Richardson. All I am trying to have you tell me is what possible use you were making of any of those 48 patrol planes on December 6.
Admiral Bellinger. From a security point of view other than the search of the operating areas, I would say none.
Mr. Richardson. The search of operating areas was simply the perimeter where you were accustomed to conduct maneuvers for the fleet?
Admiral Bellinger. Correct.
Mr. Richardson. That was very largely a training proposition?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. It wasn't a long-distance search?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; but it was not training.
Mr. Richardson. And it was an operation which you could have changed any time you wanted to, wasn't it?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Couldn't you have initiated a long-distance patrol on December 6th of your own authority?
Admiral Bellinger. By virtue of having command certainly I could have issued orders to planes, but I would have had to notify the Commander in Chief immediately and have gotten his concurrence. He must know what is available to him. A commander below him having forces such as that has no real authority to utilize his planes and so put them in condition where they are not available to him in accordance with his information.

Mr. Richardson. Did you make any effort to get his permission to fly any long-distance reconnaissance on December 5 or December 6?
Admiral Bellinger. I did not.

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest that the witness was sick in bed with the flu for 5 days before December 7 and had never heard of a war warning over a period of 2 months.

Mr. Richardson. Was there ever any decision, Admiral, that you knew anything about, made by your superiors, that there would not be any long-distance reconnaissance patrol flown from Oahu?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. How did it come about, if you know, that no long-distance patrol was initiated prior to the attack?

Admiral Bellinger. That, I think, is a question which higher authority in the fleet and the Navy Department will have to answer.

Mr. Richardson. I am asking you whether any ever was given to you?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Then you today have no knowledge of your own why a long-distance reconnaissance wasn't flown out of Oahu on the 5th or 6th or the 7th of December, of your own knowledge?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, it is my understanding, Admiral, that in flying long-distance reconnaissance it isn't well to operate the same crew and the same ship oftener than once in 3 days; is that right?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct for the crew and practically correct for the ship. The ship, for instance, that is, the plane, might be used somewhat more than the crew.

[9329] Mr. Richardson. But the plane and crew could be used once every 3 days?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And if you had 33 long-distance patrol planes available on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of December, 11 of them could have been used for long-distance search?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And if each plane covered 8 degrees that would be an 88 degree search, wouldn't it?

Admiral Bellinger. Correct.

Mr. Richardson. It would be just as thorough for those 88 degrees as it would be if other planes were scouting the other part of the whole arc of 360 degrees?

Admiral Bellinger. That is a question of mathematics.

Mr. Richardson. Yes, and a question of fact, too, isn't it?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; it depends on which way the force is moving.

Mr. Richardson. Well—

Admiral Bellinger. There is a sector in one case where there is question of passage through the area. But I grant you that that has very little to do with it and is a technicality.

Mr. Richardson. And the 11 planes that would have been sent out could have given a first-class proper military scout of the entire northwest sector out of Oahu; isn't that correct?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And it could have been continued, an echelon of 11 planes, for several weeks, couldn't it?
Admiral Bellinger. Now we are talking about something that is a variable quantity. I don’t know anything I could have done to have gotten spare parts for these planes more than I did. The 54 planes which arrived on the date as you have noted in my statements had practically no spare parts.

Mr. Richardson. Then am I to understand the reason you didn’t want to use your planes at all was because they might wear out if you did use them?

Admiral Bellinger. No; you asked me how many they could use.

Mr. Richardson. How many could they?

Admiral Bellinger. That is a question—

Mr. Richardson. I am asking for your judgment, Admiral.

Admiral Bellinger. I would say that they probably could have kept up, with a slight reduction maybe in the 11 per day, or about 2 weeks and maybe longer. It is a question of spare parts to replace the parts that are vital in a plane to keep the plane in commission. If there are no spare parts the plane stays on the beach.

Mr. Richardson. Well, we will never know because [9331] nothing was ever done about it?

Admiral Bellinger. Oh, for instance, after December 7 it became a major mission.

Mr. Richardson. Why? Why after December 7?

Admiral Bellinger. Because we were then very much on the defensive.

Mr. Richardson. And on the alert?

Admiral Bellinger. Well, that depends on how you mean “alert.” There was peace on December 6.

Mr. Richardson. Let me ask you this question, Admiral, prompted by a question asked here, how were these Navy planes parked?

Senator Ferguson. May I have the last part of the answer read.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. Richardson. In other words, you had to see the planes come in over the mountains around Pearl Harbor before the idea of patrol planes and alert entered your mind?

Admiral Bellinger. I suppose that is true with everybody in the United States.

Mr. Richardson. Maybe.

Now, let me ask you this: How were these planes parked, these 48 planes that you refer to, just describe to us where they were and how they were parked and what was the nature [9332] of their moorings?

Admiral Bellinger. On account of the size and type of planes—which was a flying boat weighing about, fully loaded, about 34,000 pounds—they were put on wheels, carts, run up ramps and put on the concrete parkways. They have to be on concrete parkways if they are put on the beach. It is the only practical way actually of operating patrol planes with any degree of efficiency or effectiveness from the beach. That was a question of dispersal and was a question with which I was very much concerned prior to Pearl Harbor, for some months prior. It was a question, how could we disperse planes properly. It was a question of trying to build up Hilo or another place. A question of building up Hilo Lagoon, which was just finished a few months, I think, ago.
Mr. Richardson. Why were you exercised?
Admiral Bellinger. I was considerably exercised, from the time I got out there, with the situation.
Mr. Richardson. Why?
Admiral Bellinger. Because I thought war was coming and we were not ready for it.
Mr. Richardson. What was there in the way in which you had to park your planes that would exercise your interest? Were they parked too closely together?
Admiral Bellinger. They were parked as far apart as they could be on the concrete. There were some in the water moored by these buoys in Kaneohe Bay, but we did not have them on those buoys that day because of the combination of work. You are losing time and losing effort when you do park them out in the water.
As a matter of fact, those that were moored out in the water at Kaneohe Bay were sunk and completely lost and those that were actually on the beach and were damaged, many of them were put back into commission.
Mr. Richardson. Is it a fact that the conditions were such in Pearl Harbor there that, in your opinion, your planes, when parked on the beach, were not sufficiently dispersed for safety?
Admiral Bellinger. Well, actually, in fact, no, they were not sufficiently dispersed for safety. It is a very difficult proposition to figure how far you have got to park them for safety, but we had worked it out from the point of view of the explosion of bombs in planes in case the bombs in the planes were exploded. Bombs were on the planes. And with the idea of the effect on other planes. The limitation of dispersion at a place like Pearl Harbor was the limitation of the concrete area on which to put the planes.
Mr. Richardson. I am confused. Is it your position that you had plenty of room at Pearl Harbor to disperse your planes or that you did not?
Admiral Bellinger. We did not at any place.
Mr. Richardson. All right. But you parked your planes as best you could with the room you had?
Admiral Bellinger. With the type of planes we had.
Mr. Richardson. Now, speaking generally, as a result of this raid you lost about half your planes?
Admiral Bellinger. Not quite half.
Mr. Richardson. Have you the figures?
Admiral Bellinger. I think so.
On December 30 of the 81 planes we had, 44 were operating and 37 were not.
The Vice Chairman. December 30?
Admiral Bellinger. December 30.
Mr. Richardson. Your idea is that the 37 that were not were those that were basically destroyed?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; although I think some later were gotten back in commission. I haven’t the exact figures on that.
Mr. Richardson. Did any Navy planes get in the air while the attack was on on that morning?
Admiral Bellinger. Some patrol planes.
Mr. Richardson. They were saved?
Admiral Bellinger. Those patrol planes went on search missions, that is the reason they took off.

Mr. Richardson. Did they search before or after the attack?

Admiral Bellinger. After.

Mr. Richardson. During the attack how many of your planes got in the air?

Mr. Murphy. I suggest we have the report of the Admiral dated December 17 in the record with these details in it. I think the witness might be presented with his own report of December 17.

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead, Admiral, if you have the information Admiral Bellinger. I have a rather elaborate answer to that.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Admiral Bellinger (reading):

According to my data the following operations took place on December 7, 1941:

At 0700—Patrol Plane 14 P-1 assisted in the sinking of a Japanese submarine off Pearl Harbor entrance.

At 0715—Message giving above information was coded and transmitted to Patrol Wing Two.

At 0735—This message was received, decoded and information received by Patrol Wing Two Staff Duty Officer.

At 0735—This message was relayed to Patrol Wing Two Operations Officer.

At 0740—This message was relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

At 0750—The patrol plane search plan assigning squadrons in accordance with their readiness was drafted.

At 0755—The first bomb dropped by Japanese aircraft was seen by the Operations Officer of Patrol Wing Two. It fell and exploded in the vicinity of the hangar utilized by Patrol Squadron 22.

At 0758—A message emanating from headquarters, Patrol Wing Two, was broadcast to all ships and units present, quote “Air raid Pearl Harbor X This is no drill” unquote.

At 0800—Search plan was transmitted by radio and telephone. This was received and acted upon by some of the patrol planes in the air at 0805.

An accurate chronological account of events from then on during the attack was impracticable.

At one time during the first attack wave, both radio and telephone communications from headquarters of Patrol Wing Two were temporarily out of commission due to the attack; however, these were shortly put back in commission.

The three patrol planes, 14 P-1, 2 and 3, on early morning security search, were assigned search sector between and proceeded on search. After the first phase of the attack, Patrol Wing One reported two planes at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, available for immediate operation, and was directed to send these two planes on a northwesterly sector. Before these could be dispatched, another Japanese attack wave put them out of commission, at about the same time communications between Kaneohe and Pearl were knocked out.

Patrol Wing One, on own initiative, diverted the two planes then on northerly sector search, 14 P-1 and 3 to cover a westerly sector because of the loss of the two planes originally detailed, and in his effort to comply with instructions.

This diversion was not known to me until a few days after December 7 when checking the sectors covered by planes. This diversion removed two planes from a sector where the Japanese task force was later determined to be near.

The four patrol planes that were engaged in tactical exercises with submarines, 24 P-1, 2, 4, and 5, had difficulty in shifting their radio frequency, so that receipt of their originally planned assignment of sector was delayed. At this time, information was received that a chart taken from a Jap plane that had been destroyed indicated enemy rendezvous bearing 223 degrees and 90 miles from Pearl. These four planes were then assigned to cover sector 240 degrees to 280 degrees for at the time it was thought the enemy might retire westward.

Two patrol planes, 23 P-1 and 6, took off from Pearl and were assigned to a sector to the southwest.
One patrol plane, 23 P–4, taking off from Pearl, was assigned a sector to the westward.

The above ten patrol planes were all that could be put in search during the attack because of damage from the attack to the other planes, and to facilities.

The Army were directed to search to the northward, and they reported dispatching three groups:

One at 1115, consisting of 2 B–17’s and four A–20A’s.
One at 1235, consisting of 2 A–20A’s.
One at 1330, consisting of 3 B–18’s.

The B–20’s and B–18’s were very limited in range.

Eight utility planes were dispatched on search as [9339] they were made ready later in the forenoon. Two of these were assigned a northerly sector, and the remainder a westerly sector.

The utility planes are for service to the Fleet and are not really military planes, but they were part of this naval defense air force, and some were made available.

Six VO–VS ship-spaced planes, short range, were assigned to a sector to the southward.

In the afternoon 9–SBD carrier planes of the Lexington, short range, were assigned to sector from NW to NE.

In the late afternoon, three B–17’s (Army) took off to cover a sector to the southeast. This sector was at the instance of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, as a result of a supposedly radio compass bearing on Japan’s radio.

It was impossible to formulate and carry out a thorough search plan because as planes at the air-bases were assigned and detailed for sectors, many were put out of commission, at least temporarily, by the Japanese attack.

In accordance with my data, the following planes engaged in search operations on December 7, with ranges from long to show:

10—Patrol planes (Navy).
8—Utility planes (Navy).
[9340] 6—VO–VS planes (Navy).
9—SBD planes from Lexington group (Navy).
5—B–17’s (Army).
3—B–18’s (Army).
6—A–20’s (Army).

Total—47 planes.

[9342] Mr. Richardson. And that was all after the attack?
Admiral Bellinger. During and after.
Mr. Richardson. Please answer my question. Did you make any search while the attack was on by any planes?
Admiral Bellinger. Immediately.
Mr. Richardson. What kind of a search did you make while the attack was on? What did you search for?
Admiral Bellinger. To search for where the carriers were.
Mr. Richardson. They were right there pouring bombs on you, weren’t they?
Admiral Bellinger. The planes were, not the carriers.
Mr. Richardson. Do you mean to tell me that planes were sent out during the first or second attack—

Admiral Bellinger. I do.
Mr. Richardson (continuing). On long-distance reconnaissance?
Admiral Bellinger. I do.
Mr. Richardson. What planes? Before 11 o’clock—before 10:30 on Sunday morning, what planes were sent out on any search in any direction for any purpose?
Admiral Bellinger. Two patrol planes, 23 Prep. 1 and 6, 1 patrol plane Prep. 34—

Mr. Richardson. Wait just a minute. Who sent them out? Who sent out the two?

Mr. Richardson. What kind of planes were they?
Admiral Bellinger. Patrol planes.
Mr. Richardson. Long-distance patrol?
Admiral Bellinger. Long-distance patrol.
Mr. Richardson. What were their orders?
Admiral Bellinger. 23 Prep. No. 16 were assigned a sector to the southwest. 23 Prep. 4 were assigned a sector to the westward.
Mr. Richardson. Just a minute. That was the area where you had your three task forces, and these various planes that you have told about earlier was the southwest, wasn't it?
Admiral Bellinger. The question was where was this task force going to go after it made a strike.
Mr. Richardson. Which task force do you mean?
Admiral Bellinger. The Japanese.
Mr. Richardson. Well, in order to find them you sent two more planes out into the area where all your task forces were and the rest of your planes. Was that your order, Admiral?
Admiral Bellinger. I take responsibility for it.
Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, let me ask you a question there. Had you familiarized yourself at all with your radar?
Admiral Bellinger. We did not have any radar in planes.
[9344] Mr. Richardson. Did you familiarize yourself—
Admiral Bellinger. We were familiar with it by technical information and had asked for it.
Mr. Richardson. I did not make myself clear. Did you have any information with reference to the operation of the Army radar?
Admiral Bellinger. I knew the Army were setting up their radar section and combining it in the air combat command.
Mr. Richardson. Did you know it was working?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I did not think it was working.
Mr. Richardson. Did you telephone to find out on the morning of December 7?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I did not telephone to find out but I knew somewhat about it because Navy Lieutenant Commander Taylor was sent over; I don't know whether it was definitely on my initiative or not, to work with the Army in connection with this and he was working with the Army air combat group in connection with the establishment of this center.
Mr. Richardson. Well, did you have any contact with him on the morning of the 7th?
Admiral Bellinger. I am not positive but I think I telephoned—I think he called me up.
Mr. Richardson. Why would he call you? You did not have any information, did you?
Admiral Bellinger. I did not have any information but we were—
Mr. Richardson. He might have had some?
Admiral Bellinger. We were interested in any information about where the planes were coming from, these Japanese planes.
Mr. Richardson. And did you call anybody in the Army that had anything to do with their radar in order to get what information they had?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I did not know if it was working.
Mr. Richardson. As far as you were concerned that radar station of the Army might just as well have been in Australia.
Admiral Bellinger. Insofar as what good it did me on December 7, correct.
Mr. Richardson. Well, you knew there was no information center for the radar, didn't you?
Admiral Bellinger. I knew that there was a center where this information came into; yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Did you phone that center?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I did not phone that center.
Mr. Richardson. That is one of the reasons why you did not know which way the planes came in from, wasn't it, Admiral?

[9345] Admiral Bellinger. I doubt that very seriously.
Mr. Richardson. Well, if it is true that the chart in the radar section showed planes discovered 132 miles north of Oahu and the chart showed them followed in until they were within a few miles of Oahu, there would have been some information there as to where the planes came from, wouldn't there?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir, if those planes had been identified. That was one thing that at that stage of war readiness that we had, the question of identifying planes. Now, radar can pick up planes but the question is what planes are they?
Mr. Richardson. But you did not go to the trouble of telephoning the station to get what information they might have had?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I was pretty busy doing other things, and I did not know that I would get any information from them.
Mr. Richardson. Well, you were not doing anything more important then than to find out where those attacking planes came from?
Admiral Bellinger. I would have been delighted to find out where they came from, but it did not seem to me that they could tell me and I don't think they could have.
Mr. Richardson. At any rate, as the result of your efforts in that connection practically all of the search that was made to find where the raiders came from was to the west and southwest?
Admiral Bellinger. As I said in my statement here, our first effort was to cover the northwest area. Two planes were removed from that by a combination of circumstances. That was not known.
Mr. Richardson. What was not known?
Admiral Bellinger. That was not known, what I just read in this statement.
Mr. Richardson. What was not known?
Admiral Bellinger. That they were removed from the search in that area.
Mr. Richardson. Somebody must have removed them, mustn't they?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. I just read it for you.
Mr. Richardson. Who removed them?
Admiral Bellinger. Commander of the Patrol Wing, in his effort to carry out what he understood to be a prior directive.
Mr. Richardson. That was the one to the southwest?
Admiral Bellinger. We had two patrol planes to the north-northwest area.
Mr. Richardson. Well, I don’t seem to get it into my thick head. You started out two planes to the northwest and then they were removed. Now, where were they removed to?

Admiral Bellinger. I would like to repeat just exactly what I read.

Mr. Richardson. Well, please tell me again.

Admiral Bellinger. There were three planes assigned to a sector between north and northwest.

Mr. Richardson. And who assigned them?

Admiral Bellinger. My organization.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Admiral Bellinger. The operations officer, to be exact.

Mr. Richardson. What became of those three planes?

Admiral Bellinger. One proceeded on. That was the one furthest to the north.

Mr. Richardson. How far did it go?

Admiral Bellinger. I am not positive exactly, but I think it was about 450 miles. I am not positive on that.

Mr. Richardson. What became of the other two?

Admiral Bellinger. The other two, as I said, were diverted after they were on this search to the westward.

Mr. Richardson. By whom?

Admiral Bellinger. By commander Patrol Wing 1’s organization.

Mr. Richardson. And was that because of a report that sent the search to the south and southwest?


Mr. Richardson. All right. Where were they diverted to?

Admiral Bellinger. They were diverted to a westerly area.

Mr. Richardson. That was the area that was being covered by the two task forces?

Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me. The reason that the—I would like to repeat this. In making out a search plan you try to cover an area and you take the planes in almost in sequence as we can get them, as they are located, and we were trying to cover a north to west sector first. The planes that we thought were available to cover certain sectors did not become available later on account of being put out of commission. Two planes that were on this north-northwesterly area were diverted to a westerly area to comply with the instruction which we had given to the commander of the Patrol Wing some time previous to that when he said he had two planes available, but those two planes did not become available later because of being knocked out by the Japanese. So in an effort to comply with the original instructions he diverted those two planes that were with the third up north.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, how many planes went into the north sector before 10:30 o’clock on Sunday?

Admiral Bellinger. That I cannot give exactly. I do not know the time proposition on that.

[9349] Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, let me ask you this: Had you any knowledge at the time of the attack that the Army was on a sabotage alert?

Admiral Bellinger. I cannot say as a fact that I did. I probably did. I knew—in looking back I remember that there was a consider-
able effort made to prevent sabotage. I know I was concerned with that to give the general lay of the land and in the general set-up of security measures on shore.

Mr. Richardson. Let me ask you this question: It has interested me, Admiral. You saw these planes come in and bomb Pearl Harbor, didn't you?

Admiral Bellinger. The first planes I saw were three planes that—

Mr. Richardson. Well, you saw some of them?

Admiral Bellinger (continuing).—which passed over the Arizona. The next instant the Arizona blew up. I had also been informed at that time, just about 2 minutes prior to that, by telephone that we were under attack, so I assumed those were Japanese planes after the Arizona blew up. The next I saw was nine planes overhead and I assumed that they were Japanese planes, too.

Mr. Richardson. I am not interested in how many planes you saw. I am simply asking you the general question if you saw the planes coming in on the attack?

Admiral Bellinger. I did not see them coming in. I saw them there.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, then, did you see the planes that were using the aerial torpedoes?

Admiral Bellinger. I assumed these planes that passed over the Arizona had used torpedoes because they acted like it. They were flying at about 150 feet and had just dropped their torpedoes, apparently, and had passed over the Arizona.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, would it be fair to say that the planes which did the bombing with the torpedoes came in over the harbor at approximately 150 to 200 feet height?

Admiral Bellinger. I would say so; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Could you, in your opinion, Admiral, have done the full duty of long distance reconnaissance during the week prior to Pearl Harbor without neglecting or slowing down the training program that the fleet was undergoing?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. They were really two irreconcilable duties, were they not?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; I would say very definitely.

Mr. Richardson. Now, when you went on the job out there, or shortly afterward, you got together with Martin and made an estimate, didn't you?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And that estimate was never used after that prior to December 7, was it?

Admiral Bellinger. The estimate was not used.

Mr. Richardson. That is right. Now, you also testified, did you not, Admiral, that the mission sanction in the plan that you and Martin prepared was that there was no unity of command?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And that plan in order to be a successful plan, or to have the greatest chance of success, should have had unity of command?

Admiral Bellinger. You are asking me?
Mr. Richardson. Yes.
Admiral Bellinger. Yes, that is the answer, unity of command.
Mr. Richardson. Now, you also testified—
Admiral Bellinger. In other words, definite, specific command in one individual.
Mr. Richardson. That is right. Now, you also testified in one of your former hearings, did you not, that the primary duty of the Army aircraft you considered to be in expansion training?
Admiral Bellinger. The Army? You said "the Army"?
Mr. Richardson. Referring to the Army aircraft.
[9352] Admiral Bellinger. I don't think I said that, sir. I never used the word "expansion." I think the Navy used that term. The Army had "training."
Mr. Richardson. Didn't you also testify that the primary duty of the Navy aircraft was in expansion training?
Admiral Bellinger. The primary duty was getting ready for war and in connection with that duty it required definite expansion training and that was assigned as such.
Mr. Richardson. And then you further testified, did you not, that when you came to look around you after you took command you found you were operating on a shoestring and a very slim shoe string at that?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. What did you mean by that? Or let me make it more direct.
Admiral Bellinger. That is all right, I can answer that.
Mr. Richardson. You meant by that, didn't you, that you did not have enough planes and you did not have enough spare parts and you did not have enough crews to do a good job?
Admiral Bellinger. I mean that and a lot more.
Mr. Richardson. Well, you meant that, as far as I went?
Admiral Bellinger. I meant that definitely but a lot more.
Mr. Richardson. Now, you also came to the conclusion, [9353] did you not, when you surveyed this shoestring that you were supposed to operate on, you came to the conclusion and testified that the Navy Department, in your opinion, could not view the situation at Hawaii with any alarm if that was all they gave you to go on?
Admiral Bellinger. That is what I inferred in my letter.
Mr. Richardson. That was your opinion.
Admiral Bellinger. You must remember this: I came out there to Pearl Harbor; I thought the situation was going to gradually run into war. The question was what did we have and what did we require and what could I do about it? That letter was a month—took a month to prepare, trying to figure how was the best way to bring this to the attention, the situation, and I used certain language in there with the idea of making that letter strong enough to bring it to the attention.
Mr. Richardson. Well, now, Admiral, I am not referring to that letter. I am not referring to what you wrote to the War Department.
Admiral Bellinger. That is the Navy Department.
Mr. Richardson. Or the Navy Department. I am referring to your own testimony, as to whether you did not testify that from all of these facts you concluded that the Navy Department did not view
the situation in Hawaii with alarm in view of what they
gave you to do business with. Isn't that—
Admiral Bellinger. In view of—
Mr. Richardson. Didn't you so testify?
Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me; you have got to be correct on this.
Mr. Richardson. Didn't you so testify?
Admiral Bellinger. There is a reference in the letter and I spoke
about a reference.
Mr. Richardson (to counsel). Will you give me 668 of the Naval
Court?
Admiral Bellinger. I think reference A indicates that.
Mr. Richardson. You will find you never mentioned reference A
here in the testimony.
Admiral Bellinger. Maybe not. It is a long time ago.
Mr. Richardson. We will pass it until it comes in.
You also envisioned at the time, did you not, Admiral, as an air
expert, after you had surveyed the situation in Hawaii, that an attack
from the air was the most likely form of attack?
Admiral Bellinger. Correct. I would like to invite particular
attention to that statement.
Mr. Richardson. All right.
Admiral Bellinger. This estimate of the situation has this intro-
duction on top:

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the
event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area.

By that I mean to infer that this is not an estimate of Japanese
strategy, over-all strategy. It is the strategy they would employ and the
tactics they would employ when they decided to make an attack
on Oahu.

Mr. Richardson. Well, was an air attack on Pearl Harbor, in your
opinion, the most likely form of attack?
Admiral Bellinger. Correct.
Mr. Richardson. All right. That is what I asked you in the first
place, Admiral.

Now, between November 26 and December 7 you never had occasion
to confer with the Army or any representative of the Army in ref-
ERENCE to the installation of long distance reconnaissance?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Admiral, if you had had your planes ready and
you had received the radar warning promptly as soon as they dis-
covered it, which was, say, an hour before the attack, in your opinion
from your experience could you have taken any measures which would have
reasonably insured minimizing the strength and force and dam-
age of that attack?
Admiral Bellinger. The question of minimizing would have been
ready at the guns, knowing that the attack was coming and the readiness of the air combat planes to meet the attack. There
would have been an indication of where the carrier force was and there is a possibility that some planes might have gotten through
without being shot down and we might have located the carrier.
Mr. Richardson. Well, do you think that on the Pearl Harbor end
there would have been any reasonable certainty that the attack could
have been seriously minimized if you had had that information?
What I am driving at is, once planes leave the carrier in force and that force is greater than the number of defending planes, don’t you as an expert on the matter recognize that the probability is that the attack can be carried through in substantial force regardless of the defense?

Admiral Bellinger. The attack could have been carried through, there is no doubt about that, under those conditions that you just mentioned, but the severity of the attack might have been reduced. For instance, on ships the antiaircraft guns knowing that the planes coming in were Japanese prior to their coming in within gunfire, for instance, would have brought about a situation which would have been quite different.

Mr. Richardson. How long would it take to put a plane that was on the concrete of your beach in readiness to go in the air either for search or combat?

Admiral Bellinger. You are speaking about patrol planes, I assume.

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. The degree of readiness has a great deal to do with it. Fifteen minutes, I would say, if the plane is standing by ready with the crew.

Mr. Richardson. I am speaking about a plane that is not ready at all. That is a perfectly cold plane. It hasn’t done anything to get ready. How long would it take to get the plane in the air?

Admiral Bellinger. That is a difficult question to answer, because where do you start from?

Mr. Richardson. I am starting from just where you started when you said in your statement that you had planes on 15 minutes’ notice, and you had planes on 30 minutes’ notice, and planes on 4 hours’ notice.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. Now, what I am wondering is why the difference in that time.

Admiral Bellinger. The 15 minutes’ notice was in order to keep a plane available at Kaneohe and one at Pearl Harbor, available to go immediately on call.

Mr. Richardson. They were all ready to go?

Admiral Bellinger. They were all ready to go.

Mr. Richardson. What about the next group?

Admiral Bellinger. The 30 minutes were the detail on alert.

Mr. Richardson. Let me ask you a question right there, Admiral. When these planes were on the beach, were they fueled?

Admiral Bellinger. Oh, yes.

Mr. Richardson. And did they have ammunition?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. They were ready for every purpose, then?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. Except to put the men in and warm the engine up?

Admiral Bellinger. To warm the engine up, to put the men in, and get their orders.

Mr. Richardson. Now, what is it that would cause a delay of 4 hours?
Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, the 4-hour information is the availability that was ordered by the naval base defense force commander. The idea was not [9359] that the planes themselves would be only ready in 4 hours but that they were not supposed to be called prior to giving a 4-hour notice.

Now, for instance, I know one plane got under way out of Pearl Harbor when the attack was on and was even fired at by our own people. That plane was one of those on a 4-hour basis, and it got under way in about between 30 and 40 minutes.

Mr. Richardson. By the way, Admiral, when Halsey's task force came in, some of the planes of his carrier that were coming in to the base at Pearl Harbor were fired on as hostile planes, were they not?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. There was not sufficient control of communications between Pearl Harbor and the Halsey task force to prevent that disaster?

Admiral Bellinger. Either a question of that or a question of itchy fingers.

Mr. Richardson. What is that?

Admiral Bellinger. Itchy fingers of inexperienced personnel. I knew they were coming in. I made arrangements with every command that it was possible to get through on to inform them that they were coming in.

Mr. Richardson. Did you have any way of contacting [9360] your planes in the air with information?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Why did not that work?

Admiral Bellinger. What planes do you mean in the air? Do you mean the Halsey planes?

Mr. Richardson. No. These Halsey planes that were shot down were shot down by what fire? The fleet or antiaircraft guns?

Admiral Bellinger. Both. I do not know which ones actually hit them, but I saw the fire, which was considerable fire.

Mr. Richardson. Was there any attempt made when you found out that Halsey's planes were coming in to notify the antiaircraft batteries and the fleet that they were coming in?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And despite that, they were fired on?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. I call your attention to a colloquy—

Senator Lucas. Will the counsel yield for one point that I would like to get clear in my mind?

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Did you get the proper information to [9361] all these battery commanders, advising them that Halsey's planes were coming in?

Admiral Bellinger. I got it through the channel that I could get, which was a set-up for that whole control. In other words, the control base at the navy yard—not my base, but the control base at the navy yard—had their circuits which went out.

Senator Lucas. Were they all working?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; as far as I know.

Senator Lucas. Then they all did get the information?
Admiral Bellinger. I think so.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? I believe you will find in the record the reason for it was there was an order not to fire; but as they came in there was a very peculiar smoke condition there, and these planes came in through the smoke; and when they did, one fellow got itchy fingers and started firing, and the others followed suit, and Admiral Kimmel ordered them to stop firing, in order to stop that.

Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, I tried to stop it.

Mr. Murphy. Well, Admiral Kimmel took credit for it, no matter who did it.

Mr. Richardson. I assume if Admiral Kimmel was to get the benefit of the good results, he must take the burden [9363] too of the bad ones.

Going back to my colloquy a moment ago, let me read from your testimony before the naval board, page 668:

I refer to a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, Serial 095323, in which it was indicated to me that there was no intention to replace present obsolescent type of patrol planes of Patrol Wing Two, prior to one year, and that Patrol Wing Two would practically be the last wing to be furnished new planes. I stated that this, together with the many existing deficiencies indicated to me that the Navy Department as a whole, did not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm, or else is not taking steps in keeping with their views.

You remember so testifying, don’t you?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And that was your information at the time?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct, sir. All I wanted to point out was that reference A had a bearing on the subject. It indicated that the Patrol Wing 2 was to be the last wing to be equipped with new planes.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, you did not see the warning message of November 24?

Admiral Bellinger. I saw none of the warning messages.

[9363] Mr. Richardson. You received no information with reference to any of the diplomatic intercepts?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. You have seen them since?

Admiral Bellinger. I have read most of them, I think.

Mr. Richardson. Now, I will ask you this:

If you had had knowledge of those dispatches and the information conveyed thereby, would your orders, or action or advice, or efforts have been changed with respect to the status quo of the part of the Navy that was under you in Hawaii on December 7?

Admiral Bellinger. I was asked that question on two different boards, and I can only state this: As to whether I would have done it, I would like to think I would have done it, but only God knows what I would have done. I would rather leave that for those who know me to make their estimate.

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, when did you arrive in Hawaii?

Admiral Bellinger. I think it was the 28th of October 1940. I took over on the 1st of November 1940.

The Vice Chairman. You took over on November 1, 1940?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.
Admiral BELLINGER. Commander of Patrol Wing 2.

The Vice Chairman. And you continued thereon until the time of the attack on December 7, 1941?

Admiral BELLINGER. Things changed a little bit. For instance, Patrol Wing 1 was established, and I was given control over that wing also as an additional job.

It had a patrol wing commander, but I had control over it.

The Vice Chairman. Did you finally reach the point that you were the air officer of the Pacific Fleet based in Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I never reached that condition at any time. For instance, the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, had an aviator on his staff who was called the aviation aide on his staff, so he was the staff officer of the revised commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

The Vice Chairman. Who was that?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was Commander A. C. Davis, now rear admiral. There were other commands out in that area in the carrier forces.

The Vice Chairman. Now, I understand you to state that from the time you arrived in Hawaii you expected war. Is that correct?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And your defense plan that you prepared provided for defense against air attack, because you thought that was the most likely form of hostile attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. As a matter of fact, Admiral Kimmel had the idea that it was necessary to bring about a cooperative, or coordinated, so far as practical, plan of air defense of the Pearl Harbor area, and the reason for this estimate of the situation was his directive to me to report to Admiral Bloch, who was going to be the commander of the naval base defense force, and to work out a plan with General Martin, the commander, Hawaiian Air Force.

The Vice Chairman. General Martin was the commander of the Army Air Force at Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Who was the commander of the Navy Air Force at Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. Martin, did you say?

The Vice Chairman. General Martin.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. General Martin was the commander of the Army Air Force at Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Who was the commander of the Navy Air Force at Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. There was no such term as Navy Air Force at that time. I was merely commander of Patrol Wing 2 and later commander of Patrol Wings, Hawaiian Area.

The Vice Chairman. Well, in that capacity, were you Martin's opposite number?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not exactly. In many cases, I was, and in this particular set-up, which I was directed to work out with him, in that I was.
The Vice Chairman. That was one of the reasons I was inquiring, Admiral, as to why it was that you happened to be the Navy man who participated in the Martin-Bellinger report unless you were the opposite of General Martin.

Admiral Bellinger. On account of the nature of patrol planes, my base of operation was necessarily on shore, except when I went out on tenders at bases where they may operate, and on account of my being based on shore, and also on account of the fact that in connection with this defense plan patrol planes would undoubtedly enter into it to a big extent—that, I think, was the particular reason that Admiral Kimmel gave this to me.

[9367] The Vice Chairman. Now, you say at the time you arrived at Hawaii, and all the time after that, you expected war.

Admiral Bellinger. Eventually; yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Did you think the war would start by a surprise air attack?

Admiral Bellinger. Knowing the background of the Japanese, I thought it would probably start with an attack somewhere; not necessarily at Oahu, and not necessarily an air attack, but that if an attack was planned for Oahu, that it would be an air attack.

The Vice Chairman. I see. But you had not reached the point in your thinking that your conclusion was that the war would start with an attack on the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Bellinger. At Pearl Harbor?

The Vice Chairman. Wherever the Pacific Fleet was.

Admiral Bellinger. I had not reached any definite conclusion; no, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, how did you think the attack would start?

Admiral Bellinger. I thought the attack would probably start in the Philippines.

The Vice Chairman. In the form of an air attack?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes; air attack combined with surface attack.

[9368] The Vice Chairman. On the Philippines?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And in your thinking, you had not reached the point that you had reached the conclusion that there would be an air attack on Hawaii?

Admiral Bellinger. No; I had not reached the conclusion that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor. I think they made a big mistake, and it was very poor strategy on their part.

I could not have anticipated the poor strategy prior to December, though.

The Vice Chairman. At least you did not agree with them in the strategy they used?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

[9369] The Vice Chairman. Now on page 4 of your statement, Admiral, at the bottom of the page you state:

Those patrol planes that were initially in the highest degree of readiness were assigned to the northwest sectors which were considered the most vital.
In your note there you state:

This was because the prevailing winds were from the northeast and enemy carriers could thus recover their planes while retiring from the Oahu area.

That would clearly show that it was your thought that if an air attack on Hawaii did come it would come from the northwest sector?

Admiral Bellinger. Not absolutely, but when it came to starting something you had to start somewhere so you start with the most probable. For instance, on that base they sometimes have corner winds which are from the opposite direction, and under those conditions, why, it might have been another problem.

Presumably the Japanese could have done their own selection as to when they were going to make the attack.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Assuming that Japan decided to initiate the war by an air attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, then would you assume that the most likely way they would come would be from the northwest [9370] sector?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. I thought that would give them the most chances.

The Vice Chairman. I see. Now, as you have indicated in your answers given to the counsel, that sector was not covered by long-distance patrol or reconnaissance on the 6th of December.

Admiral Bellinger. No.

The Vice Chairman. Had it been on the 5th of December?

Admiral Bellinger. Probably out to 300 miles.

The Vice Chairman. Just to 300 miles, but under your definition that is not long-range reconnaissance.

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. That was entirely connected with the wing tactical exercises and was not for purposes of security.

The Vice Chairman. Well, had such a search been made at any time before the attack on December 7?

Admiral Bellinger. Searches beyond 500 miles I believe had never been carried out before from Hawaii, or from Oahu.

The Vice Chairman. I mean by planes from Oahu.

Admiral Bellinger. From Oahu?

The Vice Chairman. Yes. Had that ever been done?

Admiral Bellinger. Searches beyond 500 miles, sir, had [9371] never been carried out from Oahu prior to December 7, to my knowledge.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Admiral Bellinger. But searches of lesser distance, of perhaps 400 or 450 miles, had been carried out on occasions, when ordered.

The Vice Chairman. But under your definition of long-range reconnaissance or searches, those particular searches would not qualify as such?

Admiral Bellinger. Not from the point of view of determining security from air attack.

The Vice Chairman. That is what we are talking about, security from air attack.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. What was done after December 7 in the way of long-range reconnaissance from Oahu?
Admiral Bellinger. Immediately the situation was examined into to determine how many planes we had available and there were pro-rated on long-distance search, 700 miles to 800 miles.

The Vice Chairman. That was initiated after the attack?

Admiral Bellinger. After the attack.

The Vice Chairman. So that it was done after the attack but had not been done at any time before the attack?

[9373] Admiral Bellinger. All concentration of effort of our patrol wing after December 7 was long-range search.

The Vice Chairman. All right. How many planes did you use in that long-range search after December 7?

Admiral Bellinger. We used about 25 to 30 planes a day, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Twenty-five to thirty planes a day?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, from the patrol squadron.

The Vice Chairman. And those searches were made from Oahu?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. And the number of planes you had after December 7 were just slightly more than half of what you had before December 7, was it not?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir—immediately after?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. Considerably less than that.

The Vice Chairman. Considerably less than half?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. The planes available?

Admiral Bellinger. Immediately after.

The Vice Chairman. Immediately after, than was true before the attack?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

[9374] The Vice Chairman. Well, at this point we will have to recess until 2 o'clock. I will ask you to be back at that time, please, Admiral.

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2 p.m. of the same day.)

Afternoon Session—2 p.m.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

The Chair understands that at the noon recess Congressman Cooper had finished with his examination.

Senator George is not here at the moment, but will be here, and Mr. Clark will be here.

Senator Lucas, you may go ahead.

Testimony of Vice Adm. Patrick Neison Lynch Bellinger, United States Navy (Resumed)

Senator Lucas. Admiral Bellinger, on page 3 of your statement you state:

The term "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force" might be considered a misnomer as it was not an actual command until the Naval Base Defense Force organization was placed in a functioning status.
Who is responsible for placing it in a functioning status?

Admiral Bellinger. The commander Naval Base Defense Force was the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch. He did not have full control of patrol planes or any definitely assigned to him, so before he could have put it actually in a functioning status he would have really had to talk to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Lucas. In other words, Admiral Kimmel had the last word as to whether or not the command was in a functioning status?

Admiral Bellinger. That is with reference to the Navy.

Senator Lucas. That is what I am talking about.

Admiral Bellinger. With reference to the Army going into it, you would have to get the concurrence of the Army commander.

Senator Lucas. I understand that. I am only talking now about the Navy, in respect to the functioning status.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. What do you mean by “functioning status”?

Admiral Bellinger. I mean an actual business operating schedule.

Senator Lucas. Well, I am speaking primarily now with respect to the condition of war being imminent. What would the functioning status mean to you if you knew that war was imminent with Japan?

Admiral Bellinger. A function status would have meant that the patrols would have been run every day, that fighter planes would have been standing by on an alert status, that bomber planes would have been standing by on a ready status, antiaircraft guns would have been ready to have been put in action.

Senator Lucas. As I understand, nothing like that was ordered by Admiral Kimmel previous to the attack.

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. You were more or less on a routine duty during the months of November and December.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; in accordance with approved schedules.

Senator Lucas. Did you ever detect any change from the regular routine duty that you were on during the month of November?

Admiral Bellinger. We kept one squadron ready to go wherever it might be ordered in an expeditious fashion. We placed a service group for patrol planes on Wake Island. One squadron went to Midway on October 17, I think it was. It was still out there until it returned on December 5. Another squadron went out to Midway, and the other squadron that was there went to Wake, and that was all in connection with special operations, in connection with reinforcement of Wake and Midway with Marine planes.

Senator Lucas. When was that order put into effect? Do you recall when that was?

Admiral Bellinger. On November 28 I received an order from the commander in chief, Pacific, to direct 12 patrol planes to Midway, proceed to Wake on December 1, search en route.

Senator Lucas. That was an order merely carrying out the plans which had been agreed upon by Admiral Kimmel and Naval Operations in Washington to transmit those planes out to Midway.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. What I am talking about now is the regular, ordinary routine duties that you had. Were they changed in any way whatsoever after November 27, 1941?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; not to my recollection.

Senator Lucas. In other words, the only change in your duties was with respect to some specific order that came along, and you have given us an example of that when you told us about sending these planes out to Wake Island?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now you state on the same page:

The Naval Base Defense Air Force was a paper organization; it did not exist, in fact, as an entity unto itself.

What do you mean by "Naval Base Defense Air Force was a paper organization"?

Admiral Bellinger. I mean that the nearest analogy I can give you as an explanation is that if a division of ships had a landing force organized on board of the various ships there would be someone to take command of that when the landing force was ordered to be landed. That was not in effect and would be merely a paper organization until the order came to put it into effect.

[3478] Senator Lucas. In other words, until the outbreak of war this probably would not be in effect?

Admiral Bellinger. Either that, or until joint action had been taken to put it into effect by proper authority.

Senator Lucas. You were the same Admiral Bellinger who prepared or aided in preparing the so-called Martin-Bellinger report, were you not?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Was that submitted to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; copies went to him.

Senator Lucas. And he approved it?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did he have the material to carry that plan into effect?

Admiral Bellinger. Not in the complete state; no, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did he ever do anything? Did Admiral Kimmel ever do anything toward carrying into effect the Martin-Bellinger report?

Admiral Bellinger. He initiated this at the very beginning. That is the reason it was drawn up and became the organization that it was. Except for drills it was never put into a functioning status.

Senator Lucas. What was the nature of the drills that you had?

[3479] Admiral Bellinger. The drills I am speaking about are the drills for the Naval Base Air Defense.

Senator Lucas. Yes. How were they carried out?

Admiral Bellinger. They were carried out by having—excuse me. This paper describes it minutely. The only thing left out of it was that a target was usually placed out at sea in the shape of a ship, a carrier or another type of ship, and the location of that ship would not be known and it would be a question of the ship being there at some time during the period of the drill, and it was necessary to fire on that ship and simulate an attack group going out to attack it and
simulate planes coming in from the direction in which that ship was, simulating aircraft coming in for attack.

[9380] Senator Lucas. Now, were those drills held in contemplation of an air raid?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. By an enemy?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. That is the whole basis of it.

Senator Lucas. Were they held in contemplation of a surprise attack?

Admiral Bellinger. For a real surprise, no drill is going to be satisfactory, because it is too late then.

Senator Lucas. Well, you discussed in this remarkable report that you and General Martin, as I recall, the very route that the Japanese would take in coming into Pearl Harbor on a surprise attack, and you also said it would be preceded by submarines, three or five submarines probably around the harbor.

I was tremendously interested in that report, and I wondered whether you and General Martin were not thinking about a surprise attack when you drew that report.

Admiral Bellinger. This organization, unless it is working prior to an attack, is not worth the paper it is drawn on.

Senator Lucas. I understand that it is not worth the paper it is drawn on unless it is working prior to an [9381] attack, but you fellows drew it and you drew a remarkable picture of what was going to happen to Pearl Harbor.

The Vice Chairman. And what did happen.

Senator Lucas. And what did happen. It is just a little bit difficult for me to understand, after such a remarkable report was drawn in contemplation of a surprise attack, that everybody was surprised by the attack.

I wonder if you can throw any light on it.

Admiral Bellinger. As to why we were surprised?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. Well, we were at peace on December 6.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. There was certain information in Washington and certain information in Hawaii. It is a question whether or not, analyzing and estimating the situation, it could have been predicted that the attack was going to be made there, and when.

Senator Lucas. I appreciate that. No one knew, and I do not think there is any evidence in this record to show that the Japs were going to attack at the time they did, but, nevertheless, the Navy and Army were out in the Pacific, and you had gone through all these air drills, you had drawn this plan, and it is a little difficult for me to understand just why there was not a little more [9382] confidence on the part of the Navy that there would be a possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Bellinger. To go back to this estimate again, as I brought out this morning, this estimate was an estimate covering the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu. It was not an estimate of the strategy that the Japanese would employ in starting this war.

In other words, it was not an estimate which indicated that they were going to strike against Oahu as part of their national strategy.
In other words, if they were going to strike Oahu, this was the estimate of how it would be done.

Senator Lucas. If they were going to strike?

Admiral Bellinger. If they were going to strike.

Senator Lucas. Well now, on the question of training the men to fly these ships, you discussed that at some length. Did not you, as the commanding officer there, feel that it was necessary for these boys to get some training on long reconnaissance ships?

Admiral Bellinger. They got it, but the question is "How long?"

For instance, during the week of December 2 to 5 squadrons were used on reconnaissance. Three hundred miles was about the distance they went out. The question [9383] of how far to send them does not necessarily enter so much in the picture, except for the results obtained.

Senator Lucas. Well, it is a fact that one of these aviators can get valuable training in doing long reconnaissance search; can he not?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; they had to be trained in that.

Senator Lucas. Yes. And in 1940, when Admiral Richardson was out there, he had his naval planes on reconnaissance, as I recall, for some 6 weeks. Are you familiar with that?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes; I remember that.

Senator Lucas. Were you out there at that time?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; part of the time.

Senator Lucas. You recall that he and the Army as a combination, ran a long-range reconnaissance after they received the alert order from the Chief of Naval Operations here in Washington; do you not?

Admiral Bellinger. I do not think the Army took part in that.

Senator Lucas. Just the Navy alone?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. I have never been able to understand if Admiral Richardson could run long-range reconnaissance in 1940, why it was that Admiral Kimmel could not have [9384] run a long-range reconnaissance in 1941.

Can you give me any answer to that?

Admiral Bellinger. The range of that reconnaissance that you are speaking about by Admiral Richardson, I think, was 300 miles.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. It may have been 400. I have forgotten now, but I do not think it was over 400 miles.

Senator Lucas. That may be true.

Admiral Bellinger. I am now trying to analyze the point of view maybe of Admiral Kimmel, in connection with trying to give you an answer.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. A question was asked this morning, I believe, as to why we did not make a long-range reconnaissance. Maybe I can answer that a little more fully right now.

Senator Lucas. All right, sir. I think we are all interested in it.

Admiral Bellinger. Admiral Kimmel knew the general situation in regard to patrol planes. I kept him so informed. We were trying to get these planes re-equipped with the new planes as quickly as we could.
From October 28 until November 23, 1941, 54 planes came out there, new planes. Those planes were a late type and were not equipped with spares to keep them in operation. The planes had been giving trouble with engine cowling, the nose section of the engine was cracking. That was on the first squadron that came out about midsummer.

It was expected that these would have corrected features in them. It was not exactly known at that time that the full effect of correction was satisfactory.

I think he knew all of that and knew when these planes arrived, and I think he also realized what was involved in patrol planes in connection with carrying out war plan 46, I am sure he did, and perhaps all of those considerations were borne in his mind.

Senator Lucas. Assuming that you had been the commander out there and that you knew war was imminent, and you received a war-warning message, would that have made any difference in respect to using these planes for reconnaissance work?

Admiral Bellinger. Perhaps. I answered that question this morning and said God only knows what I would have done. But I can say this, that I was very much surprised when I heard that there had been a message.

Senator Lucas. Well, I was just coming to that. I was wondering whether or not Admiral Kimmel ever discussed with you any of these messages that came from the Chief of Naval Operations to him, starting with April on up to the time of the attack.

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now General Davis was his air officer, as I understand it.

Admiral Bellinger. Commander Davis.

Senator Lucas. Commander Davis. How close were you to Commander Davis?

Admiral Bellinger. Very close.

Senator Lucas. Did Commander Davis discuss with you at any time the acceptance of any of these messages that came from the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I do not know that he knew about that.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? I expect to go into the Davis matter and show that he did not know about that either.

Senator Lucas. What were the duties of General Davis?

The Chairman. Commander Davis.

Senator Lucas. I keep getting my generals and commanders mixed.

The Chairman. Go ahead. Pardon the interruption.

Senator Lucas. It is perfectly all right, sir.

What were the duties of Commander Davis?

Admiral Bellinger. He was the aviation aide on the staff of Admiral Kimmel and his duties were assigned by Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Lucas. How often did you see him?

Admiral Bellinger. I would say I was in communication with him by telephone or saw him at least, I should say, on the average of every day.
[9388] Senator Lucas. Did he give you any direct orders as to what you should do with respect to the Air Force?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. He had no authority except by virtue of being on the staff of Admiral Kimmel.
Senator Lucas. What he was then was sort of a liaison man; is that it?
Admiral Bellinger. He was an aide to Admiral Kimmel.
Senator Lucas. And Admiral Kimmel was the only one who could give you orders as to what to do then?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. At no time, as I understand it, during the months of November and October did Admiral Kimmel talk to you about any messages that he might have received from Washington, D. C.?
Admiral Bellinger. He did not talk to me about them.
Senator Lucas. I call your attention to Exhibit 37. As an example, page 1, the message of April 1, 1941, which was sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel. It says:

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

[9389] Are you familiar with that order?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; but I was familiar with the general situation in that respect. As a matter of fact, my operations officer wrote an article which was published in the Naval Institute, I think in 1936, which practically duplicated this estimate of the situation in regard to an attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese.
Senator Lucas. Yes.
Admiral Bellinger. So that this was not any news, particularly.
Senator Lucas. I see. It was no news at all? It was merely a reminder of something you already knew?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Now, what was the condition of these planes that were destroyed by the Japanese on December 7, on the Saturday before? Were they in the same places, the same conditions, the same spots?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I don't think so. I can't say for sure but I would be willing to bet they were not in the same places.
Senator Lucas. Were there more planes on hand at that particular time than there were during the other days of the week, on this particular Sunday morning? I presume your operation schedule would show exactly as to the dispersal of your planes during that week.
Admiral Bellinger. I believe there were more, perhaps, on the beach on Saturday than there were on Sunday.
Senator Lucas. Why was that? Was that pay day?
Admiral Bellinger. Well, we had been working pretty strong on the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th, and you have got to do something about easing up on personnel.
Senator Lucas. I appreciate that.
Admiral Bellinger. But every day was a working day. That was started in my forces about March 1, or maybe April 1.

Senator Lucas. Well, it is a fact that there were more naval officers and men at Pearl Harbor on the week end than at any other time; is it not?

Admiral Bellinger. On week days?

Senator Lucas. No; on the week ends, Saturdays and Sundays. That was the custom, wasn't it?

Admiral Bellinger. Not necessarily. As far as my outfit was concerned I tried to make a schedule that would hold water utilizing every day as a work day, Saturdays and Sundays the same as Tuesdays or Wednesdays. But there were certain combinations which did make a let-up at times maybe more than others.

As I said before, if you look at this schedule you will find on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday there was considerable activity and that was when we were having wing tactics.

Senator Lucas. Well, was that the regular operation schedule every week?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir, not every week; but it was in our schedule of employment.

Senator Lucas. It shows that you were busy the first part of the week and then over the week end these fellows were entitled to some rest and recreation.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes; but that doesn't follow necessarily all the way through.

Senator Lucas. Now, where were you when the attack took place?

Admiral Bellinger. I was taken sick with what they call acute laryngitis, I believe, a type of flu, on December 2, and on December 7, that was to be my first day up.

Senator Lucas. I see.

Admiral Bellinger. I got up very hurriedly.

Senator Lucas. You didn't wait for the doctor to tell you?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Who was in command while you were away?

Admiral Bellinger. I was still in command and in touch every day with my operations officer who was my second in command, at that time Commander Ramsey.

[9392] Senator Lucas. Were you in the hospital?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I was at home. The first message that I received about the attack was from Commander Ramsey, now captain, and I would say that it was probably a few seconds before 8 o'clock.

Senator Lucas. When did you first see Admiral Kimmel after the attack?

Admiral Bellinger. I talked to him on the telephone the day of the attack, over the telephone. I did not see him until a few days later.

Senator Lucas. When was the last—

Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, I stayed in the office practically all the time.

Senator Lucas. When was the last time you talked to Admiral Kimmel before December 7?

Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember exactly, but I think the latter part of November, probably the 26th or 27th.
Senator Lucas. Do you recall what you talked about?

Admiral Bellinger. There was a conference, I remember, in connection with—whether that was the last time or not I am not sure—but I know I was over there in a conference with reference to making plans for these planes to be put on Wake and Midway.

Senator Lucas. There was nothing at that time said about the imminence of war with Japan?

Admiral Bellinger. No; not with reference to any war warning or dispatches from Washington in connection with it.

Senator Lucas. I direct your attention again to Exhibit 37. Just take a cursory glance at the messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations, particularly the one of October 16, which says:

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochment with the U. S.

And so on. Are you familiar with that message?

Admiral Bellinger. One minute until I find it. What page is it?

Senator Lucas. Page 18. Did you ever see that message?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I don't remember seeing that before December 7.

Senator Lucas. Have you read it since these hearings started?

Admiral Bellinger. Sir?

Senator Lucas. Have you read that message since these hearings started?

[939½] Admiral Bellinger. I think I have seen them all.

Senator Lucas. You have seen them all?

Admiral Bellinger. I think so. Most of these were shown to me at various investigations on this subject. And, as a matter of fact, I didn't know that there was any message other than one message, the war-warning message, until 1944.

Senator Lucas. You are familiar with all of these top secret messages that were sent?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; not familiar.

Senator Lucas. You have read them all?

Admiral Bellinger. I have read the testimony on a good many of them.

Senator Lucas. Directing your attention to the message of November 24, assuming Admiral Kimmel had given you that message—the Admiral has complained bitterly because Washington didn't give him all the information they had—I am wondering what you would have done had Admiral Kimmel given to you the message of November 24. It is found on page 36. That is the message that says a surprise aggressive movement is possible in any direction. What would that message have conveyed to you, if anything? Give us your best judgment on it now, although I appreciate it is hindsight.

Admiral Bellinger. Hindsight is one thing and foresight is another. This situation at Pearl Harbor was another. I have been asked that question many times.

Senator Lucas. The reason I ask—

Admiral Bellinger. I wish I had seen it. I don't know what I would have done. I would rather have the people who know me think what I would have done. Only God knows what I would have done. I can't make any statement on that.
Senator Lucas. Well, the reason I ask the question is that you were in charge of, more or less in charge of, the air forces there.

Admiral Bellinger. Patrol planes only.

Senator Lucas. Who had charge of the other planes?

Admiral Bellinger. Various commands of the air in the fleet. For instance, there were utility planes headed by a wing commander. There were marine planes headed by a colonel. There were carrier planes and organization headed by Admiral Halsey.

Senator Lucas. I see.

I suppose what you have said about this message would be true about the war-warning message, too, of November 27?

Admiral Bellinger. If I would have gotten any of these messages I would have made an estimate of the situation, with my knowledge and understanding at the time, and taken action accordingly.

Senator Lucas. Do you believe now, Admiral, that you were entitled to receive these messages from Admiral Kimmel in view of the position that you had there as commander of the patrol fleet?

Admiral Bellinger. I think that was Admiral Kimmel's business entirely. I can't answer for that.

Senator Lucas. Well, I was wondering what your position would be. You say that you would have liked to have seen the messages, you would have liked to have had them in your possession. You at least by implication say you would have had more insight into what was going on. I am wondering whether or not you thought it was the duty of Admiral Kimmel to pass this kind of message on to you under the arrangement that you had out there.

Admiral Bellinger. I certainly am not one to say what the commander in chief's duty was. I was under him.

[9397] Senator Lucas. In other words, whatever he did was all right with you?

Admiral Bellinger. I wouldn't have been full of inhibitions, as I remember. I think that if I saw something that I thought I should have seen at the time, I think I probably would have brought the question up with him.

Senator Lucas. Well, that is what I am trying to ask you about, that is what I am trying to find out, whether or not you think you should have seen any of these messages. I am basing that now, primarily, on the contention that Admiral Kimmel has made in his case before the committee. He complains bitterly because Admiral Stark didn't send him information.

In view of the fact that you were a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel, I am wondering what you think of his failing to send you information, if he did.

Admiral Bellinger. I think your guess is about as good as mine. I can express an opinion. I can say that if he had shown me the messages and the situation did remain as is, why, I would be in a different situation at the present time.

Senator Lucas. Well, I don't know what that situation is, and I am not going to inquire into it.

Mr. Keefe. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. Keefe. I want to make just this observation. I think it is quite apparent that Admiral Bellinger at that time was a commander. Is that true?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; a rear admiral.

Mr. Keefe. A rear admiral?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. But you were serving under the direct orders of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You were not a member of his staff?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I was a task force commander under him.

Mr. Keefe. You took orders from him?

Admiral Bellinger. Took orders from him; yes sir.

Mr. Keefe. That is the way it works in the Navy isn't it, Admiral?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. In the line of command?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Fellows down below don't usually dispute the higher-ups, do they?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. In good teamwork opinions are expressed back and forth.

[9399] Mr. Keefe. We have had some evidence of that before this committee, I think.

That is all.

The Chairman. Are you through, Senator?

Senator Lucas. One other question.

The only reason I raised these questions is that you raise it yourself. In other words, you must have attached some significance to the fact that you never saw any of these papers given to Admiral Kimmel until after the war was on, because you so state. You state in your statement on page 8:

I had no knowledge of any of the warning messages emanating from the Navy and War Departments, during October, November and December. I never knew of any warning dispatches until a few days after the attack—on the evening of about December 10, I think it was—when I was told by one of my officers that he had just heard that there had been a warning dispatch received in the District Naval Intelligence Office, and that the local Intelligence officer of the Naval Air Station knew about it. I immediately sent for that Intelligence officer, and he confirmed this information. Several days after that, when I was working on some papers with Admiral Kimmel, I first saw one of the warning dispatches.

[9400] In other words, it apparently disturbed you at the time that you hadn't seen any of these messages, and you immediately contacted the district naval intelligence office.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; I did that. I could have recommended to him that we do start patrols.

Senator Lucas. That is right. That is the point I am trying to develop. You did have it within your power to make such a recommendation, that long-distance reconnaissance be used. The point that I was hoping you would answer was whether or not, if you had all of this information at hand and had the chance to analyze it, whether or not it might have made a difference with you in respect to the recommendations that at least you might have made?

Admiral Bellinger. There is a possibility.
Senator Lucas. There is a possibility. Was Admiral Kimmel depending upon you for recommendations as to whether or not the long-distance reconnaissance would be made?

Admiral Bellinger. Not to my knowledge.

Senator Lucas. That is what I wanted to know about. You were concerned about this. You wanted the committee to know that you didn't receive any of these messages after November 27 and before. I was trying to find out why you wanted the committee to know about it.

[9401] Admiral Bellinger. I want everybody to know about it.

Senator Lucas. I see. I think that is all.

The Chairman. Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark. I have no questions.

The Chairman. Senator George would be next, but he will inquire later. The Chair would like to advise that he is advised that if possible without restricting any members' interrogation, that Admiral Bellinger is on an assignment that makes it important that he get away tonight, if possible; but I am just advising the committee of that so we may keep it in mind.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Bellinger, there has been handed to the committee a statement on your career with the United States Navy covering the time from 1913 on.

I note in the sketch that was given to us that from 1914 on, you had a very active participation in the air activities of the United States Navy; that is a fact, is it not?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You were in the first Navy plane that was ever struck by an enemy bullet; isn't that right?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

[9402] Mr. Murphy. That was down at Vera Cruz?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Then you went to Pensacola, Fla., in 1915 and in the following year—rather, on January 21, you were designated naval air pilot No. 4?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Thereafter, in 1915, you participated in the development of the use of the catapult; is that right?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Thereafter you piloted flying boat AB-3 and were on the first extended flight of this kind ordered and carried out?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. In 1915 you made the American altitude record for a seaplane of 10,000 feet; in 1915 you participated in the first actual instance in the Navy where Navy aircraft spotted actual gun or mortar fire; in 1916 you conducted live bomb-dropping tests from a plane, the first test of this nature to be conducted by the Navy; in 1916 you participated in the first instance of spotting, and firing at regular targets at sea by the Navy.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. In 1916, you conducted experimental tests with radio set in pontoon type of seaplanes; in 1917 you made the first machine-gun firing tests ever made in a Navy plane; in 1917 you conducted the first night seaplane flight in which floodlights were employed on the beach for illuminating the water, and that marks the beginning
of night flying at Pensacola and of regular night flying instructions in the Navy.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. In 1919, you participated in the first trans-Atlantic flight as commanding officer of the NC-1. You made a long overseas flight from Newfoundland to the vicinity of the Azores in May 1919.

In other words, on down through the years, those I have outlined together with others that follow, you had a very distinguished and outstanding career in the Navy, on which I want to congratulate you at this time.

And you were the type of man that was selected by Washington to be sent to Honolulu; that is right, isn't it?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; but——

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you were sent there?

Admiral Bellinger. I was ordered there.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, after you got to Honolulu, you were also ordered to conduct a survey and to prepare a plan in conjunction with General Martin of the Army Air Corps; that is right too, isn't it?


Mr. Murphy. And that plan which you developed, was in effect a chart of exactly what happened at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, with the exception of a few details; that is right, too, isn't it?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now then, you were placed under that plan in charge of certain operations which you did not have the authority to carry out until the means with which to carry it out were made available to you by higher authority; isn't that so?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that throughout this entire critical period, you were never shown any of these dispatches which in an official way showed the development of a tense and critical situation; that is true, isn't it?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. When Admiral Kimmel was on the stand I questioned him as to why he had not consulted you who were unquestionably an outstanding air expert, and he said that he consulted his own man, Commander Davis. I would now like to direct your attention to the fact that Commander Davis was called to testify before Admiral Hewitt [9405], and his testimony appears in the record as that of Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, commencing at page 96.

Mr. Masten. Pardon me. Is that the Hart or the Hewitt report?

Mr. Murphy. This is the Hart report. I beg your pardon.

And the same Rear Adm. Arthur C. Davis was the airman on the staff of Admiral Kimmel immediately preceding——

The Vice Chairman. The air aide.

Mr. Murphy. ——was his air aide on the staff of Admiral Kimmel immediately preceding December 1941.

Isn't that right, Admiral?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to go to the testimony in question.

Admiral Davis, as I recollect it, did think that there could have been instituted a system of reconnaissance whereby you would use certain planes in the less critical areas and other planes in the more
critical areas. Do you know of any such possibility? For reconnoissance purposes?

Admiral Bellinger. Actually, on December 7 we used planes of every type and description, some that could only go 200 miles. On the days following December 7 we used [9406] planes that were made available for the distances that they could go. That was to get information as far out as we could through all the various sectors surrounding Pearl Harbor.

Actually, in fact, for prevention of an air raid, the farther out you can get information the better. And in order to figure on preventing an air raid in the early morning and having this information, it was considered that the patrol planes should go out between 7 and 8 hundred miles.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, Admiral, you were never confronted with the problem because you weren’t taken into the confidence of those in command; isn’t that right?

Admiral Bellinger. In general, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And the best—excuse me.

Admiral Bellinger. I was not asked or shown.

Mr. Murphy. The best we can do is to ask you as an air expert to speculate by way of hindsight what you would have done before December 7; that is right too, isn’t it?

At any rate, you didn’t see them, you weren’t asked to pass on them; it wasn’t your problem directly until you were consulted on them; isn’t that true?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I—excuse me.


Mr. Murphy. I say, up to December 7, Admiral.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Up to December 7.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that up to the morning of December 7, you were a man sick in bed and pretty much concerned about improving the health of Admiral Bellinger, I assume. I didn’t mean to go into the actual attack itself.

Now, then, on page 97, the question was asked—you do not have this, Admiral—page 97, the question was asked of Rear Admiral Davis, who was the air aide on Admiral Kimmel’s staff:

Q. Admiral, available records indicate that you have knowledge pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that occurred on 7 December, 1941. Please state the facts within your knowledge concerning the attack and the major events leading up thereto. It is especially desired that you cover the following, and a written copy of this question is handed you so that you may refer to it as you testify—

Now, then, the admiral testified for several paragraphs as to the question itself, and what it was looking for, and [9408] then appears his answer, the last paragraph on the bottom of page 97:

A. My duty as Fleet Aviation Officer was primarily, if not almost entirely, concerned with technical training and logistics matters. As the case with the Staff as a whole, our primary interest for many months had been the improvement in strength and proficiency of the Pacific Fleet.

As is no doubt well known, it had not been possible, for various reasons, including appropriations, to develop the Fleet to a point which, it is now known, was
necessary. However, this fact made it all the more important to concentrate on all phases of matériel and training.

I, myself, had little to do with considerations of attack possibilities, and I do not recall ever being directly consulted on such matters by the Commander in Chief. Naturally, the subject was frequently discussed among members of the Staff and also by the Commander in Chief with the Staff at times when I was present.

From these discussions, I can definitely state my opinion that it was the Commander in Chief's belief that it was vitally necessary to continue as long as possible with the training and other Fleet improvements, and that going into a defensive status would interfere with this work, so that I am convinced it was his sincere intention to accomplish all that could be done before hostilities began and that he believed there was still time to keep the work going.

As to the imminent possibility of attack, I only occasionally saw or heard of warnings that may have been received by the Commander in Chief. I know that there had been many warnings of varying degrees of seriousness over a number of months, and I had the impression that it was within the Commander in Chief's discretion to determine how far to go in action with regard to such warnings.

I believe his thought throughout was to take precautionary steps within reason but to regard the warnings as all the more reason for concentration on improving the Fleet's readiness.

During the period of strain which finally led up to the events of 7 December, I am certain that the Commander in Chief gave the situation the carefulest possible consideration. I have to admit, however, that I was, myself concerned because of information that was available in the press and that I concluded that there must be other information which had not been shown me that influenced the decision to take no greater precautionary steps than were taken.

As to advice with regard to precautions, I was asked [9410] not so much for an opinion as to whether or not the fullest precautions should be taken, as for information with regard to the practicability of comprehensive searches, and their effect on training. Comprehensive and extensive air searches were practicable, and I so stated. I also stated the fact that this would very definitely interfere with the progress in general in aviation training in the Fleet.

This, as was the case in the Fleet as a whole, was important in view of the training demanded by the rapid expansion that was already beginning to take place.

With respect to the surprise air attack, I naturally expressed the opinion that this was possible and that it could only be prevented by the most extensive searches and efforts to intercept at sea by air and surface vessels.

I did not, however, realize to what a high degree of proficiency Japanese naval aviation had been developed. I do not believe that anybody else in the American Navy had any proper conception of this development either. Certainly I had never seen anything, either officially or unofficially that would lead me to suppose that Japanese naval aviation was so tremendously effective and well developed as it turned out to be.

At that point I would like to ask you, did you in [9411] Hawaii, consider the ability of Yamamoto and his daring, Admiral BELLINGER. I was asked the question at one other hearing, whether I was fully cognizant of Yamamoto's background. I am not sure whether I was conscious of it before December 7 or after. I think I was.

Mr. Murphy, Captain Layton—Excuse me. Go ahead. Admiral BELLINGER. With reference to the ability of the Japanese, which they showed in their attack on December 7, it far surpassed my estimate of their ability.

Mr. Murphy. There was a book about which Captain Layton testified in the Hart proceedings, and that book seemed to discuss the question of a possible raid on Pearl Harbor and the capabilities of the Japanese. Were you considered and brought into those discussions or given the benefit of that?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to refer now particularly to the testimony of Captain Layton, at page 214. At any rate you were not in those discussions about Yamamoto and this book that was published and the discussions about a possible raid on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, there has also been testimony in this record that the north was not the most dangerous section. As I recall, reading the record of all the hearings, there seemed to be almost a unanimous opinion that the north was the most dangerous, and in your statement you so state, do you not?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, you give as the reason for feeling that it was the most dangerous, the wind conditions. Did you also take into consideration the fact that in the north, where they did come from, was the so-called "vacant sea"?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you also——

Excuse me. Let me add this, and then you can answer both. Did you also take into consideration the fact that whatever shipping there had been previously in that area, it had been eliminated prior to December 7?

Now, will you answer both?

Admiral Bellinger. I didn't know that it had been eliminated up there. I am not so sure that it was.

Mr. Murphy. Well, there is some testimony to that effect.

Admiral Bellinger. The question was where the Japanese were going to come from, and we were not conducting patrols from Palmyra, or Johnston Islands, as a regular proposition, and I presume that the Japanese would have known about it, so there was nothing to stop them from coming from that direction either; but it is a very serious proposition, a vital proposition to a carrier, in connection with the operation of planes.

It must head into the wind, and it must get up enough speed to compensate for the wind that is blowing in order to have a sufficient force of wind over the deck. So that the wind controls the direction of movement of the carrier, and I don't believe an attack of the kind that was made on Pearl Harbor where surprise was expected to be the major affair, or where they felt there might be considerable jeopardy would take place in a direction wherein the carrier had to take on her planes after having launched them, heading toward the island.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, Admiral, had you had any knowledge of the fact that all shipping had been directed to the south through the Torres Strait before December 7?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. That had been done since October, but you didn't know about that, did you?

Admiral Bellinger. I am practically sure, I didn't. I don't recall any knowledge of it.

Mr. Murphy. That is another of the dispatches in that period.

Now, there was a conference at which time the possibility of an air raid on Oahu or Hawaii was discussed, at which time Captain Mc-
Morris made a certain statement. That would be on November 27 or 28. You were not present at that conference, were you?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, you do believe that there could have been reconnaissance if the command had been issued to have it; isn't that so?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. With the planes we had there could have been reconnaissance.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to direct your attention in that regard to the testimony of your Chief of Staff at page 595 of the record of the court of inquiry conducted by officers of the Navy. On page 596:

Q. That is a very clear explanation. However, will you please answer the question. We will put the question another way. Where there any planes at Pearl Harbor which could have been used and were not used for distance reconnaissance on the morning of December 7?

A. Yes, sir; there were planes that could have been used had such a search been ordered by higher authority.

Q. How many of these planes were in that category?

A. For an emergency effort, approximately 60 planes could have been made available in four hours or less.

Q. Who would have ordered the distance reconnaissance and under whose authority would the directive have been made?

A. For the full utilization of all aircraft, both Army and Navy, available on Oahu, the orders to us would have come from the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force.

Q. Who is that?

A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District. Orders solely for the Navy planes would probably have come from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Q. Did you consider in these plans and orders which you had that the Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force was the one who would have originated the idea of distance reconnaissance and would have directed you or Admiral Bellinger to have sent planes out on this mission?

A. I would have assumed it would be the duty of any officer higher in the echelon of command above Admiral Bellinger to have taken action on receipt of the information indicating that action was necessary.

[9416] Do you agree with those answers of your chief of staff?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. What was the name of your chief of staff at that time, Admiral?

Admiral Bellinger. He was Commander Ramsey; Logan C. Ramsey.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Now I direct your attention to the questions at page 597 of the same record, question 110:

Q. You stated that in your opinion there might be or could be an air attack on Oahu. Had you ever thought from what direction the air attack would come or the most probable direction?

A. Yes, sir, we had. We had great discussions on it, and in view of the prevailing wind conditions and the presence of outlying islands and other factors, we had decided the northwest sector was the most likely line of approach, and in our drills the squadron in the highest degree of readiness was always ordered to take up that sector from 315 to 00.

Then, if you, with your limited number of planes, had sent out distance reconnaissance, you would have sent them to the northwest sector so as to cover that sector?

For any single day, yes, sir.

[9417] Question 115:

Why did you select that sector?

A. Because we had always decided that was the most likely direction of approach.

Q. But that sector was not based on the sighting of any Japanese planes?
A. No, sir, it was in accordance with our estimate and preconceived ideas. We always selected that sector 315 to 00, as the first sector. The second sector was from 315 to around 270. We placed other sectors in their relative idea of importance.

I take it you agree with that statement or testimony because it is substantially what you yourself have stated.

Admiral Bellinger. I do.

Mr. Murphy. I would now like to refer to page 578 of the same record and the same witness, question 24:

Arriving at this estimate, did you consider any particular nation—

he was speaking of the Martin-Bellinger report—

did you consider any particular nation, or was this just a generality for any country—any enemy which might attack without a declaration of war?

A. It was obviously and solely Japan. I use the pre-war phraseology intentionally in trying to get myself into a pre-war frame of mind.

[9418] Q. Then your conclusion was that if any attack at all were made on Oahu it would be by air and not by some other means?

A. That is correct.

Q. At the time you made this estimate of the situation, did you conclude from the international situation as it existed on that date, that Japan would attack the United States?

A. It is impossible for me to say at this late date, but I do recall having mentioned to Admiral Bellinger, half in earnest and half in pure speculation, that it way my belief that if the Japanese did attack us by an air raid, that the attack would probably come on Christmas Eve or New Year's Day.

Of course, that was just discussion over the table I assume, but the fact is, Admiral, that if you had been at a conference—and now I am taking you back before December 7—and the discussions were to come up as to the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor, would it not have been your opinion at that conference, being an airman, that the most likely danger was air rather than submarine?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; that was my estimate throughout.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, at the conferences that were held Rear Admiral Davis was not voicing too much of an opinion or asked for too many opinions and you were not consulted at all, the opinion of those at the conference was that there would be an attack on Hawaii but it would be a mass submarine attack and I take it you would have differed with that. You felt it would come from the air?

Admiral Bellinger. The attack most easily for the Japanese to make would be a submarine attack and a general submarine menace in and around Pearl Harbor area. If they had contemplated an attack on Pearl Harbor, why, I certainly thought it would be air, an air attack. We suspected submarines to be out in the area, in the operating area, for some time. There were many contacts, sound contacts that were investigated but did not conclusively show any definite results, but there was a suspicion that their submarines were about, even before December 7.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, were you at any time between the 1st of December and the 7th of December acquainted with the fact that there was some definite uncertainty as to where the Japanese carriers were?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. So that between November 27 and December 7 you yourself or no one under you ordered any change in the status of alert of the planes under your command, isn't [9420] that right?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. You mean it is right?

Admiral Bellinger. I mean the schedule was being carried out, to the best of my knowledge, in the activities connected with fleet tactics that I referred to before. There may have been certain changes so far as readiness made in those squadrons and connected in that exercise, but not in connection with any security.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to now refer, Admiral, to page 583 of the naval court of inquiry, question 44, to your chief of staff. [Reading:]

Q. With the combined Navy-Army aircraft that were available for operation between 27 November and 7 December 1941, could you have complied with a directive to conduct a long-range reconnaissance through 360 degrees?

A. No. Using the most economical aircraft type of search that we could devise, a single plane going to 700 miles would only cover a sector of 8 degrees. Therefore, with 66 planes, only 50 per cent of which could be used continuously from a maintenance and pilot fatigue standpoint, only 264 degrees could be covered daily. 360 degrees could be covered only one day, possibly only two days as an emergency measure, but it could not be maintained. It would only cover about three-quarters of the circle day in and day out until the exhaustion point from not only of personnel but from the matériel standpoint, as well, was reached. The exhaustion period would have been reached in matériel before it was reached in personnel. As nearly as I could estimate the situation and in view of our almost total lack of spare parts for the PBY-5 planes, I believe that three weeks of intensive daily searches would have been approximately a 75 per cent reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit and we would have been placing planes out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other planes going. The pilots, I believe, could have kept going approximately a six week period, but at the end of that time they would have all required a protracted rest period.

I take it you agree with that?

Admiral Bellinger. In general, yes. I think very probably the pilots could not have kept up that long. That is at least a 14- to a 16-hour flight. We have on occasions, particularly in the Battle of Midway, I think, put pilots on patrol covering longer periods of patrol for consecutive days and any time I know of they were practically on their last legs at the end of it.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, under the plan, the Martin-Bellinger [9422] plan, in order for you to have any authority it was necessary for an emergency to arise. That is right, isn’t it?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. It had to be apparent.

Mr. Murphy. Right. It would be rather difficult for you, who was to be apprised of the existence of an emergency, to recognize the existence of one if you did not have this information, isn’t that right?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, on page 584 the question was asked of your chief of staff:

Had you heard anything about an Army condition of readiness designed to prevent sabotage?

A. I had heard indirectly and unofficially of various rumors of attempted sabotage and counter measures against sabotage, none of which appeared at the time to be of great importance.

My question to you is, did you know what type of alert the Army was on?

Admiral Bellinger. I don’t think so. I knew that at some stage of events at that time there was a great deal of thought given to sabotage. I am not sure whether I knew that they were in a sabotage alert or not, but I do know that the subject was a live subject and I had done something about it in my force and various other naval
forces were taking action [9423] of that kind and whether I knew the Army was actually in it or not I am not sure.

Mr. Murphy. Your chief of staff, of course, had no more information about these war-warning messages than you had, did he?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I questioned him on that.

Mr. Murphy. You also, I take it, Admiral, had no information whatsoever to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their codes and their systems?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I knew nothing of that.

Mr. Murphy. Nor any information about the Japanese consul at Honolulu destroying some of his systems or all of them, I take it?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I did not know that.

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Senator Lucas. With respect to your not knowing the Army was alerted to sabotage, did you have occasion to see on the Saturday before the Sunday morning how the Army planes were lined up on their fields from wing tip to wing tip?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I was in bed most of Saturday.

Senator Lucas. Oh, yes; that is right. And you did not receive any information from anyone that the Army was alerted [9424] to sabotage?

Admiral Bellinger. Not that I can say definitely. I may have known it; I am not sure.

Mr. Murphy. Are you through, Senator?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I would like also to refer to page 99 of the Hart inquiry, Rear Admiral Davis speaking:

Although I did not feel that I had sufficient information as to the actual situation to undertake to question the Commander-in-Chief's policy as 7 December approached, I was concerned about the general situation with respect to our outlying islands. For this reason I stressed the necessity for providing some form of air protection at Wake and Midway, which it would have been too late to attempt after actual emergency had arisen. Action was finally taken in this connection and that is why the attack on 7 December found the Enterprise task force on its way back, having landed Marine fighting planes at Wake, and the Lexington task force on its way to land Marine aircraft at Midway.

Now, the question was asked of Admiral Davis, referring to the Martin Bellinger report, a question on page 99:

Did you have that estimate at all in mind during the days which led up to 7 December?

[9425] A. I did.

Q. But I understand, from your testimony, that you made no particular estimate yourself along that same line, formal or otherwise?

A. No, sir; it was not that I made no estimate, or did not consider it; it was rather that this, like all of the other very comprehensive and thorough preparatory plans that were made, was contingent, as to its being placed in effect, on prior decision that the situation justified taking up what might be called a defensive deployment. As to whether or not it should, at any given point, have been taken up, I necessarily considered that the Commander-in-Chief's estimate was final.

Q. And your advice on the point was not asked?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see the Navy Department's dispatch of 27 November, the one which has come to be known as the war warning [indicating exhibit 8]?

A. No, sir.

Q. You never saw it prior to 7 December?

A. No, sir.
Q. Admiral, did I understand you correctly earlier in your testimony to say that in your opinion a comprehensive air search could have been carried on at that time?

A. Yes, it could.

Q. Would you elaborate on that just a little bit, as to how a 360 degree distant reconnaissance could have been carried on with the material at hand at that time?

A. There were not enough planes and pilots to establish and maintain a long-range, 360 degree search indefinitely, or even for more than a limited time. There were, however, enough to approximate this by using relatively short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors, and by obtaining some assistance from available Army aircraft, so that I think it could have been undertaken, had it been considered essential, on the basis that reinforcements could have arrived before personnel and material fatigue set in. Unless reinforcements arrived, it could not have been maintained.

Q. You may proceed to the written question given you, passing on to the Army part.

A. Prior to 7 December I had relatively little detailed information regarding the Army Interceptor Command. I knew approximately the numbers and types and my recollection is that they had about 170 P-36's, P-39's, and P-40's, of which the greater number were P-36's and P-39's. Judged by modern war standards, there were enough air fields to operate them, but not enough to provide adequate dispersal and protection, nor were revetments and dispersal runways provided at the various fields.

In that connection, Admiral, as I understand your testimony you knew that the Interceptor Command was not properly functioning, or not? Do you recall what your state of mind was before December 7?

Admiral Bellinger. It is my understanding that it was not functioning as a regular agency.

Mr. Murphy. You say what?

Admiral Bellinger. That it was not functioning as a regular continuous agency.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Kimmel testified that radar would give him coverage, at one time in one hearing, of 200 miles and in this hearing, of 100 miles. Did you so understand it?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I did not expect it to be that effective. As a matter of fact, it was not that effective to the fullest extent several months after December 7.

Mr. Murphy. Now, in connection with that and in corroboration of your feeling about it in connection with Admiral Kimmel's testimony, his airman said at page 100:

I did not feel, however, that it was yet ready for full effective employment.

[9428] That is Admiral Davis speaking.

Now, what was your information as to the ability of the Army to participate in or cooperate with you by way of help in the event you called on them? Did you feel the fliers were competent?

Admiral Bellinger. From my information from General Martin, he had difficulty in getting enough competent crews, air combat crews to man the planes he had and he was also confronted with a job of training personnel to man B-17's for further transfer to the Philippines. I know of this only because of conversations with General Martin, so that I know that he had problems of that nature which were of considerable importance.

Mr. Murphy. Now I would like to direct your attention to page 44 of the Hart inquiry, to the testimony of Vice Admiral Smith. Question 81:

What do you know about their combat efficiency, particularly as regards personnel?
Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it. That was based upon our observation during Fleet Operations, when their Flying Fortresses would come over at almost smoke-stack level, and showed an utter disregard for possible anti-aircraft fire. In the operations between our planes and theirs, our aviators, possibly [9429] prejudiced, expressed the opinion that they were not very good.

I was wondering if that feeling prevailed so that it would prevent calling on the Army to help in reconnaissance. It certainly did not with you, did it?

Admiral Bellinger. I knew that reconnaissance requires special training; it requires training which the Army had not utilized very much because it was not considered part of the job that they were going to do; at least, they had not undertaken it. Therefore, I did not think that the Army could do very much in assisting in long-range reconnaissance. It took some time after December the 7th for them to train their crews sufficiently to be really effective. That was shown up actually after December the 7th, when they did assist in the reconnaissance around Oahu.

Mr. Murphy. Did you know, Admiral, that when Kurusu was on his way to the States to participate in the conferences in Washington that his plane landed at Midway?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you believe that the plane had really broken down?

Admiral Bellinger. I don't know, but I was directed to have two planes to bring him to Oahu in case the Pan American plane was not made ready in time.

[9430] Mr. Murphy. You decided to let him wait there, didn't you? You did not use the planes, did you?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. He came finally by Pan American.

[9431] Mr. Murphy. At any rate, on his way to America Kurusu's plane appeared apparently to be disabled and did land at Midway for some time, did it not?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. I have been told Kurusu was kept in the hotel there, and I have also been told that the Marine guard, every time they moved, went around the building three times.

Mr. Murphy. Did you have called to your attention, Admiral, the fact that the Army, on November 5, had a new operating procedure order? Admiral Kimmel apparently did not know of it and I was wondering if you did.

Admiral Bellinger. The one with reference to one, two, and three alerts?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I do not think I knew of that, or the details of it. I would not normally know of the details of it, so I do not think I did know of it.

Mr. Murphy. For a long time the Army had only one kind of an alert, and then they had three alerts and they sent copies to the Navy?

Admiral Bellinger. I do not think they sent me a copy. If I knew about it, it was from conversation with General Martin.

Mr. Murphy. There has been some testimony here that [0432] the Japanese knew about the workings of our radars. The fact is that the radar at the Opana station did detect the Japanese at dis-
tances of 132 miles. If the Japanese were aware of our radar functioning that morning, would they have been at a sufficient height in the air for radar to have detected them at 132 miles?

Admiral Bellinger. The high altitude bombing planes—and they were I assume between eight and ten thousand feet when they made their attack—probably would have been detected. The torpedo planes, according to my information, assembled at very low altitudes and made their approach at a very low altitude, and they probably would not have been detected that far by radar.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to just ask one question. Do we have available any Navy exhibit showing the damage to the Arizona? I understood you to say this morning that the damage to the Arizona was from torpedoes.

Admiral Bellinger. This was the first attack on the Arizona, and I assume that there were three torpedoes that hit the Arizona, merely from seeing these three planes pass over the Arizona.

Mr. Murphy. I just wanted to check it.

Admiral Bellinger. And immediately afterward a tremendous explosion.

[9433] Mr. Murphy. I just wanted to check with the actual records so we will have it straight. I believe there were some bombs.

Admiral Bellinger. There may have been bombs, in addition.

Mr. Murphy. I do not know. Do you have that, Counsel?

Let me ask two other questions, Admiral. You did prepare, did you not, a report, which is in the record as exhibit No. 120, dated December 19, 1941, a memorandum for information for Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir, I have it right here.

Mr. Murphy. Did you prepare that report then at the request of Admiral Kimmel, as to what occurred on December 7 and immediately thereafter?

Admiral Bellinger. I am not sure whether it was made at his request or not, but I made it up for him.

Mr. Murphy. And that was your judgment, as of that date, as to what actually occurred at that time?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; that was the situation as I knew about it on that day.

Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, in regard to the Arizona, the Navy report is that she was hit by one or more aircraft torpedoes and about eight heavy bombs.

I have no other questions.


The Senator indicates that he is willing to yield to Congressman Keefe.

Senator Ferguson. I am willing to yield to Congressman Keefe. He is always on the end.

The Chairman. Congressman, the Chair takes great pleasure in recognizing you.

Senator Lucas. I want to remind the Congressman it is a quarter of 4.

Mr. Keefe. Do I understand this is just a temporary yielding or does that end the examination?

The Chairman. No, no; I cannot guarantee anything of that kind.
Senator Ferguson. I will take what is left.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you can take it all, because it will be very brief. Admiral, I listened carefully to your testimony and I am interested in certain ultimate facts. From listening to your testimony I gained certain impressions, and I want to ascertain whether they are in accord with what you have testified.

You were a task force commander prior to December 7, in charge of the reconnaissance planes; is that right?

Admiral Bellinger. They were called patrol planes.

[9435] Mr. Keefe. We will call them patrol planes, then.

Admiral Bellinger. We expected to use them for anything and everything we could.

Mr. Keefe. As such you were not a member of the staff of the Commander in Chief, Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Bellinger. I was not a member of his staff.

Mr. Keefe. And as such you were not given information as to the so-called warning messages that were sent to Admiral Kimmel from Washington?

Admiral Bellinger. I was not given those warnings; no, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you had no information concerning those until after the attack?

Admiral Bellinger. Not until after the attack.

Mr. Keefe. Am I correct in the assumption that you had sufficient planes at Pearl Harbor on December 7, and prior thereto, for a period of at least a week, to have enabled you to conduct long-range reconnaissance to the north for a period of a week?

Admiral Bellinger. I would say “yes” to that question.

Mr. Keefe. I understand that you, yourself, as a task force commander, would not put into effect the provisions of the Martin-Bellinger plan for long-range reconnaissance without an order from the commander in chief, except in case of an emergency. Is that your testimony?

[9436] Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Therefore, do I understand your testimony to be that the reason there was no long-range reconnaissance in the sector to the north in the week preceding Pearl Harbor is because you had received no order from the commander in chief to effect or carry out such reconnaissance?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. I understand your testimony also to be—and you may correct me if I am in error—that as an air man familiar with the situation in Hawaii you were in agreement with Admiral Davis that the greatest possibility of a successful air attack lay in an attack coming in from the sector to the north because of the prevailing wind conditions; is that right?

Admiral Bellinger. That is practically correct; yes, sir. You have got to utilize the conditions as you find them at the time when you make the attack, and the prevailing wind was normally about 65° or 70° coming from that direction.

Mr. Keefe. I understand your testimony to be in order to recapture your planes you have to head into the wind.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So if planes were launched downwind—
Admiral Bellinger. (interposing). Into the wind.
Mr. Keefe. They were launched into the wind?
Mr. Keefe. Now when they leave the carrier they would come
downwind, would they not? I am not an air expert, but I have been
following your testimony. When they come back onto the carrier
they have to land into the wind; is that correct, or am I in error?
Admiral Bellinger. They take off and land with the carrier heading
into the wind.
Mr. Keefe. Then the carrier turns around when they take off to
head into the wind?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Keefe. If the prevailing wind is down toward Oahu and they
are assembled up to the northwest, then when they take off they
take off into the wind and circle and come down; is that right?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Keefe. So the best opportunity to get away is when the car-
rriers are headed out away from Oahu and the planes can be recaptured
by the carrier heading right into the wind?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Is that right?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That is, as I understood, your plan set out [9438]
in the Martin-Bellinger Report. You set that out, did you not?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir, that is not in that report.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I got it from some place else. I would not be
surprised if I misunderstood what the report might be. At any rate,
whether it is in the report or whether it is not, that is a fact, isn't it?
Admiral Bellinger. That is a fact; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You do not make any complaint today because you were
not made aware of the messages that were received by the commander
in chief, do you, Admiral?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. My recollection of this war-warning message is that
at the end an injunction was laid upon the commander in chief to
distribute it only to certain restricted essential officers. Do you
remember that?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I think it was left to his own discre-
ption, but I know nothing about that.
Mr. Keefe. Isn't that in the record? I have forgotten.
Admiral Bellinger. I think you are correct on some messages, but
I am not familiar with them enough to answer.
Mr. Keefe. I guess that is right. That would be the Army mes-
sage. That was General Short.
Then am I to see this picture from your testimony to the effect
that here is a task force commander in command of [9439] patrol planes who isn't given any information at all as to what is going
on in the international situation and in the relations with Japan except
what you got from the newspapers, perhaps, while you were lying
sick in bed 4 or 5 days before the 7th of December; that no long-dis-
tance reconnaissance is ordered at all, some people claiming that that
could not be effected because of lack of personnel and lack of planes,
but you are of the opinion that if there had been a utilization of the
patrol planes that were available it could have been carried on for at least a week.

Admiral Bellinger. I think it could have, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And effectively covered the arc from which you, as an Air Force commander, at all times believed an air attack on Hawaii would come. Do I so understand it to be your testimony?

Admiral Bellinger. It could have covered that particular arc; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Narrowing this matter down, if I interpret your testimony correctly—and if I am in error you can challenge me, Admiral—the failure to conduct a long-range reconnaissance which was, under the circumstances existent on December 7 at Pearl Harbor, practically the only way in which an attacking force of carriers could be discovered, rested entirely with the commander in chief and his staff, [9440] and until an order came from the commander in chief you would not, as a task force commander, control the planes to effect such reconnaissance, is that correct?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, did you have a conversation with Admiral Smith in relation to the Kurusu plane at Midway?

Admiral Bellinger. I am not sure whether it was Admiral Smith or who it was. I got the message from someone, from the commander in chief, Pacific, to have two planes out there in case they were needed.

Senator Ferguson. Let me refresh your memory. Admiral Smith was asked this question on page 52 of the Hart Board, No. 147:

This particular dispatch [indicating exhibit 8] is different from all other warnings received previously in that the words "war warning" were used. What was your own reaction to those particular words?

He answers this way:

My reaction was we knew that negotiations were still going on; Mr. Kurusu had flown through a few days before; we were in great doubt as to what was happening. Mr. [9441] Kurusu's plane broke down in Midway. Admiral Bellinger called up at night and asked permission to fly him on in a PBY, and I said "No, it may be that the plane was told by the administration to break down. They know more what's going on than we do. Let him stay there."

Did you have a conversation like that with Admiral Smith?

Admiral Bellinger. I do not remember that; no, sir. I remember a conversation with reference to Kurusu and with reference to bringing him from Midway to Pearl. I do not remember that any of my organization suggested it in any way.

Now in connection with the two planes standing by to bring him, one being an escort plane, as I remember now, they were sent out there to stand by to bring him back. The question was evidently whether to bring him or let him wait for the Pan American plane which appeared to be about to be fixed.

Senator Ferguson. Why were you concerned about bringing him? Why did you want to get him to Washington?

Admiral Bellinger. I was not concerned about him at all, except I was told by the commander in chief, as I remember now, to furnish these planes to bring him. The question was whether they should sit there waiting for him to make [9442] up his mind and wait
for the Pan American, or to bring him right away. I had no reason to get him to Honolulu or anywhere.

Senator Ferguson. At least you did not fly the PBY?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now you have in your statement here something that I would like to have cleared up. You say:

As pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger estimate, the problem of when to place the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a functioning status resolved itself into one of timing with respect to the current status of our relations with Japan, and required specific information as to the probability of an air attack within rather narrow time limits.

Now what do you mean by "rather narrow time limits"?

Admiral Bellinger. For instance, the question comes up now could we have covered a sector or could we have covered 360°; "for how long could you cover 360°, and for how long could you cover a sector of about 90°?" The only definite assurance of early information of an air attack is by covering 360°, and—

Senator Ferguson. Now take that answer—
The Chairman. I do not think he finished his answer, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Did you want to go on?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Admiral Bellinger. So that if you were going to cover 360° it is going to come down to a question of a very few days. If it is going to come to the question of a sector of 90° even, that is going to cause a reduction in your forces sooner or later.

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it better, in case of an anticipated attack, to use what you have even though you are not able to use the full 360°?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir, that is perfectly true.

Senator Ferguson. Then why consider the question of 360° when we did not have enough planes for 360°?

Admiral Bellinger. In an estimate of the situation you are trying to work this out so as to weigh all the situations; 360° on an island is the only way you can make sure that there is not a force coming in. Actually for months after Pearl Harbor, December 7, we endeavored to have 360° covered from Oahu.

Senator Ferguson. Is this the trouble, that we were trying to work from a war plan which said that the absolute way was to cover 360°, and if we could not work from the war plan we were not going to work at all?

Admiral Bellinger. Oh, no, sir; that is not the idea. The estimate can only figure on a basis of 360°, otherwise where is the attack going to come from? If you do not put the 360° in what are you going to put in? The idea is to stop the raid.

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it a question of trying to figure out where he may come from? Isn't that part of your Intelligence system?

Admiral Bellinger. That is part of it, and that was the plan as devolved from this estimate later with reference to where we put the first available planes, and if we had no more, why, that was all.

Senator Ferguson. Now did you consider in any plan that if you did not have enough planes for 360° and we were in that condition up to the time we were going to war—that you would use the planes that you did have? Did we have any war plan on such a basis?
Admiral Bellinger. The war plans called for planes to be on Wake, Midway, Palmyra, Johnston, and Oahu.

Senator Ferguson. On Oahu?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any war plan that called for anything less, on long-distance reconnaissance, than 360°, the entire circle?

Admiral Bellinger. Why, certainly. The operating plan called for planes as they were available.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you have a plan that said if war was imminent you would conduct a reconnaissance in the segment north, into the vacant sea?

Admiral Bellinger. I am not sure. I haven’t a copy of this latest subsidiary plan that was gotten out over my signature. I do not know whether that is available or not. I was discussing the other day with my operations officer if he remembered whether or not that northwest sector was put down in that plan as a vital sector. He thought it was. I am not sure. That was a question in our minds anyway, if not definitely on paper.

Senator Ferguson. Now isn’t this true, that your plan with General Martin covered a 360° reconnaissance?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And it did not cover any particular segment in case you did not have enough to go on 360°?

Admiral Bellinger. Well, that is down in black and white. If you have got something and haven’t got enough you will do what you can with what you have got.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Did you have a plan to do what you could with what you had?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; that is exactly what I read out this morning. The first sector was from north around to west to be covered by the first available planes.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then I will ask you this: If you did not know where these carriers were, why did not you send your planes up in that direction, with the first planes that you got off the ground, to locate these carriers?

Admiral Bellinger. On December 7?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. That is what was done.

Senator Ferguson. Will you get me the evidence that you sent them up north? You sent one up north.

Admiral Bellinger. It is in my statement this morning, I thought very clearly.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us what time you sent them up there, up to the north?

Admiral Bellinger. The three patrol planes 14 P–1, 2, and 3 on early morning security search were assigned a search sector between north and northwest. Those were the first ones available.

Senator Ferguson. What time was that?

Admiral Bellinger. That was about 8 o’clock, or 8:05 when they got the message, according to my information.

Senator Ferguson. 8:05, and the attack took place at 7:55.
Admiral Bellinger. Now there is a little hitch in that.

Senator Ferguson. I want to get the hitch out of it. Let us know what happened.

Admiral Bellinger. These three planes were assigned this north to northwest sector and proceeded on search. After the first phase of the attack Patrol Wing 1 reported two planes at Kaneohe available for immediate operation and was directed to send these two planes on a northwesterly sector.

Senator Ferguson. That is another search?

Admiral Bellinger. That is another besides those three?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. One second. Before these could be dispatched another Japanese attack put them out of commission.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. At about the same time communications between Kaneohe and Pearl were knocked out. Patrol Wing 1 on own initiative diverted the two planes then on that northerly sector, that is, the 1 and 3, to cover a westerly sector because of the loss of the two planes originally detailed.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Admiral Bellinger. In an effort to comply with instructions.

[9448] Senator Ferguson. Then they violated the war plan that you and Martin had drawn up, because your first one was to be to the north?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. They may have violated it but not with the idea of violating, because they were not controlling the plan. They were carrying out orders from the patrol wing to headquarters.

Senator Ferguson. But the headquarters policy was to send them in another direction. How do you account for the fact, if this map is correct, of these carriers, six of them, and their task force, as being 200 miles north of Hawaii, if you had these planes and if you did have them sent up there, that you did not see these carriers?

I think from the data we have now they were 200 miles out, that is where they were stationed when their planes took off.

Admiral Bellinger. This diversion of those two planes removed two planes from the sector where the Japanese task force was later determined to be near.

Senator Ferguson. Could I have that answer read?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

[9449] Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that someone at headquarters diverted the two planes and that if they hadn't been diverted, they would have located the task force?

Admiral Bellinger. I wouldn't say they would have, but it was in that area.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, who was the man that diverted those two planes?

Admiral Bellinger. The Patrol Wing 1 organization.

Senator Ferguson. What?

Admiral Bellinger. Over Kaneohe.
Senator Ferguson. What about the one plane that kept going up, how do you account for not seeing those planes going back to the carrier and landing?

Admiral Bellinger. They didn't see it go.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever see this radar chart, where these planes came down and they caught them at 302, and they came straight down, and we found planes going straight back to the north?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I never saw that before.

Senator Ferguson. Well—

Admiral Bellinger. I would like to elaborate on a question of this morning, if I may, in connection with this general subject.

I understand that my operations officer, Captain Ramsey, made a statement that he had telephoned and he thought I had telephoned to the Army on December 7 with reference to the radar detection on those planes going north after they had left.

Now, in the plan for the carrying out of this Naval Base Defense Air Force in the event of a raid, there were planes assigned by the Army to follow the carrier planes back with the idea that this radar existed at this time, which it didn't, when this was made out. And so I was interested in trying to find out where these planes went to.

Commander Ramsey was also.

He says I telephoned over to Army headquarters to find out about it. I don't know whether I did or not. I don't remember doing it now, but I did ask him questions to find out where they went. We did not get information from the radar at that time that planes went north to the carrier.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any communication, any means of communication to the radar station?

Admiral Bellinger. Only through the Army.

[9451] Senator Ferguson. Only through the Army?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. You had to go through headquarters?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It turns up that the Army had this chart, and knew about it. How do you account for your not getting it?

Admiral Bellinger. I don't know.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know the radars were not supposed to be working that morning?

Admiral Bellinger. I was surprised that they were working that morning.

Senator Ferguson. Why would you be surprised that the radar was working?

Admiral Bellinger. Because I didn't think they were set up and ready to go.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you didn't even know that the Island had radar?

Admiral Bellinger. Oh, I knew that the radar was being installed, we were very interested in that.

Senator Ferguson. But you didn't know they had actually the radar working?

Admiral Bellinger. No, I didn't know it was actually working that morning.
[9452] Senator Ferguson. At any time did you know it was working before that?

Admiral Bellinger. I knew that they were establishing their system and the radar had been set up, and the individual radars were working, yes, but the system had to be set up to make it work intelligently, and they were in the process of putting that into effect.

Senator Ferguson. Well, that isn't quite an answer to my question. My question is, did you know prior to the 7th that radar was established on the Island?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, why didn't you get in touch with the radar stations to ascertain if they had picked up anything coming in or going out?

Admiral Bellinger. It would have been impossible to have gotten in touch with the radar station. You have got to go through the Army headquarters to get in touch with it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you have to call General Short?

Admiral Bellinger. General Martin, General Martin's office.

Senator Ferguson. Why didn't you call General Martin to find out what he had from his radar? That was one of the greatest instruments we had, wasn't it?

Admiral Bellinger. I am not positive I didn't do it. I talked to Martin that day twice. I think I did, as a matter of fact. I am not saying positively I did or not.

I could have also gotten that information from the Air Combat, the fighter commander. He had that—General Davidson was the one that was in charge of the interceptor.

Senator Ferguson. Well, we come down to this, that you did not get any news about any radar on the 7th?

Admiral Bellinger. No, we did not not; at least I did not.

Senator Ferguson. You were in command?

Admiral Bellinger. I was in command of the long-range reconnaissance, and this striking force.

Senator Ferguson. Now, part of the duty of the striking force would be to go out and get these carriers?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; we wanted to know about that; that was our main effort then.

Senator Ferguson. The reconnaissance would be to locate them, so you had the most important force, as far as intercepting this task force was concerned; is that not true?

Admiral Bellinger. That is true.

Senator Ferguson. You don't remember now that you ever [9453] made any inquiry as to what radar showed?

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. If he had asked General Davidson, General Davidson couldn't tell him. He didn't know.

Admiral Bellinger. You are trying to get me to say something definite describing my action. I probably did. I don't know. I know I wanted that information. I took it up with my operations officers to see if he couldn't get it too. We were both trying to figure how we could get that information.

Whether I talked personally, I am not sure. We were trying to get the information.
Senator Ferguson. How far would your headquarters be from where this information would be?
Admiral Bellinger. About 6 miles.
Senator Ferguson. And the first attack was at 7:55. When was the last one?
Admiral Bellinger. It lasted about 2 hours.
Senator Ferguson. About 2 hours.
So you had 2 hours time there to try to locate where this task force was?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. If they have got the information coming in there is the question of getting the [2455] information. It is 2 hours then, yes, but the getting of the information is only while the planes are in motion, coming from and going to.
Senator Ferguson. Well, is this true, that you had an untrained Navy there as far as getting intelligence from radar? Is that true, that you didn’t know how to use radar, you had it but you didn’t know that it was operating and you didn’t know whether it was operating that morning?
Admiral Bellinger. The radar installations, the whole set-up was an Army project.
Senator Ferguson. Then do we come—
Admiral Bellinger. The Navy did have radar on some of their ships. As a matter of fact that question has been discussed with reference to the use of that radar, when it could be used, and where it could be used.
Senator Ferguson. What was the answer?
Admiral Bellinger. There were certain sectors, certain places in Pearl Harbor where it could work.
Senator Ferguson. Would it work in the sector here [indicating chart]?
Admiral Bellinger. It would have to work in a sector to the south, to the southward, on account of the hills, et cetera.
Senator Ferguson. You are talking about the ship radar?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the Army radar.
Admiral Bellinger. What I meant was that the ship radar augmented and could augment Army radar when it was in a place where it could be used.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did the Army have radio to the Navy airplanes and did the Navy airplanes have radio to the Army airplanes?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. In other words—
Admiral Bellinger. The communication to the Navy planes was by Navy and the Army planes by the Army, and if the Navy wanted to send information to any Army planes, the information was telephoned over and they sent it.
[2457] Senator Ferguson. Then I understand that if the communications center had wanted to know, desired to know whether those were Army planes up to the north that morning the Army would have to get in touch with the Army, and if they desired to know whether they were Navy planes they would have to call the Navy?
Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And you could not communicate—

Admiral Bellinger. There was no set-up at that time for the control of all planes to keep knowledge of that kind.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did we have such a system that the planes of the Navy had no communication with the Army radio? Is that where we stand on the 7th?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Why was that true? Was that coordination? Admiral Bellinger. That was the situation. The Army did not control Navy and Navy did not control Army.

Senator Ferguson. I understand.

Admiral Bellinger. And, as a matter of fact, even up until about 2 months after December the 7th did we work out a situation whereby the Army planes on long-range scouting could be communicated with directly from my headquarters. Now, that had to be worked out and, as I say, it took about 2 months to do that.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Was that due to lack of material and manpower?

Admiral Bellinger. That is a difficult thing to say. I would say no, it was not.

Senator Ferguson. What was it due to? Because the two departments did not coordinate?

Admiral Bellinger. Primarily that, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how do you account for the Army and the Navy expecting war and no cooperation to the extent that you could communicate from the ground to both the Army and the Navy planes in each of the Army and Navy set-ups?

Admiral Bellinger. Well, that is very easily explained.

Senator Ferguson. All right, explain it.

Admiral Bellinger. There was one and there was another. One force was working under the Navy Department and one was working under the War Department. They were two separate entities.

Senator Ferguson. And do I understand that you thought that war was imminent?

Admiral Bellinger. I thought war was coming.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how far away?

Admiral Bellinger. Well, that was a question which I was very much interested in.

[9458] Senator Ferguson. Well, you were out there on the ground.

Admiral Bellinger. When I went out there in 1940 I felt that it was coming. It was a question how soon.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, you knew in 1940 that war was coming; it was a question of how soon. Then why didn’t you get into a condition so that you would have one command on that small island?

Admiral Bellinger. I would like to ask you how I was going to do that.

Senator Ferguson. Then I will ask you. I won’t answer you but I will ask you.

Admiral Bellinger. I brought that subject up, too.

Senator Ferguson. All right.
Admiral Bellinger. I mean in Oahu.

Senator Ferguson. Why couldn't it be done? You give me the facts.

Admiral Bellinger. I think you are in a much better position than I am. I have been watching this.

Senator Ferguson. It could be done. You did it after Pearl Harbor, didn't you?

Admiral Bellinger. Unity of command was placed in effect very shortly after Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, could someone of the superiors in Washington in the Army and Navy cause that to be done.

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir, I should think so.

Senator Ferguson. There is no doubt about that, is there?

Admiral Bellinger. I don't think there is any doubt about it. There might have been some objections raised; I don't know.

The Chairman. May I ask there, Senator? Could that have been done in Oahu without referring it to Washington, under what they had as an agreement as to the cooperation between the Army and Navy forces out there?

Admiral Bellinger. I don't believe it could have been.

The Chairman. You do not.

Admiral Bellinger. At least I know I discussed this same subject with Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. I want to just—

Mr. Murphy. There is evidence in the record that it could be done in Oahu.

Admiral Bellinger. It could be?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, very definite evidence.

Senator Ferguson. I want to read his answer now.

Mr. Murphy. There is also evidence that they talked for 4 or 5 days on some little island.

Senator Ferguson. Were you asked this question:

If a message had been relayed to the Army that an enemy submarine had been sunk, would that have placed your air operating plan in effect?

Now, this answer is not clear to me and that is the reason I am going to read it. [Reading:]

I doubt it. I think it would have required some higher authority in the Army to place it in effect. Now, in order to amplify that statement, I would like to refer to an air raid drill which was planned by the Army subsequent to the Joint estimate and orders issued setting up the air defense plan. During one night, prior to the operations for the next day, I received a message stating that the Bomber Command was no longer subject to the order of Commander, Naval Base Defense, and also prepared a letter for the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to General Short, trying
to straighten this out. In other words, to place the plan for air defense into effect evidently required authorization from higher Army authority for each instance. My letter, just referred to, was designed to correct that situation.

Did you ever correct the situation?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When was this?
Admiral Bellinger. Within limitations. It did not actually bring about a coordination like was necessary or unity of command like was necessary, but we did not have that same situation come up again.

Senator Ferguson. When had this happened at five o’clock in the morning that you tried to get this straightened out? Do you know about what month or what part of the month?
Admiral Bellinger. It happened about July; July 1941.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you told us this morning that your intelligence officer knew about these war warnings.
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Whose intelligence officer?
[9463] Admiral Bellinger. An intelligence officer of the naval air station, who was attached to the district but he was on the air station.

Senator Ferguson. Didn’t you have access to him?
Admiral Bellinger. I had access to him by sending for him and he came. He was not under me, not part of my command, no.

Senator Ferguson. When did you send for him?
Admiral Bellinger. I sent for him when I heard that there was or had been a warning message of some description and he was supposed to have known about it and he was the one that gave information to this officer who was in my command.

Senator Ferguson. Well, on the sixth you have told us that there was peace in Hawaii.
Admiral Bellinger. Peace with Japan.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Well, between whom was the war going on in Hawaii?
Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me.

Senator Ferguson. You indicate then that there was war in Hawaii between some other people, not Japan. Who was it between?
Admiral Bellinger. I don’t know exactly what you mean.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I took your answer when you said “peace with Japan”——
[9464] Admiral Bellinger. That is what I meant, what I was referring to. We were at peace with Japan, that is all.

Senator Ferguson. All right. And you did not anticipate any war that morning?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It was the farthest thing from your mind probably, is that right?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. He was thinking about his sore throat.

Senator Ferguson. If you would have had more air fields in Hawaii—you said something about you did not have space for your planes. Were you crowded for air space?

Admiral Bellinger. Let me go back to that. The planes that I am speaking about are seaplanes, great big two-motored seaplanes.
which come out of the water, come up a concrete ramp and are pulled up a concrete platform and you have got to keep them on that or else you cannot handle them.

Senator Ferguson. Was the Navy ready for war on the 6th and 7th of December 1941 as far as Hawaii was concerned—Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Bellinger. Ready for war?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. I would say "No," neither was any other place in the United States.

[9465] Senator Ferguson. And you are definite that in that month, that we were not ready for war in Hawaii?

Admiral Bellinger. When I say "ready for war" I mean in every way that they are supposed to be ready. I do not mean just merely the individual but I mean in the over-all picture.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have enough of equipment?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then as I understand it, you were not ready for war.

Admiral Bellinger. That is what I said; we were not ready for war.

Senator Ferguson. And you did not expect it?

Admiral Bellinger. I did not expect it then; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. May I ask this question?

Admiral, we were still getting ready for war a month before and a day before the war ended, weren't we, still getting more prepared?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; we were.

Mr. Murphy. Did you ever see a commander who felt that he had what he would have liked to have to fight the enemy and feel perfectly satisfied, fully satisfied?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; but there are times that you like to get at the enemy with what you have got.

[9466] Mr. Murphy. Now, I would like to say this: The question was asked of you why didn't you call the interceptor command? The evidence in that regard is that General Short did not have this information at least until the day after, that Admiral Kimmel did not know it until at least the day after and if you called General Davidson he would not know and if you had called the interceptor command, unless Lieutenant Tyler was there to tell you, you would not be able to find out, either him or McDonald.

Senator Lucas. May I ask one question?

The Vice Chairman. Were you through, Senator Ferguson?

Senator Ferguson. No, I had a question, but go ahead, Senator.

Senator Lucas. Admiral Bellinger, what did you understand by the war warning message of November 27, 1941, sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel when Admiral Stark advised Admiral Kimmel to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46"? What does that mean to you? What would that mean to you?

Admiral Bellinger. Of course, now it would mean a great deal different than it might have meant then and that is one of those questions that your guess is as good as mine now.
Senator Lucas. Well, what did the Navy Department have in mind when they said, "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment"? What did that mean to you as a part of the force out there?

Admiral Bellinger. Well, "deployment" means to place units.

Senator Lucas. What would you do with your planes under that sort of an order?

(No response.)

Senator Lucas. You don't know?

Admiral Bellinger. That is a question, of course, that I could say I might have done anything, I could have done anything, but what does it mean now? I am not an individual that wants to say what I am going to do or what I could have done.

Senator Lucas. I understand.

Admiral Bellinger. I am perfectly willing to stand on what I do.

Senator Lucas. Assuming that you had seen General Marshall's message, which went to Admiral Kimmel, where they directed long-range reconnaissance in his message—you are familiar with that?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Take Marshall's message and take Stark's message and construe them together. What would you have done with your planes?

Admiral Bellinger. Well, it does say, "Make a reconnaissance." I have forgotten whether it said "long-range" or not.

Senator Lucas. Well, "make a reconnaissance," I think is what it says, "that you deem necessary." "Make such reconnaissance as you deem necessary," I think is the way it reads.

Senator Lucas. Take Marshall's message and take Stark's message of Admiral Stark's, which starts out, "This is a war warning and take appropriate defensive deployment", a combination of the two of them. What would that tell you as a man that had charge of the patrol and long-range planes? Don't you scratch your head too hard over that one.

Admiral Bellinger. Well, I see you are trying to get me to make an answer which—

Senator Lucas. No, if you cannot make an answer I don't want you to.

Admiral Bellinger (continuing). I don't think I can do. As I say, I am not going to make an answer as to saying what I might have done or what I would have done because this is 4 years since it happened. As I say, I would like to think I would have taken the appropriate action immediately.

Senator Lucas. Yes. I appreciate that it is a most difficult question for you to answer and the only reason—

Admiral Bellinger. I cannot answer it.

Senator Lucas (continuing). That I place that question before you, sir, is in view of the fact that you desired to have before the committee the fact that you did not have any of these messages and I presumed that you would want us to interrogate you just a little bit upon that fact because you told us that you did not see any of these messages and it would give me some indication that you thought somebody should have given them to you, otherwise you would not have told the committee that.
Admiral Bellinger. Well, I assumed you would have asked me if I had not told you.

Senator Lucas. Well, that may be true.

Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, I did not state that in any statement.

Senator Lucas. I will not press the question, sir.

Mr. Murphy. May I ask one question?

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson has some questions to ask at this time.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, I would like to read to you the last sentence:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, comma, repeat not, comma, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

Would that have made any difference with that in it?

Admiral Bellinger. I think all modifications have a bearing on the general thought.

[9477] Senator Ferguson. One or two more questions. You got out a letter on November 19, a revised schedule for remainder of the second quarter fiscal year. Did that carry through December, November and December?

Admiral Bellinger. That was going on in December, yes.

Mr. Murphy. 1941?

Senator Ferguson. That is Exhibit 113-C. Now that would cover November and December?

Admiral Bellinger. That covers a part of November and December. I believe I am correct in that.

Mr. Murphy. 1941?

Admiral Bellinger. It covers a part of November and December.

The Vice Chairman. What year?

Admiral Bellinger. 1941.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Kimmel approved that, did he not?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. He approved it on November 22, 1941?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Then we have charts in the back of that indicating what you did with certain planes.


Senator Ferguson. Now, was there any alteration of that after you had it approved by Admiral Kimmel? Did you make any changes in the schedule?

Admiral Bellinger. Not to my knowledge; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. There were no changes at all?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have.

Admiral Bellinger. Except this; to be technically correct, patrol squadron 22 came back on the 5th of December.

Senator Ferguson. But that was under a specific order?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy has a question.

Mr. Murphy. I was just going to say in conclusion, Admiral, that I am not asking you to place yourself in Admiral Kimmel's position with all of the material he had through the months, but, as I take it,
since you were an air officer, and air-minded, if there was a discussion about the possibility of an attack on Hawaii, your mind would have been that it would be from the air and there was danger of the attack coming from the air?

Admiral Bellinger. If there was danger of an attack [9473] on Hawaii, I would expect it to come from the air.

Mr. Murphy. That is right.

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything?

Mr. Richardson. No.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have any further information that you feel could be of assistance to this committee in considering the question here under consideration?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I do not think I can add anything more to it.

The Vice Chairman. Do you have any other evidence that you desire to present?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. On behalf of the committee I want to thank you for your appearance, the information you have given the committee, and your apparent desire to be helpful to us in this inquiry.

Admiral Bellinger. Thank you very much. I appreciate the committee's consideration.

The Vice Chairman. You may now be excused with the thanks of the committee.

Admiral Bellinger. Thank you very much, sir.

(The witness was excused.)

The Vice Chairman. The committee will now adjourn until 10 o'clock in the morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m. January 31, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a.m., Friday, February 1, 1946.)
PEAHL HARBOR*ATTACK

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION,
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will be in order.

When the examination of Admiral Smith was suspended the other day, Mr. Murphy was in the process of examining, so you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. WILLIAM WARD SMITH, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Admiral Smith. Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief statement, sir?

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Smith. In connection with the length of the meeting between Admiral Kimmel and Captain Zacharias, when I last took the stand the chairman remarked on the fact that Admiral Kimmel had agreed that the meeting was an hour and a half long, and I had said 15 minutes. I have searched the record of Admiral Kimmel's testimony, and I cannot find that anywhere he mentioned any time.

However, sometime prior to his testimony, in the presence of two or more members of his staff, the legal staff, he told me that the meeting was, as he placed it, not more than 30 minutes.

The Chairman. I was speaking from memory when I was quoting him.

Admiral Smith. Yes. I would like to make a brief statement of fact to the committee in connection with the berthing system at Pearl Harbor. I believe this is pertinent to the testimony of two witnesses whom I have heard, and possibly to that of more whom I did not hear.

General Marshall, when asked how long it would take for the fleet to sortie from Pearl Harbor, qualified his answer by stating it depended on whether the ships were headed in or out. Captain McCol­lum in his testimony——
Mr. Keeffe (interposing). May I inquire, you said General Marshall? Did I understand you correctly?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; General Marshall. He was asked the question, "Had the message gone through, how long would it take the fleet to go out?" Captain McCollum, in discussing what is now called the bomb plot message, where Pearl Harbor is divided into five sections, five areas, said possibly because in some of those areas ships were headed in while in others they were headed out.

Now, anywhere in Pearl Harbor, to turn a big ship, battleship, or carrier, results in a temporary blocking of the passage. For that reason, and to facilitate very quick sortie, either day or night, all big ships throughout the period of Admiral Kimmel's command, all big ships, on entering Pearl Harbor, were turned around and pointed out before they were moored. That reduced the tugboat operations in getting them clear. All other ships, cruisers, and destroyers, were nested between buoys and they were enabled to get out without the use of tugs, and as all ships could pass on either side of Ford Island, there was no difficulty on the part of the light forces in getting clear when the battleships were leaving their moorings.

Like Captain McCollum, I was once a fleet operations officer and I know that when the fleet went to Pearl Harbor once per year, or once in 2 years, it was a staff study proposition to get the fleet into Pearl Harbor and practically an all-day job to get them out.

We had been working in 1941 in and out of Pearl Harbor so much that we could clear the entire fleet in about 3 hours. The only limit to getting them out was the fact that they had to go in single file through the channel entrance, and that the speed was limited to 12 knots. Beyond that, in shallow water, the light forces pulled such a wave that they would have wrecked everything on the beach on both sides.

But there was never any difficulty in sortieing and, as I said, the big ships were always headed out.

[9478] The Chairman. Go ahead, Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Smith, you testified, did you not, before Admiral Hart?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I direct your attention to page 38 of the testimony, your testimony before Admiral Hart. At that time you were asked this question:

What was the result in your opinion, of these personnel and matériel shortages on the training program—the efficiency of the training program of the fleet?

Answer, I think it did not lower the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet. As a matter of fact the complements had just been revised, and I have always felt that they were unnecessarily large. The fleet was adequately manned, and I consider the ships very efficient, and the efficiency of the fleet was not harmed by this; but the Commander in Chief was looking into the future when he would have to send these men home for new construction.

Were you asked that question, and did you make that answer?

Admiral Smith. That is correct. If I may do so, I would like to modify it slightly.

I will say that I went into the Hart Board absolutely cold. In the year immediately following Pearl Harbor, I [9479] was at sea practically all the time, with six different flagships from the Coral Sea through Midway, and 6 months in the Aleutians.
At the time I was called before the Hart Board I had a busy wartime job, and since I never kept a diary, I had no papers to refresh my memory. I believe my testimony, now that I have had a chance to think about it, is probably better than it was then—on the other hand, it may be worse. In either case, I stand responsible for my testimony.

As to the efficiency of the fleet, I did believe that the complements as revised were larger than necessary at that time because we had not received the additional antiaircraft guns and radar and many things that we needed.

The fleet was in a very efficient condition. We had the highest type of men I have ever seen in this Navy at that time. They learned quickly.

I believe what is meant in men being demanded more and more, it required more constant training: whereas if you had a crew that is well experienced, every man knows his station, and knows what to do, you do not require this constant day and night training that you have to have.

Very few officers had ever seen one of these permanent crews.

[9480] I had one on one occasion for 2 years, which makes all the difference in the world. We did not have it then. But the efficiency of the fleet was not impaired by the turn-over, in my opinion.

Mr. Murphy. You were also asked this question:

Q. Did that condition ever develop prior to the 7th of December whereby the Fleet was reduced due to transfers to new construction?
A. No, it did not; not below the level necessary.

And again, question 47:

Q. Did any of these matters affect the maintenance of the Fleet and the efficient condition of maintenance of materiel?
A. No. Units of the Fleet were sent to the Coast shortly before Admiral Kimmel assumed his duties of Commander in Chief for degaussing and the installation of armor—what do you call it, splinter armor around the decks and anti-aircraft guns. We had a plan mapped out approximately a year in advance for the overhaul of ships when they needed docking and repairs, and that was continued and was in effect when the attack was made on Pearl Harbor. The materiel condition of the Fleet was all right. It was satisfactory to the Commander in Chief.

[9481] And again, question 50:

Q. Did these conditions such as you have outlined have any adverse effect on the morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet?
A. As far as morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet is concerned, remember that the Fleet went out there in April of 1940, with the idea of carrying on a six-weeks Fleet problem, and was held out there indefinitely.

There is considerable more in that paragraph, but I just read that part.

Now, question 51:

Q. Did the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor rather than on the mainland, affect the material conditions and the materiel readiness of the fleet?
A. No, it did not.
And question 52:

Q. For war?
A. No, it did not. I might add to that last statement that he often discussed the question of the condition of the Fleet and we felt that it was better out.
there than when it had been based on San Pedro, and I remember the Commander in Chief making the statement that we had been wrong by basing our ships at San Pedro and going out for the day, and shooting, that he found the best thing was for them to take them out for a week and keep them going day and night.

You were asked that question, and you made that answer?

Admiral Smith. That is correct. I believe what Admiral Kimmel actually said was if the fleet were to return to the coast, he would not keep them in San Pedro where they anchored off San Clemintine every night, and came in every Friday, he would keep them going day and night.

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you make that statement at any rate?

when it had been based on San Pedro, and I remember the Commander in Chief making the statement that we had been wrong by basing our ships at San Pedro and going out for the day and shooting, that he found the best thing was for them to take them out for a week and keep going day and night.

Admiral Smith. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Now, question 53:

Q. Within your knowledge, did Kimmel ever make any definite recommendations that the custom of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor should be changed—during 1941, I am speaking of—and returning to the old way of basing on the California coast?

A. To my absolute knowledge, he never made such a recommendation by letter or dispatch. In July, I think 1941, he made a trip to Washington. He was accompanied only by Captain McMorris. If he ever made any such recommendation, it might have been done at that time, but I think I should have heard about it. I never heard him say to me or any member of his staff that the fleet should return to the coast, although he knew that his predecessor had recommended it.

Then again, question 55:

Q. Then, I understand you to mean that, in your opinion, the general war-mindedness of the personnel of the fleet was improved by its retention in Hawaii?

A. Yes, sir; I think it was. You see, in the early part of our stay out there the entire fleet was anchored at Lahaina Roads, with all lights on. I think the Fleet did get war-minded, because they began moving into Pearl Harbor, and even moved the carriers in—moved everything in, and, of course, invariably operated without lights.

Admiral, yesterday, in questioning Admiral Bellinger—you were here, were you?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. Murphy. I recalled that when Admiral Kimmel was on the stand, he said that he did not take the air matters up with Admiral Bellinger, that he took them up with his own air man, Admiral Davis. I read from testimony yesterday to the effect that Admiral Davis said he apparently was not consulted except as to logistics.

Do you know who was consulted in the air matters, if it wasn’t Admiral Davis, or Admiral Bellinger?

Admiral Smith. I think I can make a good effort to explain that if I may have the time to do it, sir.

Davis was the fleet aviation officer. Dispatches such as the war warning, which Davis states he did not get, passed first, of course, through the communications officer.

The communications officer or the communications security officer, checked on each message the officers to whom it should be shown. These
messages were carried about by a junior officer of the communications department, and shown to the officers whose names had been checked.

A copy of the message was never left with the officer, even with the commander in chief. As the commander in chief read the secret dispatch, the officer waited outside and took custody of it.

Now, Davis and I lived within a few blocks of each other in Honolulu. We almost invariably drove to and from Pearl Harbor together. That gave us a half hour going and a half hour returning each day. We talked a great deal of shop and did a great deal of business on those trips.

For example, on the evening of the 27th of November 1941, Davis drove his car, a roadster, and had great difficulty in getting to Honolulu because of the caravans of trucks and troops. I do not know what we talked about that afternoon, but I think it very probable that we talked about the war warning.

Davis was a very good friend of mine and I had no secrets from him on anything that happened. I think it might be well to read the duties of the fleet aviation officer as written in staff instructions, signed by me, and approved by Admiral Kimmel on July 14, 1941:

Fleet Aviation Officer—

(a) advises with reference to:

(1) all aircraft operations and aviation matters including those pertaining to policy with respect to:

(A) matériel; (B) personnel; (C) gunnery and bombing; (D) radio.

(2) aircraft operations and aviation short facilities.

(3) coordination of aviation activities of the Fleet.

[9488] (4) employment of aircraft in tactical exercises, analyses and reports thereon.

(5) by the development of aircraft tactics, gunnery, and doctrine.

(6) naval air operating policy.

(b) assists War Plans Officer in the preparation of war plans.

(c) keeps informed as to the effectiveness of aircraft units of the Fleet.

(d) assists Operations Officer in the preparation of Fleet schedules dealing with aircraft and aircraft services.

(e) consults gunnery officer in connection with aircraft and anti-aircraft gunnery—

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I have no objection to your reading that, but will it in any way clear the fact that the airman was not consulted about these matters, and was not shown the war warning and the other messages?

Admiral Smith. I am merely trying to confirm an impression that I have that he was consulted. Now, I don't know what was shown to him, but his desk was almost adjoining that of the operations officer—

Mr. Murphy. Are you going to show us by way of contradiction of his sworn testimony something in the staff regulations to the effect that he should have been shown them but was not shown them?

Admiral Smith. No, sir. I am telling you that he was an excellent fleet aviation officer and these were some of the reasons why he had to keep in close touch, and he did.

[9488] Mr. Murphy. He was an excellent Fleet Aviation Officer?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And you had the No. 2 aviation man at Pearl Harbor, you had some of the best air brains there, and they both say they weren't consulted.
Admiral Smith. We had another airman at Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Murphy. Was he the man consulted?
Admiral Smith. Davis was consulted by the commander in chief.
Mr. Murphy. You heard me read yesterday testimony where he said he wasn't?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, you say there was another airman there?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Who was that?
Admiral Smith. Admiral Halsey was the No. 1 airman in the whole area. He had more planes than all of them.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Halsey was a busy man, was he not?
Admiral Smith. When Halsey came into port the first thing he did was to come over to see the commander in chief.
Mr. Murphy. When did Halsey leave port, Admiral, before December 7?
Admiral Smith. He left on the 28th.
Mr. Murphy. The 28th. And the message came in on the 27th, didn't it?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. So that he was gone from then until after December 7?
Admiral Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. So, surely he wasn't consulted in his absence?
Admiral Smith. No, sir; but he was present, he saw the 27th message.
Mr. Murphy. He saw the 27th message and went out with orders to shoot down every plane seen and to sink every submarine in the ocean, every submarine sighted; is that not correct?
Admiral Smith. That is what I understand him to say; that was not his orders but I understand that is what he says.
Mr. Murphy. That is what he did with his ships, wasn't it?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, as I understand it, on the night of the 27th you were going over to the city of Honolulu in your car—
Admiral Smith. No, Captain Davis' car. He was driving.
Mr. Murphy. Yes, and the Army had some men out and some matériel out, the roads were blocked?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. So that every civilian could at least see that the roads were blocked with the Army going on an alert?
Admiral Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. There is no doubt in your mind that anyone who had eyes could see that the Army was making some special move?
Admiral Smith. Not only then but after that they were at the bridges along the highways; they were very much in evidence.
Mr. Murphy. Different than they had been before November 27?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, to question 106:
Q. What about the carriers?
A. We had no knowledge of those; no. The Fleet Intelligence Officer said that he did not know where they were.
That was your impression?
Admiral Smith. That was my impression at that time. I am informed now that I was in error. The only one that I recalled was the report of two carriers in the Marshalls sometime previously.

[9491]  Mr. Murphy. I direct your attention to question 87:

Q. Do you recall the Fleet Aviation Officer having given any opinions or advice on the matter?
A. No, sir; I do not recall that he ever did.

That was Admiral Davis, wasn't it?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Question 85:

Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier raid, the Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning?
A. Yes, sir.

That was your testimony, was it not?
Admiral Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral Kimmel says that he expected a warning, was quite sure he was going to get a warning of 100 miles. How would you account for that difference of opinion on a vital subject if this had been discussed at a conference?

Admiral Smith. I believe it has been thoroughly covered that the radar had been working and had been working in exercises with the fleet very shortly previous to Pearl Harbor but the system was not complete. The information center, as I understand it, was not working. As the radar works today there would have been in one room a representative from each command.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I would like to talk about December 7 and prior thereto. As I understand it, you say that you knew you would not get a warning. Admiral Kimmel felt that he would get a warning. Now, if there was a conference, how do you account for that disparity, you feeling you were not going to get a warning and the commander in chief saying he expected and was assured at one time of 200 miles and later correct it 100 miles, that he was depending on Army radar for a warning and you, as Chief of Staff, say you knew there wasn't going to be any.

Admiral Smith. I did.

Mr. Murphy. Question 85.

Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier raid, the Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning?
A. Yes, sir.

Admiral Smith. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Question 86:

Q. Then, if you realized the danger of such an air raid, which events proved was not only possible but probable, you would have seen that outside of anti-aircraft gunfire, there was no security to our installations in Pearl Harbor, including the fleet—is that right?


Now, Admiral, I would like to ask you a question or two about your feeling about the competency of the Army flyers. Did you have an opinion on that matter? And particularly I would like to read to you question 81:

Q. What do you know about their combat efficiency, particularly as regards personnel.
A. Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it. That was based upon our observations during Fleet operations, when their Flying Fortresses would come over at almost smokestack level and showed an utter disregard for possible anti-aircraft fire. In the operations between our planes and theirs, our aviators, possibly, prejudiced, expressed the opinion that they were not very good.

Question 82:

Q. Now, you are talking about the Army bombers, or the Army pursuits?
A. Both.

Was that the feeling of the Navy at that time, Admiral, in regard to the flyers?

Admiral Smith. I do not know what the feeling of the Navy was. That was probably an unfortunate statement of mine. I believe that I gathered most of that information from my conversations to and from Pearl Harbor with the fleet aviator.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I might say you are justified in that—

Admiral Smith. I might also say probably he got his reports from young aviators, who were rivals, and who were prejudiced.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate you stated that?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Question 84:

Q. Do you say that because of the doubt you had of the efficiency of Army aircraft?
A. That is part of it, yes, sir. I may be unjust to the Army in that. It may have been prejudice on the part of Navy flyers, but the opinions expressed by our aviators, as I saw, were not very complimentary to the Army flyers.

You were asked question 90:

Q. Do you recall whether the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were offensive or defensive, in their nature?
A. My recollection is—they were defensive.

You were in error a little, in part, there?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. As I say, I went into that cold, and I believe they told me to refresh my memory on that.

Mr. Murphy. There is one other thing I would like to ask you in conclusion. When you were before the Navy Board you made a statement from which I get the impression that the feeling you and the entire staff had was that the fleet had a job to do, to carry out a certain defensive operation, and that it was not a part of the fleet's duty to be defending Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. And is it a fair assumption that the fact that the fleet did have this offensive problem ahead of them, that having concentrated so much on the anxiety to be ready for the offensive, they overlooked the duty they had by command from the Chief of Naval Operations to help and aid the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor because of the deficiency of the local forces in matériel?

Admiral Smith. I would not say that they overlooked anything. The matter of an air attack on the fleet, either at its base or at sea, was frequently the subject of discussion in the staff and with the commander in chief.

Mr. Murphy. I do not recall at which conferences these discussions were held but they were so frequent that I would say we did not overlook the possibility. We did not expect the attack.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I do not mean overlook in the sense of entirely ignoring, but the fact is you were so offensive minded that you stressed
 offense to the detriment, perhaps, of a little bit of defense in order to protect the base itself.

**Admiral Smith.** Well, I believe that is for you gentlemen to decide.

**Mr. Murphy.** All right.

**Admiral Smith.** I did not think so at the time.

**Mr. Murphy.** Well, I have no other questions. I am awfully sorry, Admiral, to have kept you waiting.

**The Vice Chairman.** Are you through?

**Mr. Murphy.** Yes, sir.

**The Vice Chairman.** Senator Brewster? Not present. **Mr. Gearhart?** You passed, I believe, once, didn't you?

**Mr. Gearhart.** I did once but I would like to ask a question or two now, if I may.

**The Vice Chairman.** You told the committee that you did pass, as I recall it.

**Mr. Gearhart.** I think nearly all of us did.

**The Vice Chairman.** I think all of us did down to—as [9497]

I remember, Mr. Murphy was examining Admiral Smith at his last appearance, and I was thinking no one passed except possibly Mr. Keefe and Senator Ferguson. If there is no objection from the committee I think you can go ahead.

**Mr. Murphy.** I think the facts are the Admiral had been taken around down the line and when he was about to be excused I asked permission of the committee to ask him a few questions.

**The Vice Chairman.** All right.

**Mr. Gearhart.** I think everybody has passed.

**The Vice Chairman.** All right, you are probably correct.

**Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Admiral.**

**Mr. Gearhart.** Admiral, were you with the Pacific Fleet during the days when Admiral Richardson was the commander in chief?

**Admiral Smith.** Yes, sir. From June 1939—well, I was in the fleet when Admiral Richardson took over in 1940. I joined the fleet in 1939 with the command of the cruiser *Brooklyn*.

**Mr. Gearhart.** When did you become a member of Admiral Richardson's staff, if you ever did?

**Admiral Smith.** I never did. I was present at a conference between Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel on Admiral Richardson's flagship about mid-January prior to the time [9498] that Admiral Kimmel had taken over but after Admiral Kimmel had asked me to become his Chief of Staff.

**Mr. Gearhart.** Those were conferences after Admiral Kimmel had learned that he was to take over?

**Admiral Smith.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. Gearhart.** As Fleet Chief of Staff you were present at all staff meetings?

**Admiral Smith.** All of the important ones, yes, sir, where the commander in chief was present.

**Mr. Gearhart.** I will ask you if there were any discussions at the staff meetings you attended from the beginning down until the fateful day of the Japanese problem insofar as hostilities with the United States was concerned?

**Admiral Smith.** Well, there were many discussions along that line; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And in those discussions members of the staff would endeavor to put themselves in the position of the Japanese and try to think as the Jap would in order to be able to think through the answers to the questions that might be in the Japanese mind?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. In those discussions that preceded the catastrophe of December 7 did anybody in any of those staff meetings raise the question of the necessity for Japan’s [0499] immobilization of our fleet?

Admiral Smith. Not that I recall; no, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, everyone knew that Japan was interested in the Southwest Pacific?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Everyone expected that their ultimate objective was to conquer and to consolidate their conquests in that area?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; but also it must be remembered that the Japanese undoubtedly knew that our fleet could not leave Pearl Harbor to interfere with their movement to the southwest. We did not have the auxiliaries to do it. I believe Admiral Kimmel testified that we had 11 Oilers, only 4 of which could fuel at sea, whereas I know from experience this summer as Commander Surface Forces, Pacific, that for operations that we were carrying out in the Far East we had 71 modern Oilers with the fleet that could fuel at sea and 467 commercial tankers on the pipe line and the same was true of food and ammunition. We did not have these things out there in the Pacific Ocean or in the Atlantic which could have supported a movement so far west as the Philippines.

Mr. Gearhart. Why are you so sure or were you so sure at that time that the Japanese knew that we were that short of auxiliary ships?

[0500] Admiral Smith. Well, we were very positive that they were watching our every move. All they had to do was stand on the hills surrounding Pearl Harbor and they could see what we had.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if they were sure of that and sure of our lack of capacity to go to the aid of the Philippines and interfere with their operations in the South Pacific why did they take this great chance and come to the Hawaiian Islands to immobilize the American fleet?

Admiral Smith. I do not know. That is where they took us by surprise.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if they knew that we lacked the auxiliary ships and supply ships so necessary and the other necessary equipment to go to the aid of the Philippines their coming to Hawaii was an unnecessary action and one which would result in no benefit to them whatsoever, isn’t that correct?

Admiral Smith. I believe that is the way it turned out, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, in view of the fact that they came, are you willing to say that in your opinion that they knew that we could not go to the aid of MacArthur had we desired to do so?

Admiral Smith. It would appear from the results that they did not but I do not know why they could not have known. [0507] I would have thought that if in an attack on Pearl Harbor their idea would have been to blast out the oil tanks and the machine shops, then we would have been helpless for a very long time.
Mr. Gearhart. But in coming to the Islands to attack our fleet in Pearl Harbor they risked a good proportion or segment of their own fleet, did they not?

Admiral Smith. Very much so, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And since there was no purpose in their mind to serve by immobilizing our fleet doesn’t it seem absurd that they should have come at all?

Admiral Smith. It does, but long before Pearl Harbor, sir, we often said it was impossible to read the Oriental mind, what they might do.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, supposing our fleet had been taken to the Pacific coast do you think they would have still risked this large armada of theirs in going to the Pacific coast to immobilize the fleet which could not be, according to your testimony, any source of danger to them?

Admiral Smith. I have been interested here in some of the naval strategy I have heard from officers who are not naval strategists and I do not claim to be one by any means, but it is my opinion, had the fleet been on the Pacific coast, the Japanese would not have attacked it in the manner of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

It is ridiculous to believe that a large force such as the Japs had could approach San Pedro without being detected because that part of the ocean is pretty well filled with merchant ships. They would have been detected by someone.

Then there was the question they would probably have had to fuel three times on the way over and the same on the way back. They would not have dared, in my opinion, to approach the west coast of the United States.

I have even heard testimony that they might have attacked at Panama or anywhere. I suppose that includes New York, I do not know, but I do not believe that any intelligent enemy would attack the west coast and leave Hawaii as a place from which we could hit it on its way back, because it is a simple matter to fly bombers from the United States to the fields on Hawaii.

What I believe the Japs would have done had our fleet been on the coast is that they would have taken Oahu or one of the other islands of the Pacific in an amphibious operation and it is my opinion that they could have done it.

Mr. Gearhart. Is your opinion that they could what?

Admiral Smith. That they could have done it.

Mr. Gearhart. That they could have made a landing on Oahu if our fleet had been on the Pacific coast?

Admiral Smith. I would say that from what we know now of amphibious operations, certainly we could have done it to other islands. Maui, Hawaii, were not protected at all. They could have taken one of those islands without any difficulty and from there attack Pearl Harbor.

I do not believe that they would have risked their fleet to the Pacific coast of the United States without first knocking out Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Gearhart. Anyway, the—

Admiral Smith. I am an amateur strategist like the rest of them. I am just giving my opinions.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I know you haven’t got your ruler and your rocking chair there but I am willing to concede that you are a naval
strategist because I don't think you could live for so many years in that sort of atmosphere and in constant touch with people who do know that without being one yourself, but anyway it is plain to you as one who is not a strategist that the hazards to the Japanese fleet and to the Japanese as such would have been greatly increased if they had attempted to negotiate an additional 2,000 miles to the Pacific coast?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And the reasons for it are that they would have been compelled to cross many a shipping lane which would [9504] be in use at that time even though one was anticipated?

Admiral Smith. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. All right; you said no intelligent enemy would do a thing of that kind. You have already stripped the enemy of intelligence in saying that their expedition to Hawaii was a useless one.

Admiral Smith. I would say even the Japanese would not have attempted that, in my opinion.

Mr. Gearhart. So you say this whole Pacific operation was one that was devoid of intelligence, not only the question of intelligence work. I mean intelligence in the contemplation of that which exists under the canopy known as the skull. Is that correct?

Admiral Smith. I think so; yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, in view of the fact that the Japanese were not prepared for that landing, were not prepared for any landing operations, brought no transports with their armada, it would seem that they had but one objective and that was to immobilize our fleet.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; there is no question about it.

Mr. Gearhart. And in view of the fact that you say they knew or must have known or must be held to have known that we had no auxiliary ships, which would make it impossible for our fleet to be ready to interfere in any way with their [9505] operations in their advance in the Southwest Pacific—I am asking you for your hind thought—why did they do all these things?

Admiral Smith. We had for years had a plan of what we would do in the Pacific in case of war with Japan and it had been studied at the War College for years. It was steam roller tactics, but we departed from that plan in this war. I do not know but I think it possible that the Japanese had had a similar plan for years and they have shown in this war that once a plan is made they rarely depart from it.

It may be they carried that plan too long. I mean if they had had a plan years ago to do that, to immobilize our fleet, they naturally would not suppose that our fleet could move to the westward that far. I think that it was the greatest mistake they ever made to have hit Pearl Harbor as they did but it is without question that the purpose was to immobilize our heavy ships.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, have you learned either prior to Pearl Harbor or since Pearl Harbor anything which would lead you to believe that they possessed this WPL No. 46?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; I do not believe they had. I have not heard anything to that effect.

Mr. Gearhart. Then in coming to the Hawaii attack you do not know that they know about our intentions with respect [9506] to the Marshalls?

Admiral Smith. No, I do not; no, sir,
Mr. Gearhart. The fact that they came when there was so little reason behind their coming, does it not suggest to your mind that possibly they had some idea of WPL-46 and wanted to prevent us from going into the Marshalls and interfering with their installations in that neighborhood?

Admiral Smith. It does look that way, yes, sir. Now, it may be possible that such information is now available in the Navy Department. A great deal of intelligence has been gathered after the war I understand. That is a very interesting subject and it may be true; I don't know.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, did you have discussions in the staff meetings prior to Pearl Harbor about these same things that I have been interrogating you about these last few minutes?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir, we had them very frequently.

Mr. Gearhart. Was there an assumption upon the part of those who participated in those staff conferences that the Japanese were too intelligent to have undertaken such an operation against Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you think that any sense of security was developed or grew from that conviction among the members of the staff?

[9507] Admiral Smith. It is possible. I do not know.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, drawing upon your opinion, because you were there and you took part in those conferences, I will ask you, do you think that the Navy air force would have been used in long distance patrols if they did not have that conviction and that belief that the Japanese were too intelligent to have embarked upon so dangerous an enterprise and so foolhardy an enterprise in the light of the lack of profit to result from an unsuccessful attack? Does that account for the lack of patrols and lack of plans for the protection of the island against such an attack?

Admiral Smith. I would say no, sir. I believe that the lack of patrols was not only due to the small number of planes we had and the offensive operations that were planned, where it was stated maximum operations out of Wake would take a minimum of two patrol squadrons to be held at Oahu—I believe the greatest influence was our intelligence as to the position of the Japanese fleet, the fact that we knew they were on the way south, had been seen going south, and although it is true we did not know the position of the carriers, the last intelligence information that we had and I believe that the intelligence issued in the biweekly bulletin by ONI on December 1 showed that the main carrier strength was in Japanese waters.

[9508] It has been testified here that planes could have been sent out there and that the crews would have broken down in a few weeks and the planes would have broken down also. When the time came that there was an indication of any such possible movement toward Hawaii, then it would have been time to put the planes out to their maximum at the risk of wearing them out entirely, but we had no such intelligence and did not expect it. Everyone kept talking about the Philippines, Guam, and the Kra Peninsula; they never got east of that. I don't know what else I can add to that, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, let us pass the whole subject.
Now, in some of the testimony that has been taken in the course of this investigation it has appeared that there was a radio silence order which was made shortly before Pearl Harbor. Do you know anything about that?

Admiral Smith. On the part of whom, sir?

Mr. Gearhart. I got the impression it was made by the commander-in-chief of the fleet restricting the use of radio by ships at sea. Is that not correct?

Admiral Smith. That had been an order in effect for a very long time. Individual ships were not allowed to use their radio. If a message was absolutely necessary it would be sent out by one of the task force commanders perhaps. They even went so far—well, I wouldn't be so sure of that [9509] because I get events just before Pearl Harbor and just after mixed, but it was the practice when it was necessary to send a message either to fly planes inshore and send it over a shore station or if too far at sea to send a destroyer on the flank fifty to a hundred miles and have him broadcast the message from there so that no one could cut the fleet in.

Mr. Gearhart. So that the position of the ships or the group of ships might not be disclosed?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; and when the move of taking ships was made from the Pacific to the Atlantic in May 1941 they observed radio silence all the way and arrived at Panama with their names painted out and were supposed to have gone through as a complete surprise. Those ships had no radio whatever all the way.

Mr. Gearhart. Were any changes tightening or broadening the radio restriction made within a few weeks before Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; that had been going on for well, almost from the time that Admiral Kimmel took over, possibly before.

Mr. Gearhart. We have had the log of the USS Boise before us and it discloses that on the 27th and 28th of November 1941 that ship encountered enemy ships in Guam waters to whom they signaled but their signals were not returned and [9510] then the Boise turned out of its course.

Admiral Smith. I believe she was on the way from Pearl Harbor to Manila escorting a transport or something. She was away from the fleet.

Mr. Gearhart. Information has reached me that an argument ensued between the captain of the ship and the chief executive officer as to whether or not radio silence should be broken to transmit that information to American naval authorities in higher authority but that under the letter of the regulation that it was determined not to send that information. You did not receive any radios as chief of staff, did you?

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Or in general with respect to the presence in American waters around Guam that there was enemy craft?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; I heard that rumor long after the war. I never heard it at the time. I would say that it is possible. I know of one transport that went out and she carried radar to be delivered to our submarines in the Philippines and the commanding officer told me that his orders from the Navy Department were to destroy the ship if she were overhauled by Japanese forces because conditions
were tight, but it is possible the Boise was escorting that ship, in which case he would have been very reluctant to use radio under any conditions.

Mr. Gearhart. Wouldn't it have been the duty—wouldn't you conceive it to have been your duty if you had been captain of that ship, to have changed your course and gotten beyond the range of the Japanese patrols or warships of whatever type they were and to advise your commander in chief of their presence in American waters?

Admiral Smith. I would not have avoided them unless he was too big, but I would have found some way, I believe, to inform the commander in chief and his best method of doing that was to, if within perhaps 300 miles of Guam, to have flown one of his planes to shore and sent the message from there.

Mr. Gearhart. But that was not done either?

Admiral Smith. Sir?

Mr. Gearhart. You as chief of staff saw no message?

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Or received a message to that effect?

Admiral Smith. None whatever, sir. That would have been the captain's responsibility, what he did by his action, but I know of no such messages.

Mr. Gearhart. If you received information at that time, you having just received the so-called war warning message, that the Japanese were prowling American waters in the neighborhood of Guam, would that have made any difference in your attitude towards the kind of a defense that should have been invoked at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith. Well, we had been told that Guam was one of the probable places to come under attack and it could not be defended. I don't know what effect that might have had on us, but it seems to me that it would have confirmed the information that they were going to hit Guam and possibly the Philippines. We knew they were on the move to the southward.

Mr. Gearhart. But in all messages received they spoke of an attack upon Guam and an attack on Borneo as merely the outside possibilities, did they not?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. One message said:

in any direction, including Guam and the Philippines.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. And you interpreted that, didn't you, as meaning the outside limits—

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). Of the Japanese operations?

Admiral Smith. I did; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, would the knowledge that the Japanese warships were prowling Guam waters have made any difference in your orders or activities if you had been informed of it?

Admiral Smith. It depends upon the nature of the prowl. If they were light forces, not concentrated, they might have been merely scouting their flank to make certain that we did not put something over there.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, all right. If you had received air messages that the U. S. S. Wright on the 6th of December had sighted planes
that they could not identify as bearing American insignia, unidentified planes—if you had received a radio indication to that effect—what would you have done?

Admiral Smith. That would depend, of course, upon the position of the U. S. S. Wright. I don't know where she was at that time, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. According to the testimony, she was then three or four hundred miles off Hawaii.

Admiral Smith. I never received any such report.

Mr. Gearhart. She was returning with Admiral Halsey's contingent.

Admiral Smith. I don't remember that rumor. We had another one that went out that Admiral Halsey's planes had sighted two planes that they could not identify; but when that was run down, it proved to be incorrect. I don't remember—

Mr. Gearhart. But this one I am asking you about is not rumor. It is fact. These unidentified planes were flying in American waters surrounding Hawaii just preceding the attack on Hawaii. Now, did you receive any radio messages [9514] from the U. S. S. Wright—

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). That they had seen this?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; absolutely no. Had we received—

Mr. Gearhart. You have been informed that the log discloses that fact, haven't you, since that time?

Admiral Smith. No; I never heard it until you just told me.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, we have the log before the committee, and I read it. Now, the presence of unidentified planes or an unidentifiable plane would indicate that there was a carrier somewhere near, wouldn't it?

Admiral Smith. It could not indicate anything else, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. But because of your order for radio silence, no message was received by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet of this suspicious circumstance?

Admiral Smith. I would not say because of an order for radio silence. I would say it was because the captain of the ship had very poor judgment. Any order of that nature should be broken in an emergency. I am astounded, if such a thing had happened, why he did not report it, because the Wright, as I recall now, was plying between Pearl Harbor and Midway, possibly Wake. He was in our waters.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, it has been disclosed that the ship [9515] was part of the detachment which Admiral Halsey was the commander of and had been recently delivering planes to one of the far western islands of the United States.

Admiral Smith. It could not have been a part of Admiral Halsey's forces, because the Wright is not fast enough to go with that force.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, it has been identified by naval experts to have been within three or four hundred miles of Hawaii.

Admiral Smith. It is all new to me, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. What?

Admiral Smith. It is all new to me. I never heard of it.

Mr. Gearhart. Then what would you have done if, on the 6th day of December, a message had been received indicating that there were
unidentified planes flying within three or four hundred miles of Hawaii?

Admiral Smith. I would have made every effort to locate her, both by patrol planes and by the task force that was in that area not too far away.

Mr. Gearhart. You would have probably—even though you had a few planes to keep at your command—you would have inaugurated, would you not—

Admiral Smith. Stopped everything.

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). A distance reconnaissance?

[9516] Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; stopped everything and put all effort on that one problem.

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield so that I can ask one question?

Mr. Gearhart. I yield; yes.

Senator Lucas. What date was the Wright seen?

Mr. Gearhart. I understood it to be the 6th.

Senator Lucas. The day before the attack?

Mr. Gearhart. The day before the attack.

Senator Lucas. Thank you.

Mr. Murphy. The Wright is shown directly above the islands there. The log is available to the members of the committee.

Mr. Gearhart. May I have the log of the Wright? It is in my file, but I do not know where to look for it.

Mr. Kaufman. I have already sent for it, Mr. Congressman. It will be up in a moment.

The Vice Chairman. Counsel has already sent for it. It will be up in a moment.

Mr. Kaufman. I have already sent for the log of the Wright, and it will be up here in a moment, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, while we are waiting for the log—and I won't wait very long for it, because we can return to it later—did you during all of the time that you were acting [9517] as Chief of Staff see any reports of any shooting or firing between American and Japanese ships?

Admiral Smith. None whatever; no, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Would you receive—as the chief of staff for the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet—would you receive any reports from the Asiatic Fleet in that regard if there had been any exchange of fire between American and Japanese ships?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I am positive we should have, because Admiral Hart kept us very well informed on what he was doing. The report would certainly have gone to the Navy Department, and it would in any case have gone to us for information.

Mr. Gearhart. Then out at Pearl Harbor there was no knowledge of any firing in the Pacific, so far as you know, as between the fleet of the United States and the fleet of Japan, or any of its ships?

Admiral Smith. No, sir. There had not even been a depth charge dropped.

Mr. Gearhart. I beg pardon?

Admiral Smith. There had not even been a depth charge dropped.

Mr. Gearhart. That is, until the morning of the 7th.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield for a moment?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, on the ship-location charts which we have been furnished, I understand that the Navy has been asked to give the list of the names; but on the 5th and the 6th of December there was some ship right up in the vicinity from which that attack came. Now, I don't mean the exact vicinity, but to the north, and it went into Pearl Harbor that Sunday. It was not indicated what that ship was. Do we have those ship-location charts here?
Admiral Smith. I think it is very probable that was one of our destroyers.
Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, on the 5th and 6th Senator Ferguson and I remember observing that there was a ship to the north of Oahu, and then it is gradually going in and it is in port on Sunday.
I ask counsel if they will produce those ship charts? Will you please produce those ship-location charts? They are photostats. Do you have the one I mean? There it is.
Senator Ferguson. It is a large map.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, I will read this to you:
Saturday, December 6-20 to 24. Sighted vessel bearing one point abaft port beam running without lights on course approximately 300 degrees, true, distance four [9519] miles. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R. P. M., 861.
Now, I will ask you if that was sighted—that ship was sighted—and that seems to be a ship on the seas—on the 6th day of December and they could not identify it, what would you have done under the silence of the radio order?
Admiral Smith. Told the ship who reported it to identify it or send a destroyer immediately to investigate.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, here is a ship that had a one-point bearing and was running without lights on a course approximately 300°, true, whatever that means.
Admiral Smith. Of course, the first thing to have been done in that case was to go to the operations officer's board and find whether we had a possible ship in that location, because a ship then, a merchant ship, was not running without lights at that time. If we could not identify her, then send something out to identify her. Of course, I don't know what ship reported this.
Mr. Gearhart. This was reported by the Wright.
Admiral Smith. Oh, that was reported by the Wright.
Mr. Gearhart. This was recorded in the log of the Wright as of the 6th day of December 1941 between the hours of 20 and 24.
Now, if that had been reported to you as chief of staff to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, would that have [9520] alerted the fleet?
Admiral Smith. I believe it would have; yes, sir. The probability, of course, was that that ship was a submarine on the surface.
[9521] Senator Lucas. Do I understand it was an unidentified ship rather than an unidentified plane?
Mr. Gearhart. This particular item I read reveals the presence of an unidentified surface ship. My interrogatories prior to getting this log in my hand were in reference to an unidentified aircraft.
Senator Lucas. Is the unidentified aircraft in the log also?
Mr. Gearhart. I saw it the other time I had the log in my hand. This is an additional item that I have run across.

Senator Lucas. What kind of a ship was the Wright, Admiral? It was an airplane tender, was it not?

Admiral Smith. The Wright was an airplane tender of the type like the transport Chateau Thierry. They were built during the last war. The bow and stern looked alike; they were good for 12 knots, and 14 if they were in good shape.

Their speed is limited. She carried mostly parts for seaplanes and I believe was on the way to Midway at that time.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. Gearhart. I yield.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I show you a Guide to Symbols, and then I show you a chart. What would be the technical name of that chart, Admiral, do you know, in the Navy? That would be a ship-location chart, would it not?

Admiral Smith. No; I would not say so.

Mr. Murphy. What would you call that? I understand it is to keep a daily record of the ships of the United States throughout the world.

Admiral Smith. Yes. That is a secret chart and would show the convoys. These are Great Circle routes, of course.

Mr. Murphy. Now, with particular reference to the Guide to Symbols, I direct your attention to a ship which is to the north of Pearl Harbor. At what degree would you say that was on the chart, this being 160 here [indicating]?

Admiral Smith. It would be about 155 west, I should say.

Mr. Murphy. And how many degrees north?

Admiral Smith. I should say about 3° south.

Senator Ferguson. How many?

Admiral Smith. No; no. That is north latitude. I think that is about 18° north. It looks like it to me. The chart should have in the margin somewhere the latitudes. That is probably about 18° north, I should say.

Mr. Murphy. Will you resume your seat, Admiral, and I will put this before you.

I direct your attention to Exhibit 109, a secret chart that is part of Exhibit 109, and I direct particularly your attention to a ship to the north of Oahu, and about 155° west longitude, the location being that of the ship in question on the 5th of December 1941, and I ask you if you will look to the Guide to Symbols and tell us what kind of a ship that is.

Admiral Smith. It would appear to be a patrol vessel.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I show you another exhibit, a chart in the same exhibit, the secret chart for December 6. With reference to the same patrol vessel, will you compare for us the relative position of the vessel in question on the 6th of December as compared to the 5th? Is there anything that would indicate to you on the chart on the 6th as to the relative position of the vessel which was to the north of Oahu, 155° longitude, on the 5th?

Admiral Smith. It seems to have disappeared from this chart. I see nothing of the same ship or symbol.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, Admiral, will you look at the map on the wall, the Disposition of United States Pacific Fleet, 7 December, 1941, and the point from which the Japanese force came, and compare it with the secret chart [9524] for December 5? What, in your judgment, is the relative position of the vessel in question to the north of Oahu, as compared with the point from which the Japanese force came. I am referring to this one right here [indicating].

Admiral Smith. Yes; I see it. Slightly to the east of the path, through which the Japanese force went.

Mr. Murphy. Well, it is in the same general location, is it not?
Admiral Smith. It is; yes.

Mr. Murphy. On the 5th of December?
Admiral Smith. Yes. If you are trying to identify that ship—

Mr. Murphy. I would like very much to.

Admiral Smith. If you are trying to identify that ship, I would say that since we now know that the Japanese had special code messages arranged between the consul general and Tokyo about the meaning of a light in one or two houses on the north shore of Oahu, and the meaning of two lights so far as the movement of our ships in and out of Pearl Harbor is concerned, and of the hanging of sheets, I believe, in the back yard during the day, that there is no question whatever that Japanese submarines were operating to the north of Oahu, and they came to see those signals, and instead of a patrol boat this may very well have [9525] been a submarine.

Mr. Murphy. That is an American ship, Admiral. These are our reports of only American ships.

Admiral Smith. I did not know that.

Mr. Murphy. Yes, this is the American secret chart.
Admiral Smith. I cannot identify it; no, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Just to interpolate a question right there, Admiral, on the chart of the 6th, that vessel seems not to be present. It seems to have moved out of that area.

Admiral Smith. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. Can you identify where that vessel is on the 6th on that chart?
Admiral Smith. No, sir; I cannot on the chart.

Senator Lucas. I suggest the Congressman from Pennsylvania start all over again.

Mr. Murphy. I will ask the naval liaison officer to furnish us with an explanation of the ship and its name to the north of Oahu on December 6, the name of the ship, the type of the ship, and where it went after it was in the position of 155° west, and 18° north. 

Senator Ferguson. We had asked for that before.

Mr. Murphy. I am renewing it. I would like to know what happened to the ship that was to the north of Oahu [9526] on December 5, and where it went on the 7th.

I refer to the ship shown on the secret chart, giving the location of the United States ships on December 5, 1941.

Admiral Smith. It would have been possible that that ship was proceeding to or from Pearl Harbor, to Pearl Harbor from the coast, and it is not very far from the great circle course between San Francisco and Oahu.

1 The information, supplied by the Navy Department, appears in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5504.
Mr. Murphy. Except, as I understand, Admiral, there had been some order or understanding that all vessels were to be out of the north and were to take some other route, and we would ship everything down by the Torres Strait. If it was a merchant vessel, I do not know whether it would have shown on that secret chart, or not.

I believe it is only meant to show United States vessels as such. I mean patrol vessels, war vessels of different types. So, at any rate, on the chart that is before you that ship to the north of the island of Oahu appears to be in the same general direction, does it not, as the point from which the Japanese came on December 7?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; it does.

[9527] The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. I find, as far as I can find from this log, that we sighted a surface ship. This is a verification of a letter which I have referred to from one of the lookouts on that ship who has written to the effect that that ship was challenged and it turned and fled, and they turned and went the other way.

It appears conclusively on the log of the ship of December 6 that between the hours of 20 and 24 a ship was sighted by the U. S. S. Wright.

Mr. Richardson. You cannot find any airships on there?

Mr. Gearhart. No. It must be in one of the other logs. It is not in this one. I read it into the record the last time I had a log in my hand. There were two unidentified planes.

Mr. Murphy. One plane.

Mr. Gearhart. So if we are looking for precise reasons for Pearl Harbor we might fasten upon the failure of the captain of the Wright to have reported to you the unidentified vessel in Hawaiian waters on the 6th day of December 1941?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. There is no order issued that is so hard and fast that in the interests of the security of the fleet or of the country a captain with any judgment cannot break a radio silence when it is necessary.

[9528] Mr. Gearhart. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral. I would like to ask a question or two, if I may, on some of the information you gave us a short time ago.

I believe you stated that, in your opinion, the Japs could have captured Pearl Harbor or the adjacent islands if the fleet were not present there on December 7, 1941.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. By that I mean their objective would have been different. In fact, had they been accompanied by an amphibious force two days behind that strike they could have accomplished the same thing. But I believe their intentions would have been different.

The Vice Chairman. Well, if that had happened, if they had captured Pearl Harbor or the adjacent islands there, then we would have had to recapture Hawaii in order to conduct a successful war against Japan, would we not?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. I understood you also to state that if they had destroyed our oil supplies and our shore installations there rather
than attacking the fleet, the situation would have been worse for this country than it was by what they did do.

Admiral Smith. Much worse; yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Are there any other questions?

[9529] Senator Ferguson. Yes; I have some.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Senator Ferguson. You think then that the oil at Pearl Harbor was more important than our fleet? Is that your answer?

Admiral Smith. The type of ships that we had at that time in Pearl Harbor, the battleships, had been so overloaded with additional gear in the past 20 years that they were well down in the water, their speed was so reduced that we had a fleet speed of 15 knots. Our light forces were not hurt very much, and it is the light forces and carriers that carried on the war from that point until we got modern heavy ships that could travel at a fleet speed of, say, 28 knots. I would say that the result of the disaster in Pearl Harbor is, first, the unfortunate and terrible loss of life.

Senator Ferguson. No doubt about that.

Admiral Smith. The other, the material, the expense, is not so important, because after those ships were raised they were entirely modernized and rebuilt along the lines that they should have been rebuilt several years before.

Senator Ferguson. Then this fleet that we had at Pearl Harbor, in your opinion, was of very little value as far as a fighting force is concerned?


Senator Ferguson. It did not make any difference where it was, as far as the actual ships were concerned?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; except as a supporting force. That is, if the Japs sent over surface ships in connection with our move against the Marshalls—after our strike in the Marshalls—we needed a supporting force beyond which the carriers could go for protection, fueling, getting ready for something else.

Senator Ferguson. Then it was a real value?

Admiral Smith. It was a real value in that respect, yes, sir, but not as a fleet that could have gone to seek out the Japanese fleet.

Senator Ferguson. But we had more than that to do. They had taken so many islands that there was a lot to do. Would not it have been valuable to go with our landing forces, with these large guns and all, and did not it delay us because we did not have this fleet?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; it did not delay us, because to recapture those islands, to take the islands away from them we had to develop an enormous amphibious force with trained men, and we did not have them at that time. By the time we got ready to move we had the ships necessary, not only for support but for bombardment.

[9531] Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, this fleet was of no value to defend Midway or to defend Guam in case they would have struck there, or struck first in the Philippines?

Admiral Smith. We could have defended Midway; yes, sir, but not Guam. Midway is not so far.

Senator Ferguson. Could not have defended Guam?

Admiral Smith. Not in my opinion; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It could not have gone down there after they were trying to take Guam and been of any aid?
Admiral Smith. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then you come back to this, that this fleet was of very little value at the time, as far as the big ships were concerned?

Admiral Smith. The heavy ships were of very little value, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What about the airplanes that were destroyed? What value were they? We were very low in airplanes, were we not?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How much did that interfere with our action in the Pacific, the destruction of these planes?

Admiral Smith. I do not know how rapidly those planes were replaced because I left very shortly afterward, but it seems to me that we were very soon able to carry out a proper reconnaissance and that Army and Navy planes must have been sent out there promptly. I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not we had long-range reconnaissance there in July, or previous to July?

Admiral Smith. Only intermittently.

Senator Ferguson. Was there any order that ever was issued by anyone stopping that reconnaissance sometime during the summer?

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You never heard of an order to stop it?

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was it only for training purposes?

Admiral Smith. That I am unable to state. There were times when the fleet exercises were carried out to the north. Wherever we carried out the exercises the long-range reconnaissance planes took part.

Yes; you might say it was for training exercises.

Senator Ferguson. It was training?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I did not wish to go back to the alert in the summer of 1940, I was not talking about that reconnaissance at all. There was never any reconnaissance for any other purposes than training, and there was no order stopping long-distance reconnaissance?

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Any time during the year 1941?

Admiral Smith. To the best of my knowledge there was never any such order.

Senator Ferguson. You would know about that?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were the Chief of Staff, were you not?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I would know.

Senator Ferguson. Will you give me the order of command, as far as air was concerned, in Hawaii? How did Admiral Bloch fit into the command?

Admiral Smith. I will try to explain the command organization at that time. Admiral Bellinger, as he showed yesterday, had several different titles. As Commander Task Force 9, he worked with the Fleet, and had we advanced on the Marshalls he would have done so as Commander of Task Force 9, working directly under the Commander in Chief.

Now Admiral Bloch was the Naval Base Defense Officer and as such he was charged by this order, which is an exhibit, the letter
2 CL-41, he was charged with the distant reconnaissance. Two short excerpts from those orders are:

The Commandant 14th Naval District is the Naval Base [9534] Defense Officer. As such he shall—

and one of his duties is—

exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing 2—

that is Bellinger—

for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

And later:

In case of an attack the Naval Base Defense Officer shall launch air search for enemy ships.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield at that point?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. Murphy. If you look at page 398 of this hearing you will find Admiral Bloch says all they were was a volunteer fire department.

Senator Ferguson. Even though they were a volunteer fire department I want to know who was the head of the volunteer fire department.

Admiral Smith. I believe I am coming to that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right, go ahead.

Admiral Smith. So you see, had Admiral Bellinger had all this information which he said yesterday he did not have, he could not initiate a long-range search.

Senator Ferguson. Who could?

Admiral Smith. Admiral Bloch. But, of course, had that information been in Bellinger’s hands he could have advised Admiral Block of the search that should be carried out. Now [9535] Admiral Bloch knew all of these things, but Admiral Bloch had no planes. So as naval base defense officer he executed these orders.

Senator Ferguson. Without planes?

Admiral Smith. By borrowing planes from the fleet, by getting his planes from Admiral Kimmel, and he had the planes that Admiral Kimmel could spare from his other exercises or intentions.

[9536] Senator Ferguson. Well, as Chief of Staff, did you ever find these men getting tangled up in these orders?

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. They were able to keep everything in mind?

Admiral Smith. Yes.

So that if a long-range reconnaissance was thought necessary—

Senator Ferguson. If you had really had to operate this system, in anticipation of an air attack, wasn’t it very confusing?

Is it because they weren’t doing anything that they didn’t get tangled up in the red tape?

Admiral Smith. Well, they were doing things. Admiral Bellinger was over there very often. The commander in chief sent for him very often.

But if I may continue, this involved command organization—

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Admiral Smith. So Admiral Bloch had the responsibility of conducting this search. To do so, he had to call upon the commander in
chief for planes, and the commander in chief could say "yes," or "no," of course.

On the other hand, if the commander in chief thought a long-distance reconnaissance necessary, he would have commanded Admiral Bloch, who was one of his task-force commanders, to carry on the search. So that after you analyze it, the responsibility comes back to the commander in chief and Admiral Kimmel in his testimony has accepted that responsibility.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, between Admiral Kimmel, there came next in line Admiral Bloch.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And then who would be under that, on long-range reconnaissance?

Admiral Smith. Bellinger.

Senator Ferguson. Bellinger?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So if Bloch and Kimmel decided there wasn't to be any long-range reconnaissance, Bellinger would never hear about it?

Admiral Smith. Quite possible; yes.

Senator Ferguson. Quite possible? There wouldn't be any need for him to know about it if they decided not to have long-distance reconnaissance, would there?

Admiral Smith. I think he would have heard about it.

[9538] Senator Ferguson. How? Did they have rumors that they relied upon?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; but——

Senator Ferguson. Was it his duty to ask about it?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; but the fleet aviator, as Admiral Bellinger testified yesterday, I believe, was in touch with him every day by telephone and certainly the fleet aviation officer would have known had the staff met and decided not to have a reconnaissance.

Senator Ferguson. Well, as I understand it, it never arose. They never decided yes or no, on long-distance reconnaissance; isn't that right? There was no decision, was there?

Admiral Smith. Not that I know of; no, sir. The matter was discussed very frequently, but I don't know that they ever reached a decision not to do it.

Senator Ferguson. They didn't reach any decision to do it; is that right?

Admiral Smith. I know that they always had in mind doing it, because you note that Admiral Bloch had requested 200 long-range planes and received none of them. There is only one reason he wanted those planes and that was for reconnaissance. That was his job.

Senator Ferguson. Now you stated that the Japanese [9539] were taking great chances on this attack, and, in fact, it was a wrong thing to do.

Did you know that on the 6th day of December, 1941, that Honolulu notified Tokyo and we intercepted a message, we didn't translate it, but we intercepted it, and had it, with this statement in it:

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet air arm.
On page 27 of Exhibit 2, Honolulu notifies Tokyo, December 6, 1941. It was intercepted but not shown to have been decoded on the 6th. Then there is this information:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

Now, suppose that the task force was up, as shown on that map, up there, and was receiving this information, and knew by their intelligence that our radar was shut off at 7 o'clock, and that we had no balloons over the ships, and the information that I have read to you was available, what changes were they taking? Your ships were tied up there. There was nobody manning the anti-aircraft guns. They knew that. They knew there was no air reconnaissance. What chance were the Japanese taking?

We had cut off the traffic from the north. We had issued two orders, one of the 16th of October and one on the 25th of November to divert all traffic south.

Admiral Smith. The only traffic north, I believe, was Russian ships carrying lend-lease materials to Vladivostok.

Senator Ferguson. Didn't we divert all those ships?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; we had no control over the Russian ships.

Senator Ferguson. Oh, the Russian ships.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. Those are the only ships that might have been in the area.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you anticipate that if Russia had seen this Japanese task force they would have done anything about it?

Admiral Smith. I doubt it very much. In fact, I understand that the Japanese task force had orders to sink them.

Senator Ferguson. Now, with what you know now, with what I read you here, what risks were the Japanese taking for the opportunity to sink all of our battleships, or destroy them, and to destroy as many planes as they did on our airfields, and in our hangars; what risks were they taking? Use hindsight on that.

Admiral Smith. Well, there was a risk, of course, from our two carrier task forces that were missing from Pearl Harbor. They couldn't have known where those ships were, and they were prepared to meet them anyway. But if these two messages that you read—the first one I heard read for the first time, I believe, here yesterday, the second I had never heard—

Senator Ferguson. You never heard?

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In the light of this, this intelligence that was going out of Honolulu to the Japs—and we must assume that it was going to their fleet?

Admiral Smith. It was, of course.

Senator Ferguson. That was the purpose. They had a design map of the harbor and these messages were going from Pearl Harbor to the Japs, and the Japs were making inquiries right along, as shown by these exhibits.

Now, under those circumstances, with that kind of intelligence against us, what chance were they taking?

Admiral Smith. Not so much as I had testified to, sir. That makes a great difference.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to show you this message of the
25th.
The Vice Chairman. Will the gentleman yield?

[9542] Senator Ferguson. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral, I didn't quite understand you at
one place. You said something with respect to the Russian ships and
the Japanese striking force, that somebody had orders to sink some-
boby else. What was that?
Admiral Smith. There is always the opportunity in a movement of
a large naval force that a merchant vessel will sight that force and
report it to someone, so that it would be necessary for the Japs to
have intercepted that ship and secured or destroyed her radio, or
otherwise to have sunk her. I have been told since the war ended
that the orders of that Jap task force were to sink anything that they
found on the way.
I don't know that that is absolutely correct, but I believe it is.
The Vice Chairman. Even though it might have been a Russian
ship?
Admiral Smith. Even though it might have been their own ships.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, let's assume that they were 20 miles
away; the message would be sent communicating that prior to their
sinking it, would it not?
Admiral Smith. Naturally, if they expected—

[9543] Senator Ferguson. It would be too late to sink it after
they communicated with their Government?
Admiral Smith. What I mean is that had they sighted a ship 20
miles from their course, they probably would have sent a destroyer or
a light ship and placed a boarding officer on board merely to ask ques-
tions. Once he arrived on board it would be too late to send a radio.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Smith. If the neutral ship suspected that she was going to
be sunk, of course she would send a radio.
Senator Ferguson. So we must also assume that they would send a
radio first, the minute she sighted that Japanese Fleet.
Look at this message that we had changing the course of our ships.
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I remember that message.
Senator Ferguson. Now, didn't that take our vessels out of this
area?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, then, we had one area that we weren't
looking into at all, we were not using submarines, we were not using
air reconnaissance, we were not using our battleships, we were using
no ships at all; isn't that true?

[9544] Admiral Smith. By routing through Torres Strait, you
will notice that the ships are not only south of that area, but they
were well south of the Hawaiian Islands. I mean, between Oahu and
the Marshalls, and the Carolines there was no shipping either.
Senator Ferguson. So we left our flank to the south open?
Admiral Smith. We moved all the merchant shipping well to the
south so that the area to the northward and to the westward and to
the southwestward was clear of our shipping.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you say they were taking a chance so far
as our two task forces were concerned. That is, Halsey and Newton.
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Knowing now what the Japanese had, six carriers, three battleships, and whatever the other part of the task force was, was either one of these task forces a match for that task force of the Japanese?

Admiral Smith. By no means. If they had joined up, they were not a match for it, unless they caught them while the Jap planes were over Pearl Harbor. If they caught them with their planes not on the deck, they would have then done considerable damage.

Senator Ferguson. But our airplanes, our bombers, would have been quite a match for them either with the planes on them, or the planes off?

Admiral Smith. You mean our long-range bombers?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Smith. We had only six, as I understand. They wouldn't have lasted very long.

Senator Ferguson. Then, do I understand that we were absolutely helpless, whether we knew it or not? Is that what you want to tell us?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; I wouldn't say that. I will say that, as has been proved throughout this war, there is no way to stop a determined air attack. Some of them will get through no matter how strong you are in the antiaircraft guns and fighters. Some will always get through if it is a determined attack, as all Japanese attacks were.

Senator Ferguson. Did we know that on the 6th and the 7th?

Admiral Smith. I think so; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then we couldn't have stopped them?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; we couldn't have stopped them. In the sinking of the Yorktown, 18 planes came in. Sixteen were shot down. Two got off their torpedoes [9546] and were shot down. But the Yorktown was sunk. That is a determined air attack. None of them got out, but they sank their ship.

Senator Ferguson. Then the thing to have done here would have been to take all the men off of the ships, except those with the antiaircraft guns, and in that way minimize our loss of sailors; is that what you would say? Whether we knew they were coming or not?

Admiral Smith. It depends on how much advance information we had, sir. The first thing to do was to get the light forces at sea and get everything at sea, if possible.

Senator Ferguson. Did we have enough at Pearl Harbor to get them at sea and take care of these carriers and win a battle with this Japanese task force?

Admiral Smith. No; but had we gotten that fleet to sea, of course, any commander in chief would seek out the enemy. He probably would have suffered great damage.

Senator Ferguson. What would you anticipate he would have inflicted on the enemy? That is the test, isn't it?

Admiral Smith. I think we probably would have sunk at least two of their carriers, but we would probably have lost our own in doing it. We would have delayed the war for another year. There would be no battle of the Coral Sea and probably no battle [9547] of Midway had we lost those two carriers at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Then, you come back to the proposition that we were not prepared for war in the Pacific?
Admiral Smith. Not for the kind of war that was thrust upon us; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, didn’t we know the kind of war the Japanese could wage in the Pacific? Weren’t we prepared on that? Didn’t our intelligence tell us that?

I am asking you as chief of staff.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. As chief of staff of the commander in chief of the Pacific.

Admiral Smith. But to meet that kind of an attack you had to have more fighting planes and long-range planes, of course, and you had to have modern antiaircraft guns which we did not have.

Senator Ferguson. Is that what Admiral Stark and General Marshall were talking about when they wrote the message of the 5th of November and the message of the 27th of November telling Mr. Hull that they didn’t want any ultimatum with Japan?

Admiral Smith. That is what I understand from their testimony; yes, sir. They wanted a delay so that these things could be provided.

[9548] Senator Ferguson. That is what you are telling us this morning?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That we were not prepared for war?

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. With the Japanese at that time; is that right?

Admiral Smith. That is right, and we did not get such things as 40 millimeter guns and modern radar on some of the ships for almost a year. We had, for example, a 4-barreled antiaircraft gun called the 1.1, but no controls had been installed for it, and after a few rounds, the men were blinded by the smoke from the barrels.

It turned out to be a very poor gun, but that was the best we had at that time, and very few ships had that.

Senator Ferguson. Didn’t we ever try it out before?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. We tried it out repeatedly.

Senator Ferguson. Did we know that this would happen with it, that the men would be blinded after a few rounds?

Admiral Smith. The controls had been designed, the foundations were in place on the battleships, but the gear had not arrived from the United States so that a man could control that gun from one side, to keep him clear of the gun blast.

[9549] Senator Ferguson. You mentioned a letter the other day, and I would like to straighten that matter out.

To refresh your memory on the letter, I will read from the Hart report:

In fact, a few days after Pearl Harbor, we received an official letter stating, “I know that you would like to have 20,000 men and we would like to give them to you,” as I remember the exact wording: “The war is in the Atlantic and we here in Washington think you are sitting pretty in the Pacific.” This letter was actually received a few days after Pearl Harbor, although written before, of course.

Now, there is a note—and you indicated in your testimony that this was sent by Admiral Stark?

Admiral Smith. No, sir. I notice I was quoted in the newspapers that way. I did not say by Admiral Stark.
Senator Ferguson. The newspaper item said Admiral Stark.
Admiral Smith. No; that is incorrect.
Senator Ferguson. And it was Admiral Nimitz; was it not?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That letter was written by Admiral Nimitz?

[9549a] Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; and I mentioned that the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, now Personnel, was in no way responsible for not furnishing us with information.

I merely mentioned that to show the apparent attitude of mind among the Navy in Washington.

Senator Ferguson. Here in Washington?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I will read this note:

The Examining Officer identified the letter mentioned by the witness as being one in the form of a personal letter from the Chief of Bureau of Navigation to Admiral H. E. Kimmel, dated 25 November, 1941, file No. FF 12/MM (55) and copy is now on file in the secret-confidential file room of the Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

How long was it taking you to get mail there—if a letter was written on the 25th of November?

Admiral Smith. The air mail was rather uncertain. It was carried by the clipper. I remember that many people decided that straight ship mail was, for personal letters, was quicker than air mail, because often the plane would take off and have to come back. That is, going to the eastward, which is the worst way, but the mail by air was not nearly so rapid as it is today, and was not [9550] reliable.

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have. I will ask counsel to get this letter.¹

Mr. Kaufman. I think it is in the record.

Senator Ferguson. I have looked for it, and I haven’t found it.

The Vice Chairman. Are there any further questions?

If not, Admiral, do you have any further information that you can give this committee that would be helpful in this investigation that has not been brought out by questions?

Admiral Smith. No, sir. I wish I could give you more. I would only like to say that if any impression has been gained by the committee that Admiral Hart—or that Admiral Kimmel, rather, was closed to suggestions, that impression is in error. All channels to him were open at all times, and I could take anyone to see him, and I believe he listened to everyone.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question or two of this witness, in view of what has gone on.

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement, Admiral?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe.

[9551] Mr. Keefe. Admiral, were there minutes kept of the meetings of the staff out at Hawaii?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; never.

Mr. Keefe. Do you have a present recollection of the staff meeting which discussed the receipt of the message of November 24?

Admiral Smith. No. I do not, sir. There were too many of them for me to remember that. I do remember the one of the 27th, because it was held the same afternoon.

¹ The letter referred to appears in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5304 et seq.
Mr. Keefe. Do you have a present recollection as to the discussion that took place at the staff meeting after the receipt of the so-called war-warning message of November 27?

Admiral Smith. I do not recall the details of the discussion; no, sir. I know that there was a discussion and meeting.

Mr. Keefe. Is there anybody that would be able to say and tell this committee what took place in your staff and what the discussion was when this war-warning message was discussed?

Admiral Smith. Not unless someone present at that time has a better memory than I have, sir. I do not know.

Mr. Keefe. Do you recall who was present at that particular staff meeting?

[9552] Admiral Smith. There were present Captain McMorris and Captain DeLany, both of whom are now admirals. I believe Admiral McMorris is scheduled to be a witness before this committee. He is in the city.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, in view of the tremendous amount of paper work that seems to be obvious in connection with the slightest activity of the Navy, it is rather astonishing to me that there wasn't a secretary of these meetings that kept some minutes or some records; but I assume that your statement is correct that there was no record kept of any of these staff meetings.

Admiral Smith. There was no record. The paper work load was very high, and we had been trying for years, and I suppose they are still trying to reduce it.

Mr. Keefe. I should hope so.

Admiral Smith. And I too, sir. But to have brought in a secretary and taken down minutes for all of the meetings we had would have filled the files with a lot more of this secret correspondence, or paper work.

Mr. Keefe. Admiral, my purpose is this. It appears quite clearly that the message of November 27 in which the language appears "This is a war warning" is the first message of that character that any witness from the Navy has ever remembered ever having been received by the Navy— [9553] "this is a war warning."

Admiral Smith. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Now, that would mean that a staff meeting would be called to discuss the meaning of that message and the measures that should be taken in connection therewith.

Am I to understand your testimony to be that you cannot tell now, or have no present recollection as to what took place at the staff meeting at which this very unusual message was discussed?

Admiral Smith. I cannot, sir. I know that a meeting was called as soon as the message came in, and that Admiral Bloch was sent for, but what the details of the discussion were, I simply cannot remember.

Mr. Keefe. Can you tell us what determination was arrived, if any, as a result of the collective judgment of the members of the staff?

Admiral Smith. The action paragraph of that dispatch said "Take defensive deployment." The other was information. The steps that we had taken in defensive deployment—

Mr. Keefe. Admiral, I haven't asked you that—
Admiral Smith. Had already been made.

Mr. Keefe. I didn't ask you that.

Admiral Smith. You are asking what action we took.

Mr. Keefe. No. I asked you whether you have any present recollection of the agreement that was reached as a result of that staff meeting.

Admiral Smith. I have not.

Mr. Keefe. Held on the 27th.

Admiral Smith. I have not.

Mr. Keefe. Resulting from the receipt of this telegram.

Admiral Smith. I have not.

Mr. Keefe. Have you any present recollection of any discussion by the staff after the receipt of the November 24 message?

Admiral Smith. I have not. We had too many conferences. I can't remember the details of one from another. It is too long ago.

Mr. Keefe. And there is no record of any kind that you can think of that would assist this committee in gaining information along the lines that I have inquired?

Admiral Smith. It possibly may be found in the daily estimate submitted to the commander in chief on steps to be taken in the event of war with Japan within 24 hours. That would show, I believe—would reflect the action that was taken in those meetings.

[9555] Mr. Keefe. There was offered here the other day in connection with the examination of one of the witnesses two written proposals as to steps to be taken in the event of war within 48 hours, I believe, and steps to be taken in the event of war within 24 hours. Do you recall that memorandum?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Who prepared that?

Admiral Smith. That was prepared by Captain McMorris, the war plans officer, and was considered by the commander in chief, the operations officer and myself every morning.

Mr. Keefe. That is signed by C.H. McMorris.

Admiral Smith. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The first one is dated the 30th day of November 1941 and the next one is dated December 5, 1941. The first is entitled "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next 24 hours," and the next one is entitled "Recommended steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next 48 hours."

Were those orders or were those just suggestions?

Admiral Smith. That was an estimate of the situation, of what we should do, something there to put right on the air when we got word, "This is war."

Mr. Keefe. Well, you got word on November 27th, "This is a war warning"?

[9556] Admiral Smith. They did not say, "This is war." We could not go ahead with WPL-46. There is a difference between a war warning and war. They did not mobilize and they did not execute the plan.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you testified before the Navy court of inquiry that you thought it was the intent to put you on your toes and get ready to carry out the mission required in the war plans.

Admiral Smith. That is right, sir; but we had been on our toes for some time, or thought we had.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I don't want to prolong this, Admiral, to any extent, but I confess that I would like very much to get clearly in my mind just what you do at these so-called meetings that the staff had out there. A message comes in, it is brought in to somebody and you sit around a table and talk about it and decide what you are going to do and you had those meetings almost daily.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; and whenever an important message came in we also had the type and force commanders, task force commanders present in port over, and always Admiral Bloch.

Mr. Keefe. Well, was there always a unanimity of opinion expressed in the meetings?

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

[9557] Mr. Keefe. Or was there debate? Didn't anybody ever disagree with—

Admiral Smith. Oh, plenty; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, was there any disagreement as to what this message of November 27 meant?

Admiral Smith. I cannot remember that far back just what the particular debate on that message was. I wish I could but I do not.

Mr. Keefe. That is a pretty important matter for this committee, at least it is for me. You cannot recall whether there was any disagreement among any members of the staff as to whether or not that message meant war, "Let's get to it and go to it"?

Admiral Smith. I do not; no, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you cannot recall now whether at the staff meeting which considered that November 27 war-warning message there was any disagreement at all?

Admiral Smith. I don't remember whether there was or not.

Mr. Keefe. Obviously I cannot ask you any more questions because you don't remember anything that took place then.

Admiral Smith. I cannot remember any particular one conference. We had been there practically a year and we were having conferences all the time and debates all the time and [9558] now—you will have before you, if anyone will remember, the opinions it is more likely to be Admiral Pye or Admiral McMorris.

Mr. Keefe. Well, Admiral, so far as any action that was taken or not taken, either affirmative or negative, the staff evidently was in agreement with the action taken by the commander in chief; is that a fair statement?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Keefe. And all of you experienced officers out there agreed with the course of action, or took the course of action that represented your considered judgment?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. I would say that, assuming that this debate or conference was similar to all others held, that the commander in chief did not make his decision until the discussion had finished. We did not go in there to discuss whether his decision was correct or not. We debated it before he reached his decision.

Mr. Keefe. I understand.

Admiral Smith. And very often some of his decisions.

Mr. Keefe. Was Halsey at this meeting on the 27th?

Admiral Smith. Halsey did not get in there until the—yes, Halsey was in on the 27th. He left on the 28th. Admiral Pye was in on the
morning of the 28th, when we had another [9559] conference with the Army present at that time.

Mr. Keeffe. Did Halsey's so-called shooting orders have anything to do with this message of the 27th, do you suppose?

Admiral Smith. I think it very probably did.

Mr. Keeffe. It was known that Halsey was going to leave on the 28th, wasn't it?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Was the question discussed at that meeting, if I can refresh your recollection, as to what kind of orders Halsey would sail under?

Admiral Smith. No, sir. Admiral Halsey received his orders from the commander in chief direct.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, didn't the staff discuss the question, "Now, if we are going to send these task forces out to deliver planes to Midway and Wake, what kind of orders are they going to go under?"

Admiral Smith. I think they very probably did.

Mr. Keeffe. You wouldn't think that the commanding officer, Admiral Kimmel, would give shooting orders to Halsey unless there had been some unanimity of thought in the discussion of the staff, would you?

Admiral Smith. No, I would not; no, sir. I think there very probably was a discussion in the staff, but I do not remember it.

[9560] Mr. Keeffe. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I want to add but very little right there.

You said that Admiral Pye had to make a report, but I think you will find on page 424, question 31, in the Naval Court of Inquiry that Admiral Pye testified:

The instructions in effect to the Pacific Fleet were that task force commanders would not report to the Commander-in-Chief upon their return from duties unless they were so directed. I therefore did not see the Commander-in-Chief until Saturday, when I went to talk to him concerning the tactical exercises which had been carried out during the last period at sea. He then showed me this dispatch.

That was on the 29th.

The Vice Chairman. On what date?

Mr. Murphy. Well, on the 29th. He was not present at the conferences of the 27th and 28th.

Reference was made to another thing. The reference which the distinguished Congressman from Wisconsin asked you about, I think is on page 561, question 159, before the Naval Court of Inquiry:

Q. Well, what did you consider the intent of this message by heading it "A war warning"?

[9561] A. Well, I thought that the intent was to put us on our toes and get ready to carry out the mission required by the War Plan. The War Plan was not executed by the Navy Department.

And, lastly, on page 351 of the Hewitt report:

Q. Mr. Sonnett. Will you state what that was?

Vice Admiral Smith. During the discussion, we informed the Army that the planes they placed on Wake would have to remain there for the duration of a war, if any, because it was impossible to put a ship in there and take them out and Army planes are not equipped to land on a carrier, although they can take off from a carrier. Admiral Kimmel then asked, "What may I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" and General Martin of the Army Air Force replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles offshore," to which Admiral Kimmel
replied, "Then they are no damn good to me," or words to that effect. General Short stated, not angrily at all, that, "If I man these islands, I must command them," and Kimmel replied, "Only over my dead body. The Army should exercise no command over Navy bases." General Short replied, "Mind you, I do not want these islands. I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I must put troops and planes on them, then I must command them."

And that was the extent of the controversy.

Which was the extent of the controversy. No more questions.

Admiral Smith. I will say that they both smiled when that discussion was going on.

The Vice Chairman. We thank you, Admiral, for your appearance and the information given the committee and your apparent desire to be helpful to us in this inquiry. You may be excused.

(The witness was excused.)

The committee will now adjourn until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

Counsel will please call the next witness.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I desire to present to the committee Captain Safford. I may state for the information of the committee that Captain Safford's testimony is desired on two main questions: First his knowledge and information with reference to the so-called 14-part message which came in on December 6 and 7, and the second subject is the question of the winds execute message which has been a matter of some interest and controversy with the committee.

I propose, with the permission of the Chairman, to go over the 14-part message testimony of Captain Safford first. Then he has advised me, and there has been circulated to the committee, a written statement which he has prepared concerning his views on the winds message.

I would like to suggest that the Chair permit him to read his statement on the winds message, after which I will ask him a few questions and then turn him over to the committee for general examination on both of these subjects.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

Captain, will you please be sworn.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

Mr. Richardson. Captain Safford, will give your full name and your age to the reporter?

Captain Safford. Laurence Frye Safford. Age 53 years.

Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy?

Captain Safford. Thirty-four years this June.

Mr. Richardson. Will you detail in a general way to the committee, Captain, just what your naval experience has been, the general work that you have done and the present position which you occupy?

Captain Safford. After graduation from the Naval Academy I served in battleships, destroyers, submarines, mine craft, cruisers, and battleships. I have had a total of 14 years' sea duty, the last 3
of which being spent as gunnery officer on the battleship New Mexico. I was in charge of the Antiaircraft Gunnery School in the summer of 1935, which was fairly successful.

All my shore duty has been spent in my specialty as a cipher expert and radio intelligence expert. I came ashore to assume this duty in charge of the Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit in May 1936, and remained on that duty until February 15, 1942, at which time I was removed by the orders of Admiral Horne.

In 1938 I was assigned to engineering duty only by the Secretary of the Navy and ordered to remain on shore duty at my post at that time in order to get ready for the war which everybody could see was coming.

Mr. Richardson. Are you on active service in the Navy now?

Captain Safford. At the present time I am on active service in the Navy and am called the Assistant Director of Naval Communications for cryptographic research.

Mr. Richardson. Will you detail a little more what you mean by the work that you did in cryptology and in intelligence, what the scope of those activities was, what the general field was that you were working in when you were doing that work?

Captain Safford. I was ordered to duty in the Navy Department in January 1924, to establish a radio intelligence system for the United States Navy. At that time, and previous to that time, I was given some reports and told to study them and to see what I could accomplish.

Mr. Richardson. What do you mean by "radio intelligence"?

Captain Safford. By "radio intelligence" I mean the interception of the radio messages of enemy foreign nations and agents, their solution by cryptanalytic processes.

Mr. Richardson. You recall in a general way that it was a message which came into this country from Japan in 13—first a pilot message that was followed by a 13-part message.

Now, will you tell me when you first heard of anything with reference to what turned out to be the 14th part message?

Captain Safford. I probably heard of the pilot message in the early afternoon of Saturday, December 6, 1941, although I cannot recall it.

Mr. Richardson. Would it have been the regular procedure or custom there to have acquainted you with such a pilot message?

Captain Safford. It was the regular procedure to immediately acquaint me with anything of particular importance and this was of particular importance.

Mr. Richardson. Why would you think that would be a particularly important message?

Captain Safford. Because it gave information that the long-awaited reply to the Secretary of State note of the 26th of November was about to be transmitted.

Mr. Richardson. Now, you were acquainted, were you not, with the fact that the Secretary of State had submitted such a note about the 26th?
Captain Safford. We had read the text of his note from the Japanese intercept. We also knew the Japanese reaction to it.

Mr. Richardson. And your knowledge and that reaction made you very much interested in when the answer would come in?

Captain Safford. That was extremely important to me, both for information and to perform my duty, in getting this information to higher authority with the least possible delay.

Mr. Richardson. Now, would there be any duty on your part when the pilot message came in to take any steps to circulate the pilot message as an independent message of itself?

Captain Safford. That was the duty of Naval Intelligence and was normally performed by Lieutenant Commander Kramer who was attached to that office but working under me in space of my section.

Mr. Richardson. Would it have been the regular practice where the first message that came in was a pilot message for Lieutenant Kramer to proceed to deliver that message without waiting for any further message in confirmation thereof?

Captain Safford. That is correct, it would be, and this pilot message indicated that the next message would probably not be received until the following day.

[9569] Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection that the pilot message as a separate message was delivered by Lieutenant Kramer?

Captain Safford. Lieutenant Commander Kramer was absent from the office from noon until about 3:00 p.m. I do not know where he was. I doubt if he can recall, but he was probably delivering this message. We know now from information which has become available to me in the last 2 weeks that there was a time stamp on the War Department copy of this message which said, "Received 12:05 p.m. December 6." I think that is the time. That is a matter of record. It was about 12:05.

Mr. Richardson. That would refer to the pilot message?

Captain Safford. That refers to the pilot message.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, there was an answer of the witness to the question just before that indicated there was something that said the 14th part would come in the next day. May I have that?

Mr. Richardson. Let me ask him.

Captain, was there anything in connection with the pilot message that would inform you that there was another message to come?

Captain Safford. Yes. It says in the second paragraph, "This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in 14 parts and imagine that you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure."

Mr. Richardson. And it was that language which informed you that there would be more to follow?

Captain Safford. It was that language which informed me there was more to follow.

Mr. Richardson. Now, if this message was delivered and how it was delivered would be the responsibility and act of someone other than yourself?
Captain Safford. That is correct. That message was translated by the Army and the time of delivery in the Navy Department all depended upon what time the Army sent our copies of the translation over to the Navy Department. That is not a matter of record and we can only guess.

Mr. Richardson. Can you tell me how long it was after your attention was called to the pilot message that any execute appeared on the long 14-part message to which it referred?

Captain Safford. The long 14-part message actually was received in the Navy Department and our men on watch began what we call processing it before I could have seen the translation of the pilot message.

Mr. Richardson. What do you mean by, before your men were processing it, what do you mean by that, what is “processing”?

Captain Safford. The first five or six parts of the long 14-part message were received in the Navy Department I believe about 10 minutes of 12, just before noon. The officer on watch telephoned over to the War Department and found out that the War Department unit was securing it at 1 o’clock because they were observing the normal working hours prescribed by the Civil Service Commission at that time and therefore he held it and worked on it himself although it was an Army responsibility under a joint agreement under date of 1941 whereby the Army processed the messages on the even days of the month and the Navy on the odd days. Processing means decoding or decrypting where it had to be done, exclusion of the code where that had to be done, recovery of the key where that had to be done, translation and finally smoothing up and typing the smooth copies for distribution to higher authority.

A number of copies were typed; early in the year I think we were limited to 4; by December 1941 I think there were 12 or 14 copies prepared, half of which went to the Navy and half to the Army for distribution.

Mr. Richardson. Would they go to anyone else than the Army and the Navy?

Captain Safford. By agreement which was made and approved on the 12th of November 1941 the Navy made all deliveries to the White House via the Naval Aide to the President, who at that time was Rear Admiral Beardall and the Army made all deliveries to the Secretary of State.

Mr. Richardson. Well, would those deliveries be made out of the number of copies that had been furnished to the Navy and to the Army?

Captain Safford. They were made out of the total number of copies and their copy was identical with the ones of the Army and Navy.

Mr. Richardson. Would there be new copies or simply one of the multifold copies that had been delivered to them?

Captain Safford. They were one of the multifold number of copies.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, when that message was delivered in that way a copy of what was delivered, in the ordinary course of recording, would appear in the files of the particular department that got the copy?
Captain Safford. There was a file copy kept in the Navy Department in my section. There was a file copy kept in the War Department. I think it was originally kept by the SIS and later taken over by G-2 after there had been an unfortunate leak and name calling in connection with it which was followed by a controversy as to who was responsible [9573] for the leak.

Mr. Richardson. And the Navy assumed the responsibility for sending one of these copies to the White House?

Captain Safford. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And the Army would have the responsibility of sending a copy to the Secretary of State?

Captain Safford. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And when those copies were delivered they would become a part of the files of the office or person to whom they were delivered?

Captain Safford. No, sir. They were collected afterwards. Sometimes they were allowed to keep them 24 hours. We wanted them back as soon as we could get them. And they were destroyed. I believe the Army destroyed everything but the file copy. The Navy kept one file copy and also another copy so that we would have a loose copy to work with and not have to remove a copy from the file.

Mr. Richardson. Then there would be one copy remaining in the files of the Navy and one copyy remaining in the files of the Army?

Captain Safford. At all times.

Mr. Richardson. How many copies would come to rest and remain in your files?

Captain Safford. Always one; generally a second.

[9574] Mr. Richardson. How many communications units, where messages were being intercepted and brought in, were we maintaining at that time?

Captain Safford. Do you mean the intercept stations where we were intercepting?

Mr. Richardson. I want the intercept stations first.

Captain Safford. We had major intercept stations at Winter Harbor, Me.; Cheltenham, Md.; Bainbridge Island, Wash.; Heeia on the island of Oahu, and at Corregidor.

We had a small intercept direction-finding station at Guam, a small one at Imperial Beach, Calif. We had a small intercepting direction-finding station at Amagansett, Long Island; and Jupiter, Fla.

In addition a number of direction-finder stations which did not attempt any intercepting.

Mr. Richardson. If anyone made an intercept that would be transferred by them where?

Captain Safford. Normally to their primary control station or office, or CI unit, as we called it.

Occasionally it would come direct to Washington, depending upon what type of message it was, and what the instructions were in the case.

Mr. Richardson. It is a fact, is it not, Captain, that [9575] the Washington office had the most experienced personnel and was
the most extensive office of that kind that we had in the world, was it not?

Captain Safford. It had a few of the most experienced personnel, but 90 percent of them had been in service less than a year. It was a training ground, as well as a working place.

Mr. Richardson. But it was the best we had?

Captain Safford. It was the largest we had. I would say that the best we had, as far as experience and all-around skill was up at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Richardson. Was there any division of activity assigned to these various stations, for instance, Washington, Pearl Harbor, and Corregidor, as to what character of work they should do, or were they all doing the same thing?

Captain Safford. That was highly specialized. The Navy Department was responsible exclusively for the handling of anything which originated in the Atlantic Ocean. I mean from the European Continent. It was responsible for Japanese diplomatic communications; it was responsible for backing up our other two stations on their particular problems, and was responsible for the training of personnel to send out to the outlying stations, because we did not believe in sending untrained personnel into the field.

[9576] Mr. Richardson. Then this 14th part message we are talking about came into the station here in Washington in the regular course of the kind of intercepting that that station was supposed to do?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, I think you testified that around 12 o' clock the first four or five sections of this 14-part message came in.

Does that mean when they came in in code?

Captain Safford. That is when they came in, in code in teletype from Bainbridge Island, Wash., or other stations which had intercepted the message.

Mr. Richardson. Now, how long did it take before those various sections of the message that came in were translated into English?

Captain Safford. Bainbridge Island copied a whole what we call schedule of radio transmissions from Tokyo to San Francisco. They transcribed all of the Government messages and ignored the commercial messages. The Government messages included in other systems on other points, and a lot of messages which had no connection with the 14-part. There was no external way to differentiate. Everything of interest to Washington was punched on a [9577] teletype tape and when the tape was completely prepared it was sent into the Navy Department by TWX through the teletype wire exchange by mechanical transmission at a rate of 60 words a minute, and received by the Navy Department.

This high speed transmission cut our tolls to a third, and we got faster service.

[9578] Then it was taken by the watch officer and decoded into the basic form as rapidly as possible. Then we knew what we had to do with it next. In many cases the Japanese would use another code underneath this so-called purple machine. In this case they did not. Therefore we saved time. Usually these messages came in Japanese
Mr. Richardson. Let me be sure that I understand. This message, 14-part, as I understand it, came in in ordinary code which, when translated in the ordinary way, gave you the English translation?

Captain Safford. Not translated in the ordinary way. We were in possession of the Japanese diplomatic cipher machine known as purple to conceal its real nature. The Army got that for us. We helped build the machines.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if it is necessary to go into technicalities. We have gone far enough in attacking national security without going into details on this.

Mr. Richardson. Since this is the first time anybody has raised that point I am perfectly willing to stop.

Mr. Murphy. It was raised before by me and I want to again protest the necessity of the Captain revealing the mechanics and the details of how we broke the code. I do not see how it could help national security or help national defense or add anything to the inquiry.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I have no intention of going into it.

Mr. Murphy. I don't mean counsel; I don't mean to criticise counsel.

Mr. Richardson. Captain, don't give us any of the operative details as to just how a code is broken. All I am interested in is that the code came in.

Mr. Murphy. May I move that the part that the witness already related so far as the mechanics are concerned be stricken from the record?

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, that is absurd. Why be so secretive about things that every foreign agent in the world knows all about? These matters are well known, well understood, have already been the subject of books and magazine articles, there is no secret about them and there is no use pretending that there is.

Mr. Murphy. I want my position to be clear. I move that the part that is in the record about the mechanics and the construction of the where-with-all be stricken from the record.

The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to inquire. You are in a position, Captain, to know better than we are what the situation is with respect to this matter.

Captain Safford. Mr. Chairman, I think I can answer the essential part of the questions as regards the time element, which is very important, and not give away anything that is essential to security.

The Vice Chairman. Well, have you said anything so far that would endanger the element of security?

Captain Safford. No, sir; nothing that has not been brought out in the papers.

Mr. Murphy. May I ask one question? You say that the mechanics which you have just outlined have been in the papers?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to know which one? Well, I will go into that later, as to what paper.
The Vice Chairman. All right. You understand the counsel's statement?

Captain Safford. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. And the committee's desire along that line, Captain, and I feel sure that you are in better position to help take care of that than even we are.

Mr. Richardson. When this message began to come in was there any attempt made to make any delivery of any portion of it prior to the reception of the first 13 parts?

Captain Safford. No, sir; not to my knowledge, except that Commander McCollum, who was the head of the Japanese section of Naval Intelligence, knew that the message was in and coming in and being worked on when it was partially in. I think he knew that around 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

Mr. Richardson. But there was no delivery outside of your office of this message so that anyone could read it or see it or know of it or act on it or deliver it until the first 13 parts had come in, was there?

Captain Safford. The message was not ready for delivery until about 9 o'clock in the evening. It might have been ready for delivery a little earlier on a limited scale.

Mr. Richardson. Now, by "the message" you refer to the first 13 parts?

Captain Safford. I mean the first 13 parts.

Mr. Richardson. Did you consider the first 13 parts as a complete message for the purpose of delivery?

Captain Safford. I never saw the first 13 parts until Monday morning.

Mr. Richardson. When did you last see or hear anything of this message of Saturday, December 6th?

Captain Safford. I left the office at the close of working hours, at 4:30 p.m. on Saturday, December 6th. It was the first time in 2 weeks that I had observed normal working hours.

At that time Commander Linn had come on and was re-working the message. There had been a mistake in the key which was set up on the machine which decoded the message and the whole entire part we had in there was badly garbled and because of its importance Linn thought it was better to check the key first and find out the mistake and produce perfect copy rather than to clear the garble by guess and maybe make mistakes at critical points in the message. This would take quite a little bit of time and we simply had to throw away all the work that had been done before.

Linn was my best man on the watch side. Normally I do not expect watches from a man in charge of a section. He was taking the place of a man whom we had let go on Christmas eve and we were hoping that we would be able to get somebody else to take his place.

Kramer was standing by to deliver the message. As soon as it was completed McCollum knew about it.

Mr. Richardson. Were you there?

Captain Safford. I was there until 4:30. I checked it and said:

There is nothing I can do but get in your way and make you nervous. I am going home.

Mr. Richardson. Then after 4:30 you knew nothing of your own knowledge as to what happened to the 13-part message?
Captain Safford. Until Monday morning, when I got the reports from Linn and Kramer on it.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, did you on Monday morning get reports from them with reference to the 13 parts?

Captain Safford. I did immediately and about anything else that happened over the week end.

Senator Lucas. May I ask a question at this point, counsel?

Captain, did you know that these 13 parts were coming?

Captain Safford. We could read enough to——

Senator Lucas. No, I am talking about you, not "we". Did you yourself, personally know that these 13 parts were coming in?

Captain Safford. We knew—I knew at 4:30 from what we had that it was the first part of the long message. In fact, the rest of it was coming in, began coming in I think around 3:30 and it took about an hour for the whole message to come in and other messages mixed up with it.

Mr. Richardson. Did you see the 13 parts before you left at 4:30 that afternoon?

Captain Safford. No. I saw all 13 parts in their original code form but you could not identify them until they had been decoded.

Senator Lucas. That is what I say. You could not identify them.

Captain Safford. They had probably 20 or 25 messages on hand, 13 of which were the various parts of this and the rest were other messages. They could not be identified until they had all been decoded.

Mr. Richardson. Then you left your office at 4:30?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And you did not again see any part of this message until Monday?

Captain Safford. Until Monday.

Mr. Richardson. And all of the transactions that occurred after 4:30 on Saturday—on Saturday evening and Sunday morning came after you left?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And you had no independent knowledge of this?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Might I ask of the committee——

Senator Ferguson. Did he work Sunday?

Mr. Richardson. Might I ask the committee whether the committee desires me to interrogate Captain Safford as to the hearsay report which he got with reference to this message on Monday? Because it is apparent from his testimony that his own personal knowledge ceased at 4:30 on Saturday afternoon.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think we should have that because that was an official report.

The Vice Chairman. Well, permit the Chair to inquire at this point. Is counsel prepared to present other witnesses who can give definite testimony and not hearsay on these points?

Mr. Richardson. Yes, that is right.

Senator Lucas. May I ask counsel if there is any conflict in the report that was made to the captain and what the witnesses will testify to when they come to the stand?
Mr. Richardson. I do not know what the captain's testimony will be. I am entirely willing to elicit that if the committee wants it, in view of the fact that it came to him on Monday.

Mr. Murphy. May I, as one member of the committee, say that I would like to hear what he heard on Monday? I am very much interested in that.

Senator Ferguson. I move, Mr. Chairman, that we take that because it was an official report.

The Vice Chairman. Well, I had rather assumed that the committee would prefer to have the best evidence.

Mr. Richardson. Well, you will have it anyway.

The Vice Chairman. And that is the reason I was inquiring of counsel, if he expects to get the best evidence, which is not hearsay. Does counsel state that he expects to present that?

Mr. Richardson. Yes, we expect to have Lieutenant Kramer, [9587] who is the man who handled it, who was there and knows more about it than anyone else and I just want to exhaust the point with Captain Safford and to do it I would have to ask him now to relate to you what he learned on Monday when he returned to his office.

The Vice Chairman. It will be, of course, hearsay evidence.

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the events that occurred between Saturday and Monday would be hearsay but what he heard on Monday is direct evidence and in view of him being here and covering the general picture, what he heard on Monday and, therefore, as it impressed him, I think the whole situation would be direct evidence.

Mr. Richardson. Let us be realistic. What the captain heard on Monday would be a fact, of course, but it would be a fact that would ordinarily be best testified to by the people who created the acts which he heard.

The Chairman. Permit me to inquire of counsel. Are the people who reported to Captain Safford on Monday and gave him this hearsay information that is now being discussed the witnesses that counsel expects to present here?

Mr. Richardson. Well, until I hear the captain's statement I would not be able to say that I have the witnesses that [9588] he contacted, that all of the witnesses that he contacted on Monday will be here.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Mr. Richardson. I propose, in view of the interest of so many members, to go right on and inquire.

The Vice Chairman. Well, without objection then, you may proceed.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

The Vice Chairman. That takes care of your motion, doesn't it, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. At what time did you return to your office on Monday?

Captain Safford. At the beginning of working hours, which I believe was 8 a.m. at that time.
Mr. Richardson. And was your attention then called to anything relating to this 14-part message?

Captain Safford. I immediately called all of my heads of sub-sections under me into conference.

Senator Lucas. Who was it that you called?

Mr. Richardson. Whom did you call into conference?

Captain Safford. Commander Kramer, Commander Linn, particularly, and Commander Parke. I believe they were all lieutenants at the time. I called them in to find out what [9590] had gone wrong and how the people had been surprised the way they had; first, to see if our section had been to blame in any other way and the second, to immediately start writing out a full report of the circumstances, as required by Navy regulations, I believe, and certainly by Navy custom.

Now, I have been in other accidents and collisions, and so forth, and that was always done. In view of so many people being involved it seemed better to prepare such a statement or report of those in my section and let those who were in agreement with that report sign with me and those who held counterviews submit their own views.

Sometime within the week following Pearl Harbor I and the other officers were called into conference in the office of the Director of Naval Communications; I am not certain whether Admiral Noyes presided and he was called away suddenly and Captain Redmond, the Assistant Director of Naval Communications, presided.

Mr. Richardson. When was this?

Captain Safford. This was in the week following the attack on Pearl Harbor; some time prior to the 15th I remember, probably Thursday or Friday.

Mr. Richardson. And where did it take place?

Captain Safford. In the office of the Director of Naval Communications.

[9590] Mr. Richardson. The meeting was called for what purpose?

Captain Safford. The meeting was called of all of the section heads to discuss the attack on Pearl Harbor and the whispering campaign against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch which was then getting into full swing.

Mr. Richardson. Now, we are concentrating here at this moment on the 14-part message.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. May I finish my statement?

Mr. Richardson. Will you bring your testimony to that point?

Captain Safford. The discussion in that meeting was that all section heads were asked to tell all the people not to talk, there was too much loose talk going around, that there would undoubtedly be an investigation later and that anybody who had anything to say would be called before that investigation and permitted to say all they had to say, if they had anything to say, and if we had written out anything to destroy it immediately. I considered it a perfectly logical order from my superior.

Mr. Richardson. Who gave you the order that you were to destroy anything, name these people?

Captain Safford. It was either Admiral Noyes or Captain Redmond, the director or assistant director, on the instructions of Admiral Stark.
Mr. Richardson. Was it in writing?

Captain Safford. It was not in writing.

Mr. Richardson. Who told it to you?

Captain Safford. Whichever officer presided at this conference and I cannot remember which one they sent.

Mr. Richardson. It was an oral direction?

Captain Safford. It was an oral direction.

Mr. Richardson. Given to you by either Noyes or Redmond?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. What did they say?

Captain Safford. I have said it once before.

Mr. Richardson. Say it again.

Captain Safford. We had standing orders not to talk, not to spread the gossip against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, to keep anything we had to ourselves until we were called to a witness stand to testify officially and if we had anything in writing to destroy it immediately and pass that word on to our subordinates, and I carried out that order.

Mr. Richardson. What was meant by "anything in writing"? What did you understand it to mean?

Captain Safford. I presumed it to mean notes or any other kind of records which he had in writing.

Mr. Richardson. About what?

[9592] Captain Safford. About the circumstances leading up to the attack upon Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, you understood that it became your duty to go to your office, accumulate all of the files of your office that had to do with the events leading up to Pearl Harbor, and destroy them?

Captain Safford. No, sir; only notes which we had made ourselves.

Mr. Richardson. Oh. Was there any reason given why those should be destroyed?

Captain Safford. Yes; that this was an emergency situation, we had just suffered a terrible defeat, the morale was low, that all kinds of rumors were going out from the Navy Department and we had to put a stop to this whispering campaign. It seemed perfectly logical at the time.

Mr. Richardson. Well, how would you stop the whispering campaign by destroying the notes you made as to the facts?

Captain Safford. At that time I did not question my orders any more than Admiral Wilkinson questioned his verbal orders. We carried them out.

Mr. Richardson. What did you destroy yourself?

Captain Safford. I destroyed considerable notes concerning statements given to me by Lieutenant Linn and Lieutenant Commander Kramer and other people who were intimately associated with them.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, let us get this straight. Before you left on Saturday at 4:30 the first part of the 14-part message was coming in, was it not?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And you did not have any notes with you about anything informative with reference to the parts of that message that had come in, did you?
Captain Safford. The 14-part message is only one small part of the whole affair.

Mr. Richardson. That may be and you may be very anxious to get on to the other points, but what I am driving at now is to give the committee all of the facts we can find out about the 14-part message.

Now, you say that when you came back on Monday you got a report with reference to the 14-part message?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. What was that report? Give us the details of it.

Captain Safford. Well, I——

Mr. Keeffe. May we find out whether that report was in writing, Mr. Chairman? I understood the captain to say that he destroyed, that he instructed his heads, that as a result of calling his heads in, he instructed them to make [9594] sure that they make out a report in writing and sign it.

Captain Safford. No, sir. Those were verbal reports to me. I was going to make up a consolidated report which everybody would sign when we had all of the facts straightened out.

Mr. Keeffe. And those that were in opposition to that, that were dissatisfied with that report?

Captain Safford. They could make out their own report if they thought that were incorrect as to the facts.

Mr. Keeffe. May I ask counsel, was such a report as that actually made up in writing and signed by him and the other persons involved?

Mr. Richardson. Let us get first things first.

When you went back on Monday to your office and met with your associates and subordinates was there any discussion there before any report was made up? Was there any discussion there as to what had happened with respect to the 14-part message?

Captain Safford. There were many discussions.

Mr. Richardson. Now, tell us what that discussion was, what was it about, if anything?

Captain Safford. Linn told me that the fourteenth part did not come in before midnight. He had waited up beyond midnight and it had not come in until the next morning. We [9595] found out from the records of the people on watch that it had come in around 5 a.m. on Sunday morning and had been sent over to the Army for translation and there was a little doubt as to just what time the Army had sent the translation back.

Commander Kramer——

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything said about what had been done with the 13 parts?

Captain Safford. Lieutenant Linn said that his work on the 13 parts had been completed about 7 p.m. and after that it was Kramer’s responsibility to straighten the message out and get it typed.

Kramer told me that he left the Navy Department about 9 p.m.; that he first telephoned to Admiral Stark at his residence in the Observatory Circle and found that he was not at home. Then he telephoned to Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and requested instructions.

Admiral Wilkinson ordered him to leave a copy at the White House with the President, explaining its urgency and then to come out to Admiral Wilkinson’s residence and report to him with the other copies.
Kramer carried those orders out. Kramer told me he did not see the President because the President was having a dinner party and entertaining some high-ranking British official, who I think has turned out to be Vice Admiral [9596] French.

Kramer left the copy of that with the President’s aide, out in the code room, and told him to get word to the President that this was very urgent, and he was to interrupt his dinner party and let him see it as soon as possible.

Senator Lucas. What night was this, now?

Captain Safford. This is the night of Saturday, December 6, 1941.

I believe that Kramer—Kramer told me a lot of things at that time which are rather dim in my memory, having lost the notes. I believe that on the way to Admiral Wilkinson’s residence he stopped at the Wardman Park and gave a copy to Secretary Hull and discussed the matter at length with the Secretary. I know that he saw the Secretary that night and then took the copy to Admiral Wilkinson’s residence. Secretary Hull called up several people—- 

Mr. Keefe. You don’t mean Secretary Hull?

Captain Safford. Secretary Knox.

Mr. Murphy. He said "Hull" twice.

Mr. Richardson. Let us get this straight. Was this delivered at the Wardman Park or to Secretary Knox?

Captain Safford. It was Secretary Knox, and Secretary Knox called up Secretary Hull and other people and discussed the message with him. In the meantime, Secretary Hull had [9597] received his copy—-

Mr. Richardson. Go on.

Captain Safford. (Continuing). From the Army, and an appointment was made the next morning for Secretary Knox, Secretary Hull, and Secretary Stimson to meet in Secretary Hull’s office at 10 o’clock and Kramer and Colonel Bratton were requested to be there also.

Then Kramer went to Admiral Wilkinson’s house, gave him the messages; he had given him the substance of the message over the telephone.

Mr. Keefe. May I interrupt you a moment? What you are telling now is what you claim Kramer told you on Monday?

Captain Safford. Kramer told me on Monday the best I can remember it.

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead, Captain.

Captain Safford. So they got it, and I specifically asked him, I asked him about Admiral Stark, and he said Admiral Stark did not receive it but that he was told about it Saturday night and gave orders which he received through Admiral Wilkinson—I think he was a captain at that particular time—to deliver the written message to Admiral Stark’s office the following morning, Sunday, at 9 a.m., which he did.

Mr. Richardson. Anything said about General Marshall? [9598] Captain Safford. I asked him about the Army and the only thing he said that he knew about the Army was that they had been given their copies at 9 p.m. and that Colonel Bratton had gotten a copy to Secretary Hull. He knew nothing about the rest of the Army delivery.
Mr. Richardson. All right. Go right ahead and give us all that you can recall, Captain.

Captain Safford. He had made personal delivery to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, who was Rear Admiral Ingersoll. He had also given a copy to the Director of War Plans, who was Rear Admiral Turner.

Kramer remained at Admiral Wilkinson’s until about midnight, and then when he went home he stopped by the Navy Department to see if the fourteenth part had come in there, to find out if it had been, and he told the man on watch to give him a call if anything happened and that he would be down the next morning early because he had to make this 9 o’clock appointment at Admiral Stark’s office with the thirteen parts of the message.

I believe that some time during the evening that Kramer had phoned Captain McCollum, but Captain McCollum lived way out in Virginia and did not see the message until the next morning when he came into his own office.

Mr. Richardson. Now, do you recall any other facts which were reported to you when you got back to your office on Monday? I am only asking you to tell us what you can remember.

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. I am not blaming you for not remembering, but is that all you can remember?

Captain Safford. That is, in regard to the 14-part message.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. Murphy. May I interrupt, counsel? He said that after he was told to destroy the papers that he went and gave orders to those under him. I would like to know whom he gave orders to to destroy papers, the names.

The Vice Chairman. Well, that is later in the week.

Mr. Richardson. Let me ask the chairman this: This is the testimony by this witness with reference to the 14-part message. Is it the desire of the committee to interrogate now individually on that examination of the witness as to the 14-part message, or is it the desire of the committee to have me now turn from the 14-part message to the question of the winds message?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I have a request to make. Here is a witness who has told us that he went out and carried out orders to destroy papers and that he ordered those under his jurisdiction to destroy them and I think that is one of the most important things before us, and I suggest that we proceed to it immediately.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I move that the counsel proceed with the whole examination of this witness on every point that there is, and then when the committee gets to examining him it will be an over-all coverage, just like we have done with every other witness.

The Vice Chairman. I am more inclined to think that would be the better course. In other words, counsel, you conduct the examination of this witness as you have on the others.

Mr. Richardson. Until I am through.

The Vice Chairman. Until you get through, and then the committee will inquire.
Mr. Richardson. Now, go right ahead, Captain, if you think of anything that you have overlooked.

Captain Safford. I asked him if he was certain that the—

Mr. Richardson. You asked whom?

Captain Safford. Kramer; if he thought that the President had seen it that night, and he said he thought he did, that—

The Vice Chairman. Repeat that, Captain. I am sorry, I did not hear it.

Captain Safford. Kramer said he thought that the President had seen it that night; that the naval aide to the Presi- 9601 dent, Admiral Beardall, was a dinner guest at Admiral Wilkinson's and that he had phoned in at the White House and that the aide had informed him that the President had seen those 13 parts, and the President then had expressed the desire to do everything possible to get the fourteenth part to him as soon as it came in.

Mr. Richardson. Can you think of anything else now?

Captain Safford. Not on the 14 parts.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, Captain, a few moments ago you referred to a meeting later in the week at which some instructions were given with respect to a whispering campaign and about destruction of notes. When did that take place?

Captain Safford. It was probably a Thursday or Friday following the 7th of December.

Mr. Richardson. And in whose office?

Captain Safford. It was in the office of the Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. Richardson. That would be Wilkinson?

Captain Safford. That would be Admiral Noyes' office.

Mr. Richardson. And who were present?

Captain Safford. All the section heads who were on duty at that time and who were present in the building that day.

Mr. Richardson. And as far as you can remember them give me the names. Who presided?

9602 Captain Safford. Admiral Noyes presided at the meeting. Then he was called away—

Mr. Richardson. Who was Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford. He was the Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Go ahead, now.

Captain Safford. He was called away some time before the conference broke up and Captain Redmond, the Assistant Director of Naval Communications, took on in his place.

This word was given us, came down in the name of the Chief of Naval Operations. It seemed a perfectly logical and reasonable order. We were in an emergency situation and there was panic running through the Navy Department at that particular time and there were desperate measures used, it seemed, to get the situation in hand.

Mr. Murphy. I suggest to counsel, he says it came down in the name of the Chief of Naval Operations. Was it written?

Mr. Richardson. How did it come down, orally or in writing?

Captain Safford. It came down orally. I presumed there had been an earlier conference in Admiral Stark's office.

Mr. Richardson. And who purported to convey the information in the first instance, what person?
Captain Safford. The Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. Richardson. Who was that?

Captain Safford. Rear Admiral Noyes.

Mr. Richardson. Just what did he say as near as you can recall it? How did he phrase what he had to tell you? Give me your best recollection, that is all I want, Captain.

Captain Safford. He started off that there were altogether too many rumors running around the Navy Department and people running to the newspapers telling them, they were getting in the newspapers and on the radio, they were saying all manner of things against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch which were not true, that we had to put a stop to that; that we would have to stop these rumors ourselves, if we knew anything let it die with us, pass that word to our subordinates; we have got to stop this thing and not originate any rumors ourselves or any suspicion or anything.

He said if anybody wanted to talk they would be given all the opportunity to talk that they wanted because there would be an official investigation held, and we could appear on the witness stand under oath and be responsible for what we said.

He said:

Furthermore, if you have got any notes or anything in writing, destroy them because somebody might see them and start something which you don't intend.

It seemed a perfectly logical and fair order at the time.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, you had present, according to the record, yourself and Admiral Noyes and Captain Redmond. Can you think of anyone else who was there?

Captain Safford. I am not certain what ranks they hold now. They were all captains at the time.

Captain Patterson I believe was there; Capt. F. O. Willenbucher. I could probably get a list of the other section heads on duty at the time. I cannot remember them all from memory.

Mr. Murphy. Will you give us your present recollection?

The Vice Chairman. Give us your present recollection of all who were present. Give them slowly and if there is any doubt about the spelling of the name give the spelling of the name to the reporter.

Senator Lucas. And also what department they were the head of.

Mr. Murphy. If you know.

Senator Lucas. If you know.

Mr. Murphy. We have already, I think, the names of Noyes, Redmond, Patterson, Willenbucher, and yourself.

Captain Safford. I could not give any more names at the present time without a chance to refresh my memory, without guessing. I did not expect to make this statement, I did not expect this matter to come up at all. I am totally unprepared to answer that question any further.

Mr. Richardson. Were you given any direction to destroy any files or official records?

Captain Safford. We were not given any instructions to destroy files or any official records.

Mr. Richardson. Now, did you destroy any notes as a result of that direction?
Captain Safford. I destroyed all the notes I had prepared.

Mr. Richardson. Did you destroy any note that had reference to the 14-part message?

Captain Safford. Only such notes as I had made concerning the time of delivery, yes, I did.

Mr. Richardson. And those were the notes you had made when Kramer reported to you?

Captain Safford. When Kramer reported to me.

Mr. Richardson. Now, we have spoken of the fourteenth part message. There was a part of that message that contained the equivalent of 1 o'clock p.m. Was that a part of the fourteenth part?

Captain Safford. No; that was a separate message, No. 907.

Mr. Richardson. Did it come in in the same sort of a code [9606] that the other message did?

Captain Safford. It came in the same sort of a code exactly except that it was in Japanese and had to be translated.

Mr. Murphy. May I inquire, counsel? Will you have him give the names of the people that he gave orders to to destroy it? I think that is important.

Mr. Richardson. Did you give any specific orders yourself, based upon what Admiral Noyes said, to any other persons with reference to the destruction of any of their notes?

Captain Safford. I passed these orders down to my immediate subordinates whom I can name.

Mr. Murphy. Can or cannot?

Captain Safford. I can.

Mr. Murphy. Will you name them, please, the ones that you gave orders to to destroy notes?

Captain Safford. Captain G. W. Welker, OP 20-GX. That was his official designation. Captain L. W. Parke, OP 20-GY. Captain A. D. Kramer, OP 20-GZ. These were the people it directly applied to.

Mr. Murphy. How about Linn?

Captain Safford. I probably also told Linn the same thing, although Linn came under Parke, and we would have depended upon Parke to do it.

[9607] Mr. Murphy. How about Brotherhood?

Captain Safford. Brotherhood was only one of the watch officers who came in there under Linn. I did not give it to the watch officers individually, with the possible exception of Linn, who was the senior watch officer.

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to object, but it seems to me that there is quite a radical departure from the usual practice of the committee. I thought it was understood that counsel was to examine the witness, and when he is through each individual member of the committee would have a right to go into any matter that he wanted to. I do not want to interrupt the witness or the counsel during his examination.

Mr. Richardson. I will say this, Mr. Chairman, that I rather welcome Mr. Murphy's suggestions. I have no objection.

The Chairman. Well, the Chair will say that the point made by Congressman Keefe is well taken, although the members have, since the beginning of the hearing, violated it by interjecting questions dur-
ing the interrogation of counsel and other members of the committee, but the Chair thinks it ought to be observed. If the witness makes a statement that any member of the committee does not understand or gives some name that is indistinct the member has a right, of course, to clarify that, but the Chair thinks that counsel and mem-

bers of the committee when they are interrogating a witness should be permitted to do so without interruption.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, you stated that the so-called 1 o'clock section of the message came in in a separate message in Japanese.

Captain Safford. In Japanese.

Mr. Richardson. That was different from the way the first 14 parts came in?

Captain Safford. Yes, because they were in English.

Mr. Richardson. Now, do you know, or was it reported to you how long after the 14th part came in that the 1 o'clock message came in?

Captain Safford. The two parts came in about half an hour or an hour apart, maybe closer.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, what was your information that you got on Monday as to when the 1 o'clock message came in and was ready for delivery on Sunday?

Captain Safford. It was ready for delivery some time Sunday morning.

Mr. Richardson. You cannot be more definite than that?

Captain Safford. I cannot be more definite from my memory.

Mr. Richardson. Now, is it your distinct recollection, Captain, that Lieutenant Commander Kramer told you that this 13- part message, the arrival of the 13-part message had been telephoned to Admiral Stark on Saturday night?

Captain Safford. That was his report to me; it is my recollection that it was his report to me at the time. I asked him about that particularly because everybody else in authority had received a written copy in person and Admiral Stark had not and I particularly asked him about that, "Did Admiral Stark get it?" and he said, "Yes." He assured me that Admiral Stark knew about that message.

Mr. Richardson. Do you know whether any part of the 13-part message as such had been sent to Hawaii? I am speaking of the 13 parts now.

Captain Safford. I know that none of that was ever sent to Hawaii. I did not know that Monday morning, I will add.

Mr. Richardson. From your experience in that office, did you regard the 13-part section of the whole message as important?

Captain Safford. I regarded the first 13 parts just as important as the 14th part.

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything about the first 13 parts that was unusual?

Captain Safford. The Japanese, for the first time in the whole series of negotiations, became very abusive in their language in an official note to be presented to the United States Government.

Mr. Richardson. And what conclusion did you draw or would you draw, in view of your experience, with those messages, from the tone of those first 13 parts?

Captain Safford. That they were breaking off diplomatic relations with the presentation of that note, and this was particularly in view
of the instructions which they had given in the pilot message about its presentation and holding its presentation until they were told to do it.

Mr. Murphy. What was that last?

Captain Safford. Holding the presentation until they were told to present it.

Mr. Richardson. That made you intensely interested, did it not, in the 14th part that was coming?

[9611] Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Then will you explain to me why it was that you made no inquiry about the 14th part of the message until you got to your office on Monday? Why did not you call up Sunday morning the first thing and find out about the 14th part? Have you any explanation for that?

Captain Safford. I have an explanation that is perfectly logical in my own mind.

Mr. Richardson. Give it to me.

Captain Safford. I stayed out late Saturday night. I was eating breakfast in my pajamas and bathrobe when I received a telephone call from the watch officer that the Japanese had attacked Hawaii. I realized there had been a slip and a bad slip high up in the Navy Department.

Senator Lucas. What was that last?

Captain Safford. That there was a slip in the Navy Department, high up. I told the watch officer I would be on call, I would not leave my house, but if my presence was needed in the Navy Department I would go down, but I would not go down unless called for.

Mr. Richardson. Did you make any reference at all to the 14th part of the message?

Captain Safford. I did not make any reference to the 14th part to him that I can recall.

[9612] Mr. Richardson. Before you left at 4:30, Captain, did you read and understand the character of the parts of the 14-part message that had come in up to the time you left?

Captain Safford. Enough to realize that it was the 14th part of it that they were talking about.

Mr. Richardson. Did you read it far enough to conclude that there was anything unusual about it?

Captain Safford. To conclude that it was particularly hot, and it was probably the last message we would ever receive from the Japanese.

Mr. Richardson. Would you say you read enough of it to arouse your curiosity as to what the rest of it would be?

Captain Safford. Not curiosity. It gave me a sample of what the rest of it would be.

Mr. Richardson. At any rate, whatever you knew about it, when you left your office at 4:30 you did not thereafter make any inquiry with reference to it until you came to your office on Monday?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Your office was then on a 24-hour basis?

Captain Safford. My office was on a 24-hour basis since the first of February, 1941.
Mr. Richardson. Then there were in your office persons to whom you could have telephoned on Sunday morning and gotten the particulars of whatever had happened to the 14th part message?  

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Did you receive any telephone from anybody until you got the telephone about the attack?

Captain Safford. Not that I can definitely recall. I usually got three or four telephone calls at night and one more or less telephone call made no impression on me whatsoever. I imagine I was called and told what they had delivered and I promptly forgot about it. I cannot say I recall receiving any calls until I received the call that the attack was on.

Mr. Richardson. You are quite sure that there was no telephone to you that had any reference specifically to this so-called fourteenth part message?

Captain Safford. I can recall nothing about the fourteenth part specifically.

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything said about the 14-part message in this conference that you had later in the week that you testified to?

Captain Safford. There was no mention of the 14-part message whatsoever.

Mr. Richardson. Did you talk to anybody else about the 14-part message after you talked with Kramer on Monday when you got back and got his report?

[9614] Captain Safford. I asked Kramer if a warning message had been sent out and he said he thought of course it had been, but that would be for his superior officers and he did not know.

Mr. Richardson. How far did you live from your office?

Captain Safford. About 2 miles.

Mr. Richardson. Have you anything further, Captain, that you would like to tell the committee with reference to the 14-part message, or the 14th part, or the 1:00 o'clock end of it, or the pilot message? Is there anything further you would like to tell the committee?

Captain Safford. In checking up on the message afterwards we discovered that Tokyo filed the first 13 parts as separate messages a few minutes apart over a span of about 3 or 4 hours, apparently, to finish encoding it. Then they delayed about 12 hours before they filed the 14th part. We received the messages, or the parts of it in approximately the same order and the same span of time in which filed. Our people had thought for a long time that they had missed the 14th part, or for some reason we failed to intercept it, and they put in some very worried hours, the men who watched it, and they were very relieved themselves when the fourteenth part came in and they knew their job was done.

Mr. Richardson. How long was it from the time that they reported to you that the first part came in until the fourteenth part showed up?

Captain Safford. It was roughly 12 hours.

Mr. Richardson. Now was there anyone else at this meeting later in the week, when there was this admonition from Admiral Noyes, was there anyone else there from your immediate section but you?
Captain Safford. I was the only one from my immediate section.
Mr. Richardson. What time of day was that meeting?
Captain Safford. In the morning, I would say around 10:00 o'clock, 10:00 or 10:30.
Mr. Richardson. How long did it last?
Captain Safford. About 15 minutes.
Mr. Richardson. When you left it did you go right back to your section?
Captain Safford. I went right back to my section, called my section heads in, and passed the news to them.
Mr. Richardson. Orally?
Captain Safford. Orally; nothing in writing.
Mr. Richardson. And told them just what Noyes told you?
Captain Safford. Just what I had been told, and if they had any notes about the thing, to get rid of them. There was nothing said about destruction of official papers.

[9616] Mr. Richardson. Can you tell us a little more in detail as to what you said? Is your recollection keen enough to tell us just what you said to your men?
Captain Safford. As well as I could, I passed on to them the exact words that had been given to me.
Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion of that?
Captain Safford. There was no discussion. It seemed the correct thing to do under the circumstances.
Mr. Richardson. You had no idea, did you, Captain, that you were being asked to do anything that was improper or surreptitious?
Captain Safford. Absolutely not, or I would not have done it.
Mr. Richardson. You have no sense of embarrassment or shame for transmitting the report to your division heads?
Captain Safford. None at all.
Mr. Richardson. Now when this message would come in, as you testified it did, would it be taken by one man or would several people cooperate in receiving it?
Captain Safford. I did not quite understand the question.
Mr. Richardson. You had how many watch officers on duty?
Captain Safford. We had two men on watch, an officer and chief petty officer on a particular system. We had [9617] four of each on the watch list, and each one stood 8 hours on and 16 off.
Mr. Richardson. Would such a message, when it came in, be handled by one man or more than one man?
Captain Safford. By two men together.
Mr. Richardson. It would take two men to handle this 14-part message as it came in?
Captain Safford. The 14-part message, in order to save time we called the Army in and they ran off part of it on their machine in the Munitions Building, and part of it was run on our machine in the Navy Building.
Mr. Richardson. How long after the pilot message came in did you ask the Army for help?
Captain Safford. We did not ask the Army for help until about 3:00 p.m. when the rest of the 14-part message came in and decided with what we had it was more than we could handle.
Mr. Richardson. Then you wanted help?
Captain Safford. Then we wanted help.
Mr. Richardson. And you called on the Army?
Captain Safford. We called on the Army.
Mr. Richardson. Now who called on the Army? Did you?
Captain Safford. Commander Kramer called the Army and got in touch with some officer over there and he called [9618] some of his people.
Mr. Richardson. Would they come to your office?
Captain Safford. They worked in their own office on their own machine.
Mr. Richardson. And then when all the work was done it was brought together as a complete job?
Captain Safford. It was brought together as a complete job.
Mr. Richardson. What did you mean by your reference a few moments ago of having it translated by the Army?
Captain Safford. That was the 1:00 p.m. message. It is in Japanese and we did not have a Japanese-speaking officer on watch, so we had to send it over to the Army where they arranged for that Sunday, they would handle any transmission, because Kramer had all these appointments with Admiral Stark and with Secretary Knox.
Mr. Richardson. Do you speak Japanese?
Captain Safford. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Kramer does, does he not?
Captain Safford. Kramer does.
Mr. Richardson. Have you anything further now that you would like to tell us that has any reference to the 14-part message, or any part of it?
Captain Safford. I would like to say this, that calling [9619] extra men in the Navy would not have speeded up any work because we only had one machine and could only run one thing at a time. We had to call the Army people, to use their machine over in their own office.

Furthermore, the 6th was supposed to be the Army's day of responsibility, and the only reason we were handling this message was because we were standing a 24-hour watch, week-ends and everything else, and that is the reason for breaking the normal day's duty that was carried on up until this time. I think they went on a 24-hour basis at 6 p.m. on Saturday, December 6, 1941.

Mr. Richardson. How long have you known Commander Kramer?
Captain Safford. He had served under me 2 years, I believe.
Mr. Richardson. I now want to ask you some questions, Captain, about what is known as the winds code.
How many times, in how many different investigations of this Pearl Harbor matter, have you testified?
Captain Safford. I have testified four times.
Mr. Richardson. In which hearings?
Captain Safford. I testified before Admiral Hart, before the Navy Court of Inquiry, before the Army Board of Investigation, before Admiral Hewitt, but I was not permitted [9620] to testify before the Roberts Commission.
Mr. Richardson. And in each of those examinations you testified in considerable detail to the various particulars in connection with what we call the winds code and winds code execute?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. And when you were called, you knew you were going to be a witness here, you prepared a written statement as indicating what you wished to present to the committee on the winds code?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. And would you like to read that in presentation to the committee at this time?
Captain Safford. I would.
Mr. Richardson. With the committee's permission I would ask him to read it.
The Chairman. Without objection, it will be read.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, in order to save time, I believe every member of the committee has read the statement, and I was just wondering whether or not counsel could proceed to examine him on it and let the statement go in the record at this time?
I do not care to read it again. I would rather have counsel get through with his examination.
[9627] Mr. Keefe. I would like to hear the witness read this statement.
The Chairman. All right. Proceed to read it.
Mr. Keefe. I have read it carefully, but I would like to have him read it.
The Chairman. Go ahead and read it.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I forgot to bring my copy over.
Is there an extra copy?
Senator Lucas. I would like to have a copy too, as long as he is going to read it.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, before the starting of the reading of this statement, I would like to say I think Captain Safford has put parts in this statement that reveal certain mechanics which should not be revealed. I think the captain knows where they are. However, the statement has been given out so the press and everybody else has it. I will call attention to that when you come to it.
Mr. Keefe. Everything is revealed in the letters of Dewey and Marshall.
The Chairman. We will not go into the Dewey and Marshall letters. Everything that has been produced before this committee has been produced without any deletion or any exceptions to it, and we will make no exception in this case. You will read the entire statement.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, as one member of the committee when we come to that part, I would just like to enter my protest.
The Chairman. All right. It will be entered. Enter it now.
Mr. Murphy. I do not want to single it out now, but I have it marked.
The Chairman. Will you go ahead, Captain?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir. The statement regarding the winds message will start with—
PREVIEW

There was a Winds Message. It meant War—and we knew it meant War. By the best estimate that can be made from my recollection and the circumstantial evidence now available, the "Winds Message" was part of a Japanese Overseas "News" Broadcast from Station JAP (Tokyo) on 11980 kilocycles beginning at 1330 Greenwich Civil Time on Thursday, December 4, 1941. This time corresponded to 10:30 p.m. Tokyo time and 8:30 a.m. Washington time, December 4, 1941. The broadcast was probably in Japanese Morse code, and was originally written in the Kata-Kana form of written, plain-language Japanese. It was intercepted by the U. S. Navy at the big radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Maryland, which serves the Navy Department. It was recorded on a special typewriter, developed by the Navy, which types the Roman-letter equivalents of the Japanese characters.

Mr. Murphy. That is the part I do not think should be in this statement, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. We will note your objection to the reading of that at this point.

Mr. Murphy. I just want to say I do not think the witness should go into the mechanics of how this thing was done.

The Chairman. What is the will of the committee about it?

Mr. Murphy. All the papers have been given copies. I just call attention to that fact, that it is improper to do it.

The Chairman. Go ahead and read it. If the Chair is going to pass on it, he will hold that it will all be read without deletion.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. May I interrupt at this time to ask the captain who is an officer in the United States Navy, and [9624] who has carefully prepared this statement, who knows the limitations that have been placed upon him in statements heretofore made by the committee, whether or not there is anything in this statement that, in his judgment as an expert in this field, reveals anything that would be of value today to any potential or real enemy of the United States?

Captain Safford. No, sir. I have gone over this whole statement with the legal representative of the Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. Keefe. And it has his approval?

Captain Safford. His qualified approval.

Mr. Keefe. I mean as to the question raised by Congressman Murphy.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Go ahead and read it.

Captain Safford. And it has been given thorough weight by me.

The Winds Message broadcast was forwarded to the Navy Department by TWX (teletypewriter exchange) from the teletype-transmitter in the "Intercept" receiving room at Cheltenham to "WA91," the page-printer located beside the GY Watch Officer's desk, in the Navy Department Communication Intelligence Unit.
under my command. I saw the Winds Message [3625] typed in page form on yellow teletype paper, with the translation written below. I immediately forwarded this message to my Commanding Officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN), thus fully discharging my responsibility in the matter.

PREPARATIONS FOR INTERCEPTION

There are various sources of the so-called “Winds Code,” two of which have already been introduced as evidence: Tokyo Circular 2353 on page 154 of Exhibit No. 1 and Tokyo Circular 2354 on page 155 of Exhibit No. 1. The most important source was Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet secret dispatch 281430 of November 28, 1941, addressed for information to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Commandant 14th Naval District—thus letting them in on the secret. I had taken no action personally on the first tip-off (Tokyo Circular 2354), because I was still awaiting the instructions of higher authority. CINCAF 281430 together with Tokyo Circular 2353 and other collateral intercept information apparently made an impression upon the Director of Naval Intelligence, for he immediately sent word to me, through the Director of Naval Communications, that he wished the Communication Intelligence Organization to make every attempt to intercept any message sent in accordance with the Winds Codes. It was a request from Admiral Wilkinson and an order from Admiral Noyes.

[3626] I hastened to comply, with the secondary motive that it would be a feather in our cap if the Navy got it and our sister service didn’t.

Just about the time I received Admiral Wilkinson’s request, I was shown Tokyo to Washington Serial 843, dated November 27, 1941, prescribing a “schedule of (Tokyo News) Broadcasts,” which gave me something tangible to work with as well as giving added meaning to the Winds Code. The “November 29 deadline” indicated that the Winds Code might be used to notify overseas officials as to things which would “automatically begin to happen.” Tokyo Circulaturs 2353 and 2354 blueprinted what this action would be. Tokyo Serial 843 implied that such notification would be made. After a conference with my subordinates, I drafted a summary of Tokyo Serial 843 (or had Kramer do it for me), had it coded in the COPEK system, and released it myself at 6 p.m. (Washington time) on November 28, 1941. This secret message was transmitted “Priority” to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts for action, and to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet for information, and may be identified as OPNAV 282301. This took care of our overseas Communication Intelligence Units; they now had all the available technical information on the subject. I know that they monitored the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts; I [3627] also know that Corregidor monitored the Tokyo Morse Broadcasts; in fact, Corregidor and Heeia went beyond their instructions and guarded the Tokyo Broadcasts 24 hours a day. Captain Rochefort and Commander Lietwiler can verify this.

I discussed the situation with Commander Welker, in charge of the intercept and direction-finder stations, and with Chief Radioman
Lewis, his technical assistant. Our prospects for interception looked somewhat dubious. We were not encouraged when a day or two later Washington and Rio objected to the new frequency assignments and Rome complained about the poor quality of the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts.

I would like to digress long enough to invite the attention of the committee to the fact that OPNAV 282301 is not included in the “Basic Exhibit of Dispatches” (Exhibit No. 37), and that Tokyo Serial 843 (JD-1 #6899: SIS #25446) is not included in the “ Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic Messages” (Exhibit No. 1). Three other relevant intercepts not appearing in Exhibit No. 1 are also of interest at this point, namely: Washington to Tokyo Serial 1197 of November 27, 1941 (JD-1 #6908: SIS #25476), Rio to Tokyo Serial 482 of November 30, 1941 (JD-1 #6982: SIS 25571), Rome to Tokyo Serial 768 of November 29, 1941 (JD-1 #6981: SIS #25604).

These 5 documents should be introduced as evidence for the purposes of record.

[9628] Welker, Lewis and I agreed that 5160 kilocycles would probably come in nicely at Manila and at Pearl Harbor. Station JHL was of too low power to reach the greater distances to the continental United States. 9430 kilocycles appeared a bit high for a night frequency in winter, as far as the West Coast was concerned. There did not seem to be a remote possibility of the 11980 kilocycles and 12265 kilocycles being heard by any station in the Pacific Ocean or along either shore at the time of day scheduled.

Nevertheless, we decided to have Bainbridge Island monitor the Tokyo Morse Code Broadcasts on the chance that the times given in Tokyo Serial 843 might not be given in Tokyo time or the schedules could be heard because of freak conditions.

We did not order Bainbridge Island to monitor the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts because its two sound recorders were guarding the two ends of the Tokyo-San Francisco radio telephone circuit. Our estimates for Bainbridge Island were closely realized: Excellent receivability at the wrong time of day and almost a complete “black-out” of reception on the higher frequencies during the period scheduled for the winds message broadcast.

We agreed that the best chance of intercepting the listed schedules (other than those on 5160 kilocycles) was [9629] on the East Coast of the United States. During the winter months the East Coast had good reception of Tokyo during the few hours included in the schedules. Our best bet was Cheltenham, which had been guarding the MAM (Tokyo) Broadcasts to Japanese merchant vessels, so we had up-to-the-minute data on the receivability of Tokyo.

According to my memory we decided to play safe and have all East Coast intercept stations monitor the Tokyo broadcasts. We agreed it would be impossible to hear voice broadcasts from Tokyo on the East Coast and therefore did not attempt it. We did not order Guam or Imperial Beach (California) to monitor any of the Tokyo broadcast schedules.

Commander Welker or I sent TWX messages directing the intercept stations at Bainbridge Island (Washington) and at Cheltenham (Maryland) to monitor the schedules given in Tokyo Serial 843 as first priority and to forward all plain-language Japanese intercepts
on these schedules to the Navy Department by teletype. We may have set these instructions to other stations also. We did not want English or coded messages—only written Japanese. We gave the same instructions to both stations, and sent them out immediately after releasing the previously mentioned OPNAV 282301.

[9630] I have confirmation of the above orders plus knowledge of existing receiving conditions in the monthly reports from Cheltenham, Winter Harbor, and Bainbridge Island, extracts from which are quoted below:

Station "M" (Cheltenham)—Operations—November 1941
Receiving conditions throughout the month were very good on all frequencies. Atmospheric disturbances have been at a minimum. Orders received from OP-20-GX at 2315 (GCT) November 28, via teletype to give highest priority to various broadcasts at designated Japanese broadcast stations. These schedules were covered and found to be press broadcasts sent in both Kana and English. Log sheets were forwarded to OP-20-GX daily with regular traffic files.

Station "M" (Cheltenham)—Operations—December 1941
Receiving conditions during the month were fair to good on all frequencies. At 2300, 7 December 1941, telephone orders received from OP-20-GX to drop the Tokyo JJC/MAM schedules and assignments; continued watch for Orange activity.

Station "W" (Winter Harbor)—Operations—December 1941
Receiving conditions in general. Daily attempts were made to intercept Tokyo and Osaka channels employed to Europe, but only on a few occasions was any intercept [9631] possible.

Station "S" (Bainbridge Island)—Operations—November 1941
During the month of November a sharp increase has been noticed in the amount of message traffic sent on the Kana General Information Broadcasts. Where before we seldom averaged more than one or two such messages monthly, it is now not unusual for two or three such messages to appear daily. These messages are sent in both number code and Kana.

On 28 November, a directive was received by TWX from OP-20-GX which called for coverage of the following stations at times specified, with priority transmission of intercepted material by TWX. Times listed were given as PST. Because the use of PST time designation is unusual, we asked for a verification, but were told that time zone was uncertain and verification was not possible.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if the witness would tell us as he goes along what those symbols mean.

Captain Safford. Yes. TWX was the teletype exchange you call the switchboard. They plug you in and charge you by the minute.

PST is Pacific Standard Time. And GCT, Greenwich Civil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PST</th>
<th>GCT</th>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0100</td>
<td>(0900)</td>
<td>JVJ</td>
<td>12275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0130</td>
<td>(0930)</td>
<td>JUN</td>
<td>9430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0200</td>
<td>(1000)</td>
<td>JVJ</td>
<td>12275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0300</td>
<td>(1100)</td>
<td>JHL</td>
<td>5160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0400</td>
<td>(1200)</td>
<td>JHL</td>
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<tr>
<td>0500</td>
<td>(1300)</td>
<td>JHL</td>
<td>5160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0530</td>
<td>(1330)</td>
<td>JHP</td>
<td>11980</td>
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Since the time zone indicated was not certain, we were faced with the possibility that the time could be either GCT, PST, zone-9, or even a combination of these. As soon as the directive was received we started copying all broadcasts of this same type which were readable at "S". We found that in some cases other stations were tied in with the stations listed in the original directive, and that although we could not copy the station listed we could copy the cornetted channel carrying the same broadcast.
The stations and times that we can copy are listed below. Time used is GCT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCT</th>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Connected with</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>JUJ</td>
<td>12275</td>
<td>JUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0030</td>
<td>JUD</td>
<td>15880</td>
<td>JUV/JAU2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100</td>
<td>JUD</td>
<td>15880</td>
<td>JUV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0230</td>
<td>JUJ</td>
<td>12275</td>
<td>JUP/JUD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0300</td>
<td>JUJ</td>
<td>12275</td>
<td>JUD</td>
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<tr>
<td>0330</td>
<td>JUJ</td>
<td>12275</td>
<td>JUD</td>
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<tr>
<td>0400</td>
<td>JUJ</td>
<td>12275</td>
<td>JUD</td>
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<tr>
<td>0500</td>
<td>JUJ</td>
<td>12275</td>
<td>JUD</td>
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<tr>
<td>1300</td>
<td>JHL</td>
<td>5160</td>
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<td>2200</td>
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<td>2300</td>
<td>JUJ</td>
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<tr>
<td>2330</td>
<td>JUJ</td>
<td>12275</td>
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</table>

The important thing is that with the exception of the 1300 schedule from station JHL on 5160 kilocycles there was a complete "black-out" for 16 or 18 hours where no broadcasts from Tokyo could be heard and the schedules on which we expected the winds message came in the middle of this long period of "black-out".

At my instructions, or at least with my concurrence, Commander Welker consulted with his opposite number in the War Department, Captain Schukraft, and ascertained that the Army was monitoring for the winds message at San Francisco, and possibly elsewhere, but was not monitoring for the winds message anywhere on the East Coast of the United States. I do not know what sort of instructions the Army gave its intercept stations. I do not know why the Army failed to monitor for the winds message on the East Coast of the United States; Colonel Sadltler or Colonel Schukraft may remember.

I believe that the above-mentioned conference was held before we issued instructions to our own intercept stations.

The F. C. C. was requested by the War Department to monitor for the winds message on the Tokyo voice broadcasts and was given the code words of Tokyo Circular 2353 but without their meaning. The F. C. C. was not furnished the Tokyo broadcast schedules nor any mention of the fact that the winds message could come by Morse code.

The F. C. C. was requested to monitor the winds message at its monitor station at Portland, Oregon, and also at one of its monitoring stations on the East Coast of the United States. The latter request was not complied with because the F. C. C. doubted if voice broadcasts from Tokyo could be heard on the East Coast of the United States. The F. C. C. monitor station at Honolulu also monitored for the winds message, at the request of the local military authorities.

The F. C. C. monitor station at Portland, Oregon, could not possibly have intercepted the same winds message that Cheltenham did because Cheltenham was monitoring for Morse code exclusively, and the F. C. C. station at Portland was monitoring for voice, exclusively.
In addition to the stations previously named, the winds message was monitored for at the following localities, to my personal knowledge:

- **Heeia, T. H.** (U. S. Navy) Voice only
- **Corregidor, P. I.** (U. S. Navy) Voice and Morse
- **Singapore** (British Intelligence) —?
- **Australia** (Australian Intelligence) —?
- **Java** (NEI Intelligence) —?

Intercept stations in Canada, England, and China probably watched for it too. And, of course, the Japanese diplomatic and consular stations listened for the winds message themselves on their own receiving sets.

On December 1, 1941, I was shown the translation of Tokyo Circular 2444 (Exhibit No. 1, page 209), advising that London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila had been ordered to destroy their code machines, and instructing Washington to retain its machine regardless of other instructions.

The significance of the winds message now became very clear to me and I began to take the matter most seriously. [9636] So did Colonel Sadtler, over in the War Department. The only means by which Tokyo could announce its decisions of peace or war to its overseas diplomatic representatives who had destroyed their regular codes was by means of the emergency winds code. This applied to London and the Far East but not to Washington. Higher authority in the War and Navy Departments likewise took a greatly increased interest in the winds message, and began heckling me as to the possibility of having missed it. I instituted a daily check of the incoming tele-type messages to see that our intercept stations were doing as much as could be expected of them.

One evening, about December 1, 1941, I drove out to Station “M” at Cheltenham, Maryland, and remained until about midnight. The primary purpose of my visit was to inspect the new landline telegraph for direction-finder control which had been completed at Cheltenham and the Navy Department, which was scheduled to be placed in service on December 1, 1941, but which had been delayed by installation difficulties at some of the outlying stations. I made a personal check of the winds message watch and, as I recall, found that Chief Radioman Wigle was monitoring the Tokyo News Broadcasts 24 hours a day and had assigned qualified Kana operators to this duty. I have further [9637] documentary proof that Cheltenham was monitoring the Tokyo broadcasts in the fact that between 1200 and 1500 GCT, on December 6, 1941, Cheltenham intercepted and forwarded to the Navy Department Tokyo Serials 902–2 and 904, plus two other messages. This is entered in the GY log for December 6, 1941: Items Nos. 6609, 6610, 6618, and 6619. These messages were transmitted by Station JAH (Tokyo) to San Francisco on 7630 kilocycles. The Tokyo-San Francisco circuit was not a regular Cheltenham assignment.

I may summarize the preparations for interception by stating that the United States Navy listened for the winds message at Cheltenham, Maryland, and did everything that it possibly could to intercept it elsewhere, and that the other services did all that they considered reasonable.
INTERCEPTION

There is no basis for assuming that the winds message had to be sent on a voice broadcast. In 1941, the Japanese Government was sending out “General Information Broadcasts” as well as “Domei News” to its diplomatic and consular officials in foreign lands. This was partly to give speedier service, partly to permit use of the Japanese Morse Code and the Kata-Kana form of written Japanese, and partly to be independent of foreign communication \[9638\] systems in emergency.

Each office had its own Japanese radio operator and its own short-wave receiving set. We knew it. The United States Government was doing the same thing itself, with a Navy radio operator serving at each post. The German Government was doing likewise but was a bit ahead of us, with machine reception. We used to “sample” these broadcasts periodically until the F. C. C.’s Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service came into existence and relieved the U. S. Navy of this duty. I wish to reiterate that neither Japan, the United States, nor Germany was dependent on voice broadcasts for direct communication from the seat of government to overseas officials.

The radio schedules listed in Tokyo Serial 843 were in Morse (i. e., dot-and-dash) code exclusively; either Japanese Morse, International Morse, or both. We expected that the winds message would be sent in Morse Code—and it was. If the winds message had been sent on a voice broadcast the U. S. Navy would have missed it, unless it came on a schedule receivable at Pearl Harbor or Corregidor.

The original documents giving details of the interception of the winds message are not available. Therefore it is necessary to reconstruct the situation from circumstantial evidence and by process of elimination. Collateral \[9639\] information has been plotted or recorded on a single sheet, a reduced size photograph of which is appended. This graph tells the story better than words and shows just what actually happened. It should convince the most skeptical.

As I have previously testified, the frequency, distances, and time of day were such that the winds message could be heard on the East Coasts of the United States and Canada, while it was a physical impossibility for it to be heard (except under freak conditions) on the West Coast of the United States and Canada, Pearl Harbor, Manila, Java, and Singapore. Everything checks perfectly; there is no element of doubt as to conditions of radio wave propagation.

The winds message could be heard also in the North Atlantic Ocean, British Isles, and Western Europe, but it could not be heard in Burma, Australia, or in Rio de Janeiro. It was sent on the so-called “European Schedule” of Tokyo’s big foreign broadcasting station “J-A-P” and was intended for London. We knew that the Japanese Ambassador in London had destroyed his secret codes three days previously; this was the only way that Tokyo could get news to him secretly. Reception or non-reception at other points was irrelevant. Tokyo knew full well, before the winds message was sent, that it probably would not be \[9640\] received in Washington or in Rio. That was immaterial—the winds message was intended for London.
In the next sentence I would like to make a change. I would like to change the word “my” to “our”, so that the sentence would read:

[9641] Our ability to intercept it was due partly to good luck, partly to our foresight, and partly to the high quality of the Navy operators and receiving apparatus at Cheltenham.

The winds message broadcast was forwarded by teletype (TWX) from Cheltenham to the Navy Department (Op-20-GY) shortly before 9 a.m. on December 4, 1941. Kramer distinctly recalls that the Winds Message was shown to him by the GY watch Officer after 8:30 a.m. on that date. It was my recollection, as stated in previous testimony, that I had first seen the Winds Message a little after eight a.m. on December 4, 1941. The Winds Message broadcast was about 200 words long, with the code words prescribed in Tokyo Circular 2353 appearing in the middle of the message, whereas we had expected to find the code words of Tokyo Circular 2354 in a Morse broadcast. All three “code words” were used, but the expression meaning “North Wind Cloudy” was in the negative form.

When I first saw the Winds Message, it had already been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, in charge of the Translation Section of the Navy Department Communication Intelligence Unit. Kramer had underscored all three “code phrases” on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below the printed message was written in pencil or colored [9642] crayon in Kramer’s handwriting, the following free translations:

War with England (including NEI, etc.)
War with the U. S.
Peace with Russia.

I am not sure of the order; but it was the same as in the broadcast and I think England appeared first. I think Kramer used “U. S.” rather than “United States.” It is possible that the words “No war,” instead of “Peace,” were used to describe Japan’s intentions with regards to Russia.

“This is it!” said Kramer as he handed me the Winds Message. This was the broadcast we had strained every nerve to intercept. This was the feather in our cap. This was the tip-off which would prevent the U. S. Pacific Fleet being surprised at Pearl Harbor the way the Russians had been surprised at Port Arthur. This was what the Navy Communication Intelligence had been preparing for since its establishment in 1924—War with Japan!

DISTRIBUTION

I immediately sent the original of the Winds Message up to the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Noyes) by one of the officers serving under me and told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person, to track him down and not take “no” for an answer, and if he could [9643] not find him in a reasonable time to let me know. I did not explain the nature or significance of the Winds Message to this officer. In a few minutes I received a report to the effect that the message had been delivered.

It is my recollection that Kramer and I knew at the time that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the Winds Message to the War Department, to the “Magic” distribution list in the Navy
Department, and to the Naval Aide to the President. For that reason, no immediate distribution of the smooth translation of the Winds Message was made in the Navy Department. The six or seven copies for the Army were rushed over to the War Department as rapidly as possible: here the Navy's responsibility ended. The individual smooth translations for authorized Navy Department officials and the White House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941, in accordance with standard operating procedure. I have no reason for believing that the Army failed to make a prompt distribution of its translations of the Winds Message.

I am thoroughly satisfied in my own mind that Admiral Noyes telephoned to everyone on his list without delay; I cannot bring myself to imagine otherwise. There is some question as to whether the Admiral was understood, but this only shows the unreliability of telephone messages. Any [9644] misunderstanding of what Admiral Noyes said was of negligible effect because written translations of the Winds Message were distributed within 2 or 3 hours of his telephone calls. In fact it was not until 1944 that any suggestion or criticism was offered that any official on the "Magic" distribution list—Navy, Army, State Department, or White House—had not been notified that the Winds Message had been received or that the Winds Message had been translated in any terms other than War and Peace.

My final verification of the fact that the Winds Message translation was typed and distributed lies in the fact that about December 15, 1941, I saw a copy of it in the special folder of messages which were being assembled for Admiral Noyes to present to the Roberts Commission. I checked these over with Kramer for completeness as well as for the elimination of irrelevant material. Kramer told me in 1944 that he had shown Assistant Secretary Forrestal a special set of Pre-Pearl Harbor messages about December 10, 1941, when Secretary Knox was making his personal investigation at Pearl Harbor, and that he discussed those messages with Mr. Forrestal for about two hours. This set of messages was apparently the basis and possibly the identical file that was given Admiral Noyes and shown to the Roberts Commission via Admiral Wilkinson. This was the last time I [9645] saw the Winds Message. I believe that the translation of the Winds Message was given the JD—1 Serial number of 7001, because this number is missing and unaccounted for, and comes within the range of messages translated on December 3 and 4, 1941.

The distribution of the Winds Message was the responsibility of Naval Intelligence and not Naval Communications. I had no responsibility in the matter after forwarding the original message to Admiral Noyes and after checking Kramer's "folder" to see that the messages were presented in a logical and understandable order.

**ACTION TAKEN AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE WINDS MESSAGE**

About an hour after I had sent the original Winds Message up to Admiral Noyes, I received a call from him on the inter-phone to the effect that we ought to tell Guam to burn their excess codes and ciphers. I replied that I was in full agreement but there were other odds and ends to be taken care of, and that I would have some messages ready for his approval by noon.
As a direct result of the Winds Message and other contemporaneous information from intercepted Japanese messages, I prepared the following secret message:

OPNAV 041754 (Priority)—Not yet introduced as evidence.
OPNAV 042000 (Priority)—Not yet introduced as evidence.

[9646] OPNAV 042017 (Deferred)—Page 44 of Exhibit No. 37.

OPNAV 042018 (Deferred)—Not yet introduced as evidence.
OPNAV 042019 (Deferred)—Not yet introduced as evidence.

I took four of these messages up to Admiral Noyes' office, cleared them through the Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Captain Joseph R. Redman) and made an appointment to see the Admiral with his secretary, as per office instruction. I was called to his office shortly before 3:00 p.m.

OPNAV 041754 was a correction to a previous Priority message, and was sent in response to a Priority service message requesting verification of the last four groups of OPNAV 040343 (page 43 of Exhibit No. 37). I released this message myself during the noon hour to save time.

OPNAV Priority 042000 for action of CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 16, COM14, Guam and Samoa, made a "new Intelligence" cipher effective immediately and directed the immediate destruction of the old cipher by Guam and Samoa. This message was released by Admiral Noyes himself, and is the most important of the five which were sent on this occasion because the precedence did give some idea of urgency.

OPNAV Deferred 042017, for action of Guam and for information of CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 14 and COM 16 was sent in the new cipher made effective by OPNAV 042000. It directed Guam to destroy excess cryptographic aids and other secret matter. This message was rewritten by Admiral Noyes and was released by Admiral Ingersoll. My original wording was much stronger than the message actually sent, because I had directed the destruction of everything except the system in which sent and the current edition of the Direction Finder Code. However, I was not trying to use this message as the vehicle for a war warning as I had the day before in OPNAV 031855 (page 41, Exhibit No. 37). I was just trying to insure that Guam "stripped ship" before a Japanese Commando-raid from Saipan, 100 miles away, captured a complete allowance of codes and ciphers, a matter for which I was officially responsible. Admiral Noyee made no mention of a war warning when he directed me to prepare this message and I feel sure he did no have any such warning in mind when he toned down my original draft. This message had to be sent "for Information" to CINCPAC, and others, as notification that Guam's allowance of codes and ciphers was being reduced, and as a reminder to Guam to notify the addressees what systems would be available for its future communications. This message was sent DEFERRED to insure that OPNAV 042000 would arrive well in advance and thus avoid confusion and unnecessary messages at this critical time.

[9648] OPNAV 042018 and OPNAV 042019 are not important except that they help establish the date the Winds Message was intercepted and the time and date that the unsent warning message, prepared by Commander McCollum, was seen by me.
EVALUATION OF THE WINDS MESSAGE

Evaluation of the Winds Message was not based on JD-1 #6850 and #6875 alone. CINCAF 281430 gave much stronger translations of Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354, which dispelled any doubt as to whether or not WAR was meant by the literal translation:

Japan=(blank) relations are in danger.

This message contained official British translation furnished by Singapore, from which I quote:

NISHI NISHI England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malay and N. E. I.

That means war, no matter how worded. No one disputed this British translation in November–December, 1941: in fact our own translation was considered consistent with it.

Two confirmations of the British translation came from the official Netherlands East Indies Government translations of Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354. Colonel Thorpe, the Senior Army Intelligence Officer in Java, sent an official message via the Navy addressed to General Miles, the Chief of Army Intelligence in Washington, which is a [9649] matter of record in previous Pearl Harbor investigations. This message may be identified as Alusna Batavia 031030 dated December 3, 1941. I quoted from this message:

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code intercept:
Japan will notify her consulates of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end.
East wind rain United States;
North wind cloudy Russia;
West wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies.

Copies of this message were circulated in the Navy Department, and the Chief of Naval Operations was indicated as receiving a copy.

Consul General Foote, our Senior Diplomatic Representative in the Netherlands East Indies, on December 4, 1941 (Java time), which is December 3, 1941 (Washington time) sent a similar message to the Secretary of State, from which I quote:

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports:
One east wind rain war with United States,
Two north wind cloudy war with Russia,
Three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malay and Dutch Indies.

[9650] When threat of crisis exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts:
One HIGASHI east America,
Two KITA north Russia,
Three NISHI west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies.

This message was received in the State Department at 9:19 a.m. on December 4, 1941 (Washington time). Copies were forwarded to the War and Navy Departments by the State Department liaison officer, Mr. Orme Wilson. They were given a wide circulation in the Navy Department.

My own evaluation of the foregoing, on December 4, 1941, was about as follows:
(A) The Basic Japanese War Plan was divided into 3 categories or provided for 3 contingencies, any or all of which might be followed, namely:

(1) War with the United States.
(2) War with Russia.
(3) With with England including the invasion of Thailand and the capture of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.

(B) The Winds Message gave us the answer in all 3 cases:
Affirmative for the 1st and 3rd categories, and Negative for the 2nd.

(C) The Winds Message was probably a "Signal of Execute" of some sort.

The "Signal of Execute" theory received strong confirmation from a secret message received from the Philippines in the early afternoon of December 4, 1941. This message informed us that the Japanese Navy had introduced a new cipher system for its so-called "Operations Code" at 0600 GCT that date. This time was 7½ hours before the Winds Message was broadcast. I might add that there was only one J-A-P European broadcast per day, so the times coincided as closely as possible. I would like to add also that my subordinates on Corregidor spotted and reported this change only nine hours after it was made. The message may be identified as Commandant 16th Naval District Priority 041502 dated December 4, 1941, and was addressed to Naval Operations and the Commandant 14th Naval District but not to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. So far as I know, this message has not been introduced as evidence before any previous investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster. In fact, this is the first time it has ever been mentioned except to Admiral Hart. The unusual hour and unusual date at which the Japanese Navy changed its "Operations Code," combined with the Winds Message and other collateral information available in the Navy Department, made this message highly significant as the probable "Signal of Execute" to the Japanese Navy. Up till now the Winds Message has had to bear a double burden in my testimony.

[9652] As I have previously testified, we expected that if the Japanese did suddenly attack the United States this attack would come on a week-end or national holiday. In fact, a warning message to this effect had been sent out in April, 1941 (page 1 of Exhibit No. 37). The War Department over-emphasized the imminence of war as forecast by the "November 29, deadline" and predicted that the Japanese would strike during the week-end of November 29–30, 1941.

The Navy Department estimated the situation more accurately—the Japanese armada which had been concentrating for the southern invasion was too far from any conceivable objective to give serious consideration to this date. Also the covering Naval forces were not yet deployed and other signs indicated that the U. S. Army estimate was a bit premature.

The next week-end, December 6–7, 1941, was just the reverse. The winds message and the change of the Naval Operations Code came in the middle of the week; 2 days to Saturday and 3 days to Sunday. It was unthinkable that the Japanese would surrender their hopes of surprise by delaying until the week-end of December 13–14, 1941. This was not crystal gazing or "intuition"—It was just the plain, common sense acceptance of a self-evident proposition. Colonel
Sadler saw it, and so did Captain Joseph [965½] R. Redman, U. S. N.—according to Colonel Sadler's testimony in 1944, before the Army Board of Investigation.

The Japanese were going to start the war on Saturday, December 6, 1941, or Sunday, December 7, 1941.

In the next sentence I would like to change the words “Pearl Harbor” to “England and the United States”, so that the sentence reads:

The War and Navy Departments had been given 72 hours' advance notification of the attack on England and the United States by the Japanese themselves.

The Chairman. It is now a quarter after four, and we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m. February 1, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a.m., Saturday, February 2, 1946.)
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

Mr. Richardson. The committee will be in order.

Counsel, I believe, was still examining the witness.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed

Mr. Richardson. Captain, have you a copy of Exhibit 142 before you?

Captain Safford. I have.

Mr. Richardson. As I understand it, the first winds message that was intercepted was Circular No. 2353 shown in Exhibit 142; is that correct?

Captain Safford. Not necessarily.

Mr. Richardson. Well, was there one before that?

Captain Safford. Circulars 2353 and 2354 were intercepted on the same date, and I do not know which came first. Circular 2354 was translated by us 2 days before 2353.

Mr. Richardson. Then the only two intercepts establishing the so-called winds codes are contained in circulars 2353 and 2354?

Captain Safford. The only ones that we had in the Navy Department.

Mr. Richardson. The only ones that we knew anything about at the time of this episode?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. And after those messages came in every effort was made that could be made to see to it that stations were warned to monitor, for the executors under those messages?

Captain Safford. Nothing was done until we had received a message from the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, containing the translation of the same messages made by the British at Singapore.
Then we made every effort to monitor for those messages.

Mr. Richardson. How long after this message came in on November 19 then was the first monitoring direction given to intercepting stations?

Captain Safford. It was sent out about 6 p.m. Washington time on November 28, 1941.

Mr. Richardson. Was it sent generally to all stations that it was felt might be in a position to intercept the execute?

Captain Safford. It was sent to all stations which we considered had the personnel problem, the trained personnel, available personnel, and proper material, to intercept the message.

Mr. Richardson. How many stations do you know picked up the messages now identified as 2353 and 2354?

Captain Safford. I cannot tell you off-hand. I will [9658] have to search through the records.

Mr. Richardson. Were there a great many of them?

Captain Safford. There were at least two in the United States Navy, because they had translated the message, the Dutch must have intercepted it because they translated it, and the Australians knew about it, and I don’t know how they got it.

Mr. Richardson. Now, how did 2353 come in in the first instance to the intercepting station in the United States?

Captain Safford. It was in the intercept of a radio message from Tokyo to San Francisco, but addressed to Washington.

Mr. Richardson. Was it in code?

Captain Safford. It was in code, in the Japanese code which we call J–19.

Mr. Richardson. Was it in the form of message in which the Japanese were accustomed to send out weather broadcasts?

Captain Safford. I don’t understand that question.

Mr. Richardson. Do you know of weather broadcasts the Japanese stations were sending out generally?

Captain Safford. The Japanese sent out weather forecasts on most of their broadcasts just the way the United [9659] States sent out weather forecasts on most of its official broadcasts.

Mr. Richardson. Would the form of broadcast as sent out by the Japanese be the form in which Circular 2353 came in?

Captain Safford. No; because a weather broadcast would consist of nothing but weather, and this prescribed that an apparent or false weather report be inserted in the middle of news. That was never done in the Japanese broadcasts.

Mr. Richardson. Was 2353 sent out in Morse code?

Captain Safford. I do not understand.

Mr. Richardson. You understand what the Japanese sending messages in the Morse code in Japanese means?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. Was this message 2353 sent out in that way?

Captain Safford. That was sent out in International Morse Code, because it had to be received by American operators at San Francisco who did not know the Morse code.

Mr. Richardson. And that was true of 2353?

Captain Safford. It was true of 2353 and true of every translation given in this book.
Mr. Richardson. That would include 2353?

[9660] Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, the witness had some paper in his left hand when he said everything in there was by International Morse Code. May we have what that paper is? He had it in his left hand. He said everything was International Morse Code.

Mr. Kaufman. That is exhibit 142.

Captain Safford. Every message quoted in exhibit 142, also the message quoted in exhibit 1, was sent out in International Morse Code.

Mr. Murphy. Every message?

Mr. Richardson. That is right.

Now, in that code, the Japanese words which are shown in Circular 2353 as appear in Exhibit 142, appear as shown:

**HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.**

The three Japanese words were in the message as sent out in International Code?

Captain Safford. The words **HIGASHI NO KAZEAME** and the other two Japanese expressions were taken after decrypting the original Japanese message and converting the codes language into Japanese.

Mr. Richardson. And then the next step would be to translate the Japanese?  

Captain Safford. The next step would be to translate **HIGASHI NO KAZEAME** the Japanese into English, but leaving the code expressions alone because we didn’t want to alter the exact wording used.

Mr. Richardson. Well, the meaning of the Japanese words that remain in Circular 2353 as it appears in Exhibit 142 is the meaning that appears in the lower left-hand corner:

East wind rain, would be **HIGASHI NO KAZEAME**;

North wind cloudy—you pronounce that—

Captain Safford. Kitanokaze Kumori.

Mr. Richardson. West wind clear.

Captain Safford. Nishi no kaze hare.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Now, when you turn to Circular 2354, the only difference between the two messages would be that under 2354 only a single word indicating a compass point would be included in the general intelligence broadcast referred to in that dispatch?

Captain Safford. That is partially correct. There was also the further requirement that that single word be repeated five times at the beginning and at the end of the message. 2353 required that phrase be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave broadcast.

Mr. Richardson. As a matter of fact there were three requirements to comply with 2353?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. The signal had to be in the middle, it also had to be at the end; the broadcast had to be a weather forecast, and each sentence had to be repeated twice?

Captain Safford. And it had to be in the Japanese language.

[9663] Mr. Richardson. Where do you find in circular 2353 that it had to be in the Japanese language?
Captain Safford. It says:

The following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

Mr. Richardson. You interpreted that to mean that in addition to being in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast the words themselves had to be in Japanese?

Captain Safford. That is true, and the rest of the broadcast had to be in Japanese also.

Mr. Richardson. Well, it doesn’t say so; does it?

Captain Safford. It does say so.

Mr. Richardson. Where?

Captain Safford. It says:

The daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

Mr. Richardson. Yes; it says that the warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. But it does not say what is put in the middle had to be in Sanskrit or Latin or English or Japanese, does it?

Captain Safford. It merely gave the words which they [9664] would use.

Mr. Richardson. Right. Now, on 2345, Captain, the first requirement was that the dispatch—the notice was to be a general intelligence broadcast?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Would that mean a radio broadcast?

Captain Safford. That meant a radio broadcast.

Mr. Richardson. And then those compass words that we have referred to that are shown in 2354 had to be at the beginning of that broadcast?

Captain Safford. And at the end.

Mr. Richardson. And at the end of the broadcast and had to be repeated five times?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And included at the beginning and end?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, unless the execute or an alleged execute that came to your attention complied with the directions contained in one or the other of those two code messages, would you interpret it to be an execute of the original message?

Captain Safford. If it departed radically from those instructions, we would regard it as having nothing to do with the expected execute of those messages.

[9665] Mr. Richardson. Suppose it did not appear in the middle, would that eliminate it?

Captain Safford. Not necessarily, but we would regard it with suspicion.

Mr. Richardson. Suppose it was not in a short wave news broadcast, would that eliminate it?

Captain Safford. The word on “short wave” was incorrectly translated by a green translator. The correct translation of that word was “overseas broadcast.”
Mr. Richardson. Well, now, just wait a minute. You do not understand the Japanese language yourself, do you?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, are you in a position of your own knowledge to tell us what that correct translation would be?

Captain Safford. I suggest that the committee get a correct translation both in 2353 and 2354, a full translation with no words on it at the discretion of the translator.

Mr. Richardson. And the only message that you knew anything about when this episode on the winds execute came up was this message 2353 and 2354?

Captain Safford. Oh, no; we had the British translation at the same time, and we had probably verified our own translations immediately we found a conflicting translation coming [9606] in from the Navy, from the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet. That was custom.

Mr. Richardson. I don’t want any probably business in this. Was there another translation of the Japanese broadcast that was the basis for 2353 that was made by our authority here? If so, where is it?

Captain Safford. There is no other on record.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, the only one that you had available to you that was over our own stations was 2353 and 2354 on the morning of December 4?

Captain Safford. That is correct, if we are restricted to what was intercepted by our own stations.

Mr. Richardson. That is right. Now, the only other one available to you was the one sent in from the commander of the Asiatic Fleet?

Captain Safford. That is correct, up until shortly after we had actually intercepted the winds execute message.

Mr. Richardson. The fact is, is it not, Captain, that in your earlier testimony before Admiral Hewitt and in your earlier testimony before Admiral Hart you testified, did you not, that the interpretation that was placed upon the message that you saw on the morning of December 4 was based upon the meaning given to you by the Foote and the Thorpe broadcast that had come in from Canberra and Batavia? Didn’t you so [9667] testify?

Captain Safford. I will have to check that.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Captain Safford. What page is that on?

Mr. Richardson. I am referring first to page 748 of the Navy court of inquiry. My point is, Captain—I want you to get the point—didn’t you in your testimony there base your interpretation of the meaning of this execute on the Dutch translation and the Foote translation and that you did not say anything whatever about the Hart translation?

Mr. Murphy. Hart? The Hart translation?

Mr. Richardson. Admiral Hart, the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

Captain Safford. What page is that again, please?

Mr. Richardson. This is 748 of the Navy inquiry.

Captain Safford. I answered those questions as you stated.

Mr. Richardson. All right. And in your written statement that you have read to the committee in this proceeding you base your
interpretation on the message that had come in on November 28 from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, isn't the reason that you changed because you discovered that the Foote message and the Thorpe [9668] message had come in after you made your interpretation of the message on the morning of December 4 and therefore you could not have relied on it, and then didn't you turn to the message from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet as the source of your interpretation? Isn't that a specific reason why you did it?

Captain Safford. No.

Mr. Richardson. All right; that is all; that answers it.

Now, will you turn to 1-C in Exhibit 142? It is about the third or fourth page.

Captain Safford. I see it.

Mr. Richardson. Now, that is a copy of our message from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, isn't it?

Captain Safford. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And that is the one that in your statement to the committee you relied on for your interpretation of the message that you got on the morning of December 4?

Captain Safford. At the time the winds message was intercepted and translated by Kramer and sent up to higher authority; that is correct.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, will you tell me what there is in that message that says that the language that was to be used meant war? Read it to me from the message.

Captain Safford (reading):

NISHI NISHI England including occupa- [9669] tion of Thai or invasion of Malaya and NEI—

which is an abbreviation for Netherlands East Indies.

Mr. Richardson. Now, stop right there. We had been getting messages, had we not, for 10 days with reference to the movements of the Japanese toward the Thai Peninsula and the occupation of Malasia, hadn't we?

Captain Safford. We had numerous signs indicating that they were possibly contemplating an act of war; correct.

Mr. Richardson. Toward those places; toward the Thai Peninsula and Malasia?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. So there wasn't anything in that language with reference to "NISHI NISHI" that was either new or particularly startling to us, was there, at that time?

Captain Safford. Nothing except the confirmation of our suspicions or deductions.

Mr. Richardson. And the only thing you could draw—the only deduction you could draw from it fairly, Captain, would be that if the execute message came in that said "NISHI NISHI" it would mean that the Japs were going after England by going upon that occupation, did it not, or invasion of Malaya?

Captain Safford. And the Netherlands East Indies; that is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, proceed and show me what there is [9670] in that dispatch that shows war on the United States?
Captain Safford. There is nothing in the literal translation of that dispatch which says war on the United States.

Mr. Richardson. Now, when you turn back, Captain, to 1–A, which is 2353, you find the phrase "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME," with the definition, "Japan-U. S. relations in danger."

Do you find anything in the dispatch from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet that changes that interpretation of "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME," or whatever it is?

Captain Safford. There is nothing that changes the translation of that phrase.

Mr. Richardson. All right. This dispatch that you say was the execute, which you say was what you had been looking for, which was the great triumph of the Navy over the Army, you say came in on the morning of December 4 about 8 o'clock?

Captain Safford. After 8:30; shortly before 9.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, you testified at least twice before, didn't you, Captain, that it came in on the evening of December 3?

Captain Safford. I was testifying from memory and doing the best I could without the aid of the written notes which I had unfortunately destroyed in December 1941.

Mr. Richardson. Well, they were still destroyed when you made your statement here to the committee, weren't they? They still remained destroyed, didn't they?

Captain Safford. Those notes remained destroyed; yes.

Mr. Richardson. Well, what you mean is after you testified in these earlier hearings you sat down with yourself and your pencil and you made some new notes, is that true?

Captain Safford. I got new written evidence about 2 weeks ago which up till that time had not been in my possession. It helped me tremendously in reconstructing what had happened as well as refreshing my memory.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, Captain, let us go into this question.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I request that the written evidence be now produced so that we may examine it? I ask that his written evidence that was produced 2 weeks ago be submitted to the committee.

The Vice Chairman. He said he obtained written evidence about 2 weeks ago that refreshed his memory. Mr. Murphy asks that that written evidence be produced.

Mr. Murphy. And that it be spread on the record.¹

Mr. Richardson. What was that written evidence, Captain—what is the nature of it?

Captain Safford. Monthly reports from the interceptor stations at Winter Harbor, Maine, and at Cheltenham, Md., [9672] which I had requested 2 years ago and had been informed could not be discovered. We made one more attempt about 2 weeks ago, and those particular reports were located, and my assistant read them and got pertinent parts for me, and I have his penciled copies of that stuff. I have quoted those parts in my testimony, in these extracts from the logs—rather, the monthly reports of Winter Harbor, Maine, and Cheltenham, Md.

Mr. Richardson. But it is true, Captain, is it not, that at least twice before under oath you placed the date of the receipt of this

¹ In this connection see a letter from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5493.
execute message that you testified concerning on the evening of December 3?

Captain Safford. I believe I said "December 3 or 4." I think I made it broader than that.

Mr. Richardson. I don't think you did. Let me call your attention to your testimony at page 361 of the Hart investigation. Didn't you testify there as follows:

The winds message was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 Washington time, which was December 4th by Greenwich time and Tokyo time.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And then, to make sure that that was not an error, didn't you testify a little later in that same examination as follows:

[9673] The winds message was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3rd while Lieutenant (J. G.) Francis M. Brotherhood, USNR, was on watch.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, Captain, you do not know yourself of your own knowledge, when the message was received, do you?

Captain Safford. I do not know from first-hand knowledge exactly what time it was received.

Mr. Richardson. All you know, Captain, is that Kramer came to you with a piece of paper in his hand that had a message on it?

Captain Safford. It was a piece of paper which I recognized as the yellow paper from a roll on a teletype machine.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, before we go into that, let me inquire, Captain, along this line: Now, after all of this episode had transpired and you had destroyed your notes—by the way, do you now contend that you made notes of what occurred at the time this message came in?

Captain Safford. I made notes while events were fresh in my memory as to the things which were not matters of official record and were important to know, such as such things as times of deliveries of certain messages, and so forth. The winds message was then in existence. I could have referred to it for anything that I wanted, and there would be no occasion to try to check the exact time at which it was intercepted.

Mr. Richardson. You testified before the Army board, didn't you?

Captain Safford. Correct.

Mr. Richardson. And I refer now to page 160 of the Army board. Didn't you testify as follows there, Captain:

Captain Safford. Kramer made his statements of 8th and 9th of December immediately after the event when I discussed it fully with him. I called for statements. I talked to everybody concerned to see if my people had been negligent in any way, that this thing had been our fault. I made a very careful investigation.

General Russell. Did you make any records of that investigation?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Was that true?

Captain Safford. There was no written record made. All the notes I had in the rough form were destroyed when I got the orders.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, Captain—
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I—well, I don't want to interrupt. He testified yesterday the meeting was on the [9675] 15th and now he says there were notes made on the 8th and now he says that on the 14th or 15th they were destroyed.

Mr. Richardson. Captain, after all of this episode and at the time of this episode you had been a very busy man, hadn't you?

Captain Safford. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. You might almost say that you worked day and night.

Captain Safford. Not quite that much, but I was working long hours.

Mr. Richardson. And your staff was working hard?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And your office had never been as busy as it was during this week before the Pearl Harbor attack, had it?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

[9676] Mr. Richardson. And after this episode with reference to this so-called winds execute, you never turned your attention to that matter until prior to the summer or fall of 1943, did you, approximately 2 years?

Captain Safford. Approximately 2 years; a few months less.

Mr. Richardson. And the fact is, is it not, Captain, that in the fall of 1943, you concluded that you might be a witness, and then you undertook, by inquiry, by investigation, by conversation, by letters, to try and remember what occurred during that period before the attack in December 1941?

Captain Safford. I was doing more than that at that time. I was engaged in writing up a history of radio intelligence from 1924 to 1941 by the direction and instruction of the Director of Naval Intelligence. That was carried for 7 months in my monthly report of progress, in addition to doing that work.

Mr. Richardson. It was the official work you had to do. You were very deeply exercised in trying to make up your mind as to what you might testify to, if you were called as a witness?

Captain Safford. I was trying to do double duty with the same set of data.

[9677] Mr. Richardson. And the other duty, I repeat again, was to get your mind made up as to what the facts were, so if you were called as a witness you could testify?

Captain Safford. So I could testify and not be confused on the witness stand by counsel.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, I want you to know that I do not care a tinker's damn whether the winds execute message came in or whether it did not. I am only interested in whether there should be reviewed by the committee all of the reliable facts that can be adduced so they can reach a conclusion.

I do not want to mislead you or browbeat you, if I talk rather loudly. It is because I am a rather loud talking individual.

I just want to make it clear that when you started, in the fall of 1943 to prepare yourself as a witness, your whole recollection was exceedingly hazy as to what had happened 2 years before, wasn't it?

Captain Safford. There were a few outstanding facts and the details linking them together were very hazy.
Mr. Richardson. Now, let me read you what you testified to on that point in the Hewitt investigation, at page 112:

Captain Safford. In the fall of 1943, it appeared that there was going to be a trial, a court martial of Admiral Kimmel. It was hinted in the newspapers and various people in the Navy Department were getting testimony ready for it. I realized I would be one of the important witnesses, that my memory was very vague, and I began looking around to get everything that I could to prepare a written statement which I could follow as testimony.

That was the time when I studied the Roberts report carefully for the first time, and noted no reference to the winds message, or to the message which McColUm had written, and which I had seen, and which I thought had been sent, and then I began talking to everybody who had been around at the time and who knew I had been mixed up in it, to see what they could remember to straighten me out on the thing, and give me leads to follow down to where I got my hands on official messages, and things so it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory.

I also talked the thing over with whatever Army people were still around at the time, and had anything in this line, and bit by bit these facts appeared to come together.

The investigation was conducted, if you call it that, for the purpose of preparing myself to take the stand as a witness in a prospective court martial of Admiral Kimmel.

Now, you regard that today, do you not, Captain, as a fair statement of how you brought your mind to a factual conclusion as to what happened during that period, that week prior to Pearl Harbor, in the fall of 1943?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. 1941?

Mr. Richardson. 1943.

Now, Captain—

Captain Safford. May I add something to that statement?

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Captain Safford. At the time I did this, I expected to be called as a witness for the prosecution, to represent the Navy Department, in the charges which I thought would be preferred against Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Richardson. Well, that made it all the more important, did it not, Captain, that you should testify as to what you knew and not what you found out from what somebody told you, because you were then dealing with the guilt or innocence of a human being?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, you were exceedingly anxious to get hold of an execute message to the winds code, were you not?

Captain Safford. I first looked for the—

Mr. Richardson (interposing). No, no. I am asking you as to your mental condition. You were very anxious, while you waited to see what the monitoring stations would send in to see when an execute code would come in?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now the first time you ever saw the message that you say in your statement was an execute message, was when Kramer brought it to you, sometime after 8 o'clock on the morning of December 4?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. You were not a Japanese linguist?

Captain Safford. No.

Mr. Richardson. You did not decode the message?
Captain Safford. No.
Mr. Richardson. Do you know under whose watch station the message came in?
Captain Safford. Lieutenant Murray was on watch at the time.
Mr. Richardson. Did not you specifically testify in the former hearing that it came in to Lieutenant Brotherhood?
Captain Safford. I did on the first hearing, when I was under the belief that it had come in on Brotherhood’s watch, because he told me it had.
Mr. Richardson. Well, I will take up the Brotherhood matter with you a little later.
I want to pursue this matter just a moment.
Now, Kramer brought you this message, is that correct?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. Now, there was some writing on the message when he brought it to you?
Captain Safford. There was writing on the message.
Mr. Richardson. Now, outside of that writing, what was on that message when he brought it to you?
Captain Safford. He had underscored the code words in the middle of the message, so they stood out very plainly.
Mr. Richardson. Just tell me Captain, in what form was this message? Was it in English?
Captain Safford. The message was in Japanese.
Mr. Richardson. All of it?
Captain Safford. All of it.
Mr. Richardson. And you could not read Japanese?
Captain Safford. I can read a few words in Japanese, if they point it out by underscoring, and I compared them with the original words of the two winds codes.
Mr. Richardson. Now, let us not go quite so fast on that, Captain.
[9682] When the message was brought to you by Kramer, was it typewritten?
Captain Safford. It was the teletype message as it came in the machine.
Mr. Richardson. In Japanese?
Captain Safford. In Japanese.
Mr. Richardson. And with the exception of these specific words that you were watching for, you did not attempt to read it in Japanese?
Captain Safford. I did not attempt to read it.
Mr. Richardson. Now, there was some writing on that message, was there not?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. In handwriting?
Captain Safford. In handwriting.
Mr. Richardson. In English?
Captain Safford. In English.
Mr. Richardson. What was written in longhand on that message?
Captain Safford. “War with England including NEI,” and so forth. “War with the U. S.,” or possibly United States, and “Peace with Russia.”
That is to the best of my recollection after 4 years.

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Mr. Richardson. Well, it is not quite 4 years, [9683] in view of the fact that this is the fifth time you are testifying on it, is it, Captain?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything else written in longhand on this message in Japanese, except those three phrases?

Captain Safford. There was nothing in Kramer's handwriting.

Mr. Richardson. Well, there was no other handwriting on it but Kramer's?

Captain Safford. No.

Mr. Richardson. The only other writing there was on the paper was the teletype message in Japanese?

Captain Safford. And the identifying data, such as the frequency, time of intercept, station which sent it, which I glanced at, but promptly forgot.

Mr. Richardson. Well, that is not unreasonable.

Now then Captain, that message that you got, with respect to the Japanese words that were underlined, which you say Kramer interpreted in longhand on the message, was a dead ringer execute for the original code message 2353 that had been sent out, was it not?

Captain Safford. That is correct, except that it reversed it in the case of Russia, because we thought no [9684] war would be no mention, but they gave a positive, specific mention as to Russia, but in a negative sense, which we concluded meant peace, or not war as yet.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, Captain, we can dismiss from our attention in connection with any examination of you, or any contention of you as to the winds execute circular 2354, cannot we?

Captain Safford. Let me see that.

Mr. Richardson. Because this execute could not have been in completion of circular 2354, could it?

Captain Safford. 2354 is out completely, except for the fact that is what we expected to find in a Morse code message, and it did not turn out that way.

Mr. Richardson. So that the only code message, winds code message, so far as your testimony is concerned, that the committee need pay any attention to is 2353?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Now, were the words "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" in the middle of the broadcast?

Captain Safford. That is the place they were underscored.

Mr. Richardson. Were they also at the end?

Captain Safford. I do not know now. The were not [9685] underscored at the end if they were there.

Mr. Richardson. That would be a very important item in order to ascertain whether this was intended to be an execute of 2353, would it not?

Captain Safford. Not necessarily. They would be repeated at the end only as a precaution so that if they missed the early part of the broadcast, they could pick it up at the last and not lose it.

Mr. Richardson. Just a minute, Captain. Don't you think you are extending your authority a little when you interpret what the Japanese
meant in a code direction? Did not you tell me a few minutes ago that every one of those directions that were contained in 2353 were important to be considered in determining whether or not a given message was an execute message?

Captain Safford. I said they were important, that is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Well, you did not even look to find out whether these three sets of words that had been translated were also at the end of the message, did you?

Captain Safford. I never made such a statement.

Mr. Richardson. Well, you did not?

Captain Safford. I said I cannot remember whether they were repeated at the end or not. I was well satisfied that the message was authentic, an authentic signal of the execute given by the Japanese Government.

Mr. Richardson. Captain, I am not the least interested in whether you are satisfied or not. I am only interested in ascertaining whether, when you saw the message, you endeavored to ascertain, as a careful, trained Intelligence man, whether it was an execute of the winds code message 2353, and consequently I asked you, first, was it in the middle and you said “yes”; and I then asked you, was it at the end, and you said you did not look.

Now, third, was each sentence repeated twice?

Captain Safford. I did not say I did not look. I said I could not tell you from present memory.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, you cannot give us any help as to whether it was at the end, can you?

Captain Safford. I can give you no help at the present time.

Mr. Richardson. But the fact that it was in the message just impressed you, so that to this day you can remember just those words that were underlined, cannot you?

Captain Safford. I can remember them because we had the words preserved in the written record in circular 2353. I cannot remember the words in my mind. I can only leave them to this which had been preserved in the written record, and I knew it was this form, and not the other form.

Mr. Richardson. And when you looked at 2353, right in front of your nose was the phrase that all three of these phrases had also to appear at the end of the broadcast message, but that did not seem to impress you as being important.

Have you any reaction on that now? Does your mind give any reaction on that now?

Captain Safford. I have no doubt that I checked through the rest of the message, and found everything in due form and technically correct, according to 2353, but I cannot swear from memory to it at this late date.

Mr. Richardson. Well, at the present time, Captain, regardless of what you had no doubt of, you have no recollection, under oath, that you saw anything in that message except the three phrases underlined by Kramer in the message he handed you?

Captain Safford. That is correct. Those are the things that remain in my memory through all this period of time.

Mr. Richardson. Now do you have any recollection, Captain, that these sentences, these groups of words were repeated twice in the message? That would be important, would it not?
Captain Safford. It is my impression they were, but [9688] I am not certain.
Mr. Richardson. Was this message, Captain, a short-wave news broadcast?
Captain Safford. It was a short-wave news broadcast.
Mr. Richardson. How do you know?
Captain Safford. Because the frequency was recorded on the message, and we could not hear the long wave or low-power stuff, anyhow; the only thing we could hear in Washington from Tokyo was on short wave.
Mr. Richardson. How did you know it was news if you could not read Japanese?
Captain Safford. I counted on Kramer to do that.
Mr. Richardson. Well, you could have counted on Kramer to do it, but now you have not testified that you asked him anything about it.
Captain Safford. Kramer told me when he gave me the paper, he said, "This is it." There is no question in my mind or the mind of anybody else what he meant by it.
Mr. Richardson. Now, let us just temporarily, because I am going to question you about it again, Captain, probe that question.
You know, do you not, Captain, now that Kramer has three times in his sworn testimony heretofore, denied that he saw anything in this message with reference to Japanese [9689] words relating to the United States, and says that the only thing there was in the message he saw had reference to Russia. You know that, don't you?
Captain Safford. I did not know that.
Mr. Richardson. He told you that, didn't he?
Captain Safford. Kramer never told me anything about Russia.
Mr. Richardson. Did not he tell you that he was completely uncertain as to what the Japanese words were in this message?
Captain Safford. I think that Kramer had been pretty well befuddled by the middle of 1945.
Mr. Richardson. Had been pretty well what?
Captain Safford. Well, befuddled.
Mr. Richardson. Well, did the befuddling, Captain apply only to Kramer? Were you befuddled at all in 1945?
Captain Safford. In 1945 there was a determined effort made to have me reverse my testimony before previous investigations and to say I had never seen the winds message.
Mr. Richardson. All right.
Now, explain to the committee in detail just who started to exercise influence on you to make you change your testimony. Give name and dates, and the full conversations.
Mr. Murphy. May I request, Mr. Chairman, that we also [9690] have him produce the original memorandum he made 2 weeks ago?
Mr. Richardson. I did not hear that.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to request that we have presented the written memorandum of 2 weeks ago. He said he had a written memorandum of 2 weeks ago that he just got for the first time.
Mr. Keefe. He already identified it.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to have that produced.
Mr. Richardson. Go ahead and read it in detail. Give us now all of the evidence that you have to indicate that anybody tried to get
you to change your testimony in just as much detail as you can, 

Captain. Senator Lucas. Mr. Counsel, may I inquire when this statement was prepared?

Mr. Richardson. Which statement?

Senator Lucas. What he is about to read.

Captain Safford. This statement was prepared on the 14th of July 1945.

Senator Lucas. How did you happen to prepare that statement at that time?

Captain Safford. There were certain things that occurred that struck me as quite unusual. I had never seen anything like it in all my experience as a commissioned officer of the Navy, and I made notes on the spot, and combined it all into one memorandum while the events were still fresh in my memory.

Senator Lucas. You did not have this previously?

Mr. Richardson. No, this is the first I have heard of it.

The Vice Chairman. Do you set out in that statement what those certain events were that impressed you?

Captain Safford. I have it here. I merely had it with me to refresh my memory. I did not expect to produce it as evidence. I am now asked to produce it, and I have it here, if it is desired by the committee.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead.

Captain Safford. I would just as soon not go into this here.

Mr. Richardson. I think it would be well, if he read his paper rather than testifying from it, simply in refreshing his recollection.

The Vice Chairman. Yes, just read your paper completely to the committee, please, sir.

Senator Ferguson. May I suggest, counsel, if there is anything that is not in this memorandum that he recalls, that he give that also?

Mr. Richardson. Yes. I thought it was all oral, when I asked the question.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Read your paper completely, and distinctly, so we may all hear it, and then when you have finished reading it, why you may supplement it by any other statement you desire to make on this subject, in response to the question counsel has asked you.

Senator Ferguson. Might I suggest that he read it not so fast.

Captain Safford. All right.

Senator Ferguson. I have difficulty at times hearing you.

Captain Safford. This paper is dated July 14, 1945: "Memorandum of Conversations in Connection With Admiral Hewitt's Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Distaster."

Mr. Richardson. This was after you had testified before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain Safford. This was after I had testified before Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. Richardson. All right, go ahead.

Captain Safford. I believe—I am not certain on the dates.

Mr. Murphy. The Hewitt testimony was taken between May 14 and July 12, 1945, and this memorandum is July 14, 2 days after Admiral Hewitt concluded taking testimony.
Captain Safford (reading):

1. This memorandum is prepared, while events are still fresh in my mind, for possible use in connection with future Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Disaster, or Court-martials in connection with Pearl Harbor. It includes certain acts which strike me as irregular or unusual, and probably illegal.

2. On or about Friday, 11 May 1945, I was called to an unofficial conference (or meeting) conducted by Lieutenant Commander John Sonnett, U. S. N. R., in room 1083A, Navy Building.

The Vice Chairman. Spell that man's name.

Captain Safford. S-o-n-n-e-t-t.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, he has been connected with the Hart hearing, had not he?

Captain Safford. He had not.

Mr. Richardson. What hearing was he connected with?

Captain Safford. He was connected with the Hewitt hearing.

Mr. Richardson. I mean the Hewitt hearing. What was his function in the Hewitt hearing? Do you remember?

Captain Safford. He was a legal adviser to Admiral Hewitt, and a special representative of the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Richardson. And took part in that investigation?

Captain Safford. And took part in that investigation.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now go ahead.

Captain Safford. (continuing reading):

He was in civilian clothes, as he has been on every occasion on which I have seen him. Sonnett told me that he had been assigned as a legal assistant to Admiral Hewitt in an investigation of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor Disaster, that he was also a special representative for Secretary Forrestal in this investigation and that he was authorized to handle Top-Secret and Secret information and documents. He showed me papers signed by Secretary Forrestal and Fleet Admiral King verifying these statements.

At my request he let me read the Precept which directed Admiral Hewitt to conduct the investigation. It was my understanding that Admiral Hewitt had not yet returned to Washington and that Sonnett was getting things lined up to expedite matters after the Admiral's arrival.

3. I answered many questions pertaining to my testimony before previous investigations, and discussed discrepancies between my testimony and the testimony of other witnesses.

Mr. Richardson. Let me stop you right there, Captain.

Does not it commence to dawn on you that this statement of yours was made before you testified in the Hewitt examination?

Captain Safford. Some of the notes were made before, but it was written up and typed and dated afterward.

Mr. Richardson. I see. But this conversation that you had with Sonnett took place before you testified in the Hewitt investigation?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Captain Safford (continuing reading):

Sonnett requested that I give him, by the end of the next week, written memoranda to be used as a basis of study and examination (under oath) on the subjects listed below. This was done and the memoranda submitted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Date submitted</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Winds Message&quot; (6 pages)</td>
<td>15 May 1945</td>
<td>Withdrawn on 18 May 1945 at the suggestion of Lt. Comdr. Sonnett. Original retained for possible future use.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mr. Richardson. By the way, have you a copy of that paper that you gave to Sonnett?

Captain Safford. I believe I have.

[9697] Mr. Richardson. All right, go ahead.

Mr. Murphy. Will the captain go a little more slowly?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. There was something said before May 15, 1945. What was that?

Captain Safford. "Six pages."

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Captain Safford (reading):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Date submitted</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Evaluation of messages of 26 Nov., 1941 (6 pages). | 17 May 1945... | Also lists the 6 carriers described by Com. 16 as "all known first and second fleet carriers."
| Evaluation of "UTU" broadcasts (8 pages). | 19 May 1945... | No action was taken because Japanese fleet had been sighted by RAF planes off Kota Bharu.
| Tatuta Maru and the President Maidson (1 page). | 21 May 1945... | Indicates that on 7 Dec., 1941 the CNO refused to believe that the U. S. would be involved in the war that was imminent in East Asia.

On Sonnett's request, I prepared and furnished him copies of certain U. S. Naval messages, the Station "H" Chronology for 1-6 December, 1941, and Com 14 Daily CI Summaries for 1 Nov.-6 Dec., 1941.

4. It was apparent to me on my very first meeting with Lieutenant Commander Sonnett that he was acting as [9697] a "counsel for the defense" for the late Secretary Knox, and Admiral Stark rather than as the legal assistant to the investigating officer. His purpose seemed to be to refute testimony (before earlier investigations) that was unfavorable to anyone in Washington, to beguile "hostile" witnesses into changing their stories and to introduce an element of doubt where he could not effect a reversal of testimony. Above all, he attempted to make me reverse my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and to make me believe I was suffering from hallucinations.

5. I talked to Sonnett the second time on 18 May 1945, and the third time a day or two later. On these latter occasions, like the first, Sonnett tried to persuade me that there had been no "Winds Execute" Message, that my memory had been playing me tricks, that I had confused the "False Winds Message" with what I had been expecting, and that I ought to change my testimony to permit reconciling all previous discrepancies and thereby wind up the affair. In some cases the idea was stated outright, in some cases it was implied, and in other cases it was unexpressed but obviously the end in view.

Senator Lucas. The what?

Captain Safford (reading):

The end in view.

6. I distinctly recall Lieutenant Commander John [9698] Sonnett, U. S. N. R., making the following statements to me during the course of the above-mentioned conferences:

"You are the only one who seems to have ever seen the 'Winds Execute' Message."

"How could the 'Winds Execute' be heard on the east coast of the U. S. and not at any of the places nearer Japan?"

"It is very doubtful that there ever was a 'Winds Execute' Message."

"It is no reflection on your veracity to change your testimony."

"It is no reflection on your mentality to have your memory play you tricks—after such a long period."

"Numerous witnesses that you have named have denied all knowledge of a 'Winds Execute' Message."

"You do not have to carry the torch for Admiral Kimmel."
7. I testified before Admiral Hewitt the first time on or about 24 May 1945, before he went to Pearl Harbor. I testified before Admiral Hewitt a second time on 22 June, 1945, after his return from examining witnesses at Pearl Harbor. Upon completion of my testimony (in which the "Winds Execute" Message had figured), I asked him, "off-the-record" if there was still any doubts in his mind as to the "Winds Message" having been sent by Japan and disseminated in the War and Navy Departments. The Admiral looked startled, and before he could reply Sonnett said:

"Of course, I am not conducting the case, and I do not know what Admiral Hewitt has decided, but to me it is very doubtful that the so-called 'Winds Execute' Message was ever sent."

Admiral Hewitt thought a minute or two more, and then said:

"You are not entitled to my opinion, but I will answer your question. There is no evidence of a 'Winds Execute' Message beyond your unsupported testimony. I do not doubt your sincerity, but I believe that you have confused one of the other messages containing the name of a wind with the message you were expecting to receive."

Maybe I ought to go on with paragraph 9.

8. For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt's integrity——

The Vice Chairman. Just a minute. You are reading everything that is on that paper?

Captain Safford. I am reading everything that is on this paper.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Go ahead.

[9700] Captain Safford (reading):

For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt's integrity, but I do believe that Sonnett has succeeded in pulling the wool over his eyes.

9. I also believe that Sonnett employed similar tactics on other witnesses whose testimony had favored Admiral Kimmel, particularly Rochefort and Kramer.

10. Copies of the Memorandum described in paragraph 3 are appended hereto. Also appended is a memorandum to Admiral Hewitt dated 22 June, 1945, clarifying my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and indicating that Sonnett had attempted to trick me into stating the opposite of what I intended to say.

Signed, "L. F. Safford, Captain, U. S. N."

Mr. Murphy. There are more pages?

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement?

Captain Safford. That completes my statement. The other pages appended are copies of the memoranda which were referred to in paragraph 2.

The Vice Chairman. All right, proceed and read them, read every word of those papers attached to your statement.

Captain Safford (reading):

Secret
Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S. N. R.

[9701] The Vice Chairman. Permit me to ask you, is that your memorandum?

Captain Safford. That is my memorandum.

The Vice Chairman. Prepared by you?

Captain Safford. Prepared by me.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and read it.

Captain Safford (reading):

Subject: Winds Message.

1. To the best of my knowledge and believe, the following officers knew, in December, 1941, that the Winds "Execute" message had been broadcast from Tokyo on (or about) 4 December, 1941 (and prior to 7 December 1941) although some of them did not learn about it until after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Then I have listed the name, present rank, station, and duty on December 7, 1941, first for the Army, and second for the Navy.

The Vice Chairman. Are those names there?

Captain Safford. The names are there, which I will read, if you are interested.

The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead.

Captain Safford (reading):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Present Rank</th>
<th>Station and Duty on 7 December 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George C. Marshall</td>
<td>General of the Army</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawson Olmstead</td>
<td>Maj. Gen., U. S. A.</td>
<td>Director of Military Intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherman Miles</td>
<td>Maj. Gen., U. S. A.</td>
<td>War Plans Division (WGDG).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clayton Bissell</td>
<td>Maj. Gen., U. S. A.</td>
<td>Army Communications, Office of Chief Signal Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otis K. Saddler</td>
<td>Col., U. S. A.</td>
<td>In charge, Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rufus S. Bratton</td>
<td>Brig. Gen., U. S. A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I believe I was mistaken. He was only a colonel at the time.

The Vice Chairman. That is the first time you heard of him being a brigadier general?

Captain Safford. I heard he had been promoted. That was my mistake. That is what it should be. [Resumes reading:]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Present Rank</th>
<th>Station and Duty on 7 December 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rex W. Minckler</td>
<td>Col., U. S. A.</td>
<td>Chief of Signal Intelligence, Service, Office of Chief Signal Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Doud</td>
<td>Col., U. S. A.</td>
<td>In charge, Japanese Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert E. Schukraft</td>
<td>Col., U. S. A.</td>
<td>In charge, Intercept Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank B. Rowlett</td>
<td>Lt Col. (Signal Corps Reserve), U. S. Army.</td>
<td>Principal Cryptanalyst Japanese Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. S. Wilkinson</td>
<td>Vice Adm., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Director of Naval Intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leigh Noyes</td>
<td>Rear Adm., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Director of Naval Communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. R. Beardall</td>
<td>Rear Adm., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Naval Aide to the President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. R. Redman</td>
<td>Rear Adm., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Asst. Director of Naval Communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. E. Beatty</td>
<td>Rear Adm., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. W. Welker</td>
<td>Capt., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Op-20-OX. In charge Intercept and Direction Finding Section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. D. Kramer</td>
<td>Capt., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Op-20-GZ. In charge, Translation and Dissemination Section. (Actually attached to Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. W. Parke</td>
<td>Comdr., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Op-20-GY. In charge, Cryptanalytical Section. (Actually attached to Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. A. Murray</td>
<td>Lt. Comdr., U. S. N., R.</td>
<td>Watch Officer in Op-20-GY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. L. Bryant</td>
<td>Chief Ship's Clerk, U. S. N.</td>
<td>Confidential Yeoman in Op-20-GZ.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Senator Lucas. May I ask one question? Are those names you read those who are presumed to have seen the winds message?

Captain Safford. Seen or have been told about it; knew about it at the time. Whether they have forgotten it since I have no idea.

Senator Lucas. I see.

Mr. Richardson. You might indicate at this point which ones of these names according to your information actually saw this message that you say was the winds execute.
Senator Ferguson. Those that were in position to see it or that
did see it.

Mr. Richardson. That he knows saw it.

Captain, I don't want the report, or anything, but I want your
own knowledge as to which ones of these names saw it.

Captain Safford. In this memorandum which I gave Commander
Sonnett I only told him which ones knew about the winds message
either before December 7 or shortly after.

Mr. Richardson. Then you don't know of your own knowledge that
any one of these persons so named ever actually saw the message?

Mr. Keefe. Except Kramer, who he has testified gave him the
message.

[9706] Mr. Richardson. Wait just a minute——

Captain Safford. So far as direct evidence is concerned I have no
knowledge that any of those people saw it. These are turned in as a
list of prospective witnesses on the winds code.

Mr. Richardson. You do know that Kramer saw it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. That is the only one.

Captain Safford. And I saw it.

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Captain Safford. And I sent it to Admiral Noyes and the courier
who took it up reported, "Message delivered."

Mr. Richardson. Now, have you anything further?

Captain Safford. I have a great deal more.

The Vice Chairman. Go right ahead from where you left off.

Senator Ferguson. Will counsel inquire as to whether these ex-
hibits he is now reading were turned over to Commander Sonnett?

Captain Safford. These were all turned over on the days indicated.

He talked to me about these things and asked me to write a complete
statement to help him and Admiral Hewitt in the subsequent investi-
gation conducted. They were not evidence. These were leads. Off
the record and [9707] private examinations.

Mr. Richardson. But all given to Sonnett?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; to help him and help Admiral Hewitt.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I wanted.

Senator Lucas. Do I understand that just Kramer and yourself
saw this message?

Mr. Richardson. That is of his own knowledge.

Captain Safford. That I know from my own knowledge.

Senator Lucas. McCollum didn't see the message?

Captain Safford. I have no direct knowledge that McCollum ever
saw it.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in the statement he gives us he said
they all had them delivered to them. He is only reading now the
memorandum.

Captain Safford. Yes; on this list were people who knew about it,
not people who necessarily had copies.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Captain, read from the point you
left off.

Captain Safford (reading):

2. An element of confusion was caused by the Tokyo weather forecast or
"false" winds message intercepted by the FCC at 2200 GCT, 4 December 1941,
and phones to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood during the evening of 4 December 1941. It is believed that certain officers attached to Op-20-G—

The Vice Chairman. Not quite so fast.

Captain Safford (continuing):

in December 1941 had in mind the "false" winds message when they informed me that they knew of the "winds message". Their names are as follows:

Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R.—

Senator Lucas. Pull the microphone in front of you, please.

Captain Safford (reading):

Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R.
Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, U. S. N. R.
Lieutenant F. L. Freeman, U. S. N.
Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N.

The FCC interception of another winds execute message between 0002 and 0035 (GCT), 8 December 1941, proves that the Japanese Government did use this system for broadcasting war warnings.

3. There never has been any doubt in my mind that the winds execute message was broadcast from Tokyo two or three days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and forwarded to the Navy Department. The points in doubt, which I sought to clarify by sighting the incoming Japanese message (or its translation), were: [7909]
(a) Exact date [i.e. December 4 (Thursday) or December 5 (Friday) 1941].
(b) Exact wording of the original Japanese broadcast.
(c) Station call, time and frequency of the Japanese Radio Station which broadcast it. (This would reconcile "skip" phenomena.)
(d) Whether received in voice or Morse code.
(e) Station which intercepted the message.

4. After receiving the winds "execute" message I discussed with Lieutenant Commander Welker (Op-20-GX) the advisability of discontinuing the special intercept watches being maintained to pick up the winds "execute". However, only two days previously we had translated Tokyo Circular #2409 (JD #6985) dated 27 November 1941—setting up a system for sending out "Hidden Word Messages" (INGO DENPO) in event of strained relations. Although we expected these would come over regular commercial circuits (as proved the case on the morning of 7 December 1941), we could not be sure, and it seemed advisable to continue the existing set-up which covered all possibilities (even though it meant the operators continuing their doubled-up watches), and required no further orders and no possibility of misunderstanding and confusion. It is my impression that Welker discussed the matter with Captain Schenkraft, and the Army made a similar decision. I have not discussed this with Welker since September 1942 and I have no idea how well he remembers this incident.

5. Somebody must have notified the War Department about the winds "execute" message because Colonel Bratton telephoned to Admiral Noyes and requested a copy of the original Japanese broadcast so that he could verify the translation. (This was customary in highly important intercepts). Admiral Noyes got quite indignant and told Colonel Bratton that the Navy's translation was correct and that the War Department would not be furnished a copy of the original message.

Mr. Murphy. May I ask if you are now speaking of the actual intercept which you claim you saw right there?

Captain Safford. Speaking of what account I could get of the winds message from people in the War Department, and this was not testimony, this was furnished as a lead.

Mr. Richardson. But it referred to your winds execute message?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Captain Safford (reading):

The foregoing incident, if verified by Colonel Bratton, will prove that the winds "execute" got as far as Rear Admiral Noyes and G-2.
6. There is one possible source of information on the winds message which has not been checked, namely—the Australian C. I. Organization. The Australians had a small C. I. Organization and in December 1941 they were intercepting Japanese diplomatic radio traffic and reading messages in the J-19 system. (The Dutch in Java were also reading J-19, as well as the British in Singapore and London and the U. S. Army and Navy in Corregidor and Washington.) The Australian C. I. Unit had liaison with the Singapore C. I. Unit, including exchange of translation and keys, except for the purple and red machines. The winds “set-up” message (Tokyo Circulars #2353 (JD #6875) and #2354 (JD #6850), dated 19 November 1941) were in J-19. Singapore sent translations to Corregidor (CinCAF 281430 (COPEK) to OpNav) and undoubtedly sent these same translations to Australia. The Australians may have intercepted the winds “execute” message on 4 December 1941. If so, this was the basis of Senator Ferguson’s “Australian War Warning” which received much publicity in December 1943.

Mr. Murphy. Read that again, please.

Captain Safford (reading):

The Australians may have intercepted the winds “execute” message on 4 December 1941.

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Captain Safford (reading):

If so, this was the basis of Senator Ferguson’s “Australian War Warning” which received much publicity in December 1943.

Maybe is was 1944.

Mr. Murphy. Senator Ferguson’s Australian war warning?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You heard it the first time.

Captain Safford (reading):

This hypothesis could be easily proved or dis-proved.

And remember this is written in July 1945.

Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire whether or not that was to Australian Minister Dixon?

Captain Safford. That is what I was referring to, yes.

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead.

Captain Safford. I think I have a newspaper clipping of it. That is what I was referring to:

This hypothesis could be easily proved or dis-proved. The following secret message to the Fleet Radio Radio Unit, Melbourne, is suggested:

And I have a proposed message from the Secretary of the Navy to that Unit in which they were being asked to contact the Australians and see if the Australians would tell them yes or no. I will quote the message if desired.

Mr. Richardson. Quote it.

Captain Safford (reading):

“From: Secretary of the Navy
“To: Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne

“Referring CINCAF Twentyeight Fourteen Thirty November Nineteen Forty-one and Tokyo circulars Twentythree Fiftythree and Twentythree Fiftyfour dated Nineteen November same year in JIG Nineteen did Australians intercept or know of such a warning broadcast from Tokyo on or about Four December Nineteen Fortyone X if affirmative forward by airmail certified transcript of broadcast as received with notation as to date X time X frequency X voice or Morse X call letters of transmitting station X location of intercepting station and other relevant data”

7. Lieutenant Colonel Rowlett heard of the winds “execute” by office gossip a day or two before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. A few days after the
attack Colonel Saddler came to him and said, "I would like to see the winds message," or words to that effect. Rowlett referred him to Major Dond, in charge of the section, who in turn referred him to Colonel Minckler, the Chief of SIS. The rest of the story belongs to the Army Investigation rather than the Navy Investigation except for the fact that it furnishes further proof of the authenticity of the winds "execute" message and that some written record of it did exist in the War Department in December 1941.

[9713A] 8. A complete exposition of radio wave propagation would be very lengthy and out of place. It is sufficient to say that the radio frequencies used between Japan and the United States were quite erratic in performance, and that long distance radio communications in an East-West direction are more difficult and less reliable than those in a North-South direction. A few pertinent examples can be given, namely:

(a) The long fourteen (14) part Tokyo Serial #902 (JD-1 #7143) was intercepted solid at Bainbridge Island, Washington. Part Two (of Tokyo Serial #902) and Tokyo Serial #904 (JD-1 #7144) were also copied at Cheltenham, Maryland, and forwarded to the Navy Department and used for the actual decryption. (This is verified in the GY Log for 6 December 1941.) The rest of Tokyo Serial #902 was "uncopyable" at Cheltenham.

I would like to add after the memorandum, outside the memorandum, that that statement was possibly incorrect, but it was my recollection at the time.

(b) Part Two of the very important three-part Tokyo to Berlin #985 (JD-1 #6943) was missed but the first and third parts were copied solid.

I would like to add, this is not in the memorandum, that both Corregidor and England missed, and we only have [9714] the first and third parts here. We received a copy from London as well as a copy from Corregidor.

(c) We finally had to call on Corregidor to cover the Berlin-Tokyo circuits as the combined efforts of intercept stations in the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than about fifty (50) percent coverage. During the period 1 December-7 December 1941, the Navy Department received seventy (70) Japanese diplomatic intercepts from Corregidor as compared with seventy-three (73) from Bainbridge Island, twenty (20) for all other U. S. Navy Stations, and ninety-three (93) for all U. S. Army stations. The Japanese were trying to reach Rio and Buenos Aires as well as San Francisco, Mexico City, and Washington. (See distribution of Tokyo Serial #2354). It is not at all surprising that the frequency used to reach Washington, Rio, and Buenos Aires skipped over the West Coast and Hawaii. There is a possibility that this frequency was heard in Australia even though it skipped over Manila, Singapore and Java.

I would like to add also, off the memorandum, that this is written many months ago, when I did not have information which I now have.

9. There is one final place where written confirmation of the winds "execute" message may exist—the Record of [9715] Proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I cannot believe that they could cover up so completely that some mention of the winds "execute" did not slip into the record. First they said I didn't know what was going on around me; now they claim I am suffering from hallucinations. Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to search through the record for such evidence in order to prove my sanity, as well as my intelligence and my veracity.

10. In conclusion the following quotation from my secret memorandum to Colonel West, dated 2 October 1944, is submitted for consideration:

Mr. Richardson. Just one moment, Captain. Was there a memorandum that you gave to Colonel West?

Captain Safford. There was a memorandum.

Mr. Richardson. Have you a copy of that memorandum?

Captain Safford. I believe I can find a copy.
Mr. Richardson. Will you produce it so that we may see it, if you can? You don't need to do it now.

Captain Safford. I will later. [Reading:]

"The reason for my stressing the 'winds message' so much in my testimony (in all three cases) is because we could afford to talk about it, even print it in the newspaper, without detriment to the war effort. Even the Dutch knew of the code and the FCC listened for the message. [9716] We had the same information—at the same time—from more secret but less dramatic sources. Also the 'winds set-up' was the nearest thing to a warning CINCPAC ever got. If the 'winds execute' had been heard at Pearl Harbor, the fleet would not have been surprised. And because CINCPAC was given no information that the 'winds execute' had been sent, everybody at Pearl Harbor believed it had not been sent and that the Japs were still making up their minds as to the next step."

Mr. Murphy. There is still more?

Captain Safford. That is the end of that memorandum on the winds message, which is official and before the investigation given to Mr. Sonnett to help him and Admiral Hewitt get leads for their investigation.

The Vice Chairman. What else do you have?

Mr. Richardson. Have you finished with that statement?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. Have you some other memorandums?

Captain Safford. The other memorandums do not have a bearing on the winds message.

Mr. Richardson. Let me ask you this: You prefaced this reading with a statement that efforts had been made to silence you and influence you. Have you any other record of any kind, manner of description, that shows or tends to [9717] show or relates to any pressure or influence exerted upon you or towards you to get you to change your testimony or give no testimony?

Captain Safford. This has been the only time and it was before the investigation. Not during the investigation. I want to make that very distinct.

Mr. Richardson. Then you have no more to add to what you have read?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, after you wrote that and gave that to Sonnett you were examined before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain Safford. I was examined before Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. Richardson. And you were given an opportunity to testify fully and completely on every subject that you wanted to?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And you were sworn on that testimony?

Captain Safford. I was sworn on that testimony.

Mr. Richardson. And after the testimony was taken and transcribed, you read it and signed it, did you not?

Captain Safford. I do not believe that I ever read it or was given the opportunity to verify it.

Mr. Richardson. Have you ever read it since?

Captain Safford. I have read it since.

[9718] Mr. Richardson. It is correct, is it not, Captain?

Captain Safford. It is correct with a few minor errors in typing where they left out some words.
Mr. Richardson. Oh, I see. But generally speaking—

Captain Safford. General speaking it is correct.

Mr. Richardson (continuing). It was a correct report?

Captain Safford. That is right.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain—

Mr. Keepe. May we understand what these other items are that are attached to this so-called exhibit that he has there? He says it does not have reference to the winds code but it may have quite a bearing on this case. They are part of the same exhibit.

The Vice Chairman. Captain, tell us—

Captain Safford. Could I explain them?

The Vice Chairman. Tell us as plainly and as completely as you can what the other papers are that you have in your hand in addition to what you have read to the committee?

Captain Safford. I believe there were two conflicting Intelligence reports, one sent on the 26th of November 1941, one was sent from the Fourteenth District at Pearl Harbor and the other from the Sixteenth District at Manila, this concerning the question or the possibility of Japanese carriers in the Mandated Islands. They did not agree.

[9719] This is a long dissertation on that giving my impression or evaluation of it for their benefit. I was also asked to explain what the commandant Sixteenth District meant when he said, “All known first and second fleet carriers.” That is the number and their identity.

The Vice Chairman. That is the contents of the second memorandum after the point where you stopped reading?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. Then tell us what the next is. Each additional paper that you have in your hand, tell us what it is.

Mr. Murphy. May we find out how many pages there are on the carriers?

Captain Safford. Six pages.

Mr. Murphy. You say there are only six between what you read and what you have there in your hand, you mean there are only six pages there?

Captain Safford. That is correct. It is that one [indicating].

Mr. Murphy. Oh, I see.

Captain Safford. It was the one I just read.

Mr. Murphy. All right, Captain, excuse me.

Captain Safford. On the 5th of December 1941—

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, what is this—a memorandum?

Captain Safford. This is the evaluation of the “UTU” broadcasts.

The Vice Chairman. This is a memorandum from you?

Captain Safford. It is a memorandum of eight pages from me to Mr. Sonnett.

The Vice Chairman. From you to whom, please?

Captain Safford. To Lieutenant Commander Sonnett.

The Vice Chairman. All right; give us an idea of what is in it.

Captain Safford. Dated the 19th of May 1941 and it is my evaluation—

Mr. Murphy. May I just inquire, Mr. Chairman? The six pages on the carriers was also given to Sonnett?
Captain Safford. That was also given to him.
Mr. Murphy. All right.
Mr. Richardson. Go ahead.
The Vice Chairman. Tell us what these eight pages are that you have before you now?
Captain Safford. On the 5th of December 1941 the commandant Fourteenth Naval District reported to the commandant Sixteenth District and Chief of Naval Operations by a message identified as 052220:

UTU's are being sent by HA FU 6 (Tokyo Radio) [9721] on 32 kilocycles instead of 39 kcs as before—and there had been a lot of discussion. I explained it all to Mr. Sonnett and then he asked me to give him a complete writeup, as much as I could tell him about it, which I did.
The Vice Chairman. And what does this relate to now?
Captain Safford. Tokyo normally broadcast messages to the fleet on 39 kilocycles. On the 5th of December 1941 they suddenly discontinued their 39 kilocycles and opened up on 32.
The Vice Chairman. And that is what this eight-page memorandum is?
Captain Safford. This is all about what significance that might have had as a war warning or as regards Japanese intentions of a naval war.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, I think that it is important that we go into that for the reason that the Captain in his statement said that the codes were changed on December 4.
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. He now says that there was a change on December 5.
Captain Safford. In the broadcasting frequency.
Mr. Murphy. All right, and the naval narrative says—

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, that is not a correct statement of the witness, that he testified to a change in code.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I move that we proceed in order.
Mr. Murphy. I am taking it from the statement of the witness. So far as I know the witness is now referring to December 5.
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. In his statement he refers to December 4.
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. And the naval narrative refers to December 1 on the change of signals. I think we ought to have it shown.
The Vice Chairman. Do you request that this eight-page memorandum be read?
Mr. Murphy. I request that it be examined over the noon hour by counsel to see whether or not it is of help to the committee.
The Vice Chairman. Without objection, it will be so ordered. Now, what is the next, Captain?
Captain Safford. The final memorandum was a one-page memorandum from myself to Commander Sonnett dated 21 May 1945 concerning the Tatuta Maru and the American passenger ship President Madison.
The circumstances of that were there had been a lot of, [9723] I believe newspaper talk, possibly something elsewhere, that the Jap-
apanese had sent the Tatuta Maru over as a kind of a spy, a decoy, and that we had been taken in with it and I just brought out that they had arranged it long in advance, they had clearance from the State Department, that everything was in proper order and that no significance could have attached to this whatever, to this trip of the Tatuta Maru, so far as I could see.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, does that complete either a reading or a description of all the papers that you have there before you?

Captain Safford. Those were all that were referenced in this memorandum. I had some additional papers clipped together for convenience, so that they would not get displaced. I will hand them in if you care to have me to.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is that now?

Captain Safford. I had some additional papers clipped to this other bunch for convenience so they would not get displaced.

Mr. Richardson. Where are those papers that were clipped? What were they?

Captain Safford. I have a memorandum addressed to Admiral Hewitt dated June 22, 1945, correcting some of my previous testimony before him, where I had slipped and said [9724] things which were not quite correct and I was able to verify it on the spot and turn it in so that my testimony would be corrected.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I think you had better read that memorandum. It was addressed to Admiral Hewitt?

Captain Safford. It was addressed to Admiral Hewitt.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About your testimony?

Captain Safford. About my testimony.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, read it, please, sir.

Captain Safford (reading):

SECRET

22 JUNE 1945.

Memorandum for Admiral Hewitt

Subj: Pearl Harbor Investigation.

Ref: (a) My testimony given this date.

1. I now recall that Lt. Commander Brotherhood told me that he did not receive a written copy of the “False” Winds Message from the F. C. C., but merely received the information by telephone. The only written version of the “False” Winds Message we ever had prior to 1944 was a memorandum of the phone call in Brotherhood’s handwriting. Only one significant word (North) appeared and it was in English. It was this memorandum that Kramer threw in the “burn bag” after [9725] telling Brotherhood that this was not what we were looking for.

2. The Winds “Execute” Message which passed through my hands on the morning of 4 December 1941 was a teletype copy (typed on yellow teletype paper) of the entire Japanese broadcast about 200 or 300 words long. Three significant words (Kita, Higashi, and Nishi) appeared and they were in Japanese. Kramer’s translation appeared in pencil, or colored crayon, at the bottom of the sheet. There was very little chance of confusion.

3. I would like to make one correction in the testimony I gave today:

“Mr. Phillip Cate, Japanese translator, employed by the Navy Department is still alive. It was his brother, employed as a Japanese translator by the War Department, who died a few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor.”

Respectfully,

L. F. Safford,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. What else is there?

Mr. Richardson. What is the date of that memo?

79716—46—pt. 8—17
Captain Safford. That is the 22d of June 1945.

[9726] Mr. Richardson. And that was to Sonnett?

Captain Safford. No, that was to Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. Richardson. Oh, yes, I see.

Captain Safford. That was referring to——

Mr. Richardson. 22d of what?

Captain Safford. June. He will have that with his papers.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

The Vice Chairman. 22d of June 1945?

Captain Safford. Yes. In going over it afterward I realized that possibly my answers had not been clear or correct in one case, where I had him alive, Cate, and I was simply trying to make minor corrections in the testimony I had given.

The Vice Chairman. I think we understand your reasons for the memorandum. Now, what is the next?

Captain Safford. The other, the final one is a memorandum of a conversation with Mr. Walter Foote at the State Department on Wednesday, May 30, 1945, and I have a note, "Not given to Admiral Hewitt or Lieutenant Sonnett," but I did discuss it with them and I gave a very, very brief summary of this memorandum, which I believe is contained in the record of the Hewitt investigation.

Mr. Walter Foote was the American Consul General at Batavia who sent one of the winds code messages and he was in touch with the situation.

When he came back to the United States I talked with him to see if he could recall any further information on the subject. Mr. Foote said that he was positive that the Dutch in Java had not received the execute on the winds message.

The Vice Chairman. And that is what is covered in that statement?

Captain Safford. No, this is a part of it; that is the substance of it.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Captain Safford. And it was in the Hewitt report.

The Vice Chairman. That was a memorandum from you?

Captain Safford. That was a memorandum of me to myself just so I would not forget what Mr. Foote had said on the subject.

The Vice Chairman. It was not given to Sonnett or Hewitt?

Captain Safford. It was taken in and they merely asked me to take it and condense it in one paragraph in my testimony, which I did.

The Vice Chairman. All right. What else can you think of?

Captain Safford. The other papers here are merely copies of the various circulars and forms of the winds code to refresh my memory.

The Vice Chairman. What do you mean by "circulars and copies"?

Captain Safford. Tokyo circular 2353, 2354.

Mr. Richardson. Just copies of those exhibits?

Captain Safford. Copies of those exhibits.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Anything else?

Captain Safford. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. That is all, all right. Please go on now. Please hand that to counsel so they may examine the part they were requested to examine.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think this is important and I ask that all of the papers from which the witness read be made an exhibit and that we have an exact copy of those papers.
The Vice Chairman. Well, of course, all that he read has gone in the transcript of the record.

Mr. Murphy. All that he read and quoted from here is in the record.

The Vice Chairman. Now, counsel has been requested to examine the other parts that he did not read and when he reports to us on that we will be prepared to pass on that question, I imagine.

[9729] Mr. Murphy. I am just being thorough. I think counsel ought to examine what was read in connection with what we actually heard here and see if we have all of the papers in the record that are in the group.

Mr. Richardson. I do not care, Mr. Chairman, to raise any question that the Captain has read his records correctly. I am perfectly willing to examine them but I do not raise any question but what he read them correctly and the record has all of them in, unless there is a point to the Congressman’s point that if these were in an exhibit they would be a little easier of examination by the committee possibly as a unit than to follow it through the transcript.

The Vice Chairman. Well, probably it might be helpful to have them as exhibits so that we might have them together. You can have it mimeographed for us and furnish it to the committee. Without objection then that will be done.

Now, I would think that the reporter might want to refer to the part that the Captain read because there were a great many names and some Japanese words that most any reporter might have difficulty in getting exactly right, so, Captain, will you please hand them over to counsel?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Counsel will proceed.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question of the Captain?

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Are these some of your personal papers, part of your personal files that you are reading from now?

Captain Safford. This is a part of my personal records which I have made up in connection with these investigations from the beginning.

Senator Lucas. But do you care to have them at some time returned to you?

Captain Safford. I do not care to have them returned. That is final, I hope.

The Vice Chairman. We hope so, too. All right, counsel may proceed.

Mr. Richardson. Our hopes synchronize on that last, Captain.

Two things came to my attention as you read. You have no doubt that the Dutch stations did not get any execute of the winds message.

Captain Safford. I have it from two sources now; an officer who was there serving in liaison with the Dutch and Mr. Foote.

Mr. Richardson. And they both said they did not get it?

Captain Safford. And they both said they did not get it.

Mr. Richardson. And that station did get the original winds message?
Captain Safford. They knew about the original message, either got it direct or possibly the British sent it to them or we presumed they got it themselves.

Mr. Richardson. Now, a second thing that caught my attention was that in one of these documents that you wrote for your own reference you said that the message that came in had the single words "HIGASHI NISHI" and something else. Now, there is no doubt in your mind, is there, that the execute message you saw had the three groups of Japanese words that are contained in 2353, with the exception of the negative being applied to Russia?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Captain Safford. I was trying to clarify the question of misinterpretation of one of those compass directions which were the governing things.

The Vice Chairman. If counsel permits an interruption, the Captain states that in his written statement on page 12.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, in circular 2353 the emergency which gave birth to the desire for the new code, winds code, is recited as "the danger of cutting off of our diplomatic relations and the cutting off of international communications," is it not?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. That would mean, would it not, that the Japanese felt that there might come a time when because of the status of their diplomatic relations and their international communications that they would have to have some new way of communicating and to furnish that new way they invented this so-called winds code?

Captain Safford. This so-called winds code which was to be used there by their broadcasts and not by the commercial telegraph companies.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, it is a fact, is it not, Captain, that on the 4th of December all of the methods of communication were open to the Japanese that had been open at any time since the 1st of January 1941, were they not?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. So there wasn't any reason on the basis of a loss of other methods of communication on December 4th to use this winds code at all, was there?

Captain Safford. There was no reason that you could account for but we had been listening for it from the 28th of November and we had made every effort to get it.

Mr. Richardson. Now, keeping in mind your testimony that the message which Lieutenant Kramer brought to you was in Japanese and in that message, in the middle of that message were the phrases in Japanese which are used as 1, 2, and 3 and mentioned in circular 2353, keeping that in mind can you point to any record then in existence of which either you or Kramer had any knowledge that interpreted or translated those words as meaning war?

Captain Safford. War was the meaning that we gave it and war was what appeared in the translation, whether justified or not.
Mr. Richardson. All right. Except for the written words that Lieutenant Commander Kramer put on this dispatch there is no known writing emanating from Japan or any other source at that time that puts the interpretation on the language "HIGASHI NA KAZEAME" as meaning war with the United States, is there?

Captain Safford. If that word had appeared alone it might have merely meant the breaking off of diplomatic relations, they might have meant nothing else.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, you pay attention to my question. I want to find out whether you can put your finger on any existing authority that up to the time you saw the message interpreted the phrase "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" to mean war with the United States?

Now, let me carry it further. The message from the [9734] Commander of the Asiatic Fleet does not so say, does it?

Captain Safford. Not for "Higashi", and so forth.

Mr. Richardson. And the message 2353 does not so say, does it?

Captain Safford. No.

Mr. Richardson. And you did not have the Foote or Thorpe messages available at 8 o'clock on the morning of December 4, did you?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. So that so far as you know the definition of those words that appeared on that message that morning was the invention of Lieutenant Commander Kramer?

Captain Safford. I would not call it that.

Mr. Richardson. Well, it was the act of Lieutenant Commander Kramer.

Captain Safford. I would say that all the higher authority—

Mr. Richardson. Now, wait a minute, I am speaking about this specific message when it was brought to you by Lieutenant Com- mander Kramer and I want to know what authority he had, if you know, for translating the phrase "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" as meaning war with the United States?

Captain Safford. I do not know now what authority he [9735] had for using those words.

Mr. Richardson. All right. And it was the first time in your whole life up to that point that you had ever seen the word "War" used as a part of the definition of the words "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME"?

Captain Safford. In written form, correct.

Mr. Richardson. That is right. But when this yellow sheet was brought to you with Lieutenant Commander Kramer's notation on it he had written out, as I understand it, "War with the United States" in English?

Mr. Richardson. Are you sure about that, Captain?

Captain Safford. As sure as I can be about anything when I first recorded it in writing at the end of 2 years.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, was that point, Captain, one of the things which you said was very hazy in your mind when you commenced to remembering in the fall of 1943 under your testimony that I have read to you? Was that one of the points that was very hazy in your mind as to just what that interpretation of Lieutenant Commander Kramer read?

Captain Safford. I wanted verification of my memory that he used the actual word "war." That was the only word that I could re- member.
Mr. Richardson. But you remembered the word "war"?

Captain Safford. Rather than merely the weaker form, "Relations in danger."

Mr. Richardson. Well, the form "Relations in danger" would be a good deal weaker, wouldn't it, Captain?

Captain Safford. It would be very much weaker.

Mr. Richardson. It would be right along the line of the various messages that had been going back and forth for several days, wouldn't it?

Captain Safford. That is correct, as far as the wording is concerned.

Mr. Richardson. You knew that the Japanese-United States relations were in danger?

Captain Safford. We had known that for 3 months.

Mr. Richardson. Now, after you saw the message, the yellow message that had the written words on it from Lieutenant Commander Kramer, you sent that to Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford. I sent it up to Admiral Noyes exactly as it was.

Mr. Richardson. And who took it up to Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford. One of the officers serving under me, and I cannot be certain who it was. It was probably Lieutenant Howes.

Mr. Richardson. Lieutenant who?

Captain Safford. Howes.

[9737] Mr. Richardson. Spell it.

Captain Safford. H-o-w-e-s. The natural presumption would be that Kramer or Morey had taken it up there but both of them said they did not, and I should think their memory on that is better than mine.

Mr. Richardson. Then your idea as to who took it up is just a guess on your part at this time?

Captain Safford. I stated in my written statement it was taken up by one of the officers serving under me; I did not take it up myself, and I received a report from him "Message delivered."

Mr. Richardson. But you have no recollection what officer it was?

Captain Safford. I cannot be certain which of about five officers, who might have taken it up, actually took it up.

Mr. Richardson. Now, give us the names of the five officers, one of whom must have taken it up.

Captain Safford. From memory it was Howes—I can give you the initials later—Peterson, Densford, Clark, or White—P. R. White, Paul R. White.

Their names and present stations are:

Commander Robert L. Densford, U. S. N., staff, commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, headquarters Pearl Harbor, Hawaiian Islands.

[9738] Commander William C. Howes, USNR, 142 Southwest Seventeenth Court, Miami, Fla. I believe that he has been demobilized.

Lieutenant Commander Frederick A. Peterson, Jr., USNR, Southborough, Mass. He has also been demobilized.

Commander C. F. Clark, USNR, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

And finally Lieutenant Commander Paul R. White, USNR, who is on duty in Naval Communications in Washington.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it this was a list of the possible persons who might have been the one who took the paper to Admiral Noyes.
Captain Safford. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. Well, he said, as I understood him, one of those named would have.

Captain Safford. One of those named.
The Vice Chairman. Would have had to have taken it to Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. All right.

Mr. Richardson. One thing further I neglected to call to your attention in circular 2353 and that is the notation toward the end, “When this is heard, please destroy all code papers.”

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. You are familiar with that?

[9739] Captain Safford. Very definitely; I was familiar with that.

Mr. Richardson. Now, as a matter of fact, Captain, before this message was received there had been a series of messages sent out by Japanese by other methods of communication all over the world directing the destruction of codes?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. So there wasn’t any reason to use this message on December 4 for that purpose either, was there?

Captain Safford. Not for just the destruction of codes.

Mr. Richardson. I see.

Mr. Gearhart. But there was a purpose indicated by you in your original statement, was there not?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. The British had destroyed their codes. There were no Japanese codes in London. This is the only way they had of informing the Japanese at London that something was imminent?

Captain Safford. That is correct, and the same situation existed at Singapore and Hong Kong.

Mr. Richardson. I would like at this point, in view of the interrogation of the Congressman, to advise the committee that under date of January 31, 1946, we have a memorandum from the War Department reading as follows:

Pursuant to your request the War Department has made inquiry of the British concerning the number of coded messages sent by the Japanese representatives in London subsequent to December 2, 1941.
The War Department has been informed that two coded messages were sent by the Japanese representatives in London on the 3rd of December 1941 and one coded message on the 5th of December 1941 and one coded message sent on the 6th of December 1941 and all four messages were sent on the code system known as PA-K2—

indicating that coded messages were proceeding to England both before and after December 4.

[9741] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may we request that we have produced the memorandum which the witness acquired 2 weeks ago? If there was information made available to him 2 weeks, I think it should be produced at this time.

Mr. Gearhart. May I inquire of counsel? I am interested in it very, very much. If that is true, as reported by the British, it merely means the British Ambassador had violated the instructions and had not destroyed his codes; isn’t that right?

Mr. Richardson. I am not going into the implication.
Captain Safford. May I explain that?
There were two systems that were exempt from destruction. One
was PA-K2, and the other was LA, neither of which were considered
by ourselves as secret, and we presumed the Japanese did not consider
them secret.

Mr. Richardson. The only point, Captain, involved in it would be
there was still a method open to the Japanese to communicate with
the British outside of the winds code.

Captain Safford. Yes, but not to communicate secretly. I used that
word "secretly" in my statement.

Mr. Gearhart. That is the point.

Senator Lucas. Does the counsel now know what messages went
from Japan?

Mr. Richardson. I read everything that the War Department
[g742] gave us.

What is the system known as PA-K2?

Captain Safford. That is a minor system which had been in effect
for a very long time, and was used for matters of negligible importance,
but they presumably wanted to keep up with the newspapers, minor
money matters, visas, things like that.

I believe there were only three or four PA-K2 messages that had
ever been submitted in evidence before this investigation and that
were sent by Pearl Harbor after Pearl Harbor had destroyed its
J-19 system, and I do not—I won't go into that.

Mr. Richardson. Are you sure, Captain, that you are correct when
you say that important messages were not sent in this code PA-K2?

Captain Safford. Until after Pearl Harbor had destroyed its J-19
system, which really had some security.

Mr. Richardson. Let me read you from Exhibit 2, page 29, which
is a message that went from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6, 1941.
It is No. 254.

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were
--- and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor
on the 6th:
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, [g743] 17 destroy-
ers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the
heavy cruisers and air plane carriers have all left).
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet
air arm.

That would be a rather important message, would it not, Captain?

Captain Safford. That is correct, and that message was sent after
the Japanese Consulate had destroyed its J-19 system.

Mr. Richardson. Well, there was in existence, between Honolulu
and Tokyo, after the winds code had been promulgated and after the
codes had been directed to be destroyed, a method of communicating
under PA-K2 that took care of important messages, was there not?

Captain Safford. There was not.

Mr. Richardson. There was not?

Captain Safford. PA-K2 was specifically exempt from destruc-
tion by the orders telling them to destroy the other things.

Mr. Richardson. All right. It was in existence, wasn't it?

Captain Safford. There was a code of a very low security sub-
stantially no better than plain language, which [g744] they
had, and could use.
Mr. Richardson. Just forget the low security for a moment. The code was in existence, wasn’t it?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And it was in use, was it not?

Captain Safford. It was in use by one man.

Mr. Richardson. Well, it was in use, was it not?

Captain Safford. It was in use at one station.

Mr. Richardson. Well, we only live once. It was in use by one station, then?

Captain Safford. Correct.

Mr. Richardson. And that man at that one station could send in that code to Tokyo?

Captain Safford. Correct.

Mr. Richardson. And he could send important messages to Tokyo?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Was there any reason that London could not send under that code to Tokyo?

Captain Safford. But Tokyo was not sending anything important to London in that code, or to Honolulu.

Mr. Richardson. Let us not go into that. Let us inquire whether it was possible for London to use that code for communicating with Tokyo.

[9745] Captain Safford. It was physically possible.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Now, do you see anything particularly exciting in a code that only broadcasts the weather message? Is not that a very low degree of secret information?

Captain Safford. That was set up in what the Japanese considered one of the high security systems, their second level of security.

Mr. Richardson. Then it is your idea, is it, that the Japanese, in promulgating a weather report, a daily weather report in the ordinary news broadcast, was putting it into their most difficult code in order to convince them that it was an ordinary weather broadcast? Is that your testimony?

Captain Safford. Not at all.

Mr. Richardson. Well, wherein do not we agree?

Captain Safford. I do not follow you, that is all, sir.

Mr. Richardson. What I am interested in is this. It was my idea of the winds code, Captain, that it was to be used to deceive other nations, because the broadcasting of weather information in a news broadcast was relatively unimportant, and by injecting certain key words in that message you could use the humble method of a news broadcast [9746] to convey very important information.

Now, was that right?

Captain Safford. That is not correct.

Mr. Richardson. Well, all right. Give me your explanation.

Captain Safford. The Japanese Government had been sending these news broadcasts to its stations overseas, diplomatic posts, for several months. They were always copied; they knew they could be heard, and therefore if they wanted to send a message not through any commercial channels and be certain it would not be held up by censorship or delayed purposely, as sometimes happens, to be absolutely certain of it, they could include a war warning message or any-
thing else of that nature in one of their own news broadcasts, which they controlled. They could not afford to send it out in plain language, that "we are going to have war," they had to give it a somewhat disguised form which could be understood when received.

Mr. Richardson. Why would they put it in a weather message? Captain Safford. Because that is merely the form that they happened to choose for it. If we had merely the word "higashi" and the rest of it, and had not had the translation of these messages, we would not have had the slightest idea [9747] what they were talking about.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, the witness has said this could be translated easily, as I understand it, the one sent from Honolulu to Tokyo. I think it is important, since it says:

it appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet air arm.

I do not see why it could not have been translated before December 8. It is of the utmost importance.

Mr. Richardson. I did not get your point.

Mr. Murphy. It was sent out on the 6th, and not translated until the 8th, and it says

it appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet air arm.

That was an important message from Honolulu to Tokyo, so why was it not translated before the 8th?

[9748] Mr. Richardson. Well, my associate suggests to me that that is an Army translation.

Mr. Murphy. He said it is easy. It is one of the most important messages.

Mr. Richardson. Well, you can take it up with him.

Now, Captain, will you turn—

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we let counsel proceed in order so as not to interrupt his train of thought.

The Vice-Chairman. Yes; I think it is better if counsel proceeds. Go ahead, Counsel.

Mr. Richardson. Captain, let me call your attention to document No. 4—3 (d) of Exhibit 142.

Captain Safford. That is what?

Mr. Richardson. It is 3 (d).

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Entitled "Document No. 4."

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, referring back to 2353, what did "West Wind Clear" mean when translated under the Japanese phrase, according to 2353?

Captain Safford. According to the full and correct translation of 2353, it meant Japan-British relations in—[9749] including invasion of Thailand and occupation of Malay and the Netherlands East Indies.

Mr. Richardson. Now, turning to document 4, that you have there, have you not, a full admitted execute of the winds message 2353, don't you?

Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. And the words "West Winds Clear" are repeated twice?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. At the end of the document?

Captain Safford. It would appear they were repeated twice in the middle of the document rather than the end.

Mr. Richardson. Did that message "Document No. 4"—did that look anything like the message that you saw on the morning of December 7?

Captain Safford. No, sir; because this was a transcript of a voice broadcast, and what I saw was the Morse broadcast.

Mr. Richardson. Then the only actual execute that we all agree was sent, didn't look anything like the message that Kramer handed to you on the morning of December 4, did it?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, you have been very much concerned about this wind execute, haven't you, Captain, for a number of years?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. You made a great many inquiries?

Captain Safford. I have.

Mr. Richardson. Do you know a single intercepting station on the face of the earth that has ever reported it received a wind-code execute, except the one, document No. 4, that came from Japan on December 8?

Captain Safford. I know of my own personal knowledge that it was received from one of the east-coast intercept stations, and shown to me shortly after 8 or shortly before 9 o'clock on Thursday, December 4, 1941.

At the time I, within a few months, I could have named the station. Later on that detail slipped my memory. I discussed the matter afterward with Welker and we remarked how fortunate it had been that we had made a careful study of the proposition and it seemed that our best chances for interception were on the east coast of the United States rather than the west coast. If we, like the Army, had failed to monitor for it on the east coast of the United States, we never would have received it at all.

Mr. Richardson. You have covered that. You said that in some detail. But conceding the correctness of your analysis, that is the only single station on earth that you claim picked up this execute winds broadcast?

Captain Safford. I do not know what provisions the English may have made to monitor for this message in London and whether there were in England any operators capable of copying the Japanese Morse code. They had such operators at Singapore and Singapore was listening for the winds code, but I have been assured by a British officer who was in Singapore at the time Pearl Harbor was attacked, and who later came to Washington, that the British listened in vain for the winds message at Singapore, and when the attack at Pearl Harbor did come, they were just as much surprised as we were.

Mr. Richardson. All right, Captain.

Again I say—we have that in your statement. I repeat my question: Do you know of any station on the face of the earth that has ever reported to anybody, you or anybody else, that they received a wind
execute message prior to the one on December 8 except what you now testify with reference to Cheltenham, the Cheltenham station?

Please answer that question directly, Captain.

Captain Safford. None, except Cheltenham station.

Mr. Richardson. You are familiar with the documents contained in exhibit 142, are you?

Captain Safford. I am.

[9752] Mr. Richardson. You know that they indicate, in the reports given by the British, that they have intercepted, they found no record of the intercept of a winds execute?

Captain Safford. That is possibly true.

Mr. Richardson. And you found out that the Dutch hadn't, when you talked to the representative of the Dutch Government?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, let's go into this Cheltenham matter for just a minute. When you testified in the Hart hearing you testified that you didn't know what station in the east got the message, didn't you?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, when you testified before the naval board you testified you didn’t know what station got the message?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And you told the reason why you couldn't find it, didn't you, before the naval board?

Captain Safford. I also told Admiral Hart, but he didn’t include it in the record because he thought it was irrelevant.

Mr. Richardson. Well, you said before the naval board that the reason you couldn’t get the message was because all the records had been destroyed?

[9753] Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Then at the Hewitt hearing, less than a year ago, you testified that you didn’t know what station got it, but you gave first guess to Cheltenham or Winter Harbor because they had better facilities?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, have you got any record from the Cheltenham station that shows that this wind execute message that came into Washington and came to you from Kramer on the morning of December 4 was ever received at the Cheltenham station?

Captain Safford. There is no existing record because all the intercepted messages for that period have been destroyed and cannot be located in spite of repeated search for more than 2 years now.

Mr. Richardson. Then you don’t know any more about what station intercepted the message today than you did when you started to make up your memory test in the fall of 1942, do you?

Captain Safford. I know a great deal more now.

Mr. Richardson. What more information have you had?

Captain Safford. About 2 weeks ago I was given access, or one of the officers under me was given access and permitted to read the reports from the stations at Winter Harbor. [9754] Maine, and at Cheltenham, Md., for the months of November and December 1941. Where they had been before I don’t know. I had requested them 2 years ago and was informed they could not be located. The inter-
cepted messages are still missing. We have nothing but the reports. We did not tell the operators what to listen for. They did not know anything about the winds message. We merely told them to copy everything on the schedules and forward them to us.

The operator who did get the winds message never knew and was never told because we were afraid there would be a leak.

Mr. Richardson. Well, Captain, what you are telling me is this, if I understand, you are proving conclusively that you have no evidence that the message was ever received at Cheltenham; isn’t that the result of it?

Captain Safford. There is—

Mr. Richardson. I am not objecting to it. I simply want to know if you have any evidence that Cheltenham got this message.

Captain Safford. There is no evidence in existence now that Cheltenham actually got that message.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Then your information as to what station got the message is just as indefinite today as it was in the fall of 1942 when you started to make up your mind?

Captain Safford. Not at all.

Mr. Richardson. What evidence have you discovered?

Captain Safford. We know from the record that—

Mr. Richardson. What record, what record that you have seen and examined?

Captain Safford. That Cheltenham received the order to monitor for these messages.

Mr. Richardson. Agreed.

Captain Safford. That it did.

Mr. Richardson. Agreed.

Captain Safford. It could hear them all.

Mr. Richardson. Agreed.

Captain Safford. That some were in English, which we weren’t interested in.

Mr. Richardson. Agreed.

Captain Safford. Others in Japanese Morse code. They were all sent into the Navy Department.

Mr. Richardson. Then your point is that since you think Cheltenham could get them all and since you are convinced that this came it must have got this one?

Captain Safford. We also had another thing from Winter Haven which said they had been unable to copy Tokyo or Osaka communicating with Europe except at rare intervals, which eliminates Winter Harbor. That refreshes my memory and I remembered at the time of Pearl Harbor receiving conditions at Winter Haven were very unsatisfactory. It was on Interior Department land, and we were up against the same thing the Army were with regard to the radars at Pearl Harbor, except this was less important. We could hear the strongest signals but the pine trees, which were higher than the antenna, shielded out the weaker signals, and we couldn’t get them.

As a result we gave the easier work to Winter Harbor and the harder work to Cheltenham. Immediately after Pearl Harbor the park system said those trees could be cut down and the receivability increased. So, by the middle of 1943 Winter Harbor was as good
or better than Cheltenham. Winter Harbor had the best of apparatus, but we had this other unfortunate situation. I did not remember in 1943 that it was not until after Pearl Harbor that we had improved the receivability.

Mr. Richardson. What you mean is that when you discovered that it couldn't have been received by Winter Harbor, then you crossed Winter Harbor off?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. And then that left Cheltenham?

Captain Safford. We—

[9757] Mr. Richardson. Wait a minute. Please answer that question.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Then you came to Cheltenham, didn't you, in your mind?

Captain Safford. At the same time.

Mr. Richardson. Now, then, you took the position, did you not, that Cheltenham could get all the stations because of its location?

Captain Safford. And for—

Mr. Richardson. Please answer my question, Captain.

Captain Safford. Not all but certain frequencies at certain times of day.

Mr. Richardson. And you felt that this message would come in under one of those frequencies?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And because of that you inferred that since Winter Harbor was out it must have come in through Cheltenham; is that correct?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, if it never came to Cheltenham you would be in exactly the same position you are today, wouldn't you?

In other words, Captain—I don't want to misstate you— [9758] you have got to presume that the message was sent out by Japan?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Before you can ever get to Cheltenham?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And if you assume that the message was sent out by Japan then you think Cheltenham must have got it because it was on that wave length and because they were properly situated?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, do you suppose that broadcast was intended to go to England?

Captain Safford. The Japanese themselves, in their own instructions, said that, the literal translation of that message said, smoothed up a little, "From JAP to Europe," at such and such a frequency, at the 1330 GC schedule.

Mr. Richardson. What I want to find out is whether the message which you say Cheltenham might have picked up if there was such a message—was that a message started by Japan to go to England?

Captain Safford. By Japan presumably intended for England, but it was broadcast with no address.

Mr. Richardson. Then it would be rather significant, wouldn't it, that England reports to us officially that they [9759] have been unable to find any such message?
Captain Safford. Not necessarily.

Mr. Richardson. Not necessarily, but it would be a strong probability, wouldn't it?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. It wouldn't?

Well, we come back, Captain—I want to labor the point so that you can't be misled—the only station that you think could have gotten it was Cheltenham, and you don't know whether it got it or not?

Captain Safford. Or Halifax. They would be in a receiving condition and the Canadians were guarding those Japanese stations the way we were.

Mr. Richardson. Captain, don't give me any more stations that couldn't get it, tell me some stations that could.

Captain Safford. Halifax could have got it if they were capable of copying the Japanese Morse code.

Mr. Richardson. You didn't hear anybody suggest that Halifax did get it?

Captain Safford. I never did; and never that they didn't.

Mr. Richardson. I press you again, the only station on which you pin your faith that they received this execute message was Cheltenham; isn't that correct?

Captain Safford. We had two—

[9760] Mr. Richardson. Please answer my question. Wasn't Cheltenham the only station at the conclusion of your evidentiary efforts at which you now assert to the committee this message was received?

Captain Safford. With any degree of confidence, yes.

Mr. Richardson. Was there any other intercepting station in which you didn't have so much confidence that you have any evidence they received it?

Captain Safford. To my recollection I think we told Amagansett, Long Island, to listen for it.

Mr. Richardson. Did they report—

Captain Safford. And Jupiter, Fla., to guard the schedules and send them in.

[9761] Mr. Richardson. Did they report they found it?

Captain Safford. They were submitting some intercepts of those schedules as they got them. How many they sent I do not know because we didn't attempt to save any of the matter we were not interested in.

Mr. Richardson. Are you suggesting that maybe this message on the morning of December 4 came from either of those station?

Captain Safford. I don't but I have a vague memory that we got a confirmation of it from some secondary station.

Mr. Richardson. Let me make this suggestion:

Isn't all you know about this winds message, how it came in, the same vague memory?

Captain Safford. It is not a vague memory.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

The Vice Chairman. It is now 1:30. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request of the Navy liaison as to the monthly reports from Cheltenham, Winter Harbor, and Bainbridge Island, as to who was the custodian, where
these reports were made to, and whether or not they have been available since 1941.

Mr. Richardson. We have been trying to get them for 2 weeks.

Vice Chairman. We will adjourn until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee adjourned until 2 p.m., of the same day.)

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed

Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything before resuming examination?

Mr. Richardson. No.

Vice Chairman. Do you have anything, Captain?

Captain Safford. No.

Vice Chairman. Counsel is recognized.

Mr. Richardson. Captain, after you handed this message which Kramer gave to you to an officer whose name you can't be sure of, and which is understandable, to take to Admiral Noyes, you never saw that message again, did you?

Captain Safford. I never saw that particular message in that particular form.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Now, did you—well, wait a minute. What do you mean, you never saw that message in that particular form? Did you see that message in some other form?

Captain Safford. I saw that message in the smooth write-up as a translation with the Japanese eliminated and merely the translation of the code part.

Mr. Richardson. Now, then, the message that you gave to Kramer—that you gave to this officer to take up to Admiral Noyes, was an approximately 200-word message?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. All in Japanese?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Do you know whether Admiral Noyes could read Japanese?

Captain Safford. Admiral Noyes could not read Japanese.

Mr. Richardson. Then all he had to go on was what you had to go on, the presence in the dispatch of these words that were set forth in 2353?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And the writing of Kramer on the bottom?

Captain Safford. That is correct, plus—

Mr. Richardson. And—

Captain Safford. May I finish my answer?

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Captain Safford. Admiral Noyes also had a card on his person on which was written the Japanese expressions and their meaning, their translation.

Mr. Richardson. And that translation that he had on the card was the translation taken from the original winds code message 2353?
Captain Safford. I presume so. I believe that Kramer prepared the card. I didn't—

Mr. Richardson. Now, I would like to have you, Captain, if you will oblige me, in answering these questions I am going to ask you, to confine yourself to what you know and not what anybody told you or what you have reason to infer.

We will go back to those others later.

Now, did Kramer hand you more than one paper copy of the message?

Captain Safford. Not at that time.

Mr. Richardson. And that one copy that he handed to you then was the precise copy which you gave to your officer to take up to Noyes?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And you never saw that precise paper again?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. What did you make your copies from then?

Captain Safford. Everything that came in by the teletype was in duplicate. There was a whole paper in duplicate with a carbon behind it. The original remained in the role.

Mr. Richardson. But the duplicate wouldn't have Kramer's writing on it, would it?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. When you made up your smooth copies, did you put on the bottom that Kramer translation?

Captain Safford. Kramer made up those smooth copies, not me.

Mr. Richardson. Did you make up any copies of it?

Captain Safford. No, sir. I made up no copies.

Mr. Richardson. Do you know of your own knowledge when Kramer made up the copies? Did you see him make them up?

Captain Safford. I did not.

Mr. Richardson. Did he deliver them to you or expose them to you after he had made them up?

Captain Safford. I saw one copy about noon between 11 and 12 o'clock on the morning of the 4th of December 1941.

I took it for granted—

Mr. Richardson. Now, wait a minute. Don't let's take anything for granted. You saw a copy?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, that copy that you saw, was it in Japanese?

Captain Safford. That was in English.

Mr. Richardson. Then the copy that you saw was a translation of the whole message?

Captain Safford. It was a translation of only the part that contained the warning, the hidden warning.

Mr. Richardson. Did the rest of the 200 words, outside of these three set Japanese phrases, remain in Japanese?

Captain Safford. They were disregarded.

Mr. Richardson. They didn't appear in the message you saw?

Captain Safford. They did not appear in the message I saw at noon.

Mr. Richardson. Then all you saw in these copies that were circulated with the three code phrases HIGASHI NO KAZEAME—what is the rest of it?

Captain Safford. I will have to look.
Mr. Richardson. I will get it. HIGASHI NO KAZEAME, KITANOKAZE KUMORI, and NISHI NO KAZE HARE.

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. Were those three Japanese phrases all there was on the one message that you saw around noon on that day?

Captain Safford. It was the translation—

Mr. Richardson. Just answer my question, please. Was there anything on the message that you saw around noon except those three phrases in Japanese?

Captain Safford. Yes; there was.

[9768] Mr. Richardson. What else was there?

Captain Safford. There was the identification date of the intercepting station at the time and other things that were customarily put on messages.

Mr. Richardson. I realize that. What, with reference to the substance of the message?

Captain Safford. The translation as to what it meant.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, that translation was in type?

Captain Safford. That was typed.

Mr. Richardson. You don’t know of your own knowledge who typed it?

Captain Safford. No; I didn’t see it typed.

Mr. Richardson. What did that typed translation say?

Captain Safford. It said the same thing as was said in pencil at the bottom of the other message.

Mr. Richardson. And it said that the words HIGASHI NO KAZEAME meant war with the United States?

Captain Safford. I do not believe that the words HIGASHI NO KAZEAME appeared. I believe only the translation of what it meant in English. Its meaning. Not the literal translation. The meaning was there.

Mr. Richardson. Let me reform our recollection. You just told me in detail that on the copy you saw were the [9769] three Japanese phrases to which we refer. Now am I to understand you were in error and that all there was on the copy that you saw were the three English phrases which you said were an interpretation of these Japanese phrases?

Captain Safford. I am sorry, I did not understand your question.

Mr. Richardson. That is all right.

Captain Safford. The Japanese did not appear there. It merely would have had the expression in the upper left-hand corner in plain language, possibly the winds code, and then would have mention of these three code words; and it was the same wording that had been written in pencil on the bottom of the sheet that was sent up to Admiral Noyes.

Mr. Richardson. Then it is perfectly clear in your mind, is it, that there were no Japanese words on the message that you saw around noon?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And the English words that were there were simply the definition of these Japanese phrases; and that definition was given, was it, the same as that written by Kramer on the bottom of the original message you saw?
Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Then there was no part on this message in type with the phrase "War with the United States"?

[9770] Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. That copy that you had was one of a number of copies that had been made for circulation?

Captain Safford. It was a flimsy copy and presumably one of a book which had been typed at the same time.

Mr. Richardson. That is, you mean, at the same time that the copies were prepared for distribution?

Captain Safford. For distribution. We prepared 12 or 14 at one time.

Mr. Richardson. Now, when they were distributed, where would they go in the ordinary practice?

Captain Safford. Half would be sent over to the War Department and in the case of important messages they were sent immediately by special courier and the less important messages were sent over in a routine delivery trip which were two or three a day.

Mr. Richardson. Where would they go to in the War Department, what division?

Captain Safford. I believe they were sent over to the Japanese section of the Signal Intelligence Service and they took off the file copy.

Mr. Richardson. Don't say what they did. They went to that office.

Captain Safford. And they made subsequent delivery to [9771] Military Intelligence, who were responsible for the detailed distribution.

Mr. Richardson. You are getting into the realm of supposition. I only asked you where they would send the message. You said, it would go to the War Department. Now, I asked you what division of the War Department it would be; and that would be the Japanese section?

Captain Safford. Of the Signal Intelligence Service. Office of the Signal Intelligence Service.

Mr. Richardson. Who was in charge of that office at that time, if you know?

Captain Safford. Major Doud was in charge of that office. D-o-u-d.

Mr. Richardson. Now, the other copies would be sent to the Navy Department?

Captain Safford. Were sent to the Navy Department. One copy was retained in Commander Kramer's own files, never left there; one copy was given to the naval aide to the President; one copy was given to the naval aide to the Secretary of the Navy; one copy was given to the Director of Naval Intelligence; one copy given or shown to the Director of War Plans, Admiral Turner; and one copy was given to the aide to the Chief of Naval Operations who showed it to both Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Stark. That is the best [9772] distribution that I can give you at the present time from memory. There are written notes to that effect.

[9773] Mr. Richardson. Well, now, Captain, all of those officers, how many or few they were, would simply get a sheet of paper

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, on the ship-location charts which we have been furnished, I understand that the Navy has been asked to give the list of the names; but on the 5th and the 6th of December there was some ship right up in the vicinity from which that attack came. Now, I don't mean the exact vicinity, but to the north, and it went into Pearl Harbor that Sunday. It was not indicated what that ship was. Do we have those ship-location charts here?

Admiral Smith. I think it is very probable that was one of our destroyers.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, on the 5th and 6th Senator Ferguson and I remember observing that there was a ship to the north of Oahu, and then it is gradually going in and it is in port on Sunday.

I ask counsel if they will produce those ship charts? Will you please produce those ship-location charts? They are photostats. Do you have the one I mean? There it is.

Senator Ferguson. It is a large map.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I will read this to you:

Saturday, December 6-20 to 24. Sighted vessel bearing one point abaft port beam running without lights on course approximately 300 degrees, true, distance four [9519] miles. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R. P. M., 881.

Now, I will ask you if that was sighted—that ship was sighted—and that seems to be a ship on the seas—on the 6th day of December and they could not identify it, what would you have done under the silence of the radio order?

Admiral Smith. Told the ship who reported it to identify it or send a destroyer immediately to investigate.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, here is a ship that had a one-point bearing and was running without lights on a course approximately 300°, true, whatever that means.

Admiral Smith. Of course, the first thing to have been done in that case was to go to the operations officer's board and find whether we had a possible ship in that location, because a ship then, a merchant ship, was not running without lights at that time. If we could not identify her, then send something out to identify her. Of course, I don't know what ship reported this.

Mr. Gearhart. This was reported by the Wright.

Admiral Smith. Oh, that was reported by the Wright.

Mr. Gearhart. This was recorded in the log of the Wright as of the 6th day of December 1941 between the hours of 20 and 24.

Now, if that had been reported to you as chief of staff to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, would that have [9520] alerted the fleet?

Admiral Smith. I believe it would have; yes, sir. The probability, of course, was that that ship was a submarine on the surface.

[9521] Senator Lucas. Do I understand it was an unidentified ship rather than an unidentified plane?

Mr. Gearhart. This particular item I read reveals the presence of an unidentified surface ship. My interrogatories prior to getting this log in my hand were in reference to an unidentified aircraft.

Senator Lucas. Is the unidentified aircraft in the log also?
Mr. Gearhart. I saw it the other time I had the log in my hand. This is an additional item that I have run across.

Senator Lucas. What kind of a ship was the Wright, Admiral? It was an airplane tender, was it not?

Admiral Smith. The Wright was an airplane tender of the type like the transport Chateau Thierry. They were built during the last war. The bow and stern looked alike; they were good for 12 knots, and 14 if they were in good shape.

Their speed is limited. She carried mostly parts for seaplanes and I believe was on the way to Midway at that time.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. Gearhart. I yield.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I show you a Guide to Symbols, and then I show you a chart. What would be the technical name of that chart, Admiral, do you know, in the Navy? That would be a ship-location chart, would it not?

Admiral Smith. No; I would not say so.

Mr. Murphy. What would you call that? I understand it is to keep a daily record of the ships of the United States throughout the world.

Admiral Smith. Yes. That is a secret chart and would show the convoys. These are Great Circle routes, of course.

Mr. Murphy. Now, with particular reference to the Guide to Symbols, I direct your attention to a ship which is to the north of Pearl Harbor. At what degree would you say that was on the chart, this being 160 here [indicating]?

Admiral Smith. It would be about 155 west, I should say.

Mr. Murphy. And how many degrees north?

Admiral Smith. I should say about 3° south.

Senator Ferguson. How many?

Admiral Smith. No; no. That is north latitude. I think that is about 18° north. It looks like it to me. The chart should have in the margin somewhere the latitudes. That is probably about 18° north, I should say.

Mr. Murphy. Will you resume your seat, Admiral, and I will put this before you.

I direct your attention to Exhibit 109, a secret chart that is part of Exhibit 109, and I direct particularly your attention to a ship to the north of Oahu, and about 155° west longitude, the location being that of the ship in question on the 5th of December 1941, and I ask you if you will look to the Guide to Symbols and tell us what kind of a ship that is.

Admiral Smith. It would appear to be a patrol vessel.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I show you another exhibit, a chart in the same exhibit, the secret chart for December 6. With reference to the same patrol vessel, will you compare for us the relative position of the vessel in question on the 6th of December as compared to the 5th? Is there anything that would indicate to you on the chart on the 6th as to the relative position of the vessel which was to the north of Oahu, 155° longitude, on the 5th?

Admiral Smith. It seems to have disappeared from this chart. I see nothing of the same ship or symbol.
Captain Safford. For one thing there is instruction to destroy all code papers. If that is regarded as synonymous with the outbreak of war, as I have heard testified before in this room, that by itself means something more than the wording in these three paragraphs above.

Mr. Richardson. And you had had a number of dispatches with reference to burning of codes and this Government, your own Government, had sent out a number of dispatches with reference to burning of codes before the morning of the 4th, hadn't they?

Captain Safford. The warnings from—

Mr. Richardson. Now you can answer my question "Yes" or "No."

Captain Safford. That question cannot be answered by a plain "Yes" or "No."

Mr. Richardson. All right, go ahead. I think it can; but I will take your explanation.

Captain Safford. Tokyo had sent out instructions to various people telling them to burn their most important codes but to leave two codes open. One was the so-called PA-K2 code and the other was the LA code. Now, with those two exceptions all codes had been burnt, but this said, "Please destroy all code papers," and so forth. In other words, there were no exceptions in this one.

Mr. Richardson. And it is that phrase which led you to believe that when you got an execute message that said "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" you could safely interpret it as meaning "war with the United States?"

Captain Safford. There was much beyond what appears in this paper that led to our interpretation of it in that way.

Mr. Richardson. Well, the men who were getting a copy of that dispatch with this dispatch wouldn't have your imagination as to what it meant. How would he find out what it meant?

Captain Safford. The Navy Department had been very jittery about whether by any chance this winds execute might have been sent out before the 28th, when we began listening for it. I have been questioned on that repeatedly. They were also very much worried about the fear that with all the stations which were known to be listening for it, by some freak chance we might fail to catch it and the reason for that was everyone in authority from the President down believed that this would be the Japanese Government's decision as to peace or war announced to their own officials overseas and that was our chance of a tip-off, to gain the necessary time to prevent a surprise attack on our fleet.

Mr. Richardson. Captain, did it ever occur to you that you are taking in an elastic authority when you quote what the President understood and and every other important official down? Was there any official in the Government, from the President down, that had any basis, sir, for the interpretation of this message 2353 except what the message 2353 said?

Captain Safford. I do not know the basis on which they made their evaluation.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, will you take a look again at Exhibit 142 and turn over to the dispatch from the commander in chief of the Army forces in the Pacific under date of November 13, 1945? There seems to be no page number. It is under 4-A. Have you the one of November 13th?
Captain Safford. I have BSG 196. Is that the one?
Mr. Richardson. That is right. Now, from your experience in this message and intelligence work wouldn't you construe that message from MacArthur as indicating that the Japanese never sent out an implementing message?
Captain Safford. I would not.
Mr. Richardson. Why not?
Captain Safford. It says here:

Interrogation of authorities so far has resulted in absolute denial of transmission of such an implementing message and existence of any prearranged instructions which would permit transmission of such an implementing signal.

In other words, the Japanese authorities denied ever having sent Tokyo circular 2353 and 2354.

Mr. Richardson. All right. You find from that, do you, evidence that they did send out the execute?
Captain Safford. I find evidence from that that they had denied everything.

Mr. Richardson. All right.
Captain Safford. And also that they burned all pertinent records prior to August 14, 1945.

Mr. Richardson. All right; we will take the Japanese at any sort of an estimate you want, but insofar as that message refers to an execute winds message they deny having sent it, don't they?

Captain Safford. The Japanese deny having sent it.
Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, turning over to the dispatch from MacArthur of November 21, how do you interpret the language used:

That signal implementing circular 2353 and 2354, was probably not transmitted prior to 8 December, Tokyo time, but was transmitted by radio voice broadcast at some hour after 0230, 8 December, Tokyo time. Exact hour unknown.

How would you interpret that language?

Captain Safford. That they had not found anybody who knew it or admitted it but MacArthur was not certain and, therefore, he said "probably" "probably not then transmitted."

Mr. Richardson. Well, we have got on the antiexecute side the word "probably," haven't we?

Captain Safford. Correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, lower in the message there is another reference there to information from another employee that he did hear an execute message under date of December 8.

Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. Now, turn over to the dispatch of the 24th, the next following, the language reading:

Only use of Winds code (either voice or radio telegraph) shown here by available contemporaneous records is voice broadcast from Tokyo between 0002 and 0033 on 8 December.

That also indicates that the response from the Japanese records further was negative on this execute, doesn't it?

Captain Safford. I do not agree with that, sir.

Mr. Richardson. All right. What does it indicate?

Captain Safford. That was from the War Department to General MacArthur.

Mr. Richardson. That does not spoil it, does it?
Captain Safford. And they were referring to the FCC monitoring records and the FCC were only monitoring voice, and the winds message intercepted by the Navy came in Morse code.

Mr. Richardson. Well, it shows that there was a message, however, that was sent on December 8.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, go on over to the one of the 27th from MacArthur where he says that:

Persons who conducted interrogation had no knowledge that prior to interrogation United States had information establishing use of Winds code on 8 December Tokyo time.

Making it certain that the people who were doing the interrogating did not know what they did it for would be important, wouldn't it?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Well, turn over now to the document entitled, "U. S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan," one or two pages following the one I just read from. Do you have that before you?

Captain Safford. I have that before me.

Mr. Richardson. Now, look at the last paragraph on that page, where the person making the document says:

He stated that he would have known of it if a message such as that described as being broadcast December had been transmitted and that he had no recollection at all of any "east wind rain" report or any similar phrase being broadcast prior to December 8.

That would also indicate that they did not know out there if this man was telling the truth that there had been any winds execute message until December 8, doesn't it?

Captain Safford. I would not consider that conclusive.

Mr. Richardson. It is quite pertinently suggestive, though, isn't it, Captain?

Captain Safford. From one point of view: yes.

Mr. Richardson. Now, following 8 o'clock on the morning of December 4, when did you see McCollum?

Captain Safford. I cannot state any specific time that I saw McCollum in 1941.

Mr. Richardson. Did you go to him with a message that you had prepared suggestive of one that should be sent to the field?

Captain Safford. I did not.

Mr. Richardson. You had nothing to do then with a so-called McCollum message?

Captain Safford. That is correct; except for seeing it.

[9785] Mr. Richardson. Now Brotherhood was one of your watch officers?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. If there was an execute message that came in on the morning of December 4, Brotherhood would naturally know about it, would not he?

Captain Safford. Not in the morning.

Mr. Richardson. Beg pardon?

Captain Safford. Not in the morning of December 4.

Mr. Richardson. Would he naturally know about it during the day?
Captain Safford. If it came in on his watch he would have known about it.

Mr. Richardson. Well, what was his watch?

Captain Safford. He was on watch from 4 p. m. to midnight on the 3d and from 4 p. m. to midnight on the 4th of December 1941. That is established from an official record.

Mr. Richardson. Now all of those watch officers were on edge to pick up this winds execute, weren't they?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And that message coming in, as it did, at 8 o'clock, Captain, on the morning of December 4, was the most important piece of business transacted in that office that morning, wasn't it?

Captain Safford. I will go further and say it was the most important piece of business transacted up to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Then don't you think it quite reasonable that as soon as Brotherhood came into the office at 4 o'clock for his watch, that someone there would tell him that the great day had come, that the execute was there and they all knew about it?

Captain Safford. It has been my impression all along that Brotherhood did know it.

Mr. Richardson. All right. You know now, don't you, that he, under oath, testified that he never heard anything about the winds execute message in the office there on December 4?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And you know also that on the evening of December 4 he, as one of your watch officers, was telephoning to the Federal Communications Commission to find out if they had located any piece of an execute message?

Captain Safford. No, it was just the reverse.

Mr. Richardson. All right. They phoned him?

Captain Safford. And said they had one.

Mr. Richardson. They knew that he was looking for one?

[9787] Captain Safford. They had been requested if anything came in to call up certain telephone numbers, including the GY watch officer.

Mr. Richardson. Captain, he certainly told them just as soon as they phoned him that the stuff was all off and you had the message?

Captain Safford. We were telling the FCC nothing.

Mr. Richardson. That was not because nothing had happened, was it, Captain?

Captain Safford. We did not tell the station at Cheltenham that we had intercepted anything we wanted.

Mr. Richardson. I have before me, Captain, under Exhibit 142-A, a copy of the log, if you may call it that, of the FCC on the 4th day of December. Under item 6—

Captain Safford. I haven't gotten to it yet.

Mr. Richardson. Have you got a copy that you can lay in front of the captain?

Captain Safford. I have got it. What was that date?

Mr. Richardson. I will get it for you.

Captain Safford. December 6?
Mr. Richardson. December 4. Item 6, reading as follows:

9:05 p.m. Lieutenant Brotherhood 20-G Watch Officer, Navy Department, telephoned to state that he was authorized [9788] to accept message in question. Gave Lieutenant Brotherhood the message from Mr. Carter.

Going back to No. 2 is a notation:

8:12 p.m. received a message from Mr. Carter at Portland, Oregon.

Now you know, don’t you, Captain, that the message that was received from Carter was one of these false winds messages?

Captain Safford. Yes, a true weather report.

Mr. Richardson. So Brotherhood was telephoning the Communications Commission about that message, wasn’t he?

Captain Safford. No, they told him.

Mr. Richardson. Now just let us look——

Captain Safford (interposing). Let me read 5 first, please.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Captain Safford (reading):

5:45 p.m. called ONI Watch Officer at Navy Department to ascertain if he was permitted to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton’s office. The officer in charge stated that he was not certain, but that he would inquire and call back.

Mr. Richardson. Read the next one.

Captain Safford. That was standard practice, to check up to be certain we did not get pulled in by some unauthorized [9789] person.

Mr. Richardson. All right, read the next one.

Captain Safford (reading):

9:05 p.m. Lieutenant Brotherhood 20-G Watch Officer, Navy Department, telephoned to state——

Mr. Richardson. Telephoned whom?

Captain Safford. He telephoned the FCC.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Captain Safford (reading):

—to state that he was authorized to accept message in question. Gave Lieutenant Brotherhood the message from Mr. Carter.

Mr. Richardson. Now read No. 7.

Captain Safford (reading):

9:32 p.m. Lieutenant Brotherhood called to inquire if any other reference to weather was made previously in program intercepted by Portland. Informed him no other reference was made.

Mr. Richardson. That would rather throw some light on your suggestion that Brotherhood did not telephone the FCC, wouldn’t it, Captain?

Captain Safford. Brotherhood called back for a verification and check-up to see if he had the whole story; that is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now if a copy of this alleged winds execute message that you said came in went to the War Department, you would expect that Colonel Bratton would see it, [9790] wouldn’t you?

Captain Safford. I would expect they would all see it.

Mr. Richardson. You would expect Colonel Bratton, from his position as Chief of Staff, to see it, wouldn’t you?

Captain Safford. I would.
Mr. Richardson. Then would it be a matter of surprise to you that Colonel Bratton was telephoning the FCC at 7:50 p. m. on the 5th day of December trying to find out if there had been any receipt of any winds execute message?

Captain Safford. I would not expect such a thing as that.

Mr. Richardson. And the only inference that you, with your experience, could draw from such a telephone, Captain, would be that Bratton did not know there had been any winds execute message received 56 hours before, or 36 hours before? That would be your inference, wouldn’t it?

Let me turn it around. I don’t want to confuse you. There would be no reason for Bratton telephoning to find out something that he already knew, would there?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, let us pursue this question of when this elusive document appeared a little further.

Did you testify, Captain, in the Hart hearing, at page 361, that the winds message was received while Lieutenant Brotherhood was on watch on December 3?

Captain Safford. I did, and that statement was incorrect.

Mr. Richardson. You did not correct it because you found out later that Lieutenant Brotherhood denied that he ever saw any such message, did you, Captain?

Captain Safford. I did that because that was the best information that was available to me at that time as to the exact time and date at which the winds message had been broadcast, which turned out to be incorrect.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, you were advised, after you testified in the Hart hearing, that Brotherhood did deny that any winds execute message ever came in to him, were you not?

Captain Safford. Not as such. I was informed afterward, that what Brotherhood had seen was this so-called false winds message which had been telephoned over by the FCC.

Mr. Richardson. Precisely, the only message that Brotherhood had any knowledge of, was one of these false winds code messages, wasn’t it?

Captain Safford. Apparently.

Mr. Richardson. Did it ever occur to you that that was the only message that ever came in there on the 4th, and that you were mistaken?

Captain Safford. This is only about the 20th time such suggestion has been made to me, but I saw the winds message myself.

Mr. Richardson. I understand that, but you first saw it on December 3, and then you saw it on December 4.

Captain Safford. Oh, no.

Mr. Richardson. Wait a minute. I believe you testified that it came in on Brotherhood’s watch, and then you testified it did not come in on Brotherhood’s watch, and then you said you did not know what station it had come in on, and then you testified it came in from the Cheltenham station, so consequently most of the things relating to the message, except the fact that it came in, are rather sadly messed, aren’t they, Captain?
Captain Safford. I do not consider it so at all. I thought my testimony was fairly consistent.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Now, let us go a little further with it. You testified, [9793] did you not, that when you went back to try and find out what the facts were, you found that these copies that should have been around in the various departments were all missing.

You did so find, did you not?

Captain Safford. We only expected one—we could only count on one department in all these departments for it to be in existence.

Mr. Richardson. And they were all missing, weren't they?

Captain Safford. They were missing.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Then you had a conversation, you testified, with Brotherhood in which you said that Brotherhood said, "I know what became of the copies, but I won't tell you," and then were not you pressed later in the Hewitt investigation, and did not you testify that Friedman, who had been a cryptologist, whom you knew, had told you that a Colonel Bissell had said to him, Friedman, that he had destroyed all of these copies under the direct order of Gen. George C. Marshall? Did not you so testify?

Captain Safford. I would like that question repeated.

Mr. Richardson. Read it to him, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Captain Safford. May I be informed of the page that [9794] is on in the Hewitt report?

Mr. Richardson. Well, let's see. It appears several times. You won't have any trouble finding it.

Mr. Murphy. Page 114 of the Hewitt report.

Mr. Richardson. Look at page 114 of the Hewitt report, Captain.

Captain Safford. May I read from this report about half that page?

Mr. Richardson. Beg pardon?

Captain Safford. May I read from that report into this record?

Mr. Richardson. Yes, sir.

Captain Safford (reading):

Admiral Hewitt. Then you have no information that the Army ever got copies of the winds message relating to the United States to which you testified?

Captain Safford. I have no information which will be acceptable as evidence before this court. I heard the story, and I believe it true, but it is very third-hand.

Admiral Hewitt. The information that you have, even though second or third-hand, may be of assistance in furnishing a lead. Will you tell us your information?

It does not show in the record, but I believe I was asked that about three times before I made my answer.

[9795] Captain Safford. The information that I got was that written copies of the winds message had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall.

Admiral Hewitt. You do not recall the direct source of that information?

Captain Safford. I would prefer not to give the direct source, but I think it may be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Saddler before the Army Investigation.

The question first asked me, the original question, with the statement that I had made charges against General Marshall, may I state
that I was testifying in secret before a Navy court, and the evidence was all marked "top secret," was not to be made public.

I was asked to give a lead to assist Admiral Hewitt. I was pressed for an answer, and I reluctantly gave it. I was not testifying in a public hearing.

Mr. Richardson. Well now, Captain, let us orient this just a little. You did have a talk with Brotherhood about what had become of these copies, did you not?

Captain Safford. No; I wrote to him. He was out in—

Mr. Richardson (interposing). Wait a minute. Before you wrote to him, you had a talk with him; did you not?

Captain Safford. Not about the copies.

[9796] Mr. Richardson. What did you write to him about the copies?

Captain Safford. Brotherhood had told me it had come in on his watch. He verified that. Then I wrote him. "Do you know what became of the copies?"

Mr. Richardson. Wait a minute, Captain. Did you ever testify in any hearing anywhere that Brotherhood told you that the winds execute message had come in on his watch? If so, give me the page where you so testified.

Captain Safford. I believe that is in the Hart report on page 361, which you have just quoted from.

Mr. Richardson. I was quoting from the Hewitt report.

Captain Safford (reading):

The winds message was received in the Navy Department during the night of December—

Mr. Richardson. Wait a minute until I find it. Page 361?

Captain Safford. Near the middle.

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead.

Captain Safford (reading):

The winds message was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch.

Mr. Richardson. Read the rest of it.

Captain Safford (reading):

There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message meant, because it came—[9797]—in a different form from what was anticipated.

Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer who came down that evening and identified that message as the winds message we had been looking for.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, Captain, it would be pretty hard for him to come down that evening when the message came in the next morning, would it not?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. You refer to that as an error that you made in fixing the time about when the message came?

Captain Safford. The time of the officer on watch when the message came in.

Mr. Richardson. Do you take that testimony there as the basis for your claim that Brotherhood told you a real, genuine execute message came in on his watch?
Captain Safford. I never used such explicit terms with him. I merely said the winds message he told me had come in on his watch.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Now, after that you had some talk with him about what became of these copies, didn't you?

Captain Safford. I wrote him.

Mr. Richardson. And he told you, as I recall the testimony—I can find it, but I haven't been able to [9798] just this minute—he told you that he knew but would not tell you?

Captain Safford. That he would not tell me now.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Mr. Murphy. Page 113 of the Hewitt report is what you are looking for.

Mr. Richardson. Let me see it.

Mr. Murphy. That is right in the middle of the page.

Mr. Richardson. Oh, yes.

Now, let us take the exact language here on page 113 of the Hewitt report. You are right, Captain, when you say this:

I wrote him a letter about the thing because that was looked for throughout a period of six months repeatedly. Various people looked for it in the Army and finally couldn't find it, and I asked him if he knew anything about it. He said yes, but he did not care to tell me about it then; but when he came back to the States, I asked him about it and found out he hadn't understood. We were working at cross-purposes. I found out that he was referring to the false "winds" message, which we had thrown in the wastebasket.

[9799] Mr. Richardson. So it was the false winds message that Brotherhood was talking about when he mentioned the winds execute message that came in on his watch?

Captain Safford. Yes; but we only called it the winds message.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Now this story that you told in secret—and, Captain, I am not criticizing you for telling it in secret, because all of those hearings were secret and had to be—but the story you told here that Friedman had told you that the messages had been destroyed by Colonel Bissell under the direction of General Marshall——

Captain Safford (interposing). That is the way I got the story and remembered it. I did not write it down.

Mr. Richardson. And you said you thought it was true?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, you know, later, do you not, Captain, that Mr. Friedman denied having made any such statement to either you or anybody else—you know that, don't you?

Captain Safford. I did not know that he denied it.

Mr. Richardson. And you know that Colonel Bissell also, in sworn testimony, before Admiral Hewitt, or before Colonel Clarke in the Clarke investigation, denied having [9800] destroyed any records?

Captain Safford. I did not know that until this moment.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

The Chairman. You mean Clarke or Hart?

Mr. Richardson. I mean Clarke.

Senator Ferguson. General Clark?

Mr. Richardson. Colonel Clarke.

You don't now believe it, do you, Captain?
Senator Lucas. What was the last question?

Mr. Richardson. You don't now believe that Bissell destroyed any copies under the direction of General Marshall, do you?

Captain Safford. That is another question which I prefer not to answer.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Now, let me call your attention to page 114 of the Hewitt investigation, and let me ask you whether this question was asked you, Captain:

Admiral Hewitt. Then you have no information that the Army ever got copies of the winds message relating to the United States to which you testified?

Captain Safford. I have no information which would be acceptable as evidence before this court. I heard the [9801] story and believe it true, but it is very third-hand.

Then followed the testimony:

The information that I got was that written copies of the winds message had been destroyed in the War Department by Colonel Bissell under the direct order of General Marshall.

That is what we have been talking about?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, there is another thing that I would like to have you explain, Captain.

On page 361 of the Hart testimony, you testified that the execute message came in full form of words in accord with the original winds message just as you testified. That is your recollection?

Captain Safford. That is from my own recollection and nobody else.

Mr. Richardson. Now, then, before the naval board, at page 746, you testified—did you not?—that the message came in in the Jap language and had a full translation on it into English when you first saw it. Now, by that you mean simply that those Japanese phrases had been translated into English?

Captain Safford. May I see it?

Mr. Richardson. Page 746.

[9802] Captain Safford. I meant by that, and I thought it was clear:

The translation consisted of the words which I quoted in my answer, namely, war with America; war with England, and peace with Russia, to the best of my recollection after almost three years.

The only part of that message which was translated was the winds code words. The rest was a pure Japanese broadcast of news of no importance at all to us.

Mr. Richardson. Are you, Captain, familiar with the testimony of Lieutenant Kramer, or Commander Kramer, in the naval court of inquiry?

Captain Safford. Only in a general way.

Mr. Richardson. You know, do you not, Captain, that Kramer testified that he never would have gathered the winds execute message, if received, to mean war?

Captain Safford. You were quoting from that?

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Captain Safford. All right.
Mr. Richardson. I give you pages 968 and 969 in Kramer's testimony before the naval court, and I am wondering whether you were familiar with the fact that Kramer took the position that the winds message, under code 2353, would not mean war, the winds execute message?

[9803] Captain Safford. Kramer left the United States, I believe, in the spring of 1943, and did not return until, I believe, the spring of 1945, or possibly late in 1944; I am not certain. I had no idea what Kramer's answer had been, and I am giving the translation of the winds message from my memory and nobody else's.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, Captain, you did get some command from Admiral Noyes, after you sent up the message to Noyes—you did get a report through Brotherhood, did you not. that Noyes complained that the message he got "showed the wind blowing from a strange direction"?

Captain Safford. That was not sent up to Admiral Noyes. That was telephoned to him in the night.

Mr. Richardson. He did not have the actual physical message before him then when he made that remark?

Captain Safford. He received nothing but a phone call from Brotherhood, and he immediately spotted it was the wrong thing and made that remark; and I asked Brotherhood the next time I saw him, "Why did you call the admiral?"

And he said, "I had written orders; and remember what you told me when you first came to duty here—that no watch officer was ever given a court martial for calling the captain in the middle of the night," or words to that effect.

[9804] Mr. Richardson. All right, Captain. Did you consider that a reasonable order?

Captain Safford. I do not understand.

Mr. Richardson. Will you read the captain's previous answer, Mr. Reporter?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Captain Safford. What I meant was that Brotherhood knew it was a false alarm, but was taking no chances and was calling Admiral Noyes as per orders, and he did the correct thing, and I complimented him for it.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, you have no doubt, have you, that all of these copies that were sent out to be distributed were distributed in the regular order to the people who should have received them?

Captain Safford. I have not, or I had no reason for doubting it.

[9805] Mr. Richardson. And there should be in the files of those respective departments the one copy of that message which they are supposed to keep?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And when you investigated you found that none of the files had any copy?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Including your own files in your own office?

Captain Safford. There was only one other file in which it could be expected and that was in the War Department.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, then, in order to completely erase that order from the entire Military Establishment in Washing-
ton, there would first have to be deleted from the file the copy that went to Beardall in the White House, would not there?

Captain Safford. No, because that was taken back and destroyed as a matter of routine within probably 24 hours.

Mr. Richardson. And nothing was left with him?

Captain Safford. Nothing was left with him.

Mr. Richardson. All right. You would expect him to remember the message, would not you?

Captain Safford. I would expect him to remember the message; yes.

[9806] Mr. Richardson. So that if the message was destroyed he should remember that he saw it regardless of the destruction, should not he? Keep in mind, Captain, that this message, according to you, meant war. Can you think of anything that would fix a man's mind more than such a message as that?

Captain Safford. He should have remembered it.

Mr. Richardson. And the President should have been very interested in it, should not he?

Captain Safford. He should have been. I think he was.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, then, someone would have had to have gone into the office in the War Department and filched the copy there and destroyed it, would not he?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And someone would have to go in the Navy Department office where a file copy was kept and destroy the copy there?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And somebody must have gone into your office and destroyed the copy there?

Captain Safford. I had no personal copy.

Mr. Richardson. Was not there a copy kept in your section?

Captain Safford. Kramer was the sole custodian.

[9807] Mr. Richardson. Where would he keep it? In his pocket?

Captain Safford. In his safe.

Mr. Richardson. Then somebody would have to get into Kramer's safe to destroy his copy?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Well, who was in charge of the files in the Navy Department?

Captain Safford. These magic or intercepts, Kramer was in charge of them. I was indirectly responsible up to the 15th of February 1942. The actual custodian was Lieutenant Commander Harrison, U. S. Naval Reserve.

Mr. Richardson. What was that last statement?

Captain Safford. The actual custodian was Lieutenant Commander Harrison, U. S. Naval Reserve. He had the physical custody.

Mr. Richardson. Well, do you think that there was a general conspiracy running from the White House through the War Department and Navy Department and through Kramer's section to destroy these copies?

Captain Safford. I have never indicated the White House at any time in my testimony.
Mr. Richardson. Well, do you think there was an conspiracy between the Navy Department and War Department to destroy these copies?

Captain Safford. There is an appearance of it.

Mr. Richardson. And whom do you suspect as individuals who took part in that conspiracy?

Captain Safford. I have no first-hand knowledge.

Mr. Richardson. All you have is a suspicion?

Captain Safford. I have more than that.

Mr. Richardson. Well, let us have your knowledge, let us have you tell this committee in words of one syllable what evidence you have that any human being in Washington sought to destroy official copies in the military department.

Captain Safford. Messages have been known to be mislaid, but we always, as a matter of policy from the very beginning, kept a file copy of the original incoming message, we kept a copy of all our codes and we could prepare a new message at will. When I began working on the winds message I was much more interested in the intercept form of it than I was in its translation. We were requested first and I think finally we were permitted to search ourselves through the files of intercepted messages in the custody of OP-20-GX, that is the intercepting direction finder station of the Navy Department, and not only was there no copy of the winds message but there was no copy of any intercepted messages from any of our east coast stations for the month of December 1941, and possibly other times. That search was made repeatedly. The men in charge did not know that these were missing, they had no record of it being missing, they had no authority for destruction and no record of destruction.

When that became known Capt. E. E. Stone, who was in charge of the Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit at that time and is now Rear Admiral Stone and Director of Naval Communications, immediately called for written statements from everybody concerned, to see what could be found out about it, and nothing showed up. They had simply evaporated from the face of the earth. They were gone, and no records of them.

It was an unwritten law in that section that we retain the original intercept forever, because we could never tell when it would be useful or how many years we might want to go back to verify something. At the time I turned over the section some of our logs were running back, without missing, as far as 1925. Then we tried to find the orders which had gone out, and there was no trace of the original teletype orders to either Cheltenham or to Bainbridge Island, that we had ever told them to do anything about trying to monitor for the winds message.

They did find the reports as well as the intercepted messages from Bainbridge Island and that told us the whole story. They were intact and the monthly report acknowledged the orders to monitor the message and told exactly what they had done toward it, as appears in my written statement.

Mr. Richardson. But they didn’t report at Bainbridge that they had any winds execute message, did they?

Captain Safford. Because they did not know what they were looking for but their message reports, when we finally checked them over
in January 1946—I don’t mean the messages—not only the messages but also in their reports it showed specifically that they had monitored every one of those schedules given them and had not been able to hear the message on December 4, or practically on any other day. They were listening for them but did not hear them. We got that distinct negative information. They attempted to hear the message but didn’t get anything.

**Mr. Richardson.** Now, Captain, I don’t want to burden you any further—

**Captain Safford.** May I add this—

**Mr. Richardson.** All right.

**Captain Safford.** Then I tried to find out what the Army had done in the line of monitoring for the winds message. [9811] Captain Schukraft at that time was in India—or abroad somewhere.

**Mr. Richardson.** Captain, just a moment. Are you under the impression that there is any doubt that the monitoring admonition went out? We were talking about whether the execute message came in. I am wondering what the connection is.

**Captain Safford.** The Army tried to check through their records to see what kind of instructions had gone out and that was completely gone. There was no record in the War Department, in other words, except for the hazy memory of one or two individuals, that the Army had made an attempt to monitor the winds message at all anywhere, although later I believe Captain Schukraft did state they had monitored for it at San Francisco. I was trying to confirm the fact which is my memory after several years that the Army had made no attempt to listen for the winds message on the east coast of the United States. It was important to me where they had not monitored for it rather than where they did.

Those letters had disappeared without trace. It was not only the winds message itself; it was everything connected with the winds message which had disappeared.

**Mr. Richardson.** Now, Captain, you commenced in the [9812] fall of 1943 to collect your thoughts and information on the subject of this wind execute message, did you not?

**Captain Safford.** And other matters associated with it.

**Mr. Richardson.** You have continued that down to the present time?

**Captain Safford.** Intermittently; yes.

**Mr. Richardson.** You filed this written statement which you read to the committee on the subject, did you not?

**Captain Safford.** I did.

**Mr. Richardson.** Now, it is a fact, isn’t it, Captain, that every single witness who has testified on the winds code, on the subject of having received or seen a wind execute message, testifies that they never saw one; isn’t that a fact? Every single one of them.

**Captain Safford.** Do you mean before this committee or other investigations?

**Mr. Richardson.** I mean before any investigating committee, including this one.

**Captain Safford.** I don’t think it is as complete as “everyone.”

**Mr. Richardson.** Can you think of one individual today that has not under oath testified that he never saw a wind execute message with
the exception of the one that came in  9813  on the 7th or 8th
which all agree upon?
Captain Safford. I think that Admiral Ingersoll for one has testi-
    fied that he saw the wind message and it meant war with the United
    States. I think he gave that testimony before the Navy Court of
    Inquiry.
Mr. Richardson. Doesn't Admiral Ingersoll's testimony specifically
    say that he doesn't remember whether he saw a written execute mes-
    sage before December 7 or after; isn't that what he testified to?
Captain Safford. He also testified to that. He wasn't certain as
to the date but he saw it and it was in writing.
Mr. Richardson. Now, there was a wind execute message came in
on the 8th?
Captain Safford. Yes; but it was not in writing in the Navy De-
    partment.
Mr. Richardson. It eventually was in writing, wasn't it?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir; in the summer of 1944.
Mr. Richardson. We have it here in the exhibit in writing, don't
we?
Captain Safford. May I see it, please?
Mr. Richardson. Yes. I read it to you this morning and showed
it to you. I refer to the message 3 (d) which I read this morning
and which you identified this morning  9814  as having been
the message of December 8 out of Tokyo.
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Have I been asked a question, or what?
Mr. Richardson. I asked you this morning to look at 3 (d) and
called your attention to the form of that message.
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. To point out to you that that was a very different
looking message from the one you described of December 4.
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. Now, the admonition at the bottom discloses that
was a message of December 8, 1941?
Captain Safford. Correct.
Mr. Richardson. It meant war with England?
Captain Safford. Correct.
Mr. Richardson. Now, the point that I make with reference to it is
that there was, and everybody admits there was and almost every
station took it as it came in, an execute message on the 8th of December,
so that when you say that Admiral Ingersoll admitted that he saw a
wind execute message, I ask you whether he didn't testify that he didn't
remember whether he saw one before or after December 7, so it may
have been this message that he saw.
Captain Safford. Admiral Ingersoll could not possibly  9815  have seen
that message on, before, or shortly after December 7, 1941.
Mr. Richardson. Why not?
Captain Safford. This page 3 which precedes—sheet 3 which pre-
  cedes 3 (d), the certificate from the Federal Communications Com-
    mission dated August 18, 1944, and signed by T. J. Slowie, secretary, states
    in part:

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Com-
mission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG-4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035
GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8:00 p.m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Romanji version of these messages.

on file in this Commission and I am the proper custodian of the same.

That was a telephoned message to the War Department and no written copy of this was received in the Navy Department prior to August 18, 1944.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in Exhibit 1 at page 251 it is shown dated December 7, translated by the Navy December 7:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

[9817] Captain Safford. That is a different one.

Mr. Murphy. There is an execute on the 7th.

Mr. Richardson. Were there two executes on December——

Captain Safford. That was in the so-called hidden word code.

Mr. Richardson. That is right.

Now, Captain, let me ask you this question: Why do you think anybody wanted to destroy the wind execute message that came in as you say on December 4?

Captain Safford. Because that was the unheeded warning of war.

Mr. Richardson. Well, everybody in the Military Establishment in Washington was looking for war, weren't they?

Captain Safford. That question cannot be given a simple answer.

Mr. Richardson. If you can't answer it simply, was there any doubt generally in the minds of the people, the heads, the high command and the Military Establishment, that we were heading for a war with Japan?

Captain Safford. There was considerable doubt in the high command of the Navy Department, at least, that war with Japan would commence in early December 1941. Eventually, yes; but not at that particular time.

Mr. Richardson. All right. And nothing on earth was [9817'] of more interest to them than to try and find out when that would be?

Captain Safford. That is correct. That is the reason we had all the pressure put on us to monitor, to intercept that wind message if it were humanly possible to get it.

Mr. Richardson. And you believe, do you not, that everyone of the officers in a subordinate capacity and in the high command were anxious to find out when and where war would begin?

Captain Safford. And also against whom.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

[9818'] Now, why would anyone want to fail to make use of a wind execute message that meant war, just the minute it came in? What motive would they have in doing it?

Captain Safford. That is a question that has puzzled me for 4 years. I have no logical answer to it.

Mr. Richardson. The reason that it wasn't used is because it is diametrically contrary to the theory you have got in your head that there was a wind execute message on December 4, isn't it?

Captain Safford. By no means.

Mr. Richardson. Don't you think, Captain, with your long experience in the Navy, that there were a hundred officers in the military
establishments that would be anxious to get their hands on a winds execute message that meant war on December 4?

Captain Safford. I would doubt if more than 20 officers in both the Army and Navy ever knew about the winds message at the time it was sent or immediately thereafter.

Mr. Richardson. Do you think seriously, Captain, that any of those 20 would secrete, delete, purloin, destroy, cover up that message so that our people here and our people on the Pacific front wouldn't know that Japan was about to commence war; is that your belief?

[9819] Captain Safford. No.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, why would anybody want to press the veil of secrecy, destruction, on this wind execute message that you say came on the 4th of December, why would they?

Captain Safford. It is human to try to cover up mistakes.

Mr. Richardson. Well, what was the mistake that was made with reference to that message?

Captain Safford. The fact that no war warning was ever sent. The fact that an attempted war warning in the Navy Department was suppressed by higher authority and that the War Department didn't even attempt to get a war warning out.

Mr. Richardson. Then it is your idea that, with a message in the hands of the officers of the Navy, the officers of the Army, and the President of the United States, that everybody forgot that they were interested in the war and forgot to make use of this message?

Captain Safford. I do not know why the warning did not go out.

Mr. Richardson. I suggest, Captain, that the reason the warning didn't go out was because there never was a winds execute message on the 4th day of December. You disagree with that?

[9820] Captain Safford. I disagree with that.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

That is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. May I ask one question only at this time, because I have not been privileged to hear Captain Safford's testimony.

Captain, if there were any officers in the War or Navy Departments, who desired to cover up the fact that an execute message was received by destroying that execute message, why wouldn't they have gone all the way and destroyed all of the other messages that predicted that such a message was coming in, so there wouldn't be any evidence at all that anybody ever talked about it?

Captain Stafford. I cannot account for other people's motives or actions.

The Chairman. Well, you have stated here in answer to a question by counsel, that there was evidence to justify your suspicions that somebody had destroyed this message purposely for the purpose of covering up the record.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Chairman. Well, now, if they were seeking to destroy a record in order to cover up any mistake, why didn't they destroy the messages that were on file there predicting that there might be an execute message coming [9821] in shortly? They could have done that as well as destroying this execute message, couldn't they?

Captain Safford. Yes; except that that information had been sent out to the Asiatic stations, to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet,
and also the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I think it would have been impossible to get all those things destroyed on that theory.

The Chairman. Well, one of the complaints made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short, was, as I recall, that they did not receive that information. That is one of the bills of particular against which they complain against the Departments here.

Captain Safford. They received the message sent by the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, giving the so-called British or Singapore version, or translation of Tokyo's circulars 2353 and 2354, setting up the wind code. They immediately monitored for the wind message themselves at Pearl Harbor, but did not hear it.

Not hearing from the Navy Department, they naturally came to the conclusion that the wind message had never been sent. And when some of those officers came East I talked to them and told them that the winds message had been sent, and they were surprised, naturally, and wanted to know why no warning had been sent out.

[9822] The Chairman. Did those who you think destroyed this message in the War and Navy Departments, know that this Singapore intercept of the Japanese message had been forwarded to Oahu or Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford. I don't know whether they knew. Probably they didn't.

The Chairman. Probably did not?

Captain Safford. Yes.

The Chairman. If they did not know it then they would have had the same incentive to destroy that here in the Department as they did in the execute message that you say came in, so that there wouldn't be any message at all.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Chairman. That is all. I may want to ask some questions later. I did not have a chance to hear Captain Safford's entire testimony. I want to read it over the week end and may have some questions later.

Congressman Cooper.

The Vice Chairman. Captain Safford, what is the important information that you are conveying to this committee about the so-called 14 parts message and the so-called winds message?

Captain Safford. The 14-part message and my connection with it was introduced by the counsel, not by myself.

[9823–9824] The Vice Chairman. Pardon me. I am asking you now. You are appearing as a witness. We appreciate your appearance and the information you have given us. I am just asking you if you can tell me what the important information is that you want to give us about the 14-part message and the winds message?

Captain Safford. The 14-part message was another opportunity that the Office of Naval Operations and the General Staff had to get a warning out to Hawaii before the actual attack occurred.

Whether people believed the wind message or not, the 14-part message is a matter of record. It is also a matter of record. I believe, in our investigations that the first 13 parts had been distributed before midnight on Saturday, December 6, 1941, to all the important officials in the Navy Department who had cognizance of the matter.
That is, Admiral Wilkinson, who was the Director of Naval Intelligence, and who had authority to send out war warnings; to Admiral Turner, the Director of War Plans, with authority to send out war warnings, and to Admiral Ingersoll, who was the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and also had the authority to send out war warnings.

There is a question as to whether or not Admiral Stark was notified, and Admiral Stark did not see the [9825] message until about 9:30 the next morning.

In addition to these, the Secretary of the Navy saw it, though he would not initiate a war warning, he would do that through the Chief of Naval Operations, and the President of the United States saw it, but he would not initiate a war warning on his own accord, but go through the Secretary of the Navy.

In addition, General Miles, the Director of Military Intelligence, saw it at Admiral Wilkinson’s home, and he had the right, at least I presume he had the right to send out a war warning, or call it to the attention of his superior officer, and he did nothing about it.

All this time, time was running out.

The Vice Chairman. Captain—

Captain Safford. May I go on, please?

The Vice Chairman. Yes; but I wanted to try to direct your attention more specifically to what I was asking you for.

Do you consider that you are giving the committee important information when you state that these responsible officials of the Government received the information about the 14-part message?

Captain Safford. I do. I think that is highly important information.

[9826] The Vice Chairman. Don’t you know we have received that information from a number of witnesses?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. What is it that you can give us about it here that we haven’t already received from a number of witnesses?

Captain Safford. I understand.

I can give you one thing in regard to some of the junior officers who handled it, if I may.

The Vice Chairman. The 14-part?

Captain Safford. The 14-part message.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Captain Safford. I have no authority to issue war warnings, and could only pass it on to higher authority. Furthermore, as soon as the message had been decoded and was in Commander Kramer’s hands, the responsibility belonged to Naval Intelligence and not to Naval Communications.

Kramer had no authority to issue war warnings, but he did notify his superior officer, Captain McCollum, as I believe testified by the captain here, and from that time on it was Captain McCollum’s responsibility.

Furthermore, Kramer had the messages delivered to Admiral Wilkinson by around 10 o’clock. I believe, at [9827] the latest, and after that, it became Admiral Wilkinson’s responsibility to take action of some kind. That automatically relieved Kramer and Captain McCollum of any further responsibility. So it passes up the line.
Once Admiral Turner knew about it, he was senior to Admiral Wilkinson; it was his responsibility.

The last man that we know definitely got it was Rear Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and it was his responsibility to send out the war warning, or to get that message to the Chief of Naval Operations, or if he took no action he was responsible for the result.

The Vice Chairman. Now, from a practical standpoint, as one member of this committee, I was just trying to find out from you what important information you were prepared to give us that you thought we ought to have about the 14-part message that we didn't already have.

[9828] The only thing about it was the receipt of it and the decoding and the transmitting of it to these officials whom you have named. That was the whole thing, wasn't it?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. Then, of course, you know Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkinson, and Captain McCollum have all testified here. You know that General Mashall and General Miles and General Gerow have already testified here? You knew that, didn't you?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right; now, then with respect to this 14-part message, only the first 13 parts of it came in before the morning of December 7; that is true, isn't it?

Captain Safford. That is true.

The Vice Chairman. And you testified that you left your office about 4:30 on Saturday afternoon, December 6?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. And that at that time the 13 parts had been received but in the decoding and translating it had been so garbled that it was thought that all ought to be discarded and the whole thing done over again; you said that, didn't you?

[9829] Captain Safford. They had to correct the key set up on the machine so as to get out perfect copy instead of imperfect copy, which delayed it about 2 hours, so I was told.

The Vice Chairman. Well, anyhow, at the time you left the office it had been decided that the whole thing should be done over again to get at absolutely right?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. Then you never did see it after it was fixed right until the following Monday, did you?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. Now, I am not quite clear on one other point in connection with that. I believe you testified that you had not even seen all of the 13 parts in the incorrect form up to the time you left at 4:30. Is that right?

Captain Safford. About half of it.

The Vice Chairman. About half of it; about five or six parts of it.

Captain Safford. And then they stopped to straighten out the key before they went ahead again.

The Vice Chairman. I see. As I remember you said about 5 or 6 parts of it. So that you did not at any time see the finished copy of the first 13 parts of that message until the following Monday?
Captain Safford. Until the following Monday.

[9830] The Vice Chairman. Now, you regarded that as highly important, you stated that here?

Captain Safford. That is right.

The Vice Chairman. And you stated that you considered the first 13 parts as important as the fourteenth part, didn't you?

Captain Safford. I did after I saw it afterwards, not at the time.

The Vice Chairman. After you saw it afterwards. Did you at the time you left your office at 4:30 on Saturday afternoon regard what you had seen and understood about it as highly important?

Captain Safford. I did.

The Vice Chairman. You did?

Captain Safford. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. You stated that you were out late Saturday night.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. Would you mind telling us what kept you out late Saturday night?

(No response.)

The Vice Chairman. Nothing connected with your business or your office work?

Captain Safford. No.

[9831] The Vice Chairman. And you stated that you were in your pajamas and bath robe eating breakfast when the word came of the attack on Pearl Harbor on Sunday?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, you never had at any time from the time you left your office at 4:30 on Saturday with a highly important message coming in, you never at any time inquired about that message until after the attack, did you?

Captain Safford. Not that I remember.

The Vice Chairman. Not that you remember. You did not call your office to find out whether the other parts had come in or what they might say or what the meaning might be?

Captain Safford. We thought we had the whole message there and more. There were about, roughly, 20 messages.

The Vice Chairman. Never mind about "we." I am asking about you.

Captain Safford. Well, I.

The Vice Chairman. You thought you had what?

Captain Safford. The full 14; we did not know. I mean the people on watch did not know until the last and everything on hand had been translated, if the fourteenth part had been made up. There were a lot of other messages in at the same time and I think they were fully taken up; we didn't know which was which.

[9832] The Vice Chairman. But of the first five or six parts which were not in complete form, that you did see at the time you left your office at 4:30, you considered it highly important?

Captain Safford. Very important.

The Vice Chairman. And you did not make any effort to inquire from 3:30 in the afternoon on Saturday until after the attack as to whether the rest of the parts of the message had come in or what they said?
Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. I see. Now, you did see the full 14 parts of the message on Monday when you came to the office?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. All right; now, then, I understood you to say you did not regard the fourteenth part of that message as any more important than the first 13 parts.

Captain Safford. Than the first 13 combined.

The Vice Chairman. The first 13 combined.

Captain Safford. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Well, the opinion given to this committee, as I recall it, by everybody who has testified is to the effect that the fourteenth part was really the important part of the message and that the 13 parts were just a restatement of Japan's position and views and ideas that everybody had known about all along. Did anybody call that to your attention?

Captain Safford. I have heard some of the witnesses state that and I have read it in the newspapers numerous times.

The Vice Chairman. But you do not agree with it?

Captain Safford. That was not my impression at the time.

The Vice Chairman. You regarded the first 13 parts just as important as the 14th part?

Captain Safford. Correct.

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, you have no personal knowledge as to what was done about that 14-part message or the first 13 parts of it on Saturday night or Sunday, no personal knowledge on your part?

Captain Safford. Except as I have checked up all the written documents, what written documents were available to see, the times of intercept, and see if there were any unreasonable delays at any stage of the game.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you did not find any indication of any unreasonable delays; did you?

Captain Safford. There was no indication of unreasonable delay.

The Vice Chairman. All right; so that is all, really, that you know about the 14-part message then, is what you have told us?

Captain Safford. I would like to make one statement which may or may not be important, that the Navy completed its distribution of that message, all 14 parts, plus the pilot message, about 3 hours before the Japanese Embassy in Washington called up the State Department and asked for a delay in their appointment with Secretary Hull because they were not ready.

The Vice Chairman. Where did you get that information, Captain?

Captain Safford. That comes from one of the State Department white papers.

The Vice Chairman. One of the State Department papers?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You did not deliver the message. Captain Kramer is the man who was charged with that responsibility; wasn't he?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. So you did not know anything about it of your personal knowledge; did you?
Captain Safford. Only now that it is a matter of record.
The Vice Chairman. Well, you did not have any personal knowledge about it yourself?
Captain Safford. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. I am only mentioning the fact that in connection with possible delays on the part of my people we handled it much more expeditiously than did the Japanese Embassy.
The Vice Chairman. All right; now, then, I would like to ask you a few questions, if I may. I do not want to dwell too long on that because I don't think there is any material dispute in the record or any variance from your testimony of any importance so far as this 14-part message is concerned.

Now, Admiral Noyes was the Chief of Naval Communications at that time?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. How far was his office from your office?
Captain Safford. His was upstairs and almost directly over it.
The Vice Chairman. The next floor above you?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. In other words, just one floor above you and almost exactly over your office?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, then, you say that you had been looking for some time and had your whole organization on an intensive alert looking for this winds execute message; that is true, isn't it?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. That was the most highly important thing that you had in mind at that time?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. Now, then, you finally received the message?
Captain Safford. Correct.
The Vice Chairman. Why wasn't it important enough for you to take it yourself to Admiral Noyes?
Captain Safford. I did not expect Admiral Noyes would be in his office and I thought it might take as long as a half an hour to find him. He was a very busy man serving on two or three selection boards and had told his office that they might have to chase him all over the Navy Department to find him. As soon as I could dispatch this by courier I immediately called in my other people and particularly the office in charge of the Register Publication Section and we began looking through everything to see what would have to be done to set our house in order for the immediate outbreak of war. I was actually working on it at that time when Admiral Noyes gave me the call and suggested that we tell Guam to destroy all their excess codes and ciphers.
The Vice Chairman. I know, but going back to the great importance of this message that you had been looking for for days and exerting every effort to try to get it, then when it did come did it ever occur to you that that was so important that you ought to take it yourself to Admiral Noyes?
Captain Safford. It did not. I wished I had afterwards.
The Vice Chairman. I see, but it did not occur to you then?
Captain Safford. The only thought was to get it up to Admiral
Noyes as soon as I possibly could by a commissioned officer.

The Vice Chairman. Did you think anybody could take it to him
faster than you could yourself?
Captain Safford. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, then, did this winds mes-
 sage say anything about when or where war with the United States
would be?

Captain Safford. There was no time or place. It merely gave this
 raw information, general information I might say.

The Vice Chairman. Then the immediate transmission of that
message to Admiral Kimmel would not have given him any infor-
mation about when or where the war would start, would it?

Captain Safford. It would only give him the fact that the
 war was about to start and very definitely and that the
United States was in it and not a spectator at the beginning.

The Vice Chairman. You stated in your testimony that if this
message had been promptly transmitted to the commander in chief of
the Pacific Fleet it would have saved the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Captain Safford. I believe it would have.

The Vice Chairman. You believe it would have?

Captain Safford. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Well, the main point stressed by Admiral
Kimmel in his testimony before this committee was that he had not
been given information as to just when or where the war would start,
and this message would not have given him that information, would it?

Captain Safford. I considered that the—as I have testified pre-
viously, that the winds message, the winds execute marked the out-
break of the war for Saturday, December 6th or Sunday, December
7th, for that week end, for that span of 48 hours, and we had it 48 or
72 hours in advance. It was no long range forecast. It was a short
range forecast. It could have been a false alarm but it was an alarm.

The Vice Chairman. I know, but, Captain, the fact is, as you have
just stated, there wasn't anything in this winds—execute
message about the time or the place that the war would start.

Captain Safford. There was nothing in that; no.

The Vice Chairman. All right; and Admiral Kimmel has told us
that that was the most important thing of all to him, so this message if
sent to him would not have given him that information, would it?

Captain Safford. No the winds message of itself.

The Vice Chairman. All right; now, then, all the winds message
could have told Admiral Kimmel was that war was imminent between
the United States and Japan, was it?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Captain Safford. As well as war with England.

The Vice Chairman. How?

Captain Safford. As well as war with England.

The Vice Chairman. That war was imminent between Japan and
the United States and England?

Captain Safford. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, don't you know that on November 27, 1941, several days before you saw you saw the winds message on December 4, that Admiral Kimmel had been sent the war warning message by the Chief of Naval Operations?

Captain Safford. He had been sent a message in which the [9840] words appeared, "This is a war warning."

The Vice Chairman. All right. This is the message appearing on page 36 of exhibit 57 of this hearing. I will only read you the first words. It is known by heart by everybody on the committee and everybody in this room I think. It has been put in the record a thousand times more or less, very few less, I believe.

Mr. Keefe. 1001 now.

The Vice Chairman. But this message states in the opening words: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning."

That is all your winds message could have been, isn't it, a war warning?

Captain Safford. This message of November 27 represented our estimate of what might happen. The winds message announced the intentions and decision of the Japanese Government. That was something very different.

The Vice Chairman. Well, could anything in the winds message have conveyed more clearly to Admiral Kimmel a war warning than the plain bold words, "This message is to be considered a war warning"?

Captain Safford. It is my opinion as a communication expert and not as a strategist or line officer——

The Vice Chairman. You are a communications expert?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

[9841] The Vice Chairman. And are testifying as such here?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead.

Captain Safford (continuing). That the effect of this first sentence was largely nullified by what followed as regards any implication that the Navy Department expected Japan to suddenly declare war on the United States.

The Vice Chairman. So then you discount the meaning of the words, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning," as not amounting to much?

Captain Safford. As not amounting to as much as it would if the words had stood alone or there had been less stress on the Far East and equal stress on the fact that Japan might deliberately start a war against the United States.

The Vice Chairman. Well, who was there in the Pacific that the United States might be involved with in war except Japan?

Captain Safford. Nobody as far as Japan.

The Vice Chairman. Nobody out there. We had no potential enemy of this country in the Pacific area except Japan, did we?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. All right. And the fortress at Pearl Harbor had been built as a protection of this country against Japan, hadn't it?

Captain Safford. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. Everybody in the Navy knew that, didn't they?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, then, 3 days prior to November 27, or on November 24, a message was sent from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, known as the message of November 24, 1941. You are familiar with that, aren't you?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. In which it is stated:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam, is a possibility.

That is a pretty fair war warning message, isn't it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. It certainly relates to the very strained relations with Japan.

Captain Safford. And may I comment that if those two messages had been sent in reverse order I think the effect would have been much better as regarding a warning of war against the United States and United States territory.

The Vice Chairman. You think if the message of November 27 had been sent on November 24 and the message of November 24 had been sent on November 27, why, the situation would have been better?

Captain Safford. I think it would have been much clearer in Admiral Kimmel's mind.

The Vice Chairman. All right. In other words, then, as a communications experts you think if you had prepared these messages you could have done a better job than was done with these two?

Captain Safford. As a communications expert I have seen a lot of confusion by messages which were not understood or, worse, which were misunderstood by the party that received them. The party that receives a message has no choice, he has to take it as it is. If he recognizes two meanings, he asks for clarification. If he only recognizes one meaning and it is the wrong one, it is too bad and it does happen from time to time.

The Vice Chairman. Tell me then: You think then as an expert communications officer you could have prepared better messages for Admiral Kimmel than these two to which I have referred?

[9844] Captain Safford. I believe that if either or both messages had been shown to some disinterested party, possibly corresponding to General Grant's fabulous Colonel Smith, that they might have changed the wording out and got the meaning across a little more accurately to Admiral Kimmel.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you mean to say then that you think you could have written better messages than these?

Captain Safford. I think that anybody who tried to read those messages from the point of view, first, were they capable of misinterpretation would have suggested certain changes in them which would have clarified the situation to the man who received that, not only Admiral Kimmel but to Admiral Hart just as well.
The Vice Chairman. Captain, I want to be just as fair and reasonable with you as I know how. I am only seeking information. I am only trying to find the truth about this question that we are called upon to consider here. I have asked you twice. I will ask you the third time. Do you think you could have written better messages than these two?

Captain Safford. I should have been able to write a better message but I might have done worse myself if I had been writing the message. If I had an important message I always left it to somebody else to see if he knew what I was talking about.

[9845] The Vice Chairman. Well, hindsight is always better than foresight anyhow, isn't it?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. But I think the testimony shows that Admiral Turner, the head of War Plans of the Navy Department, prepared these two messages. Now, was there any reason why Admiral Kimmel could not have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for clarification or an explanation of either one of these messages if he had thought it necessary?

Captain Safford. There is no reason except there is always a natural hesitancy of a junior to request clarification from a senior. It generally works the other way around.

The Vice Chairman. Well, I know, but, Captain, Admiral Kimmel was in command of the Pacific Fleet of the United States Navy. That was the greatest possession that this Government owned, wasn't it?

Captain Safford. That was.

The Vice Chairman. And he was responsible for that fleet as its commander in chief.

Captain Safford. That is right.

The Vice Chairman. If there had been any doubt in his mind as to the meaning of these messages wasn't it his plain duty to call for clarification or an explanation about it?

Captain Safford. If there had been doubt—

[9846] The Vice Chairman. If there had been any doubt.

Captain Safford (continuing). It was his duty.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, what was Captain McCollum's position at that time?

Captain Safford. He was Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The Vice Chairman. Was he superior to you?

Captain Safford. He had a corresponding job to me. He was junior to me in rank.

The Vice Chairman. He was junior to you in rank?

Captain Safford. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. You were senior to him?

Captain Safford. I was senior to him by 3 years.

The Vice Chairman. In rank?

Captain Safford. In rank.

The Vice Chairman. Well, how did your respective jobs compare?

Captain Safford. They were essentially on the same level of importance.

The Vice Chairman. On the same level of importance?

Captain Safford. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. But he was the man in charge of intelligence for the far eastern part of the world, wasn't he?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

[9847] The Vice Chairman. Now, did you ever bring this winds message to his office?

Captain Safford. Not as such.

The Vice Chairman. He testified here that he had been anxiously looking and watching, exerting every effort to get it for days, and he never did see it; so you never did bring it to his attention?

Captain Safford. The message that I saw in Admiral Wilkinson's hand at about 3 p.m. on the afternoon of December 4, 1941, which had been certainly prepared in Captain McCollum's section, it bore all the earmarks, no other section of Naval Intelligence could have prepared it, gave every indication to me that Captain McCollum had read the winds message, had appreciated its importance, and was trying to get an urgent war warning out to the Pacific Fleet.

Furthermore, I thought it had been sent and I just did not discuss it.

The Vice Chairman. Did not what?

Captain Safford. I did not discuss the message with McCollum.

The Vice Chairman. Oh, you did not?

Captain Safford. No. I took it for granted that it had been sent and I just merely shook hands with McCollum for doing such a splendid job and writing up such a comprehensive [9848] war warning.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you did talk to him a long time ago?

Captain Safford. I had talked to him on the phone the day before about getting out a war warning and at that time I understood from McCollum that he just could not get it out, that he was stuck.

The Vice Chairman. All right. You talked to him on the third?

Captain Safford. On the third.

The Vice Chairman. And you knew of his anxiety in the matter and how anxious he was to try to get out all the information that would help the fleet in the Pacific and then the following day you get this winds message and you did not say anything to him about it?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You did not mention it to him. Now, then—

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield there?

The Vice Chairman. Yes; I yield.

Senator Lucas. Why was it you did not talk to McCollum about this message at the time?

Captain Safford. Well, it just did not occur to me to mention it. Kramer had it: Kramer was McCollum's immediate [9849] subordinate. Kramer was up there every day and sometimes twice a day. We were sending a written copy around and I was busy. I could see no reason for bringing it up with him. I was going to anyway.

The Vice Chairman. Did you ask Kramer whether he showed that message to McCollum?

Captain Safford. I don't believe I ever did. I cannot recall it.

The Vice Chairman. It did not occur to you to say to Kramer, "Why, McCollum and I were talking yesterday. I know he is exceedingly anxious about this thing. Did you show him that message?"
Didn't it occur to you to do that?

Captain Safford. 'We did not discuss the winds message the other day. We had discussed other war warnings or warnings as to the approach of war, which had come in, particularly the message from Tokyo which had been sent on Monday to destroy the codes and here it was Wednesday and no notification of that had gone out from the Navy Department. I was trying to find out from McCollum why it had not gone out and what its prospect was.

When I found that McCollum could not get one out I wrote one myself and succeeded in getting it released, but I tried to convey a hint or an evaluation by means of sending that [9850] message out with an "urgent" precedence. "Urgent" was so important and so rarely used except to float, that there was no place on the Navy Department message blanks for "urgent" and it had to be typed in. I had the stenographer who prepared it type out the word "Priority," type out "Urgent" and put the X marks beside it.

I sent the message to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet and the commandant Sixteenth Naval District, who were apparently working on the purple system and drafted it in highly technical terms so they would know that the local purpose machines were being destroyed, there would be no more purpose traffic and they could turn their energies elsewhere. It was also sent "Priority" to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and the commandant Fourteenth Naval District for information.

This was the first time for a long time anything pertaining to diplomatic traffic had been sent to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, with the exception of a message released on the 1st by Admiral Noyes discussing the Japanese intrigue in Thailand and that was also sent "Urgent."

I sent that message up at noon and I initialed it, then Captain Redmond initialed it and he took it in to Admiral Noyes, found Admiral Noyes was out, so he signed it himself and released it, but Captain Redmond made one change. Knowing the tradition that we had not sent an urgent message from the [9851] Navy Department since 1918, with the exception of this one which had been released by Admiral Noyes personally, he erased the "Urgent" designation, replaced it with check marks in pencil beside "Priority" and it went out in that form.

The result was that the people at Pearl Harbor, Captain Layton, also Rochefort, could not read between the lines and missed the warning that I was trying to get out there. Captain Layton, I believe, has told me that he did discuss what was meant by the words "purple machine" with Lieutenant Coleman, who stood watch for 2 months in the Navy Department and was thoroughly familiar with it and Coleman more or less decrypted "machine" as being of no particular importance.

Admiral Hart did get the news as he told me in his investigation; and I sought, in other words, to just take——

The Vice Chairman. Captain, is all this you are telling us now in response to my question? I want to be highly respectful.

Captain Safford. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. I just want to know. Is all this you are telling us now responsive to the question I asked you?
Captain Safford. That is what I thought.

[9852] The Vice Chairman. I want you to be the judge, of course, but I just asked you if you did not think it was highly important that you tell McCollum about receiving this winds execute message.

Captain Safford. I did not at the time or I would have done it.

The Vice Chairman. Let me see. You say you had a conversation with Captain McCollum on December 3.

Captain Safford. On December 3.

The Vice Chairman. And you saw the winds execute message the following day, December 4.

Captain Safford. December 4.

The Vice Chairman. And you did not at any time have any conversation with him about the winds execute message?

Captain Safford. Not that I can recall.

The Vice Chairman. Well, I invite your attention to your testimony appearing at page 360 of the Hart investigation, and I will read you this from it and ask for your comment on it:

On the 4th of December 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the winds message.

Do you see that?

[9853] Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You testified to that, did you?

Captain Safford. I testified to that.

The Vice Chairman. Now you say you do not know whether McCollum ever knew anything about the winds message. Is that right?

Captain Safford. That is the reason I took for granted that McCollum had seen the winds message, because he used the same thought, if not the exact words of the winds message in his closing paragraph in his message before the final statement "War is imminent."

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to tell me just a moment ago that you did not know McCollum ever saw the winds message or knew about it.

Captain Safford. I believed at the time, and I still believe, that McCollum did get a copy of the winds message, was shown it, and that McCollum has not remembered it; but I have no first-hand information that he ever saw it. I did not give him a copy in person and I did not discuss it with him on the telephone or in person.

The Vice Chairman. You haven't discussed it with him at all?

Captain Safford. No.

The Vice Chairman. Then how did you know, in this answer you gave here, that he used the winds message in this dispatch that he drafted?

Captain Safford. The one thing above all I was interested in that message, that long message, was to see if it did bring in the winds message, or the information contained in the winds message. It did, and I took for granted that McCollum had seen the winds message and was quoting from it.

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to say that you did not talk to McCollum about the winds message at all on December 4; that you had talked to him the day before, December 3.
Captain Safford. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. So then when you state here:

On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the winds message—

Captain Safford. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman (continuing). If you did not even see him on the 4th of December how did you know about this?

Captain Safford. I saw the message. I read the message; I was in Admiral Noyes' office when Captain Wilkinson brought it in, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and he gave it to Admiral Noyes to read and Admiral Noyes read it page by page, and as Admiral Noyes finished the page he gave it to me and permitted me to read it for my information, too. So I saw the message; I read the whole message.
The Vice Chairman. I remember Captain McCollum said the whole message was about a half page, and he also stated that it had no reference to the winds message or winds code.

Captain Safford. That is correct. I heard Captain McCollum say that same thing.
The Vice Chairman. You heard him testify, did you not?

Captain Safford. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. He said that, did he not?

Captain Safford. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. There is a mistake somewhere, isn't there?

Captain Safford. Mr. Cooper, I can only tell you things—that is one thing I do know from my own memory and that is I saw that message myself.
The Vice Chairman. You have said that, Captain, repeatedly.

Captain Safford. And, furthermore, I described the message in detail to Admiral Hart, but he did not want the details, he wanted to keep the record just as short as he could.
The Vice Chairman. As least you do not remember anything like Captain McCollum says he remembers, do you?

Captain Safford. No, sir; and I testified in detail on that, I believe, in some of the other investigations, as I remember.
The Vice Chairman. And he testified several times too, did he not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield?
The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Senator Lucas. I want to clear this one question up that he is now discussing.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Captain McCollum was head of the Intelligence Branch, Far Eastern Division?

Captain Safford. He was the head of the Far Eastern Division Intelligence Branch.

Senator Lucas. Now, wasn't it your duty to see that he got this winds message in order that he might make proper evaluations to the Chief of Naval Intelligence? Was not that the orderly way in which these messages went, as a general rule?

Captain Safford. The messages were given to Commander Kramer, who was officially attached to McCollum's office, but looking down,
in space, to my office. As soon as the [9857] message in the decoded form was turned over to McCollum—I mean to Kramer—my responsibility ceased. It was Kramer's responsibility to complete them and to type them smooth and to make a distribution. Its distribution included McCollum.

Senator Lucas. But in this particular case you directed a man in your office to take this particular message direct to Admiral Noyes.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. Why was that done instead of giving it to McCollum?

Captain Safford. Admiral Noyes issued special instructions on the matter and I carried out the instructions of my commanding officer.

Senator Lucas. I mean before.

Captain Safford. Before.

Senator Lucas. Before the so-called execute winds message.

Captain Safford. At the time they set the watches on November 28, and I presume that Admiral Noyes had discussed the matter with Admiral Wilkinson and they were both in agreement on this method of doing business.

Senator Lucas. You had specific instructions from Admiral Noyes to deliver any so-called winds message direct [9858] to him?

Captain Safford. Direct to him if it came during office hours, and to telephone it to him if it came outside of office hours. That is the reason Brotherhood gave him that call on the message which Brotherhood knew we were looking for.

Senator Lucas. Did McCollum know about this?

Captain Safford. McCollum know about that; Kramer knew about that; and Admiral Wilkinson knew about that.

The Chairman. The Chair would like for the committee to give consideration over the week-end to the possibility of meeting a little earlier and sitting a little longer as our present extension runs out on the 15th. I am not asking you to make any decision now, but it is a pleasant subject for you to be thinking about over the week-end.

We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:25 p. m., February 2, 1946, the committee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a. m., on Monday, February 4, 1946.)
Pearl Harbor Attack

Monday, February 4, 1946

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318) Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

Chairman Barkley was called to the White House for the usual Monday morning conference of the leaders and will be detained a little while and we will go ahead, without objection.

Does counsel have anything to present to the committee at this time before the examination of the witness is resumed?

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, on page 9850 of our transcript, Captain Safford referred to a telegram which was sent on December 1, 1941, from Washington to Admiral Hart and the Commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District, for the information also of Admiral Kimmel and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Inasmuch as that telegram or dispatch has not previously been made a part of this record we would like to have permission to have it copied into the transcript at this point.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered.

Mr. Masten. It was distributed to the committee last Saturday.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

(The dispatch referred to is as follows:)

Naval Message

From: OPNAV

[9861] Released by Adm L. Noyes

CinCaf
Com 16

Date: 1 December 1941

Com 14
CinCPac

Typed by: McClellan
011926

Ambassador Tsubokami in Bangkok on 29th sent to Tokyo as number 872 the following "conferences now in progress in Bangkok considering plans aimed at forcing British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora."
As counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bahru, since Thai intends to consider first invader as her enemy, Orange believes this landing in Malay would force British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa.

Thai would then declare war and request Orange help. This plan appears to have approval of Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto.

Thai Government circles have been sharply divided between pro British and pro Orange until 25 November but now Wannato and Shin who favor joint military action with Orange, have silenced anti Orange group and intend to force Premier Pibul to make a decision. Early and favorable developments are possible."

Certified to be a true copy of unencrypted version of original 011926 Dec 1941. Decrypted from original code on 1/31/46.

SECRET

/s/ V. H. Cook,
Comdr. USNR

011926.

Mr. Mastex. We would also like to add to Exhibit 142, as Exhibit 142–B, the material which was distributed to the committee last Friday or Saturday, and which relates to Circular No. 2494 from Tokyo and is translated as follows:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations.

That intercept appears at page 251 of Exhibit 1, and the four pages which have been distributed to the committee are further information in connection with that message, which is one of the so-called “hidden word” messages from Tokyo to Washington and other points. We would like to offer that as Exhibit 142–B.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 142–B.”)

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything else at this time? [9863] Mr. Richardson. No.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY—(Resumed)

The Vice Chairman. Captain, do you have anything you want to present to the committee before your examination is resumed?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. I would like to ask you just a few more questions, please, Captain.

I understood you to state to us Saturday that you would provide the committee a copy of the memorandum from you to Colonel West. Have you been able to locate that over the week end?

Captain Safford. I have a copy; yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You have it?

Captain Safford. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Well, counsel had inquired about it. Does counsel desire to examine it?

Mr. Richardson. You may proceed and I will look it over.

The Vice Chairman. I will proceed to ask you a few more questions then, Captain.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Captain, did you read to the committee from your memorandums or tell the committee everything [9864] you know about anybody trying to get you to change your testimony about the winds message?
Captain Safford. I have. There is nothing to be added to that.

The Vice Chairman. All right. You gave us all the information either in your oral statements or the memorandums that you read to us bearing on that subject?

Captain Safford. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, I believe you stated that the copy of this winds execute message that should have been kept in the files of your division would have been in the safe of then Commander, now Captain, Kramer, is that right?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, and the personal or immediate custodian was Lieutenant Commander H. S. Harrison, U. S. Naval Reserve.

The Vice Chairman. Well, who would have had access to Captain Kramer's safe?

Captain Safford. Normally only the people on duty under Captain Kramer. That is, all the translators had access to those messages when necessary, though everything was normally cleared through Commander Harrison.

The Vice Chairman. Commander Harrison was in immediate charge of the files in Captain Kramer's safe?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

[9865] The Vice Chairman. And nobody would have had access to those files without the knowledge of Commander Harrison?

Captain Safford. Except in Commander Harrison's absence.

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, what was the situation there? If he wasn't there could anybody—

Captain Safford. Commander Harrison left the office every day to go to lunch and occasionally he would make a messenger trip in place of Captain Kramer, but he was in the office almost all the time. Captain Kramer was absent from his office a good part of the time.

The Vice Chairman. Well, how many people do you think would have had access to Captain Kramer's safe, lunch time or any other time? How many people could have gone into Kramer's safe and had access to these secret files?

Captain Safford. Not more than ten at the most.

The Vice Chairman. So about ten people then would have had access to Kramer's secret files?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. I believe you said they were translators.

Captain Safford. The translators and the yeomen on duty in Kramer's section and the head of the section could call for a file at any time. I could call for a file from Kramer, or the people that relieved me could have called for a file.

[9866] The Vice Chairman. People where?

Captain Safford. The officer that relieved me could have called for the files or it is possible that the Director of Naval Intelligence might have wanted to see them. Any higher authority would have been given the file without question if he had requested it.

The Vice Chairman. I understand that, Captain. I assume Admiral Stark could ask for one of those files and it would be brought to him.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. I am trying to get down to the point of how many people had the combination to the safe or the key to the safe or could get in there?
Captain Safford. To the best of my knowledge the combination to the safe was held by Kramer and Harrison alone. There was a copy of the combination in a sealed envelope in my safe. There was another copy of the combination in a sealed envelope in the safe of the Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations. That was required for all safes in naval operations, so in case of casualty to the man who regularly opened the safe the safe could be opened when we had to.

[9867] The Vice Chairman. When did you ever use this secret combination that you had to Kramer's safe?

Captain Safford. I never used it.

The Vice Chairman. Do you know of any of these other people having the secret combination, in an envelope or otherwise, ever having used the combination to enter the safe?

Captain Safford. I know of no occasion when we ever had to open those sealed envelopes, and enter the safe. I might add, whenever an officer was relieved, we changed the combination on his safe and substituted the new cards, and that was the only time we ever had to go into those envelopes.

The Vice Chairman. Then is it your best judgment, Captain, that Captain Kramer and Commander Harrison were the only two people who were actually in control of this safe and the secret files in it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And anybody else going in there for any file that had been called for, or that was needed, would really have to go to Captain Kramer or Commander Harrison to do that?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

[9868] Now, this winds execute message that you have testified about was kept in the secret file in Captain Kramer's safe?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, I would like to ask you just one more question, I believe, Captain, and invite your attention to the last line of your written statement that you presented to the committee, in which statement, as you prepared it, and as it was distributed to the committee,—you wrote the statement yourself, did you?

Captain Safford. I wrote the statement myself.

The Vice Chairman. All right. You used the words "Pearl Harbor"?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, when you read the statement to us, you said you wanted to change those words "Pearl Harbor" to "England and the United States."

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Why was that change necessary?

Captain Safford. I had used the words "Attack on Pearl Harbor" mentally as synonymous with the outbreak of the war. I realized, in my statement in the winds message there was nothing whatsoever which pointed at Pearl Harbor specifically.

[9869] The Vice Chairman. So you had just used the words "Pearl Harbor" inadvertently?

Captain Safford. I used the words "Pearl Harbor" inadvertently, and I made that correction when I noticed it.
The Vice Chairman. You say here, "The War and Navy Department had been given 72 hours' advance notification of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese themselves."

Well, that was not correct, was it?

Captain Safford. That was not correct, and when I read it, I realized it.

The Vice Chairman. When you first wrote your statement, why did you use the words "Pearl Harbor" if that was not correct?

Captain Safford. I wrote that statement, the final draft, on Thursday night, and the next night at 5:30 it had been presented to Commander Baecher for clearance to the committee counsel, and I had not had the opportunity to proof read it, to see exactly what impression I might be giving, or if I made a mistake inadvertently.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you did make a mistake when you used "Pearl Harbor" in that sentence?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you changed that to "England and the United States"?

[9870] Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Because you realized that there was nothing in the winds execute message that related to Pearl Harbor at all?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Thank you.

Senator George will inquire.

Senator George. Captain, you were aware of the constantly deteriorating relations between Japan and the United States for some 3 months at least; were you not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator George. Prior to Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator George. You had known of the Secretary of State's statement made in the council to both the Secretary of Navy and Secretary of War in November, specifically about the 26th of November, that sets forth the safety and security and defense of the country was in the hands of the Army and Navy?

Captain Safford. I knew nothing about that, sir.

Senator George. You had no information about that?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator George. Well, you did know that practically the diplomatic relations had broken off; did you not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

[9871] What I knew was entirely from my reading of the intercepted messages passing between Washington and Tokyo.

Senator George. You were familiar with the so-called war message, or "This is to be construed as a war message," that went to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet on the 27th of November?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; I had been permitted to read that.

Senator George. Therefore you knew that diplomatic relations had ended; that is, from all the information you had, you knew that conditions had progressed to the point where diplomatic relations had practically ended?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Senator George. And you testified, I believe, in your direct, that for 3 months you regarded war as inevitable with Japan—or did you use the word "inevitable"?

Captain Safford. I do not recall making that statement, but I did regard war with Japan as just a matter of time.

Senator George. Just a matter of time?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Senator George. In other words, you regarded a war with Japan as certain within some reasonably early time, and for some 3 months you had had that view?

[9872] Captain Stafford. Yes, sir.

Senator George. Well, now, Captain, let me ask you, what was the special significance of the winds execute message of December 4—I believe you have identified that day—to you? What additional special information did it give to you, or convey to you?

Captain Safford. It confirmed the suspicion that I and I believe most of the high ranking officers in the War and Navy Departments held, that Japan was intending to proceed with its program of conquest in the Far East, and that would include invasion of Thailand and the capture of Malaya and Netherlands East Indies, if and when Japan decided to make war on England.

The United States would not necessarily be involved. In fact, the whole tone and purpose of the diplomatic negotiations between Tokyo and Washington had been to isolate the Far East and to persuade the United States to give a free hand out there. So the winds message meant not only that Japan was about to declare war on England and attack foreign territory out in the Far East, it also meant that Japan realized that the United States would not yield, as a matter of principle, and that she had determined to bring the war to us rather than to start the war in the Far East with a neutral but hostile nation on the flank.

[9873] Senator George. Well, it was abundantly clear, was it not, after Secretary of State Hull's message, or answer to the Japanese note, that the United States would not yield, and I believe you testified that the winds execute message did not designate any time or place where the war on the United States would begin, and therefore, I am asking you what additional significance did the winds execute message, conceding for the purpose of the question that it came through as you have testified, what additional significance it had to you, in view of the reply of the Secretary of State, in view of what had happened, in view of the message of November 27 of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in view of the Marshall message to General Short, the Military Commander of the Hawaiian Area?

Is the committee to understand that it only had the additional significance of confirming what you already believed, what you had already concluded?

Captain Safford. My interpretation was that it gave a tip-off or preview of what Japan's reply to Secretary Hull's note of November 26 was going to be.

[9874] Senator George. Well, now, we come to the 14 parts message of December 6. I believe your testimony is that you left your office at about 4:30 on the afternoon of December 6, at which time some portions of the 14-part message had come in, but that you
had not carefully studied the portions that had been received; is that
correct?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator George. And then you left your office and learned noth-
ing more about the 14-parts message, or the message directing the de-
livery to Secretary Hull at 1 p. m., until you were advised over the
radio on Sunday afternoon, after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator George. You did not follow up, during Saturday evening
or Saturday night, or early Sunday morning, the fourteenth part
of the message?

Captain Safford. I did not.

Senator George. Well, you did not think that there was anything
especially significant about so much of the 14-parts message as you
had seen before you left your office at 4:30, did you?

Captain Safford. I considered that as the confirmation of my
evaluation of the winds message 48 hours earlier.

Senator George. You mean the first 13 parts or the [9875] 13
parts taken all together?

Captain Safford. What I had seen, the five or six portions in their
garbled form. They did not arrive in serial order, they were quite
mixed up as we broke them down, but we could get the sense of the
whole thing. The Japanese were rejecting the American proposal
of November 26.

Senator George. And that reply was somewhat more abusive in
tone, was it not, than the ordinary Japanese message?

Captain Safford. The ordinary Japanese message had been very
courteous in tone up to this particular message.

Senator George. Up to this particular message?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Senator George. And did you take any steps to see that your evalu-
atation of the 14-parts message was transmitted on Saturday afternoon
or evening, or night, or early Sunday morning?

Captain Safford. No, sir; I did not.

Senator George. There was nothing in the 14-parts message itself
that indicated an attack at any particular place?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator George. If any particular place was indicated at all it was
in the pilot message, the message we refer to [9876] here as the
pilot message, the message directing the delivery to the Secretary of
State Hull at a given hour?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt there?

The Vice Chairman. I believe we agreed Saturday we would not
have any interruptions.

Mr. Keefe. I wanted to ask the Senator only a question, to clear
this up.

The Vice Chairman. Are we going to have the rule lived up to?

Senator George. I have no objection, so far as I am concerned.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Mr. Keefe. He is referring to the pilot message.

The Vice Chairman. Do you want the Senator to yield?
Mr. Keefe. I ask the Senator if he will yield; yes.

Senator George. I will be glad to.

Mr. Keefe. You referred to the pilot message as being the message which called for delivery at 1 o'clock. My understanding of the situation is that the pilot message, referred to as such, is the message that came in first indicating that the 14-part message would be received, and that the message, as heretofore referred to, the last message received was the 1 o'clock message. I am offering that [9877] so the record will not be mixed up.

Senator George. I think, Congressman, you are correct. I was referring to the 1 o'clock message, that is the message directing delivery of the 14-parts message to the Secretary of State.

You did not see that until the 8th?

Captain Safford. I did not see that until the 8th.

Senator George. You did not know anything of it until the 8th?

Captain Safford. It is possible that my people on watch telephoned it out, but I have forgotten it if they did.

Senator George. Well, Captain, you say that the winds execute message was seen by you under the circumstances detailed by you on the 4th of December?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator George. That is your testimony, as I understand it.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator George. That message contained the definite statement, along with others, of “west wind clear,” did it not?

Captain Safford. That included “west wind clear.”

Senator George. Meaning war with England?

Captain Safford. Meaning war with England and invasion of Thailand and attack or occupation of Malaya and the [9878] Netherlands East Indies.

Senator George. Well, Captain, can you give any reason why, on the afternoon of December 7, after the attack at Pearl Harbor, I believe, the message referring alone to England, using the same code words or same weather forecast terms “west wind clear” was sent out? If it had already been sent out on December 4, why was it again repeated on December 7?

Captain Safford. I do not know.

Senator George. Well, if your memory is not playing tricks with you and there really was, as you have testified, the winds execute message of December 4, which contained the same information, why was it again repeated, and your answer is that you are not able to say, is that correct?

Captain Safford. I never saw or heard of that FCC intercepted winds message which was broadcast about 6 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor until the summer of 1944.

Senator George. You haven’t any reason to think it was not reported to the Navy Department on the afternoon of the 7th, have you?

Captain Safford. The FCC document stated that that message was telephoned to Colonel Dusenbury, I believe, of the Army, and I think it was at his home. I have no personal knowledge and no record can be found that that message was [9879] delivered to the Navy Department either by telephone or in written form.
Senator George. I have no further questions.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark, of North Carolina, will inquire, Captain.

Mr. Clark. Captain, you understand that the intercepted messages have been referred to in this hearing as magic, do you not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. I believe General Marshall of the Army and Admiral Stark for the Navy established a rather particular method for the handling and distribution and final disposition of magic, did they not?

Captain Safford. Are you referring to within the War and Navy Departments and in Washington? Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Now, on the Army side, copies of this magic were enclosed in a leather pouch which was locked and sent by messenger from person to person among those who were entitled under that plan to have access to magic?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. And when that was presented to an officer he was permitted to read the message and then return it to the pouch to be carried on to the next person?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. And I believe Admiral Stark established in the Navy a very similar method except perhaps they did not use the leather pouch?

Captain Safford. I believe we ended up by using leather pouches the same as the Army did.

Mr. Clark. So that the system in the two Departments was practically the same?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Now, that having been established by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, no one would have the right to vary or change that method except with the knowledge and consent of General Marshall and Admiral Stark, would they?

Captain Safford. Yes; or except in emergency, when the officer who made the change had to accept the responsibility for it if he guessed wrong.

Mr. Clark. And that would have to be some high-ranking officer to assume that responsibility?

Captain Safford. I believe that Kramer made an emergency change on the evening of the 6th of December 1941.

Mr. Clark. Was that for the purpose of expediting the delivery of magic?

Captain Safford. That was for the purpose of expediting delivery.

Mr. Clark. And it was supposed to be made available very promptly when it came in?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Am I right in thinking that this magic was distributed to the White House, to the Department of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, the War Plans Division, the head of Intelligence in the Army and the Navy?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. CLARK. And was there anyone else to whom it was accessible to your knowledge?

Captain Safford. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations always saw it. I believe that the Naval Aide to the President always saw them and reviewed them, with Kramer, in the name and acting for the President.

Mr. CLARK. The offices I have named or people in those offices were trusted to see the magic?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. There was one more exception. Captain Schuirmann, who was the Navy liaison officer with the State Department, was sometimes shown them by the direct orders of Admiral Stark or Admiral Ingersoll. There was an exception made in his case in each individual instance.

Mr. CLARK. Now, aside from the ones you have mentioned do you know of anyone else who was entitled to examine this magic?

Captain Safford. The Director of Naval Communications and the Chief Signal Officer of course were entitled to see it. And I was entitled to see it because my people were working with it. Everybody working with it. The heads of the Far Eastern Section of the Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence were, of course. We who were working with it had to see it in order to know what was going on.

Mr. CLARK. It was limited to a comparatively few people, was it not?

Captain Safford. Just as few as we could and still have the proper people know it.

Mr. CLARK. I see.

By whom was this distribution made in the Navy Department?

Captain Safford. The distribution was normally made by Captain Kramer.

Mr. CLARK. Do you know who did it in the Army?

Captain Safford. Colonel Bratton.

Mr. CLARK. Now, do you think of anyone in that group who were entitled to examine magic that you would not classify as a highly intelligent and competently loyal American?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I presume that magic was limited to a comparatively few because of its very great significance and importance?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, and to minimize the chance of a leak and to enable us to place responsibility in case a leak should occur.

Mr. CLARK. I see. And, of course, a leak was to be avoided because of the great importance of magic?

Captain Safford. We were afraid our source of information would dry up.

Mr. CLARK. I didn't quite get that.

Captain Safford. We were afraid our source of information would dry up if there was a leak.

Mr. CLARK. You are familiar with the episode between General Marshall and Governor Dewey in which General Marshall went to some trouble to be sure that the Governor thoroughly appreciated the importance of keeping the magic secret?

Captain Safford. I read about it in the newspapers.

Mr. CLARK. How is that?

Captain Safford. I have read about it in the newspapers.
Mr. Clark. Well, that indicated that General Marshall regarded magic as being highly important, did it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. After the original winds message which disclosed that weather forecasting language was to be used as a code there was a great interest in all the group who had access to magic to know whether and when the winds execute message might come, was there not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. I believe you had your people on a 24-hour basis?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. And you were, I think, as you have expressed it, strain- ing every fiber to pick this winds execute message out of the air?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Can you think of anything that the War and Navy Departments in those days just before Pearl Harbor, when so many people thought we were on the brink of war with Japan, considered of more interest or considered of more importance than the winds execute message?

Captain Safford. That was the most important message we had up to the time of the pilot message on December 6.

Mr. Clark. And it was so considered by the group who had the right to read magic?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. And they were expecting or at least they were anxious to know whether the message came and when?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. And I believe you have testified that you received this message and immediately put it in the process of handling and distribution and disposal just as in the case of all other magic?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; and in addition it was telephoned around to various people by Admiral Noyes and so far as I know that was the first time that had ever been done.

Mr. Clark. Now, you say it was telephoned around. What do you mean?

Captain Safford. I am afraid I am possibly giving second-hand information, but if the committee wants to hear it I will answer the question.

Mr. Clark. I am very much obliged to you, Captain, but so far as I am concerned we can leave it out.

You put this particular message in course of distribution on the 4th of December?

Captain Safford. I sent it originally up to Admiral Noyes with the expectation and belief that he was going to telephone it to a selected list of the same officials who received all other magic. He would not give it to the Army distribution list. He would only give it to the Navy.

Mr. Clark. I am very sorry, I am not hearing you, for some reason, Captain.

Captain Safford. I sent the first winds execute message to the Di- rector of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes. It was my expectation and my belief at the time that he telephoned the substance of that message to somebody in the War Department who
was authorized to receive it and also to the naval aide to the President and to the various officials in the Navy Department who were entitled to receive magic information.

Mr. Clark. Do you know whether he did telephone it or not?

Captain Safford. I do not know of my own direct knowledge.

Mr. Clark. Well, now, the question I asked you, was whether you filed this for distribution in the same manner as other magic.

Captain Safford. Would you repeat the question?

Mr. Clark. The question was whether or not on the 4th day of December you filed this particular message for distribution in the same manner as other magic.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; we did that also.

Mr. Clark. That is what I was asking you.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. That, of course, was 3 days before Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Can you think of any reason at all why this important message, this message of such wide interest [9887] shouldn't be immediately handled and distributed and examined and disposed of in exactly the same manner as all other magic?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Clark. So far as you know that was done?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. And if it was done then that message went immediately to the group of people we have just referred to as being entitled to receive magic?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Captain, will you tell me, please, exactly why this message made such an impression on your mind?

Captain Safford. Because I expected to see a very strongly worded war warning sent out to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel as the direct result of receiving this winds execute message.

Mr. Clark. But I am asking you about the impression that the message made on your mind, not your impression of what some naval officer might have been going to do.

Captain Safford. I understand.

To me that message meant that the war would commence within two or three days in all probability, possibly Saturday, December 6, possibly Sunday, December 7. That was the best estimate that could be made as to the timing [9888] implied by a message of that nature.

Mr. Clark. Now, can you think of any reason why it wouldn't have made exactly the same or very similar impression upon the minds of the members of this group who were so interested in that very question, too?

Captain Safford. I can see no reason why it did not make the same impression on their minds.

Mr. Clark. Well, it was almost bound to make the same impression?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

[9889] Mr. Clark. As a matter of just plain common sense.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. So that if the members of that group later denied having ever seen that message that could not be explained upon any theory that
it was not important, or that they were not interested, or that it didn't mean anything to them?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Clark. And their statement that they hadn't seen it would have to be knowing and willful?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Now, you have referred in your testimony to the fact that the only theory upon which you can explain what has happened, is that this message was destroyed to cover up mistakes; is that right?

Captain Safford. I believe I have given that implication.

Mr. Clark. Yes, sir. Of course, it wouldn't have done any good to have destroyed the message and all records about the message, in the War Department unless it was also done in the Navy Department?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. And in the Secretary of—well, it wouldn't be there.

[9890] No one in the Navy below the rank of Admiral Stark would rest under any duty or obligation or have any right to send a warning message to the commander of the fleet in the Pacific, would he?

Captain Safford. The director of naval intelligence had always the authority to send out what we might call enemy information.

Mr. Clark. Yes; but I am not talking about that.

Captain Safford. He could not direct action to be taken.

Mr. Clark. Pardon me. You referred here to the kind of a warning message that would put the Navy on the alert and have it ready for imminent war. No one below Admiral Stark would have the right to send that message without his knowledge?

Captain Safford. Without his knowledge, except in an emergency.

Mr. Clark. Well, there wouldn't be an emergency of that kind if he was in Washington?

Captain Safford. If Admiral Stark was available no one junior to him would take that step.

Mr. Clark. And he was available at that time.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; he was in his own office, so far as I know.

[9891] Mr. Clark. So then, it comes down to the proposition that nobody below him in rank would have any duty to cut loose and notify the commander of the Pacific fleet as to something about war breaking out, would he?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Clark. Therefore, nobody below him in rank would have any motive for covering up any mistakes, would they?

Captain Safford. It would be the duty of somebody below Admiral Stark to prepare a message of warning and submit it to Admiral Stark for approval and release.

Mr. Clark. But what I am asking you is this; if that authority and that responsibility rested upon Admiral Stark, it wouldn't be neglect of duty for some man below him in rank not to have sent out that kind of message?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Clark. Therefore, there would be no mistake to be covered up, would there? I am talking about below Admiral Stark.

Captain Safford. That question goes beyond anything I want to answer.
Mr. Clark. Well, Captain, you are dealing with a very serious situation here, and I am submitting to you a fair question.

Captain Safford. It is possible that some subordinate [9892] might have given Admiral Stark some very bad advice at that particular time. I don't know. That is only——

Mr. Clark. Pardon me, Captain. I am confining myself to the sending of a warning, the kind that you have been talking about, not advice.

Now, I am asking you if it is true that it wouldn't be a mistake or a breach of duty for any man in the Navy Department below Admiral Stark to have failed to send that kind of a warming message?

Captain Safford. You are right.

Mr. Clark. And the same would be true in the Army as to everybody below General Marshall, wouldn't it?

Captain Safford. You are right.

Mr. Clark. So that the neglect of duty if there was any rested in the realms of Admiral Stark and General Marshall.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Captain, did you know that it was then and is now, a violation of the criminal law of the United States to secrete or remove or deface or destroy a public record?

Captain Safford. I knew that in a general way.

Mr. Clark. To have cleaned the record of the winds execute message of all reference to it in the War and Navy Departments, General Marshall and Admiral Stark would have [9893] had to violate the law?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. And destroy public records?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Now, do you charge that they did that?

Captain Safford. I am merely stating that not only the translation of the winds message is missing, but the intercepted messages of that time which were also public records are also missing and unaccounted for. I cannot go beyond that statement.

Mr. Clark. You don't mean to make that kind of a charge?

Captain Safford. I will not make that charge and I am not denying that charge.

Mr. Clark. I am not asking you about denying it, I am asking you if you make that charge.

Captain Safford. I understand.

Mr. Clark. I ask you again whether or not you make such a charge against General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

Captain Safford. Not personally.

Mr. Clark. What is that?

Captain Safford. Not against them personally.

Mr. Clark. Well, if you made it at all against them it would be personally, wouldn't it?

[9894] Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Do you make any assertion to that effect against General Marshall and Admiral Stark?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Clark. Do you make any suggestion to that effect against them?
Captain Safford. I am not going to make any suggestions of any sort.

Mr. Clark. I beg your pardon?

Captain Safford. I am not making suggestions of any sort.

Mr. Clark. And you don't make any suspicion of that character against them?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; there is a suspicion.

Mr. Clark. Against them?

Captain Safford. Against them.

Mr. Clark. And you as a witness before this committee are suggesting this suspicion?

Captain Safford. No, sir; I am answering a question.

Mr. Clark. Well, my question was whether or not you did suggest a suspicion against them.

Captain, on yesterday, the press carried pretty well throughout the country and the world the news that there was a suspicion cast in that direction by your testimony [9895] here.

I want to know from you, please, sir, whether by your appearance and testimony before this committee, you mean even to create the suspicion in the minds of the committee or the public that either General Marshall or Admiral Stark violated the law of this Nation by destroying a public record in order to cover up a mistake?

Captain Safford. In—

Mr. Clark. Let me add, I think you owe it to them and to yourself and to the public to make a frank statement in response to that question.

Captain Safford. In my own mind that suspicion does exist.

Mr. Clark. Captain, I have been impressed by your testimony that you are a man of fine ability. I believe you have been diligent and interested in your work. I don't mean to ask you an unusual question, or one that would be embarrassing, but I am a little perplexed, and consequently I want to ask this final question:

You have testified here to the existence of the winds execute message and have referred to a certain memorandum that might have been made in connection with it, and you have testified both the winds execute message and interception memorandum have disappeared from the face of the earth, but [9896] it seems from this record and all of the witnesses we have heard and the records in previous examinations, that there isn't a line of written evidence to corroborate your statement, or support it in any respect, nor is there a word of oral evidence to corroborate or support your statement in any respect, and, in fact, all those who would have had access to this message had it been distributed in the regular course in which magic was distributed have denied that they ever saw it.

Now, can you suggest any theory to me as a member of committee under which I might consistently accept your statement as being correct?

If so, I would like to have it.

Captain Safford. I realize that my statements are diametrically opposite to the testimony that you have quoted.

Mr. Clark. That is all I have.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire, Captain.
Senator Lucas. Captain, I should like to develop a thought or two advanced by the able Congressman from North Carolina.

You stated definitely that you thought the message that came in on the 6th and 7th, known as the 14-parts message was an extremely important one as far as the breaking of our relations with Japan at that time was concerned?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. In fact, that was more important, was it not, than the execute winds message?

Captain Safford. It was more important to the State Department and to the White House, but not to the Navy Department.

Senator Lucas. Well, of course, the Navy and War Departments would know about the 14-parts message?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And did know about it?

Captain Safford. Did know about it.

Senator Lucas. Now, can you tell this committee, in view of your statement of the importance of this 14-parts message, why it is you have labored so long on the execute winds message, and yet on the 6th of December you left at 4:30 and never took any more interest in the 14-parts message?

Captain Safford. I regarded my work as completed when that 14-part message had been intercepted, relayed to the Navy Department, broken down enough to see that we did have the correct key, with a minor change in it to make smooth language, my best watch officer available to process it, and the officer who was charged with responsibility was there and assured me he would stay with it until the distribution had been completed. I figured I could do no more. It merely expresses my confidence in the people under me.

Senator Lucas. Did you have that same confidence in your people with respect to the winds execute message?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator Lucas. And still have?

Captain Safford. And still have.

Senator Lucas. The point I am trying to develop in order that I might weigh your relative comparison of the importance of the two messages deals with the fact that you were extremely interested in the winds execute message, and that you labored overtime in order to try to get that message, and you did a great number of things after the message came in, as I recall, in order to see that it was properly delivered, as you say—that is correct, isn't it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; and also to make the final arrangements to set my own house in order before the war hit us.

Senator Lucas. What do you mean by setting your own house in order?

Captain Safford. We had a few codes and secret papers exposed to danger of capture in outlying stations. Everything that we could think of had been taken care of prior to that, which came within my cognizance and responsibility, had been completed prior to 4 p.m. on Saturday, December 6.

Senator Lucas. Did you have a copy of this winds execute message for your own files?

Captain Safford. I did not have a personal file.
Senator Lucas. Did you have a file over which you had control, to which you had access, in your department where this message was filed?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; in Captain Kramer’s file.

Senator Lucas. You had access to Captain Kramer’s file where the winds execute message was filed?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. How long did you have access to that file after the winds execute message came in on December 4?

Captain Safford. Up until the 15th of February 1942.

Senator Lucas. The 15th of February 1942?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, was there ever any discussion with you and anyone else in the Navy up to that time about this winds execute message?

Captain Safford. There was not, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you ever have occasion to go to that file and investigate up until the time you left to see whether it was there?

[9900] Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. How was that?

Captain Safford. No, sir; I never checked it one way or the other.

[9902] Senator Lucas. You did not?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Didn’t you say something in your original statement to the committee about examining that file in the presence of Ingersoll and some other men when they were getting ready to submit the file to the Roberts Commission?

Captain Safford. About the 15th of December 1941 Captain Kramer brought in to me a special folder of messages leading up to Pearl Harbor which he was preparing to give, to show or give to Admiral Noyes, and as I understood it to be given or shown to the Roberts Commission. In fact, I think the order came down from Admiral Noyes to prepare this special folder. I checked it over with Kramer to see that it was reasonably complete, that we had the important messages there, and that we did not have a lot of unimportant messages there. I believe that I suggested no change. I approved what Kramer had and it was sent up to Admiral Noyes.

Senator Lucas. Why would Kramer discuss that with you?

Captain Safford. As verification of his own judgment before he gave it to Admiral Noyes because I was very familiar with events.

Senator Lucas. And now you state that in your opinion this execute winds message was in that folder that Captain Kramer discussed with you?

[9902] Captain Safford. In my opinion and to the best of my recollection the winds execute message was in that folder I have just described.

Senator Lucas. What other messages were in that folder?

Captain Safford. There was the pilot message, the 14-part message, the 1 p. m. message, there was this message from Tokyo to Berlin which had been introduced in testimony, every message that was in that folder. I believe, has been introduced as evidence.

Senator Lucas. Did you personally examine each and every one of the messages?
Captain Safford. I looked through each one to see if it read up and told a complete story.

Senator Lucas. And again you saw the wind execute message, these same figures of speech, that you witnessed on the day the message came in?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. That is, the English. There was no Japanese there at all.

Senator Lucas. That is your best recollection?

Captain Safford. That is my best recollection.

Senator Lucas. Captain, when you received this execute message you telephoned Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford. No, sir; I sent it up to him by an office messenger. [9903] Senator Lucas. Yes, and you do not recall what subordinate in your office took it?

Captain Safford. I do not recall which particular subordinate took it up.

Senator Lucas. What happened after that, Captain, with respect to that message?

Captain Safford. The next thing with respect to the message, about an hour later Admiral Noyes called me on the office interphone, which did not go through a switchboard, and told me that we had better tell Guam to destroy all their excess codes and ciphers.

Senator Lucas. Did he say anything about the execute message in that telephone conversation?

Captain Safford. He did not specifically mention it.

Senator Lucas. Wasn't that a little strange, for Admiral Noyes not to speak about this message in view of its importance?

Captain Safford. I did not think it strange, no, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, did you do any more with respect to that execute message after that?

Captain Safford. When Kramer commenced his daily routine delivery at noon, he took in one folder, as had been his practice, to let me look at it and tell me the high lights of the news, and that message was present at that time.

Senator Lucas. Did you make any further inquiry about it in view of the importance of it?

Captain Safford. I did not, sir.

Senator Lucas. And no one ever talked to you about it after until these investigations started?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. And it was how many years after you first saw the message until someone first started discussing it with you?

Captain Safford. Approximately 2 years.

Senator Lucas. Approximately 2 years?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. During that time you have been exceedingly busy in connection with the prosecution of the war, have you not?

Captain Safford. I have been attending my duties in the prosecution of the war.

Senator Lucas. Well, with whom did you first discuss it in 1943?

Captain Safford. I probably first discussed it with Commander Lynn, who was serving in my office, and who had been on duty before Pearl Harbor and had been working with these magic messages.

Senator Lucas. Did he recall it?
Captain Safford. He thought he knew about it, but said he had never seen it.

Senator Lucas. In other words, it was hearsay with him?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. He could have received that information from you because he was on duty there with you?

Captain Safford. He could have received it from me at the time of Pearl Harbor, either before or afterward.

Senator Lucas. Now, when did you next talk about this message and to whom?

Captain Safford. Any time that I came in contact with anybody who had been on duty in the War and Navy Departments, prior to Pearl Harbor, and might have been expected to have first-hand knowledge of the winds message, I talked to them to see what they could remember. I remember I specifically talked to Colonel Rowlett.

Senator Lucas. What did he say?

Captain Safford. He said he knew about it in office gossip, but had not seen it himself.

Senator Lucas. Would he be one of the individuals who should have seen it?

Captain Safford. He normally would not have, because he was interested in decoding and breaking down the Japanese cipher systems.

Senator Lucas. Why did you talk to him about it?

Captain Safford. Because he was one of the officers who had more direct contact with all officers at that time. He had been serving throughout the war there. I knew him personally. And there was a chance he might have been shown it or knew something about it.

Senator Lucas. Did you talk to Captain Kramer about it at that time? He was the individual who translated it. Did you talk to him?

Captain Safford. Captain Kramer at that time was at Pearl Harbor, and later on he went to the South Pacific. He was not available to talk to.

Senator Lucas. Did you communicate with Captain Kramer about this winds message?

Captain Safford. I wrote him one letter asking him if he could recall anything about it, and, if so, please let me know.

Senator Lucas. When was that, sir?

Captain Safford. I do not know. It was about December, I would say, 1943; possibly January 1944.

Senator Lucas. Do you have a copy of that letter?

Captain Safford. I do not have a copy of that letter.

Senator Lucas. Do you know whether Captain Kramer has the original?

Captain Safford. I do not know.

Senator Lucas. Do you recall what you said?

Captain Safford. I asked him about the winds message and asked him if he could recall it because we were looking for it.

Senator Lucas. Whatever you said in that letter, Captain, at that time, would probably be your best recollection of what happened in connection with the winds message, would it not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Your memory would be better then than it is now, would it not?
Captain Safford. As far as that aspect was concerned.

Senator Lucas. In other words, whatever happened with respect to the winds message when you wrote to Captain Kramer, your memory would be more reflective to what actually happened, than it would be now?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And if, in that letter you said the whole thing was somewhat vague and uncertain—I don’t know whether it did or not, I haven’t seen the letter, but maybe we can get it—that would be true, would it not?

Captain Safford. I believe I did not go into details at all.

[9908] Senator Lucas. I see.

Captain Safford. And I did not want to suggest anything to Kramer. I was trying to ask a question.

Senator Lucas. I see.

Is Captain Kramer in the room?

Captain Kramer. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Do you have that letter, Captain?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I do. I made it available to counsel.

Senator Lucas. May I see it?

Captain Kramer. Mr. Baecher has a photostatic copy of it.

[9909] Senator Lucas. Will counsel mark this as an exhibit and put it in the record? Or maybe read it into the record, that might be better. Submit it to the Captain and ask him about it.

(Document referred to handed to the witness.)

Senator Lucas. Captain, have you seen this letter dated December 22, 1943?

Captain Safford. I have, sir.

Senator Lucas. Is that the letter you wrote Kramer?

Captain Safford. That is the letter I wrote Kramer.

Senator Lucas. Did Kramer ever reply to that letter, do you know?

Captain Safford. He gave me a reply.

Senator Lucas. Do you have the reply?

Captain Safford. I do not have the reply.

Senator Lucas. How is that?

Captain Safford. I do not.

Senator Lucas. Why? Where is it, do you know?

Captain Safford. That was destroyed some time ago, after I took the information out, what little he was able to give me.

Senator Lucas. That is, you mean you destroyed the letter?

Captain Safford. I destroyed the letter.

[9910] Senator Lucas. Well, you say in this letter:

My dear Kramer-san.

What does the “San” mean?

Captain Safford. That is Japanese for “envoy.” “My dear Envoy Kramer.”

Senator Lucas. I see; that is the Japanese word for “envoy.”

I am preparing a secret paper covering events which took place the early part of December 1941. I am getting all the help that I can from Linn and from such records as are still available.

Now, why were you preparing that record?
Captain Safford. For one thing I had been ordered by the Director of Naval Communications to prepare a history of radio intelligence up to and including the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator Lucas. Had anything been said to you at that time about the winds execute message or the 14-part message by any individuals who were your superiors in the Navy Department?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. In other words, the winds execute message was not a controversial matter at the time you wrote this letter?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

[9911] Senator Lucas. You say:

I am getting all the help that I can from Linn and from such records as are still available. My memory is bad as to details.

Was that true of the winds execute message at that time?

Captain Safford. That is true on the details. You will see I had not been able to establish the date at that time, the exact date. I knew it within 2 or 3 days.

Senator Lucas. Well, the date is a detail but something else would be details, would it not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas (reading):

My memory is bad as to details, which is the reason for preparing this memorandum, and I have forgotten or am very vague as to certain things which I clearly recalled a year ago.

What do you mean by that?

Captain Safford. That in the course of time I did not remember as well at that time at the end of 2 years after Pearl Harbor as at the end of 1 year after Pearl Harbor.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, when you wrote this letter you had no reason whatsoever for talking about the winds execute message?

Captain Safford. Only incidentally, as you will see [9912] later on the second page.

Senator Lucas. But there was no controversy at that time as to whether or not a winds execute message was ever received or whether it was missing or anything of that kind?

Captain Safford. No, sir. It could not be located but I was concerned mostly with the time of delivery of the 14-part message.

Senator Lucas. And at that time, up to December 1943, which was 2 years after the war started, you had never discussed the execute winds message with anyone?

Captain Safford. I believe I had discussed that with Kramer 6 or 8 months previously, before he went to Pearl Harbor. We did not look for it. We just discussed the significance of general things. We discussed everything and I believe the winds message came up.

Senator Lucas. Yes. I am talking about the details now of the winds execute message. You did not go into that, did you?

Captain Safford. We did not go into the details particularly.

Senator Lucas. You just talked about it in a general way?

Captain Safford. In a general way.

Senator Lucas. You further say:

[9913] I realize that your reply will have to be censored and therefore you must be guarded as to what you state. Also, I am phrasing my questions very carefully, in the event that my letter might fall into unauthorized hands.
What did you mean by "unauthorized hands"?

Captain Safford. There is always danger of mail miscarriages, particularly in war.

Senator Lucas (reading):

I am saving a copy of my letter so it will be merely necessary to give the question number and a brief answer, which should not disclose anything to an outsider.

Then you go ahead and ask a series of questions which apparently have nothing to do with the winds execute message at all.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. Then on the second page you ask this question:

Did you ever tell Admiral W. what you told me?

Who was that, Admiral W.?

Captain Safford. That was Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator Lucas. What were you talking about there?

Captain Safford. That had reference to informing Secretary Knox about the significance of the times; that 1 o'clock Washington time was approximately sunrise at Pearl Harbor and around the middle of the night in the Far East.

Senator Lucas. That is, you were talking to Kramer about that in this message?

Captain Safford. I was asking him—he had told me that some time before and I was asking him if he had told Admiral Wilkinson about that.

Senator Lucas. What was his reply when he wrote you?

Captain Safford. I do not know for certain. I believe he said that he had.

Senator Lucas. Why did you destroy that letter, Captain? You have been talking about a good many things that have been destroyed around here in the Navy and Army and I am anxious to know why you destroyed that letter?

Captain Safford. That all went into my testimony before Admiral Hart. It became a matter of official record then.

Senator Lucas. That is, the letter itself?

Captain Safford. No, the facts of the statements in the answer.

Senator Lucas. I know but that does not answer my question. I am asking you why you destroyed the letter in answer to these questions?

Captain Safford. Because I had the evidence that I wanted and I could see no purpose in retaining it.

[9915] Senator Lucas. I see. In other words, you obtained the evidence—

Captain Safford. The information.

Senator Lucas. How is that?

Captain Safford. I obtained the information, such information as Kramer could give me.

Senator Lucas. You obtained the information through other sources after that that you had requested Captain Kramer to send to you, is that it?

Captain Safford. I beg your pardon?

Senator Lucas. I was wondering whether you mean to tell the committee that you had obtained this same information you were requesting from Captain Kramer through other sources?
Captain Safford. No. Some of these things Kramer was the only one who could possibly tell me, as to his movements on the night of the 6th of December.

Senator Lucas. You asked him in question 17:

When did Admiral W, first see or learn about Part 14 and other papers?

18.

We can't find the original "Weather Report" (sent on Dec. 5th) and its translation. What became of it?

What was that weather report?

Captain Safford. That is what we now call the winds [9916] message.

Senator Lucas (reading):

We can't find the original "Weather Report" (sent on Dec. 5th.) and its translation. What became of it?

What did he say when he wrote back?

Captain Safford. Kramer had that confused with the—I think it was with the hidden word message which was received on December 6th. Anyhow, he said it came in—on December 7th. He replied that it came in on the morning of December 7th after 10 o'clock and was given out on the delivery trip which ended up at Secretary Hull's office at 11 a.m. on Sunday.

Senator Lucas. Why would Kramer be confused about this message? He was the fellow who translated it, wasn't he?

Captain Safford. He had not seen it for a long time.

Senator Lucas. Well, but you are asking Captain Kramer there in question 18 for information on the weather report which, as you say, was the winds execute message sent on December the 5th?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. And its translation. you asked what became of it and you say that he did not understand that question?

Captain Safford. His answer was that it came in on the [9917] morning of December 7th and was distributed in the morning of December 7th.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, isn't that the false weather message that actually did come in at that time? 1

Captain Safford. The only thing of that nature which was distributed on the morning of December 7th was this hidden word message which said, "Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations," or something like that.

Senator Lucas. That is the one that he was talking about. That is the one he was talking about when he replied to you.

Captain Safford. When he replied to me.

Senator Lucas. Yes. Now, certainly if there had been an important message, an important message that you claim came in on December 5th, which was known as the winds execute message, with all the furore that we now find about this winds execute message don't you think that Captain Kramer would have been able to reply direct to that question 18 and give you some definite information as to what happened to the so-called winds execute message as you designate here as the "weather report"?

Captain Safford. Not necessarily.

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1 See memorandum from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5304.
Senator Lucas. Was everybody out of step here but you? 

Captain Safford. I wrote to Captain Welker after VJ-day to see if he could recall anything about it. The letter apparently was lost in a typhoon. I wrote to him some time later and he replied that he not only could not remember it, that he had done nothing whatsoever about it. In other words, it was completely erased from his memory.

Senator Lucas. Well, I cannot quite understand a number of these ciphers and letters that are in here. Did you have a sort of code between you and Captain Kramer that you were operating under?

Captain Safford. May I see what you are referring to?

Senator Lucas. Here is a memorandum that was prepared for Captain Safford by Commander Kramer or Captain Kramer in response to a letter written by Captain Safford in December 1943. You take a look at that, Captain, and see whether or not that is a true and correct copy of the letter you received from Captain Kramer.

Captain Safford. That looks like it.

Senator Lucas. All right. Now, look at the answer to question 18. Captain, and give the committee the information here as to what Captain Kramer meant by that answer.

Captain Safford. May I see the original letter, please?

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir. You want to see Captain - Kramer's letter?

Mr. Kaufman. His own letter.

Senator Lucas. Yes; that is, your own letter you want to see.

Captain Safford (reading):

The first one of the quotes was not as indicated in parentheses, but as indicated in Item 10–c above,

and that refers to messages which were delivered by Kramer on the morning of December 7, 1941.

Senator Lucas. Yes. Well, now, do you believe that Kramer's memory was as good as yours about this winds execute message?

Captain Safford. I thought it was or I would not have asked him.

Senator Lucas. That is exactly what I thought. In other words, you were not certain of your own memory at that time with respect to what happened to the weather report which is known as the winds execute message and you were making inquiry from Kramer to see whether or not he knew anything about it and you were asking him for this information in order to rely upon it or to aid you in fixing a definite opinion as to what did happen to this message?

Captain Safford. As to the disposition of it; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. As to the disposition of the message; yes. Now, was there any man in the Navy Department more interested in the winds execute message than Kramer?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. That was myself and higher authority. I was responsible for its interception and if I had missed its interception and its interception would have been humanly possible I would have been held to blame. Kramer was only responsible for its brief translation, which took a matter of a minute or two and its subsequent distribution. He took no other personal action on it.

Senator Lucas. I understand, but Captain Kramer was the individual who translated this message from Japanese into English?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Captain Kramer is the individual when he translated it would have known, if his position was the same as yours, that war was definite with Japan as a result of it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And is there any question in your mind that a message of that kind would make any lighter impression upon Kramer than it did upon you?

Captain Safford. I discussed that matter with Kramer in the spring of 1943 before he left Washington to go to Hawaii and he recalled it and his impression or memory and mine agreed as to the fact of its interception, not the date. I do not [9921] think we said specifically what date. It was a few days before Pearl Harbor, I think that is as close as we came, but that we received it and what its significance was.

Senator Lucas. Yes, and what its significance was, you discussed that?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Senator Lucas. And notwithstanding that, later in the fall you are still asking him for information?

Captain Safford. One question out of eighteen.

Senator Lucas. Yes, but that is the big question, Captain, in this entire proceeding here right now. In one question out of eighteen you say but that is the only one that I am vitally interested in, sir.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And it goes without saying that you were still looking for some information about this message or you never would have written to Kramer, and the fact of the matter is at that time there was no execute winds message in controversy at all insofar as the Navy Department is concerned.

Captain Safford. When I had talked about that message with Kramer in the spring of 1943 neither of us had the slightest knowledge that we would not find everything pertaining to that winds message in the files.

Senator Lucas. Are you certain that when you talked to Kramer in the spring that you did not have in mind the same answer that he gave you in this letter, where he specifically refers to the message that came in on the 7th?

Captain Safford. I am positive.

Senator Lucas. Why would he put that in writing? Why would he answer about a completely different message than what you were inquiring about? Does his memory play him tricks, too?

Captain Safford. I cannot understand. I was very surprised when I received that answer because the other answers I got just as I expected.

Senator Lucas. In other words, of all of the questions that you asked him here, which were nineteen in all, in your letter of December the 22d, the only answer that came back from Kramer which was wrong was No. 18, dealing with the implementing winds message?

Captain Safford. That was the only one in which I was disappointed.

Senator Lucas. Well, the only one you were disappointed in?

Captain Safford. Yes.
Senator Lucas. And it was at complete variance with the question, his answer was at complete variance with the question propounded by you?

[9923] Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that those letters be incorporated in the record at this point?

The Vice Chairman. Well, I was going to suggest that they be copied by the reporter in full at this point in the record. It will be so ordered. Counsel will please supply the reporter with the two letters and they will be spread on the record in full at this point.

Mr. Kaufman. The offer will be a letter from Captain Safford to Captain Kramer dated the 22d of December 1943, a memorandum from Captain Kramer to Captain Safford dated 28 December 1943 and a letter from Captain Safford to Captain Kramer dated 22 January 1944.

The Vice Chairman. All right; it will be so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 22 December 1943.

My Dear Kramer-San: I am preparing a secret paper covering events which took place the early part of December, 1941. I am getting all the help that I can from Linn and from such records as are still available. My memory is bad as to details, which is the reason for preparing this memorandum, and I have forgotten or am very vague as to certain things which I clearly recalled a year ago. I am writing to you to ask you to help me as far as you may be able to do so.

I realize that your reply will have to be censored and therefore you must be guarded as to what you state. Also, I am phrasing my questions very carefully, in the event that my letter might fall into unauthorized hands. I am saving a copy of my letter so it will be merely necessary to give the question number and a brief answer, which should not disclose anything to an outsider.

With reference to events on December 6, 1941:
1. What time did you see Mr. R. that evening and show him the papers?
2. Was Mr. H. there or was he called in, or did you see him first and go over to Mr. R. with him?
3. What time did you see Admiral S. that evening and show him the papers?
4. If answer to 3 is negative, how and when was Admiral S. first informed?
5. How and when was Admiral W. first informed?
6. Linn remembers that you stayed till after 1 a.m. What time did you leave the Navy Building and go home?

[9925] 7. What time did you get down to the Navy Building the next morning? (Brotherhood said it was sometime after 0700).
8. What time did you see Mr. R. that morning and show him the new papers?
9. Was Mr. H. there or was he called in?
10. My check shows you had Part 14 plus another paper setting the conference time at 1 p.m. Do you recall taking any other papers with you, and can you give me a hint as to their contents?
11. Were Mr. K. and Mr. S. called in that morning or were they notified in any way?
12. How long did you stay with Mr. R.?
13. When did you see Admiral S. that morning?
14. With reference to a certain conference held that morning, do you know who attended it and how long it lasted?
15. With regards to what happened afterwards:
16. Did you ever tell Admiral W. what you told me?
17. Or McCollum, or anyone else?
18. When did Admiral W. first see or learn about Part 14 and other papers?
19. We can’t find the original “Weather Report” (sent Dec. 5th) and its translation. What became of it?
10. Can you offer any pertinent remarks? Things seem running better out at the Annex now that Wright is here. I think he has done a marvelous job of creating order out of chaos, but his task is by no means finished.

I hope you are enjoying the balmy climate of Hawaii. I certainly think that you, personally, have benefited by the change of duty. Please give my regards to Dyer, Huckins, Williams, and the others. With best wishes for the Holidays,

Sincerely,

L. F. Safford,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. N.,
Fourteenth Naval District, Pearl Harbor, T. II.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER,
* PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS,
COMMANDANT, NAVY 128,
% Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif., 28 December 1943.

Memorandum for Capt. Safford
1510 First indications of arrival
2100 Completed. Left after phoning to locate Adm B., Adm T., Col. B. of M. I. D., Adm W., etc.

1. Did not, personally, but left with one of Adm B’s * ass’ts in the situation room on Penn Ave. with positive instructions re-urgency (to be delivered at once). He was entertaining at the time, but I learned later in the evening he had seen it.

2. No, on all counts. Army was taking care of that and I know only that he knew of it by 2230 (see item 9) and possibly had seen it % Col. B. by then.

3. Did not. (See items 4 and 5.)

4. Believe Item 5 phoned that eve (see next). Possibly Adm. T. did too. I know he saw it as soon as he reached office next A. M. (about 0900).

5. At 2105 by phone to his home where he was entertaining Adm B and others, told him what I planned to do. His chief concern was getting it to Item 1 and 2, which are covered above. Arrived at his home at 2320 where he, and Adm B. also, saw it and were informed re-others, particularly Item 1. I don’t recall whether B then phoned re-Item 1 to check delivery or not. Believe at this time Item 5 phoned 3.

6. Left Item 5 place about 0030, stopped by, then proceeded.

7. About 0730.

8. Did not personally, but left first batch about 0945, 2nd about 1100 at Item 8 house, c/o Adm. B.

9. No.; at his office. Item 11 (first one) was shown it at his home about 2200 previous night and he made a number of phone calls including Item 2. Meeting was then arranged for Item 2, 11 (both) and others at Item 2 office at 10:00 A. M. where I was instructed to be with it and anything else. Meeting held at 1000 as scheduled and new items (1st batch) delivered together with old. Col. B. was on hand there too for Item 11 (second).

10. (a) I don’t recall precisely how our friend’s numbers ran in the hundreds (or thousands) but in units from about 02 to 09 or 10.

(b) The first few of these, NOT including first sentence last half this item, were on hand by 0900 and were completed and being delivered at 0945 (to Item 8) and 1000 (see Items 9 above). Item 5, 3, 1, and others got them about 0830 at a meeting held in Item 3 office.

(c) On returning about 1020 from Item 9 office the remainder of #02-10 were arriving, including this item, i. e., 1st sentence last half, and also quotes in Item 18. These were delivered to all hands, including Items 11 (both) at Item 2 office by 1100 with my comments to Item 11 (first one) on how the hour tied with the sun, and moves in progress, elsewhere.

11. Yes. See 9 and 10 above.

12. Did not. See 8 above.

13. About 0900 at his office with others, and left night before matters. 1st batch of new given about 0940, 2nd about 1045 (all this was not personal but via his senior aide because of meeting in progress. They were passed in to him promptly however.)
14. There were 2 I know of, and I believe another c/o Col. B. The one in Item 9 above was at least 1½ hours. Another started about 0900 with 10, 11, 12, 16, 20, and others there, lasting to 1130 that I know of, and probably later. 15—16. Reference obscure. Would you clarify? If regeneral security (i.e. lack) late in spring, yes.

17. See Items 13 and 14 above.

18. The first one of the " was not as indicated in parentheses, but as indicated in Item 10—c above. It went into Z files. GL should have it now unless it was among files turned over to Army.

19. For the most part covered above, until Item 15 (16) is clarified.

[9930]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 22 January 1944.

My dear Kramer-san: Thanks for your very prompt reply. I did not receive your Dec. 28th letter until Jan. 17th, and had almost given up hopes. What a break for you, as well as for the cause, to be ordered to Admiral Halsey’s staff. I can see the hand of Providence in it.

I am sending by separate cover (air mail) a condensation code to use. If you want to add to it, use numbers #151—#200 inclusive. I would like to hold it down to a single sheet of paper. I am also sending by ordinary mail a copy of #35 and a clipping to give to #42 at some auspicious occasion. You will understand this letter better when they arrive.

With regard to taking #42 into confidence, wait patiently for the proper moment, and then shoot the works. Tell him everything he will listen to and show him whatever documentary proof you may have. Use your own judgment and don’t force the issue. Do as good a job as you did on #136 and #137. In my opinion the proper moment for disclosure would be any of the following:

[9931]
(a) #42 is detached from Sopac
(b) #5 is detached from Sopac;
(c) #10 is detached from Sopac;
(d) #9 calls on #42 or #10;
(e) #18 calls on #42 or #10;
(f) #42 discusses #31 or attack on #92 in your presence;
(g) #42 asks you the reason for the alleged failure of 20-G to know what was going on;
(h) #137 (plus 3 years);
(i) #6 visits #42;
(j) #42 visits #6.

Be prudent and be patient. I am just beginning to get things lined up on this end. No one in #15 can be trusted. Premature action would only tip off the people who framed #31 and #32, and will also get #8 and #10 into very serious trouble. Yet we must have the backing, the rank, and the prestige afforded by #42. Tell #42 that I knew #31 was a scapegoat from the start, but I did not suspect that he was victim of a frame-up until about #114 (plus 2 years), could not confirm it until #132 (plus 2 years), and did not have absolute proof until about January 18, 1944. #8 has overwhelming proof of the guilt of #15 and #65 plus a list of about fifteen reliable witnesses.

[9932]
Please answer the following questions by Item No.:
20. Re your Item #2, is Col. B. #59?
21. What or whose job in the Navy did Col. B.’s job correspond to?
22. Do you know what Army officers were notified or shown the papers by Col. B., and when?

In amplification of my items #15 and #16: I recall your telling me that you saw #2 about 0900 (EST) on #137. He looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God! This means War!" You said, "Admiral, it has meant war for the past three months." #3 continued, "I must get word to #31", and picked up a message blank.

Then another idea entered his mind, and he said, "Does #53 know of this?" You replied, "Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (#77) was sent over ten minutes ago and should be on the General’s desk now."

#3 dropped the message blank and reached for the telephone.

(End of your tale.)

23. Can you verify or correct the foregoing?
24. Did #3 get #53 on the telephone and what did he say? [9933]
25. Were there any other witnesses; If so, who?
26. Did you tell #9 or #5, or anyone else?

(Incidentally, tell Admiral Halsey—when the time comes.)
27. Re your Item #15 and #16. What do you mean by "general security" (i.e. lack) late in spring? Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway? Incidentally, tell the full story of this to #42 and explain that #5 tried to stop the prosecution and attending publicity but #24 insisted (to give Publicity to himself and to #25) and was backed up by #29 and #28.
28. Do you know if any of the following were called as witnesses by #36?
   (a) #5
   (b) #9
   (c) #10
   (d) #6

29. Were the JD files in GZ custody or any message from these files ever submitted to #36?
30. Were #5, #9, #10, or anyone else, cautioned or warned, or instructed not to ever mention the events of #136 and #137 or the investigations conducted by #36? In this connection, I am sending you #35 by ordinary ship's mail.

[9934] I will comment on it in further correspondence.
31. Do you know when and how #53 first got the news of #75 and #76, and what action he took?
32. Same for #77 and #78.
33. Re my #14. I meant the conference on #137 between #3 and #53 which resulted in #89. I did not know of the other conferences and am delighted to learn of them. Can you add any names to those already given by you for:
34. The one in #2 office?
35. The one in #3 office?
36. The one "% Col. B."
37. The one between #3 and #53?
38. How much does #9 know?
39. Will #9 come through willingly?
40. What is your estimate of #5 in this respect?
41. Will he talk for #42?
42. What about #6?

COMMENT

With regard to the quotes of my Item 18 and your Items 18 and 19 (c), you were describing #80, of which we have copies of the original and its translation in the GZ files. This was sent and received on #137. I was asking about #74 which was broadcast at 0430 (EST) on #134 or #135. (Not sure of exact date.) It was heard by "M" and "W" and sent in by "S", "H", and "C", who listened for it. (I have this from the Station "A" files, plus statements of #19 and #23.) This message (in Morse) included the words—"Hirigashi no kazeame. Nishi no kaze hare. (Negative form of kita no kaze Kunori)" The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by #72 or #73, but was a mixture. The GY watch officer was not sure of it so he called you and you came in early and verified it. Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood (?) were waiting in my office when I came in that morning and said, "Here it is!" We had been waiting for it and Station "S" had been forwarding reams of P/L messages by teletype.

As a result of #74, #9 prepared #90—which was a very long message ending up with the translation and significance of the warning in #74. I read the message in #7's office and was witness to the discussion of it between #7 and #5. I took for granted that #90 would be sent and did not know otherwise until #132 (plus 2 years). I believe that I told you about this message and stated that it had been sent. Anyway, I was living in a fool's paradise from #134 to #137. I learned from #19 that #9 knew #90 had not been sent (#19 was informed by #9 at #92).

MORE QUESTIONS
43. Do you recall #74? [9936]
44. Did you know any or all of the circumstances of #90, how much, and when did you learn it?
45. When did #9 learn that #90 had not been released?
46. Do you know who blocked #90 or refused to release it? (#5 was pushing it but apparently did not feel he had the authority to release it himself.)
47. Can you throw any other light on the subject?

One final word—I do not know how well you knew #18. I have known him for 18 years. He can be trusted and will come through for us. Get in touch with him out there if you can.

Well, this is about enough for one installment. Please give my best regards to any of my friends that you may run into out there.

Sincerely,

/s/ L. F. Safford
L. F. Safford,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

Commander Alwin D. Kramer, U. S. N.,
COMSOPAC Staff, c/o F. P. O. San Francisco, Calif.

(Note.—Enclosed with the above letter dated January 22, 1944 were the following excerpts from an article in the Saturday Evening Post dated December 25, 1943.)

[9937]

Four-Star Sea Dog

By J. Bryan, III Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.

Cusser extraordinary, tattooed like any other gob, one-time owner of a parrot, bluff Buck Halsey, commander of our South Pacific Fleet, is the saltiest admiral of them all.

* * * * * * * * *

There is only one flaw in his role. When he retires, it won't be to the sailor's usual farm, but to Alexandria, Virginia. He bought a house there in 1939, but has never had time to live in it. His friends doubt his intentions "to play golf and do nothing else—nothing!" They believe that he will not relax until he has discharged a duty of his own assumption. They can cite the day, even the hour, when he assumed it—eight p. m. on December 8, 1941.

His flagship, the Enterprise, had reached Pearl Harbor that afternoon, and Halsey had stepped off his barge into a sucking undertow of accusations against Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, then commander in chief of the United States Fleet. "Sound asleep," the murmurs said. "Criminal negligence—court-martial—"

Halsey's devotion to Kimmel, an Annapolis classmate, is almost religious. He was shocked to see him cast as a scapegoat. When the Roberts Committee of Investigation asked Halsey how he, almost alone, happened to be ready for the Japanese attack, his answer was, "Because of one man—Admiral Kimmel." It would surprise none of Halsey's friends if, on retirement, he applied himself to Kimmel's exoneration.

(The above article also included a photograph of Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., with the following caption: "Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr., who restored public confidence in the Navy and gave a fearful drubbing to the mushrooming myth of Japanese invincibility," beneath which appeared the following typewritten note:)

January 19, 1944.

My dear Kramer: When the proper time comes, show the above to Admiral Halsey as a sort of letter of introduction. Assure him that his ambition will come true. And it will not be necessary for him to wait until his retirement to see Admiral Kimmel completely exonerated. But we will need Admiral Halsey's help. Do not hesitate to tell him everything.

Sincerely,

(S) L. F. Safford
L. F. Safford.
Air-mail code for personal correspondence, January 21, 1944

#1—Mr. Roosevelt
#2—Mr. Hull
#3—Ad. Stark
#4—Ad. Ingersoll
#5—Ad. Wilkinson
#6—Ad. T.
#7—Ad. N.
#8—Safford
#9—McCollum
#10—Kramer
#11—Mr. Knox (#11—first
#12—Linn
#13—
#14—
#15—Opnav
#16—Nav. Intell.
#17—Nav. Comm.
#18—Rochefort
#19—Wright
#20—Dyer
#21—Huckins
#22—Holtwick
#23—Mason
#24—Big JRR
#25—Little JRR
#26—Wenger
#27—Goggins
#28—Ad. King
#29—Ad. Horne
#30—Ad. Nimitz
#31—Ad. Kimmel
#32—Gen. Short
#33—Ad. Bloch
#34—Ad. Hart
#35—Roberts Report
#36—Roberts Commission
#37—Chief Justice Roberts
#38—Ad. Standley
#39—Ad. Reeves
#40—Gen. McCoy
#41—Gen. McNarney
#42—Admiral Halsey
#43—Ad. Beardall
#44—White House Aide
#45—Aide to CNO

#46—CincAF
#47—Com 16
#48—Comsopac
#49—Cincpac
#50—Com 14
#51—
#52—
#53—Gen. Marshall
#54—Deputy Chief of Staff
#55—D. M. I.
#56—D. W. P.
#57—C. S. O. (Gen. O.)
#58—Minekler
#59—Brattan (?)

#60—Dowd
#61—Mr. Stimson (#11 last)
#62—Rowlett
#63—Adjudant General
#64—Chief of Air Corps
#65—General Staff
#66—M. I. D.
#67—Signal Corps
#68—
#69—J-19
#70—Machine
#71—Minor System
#72—Circular #2353 (Sets up #74)
#73—Circular #2354 (Sets up #74)
#74—General Intelligence Broadcast containing false "Weather Report"
#75—Serial #901 (Sets up #902)
#76—Serial #902 (1-13) (The Works)
#77—Serial #902 (14) (The Finale)
#78—Serial #907 (1:00 p. m.)
#79—Circular #2400 (Sets up #80)
#80—Circular #2404 (PL code msg.)
#81—Tokyo Circular #
#82—Tokyo-Washington Serial #
#83—Washington-Tokyo Serial #
#84—Tokyo-Berlin Serial #
#85—Tokyo-Hsinking Serial #
#86—Hsinking-Hongkong Serial #
#87—Message sent on date indicated
#88—Message indicated by following ref. No.

[9939]  #89—*

** Message to #31 originated by #9 on #134 (or #133) but never released.
Air-mail code for personal correspondence, January 21, 1944—Continued

#116—Nov. 17, 1941
#117—Nov. 18, 1941
#118—Nov. 19, 1941
#119—Nov. 20, 1941
#120—Nov. 21, 1941
#121—Nov. 22, 1941
#122—Nov. 23, 1941
#123—Nov. 24, 1941
#124—Nov. 25, 1941
#125—Nov. 26, 1941
#126—Nov. 27, 1941
#127—Nov. 28, 1941

[9942] Senator Lucas. Well, I am not going to direct any questions to the witness on this letter of January 22. It is at some length and I think perhaps counsel should make some study of it over the noon hour and see whether there are any questions in it that are material and pertinent to ascertain.

Captain, I want to examine you just a moment or two on the first statement that you made in your statement to his committee. You state: "There was a winds message, it meant war and we knew it meant war."

Who do you include in that word "we"?

Captain Safford. The people who were working on magic and whom I was in close enough touch with to be able to know how they viewed it.

Senator Lucas. Name those people, please.

Captain Safford. That would be Kramer—myself first, Kramer, McCollum, Admiral Wilkinson, and possibly Admiral Noyes.

Senator Lucas. Possibly Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Now, those are the five that you have named here when you give out this statement that goes to the press of the country and you want the people of this country to know that you claim that this message meant war, and by that you would have to imply at least that they received the message and that they knew about it at the time. Is that [9943] what you want to tell the committee?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Is that it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. How can all these fellows be wrong, Captain, when they say they never saw this winds message?

Captain Safford. I cannot explain other people.

Senator Lucas. Well, you never had any trouble with Captain McCollum, did you?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. You were on good terms with him?

Captain Safford. Very good terms.

Senator Lucas. Was there any reason to believe that Captain McCollum would want to secrete or destroy this message?

Captain Safford. To the best of my knowledge and recollection Captain McCollum tried to send out a war warning as a result of that message.

Senator Lucas. Just answer my question now, Captain.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Repeat it for him, please.
(Question read.)

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Were you on friendly terms with Admiral Wilkinson?

[9944] Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you ever have any trouble with him at any time before December 7, 1941?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. He never gave you any orders that you could not execute. I take it?

Captain Safford. No, sir. I was not at all well acquainted with him. I had only known him for 10 weeks but we were on good terms.

Senator Lucas. Well, do you know of any reason why Admiral Wilkinson, a man who went out and did what he did in this war, would want to secrete or destroy or disturb an important message of this kind?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

[9945] Senator Lucas. Is that true of Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And Captain Kramer?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. You were on good terms with him?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. So there is no reason that you know of, of any kind, why these men, who all contend, as I understand from previous testimony, that they never saw the winds message, would want to do anything but what was the correct thing in order to prosecute the war successfully?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. They are loyal and highly patriotic Americans, all of them?

Captain Safford. Yes, all of them.

Senator Lucas. Now let me ask you this, following Congressman Clark’s questions: Do you have a suspicion that any of these men that you mentioned would destroy or secrete any of these messages?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. But you do have a suspicion toward Admiral Stark and General Marshall?

Captain Safford. I presume I have no proper basis for suspicion. I have no proper basis for suspicion against any individual.

Senator Lucas. Then you want to change your testimony that you gave awhile ago with respect to having that suspicion against Admiral Stark and General Marshall? I think I am correct in my understanding of your answer to Congressman Clark’s question. If I am not, you may correct me.

Captain Safford. I would like to change my answer to Congressman Clark’s question, and in reply to yours, that I have no suspicion directed against any individual who can be named.

The Vice Chairman. What was that answer?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)
Senator Lucas. We are now talking about the winds execute message?

Captain Safford. I am now talking about the winds execute message.

Senator Lucas. Congressman Clark asked you a series of questions along that line.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. You answered strictly in the negative until you got to the last question in regard to suspicion and your answer was in the affirmative, and you now desire to make a change in that.

The Vice Chairman. Will the Senator yield?


The Vice Chairman. I do not quite understand that kind of a reply, Captain. How can you suspect somebody that you cannot name?

Senator Lucas. He is changing it.

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to say you did not suspect anybody that you could name.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. What do you mean by that?

Captain Safford. Official records have disappeared from the files of the Navy Department, and that is a suspicious circumstance. I have no idea how they disappeared. It is a fact that they are not present and cannot be accounted for.

The Vice Chairman. Well, do you have any suspicion against anybody?

Captain Safford. I have no suspicion against any individual.

Senator Lucas. Well, if these files had been destroyed and you cannot account for them, then some one of these individuals that you named would have to be responsible for the destruction of them, would they not?

Captain Safford. Not necessarily.

Senator Lucas. Well, name others that would have the custody of the files to the point where they could get in and [9948] fool around with them.

Captain Safford. I can name nobody.

Senator Lucas. I see. Now you said a moment ago that there was no record that the FCC had ever telephoned or sent a written order to the Navy Department with respect to the false winds message—on December 6, was it?

Captain Safford. No; December 7, after the attack on Pearl Harbor. That is to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Senator Lucas. Well, you have made an examination of that, I take it?

Captain Safford. I have made an examination and I request to be furnished a written copy, if there was one, or a photograph. I requested that through Captain Walsh of the Navy Department several days ago, and there has been no reply.

Senator Lucas. Well, in your testimony on Saturday you indicated that there was apparently a conspiracy to get rid of this message. Then you must include the FCC record on this, must you not?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, would not that be true by implication, in view of the question asked you by Senator George, as to why the Japanese
would want to send out a similar message on December 7, I think it was, or the 8th, which was practically
[9949] the same message as the winds execute message, and then you said you made an examination of the FCC records and there was nothing there whatever to show that such a message was received?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. What did you say?

Captain Safford. I said that the Navy Department had received no notification of such a message either by telephone or in writing prior to the summer of 1944, to the best of my knowledge and belief, as far as I have been able to ascertain.

Senator Lucas. Do you believe the FCC received such a message?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; but the Navy Department did not know about it at the time.

Senator Lucas. And you do not believe that they telephoned?

Captain Safford. They telephoned to somebody in the Army; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. But they did not telephone to the Navy?

Captain Safford. I do not think that they telephoned to the Navy, and if they did there has been no record preserved of it and I never knew of it at that time.

Senator Lucas. Was there a written record that they [9950] telephoned or sent a copy of this message to the Army?

Captain Safford. There is in the files of the FCC.

Senator Lucas. There is in the files of the FCC?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. What about the Army files?

Captain Safford. To the best of my knowledge they had no record of receiving this telephone call. I may be wrong.

Senator Lucas. Receiving what?

Captain Safford. To the best of my knowledge the War Department had no record of receiving this telephone call from the FCC.

Senator Lucas. I am talking about whether or not there are any files in the Army that show that a report on the message had been received. You say there is not, to the best of your knowledge; is that correct?

Captain Safford. To the best of my knowledge. It was looked for, we will put it that way, a couple of years ago and nothing could be discovered.

Senator Lucas. I would like to ask counsel to see if they can find the FCC report on the false winds message of December 8, I believe it was, and whether or not the Army or the Navy has a copy of it in its files. If it is not here I would like to have you make a search. It is very important.

[9951] The Vice Chairman. It is now a little past 12. Do you want to complete, Senator?

Senator Lucas. I have a few more questions.

The Vice Chairman. It is now a little past twelve o'clock. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

Captain, please be back at that time.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee recessed until 2 p.m. of the same day.)
The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. Does counsel have anything at this point before the examination is resumed?

Mr. Richardson. I don't think so, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Do you have anything you want to present, Captain, before your examination is resumed?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY—(Resumed)

Senator Lucas. I may want to return to the line of questioning that I was following just before lunch, but I would like to talk to you for just a moment about another matter.

In this statement that you read to the committee you state on page one that, "this message was intercepted by the United States Navy at the big radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Md., which serves the Navy Department. When did you finally reach the conclusion, Captain, that this station was the one that did receive it?"

Captain Safford. That was a week ago, about, by the elimination of the other possibilities and by the confirmation of the fact by documentary evidence which I had just been able to see, that Cheltenham was in fact covering other messages broadcast from Tokyo, had received orders to monitor the winds message, at least to guard specific Tokyo broadcasts and had reported in writing that it was receiving those broadcasts. I had had nothing as strongly confirmatory as that since 1941.

Senator Lucas. What other stations could possibly have received this message?

Captain Safford. I had thought at the time that Winter Harbor, Maine—

Senator Lucas. I am not talking at the time. I am talking what you think today as a result of your latest investigation, what other stations do you believe, if there are any, that possibly could have received this?

Captain Safford. There was a possibility that it could have been heard at Amagansett, Long Island, and at Jupiter, Fla. The monthly reports—


Captain Safford. All right.

Senator Lucas. Those two are the only two stations, you believe, in the world that were monitoring messages at that time, that could have possibly received it?

Captain Safford. No, sir; those are the only ones in the United States Navy.

[9954] Senator Lucas. All right. Now, what other stations that were operating at that time that you knew about had the opportunity or the possibility of receiving it, at least?

Captain Safford. The British were operating a monitoring station at Halifax, which I was told about by a British officer who spent
about 2 weeks in my section in the spring of 1941. He was a liaison officer.

Senator Lucas. Was that station capable of receiving a message of this character?

Captain Safford. I don’t know whether they had any——

Senator Lucas. That is all I am interested in, just the stations that were capable of receiving a message of this kind throughout the world.

Captain Safford. The capability of any station to receive that message would depend upon whether the operators were capable of copying the Japanese Morse code. That is something that I do not know for any station outside those the United States Navy controlled.

Senator Lucas. From your previous experience in this particular department and from your careful investigation of the different messages that have come into these hearings from these various monitoring stations throughout the world do you know of any that were capable of deciphering the Morse code?

Captain Safford. I do not know what the qualifications of [9955] the operators at Halifax were or at other stations, outside of our own United States Navy controlled.

Senator Lucas. So outside of the two stations in the United States you do not know of any others in the world that were capable of receiving this message?

Captain Safford. I cannot specifically name any.

Senator Lucas. I understand. And the records of these two stations show that they did not, as I understand it, intercept a message of this kind on December the 5th?

Captain Safford. The record of those two other stations cannot be located. It is missing even today.

Senator Lucas. Well, are there are records of any kind, or from your investigation—as I understand it, you have pursued this rather vigorously—show that these stations ever received a message of that kind?

Captain Safford. There are no records from those stations of any sort which could be located in 1943 or at the present time.

Senator Lucas. What is the practice with respect to those records that come into these stations from time to time, about keeping them or destroying them? What do they do at these stations?

Captain Safford. The monthly reports were supposed to be retained for a permanent record in the Navy Department. [9956] Messages were submitted in duplicate. One set of messages was broken up for immediate use at the time and their identity lost. The other set of messages was supposed to be retained for permanent record.

Senator Lucas. Well, have you examined the various stations throughout the United States with respect to monthly reports?

Captain Safford. I have requested them and I have been informed that those monthly reports for November and December 1941 for those two stations, as well as all their intercepted messages of any nature, could not be located.

Senator Lucas. What about the other stations in the United States? What about their monthly reports?
Captain Safford. The remaining station of Winter Harbor, Maine, the monthly reports were located or at least were made available to me 2 months ago—I mean 2 weeks ago although they could not be located 2 years ago. However, none of the intercepted messages from Winter Harbor for this period can be located now, or 2 years ago. We have one more station, which is Bainbridge Island near Bremerton, Wash., and we have both the monthly reports and the complete file of intercepted messages.

Senator Lucas. Would there be any reason why these monthly reports, say, for November should not be sent in here [9957] to the Department?

Captain Safford. They were sent in and receipt was given by the Department, receipt was acknowledged by the Department, and if by any chance it miscarried in the mail a duplicate would be sent in from the station. The station kept a duplicate report and also a third set of messages which they held until after they had heard, after they had received word from the Navy Department that the previous report and previous messages had been received.

Senator Lucas. You have stated that the station at Singapore and the station at Australia, the station at Corregidor and the station at Java used both the voice and the Morse method in transmitting messages. Is that right?

Captain Safford. I believe I said I was doubtful as to which series they had listened for and indicated that by a question mark.

Senator Lucas. How about those at Corregidor? You just had Corregidor voice and Morse and the three remaining stations you do not know?

Captain Safford. Corregidor had voice and Morse and Pearl Harbor for voice only and the others I do not know whether they listened for one or the other or both.

Senator Lucas. Well, they could have received the message at Corregidor?

[9958] Captain Safford. They could have received the message at Corregidor.

Senator Lucas. And we were supposed to have the best men in the Pacific in every branch of the naval service there, were we not?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

[9959] Senator Lucas. On page 12 you said:

Kramer distinctly recalls that the winds message was shown to him by the GY watch officer after 8:30 a.m. on that date.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. You are sure that is not the false winds message that you are talking about here?

Captain Safford. Kramer told me that shortly before Christmas of 1945, either in his room or in the rotunda just outside of it.

Senator Lucas. When was that? Just before Christmas?

Captain Safford. Just before Christmas, during the early part of this investigation.

Senator Lucas. And you were talking about the winds execute message?

Captain Safford. We were talking about the winds execute message.
Senator Lucas. You are sure he knew what you were talking about?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Senator Lucas. You fellows did not know what you were talking about when you wrote that letter in December, I think it was, did you?

Captain Safford. We certainly knew what we were talking about this time.

[9962] Senator Lucas. You say this is a tip-off which would prevent the United States Pacific Fleet being surprised at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, if it was simply a war message and did not give any place of attack, how did you figure that?

Captain Safford. It gave a tip-off that we could expect war almost immediately.

Senator Lucas. Everybody knew that. It was testified around here that they all knew the war was imminent, as the result of messages received. You make the statement here that this was a tip-off in the event the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor. I would like to know what the basis of that was.

Captain Safford. This was positive to me, it was positive evidence that Japan was going to reject our terms as presented in the note of November 26 and declare war on the United States.

Senator Lucas. Well, you were very much excited about this message, too, were you not, when you got it?

Captain Safford. My main excitement had been as to the question of——

Senator Lucas. Well——

Captain Safford. Yes; I was.

[9961] Senator Lucas. I mean by that you were highly satisfied that you had received it?

Captain Safford. Highly satisfied that I had received it.

Senator Lucas. You knew war was imminent as the result of that message?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. You knew war was more imminent following the beginning of the receipt of the 14-part message, did you not?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. Notwithstanding that you knew war was imminent when you received the winds message, and notwithstanding you knew war was imminent when you received the beginning of the 14-part message, you left on Saturday, December 6, at 4:30, when this message was coming in, and you never knew any more about the 14-part message until after the bombs struck Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. You told Senator George that you knew war was imminent within 2 or 3 days after the receipt of this so-called winds message. Did you not believe that it was your duty to stay right around as close as it was possible from that time on, to see just what would happen?

Captain Safford. I had done everything I could do by [9962] 4:30 p. m., on Saturday, December 6.
Senator Lucas: You were not interested in whether they struck us or did not?

Captain Safford. I was very interested, but there was nothing I could do to help.

Senator Lucas. I only ask this question because under the heading "Distribution" you say:

I immediately sent the original of the winds message up to the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Noyes) by one of the officers serving under me and told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person, to track him down and not take "no" for an answer, and if he could not find him in a reasonable time to let me know.

You did not show the same concern about the 14-part message as you tell us you showed about this winds message?

Captain Safford. We had orders—no, sir.

Senator Lucas. In other words, you did not tell those delivering the winds message to track anybody down, that if they could not find the fellow to be sure to report back to you?

Captain Safford. Will you please repeat the question, sir?

Senator Lucas. I say you did not show the same concern about this 14-part message, which was a message that brought us closer to the peril than the winds message. That is a [9963] little difficult for me to understand. You knew these messages were coming in; you knew the significance of the few that you read, and you did not take the same precaution with the 14-part message, with the messengers, your couriers, or whatever it was, as you did with the winds message?

Captain Safford. It was not carrying out a precaution. We had direct orders from Admiral Noyes when the winds message came in to get it to him as soon as possible, to get it to him personally, and he was going to attend to the emergency distribution.

Senator Lucas. And you had no such order on the 14-part message?

Captain Safford. I had no such order on the 14-part. It was handled by Naval Intelligence in the customary manner.

Senator Lucas. All right. You did not testify before the Roberts Commission?

Captain Safford. I did not testify before the Roberts Commission.

Senator Lucas. You heard Justice Roberts testify that there was no winds message delivered to the commission, did you not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you believe him?

Captain Safford. I will believe him, as far as the [9964] statement is concerned.

Senator Lucas. What do you mean by that?

Captain Safford. Well, it is possible that his memory was not of the best on this. That was only one of many top-secret matters which were discussed and not made a matter of official record at that time.

Senator Lucas. You contended right along that this was probably the most important message you ever received. Don't you believe it would make an impression on Justice Roberts at that particular time and he would recall it?

Captain Safford. I thought it would.

Senator Lucas. You are not sure whether he saw it or whether he did not?
Captain Safford. I have no idea what was shown to or discussed with Mr. Roberts, or any of the other members of the Roberts Commission.

[9965] Senator Lucas. The only reason I ask this question, sir, is because you stated flatly that it was presented to the Roberts Commission, that it was being assembled by Admiral Noyes for being presented to the Roberts Commission, and that gives an indication, at least, that you believed this was presented to the Roberts Commission.

Captain Safford. That is what I was informed at the time—that these papers were being assembled to be shown to the Roberts Commission.

Senator Lucas. As far as you are concerned, you are not sure whether Roberts remembers whether it was in there or not?

Captain Safford. I have no idea whether he remembers that or whether he was ever shown it.

Senator Lucas. With respect to Captain McCollum, who was the head of the Intelligence Branch of the Far Eastern Division, and you were working very close to him, as I understand, you did not submit to him a copy of the so-called winds message at the time it came in?

Captain Safford. Not to him personally from me. It was handled through our liaison officer, who was Captain Kramer.

Senator Lucas. Do you now say Captain Kramer talked to McCollum about this so-called winds-execute message?

[9966] Captain Safford. I do not know what Captain Kramer ever said to Captain McCollum on the subject.

Senator Lucas. You sent the message direct to Noyes because he had requested you to do that?

Captain Safford. He had directed that that be done. It was an order, not a request.

Senator Lucas. Now, is that the only time that Noyes ever directed you, during the months of November and December, to send a special message of that kind to him?

Captain Safford. That is the only time that I ever recall at any time.

Senator Lucas. At any time? In the regular routine of affairs, McCollum would be the first fellow to get the message, would he not?

Captain Safford. The first man assigned from Kramer who had any responsibility for it. Kramer usually showed me the message on the way up to McCollum as a matter of convenience, to keep me posted, and also to see if he could explain the circumstances and significance clearly, so then they could ask him questions and he would have a clearer story to tell the other officers that he showed the messages to.

Senator Lucas. But you never talked to McCollum about this message at all?

[9967] Captain Safford. I never talked to McCollum about this message at all.

Senator Lucas. And McCollum was the man upon whom the Naval Intelligence depended for his proper evaluation of intelligence, as far as the Far East was concerned?
Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire, Captain.

Mr. Murphy. Captain Safford, I understand this morning you were shown a photostatic copy of a letter dated January 22, 1944, purporting to be signed by you, and, as I understand it you said you did sign that letter addressed "My dear Kramer-san."

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. That letter was dated January 22, 1944, was it not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I wish counsel would hand the witness a copy of the letter so I can go over it with him.

I would like to go over it with you, Captain. The letter which was shown to you this morning had certain omissions, did it not, certain blank spaces for certain numbers?

Captain Safford. I was not shown this letter that I have here. I was shown the letter that was sent, I believe, December 22 or 23.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that during the noon hour, we took the original letter which refers to names by number and prepared a copy of it where we retained the number but added the name of the person, so the letter could be read intelligently. That is the copy handed the witness. We could furnish the original photostat.

Mr. Murphy. I think that is important, in view of the testimony here, I think it is important to be shown the photostat. I would like to have him read the photostat.

Senator Lucas. Is this the copy that I have?

The Vice Chairman. I think the reporter took the photostat with him. It is probably not available at this time.

Mr. Murphy. It is important that we have it. In the meantime I am going to proceed with my examination.

Captain, as I understand it, you wrote a letter to Kramer, and then there was a separate code which you had with him whereby you had certain numbers and those numbers referred to certain individuals, and to certain incidents; that is right, isn't it?

Captain Safford. I sent him such a letter; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Who prepared the secret code?

Captain Safford. I did.

Mr. Murphy. You did.

Now, then, that secret code that you supplied to Kramer was to refer to certain incidents by way of intercepts, and also to refer to certain individuals; that is right, isn't it?

Captain Safford. That is right.

Mr. Murphy. Now, as I understand you, you said that you began preparation in this case because you thought you would be called as a witness for the prosecution against Admiral Kimmel.

Was that an accurate statement?

Captain Safford. Will you please repeat the question?

Mr. Murphy. Read the question, Mr. Reporter, please.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Captain Safford. That is a correct statement.
Mr. Murphy. Was that before or after you read the Roberts report that you felt you would be a witness for the prosecution?
Captain Safford. That was after I had read the Roberts report.
Mr. Murphy. What was that, please?

[9970] Captain Safford. It was after I had read the Roberts report.
Mr. Murphy. You still felt you would be called as a witness for the prosecution? Would that be a correct statement?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And you felt you were a prosecution witness?
Captain Safford. I expected to be called as a prosecution witness.
Mr. Murphy. And not a defense witness?
Captain Safford. Not a defense witness.
Mr. Murphy. And then you went about preparing the prosecution as against the defendant, isn't that correct?
Captain Safford. That is correct; yes.
Mr. Murphy. You sent a letter to Kramer and then, under separate enclosure, you sent the secret code, did you not?
Captain Safford. That is right.
Mr. Murphy. On January 22, 1944, you were preparing material as a prosecution witness. I repeat that because I want to emphasize it. Is that right?
Captain Safford. I was not preparing material as a prosecution witness in January 1944.
Mr. Murphy. When did you shift? I want to be fair with you now.

[9971] Captain Safford. I shifted at the time that I had definitely determined that the war warning message which I saw and read on the afternoon of December 4, 1941, at about 3 p.m., in Admiral Noyes office had not been sent out from the Navy Department.

Mr. Murphy. Will you tell us when you shifted from a prosecution to a defense witness? Give us the date, please. Up to this moment you have held yourself up as preparing yourself as a witness for the prosecution, and now you have just shifted to the defense.
Tell us when you shifted from a prosecution witness to a defense witness.
Captain Safford. About the middle of January 1944.

[9972] Mr. Murphy. Now where were you on Saturday night the 6th of December 1941? You were asked that question before and did not answer it, but I feel this committee is entitled to an answer from you, sir. Where were you and what did you do?
Captain Safford. I was out with my wife visiting friends, and I do not recall whom we saw that morning.
Mr. Murphy. Did you do any drinking?
Captain Safford. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. You were still in your pajamas the next afternoon at 2:20, having breakfast, on December 7, is that right?
Captain Safford. That is right.
Mr. Murphy. At 2:20 you were still in your pajamas having breakfast?
Captain Safford. That is right.
Mr. Murphy. Now the fact is that the 1 o'clock message was a very important tip-off, was it not?
Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. And the fact is further, Captain, that the man under you had the 1 o'clock message translated at 5 o'clock in the morning, did he not? Did not Brotherhood know what was in that message at 5 o'clock in the morning of the 7th?

[9973] Captain Safford. He knew what it meant before 7 o'clock.

Mr. Murphy. Did not he know at 5 o'clock what was in it?

Captain Safford. Not to my knowledge that early.

Mr. Murphy. Did not it take about 2 minutes to translate it?

Captain Safford. It took a little time to break it down into its Japanese.

Mr. Murphy. Is it not a fact that just shortly after 5 o'clock, of 7 hours before Pearl Harbor, in your department, while you were not in your department, they knew that the warning was given that 1 o'clock was the deadline? Isn't that right?

Captain Safford. Brotherhood did, that is correct.

Mr. Murphy. What is that?

Captain Safford. Brotherhood did.

Mr. Murphy. And Brotherhood was directly under you and you were responsible for your subordinate, weren't you?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Where were you at 5 o'clock in the morning?

Captain Safford. I was at home.

Mr. Murphy. At home. The fact is further that the 7th was the Navy day for translating, was it not?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. There was no interpreter who knew Japanese in your Department, was there?

Captain Safford. There was not.

Mr. Murphy. And you are over home at a time when you think war is coming, because you have told this committee that war was coming on Saturday or Sunday, you knew that there is going to be a time fixed which will fix the deadline and you leave on Saturday afternoon at 4:30, and you do not inquire as to anyone under you until after the war has started; that is right?

Captain Safford. That is right.

Mr. Murphy. And if you had followed your subordinates at 5 o'clock in the morning we would have known that 1 o'clock was the deadline, wouldn't we?

Will you answer that, please?

Captain Safford. My subordinate sent it over to the Army for translation. There had been a local arrangement made whereby the Army would provide a translator for the 7th because we had furnished the translations for the 6th, and that was sent over in accordance with those instructions from Kramer. Also Brotherhood called Kramer to tell him what was in and to be sure Kramer would come down.

[9975] Mr. Murphy. We are talking about you, in charge of 200 men. You, the witness before the committee, accusing everybody else of having heard. We are now talking about you.

The fact is that in your Department at 5 o'clock in the morning of Pearl Harbor Day your subordinates knew that 1 o'clock was the time for the delivery of this fatal message, didn't he?
Captain Safford. He thought, but he could not be sure. He was not a qualified Japanese translator.

Mr. Murphy. Did he not say that he knew what was in that message but he was not sure; is that right?

Captain Safford. I don't know what he said.

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that you had no interpreter there on the day you expected the war to start, did you? Kramer was a subordinate of yours. You had no interpreter there, did you?

Captain Safford. We had no interpreter there at the time.

Mr. Murphy. The 7th was the Navy's day?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And it was the day that you expected war to start, wasn't it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And you are still in pajamas having breakfast at 2 o'clock?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Do you have any sense of responsibility for the failure of this 1 o'clock message to get to the proper people in time? Do you feel responsible?

Captain Safford. Not in the least.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you are not responsible for the failure of the Brotherhood to do something about it when he knew it was 1 o'clock in the day at 5 o'clock in the morning and he knew the time of delivery? Why aren't you responsible? You are responsible for your subordinate aren't you?

Captain Safford. Three official naval investigations have listened to all the facts and none of them found me responsible.

Mr. Murphy. Not one of them have gone into this, have they? This is the first time you have been confronted with these questions, isn't it?

Captain Safford. I don't believe so.

Mr. Murphy. Whoever asked you about your responsibility and failure to be there on Sunday, whoever asked you that question before?

Captain Safford. That question was not specifically asked.

Mr. Murphy. You believe that the best defense is an attack, don't you?

Captain Safford. I believe that the best defense is telling the truth.

Mr. Murphy. Right.

Now, then, the fact is in all these investigations you have been talking about a so-called winds execute and nobody has questioned you as to your responsibility, since this 1 o'clock hour was known under you, directly under you, from 5 o'clock in the morning; isn't that right?

Captain Safford. Approximately 5 o'clock.

Mr. Murphy. Everybody is asking how soon General Marshall got it, and as I understand it, it was around 11:30, and how soon Admiral Stark got it, which was somewhere after 9:30 to 10:30, and your subordinate knew it at 5 o'clock in the morning, didn't he?

Captain Safford. Or maybe 6.

Mr. Murphy. You weren't concerned about your Department then, you were taking some time off on the day the war was to start; isn't that right?

Captain Safford. I was taking time out.
Mr. Murphy. You felt you had done all you could even though you knew that there was a definite time of delivering to be fixed when you left on that Saturday afternoon?

Captain Safford. That is right.

Mr. Murphy. Do you think if you had followed your Department or watched it closely on that dead-line day you wouldn't have seen there was somebody from 5 o'clock in the morning for 4 or 5 hours to translate it?

What do you say to that?

Captain Safford. If I had seen that message at 5 or 6 a.m. on the 7th, all I could have done was put in a telephone call for Kramer to come down.

Mr. Murphy. The fact is you or somebody would have seen that 1 o'clock was significant because that was sunrise at Pearl Harbor, wasn't it? You knew that?

Captain Safford. I knew that.

Mr. Murphy. It was your department that had it from 5 o'clock until at least some time about 9:30 or 10:30 before it got to your people, wasn't it?

Captain Safford. We sent it over to the War Department about 7 o'clock for translation. They had from 7 o'clock until the translation was returned.

Mr. Murphy. And your department, when you knew, and you say you knew 3 days before that war was coming on Sunday, your Department on the day that war was supposed to start has no interpreter on hand at all to handle the Navy's obligation, which was to translate the messages on Sunday, December 7? That is right, isn't it?

Captain Safford. On a matter of technicalities naval intelligence was entirely responsible for translation. Not naval communications.

Mr. Murphy. Will you please answer my question. Your department knew, did they not, and didn't you know, that there wasn't a translator on hand to translate anything in Japanese on the day that you knew the war going to start? You say you are the only one in Washington now that recognizes the—withdraw that. You are the one who says that you knew 3 days before that war would start on Sunday, and you are responsible for the communications, and you said you saw every translation. The fact is that in that department, sir, there wasn't a person on the day that you expected war to start to translate a word of Japanese, was there?

Captain Safford. Not until Kramer came down about 8 a.m.

Mr. Murphy. From 5 o'clock until 8 o'clock there was no one in your department on that day that war was going to start?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. So that is 3 hours, isn't it?

In other words, you blamed the Americans because you said the Japanese had given a certain notice, as I recall, but you didn't say anything about the 3 hours in your department did you?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, Captain, let me go over this letter with you, if you will, please.
And as soon as we come to anything that you feel is not correct, sir, please stop me.

My Dear Kramer-san: Thanks for your very prompt reply. I did not receive your December 23 letter till January 17, and had almost given up hopes. What a break for you, as well as the cause, to be ordered to Admiral Halsey's staff. I can see the hand of Providence in it.

What cause? My question is, What cause? You say "as well as the cause."

What a break for you, as well as the cause.

What was the cause?

Captain Safford. I didn't know if Kramer would understand that or not.

Mr. Murphy. Will you please tell us, sir. They are your words. What cause, please?

[9081] Captain Safford. I meant the cause of Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you were bending every effort to have Admiral Kimmel freed, weren't you?

Captain Safford. At that time.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Now, after December 7, 1941, you did not remain in Washington, did you?

Captain Safford. I was attached to the Navy Department throughout that period.

Mr. Murphy. Were you on the New Mexico?

Captain Safford. I was on the New Mexico from about 1934 to 1936.

Mr. Murphy. Then you have not left Washington from December 7, 1941, for official assignment until today?

Captain Safford. Except on temporary duty.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate we proceed:

I am sending by separate cover (airmail) a condensation code to use. If you want to add to it, use Nos. 151-200, inclusive. I would like to hold it down to a single sheet of paper. I am also sending by ordinary mail a copy of #35——

which was the Roberts report, was it not?

Captain Safford. That is right.

[9082] Mr. Murphy. (reading):

And a clipping to give to #42——

What was Admiral Halsey, was it not?

Captain Safford. That is right.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

At some auspicious occasion. You will understand this letter better when they arrive.

What was the clipping?

Captain Safford. That was a clipping from the Saturday Evening Post.

Mr. Murphy. About what?

Captain Safford. It was an article about Admiral Halsey which had been written by a Reserve officer who, I think, was on his staff.

Mr. Murphy. In which you learned Admiral Halsey had said, sir, that he would devote his life after retirement to having Kimmel freed; is that right?
Captain Safford. Right.
Mr. Murphy. You wanted to send that clipping to him and have Kramer turn it over; right?
Captain Safford. Right.
Mr. Murphy. Now, the next paragraph:

With regard to taking #42 (Admiral Halsey) into confidence wait patiently for the proper moment, and then shoot the works. Tell him everything he will listen to, and show him whatever documentary proof you may have. Use your own judgment and don't force the issue. Do as good a job as you did on #136 (December 6, 1941) —

What job did he do on that?

Captain Safford. The distribution of that message to the various people for whom the Navy Department was responsible.

Mr. Murphy. Right. And it follows:

and #137 (December 7, 1941).

Captain Safford. That is the same thing.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

In my opinion, the proper moment for disclosure would be any of the following:

(a) #42 (Admiral Halsey) is detached from Sopac —

That is the South Pacific?

Captain Safford. Correct.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

(b) #5 (Admiral Wilkinson) is detached from Sopac;

(c) #10 (Kramer) is detached from Sopac;

(d) #9 (McCollum) calls on #42 (Admiral Halsey) or #10 (Kramer);

(e) #18 (Rochefort) calls on #42 (Admiral Halsey) or #9 (Kramer) —

At that time you had become counsel for the defense, had you not, an advocate for the defense instead of a witness, hadn't you? Is that a fair statement?

Captain Safford. That is a fair statement.

Mr. Murphy. You were planning and plotting then different ways of getting evidence to prepare for a defense when the occasion arose; isn't that right?

Captain Safford. That is right.

Mr. Murphy. Next:

(f) #42 (Admiral Halsey) discusses #31 (Admiral Kimmel) on attack on #02 (Pearl Harbor) in your presence;

In other words, you were telling Kramer to wait for the auspicious moment when he might get Halsey's ear and then start to work together with Halsey: isn't that right?

Captain Safford. That is right.

Mr. Murphy. Next.

(g) #42 (Admiral Halsey) asks you the reasons for the alleged failure of 20-G to know what was going on —

That would be Kramer that you were suggesting?

Captain Safford. That is right.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

(h) #137 (December 7, 1941) (plus 3 years);

(i) #6 (Admiral Turner) visits #42 (Admiral Halsey);

(j) #42 (Admiral Halsey) visits #6 (Admiral Turner).
The next paragraph.

Be prudent and be patient. I am just beginning to get things lined up on this end.

By that you mean what?
Captain Safford. By finding out what happened.
Mr. Murphy. Finding out what happened, or lining up evidence?
Captain Safford. Lining up evidence. Not witnesses.
Mr. Murphy. Not necessarily what happened, but lining up evidence?
Captain Safford. Evidence.
Mr. Murphy. Not necessarily what actually happened, but evidence; isn't that right?
That is a keen question, now. Think before your answer it.
Captain Safford. Evidence is the answer I want to make.
Mr. Murphy. What is it?
Captain Safford. Evidence is the answer I want to make.
Mr. Murphy. Do you understand the distinction between the two now? That is an important question. Do you understand the question?
[9986] Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And you want to make the answer "evidence"?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy (reading):
No one in #15 (Opnav) can be trusted.
Will you give us who you felt was not worthy of trust in the Navy of the United States during the course of the war on January 22, 1944?
Captain Safford. That is a rash statement; I will not expand it.
Mr. Murphy. It is a rash statement, is it?
Captain Safford. Yes.
Mr. Murphy (reading):
No one in #15 (Opnav) can be trusted, said you.
Did you mean also Admiral King, at that time? Wasn't he in Opnav?
Captain Safford. No; he was commander in chief, U. S. Fleet and was not in Opnav.
Mr. Murphy. Tell us who was in Opnav who could not be trusted, even though it is a rash statement? You made a lot of statements here, sir. Let's find out who couldn't be trusted.
Please give us some names.
Who do you mean then couldn't be trusted on January 22, 1944?
[9987] Captain Safford. I will not give any names.
Mr. Murphy. You will not? You refuse! I ask you to tell us. You are now under oath. Please tell us, sir, who you say there cannot be trusted, because, sir, that is an important accusation. It is an accusation against one of the important departments of the United States Navy during the war.
You were making assertions. This is going into the papers of the country as well as are your other statements.
You say "they cannot be trusted." Who were you saying could not be trusted?
Names, please.
Who could not be trusted?
Senator Lucas. He says all of them.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to have names.
Here is a man making an accusation in writing. This is going to the papers.
You, sir, a captain in the United States Navy, say:
No one in No. 15 (Opnav) can be trusted.
Who did you mean?
I don’t want any sweeping statement. We are going to get down to details. Who could not be trusted?
Names, please.
I am still waiting. Waiting. Will you please give us the names as to who could not be trusted in Opnav?
Please, sir.
What did you mean by saying no one in No. 15, Opnav, can be trusted?
The Chairman. Do you wish to answer?
Captain Safford. I would prefer not to answer.
The Chairman. Do you want to refresh your recollection about the names?
Captain Safford. I prefer not to answer.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I submit when an officer of the United States Navy, a captain, who has made some statements before the committee over the past 3 days, says “No one in Opnav can be trusted,” in view of the statements of this morning, should be obliged to answer.
Senator Lucas. This was made in January 1944?
Mr. Murphy. 1944; during the course of the war.
The Chairman. The Chair thinks you should answer if you can answer. We are trying to hold these hearings in public without concealing anything, and it occurs to the Chair that you have no more right to conceal anything than any other witness, or the committee itself has a right to conceal anything that is pertinent.
Captain Safford. That was a private letter to Commander Kramer.
[9889] The Chairman. It was a private letter, but it pertained to public business, and a very pertinent inquiry which we are undertaking to go into. It raises the question of whether any letter of that sort can be regarded as privileged.
Mr. Murphy. I think, Mr. Chairman, it is also pertinent, because it shows the state of mind of the witness.
You have made certain accusations against others. Now here is another one. You say they cannot be trusted.
You refuse to answer?
Captain Safford. I would rather not mention any names.
Mr. Murphy. But, sir, a statement is going out to the papers of the country. You said no one in Opnav could be trusted. That would include everybody in it. Do you mean that there wasn’t one single person in Opnav? What did you mean by Opnav? What was Opnav?
Captain Safford. Opnav is Naval Operations.
Mr. Murphy. Now, did you mean—I will try to help you—did you mean that there wasn’t one person in Navy Operations on January 22, 1944, worthy of trust?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. What did you mean? What did you mean?

Captain Safford. I meant that there was no one that I knew of that I desired to confide this information to.

Mr. Murphy. Who would work with you; is that right?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. The next sentence:

Premature action would only tip off the people who framed #31 (Admiral Kimmel) and #32 (General Short) and will also get #8 (Safford) and #10 (Kramer) into very serious trouble.

What did you mean by that? How would it get Safford into trouble if he was doing the right thing?

Will you answer that, sir?

Still waiting.

The Chairman. Go ahead. Answer if you can. You must have some sort of an answer to that.

Captain Safford. What I meant was that nothing should be done in the way of making any statement or anything of that sort until the expected court martial, or the expected investigation at that time which had been directed by Congress had taken place, so I could come on the witness stand, or Kramer could come on the witness stand and present the facts.

Mr. Murphy. And spring a surprise; is that right?

Captain Safford. Not necessarily.

Mr. Murphy. What is it?

Captain Safford. Not necessarily.

Mr. Murphy. How would you get into trouble, what trouble could you get into for telling the truth, if you were telling the truth? Who would make trouble for you?

Captain Safford. I was standing almost alone at that time.

Mr. Murphy. Who would make trouble for you, sir?

Captain Safford. Anyone who doubted the accuracy of my statements.

Mr. Murphy. You say:

Premature action would only tip off the people who framed Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Who did the framing of Admiral Kimmel and General Short?

Name names, please.

That also is a serious accusation.

Names.

Do you know that to frame anybody is one of the meanest and lowest crimes?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you say some people did frame these two people, Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Who framed them?

Captain Safford. I do not know.

Mr. Murphy. Whom do you refer to and whom are you cautioning Kramer against?

[9992] Premature action would only tip off the people who framed Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
Whom were you referring to?

Captain Safford. I was referring to the War and Navy Departments in general, but not to any specific individual that I can identify.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, you wouldn't accuse the whole War and Navy Departments with the stigma of the vile crime of framing anybody? Can you narrow it down?

Captain Safford. Well, I will narrow it down to the people concerned, the General Staff and officers.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you felt that the General Staff of the United States Army under General Marshall, and the General Staff of the Navy under Admiral Stark had framed Kimmel and Short; is that right?

Captain Safford. I felt that way.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Would you include anybody else?

Captain Safford. No.

Mr. Murphy. Well, what about Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves, both distinguished and able officers of the United States Navy with long and honored careers?

This is after you had read the Roberts report. Did you feel that they, too, were in on the framing?

Captain Safford. No, sir. I had served under both of them.

Mr. Murphy. What is that?

Captain Safford. No, sir. I had served under both of them.

Mr. Murphy. Well, do you feel the Roberts report was a fair one, and an honest one?

Captain Safford. From the testimony which I have read, and their interpretation as given by Justice Roberts, I do.

Mr. Murphy. In other words—

The Chairman. You do what?

Captain Safford. I feel that the Roberts report was a fair report.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Murphy. I go on.

Yet we must have the backing, the rank, and the prestige afforded by #42 (Admiral Halsey).

What did you mean by that, "We must have the backing, the rank, and prestige afforded by Admiral Halsey."

Captain Safford. I meant Kramer and I could do nothing by ourselves.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

Tell #42 (Admiral Halsey) that I knew #31 (Admiral Kimmel) was a scapegoat from the start, but I did not suspect that he was the victim of a frame-up until about #114 (November 15, 1941) plus 2 years——

In other words, you have just said you agreed with the Roberts report.

You now say, in this sentence, that you knew he was a scapegoat.

Do you think those two are consistent?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. You do?

Captain Safford. I do.

Mr. Murphy. And you repeat then that he is the victim of a frame-up and you found out he was a victim of a frame-up on November 15, 1941. What facts lead to that conclusion?
Captain Safford. I said I did not even suspicion him until then.

Mr. Murphy. What led to your suspicion?

Pardon me. There was something left out there:

until about #114 November 15, 1941 (plus 2 years)—

Did I read that?

Captain Safford. I thought you did.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Will you tell us what led to your suspicion? What led to the suspicion at that time?

Captain Safford. That was the discovery that we could find no copy of the winds message or any intercepted messages from the East Coast intercept stations, and plus the fact that there was no mention in the Roberts report anywhere about the warning message which I saw on December 4 and described to this committee but did not get sent.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, the Roberts report apparently approached the proposition from this way, what did Admiral Kimmel and General Short do with the information they had. You understand?

Captain Safford. I do.

Mr. Murphy. And they concluded from what they actually had, certain things that followed. You said you thought that was a fair report; is that right?

Captain Safford. That is right.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you feel, I take it, that if certain information had been sent to them, added information, the result would have been different; is that right?

Captain Safford. Is that right.

Mr. Murphy. Let me go on with your next sentence. You say you had that suspicion in November 1941 plus 2 years. You say:

could not confirm it until #132 (December 2, 1941) (plus 2 years), and did not have absolute proof until about January 18, 1944. #8 (Safford) has overwhelming proof of the guilt of #15 (Opnav) and #65 (General Staff) plus a list of about 15 reliable witnesses.

Will you give this committee your evidence of the overwhelming proof of the guilt of Opnav and the General Staff?

Captain Safford. I was referring to the winds execute which had been received and no action taken on it.

Mr. Murphy. You said this morning, sir, right before the noon recess, and after this letter had been shown to you, [9997] as I recall it—you saw that letter earlier, didn’t you?

Captain Safford. I did not see this particular letter. This had been introduced as evidence but I had not seen it.

Mr. Murphy. All right. You didn’t know we had that one, did you?

Captain Safford. I saw a letter introduced as evidence. I had not read it.

Mr. Murphy. You didn’t know the committee had this letter or that it was in existence, did you?

Captain Safford. I didn’t know you had it before you.

Mr. Murphy. You thought it was destroyed, didn’t you? This letter?

Captain Safford. My copy had been destroyed.

Mr. Murphy. You never expected Kramer to produce it, did you? I mean this morning.
This morning, when you were testifying in answer to Judge Clark and Senator Lucas you didn't expect this letter would ever turn up, did you?

Captain Safford. I did not know anything about this letter. In fact, I never thought about it.

Mr. Murphy. Before the noon recess you said to Senator Lucas that you wanted to change your testimony, that you didn't want to say that you had a suspicion directed to Admiral Stark and General Marshall, and here you say you have absolute proof, overwhelming proof, you say "and did not have absolute proof until about January 18, 1944."

Then you have "overwhelming proof of the guilt of OpNav and the General Staff."

What do you want to do with your statement just before the noon recess in view of that?

Which one do you stand on, your answer to Judge Clark or your answer to Senator Lucas?

Captain Safford. I will stand on the answer to Senator Lucas.

Mr. Murphy. Will you outline to this committee all of the evidence you have in the way of absolute proof and overwhelming proof of the guilt OpNav and the General Staff in addition to what you say is the failure to find a winds execute in the files?

Is that what you call absolute proof and overwhelming proof of the guilt of all of the members of the staff of the Army and the Navy?

Captain Safford. That plus the disappearance of official documents.

Mr. Murphy. Which documents, outline them, please.

Captain Safford. Which I have referred to.

Mr. Murphy. In connection with this examination I would like to have you outline them, because I want to go to them.

[9999] Captain Safford. There was the document JD–1 No. 7001.

Mr. Murphy. What else?

Captain Safford. And at that time there were no reports from any of the four East Coast intercept stations which could be located. Two are still missing. Two have subsequently made their appearance. And all the intercepted message files from those four stations were missing then and are still missing.

Mr. Murphy. What does "S" mean? What station?


Mr. Murphy. What?


Mr. Murphy. Let me go on a little bit and then I will come back:

Please answer the following questions by Item No.—

Senator Lucas. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Did the witness name the 15 witnesses?

Mr. Murphy. I beg pardon. I want to go to that.

You say:

—plus a list of about 15 reliable witnesses.

Will you let the committee have what you are referring to there, that you told Kramer you had, so we might look them over. [10000]
Captain Safford. These were all witnesses or people who had told me at this time, by that time, that they know of the receipt of the winds execute message.

Mr. Murphy. Will you please give us the names?

Captain Safford. I cannot give them to you from memory but I did give them, I believe, in my testimony to Admiral Hart.

Mr. Murphy. You gave Admiral Hart a list of 15 reliable witnesses; is that right? And the same ones who were referred to when you wrote Kramer?

Captain Safford. I believe so.

Mr. Murphy. Do you know of one witness now who will corroborate you, one reliable witness?

Captain Safford. I do not know what any other witness will say.

Mr. Murphy. Well, do you have the name of any single witness now, who is a reliable witness, who can give anything in the way of absolute proof or overwhelming proof of the guilt of OpNav and the General Staff; one witness?

You said you had 15 of them. Give us one now.

Captain Safford. I can't give you any specific name now other than those I have given in previous testimony.

Mr. Murphy. Do you still say those 15 will corroborate you and give proof of the guilt of OpNav and the General Staff in the light of the evidence as of today, do you say they will corroborate you?

Captain Safford. Some of them won't very definitely.

Mr. Murphy. Well, will any of them, a single one of them?

Captain Safford. I would rather not attempt to estimate what any other witness is going to say on the stand.

Mr. Murphy. You say this is extremely important and you want the truth. You said you hoped this would be the last investigation. We want the truth. Why won't you give us the name of one witness that you say will corroborate you, if you know of one? All we are looking for is the truth. Let the chips fall where they may.

Do you understand my question now? You have been shown the Hart testimony and reference is made to page——

Captain Safford. 362.

Mr. Murphy. And my question is now: Can you give to the committee the name of a single witness out of the 15 whom you said were reliable on January 22, 1944 to furnish absolute proof or overwhelming proof or any proof of the guilt of OpNav and the General Staff of the United States Army?

Have you some names?

[10002] Captain Safford. I have names from the people who were listed in the testimony before Admiral Hart who I believe will give me some support if not complete support.

Mr. Murphy. All right; those names.

Captain Safford. Kramer, A. D. Kramer, United States Navy.

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Captain Safford. Colonel Moses Pettigrew.

Mr. Murphy. Pettigrew.


Mr. Murphy. Sadler.

Captain Safford. Colonel R. S. Bratton.
Mr. Murphy. Anybody else?
These are witnesses who have proof of the guilt of OpNav and the General Staff of the Army. Does that conclude the list?
Captain Safford. That concludes all the list I can give you.
Mr. Murphy. What happened to the other 11? Are they no longer reliable?
Captain Safford. They no longer make the same statements they did two years ago.
Mr. Murphy. Well, does Sadtler make the same statement that he—did he ever make a statement about the guilt of say General Marshall? Did Sadtler ever say anything to you that he felt General Marshall had violated the criminal laws of the United States?
Captain Safford. Colonel Sadtler did not directly.
[10003] Mr. Murphy. What did he say that would make you think that he believed General Marshall, General Gerow, and the other generals would commit crime by ordering the destruction of—withdraw that.
What did he say that would lead you to believe that those men were guilty of what you were referring to in this letter to Kramer? I am speaking of Sadtler.
Captain Safford. I cannot estimate anything that Colonel Sadtler will say specifically.
Mr. Murphy. Well, what do you have to offer to the committee by way of generalization as to what he might say that will prove the guilt of the General Staff of the Army? Have you any lead? Have you any suggestion? Have you any idea, that led you to believe that they will testify and support you and corroborate you as to the guilt of the General Staff of the Army?
Upon what do you base your statement here today that these men would corroborate you? This is going into the papers, the statement that you made that four men will corroborate you in these charges.
Captain Safford. Colonel Sadtler knew of the winds execute.
Mr. Murphy. What else? You say he would give us some evidence of guilt of the General Staff.
[10005] That is part of the picture. You say he knew of the execute.
Captain Safford. That there had been an execute of the winds message in the middle of the week, that is, on the 4th or 5th of December 1941, and prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Murphy. What will he say about the guilt of General Marshall or anybody on the staff, if you know?
Captain Safford. I believe that Colonel Sadtler knows about the destruction of the official documents in the War Department.
Mr. Murphy. Did you ever discuss that subject with him?
Captain Safford. I never discussed it.
Mr. Murphy. You are just imaging that, are you, that he knows that?
Have you any basis for it?
You say you believe he knows. What is the basis for your belief?
He knows about the destruction of the records in the War Department.
Captain Safford. Only what Mr. Friedman told me.
Mr. Murphy. You are basing it all on Friedman?

Captain Safford. What Friedman told me.

Mr. Murphy. Have you seen the Clarke report?

Captain Safford. No.

[10006] Mr. Murphy. Have we the Clarke report?

I would like to call your attention to the testimony of Mr. Friedman, to whom you refer.

Haven’t you learned that the Clarke report went into that whole matter and came to the conclusion that there was absolutely no foundation for that charge?

Captain Safford. I never heard of the Clarke report until this present investigation. I have never known there was such a thing.

Mr. Murphy. Well, there has been a lot of testimony about it—a lot of questions asked about it.

Captain Safford. I heard something about it here in this room.

Mr. Murphy. I ask counsel to get that. I will come back to it, about Mr. Friedman, and show you exactly what he said.

What about Colonel Pettigrew, what evidence can he give, do you believe, as to the guilt of the General Staff?

Captain Safford. Colonel Pettigrew, I believe, made an affidavit to Colonel Clausen that he saw a written copy of the winds execute which had come over from the Navy. This was about the 4th or 5th of December 1941.

Mr. Murphy. What evidence can he give as to the guilt of the General Staff?

[10007] You see, there is quite a difference between the alleged or actual existence of a winds execute and the violation of the criminal laws of the country in destruction or pilferage, stealing from the files.

What evidence can he give on that subject? You say he is a reliable witness as to the guilt of the General Staff of the Army.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to object, but aren’t Colonel Sadtler and Colonel Pettigrew and these other people going to be witnesses, and won’t their testimony be the best that this committee can get as to what they are going to testify, instead of speculateing as to what this witness may think they will say?

Mr. Murphy. This man has made statements in the record.

The Vice Chairman. The Chair is of the opinion that the inquiry of Mr. Murphy is entirely proper.

Mr. Murphy. Will you tell us?

Captain Safford. What Colonel Pettigrew knows beyond the winds message, I do not know.

Mr. Murphy. What does Colonel Bratton know about the guilt of the General Staff?

Captain Safford. Colonel Bratton knows about the receipt of the winds execute and about his attempts to get a warning sent out to General Short.

[10008] Mr. Murphy. You say he knew about the execute, about the winds execute?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. On what day?

Captain Safford. About the 4th or 5th of December 1941.

Mr. Murphy. How do you explain the fact that General Miles sent a message, which we have before us, out to Hawaii to the G-2, on the
5th of December, asking them to inquire of Rochefort of the Navy if he knows anything about the weather business?
And may we have that exactly so we can put it before the witness?
I am speaking about the message of December 5 from General Miles to G-2 in Hawaii, asking him to look into the questions of the winds execute with reference to weather.
The Vice Chairman. It is not in Exhibit 1.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Masten, do you have the dispatch from Miles to G-2 in Hawaii on the 5th of December, the Rochefort message?

[10009] Mr. Richardson. He has it.
Mr. Murphy. I am referring now to—Exhibit 32, is it?
Mr. Richardson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Exhibit 32, page 20. [Reading:]

Sent No. 51, 12/5

Assistant Chief of Staff,
Headquarters, G2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii:

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather Miles.

If there had been an execute on the 4th, as you say, and if Bratton knew about it, and this was certainly long before any destruction of papers, this was before anybody could possibly have slipped up, how do you account for this message?

Captain Safford. Colonel Bratton indicated in his testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board investigation when questioned upon that point by General Grunert that that was the only way he could get word out to General Short that the winds execute had been sent.

Mr. Murphy. Do you know of any page where he said anything that would suggest that? You say he was sending [10010] this out to inform Hawaii that there had been a winds execute?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Is there anything that would lead you as a communications expert to even slightly indicate that or suggest it? How in heaven's name could anybody get that out of that message, will you tell us?

Captain Safford. It is not in the message. He said he thought that Rochefort had it and that his man would get the news as soon as he contacted Rochefort.

Mr. Murphy. Do you have any idea where anything like that can be found, in what evidence, before what board?

Captain Safford. The Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Mr. Murphy. Do you have Bratton's testimony? I have part of it here. I have just a part of it here. Will you give me the page—

Senator Ferguson. I have it.

Mr. Murphy. You have it?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Here it is.

Mr. Murphy. Do you have any idea where anything like that can be found in that record? I have read quite a few pages out of it and I haven't found it. Have you found it, or do you know where it is?

Captain Safford. I believe it is the last time Colonel [10011] Bratton testified. He appeared two or three times.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Masten, will you look through it in the meantime and I will go on?

Senator Lucas. Before the Congressman goes on to the next question will you yield?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, surely.

Senator Lucas. As I recall, the captain this morning told me that when he wrote the letter to Captain Kramer on December the 28, 1943, that at that time you had not considered the winds message, at all because it was not in controversy.

Captain Safford. We expected that it would turn up. I merely asked him did he know what happened to it.

Senator Lucas. Yes. The point I am making is you did not at any time discuss the winds message with anyone because it was not in controversy at that time. That is what you told me this morning, outside of the one at that time when you saw it in the files and it was being prepared by someone for the Roberts Commission; I think that is what you said.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. That is your testimony. Now, you say here that you did not have absolute proof of it until about January 18 and I think you told Congressman Murphy that was the winds execute message that you were talking about.

[10012] Captain Safford. No; that was referring to this warning message, to this other warning message which I had seen and which was not sent; which I had seen and thought was sent but that had not been sent.

Senator Lucas. Well, you were talking then, when you said you had no absolute proof of it about January 18, you were talking there about the memorandum that McCollum prepared for Admiral Wilkinson?

Captain Safford. This was not a memorandum. This was a regular message on a regular message blank and only required the signature of someone in authority to be sent.

Senator Lucas. That is, the McCollum message is what you were talking about?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. I misunderstood you, sir. I thought you were talking about the winds execute.

Mr. Murphy. Have you finished, Senator?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

[10013] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, this is a little irregular, but I wondered if anyone would have any objection? I refer to page 62 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Colonel Bratton testifying:

There were several codes sent out by the Japanese foreign office at about this time, to their diplomatic officials abroad, which they hoped to use in the case or in the event of a sudden rupture of communications. There were several versions of this wind and weather code sent out. I discussed these codes with my opposite number in the O. N. I, Commander McCollum, on a number of occasions. Learning from him that they were monitoring the Japanese communication system in Honolulu as a function of naval communications, and learning also from him that their expert there was a Commander Rochefort, who was thoroughly familiar with the whole matter, I deemed it advisable, on or about
the 5th of December, to have our G-2 in Honolulu contact Commander Rochefort, with the end in view that the latter could explain to G-2 what it was we were waiting for, and could explain to him orally, with complete security, the significance of the message. G-2 did send a message.

Now, then, I am going to page 284, Top Secret Army Pearl Harbor Board, volume D.

[10014] I discovered from Commander McCollum that their S. I. S. man in Honolulu, a Commander Rochefort, knew everything that we did about this, had all the information that we had, and was listening for this Japanese weather broadcast. He suggested that as a way out of our difficulty I instructed our G-2 in Hawaii to go to Rochefort at once and have a talk with him, as in a short period of time Rochefort could tell Colonel Fielder, our G-2, exactly what was going on and what we knew.

Do you take it from that that Bratton felt there was a winds execute and that was his indirect way of telling Hawaii?

Captain Safford. There is more than that in the record.

Mr. Murphy. Well, what do you refer to, I mean anything in particular?

Captain Safford. General Grunert, I believe, asked him why he sent the second Miles' message and there was about a half a page of testimony from that point.

Mr. Murphy. Well, will counsel look for that?

The Vice Chairman. He said about a half a page further on.

Mr. Murphy. Oh, half a page from this point. I thought it was somewhere else.

Captain Safford. About a half a page of testimony trying to get the second Mile message.

[10015] Mr. Murphy. Let me read on:

I managed to get General Miles to O. K. this message to G-2 in Hawaii because he and I both thought that we could get that message out without violating any of the policies that were then in effect about getting concurrences from OPD.

I also had a message sent to the Canal Zone on the night of the 5th, to the G-2 out there. I had forgotten about this message until I found it in the file this morning. The document that I lay before you now is in the files of G-2. It is a paraphrase of an outgoing message, No. 512, sent December 5, 1941, to G-2, Panama Canal Department. It reads as follows: 

"(Message dated December 5, 1941, to G-2, Panama Canal Department, is as follows:) "In the event severance of diplomatic relations is near, this office will notify you. Japanese-U. S. relations are now very difficult."

Signed "Miles." Would that make you think that on the 5th he knew there was a winds execute in view of that dispatch to Panama?

Captain Safford. That is not what I was referring to. There is more beyond that.

Mr. Murphy. Well, let me ask you about that. Here is a [10016] message on the 5th of December to Panama, which says:

In the event severance of diplomatic relations is near, this office will notify you. Japanese-U. S. relations are now very difficult.

Signed "Miles." Would you think that General Miles or Colonel Bratton had any information about there being an execute when they sent that out on the 5th?

Captain Safford. That message is not consistent with what he had told me.

Mr. Murphy. Well, would you think that a man who was in his sound senses—and I assume you felt General Miles and Colonel Bratton were in their sound senses, do you?
Captain Safford. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Yes. Would you think that if there had been an execute they would send a message like that on the 5th to Panama?
Captain Safford. I do not know anything about it.
Mr. Murphy (reading from p. 286):

General Russell. Colonel, this action on the 5th, the message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, and the message to the Panama Canal Zone, resulted from the code destruction message of December 3, and the conversations about the "wind" implementing message of December 5, is that true?

[10017] Colonel Bratton. To the best of my recollection and belief they were the results of my receipt of this order to the Japanese Ambassador to destroy his code and his machine.

General Russell. In your message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department you make a reference to a "weather" reference—"broadcast reference weather"?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

General Russell. So apparently, when you said that, you had in mind not only the destruction of the machines in Washington but also the possibility of the implementing "weather" messages, is that true?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. As you see, I had been told by Commander McCullum that Commander Rochefort had the same intercepts that we had, and this was just a device on my part to bring Fielder and Rochefort together.

General Frank. After you had been prevented from sending a warning message, by Gerow?

Colonel Bratton. I couldn't get it out any other way.

General Russell. Colonel, I want to clarify another message of his.

Now, would that be the part you mean?

[10018] Captain Safford. That, I believe, is the part I refer to.

Mr. Murphy. Well, don't you know that Colonel Bratton also testi-fied that he called Admiral Noyes on the phone and Admiral Noyes would not give him the kind of information he wanted, that Admiral Noyes hung up rather briefly and that it was only trying to find out what Hawaii might know when he could not get it from Noyes that prompted him to telegraph? Didn't you hear that kind of testimony?

Captain Safford. I did not hear that testimony.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I will go into that later. I think you will find it directly. Now, let me go on with your letter [reading].

Please answer the following questions by Item No.

I am reading from page 2.

No. 20. Re your Item #2, is Col. B. #59? Bratton.
21. What or whose job in the Navy did Col. B.'s job correspon-d to?
22. Do you know what Army officers were notified or shown the papers by Col. B., and when?

In amplification of my Items #15 and #16:
I recall your telling me that you saw #3 about 0000 (EST) on #137 December 7, 1941.

We looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God:

[10019] This means war."

Captain Safford. That should be "He," not "We".

Mr. Murphy. What is it?

Captain Safford. That should be "He," not "We".

Mr. Murphy. It should be "He"?

He looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God; This means War."

Now, you are talking to Kramer?

Captain Safford. No, it is Kramer.

Mr. Murphy. This is you talking about Kramer, repeating his words that he heard Stark say, is that right?
Captain Safford. Correct.
Mr. Murphy. Now, how do you reconcile the fact that if he saw that on December 7 and he said "My God, this means war," how do you reconcile that with having seen the winds execute on the 4th of December when you said that "it was war"?
Captain Safford. I cannot explain that.
Mr. Murphy. They are a little inconsistent, aren't they, if he said, "My God, this means war" on the 7th?
Captain Safford. Yes, it seemed very strange.
Mr. Murphy. Yes, at least that. Now, then, I will go on further:

He looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God, this means war."
You said, "Admiral, it has meant war for the past three months."

This is Kramer talking. How would Kramer say that if he knew of a winds execute on the 4th? That is inconsistent, too, isn't it?
Captain Safford. I do not try to explain why Kramer said anything. That is what he had told me in a previous conversation and I was trying to check up to see was it true, would he stand behind it or not.
Mr. Murphy. Yes, you wanted to know if he would stand behind this that you had typed up here?
Captain Safford. Correct.
Mr. Murphy. This was going to be his testimony when you went in before some court martial; isn't that right?
Captain Safford. Correct.
Mr. Murphy. Now, let me read the next sentence:

#3 continued: "I must get word to #31" (Admiral Kimmel) and picked up a message blank.
Then another idea entered his mind and he said, "Does #53 (General Marshall) know of this?"
You replied, "Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (#77) (Serial 902 (14) (The Finale) was sent over ten minutes ago and [10021] should be on the General's desk by now."
#3 (Admiral Stark) dropped the message blank and reached for the telephone.

And then you say, "End of your tale." What did you mean by that?
Captain Safford. I meant that was the end of what he had told me on this previous occasion.
Mr. Murphy. In other words, you were preparing a brief then and that would be the tale he would tell, is that right, Kramer?
Captain Safford. No; that was the end of what he told me.
Mr. Murphy. You say the "end of your tale." You were referring to the part you recalled him telling you, is that right?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. All right (reading):

23. Can you verify or correct the foregoing?
24. Did #3 (Admiral Stark) get #53 (General Marshall) on the telephone and what did he say?

By the way, you were away from the winds execute then. You were counsel for the defense at this time, weren't you, the advocate preparing a defense for Kimmel, isn't that right?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And going beyond the scope of anything dreamt [10022] of in Navy regulations whatsoever for your office down there, isn't that right?
Captain Safford. For my office?
Mr. Murphy. Yes—beyond.
Captain Safford. Yes.
Mr. Murphy (reading):

25. Were there any other witnesses? If so, who?
26. Did you tell #9 (McCollum) or #5 (Admiral Wilkinson), or anyone else?
(Read sure to tell Admiral Halsey—when the time comes.)

Now, then, I wish you would notice closely No. 27 because I think it is highly important.

27. Re your Item #15 and #16. What do you mean by "general security" (i.e., lack) late in spring? Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway?

Is that what you were referring about, to the leak you told us about 2 days ago?
Captain Safford. No, that was another one. That was within the State Department.
Mr. Murphy. What did you mean by that?
Captain Safford. That was a lost magic translation that was lost in the State Department. The Army had sent it to them and it never came back.
Mr. Murphy. What is it? Will you read to the witness [10023] exactly what he said and see if he means it?
(Answer read.)

Mr. Murphy. Is that what you mean? Are you referring now to the Chicago Tribune incident or referring to another leak?
Captain Safford. I thought I was answering your question. May I have the question over again to be certain?
Mr. Murphy. Well, let us not get it mixed. There were two leaks, then, as I understand it. There was one of something that was lost in the State Department?
Captain Safford. In 1941.
Mr. Murphy. In 1941. And then you speak of another. What do you mean by "General security (i.e., lack) late in spring? Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway?"

Well, that Chicago Tribune incident was some time after Pearl Harbor, wasn't it?
Captain Safford. That was 1942.
Mr. Murphy. Yes. Was the Chicago Tribune business late in the spring or was that the State Department one that you are referring to here?
Captain Safford. The State Department, I think, occurred in March and the Chicago Tribune in June.

Mr. Murphy. That was a case of a story in the Chicago Tribune as to the number and the names of the Japanese vessels [10024] that were at Midway at the time we took them by surprise, wasn't it?
Captain Safford. Yes; that is correct.
Mr. Murphy. And there was quite some disturbance about publishing in Chicago or in any paper in America the names of the Japanese ships because that might have shown to the Japanese that we had broken their code, isn't that right?
Captain Safford. There was a possibility of that.
Mr. Murphy. Well, there was a very definite possibility, wasn't there? If they had in a Chicago paper the names of all of the Japanese ships taking part in the Battle of Midway wouldn't it be a pretty
good indication to the Japanese that somebody had broken their code or that we had advance knowledge, since that story came out immediately after the Battle of Midway?

Captain Safford. Mr. Murphy, I do not want to dodge that question, but my orders, which are in accordance with the Presidential directive, forbid any reference to things of that kind.

Mr. Murphy. All right, we will pass that one and we will come to the leak you are talking about. You say to him, "What do you mean by 'general security' (that is, lack) late in spring?" What did he mean?

Captain Safford. I did not know which has was referring [10025] to. I was trying to find out.

Mr. Murphy. What Presidential directive are you referring to that stops you from giving answers to questions in this inquiry? Is there any Presidential directive that stops you from answering this inquiry? What do you understand it to be?

Captain Safford. I understood that I was not permitted to discuss any magic messages or anything of that nature after December 7, 1941.

The Chairman. May I inject there. You haven't any information or knowledge concerning any Presidential directive looking toward the testimony before this committee that limits you in any way, have you?

Captain Safford. Sir?

The Chairman. I say, the President has issued no Executive order limiting you in your testimony before this committee?

Captain Safford. That may have been an interpretation which I received in writing from Commander Baecher, who is here—or through Commander Baecher. It was not his signature.

The Chairman. Well, if any commander or any other officer has advised you to that effect I think that they are in error. The President has issued no order of any sort affecting the nature of any of the testimony here or restricting any witness in answering questions that may be asked of him by this committee.

Mr. Murphy. In addition to that—

The Chairman. If you have been informed to that effect, why whoever gave you that opinion is in error.

Mr. Murphy. Well, the fact is we have been talking about magic after December 7, haven't we? Haven't we had some messages after December 7?

Captain Safford. I believe that they were all transmitted prior to December 7.

Mr. Murphy. You think then that the reason you cannot discuss that is because of your interpretation of something that you got about magic after December 7; is that right?

Captain Safford. It is not my interpretation and I will abide by instructions of the chairman of this investigating committee.

Mr. Murphy. May I ask this question: You say:

What do you mean by "general security" (i.e. lack) late in spring? Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway?

Now, what were you speaking about and what answer did Kramer make to the question? What leak was it?

Captain Safford. Kramer never answered the question.
Mr. Murphy. Well, what did you think it was?

Captain Safford. I was referring not only to the Chicago Tribune story but to the subsequent grand jury investigation which had great publicity.

Mr. Murphy. Had you had much publicity before this report of it?

Captain Safford. None whatsoever before this report.

Mr. Murphy. No. And you say the Chicago Tribune item did have great publicity?

Captain Safford. It did.

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, why did you mention it here? What were you talking about? What were you referring to it for? You asked him: "Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway?" What were you talking about in connection with the Pearl Harbor investigation?

Captain Safford. He made a statement relative to the general security and I did not know at the time what he was talking about.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you say there:

Incidentally, tell the full story of this to #42 (Admiral Halsey) and explain that #5 (Admiral Wilkinson) tried to stop the prosecution and attending publicity but #24 (Big JRR) insisted (to give publicity to himself)—

[10028] Who was giving publicity to himself? Who did you mean there, somebody looking for head lines and, if so, who was it? Whom did you mean?


Mr. Murphy. Who?

Captain Safford. Joseph R. Redman, Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. Murphy. Was he your superior?

Captain Safford. He was my superior.

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, let me read the whole sentence:

Incidentally, tell the full story of this to Admiral Halsey.

What did you mean by that, "Tell the full story to Admiral Halsey? About the leak or what?

Captain Safford. About the attempts to keep that out of the newspapers and not let the Japanese know that we had solved their code.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you were planning your attack in case there was a hearing and you were wondering about the publicity they got in Chicago and were wondering what publicity you would get, or what?

Captain Safford. I was not thinking about publicity.

Mr. Murphy. Well, what were you thinking about? That is what I am puzzled on. I am not clear on it yet. You [10029] wanted Admiral Halsey to know about all the publicity they got in Chicago about that incident. is that right?

Captain Safford. It may not be clear.

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, you explain it. I do not want to confuse you. What did you mean by that sentence—it is your sentence—in that paragraph?

Captain Safford. The Japanese had taken the precaution of changing their code about a week before Midway and putting a new one in. The Chicago Tribune's story was promptly noticed by the Navy Department censors and killed.
Mr. Murphy. What was that?
Captain Safford. And killed. It was not repeated, that Stanley Johnston story.
Mr. Murphy. What story again?
Captain Safford. The story made out by Stanley Johnston.
Mr. Murphy. Stanley Johnston?
Captain Safford. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Oh, he was the managing editor or assistant editor of the Chicago Tribune, was he, or a reporter?
Captain Safford. He was a reporter.
Mr. Murphy. A reporter, I should say.
Captain Safford. When the question of a prosecution came up both Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum did their best to stop it because they knew that would have great publicity and tip off the Japanese.
Mr. Murphy. Well, didn't they have a very proper purpose for stopping it and wasn't it because they did not want to let the Japs know that we had cracked their code? Wasn't that their reason?
Captain Safford. The publicity did tell the Japs that we had cracked their codes and a few days after the Grand Jury they did change their code again. It set us back.
Mr. Murphy. Well, the fact is that Admiral Wilkinson, you say, tried to stop the prosecution and publicity and wasn't his reason and don't you know that his reason for not wanting to go through with the trial was that we would have to spread on the court records at Chicago the fact that we had broken the code and the mechanics of it in order to have any jury convict? Isn't that so, or do you know that?
Captain Safford. I do not know. I was not in on all the details.
Mr. Murphy. You had been writing a—
Captain Safford. I do know he had been trying to stop it.
Mr. Murphy. You had been writing a history, you said, of that period and as one who was writing a history you would know some details on it, wouldn't you? Do you know why it was stopped?
Captain Safford. It was not stopped. They went on with it.
[10030] Mr. Murphy. Well, they went on with it but they did not disclose evidence about the codes, did they?
Captain Safford. But the Japs changed their codes just the same.
Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, to go on with your letter. You say:
Admiral Wilkinson tried to stop the prosecution and attending publicity but #24 (Big JRR) insisted (to give publicity to himself and to #25 (Little JRR) and was backed up by #29 (Admiral Horne) and #28 (Admiral King).
In other words, do you think those four were all trying to get publicity out of it?
Captain Safford. Not Admiral Horne and Admiral King.
Mr. Murphy. Well, who is "Little JRR"?
Captain Safford. That was Admiral Redman's younger brother.
Mr. Murphy. Who?
Captain Safford. Admiral Redman's younger brother.
Mr. Murphy. And you felt then that your superior, Admiral Redman, and his younger brother were trying to have this trial in Chicago so that they would get publicity, is that right?
Captain Safford. I did.
[10032] Mr. Murphy (reading):

28. Do you know if any of the following were called as witnesses by #36 (Roberts Commission)?
   (a) #5 (Admiral Wilkinson)
   (b) #9 (McCollum)
   (c) #10 (Kramer)
   (d) #6 (Admiral Turner)

29. Were the JD files in GZ custody or any messages from these files ever submitted to #36 (Roberts Commission)?

   What answer did he make to that?
   Captain Safford. Kramer never replied to that letter at all.
   Mr. Murphy. Well, did you ever talk to him about that?
   Captain Safford. I have never talked to him.
   Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield?
   Mr. Murphy. Yes.
   Senator Lucas. Do I understand you to say, sir, that Captain Kramer never replied to this letter?
   Captain Safford. I have never received a reply of any sort from Captain Kramer.
   Senator Lucas. Thank you. That is all.

[10033] 30. Were #5, (Admiral Wilkinson), #9 (McCollum), #10 (Kramer), or anyone else, cautioned or warned, or instructed not to ever mention the events of #136 (December 6, 1941) and #137 (December 7, 1941) or the investigations conducted by #36 (Roberts Commission)? In this connection, I am sending you #35 (Roberts Report) by ordinary ship's mail. I will comment on it in further correspondence.

   What did you mean by that? Were they instructed not to mention the events of December 6 and 7?
   Captain Safford. I was just asking for information.
   Mr. Murphy. Did you suppose they had been stopped discussing the events of December 6 and 7?
   Captain Safford. I was wondering if they had the facts.
   Mr. Murphy. What is that?
   Captain Safford. I was wondering if they had the facts and was asking for information.
   Mr. Murphy. Well, sir, McCollum was under Admiral Noyes, was he not?
   Captain Safford. McCollum was under Admiral Wilkinson and so was Kramer.
   Mr. Murphy. And you told us here that you remembered distinctly that meeting of January 14 and 15 at which Wilkinson and McCollum were present. Did not you tell us about a meeting on January 15? I beg your pardon. I withdraw that.

[10034] There was Redman Noyes, you and some others.
   Captain Safford. This was in Naval Communications.
   Mr. Murphy. Yes. Wilkinson and McCollum were not there, is that correct?
   Captain Safford. Wilkinson and McCollum were not there.
   Mr. Murphy. You did say the order came down from Admiral Stark, did you not?
   Captain Safford. As I understood, or from Admiral Ingersoll, I do not know which.
Mr. Murphy. When you made that statement did you mean to imply or to infer that there was anything improper about what you were told to do at that meeting?

Captain Safford. Which do you mean, sir?

Mr. Murphy. I am speaking of the meeting where you said you were told to destroy certain notes and you were told to stop the whispering campaign against Kimmel, and you were told to stop rumors. You have been asked questions about that.

At one time you said you did not see anything wrong with it or you would not have done it, and at another time you said you did not see anything wrong with it at the time.

The papers in the country carrying that story had drawn something sinister from it. Did you mean to imply that these were the men that had to destroy official papers? Did you mean anything like that?

Captain Safford. Not official papers.

[10035] What I was trying to find out—

I did not mean anything wrong, I thought it mean it would all be done openly.

I was trying to check it.

The Chairman. The time for recess has arrived.

The Chair would like the committee to remain for a few minutes in executive session.

We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4 p.m., February 4, 1946, the committee recessed to 10 o'clock of the following day, Tuesday, February 5, 1946.)
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[10038] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Is there something counsel wishes to put in the record?

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we received yesterday, from the State Department, a letter dated February 4, 1946, enclosing paraphrases of three telegrams, two of which were received from London and one of which was received from The Hague, with further reference to the inquiry made as to whether any of the monitoring stations maintained by those governments had ever picked up the execute of the winds code. The response has been negative in each case.

We would like to add these documents, mimeographed copies of which have been distributed to the committee, as a part of the general exhibit relating to the winds message and mark them as “Exhibit 142-C.”

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The documents referred to were marked “Exhibit No. 142-C.”)

Mr. Masten. That is all we have.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY—(Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy, you may proceed.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, is it not your understanding that the Japanese were very security-minded, very secretive about their proceedings?

[10038] Captain Safford. The Japanese were secretive, but they had a very erroneous impression or evaluation of the security of the cipher systems which they were using for highly important secret messages.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, they did everything they could, did they not, to protect their secret?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And reading the correspondence of Nomura in Washington to Japan, were you of the opinion that Nomura knew that war was coming?

Captain Safford. I believe that Nomura knew that war was coming, but not just exactly when.

Mr. Murphy. Why would the Japanese want to tell London 3 days before and give them a signal of when they were going to start war, why would they be broadcasting that all over the earth 3 days ahead?

Captain Safford. I do not know why the Japanese did that.

Mr. Murphy. Rather unusual if they did? Don’t you think so, in the light of your experience and your study of the Japanese that that would be most unusual?

Captain Safford. Not for the Japanese.

Mr. Murphy. That they would broadcast a message 3 days before as to what they were going to do?

[10039] Captain Safford. The Japanese frequently did things in their communications that seemed foolish to us.

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you expect the Japanese would be broadcasting the fact that war was going to start definitely in 3 days?

Captain Safford. I did not.

Mr. Murphy. The fact is they did broadcast on Sunday as to the English, didn’t they, but after the attack was made at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford. After the attack at Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I would like to come back with you to your letter, if I may.

As I recall, the last thing we went over yesterday would bring us down to question 29. Question 29:

Were the JD files in the GZ custody or any message from these files ever submitted to #36 (Roberts Commission)?

In that connection I would like to ask you, what is the GY log?

Captain Safford. That was a log kept by the watch officer. We had four officers standing 24-hour watches on the incoming messages particularly in purple which were given priority handling in the section.

Mr. Murphy. Well, it covered, did it not, or purported to cover, all important incoming messages?

[10040] Captain Safford. All important messages in the purple system which were of particular importance to the White House and to the State Department. Occasionally they would include other systems which were done by the man on watch in slack time.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you still have the GY log, do you not?

Captain Safford. It is still in existence but not in my custody.

Mr. Murphy. I mean, the GY log covering December 4 is available, is it not?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Shouldn’t it show what messages came in on that day if it is still in existence?

Captain Safford. That does not show incoming messages. It only shows decodes that were made by the GY officer on watch and his yeoman.

Mr. Murphy. Well, don’t you think that if you had everybody in the naval service and in the Army service and Communications looking for some special message that there would be something in the
GY log about it if it came in? Wouldn't you expect that, as head of Communications?

Captain Safford. Not unless it was personally handled and decoded by that officer or his yeoman.

Mr. Murphy. Well, somebody under you did just that, [10041] didn't they, one of your men? You were in charge of all of them. One of your men did that, didn't they?

Captain Safford. The man on watch kept the log.

Mr. Murphy. It was one of your men, wasn't it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Have you ever ascertained whether or not there is an entry that would support you in any way, about this so-called winds execute?

Captain Safford. There is no entry in that log which would support me.

Mr. Murphy. Is there any other entry of any kind missing from the GY log?

Captain Safford. There is a very similar entry which is missing on December 7. That is in regard to the so-called hidden word code and the message in it. We have the message. I believe it has been introduced as evidence. But there is no mention of this particular message in the GY code.

Mr. Murphy. And you made a study of that, did you?

Captain Safford. I did.

Mr. Murphy. Who was the officer then that failed to make an entry, who was on watch? You made an inquiry. What are the circumstances? The details, please?

Captain Safford. The inquiry was not made for more than 2 years after the event. No action was taken by me.

[10042] Mr. Murphy. Give us the details, please. Who failed to note what?

Captain Safford. Nobody failed to note anything.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you have just told us that there was something not noted in the GY log and you made an inquiry. What were the circumstances and who was involved? This is one more person now. Who is the person this time? Who is it?

Captain Safford. The officer who was on watch at that time on the morning of December 7. I cannot tell you from memory.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you know it was Brotherhood, don't you?

Captain Safford. I thought it was Parren.

Mr. Murphy. Don't you know Brotherhood saw at 5 a.m. the 1 p.m. message?

Captain Safford. This message I am referring to came in somewhere around 10 o'clock and I believe that Parren was on watch. I think he followed Brotherhood.

Mr. Murphy. Didn't you make an inquiry? This is something immediately under you and your supervision. You say that there is an entry not in there on the 7th. I am going to go back with you to the 4th pretty soon, but I would like to clear up the 7th first.

Now, who was the person and is there anything sinister about that one?

[10043] Captain Safford. There is nothing sinister about that
at all. It simply was not recorded.

Mr. Murphy. Who failed to record it, if you know?

Captain Safford. Parren was on watch, I believe, at the time.

Mr. Murphy. That is the best you can give us?

Captain Safford. That is the best I can give you.

Mr. Murphy. All right. We come to question 30.

Before I go to that, the 4th was the Army day for translating, wasn’t it? That was an even day.

Captain Safford. The 4th was an Army day for translating.

Mr. Murphy. Why didn’t they translate on the 4th? That was their day.

Captain Safford. I do not know why the Army did not translate that day.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you had an arrangement whereby the 4th was the Army day, the 5th was the Navy day, the 6th was the Army day, and the 7th was the Navy day. I asked you yesterday about the failure to have a translator in the Navy. I am going to come back to the 4th. Why, if there had been a message come in, would it not be translated by the Army because it was their day?

Captain Safford. It would in the normal course of events.

[10044] Mr. Murphy. Well, what was there out of normal on December 4 and why wouldn’t the Army handle it? You say this thing happened that day. Ordinarily the Army would handle it. Why didn’t they? Can you tell us any reason why?

Captain Safford. Only because the Navy had started to handle it through Admiral Noyes telephoning it direct.

Mr. Murphy. On the night before?

Captain Safford. At the time.

Mr. Murphy. What time?

Captain Safford. Approximately 9 o’clock in the morning of December 4, 1941.

Mr. Murphy. Well, how would it get to Admiral Noyes if it was the Army day? Why wouldn’t the Army get the message to translate?

Captain Safford. The original message was sent directly to Admiral Noyes by me in accordance with his orders.

Mr. Murphy. At what time on what day?

Captain Safford. About 9 a.m. on December 4, 1941.

Mr. Murphy. Now, how did you get it then if it was the Army day?

Captain Safford. It was intercepted by a Navy station, came in on the teletype to my office, and was delivered to me by hand.

Mr. Murphy. Wouldn’t that be unusual, since the interpreter knew that the Army was to handle messages on that day? Why would it go to the Navy?

Captain Safford. The interpreter knew nothing about those arrangements. We sent everything to the Navy Department. We sorted it out ourselves.

Mr. Murphy. You yourself before you knew what the message was and before you understood it decided that you were going to do some translating that day, I take it; is that right? Here is a message that comes in, here it is the Army’s day to get those things to translate them, and here you are, according to yourself, and you were having these translations made when you don’t know what is coming at all, on the day the Army is supposed to do it. How do you explain that?
Captain Safford. I was carrying out the instructions of my superior officer.

Mr. Murphy. What were those instructions? To disregard the arrangement you had made?

Captain Safford. As soon as that message came in to notify him immediately.

Mr. Murphy. Well, there is a question more fundamental than that. Did you disregard the arrangements you had made with the Army that they would translate on one day and you on the other because you didn't know until it was translated [10046] that that was the Army day to translate? What is your answer to that?

Captain Safford. It had already been translated when I saw it.

Mr. Murphy. You mean it was translated before you saw it. Who in the Navy was it that decided not to follow the rules and have the Army translate that day? Who did, before you saw it?

Captain Safford. The translation had been made by Kramer.

Mr. Murphy. But you can't explain to us why the regular procedure wasn't followed out on the 4th? If you know.

Captain Safford. On listening for the winds message the Navy translated everything that came in in plain language Japanese to see whether or not the winds message was there. The Army did the same thing on their circuits. We had been standing watches for about 7 days by that time. We were receiving a great many plain language and press broadcasts which we were looking over and every one but this particular message had had nothing in it and had been discarded. Kramer could not tell whether to discard or not until he had translated. It was all done at the same time.

Mr. Murphy. You decided not to follow the regular procedure but to stay at it entirely yourself; is that right?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

[10047] Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield so I may ask a question for clarification?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. You are not a translator, you are not a Japanese language expert, are you?

Captain Safford. I am not a translator, and I had no responsibility whatsoever over the translation section. My only authority rested in matters pertaining to my section.

If there was any arrangement to be worked out or any disagreement between GY, which is the decoding section, and GZ, which was the translation, I would be called in to settle it.

[10048] Mr. Keefe. You couldn't translate; you personally did not translate?

Captain Safford. I personally translated nothing.

Mr. Murphy. Now, you told us that 2 days ago, you didn't translate. One of your men told us that the 13 parts were garbled, that they had to get a new key, that there were many lines missing from it. But you were able to tell what were in those parts, weren't you, the parts you saw?

Captain Safford. That is right. But that was in English.

Mr. Murphy. You also told us time after time after time, that Kramer was under you; that is right, isn't it?

Captain Safford. He occupied space under me.
Mr. Murphy. Did you not tell us three or four or five or ten times in this record that Kramer was under you? Wasn’t that the arrangement? Not in this hearing, but didn’t you say so in the other hearings?

Captain Safford. I thought that was clear. Kramer was attached to the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, and they made out his fitness reports. For example, he was listed in the Naval Directory under them. I was senior to him and to a certain extent Kramer had two bosses, an unfortunate arrangement, but as far as responsibility for any translation or distribution of material, that was the responsibility of Captain McCollum as Kramer’s commanding officer, and not mine.

Mr. Murphy. So he went to you first and you were the one that wanted McCollum notified, is that right?

Captain Safford. I was shown these things as a matter of courtesy.

Mr. Murphy. You were the one that wanted McCollum, his boss, notified?

Captain Safford. I did not say that.

Mr. Murphy. What did you say?

Well, I won’t press that. I think I understand it clearly.

Now, here is Saturday, the day the war is going to start, according to you. You say the Army and Navy know it is going to start.

How do you account for the fact that the Army is quitting on Saturday noon on the day the war is going to start? You said everybody knew it.

Captain Safford. I cannot account for that.

Mr. Murphy. How can you account for the fact that your people are not working on Sunday, the next day, when the war is going to start?

Captain Safford. My own people were on a 24-hour basis, and had been for months.

Mr. Murphy. There was not one translator in the Navy that day, was there, outside of Kramer?

Captain Safford. I cannot answer for the translators.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you weren’t so concerned about getting the message translated?

Captain Safford. It was not my responsibility, and I had no responsibility to issue any orders about translators.

Mr. Murphy. Weren’t you interested in protecting the American Navy? You said war was going to start that day. Do I understand you to say you were not responsible for anything at all that might help with winning the war?

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think that the answer bears any such interpretation. I think it is an unfair question. The witness didn’t testify to any such thing. The witness is entitled to some degree of fairness and fair play.

Mr. Murphy. I expected Mr. Keefe to be concerned, and I expect he will have more trouble all day. What is the objection?

Mr. Keefe. I object because the witness has testified that under the set-up he had no responsibility for translators. You are trying to make it appear that he did have and had no interest in protecting the welfare of the Nation.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. That applies to the guests.
Mr. Keepe. Mr. Chairman, I have sat here all during this hearing without hardly opening my mouth. I think it is unfair on the part of the Congressman to say he expects to be interrupted by me all the time. But there is a limit to fairness even with this witness.

Mr. Murphy. I think I understand what is happening, and I am not going to be taken off the track by either certain people in the audience or by the objection. I will proceed. I will get the facts regardless of any hindrances, sir.

The fact is, sir, that you were head of communications, and you felt war was going to start on Sunday. The fact is also, is it not, that there was not one translator in your section, or in the Navy Department, who understood a word of Japanese on Sunday, December 7, on the day that you felt the war was going to start, were certain it was going to start?

Captain Safford. I cannot answer for Captain Kramer or Captain McCollum, on what arrangements they had made to handle Sunday. They will have to speak for themselves, and I believe they will have an adequate answer.

Mr. Murphy. The fact is you weren’t concerned, were you? Answer that question “yes” or “no,” please. You showed no concern, did you, about this message that would tell, in effect, the time the war was going to start?

Captain Safford. I felt that message would be decoded and handled promptly, and in my opinion it was.

Mr. Murphy. You left at 4:30 on Saturday, and at least you never inquired as to what time this message would come in, or what it said, did you? You have told us you didn’t. That is true, isn’t it?

Captain Safford. That is true.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I come to question No. 30:

“Were #5 (Admiral Wilkinson) #9 (McCollum) #10 (Kramer) or anyone else, cautioned or warned, or instructed not to ever mention the events of #136—”

I believe I have covered this question, but I will read it:

not to ever mention the events of #136 (December 6, 1941) and #137 (December 7, 1941) of the investigations conducted by #36 (Roberts Commission)? In this connection I am sending you #35 (Roberts Report) by ordinary ships mail. I will comment on it in further correspondence.

I believe I talked to you about that yesterday.

Now, I come to #31.

Do you know when and how #53 first got the news of (Serial No. 901) (sets up No. 902) and No. 76 (Serial No. 902) (1-13) (the works), and what action he took.

I understand there you were talking about the 13 parts; is that right?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. That is what you refer to as “the works”?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Was there any significance in that description?

Captain Safford. That meant the bulk of the message and what we had up to midnight on the 6th.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you called it “the works”. There is a slang expression. “The works” means the real paper, the important paper, the important thing. Where was there anything there? You said
your so-called winds execute was the works, as I understand it, or the tip-off.

Captain Safford. The winds message was the tip-off.

Mr. Murphy. You do not put any particular significance on "the works"?

Captain Safford. It was the bulk and contained the intent of the fourteenth part message and the first 13 parts.

Mr. Murphy. I say you don't put any significance on the title? There is nothing unusual about the words "the works"?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. All right. Then the next question: "(Sets up #902 and #76 (Serial #902 (1-13))"—you have it repeated there. That would be the fourteen-part [10055] message?

Captain Safford. That would be the fourteen-part message.

Mr. Murphy. (Reading.)

No. 32. Same for #77 (Serial #902 (14) (The Finale)) and #78 (Serial #907 1 P. M.)

As I understand it, you were questioning Kramer then about these two particular messages, the fourteen-part message and the 1 p. m. message?

Captain Safford. What he knew about the delivery, not as to their significance.

Mr. Murphy. All right. (Reading.)

33. Re my #14—I meant the conference on #137 (Dec. 7, 1941) between #3 (Admiral Stark) and #53 (General Marshall) which resulted in #80. I did not know of the other conferences and am delighted to learn of them.

What conferences were you delighted to learn of?

Captain Safford. These were conferences that Kramer made some reference to in his letter earlier probably.

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, why were you so delighted about that? I mean what brought delight to you?

Captain Safford. I thought it would bring information out.

Mr. Murphy. Had you been in conference with anybody [10056] about your work in this case prior to sending this letter to Kramer? Had you conferred with certain people?

Captain Safford. Only to ask them questions.

Mr. Murphy. Well, will you tell us who you conferred with on your work?

Captain Safford. I did not confer with anybody on my work. I was doing that single-handed.

Mr. Murphy. Did you confer with anybody who was writing articles in order to get particular publicity for the cause?

Captain Safford. I did not.

Mr. Murphy. Did you do anything for cause except what you have told us here? What other letters did you write?

Captain Safford. I did nothing toward writing except this one letter and another one which was sent about the same date to Kramer and Kramer did not reply to either.

Mr. Murphy. What was the other letter, the letter to Kramer?

Captain Safford. That is one to Kramer enclosing the magazine clipping and suggesting he see Admiral Halsey.

Mr. Murphy. Is that all?
Captain Safford. That has been introduced in evidence. That is all that I know of.

Mr. Murphy. What is it?

[10057] Captain Safford. That is all that I know of.

Mr. Murphy. You wrote other letters, didn't you?

Captain Safford. Not that I know of.

Mr. Murphy. How about Brotherhood? You wrote to him, didn't you?

Captain Safford. I did not ask Brotherhood to do anything. I merely asked him to give me some information.

Mr. Murphy. Well, do you have a copy of that letter or did you destroy it?

Captain Safford. I don't think I have a copy of any of my letters.

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you destroy the copy or did you make a copy? You did write to Brotherhood, didn't you?

Captain Safford. I wrote to Brotherhood.

Mr. Murphy. Who else?

Captain Safford. And I mentioned that in my testimony at the previous investigations.

Mr. Murphy. That is right, that is why I know it, I read your testimony. Who else did you write to, if anyone?

Captain Safford. I wrote to Welker, Captain Welker, after VJ-day.

Mr. Murphy. That is right; that is in your other testimony, too, isn't it, about Welker?

Captain Safford. I mentioned him but I had not written [10058] to him before VJ-day.

Mr. Murphy. Right. What did you write to Welker about?

Captain Safford. To ask him then if he could recall anything concerning the winds message.

Mr. Murphy. What else?

Captain Safford. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Who else did you write to?

Captain Safford. I also wrote to ship's clerk H. L. Bryant who had served as Commander Kramer's confidential yeoman at the time. I wrote to him after VJ-day.

Mr. Murphy. Do you have a copy of that letter?

Captain Safford. I do not know whether I have or not.

Mr. Murphy. Well, will you produce the copies of the letters you have, sir, so the committee can see them, the copies of the letters you wrote on this question?

Captain Safford. I will make search and produce those letters, what I have, at the first opportunity.

Mr. Murphy. All right. In the meantime I will go on. Then there is a parentheses:

Message described in paragraph 50 (Page 9-XI) of #35 (Roberts Commission).

Now, what were you referring to there, if you know?

Captain Safford. I haven't a copy of that report handy.

Mr. Murphy. What is it?

[10059] Captain Safford. I do not have a copy of that report handy.

Mr. Murphy. Gentlemen, do you have a copy?

Captain Safford. No, I haven't.
Mr. Murphy. I am sorry, sir. I withdraw that. What happened to the copy you had yesterday? Did counsel take it back?

Captain Safford. I did not bring that with me. Of the Roberts report?

Mr. Murphy. Oh, no. Is it the Roberts report you want or is it the copy of the letter? You do have a copy of the letter here right before you, do you not?

Captain Safford. Oh, yes; I have that.

Mr. Murphy. Yes, but you do not have a copy of the Roberts report, do you?

Captain Safford. Of the Roberts report.

Mr. Murphy. Will you get that?

The Vice Chairman. Counsel is working on it.

Mr. Murphy. All right. While they are getting that I will go on. (Reading:)

No. 34. The one #2 (Mr. Hull) office.

What concern did your department have with that? How did that affect Communications?

Captain Safford. Kramer made the delivery at that time and what time he made the delivery is information.

Mr. Murphy. Well, was what time Kramer made delivery of concern to your office?

Captain Safford. Not officially, not to me.

Mr. Murphy. What is it, please? You said that was of concern to your office, what Kramer did?

Captain Safford. That was curiosity on my part.

Mr. Murphy. For what purpose?

Captain Safford. For knowing what happened.

Mr. Murphy. Well, for what purpose? You wanted to know for what purpose? You wanted to do something with the information, didn't you?

Captain Safford. For possible use as evidence.

Mr. Murphy. By you?

Captain Safford. By me, if acceptable.

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now, number 35. (Reading:)

35. The one in #3 (Admiral Stark) office?

36. The one “c/o Col. B.”

What did you mean by that?

Captain Safford. I think it meant care of Colonel Bratton.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

37. The one between #3 (Admiral Stark) and #53 (General Marshall)?

[10067] What concern of yours could that have? I mean why would you want that, a meeting between the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations. Why would you over in Communications want that? Did it have anything at all to do with your work for the Navy?

Captain Safford. That was beyond anything under my authority.

Mr. Murphy. For what purpose?

Captain Safford. For possible use as evidence.

Mr. Murphy. Well, surely Admiral Kimmel did not know you were doing all this, did he?
Captain Safford. Admiral Kimmel did not know I was doing this. Mr. Murphy. Did you ever contact him, good, bad or indifferent, since Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford. I contacted Admiral Kimmel —

Mr. Murphy. When?

Captain Safford (continuing). About a month after this letter was written. Mr. Murphy. When? Now, that would be in February of 1944, is that right?

Captain Safford. On the 21st of February 1944. Mr. Murphy. Do you have a copy of that letter?

Captain Safford. I did not write a letter. [10062] Mr. Murphy. How did you do it?

Captain Safford. I was in New York and I went to his office and saw him personally. Mr. Murphy. Who else did you see at that time—his counsel?

Captain Safford. His counsel was not there. Mr. Murphy. Well, who else was there?

Captain Safford. Just Admiral Kimmel. Mr. Murphy. Did you ever talk to his counsel?

Captain Safford. I did not talk to Admiral Kimmel’s counsel until after the Navy investigation. Mr. Murphy. When did you first talk to his counsel—Mr. Rugg I mean? I don’t mean any sinister inference. I just want to know when you talked to him.

Captain Safford. After the Navy investigation was completed. Mr. Murphy. Well, about when? About when, just your best judgment.

Captain Safford. I believe it was August or possibly September 1944. Mr. Murphy. August or September of 1944?

Captain Safford. 1944. Mr. Murphy. Did you make a special trip to New York to go to Admiral Kimmel’s office in New York?

[10063] Captain Safford. No. I was up there with my wife. Mr. Murphy. What is it?

Captain Safford. I was up there on a little leave. Mr. Murphy. Well, was that your reason for going to New York?

Captain Safford. I took advantage of the trip to see—to look up Admiral Kimmel and see if he was in and would wish to talk to me. I took the initiative, not Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I mean is that why you went to New York or was that a thought after you got there? Do you understand me? I don’t want to—

Captain Safford. I went up on personal reasons with Mrs. Safford who wanted to go, wanted to take me up, and as long as I was up there I thought I would go in and see Admiral Kimmel if I could locate him in his office.

Mr. Murphy. And you then told him what you were doing, did you?

Captain Safford. No; I did not tell him what I was doing—or everything I was doing.

Mr. Murphy. Did you tell him about the letters you were writing?
Captain Safford. No.
Mr. Murphy. Did you tell him about this plan that you had sent to Kramer about how he was going to arrange things?

[10064] Captain Safford. No.
Mr. Murphy. Did you talk to anybody else in New York State—
Captain Safford. No.
Mr. Murphy (continuing). Or give them any information?
Captain Safford. Nobody.
Mr. Murphy. You are sure, no one else in New York State?
Captain Safford. Positive.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I come to No. 38:

How much does #9 (McCollum) know?

What did you mean there? Know about what?
Captain Safford. About one of these details.
Mr. Murphy. Details? Which one? I mean what particular subject?
Captain Safford. With—
Mr. Murphy. On any particular item? And if so, which one?
Captain Safford. I cannot remember just what I meant by something I wrote 2 years ago.
Mr. Murphy. All right. And then the next one:

Will #9 (McCollum) come through willingly?

What did you mean by "come through"?
Captain Safford. Testify.

[10065] Mr. Murphy. You mean take your side, the side you were taking, or what?
Captain Safford. No.
Mr. Murphy. Just testify?
Captain Safford. Just testify willingly.
Mr. Murphy. Well, you had some doubt about whether he would testify as to the truth under oath, did you?
Captain Safford. Not that.
Mr. Murphy. Well, what did you have in mind, whether he would have a good memory or a bad memory? You say "come through willingly."

Captain Safford. Whether he would be hesitant or not.
Mr. Murphy. Hesitant about telling the truth?
Captain Safford. About volunteering.
Senator Lucas. What was the last answer, please?
(Answer read.)
Mr. Murphy. Then I come to No. 40:

What is your estimate of #5 (Admiral Wilkinson) in this respect?

And you were then wondering from Kramer whether he would come through, is that right?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy (reading):

No. 41. Will he talk for #42? (Admiral Halsey)

[10066] You meant if Admiral Halsey were to question him would he answer questions, is that it?
Captain Safford. Correct.
Mr. Murphy (reading):
No. 42. What about #6 (Admiral Turner)?

Captain Safford. The same thing.

Mr. Murphy. Well, didn’t you feel that Admiral Turner was involved in these charges that you had made about a conspiracy? Wasn’t he on Admiral Stark’s staff?

Captain Safford. He was.

Mr. Murphy. Well, haven’t you charged him with being one of the group that framed Kimmel—Admiral Turner? He is one of the staff. Isn’t he within the group that you charged with framing Kimmel?

Captain Safford. I did not know that Admiral Turner had anything to do with this at that time.

Mr. Murphy. Well, wasn’t Kelly Turner Chief of War Plans and wasn’t Kelly Turner the one who would not send the message after McCollum and Wilkinson discussed it and you looked it over?

Captain Safford. I knew nothing about that whatsoever, about Admiral Turner ever having seen that message.

Mr. Murphy. Well, wasn’t Admiral Turner the head of War Plans on Admiral Stark’s staff?

[10067] Captain Safford. Admiral Turner was the head of War Plans.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. And haven’t you charged the whole staff and didn’t you think you had overwhelming evidence against them? Let me not misquote you. Let me get your exact words:

Having overwhelming proof of the guilt of OPNAV.

Now, the fellow who is head of War Plans is a pretty important fellow on OPNAV, isn’t he?

Captain Safford. He is.

Mr. Murphy. Well, how do you square this about? You have overwhelming proof of the guilt of OPNAV and here you are trying to get a conference and apparently feeling that was all right with the Chief of War Plans of OPNAV. Are those two inconsistent?

Captain Safford. They are inconsistent.

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you include Kelly Turner and the Chief in your charge of frameup?

Captain Safford. I did not.

Mr. Murphy. Well, who did you charge then? Now, he is one of OPNAV that is out. Who do you include?

Captain Safford. I did not know where it lay.

Mr. Murphy. What is it?

Captain Safford. I did not know where it lay.

[10008] Mr. Murphy. Well, now, you said 2 days ago that you felt that Sonnett was counsel for the defense for Secretary Knox who was then dead when you wrote that letter, wasn’t he?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Now, what in the world did Secretary Knox do that he needed counsel for the defense?

Captain Safford. Nothing.

Mr. Murphy. Well, why did you originate it? It has gone out to the papers of the country that you said that you felt that Sonnett was counsel for the defense for Secretary Knox who was then dead. That has been in all the papers, I suppose, in the country, and you said it.

Captain Safford. That was the man I gathered at that time.
Mr. Murphy. What basis was there for such a statement, for Frank Knox needing counsel for the defense after he has gone beyond? What did you mean by that? There has been a lot of talk about a smear campaign in one or two witnesses' testimony here and I am wondering what you mean now by referring to Secretary Knox in that way? You felt Sonnett was counsel for the defense for Secretary Knox. Sonnett is a fellow officer in the Navy, isn't he?

Captain Safford. He is.

Mr. Murphy. An officer of the United States Navy, isn't he, Sir?

Captain Safford. He is.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Now, what did you mean by saying that an officer of the United States Navy was counsel for the Secretary of the Navy who had previously died, counsel for the defense?

Captain Safford. It had seemed he had conducted a long unofficial examination in conversations with me and my impression was that he seemed more interested in protecting—in looking after anything which might tend to be prejudicial to Secretary Knox rather than to get at the meat of things.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at that time and up to that time did anybody ever accuse Secretary Knox of anything?

Captain Safford. He had never been.

Mr. Murphy. But you felt that he needed a defense, did you?

Captain Safford. No, but the defense was working.

Mr. Murphy. For Knox, Sonnett was working a defense for Knox. Why did he have to be defended? What did he do?

Captain Safford. Nothing.

Mr. Murphy. But you felt that it was the right thing to do, to write in your letter, in your memoranda that if Sonnett was counsel for one other—the one other I will come to later—was counsel for Secretary Knox, you felt that was the important thing, did you not, that was the important thing to do?

Captain Safford. I wrote it.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Now, then, did you and Admiral Stark ever have any trouble?

Captain Safford. Never.

Mr. Murphy. Well, when was it you first turned against him? You have turned against him, haven't you? You feel he is guilty of a crime, don't you? You said he could not be trusted, didn't you? You said he was guilty of a frame-up.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, there are three questions now.

Mr. Keefe. There are four questions.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Senator Lucas. I would like to have one at a time, so far as I am concerned.

Mr. Murphy. I will ask one question then. Strike out the other three.

You felt that Secretary Knox—rather, that Admiral Stark was guilty of a frame-up of Admiral Kimmel, did you not?

Captain Safford. I said that in a private letter.

Mr. Murphy. What is it?

Captain Safford. I said that in a private letter.
Mr. Murphy. Well, sir, you always speak the truth privately or publicly, don't you?

Captain Safford. You try to.

Mr. Murphy. What is it?

Captain Safford. You try to.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Well, now, was it or was it not your feeling when you said that you felt that Admiral Stark was guilty of a frame-up?

Captain Stafford. May I have the question again to be certain I have got it straight?

(Question read.)

Mr. Murphy. Will you answer the question, sir?

Captain Safford. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Your answer is "Yes," Captain?

Captain Safford. No. I said I would answer the question.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Captain Safford. I beg your pardon; I am sorry.

Mr. Murphy. Take your time. I will wait.

Captain Safford. I want a chance to get that straight.

Mr. Murphy. I don't want to ask you these questions but my job here is to get the facts. I don't want to embarrass you at all, I would rather not be here, but being here I am obliged to get the facts.

Captain Safford. It was not my feeling at the time and if I wronged Admiral Stark I regret it.

Mr. Murphy. Well, do you now feel that he cannot be trusted? You so stated in your letter. Now, has there been anything since the time you wrote the letter and now to change your opinion?

Captain Safford. That question of trust, may I explain, I meant by that that I thought everybody was so prejudiced against Admiral Kimmel at that time that they would not do things fairly. That was with the exception of a few. I might say, close friends of Admiral Kimmel's. It did not mean trust in the ordinary sense of the word.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you did state as an officer of the United States Navy that the leading officers, the commanding officers of the Navy were guilty of a frame-up and that, in your judgment, a frame-up is about as vile and low a thing as can be done to a human being, isn't it, or by a human being?

Captain Safford. It is.

Mr. Murphy. And do you feel now, sir, today, that Admiral Stark and the members of his staff did bring about a frame-up of Admiral Kimmel?

(No response.)

Mr. Murphy. I won't press you upon that point.

Captain Safford. All right, thank you.

Mr. Murphy. You have answered a good many others.

Now, I would like to come to the next question under "Comment." [Reading:]

With regard to the quotes of my Item 18 and 10 (c), you were describing #80 (Circular #2494 (PL code mag.) of which we have copies of the original and its translation in the GZ files. This was sent and received on #137. (Dec. 7, 1941).

Now, as I understand it there you make the statement in your letter that the message of December 7, 1941, referred by inference to Circular No. 2494. Is that right?
Captain Safford. I thought that he was describing that message.

Mr. Murphy. You say:

I was asking about #74 (General Intelligence Broadcast containing false "Weather Report") which was broadcast at 0430 (EST) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941). (Not sure of exact date.)

Now, up to that minute in that paragraph you are talking about a false weather broadcast, isn't that right?

Captain Safford. A false weather report.

Mr. Murphy. A false weather report?

Captain Safford. In a general intelligence broadcast.

Mr. Murphy. Right. [Reading:]

It was unheard by "S," "H," and "C," who listened [10074] for it. (I have this from the Station "S" files, plus statements of #19 (Wright) and #22 (Mason).) This message (in Morse) included the words "Higashi no kazeame. Nishi no kaze hare. (Negative form of kita no kaze Kumori.)" The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by #72 (Circular #2353 (Sets up #74) or #73 (Circular 2354 (Sets up #74), but was a mixture. The GY watch officer was not sure of it so he called you and you came in early and verified it. Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood (71) were waiting in my office when I came in that morning and said, "Here it is." We had been waiting a week for it and Station "S" had been forwarding reams of P/L messages by teletype.

Captain Safford. That is what I thought.

Mr. Murphy. Now, from whom? Teletype from whom?

Captain Safford. Station "M," from station "M" which is Cheltenham and station "W" which is Winter Harbor.

Mr. Murphy. So that at that time you did know that there was a message came in, a false weather report from either Cheltenham or Winter Harbor?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. And that is what you were talking about?

Captain Safford. That is what we were talking about.

[10075] Mr. Murphy. "It was unheard by 'S.'" That would be Bainbridge Island station, wouldn't it?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. "H". What would "H" be?

Captain Safford. Heeia, or Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Murphy. And "C" Corregidor?

Captain Safford. Corregidor.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

Who listened for it. (I have this from the Station "S" files.)

Now, if you had Station S's files, that was Bainbridge Island, did you at that time try to get the other stations' files?

Captain Safford. We asked for the other stations' files at the same time.

Mr. Murphy. And the inference here from your own testimony was that you felt those files had been improperly destroyed?

Captain Safford. That those files could not be located.

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, what was your testimony on that before? You gave a very good reason for that before, didn't you? I am referring to your testimony before the Hewitt Board where you explained the reason for certain records of Cheltenham and Winter Harbor being missing.

[10076] Will you get that testimony if you have it there?
Captain Safford. On what page, please.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you talked three different times. I will get it for you in a minute. You told Admiral Hewitt the reason for both of those not being located. The Cheltenham station was moved from Cheltenham up to Massachusetts, wasn't it?

Captain Safford. On what page is that, sir?

Mr. Murphy. I did not come to it yet but I am asking you now wasn't the Cheltenham station moved to Massachusetts?

Captain Safford. The regular receiving activity took over the whole station and the rest, the intelligence unit was moved over to Chatham, Mass.

Mr. Murphy. I am referring to page 120. I will come back to that; that is another thing. That is about Cheltenham but that is not what we are looking for. Page 122:

Captain Safford. This search was made in November or December 1943 and again in the spring of 1944. I cannot place that any closer. After we got notice that Admiral Hart would conduct his investigation the logs of Winter Harbor, Maine were destroyed in the spring of 1943 simply to make room. They destroyed everything for about six months back. Cheltenham's logs were destroyed when the intercept unit left Cheltenham and moved [10077] up to Chatham, Massachusetts, which was some time earlier than that. I cannot say offhand what happened to the logs of the other two stations, but I can produce nothing.

At that time you felt there was nothing sinister or improper, didn't you, about Cheltenham?

Captain Safford. May I comment on that?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Captain Safford. I did not verify my testimony and there was one word left out, I know, which changes the sense of things because it is not true.

Mr. Murphy. What is that word?

Captain Safford. There is an “except.” The logs of Winter Harbor were destroyed in the spring of 1943 simply to make room. They destroyed everything except for about 6 months back.”

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, what word do you insert there?

Captain Safford. “Except”.

Mr. Murphy. They destroyed everything except for about 6 months back?

Captain Safford. You said “For about 6 months back.”

Mr. Murphy. I see. Well, at that time did you feel that it was as a result of the conspiracy by people in the Navy to get the records destroyed?

[10078] Captain Safford. I am not referring there to the logs of the stations. The third copy which the station itself kept. We had finally asked about that just to see if they could throw any light on the thing.

Mr. Murphy. Well, would they possibly, since the station did not know what you were looking for and since you had about 20 to 25 messages in there. I suppose, each day, from Cheltenham, did you?

Captain Safford. We had everything intercepted by it arranged in chronological order, the time of intercept.

Mr. Murphy. You mean they kept copies of these messages at these outlying radio stations of things that we were trying so hard to protect, they kept copies of them?

Captain Safford. They kept copies.
Mr. Murphy. And if another government wanted to get a copy of magic at any time all they would have to do is find out what was being done and go into one of these outlying radio stations and they could find a complete file, is that right?

Captain Safford. They only had a copy of the message that went through the air.

Mr. Murphy. But they did keep a complete file of everything they ever received, a record? Did they or not?

Captain Safford. They were required by our instructions [10079] to retain their third copy until the Navy Department had acknowledged receipts of the other two copies. Then they had permission to burn or retain for a short time at discretion. They often found the backlog there useful in helping them with their work, research, and so forth.

Mr. Murphy. Well, do you now feel that anyone at Cheltenham participated in this plan that you speak of to destroy the copy of the alleged winds code about which you speak?

Captain Safford. No one at the stations. I was merely trying to show when it was brought up the effort that we had made to run down, to see if there was any copy in existence.

Mr. Murphy. Well, let us proceed (reading):

I have this from the Station "S" files, plus statements #19 (Wright).
Now, who would Wright be?
Captain Safford. He is now a Captain; W. A. Wright.
Mr. Murphy. What statement did you have from him?
Captain Safford. He told me that they had listened for the winds message at Heeia.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

And #23 (Mason).
That would be at Corregidor?
Captain Safford. He had listened at Corregidor and I thought he had listened personally there and had not heard it.

[10080] Mr. Murphy (reading):

This message (in Morse) included the words—by the way, a false weather broadcast now, according to this, was Morse telegraph, wasn’t it, or Morse code?

Captain Safford. I always said it was Morse.

Mr. Murphy. What is it?

Captain Safford. I always said it was Morse.

Mr. Murphy. I thought you said the other day that the only place—or in your statement don’t you say something about that was the only station they could get Morse and the others were listening for voice? Now, if I am wrong in that I suggest that we get your statement. Will counsel find that particular part there where he is discussing the Morse code there? I will come back to that, Captain, when we find it.

This message (in Morse) included the words “Higashi no kazeame. Nishi no kaze hare. (Negative form of Kita no kaze Kumori.)” The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by #72 (Circular 2353).

Now, when Mr. Richardson was questioning you the other day you said this alleged intercept that you were speaking about did not follow
the regular manner, didn't you, that you saw the words in the middle, or did you say that it had words in the middle and at the end?

Captain Safford. I said that I saw the words in the [10081] middle and could not say whether or not they also appeared at the end.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you say:

The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by #72 (Circular 2353 (Sets up #74) or #73 (Circular #2354 (Sets up #74), but was a mixture. The GY watch officer was not sure of it so he called you—

By “you” meaning he called Kramer?

Captain Safford. Kramer.

Mr. Murphy. (reading):

and you came in early and verified it. Murray recalls it, so do I.

So that you do recall the false weather report, do you?

Captain Safford. I recall the false weather report in a general intelligence broadcast.

Mr. Murphy. Yes, and at what time? On the night of December 3d or the early morning of December 4, isn't that right?

Captain Safford. It was the early morning of December 4 that I saw it.

Mr. Murphy. Right [reading]:

Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood were waiting in my office when I came in that morning and said, “Here it is.”

[10082] Now, this is the morning of December 4 you are speaking about in your letter and before this committee? On the morning of December 4 you saw the real intercept, didn't you?

Captain Safford. I am talking about the real intercept.

Mr. Murphy. You are talking about the real intercept here?

Captain Safford. We are talking about the same thing.

Mr. Murphy. Well, here you call it a false weather broadcast.

Captain Safford. The true winds message was a false weather broadcast in the middle of a general intelligence bulletin and possibly repeated at the end.

Mr. Murphy. Sir, all through these hearings a certain false weather broadcast had been referred to as meaning the one that came in and Kramer threw in a waste basket.

Captain Safford. That was always referred to as the “false winds” message, which was a true weather broadcast.

Mr. Murphy. Well, let me go on. I think that will come out in a line or two [reading]:

Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood were waiting in my office when I came in that morning and said, “Here it is.”

Now, then, if you are speaking about the real bona fide intercept that is what you are speaking about here, isn't it?

[10083] Captain Safford. That is what I am speaking about now.

Mr. Murphy. That would mean that Brotherhood should know about it, that you did know about it and that Murray knew about it, isn't that right?

Captain Safford. That is what I thought and I had so understood at the time I wrote this letter.
Mr. Murphy. You know that they both have testified that they know nothing about any such things?

Captain Safford. I understand they have since testified to the contrary.

Mr. Murphy. To the contrary? Did they ever testify as you say they would? They testified contrary, you mean, to what you thought they would?

Captain Safford. To what I thought.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

We had been waiting a week for it and Station “S” had been forwarding reams of P/L messages by teletype.

Captain Safford. That is for the long messages.

Mr. Murphy. Now, reading on:

As a result of #74 (General Intelligence Broadcast containing false “Weather Report”) #9 (McCollum) prepared #90 (Message to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) (or #135) (Dec. 5, 1941), but never released)—which was a very long mes- [10084] sage ending up with the translation and significance of the warning in #74 (General Intelligence Broadcast containing false “Weather Report”). I read the message in #7’s (Admiral Noyes) office and was witness to the discussion of it between #7 (Admiral Noyes) and #5 (Admiral Wilkinson).

Now, you say then that this so-called winds intercept would be there before the three of you, wouldn’t it, at that time? I mean the winds intercept that you are speaking of here, that was there before you at that time, wasn’t it, that intercept?

Captain Safford. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Murphy. The intercept of the winds message which you testified about in your statement, which you said came in on December 4, if it existed was in the room then with you when you were talking to Wilkinson and Noyes?

Captain Safford. It was not.

Mr. Murphy. Where was it?

Captain Safford. I do not know.

Mr. Murphy. Well, do you think they knew about it at that time?

Captain Safford. I did.

Mr. Murphy. You know they both testified they did not, don’t you?

[10085] Captain Safford. I believe so.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Now, then (reading):

I took for granted that #90—

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield for a moment before he gets away from this last point?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Do I understand, Captain, now you are talking, under the heading “Comment” you are talking all the way through to what you point as the intercepted winds message?

Captain Safford. The intercepted winds message. That other message, the false one, had completely gone from my memory at that time. I had no recollection that we had ever received anything but our winds message.

Senator Lucas. Yes. Now, that statement that the Congressman just read, which says, “I read the message in seven’s office,” is that partment censors and killed.
Captain Safford. Admiral Noyes.

Mr. Murphy. Let me just ask one question there. Captain, you now say that the false winds message was the true winds message, is that what you say? It was the one that you were expecting to come by broadcast? I so understood you. Now, I don't want to confuse you. You go ahead and clear it up.

[10086] Captain Safford. What I have later termed the true winds message was a false weather report included in and as part of a general intelligence broadcast or Japanese language, where a Japanese language broadcast was made, or a general intelligence broadcast, however you want to phrase that one.

Mr. Murphy. I understand. Excuse me, Senator. Go ahead.

Senator Lucas. And the words:

I read the message in #7's (Admiral Noyes) office and was witness to the discussion of it between #7 (Admiral Noyes) and #5 (Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum)

As I recall, on yesterday when I examined you on that point I thought you told me that you sent the message direct to Admiral Noyes and that you did not see the message any more until sometime when you were investigating with Kramer in going over the files for Admiral Noyes. Am I wrong in that? If I am, you correct me.

Captain Safford. The original message, the original intercept with the translation in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom was sent up to Admiral Noyes' office immediately and I never saw that message again ever.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, what message are you talking about here in your letter to Kramer when you said, "I read the message in seven's office"? What message is that you are talking about?

[10087] Captain Safford. I am referring to another message of warning to Admiral Kimmel and I believe there are other addressees who are not important and which Admiral Wilkinson took in with him and showed to Admiral Noyes on that occasion. This is about 3, very close to 3 p.m. on the afternoon of December 4, 1941, and I was permitted to read the message a page at a time. After Admiral Noyes had finished reading a page he would give it to me. I read the whole message once.

Senator Lucas. That is correct. I am wrong and you are right. That was the message that McCollum prepared?

Captain Safford. Yes, ostensibly—I mean which indicated by telephone number or something, as well as subject, that it had been originated in the Far Eastern section of Naval Intelligence. McCollum was not there. It was just the three of us, Admiral Wilkinson, or Captain then, Admiral Noyes and myself, in Admiral Noyes' office.

Senator Lucas. That is correct. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, going on (reading):

I took for granted that #90 (Message to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) (or #135) (Dec. 5, 1941) but never released) would be sent and did not know otherwise until #132 (Dec. 2, 1941) (plus 2 years). I believe that I told you about this message and stated that it had been [10088] sent. Anyway, I was living in a fool's paradise from #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) to #137 (Dec. 7, 1941).

In other words, you were living during that time feeling that the McCollum dispatch had been sent out?
Captain Safford. Had been sent; that is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, did you know that there was some conversation subsequent to your departure when the person who wanted the message sent was shown the "This is a war warning"? You did not know about that conversation?

Captain Safford. I knew nothing about that whatsoever.

Mr. Murphy. And the fact that there had been a war warning message sent out on the 27th of November, you did not know that?

Captain Safford. I believe I had seen—I had been permitted to see the "This is a war warning" message of November 27 by the Navy Department in the code room. I believe Admiral Noyes authorized me to go in and look at that message.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

I learned from #19 (Wright) that #9 (McCollum) knew #90 (Message to #31 originated by #9 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) (or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941) but never released) had not been sent #19 (Wright) was informed by #9 (McCollum) at #92 (Pearl Harbor).

What do you mean by that, that Wright was informed?

[10089] That it was never sent, is that what you mean?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Some "More Questions";

Do you recall #74? (General Intelligence Broadcast containing false "Weather Report").

Now, do I understand that you are both telling Kramer what he should recall and then you ask him if he does recall it, is that it?

Captain Safford. I was describing it and asked him if he recalled what I described.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

No. 44. Did you know any or all of the circumstances of #90. (Message to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941) but never released). How much, and when did you learn it?

You are asking him then if he recalls what you told him up above, is that right?

Captain Safford. I am asking him if it is correct that I had told him about that message. I thought I had but I was not certain of it.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

45. When did #9 (McCollum) learn that #90 (Message to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum) [10089] #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941) but never released) had not been released?

You are asking Kramer what he knew about McCollum's knowledge there is, is that it, or were you asking him to ask McCollum?

Captain Safford. I was asking what he knew. He saw McCollum every day and he might have known something.

Mr. Murphy. That is right.

Captain Safford. I asked him what he knew.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

46. Do you know who blocked #90 (Message to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941) but never released) Or refused to release it? (#5 (Admiral Wilkinson) was pushing it but apparently did not feel he had the authority to release it himself.)

47. Can you throw any other light on the subject?

One final word—I do not know how well you know #18 (Rochefort). I have known him for 18 years. He can be trusted and will come through for us.
Now, what could he come through with you?

[10091] Captain Safford. He had served out there, and I had known him for a long time and knew that he was not prejudiced against Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Murphy. When you said, "He can be trusted and will come through for us," you meant you and Kimmel at that time, or did you mean you and Kramer?

Captain Safford. I did not refer to Admiral Kimmel at that time.

Mr. Murphy. You said, "Can be trusted, and will come through for us." You meant you and Kramer?

Captain Safford. Me and Kramer.

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now what could he come through with? Don't you know that Rochefort testified he never heard of a winds execute message?

Captain Safford. I knew that he had not.

Mr. Murphy. Then what could you expect him to come through with, if you knew he had not heard of it? When did you find out he had not heard of the winds execute message?

Captain Safford. We knew by inference on the 4th of December that they had not heard it because we received no report from either Pearl Harbor or from Corregidor, that they had heard it. We had every reason to believe if they had heard it, they would send it in to us, but they did [10092] not.

Mr. Murphy. You knew on the 4th of December that they did not hear it at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford. We knew on the 4th that they did not report it.

Mr. Murphy. Right.

Captain Safford. And by inference that they had not heard it.

Mr. Murphy. Right.

Captain Safford. But we did not get a specific report from them, which I could recall, that they had monitored for the message. We took for granted that they had. It was probably submitted and not recalled by me. But I did not know for certain until 2 years later, until about the time Wright came and told me they had listened for it, but had not heard it.

Mr. Murphy. You knew on the 4th of December, didn't you, or felt certain that Rochefort had not heard it, because of the way you said it came over?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Why would this telegram go out? You remember I asked you about the one going out in the 5th asking them to get information from Rochefort. My understanding was that they sent to Hawaii to find out if they had heard any- [10093] thing because they had not heard anything in Washington, and I understood you to say yesterday they had tried to find the details from Rochefort after you had it already in. How did you explain that?

Captain Safford. I would rather let the people who sent the telegram explain that rather than myself.

Mr. Murphy. That is a rather puzzling circumstance, isn't it, that on December 5 a message was going to Hawaii to Rochefort, or to G-2 there, asking him to contact Rochefort, apparently to find out what he knew about the weather broadcast 24 hours at least, or close thereto, after you say it had already been in Washington; is that right?
Captain Safford. Right.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, who was it that ever decided, if there ever had been an execute message, that war would come 2 days to Saturday and 3 days to Sunday? Where does that come up? Is that good Navy strategy, or is that your own plan, or what is it? You say in your statement, "Two days to Saturday and 3 days to Sunday."

I am only a layman. I do not understand those things. What do you mean by that?

Captain Safford. It had been generally believed for a long time that if Japan did declare war without previous warning, it would come on a week end or national holiday. A warning message to that effect had been sent out several months before.

Mr. Murphy. Did you know Admiral Kimmel testified he never heard of such a warning?

Captain Safford. I did not know that.

Mr. Murphy. He said he never heard of it, because it went back to Admiral Bloch. That was back in April, wasn’t it?

Captain Safford. That was back in April.

Mr. Murphy. In February or March there was that Peruvian message about the attack on Pearl Harbor, wasn’t there? Did you hear of it?

Captain Safford. I never heard of it.

Mr. Murphy. You never heard of it, not until now?

Captain Safford. Not up until this time that I recall.

Mr. Murphy. There was a message sent to Pearl Harbor that came from Tokyo, from Ambassador Grew, that someone had heard the Peruvian Minister to say there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor. You never heard of that?

Captain Safford. No; I never heard of that.

Mr. Murphy. How did you arrive at this week-end business? Was that inference, was it the feeling generally in the Navy that the attack would come on Saturday or Sunday, or on a holiday?

Captain Safford. I believe that any time there was a discussion of war, the feeling was expressed by officers who were experienced that the Japanese would probably begin their war the way Hitler had begun his war in Europe over a week end so as to take the maximum advantage of the disorganization of the Government they were attacking by having their offices closed, and taking some time to get back into stride again.

Mr. Murphy. You feel, do you not, that General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, General Gerow, and General Smith of the Army, all knew, after they got this so-called message of Thursday, that war was coming Saturday or Sunday, did you feel that?

Captain Safford. I thought they did at the time.

Mr. Murphy. And you felt it too?

Captain Safford. I thought so too.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I would like to go to your message to the committee, and you have on the back page a chart. Who drew that chart?

Captain Safford. That chart was drawn in my office.

Mr. Murphy. By whom?
Captain Safford. By Lieutenant Stenback and myself. The actual
drawing was done by Lieutenant Stenback, who is [10096] in
the room assisting me. I am responsible for the date supplies.

Mr. Murphy. That was done by Admiral Stenback?

Captain Safford. Lieutenant Stenback.

Mr. Murphy. Lieutenant Stenback who is in the room with you,
and just to the rear, at the table, with another lieutenant from the
Navy who was also, I assume, assisting you?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. He drew this chart?

Captain Safford. He drew this chart.

Mr. Murphy. What was the basis for it? I see noted on here
“prepared January 25, 1946.” I see here “Attack on Pearl Harbor,
December 7,” and some other things.

What is it meant to convey?

Captain Safford. It is trying to put down in one place all data
concerning distances, day and night, which has a great effect on
receivability conditions of short-wave radio, time of the day, and any-
thing which was on record and available which would plot in the
receivability conditions of Bainbridge Island, and also the FCC sta-
tion at Portland, Oreg., from a few odds and ends of information we
had, and Cheltenham, Md., with particular reference to the JAP
1330 GCT schedule on the 4th of [10097] December 1941.

Mr. Murphy. Are the FCC intercepts on here?

Captain Safford. The only ones that I have any personal knowl-
dge of.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the FCC intercepts that we have in evi-
dence here aren’t on here, are they?

Captain Safford. They are on there; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Where? Where do you see the one that turned out
to be the false weather report?

Captain Safford. There [indicating].

Mr. Murphy. I show you the exhibit which is attached to your
statement.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And I ask you if you will mark with an “X” the FCC
intercept which is shown on page 3 (b) of Exhibit 142.

Captain Safford. May I see that?

Mr. Murphy. This one here [indicating].

That says it is a weather message from Station JVV8, transmitted
approximately 2200 G. m. t., December 4, 1941.

Captain Safford. There is an “X.”

Mr. Murphy. All right. The witness makes an “X” in pencil.

Now, then, I show you page 3 (c), a weather message from
[10098] the Tokyo station JVV3 transmitted at approximately
2130 G. m. t., December 5, 1941, and ask you if you will put an “X” on
your chart to show that one.

Captain Safford. Here is a second one right here [indicating].

We will make a small “X.”

Mr. Murphy. You mean it was received on the same day at the
same time?

Captain Safford. It was received on the 5th. This one [indicat-
ing] is an hour earlier in time. This chart here, in order to get
enough data, was made during the entire period. We monitored all of these intercepts that we have any record on. This is Greenwich
time.

Mr. Murphy. Is there anything in any chart before us that would
indicate to anyone that these two messages are in it until you now
put on “X” in there?

Captain Safford. The FCC intercepts are indicated with an “X”
and the dates were noted, and they were correctly plotted as to time
and frequency.

Mr. Murphy. Where do you find the dates noted?

Captain Safford. With a small letter “x.”

Mr. Murphy. I see. December 4?

Captain Safford. December 4 and December 5.

Mr. Murphy. The “December” is obliterated.

Captain Safford. December 5 and December 4 are marked

[10099] there [indicating].

Mr. Keefe. Is it there, Mr. Murphy?

Mr. Murphy. I do not know, but I am assured it is.

Captain Safford. It is there.

Mr. Richardson. It is there.

Mr. Murphy. Yes; it is “December 5” and “December 4” with two
small “x’s.”

Captain Safford. I just wanted this unobliterated.

[10100] Mr. Murphy. You better get a copy so you can have it
marked.

As I understand it, sir, where you have put the two x’s on there, very
small.

Captain Safford. Yes; already plotted.

Mr. Murphy. Now there was a message which Captain Kramer was
supposed to have thrown in the waste basket. Is that on there, and
the time that that was received, the one they thought was a proper
message and then he threw it in the waste basket? Which one would
it be? Will you mark that one with an “A”?

Captain Safford. It would be one of these probably indicated by
the little bits of dots here, but I could not specify which one. Those
were all press broadcasts and it could be any one of those which came
in the night.

Mr. Murphy. Now is the intercept of December 7, relations with
England being strained, on that chart?

Captain Safford. That would be shown in one of these long spaces
here [indicating].

Mr. Murphy. Is it indicated by you in any way so anyone examin-
ing that chart would ever find it? Is there any notation or any refer-
ce to it?

Captain Safford. That message was not specifically noted.

[10104] Mr. Murphy. Right. Is there anything on that chart
that would show the hidden words messages and their receipt?

Captain Safford. Not specifically.

Mr. Murphy. Is there anything at all that anyone would find if
they were to read that chart, without your explanation or without
something added to it, about hidden words?

Captain Safford. It included all the other Tokyo transmissions
which could be heard at Bainbridge Island in this range of frequen-
cies.
Mr. Murphy. What station was radio station JVW-3? Where was that located?

Captain Safford. That was in Japan.

Mr. Murphy. JVW-3 was in Japan?

Captain Safford. Yes. That is in Japan, near Tokyo.

Mr. Murphy. And JVW-3 on the second one would be the same one?

Captain Safford. Would be the same one.

Mr. Murphy. That would be at Tokyo. Then there is nothing on here to show what station received those messages in America, is there, on these exhibits 3 (b) and 3 (c)?

Captain Safford. They were received from the FCC monitoring station at Portland, Oregon. It is not on this, but it is on the letter of transmittal, and I have it here, the FCC intercept, Portland, Oregon.

[10102] Mr. Murphy. All right, thank you. Now I just want to clear one thing up and I am through with the letter.

You referred in that letter to paragraph 50, as I remember it, in the Roberts report. Do you have a copy of it there now?

Captain Safford. I have the report.

Mr. Murphy. Was that paragraph 50 you spoke of, the message described in paragraph 50, pages IX—XI?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. That reads as follows:

About noon Eastern Standard Time, 6:30 a.m., Honolulu time, December 7, an additional warning message indicating an almost immediate breaking of relations between the United States and Japan was discussed by the Chief of Staff after conference with the Chief of Naval Operations for the information of responsible Army and Navy commanders. Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack.

Now, as I understand it, you were asked what you knew about that particular transaction.

Captain Safford. I believe so. What is the question number, please, that they referred to.

[10103] Mr. Murphy. It is that little asterisk under 33, Captain.

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. I think it is clear. It is clear to me what you mean. You understood what you meant, did you not?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, I promised yesterday that I would get the Clarke report. The Clarke report is here. I am not going to question you in detail about it, but I think you will find in the Clarke report that is before you that this Friedman about whom you spoke yesterday denied there was any basis whatever for any allegation about General Marshall ordering certain papers destroyed.

With that I am finished, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Are you through?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster would be next. He is not present.

Congressman Gearhart of California will inquire, Captain.

Mr. Gearhart. Captain, the methods of transmittal that were used in the 14-parts message was that code or cipher?
Captain Safford. That would technically be called a cipher, but we use the word "code" loosely to mean both.

[10104] Mr. Gearhart. But, technically speaking, the method they used was the cipher method in transmitting that long 14-parts message?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, a cipher can be analyzed and broken down by expert study, a study by experts?

Captain Safford. In some cases.

Mr. Gearhart. That is, if it is not too good a cipher?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, in this instance the 14 parts comprised a very long document, did they not?

Captain Safford. Very long, indeed.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, if we had a very long document in a cipher and were immediately thereafter supplied with its translation into English, and it was a cipher, the probabilities are that cipher experts would break down that cipher and be able to interpret future messages very quickly?

Captain Safford. That all depends upon the system used.

Mr. Gearhart. Some are harder than others, but if you have a long cipher extending over pages and then you have its translation into plain, simple English, and you lay them down side by side, that is a pretty good lead to an expert in breaking that cipher, isn't it?

Captain Safford. It is a help, on the ciphers that can be broken, but it is no help on the ciphers that cannot be broken.

Senator Lucas. Captain, I still have a little trouble hearing you.

Captain Safford. I am sorry, Senator.

Mr. Gearhart. The point I was leading up to, I got the impression that the Japanese changed that cipher immediately afterward. Is that correct?

Captain Safford. After when?

Mr. Gearhart. After December 7, or after the message was delivered, I guess that was on December 7, at 1 o'clock, wasn't it?

Captain Safford. The cipher key was changed every day at midnight, Tokyo time, as a matter of routine, or standard practice, but that cipher system remained in effect long after December 7, 1941. I do not know just how long.

Mr. Gearhart. Was not that a very strange thing, in view of the fact they had delivered a message when they knew we had intercepted their cipher as well, or were reasonably certain of it?

Captain Safford. The Japanese on previous occasions had given the United States Government numerous notes in English which had to be translated to our Government, and they kept on using the same old machine. I cannot speak for the Japanese, but it was apparent to us that they thought their cipher was as secure as the United States high-grade cipher actually was.

Mr. Gearhart. There were so many very strange performances on the part of the Japanese it is kind of hard for us to decide what is rational and what is not.

For instance, the gentleman from Pennsylvania became very excited about the fact that they had sent, as you contended, on December 4 a message that said they were contemplating military action in two or three days. Why would they send a war warning to any place?
Well, if that were foolish, absurd, out-of-line, then how ridiculous becomes the sending of the winds execute on the 7th or 8th? As between the two which is the more absurd?

Captain Safford. We did not understand it. It was just a fact.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, sending the winds execute on the 7th or 8th, after it had already been on all the civilian radios, and after it had been in the newspapers, makes that action still more absurd, does it not, than anything they could have done in the way of advanced warning theretofore?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you have testified, haven't you, that the message of the 4th was sent in Morse code, that is 10107 by the dot and dash method?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You also testified you are convinced that that was a directional broadcast?

Captain Safford. The Japanese told us it was going to be a directional broadcast, or supposed to survey certain area where they would use the frequency suited to reach that area at that time of day and season of the year.

Mr. Gearhart. And being a directional broadcast directed towards Europe, because of climatic conditions and other scientific phenomenon that message could also be received on the east coast of the United States?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And being directed to Europe and being directed to the east coast, the same scientific phenomenon caused it not to be heard on the west coast of the United States, is that correct?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. Now about the interpretation. Technically speaking, the literal translation would indicate that relations with the United States were dangerous, is that not correct?

Captain Safford. That is a literal translation of that part referring to the United States.

[10108] Mr. Gearhart. It was understood by you, and by the other officers with whom you immediately discussed it, as indicating relations with the United States meant war, that "dangerous" meant war?

Captain Safford. The importance given to that message before we intercepted it by my superior officers, and also the senior officers in the War Department and their worry for fear it might have been sent out before the 20th of November when we started to listen for it, or the fear we might have failed to catch it, made me believe that it meant much more than the mere diplomatic relations becoming serious.

[10109] Mr. Gearhart. And when it did arrive, you naturally interpreted it in the light of other information that you had already had called to your attention?

Captain Safford. There was considerable information available at that time, and immediately prior thereto, which indicated that Japan was considering war against England and against America, and was definitely maintaining peaceful relations with Russia, as a matter of policy.
There was other information which indicated that the actual outbreak of war was going to occur in the rather near future. But this had seemed more important than any of those other messages individually, because this seemed to be a commitment of the Japanese Government to some course of action, whereas the other messages were more hints, or you might say statements of intent.

Mr. Gearhart. The very fact that the Japanese Government considered it important to notify all of its nationals all over the world, that were in the diplomatic and military activities, that they would convey to him in a false weather report, a pronounced deterioration of relations, indicated that they would not do so unless there was a very important idea to convey?

Captain Safford. Unless there was compelling reason.

Mr. Gearhart. Some compelling reason.

Then, when you interpreted this winds warning, and the giving of the code to the Japanese nationals as important, you had to interpret the deadline message which had passed over your desk as adding importance to that fact? Is that not true?

Captain Safford. The importance of the winds message built up to the point of its actual receipt.

Mr. Gearhart. That is right. The importance of the winds message was built up by other messages which were going over your desk, with which you were familiar?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. One of those was the so-called deadline message advising you that on the 29th something automatically would begin to happen, you did not mean that they were not to do something of no consequence, but something of very great consequence, following the 29th day of November 1941, isn't that correct?

Captain Safford. That was very definitely implied.

Mr. Gearhart. Then another series of messages had a very emphatic impression upon you, and those were the messages that had to do with the instructions to the Japanese nationals beyond the borders of Japan, to destroy their codes; is that not correct?

Captain Safford. Yes, but that did not seem anywhere near as important as the winds message, although it came in 2 or 3 days earlier. It was one of the things that built up the winds message in importance.

Mr. Gearhart. That is right. That is what I am trying to bring out, that these other messages built up the importance of the winds message, and winds execute, that you were waiting for?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And also in addition to that, you knew that other persons were impressed by this series of messages that were coming in, because it was brought to your attention, was it not, that the United States directed her consular agents and embassies in the Far East to destroy their codes?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. So there was only one interpretation that you could possibly give to the Japanese phrase "Relations with the United States dangerous," that that would mean when you received it, that relations with the United States had resulted in war?

Captain Safford. Correct.
Mr. Gearhart. And you have testified that when you were finally allowed to search the records, if you ever were, you found that all records, and reference to this [10118] code had been destroyed, or had disappeared from the files?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you been permitted the privilege of looking at file 7001 since you left the office that you were then connected with?

Captain Safford. I was loaned that file in 1944, and permitted to look myself. I also questioned Harrison who had been the custodian at that time in December 1941, and he said he knew nothing whatsoever about it at all.

Mr. Gearhart. You know the members of this committee have been denied the right to look at that 7001 file, so you aren’t the only one who has been denied the privilege.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I challenge that statement.

Mr. Gearhart. The Senator hasn’t forgotten the motion that was made?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I challenge that statement. I will go down with the Congressman this afternoon if he wants to look at 7001. The committee has the right to appoint a subcommittee to go down and look at that file.

Senator Ferguson. It seems that the memory of the Senator is very short. You made a motion to that effect, and the [10118] vote was 6 to 4 denying us the right to go down and look at the file.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, that was to prevent individual members from snooping and sniping and going on a fishing expedition into all of the files down there.

Mr. Gearhart. I might say that the Senator from Illinois has indicated that he is willing to go snooping and sniping with me this afternoon in violation of the motion.

Senator Lucas. The motion that prevailed was that a subcommittee could go down and look at the files and the chairman appointed that subcommittee. If the Congressman from California is not satisfied as to what counsel has told him, and what the Navy Department has told him about 7001, I will be delighted as a member of the subcommittee to go and look at that file.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment. Can’t we get along with the witness and decide these matters later? This witness doesn’t know anything about what the committee has done. I hope we can proceed with the Captain. We have detained him here for a long time. Let’s get along with his testimony. He couldn’t know about what the committee has decided to do or not to do.

[10114] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, just one thing—

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the Chairman that the witness does not know what the committee did, but I now ask that 7001 of the Navy be brought here in open session so that we can question this witness about it and all data relating to that file.

The Vice Chairman. Counsel will observe that request.1

Senator Ferguson. I want to have it when I examine the witness.

Mr. Gearhart. And I would like to have 7000 and 7002 also brought, so that we can have some idea of the sequence.

1 See p. 3800, infra.
Mr. Richardson. There is a photostatic copy available of the file.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to see that now.
Mr. Masten. That is all part of Exhibit 142.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that Exhibit 142 shows all of these numbers, and it has been in the committee’s hands, each individual, for about 1 week.
The Vice Chairman. Proceed.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I want to make one further statement. If the photostatic copies are not sufficient, in the opinion of the Senator from Michigan and the [10116] Congressman from California, I will be delighted to go down and have them look at the originals. If they cannot trust the Navy Department to give us true photostatic copies of what is in 7001, then I am willing, as a member of the subcommittee, to go into the Navy Department files and take a look.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I know of no subcommittee being appointed, but I want to call attention to what has been handed to me as a photostatic copy of the file.
This is one sheet. At the top in red stamp is TOP SECRET—ULTRA. Then in pencil in parentheses, the letters Y-P-E-D. Then there is typewritten JD-1: 7001. Typewritten number canceled.
Now, at the bottom in writing, in ink, 7001; in stamp TOP SECRET—ULTRA.
Now that is the thing that is given to the committee as the file. I would take it that merely indicates that there is no evidence now in the Navy Department that there is a file 7001, but that the number for that file is canceled.
That is what I am handed. Is that correct, counsel?
Mr. Kaufman. I don’t think so.
Senator Ferguson. Then will you explain that sheet of [10116] paper? I assumed there was a file with that number on it, and nothing in it.
Now, what is that sheet?
Mr. Kaufman. I think that is one of the binding sheets, and it is part of the rest of the exhibit, and the photostats. It is part of that volume of file.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand all the other papers in this binder is the file 7001 JD-1? Is that right, Commander Baecher?
Commander Baecher. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What is right then, that just the number is canceled and there is no file down there?
Commander Baecher. That is a sheet of paper in the file such as any other sheet on which would be written the message with the number.
Senator Ferguson. Well, is there a file?
Commander Baecher. There is.
Mr. Richardson. The file is the sheet of paper—or it is bound, sheets of paper—that cover a long period of time. This is one sheet of paper in the file. We have offered in one of our exhibits here all of the sheets of paper which precede that sheet, and all of the sheets of paper which follow that sheet, for the purpose of showing the nature of the whole file. If you go down to look at [10117] this specific file, you will just get a blank sheet of paper which says on it “File canceled.”
Senator Ferguson. Just what I read?
Mr. Richardson. Just what you read, that is right.
The question here, Mr. Chairman, is, as I understand it, that that sheet of paper is in effect a substitute for a true sheet of paper which might have contained the winds execute message that this witness is talking about.

Of course, we know nothing about it except that sheet of paper. We have offered Exhibit 142, all of the preceding sheets, and what they are about, which are on the 2d of December and the 3d day of December, in this file, in this bound volume of sheets of paper, as I understand it.

Then we have shown that in the next page, which would be 7002, we again pick up the 2d and 3d of December, for the purpose of indicating, at least by analysis, that a sheet of paper in the place where this 7001 cancellation is, couldn't have referred to a document on December 4, because you don't reach December 4 until further pages in advance.

Then we have also in Exhibit No. 142, submitted the subject matter that is involved in the earlier sheets and in the later sheets, to show the subject matter had no relation whatever to the subject of the winds code.

[10118] Now, then, that is purely a mechanical method of recital in order to see if there can be spelled out what 7001 originally was.

We also show in Exhibit 142 a number of other messages other sheets of paper, which appear in this general compilation, that are marked canceled at different portions of the year, to show that a cancellation of a sheet is not an unheard of proceeding.

[10119] Now, that is all physically that you could see if you went and looked at this file, and whatever inference the Senator or the committee may draw from that constituted the only answer that can be made to the fact that in that file is a blank sheet 7001 that is marked canceled.

Senator Lucas. What date was that?
Mr. Richardson. That would be in a group of sheets that run on December 2 and December 3.

Senator Ferguson. Counsel, I would like to call attention to some of these others as being canceled. I have examined this and have read it carefully, and I think that every one of them that are canceled, every number that is canceled is initialed and the date is put on when it is initialed as being canceled by a person, he initials the cancellation, but on this particular one "No. canceled" there is nothing on it except what I have read.

Now, I would like to have the file brought to this committee room so that the witness may be examined in relation to what other papers there are and so that the committee may see once and for all this file and that we can settle this matter of a number.

The Vice Chairman. Permit me to inquire of counsel, is there any reason why the responsible official of the Navy Department who is the custodian of this file could not [10120] appear here with the file with the understanding that it will be examined here and returned to him and taken back to the Navy Department?

Commander Beacher. May I discuss that with counsel, sir?
The Vice Chairman. All right. Discuss that with counsel and we will get a report on it.

1 See p. 3800, infra.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman—
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I will not yield further. I have only a few more questions.
The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Mr. Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. Captain, this file 7001 was succeeded by a file of 7002, was it not?
Captain Safford. Correct.
Mr. Gearhart. Can you explain to us what the system is in giving numbers to files of this kind? Do they represent subjects or do they represent chronological successions in respect to time transactions?
Captain Safford. Approximately chronological but the dates have often got mixed up. You will find many places in the file where messages were inserted out of turn, out of their order of translation. I think Captain Kramer can give a better answer to that than myself because his office actually filed and put the numbers on them.
Mr. Gearhart. Generally speaking they are chronological in respect to time?
Captain Safford. Generally.
Mr. Gearhart. But because some papers are retained on the desks of different officers a day or so sometimes papers get into the file that are subsequent in point of time of action, that occasionally happened?
Captain Safford. May I explain it this way—
Mr. Gearhart. Will you please explain it.
Captain Safford. The least important messages in the minor systems often were out of turn, delayed 2 or 3 days behind the more important messages. I think that is most likely the reason for the mix-up.
Mr. Gearhart. In whose charge were these files?
Captain Safford. They were in Captain Kramer’s.
Mr. Gearhart. Was this a file of Captain Kramer’s office or was it a file of the Navy Department, generally speaking?
Captain Safford. It was entirely separate from any Navy Department files. These translations of intercepts were not permitted in the Navy Department files. This is a special file kept in—all the files were in Captain Kramer’s safe.
Mr. Gearhart. Then the file itself was in use for some time if the numbers had gotten as high as 7,000. Did they start from 1?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir; they started from 1 at the beginning of the calendar year 1941 and worked up a little above 8,000 by the 31st of December 1941.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, from your observation of the file was the file 7,001 in a proper position to have contained the messages you have described?
Captain Safford. There was this, you might call it guide card, or dummy, between 7,000 and 7,002. All the papers were in proper chronological order. In fact, I went through the whole month of December to be certain that that particular message might not be correctly numbered but inserted out of turn and it was not there. I did not look outside of the month of December 1941 for it.
Mr. Gearhart. Then 7,001 is a file that might have contained the message you have testified to, the winds execute?
Captain Safford. It could have.
Mr. Gearhart. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire, Captain.

Senator Ferguson. Captain, I wish you would look at this paper. It was handed to me as this canceled file. I want to call your attention to it. The page before. This is at the bottom of the page. Translated 12-3-41. In [10123] parenthesis 5. That is at the bottom of the page. That is the message before. And on the page following it is "Translated 12-3-41." In parenthesis "A." Now, if those two papers when that file arrives here are in that file would that indicate that messages coming in or translated on the 3rd would be in that file or could be in that file? Will you look at just what I am talking about, please.

(A document was handed to Captain Safford.)

Senator Ferguson. Look at the bottom of the two pages, the one in front of it and the one in back of it.

Captain Safford. Yes. Now will you repeat the question.

Senator Ferguson. The question is, The page before this canceled number and the page after being dated as translated the 3rd of December would that indicate that this so-called winds message that you are talking about could have been in that JD-1: 7001 file?

Captain Safford. It could be because there was only 1 day out.

Senator Ferguson. Now, in your department—yours was the Communications Section, was it not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was that a file and a file number in the Communications Section or in what section was this file?

[10124] Captain Safford. It was in a file of the Translation Section which was a part of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence which had office space immediately adjacent to the rooms occupied by the section under my command and for which I was entirely and fully responsible.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that the Communications Section itself did not have files, they relied upon the Intelligence Section which had the office next door and the Translation Section for their filing; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Not in the case of these diplomatic messages. We had no files whatsoever of our own with the exception that we did have a complete file of the intercepted messages as they came in. Not the translations.

Senator Ferguson. Is that the one that is missing, is that the file 7001 that is missing or canceled—it doesn’t appear to be missing, it is just marked on that “canceled.”

Captain Safford. That belonged to Commander Kramer’s file or the Naval Intelligence file.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of your own knowledge who had the right to cancel a file and not to initial it?

Captain Safford. To my knowledge nobody had that right.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first look for file 7001—do I have to use the JD, is that part of that number?

Captain Safford. J is “Jap-Dip”, and “1” means 1941.

[10125] Senator Ferguson. Then I should refer to that?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever look for that file?

Captain Safford. I looked throughout all of the messages for the month of December 1941 personally. It had been looked for before and then I asked permission to make a personal search. It was not there.

Senator Ferguson. And when did you do that personal search of yours?

Captain Safford. Before I testified before Admiral Hart. I cannot recall the date. I had known it couldn't be located, the guide card, for a long time, but the personal search to see that it might not be mislaid in the wrong order was made just before I testified I believe before Admiral Hart.

Senator Ferguson. Who had custody of and who was in charge of files which included JD-1: 7001? Who would be the custodian and in charge of files that contained that number?

Captain Safford. In December 1941?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain Safford. The individual custodian was Lt. Comdr. H. S. Harrison, United States Naval Reserve.

Senator Ferguson. And he was in what section?

Captain Safford. He was attached, we might call it on \[10126\] temporary duty, in Opnav 20-GZ, under Commander Kramer, assisting him. He was not a language officer.

Senator Ferguson. Now, who followed Kramer and Harrison to your knowledge?

Captain Safford. There was a general change of organization in early 1942 and I am not familiar with the details of it.

Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with that?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How long did you keep your position that you had on the 7th?

Captain Safford. Until the 15th of February 1942.

Senator Ferguson. Were there any charges ever placed against you in the Navy Department?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you removed from that position for any reason that you know of?

Captain Safford. For no reason that was ever explained to me. They split the organization up into several component parts and I was given the part which was considered by Admiral Noyes, I believe, to be the most important, our own codes and ciphers, because we were better off at that time, for 2 or 3 months, in the solution of foreign codes and ciphers, than we were in the production of our own. \[10127\] We had just made it and we were on the ragged edge as regards distribution and production for the increasing demands of war.

Senator Ferguson. Then the fact that you left your position in February of 1942 was due to a change in the organization set-up, and you went to a position in the same organization excepting one part of it, is that correct?

Captain Safford. The organization under me from 1936 until 1941 had included the design and production of our own codes and ciphers. That was another subsection, which has never been mentioned here
because it has nothing to do with this investigation. I took that over when it was split up. There were further changes made at some unknown time and a lot of responsibilities which had been under Naval Intelligence at that time were transferred to Naval Communications and I am not close enough to it to possibly speak with any degree of accuracy.

Senator Ferguson. Did you remain in a very responsible position in relation to codes, ciphers, and messages as far as our war effort was concerned?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And how long did you remain in that highly responsible position?

Captain Safford. There was a further subdivision [10128] about, I believe, September 1942 whereby the production was separated from the pure research and development of new and superior systems, and I took the research over at that time. I think it was generally conceded I was the best officer qualified in the Navy to do that particular type of work. And another officer who served under me took over the production.

Senator Ferguson. Now, was that a highly important position in our war effort?

Captain Safford. It was highly important and highly specialized.

Senator Ferguson. And how long did you remain in that position?

Captain Safford. I am still in that position.

Senator Ferguson. You are still in that position?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, has anyone brought any charges in any way against you in relation to your neglect up to and including the 7th of December 1941?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever been charged with any neglect or, let's say, malfeasance and nonfeasance?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Or misfeasance?

[10129] Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was there ever an investigation made as to your office as to why you didn't get that 1 o'clock message which came in and was known from 5 to 6 o'clock to the White House, to General Marshall or Admiral Stark?

Captain Safford. The nearest thing to that came in a statement from Admiral Noyes. He said the Roberts Commission "has given your outfit a clean bill of health."

Senator Ferguson. That is the only thing?

Captain Safford. Or words to that effect. That is the only thing that remotely relates to an investigation.

[10130] Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it you never received any criticism for not being down on Sunday morning?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was your day off, as we call it? When was your leave day, as you call it in the Navy?

Captain Safford. Sunday was my regular day off.

Senator Ferguson. That was your regular day off?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was your office alerted to war on Saturday and Sunday?

Captain Safford. Yes, it was.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why? Did you ever make an investigation as to why this message of one o'clock delivery and the 14 part—the 14th part of the 14-part message was not decoded and translated—as I understand it was in English so it didn't need translation—but polished up and taken to the respective men prior to the time it was taken?

Captain Safford. That particular 1 o'clock message turned out to be Japanese when it was decoded. I made an investigation. I asked the officers concerned. Brotherhood knew what it meant, or thought he knew what it meant, and he called Kramer on the telephone, and then he sent the message over to the Army to be translated.

[10131] Senator Ferguson. I didn't get the name of the man who was telephoned.

Captain Safford. Captain Kramer.

Senator Ferguson. Here is what I am trying to get at.

If you were on a war basis, if you were fully alerted, you anticipated trouble that morning, why didn't we get more speed in your office and every other office in Washington, as far as you were concerned? Why did we have these lapses of time when we were all alerted to war?

Captain Safford. The message was decoded very promptly.

Sunday, December 7, was one of those days on which we were fortunate enough to acquire the key to the purple machine before it became effective and was ever used. The same thing had been true of the day before, for the 6th. We had acquired the key in advance. I believe we sent one of those—I am speaking by guesswork now—

Senator Ferguson. I don't want you to guess. We can't act up here on guesses, and we want to keep guesses out.

Captain Safford. We had sent those keys out more than 28 hours in advance. We had believed we furnished them to the Army. I am not positive of that. The Army had them anyhow, and therefore we were in a position to read those messages off, or we thought we were just as fast as the Japanese could do it, except for the question of translation

[10132] afterwards.

Now, on the key for the 6th there had been apparently some mistake in transcription. Two of the letters got mixed up in the order. That caused trouble. Both were garbled and the officer who came in took time out to correct that before we made the delivery.

Senator Ferguson. I don't think you are quite answering my question. What I am trying to get at is this—I will put it in a little different way:

How far was the Army translation department from your office?

Captain Safford. It was about 5 minutes walk.

Senator Ferguson. Five minutes walk? What I am getting at is why didn't you have a runner outside. You were anticipating, you were alerted fully to war; why didn't you have a runner standing by for that matter so that he could go immediately at 5 o'clock, or whatever time it was, when that message was delivered in your department or in the Intelligence Section—or wasn't the Army office open?
Captain Safford. I do not know whether the Army office was open or not. We had a runner available. We had an officer and an enlisted man on watch at the time. We had two men at all times on watch which always gave us a courier [10133] available for any immediate trips.

Senator Ferguson. So you had the men, then?

Captain Safford. I had the men, but we didn't have the translators.

Senator Ferguson. Whose duty was it to send this message when it came in there at 5 o'clock over to the Army translators? Let's get down to who is responsible for these delays.

Captain Safford. It was the responsibility of the officer on watch.

Senator Ferguson. Who would that be that morning?

Captain Safford. That was Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood.

Senator Ferguson. Well, we can ask him about that.

The Vice Chairman. It is now 12:30. Would it be convenient for you to suspend now?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. We will take a recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 1:30 p.m., the same day.)

[10134] Afternoon Session—1:30 P.M.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. Masten. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we would like to read into the record at this time two short memoranda which deal generally with this winds-message problem.

One is a memorandum for Mr. Richardson from Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe, dated January 26, 1946, which reads as follows:

Pursuant to the request of former counsel to the committee, a comparison was made of the intercepted messages in the Army Signal Intelligence Service file which had been translated on 2, 3, and 4 December 1941 and those in the Navy file translated on the same dates. The purpose of the comparison was to ascertain whether the Army file contained a message not in the Navy file. The comparison, which was jointly made by the Army and the Navy, showed that each message in the Army file was also in the Navy file.

The results of the comparison were reported orally [10135] to the former counsel to the Committee at the time the comparison was completed.

[s] Harmon Duncombe, Lt. Colonel, GSC.

The second memorandum has to do with item 1 (e) of exhibit 142, and is from Lieutenant Commander Baecher to Mr. Richardson, under date of February 1, 1946.

It reads as follows:

With reference to ALUSNA Batavia dispatch 031030 December 1941, please be advised that the time of receipt of this dispatch in the Navy Department was 0621 GCT 4 December 1941, which corresponds to 1:21 am 4 December 1941, Eastern Standard Time. This message was transmitted from Radio Honolulu as deferred precedence.

[s] John Ford Baecher, John Ford Baecher, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.
We would also like to add, as another letter number to Exhibit 142, the photostat which has just been distributed, and which consists of a photostat of a letter dated November 7, 1945, to Mr. George E. Sterling, Chief of Radio Intelligence Division, Federal Communications Commission, and certain enclosures, all of which had to do with the true winds execute which was received by the Federal Communications Commission on the afternoon of December 7, 1941. We would like to offer that as Exhibit 142-D.

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 142-D, and all the memoranda read by counsel will be transcribed on the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142-D").

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire, what is meant by the "true"? You have used the expression "true winds execute." What do you mean by that?

Mr. Masten. Senator, I was referring to the voice broadcast, which is included as item 4 in the Federal Communications material included in Exhibit 142.

Senator Ferguson. Why did counsel describe it as "true"?

Mr. Richardson. It is an actual message in the winds code. All the messages are in dispute here. That is the reason, Senator.

The Vice Chairman. Did you have something else?

Mr. Masten. Mr. Richardson would like to have this memorandum read into the record at this time. It is a memorandum dated December 6, 1941, which reads as follows:

Memorandum for Colonel Holbrook:

Word has just been received from ONI by telephone [10137] to the effect that the Japanese Embassy, in Washington, D. C., was reliably reported to have burned its Code Book and Ciphers last night.


The memorandum is on the stationery of the War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington.

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete the exhibits?

Mr. Masten. That is all, yes.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. Richardson. I had intended to inject a couple of short witnesses here who had to leave town, but I think in my error, I told them to come at 2 o'clock, so I think we can proceed with the captain until 2 o'clock, and when they come, we can pause and take their testimony.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, that will be done. Senator Ferguson will examine you, Captain.

[10138] TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. This last exhibit that was read into the record, the memorandum for Colonel Holbrook, do you know a Colonel Holbrook? Did you ever have any dealings with him?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It says, "Word has just been received from ONI"—what is the ONI?

1 See Mr. Masten's statement in hearings, Part 10, p. 5147.
Captain Safford. The Office of Naval Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson. That was the office over you?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

by telephone to the effect that the Japanese Embassy, in Washington, D.C., was reliably reported to have burned its Code Book and Ciphers last night.

This is dated December 6, 1941.

Have you ever heard of that before?

Captain Safford. I had not heard of that before.

Senator Ferguson. And this is signed "James F. Perry, First Lieutenant, Military Intelligence, Evaluation Subsection."

This is in the War Department.

Did you know Perry?

[10139] Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if that kind of a message had come in, should not Communications have received it first? Or did Intelligence get things from Communications by telephone, that did not go through your department?

Captain Safford. That apparently bypassed me entirely.

Senator Ferguson. How is that?

Captain Safford. Apparently that one bypassed me. I do not remember it.

Senator Ferguson. That is a rather significant message, is it not?

Captain Safford. It is.

Senator Ferguson. Now, who would know whether that was distributed to the White House, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of State, and the various others? Would you have anything to do with the distribution?

Captain Safford. It is not in my knowledge, and I had nothing to do with it.

Senator Ferguson. Was it ever distributed out of Washington? This information? Was it ever sent to Kimmel or Short, or to the Philippines?

Captain Safford. Not to my knowledge.

[10140] Senator Ferguson. You had charge of a department that not only received messages, but sent messages, did you not? Communications?

Captain Safford. The Communications Center.

Senator Ferguson. Did you also send messages, as well as receive them in your department?

Captain Safford. My department only sent technical messages pertaining to the work and methods of the work. Intelligence was handled by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Information such as you describe would be the function of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson. What I am getting at, what department would send the message of November 24 to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Safford. That was actually handled by Naval Communications.

Senator Ferguson. That is your department, is it not?

Captain Safford. I was not in charge of it. I was only a subordinate officer.

Senator Ferguson. Well, Noyes was in charge of it?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did the top of the section handle all messages being sent out as so-called not information but direction orders?

Captain Safford. That is correct. I did.

[10141] Senator Ferguson. You handled those, or did Noyes handle them personally?

Captain Safford. I prepared the messages and the admiral released them when available.

Senator Ferguson. Then you never heard of this information in ONI that "last night" which would be on the 5th "it was reliably reported to have burned its code books and ciphers last night"? That is the Japanese Embassy. You never heard of that before today?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You knew that there had been instructions to the Embassy here, that is, through intercepted codes, that they were to burn their ciphers and so forth, and their codes?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. I think that is shown on page 215 of Exhibit 1, from Tokyo (Togo) to Washington, December 2, 1941. Will you look at that to see whether or not that is what we are talking about, exhibit 1, page 215?

Captain Safford. That is the one.

Senator Ferguson. That is the one?

Captain Safford. Yes.

[10142] Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar with the fact that our Embassy in Tokyo was advised to destroy its codes?

Captain Safford. I had no information about that.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me?

Captain Safford. I had no information about the Embassy.

Senator Ferguson. The military attaché or the naval attaché?

Captain Safford. The naval attaché, yes; the military attaché, no.

Senator Ferguson. You had it as far as the naval attaché was concerned?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. On what date was that message sent? It was sent, I believe, on the 5th, was it not?

Captain Safford. I believe that was on the 3d.

Senator Ferguson. Would you check that? It is important after we get this message of the 6th.

Captain Safford. That message appears on page 42 of Exhibit No. 37. It was sent on the 4th Greenwich time, but on the 3d Washington time.

Senator Ferguson. So the instrument that we have just now read into the record would not be the foundation of sending that?

[10143] Captain Safford. No.

Senator Ferguson. What was the foundation, if you know, for sending that?

Captain Safford. The foundation for that was the message on page 215 of Exhibit 1, which you have just referred to, plus another message on page 209 of Exhibit 1, which may be identified as JD-1: 6984.

Senator Ferguson. Page 209? Can you help me again?
Captain Safford. Page 209. It is the first complete message.
Senator Ferguson (reading):

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately?

That is a London message.

Captain Safford. This was to Washington, No. 2444, just above it.
Senator Ferguson. The one above it:

The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my circular message No. 2447, the U. S. (office) retains the machines and the machine codes.

Please relay to France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey from Switzerland; and to Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico [10144] from Washington.

Captain Safford. That is the one.
Senator Ferguson. That is the one?

Captain Safford. Yes. The other one was not translated until the 5th. We did not have it at the time.

Senator Ferguson. Will you go to page 245 of Exhibit No. 1, the message from Tokyo to Washington, December 6, 1941, No. 904, “Reply #902,”—902 was the 14-parts message was it not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. (reading):

There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person.

Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.

Now that is the end of that message. Did you know that message came in?

Captain Safford. I did not know that message came in until Monday morning.

[10145] Senator Ferguson. Now here is what you have: You have, first, the pilot message saying there is going to be a time of delivery and “we are going to send 901,” which is the pilot message, and that told us,

the Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

So that tells us the number of the message and it tells us it is going to be in English, so in intercepting it we would know immediately by the number 902 that we are getting a part of the 14-part message, would we not?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. So if we wanted to make haste we would have the information all in advance, as soon as we received the message?

That is one of the first things that came in?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And it would not be a difficult thing to decipher and decode that number 902, would it?

Captain Safford. Except that was in Japanese and the Army translated it, not the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Was the Army as good or not as good in translating? Do you make a distinction there by saying [10146] that the Army had it instead of the Navy? Do I understand now if one word in this message, for instance, this part about 901 or 902,
happened to be in Japanese and the other part of the message was in English that you would have to send it over to the Army to have translated No. 902?

Captain Safford. 904, sir.

Senator Ferguson. No. The long 14-parts message was 902.

Captain Safford. I am sorry, sir, I did not understand.

Senator Ferguson. You do not understand?

Captain Safford. No.

Senator Ferguson. I did not understand you, then. You said that if this part 901 and 902, or whatever the number of the message was, was in Japanese it, therefore, had to be sent over to the Army. Is that right?

Captain Safford. This particular message we are talking about, which is No. 904—

Senator Ferguson. No, I am back now to the pilot message.

Captain Safford. The pilot message was in English.

Senator Ferguson. The pilot message gave you the number of the 14-part message, didn't it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, No. 902.

Senator Ferguson. So if you knew that number you would know immediately that that was what you wanted to work on [10147] at once, is that true?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. You knew the number of the pilot message and the number of the 14-part message?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is not that what you were looking for that day?

Captain Safford. We were giving precedence to No. 902.

Senator Ferguson. Now, then, they not only told you that they are going to describe the time of delivery of the message and give you the number of parts, they say, "I will send it in 14 parts," and they tell you they will give a time of delivery on it, but they sent another message which you intercept on the same day, telling them not even to use a typist on it. What would that indicate to you?

Captain Safford. That that message was most important to the Japanese Government to keep secret until the No. 902 had been delivered to the United States Government.

Senator Ferguson. So that was further evidence that this 14-parts message was a very very important message, and they wanted it secret until it was delivered, they did not want even any Japanese typists working on it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That was known to us here in Washington?

[10148] Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now there has been considerable said or questions asked about your absence on Sunday, and you told me it was your day off.

Captain Safford. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were there sufficient personnel in that office to intercept these messages and deliver them to the proper translation people?

Captain Safford. There were.
Senator Ferguson. Now coming back to this delay again, did you know of any other delays in delivery of these 14 parts of the message, or that No. 904 that said "Don't use a typist"?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Or the 1 o'clock message?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for those messages not being translated and delivered to the proper parties?

Captain Safford. We did not have enough translators to maintain a 24-hour watch with them.

Senator Ferguson. How many translators had they in the Army and Navy?

Captain Safford. I cannot give you those exact figures. We had very few.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you did not have to translate [10149] the 14 parts?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now the only one that you had to translate was the short one that I just read, and the one about the delivery, isn't that true?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How many translators would it take to translate those, and in how long a time? They are very short, aren't they?

Captain Safford. They are very short.

Senator Ferguson. You said you had found the key so you knew how to do it that day.

Captain Safford. We knew how to do it that day.

Senator Ferguson. Now take that message I just read to you, No. 904, how long should it take to translate that? It is on page 245.

Captain Safford. That should take 5 to 10 minutes.

Senator Ferguson. Five to ten minutes. By how many translators?

Captain Safford. One.

Senator Ferguson. Now let us go to the 1 o'clock message. Have you got the number of it there?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. What is the page number?


Senator Ferguson. That is another three-line message, and it starts out "Re my #902," which is the fourteenth part, so there would be another tip at least that it belonged to that series of messages, is that right?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And how long would it take to translate that message?

Captain Safford. Five to ten minutes.

Senator Ferguson. Five to ten minutes, so at the most we have 20 minutes to translate those two messages?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now let us go to the fourteenth part of the message. You will note at the top of it it has got the note:

In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "Very Important."
So you have standing out on the fourteenth part of the 14-parts message in plain English to the broadcasting station so that everyone receiving it in communications, or anyone else, would not have to use Japanese translation or anything else, they could see "very important," and it was No. 902?

Captain Safford. There was no delay on any of those messages, on any of the processes for which I was responsible. [10151] They were intercepted promptly, correctly, they were forwarded almost immediately by teletype from the west coast, and were decoded promptly.

Senator Ferguson. Now I direct you to page 245, at the top of the page, to the plain English phrase "very important," and that was to the radio station. That would not be in Japanese, would it?

Captain Safford. No, sir, that was in English.

Senator Ferguson. That was in English and it did not have to be decoded?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So whoever received that message would have the flag "very important" right at the top of it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In English?

Captain Safford. In English.

Senator Ferguson. Have you any idea how long it would take to translate that fourteenth part? You told us they had the key.

Captain Safford. That would be roughly a half hour.

Senator Ferguson. A half hour?

Captain Safford. A half hour, and possibly a few minutes longer.

Senator Ferguson. Now we are going to another subject.

[10152] Among these papers that you read from the other day—

It has been suggested by counsel that he had other witnesses here at 2 o'clock, so I would suggest that we take those other two witnesses and stop here, because I was going to another subject.

The Chairman. Captain, you may stand aside for a few minutes, until a couple of other witnesses are examined who must leave the city.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I assume you want to direct the reporter to place the testimony of these two witnesses following the completion of Captain Safford?

The Chairman. Yes. The testimony of the two witnesses that will come on now will be placed after the conclusion of Captain Safford's testimony.

(The testimony of witnesses Beatty and Dillon, taken at this point, will be found following the testimony of Captain Safford.)

The Chairman. Go ahead, Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Captain, you had in your possession and gave to the committee a certain exhibit, dated May 14, 1945. It was attached to a memorandum that you read into the record that you said you made up in 1945. On that exhibit I see that on May 18, 1945, you have got in pen

delivered to Lieutenant Commander Sonnett by Lieutenant [10153] Commander Linn about ten hundred May 15, 1945.
Will you explain that?

Captain Safford. I was asked for that and I sent over by Commander Linn and he made a note at the time and delivered it.

Senator Ferguson. On the end of this instrument you have this:

9. There is one final place where written confirmation of the winds "execute" message may exist—the record of proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I cannot believe that they could cover up so completely that some mention of the winds "execute" did not slip into the record. First they said I didn't know what was going on around me; now they claim I am suffering from hallucinations. Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to search through the record for such evidence in order to prove my sanity, as well as my intelligence and my veracity.

You delivered this message to Sonnett?

Captain Safford. One of my officers did.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but that was in it at the time that you delivered it to Sonnett?

Captain Safford. That was in it at the time I mailed it to Sonnett.

Senator Ferguson. Was that because of what Sonnett [10154] had said to you or did anybody else question your sanity or your intelligence or your veracity?

Captain Safford. No. He had repeatedly told me that he thought my memory was playing me tricks and maybe I was suffering from hallucinations.

Senator Ferguson. So then you put it in writing and delivered it to him with this part that I have read to you?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; that was in it.

Senator Ferguson. Then you have—this is in red pencil "see testimony of Colonel Fielder and Colonel Bicknell December 24, 1941." Was that on at the time it was delivered?

Captain Safford. That was put on afterwards, in December 1945, shortly before Christmas, after I had been permitted at length to read the testimony given before the Roberts Commission.

[10155] Senator Ferguson. Now, did Sonnett ever call you up or question that part of the memo that you had delivered to him, number 9?

Captain Safford. He never discussed that specifically with me after that. The next time I came over he made some remark that he did not want to give that to Admiral Hewitt, though he would if I insisted. I told him I was only trying to assist and I was not trying to run that investigation. He gave it back to me and I made a notation as soon as I got back to the office of the date at which it was returned. Admiral Hewitt never did see that memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, you have written across the face of it:

Withdrawn on May 18, 1945 at the suggestion of Lieutenant Commander Sonnett. Returned for possible use at the next (?) investigation Pearl Harbor, L. F. Safford.

Captain Safford. That was "retained", sir.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon?

Captain Safford. That was "retained."

Senator Ferguson. Now, then, do I understand then that this did not reach the possession of Sonnett or did he have it to read it?

Captain Safford. He did have that about 3 days and read it and then suggested that I withdraw it, though if I insisted he would give
it to Admiral Hewitt. I withdrew it. [10156] He had read it.

Senator Ferguson. So he had it from the 15th to the 18th?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the only conversation you had about it was what you relate now?

Captain Safford. And the other conversation was that I would not be permitted to inspect the records of the Roberts investigation; that was out.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read that, please?

(Answer read.)

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you have any conversation with Sommert about inspecting the records of the Roberts investigation?

Captain Safford. None other than that.

Senator Ferguson. Just that part?

Captain Safford. I had requested it in writing and he said it could not be done.

Senator Ferguson. When did you request it in writing?

Captain Safford. In my last paragraph.

Senator Ferguson. Oh, in this instrument?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. That was the only time.

Senator Ferguson. Did he say anything to you in any of the conversations about the wind execute message?

Captain Safford. We would discuss other matters and always get around to that question.

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean “get around to it”?

Captain Safford. Well, I believe he would lead up to it or something. It kept cropping up in the conversation.

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you why the Navy were making the Hewitt investigation?

Captain Safford. To see if they could reconcile conflicting testimony and to examine witnesses who had not been available before, particularly Captain McCollum and Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss what the reconciling testimony was that you did want to reconcile?

Captain Safford. It was largely in regard to the winds message. There were other matters which did not particularly concern me. All of these things on which I presented memorandums were not clear in his mind, at least, what the significance was, and I spent a lot of time preparing those to do my best to straighten them out from my point of view and from what I knew.

Senator Ferguson. Did he mention to you who had testified that there was no wind message?

Captain Safford. I believe that he told me that I was the only person who had any recollection of the winds message.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, that was on May 18, 1945. [10158] Did he tell you or mention to you that on the 6th of June 1944 that Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, United States Navy, an admiral, had been asked this question:

68. Q. During November or December, 1941, were you cognizant of a special code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform their nationals concerning against what nations they would make aggressive movements, by means of a partial weather report?

A. Yes, I do recall such messages.
Q. 69. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4 December, the broadcast directive, thus given, indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States?
A. Yes.

70. Q. Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
A. I do not know except it was probably supposed that the intercept stations in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. However, it may have been because of a message sent in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes which had been sent to London and Washington which indicated that war with the United States and with Great Britain is imminent.

Did Sonnett ever call that to your attention, that Admiral Ingersoll had said that?

Captain Safford. He did not.

Senator Ferguson. I am reading that which is in the Hart report. Now, were you told that by Mr. Sonnett?

Captain Safford. I was not.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what Admiral Ingersoll could be talking about there other than the wind code intercept execute?

Captain Safford. Nothing else at all.

Senator Ferguson. Now I am going to read you Admiral Ingersoll’s testimony from another hearing, not the Hart hearing at all, and I would like to have the original so that we can get the date. This is the Navy. I want to find out the date he testified. I cannot find it but I will put it in the record later, when he is testifying before the Pearl Harbor Navy Board of Inquiry. It is a different investigation. The one I read from to you was the Hart investigation and this is in the first Navy. It is after Hart.

Q. Can you remember under those circumstances what this doubt was—

I think I will go back far enough to clear up that question.

Can you state whether or not this information was discussed by you and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark?

Going back to 35.

A. I don’t remember whether it was discussed with Admiral Stark or not.

36. Q. Did you take any action yourself as a result of the information that was contained in this document 15?
A. As far as I recall, we took no action on this dispatch at that time, because, as I have stated before, I believe there was some doubt in the minds of the translators as to just what the translation should be.

37. Q. Can you remember in substance what this doubt was?
A. No, I do not recall, except that there was some doubt as to whether they had an exact translation—a difference of opinion among the translators as to what the Japanese words meant.

38. Q. Can you recall whether this difference of opinion related to the subject of a declaration of war or whether it related to severance of negotiations, or what the discussion was about—can you remember that?
A. No, I don’t remember that point now.

39. Q. On or prior to 7 December 1941 did you receive any information as to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy Department which would put in effect the action contemplated by the so-called “winds” message?
A. Yes.

40. Q. Will you state the circumstances?
A. I recall that some time I did see the messages which were supposed to put this “winds” message, translated on the 28th, into effect. I do not recall whether I saw them prior to December 7 or afterward. If I saw them prior to December 7 I am quite sure that would have been considered confirmation of the information which had previously been received and which had been sent to the Fleet
on December 3 or December 4 regarding the destruction of codes at London, Washington, Manila and elsewhere, which indicated definitely that war was imminent.

41. Q. Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941 any action was taken in the office of Chief of Naval Operations as a result of the information contained in this execution of the "winds" code which you state you saw?

A. As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, whether it was on or prior to December 7, or whether it was after December 7. If it was after December [10163] 7 there was no purpose in sending it out. If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent out because we considered that the dispatch sent to all fleets regarding the destruction of codes was ample warning that war was imminent, or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be broken off, and that this dispatch was only confirmatory.

42. Q. Did you have any knowledge of the location of the dispatch or of the information which conveyed to you the execution of the "winds" code?

A. I have no knowledge regarding the location or disposition of any of these dispatches, as I have seen none of them since December 1941.

[10163] Now, that was the testimony given on August the 31st, 1944. Did Mr. Sonnett call that to your attention?

Captain Safford. He did not.

Senator Ferguson. Now, he said he did not see any of these messages after December 1941. Now, let us take the message in Exhibit 1, the so-called regular message of the weather. Do you know what I am talking about? The one that they had some trouble about translating?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is on page——

Captain Safford. 154 and 155.

Senator Ferguson. No; that is circular 2353.

Captain Safford. Isn't that what you have reference to?

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the one that came in on the 7th or 8th. They thought it was a wind execute. It is on page 251, the top of the page. It is dated the 7th of December 1941 [reading]:

(Plain Japanese language using code names)

Circular #2494

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

Captain Safford. That was not the winds message. That was in the hidden word code.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; but didn't some people think that [10164] that was a wind message?

Captain Safford. There has been some confusion over that.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon?

Captain Safford. There has been some confusion over that.

Senator Ferguson. Over that. Well, now, when did that come in to the Navy Department?

Captain Safford. That was received a little after 10 a.m. and had been distributed to everybody in the Navy at least and to the White House and State Department by 11 a.m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941.

Senator Ferguson. What was wrong with that translation? Wasn't there some trouble over the translation?

Captain Safford. The translation was hurriedly made and the word "United States" or "U. S." should have been included in it.

Senator Ferguson. When did they make a correction of that?

Captain Safford. I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Well, is the language "not in accordance with expectations," is that not a correct interpretation?

Captain Safford. That was the translation given by the Navy for the so-called hidden word code, which was the vehicle for sending this information. At a later date it was [10165] pointed out to me—this is 1944—that the Army translation of that was somewhat stronger, but that stronger translation was never distributed.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you know of this message, circular No. 2494?

Captain Safford. I had known about that since the 8th of December 1941.

Senator Ferguson. And where was it kept?

Captain Safford. That was kept in the file along with the other translations of intercepted diplomatic messages which came in code.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you made a statement yesterday or the day before that they could not have been talking about this message because it was not in the Navy Department. What message were you talking about? I thought you were talking about this message that I am now showing you on page 251.

Captain Safford. I was not talking about this message at all.

Senator Ferguson. What message were you talking about? You made an answer that indicated that the message was not in the file, it was not in the Navy Department until 1944. What message were you talking about?

Captain Safford. I am talking about a translation or a possible translation which somebody in the Army pointed out [10166] to me in 1944. It was not an official translation because it had never been distributed.

Senator Ferguson. What message is that that was never distributed?

Captain Safford. This same message. It was simply an independent translation made at some later date.

Senator Ferguson. So Admiral Ingersoll could not have seen a code, a winds code execute message with the "United States" on in the Navy Department in December 1941?

Captain Safford. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Because they never had one that contained the "United States" until 1944 as far as circular No. 2494, December the 7th, 1941, was concerned?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that is clear.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you have been asked many questions on the subject of whether or not you saw this execute message. Now, at this late time in your examination are you positive that you did see such a message?

Captain Safford. I am positive, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Is there anything that you want to add to any of your testimony or subtract from in relation to the fact that you positively and without any doubt in your mind [10167] saw the execute message on or about the 4th of December 1941 and prior to the time of the 14 part message and the attack?

Captain Safford. That is exactly correct as you have stated it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. There is no doubt, then, in your mind?

Captain Safford. There is no doubt.

Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with a man by the name of Pettigrew, Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew?

Captain Safford. I do not know him personally.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I want to read you something from an affidavit of his, and he made this affidavit on the 13th day of February 1945 [reading]:

That someone whom affiant does not now recall showed affiant on or about the 5th of December 1941 an implementation intercept which had been received from the Navy and which indicated that Japan-U. S. relations were in danger. That in view of the prior intercepts which had been read by affiant he took the implementation message to mean that anything could happen and, consequently, he had prepared that dispatch to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, at the request of someone whom he does not now recall, a secret cablegram, a copy of which is attached.

[10168] Now, what could Col. Moses W. Pettigrew, M. I. S., be talking about there if it was not the intercept message that you claim you saw?

Captain Safford. It was the same intercept winds message.

Senator Ferguson. And attached to that is this: The exhibit attached is the Rochefort message:

This is sent on No. 519 12-5.

December 5, 1941.

Assistant Chief of Staff,

Headquarters G-2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately through Commandant 14th Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. Miles.

Now, that is what he attaches to his affidavit and that is in the Army. Now, could they have been talking about the message on page 251 of exhibit I that came in on the 7th, because the Rochefort message is going out on the 5th?

Captain Safford. They could not possibly.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know of any other message that Pettigrew could be talking about in that affidavit?

Captain Safford. I have never heard of any other message that Colonel Pettigrew could have been talking about.

Senator Ferguson. And I want to read you “Top Secret” [10169] Navy.” of Admiral Turner, question 86:

Q. Referring to this so-called “Winds” message, are we correct in understanding that you had no knowledge of any execute of that message designating the objective of Japan?

A. I will correct my previous answer on that. Admiral Noyes called me up on the telephone. What day or time of day I don’t recall. I think it was on December 6. He said something like this: “The Winds message came in,” or something of that sort.

St. Q. Did he report to you what the “Winds” message meant and what it was interpreted as?

A. Yes.

88. Q. Was the Chief of Naval Operations aware of that, either from information from you or otherwise?

A. Not from me. I believe Admiral Noyes informed him.

89. Q. Was any discussion had as to the importance of sending that reply to the Commander in Chief, Pacific?

A. Not so far as I know. I did not participate in any such discussion. I assumed that the Commander in Chief had that.

Now, I want to read a couple more answers.
Cross examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

93. Q. Admiral, referring again to document 15 of Exhibit 63, which is the message which set up the so-called Winds code, do you recall whether or not you had any feeling that the execute of the Winds code meant that war would necessarily follow between the United States and Japan or whether the execute of the Winds message merely meant a break in diplomatic relations or a strain in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan?

A. My impression was that it was at least a break in diplomatic relations and probably war.

Reexamined by the court:

94. Q. When you heard the news from Admiral Noyes that an execute of the message had been received, did you consider that it was of such high significance that action should be taken immediately to transmit that information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. No, I assumed that he had it. On Friday there was a discussion between Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and me on the general situation.

95. Q. Friday, December 5?

A. There was a discussion among the three of us, and we all felt all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of command preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary.

Then this is: Recross-examined by the interested party. Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, United States Navy (Retired.)

96. Q. In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes as to the receipt of the execution signal of the Winds code system, was it your understanding that it referred to United States-Japanese relations?

A. Yes.

97. Q. Was it at any time before the 7th of December that you received information that the Commander-in-Chief was not receiving this decrypted, intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic, or was it after December 7, 1941, that you received that information?

A. I have never received such information. I have never been informed that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was not decrypting the diplomatic dispatches.

And then he is reexamined by the court.

Now, did Mr. Sonnett ever tell you or relate that kind of testimony to you?

Captain Safford. I was never told that at all.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know of that testimony before I read it to you?

Captain Safford. After this investigation commenced the 15th of December 1945 or later and also in January of this year I was permitted to examine the records of those previous Pearl Harbor investigations. That was the first time I knew what other witnesses said and was the first time that I did not know that I was standing alone against the world in my testimony.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, Admiral Turner appeared before this committee and on page 5384 he testified:

Admiral Turner.

I have to go back a question so that we get the run of this. This is on the bottom of page 5383 [reading].

Senator Brewster. On the Winds message, I wanted to clear up a little of your testimony from your former statement.

At that time you said in your examination, Admiral Turner, if I may quote from the questions which were asked you on page 1006:

"In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes as to the receipt of the scout's signal of the Winds code system, was it your understanding it referred to United States-Japanese relations?"

Your answer at that time was, "Yes".
As I understand now, you feel you got it somewhat [10173] clearer? Admiral Turner. Was that before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Senator?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Turner. That is correct, because up until the time I returned to San Francisco about two months ago I thought the entire thing in that Wind message was authentic and that they had merely made a mistake about that "North Wind so and so."

On talking to some of the officers who had gone into it in San Francisco, why, they said it had been found out later that that was a false broadcast picked out of the ordinary news, but it was news to me at that time.

Senator Brewster. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. The question was asked of the witness whether or not Mr. Sonnett had informed him about the Admiral Turner testimony. The fact is that on page 96 of the appendix, which is the Hewitt report, they cited the Turner testimony but nevertheless found there was no winds execute.

Senator Ferguson. Now, we have Admiral Turner's testimony here as well. I want to give you that in relation [10174] to the other.

Now, did you or did you not read the Admiral Turner testimony?

Captain Safford. I do not recall reading any of the testimony before this committee except what appeared in the newspapers.

Senator Ferguson. Were you here when Justice Roberts was on the witness stand?

Captain Safford. I was, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You heard the two questions read to him in relation to this code message; did you?

Captain Safford. I heard them but I do not recall what they were.

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall them?

Captain Safford. Well, I——

Senator Ferguson. What do you want to say? Do you want to answer it?

Captain Safford. No, sir; I cannot answer it.

Senator Ferguson. You just did not hear?

Captain Safford. I do not recall specifically what they were. There were questions asked and he answered them.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will get this clear, so that there can be no mistake on what code message you were talking about or what the people were talking about in it. [Reading from Roberts Commission transcript, page 290, examination of Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder:]

[10175] The Chairman. It has been reported to me that about ten days before the attack a code was intercepted which could not be broken, but it was forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken, and the War Department found out it could be broken and did break it, and found out it contained three important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.

Now, do you know of any other three words prior to the 7th, not including this one of the 7th but prior to the 7th, of any three-word message other than the wind code message?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You know of none?
Captain Safford. I know of none.

Mr. Murphy. Now, will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. What about the "hattori" and "minami" and the other one? Weren't those three words? "Minami" was the United States and "hattori" and one other one.

Senator Ferguson. Congressman, are you asking him a question?

Mr. Murphy. No, no. I was just suggesting the three words. There was one, "minami"—

Senator Ferguson. I mean do you still want the answers to it?

Mr. Murphy. No; I am not asking the witness. I am just suggesting it to you.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Murphy. Go ahead, Senator.

Captain Safford. Excuse me, Senator. I thought I was asked the question.

Senator Ferguson. You thought there was a question pending?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; and I was looking up the answer.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, Congressman, have you got a question?

Mr. Murphy. I will hold it.

Senator Ferguson. Oh, you will pursue it later?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. He will get to it later and present it and clear the thing up.

How many times since Pearl Harbor have you contacted General Short?

[10177] Captain Safford. I have never seen General Short except in this room. I have never talked to him and have never written to him.

Senator Ferguson. Had you been in contact with Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Safford. I have seen Admiral Kimmel, as I previously testified, on the 21st of February 1944. Then I saw him next when I went in and took the witness stand as a witness before the Navy Court of Inquiry.

Senator Ferguson. Had that been the first time after Pearl Harbor that you saw him?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And how many times since that have you seen him?

Captain Safford. I have probably seen him half a dozen times in Washington.

Senator Ferguson. Had you had any conversations with him about this trial?

Captain Safford. In a general way.

Senator Ferguson. As to what your testimony would be?

Captain Safford. As to the fact that my testimony was just what I had given before; I was not making any changes.

Senator Ferguson. Is that the substance of your conversation?

[10178] Captain Safford. That was the substance of our conversations.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you mentioned a long—you described it as long, or it has been described as a long message drawn up by McCollum.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you read that message?

Captain Safford. I read it page by page.

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell me what was said which would indicate why somebody in the Intelligence Department like McCollum was wanting to get other than information out, wanting to get an order out to the Fleet?

Captain Safford. This was information of developments running back at least a month, probably more. It was very complete and very well thought out. After all this time I cannot give many of the details except the very last end, which is the part that interested me most, because the very last, you might call it, paragraph, there was a sentence there, was what appeared to me the same information that had been put on as the translation of the winds code. That is, we were to have—Japan was about to declare war on the United States, about to declare war on England, including the Netherlands East Indies, and so forth, and would maintain peace with Russia, and the last sentence, as I recall it [10179] added the forecast or evaluation “war is imminent.” Everything up to that last sentence had been pure information. The only piece of evaluation was the very last sentence, “War is imminent.” There was no order or directive to do anything.

Senator Ferguson. It was information then?

Captain Safford. Information, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, can you give us the substance of the other part of the message, what was he conveying?

Captain Safford. Information showing the progressive deterioration of relations between the United States and Japan and of the sure indications, such as the withdrawal of merchant ships. I believe Captain McCollum has testified about other things. I cannot go into detail, Senator; it is too long ago.

Senator Ferguson. I just asked you the substance. Will you look at page 204 of Exhibit 1? There is a message there from Tokyo to Berlin dated November the 30th in three parts. It shows that you only intercepted two parts, 1 and 3. The third part indicates that there was something in between and was missed by someone. [Reading]:

If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the [10180] Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south, and so forth.

Doesn't that indicate that you are going to have war with the United States and not with Russia unless Russia comes in?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. That puts Russia out of the war with Japan.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, that being true—that was translated the 1st of December. That was received on the 30th of Novem-
ber. Hadn’t you all the knowledge that came in the so-called execute wind message? Why did you want to wait and if you had that information and which is set up in the first part. [Reading:]

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

 Didn’t that give you warning that there was going to be war between the United States and Japan and Britain and Japan [10181] and not Russia unless Russia came in?

 Captain Safford. That gave a warning also.

 Mr. Richardson. What was that last answer?
    (Answer read.)

 Senator Ferguson. But didn’t it give you everything that you got in the code? Now, I am not saying anything about what the embassies were going to get, other embassies, but didn’t they give to the United States here in Washington the whole answer?

 Captain Safford. It gave a complete verification or proof of the winds message—of its evaluation I mean.

 Senator Ferguson. Now, what happened to part 2 there? That would be a very important message, would it not? And what did you do to try to find it?

 Captain Safford. We received parts 1 and 3 from Corregidor for forwarding. While we were working on them we received a message from London which said, “We are forwarding parts 1 and 3 of Tokyo to Berlin. Serial No. 985. Have you got part 2?” And the answer was sent back to the effect that we were sorry, that we did not have part 2. That was our lack of—

 Senator Ferguson. What message did you read me there? What page is it on? Did you read a message there?

 Captain Safford. I am telling you the substance of a [10182] message that was received from London.

 Senator Ferguson. Oh.

 Captain Safford. It was relative to this Tokyo to Berlin No. 985.

 Senator Ferguson. You were looking at a paper and I thought you were reading it out of a book.

 Captain Safford. I was checking the number to see that I did not make a mistake.

 Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you inquire from England again to see about that, as to whether or not they got that part 2?

 Captain Safford. England had already asked us for it and we told them we did not have it. If they had had part 2 they would have sent it along with parts 1 and 3. We made a very careful check of the incoming traffic from all our stations and part 2 simply, we had failed to get it, the same as England had.

 Senator Ferguson. Did that happen often, Captain?

 Captain Safford. It happened often enough to be very distressing. It was not at all uncommon to have a hole in messages, incomplete parts, sometimes it was the first part missing, sometimes it was the last. It was usually at one end or the other rather than the middle.

 Senator Ferguson. How do you account for that? Was it [10183] radio reception?
Captain Safford. Radio reception, interference and sometimes they were allowed to send one part of a message over one circuit and another part of a message would go over another circuit and due to some combination we could get the one and not the other.

Senator Ferguson. Then in effect you did not purport to be absolutely certain that you were getting all of the Jap messages?

Captain Safford. We could not, sir, and we kept on telling our stations to that effect. We were endeavoring to get as much as we could but we could not guarantee a hundred percent performance.

Senator Ferguson. And when you would deliver these raw messages to the various offices you were only trying to deliver those that seemed important to you?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You did not deliver all that you intercepted but you delivered all that seemed important?

Captain Safford. And particularly those that seemed important to the White House and to the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. And is there any doubt but some of these messages in No. 1, diplomatic, and also in No. 2, the ship movements, is there any doubt that all those [10184] messages were translated, as translated were sent to the White House and State Department? Do you know what Exhibit 1 is?

Captain Safford. I have Exhibit 1 here.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain Safford. I feel certain that everything in Exhibit 1 was sent to the White House and the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what exhibit—

Captain Safford. Wait a minute. What is Exhibit 2?

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 2 is the large yellow one. It is ship movements. It is Japanese messages concerning military installations, ship movements, and so forth.

Captain Safford. A large part of Exhibit 2 probably was not sent to the White House or the State Department as they were not interested. They were sent up to Naval Intelligence and they determined the subsequent distribution of them.

Senator Ferguson. All right. I will show you some and see whether or not they were sent. On page 12. Can you answer that?

Captain Safford. I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. Wasn't the State Department and the White House concerned with where war would come as well as when war would come?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; but I cannot tell you this from memory.

[10185] Senator Ferguson. I see. And you know of no records in your department which would indicate, or any department to your knowledge—and I only want your knowledge on this—that would indicate which one of these messages did go or did not go?

Captain Safford. There may have been or there should have been a record in Naval Intelligence or in Captain Kramer's portion of the far eastern section of Naval Intelligence, but I do not have any personal knowledge, or did not have.

Senator Ferguson. How far away from your desk was Captain Kramer's desk?
Captain Safford. At that time he was about halfway down the corridor from me, in the Navy Building.

Senator Ferguson. Will you look on page 22? That is a message from Honolulu to Tokyo December 3, 1941. I believe that was picked up by the Army at some station here in Virginia, but was sent to the Navy for translation. Did you ever see that?

Captain Safford. I had seen that before. Kramer called it to my attention on Monday, December 8, 1941.

Senator Ferguson. He called it to your attention on the 8th?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you had seen it prior to that?

[10186] Captain Safford. I had not seen it prior to that.

Senator Ferguson. You had not seen it prior to that?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation as to whether or not that was translated in the rough by Mrs. Edgars and put on his desk on Saturday the 6th?

Captain Safford. Just what we said about that at the time I do not recall. That question of Mrs. Edgars came up about 2 years later, when I checked up on it, but he did say, “Here is this thing; it is too late. What should I do with it?” He said, “It is in a bad shape, we cannot handle it now.” And I said, “Well, you finish it anyhow and turn it into the file for purposes of record; it might be important.” Then after it was smoothed up it did appear to be very important.

Senator Ferguson. Is that about all that you remember that he said in relation to that particular message?

Captain Safford. He asked me furthermore—he told me that he had received it in imperfect form on Saturday afternoon around 3 o’clock and that it was a question of working on that or working on the highly important 14 parter and, therefore, he let this thing go to be finished when time was available.

Senator Ferguson. Were all of the interpreters in the [10187] Army and Navy sections busy on Saturday translating?

Captain Safford. Not in the Army, sir. I believe they all went home at about 1 o’clock.

Senator Ferguson. They all went home in the Army?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, couldn’t Kramer have gotten someone in the Army or someone in the Navy to translate this message on page 22 of Exhibit 2? I understood you were alerted for war.

Captain Safford. Mr. Ferguson, it was my understanding that this was much more than a mere translation. This is a very badly garbled message, which had to be thought out and I believe this has been in the testimony of other witnesses before other investigations. All I know about it is quite second-handed and I would rather not discuss it.

Senator Ferguson. You know it second-handed. You mean you got it by hearsay from Kramer.

Captain Safford. Kramer said it was not a question of translating it. It was a question of taking away people off the purple system onto this.

Senator Ferguson. And that was given as the reason for not decoding this message other than in the rough as indicated?
Captain Safford. Taking it back. I would rather let [10158] Kramer describe that message than myself.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Captain Safford. And possibly Captain Rochefort if he is to be called as a witness can also describe it.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to ask counsel or the naval attaché here if you know whether or not they are going to produce file 7001?

Commander Baecher. We have it here, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You have it?

Commander Baecher. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Could I see it?

Commander Baecher. It is not in a file, sir. It is in a book.

Senator Ferguson. I think the committee would be interested in knowing what is meant by a file.

Mr. Richardson. We made the name “file.” The Navy does not.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, the Navy does not make the name “file”?

Mr. Richardson. No.

Senator Ferguson. Let us get it straightened out. Is this officer the custodian?

Commander Baecher. He is the present custodian.

Senator Ferguson. Maybe he can help us.

[10189] Commander Baecher. Captain Kramer can explain it better than anyone else.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then I will wait until Kramer comes on. I don't want to waste any time.

Now, there has just been placed on my table here a message. Will you show the witness this message? It is one you described the other day, that it went to CINCAF urgent and CINCPAC, which is Kimmel, priority, but it went to Hart urgent. How do you account for that? How do you account for the change? It was all marked “Urgent” you said.

Captain Safford. The action addressees were “urgent” out in the Asiatic station. The information addressees, that is CINCAP and COM 14 were only priority, but it was all in one message blank.

Senator Ferguson. One is marked “urgent” at the top and the other one is marked “priority.”

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But the one for information was only marked “priority.”

Captain Safford. Priority.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that message was an intercepted Japanese message, was it not?

Captain Safford. That was, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And then it was sent out on December [10190] the 1st, 1941, in this form to both Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel; is that correct?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that if you could send this kind of an intercepted message do you know any reason, as the head or one of the officers in the communications section, that you would be risking any more to send that kind of a message out over the wires than you would to alert Hawaii on the morning of the 7th?
Captain Safford. None at all, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I am asking you as a communications officer.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; and I am speaking as a cipher expert with years of experience behind it. There was no danger whatsoever in using our top grade ciphers for any kind of information.

Senator Ferguson. And there was no more danger of sending out that particular dispatch by McCollum and released by Admiral L. Noyes on December the 1st, 1941? You understood my question?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And your answer is as an expert in this field?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

[10191] Senator Ferguson. Now, so that there is no mistake on this record, when you were referring to a false weather report, an executed message, you are talking about the method that it was to translate or execute these three words relating to America, England, and so forth; the message would be a false weather report, not a correct weather report but a false one?

Captain Safford. A false weather report, correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So that when in any of your statements or your language you are talking about a false weather report, that does not indicate, does it, that you never saw the report, or does it indicate that?

Captain Safford. That indicates to what I have called the winds message in other testimony, to what I did see.
Senator Ferguson. And it is the execute part of the winds message?
Captain Safford. That is it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But it is false as far as the weather is concerned in Japan, is that correct?
Captain Safford. Or anywhere else, because the actual language that came over said, "North wind, south wind, and west wind"—I mean "North wind, east wind, west wind," all in the same manner and no places or direct name. It was obviously a false weather report which no one could mistake.

[10192] Senator Ferguson. Now, that is what is known as a word-cipher-word, is it not?
Captain Safford. It is often—
Senator Ferguson. A code word?
Captain Safford. This is in hidden word, yes, sir; or hidden-word.
Senator Ferguson. Hidden words?
Captain Safford. Or open code it is sometimes called because it appears disguised in an apparently innocent message.

Senator Ferguson. But a hidden word can be sent in Morse code, Japanese Morse code, or international code or by voice, is that right?
Captain Safford. Any way they want. There was no restriction. The message which set it up simply said "Japanese language broadcast," and that could have been in the form of Japanese, written, yes, sir, as well as voice, but it could not have been in English or any other foreign language.

Senator Ferguson. It had to be in Japanese?
Captain Safford. It had to be in Japanese.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know of any other messages in the same way that were transmitted and known as code word messages? Was that a customary way to send messages?
[10193] Captain Safford. That was only done in an emergency.
Senator Ferguson. Now, was it your understanding that the various Japanese embassies had short-wave radio and picked these messages up, or how did the Japanese embassies get these messages?
Captain Safford. Japan sent a series of broadcasts on short wave to their embassies overseas. They were mostly in Japanese and I think some of the broadcasts were in voice, but the important ones were in Morse code and they had radio receiving apparatus at each embassy and they had an operator who could take them in and they would change their schedules from time to time, discuss it in plain language. There was nothing secret about this arrangement. It was done openly and above-board.
Senator Ferguson. But did the Japanese embassies receive it on their own receiving sets?
Captain Safford. The Japanese embassies received it on their own receiving sets, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And not on some commercial set?
Captain Safford. And not on some commercial set.
Senator Ferguson. So that it was going directly to the various embassies?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that was short-wave radio?
[10194] Captain Safford. Short-wave receiving sets. If they wanted to send anything back they could not.
Senator Ferguson. And did we have short-wave receivers at Tokyo so far as the Navy was concerned?
Captain Safford. I cannot say for Tokyo but we did in most of the capitals of the world. We had to get diplomatic clearance in every case.
Senator Ferguson. Now, how would an embassy, let us assume that this kind of a message was received here on Massachusetts Avenue, where their embassy was, and they would decode back a message that they had received. How would they send their message back?
Captain Safford. This was normally used just for sending out press, for just information as it calls it, the general intelligence broadcasts and the news broadcasts.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, but how would the Japanese embassy get back a message to Tokyo?
Captain Safford. Through commercial radio.
Senator Ferguson. Through commercial radio?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that is when you were able to pick up that commercial radio, because they did use the commercial radio?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
[10195] Senator Ferguson. It was not cabled; it was radioed?
Captain Safford. It was practically 100 percent radio.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Chairman. Mr. Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Captain, where were you born?
Captain Safford. I was born in Massachusetts.
Mr. Keefe. I believe you have testified that you have had 32 years of service in the Navy?
Captain Safford. Going on 34.
Mr. Keefe. The statement has been made quite repeatedly, especially by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, who cross-examined you at length, that you stand alone in your testimony with respect to this winds message.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, regardless of that, Captain Safford, is the testimony which you have given to this committee what you believe to be the truth?

Captain Safford. It is.

Mr. Keefe. You testified that you have thought that your testimony would be supported by certain witnesses whom you named. I take it the four in number were the names you gave us yesterday?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

[10196] Mr. Keefe. Men who are expected to be witnesses before this committee following your testimony?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You were intimate with Captain Kramer, were you not?

Captain Safford. I served with him for two years and saw him every day.

Mr. Keefe. Did you hear Captain Kramer's testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Have you read it since this hearing began?

Captain Safford. I have read it since this hearing began.

Mr. Keefe. From that testimony did you obtain the impression that Captain Kramer would support the testimony which you have given here?

Captain Safford. I did from that testimony.

Mr. Keefe. And from statements which he had previously made to you?

Captain Safford. And from statements he had previously made to me.

Mr. Keefe. Reference has been made by the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Ferguson, to the testimony that has heretofore been given by Admiral Ingersoll, that has been read into the record.

[10197] Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Also some testimony previously given by Admiral Turner with respect to his knowledge of the existence of the winds execute message.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You have referred to your belief that Captain Sadtler also has knowledge of the existence of this winds execute message on or about the 4th of December 1941?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Captain Sadtler has also testified——

The Vice Chairman. Colonel Sadtler.

Mr. Keefe. Colonel Sadtler I believe it is, yes.

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. I don't want to demote him.

You were familiar with the testimony that Colonel Sadtler had given before the Army Board?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; I read that within the 2 months—within the past 2 months also.
Mr. Keeffe. Yes. Now, from the reading of the testimony of these witnesses and from your knowledge of the facts as you have testified to them yourself, was that the basis of the statement which you made in response to Mr. Murphy's questions yesterday that you expected some of these witnesses to justify the position which you have assumed before this inquiry?

Captain Safford. That is correct. It was not from their own mouths. [10198]

Mr. Keeffe. Now, in order that the record may be clear at this time, in view of your previous cross-examination, I call your attention to the testimony of Capt. Alwin D. Kramer before the naval court of inquiry, volume 5, pages 956 and 957, where he was asked question No. 30:

Q. Commander, I am going to show you some documents and ask you if you saw them on or before the 7th of December, 1941. The first one I shall show you is Document 15 from Exhibit 63.

Now Document 15 was the original set up of the winds message, was it not?

Captain Safford. I am sorry, I cannot answer that.

Mr. Keeffe. I think it will appear later on.

A. Yes, sir, I did. This was written up by my section.
Q. Can you recall about when you first saw it?
A. The fact that the date "28 November" is on here would indicate that I saw it and confirmed it for writing up on that date for the first time. Also, there is an indication at the bottom that it was received by teletype, which would indicate it was handled promptly after received.
Q. Do you know what action was taken with reference to intercepting any communications which would have executed the phrases of this code?

Obviously he was referring to this Document 15 being the original set-up of the winds message.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. That is clear, is it not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Then Captain Kramer answers:

On receipt of this particular message, on instructions of the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes, I prepared some cards, about 6 as I recall it, which I turned over to Admiral Noyes.

Now, stopping his answer right there, I want to ask you did you have knowledge of the fact that Captain Kramer had prepared these cards on the instructions of Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; he did.

Mr. Keeffe. And those cards were turned over to Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford. They were turned over.

Mr. Keeffe. Going on with the quote from Kramer's testimony:

He indicated that his purpose in getting these cards was to leave them with certain senior officers of the Navy Department and I do know that he arranged with Captain Safford, the head of Op–20–G, the section of Communications that handled this material, to have any message in this phraseology handled promptly by watch officers, not only in Op–20–G but through the regular watch officers of the Communications section of the Navy Department, to those people who had the cards. These cards had on them the expressions contained in this exhibit.

referring to Exhibit 15—

and the meaning. Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, I believe either the third or fourth of December,
I repeat that quote—

Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, I believe either the third or fourth of December, I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it as being of this nature, walked with him to Captain Safford's office, and from that point Captain Safford took the ball. I believe Captain Safford went directly to Admiral Noyes' office at that time. Again, because of the fact that this was a plain language message, and because of the fact that special arrangements had been made to handle this Japanese plain language message which had special meaning, I did not handle the distribution of this particular message, the one of the third or fourth.

Q. You say it is your recollection that you received some Japanese plain language words which corresponded with the language set out in Document 15; is that correct?  

A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it.

Q. Can you recall from looking at Document 15 which Japanese language words you received?

A. Higashi No Kazeame. I am quite certain. The literal meaning of Higashi No Kazeame is East Wind, Rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States.

Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that you saw which contained the words about which you have testified, Higashi No Kazeame?

A. I am almost certain it was typewritten. I believe it was on teletype paper.

Q. Can you recall who had this paper in his possession when you saw it?

A. I don't recall the name of the officer who had it. It was, however, the GY watch officer, the man who had the watch breaking down current systems that were being read.

Q. Can you indicate or state the source of the information that was contained in this communication?

A. No, sir, I cannot positively, but the fact that my recollection is that it came in on teletype would indicate that it was a U. S. Navy intercept station.

Do you remember discussing, in your discussions with Kramer, that he had given you that information as to what his knowledge was on this situation prior to the time that you testified before either the Army Board or Naval Court or Hewitt examination?

Captain Safford. I discussed that with Kramer before he left Washington to go to Honolulu. I believe it was late in 1942 or early in 1943. I have not discussed it with him since.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Captain Safford, I want to get perfectly clear, in my mind at least, this set-up on the operation of this teletype device. That hasn't anything to do with cryptology?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Or anything secret at all. Teletypes are used all over the country.

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. Now, as I understand it, you had direct wires to your intercept stations on the east coast and the west coast; is that right?

Captain Safford. It was just like a long-distance telephone circuit. It went through switchboards. You rang the numbers and got your connections, but instead of talking the messages are typed and automatically printed at the other end.

Mr. Keefe. That is the way all these messages came in?

Captain Safford. At that time, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. At that time?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. We did not have leased lines at that time.

Mr. Keefe. So you had the regular teletype machine such as they have in a newspaper office or any other offices?
Captain Safford. Yes.
Mr. Keeffe. There is a double roll, as I understand it, of the receiving paper.

Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Keeffe. On which the words are printed?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. So you would have an original and a copy?
Captain Safford. Yes.
Mr. Keeffe. And it was a regular yellow sheet, was it not?
Captain Safford. Yes, a standard copy.
Mr. Keeffe. A standard yellow sheet copy, the first sheet and then a carbon for the copy, is that right?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Keeffe. And these messages would come in and the watch officer would take them off the teletype as they would come in, and I suppose they would be handed over to the translators as to anything that might be considered to be important?

Captain Safford. They would have to be decoded first generally, and then the translator got them.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. Now Kramer, in his testimony before the Navy court which I have indicated, states with positiveness that the watch officer on the 4th of December took a message off the teletype embodying three of these words, “Higashi No Kazeame.”

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. And he states positively that the watch officer brought that before him and he walked down with the watch officer. Do you recall that incident?
Captain Safford. Yes, I recall that incident.

Mr. Keeffe. Now let us read on further:

Q. And I believe you have testified that you have no knowledge of what disposition was made of the communication after you saw it; is that correct?
A. No first-hand or direct knowledge. It would simply be inference.
Q. Have you seen that communication since?
A. I have had no occasion to; no, sir.
Q. The question was, have you seen it since?

[10205] A. I have not, no, sir. I have not because I have had no occasion to.

Q. Now, referring to the winds message, you were familiar with the original winds message, wherein they designated at some future date in a weather report, if they gave execute and used certain words, it meant certain things?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you standing by for an answer to that message? Did you consider it important enough that when that message was received it would be a most important message in reply. In other words, were you on the lookout for that answer?
A. I am not sure what you mean by “answer”.
Q. Well, the execute of the message.
A. Yes, sir, not only myself but all that Op-20-G organization were much much on the qui vive looking for that. I prefer to refer to that as a warning.
Q. When this execute came in, did you receive it?
A. I did not receive it myself but was shown it by the watch officer who receives the information off the teletype.

Q. Were you the officer who went to the communications officer and said, “Here it is”?
A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch officer to Commander Safford’s office.

[10206] Q. You had that information then?
A. We had, as I recall it, this typewritten piece of paper with the meaning well in mind.
Q. About what was the time and date when you got that?
A. I am not certain. I believe it was about the 4th of December. It may have been the 3rd.

Q. What did you do with it?
A. As I indicated before, I did not handle it from there on at all.

Q. Who handled it?
A. I left Commander Safford's office as soon as I knew he had the picture and knew what the message was, and I believe he at once went to Admiral Noyes' office. I knew that Admiral Noyes was highly interested in that particularly plain language code because of his previous instruction to me to make out these cards so that he could leave it with certain high officers and the Secretary, all with the view of getting the word to those people promptly, whether it was any time of the day or night.

Q. When the original winds message was received, was that to your knowledge sent to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations?
A. I am sure it was, yes, sir.

Q. When you took the execute of the winds message in [10207] to Captain Safford, and, I believe said, "Here it is," did you mean by that exclamation, "Here it is," that this was the execution of the Japanese War Plan, or did you have any further discussion with Captain Safford which would indicate he thought that this was the message which executed the Japanese War Plan?
A. Nothing of that nature whatsoever. I did not deliver the message myself. I accompanied the GY watch officer on the way to Commander Safford's office, and the expression "Here it is" simply meant that finally a message in this plain language code had come through—a message which we had been looking for many days and that we had made special provisions to handle for many days.

Q. To your mind that was of no more significance than "here is the message which indicates a break in negotiations between Japan and the United States"?
A. It meant more than that. This plain language code did not refer specifically to the United States-Japanese negotiations. It referred to the general diplomatic relations between the nations concerned and therefore meant a critical stage in the negotiations or relations which could very well involve a break.

[10208] Now, thus Captain Kramer testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. As I have indicated?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. From that testimony, and from the other testimony, is that the reason why you testified yesterday that you had reason to believe that these witnesses would substantiate the story which you have told to this committee?

Captain Safford. It was.

Mr. Keeffe. And you had reason to believe that you would not be coming before this committee standing alone, did you not?

Captain Safford. That is right, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. I shall not take the time to read at this time the testimony of Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler. Those witnesses will be here to testify. But from the whole picture as you had it from the testimony that these people gave under oath and from the information which they gave you in the talks you had with them subsequently, were you of the opinion that your position would be corroborated by these witnesses when they came here to testify?

Captain Safford. I believed that they would support me in general.

[10209] Mr. Keeffe. Now, the thing that has puzzled me, and I assume that it must be puzzling to other members of this com-
mittee, and I speak with utter and complete frankness, Captain Safford, I am unable to understand any possible interest, personal interest, that you might have in this controversy, and if you have any such personal interest, I would like to have you state it.

Captain Safford. I have no personal interest, except I started it and I have got to see it through.

The Chairman. The guests of the committee will be in order.

Mr. Keefe. You realize, of course, that in view of the implications that have been stated in the cross-examination of you, especially by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that you have made some rather strong charges?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That may well militate against your career as a naval officer. Did you realize that when you came here as a witness?

Captain Safford. I realized that every time I have testified.

Mr. Keefe. And despite the fact that you have nothing personally to gain, and everything to lose, you have persisted in this story every time you have testified?

[10210] Captain Safford. I have.

Mr. Keefe. Now, you have testified that from information which you subsequently obtained, Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, who was standing watch at 5 a. m. on the morning of the 7th, had this final fourteenth part of the 14-part message plus the short message of instructions for its delivery to Secretary Hull at 1 o'clock?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I take it that that testimony means, and you will correct me if I am in error, that the message was received, but not yet decoded or translated?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I am a little confused about the character in which this fourteenth-part message and the short message came in? Did it come in in Japanese or English or what?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. after decoding, after taking it out of the purple machine, one of the messages, the fourteenth part was in what you might call a modified sort of English, and the other was in a modified form of Japanese.

There were a great many conventional symbols used also in combination which had to be broken down into numbers, capitals, punctuation points, all manner of things like that. So then the message had to be completely retyped [10211] from that and in the case of the Japanese, of course, it had to be translated into English. So it was not quite as rapid a job to process them as would be in our own systems where it comes out straight.

Mr. Keefe. Now, you have no knowledge, personal knowledge, because you weren't there, as to what Brotherhood did with this message, have you?

Captain Safford. Brotherhood told me that——

Mr. Keefe. I don't care what he told you.

Captain Safford. I have no personal knowledge, no, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, we will get that from Brotherhood at the proper time. I don't want you to testify to a lot of hearsay evidence. I want your own knowledge. You know nothing about what transpired as to the decoding or translating, or writing of the fourteenth-part message and the short message because you were not there?
Captain Safford. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Any knowledge which you might have on that has been gained as a result of conversations with those who were there?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, you were rather bitterly assailed yesterday because you were home eating your breakfast in your pajamas on a Sunday, something which I personally do [10212] almost every Sunday, but you were assailed as though you had a direct responsibility to do something about this situation on Sunday, and failed to do it, although you are not here on trial. No charge has ever been made by anyone against you.

Now, when you were at home on Sunday, was there anything that you could have done had you been in your office to have accomplished more than what was done in your absence?

Captain Safford. Not one thing, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You are not a translator, are you?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You had to rely upon other Army or Navy translators?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And on this particular Sunday there weren’t any Navy translators there?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You had an arrangement, as I understand it, that the Army was to do translations on that Sunday?

Captain Safford. Kramer had made that arrangement himself.

Mr. Keefe. Previously entered into?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Although it was the Navy’s day to do it, [10213] you had done it, as I understood, for the Army on Saturday, and the Army was taking over your duties on Sunday; is that correct?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So that if you had been there at 5 o’clock or 6 o’clock or any other time, you wouldn’t have known any more about what was in that message than Brotherhood, would you?

Captain Safford. Less.

Mr. Keefe. Less.

Now, when you left your office at 4:30 or thereabouts, on Saturday, were you violating any order or directive, or regulation of the Navy in so doing?

Captain Safford. On the contrary sir, I believe the official closing hours were 1 o’clock, but military personnel were supposed to stay on until 4:30. All the civil-service employees went home at 1 o’clock that day in the Navy as well as the War Department.

Mr. Keefe. We had gone on a 40-hour week?

Captain Safford. I believe it was a 40-hour week then, I am not certain.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, counsel has asked you for your beliefs, asked you for conclusions repeatedly as to certain things. You expressed some hesitancy from time to time in [10214] expressing those conclusions.

In the cross-examination it developed that you at least had a suspicion that there was some attempt in high places, in Opnav and
the General Staff, to cover up and to make Kimmel and Short the goats in this transaction.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. May I have that last question read?

(The question referred to, as recorded above, was read by the reporter.)

Mr. Keeffe. I didn't mean counsel. I meant Mr. Murphy.

You meant that did you?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Was that suspicion, as I believe you testified by the fact of the change in front in certain quarters with respect to this so-called winds execute message?

Captain Safford. It was increased and strengthened by that.

Mr. Keeffe. And the disappearance, as you have related of the files relating to the so-called winds execute and certain other intercepts relating to it; is that the way I am to understand your testimony?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, you have testified and Kramer testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that this winds execute message that was received on the 4th was sent right up to Admiral Noyes?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. After Admiral Noyes got that message and the same afternoon were messages prepared and sent out to Guam and our outlying possessions to destroy their codes and confidential papers?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, they were.

Mr. Keeffe. Who drew those messages?

Captain Safford. I did myself personally.

Mr. Keeffe. And were they sent out?

Captain Safford. They were all sent out.

Mr. Keeffe. And did those messages follow in immediate sequence to the receipt of this so-called winds execute message?

Captain Safford. I began working on them, checking up to see what we had to go, immediately after the receipt of the message.

Mr. Keeffe. And were those messages prompted entirely by the receipt of this winds execute message, so far as you were concerned?

Captain Safford. So far as I was concerned, they were.

Mr. Keeffe. And did Admiral Noyes approve the sending of those messages for the destruction of codes and confidential papers?

Captain Safford. Admiral Noyes did.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, there is something a little peculiar.

As I have been reading this testimony, I am impressed that some of these messages did not get out.

For instance, the message to Guam didn't get out.

No, I think that message did get out.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; Guam destroyed everything before they were captured.

Mr. Keeffe. Oh, yes. That message got out. I think I was referring, perhaps to the McCollum situation.

When was the McCollum message drawn? I want to get that clear in my mind. In relation to the winds message, if it had any relation to it at all.
Captain Safford. It had apparently been drawn that day. McCollum had sent a message the day before, which Admiral Wilkinson had approved, had released, in fact, and the winds message came in quite early in the morning, about 9 o'clock, and I saw the message all typed smooth on the pages, no changes or interlining, or anything like that, requiring only a signature, and depositing in the Naval Communications office to be on its way. I saw that message approximately 3 p.m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941.

[10217] Mr. Keefe. You drew a message?

Captain Safford. The messages which I had drawn were up in Admiral Noyes' for discussion with him and his approval at the same time that I saw McCollum's message.

Mr. Keefe. Did the drafting of the McCollum message follow as a result of the receipt of this winds execute message?

Captain Safford. It did.

Mr. Keefe. The messages which you drew to send out after the receipt of the winds execute message to destroy codes, were sent?

Captain Safford. They were.

Mr. Keefe. Now, what happened to the McCollum message?

Captain Safford. I do not know.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, did you talk with McCollum about drafting this message and getting this warning cut?

Captain Safford. I did not talk to McCollum about that message and I did not talk to him about the messages that I was preparing myself that I have any recollection of. We simply got the same signal, and we proceeded to carry out our duties.

Mr. Keefe. You saw the McCollum message that afternoon in Admiral Noyes' office?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

[10218] Mr. Keefe. When it was discussed with Admiral Turner, I believe?

Captain Safford. No, it was discussed between Admiral Noyes and Admiral Wilkinson.

Mr. Keefe. Oh, yes; Wilkinson, and they let you read it?

Captain Safford. And they let me read it.

Mr. Keefe. And you are of the opinion that that long message which you read which had been drawn by McCollum in the last few sentences contained specific reference to the winds message—the winds execute message?

Captain Safford. Or the same information so that I took for granted it was a quotation of the winds message or a paraphrase of the winds message?

Mr. Keefe. You never testified before the Roberts Commission, did you?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You mean by that, you were not asked to?

Captain Safford. I was not requested to; I did not refuse.

The Chairman. I didn't understand.

Captain Safford. I said I was not requested.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman——

The Chairman. Captain, let me ask you a question.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Captain McCollum testified before this committee that he never saw the winds execute and that the message he did prepare was in no way related to it or based upon it. Notwithstanding that, you insist on saying that he did see it and that the message he prepared was based on it.

Captain Safford. That his Section had prepared it and I took for granted that he had prepared it personally or had O. K.'d it.

The Chairman. But a little while ago you said that both he and you based the messages that you wrote on the winds execute. Do you modify that now by saying that you took it for granted?

Captain Safford. I took it for granted that McCollum initialled and approved all the messages released from the Far Eastern Section.

The Chairman. He testified that he never saw any winds execute message, that his message, the message he prepared, which was never sent, was not in any way related to or based upon it. If he testified to that, would you accept his statement on it?

Captain Safford. I would think that there must be two messages, not one. That shorter message which he described, which I heard him describe, and the longer message, which I saw myself, and which I saw Admiral Wilkinson leave Admiral Noyes shortly after three, a few minutes after three, with in his hand, and he turned around and made the statement "I am going to send this message if I can get the front office to release it."

The Chairman. Well, you are talking now about the message that he said he wrote out which was never sent?

Captain Safford. I am talking about the long message which was never sent. When Admiral Wilkinson took it around.

The Chairman. These messages that you say you prepared, under whose name were they sent?

Captain Safford. There were five altogether. One I released myself during the noon hour, because it was a rush job, and not particularly important. One of them Admiral Noyes released. The other three involved more than the destruction of codes, but also destruction of other confidential papers and Admiral Noyes started to release them himself and then he made some remark to the effect, "Well, this goes a little bit beyond the cognizance of Naval Communications and I guess I better take it around and have Admiral Ingersoll release it."

That was done. They were all released.

The Chairman. You didn't sign any of them yourself?

Captain Safford. Only one.

The Chairman. Which one was that?

Captain Safford. I have a copy for the record. I can identify it.

The Chairman. To whom was it sent?

I believe you say that was not particularly important?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

The Chairman. We won't pursue it.

Captain Safford. I only released it to save time.

The Chairman. All right. I waive that.

Now, awhile ago in response to a question by Mr. Keefe you stated that you started out with this story, about which he was asking, and you had to stick to it, go through with it or stick to it, which ever expression you used.
Are you testifying now before this committee because you started out that way—

Captain Safford. No, sir, not on the story.

The Chairman. Well, he was talking about, I think he used the word "story," maybe not, but that is the impression I got, that your version of this thing, you were still sticking to it. I am wondering whether you mean to create the impression that because you started out with it you are going to stick to it?

Captain Safford. No, sir. If the chairman will give me the opportunity—I thought that he referred to what might [10222] be termed my unsolicited support for Admiral Kimmel.

The Chairman. Well, when you were asked if you had any personal interest in this matter you said you had not. Did you disassociate any personal interest you might have in it with your interest in vindicating Admiral Kimmel to which you testified yesterday or the day before?

Captain Safford. I have no personal interest. I have never considered myself as anything except distantly acquainted with Admiral Kimmel. He knew who I was, that was about all.

The Chairman. That is all.

Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask one or two questions along that particular line.

Captain, you say you were only slightly acquainted with Admiral Kimmel before the Pearl Harbor disaster?

Captain Safford. In a personal manner. Officially I had served under him, but not directly under him, on several occasions.

[10223] Senator Lucas. Did you have an intimate acquaintance-ship with him, or was it a mere passing one?

Captain Safford. Not at all, sir. It was quite distant.

Senator Lucas. Quite a distant relationship?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, when you wrote the letter to Captain Kramer back in 1943—is that right?

Captain Safford. There was one in December 1943.

Senator Lucas. No one at that time had——

The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask the members of the committee if there is any chance of finishing with the captain today. If not, we might as well suspend here.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to say that there was a request made that the captain produce the letters he had written to other people. They have not yet been produced.

Captain Safford. I will get those at the first opportunity.

Mr. Murphy. A request was made that the captain produce the material which he said was denied to him for four years, and which he only got two weeks ago. That has not been produced. There are certain other questions still open and not answered.

I am sorry that I am the one to ask these questions; [10224] somebody, if they want the truth, will have to ask them, and I propose to get the whole truth.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we go over until morning.

The Chairman. Obviously, we can't finish with the Captain, and we will suspend until 10 o'clock in the morning.¹

¹ Capt. Safford's testimony is resumed on p. 3842, infra.
(At the direction of the chairman, the testimony of Witnesses Beatty and Dillon, previously taken, is inserted at this point.)

"Mr. Richardson. I would like to present, Mr. Chairman, Admiral Beatty.

The Chairman. Will Admiral Beatty come around? Admiral, you will be sworn, please.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. FRANK E. BEATTY, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, will you state your full name?

Admiral Beatty. Frank Edmund Beatty, rear admiral, United States Navy.

Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy?

Admiral Beatty. Since June 1912.

Mr. Richardson. Where are you stationed now?

Admiral Beatty. I am now commander, destroyers, Atlantic Fleet, with my flagship at Portland, Maine.

Mr. Richardson. What was your engagement in the Navy during the year 1941?

Admiral Beatty. I became aide to Secretary Knox early in 1941.

Mr. Richardson. How long did that position continue?

Admiral Beatty. Until March 1943.

Mr. Richardson. It is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that you accompanied Secretary Knox on his trip to Honolulu following the Pearl Harbor attack?

Admiral Beatty. It is.

Mr. Richardson. Were your relations with Knox close and intimate?

Admiral Beatty. Extremely so.

Mr. Richardson. How were you connected with his office in the Navy Department?

Admiral Beatty. I was his naval aide.

Mr. Richardson. Was your office in connection with his?

Admiral Beatty. Very close to it; one room removed.

Mr. Richardson. When he was on duty in the Navy Department, were you required to be on duty also?

Admiral Beatty. I would not say I was required, but I was normally there whenever he was in the office.

Mr. Richardson. Did your connection with Secretary Knox put you in the position where you had definite knowledge of specific documents of importance with which he was concerned in the war effort?

Admiral Beatty. I would say most of them, but not necessarily all of them.

Mr. Richardson. When he went to Hawaii with you did you travel on the same plane?

Admiral Beatty. We did.

Mr. Richardson. Had frequent conversations with him?

Admiral Beatty. Many conversations.

Mr. Richardson. Were you present at some of his conferences in Honolulu with Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Beatty. I was present at, I would say, most of them, yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Admiral, there has appeared in the testimony here a report, I think coming from Admiral Kimmel, that upon meeting Secretary Knox in Honolulu, upon the Secretary's visit there, Secretary Knox asked Admiral Kimmel whether Kimmel had received his message, which apparently had been sent by Knox to Kimmel Saturday night before Pearl Harbor, and that Kimmel replied, "No, I never received the message."

Now keeping that incident in your mind, I want to ask you whether you have any information or knowledge or recollection or memory of any message that Secretary Knox sent, or said that he sent, or announced that he thought he sent to Admiral Kimmel on the Saturday before Pearl Harbor, and particularly in connection with the receipt of the 13 or 14 parts message that came in on the night of the 6th and morning of the 7th?

Admiral Beatty. I believe I understand the entire question. I have definitely no knowledge of any message being sent by Secretary Knox at that time.

[10229] Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection of his ever having mentioned such a message to you?

Admiral Beatty. I have not.

Mr. Richardson. Was any such message, or copy of any such message, returned to his office file, so far as you know?

Admiral Beatty. No, not so far as I know.

Mr. Richardson. Did Secretary Knox at any time mention to you any inference on his part that he had either prepared or authorized such a message?

Admiral Beatty. Not to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Richardson. In the ordinary routine of messages would a message from the Secretary of the Navy proceed directly to a field officer?

Admiral Beatty. I would say normally no. Before sending any message which would have been as vital as such a message would have been he would have taken it up with the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Richardson. So have you any other information, Admiral, on this point, which would throw any light upon that transaction?

Admiral Beatty. Only this: At the time—I better amplify this—when I speak of the message now I speak of the message sent by General Marshall and agreed upon by Admiral Stark, sent over Army circuits or other circuits [10229] to Pearl Harbor as a final warning, and addressed, I believe, to General Short, to be delivered by him to Admiral Kimmel.

At the time the message was sent I did not know it was going out. It was a matter directly, apparently, between the Secretary and Admiral Stark. When I left Washington with the Secretary several days later I knew about the message, but I had apparently the misconceived idea that the message was sent on Saturday.

I came back from Pearl Harbor with that same idea, and endeavored out there to try to pick up at that end what became of the message at that end.

As I remember, we talked to General Short and Admiral Kimmel about it and found out the time of the receipt of the message in the Hawaiian Islands, the time it was decoded and the time it was delivered to those commanders. But there is nothing now that I can tie to
that shows me that my recollection that the message was sent on Saturday is at all correct.

Mr. Richardson. There was only one message in any case?

Admiral Beatty. Only one message, yes.

Mr. Richardson. And the message which you thought went on Saturday was the Marshall message?

Admiral Beatty. Was the Marshall-Stark message, yes.

Mr. Richardson. And is the message which is referred to in Secretary Knox’s report to the President?

Admiral Beatty. It must have been, yes, sir. I presume it was. I saw his report to the President and I do not recollect the reference, but I presume it was the same message.

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to ask a question.

The Chairman. Any questions, Congressman Cooper?

The Vice Chairman. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator George?

(No response.)

The Chairman. Congressman Clark?

(No response.)

The Chairman. Senator Lucas?

Senator Lucas. No questions.

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Beatty, I understand Captain Safford said that he thought that Lieutenant Commander Kramer was acting as counsel for the defense for Secretary Knox. Do you know of anything that Secretary Knox did in regard to the war effort that needed any defense?

Admiral Beatty. Absolutely nothing.

Mr. Murphy. Do you know, or did you ever hear of any such thing as a winds intercept having arrived in Washington on December 4?

Mr. Keefe. Now, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. Murphy (continuing). Did you ever hear or do you know of it being brought to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy, which would show that the Japanese had announced that there would be war with England and war with the United States?

Mr. Keefe. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman. I do not know whether we have any rules at all here governing the admission of evidence, but I understood that Admiral Beatty was being called here for just one specific thing.

If we are going to open up this cross-examination into a general cross-examination of Admiral Beatty on all things connected with this I assure you he will not be here for just a few minutes. I did not understand that that is what he was being called here for; and under any ordinary rules of cross-examination, nothing has been asked about the winds message, and he was not brought here to testify on that subject.

If we are going into it, then let it be understood that each member of the committee will be privileged to cross-examine the witness on any subject relating to this whole controversy.

[10230] Mr. Murphy. I understand, Mr. Chairman, that this is not a cross-examination; this is an examination of the naval aide to
the Secretary of the Navy, who said he was very intimate with him, after we have evidence from the gentleman preceding him that he needed a defense.

The Chairman. Admiral Beatty was brought here as a witness by counsel to discuss a certain matter, but that places no limitation on the members of the committee as to what questions they might ask him.

Go ahead.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I was about to ask you, and I will repeat the question, Admiral, there has been testimony placed before the committee to the effect that on December 4, 1941, there was received in the Navy Department what was known as a winds intercept message, and which, in effect, told us—told the Navy and Army, the high officials, that the Japs had announced to London war with England, including some of the far eastern possessions, and war with the United States, and that that copy of the magic had been delivered to Secretary Knox.

Did you ever hear of any such thing while you were aide to Secretary Knox?

Admiral Beatty. I did not.

Mr. Murphy. Do you know of any conduct on the part of Secretary Knox whereby his failure to get in touch with Hawaii, would be such as to have him participate in any plan for the destruction of naval files?

Admiral Beatty. Destruction of what, sir?

Mr. Murphy. Navy files.

Admiral Beatty. Oh, definitely not.

Mr. Murphy. There has been evidence placed before us by Captain Safford to the effect that the Navy files on this so-called very important intercept are missing.

Did you have anything to do with that?

Admiral Beatty. Absolutely not.

Mr. Murphy. And you certainly do not think the late Secretary Knox would be a party to such thing, do you?

Admiral Beatty. I do not.

Mr. Murphy. No other questions.

The Chairman. Senator Brewster being absent, Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it now, Admiral Beatty, this is where you think the confusion was: That it was your understanding that the message that was sent at noon on Sunday had been sent on Saturday night?

Admiral Beatty. That was the confusion in my mind. I do not know who else had that difficulty.

[10234] Senator Ferguson. Now, I notice when the Secretary Knox report was put in evidence it indicated the same thing, that a message was sent on—I think it used the expression Sunday night before, meaning at midnight on Sunday, or on Saturday night. So that wrong impression that you have was carried on through even in the report?

Admiral Beatty. Well, I cannot——
Senator Ferguson (interposing). I will read you part of it.
Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. On page 6223 of our record:

A general warning had been sent out by the Navy Department on November 27 to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight before the attack failed to reach him until 4 or 5 hours after the attack had been made.

So you were under the impression that there had been a warning message sent sometime on Saturday?
Admiral Beatty. No, sir; I had never thought of but the one message to which I referred, the one war warning from General Marshall and Admiral Stark. I have never thought of the existence of any other messages.

Senator Ferguson. I understand that.

Admiral Beatty. You do not think there were two messages, one on Saturday and one on Sunday?
Senator Ferguson. But you thought that the message that was sent on Sunday was actually sent on Saturday?
Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir; I thought that for a long time.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not Secretary Knox was under the same impression?
Admiral Beatty. I have no way of knowing, sir. It would be—well, I will not go into that.

Senator Ferguson. Did he discuss it with you?
Admiral Beatty. I do not remember discussing it with him, but, as I say, I saw that report as he wrote it out in the rough on the plane on the way back, and if his recollection had been different than mine, we might have discussed it.

Senator Ferguson. But on the way out you understood this Marshall message had been sent on Saturday?
Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss that with the Secretary?
Admiral Beatty. I do not remember discussing it with him.

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get that impression? What day did you leave for Hawaii?
Admiral Beatty. We left on Tuesday morning, as I recall.
Senator Ferguson. The Tuesday following?
Admiral Beatty. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss with anyone this message that was sent by General Marshall?
Admiral Beatty. Frankly, I do not recall discussing it, but there must have been something to tie it up in my mind at the time, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you discuss it with anyone other than Secretary Knox?
Admiral Beatty. I do not believe so.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not your impression about this Marshall message came from Secretary Knox?
Admiral Beatty. I do not believe it did.
Senator Ferguson. Whom else did you discuss that message with besides the Secretary?
Admiral Beatty. I am trying to recall whether the message would come back in the returned messages, or the returned copies of the outgoing messages. It might have done [10237] that, but even so, there would have been no question of the time group on it from later evidence.  

Senator Ferguson. Now, was your office alerted to war on the 6th and 7th?

Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What were your hours of watch?

Admiral Beatty. My hours?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, on Saturday?

Admiral Beatty. On Saturday I stayed at the office until, as I recall, roughly, 6 o'clock in the evening, I went home and stayed near the phone all evening.

I was in my office at 8 o'clock, or shortly thereafter, on Sunday morning.

[10238] Senator Ferguson. Was the office closed when you went home at 6 o'clock and on the next morning?

Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now how could you have been reached? Who would know where you were?

Admiral Beatty. Well, the duty officer in the Navy Department had my phone number. I was very frequently called when messages would come in. My number was always available down there in the Navy Department by the operations duty officer.

Senator Ferguson. When you got there on the morning of the 7th, about 8-something, or 8:30, was it?

Admiral Beatty. I would say so; yes.

Senator Ferguson. Did the Secretary come in that morning?

Admiral Beatty. As I recall, he came in for a short while and went out again.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what hour he came in?

Admiral Beatty. My guess would be between 9:15 and 9:30.

Senator Ferguson. Was there anyone with him?

Admiral Beatty. I do not believe so, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what hour he returned to his office prior to the attack?

[10239] Admiral Beatty. I would say around 11:30, but that is again vague.

Senator Ferguson. You were his aide, were you not?

Admiral Beatty. I was; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did he ask you to go with him that morning when he left the office?

Admiral Beatty. No; I never went on those conferences.

Senator Ferguson. You never went on those conferences?

Admiral Beatty. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you hear where he had gone? To what conference?

Admiral Beatty. I knew he was going to the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. Now he had a confidential secretary, did he not?

Admiral Beatty. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. And who was his confidential secretary?
Admiral Beatty. Mr. Dillon.

Senator Ferguson. He was a commander?

Admiral Beatty. Captain Dillon, Marine Corps.

Senator Ferguson. Was he there that Sunday morning?

Admiral Beatty. He came in a bit later. It was an agreement between us that I would come in first, and he came in I think around 11 o'clock or so.

[10240] Senator Ferguson. Do you remember of Admiral Stark coming to that office that morning before the attack?

Admiral Beatty. I am pretty sure he was in there possibly once or twice, but I would not be able to say the times.

Senator Ferguson. I will try to refresh your memory. Do you remember of the message on the attack coming in?

Admiral Beatty. I was not in the office at the time.

Senator Ferguson. You were not in the office at the time?

Admiral Beatty. I was out at lunch at the time.

Senator Ferguson. But your best knowledge is now that Admiral Stark visited Secretary Knox a couple of times, once or twice prior to the attack on Sunday morning?

Admiral Beatty. That is my best recollection, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. As his aide did you get magic notes?

Admiral Beatty. I did.

Senator Ferguson. Did you get the ones on Saturday?

Admiral Beatty. Not the Saturday night.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what ones were delivered on Saturday to you for Colonel Knox?

Admiral Beatty. At what time Saturday do you mean, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Well, up to the time you left.

[10241] Admiral Beatty. No, sir, just the regular daily ones, as far as I remember.

Senator Ferguson. Had you any knowledge, as indicated here by ONI, on December 6 that on the evening of the 5th the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D. C., had burned its code books and ciphers?

Admiral Beatty. If I had such knowledge I do not recollect.

Senator Ferguson. Did that come to you on Saturday?

Admiral Beatty. I really could not say, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall any such occurrence?

Admiral Beatty. I do not recall.

Senator Ferguson. Were you surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Beatty. Completely.

Senator Ferguson. You did not anticipate an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Beatty. I definitely did not.

Senator Ferguson. Were you surprised at an attack on Sunday?

Admiral Beatty. An attack on the United States?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, an attack on the United States.

Admiral Beatty. Yes, an attack on any United States possessions, I was very much surprised.

[10242] Senator Ferguson. You would not have been surprised at an attack on the Kra Peninsula or the British possessions or Dutch possessions on Sunday?
Admiral Beatty. I believe, as I recall, I would have been surprised at an attack on the Dutch possessions, but not definitely on the Kra Peninsula.

Senator Ferguson. You had knowledge then, as aide to Secretary Knox, that there would be an attack on the Kra Peninsula on Saturday, or on Sunday?

Admiral Beatty. I do not know how specific the knowledge was, but I am sure we had knowledge that the Japs would attack somewhere down in that direction on the Saturday. Whether it was specifically——

Senator Ferguson (interposing). You mean on Saturday or on Sunday?

Admiral Beatty. On Sunday. I beg your pardon.

Senator Ferguson. On Sunday. So that your office knew or were expecting an attack on the British, or on the Kra Peninsula, or that district by the Japanese on Sunday, but you were completely surprised at an attack on any American possessions?

Admiral Beatty. Yes, to this extent, that when I speak for my office I speak for myself.

Senator Ferguson. I understand you are only speaking for yourself.

Admiral Beatty. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. But your knowledge was obtained while you were the aide of the Secretary?

Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now did you know what the Secretary had in mind about an attack? Did you discuss with him as to whether or not he was surprised by the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Beatty. I am certain from just the reactions that he was surprised, but I do not remember personally discussing it with him. He would have talked on a higher level. He probably discussed it with Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson. But from his actions on that day you deduct that he was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Beatty. I think that was definitely obvious, yes, sir.

[10244] Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any conversations, did you hear any conversations he might have had with Admiral Stark, or the President, or the Secretary of War, or anyone that day?

Admiral Beatty. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was your rank at that time?

Admiral Beatty. I was a captain.

Senator Ferguson. You were a captain?

Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Where did you get the information that indicated to you that the war warning message had been sent at all? How did you get that information?

Admiral Beatty. By that, sir, do you refer to the message that we sent out?

Mr. Keefe. I am referring to the message which you have referred to, namely, the one sent by General Marshall, with the concurrence, as you said, of Admiral Stark?
Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. When did you get the information that such a message had been sent at all?

Admiral Beatty. As I said, I got it after it was sent, and I think it developed in the afternoon after Pearl Harbor, that the message had gone out. That such a message had gone out.

Mr. Keefe. Then, if I understand it, the message was actually sent Sunday morning sometime shortly before noon on that day?

Admiral Beatty. I got that from the newspapers.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, I am thinking of what information you had on the 7th day of December as to that message having been sent, if any.

Admiral Beatty. My best recollection is that Sunday afternoon after Pearl Harbor I heard about the message having been sent.

Mr. Keefe. And you got the impression from the source from which you obtained that information that it had been sent the night before, on Saturday night?

Admiral Beatty. Somewhere I got that impression definitely.

Mr. Keefe. And the Secretary had that impression too, didn’t he?

Admiral Beatty. I can only say “apparently.”

Mr. Keefe. Just apparently?

Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Because when you went out to Hawaii on Tuesday following, you stated to us that you tried to pick up the loose ends, as I understood from your testimony.

Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And find out why that message wasn’t received. Did I correctly interpret your statements?

Admiral Beatty. Not a question of why it wasn’t received, as to the time of its receipt. Why it hadn’t gotten through before the attack. That was the idea.

Mr. Keefe. In other words, you were under the impression that a message had been sent on Saturday evening to General Short from General Marshall?

Admiral Beatty. That was my impression; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. He had been given instructions to give that information to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So when you went to Hawaii, you didn’t understand why it was that Short hadn’t received that message and given the information to Kimmel, and you were seeking to find out the facts about it?

Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Is that right?

Admiral Beatty. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Then it would be perfectly natural, would it not, for Secretary Knox, if he was similarly minded, to have asked Admiral Kimmel the question “Did you receive the message that was sent to you last night?”

Admiral Beatty. Perfectly, in my opinion.

Mr. Keefe. That would be a perfectly natural question for him to ask, wouldn’t it?

Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. And as Admiral Kimmel has testified, he did ask it. You don't mean to say that that question wasn't asked by Secretary Knox of Admiral Kimmel, do you?
Admiral Beatty. I don't think I have made such a statement.
Mr. Keeffe. I am asking you, you do not intend to make such a statement; do you?
Admiral Beatty. Oh, no; no, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. In fact, it would be the most natural thing for Secretary Knox to ask, in view of the confusion?
Admiral Beatty. If he had the confusion in his mind that I did, it would be the most natural thing.
Mr. Keeffe. Did you ask that same question of anybody out there?
Admiral Beatty. I believe I did.
Mr. Keeffe. How many did you ask it of?
Admiral Beatty. I think I asked among the lower echelons of the two commands, "What time did that message get here?"

[10248] Mr. Keeffe. Yes.
Then you found out afterward that the message had not been sent until about noon; is that right?
Admiral Beatty. I didn't find that out until I read about it, sir, a few months ago.
Mr. Keeffe. You were also under the impression that that message had gone out there the night before; is that right?
Admiral Beatty. Up until a few months ago, yes, sir, and then something came out that seemed to show me entirely wrong.
Mr. Keeffe. Well now, you were at the office of Secretary Knox on Sunday morning, December 7, and Secretary Knox came into the office?
Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. You have further testified that you were usually given copies of intercept messages to appraise?
Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Did Secretary Knox hand you that morning the first 13 parts of the 14-part message?
Admiral Beatty. As I recall he did not.
Mr. Keeffe. Did he tell you that Kramer had delivered to him and permitted him to read the 13 parts of the 14-part message the night before?

Mr. Keeffe. Evidence in previous hearings indicate that Captain Safford delivered the first 13 parts of the 14-part message to Secretary Knox at his apartment out at the Wardman Park——

The Vice Chairman. Kramer?
Mr. Keeffe. I mean Kramer.
Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. And that Secretary Knox made some telephone calls and then instructed him to be at the State Department at 10 o'clock the following morning.
Now, at 10 o'clock the following morning, or before 10 o'clock, Secretary Knox left your office, as you understood to keep that appointment, did you not?
Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. But he didn't tell you anything about the 13-part message that he had seen the night before?

Admiral Beatty. Not that I recall at all, sir. I don't recall any conversation. As I remember it, he came in, was busy, went right over to the State Department.

Mr. Keefe. Did Secretary Knox write his report on the way back on the plane?

Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir, he did.

Mr. Keefe. Did he write two reports, or one?

[10250] Admiral Beatty. He wrote one report. He wrote it in long-hand on the flight over the ocean. It was then revised. Just corrected. He passed it around to the three of us who were with him, to read. It was typewritten on the next plane, after we departed from San Diego, and while the plane was grounded in Midlands.

The typewriting was completed by the time the plane landed in Anacostia, and it went directly by Secretary Knox to the White House.

Mr. Keefe. It appears that the report which was given to the public, and it is perfectly reasonable that it should be, I am not critical of it, was quite different than the report which was made to the President. You are aware of that now?

Admiral Beatty. I am aware of it, yes, sir. I knew it at the time.

Mr. Keefe. Did he write the report that was given to the public, or was that a press release gotten out by the Navy Department?

Admiral Beatty. No, sir. This is just as I recall it: I believe we got back Sunday night. He had a conference on Monday morning at the White House, and I think he came back with the verbatim wording of it, of that release.

I believe that release was made up at the White House. [10251] That is my opinion.

Mr. Keefe. The report which he actually wrote on the plane coming back and which was passed over to you, and two others on the plane who had accompanied him, which was passed over to you to look over, was delivered verbatim to the White House immediately upon your arrival back from Pearl Harbor; was it?

Admiral Beatty. I feel definitely certain that it was.

Mr. Keefe. And your impression is that the news release that went to the public came from the White House?

Admiral Beatty. That is my impression.

Mr. Keefe. Is that right?

Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir. May I amplify that?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Admiral Beatty. Came from the White House after the conference.

Mr. Keefe. After the conference with Secretary Knox?

Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir; in which I believe the Secretary of War participated, and the Secretary of State also.

Mr. Keefe. Was General Marshall there at the conference, or Admiral Stark?

Admiral Beatty. Well, I didn't think they were, but [10252] they may have been. I wasn't there.

Mr. Keefe. You didn't go there?

Admiral Beatty. Oh, no, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did the Secretary call you on Saturday evening?
Admiral Beatty. He did not.
Mr. Keeffe. So that you had no knowledge on Sunday morning of the receipt of the first 13 parts of the 14-part message?
Admiral Beatty. As I recall, I had none, although there is a possibility that I heard before I left the office on Saturday that such a message was coming in, and that was before it was broken.
Mr. Keeffe. You were at the office of the Secretary at about 8 o'clock as I understand it, on Sunday morning?
Admiral Beatty. Between 8 and 8:30.
Mr. Keeffe. Was the 14-part message and the short message of instruction to the Japanese Ambassador delivered to the Secretary's office that morning?
Admiral Beatty. If so, I don't believe it was through me.
Mr. Keeffe. You did not see those two messages either; did you, the morning of the 7th?
Admiral Beatty. As I recall, when I went to lunch, I did not know of the 14th part or the time of appointment.
Mr. Keeffe. What time did Secretary Knox come back to his office from the State Department that morning?
Admiral Beatty. To the best of my recollection, between 11 and 11:30.
Mr. Keeffe. Do you know whether or not, can you state with certainty whether or not Admiral Stark was in the Secretary's office during the time that the Secretary was over at the Secretary of State's office?
Admiral Beatty. Not with certainty.
Mr. Keeffe. Do you have any present recollection that Admiral Stark was in the Secretary's office Sunday morning at all?
Admiral Beatty. I am under the impression that he was in there some time during the morning once or twice, but it is not a definite recollection.
Mr. Keeffe. Was it at a time when Secretary Knox was present or absent?
Admiral Beatty. If he was there it would be during Secretary Knox's presence. He very seldom came up during the Secretary's absence and generally inquired before he came up whether the Secretary was there or not.
Mr. Keeffe. I see. That is all.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask just one question?
The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. I have one question in view of what was brought out by Senator Ferguson.
You said you expected an attack on Sunday on the Kra Peninsula. The basis of that was some other dispatch. I take it, other than some winds intercept message?
Admiral Beatty. Yes, sir. The winds intercept message had nothing to do with it.
Mr. Murphy. Captain Safford said the Navy had 3 days' notice of the attack on the United States on Sunday. Did you ever hear of such a thing?
Admiral Beatty. I did not.
Mr. Murphy. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson?
Senator Ferguson. Did you help to prepare the exhibits for the Roberts Commission or did you know anything about that?
Admiral Beatty. The only thing I had to do with the Roberts Commission was I talked with Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves before the Commission was formed up. I had nothing to do with the Commission itself.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have anything to do with preparing exhibits for them?

Admiral Beatty. Nothing.

Senator Ferguson. Or did you see any exhibits?

Admiral Beatty. I don't know what you mean, sir, but I had nothing to do with it that I know of.

Senator Ferguson. Did you check any papers in connection with getting the file ready?

Admiral Beatty. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. After it was over do you know whether or not a copy of the report, a copy of the testimony, and a copy of the exhibits came to the Secretary's office?

Admiral Beatty. I remember that one came. I can't say when and I don't believe I saw it.

Senator Ferguson. You knew that such a thing was delivered back to his office after it was over?

Admiral Beatty. That is my definite recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see it?

Admiral Beatty. No, sir; I have never seen it to the best of my knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. You didn't do any stenographic work?

Admiral Beatty. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that you weren't in any way in charge of the files so that you would see those things?

Admiral Beatty. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral, for your cooperation, and I hope that the committee hasn't inconvenienced you too much.

Admiral Beatty. Not at all.

(The witness was excused.)

Mr. Richardson. May I now present, Mr. Chairman, Major Dillon.

The Chairman. Major Dillon, will you come around, please.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. JOHN H. DILLON, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Mr. Richardson. Major, will you state your full name for the record, please?


Mr. Richardson. Were you in the naval service during the war?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir. I came in the Marine Corps Reserve on April 10, 1942.

Mr. Richardson. Were you connected with the office of Secretary Knox, Secretary of the Navy?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. Richardson. What was your position there?
Major Dillon. I was confidential assistant and later Marine aide to the Secretary.

Mr. Richardson. How long a period did that work last?
Major Dillon. From the time he took office until he died.1
Mr. Richardson. How closely were you associated with him in that occupation?
Major Dillon. I would say very closely.

[10258] Mr. Richardson. Were your offices adjacent?
Major Dillon. Right next door.
Mr. Richardson. What was the nature of the work that you performed in connection with Secretary Knox's activities?
Major Dillon. I handled all of the Marine work dealing with the Navy Department.

Mr. Richardson. You were not with him when he went to Hawaii?
Major Dillon. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Were you on duty on the 6th and 7th of December?
Major Dillon. I was.
Mr. Richardson. You heard the inquiry that I made of Admiral Beatty as to the incident concerning a message supposed to have been sent by Secretary Knox to Hawaii?
Major Dillon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Have you any knowledge of any such message or communication on the part of Secretary Knox?
Major Dillon. I recall that on Sunday morning there was some mention of a message. When it was sent I can't say. It could have very likely been the message referred to by Admiral Beatty.

Mr. Richardson. Do you recall any statement by Secretary Knox on Saturday December 6 with reference to any [10259] message?
Major Dillon. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Do you know what message was referred to in the discussion which you heard on December 7?
Major Dillon. I don't know which message it could have been.

Very likely was the Marshall message.

Mr. Richardson. Did you hear about more than one message?
Major Dillon. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. Richardson. Did you ever see more than one message in any of Secretary Knox' papers?
Major Dillon. I didn't even see the Marshall message.

Mr. Richardson. There was no message there at all?
Major Dillon. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Do you know whether Secretary Knox issued orders or sent messages to commanders in the field direct?
Major Dillon. That was not the usual practice.

Mr. Richardson. Do you know of his having done it at any time?
Major Dillon. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Where were you on Sunday morning?
Major Dillon. As I recall I got to the office about 9:30, somewhere around 9:30.

Mr. Richardson. Was the Secretary there when you arrived?
[10260] Major Dillon. He was there for a few minutes and left practically immediately.

Mr. Richardson. You had nothing to do with him on that morning in connection with his activities?

1 Before being commissioned in the Marine Corps, Major Dillon was a civilian aide to Secretary Knox.

79716—46—pt. 8—30
Major Dillon. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. You didn’t attend any of his meetings?

Major Dillon. No, sir. He came back from the State Department, as I recall, about 11:30, possibly a little later. He had a meeting in his office with Admiral Stark and I think Captain Turner, now Admiral Turner. I was not present. And that lasted possibly an hour. He was about ready to leave the office, as I recall, about 1:30, and was actually standing in my room, in the presence of Admiral Stark and Captain Turner, when the message from Pearl Harbor came in.

Mr. Richardson. About the attack?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, you can’t throw any light here at all from your best recollection as to any messages in which Secretary Knox was interested in connection with communications with Pearl Harbor prior to that attack?

Major Dillon. No, sir; I cannot.

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions

The Chairman. Mr. Cooper.

[10261] The Vice Chairman. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator George.

Senator George. No questions.

The Chairman. Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. No questions.

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Brewster is not here. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Major, you say that Colonel Knox, Admiral Stark, Captain Turner, were coming out of the Secretary’s office when the message came in that there was an attack?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir. They were standing at my desk.

Senator Ferguson. Standing at your desk. And how long would you say they had been in Secretary Knox’ office?

Major Dillon. Well, I would say possibly an hour, maybe longer. I can’t say during that period whether Admiral Stark went out and came back in but I would say an hour possibly.

[10262] Senator Ferguson. Had Admiral Stark been in to see Secretary Knox prior to the time the Secretary came back from the Secretary of State’s office?

Major Dillon. I think the Secretary came back from the State Department and immediately sent for Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson. And then there was the conference with Admiral Stark?

Major Dillon. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And you were not invited in?

Major Dillon. I was not.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have the message of the attack in your possession at the time they came out of the office?

Major Dillon. No, sir. They were standing at my desk when the message was brought in the door.
Senator Ferguson. And to whom was the message shown?
Major Dillon. It was handed to the Secretary.

Senator Ferguson. And did he make any remark?
Major Dillon. As I recall, his remark was, "My God, this can't be
true, this must mean the Philippines."

Senator Ferguson. And what was said by Stark or Turner?
Major Dillon. As I recall Admiral Stark said, "No, sir; this is
Pearl."

Senator Ferguson. Did Turner say anything?

[10263] Major Dillon. I can't recall that he did; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that was your first knowledge and ap-
parently from what you told us Secretary Knox' first knowledge of
the attack at Pearl Harbor?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you help to make up any file of exhibits for
the Roberts Commission?

Major Dillon. No, sir; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see the report of the Roberts Com-
mission that was delivered to Secretary Knox, the report, the testi-
mony and any exhibits?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir; I did. It was turned over to the Secretary
and he in turn gave it to me to place in his safe which was in his
immediate office.

Senator Ferguson. And did you place it in his safe?
Major Dillon. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When was it that the Secretary died?
Major Dillon. He died April 28, 1944, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not that report and
 testimony and exhibits remained in his safe until after the Secretary's
death?

Major Dillon. No, sir; it did not. It remained in the safe until
December 9, 1943.

Senator Ferguson. December 9, 1943, it was taken from his safe?
Major Dillon. Yes, sir.

[10264] Senator Ferguson. And by whom was it taken from
his safe?

Major Dillon. At his direction I turned it over to the Judge Advo-
cate General and it was signed for by Lieutenant Commander John-
son, commander, United States Navy, retired.

Senator Ferguson. He gave you a receipt for it?
Major Dillon. He gave me a receipt, which is this [indicating].

Senator Ferguson. You have the receipt. Could I just see it?
Major Dillon. Yes, sir.

(The receipt referred to was handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Senator Ferguson. This starts out—it is on the stationery of the
Navy Department, December 9, 1943, and it starts out:

The following listed correspondence has this date been received from Major
JOHN H. DILLON, U. S. M. C., Marine Aide to the Secretary, for use in the
Office of the Judge Advocate General:
   Item No. 1. Subject:
   Report of the Secretary of the Navy to the President—No date Re Japanese
   air attack on the Island of Oahu, on December 7.

[10265] 2. Sixteen volumes Transcript of Testimony before Commission
   Investigating Attack on Hawaii, December 7, 1941, plus 1 Annex of Amended
   Testimony.
Now, the first does not show a report of the Roberts Commission, does it? It shows a report of the Secretary of the Navy to the President?

Major Dillon. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And the next is the 16 volumes. That is the Roberts testimony?

Major Dillon. That is the Roberts testimony.

Senator Ferguson (reading):


That also related to the Roberts Commission?

Major Dillon. Yes. I think that was the report of the reporter, after the time.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

No. 4. A list showing the documents furnished the Secretary of the Navy.

Now, what are those documents, a list showing the documents furnished the Secretary of the Navy?

Major Dillon. At the time the Roberts report was turned over to the Secretary, there was a listing of the Roberts report. That is what that is. It was listed by [10266] volumes, and so forth.

Senator Ferguson. Did it include the exhibits?

Major Dillon. I think it did, sir. I think it was a complete report.

Senator Ferguson. A complete report of all the exhibits that they had had?

Major Dillon. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. No. 5:

A list showing the documents that were furnished the Secretary of War.

Major Dillon. That is the same thing, you see, except War and Navy each got a copy.

Senator Ferguson. Each got a complete copy?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Packet No. 1.

Documents in the possession of the Commission on January 24, 1942, received by it from sources other than military or naval officers or their agencies, and to be delivered to the Secretary of the Navy.

Those were other exhibits?

Major Dillon. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, there are 51 items that were turned over, and I don't know as I will want to [10267] examine this witness to the extent of examining him on each one of these 51 items.

You were satisfied that you were turning over what the description called for?

Major Dillon. Very definitely. I think you will notice some pencil check marks there which were made at the time.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Each of the 51 are checked with pencil indicating that you made an examination of the documents?

Major Dillon. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And knew that this was a good description of the instruments that were being turned over?
Major Dillon. I think it was a description, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. You are here in the city now?
Major Dillon. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You are not on any leave?
Major Dillon. I am on terminal leave, but I am employed in Washington.
Senator Ferguson. In the Secretary of Navy’s office?
Major Dillon. In the executive office of the Secretary.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this be spread upon the minutes as showing what was turned over and then we will have time to examine this, and if it is necessary to ask the witness to come back, that can be done.
The Vice Chairman. This is your receipt, is it, Major?
Major Dillon. It is my receipt for the report.
The Vice Chairman. And you want to keep that, I assume?
Major Dillon. I would certainly like to, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You haven’t any objection to the stenographer copying it?
Major Dillon. No, sir; I have none. That was titled as a secret document, and it was secret at that time, but there is no need of it being secret now.
The Chairman. You would like to have it back?
Major Dillon. Yes, sir; I would.
The Chairman. There being no objection to spreading it on the minutes, it is so ordered.
Senator Ferguson. That is all I have.
(The receipt referred to follows:)

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, Dec. 9, 1943.

The following listed correspondence has this date been received from Major JOHN H. DILLON, U. S. M. C., Marine Aide to the Secretary, for use in the Office of the Judge Advocate General:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President—No date Re Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on December 7th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>A list showing the documents furnished the Secretary of the Navy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>A list showing the documents that were furnished the Secretary of War.</td>
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PACKET NO. 1

Documents in the possession of the Commission on January 24, 1942, received by it from sources other than military or naval officers or their agencies, and to be delivered to the Secretary of the Navy

1. Two copies of letter dated December 10, 1941, from A. A. Buta, Chief Inspector of Customs, and John D. Williams, Inspector of Customs, to Collector of Customs, Federal Building, Honolulu, T. H., giving the writers’ version of the airplane attack on Pearl Harbor.
2. Letter dated Dec. 30, 1941, Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Commission, concerning warnings of attack conveyed by the Secretary to the Department of War and Navy in the period between November 1 and Dec. 7, 1941.
3. Letter dated Jan. 16, 1942, William L. Langer, Director of Research, Coordinator of Information, to General Frank McCoy, transmitting résumé of public opinion about the Commission, together with the résumé mentioned in said letter.
4. Letter dated Jan. 3, 1942, Paul B. Waterhouse, President, and Chris J. Benny, Executive Secretary. The Temperance League of Hawaii, to the Chairman of the Commission, charging lack of sobriety on the part of the army and navy personnel, and urging [10271] that alcoholic liquor be barred from the service; also copy of letter dated Jan. 4 '42 by the Recorder of the Commission, inviting Mr. Waterhouse and Mr. Benny to appear before the Commission.
5. Certified copy of Executive Order appointing the Commission.
6. Copy of Joint Resolution authorizing the Commission to compel attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents.
7. Memorandum dated Jan. 9, '42, R. L. Shivers, Special Agent in Charge, FBI, Honolulu, to Mr. Justice Roberts, conveying certain items of information pertinent to the Commission's investigation.
8. Correspondence with and report by W. A. Gabrielson, Chief of Police, Honolulu, concerning complaints and reports received by his department of Dec. 6 '41, relative to Army and Navy personnel.
9. Tabulation of population estimates of the Territory of Hawaii as of July 1, 1940, and July 1, 1941.
11. Outline of plan for protective measures for civilian population of Oahu in case of bombardment, dated March 25, 1941.
12. Letter dated December 22, 1941, from Hawaiian business and social organizations to The President, commending General Short.
13. Precis of testimony before the Commission prior to its departure for Honolulu, given by Admiral Stark, Rear Admiral Turner, and Captain Wilkinson.
14. FBI graphs showing racial composition of Territory of Hawaii & c.
15. FBI graphs showing racial composition of Territory of Hawaii & c.

Documents in the possession of the Commission on January 24, 1942, received by it from Navy Officers or agencies, and to be delivered to The Secretary of the Navy

1. Map of Oahu showing main military and naval establishments.
3. Copy of letter of 1/24/41, Sec. Navy to Sec. War, re security of U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself.
4. Summary of reports and messages sent to CNO since attack on Pearl Harbor (three copies).
5. Six copies Memorandum 2/17/41 CNO to sundry Commandants of Naval Districts—Subject: Anti-torpedo baflles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.
7. Six copies "Summary of Reports and Messages" 8 Dec. 0427 to 17 December 0928.

11. Memorandum, Edwin Thomas Layton, Lt. Comdr. U. S. Navy, Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Commission, dated 5 Jan. '42, summarizing frequency of occurrence of periods when information was lacking in regard to location or activity of a group, type or unit of Japanese Fleet during last six months of 1941.


15. Copy of Memo. dated 1/16/41 from Comdr. Patwing Two to CNO, subject: Readiness of Patrol Wing Two.


18. Memo. dated 1 Jan. 1942, P. N. L. Bellinger, Comdr. Patrol Wing Two to Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of Dec. 7, 1941, transmitting 6 copies of report of Army-Navy Board of 31 Oct. 1941, and specifying dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held between 24 April 1941 and 12 Nov. 1941.

19. Typical operations program of Commander Task Force.

20. Three copies Memo. of 12/22/41, W. E. G. Taylor, Lt. Cdr. USNR to Aide to The Commandant 14th Naval Dist. outlining the Commanders's assignments and duties.

21. Memo. dated 1/2/42, Captain Mayfield to the Commission, [10275] subject: long coded message regarding arrangements for display of signals at Lanikai, Kalawa and on Island of Maui.

22. Memo. (undated) P. S. Crosley, Flag Sec'y. to Lieut-Comdr. Covington, forwarding copies of operation orders for combined inter task force tactical exercise held during second quarter of fiscal year (Sept. 24, 1941, to Nov. 25, 1941), and specifying areas where exercises were held. Copies of the orders are attached to the memorandum.

23. Memo. 7 Jan. 1942, Dist. Intelligence Officer to President's investigating committee, enclosing 5 copies excerpts from letter from CNO dated 15 March 1941 to Commandants of all Naval Districts, the Governor of Guam and the Governor of Samoa, and 5 copies of report dated 16 Dec. 1941 on subject of enemy plane that crashed on Nihiu. There is attached to this memorandum one copy of the Nihiu report.


27. Three copies of History of Action occurring at Palmyra Island from Dec. 7 to Dec. 31, as compiled from official despatches and correspondence.

28. Three copies of History of Action occurring at Johnston Island from Dec. 7 to Dec. 31, as compiled from official despatches and correspondence.

29. Three copies of History of Action occurring at Wake Island from Dec. 7 to Dec. 22, as compiled from official despatches and correspondence.


32. Three copies of report dated Dec. 19 '41 concerning attack on Johnston Island; from C. O. U. S. Naval Station (Air), Johnston Island, to Commandant 14th Naval District.
33. Security orders, instructions and arrangements issued since Dec. 7 '41 by units of fleet and 14th Nav. Dist. [10277] pertaining to security of Pearl Harbor and the Pacific Fleet.

34. Five copies of history of action occurring at Midway Island from Dec. 7 to Dec. 31, as compiled from official despatches and correspondence.


37. Report dated 17 Dec. 1941, from resident officer in charge public works at Midway Island, containing "Miscellaneous comments covering period 1 December 1941 to 17 December 1941" concerning work progress and effects of attack thereon.


40. Location of regularly assigned commanding officers of ships present during Japanese attack of 7 December 1941.

41. Shore Patrol reports 6, 7, 8 Dec. (enlisted personnel).

42. List of shore patrol reports of offenses committed by commissioned officer personnel of the Fleet 1 April—18 December 1941. [10278] 43. Copies of Radar plots furnished by Admiral Bellinger.

44. Photographs taken during attack at Kaneohe Bay and thereafter, indicating damage done at the field, etc.

45. Copy of Naval Base Defense Officers' Operation Plan dated 7 March 1941.

46. Copy of memorandum concerning coordination of FBI, ONI and MID.

47. 14th Naval District Control Post Watch Officer's Log War Diary Reg. No. 2.

48. Chart of Pearl Harbor showing location of various units of Fleet.

49. Copy of report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President.

50. Copy of excerpts from CNO's letter dated March 15, 1941 to Commandants of all naval districts, Governor of Guam, and Governor of Samoa, re investigation of Japanese Espionage, Counter-Espionage, Sabotage, and Subversive Activities.

51. Letter dated Jan. 5, '42, from Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy to the Commission, recommending revision of transcript of Rear Admiral Kimmel's testimony before the Commission on December 27 and 29.

/s/ L. H. C. JOHNSON.

Commander, U. S. Navy (Ret.) Rm. 2342.

[10279] The Chairman. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. There are one or two things that I would like to get clear, Major, in my mind.

You fix the time quite definitely at approximately 1:30 when the Secretary, Admiral Stark, and others with Admiral Stark, I believe you said Admiral Turner, were going out the door when a message came in announcing the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Major Dillon. Well, if I fixed it quite definitely, I probably was in error. To the best of my memory it was around that time. It may have been earlier.

Mr. Keefe. Who was the individual that brought that message?

Major Dillon. I think it was Commander Fernald.

Mr. Keefe. Did he come from the Navy Department, Navy Signal Corps?

Major Dillon. Communications, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Navy Communications?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So this message had been sent from Hawaii through Navy Communications?

Major Dillon. That is right.
Mr. Keefe. Announcing the attack at approximately 1 o’clock Washington time, 7:55 Hawaiian time, that day?

[10280] The Chairman. 1:30 approximately, you said, didn’t you?

Major Dillon. Approximately 1:30.

Mr. Keefe. And it was received here about 1:30; is that right?

Major Dillon. I wouldn’t like to say that definitely. It could have been 1:15 that Commander Fernald came into the office. I don’t remember the exact time.

Mr. Keefe. The time shown on that message—have we got that message in evidence?

Mr. Richardson. I don’t know anything about the message or the time of its receipt.

Major Dillon. It should be a matter of record.

Mr. Murphy. I don’t think there is a word in the record about it.

Mr. Keefe. Can we get that message and have it brought here?

The Chairman. There has been no message filed with the committee in these hearings such as the major refers to announcing an attack on Pearl Harbor. It has been talked about, but I don’t think the message was ever filed.

Major Dillon. It was a one-line message in clear language, as I recall.

[10281] The Chairman. Who sent it?

Major Dillon. As I recall, it came from CINCPAC.

The Chairman. How is that?

Major Dillon. CINCPAC, which, of course, would be Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Keefe. Your recollection is that it came directly through Naval Communications?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir. It is quite possible that the message could have been an intercept on the part of Naval Communications. As I recall, the message read something like “We are being attacked. This is no drill.”

That is about all it said. “We are being attacked. This is no drill.”

Mr. Keefe. “We are being attacked. This is no drill”?

Major Dillon. I think that is approximately what it said.

Mr. Keefe. That is a message that went out and was caught by Admiral Halsey’s fleet from Pearl Harbor.

Major Dillon. It could have been the same message.

Mr. Keefe. It might have been the same message. Is that right?

Major Dillon. It could have been; yes, sir. And it could have been intercepted here in Washington and transmitted from the Signal Corps and delivered over to the Secretary’s office, sometime between 1:15 and 1:30?

That was the first we knew about it, and that was the message which told us that Pearl Harbor was being attacked.

Mr. Keefe. That could be an intercept of a radio communication issued out of Pearl Harbor?

Major Dillon. Very likely; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I would like to get that message to settle this question, if we can, counsel.

The Chairman. Counsel will see if they can locate it, and if so will bring it to the committee.
Mr. Keefe. Now, you have stated to us that as soon as the Secretary saw the—well, a message has been shown to me. The message which has been shown to me is quite a long message from Admiral Kimmel telling about the damage and that sort of thing. That is not the message you have reference to, Major, is it?

Major Dillon. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You think that the message you saw was a simple one-line message?

Major Dillon. As I recall, it was one line; yes, sir. I saw the message at the time.

Mr. Keefe. That is perhaps Admiral Kimmel's first [10283] report, which is shown here in the Navy report. I don’t think that is the message you have referred to.

At least, when this message came and the Secretary saw it, his first exclamation was, “My God! This can’t be true. It must mean the Philippines.”

Major Dillon. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Was there pretty general agreement, as you understood it, in the Secretary’s office, that if any attack took place by the Japanese, it would take place out in the Far East?

Major Dillon. In the Far East; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. There was never any thought, so far as you could ascertain it from your own contact in the Secretary’s office, that there would be any attack at Pearl Harbor?

Major Dillon. None whatsoever.

Mr. Keefe. Now, my interest in inquiring about the receipt of this message is to determine the speed with which the announcement of the attack was issued out of Pearl Harbor, either by radio or by direct message, and its receipt here, causing me to wonder why the same speed wasn't used in sending the warning message out to Pearl Harbor. That is clear to you, is it not?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir.

[10284] Mr. Keefe. The purpose of my question.

Major Dillon. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one question.

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. On page 640 of the Navy narrative, to which the gentleman from Wisconsin referred, I find the following: “Dispatch 072244, from Admiral Kimmel, commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, advising of the Japanese attack,” stated that it commenced at 0750 Pearl Harbor time, which was 2:20 Washington time.

Now, apparently that report—

Major Dillon. That is not the message.

Mr. Murphy. No; but the advice from Admiral Kimmel was that it started at 7:50 Hawaiian time or 2:20 Washington time. You say we had word here between 1 and 1:30 of the attack.

Major Dillon. Well, 7:50 Honolulu time would have been 5½ hours’ difference, I think, between the time—

Mr. Murphy. I am just wondering if the naval narrative is in error here.

Mr. Keefe. Not only in that respect but in many others.
Mr. Murphy. Please. I haven't yielded.

Do you know whether or not it was between 1 and 1:30 or whether or not this is in error, whether Admiral Kimmel was in error?

Major Dillon. Well, the message that I referred to is a message that I thought was around 1:15 to 1:30. It could have been 1:40.

Mr. Murphy. You have no definite recollection of the exact time?

Major Dillon. Not of the exact time.

Mr. Murphy. No other questions.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us after the message was received by Secretary Knox, did he go back into his office for a conference?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir; he did.

Senator Ferguson. Who went back with him?

Major Dillon. As I recall, Admiral Stark and Captain Turner and I think they sent for one or two others. I don't recall their names.

Senator Ferguson. And how long did they remain in the office, roughly?

Major Dillon. I would say 45 minutes.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know Admiral Ingersoll?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir.

[10236] Senator Ferguson. Did he come and go into the office?

Major Dillon. I don't remember that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know of any conversation between the Secretary and the White House that morning up until the time of the attack?

Major Dillon. Up until the time of the attack?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Major Dillon. No, sir; I know of none.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know of any immediately following the attack?

Major Dillon. No. The minute the Secretary received this message from Commander Fernald he immediately called on the White House phone and spoke to the President.

Senator Ferguson. I assume that you didn't hear the conversation?

Major Dillon. I heard the one end, of course.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the Secretary said?

Major Dillon. He simply stated what was in the message, said that we had no further details but that he would be kept advised.

Senator Ferguson. Anything else?

Major Dillon. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you get any telephone calls while the Secretary was over at the Secretary of State's office [10237] from Admiral Stark or anyone else in the Navy that you recall that morning?

Major Dillon. As I recall, I think Admiral Stark asked to be informed when the Secretary returned.

Senator Ferguson. And did you inform him?

Major Dillon. I am sure I did; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did anyone else call for him?

Major Dillon. I don't recall.

Senator Ferguson. You don't recall anybody else except Admiral Stark?

Major Dillon. That is all.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any knowledge as to whether or not the Secretary was consulted about the so-called Marshall message? You know what I am talking about?

Major Dillon. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That went out at noon. Do you know whether or not he was consulted about that?

Major Dillon. I don't know that; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You have no knowledge?

Major Dillon. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Chairman. Thank, you Major.

(The witness was excused.)

(Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., February 5, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a.m., Wednesday, February 6, 1946.)
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman) Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, last Saturday, I think it was, we distributed a collection of documents, mimeographed copies of documents, consisting of four pages, the first of which is a note on the stationery of the White House from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, undated but attached to a letter dated October 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to President Roosevelt.

Mr. Masten. At pages 1860 to 1863 of the committee's transcript, Congressman Keefe requested that a search be made for communications between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, either directly or through intermediaries, during the period November 24 to December 7, 1941. That request was transmitted to the War, Navy, and State Departments and to Miss Tully. We have received communications from the War Department and the Navy Department, with the certificates requested by Congressman Keefe, which we would like to have spread on the record at this point. These communications
indicate that neither the War nor the Navy Department has found any communications of the nature requested by the Congressman.

Also, it is our understanding that at a conference which Congressman Keefe had with Mr. Richardson and Under Secretary Acheson of the State Department at his request, such communications as had been found in the State Department files were shown to him at that time, but that it was his conclusion that they had no relevance to this proceeding.

As far as Miss Tully is concerned, Mr. Mitchell covered that in his memorandum to the committee, and it is our understanding that if she is called as a witness the question will be considered with her at that time.

I request permission to have these spread on the transcript at this point.

[10291] The Chairman. That will be done at this point.

(The communications referred to follow:)

**War Department,**


Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell:

At pp. 1860–63 of the transcript, Congressman Keefe requested that a search be made for any communications in the War Department files between the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister, either directly or through an intermediary, during the period 24 November–7 December 1941. Careful searches of the War Department files have disclosed no such communications. Certificates to that effect, as requested by Congressman Keefe, are inclosed herewith.

/S/ Harmon Duncombe,
Harmon Duncombe,
Lt. Col., GSC.

Incls.

**War Department,**

The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, 3 December 1945.

[10292] I hereby certify that the War Department files in the possession of The Adjutant General's Office contain no record of communications between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, either directly or through an intermediary, during the period 24 November through 7 December 1941.

/S/ Edward F. Witsell,
Edward F. Witsell,
Major General,
Acting The Adjutant General.

**War Department,**


The undersigned was Officer in Charge of the War Department Signal Center and War Department Code Room from September 1939 until May 1945.

This is to certify, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that at no time prior to 7 December 1941, did either the War Department Code Room or War Department Signal Center handle any messages from or to the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of England, sent either directly or through an intermediary. The War Department Code Room and War Department Signal Center were not in the normal channel for handling messages between the President and the Prime Minister. Had any message been so routed, it [10293] would have been brought to my attention as being most unusual.

/S/ Edward F. French,
Edward F. French,
Colonel, Signal Corps.
MEMORANDUM

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

The Staff Communications Branch, Office Chief of Staff, was established 1 April 1942. At that time a fragmentary file of messages transmitted during the period prior to 8 December 1941 was turned over to the Staff Communications Branch. That entire file was microfilmed and the microfilm remains in the possession of the Staff Communications Branch. I hereby certify that the microfilm contains no communications between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, either directly or through an intermediary, during the period 24 November through 7 December 1941.

/s/ C. E. Tennesson, Jr.,
C. E. Tennesson, Jr.,
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Chief, Staff Communications Branch.

13 December 1945.

[10294] All personnel immediately available who would be likely to have knowledge of any messages between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of England transmitted, either directly or through an intermediary, during the period 24 November through 7 December 1941 via the War Department Signal Center have been questioned, and have expressed the belief that there were no such messages.

Under Army Regulations 105-25, 12 February 1945, paragraph 3b, Signal Centers will not be used as offices of record. That same provision was in effect during and since 1941. Accordingly, the War Department Signal Center's microfilm records covering messages transmitted during 1941, 1942 and the first six months of 1943 are no longer in existence.

/s/ P. C. Maynard,
P. C. Maynard,
Colonel, Signal Corps,
Chief, Traffic Operations Branch.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 21 January 1946.

MEMORANDUM

[10295] To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. In respect of the memorandum of Mr. William D. Mitchell dated 28 November 1945 enclosing a copy of a request made that day by Congressman Keefe, which was transcribed at Page 1861 of the Report of Proceedings, for the production from the files of the Navy Department of all communications from the President of the United States to the British Prime Minister or to any intermediary of the British Prime Minister, such as the British Admiralty, from the period of November 24, 1941 to and including December 7, 1941, together with a certificate as indicated, this will advise that a careful search of the pertinent files of the Navy Department have disclosed no such communications. As requested by Congressman Keefe a copy of a certificate by Rear Admiral Redman, Chief of Naval Communications, dated 21 January 1946, is forwarded herewith.

/s/ John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.
Top Secret
From: Chief of Naval Communications.
To: Rear Admiral O. S. Colclough, USN, Judge Advocate General.
Subject: Dispatch communications via Naval Communications Service between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill between 24 November 1941 and 7 December 1941, inclusive.

1. All appropriate files of the Naval Communication Service have been searched for any dispatch communications from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill or any of his subordinates, or from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt or any of his subordinates between 24 November 1941 and 7 December 1941, inclusive. This will certify that no such dispatches are contained in those files.

Joseph R. Redman.

January 22, 1946.

Memorandum for Congressman Keefe.

With reference to your request for any communications in the State, War, and Navy Department files between the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister, either directly or through an intermediary, during the period November 24–December 7, 1941, there are enclosed copies of memoranda dated December 13, 1945, and January 21, 1946, which we have received from the liaison officers of the War and Navy Departments, together with copies of the certificates enclosed therewith.

It is our understanding that a complete response to your request was made by Mr. Acheson for the State Department during our conference with him on January 21.

/s/ Seth W. Richardson
Seth W. Richardson

Encs.

[10298] Mr. Masten. Finally, I would like to refer to the request made by Congressman Gearhart originally at page 5458 of the transcript relating to certain of the Japanese intercepts in Exhibits 1 and 2 bearing date of December 6, 1941.

At pages 5511 to 5518 of the transcript, there was placed in the record additional information regarding the times of receipt of certain of those intercepts, and following renewal of Congressman Gearhart's request at page 7689 of the transcript, the papers requested were delivered to Congressman Gearhart on the following Tuesday, I believe it was. We would like to have that noted in the record, as showing the delivery of those papers.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be noted.

Mr. Masten. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY—(Resumed)

Mr. Murphy. Captain, will you now produce the several letters—The CHAIRMAN. The Chair was confused. Senator Lucas was examining.

Mr. Murphy. I beg your pardon.

[10299] The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas was examining.

Senator Lucas. I will yield.
Mr. Murphy. I just wanted to make a request that we have produced the four letters and the station records.\footnote{See p. 3887 et seq., infra. See also Hearings, Part 9, p. 4009. 70716—46—pt. 8—31}

Captain Safford. I have not the station records. They are not in my custody. Counsel will have to get them from the Navy Department.

I have here copies, extracts made from those station records, by one of my assistants and this is all I had to work with, these papers I have here.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the four letters.

Captain Safford. The only letter that I have and can find is a letter from Commander Welker that is dated January 15, postmarked January 16, 1946.

Mr. Murphy. You don’t have your letter to Welker or your letter to Brotherhood?

Captain Safford. I cannot find them.

Mr. Murphy. You don’t have your letter to Welker, your letter to Brotherhood, or your letter to Bryant?

Captain Safford. I do not have them.

Mr. Murphy. You cannot produce them?

Captain Safford. I can’t produce them.

The Chairman. All right. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Captain, in the statement you furnished \[10300\] to the committee, on page 1, you state, “The broadcast was probably in Japanese Morse code.”

You were there speaking about the winds execute message?

Captain Safford. The winds execute message.

Senator Lucas. Now, as you go through your statement, and as I have understood the testimony from time to time, you have almost taken a clear position that it was broadcast in the Morse code, and I would like to have you explain what you mean by “probably” because it seems to me to be somewhat important.

Captain Safford. There are two forms of Morse code. The International Morse code, which has an alphabet of 26 characters, and the Japanese Morse code which has an alphabet of approximately 45 characters. Not being able to locate any copies of the JAP broadcasts of that time, it is not quite definite what was used. The best reference we can have is the station report from Cheltenham, which said they monitored all these schedules and found they were all in English and Kana, which means Japanese Morse code. So there is a very strong presumption that it was in the Japanese Morse code and not in the International Morse code. But in either event, it was not in voice. It was not \[10301\] the spoken word.

Senator Lucas. I still don’t quite understand when you say it was “probably” in Japanese Morse code. Are there two Morse codes?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; the Japanese Morse code of approximately 45 characters, and the English Morse code of 26 characters.

Senator Lucas. Were you intercepting both codes?

Captain Safford. We were intercepting both codes from time to time. At that time we had approximately 110 radio operators in the United States Navy who were proficient on the Japanese Morse code.

Senator Lucas. One of these codes is easier to intercept; is that it? Captain Safford. Any trained operator can intercept the Inter-
national Morse code. The Japanese Morse code requires special training.

Senator Lucas. In other words, any station in the country could intercept the International Morse code?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. While it would take a trained operator to intercept the Japanese Morse code?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And you are not positive; you say there is a slight possibility that it would have been in the International Morse code?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; because we can't produce any message sent around that time sent from Station JAP. I have requested them, and none can be furnished.

Senator Lucas. Now, Captain, leaving that subject for a moment, I want to turn to your testimony on page 9911 of the record.

When I was reading to you the letter that you had written to Captain Kramer, I read the following:

I am getting all the help that I can from Linn, and from such records as are still available. My memory is bad as to details.

And I asked you this question:

Was that true of the winds execute message at that time?

And you answered:

That is true on the details. You will see I had not been able to establish the date at that time, the exact date. I knew it within two or three days.

Now, bear in mind this letter was written in December 1943, two years and a few days after the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Reading this statement over last evening, I notice you still tell the committee that the exact date of this so-called winds execute message was not definitely fixed in your mind when you wrote Captain Kramer, and you say in answer to me that you knew that it was within 2 or 3 days.

Now, my query is, What documentary proof, what evidence, is there in this record that shows definitely that this message did come in on the date of December 4, as is alleged throughout in your statement?

Captain Safford. The messages referred to in my testimony which were filed for transmittal between 3 p. m. and 3:20 p. m. on the afternoon of the 4th of December 1941.

Senator Lucas. All right. Now, you knew, of course, when you wrote that letter to Kramer, you knew exactly the circumstances at the time; did you not?

Captain Safford. I knew that the messages had been, that these messages, I knew approximately what they said, who they were to, but I did not know the date of those things.

I found that out shortly after I had written Kramer.

Senator Lucas. You testified yesterday, Captain, that this one message that you sent to Guam—and that is the one we are talking about now—

Captain Safford. That was one of them.

Senator Lucas. You testified yesterday that that message was the only message that you sent over your name in that crisis and that—am I right?
Captain Safford. That is slightly out, sir.
Senator Lucas. Well, you correct me.
Captain Safford. I released one message personally at noon. It was not introduced as evidence. It was not very important.
Senator Lucas. That is correct.
Captain Safford. That was over my signature. The message to Guam, one message to Guam went out over the signature of Admiral Noyes. The others went out over the signature of Admiral Ingersoll. But all bore the notation that OP-20-G was the originator.
Senator Lucas. You are correct about that. There was one message that you said was of little or no importance.
Captain Safford. It was merely a correction to a previous message.
Senator Lucas. But the only message that you sent during this crisis was the one you sent to the communications officer in Guam requesting the burning of all the papers and codes there; am I right?
Captain Safford. The more important message was the one which I originated and Admiral Noyes released.
Senator Lucas. I am not talking about that. I am talking [10305] about this one message that you sent. That is the one you did send, according to your testimony yesterday, as far as being important is concerned, you only sent one message say from December 3 to the 7th; is that right?
Captain Safford. There was a second message which was sent on the 6th also which was originated by me.
Senator Lucas. It was originated by you, but did you sign it, send it over your name?
Captain Safford. I did not.
Senator Lucas. Well, that is all I am asking you about, Captain.
Captain Safford. I am sorry.
Senator Lucas. I asked you the question twice. Perhaps the construction of my question was a little poor and maybe you didn't understand me. All I was trying to get you to corroborate was the statement you made yesterday that you sent out two messages, one not so important, but the second one, which went out over your name, had to do with the burning of the codes in Guam and other papers.
Captain Safford. That was not sent out over my name; no, sir.
Senator Lucas. What message was sent out over your name, if any?
Captain Safford. Just this one message which I referred [10306] to, which was a correction to a previous message.
Senator Lucas. That is the only one that was sent out over your name?
Captain Safford. Over my name to those stations.
Senator Lucas. Then I am wrong about that. I thought there were two messages. I was sure that you testified yesterday you did send out two messages. Anyhow, you distinctly recall the sending out of the message to Guam because you had prepared it, and you testified that on the basis of that message those in Guam representing the Navy there did follow out those instructions?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
[10307] Senator Lucas. And you now tell the committee that you did not know the date that you prepared that message, which was so important as far as Guam was concerned, when you wrote this letter to Captain Kramer in December 1943?
Captain Safford. I knew it was the same date that we had received the winds message but I could not tell exactly what that date was. As soon as I established the date, the filing time of that message, I had fixed my date for the winds message.

Senator Lucas. Yes. And when you wrote Captain Kramer that letter and he replied to you in his reply to your eighteenth question, he did not have the same date as you did in that letter?

Captain Safford. No, sir. He said it was the 3d or 4th, I believe. Senator Lucas. No, he did not say that, Captain, I don't believe. I want to check that now with you.

Now, I call to your attention page 9916. I asked you to look at that statement which said,—I mean that part of your statement which reads as follows:

We can't find the original "Weather Report" (sent on Dec. 5th) and its translation. What became of it?

And I say:

What did he say when he wrote back

Your answer is:

[10308] Kramer had that confused with the— I think it was with the hidden word message which was received on December 6th. Anyhow, he said it came in—or December 7th. He replied that it came in on the morning of December 7th after ten o'clock and was given out on the delivery trip which ended up at Secretary Hull's office at eleven A. M. on Sunday.

And didn't I ask you to look at his answer?

Captain Safford. That is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir.

Captain Safford. My memory was off.

Senator Lucas. I thought I was correct in that because I requested you to look at his answer and that was the reply that you gave me from the answer to the letter, or from the letter itself.

Now, as I listen to this testimony it seems to me that this question of a date becomes more and more important all of the time, and you are asking Captain Kramer in December 1943 to fix the date of this so-called winds execute message which you have told the committee from circumstantial evidence you believe was on December the 4th, but the first word that you get in reply to that query comes from the man who translated the message, who said directly to you that in his opinion that message came in on the 7th, that is correct?

[10309] Captain Safford. Yes.

Senator Lucas. And your position is that Kramer was confused with another message; that is as I understand it.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. But, nevertheless, of the 19 questions that you asked Kramer in this letter, the other 18 replies were satisfactory to your queries but the nineteenth one, which dealt with the winds message on the question of time, alone was not in accord with what you believed to be the fact?

Captain Safford. From memory. It did not agree with my memory.

Senator Lucas. Your memory at that time was not infallible on this question of date?

Captain Safford. Not as to the day.
Senator Lucas. That is right. And had it been, you would not have written Captain Kramer or any other individuals with respect to the date, would you?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. That is to say, if you had documentary proof, if you had the file or anything to have shown the date that this so-called winds execute message came in, you would not have started this series of letter writing around to individuals who were interested in this to try to ascertain and \[10310\] fix the proper date?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Thank you, sir. Now, you notice on page 9918 of the transcript, in answer to a question propounded by me, you said:

I wrote to Captain Welker after V-J Day to see if he could recall anything about it.

Now, VJ-day was last August, was it not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas (reading):

The letter apparently was lost in a typhoon. I wrote to him some time later and he replied that he not only could remember it, that he had done nothing whatsoever about it. In other words, it was completely erased from his memory.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, even after VJ-day you were still seeking to determine from someone to corroborate your memory upon the question of this date?

Captain Safford. Not upon the date, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, did you ask him about the date in that letter?

Captain Safford. I did ask the date but I asked him his part of it, if he remembered what orders we had sent out, be- \[10311\] cause at that time I had no written record of the fact that orders had been sent to Cheltenham. I only had that in my memory. I asked him if he remembered his conference with Captain Schukraft in the Army about that. I asked him if he remembered about the Army requesting the FCC to get it, and I asked him if there was anything else of that nature which he knew. Also I asked him if he personally recalled the receipt of the winds message. I was not concerned with the date of it then.

Senator Lucas. Well, I am not so much interested in what you asked him, other than this one point that I am trying to develop. You have no copy of the letter that you sent to Captain Welker?

Captain Safford. I have no copy of the letter. I have his reply.

Senator Lucas. Did you say anything to him in there about the question of the date, as to whether or not he remembered the date that this so-called implementing message came in?

Captain Safford. I believe I told him that was the date.

Senator Lucas. Well, how did you know at that time if it is still a question here? Was that your best judgment on it?

Captain Safford. That was my best judgment of the time \[10312\] from this other circumstantial documentary evidence of the period.
Senator Lucas. All right. Now, one other statement that I want to read upon this point in answer to my question of yesterday at page 9920 of the record:

Senator Lucas. And is there any question in your mind that a message of that kind would make any lighter impression upon Kramer than it did upon you?

Your answer is:

I discussed that matter with Kramer in the spring of 1943 before he left Washington to go to Hawaii and he recalled it and his impression or memory and mine agreed as to the fact of its interception, not the date.

Is that correct? Now, this is your own statement of yesterday. Captain Safford. May I correct that statement a little?

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir; you may.

Captain Safford. I do not recall any direct reference to the date other than 2 or 3 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor. We were not in disagreement on the date. The exact mention of date did not come up.

Senator Lucas. I see. All right, sir.

May I have Circulars 2353 and 2354? I now direct your attention, Captain, just for a moment or two, to Circulars 2353 [10313] and 2354, with which you are familiar, of course.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, I should like also to direct your attention to the second letter that you wrote to Captain Kramer, which is in evidence, to the statement found on page 9933 of the transcript. You stated as follows:

I have this from the Station "A" files, plus statements of #19 and #23. This message (in Morse) included the words—"Higashi no kazeame. Nishi no kaze hare." (Negative form of kita no kaze Kumori.)"

Now, you state:

The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by #72 or #73, but was a mixture.

Will you explain that to the committee, please?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. We expected at the time, both Army and Navy, that the reason for possibly having these two different set-ups was that instructions on the warning which was contained in Circular 2353 would be used on the voice broadcast from Tokyo and that the words appearing in 2354 would be used on the Morse code broadcast from Tokyo.

Therefore, I was quite astonished when I found words which I expected would come by voice only, appearing in the Morse code broadcast.

Senator Lucas. Can you explain that?

[10314] Captain Safford. It was our failure, the Army and Navy, to understand exactly what distinction the Japanese themselves did make between the two forms which they had provided in these two messages. If I may —

Senator Lucas. Pardon me, sir.

Captain Safford. If I may continue, please.

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir.

Captain Safford. 2353 simply said, "Daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast," and that in the broad sense and maybe the proper sense could apply to any form of Japanese, whether written
or spoken. We possibly jumped at conclusions. I know that the FCC were given those words and they were told it would come by voice; the Army did that.

Senator Lucas. Now, in this same statement you follow up by saying:

The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by #72 or #73, but was a mixture. The GX watch officer was not sure of it so he called you and you came in early and verified it.

Now you are talking to Kramer. In other words, when this mixture message came in there wasn’t anybody that was certain as to whether or not this was it or not; that is correct, isn’t it?

Captain Safford. That is what appeared at the time, [10315] though—

Senator Lucas. Well, now, I am just talking about that time.

Captain Safford. That was my belief at the time.

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir; that was your belief at the time and you so stated to Kramer 2 years afterward or more, that when this message came in, it was a mixture between these two circulars that had been sent out by Japan, and there wasn’t anybody at that time that thoroughly understood what this message was; that is correct, isn’t it?

Captain Safford. Because it was—

Senator Lucas. Now, just wait a minute. Not “because.” Is that true or not? I am just taking your own words here to Kramer and you can qualify it later on, but I am just asking a simple question as to whether or not when this message came in, that you men there who saw it first and before Kramer got them did not believe that it was a mixture between the two messages and you did not know what it meant.

Captain Safford. The watch officer that received it was not certain if it was what we were looking for or not.

Senator Lucas. That is right. Well, counsel calls my attention and Senator Ferguson from Michigan, and they are correct; you were not there when it came in at all?

Captain Safford. I was not there when it came in myself [10316] personally. I did not see it until Kramer took it in and showed it to me.

Senator Lucas. And after Kramer came, then you had the talk with him about the message—I mean after you came in you had the talk with him about the message?

Captain Safford. A very short talk and summed it up.

Senator Lucas. Yes. How long was it after this mixture message was received until you arrived, if you recall?

Captain Safford. I do not know. That statement was made from a witness who has later denied he ever saw the winds message, so it does not amount to anything.

Senator Lucas. Well, it does amount to a good deal, Captain, as far as I am concerned, and I am the one that has to—one of the men that has to pass finally on this question. This winds message is probably the most important, one of the most important things in this examination, and I am trying now to ascertain your state of mind at that particular time, as a result of this very interesting letter that you wrote to Captain Kramer.
Senator Ferguson. Would you read that question and answer? I would like to hear that last question and answer.

(The last question and answer were read by the reporter.)

Senator Ferguson. Thank you.

Senator Lucas. Are you talking now about the statement [10317] which you prepared for Kramer that it was a mixture, that that was given to you by another witness who now says he never saw the winds message?

Captain Safford. No; that was from my own memory.

Senator Lucas. That was from your own memory?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Now, what did you mean by that last answer? Read that question again and let the witness answer it. I am sure I do not understand it.

Senator Ferguson. He said it did not amount to anything; that was the answer.

Senator Lucas. Yes. What did you mean by that?

Captain Safford. May I go back there for a few questions to get this straight in my mind?

Senator Lucas. Yes, we will be glad to have you do that, Captain. (The record was read by the reporter.)

Captain Safford. I should have said I did not know then when the winds message was received. I believe I told Kramer I thought it came in at 4:30 a. m. Washington time, because I think this time of arrival was given me by a witness who later has stated that he never saw the winds message. That was what I had reference to.

Senator Lucas. All right.

[10318] Captain Safford. I am sorry I was not clear.

Senator Lucas. Now, when you came in that morning, where did you find Kramer?

Captain Safford. When I think about that afterward I cannot remember anything about that particular day prior to seeing Kramer and holding up a sheet of paper and saying, "Here it is" or "This is it." It was a very simple statement which contained the word "it," "it" referring to the winds message.

[10319] Senator Lucas. Well, now, that is practically all you remember with respect to this message known as the winds execute message? You talked to Kramer about it and he held it up and you saw these three words written on it, and he said, "This is it," and that is the last time you ever saw the message?

Captain Safford. I read it over. He explained it was the genuine execute of the winds code. I saw the writing, and it was sent up to Admiral Noyes immediately and never sent back to my section.

Senator Lucas. Now how do you account for the Japanese not going through, word by word, with their circulars, either 2353 or 2354, on an important message of this kind? If you fellows had it mixed up, would not the Japs have it mixed up also?

Captain Safford. The Japanese had both forms, and so did we, so whatever we received we could understand.

Senator Lucas. Well, you did not understand it, the watch officer did not understand it when it came in, and you were, 2 years later, asking Kramer for information about this very thing.
Captain Safford. The watch officer had been informed that if it came by voice, it would be in the form given in circular 2353, and if it came in the Morse code, it would be [10320] in the form given in Circular 2354. The watch officer was not a Japanese translator and therefore he was confused, because he recognized the words, but he was still uncertain because it did not come in in the form he expected it.

I think it was sent out the way the Japanese intended to send it, but it did not come in in the form in which we expected to receive it.

Senator Lucas. Captain, Circular 2353 is clear and free from ambiguity, is it not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And so is Circular 2354?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. The winds execute message following this circular was probably the most important message that Japan sent, unless it was the 14 parts message?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. All right. Now, isn't it a fair assumption to believe that, in view of the fact that Japan was sending this implementing message, they would either send it as set forth in Circular 2353 or as set forth in Circular 2354, so that the Japanese nationals throughout the world would not be confused about it?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. Well, they did not do that, did they, [10321] according to what you saw on this sheet?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; they did, according to what I saw on the sheet.

Senator Lucas. Now I will take Circular 2353 that you are talking about. It says, "In the case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast."

In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.

Then it says:

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice.

Did you see that on that teletype message?

Captain Safford. I saw it in the middle.

Senator Lucas. All right. Did you see it on the end?

Captain Safford. I cannot say now whether it was on the end or not.

Senator Lucas. You never testified that it was on the end, have you, Captain?

Captain Safford. I do not believe so.

Senator Lucas. You always testified that it was in the [10322] middle and it was there just in three words?

Captain Safford. Three phrases.

Senator Lucas. Three phrases, yes. And it says:

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice.

Was that done?

Captain Safford. I could not testify from my own memory at the present time whether each sentence was repeated twice or not.
Senator Lucas. You considered this an important injunction on the part of the Japanese Government to its nationals throughout the world?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. You do not believe they would comply with that word for word in the event they were sending the implementing message if it meant war with the United States?

Captain Safford. They could be expected to send it that way.

Senator Lucas. They did not do that, as far as you know?

Captain Safford. I cannot prove they did from my memory at the present time.

Senator Lucas. Your memory up to this point, Captain, has been consistent on one thing, and that is that you saw these three words, or these three phrases, in the middle of the [10323] message. That is correct, isn’t it?

Captain Safford. And immediately adjacent to each other.

Senator Lucas. Yes. But you have never testified that you saw these three phrases at the end of the message, on this teletype message?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. And you never testified at any time that when Kramer talked with you about it and you read this message over, as you just told me you did, and understood it, you never testified that each sentence was repeated twice on this teletype message?

Captain Safford. I have never testified that.

Senator Lucas. Yes. And the reason that you have not, is because you only saw, as I understand it, these three phrases in the middle of the message?

Captain Safford. The reason I did not is because it did not stick out in my memory or did not strike me as particularly important, so it would be something that would stay in my memory.

Senator Lucas. Captain, you could not say that this would not be important, could you? Here you are looking now for the implementing message, and you know exactly what this circular says that the Jap Government has to do in order to make this a really genuine implementing message.

[10324] In other words, they use these phrases in the middle, they use them at the end, and they repeat the sentence twice. Here is a serious situation. Here is Japan getting ready to go to war with the United States upon this kind of an implementing message, and certainly it must have been important to you or you would not be before this hearing now.

Captain Safford. The significant part of the winds message; that is, the code words comprising the winds message, in this broadcast were underscored and Kramer and I at that time were both thoroughly sure that this was the genuine execute of the winds message.

Senator Lucas. Well, Captain, how could you be? How could you and Kramer be certain of that, if you believed that the Japanese were going to follow out what they said in Circular 2353?

Captain Safford. Because I, at least, considered that the repetition at the end, either in the case of this message or the other message, was just as a safe precaution to insure that the highly important words were received in case there was difficulty in receiving at the time.

Senator Lucas. When did you think about that?
Captain Safford. At the time.

Senator Lucas. I see. In other words, you did not think that it was important to have these three phrases at the end, or that they be repeated twice. You thought any place that you saw them, either in the center of the message or at the end of the message was sufficient to tell you that there was war with the United States?

Captain Safford. It was where the words appeared together in a contradictory sense and making no possible weather forecast, but in the middle of the Japanese language short wave news broadcast as set out herein. That was the all-important thing.

Senator Lucas. You can reach that conclusion, Captain, but as one member of the committee, where a nation is sending out an implementing message of this kind which means war, it seems to me, in order that they might notify their nationals, without any question they would follow that message to the letter. They had some reason to send this type of a message in the beginning. It was either the making or breaking of Japan, that is how important it was. And you, 2 years later, Captain, were still thinking about the mixed message that came in at that time when you wrote to Kramer.

Captain Safford. What I meant by “mixture” was what we considered the voice form being sent in Morse code. That was the only mixture I had reference to.

Senator Lucas. “The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by 72 or 73.” That is what we are talking about right here, 72 and 73, these two circulars, and you did state, “It was not sent in the manner prescribed by 72 or 73 but was a mixture.” That is what you are talking about.

Captain Safford. That was a very vague statement given to Kramer.

Senator Lucas. Very vague, but it becomes a very important statement, as far as the Senator from Illinois is concerned, because we are right down now, as I see it, to the real point and real meat of the whole situation as far as this winds message is concerned.

Captain Safford, this may be repetition and, Mr. Chairman, you will pardon me if I deal with it just a little.

On December 7, 1941, what was your exact position in the Navy at that time?

Captain Safford. I was the head of the Communications Security Section and Communications Division of the Office of Naval Operations.

Senator Lucas. You were at the head of it at that time?

Captain Safford. I was at the head of it.

Senator Lucas. What was you rank at that time?

Captain Safford. I was Commander.

Senator Lucas. And since that time you have been promoted?

[10327] Captain Safford. I was promoted to Captain on the 1st of January 1942.

Senator Lucas. 1942 in January. All right. Now who were your superiors on December 7, 1942?

Captain Safford. 1941.

Senator Lucas. I mean 1941.

Captain Safford. Capt. Joseph R. Redman was Assistant to the Director of Naval Communications; Admiral Noyes was Director of
Naval Communications, and then over them came Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Lucas. Redman and Noyes were your two immediate superiors?

Captain Safford. Two immediate superiors.

Senator Lucas. What happened to Redman after December 7, 1941? Was he promoted?

Captain Safford. He was promoted subsequently to rear admiral, and has recently retired.

Senator Lucas. Recently retired. What happened to Noyes?

Captain Safford. He went to sea in the middle of February about February 15, 1942.

Senator Lucas. Was he promoted, too?

Captain Safford. He was not promoted. He was already rear admiral and later he had a carrier task force in the Pacific Ocean.

Senator Lucas. You had been in this department since that year?

Captain Safford. Since 1936.

Senator Lucas. You had been at the head of this communications department?

Captain Safford. In this position.

Senator Lucas. When did Redman come in?

Captain Safford. His last tour of duty as Assistant Director of Naval Communications, he came about January 1941.

Senator Lucas. January 1941. And when did Admiral Noyes come in?

Captain Safford. I think that Admiral Noyes came there about September or August of 1939.

Senator Lucas. August 1939?

Captain Safford. That is as I remember it.

Senator Lucas. In that same position?

Captain Safford. In that same position.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, were you on friendly terms with Redman?

Captain Safford. Reasonably; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. How is that?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

[10328] Senator Lucas. Did you ever have any trouble with Redman at all?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. At no time?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you ever have any trouble with Noyes at any time?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you have any feeling against either one of those officers?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. None whatever?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. All right. Your department was split up? I think you told that to Senator Ferguson yesterday.
Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. Did you lose any authority or power as the result of splitting up that department?

Captain Safford. Why, yes; I lost authority over the intelligence portion of it.

Senator Lucas. When was that?

Captain Safford. That took place in a reorganization within the Navy Department which was effected the same day that Admiral Noyes left the department.

[10330] Senator Lucas. What date was that?

Captain Safford. That was about the 15th of February, 1942.

Senator Lucas. February 15, 1942?

Captain Safford. Yes. May I add, Senator, for the record, that about a month before that Admiral Noyes called me up and notified me of the prospective change, and Admiral Noyes said he thought the job was too much for one man to handle, and I told him I thought I needed rest personally at that time.

Senator Lucas. That is when they split the Division?

Captain Safford. That is when they split the department.

Senator Lucas. You said yesterday that you went to New York and talked to Admiral Kimmel some time in 1945, is that right?

Captain Safford. No, sir; 1944.

Senator Lucas. 1944. And you also said you talked to his attorney, Mr. Rugg?

Captain Safford. Not at that time.

Senator Lucas. When did you talk to Rugg?

Captain Safford. Not until after I had testified before both the Hart investigation and Navy investigation.

Senator Lucas. Did you look him up or did he seek you? I am referring to the attorney, Rugg.

[10331] Captain Safford. I don't remember. I think that he asked me to see him when he came to Washington in connection with something to do with any further investigation.

Senator Lucas. What date do you say that was?

Captain Safford. I do not recall.

Senator Lucas. Well, give us your best judgment, Captain. Was it 1944, 1945, or 1946?

Captain Safford. I would say it was about the time of the Hewitt investigation.

[10332] Senator Lucas. What date was that? I don't remember when the Hewitt investigation was.

Captain Safford. I think that was in——

Mr. Murphy. 1945.

Captain Safford. About July 1945 or thereabouts.

Mr. Murphy. It started on the 14th of May and ended on the 12th of July.

Senator Lucas. What year?

Mr. Murphy. 1945.

Senator Lucas. Did you talk to Mr. Rugg more than once?

Mr. Richardson. That can't be so. It must be in 1944.

Mr. Murphy. It says 1945.

Mr. Richardson. Isn't it the Navy investigation you are talking about?
Mr. Murphy. No; the Hewitt investigation.
Mr. Richardson. Yes; that is 1945.

Senator Lucas. Did you talk to Mr. Rugg more than once about this matter?
Captain Safford. Oh, I talked to him a half dozen times altogether.

Senator Lucas. Did you talk to him about the winds execute message?
Captain Safford. I have talked about the winds execute message. [10333] Senator Lucas. Well, that winds execute message was magic, was it not?
Mr. Keefe. What is that question; I did not get it?
Senator Lucas. Was magic?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Lucas. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. I was wondering when it was you borrowed the entire file on magic.
Captain Safford. I did not borrow the entire file. I only borrowed a portion of it.
Mr. Murphy. Well, you borrowed some magic, did you not?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And you took it with you. Where did you take it?
Captain Safford. It never left my office.
Mr. Murphy. You borrowed it from whoever had it in the safe; they turned the file on magic over to you, didn't they—some magic?
Captain Safford. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Quite a lot of it, wasn't it?
Captain Safford. That is right.
Mr. Murphy. Did you show anybody that magic then?
[10334] Captain Safford. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. All right.

Senator Lucas. Well, when you were talking to Attorney Rugg about the implementing winds message, Admiral Kimmel was not charged with anything at that time, was he?
Captain Safford. No; except by the Roberts Commission.

Senator Lucas. Now the Roberts Commission found him guilty of some negligence, as I recall, but he was under no trial; he was not up for court martial or trial, or anything of that kind at that time, was he?
Captain Safford. Only investigation.
Senator Lucas. Yes. Notwithstanding that, Captain, you gave to his attorney all you knew about the winds message, which was supposed to be highly confidential at a time when we were in war, is that right?
Captain Safford. His attorney had already had all of this information given in the testimony in the Navy court of inquiry.
Senator Lucas. Well, he had gotten that testimony, you say, in the Navy inquiry?
Captain Safford. He was present as Admiral Kimmel's counsel in the Navy court of inquiry, and he had all of that.
Senator Lucas. And you testified there?
[10335] Captain Safford. I testified there.
Senator Lucas. Well, did you see Rugg, or Kimmel before the Navy court of inquiry at any time?
Captain Safford. I saw Admiral Kimmel once, as I have testified, on the 21st of February 1944.

Senator Lucas. Did you talk to any other public official or lawyer, or anyone else, aside from your immediate family, about the winds execute message?

Captain Safford. No, sir; and my own immediate family never heard about the winds execute message until they saw it in the newspapers.

Senator Lucas. I see.

Now, your acquaintance with Admiral Kimmel was very slight?

Captain Safford. Very slight.

Senator Lucas. You never visited him at any time in his home?

Captain Safford. I never visited him at any time.

Senator Lucas. Never served under his command at any place?

Captain Safford. Not directly, at all.

Senator Lucas. Did you ever talk to any newspapermen or magazine writers about this?

Captain Safford. No.

[10336] Senator Lucas. Now, when you started to prepare the secret paper covering events which took place early in December 1941, as outlined in your statement to Kramer, those secret papers in reality were dealing with the defense of Kimmel at that time, were they not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. The answer was "yes, sir"?

Captain Safford. The answer was "yes, sir."

Senator Lucas. And in your second letter to Kramer, you went into great detail and elaborated considerably upon what you thought ought to be done in his behalf?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. For instance, on page 9931 of the transcript of yesterday, you stated:

Tell #42 that I knew #31 was a scapegoat from the start.

Now, #42 was Kimmel, was it?

The Chairman. #42 was Halsey.

Senator Lucas (reading):

Tell Halsey that I knew #31 was a scapegoat from the start, but I did not suspect that he was victim of a frame-up until about #114 (plus 2 years)—and that would be November 15, 1943.

So on November 15, 1943, from the information you received you made up your mind that there was something [10337] wrong?

Captain Safford. I began to—not know, but suspect. I had no suspicions up until that time.

Senator Lucas. On November 15, 1943, you state here in this letter, "I did not suspect that he was victim of a frame-up until November 15, 1943."

Then it was following that you wrote the first letter to Kramer in December of that same year, and you said you could not confirm this until December 2, 1943, and did not have absolute proof until about January 18, 1944.

Captain, the defense of Admiral Kimmel by yourself rather puzzled me.

I have gone over these letters. I have listened to your testimony. I have observed how much time the preparation must have taken,
even to get out this letter that you wrote to Kramer in January 1944, with an air mail code for personal correspondence, with numbers from 1 to 138, inclusive.

In that code, you set up a number for the Roberts report, a number for Admiral Hart, a number for the Roberts Commission, a number for Justice Roberts, a number for Roosevelt, a number for Hull, a number for Stark, McCoy, General McNarney, Admiral Halsey, the White House [10338] aides and then numbers for the various important messages, numbers for Washington, Guadalcanal, Corregidor, Singapore, Kurusu, Nomura, General Umedzu—what would he know about the Pearl Harbor business, General Umedzu in Hsinkiang?

Captain Safford. He sent some very important messages early in November which were given to Mr. Kurusu, the Japanese delegate who was on his way here.

Senator Lucas. Well, in the case of practically every one of these code numbers you had a particular reason for giving it, or otherwise you would not give it. You had a particular reason for giving it to Kramer or otherwise you would not give it to him?

Captain Safford. Or the possibility it might be used.

Senator Lucas. No. 109, "The Son of Heaven." What did you have in mind about "The Son of Heaven"?

Captain Safford. Nothing at that time. He was just the Emperor and he might come in, I did not know.

Senator Lucas. I see. You might have had to use him before you got through with the defense of Kimmel, is that it?

Captain Safford. I did not know.

Senator Lucas. Well, of course, you knew, Captain, when you were sending this code to Kramer that you were [10339] doing something that was wrong, and were violating naval regulations; did you not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. That is what I cannot understand, Captain Safford, how a man who is as intelligent as you are, and who is such a brilliant officer as you have appeared before this committee, would take a chance on the violation of naval regulations in order to help a man that you never saw to know intimately, in order to help Admiral Kimmel, an individual whom you never served under, that you slightly knew, but you did all of this taking a chance of ruining your own career to help a man that you hardly knew.

Can you explain that to me?

Captain Safford. Mr. Lucas, I had been very bitter against Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Lucas. You had been what?

Captain Safford. Very bitter.

Senator Lucas. Very bitter?

Captain Safford. Very bitter.

Senator Lucas. Against Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Safford. Against Admiral Kimmel up to that time. I had not indulged in spreading gossip about him, but my experience about him, when it happened to come up to my immediate friends had not been at all complimentary [10340] to the admiral.
This was true particularly in the case of Captain Welker who had served——

Senator Lucas. I did not quite get that.

Captain Safford. We had many discussions about the Pearl Harbor case with Captain Welker, who had served in Admiral Kimmel's staff, and he considered him a very, very capable and outstanding officer, and when I discovered what had happened, or what I thought had happened, I thought I had to do something to make amends.

Senator Lucas. Well, if I understand your answer correctly, then, you, in the first instance, became very bitter at Admiral Kimmel as the result of what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And you did not hesitate to comment to your friends about that situation?

Captain Safford. When it came up.

Senator Lucas. And then, as time went on, you felt that you had done Admiral Kimmel an injustice?

Captain Safford. I thought that this warning message which I have described, which I saw on the 4th of December, had gone out, and I could not understand how anybody, with the receipt of that information, could not have been completely ready for the attack on Pearl Harbor, in fact with his fleet at sea, and Pearl Harbor just an empty nest.

Senator Lucas. All right.

So your bitterness toward Kimmel after you learned the facts changed to bitterness toward the men here in the Navy Department whom you thought in error?

Captain Safford. Bitterness to them and to myself.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

You were a little bitter at yourself then as the result of this whole transaction?

Captain Safford. I was.

Senator Lucas. Well, it is certainly most unfortunate, Captain; I will say that.

Well, now, of course, in your defense of Admiral Halsey as the result of your change of front against him——

The Chairman. Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Lucas. I mean Admiral Kimmel, as the result of your change of front, you then felt it your duty to go all out and do everything you could for him?

Captain Safford. I did.

Senator Lucas. And in so doing you realized that Captain Kramer was probably the most valuable man you could get on your team in the defense of Kimmel?

[10342] Captain Safford. Yes; that is, if Kramer was so disposed.

Senator Lucas. I understand. But Kramer was the most valuable man in the whole United States that knew anything about these transactions that would be in a position to help you in your desire to right the wrong that you felt at least that you had done to Kimmel?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Kimmel, of course, did not know anything about this purported wrong that you had done to him up to that time, did he?
Captain Safford. No, sir.
Senator Lucas. That was just within yourself?
Captain Safford. That was within myself.
Senator Lucas. Now, if Kramer had answered your second letter wherein you used this code against Navy regulations, Kramer would have been in the same position as you are with respect to the violation of Navy regulations; would he not?
Captain Safford. That is right.
Senator Lucas. In other words, Kramer would have had to have gone along with you on all of your testimony in connection with this hearing, if you fellows had had this secret code between you, and both of you knowing that you were violating Navy regulations to the extent that you might be court-martialed for it?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir. Kramer used better judgment on that occasion than I did.
Senator Lucas. Yes. The point I am making is, though, if Kramer had answered this important second letter that you wrote, then Kramer would have been just as guilty of violating regulations as you, and you and Kramer, in defense of yourselves, would have had to have stuck together, and this second letter that I am reading from, and the first letter you wrote to Kramer, would have never been before this committee?
That is probably true, isn't it?
Captain Safford. That is right.
Senator Lucas. So, if Kramer had answered the letter you had him in your lap to the extent he would have had pretty clearly to have gone along with you?
Captain Safford. Mr. Lucas, no such thought was in my mind.
Senator Lucas. I understand that. I don't charge you with anything against Kramer, but as the result of circumstances, Kramer would have been compelled to go along with you had he answered these queries, and he would have been in the same boat that you are in, as far as the code is concerned. Isn't that right?
Captain Safford. Kramer has always been a free agent, as far as I am concerned.
Senator Lucas. How is that?
Captain Safford. Kramer has always been a free agent, as far as I am concerned.
The Chairman. He said Kramer had always been a free agent, as far as he was concerned.
Senator Lucas. I understand. He has always been a free agent, but he took care of himself in failing to answer the second letter, or he would not be a free agent in this case, but right before this committee, and it would have been a difficult story to break down with you and Kramer both sticking to it.
I do not want to infer that you haven't given us probably your best understanding of this whole transaction, but there is a lot of testimony here against you on this winds message, and if Captain Kramer had been with you on this completely from beginning to end—which
he would have had to have done, if he had answered the second letter—
this committee would have had a pretty difficult time making any
determination upon that question.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lucas. I will withdraw it, if the Senator [10345]objects to it. Please don’t take it, you men, for the newspapers. I will withdraw the whole thing. I do not want to get into any argu-
ment with the Senator from Maine.
Senator Brewster. I quite appreciate your request to the news-
papers, but I am afraid it will be difficult for them to completely dis-
regard it.
I think any suggestion that you have been very fair to Captain
Safford in implying any plot on his part—you did use the word “net”
which I believe you agree was perhaps unfortunate—that he was
laying a net for Captain Kramer and also the fact if Kramer had
responded to his letter, then Captain Safford would have had him at
his mercy, certainly those things imply that Captain Safford was plot-
ing in this situation, and I understand you do not mean any such
insinuation.
If Captain Kramer had innocently and not evilly answered Captain
Safford, that would not imply anything at all, that Captain Safford
would have blackmailed Captain Kramer, or that Captain Kramer
would have yielded to Captain Safford.
I think all of those implications are unwarranted and unfair.
Senator Lucas. I did not yield to the Senator from Maine.
[Applause.]
[10346] The Chairman. The Chair desires to say to the guests
that this is not a political convention, and any further outbreaks in
the midst of this testimony will be dealt with accordingly, no matter
in whose behalf they are or in response to whose questions.
I hope the audience, who are guests of this committee, will keep
that in mind.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, do I understand when the wit-
ness has completed his testimony, it is permissible for the audience
to express themselves as they have on every previous occasion?
I simply want to be clear about that.
The Chairman. The Chair has made no objection to demonstra-
tions on the part of the audience when the witness has concluded his
testimony.
That was true in regard to Secretary Hull, General Marshall, and
the others, but the audience has repeatedly broken into the testimony
of the present witness to make demonstrations.
If they want to applaud when he finishes, that is their business.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to whether or
not these remarks of Senator Lucas are still in this record?
[10347] Senator Lucas. You can leave them on or take them off,
it does not make any difference to me. I was trying to accommodate
the Senator from Maine. It does not make any difference to me, and
the remarks can stay on the record. I will not take them off as the
result of that last query.
The Chairman. Proceed with the examination of the witness.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, as far as my attempting to lay a
net around the captain is concerned, I will leave that to the commit-
tee to test it from his own testimony.
I do not take back anything I said. What I do say with respect to the second letter that the captain wrote, if Captain Kramer had been foolish enough to answer that letter, and it had become known to the public, Captain Kramer would have been in the same position as Captain Safford, and certainly Captain Safford was the moving spirit in this attempt to salve his conscience because he had done Admiral Kimmel what he thought was a wrong, and he went a long way, it seems to me.

If anybody wants to take exception to that remark, I will listen to it.

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take any exception toward the remark of the gentleman from Illinois, but I do not want the record to show that the innuendos contained in this remark, or the previous remark, are to be intended as indicating the conclusions of the committee itself.

Senator Lucas. I leave that to the gentleman from Wisconsin. He has his own opinions and they are pretty good. I appreciate that.

I like to hear him examine witnesses and I like to hear him in executive committee sessions. He is usually pretty sound.

The Chairman. What do you mean by "sound"?

Senator Lucas. We won't go into that.

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, if this hearing is going to get through by the 15th of February, I suggest that we go ahead with this hearing.

The Chairman. Let the Chair make this observation: No member of the committee, nor is the committee itself, bound by any statements or innuendos that may be incorporated in the record by any other member of the committee.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I understand that.

The Chairman. If that would be true the committee would have bound itself long ago.

Senator Lucas. That is exactly what I was going to say. Mr. Chairman, as far as innuendos and implications are concerned, the Senator from Maine has made implications of that kind to the press, and on the floor of the Senate, long before the case started.

The Chairman. Let us get on with this witness. The Chair would like to express the hope that we finish with him by the 15th of February, even if we do not finish with the whole testimony.

[10350] Senator Lucas. I won't detain these boys very long, Mr. Chairman. It usually hurts a little when you make a point or two against somebody.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Chair does not recognize the Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson. It depends on whether you can give it or take it.

Senator Lucas. I can do both.

The Chairman. The Chair recognizes nobody else except the Senator from Illinois. Let him proceed.

Senator Lucas. I think that is all. I think it is a good place to quit, right here.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, this letter which you sent to Captain Kramer and the secret code which you sent to him, by what means of transportation was that conveyed?
Captain Safford. They were sent by air mail on different days, I think about a week apart, so that in case anything miscarried on one it would not miscarry on the other. The main purpose of the code was to cover this letter.

Mr. Murphy. It was sent to Hawaii, was it not? Was that [10351] where the captain was at the time?

Captain Safford. Wherever the captain was. I think he was still in Hawaii; I don't think he left for his new assignment.

Mr. Murphy. Assuming a Japanese spy were to get your letter and read it, would it not be quite apparent to them that we had broken their code? You talk about the winds intercept and the false weather broadcast, and every Japanese agent in the world, as I understand it, had been notified to be on the lookout, and at least all stations on our side were on the lookout for it? Is it not true that any Japanese spy, or any Japanese national, or anyone friendly to Japan, if they intercepted your letter, which was sent air mail, would have known that we had broken the Japanese code?

I am referring particularly, Captain, to the part where you talk about the false weather broadcast, and what time we received it, and the part I read here the other day.

Would not any person who could understand the English language and who knew anything about the Japanese situation know that we had broken their code if they got your letter?

Captain Safford. Not anybody who would pick up the letter. If it got back to Tokyo and was studied carefully they might reach that conclusion.

Mr. Murphy. After we had taken the precaution to lock these papers in safes so that only six or seven persons in [10352] the naval branch and six or seven persons in the military branch or the Army branch could get them, you did, by air mail, send from America to Hawaii what, if intercepted by the Japanese, would have shown we broke their code, did you not?

Let me make it quite positive to you.

Captain Safford. You are correct.

[10353] Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I would like to talk a little bit about national security.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I——

Mr. Murphy. I do not yield.

Senator Brewster. Will you allow me to just say this: As I understand it, this is the second round?

Mr. Murphy. I do not yield.

The Chairman. The Chair might say that during the first round the Senator from Maine was absent. We are now on the second round.

Senator Brewster. I heard Mr. Keefe finish. At that time I didn't realize that we were going to start over again. I have just one question that I wish to ask. I do feel that I have certain rights.

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to observe all rights.

When we had finished yesterday, the Chair asked if there were any further questions. The Senator from Illinois, Mr. Lucas, and the Congressman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy, asked for recognition simultaneously, and the Chair recognized the Senator from
Illinois, Mr. Lucas, and felt that under the circumstances that he should recognize Mr. Murphy when Senator Lucas had finished, as a matter of courtesy.

The Chair did not understand that the Senator from Maine was seeking recognition.

Senator Brewster. I was. I was a little more remote. I didn't realize just what the procedure was.

The Chairman. The Senator's rights will be protected in the matter.

Senator Brewster. I have to go to a conference at 11:30. There is only one question that I have, and I am sure it will not take more than a minute.

Mr. Murphy. I do not yield.

The Chairman. The Chair cannot compel a member to yield to another. It looks as though the witness will be on the stand most of the day and the Senator from Maine will be recognized.

Senator Brewster. I shall be back as quickly as I can.

The Chairman. Very well. Proceed.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, as I understand it from your statement, you said the Army did not know where you were intercepting, and you did not know where the Army was intercepting, for this all-important message?

Captain Safford. I said that there had been a conference, according to my recollection, between Captain Welker and Colonel Schukraft about it on the afternoon of November 28, 1941, and that that conference was held before we sent out our own instructions.

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you, or did you not, know where the Army was attempting to intercept?

Captain Safford. I did at the time, definitely.

Mr. Murphy. You did?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Isn't it the fact that you said in this hearing that you never heard of the FCC intercepts until this hearing, or until later?

What is your testimony on that?

Captain Safford. I said that this specific FCC intercept which had been forwarded, I had never heard of except those specific intercepts.

Mr. Murphy. Had you any knowledge of any intercepts by the Army in regard to the winds message, or the hidden word message?

Captain Safford. The Army had sent us no information at all as to anything coming in.

Mr. Murphy. Well, then, you, as head of Communications up to December 7, had no word from the Army as to whether they intercepted or not anything through the medium of FCC; is that right?

Captain Safford. I checked with them daily and they checked with us to see if it had come in, and the answer from the Army was always negative.

Mr. Murphy. And did you check on the 5th and 6th and the 7th of December?

Captain Safford. I did not check after we got it.

Mr. Murphy. You stopped checking on what day?

Captain Safford. On the 4th.
Mr. Murphy. Now, I refer particularly to your statement at page 14, your own statement, where you say:

It is my recollection that Kramer and I knew at the time that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the winds message to the War Department.

What was the source of the information on that item?
Captain Safford. It was just an impression that I had.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you are now stating categorically under oath something as being true—it is your recollection, at any rate?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And it is only based on an impression?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, you say that your impression is that there was a call to the six receivers of the magic in the Navy and to the President. That is based on an impression?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And "for that reason no immediate distribution of the smooth translation of the winds message was made in the Navy Department."

[10357] Then you say:
The 6 or 7 copies for the Army were rushed over to the War Department as rapidly as possible.

What is the source of your information on that?
Captain Safford. Just my recollection that it had been done.

Mr. Murphy. Can you give us any idea who did it? What is it based on?
Captain Safford. We had an arrangement whereby anything of routine importance was exchanged about twice a day with the Army and anything of special importance was sent over immediately. We took a division of responsibility on that and when anything came up, the watch officer would lift up his phone which had a trunk line to the other department, and they would call for a message or send it over themselves, according to whose turn it was.

Mr. Murphy. Then this statement, which is a categorical statement, "The six or seven copies for the Army were rushed over to the War Department as rapidly as possible," you don't know whether they were or not but you assume they were because they ordinarily were?

Captain Safford. We had the facilities for doing it, and it was my impression throughout the time that that was done.

[10358] Mr. Murphy. Well, before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, you said that if Colonel Bratton were called that he would corroborate you, and on page 7 of the top-secret report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board they say Colonel Bratton testified that no information reached him as to the break in relations shown by the winds message prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster December 7, 1941, and he does not believe anybody else in G-2 received any such information.

Did you know that?
Captain Safford. I did not know that at the time I made that statement.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you said that he would support you and here is his statement, and you say here that six copies were sent over to the Army and Colonel Bratton was the one to deliver them.
Do you still say there were six copies sent over to the Army, or do you know?
Captain Safford. I still think there were.
Mr. Murphy. Well, on what basis? I mean, do you know, or does anybody know? Can you help us?
Captain Safford. I can't give you any more than what I have said.
Mr. Murphy. Do you have any personal knowledge on the matter?
[10359] Captain Safford. I have no personal knowledge. I did not take them myself.
Mr. Murphy (reading):
The individual smooth translations for authorized Navy Department officials and the White House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941, in accordance with the standard operating procedure.
Do you know that? You state here categorically that it was done.
Captain Safford. I saw one of them.
Mr. Murphy. Do you know whether this is true, what you say here, do you know that they were distributed, or is it just a hunch or an impression? Do you understand me?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir. Specific definitions.
Mr. Murphy. You say it was done. I mean, how do you know that?
Who told you, or do you know anything about it?
Captain Safford. I saw one of them in one of the books at the time that Kramer started his regular noon delivery, and I simply had to take it for granted that the same copy was in the other book.
Mr. Murphy. You say you saw one in a book with Kramer and that is the basis then for your statement here that they were delivered?
Captain Safford. The others were.
Mr. Murphy. And that they were delivered to the White House, just because you saw one paper in a book?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. When you saw that one in a book, how long was it, how long was this message that had the winds intercept in it that you speak about?
Captain Safford. Just three lines.
Mr. Murphy. Three lines.
I now refer you to your testimony before Admiral Hewitt. Before Admiral Hewitt, you said:
The President insisted on seeing the original messages because he was afraid when they tried to condense them someone would change the meaning.
How do you reconcile that with your saying it was only three lines?
Captain Safford. Up until sometime in the fall, I can't say the exact date, the messages used to be paraphrased and cut down and then prefixed by a summary or evaluation of them. It wasn't given the literal translation of the Japanese message into English. At that time the President and Secretary Hull became of the opinion that the meaning might be altered in the evaluation or paraphrase, and that something important might be left out. So he requested that the original be sent over to him and that was done.
We never gave the original Japanese to the White House [10361] or these other people. It wouldn't do them any good.
Mr. Murphy. But you said it was three lines, as I understand it, and I understood it was quite a lengthy message, something of about two or three hundred words. You said that, didn't you?
Captain Safford. That was in Japanese.

Mr. Murphy. You say here:

The President insisted on seeing the original messages because he was afraid when they tried to condense them someone would change the meaning.

You did so testify before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Can you reconcile that with your two or three lines?

Captain Safford. The rest of that broadcast was ordinary Japanese that nobody had any interest in, and it was never translated. They only translated the three significant phrases which have been previously described.

Mr. Murphy. You think the President was satisfied in not seeing the original message in this case, but only that which you thought was important?

Captain Safford. I think he was perfectly satisfied.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I would like to review with you, sir, if you will go to page 5 of the exhibit on the winds code.

It is a little difficult to find. It is marked “Winds Code.” “Material Relating to the Winds Code.” It is marked, page 5.

I agree you will find it difficult to find.

Captain Safford. I think I have it.

Mr. Murphy. It has a list of pages under committee exhibit 1, Captain.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Do you have it?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Now, there have been placed in the record by that exhibit various page references which you see outlined, from 208 to 249.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to direct your attention to page 224 of exhibit 1.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. On page 244, at the top of the page, I find:

From: Canton.
To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.

If hostilities are to begin we here are all prepared. The Army has completed all preparations to move immediately upon Thai. Should the British resist to the bitter end, it is understood that the Army is prepared to go so far as to militarily occupy the country.

Now, then, will you go to page 226, the middle of the page, from Tokyo to “Circular.”

What would “Circular” mean?

Captain Safford. That meant all their stations who received these circulars.

Mr. Murphy. Don’t you think that would include London?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; it would include London.

Mr. Murphy. On December 3 here is a message then to London as well as all the other stations:

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE) (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify us of this fact immediately.
By that Tokyo is asking them to keep the code in regard to broadcasts; is that right?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. The next one, from Tokyo to Vancouver, on December 3, 1941:

Please retain the "hidden meaning" codes and the codes to be used in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment. If you have already destroyed them, advise and we will retransmit them.

I direct your attention to page 227:

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.

[10365] 3 December 1941.
Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

Now, will you go to page 233. This is on December 4, 1941, from Tokyo. In the first paragraph:

Until a state of war develops between Japan and the Netherlands, the Netherlands Government will be considered a quasi-enemy power.

Then beginning with paragraph 2:

In the event the Netherlands declares war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands.

That is sent on the same day, is it not, Captain, on the 4th, on the day on which you say they sent the winds execute?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, they say "In the event the Netherlands declares war", and you say on that very day Japan sent out word that they were declaring war on the Netherlands.

Captain Safford. They were intending to or committed to.

[10366] Mr. Murphy. They were what?

Captain Safford. They were committed to the occupation or the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies.

Mr. Murphy. Didn't you believe, when you got that, that that meant war within 2 or 3 days?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Right. Now, then, I read further:

In the event that a state of war exists between our country and the Netherlands before the Netherlands has actually made a declaration of war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands.

Now, go to page 234. This is on December 4 from Tokyo to Hsinking. They say there:

On the fourth, in a joint conference with the Government Control Board, we decided upon the steps which we will have Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my #873 our policy was changed as follows:

Then they commence the next paragraph:

When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities, for the time being Manchukuo will not participate.

Now, then, on the same date, from Berlin to Tokyo, and this is on the day you say the winds execute was sent, from [10367] Berlin to Tokyo, December 4, 1941:
In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have—

Then he refers to certain officials.

Mr. Richardson. May I ask, are you taking into consideration the difference in date?

Mr. Murphy. No; I will come to that.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Mr. Murphy. I am going to follow through.

Now, I come to December 5, and that would be the 4th in Washington, wouldn't it?

Captain Safford. That would be the 4th in Washington.

Mr. Murphy. Right. From Tokyo to Washington:

Will you please have Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days.

Now, I come to page 236, December 5, from Washington to Tokyo, the second paragraph:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

I ask that that be stricken out because that is already referred to. It is 2361 in this schedule.

Now, I go to page 246, Captain. This is dated from [10368] Tokyo to Berlin, December 6, 1941. That would be December 5 in Tokyo, would it not?

Captain Safford. December 5 our time.

Mr. Murphy. In Tokyo.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. On page 246, at the top of the page it says:

—and that in case we start our war, with the United States we will capture all American ships destined for Soviet Russia.

As I understand it, you say on the 4th the winds execute had already gone out, and on the 5th I find Tokyo saying that "in case we start our war with the United States" we will do so and so. Would that be consistent with the winds execute on the 4th?

Captain Safford. It is not inconsistent.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Now, I come to page 247, the top of the page. I have had some trouble with this one. Maybe you can help me. It is from Tokyo to Bangkok, December 6, 1941:

The (——)

And they say in the footnote "proclamation or declaration."

The (——)th day (Xth day) decided by the ——

Then referring down to the footnote:

[10369] "Ambassadorial" or "China."

—liaison conference on the 6th (?) is the 8th and the day on which the notice is to be given is the 7th (?) (Sunday). As soon as you have received this message, please reply to that effect.

What does that mean to you?

Captain Safford. It means to me that on the 6th Tokyo time, which is the 5th Washington time, they sent a message to their Ambassador at Bangkok on the purple machine which Bangkok—I don't know
what system that was, whatever system it was—that X day would be the 8th Tokyo time or the 7th Washington time and we would have to infer what X day was, except by the time we had translated that, which was the 8th Washington time, we already knew that X day was the date of the outbreak of war, the Japanese attack.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate Tokyo is saying on the 6th that there was a meeting on the 6th, aren't they, and that is when they decided they will do certain things?

Captain Safford. There was a question mark after that "6th."

Mr. Murphy. I know. It says on the bottom, in the footnote, that they don't know what it means, it could be either the 6th or the word "November." If it read "November" it would read "liaison conference on the November." That wouldn't make much sense, would it?

[10370] Captain Safford. I believe there is other testimony, maybe it is not submitted in evidence in this investigation, that the Japs made up their mind in late November and that the Imperial rescript was actually signed on the first day of December, 1941.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you think that is a wrong translation then by the Navy, do you, the 6th?

Captain Safford. That was an Army translation and the 6th apparently is inconsistent with what we have learned long afterward.

Mr. Murphy. You think the Army is wrong in the translation, the 6th?

Captain Safford. They knew it wasn't a good translation themselves, they called our attention to the thing.

Mr. Murphy. All right. I come to page 251. I find:

From: Tokyo
To: [Circular telegram]
7 December 1941
(Plain Japanese language using code names)
Circular #2494.
Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

What particular code was used there? Was that the hidden word?

[10377] Captain Safford. That was the hidden word code.

Mr. Murphy. I go back with you to page 226. You say they used the hidden word code on 251 and on page 226 they tell London to keep that so they will be able to get a hidden word code, don't they?

Captain Safford. London could not have read this Tokyo circular 2461 because it had received orders 2 days earlier to destroy the purple machine.

Mr. Murphy. I thought you told me before that Tokyo circular said that it was sent to London, just a few minutes ago?

Captain Safford. London would be included in the list of addressees, but London couldn't read it. London had no machine to decode it with.

Mr. Murphy. How about Vancouver?

Captain Safford. Vancouver never read that message.

Mr. Murphy. Vancouver couldn't read it?

Captain Safford. No; never had the purple machine.

Mr. Murphy. Referring to page 226, why are they sending the message to Vancouver?

Captain Safford. I beg your pardon.

Mr. Murphy. There is a message right there to Vancouver.
Captain Safford. I presume Vancouver had sent them some message of which we know nothing asking for instructions.

[10372] Mr. Murphy. Vancouver is told:

Please retain the "hidden meaning" codes and the codes to be used in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. They had something that they could read.

Captain Safford. That was sent in another system. That was not sent in the same system in which they talked to Washington and London.

Mr. Murphy. Where do you have evidence that London destroyed the system that Vancouver had, what evidence do you have of that, that London didn’t have what Vancouver had. Will you point to anything in the record that indicates that, except your inference?

Captain Safford. That will take a little time.

Mr. Murphy. What basis is there to show you that London did not have such a machine as Vancouver had, when they are telling everybody else, you say they told the whole circular, and you said first it was sent to London, and they say:

If by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify of this fact immediately.

At that time all kinds of communications were open to London, weren’t they? I mean normal communications, peacetime communications?

[10373] Captain Safford. The circuits were, yes, sir; the regular circuits.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. They could have gotten London by commercial telegraph if they wanted to, couldn’t they?

Captain Safford. They could have.

Senator Ferguson. Might I interrupt?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Maybe it will help. Look at page 209 and see whether the second and third messages, Circulars 2443 and 2444, won’t help you any.

Mr. Murphy. 209. It says the four offices have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them.

Would that be the answer to the question?

Captain Safford. That is the answer to the question, and also the next message.

Mr. Murphy. The next one, December 1, 1941:

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

Is that the part you are looking for?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I thought you said they didn’t have a purple machine at Vancouver but another means to get the purple machine broadcasts. What is there that helps your [10374] situation?

Captain Safford. I don’t understand.

Mr. Murphy. I am saying this: On page 226 they say:

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE) (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment—
As I understand it you say the winds intercept—that that came over a broadcast?

Captain Safford. Over a radio broadcast, correct.

Mr. Murphy. I am talking about the hidden-word code which they had. You know what the hidden-word code was?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. That has been introduced.

Mr. Murphy. There they say:

Please keep the code list (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify us of this fact immediately.

You say that was sent to London; is that right?

Captain Safford. I don't know that that was sent to London.

Mr. Murphy. Right. Now, I show you the original photostat of this particular one to show that that was sent in PA-K2. Did London have facilities for PA-K2?

Captain Safford. London, so far as we know, had facilities for PA-K2 at that particular time. Which message [10375] is that, may I ask?

Mr. Murphy. All right. I show you——

Captain Safford. Which message is that?

Mr. Murphy. I am speaking of the one on page 226.

Captain Safford. Page 226.

Mr. Murphy. About the radio broadcasts. I am going to show you the photostatic copy of the message on page 226.

[10376] Will you take it, Captain, please?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. The message from Tokyo to circular. That was sent, was it not, by PA-K2?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Now, the message to Vancouver on December 3 was sent by PA-K2, was it not? It is the following page, I think, Captain.

Captain Safford. That was sent in the same system, PA-K2.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Captain Safford. That did not show in exhibit 1 and I had no way of estimating what system had been used.

Mr. Murphy. I understand, Captain, the reason why the code designations were not all in the papers in Exhibit 1 was they were all left out of the exhibit at the time it was printed.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Right.

Captain Safford. None of them are in there.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, isn't it fair then to say, Captain, from that that you have no information whatsoever and never did have that the London facilities for receiving PA-K2 were ever destroyed?

Captain Safford. I have no direct information at all [10377] concerning the destruction of PA-K2 at London.

Mr. Murphy. Well, so far as you know you don't know whether London had them or did not have them?

Captain Safford. I do not know. London did have them but I do not know on what date London destroyed them.

Mr. Murphy. Right. But you have no message before you that would show any direction to London to destroy the PA-K2 facilities, do you?
Captain Safford. To the best of my knowledge there is nothing in exhibit 1 or anywhere else which directed London to destroy PA-K2.

Mr. Murphy. Right. Now, then, these two messages that are set up on page 226, where they are both asked to retain the material in connection with radio broadcasts and in the Vancouver message to retain the hidden-meaning codes and the codes to be used in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment, you do not know—I withdraw that.

These two messages that are here, which refer to radio broadcasts—they refer to radio broadcasts and to the hidden meaning words, do they not, or the hidden meaning message?

Captain Safford. They referred to the codes to be used by radio broadcasts, which refers to the codes which are set up on page 154 and 155 of Exhibit No. 1.

Mr. Murphy. 154 and 155 are the hidden-meaning words?

[10378] Captain Safford. No; they are the codes to be used in radio broadcasts and it so specifies.

Mr. Murphy. Now, on page 251, then, there is a broadcast to England—a broadcast to circular telegram, Tokyo to circular telegram:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations—isn’t that right?

Captain Safford. That is right, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, does that change your statement any where you say that London could not have received any message from Tokyo and, therefore, that is the only one they were directing this winds intercept to? For instance, in your statement, your prepared statement for this committee, you say that the only place they were directing this message to on the 4th was London, because London’s facilities had already been destroyed. Isn’t that what you said?

Captain Safford. That London’s facilities had been destroyed.

Mr. Murphy. Had been destroyed and that, therefore, they were doing that in that manner to get word to London and they did not care about any other destination, isn’t that right?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, isn’t it a fact from these telegrams [10379] here, isn’t it obvious that London still had PA-K2 up to the end and could have received the message directed to London on the 7th?

Captain Safford. I would like to correct that, what I said.

Mr. Murphy. Will you get at exactly what you are going to correct?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. What page?

Captain Safford. I just want—

Mr. Murphy. Captain, I just want the reference to the part you want corrected.

Captain Safford. Which page is that, please?

Mr. Murphy. The part about London?

Captain Safford. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I will get it for you. It is on page 11. On page 11 you say:

It was sent on the so-called “European Schedule” of Tokyo’s big foreign broadcasting station “J-A-P” and was intended for London. We knew that the Japanese Ambassador in London had destroyed his secret codes three days
previously; this was the only way that Tokyo could get news to him secretly. Reception or nonreception at other points was irrelevant.

[10380] Now, what do you want to change there?
Captain Safford. I will have to correct that to read:

This was the only way other than the so-called hidden word code, which was another emergency system for transmitting information. We knew that Tokyo could get the news through secretly.

Mr. Murphy. Now, does that change your statement considerably or not in view of the fact that you say it was only intended for London and now we have the situation where London could have, and the other one which would have told them that relations were strained or that war would break out or anything they wanted to tell them—wouldn’t that change your statement considerably as to why it was being beamed only for London and as to all other places being irrelevant?
Captain Safford. Not as to the rest of it.
Mr. Murphy. Now, I am sorry to take so much time, Captain, but you see the fact is that we have charges against the staff at the time war broke out and charges against the staff in 1944 and charges against Mr. Sonnett and charges against Secretary Knox and I now want to come to Secretary Forrestal and before I finish I would like to cover Admiral Hewitt.
What did you think of Admiral Hewitt? Was he honest?
Captain Safford. He certainly was, and I so stated in [10381] writing.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Hewitt gave you a fair hearing; did he not?
Captain Safford. He certainly did.
Mr. Murphy. And you had an opportunity to say everything you wanted to say before Admiral Hewitt?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Hewitt found there was no winds execute; did he not?
Captain Safford. He did later.
Mr. Murphy. What is it?
Captain Safford. So it developed later.
Mr. Murphy. Well, in his report he enters—and he starts at page 94 of the appendix which has been furnished to us and he speaks of the wind code and the alleged winds message. And then he reviews the investigation of the naval court of inquiry, he reviews the Army Pearl Harbor Board, he discusses the basis of the previous findings that there was a winds execute message prior to the attack. Then he goes on and discusses the evidence obtained in this investigation concerning the winds message, the testimony of Captain Safford, Captain Kramer, Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, Lieutenant Commander Linn, Lieutenant Commander Pering, Lieutenant Commander Murray, Lieutenant Freeman's testimony, Captain McCallum, [10382] Admiral Wilkinson, Captain Mason, Commander Fabian, Captain Layton and Captain Safford recalled, Mr. Friedman, Captain Rochefort and after hearing all of those witnesses he came to the conclusion that there was no winds intercept; did he not?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Winds execute message. Now, have you any criticism of Admiral Hewitt?
Captain Safford. None at all.

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, Mr. Sonnett, whom you accused of doing things which you said were possibly illegal, was an officer designated by Secretary Forrestal to assist Admiral Hewitt in this investigation; was he not?

Captain Safford. He was.

Mr. Murphy. And as I understand it he told you that there was no previous intercept or execute; he told you that, did he not?

Captain Safford. He told me that there was no evidence as to a previous execute.

Mr. Murphy. Right. He also makes certain accusations about your physical condition which I do not care to discuss; did he not?

Captain Safford. Thank you. No; he only suggested repeatedly that I had hallucinations and that I was out of step with the rest of the world.

[10383] Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate you felt then that he was deliberately trying to get you—or to commit what they call in the law subornation of perjury. He wanted you to lie, didn't he, instead of telling the truth?

Captain Safford. He wanted me to testify that there had been no—or apparently—it was never outright—but the thought that he expressed was that I should change my testimony and wind the whole thing up.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you feel that he wanted you to tell other than what you felt was the truth; isn't that right?

Captain Safford. That is the way I felt. That is the reason I wrote that statement out.

Mr. Murphy. Now, one of the big papers of the country said yesterday that—

Captain Safford has testified in two investigations that the Navy intercepted the Japanese East wind-rain message which meant war with the United States, on December 4, 1941.

Now, then, they go on to say:

Although Sonnett was nominally the legal adviser to Admiral Hewitt, he ran Forrestal's investigation, incidentally, treating his superior, Admiral Hewitt, much as if he was an errand boy.

You would not join in that accusation, in an accusation of that kind, would you?

[10384] Captain Safford. I never made any such statement.

Mr. Murphy. No; I know you did not. I say one of the big papers in the country did. I am quoting now from an editorial of Tuesday, February 5, 1946, in the Chicago Herald-Tribune, but you never meant to go that far?

The Chairman. Not Herald. The Tribune.

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. The Chicago Tribune.

Captain Safford. May I state for the record again that every time that I had a conference with Lieutenant Commander Sonnet it was in Admiral Hewitt's absence and as I believed at the time that Admiral Hewitt was on his way to Washington and had not yet arrived.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate you feel that Admiral Hewitt conducted a fair investigation?

Captain Safford. Absolutely, and I tried to emphasize that in my own words.
Mr. Murphy. I know you did, Captain. I am just talking about the inferences that were drawn. I don’t think you ever meant anything like that, did you? Certainly not.

Captain Safford. Absolutely not.

Mr. Murphy. No. I want to be fair with you about this. This is in one of the big papers of the country, I said.

Mr. Keeffe. Are we going to try all the newspapers too, [10385] before we get through?

Mr. Murphy. I did not yield, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Proceed, please.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I would like to take one more part of your statement, Captain. You quote from the messages from the Dutch. Will you get that? It is on page 19. You quote the messages from the Dutch but you do not have all of it in there, do you, all of that dispatch?

Captain Safford. I left out certain parts. I said, “From which I quote.”

Mr. Murphy. Well, let me show you what you left out. You say that this message from the Dutch had a great influence on you in deciding that it was war instead of rupture of relations; is that right?

Captain Safford. That is right.

Mr. Murphy. Right. Now I direct your attention to page 1-d of the winds intercept exhibit. Do you have it?

Captain Safford. I have got it.

Mr. Murphy. As I understand it you were talking to Mr. Foote some time later than the date referred to in this exhibit.

Captain Safford. I talked to him shortly before I was questioned by Admiral Hewitt. He was in Washington at the time. He went out to the Far East a little later.

[10386] Mr. Murphy. You consider him a man of integrity?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I notice on the bottom of his message in regard to his statement which you say influenced you greatly in deciding that they meant war rather than a rupture of relations:

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936.

That is what Foote said of that message.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you take that into consideration when you were giving it its importance and that it varied the other three messages?

Captain Safford. May I make myself very clear on that?

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Captain Safford. He regarded the whole thing as possibly a fake. What we were interested in, we had one translation from the British which varied somewhat with the current translation of the United States. The Dutch translation agreed with the British translation. It was just a question of translation of messages which we knew existed, not of whether the message itself was authentic or not.

[10387] Mr. Murphy. Now, I have just one other thing and then I am through, Captain. Will you refer to the part of your testimony where you say you borrowed the files of the intercepts? That is not in the statement. Do you remember where you said that? You
did testify in one of the hearings that you borrowed a copy of the file which had the intercepts in it. Do you remember that?

Captain Safford. That is substantially correct. I do not remember the exact words.

Mr. Murphy. Will you tell us the circumstances under which you got this file of intercepts, why you got it and what you did with it?

Captain Safford. I would like to have something more specific about that statement I made before I try to explain it.

Mr. Murphy. Well, let me put it this way: It is a fact, sir, that you did borrow the intercepts from their proper place in the Navy Department; did you not?

Captain Safford. I borrowed them on custody receipt. I looked through for the information I was looking for and I returned it.

Mr. Murphy. Who did you borrow that from? That would be the file that would have 7001 in it, wouldn’t it, this particular intercept if it existed?

Captain Safford. It was borrowed for the specific purpose of looking through it. That refreshes my memory now as to the information you want. So that I could look through the file to see if by any chance that message had been misplaced and was in there later.

Mr. Murphy. I understand, Captain, you looked through that one and then you looked at a file, a rather complete file of intercepts, ones you examined, not the one looking for a missing intercept. You looked at that one, you looked at that one personally, but you also had a file of papers that you borrowed, do you remember?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, what was that and why did you have it?

Captain Safford. So as to refresh my memory on things which I had known of about previously and particularly to establish dates.

Mr. Murphy. Who was it that let you have that file of intercepts?

Captain Safford. I do not recall.

Mr. Murphy. Are you sure?

Captain Safford. I am positive.

Mr. Murphy. When did you get the file of the intercepts?

Captain Safford. I believe that I got that file of intercepts around October or September 1943. It was considerably in advance of November.

Mr. Murphy. It was when you were shifted from the—

Captain Safford. It was before. I was simply expecting that I would be a key witness, that I was in Washington available and—

Mr. Murphy. Key witness for whom?

Captain Safford. That I would be called by the Navy Department as a key witness to establish what had happened.

Mr. Murphy. You were borrowing the file then at the time when you were going to be a prosecution witness?

Captain Safford. I had not been so notified, but I was expecting to be.

Mr. Murphy. Are you sure that is the reason?

Captain Safford. I am positive.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I will get to that testimony a little later. Now, then, one other question. You say that before you made this change of heart you had spread rumors about Admiral Kimmel. Is that true; what you said?
Captain Safford. No: I had not spread rumors but—
Mr. Murphy. What did you do?
Captain Safford. Because that was what everybody was trying to spread.
Mr. Murphy. Well, what did you do that you felt guilty about? You were told on December the 15th not to spread any [10390] rumors and apparently you obeyed the order; you said you did.
Captain Safford. That is right.
Mr. Murphy. And then in the fall of that year you say your conscience is troubling you for what you did and you had to justify yourself. Now, what did you do that was wrong, if anything?
Captain Safford. Well, later on whenever there was any discussion about the matter I was quite condemnatory in my attitude toward Admiral Kimmel.
Mr. Murphy. Well, do you know of any single thing you did you felt was wrong up to the time you took this change of heart? Why would you be blaming yourself? Did you do this in order to harm him in any way?
Captain Safford. Well, I ran him down, if that is what you mean. I did not spread any rumors about what he had done, except I could not see how anybody that had the information he had could be caught the way the Pacific Fleet had been. That was the general gist.
Mr. Murphy. The one thing that changed your mind then—and this is my last question—is the fact that we were supposed to have got the winds intercept which said:
War with England, including the Kra Peninsula and the Dutch N. E. I. and war with the United States—
the fact that we got that and we did not send a message on the 4th of December, is what changed [10391] your whole opinion; is that right?
Captain Safford. The fact that I had also seen the long warning message going out covering very completely Japan's preparations and intentions for war and coming with increasing tempo, that when Admiral Wilkinson left Admiral Noyes' office he made the definite statement to Admiral Noyes in my presence, and I heard it. He said:
I am going to send this message if I can get it released by the front office.
Mr. Murphy. Well, you based it on two things: One would be that there was a long warning going out written by McCollum that should have gone out in your judgment and did not; that is No. 1; right?
Captain Safford. Right.
Mr. Murphy. No. 2 is that nothing was done about that so-called winds intercept when it came in; is that right?
Captain Safford. That is No. 2.
Mr. Murphy. Right. Now, what could they have told Admiral Kimmel after receiving this winds intercept:
War with England, including the Dutch and the Kra Peninsula and war with the United States—
that he had not already been told?
Captain Safford. The fact that war was so close.
Mr. Murphy. Well, he was told on the 27th that it was a war warning and then on the 3d there was a code message sent out about destruction of codes, code information, and then on the 4th you prepared a message for him—did you not—about codes at Guam?

Captain Safford. May I refer to this, please?

Mr. Murphy. Yes. I am speaking about the one to Guam that you said you prepared, the message to Guam about the destruction of codes and papers. You did send that or you prepared it; did you not?

Captain Safford. I prepared it.

Mr. Murphy. And the purpose of that was to have them destroy the codes because you felt that war was coming on Saturday or Sunday; is that right?

Captain Safford. That war was coming on Saturday or Sunday.

Mr. Murphy. Right.

Captain Safford. The best estimate of the time I could give.

Mr. Murphy. And the reason for that—the significance of that you would say was that anyone who received it would know that war was coming, wouldn't they, and would have time then to destroy their codes?

Captain Safford. Not necessarily.

Mr. Murphy. But code destruction is pretty strong evidence of war, isn't it?

Captain Safford. It is a very strong way of hinting that war was about to break.

Mr. Murphy. And Admiral Kimmel got the hint that you prepared, didn't he? He received that dispatch; he said he did.

Captain Safford. Admiral Kimmel got that hint.

Mr. Murphy. That is all.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Captain, you wrote a letter on the 22d of December 1943 to Kramer; did you not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you used some code in it. You used initials and things as a code?

Captain Safford. That was merely to disguise identities.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And Captain Kramer replied in code?

Captain Safford. He replied going even more so, because he referred to the numbered paragraphs, and so forth, in the first letter.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what difference would it make, as Senator Lucas was trying to bring out, whether the answer was in code, whether he answered your next letter in code or not? He had already answered your letter in code.

Captain Safford. He had already answered that. If Kramer would have answered, the reply would have meant nothing to anybody.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me?

Captain Safford. If Kramer had answered my second letter and if it had gone astray, the answer would have meant nothing to anybody because it was all in code.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. And there was the first letter that he answered, he answered that in code?

Captain Safford. Kramer's answer to that would have meant nothing to anybody.

Senator Ferguson. So that if they are both in code it would have no difference?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what regulation did you have in the Navy that you could not write a letter from one man to another in the Navy in code?

Captain Safford. There is no regulation as to that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was Senator Lucas talking about with you about it being a crime for you to write these letters?

Captain Safford. I did not know of any specific regulation against it but I did not want to enter any categorical denials on something that I might be found wrong on.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you don't know that?

[10395] Captain Safford. I don't know of anything that I violated.

Senator Ferguson. But it would not make any difference whether he wrote to anybody in code or one or both of them in code; I don't know of any law or regulation that says you can do it once.

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that true?

Captain Safford. That is true.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you get instructions from—I will read you this from your answer. This is on page 10025 of the transcript:

Captain Safford. That may have been an interpretation which I received in writing from Commander Baecher, who is here—or through Commander Baecher. It was not his signature.

Did you get instructions as to what you should testify to here, that is, regulating your testimony?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have it?

Captain Safford. I believe I have. I will look.

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you get it so that we can get it in evidence?

Captain Safford. If I haven't it here I can get it during the noon hour.

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you bring it in at 1:30 then?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to ask you another question. Did you know of anyone in the Navy who questioned the code message received on the 4th—as you say the 3d or the 4th, the so-called implementing code message, that it was not in the proper form?

Captain Safford. No, sir; nobody questioned it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know why they would not keep what you saw even though it came in only repeated once or twice and was not in exact regulation?

Captain Safford. No reason at all. They relied upon my professional experience and judgment and upon Kramer's professional experience and judgment, and if they had had any doubts they would have requested verification on the spot.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did anyone every question that what you saw was not in correct compliance with these two previous messages?

Captain Safford. Never.

Mr. Murphy. May I have that last question and answer read?

(Record read.)

Captain Safford. May I say that—may I change that? [10397]

Not prior to this investigation.

Mr. Murphy. Now, will the gentleman yield?

Senator Ferguson. Just one moment.

Mr. Murphy. This is extremely important.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you understand my question?

Captain Safford. Please ask it again then.

Senator Ferguson. All right, I will put it in another form.

Did anyone question the fact that what you were talking about as an implementing message, that it was only repeated once and it was not at the end or that it did not comply with the previous message that had been sent out giving these code words?

Captain Safford. Not prior to this investigation.

Senator Ferguson. Now, when you talk about “this investigation” you mean this congressional investigation?

Captain Safford. This congressional investigation before which I now appear as a witness.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, is it true that the questionable or the doubtful message was the one in exhibit 1 on page 251 that some time later, in 1944, someone discovered that there was a word left out of that message, “Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations”; that the word “United States” was left out of that [10398] message in some way?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, was that question raised or did you ever hear of it prior to 1944?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, one more line. On this Friedman message, this Friedman story; did you read the Clarke report?

Captain Safford. No, sir, I did not. I would like to have that, if it is going to be discussed.

The Chairman. Well, if we are going to discuss it very much we will have a recess.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I just wanted him to read it over the noon hour, I only have several questions on it, whether or not he ever denied that someone had told him that story.

Captain Safford. I would like a chance to familiarize myself with this, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon?

Captain Safford. I would like to defer this until we meet again.

Senator Ferguson. Until we meet again?

Captain Safford. All right.

Senator Ferguson. All right, I have no objection but I don’t want to keep you any longer than necessary, so will you [10399] read it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, I will.

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:32 p. m., a recess was taken until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)
The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. Senator Ferguson will resume his inquiry.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY—(Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. Captain Safford, were you able to get the memorandum that was given to you by the Navy Department?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; I have it here.

Senator Ferguson. Will you let me see it, please?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

(A paper was handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Senator Ferguson. When was that given to you?

Captain Safford. That was given to me in January shortly before I appeared as a witness here.

Senator Ferguson. What was said when it was given to you?

Captain Safford. It was explained that this was a duplicate of an earlier paper which had been furnished me on the 15th of December 1945, except they were adding excerpts on the flimsy copy from a memorandum by Admiral Edwards concerning the fact that our testimony could not cover cryptanalytic successes after Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether witnesses that were not in your department were given this same kind of a memorandum?

Captain Safford. It is my understanding that all witnesses were given the same sort of memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. Whether in your department or not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That was your understanding?

Captain Safford. That is my understanding.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not a similar paper was issued to any Army witnesses?

Captain Safford. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this be put in the record at this point. It explains his testimony yesterday.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator describe what it is?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. The first part reads:


Mr. Richardson. Might I suggest for the record at this point that with the exception of a short memorandum from Edwards, all there is in this are the various announcements made by the President with reference to witnesses, so that there is nothing in this of any specific direction emanating from the Navy Department itself.

It consists of copies of directives received from the President which had been changed from time to time with reference to this committee, except there is in one place a memorandum from Edwards, in which
he deduces for some reason that witnesses shall not testify with reference to cryptographic successes subsequent to Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. I could put those two in. I don't care to put the last part in.

The Vice Chairman. Let me inquire, Mr. Masten can probably tell us, and I am sure the other counsel are familiar with it, too—

Senator Ferguson. I don't think counsel knew of it before yesterday.

The Vice Chairman. When the hearing began, Mr. Mitchell presented for the record all of these documents, didn't he? [10403] Executive orders from the President, all those things?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but this first part is not in.

I will ask the witness to read the two parts up to the Presidential directives. One is dated the 13th of December 1945 and the other is without a date.

Then we will have the complete thing in the record. I think the record ought to show what the instructions to the witnesses were.

The Vice Chairman. I will ask counsel to check the reading so that if the Captain begins to read—he is not familiar with our record in the beginning of this hearing—if he starts to read something that is already in the record, why, stop him.

Senator Ferguson. I don't think these two are in the record.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Captain.

Captain Safford. (reading):

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Secretary,

Memorandum.
To: Captain L. S. Safford, USN.
[10404] Subject: Pearl Harbor Congressional Investigation.

Refs:
(a) CNO Memorandum Op21B/1bb Serial 226P21 dated 15 November 1945.
(b) CNO Memorandum Op216/Hbb Serial 218P21 dated November 6 1945.

Encs:
(A) Copy of Reference (a).
(B) Copy of Reference (b).
(C) Copy of excerpt of Memo of Admiral Edwards.

1. Admiral Colclough wants to be sure that each witness, and each prospective witness, before the Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor Attack, has a copy of the Presidential Directives concerning testimony before the Committee.

2. In order to comply with Admiral Colclough's desire, there is enclosed herewith for your retention a pamphlet entitled "Presidential Directives for Witnesses Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack", containing References (a) and (b), which quote the Presidential Memoranda dated 7 November 1945, 9 November 1945, 23 October 1945, and 28 August 1945, and also of excerpts from a memorandum of Admiral R. S. Edwards.

3. Please acknowledge receipt of this pamphlet, using the attached form, and return the receipt to Room 1083A in the enclosed envelope.

s/ John Ford Baecher,
Lieut. Comdr., USNR.

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete the reading?

Captain Safford. That completes the reading of the original directive.

Senator Ferguson. Now, attached is a memorandum. It mentions Admiral Edwards' memorandum, does it not?

Captain Safford. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read that memorandum?
Captain Safford (reading):

Excerpt from Memorandum of Admiral R. S. Edwards.

Subject:


1. . . . The Presidential Security Directive . . . prohibits release to the public of information regarding any specific results or degree of success attained by any cryptanalytic unit.

2. The President modified his original directive to allow any witness to testify and give information regarding cryptanalytic activities which had to do with the investigation of the Pearl Harbor Incident. This specific exception to his original security directive did not, however, authorize witnesses to introduce discussions of cryptanalytic successes, subsequent to Pearl Harbor.

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete the reading of it?

Captain Safford. That completes the reading.

[10407] The Chairman. Permit the Chair to ask you at this point, Captain, if in your testimony you have revealed anything with respect to the cryptanalytical successes since Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford. Only in the one case where I pointed this directive out to the committee and the chairman decided that what I had to testify to would not be in violation of the Presidential directive, and I said in view of his instruction I would continue my testimony.

The Vice Chairman. And otherwise you have complied with those instructions?

Captain Safford. Otherwise I have complied with these instructions implicitly.

The Vice Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Ferguson. Who is Admiral R. S. Edwards?

Captain Safford. He was the Deputy Chief of Staff at the time that Admiral King was—Admiral Edwards was Chief of Staff at the time Admiral King was known as commander in chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. I cannot recall immediately what Admiral Edwards’ present capacity is.

Senator Ferguson. Is that signed by Admiral Edwards?

Captain Safford. There is no signature on this paper.

Senator Ferguson. There is no signature?

Captain Safford. No, sir. The only signature I had to [10408] go on is that of John Ford Baecher, lieutenant commander, USNR.

Senator Ferguson. You have stated that except in one case you have tried to live up to that restriction?

Captain Safford. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were there any other restrictions issued prior to this in any other hearings on your testimony?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. This was the only memorandum that you ever had, or the only restriction that was ever placed upon you?

Captain Safford. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did the various parties to these hearings, to your knowledge, have lawyers representing them, some in the Navy and some outside of the Navy?

Captain Safford. Only in the case of the Navy Court of Inquiry in 1944.

Senator Ferguson. And do you know, of your own knowledge, that the lawyers were privileged to papers, and so forth, and the knowledge that you had, was that the purpose of having lawyers?
Captain Safford. They were at that investigation.

Senator Ferguson. In the Pearl Harbor Navy inquiry?

Captain Safford. In the Navy Pearl Harbor inquiry which [10409] Admiral Murfin was the senior member of or president.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I asked you to read the Clarke report insofar as it related to the Friedman statement. I just want to get this clear on the record.

As I understand you claim that this statement was a hearsay statement; you knew it was a hearsay statement?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And it was more than one removed a hearsay statement?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, in that Clarke report does Friedman deny that he repeated part of this to you?

Captain Safford. In the Clarke investigation Mr. Friedman acknowledged this conversation with me and stated far more detail than I had ever given Admiral Hewitt.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you say that in his testimony he is more in detail than what he told you?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did he state to you where he got the story?

Captain Safford. He stated that he got the story from Colonel Sadtler.

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you that?

Captain Safford. He told me that.

[10410] Senator Ferguson. So that he related where the hearsay came from?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; he did.

Senator Ferguson. Did he trace it back any further than Sadtler?

Captain Safford. No, sir; Sadtler was as far as I knew anything about.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not Friedman testified before the Hewitt investigation somewhat the same as he did before the Clark investigation?

Captain Safford. I know that Friedman was call because he came out of Admiral Hewitt’s office just as I was going in on a recall. I have read his testimony subsequently in the past 2 months and he told Admiral Hewitt a little but not very much.

Senator Ferguson. Not as much as he did Clarke?

Captain Safford. Nowhere near as much as he told Colonel Clarke.

Senator Ferguson. I assume that the Clarke and Hewitt reports are going into evidence, so I am not going to ask you to read this report. I merely wanted to know whether or not the fact was in there that he had repeated it and didn’t deny that he had told you part of that story.

Captain Safford. He admitted telling me the story.

[10411] Senator Ferguson. When you read over that did it cause you to want to change your testimony in any way about this Friedman case, about the disappearance of the winds code and the implementing message?

Captain Safford. I consider that the information which I have read this noon in the Clarke report strongly supports my statements in regard to the disappearance of official documents pertaining to the winds code and the winds implementing message.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Inasmuch as the witness has been asked and has given conclusions from certain words which appear before him which are not made known to the public, I ask unanimous consent now that the Clarke report be made a matter of record at this point.

Senator Ferguson. I have no objection. I just wanted to save time. I would be glad to have him read now what he says here.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I understood that all of these reports commencing with the Roberts report are to be developed in your hearing. There would be no need for any expeditious action with reference to the Clarke report.

The Vice Chairman. That is what I would think.

[10413] Mr. Murphy. Instead of spreading it in the record I ask that it be made an exhibit and made available as soon as possible so that the papers can have the benefit of what is in the Clarke report.

Senator Ferguson. I have no objection to that.

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have any comment on that request?

Mr. Richardson. No. If the committee thinks that these copies should be made someone else will have to make them so I have no reluctance with reference to it.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection the request will be granted.

Mr. Richardson. It will all be printed in a very short time and then be issued to the papers, but, as Congressman Murphy now suggests, if it could be made an exhibit expeditiously and go to the press now it might get to the press when the subject is a little hotter than it would be later.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection the request is granted.

Senator Ferguson. I think under those circumstances that the testimony of Friedman in the Hewitt report should be made an exhibit and released at the same time.

The Vice Chairman. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

The Chair would like to know the numbers to be given the [10413] two exhibits.

Senator Ferguson. All of the Friedman testimony will be made an exhibit out of the Hewitt report.

It is understood, Captain, that you were only testifying from hearsay, so that there can’t be any mistake about this?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; that was thoroughly understood.

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment, Senator. I thought we should have the numbers of these two exhibits.

Mr. Richardson. The next exhibit number would be 143.

The Vice Chairman. No. 143, for the first of the two exhibits here offered?

Mr. Richardson. Yes. Then you can make the Hewitt copy 143–A.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is better.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection that will be done. All right, Senator, you may proceed.

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman——

[Subsequently modified; see Hearings, Part 9, p. 3329.]
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, over the noon hour you had a conversation with Lieutenant Bryant, did you not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

[10414] Mr. Murphy. I asked you to produce the letters which you had written to Lieutenant Bryant and his answers thereto, and did I understand you to say that you destroyed his answers?

Captain Safford. I have not got them. I destroyed them when they came in and I found out that he couldn't remember anything which would help me.

Mr. Murphy. Which would help you?

Captain Safford. I mean throw light on the subject.

Mr. Murphy. Throw light on the subject?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Do you feel that the reply of Lieutenant Bryant to you did not throw considerable light on the subject of the truth as to whether or not there was a winds intercept?

Captain Safford. I think it indicated confusion in his mind and I let it go at that.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you destroyed his answer?

Captain Safford. I destroyed his answer.

Mr. Murphy. I now show you two letters. I show you first the letter dated September 10, 1945, purporting to be signed by L. F. Safford. Is that your signature?

Captain Safford. That is my signature and I sent this letter.

Mr. Murphy. Now, there is an envelope there attached to [10415] the letter and I ask whether or not your signature appears on the envelope.

Captain Safford. My signature appears on the envelope.

Mr. Murphy. I ask you to examine the answer of Lieutenant Bryant and ask whether or not that is the answer you received to your first inquiry or your first letter?

Captain Safford. It was.

Mr. Murphy. I now show you a letter dated September 14, 1945, purporting to be signed by L. F. Safford, and ask you if that is your signature.

Captain Safford. I wrote the letter and signed it.

Mr. Murphy. I show you in addition thereto a paper attached thereto and ask you if that is the answer you received from Lieutenant Bryant?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. I now show you an envelope bearing the name of L. F. Safford on the front and ask you if this is the envelope in which you sent the letter?

Captain Safford. That is the envelope.

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment. Counsel has called attention to the fact with respect to those two exhibits that the committee only has one copy of one of those records and two copies of the other record. Obviously the committee will have to continue to use those copies during the further [10416] hearings here. So without objection the Chair will hold that these exhibits be made available when released by counsel. Is there objection? The Chair hears none. So ordered.
Mr. Murphy. Captain, I would like to read for you and into the record your first letter to Lieutenant Bryant, and in order to identify Lieutenant Bryant his name was Chief Ship’s Clerk Harold L. Bryant, United States Navy, Naval Auxiliary Air Station, Chincoteague, Va., was it not?

Captain Safford. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. And he in December of 1941 was the stenographer or typist for Captain Kramer, was he not?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And he is the one whose duty it was to type the papers which were presented to Captain Kramer; is that right?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, he did.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, on September 10, 1945, you wrote on stationery carrying the letterhead of the Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington 25, D. C.:

My Dear Bryant. Now that the war is over and the reports of the Pearl Harbor Investigations have been made public, I feel free to write to you concerning events in early December, 1941.

Do you recall the “winds message”, or do these words [10417] mean anything to you? According to my memory, it was intercepted during the night of 3-4 December 1941, and sent in by teletype.

(1) Did you type its translation for Commander Kramer?

(2) Or did you see this message?

(3) Or did Commander Kramer tell you about it?

(4) Do you recall what it said or what it meant?

(5) Can you throw any light on the subsequent disposition of this message?

(6) Have you any other pertinent information?

I appreciate that nearly four years have elapsed since the event in question and that only unusual circumstances would make you remember it all this time. So I will not be too disappointed if your memory is a complete blank. However, the information is very important to me, personally, and I would appreciate an immediate reply. It goes without saying that this inquiry must be regarded as secret.

Thanking you in advance for the favor requested,

Sincerely,

L. F. Safford.

And then typed, “L. F. Safford,” the first one being in ink written by you, Captain, “U. S. N.”

[10418] The Chairman. What was the date of that letter?

Mr. Murphy. September 10, 1945.

Under date of September 12, 1945:

Dear Captain Safford: I have just received your letter of 10 September 1945, and I will reply to the questions you asked as well as I can with due regard to the necessity for secrecy.

I do recall the message you mentioned.

Your other questions I will answer by the numbers you assigned them—

1. I probably did.

Senator Ferguson. I didn’t get that.

Mr. Murphy. I will read the question and answer.

Your question was:

(1) Did you type its translation for Commander Kramer?

And the answer is:

1. I probably did.

(2) Or did you see this message?

Answer to No. 2:

(2) I did.

(3) Or did Commander Kramer tell you about it?
Answer to No. 3:
(3) I probably saw it before he did.

Question 4:
[10419] (4) Do you recall what it said or what it meant?

Answer to No. 4:
(4) I believe I have an idea of what it said, although at the time it was a matter of conjecture as to what it meant.

Question No. 5:
(5) Can you throw any light on the subsequent disposition of this message?

Answer:
(5) It was, I believe, filed in its proper place.

Question 6:
(6) Have you any other pertinent information?

Answer:
(6) None regarding this particular message.

Paragraph:
Although, as you say, nearly four years have elapsed, I am still unable to forget many of the events in GZ and at times the events of the week preceding are brought back to me with considerable force.

Respectfully yours,

HAROLD L. BRYANT,
Chief Ships Clerk, U. S. N.

Then there followed your letter of September 14, 1945:

[10420]

DEAR BRYANT: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 12 September, and thank you for your very prompt reply.

There is just one thing more I would like from you at the present time.

Please send me from memory what this "wind message" said or the significant words in it. Also give me as good a description as you can in regard to length, language used, whether in Kana, International Morse, or voice, and any further particulars which would help identify this message. Also station at which intercepted if you know or have any idea, time it was intercepted, time and date it was received in Op-20-G, what officer was on watch.

I do not want to influence your answer in any way or to attempt to prompt your memory, or to suggest the probable contents of this message to you, and therefore will not give you any further description.

The fact that you state that you probably saw this message before Commander Kramer, led me to believe that you know more about this message than I had realized. I cer- [10421] tainly appreciate the information that you have given me and you cannot realize how important it is to many of us.

Sincerely,

L. F. Safford

In ink, and typed:

L. F. Safford,
Captain, U. S. N.

I now read the answer of Lieutenant Bryant, dated September 16, 1945:

MY DEAR SAFFORD: I have just received your letter of 14 September.

Perhaps I have given you the wrong impression regarding this particular message. Frankly, I had not given it a thought until I received your first letter. When I said I probably saw it before Commander Kramer did, that statement would apply equally to any messages we received, simply because the channels
through which they passed made it so. That is, they passed through me for typing and thence to him for evaluation and distribution.

I hesitate to elaborate on these matters because I am not unmindful of the obligations placed on me by my association with the unit, and I do not know to what extent the security has been relaxed.

I do not know any of the details of the message you [10422] mention as to length, language, code, method of transmission, origin, or date. It was interpreted at the time, as I recall it, to provide code words for movements in force in certain directions and significantly for us, towards Malaya and the Dutch Indies. If there was any other direction indicated, we missed it.

If I can be of any further service in this or any other matter, please call on me.

Very respectfully,

HAROLD L. BRYANT,
Chief Ship's Clerk, U. S. N.

Now, as I understand it, Captain, when you got this letter from the person who said he had typed papers for Captain Kramer, and when he said if there was any other direction indicated, "we missed it—" having that paper from the typist you destroyed the answer, did you?

Captain Safford. I destroyed the papers subsequently.

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one or two further questions.

Captain Safford, I gather that there either was, or there was not, a winds execute message received on or about the 4th day of December? [10423] Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You say there was?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; I say there was.

Mr. Keefe. Others claim there was not.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The letters just read would indicate that there was some kind of a message received that day?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So far as the records in the Navy Department are concerned, all the messages of that character are absent, are they not?

Captain Safford. That is absolutely correct.

Mr. Keefe. There isn't any message in the files showing any type of code words, is there?

Captain Safford. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Whether the code words were in the middle or at the end, or whether repeated two or three times or not, there is no message of any kind or character involving those code words received on the 4th that you have been able to find?

Captain Safford. No message whatsoever, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So we are face to face with the determination of the question as to whether or not there was a message of some kind that was intercepted and delivered to you by Kramer that night?

Mr. Keefe. If there was any kind of a message of any kind or character, regardless of what was in it, that message should be in the file, shouldn't it?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And it is not there in the files?

Captain Safford. Very definitely not.

Mr. Keefe. Did you ever have a conversation with Admiral Hart about the winds message?
Captain Safford. I had a very long conversation with Admiral Hart off the record before I gave my sworn testimony, because in the sworn testimony he wanted to keep the record just as short as he possibly could and avoid any references to our sources of information, because he hoped that he could avoid all the extrasecurity precautions in his report which had to be taken in some of the later reports.

After this long off-the-record conversation, he gave me a list of questions he was going to ask, allowed me about a week to prepare the answers for them, taking great care not to make frequent references to sources of material, he said all he wanted to know was what we knew and the date, and Admiral Hart himself having had access to all this intercepted top secret magic information when Commander [10425] in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet during this period, he knew exactly what I was talking about and where my information was coming from.

After I had prepared my paper, I went back to his office under the date set. He read the questions to me, and I read the answers from my prepared paper, which was turned over to him for use in verifying my testimony.

Later I was permitted to return to his office and verify my testimony, all of which shows in the record of the proceedings of the Hart investigation.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I have, some place in my mind, in connection with this testimony that there was some conversation between you and Admiral Hart with reference to the winds execute message, and that in connection with that testimony Admiral Hart made certain statements to you.

The reason I have gone into is because the Senator from Maine wanted to inquire about, and I didn’t know whether he would get here. I see he is here now.

Let me finish one or two questions, and then you can go into that Hart situation, Senator.

I will withdraw the last question that I asked of the witness. Let the Senator from Maine inquire with reference to it.

Now, you have been shown or read, or there has been [10426] read into the record by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy, two letters written by you to Chief Ship’s Clerk Harold L. Bryant, and Bryant’s answers thereto.

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, these letters were written in September 1945?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That was after you had testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Captain Safford. After I had testified.

Mr. Keefe. After you had testified before the Hewitt board?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And was it after you had testified before Hart?

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; and after I had testified before the Army board also.

Mr. Keefe. So you had already given your testimony before all of these courts of inquiry and it expressed your knowledge as to what you knew about this winds execute before you even wrote these letters to Mr. Bryant?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That is all.
The Chairman. Might I ask you this question:

[10427] Did that letter, the first letter you wrote to Mr. Bryant, have any relationship to the passage of the joint resolution under which this committee is holding this inquiry, that joint resolution having been passed on the 6th of September, and your first letter being dated the 10th?
Captain Safford. I believe that it did, sir. That and VJ-day. I had not attempted to communicate with Bryant before VJ-day, but I think it was that relationship that prompted it.
The Chairman. You took it for granted that, this resolution having been passed, you would be called upon to testify again?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I see.
Captain Safford. In view of my previous testimony.
The Chairman. And you were seeking corroboration from Mr. Bryant of your viewpoint?
Captain Safford. Or get what information he could throw on the subject.
The Chairman. But you had in your mind the possibility of corroboration on his part?
Captain Safford. I expected that anybody who could remember the incident would corroborate me.

[10428] The Chairman. I understand, but I am talking about these letters; not somebody else.
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is your answer to that question "Yes"?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Brewster.
Senator Brewster. Captain, I want to speak about this Hart incident, which has come to my attention, and in that connection will read the testimony which you gave before the Army Board at pages 172, 173, and 174:

Captain Safford. There is a possibility that the original distribution copy of that message is in existence in the Navy Department in the hands or in the safe of some high official, probably the Vice Chief of Naval Operations if it is in existence, possibly the Secretary of the Navy. Admiral Hart made a statement to me which implied that he had sighted it and that I was not justified in the statement that all copies of the "winds" message had been destroyed, or all the Navy Department copies had been destroyed.
Major Clausen. In connection with the answer that you just gave to General Russell you stated that Admiral Hart informed you he had cited a distribution list. Do you recall that?

[10429] Captain Safford. No, sir. That he had sighted the actual "winds" message.
Major Clausen. That he had cited the message in a written report that he rendered?
Captain Safford. No, sir. He said to me, "I have just come from the front office, and I have seen your "winds" message. Now, don't make statements that you can't verify." This is of the time I came in to verify my testimony, so I withdrew from my testimony any statement to the effect relative then to other copies having been destroyed, because I didn't know where I stood then.

That is the end of the quotation of the testimony.
Now, do you recall the statement of Admiral Hart to you?
Captain Safford, Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. That is substantially correct, as you testified?
Captain Safford. It is substantially correct.
Senator Brewster. And that was at the time you were going to verify your testimony before Admiral Hart when he cautioned you to be careful about any statement that the winds message had been destroyed because you understood him to say he had seen a copy just before that?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir; immediately before that.
Senator Brewster. That is all.
[10430] The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?
Captain, I suppose it might be said that the committee has kept you much longer than it anticipated, and I suppose much longer than you had anticipated. We appreciate your patience and your willingness to come and help as best you can to clear up this whole problem.
You are now excused.
Captain Safford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(The witness was excused.)
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to present Captain Kramer.
The CHAIRMAN. Captain Kramer, come around, please.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN DALTON KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)
The CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed.
Mr. Richardson. If the Chair permits I shall follow the same course of conduct with Captain Kramer that I did with Captain Safford because Captain Kramer’s testimony, like that of Captain Safford, applies to two main evidentiary issues in this hearing, first with reference to the 14-part message, with which he was intimately connected, and second with reference to the asserted winds execute message which has been recently discussed with Captain Safford.

[10431] Captain, will you give your name in full to the reporter?
Captain Kramer. Captain Alwin Dalton Kramer, United States Navy.
Mr. Richardson. How old are you?
Captain Kramer. I was born September 5, 1903.
Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy?
Captain Kramer. I entered the Naval Academy in June of 1921; graduated in June 1925.
Mr. Richardson. Would you detail in a general way what your assignments in the Navy have been from then until now?
Captain Kramer. On graduation I was ordered to the United States Naval Rifle Team Training in Annapolis, Md., an organization which is primarily a small-arms school for the Navy. This training culminates in matches which were held in those days annually at Camp Perry, Ohio, in which the United States Navy entered a team. I was similarly detailed to that team in 1929, 1930, and 1931 as a firing member of the United States Navy team.
After completion of that summer’s training in 1925 I was ordered to the U. S. S. Tennessee, where I remained until the end of 1946. My next assignment——
Mr. Keeffe. 1946?

Captain Kramer. 1926, I am sorry.

My next assignment was the U. S. S. Rochester which I[10432] joined in the early spring of 1927 and remained aboard her operating in Central American waters, Panama Canal Zone, in both the Atlantic and Caribbean, until June of 1929.

At that time I was again ordered to the rifle team on completion of which assignment I was ordered to the U. S. S. Detroit, a light cruiser. I joined the Detroit in the fall of 1929, remained assigned to her as "spot one and gunnery duties" until June of 1931, with a short period, 4 months period in the summer of 1930 detached on temporary duty to the rifle team.

On completion of the rifle team assignment in 1931 I was ordered to Tokyo, Japan, as a language officer, where I remained until the fall of 1934.

On returning to this country, after leave, I reported to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Far East Section, of the Division of Naval Intelligence through the spring of 1935 after which I was ordered to destroyers in the Pacific, operating chiefly in San Diego, in 1936, and then for the subsequent 2 years in Hawaiian waters out of Pearl Harbor.

In June of 1938 I was ordered to the Navy Department, Washington, and assigned to the Far East Section of the Division of Intelligence. For the next approximate year and a half I had the Japanese desk in the Far East Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence. Part of that time I[10433] was assigned to the Communications Security Group under then Commander Safford.

In June of 1940 I was assigned to that section of Commander Safford's office on a full-time basis and remained on that duty until June of 1943.

I was then ordered to COM-14, the Joint Intelligence Center at Pearl Harbor, as an activity operationally under Admiral Nimitz, CincPac.

I remained attached thereto through the fall of 1943 with the exception of 1 month temporary duty in the South Pacific.

In January 1944 I was ordered to the South Pacific and joined Admiral Halsey's staff. I remained there until Admiral Halsey's detachment in the middle of June 1944 and continued attached to the South Pacific Force and area through the summer of 1944, at the end of which I again was ordered north to the Hawaiian Islands.

My transfer at that time, I learned on arrival in Hawaii, was for the purpose of testifying before the naval court of inquiry then meeting at Pearl Harbor. I remained there attached to the Joint Intelligence Center at Pearl Harbor until ordered to the United States early last year.

Since the spring of 1945 I have been attached to the Division of Intelligence of the Office of the Chief of Naval[10434] Operations, until I was transferred, detached, rather, temporarily to the hospital for treatment, or observation initially in August and treatment from September. I am still attached by permanent Bureau of Personnel orders to Naval Operations and temporarily detached to the Naval Hospital undergoing treatment.
Mr. Richardson. Captain, you are a married man?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. From what State were you appointed?

Captain Kramer. Massachusetts.

Mr. Richardson. What family have you?

Captain Kramer. I have a wife and two children, boys.

Mr. Richardson. Do you speak Japanese?

Captain Kramer. I do, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Fluently?

Captain Kramer. I will leave that to my betters to judge.

Mr. Richardson. Were you supposed to be a fluent Japanese linguist?

Captain Kramer. I presume I was supposed to be.

Mr. Richardson. What were your duties, Captain, during the months of November and December 1941 in a detailed way, if you will describe them to us?

Captain Kramer. I was in charge of a section in the Division of Naval Communications which was a subsection under then Commander Safford, known as OP-20-GZ, OP-20 being the designation of the then Commander Safford, known as the Communications Security Group.

GZ was the subsection concerned with the translation of decrypted ciphers and the recovery of Japanese codes. My permanent assignment was to the Far East section of the Division of Naval Intelligence. My status was a loan status to OP-20-GZ.

As a subordinate of the Director of Naval Intelligence I was given the further duty of disseminating at the direction of the Director of Naval Intelligence or my immediate superior, the head of the Far East section, translations produced in my section.

Mr. Richardson. What were your customary office hours at that period?

Captain Kramer. That is a difficult question to answer, counselor. The regular working hours in those days was from 8 o'clock in the morning until 4:30 in the afternoon, except Saturday, when closing hours were. I believe, at a quarter of 1. However, not only myself but translators and yeomen were all considered on duty, especially during the latter part of 1941, on a 24-hour basis. There were numerous occasions when we worked until 9, 10, or 11 in the evening. There were a number of occasions when I was called down to the office during the course of the night and when I phoned for certain translators to come down to help out.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. Richardson. If messages came into your unit by whom were they received?

Captain Kramer. By "my unit" you refer to Section GZ. I take it.

Mr. Richardson. That is right.

Captain Kramer. Normally they went to then Chief Yeoman Bryant, who passed them to translators.

Mr. Richardson. Right at that point, how did they come in mechanically?

Captain Kramer. By hand from the GY watch officer.

Mr. Richardson. And where were those watch officers located and how many were there?
Captain Kramer. I believe there were four, with the most experienced one, a fifth one, in general charge, keeping the office hours which he saw fit or which was required by the situation at the time.

Mr. Richardson. Well, my recollection is that at this particular time Ramsay, Linn, Pering and Brotherhood were the watch officers.

Captain Kramer. Linn, Pering, and Brotherhood I recall. I do not recollect Ramsay. There was one other whom I distinctly recall, named Murray.

Mr. Richardson. That is right. They, as I understand it, Captain, would take the messages mechanically in the first instance. Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And what would they take it from?

Captain Kramer. From whatever source it arrived in Section GY from. There were many sources.

Mr. Richardson. Illustrate the sources that would bring a message into GY?

Captain Kramer. In 1940 and early 1941 the primary source was mail, air mail from the intercept stations. At some date during 1941, I am uncertain as to the exact date, teletype transmission of that traffic was instituted from shore stations within the United States proper. Furthermore, I know that some time during 1941 stations in outlying possessions were directed to encode in United States naval systems traffic on certain channels we were intercepting. One I recall distinctly is the Tokyo-Berlin channel. We had other sources than I have given.

Mr. Richardson. Yes. When these messages would come in they would be in the precise language of the message as it was delivered to GY?

Captain Kramer. Do you mean when they came into GZ?

Mr. Richardson. Into GZ, yes.

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. What change would occur in the message after it was received in process of handling it?

Captain Kramer. GY was a subsection of this Communications Security Group, responsible for the attack on, the break-down, and the decryption or decoding of recovered systems.

Mr. Richardson. Including translation?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; by "break-down" I mean cryptanalytical break-down.

Mr. Richardson. After that stage had been passed through what was the next stage into which a message would pass?

Captain Kramer. The text broken down into the Japanese text which we had recovered was sent to my section from that point. That applies primarily to ciphers, of course. In the case of codes most of the recovery work, at least after the initial breaks into a new code were made, were done by my section. It was primarily a language problem.

Mr. Richardson. And about how many people did you have there in late November and early December assisting in the translation of such messages?

Captain Kramer. We had three linguists whom I would characterize as the most highly skilled occidentals in the Japanese language
in the world. We had three others that we had acquired, I believe the first one in 1940 and the second two in the fall of 1941, who were less skilled in the work of our office. The two last ones I mentioned above were in more or less of a training status at that time.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, when the message had been put into the Japanese language was there anyone that assigned a particular message to a particular linguist?

[10440] Captain Kramer. Not a particular message, no, sir. However, I made general assignments of what translators would handle what type of traffic. I will amplify that, if you desire, by stating that the most important circuits, two of which at that time were the Tokyo-Washington circuit and the Tokyo-Berlin circuit, were for the most part in a system which was the best the Japanese had, namely, the so-called purple machine.

The Berlin circuit, of course, was concerned with the war in Europe and negotiations with reference to the Tri-Partite Pact. The Washington circuit primarily was concerned with the Japanese-American negotiations.

Certain minor circuits, for example, what we termed the "China net," I assigned to one of the less skilled translators who did most of the work on that traffic. That was not an ironclad assignment by any means. If a translator finished important traffic he was handling he dug into whatever remaining traffic was untranslated in the section.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, Captain, until someone in your immediate section translated the message that came in, no one in the Navy Department beyond you would know what that message meant?

Captain Kramer. In general that is correct, sir. However, it should be modified to this extent. It is of some assistance [10441] to crypt-analyists to have at least a slight knowledge of the language with which they are working, the language in the crypts they are working with. For that reason there had been periodic lecture courses given to the crypt-analysts, not only the top crypt-analysts but those in training, by my predecessor Captain Mason. I believe by my immediate predecessor now Captain Carlson, and by myself, so that the GY watch officers and a number of the crypt-analytical clerks had a certain familiarity with the Japanese language.

Mr. Richardson. But the information which they might get, be it little or be it much, would not pass out for use by the Navy Department except out of your section after the message had been adequately interpreted?

Captain Kramer. With one exception which I have in mind that is precisely correct.

Mr. Richardson. What is the one exception you mean?

Captain Kramer. The one exception is this winds message, sir.

Mr. Richardson. All right; now, were you on duty on your assignment on the 6th day of December 1941?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. Richardson. Was it essential and was it necessarily a result of your handling of these various messages that you were familiar with the status of the diplomatic arrangements [10442] and intercourse between this country and Japan, particularly as evidenced by the dispatches which came through your office?

Captain Kramer. It was not essential for the activities of my section that I be so familiar with the negotiations.
Mr. Richardson. But were you so familiar?
Captain Kramer. Primarily from the intercepts.
Mr. Richardson. That is right.
Captain Kramer. I saw very little extraneous to those intercepts.
Mr. Richardson. Now, do you recall the fact of what has been referred to here as the incident relating to the so-called 14-part message?
Captain Kramer. I am not certain what incident you refer to, sir.
Mr. Richardson. I mean the entire incident of there having been a 14-part message.
Captain Kramer. I believe I am thoroughly familiar; yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Now, when was the first thing that brought into existence in your mind what later turned out to be this incident that I refer to?
Captain Kramer. I am as certain as I can be, sir, that the first knowledge I had that the Japanese note was being sent to the United States was around 3 or shortly after 1044. 3 p.m. Saturday, December 6, 1941.

The issue of that time arose from this circumstance: Because of traffic on hand at noontime on Saturday, December 6, I requested certain of the translators to remain on past the regular working hours, about a quarter of 1, to clean it up. They were still there at about 3 p.m. Before releasing them for the afternoon I made a final check with the teletype and the GY watch officer to see if anything were coming in on the Tokyo-to-Washington circuit, in other words, dispatches originating in Tokyo addressed to Washington, which might by any chance either be such a note in reply to Secretary Hull's note of November 26 or which might bear on these negotiations.

When I made that check there was something coming in on the teletype so addressed. I therefore requested the translators to hold on for a while longer, until we broke down that message coming in.

Within, I recollect, one-half hour or less the first part of a message which we broke down was broken to the extent of reading the first few lines of the text of the message, specifically the first part of the first line, which is an internal indicator of how many parts there are to that message. That was standard Japanese practice and procedure.

The first part we broke down I rather distinctly recollec- 1044] lect was part 8 of a 14-part message. After about the third line, as I recollect, it went into English text with many insertions of three-letter code groups, indicating statements of various kinds.

Does that answer your question, sir?
Mr. Richardson. Proceed and carry through what happened with reference to that message during the afternoon while you were there.
Captain Kramer. Well, then—

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, might I ask before counsel starts on this line, whether or not the 3 or 3:15 message refers to the pilot message or the first 13 parts?

Mr. Richardson. Was there, Captain, what may be called a preliminary pilot message a part of this incident?

Captain Kramer. I believe, Mr. Counsellor, that you are referring to Tokyo Serial 901 on page 238 of Exhibit 1. I have no recollection of seeing that message until later in the afternoon, although it is possible that the Army delivered it to my section earlier in the afternoon.
I would like to invite your attention to the fact that at the foot of that message there is indicated as a file number, "J, D, 7149"; that at the foot of each of the parts of the 14-part note is "File No. 7143," six numbers earlier. I stated that I was uncertain whether that came in [10445] earlier in the afternoon or not. In any case, it was not stamped with a file number until approximately 8:30 that evening for dissemination.

Mr. Richardson. When had the first 13 parts finished coming in?

Captain Kramer. My recollection is that the last of the first 13 parts was coming in about 7:30 that evening.

Mr. Richardson. Did you make a more or less detailed examination of those 13 parts?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. From your experience in the matter and your familiarity with other dispatches, particularly the intercepts between Tokyo and the United States, were you impressed with anything unusual about these 13 parts as you read them?

Captain Kramer. I have stated that the first part I recollect seeing is part 8. If you will refer to that you will see that there is nothing in that part—in fact, the last half of that part quotes the United States note—that was materially different than the general tenor of previous notes back and forth between the United States and Japan.

When the first 13 parts were complete I did, however, have that distinct impression, that this note was far and appreciably stronger language than earlier notes had been [10446] and that it indicated a strong probability that the Japanese were concluding any further negotiations.

Mr. Richardson. That was the impression you had?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, was the message translated and in shape for delivery further into the Navy Department by 7:30 in the evening?

Captain Kramer. It was not; no, sir.

Mr. Richardson. When, as near as you can recall—and bear in mind, Captain, that everyone here recognizes that recollections are only recollections.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. About what time do you think this 13-part message was ready for delivery?

Captain Kramer. I am quite certain regarding my times that that was ready for delivery. Briefly it is as follows:

The folders for delivery to the usual recipients of this traffic were in process of preparation about between 8:30 and a quarter of 9 Saturday evening. At about a quarter of 9 I commenced my usual practice of phoning to the probable locations of these usual recipients.

Mr. Richardson. And who would those recipients normally be?

Captain Kramer. The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox; [10447] Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, or his flag secretary, then Commander Welborn; Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson; the head of the Far East section of the Division of Naval Intelligence, then Commander McCollum; the Director of the War Plans Division, Admiral Turner; and either the White House directly or the naval aide to the President, then Captain Beardall.
Mr. Richardson. Would there be any distribution made to the Army?

Captain Kramer. Distribution was automatically made to the Army of all messages typed by my section. Within a matter of minutes or at the most a couple of hours after they were typed.

Mr. Richardson. And to whom would they go as representing the Army?

Captain Kramer. To the parallel section to mine in the Signal Intelligence section of the Army.

Mr. Richardson. Who was in charge of that, if you recall?

Captain Kramer. I believe then Captain Doud, or Major Doud, was in charge of that section.

Mr. Richardson. But you had no further duty with respect to dissemination of any such message within the Army beyond the delivery to the Doud section?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. But it was your duty, as I understand your testimony, to arrange for the delivery of the message to the individuals connected with the naval establishment whom you have just identified in your testimony?

Captain Kramer. In general, that is correct, sir. My responsibility in that regard was as a subordinate of the Director of Naval Intelligence. In carrying out those responsibilities I was acting for him. I could, and on a number of occasions did, make special deliveries on his direction.

Mr. Richardson. Did you physically make any deliveries yourself of such messages?

Captain Kramer. In most cases I physically made the deliveries myself.

Mr. Richardson. Well, when the first 13 parts of this message we are talking about had been completed and had been translated and was in shape to be delivered, did you deliver it?

Captain Kramer. I began to describe what I was doing at a quarter of 9. If I may continue I think it will answer your question.

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead.

Captain Kramer. I phoned the usual recipients I have already named at their offices or homes in order to locate them. As I have indicated, that was my usual practice day or night.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, you will pardon me if I interrupt you as you go along, because I have to get it into my head my way. When you telephoned a recipient would you give that recipient over the telephone any information as to why you were telephoning him and what you proposed to tell to him?

Captain Kramer. In cryptic language, yes. Generally it was in such terms as, "I have something important that I believe you should see at once," or something of that nature.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, go ahead with your narration as to what occurred on Saturday night.

Captain Kramer. I phoned the quarters of Admiral Stark on Observatory Circle on Massachusetts Avenue, but could not reach him. He was apparently not at home. I similarly phoned Admiral Turner's home. I phoned the situation room at the White House.

Mr. Richardson. What do you mean by the "situation room"?
Captain Kramer. It was a room on the ground floor, south side, in
the center of the White House which the naval aide, Captain Beardall,
had set up a month or two before, equipped with maps to follow the
war in Europe and to assist, presumably, the President with those
maps and to have a center to handle any messages or traffic of intelli-
gence from the Navy Department.

Mr. Richardson. Who was Beardall?

[10,50] Captain Kramer. Naval aide to the President.

Mr. Richardson. And who was under him in that work at the White
House?

Captain Kramer. When that room was set up my recollection is
that there was initially one Army and one Navy junior officer as as-
sistants. Other assistants were brought in later. I believe at about
the time of Pearl Harbor a classmate of mine at the Naval Academy,
then Lieutenant Commander Leahy, was put in charge of those as-
sistants to the situation room.

Mr. Richardson. Now proceed with what you did by way of han-
dling this message, the 13 parts of this message.

Captain Kramer. I further phoned then Commander McCollum at
his home in Alexandria, indicating what had come in in cryptic terms
on the phone, and after completing these various phone calls then
phoned Admiral Wilkinson at his home in Arlington to inform him
of whom I had been able to contact.

First I informed him of the nature of what I had that I felt should
be delivered at once, and further informed him what I proposed to
do in the way of delivery. He approved my proposals, which con-
sisted of delivery to the White House, to Mr. Knox, who, incidentally,
I had also phoned, and then to his home.

Mr. Richardson. Whose home?

Captain Kramer. Admiral Wilkinson’s home.

[10,51] Mr. Richardson. Yes. Well, about what time did you
start out to make these deliveries?

Captain Kramer. There was one other phone call I made and that
was to my own home, to my wife, asking her to be my chauffeur.

Mr. Richardson. I thought, Captain, you were going to ask per-
mission. Proceed.

Captain Kramer. She very graciously complied and did act as my
chauffeur during the evening.

We reached the White House, I should say, about 9:15, where, as
I recollect it, one of these junior aides to Captain Beardall was on duty.
I do not recall whether it was the Army or the naval aide; in fact,
they may both have been there. I left rather categorical instructions
with him to get that folder to the President as quickly as possible.

Mr. Richardson. Would you mind telling us the exact language as
near as you can remember it?

Captain Kramer. I said in approximately these terms that “there
was something in this folder”—which, incidentally was inside a locked
pouch—that the President should see as quickly as possible.” I was
given to understand that the President was entertaining at the mo-
ment. I learned only within the last couple of months that Mrs.
Roosevelt was entertaining rather than the President. I learned only
the [10,52] last few days who was being entertained, when
Captain Safford testified—and told him that when I had phoned
Admiral Wilkinson I was informed that the naval aide, Captain Beardall, was at dinner at Admiral Wilkinson’s home. I therefore told this assistant of Captain Beardall’s that I would show it to him, that I would show it to the aide when I reached Admiral Wilkinson’s home and that very likely he would get in touch with him at that time to find out whether Mr. Roosevelt had seen this traffic. From there—

Mr. Richardson. Now, you said that this message was in a locked pouch. Was it customary when you delivered messages that they be kept in a locked pouch?

Captain Kramer. Invariably; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Who had the key to the pouch?

Captain Kramer. The recipients and my section only.

Mr. Richardson. The pouch then, as I take it, was not opened until you reached the recipient who was to receive the message?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. When a copy was delivered on such an occasion did it remain with the recipient?

Captain Kramer. It remained for a period normally of 1 or 2 or 3 days. In some cases, specifically the State Department, where I had delivery responsibilities, earlier in 1941, they at times retained them for as much as 1 or 2 weeks and occasionally called for earlier ones that had been returned. The only exception to that general statement is that in the Far East Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence there was normally a back file kept running for several weeks to a month.

Mr. Richardson. Then the file check would show whether a copy had been returned by a particular recipient or not?

Captain Kramer. Such a file check was kept in my office; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And ultimately it was expected that that file list would check out by an ultimate return of the dispatch originally delivered?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Did you deliver a copy of this 13-part section to the aide in charge at the White House on this evening around 9:15?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And where did you go after leaving the White House?

Captain Kramer. To the Wardman Park Hotel on Connecticut Avenue.

Mr. Richardson. Whom did you see there?

Captain Kramer. Mr. Knox, the Secretary of the Navy.

[10453] Mr. Richardson. Did you have any conversation with the Secretary?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. Richardson. What was the nature of it?

Captain Kramer. The first 20 minutes or so of my presence in his apartment, where there were also incidentally Mrs. Knox and a civilian business associate of Mr. Knox, I believe acting manager of the Chicago Daily News, whom I had seen on frequent occasions in his outer office in the Navy Department—Mr. Knox read the dispatches for the first 20 minutes or so. During that time there was very little said. During that time I sat near him in a corner of the
room part of the time, the rest of the time engaged in general conversation with the other two people present.

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything said after the Secretary completed his examination of the document?

Captain Kramer. Not specifically bearing on this traffic in the folder he was reading. Mr. Knox was very security-minded and had been since he was indoctrinated, if I may use that term, into the security features and identified in handling this traffic and I do not believe customarily discussed this decrypted traffic with either his wife or his business associates.

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything said by the Secretary [10455] with respect to taking any action on the message which he had read?

Captain Kramer. There was not, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, about what time do you think you left the Wardman Park?

Captain Kramer. Between 9:45 and a quarter of 10 I should say.

Mr. Richardson. Whither did you go?

Captain Kramer. To Arlington, Va., the home of Admiral Wilkinson.

Mr. Richardson. Now, when you arrived at the home of Admiral Wilkinson who in respect to the members of the Naval Establishment did you find there?

Captain Kramer. Admiral Wilkinson was present, also Captain Beardall. I have had my memory refreshed only quite recently to the effect that General Miles was also present.

Mr. Richardson. Was Admiral Wilkinson there?

Captain Kramer. Admiral Wilkinson was there; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. To whom did you make delivery at the Wilkinson home?

Captain Kramer. To Admiral Wilkinson in the first instance. Captain Beardall also read the traffic from an extra folder I had. General Miles also perused it.

[10456] Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion of it while they were perusing it or following the perusal?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; there was.

Mr. Richardson. Can you give us the general nature of it?

Captain Kramer. The general nature of it was to the effect that it certainly looked as though the Japanese were terminating negotiations with the United States. Other than that I can recall no specific phraseology used.

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything said in that conversation by any of them with respect to sending any message or taking any action based on this traffic?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; there was not.

Mr. Richardson. About what time do you think you left the Wilkinson home?

Captain Kramer. It was about 12:30; after midnight.

Mr. Richardson. And did you attempt to make any further deliveries that night?

Captain Kramer. I did not.

Mr. Richardson. You went home, I presume, from the Wilkinson home?
Captain Kramer. No, sir. I never took these folders with encrypted traffic to my home. They were returned—speaking specifically of the copies shown Mr. Knox and Admiral Wilkinson and the extra copy I had—to my safe in section GZ in the Navy Department.

Mr. Richardson. Then when you returned to your office where your safe was, were all of the copies of this message that you had started out to deliver returned to your safe or did certain copies remain with certain recipients?

Captain Kramer. The only copy that remained out that I recollect was the one left in the situation room at the White House in a locked pouch.

[10458] Mr. Richardson. How long did you remain in your office upon your return there when you put these documents in your safe?

Captain Kramer. Probably 10 or 15 minutes, checking with the GY watch officer to see if anything new of interest or importance had come in.

Mr. Richardson. Did you have reason to believe at that time that there was still another part of this message to come in?

Captain Kramer. I had positive knowledge that there was another part. There were 14 parts indicated as the number of parts of this message, and we still had only 13 parts.

Mr. Richardson. Did you inquire from your staff there as to whether the fourteenth part had come in?

Captain Kramer. That was one of the things I specifically inquired about.

Mr. Richardson. And you ascertained what as to that fact?

Captain Kramer. There was still no fourteenth part, or anything that looked as though it might be the fourteenth part.

Mr. Richardson. Then sometime between half-past 12 and 1 you left your office and returned home?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

[10459] Mr. Richardson. Now, how early did you go to the office the next morning?

Captain Kramer. My recollection is it was very shortly after 7:30 that I arrived at my office the following morning.

Mr. Richardson. What was your customary hour of arrival in your office?

Captain Kramer. The normal office hours commenced at 8 o'clock. I customarily arrived about that time.

Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection, Captain, that you went to your office earlier the next morning than usual?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection of having any reason for going there earlier than usual?

Captain Kramer. Aside from the fourteenth part, there were other messages of a minor nature that had come in before I left the office the previous night, and I further wanted to be at the office earlier that morning than usual because of the likelihood that I would have to make earlier disseminations that morning than usual.

By that I mean that normally the folders during the course of 1941 were disseminated in the latter part of the morning and another dissemination was frequently made in the afternoon, and others at other
odd times. I had a specific appointment to be at the State Department by 10 that morning, on instructions from Secretary Knox. I gathered from conversation with Admiral Wilkinson that Admiral Stark would very likely be in Sunday morning, which was not a usual practice.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, let me get these threads together.

Captain Kramer. Those are various reasons influencing my arriving earlier that morning.

Mr. Richardson. And those reasons were connected with the dispatch of business that was waiting for you in your office?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Among which would be matters that might be involved in the receipt of the fourteenth part of this message?

Captain Kramer. Aside from the fourteenth part, probably my principal objective in arriving early was to make sure that anything that might have come in in the early morning would be in shape for delivery for Mr. Knox or for Admiral Stark.

Mr. Richardson. Was there any arrangement, Captain, in connection with your conversation at Admiral Wilkinson's house on late Saturday night, with reference to having a conference the next morning?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; there was not.

Mr. Richardson. They did not then speak of having a conference or of arranging one, that you can recall?

Captain Kramer. There is not only no recollection of a conference mentioned but it was an unusual thing for Admiral Stark to be there on Sunday morning. On a number of occasions that fall on Sunday morning I had delivered folders to his home and had been received in his study on the second deck, he being in pajamas and dressing gown on one occasion having breakfast. I recollect that because I was offered some coffee.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, having reference, Captain, to Wilkinson, and Turner, and Beardall in the Wilkinson home, there was nothing said there about having an early Sunday morning meeting?

Captain Kramer. Not a conference; no, sir. My recollection is that Admiral Wilkinson had indicated that Admiral Stark would probably be in the office early the next morning.

Mr. Richardson. Now you got in your office around 7 o'clock on Sunday morning?

Captain Kramer. Shortly after 7:30, is my best recollection.

Mr. Richardson. When you got there did you find that the fourteenth part of the message had come in?

[10462] Captain Kramer. I do not distinctly recollect in what shape it was then. By that I mean whether it was still being broken down or had been broken down, or was being translated, but my recollection is that the fourteenth part was there shortly after I got in that morning, or possibly when I got in that morning.

Mr. Richardson. Was there anyone there who could translate such a message from Japanese into English?

Captain Kramer. Not in my office; no, sir. That interpretation "no one there" should be modified, I feel, by stating, as I have previously indicated, that I was on a 24-hour basis, and my translators were also. I had on at least two dozen occasions, during the course
of 1941, been called to my office at odd hours of the night, sometimes 2 and 3 in the morning. I had standing instructions with the GY watch officer to call me any time they felt a translator was required.

On a number of occasions that general instruction was emphasized with specific instructions before I left my office in the evening to call me if anything on a particular circuit came in. I was the nearest translator to my office, only 5 minutes away in Arlington, my home being near Fort Myer. I therefore put myself in the status of being the first one called rather than one of the translators whose homes were in outlying districts.

Mr. Richardson. Do you know who received the fourteenth part from the wire?

Captain Kramer. From first-hand knowledge I do not, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Who translated it? The fourteenth part, I mean now.

Captain Kramer. At the foot of the fourteenth part, before the expression "Navy translation," is the parenthetical letter (M). That means me.

Mr. Richardson. Your answer would be then that you translated the fourteenth part?

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection, but by looking at this part of the message on page 245 of Exhibit 1 it would indicate I was the translator.

Mr. Richardson. Now, when that message was translated, was it put in the shape of a separate dispatch by itself?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; it was. That, however, was contrary to the usual practice in my section. It was done because the evening before one of the various other parts of this note were coming in, and we called on the Army at about 6 o'clock, as I recall it——

Mr. Richardson. P. m.?

Captain Kramer. Six p. m.—for assistance, primarily the assistance of their purple machine in breaking down these parts which were beginning to pile up on our machine.

It was almost invariably the practice in my section to include all parts of a multipart message under one heading 1 and 2, to assign the same file number to all those parts, but that was contrary to the Army practice which assigned a separate file number to each part of multipart messages.

The exception to our usual practice was made in the case of this code, because we proceeded to type up each part as they were finished in rough form.

Some of those parts were finished in rough form, long hand, by Army and sent over to us. They were all [10465] typed in my section in finished form.

Mr. Richardson. Well, was a delivery made on Sunday morning of the fourteenth part?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, it was; in its proper place, accompanying the first 13 parts.

Mr. Richardson. When the delivery was made on Sunday morning then the entire 14-part message was delivered as one message.

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. So that there would have been, in effect, a duplication in delivery, so far as the first 13 parts were concerned?
Captain Kramer. That was frequently the case.

Mr. Richardson. Did you make delivery Sunday morning?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, will you tell the committee just what you did, whom you saw, how you made delivery, and what time it was?

Captain Kramer. Some details of delivery between 8 and 9 o'clock I have only in the last month or so had my memory refreshed on, in conversations with other officers.

The first delivery, to my present best recollection, was made to Commander McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section, Navy Intelligence.

[10466] Mr. Richardson. Where and at about what time?

Captain Kramer. It was probably about 8 or a few minutes after.

Mr. Richardson. At his office in the Navy Building?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Well, proceed.

Captain Kramer. Another delivery was made, I believe, about a quarter of 9 to Captain McCollum, also, or Commander McCollum then, when I was informed that Admiral Wilkinson had arrived at his office, and I therefore automatically delivered another copy to Admiral Wilkinson. It was about that time, or shortly afterward, that another copy was delivered to Admiral Stark's office.

Mr. Richardson. Now, at the time of delivery to Admiral Stark's office, who delivered it? Did you?

Captain Kramer. That first delivery to Admiral Stark's office, I believe, was done by either Admiral Wilkinson or Captain McCollum.

Mr. Richardson. Did you see that delivery made?

Captain Kramer. My recollection is not positive in that regard. If it was made by Admiral Wilkinson or Captain McCollum, I would not have seen it.

Mr. Richardson. How early was the first time you saw Admiral Stark on Sunday morning, as nearly as you can recall?

[10467] Captain Kramer. My first positive recollection of seeing Admiral Stark is when I was on my way to the State Department to keep my 10 o'clock appointment when I left a copy of some of the other traffic that had come in in Admiral Stark's outer office. That was probably 9:30 or 9:40.

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything said at that time by you to Admiral Stark with reference to this 14-part message?

Captain Kramer. There was not, sir.

Mr. Richardson. What was this 10 o'clock appointment you had with the State Department?

Captain Kramer. The previous evening when I was in Secretary Knox's apartment, after he had read the folder of traffic, he directed me to be at the State Department at 10 o'clock the following morning where there would be a meeting between he, Mr. Hull, and, I gathered, Mr. Stimson.

Mr. Richardson. Did you attend such a meeting?

Captain Kramer. I did not attend such a meeting.

Mr. Richardson. Did you make any delivery to the State Department on Sunday morning of the whole 14-part message?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I was at the State Department almost exactly 10 minutes of 10.

Mr. Richardson. And to whom did you make delivery [10468] actually?
Captain Kramer. Actually to Mr. Knox directly. He came in, as I recollect, about 5 minutes of 10, a few minutes after I got there, and went into the conference room, Mr. Hull's office.

Mr. Richardson. Did you have any discussion on the matter with Secretary Knox?

Captain Kramer. Only to the extent of pointing out what new traffic was in the folder which he had not seen the night before.

Mr. Richardson. But nothing with reference to the details of the 14-part message?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. How long were you at the State Department making your delivery?

Captain Kramer. There was a brief discussion between myself, the Army courier, and Mr. Hull's private secretary in Mr. Hull's outer office. It lasted probably not more than 3 or 4 minutes, and then I headed back for the Navy Department.

Mr. Richardson. What time did you return to the Navy Department?

Captain Kramer. My best recollection is about 10:20.

Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection as to what you did upon your return at 10:20?

Captain Kramer. On my arrival there at 10:20, the most striking recollection I have is the first sighting of that message from Tokyo directing the delivery of this note from Tokyo at 1 o'clock p.m., December 7, Washington time.

Mr. Richardson. Now, that was in a separate dispatch, was it not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. It came in separately?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Was it in the same character of code transmission that the fourteenth part had been?

Captain Kramer. The same general character; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. It had come in by the time you returned from the State Department?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, when you came to your office at 7:30 that morning, who was in your office carrying on business there?

Captain Kramer. My only positive recollection is that the then Chief Yeoman Bryant was there. I have a somewhat vaguer recollection that two of the translators were also there. There may only have been one.

Mr. Richardson. Who was at your office, if you can recall, when you returned from the State Department and found the 1 o'clock section of the message?

Captain Kramer. It was probably Dr. Hoffman, one of my chief translators.

Mr. Richardson. What did you do, if anything, with this 1 o'clock section?

Captain Kramer. I immediately instructed my chief yeoman to prepare another set of folders so I could make immediate delivery of them.

Mr. Richardson. He did so?

Captain Kramer. In the course of 5 minutes or so.
Mr. Richardson. And what did you do then with respect to delivering that section?

Captain Kramer. In that folder I mentioned, there were several other short messages, some of which appear in Exhibit 1. Just as I was about to leave the office, a plain language Japanese message was sent in to my office by the GY watch officer that carried, I believe, the so-called hidden word message on page 251 of Exhibit 1. I recognized it as such from an external indicator, namely, the word "Stop" at the end, and recognized the first word as being one of the code words referring to England. In scanning the [10471] rest of the message, as I recollect, the sixth or seventh word had another code word, which, incidentally, were all proper names. The word was "Hattori" which, although I recognized as a code word, I did not immediately recall the meaning of, and hastily referred to the list of such code words, which appears in this Exhibit 1, referring—or rather, interpreted as "relations between Japan and (blank) country," to be inserted, was not in accordance with expectations.

I dictated to my chief yeoman the sense of that message, which now appears in Exhibit 1.

I took time to insert those in the folders that were made up and was on my way.

Mr. Richardson. Where did you go?

Captain Kramer. I stopped off at Admiral Stark's office, and then hurried first to the State Department.

Mr. Richardson. Did you find Stark there?

Captain Kramer. Admiral Stark was in his office.

Mr. Richardson. To whom did you make delivery?

Captain Kramer. The office door was closed when I arrived at his outer office. Word was sent in with one of the people there—I do not recollect who it was—that I had something for him.

My impressions earlier have been that it was his Flag [10472]

Secretary, then Commander Wellborn. That has only quite recently been corrected on that score since I am informed that Wellborn was not there that morning at all. My recollections were fully refreshed in a conversation only in the last few days with Captain McCollum to the effect that he was the one who came to the door.

I distinctly recollect that now.

I further recollect pointing out to Captain McCollum the tie-up of the time, 1 o'clock Washington, with the scheme that had been developing for the past week or so in the Southwest Pacific with reference to Malaya and the Kra Peninsula.

Captain McCollum reacted instantaneously to my pointing that out. His reactions, I believe, were identical with mine. I do not believe our conversation lasted more than 10 seconds or so, and then I headed for the State Department.

Mr. Richardson. Now, at what time do you think it was that delivery was made at Stark's office, as you have testified?

Captain Kramer. I should say it was between 10:30 and 10:35.

Mr. Richardson. Are you able to state, Captain, when the 1 o'clock message was ready for delivery out of your office?

[10473] Captain Kramer. It was ready for delivery when I returned to my office about 10:20, to the extent of its being completely translated.
Mr. Richardson. Now, what time did you arrive at the State Department?

Captain Kramer. Within probably 10 minutes after I left Admiral Stark's office.

Mr. Richardson. To whom did you make delivery there?

Captain Kramer. To one of the private secretaries of Mr. Hull, who was the normal recipient for Mr. Hull.

Mr. Richardson. Did anything else transpire there after you made the delivery?

Captain Kramer. Before that folder was taken in to Mr. Hull, there was a brief conversation of the identical nature that I had had with Captain McCollum at Admiral Stark's door, pointing out the tie-up of the time 1 o'clock Washington, with the situation in the Southwest Pacific.

Mr. Richardson. One o'clock Washington meant dawn in Hawaii, did it not?

Captain Kramer. It was 7:30 in Hawaii, yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And was that fact pointed out in your conversations with McCollum, and at the State Department?

Captain Kramer. It was mentioned in passing, yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, proceed.

[70474] Captain Kramer. I should like to amplify that further, since such an issue has been made of that.

I earlier indicated, in outlining my naval career, that for about 2 years I was operating out of Pearl Harbor. I was executive officer and navigator of a destroyer based at the submarine base at Pearl Harbor.

I had had earlier experience as a navigator; namely, in Central America, in fact navigation was a hobby of mine.

Pearl Harbor uses a time zone which is rather unusual in the Navy in that it is not an even time zone, but is time zone 10½.

It is customary for navigators to draw time circles in working out navigation problems. I had made such a time circle in the few minutes I was in the Navy Department between 10:20 and 10:30 that morning, to get a picture of how this 1 o'clock Washington tied up with the movement of the big Japanese convoy down on the coast of French Indochina; in other words, to get an idea of whether it was evening or midnight or early in the morning around Kota Bharu.

Incidentally, in drawing that time circle, that is figuring out roughly those times, I did not take the time to check to see what the actual time zone was. The 10½ [70475] time zone at Pearl Harbor was part of that time circle.

Furthermore, 7:30 Sunday morning at Pearl Harbor, at the time I was out there, and at other times during fleet problems, was probably the quietest time of the week aboard ship at Pearl Harbor.

I am not presuming to state what the situation was in 1941—7:30 is the normal time for the piping of the crew to breakfast.

There would, therefore, normally be only top side out of the living quarters, only those men on watch.

Furthermore, it was customary over week ends when I was serving out there for a larger percentage of the crew to be ashore on Sunday than other days of the week when ships were in port.

Those were all factors bearing on this idea of mine that 7:30 Sunday morning was a quiet time of the week.
Mr. Richardson. What would be the significance of that to you as a Navy man?

Captain Kramer. Nothing more than I have already indicated, that it would probably be the time of the week when there would be the fewest people aboard ship, when there would be less ship's work going on.

Mr. Richardson. When you got to the State Department did you see Secretary Knox?

[10476] Captain Kramer. I did not see him myself, except when the door was open to the conference room, Mr. Hull's office.

Mr. Richardson. There was no communication then between you and Secretary Knox in any way?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now after you made delivery at the State Department, where did you go then?

Captain Kramer. I went to the White House to deliver that same set of traffic.

Mr. Richardson. To whom did you deliver at the White House?

Captain Kramer. I do not recall the individual, but the delivery was made, to the best of my recollection—in fact I can state rather unequivocally I cannot conceive I would have delivered to any other place than the room I had previously described.

Mr. Richardson. What time?

Captain Kramer. Within 10 minutes of the time I left the State Department.

[10477] Mr. Richardson. Where did you go from the White House?

Captain Kramer. Back to the Navy Department.

Mr. Richardson. With whom did you come in contact when you got back to the Navy Department?

Captain Kramer. The people in my office, plus the watch officers and other people in the adjacent office, section GY. I believe I also saw some time before noon Captain McCollum again.

Mr. Richardson. When you were at the State Department, you said when the door opened, you saw Knox. You did not send him a note, or have any intercourse with him at all that morning?

Captain Kramer. Most emphatically not.

Mr. Richardson. I have a note that rather indicated to me that there was an explanation of the 1 o'clock message sent by you to Knox on this theory of yours as to what was meant.

Captain Kramer. There was only the verbal explanation, which I may not have fully explained due to interruptions with the foreign-service officer, Mr. Hull's private secretary.

Mr. Richardson. What was that?

Captain Kramer. The identical tenor and nature that I described in the case of Captain McCollum.

Mr. Richardson. The significance of the 1 o'clock date? [10478]

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now. I really would like to have you, since you discussed it with McCollum, and you discussed it with the private secretary of the Secretary of State—
Captain Kramer (interposing). There was also a conversation with the Army courier who was there at the same time with the same set of traffic for Mr. Stimson.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now then, give the committee as detailed an account as you can of just what that conversation was and what its significance was, what you were talking about, what you had in mind, and what you feared, or expected, or anticipated, as the result of that 1 o'clock date.

Captain Kramer. The primary point of that was the conviction, at least in my mind, that the Japanese intended to carry out their plans against Kota Bharu, with the intention and purpose of forcing the hand of the Thai Premier, Pibul, who had been maintaining, for some time past, the position that his country was neutral, that any foreign nation that invaded his quarters would be considered an enemy, and that the moment such an invasion took place he would call on the other party for assistance. By "other party," I refer to Japan or to Britain.

[10/179] Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion that the 1 o'clock date had any significance in connection with any attack at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. Absolutely none, sir.

Mr. Richardson. That was not in your mind primarily in connection with this 1 o'clock date at all?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; it was not. It was mentioned only in passing; it was incidental to our general conversation.

Mr. Richardson. Now, when you got back to the Navy Department—by the way, did you see General Marshall that morning?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Did you have any contact with any of the Army people other than the courier that morning?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Richardson. What was the name of the courier, do you recall?

Captain Kramer. My recollection has been, and I am still of the conviction, it was Colonel Bratton. He, however, has indicated to me in private conversations that he did not make those courier trips, in which case it must have been one of his subordinates.

I might further amplify possibly my reasons for thinking it was Colonel Bratton by stating it had always been Colonel [10/180] Bratton in the past, and when I testified for the first time before the court of inquiry of Admiral Murphy at Pearl Harbor, that was my impression at the time.

Mr. Richardson. Did you see Admiral Stark again that morning?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Mr. Richardson. You knew nothing about any of the contacts he might have had with Marshall, in connection with sending any message to Hawaii?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Did you have anything whatever to do with, or any knowledge of the sending of, the message that was later sent to Hawaii?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. I first heard of it after the hearings before the Roberts Commission.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, when you returned to the Navy Department, did your connection with the 14-part message then end?
Captain Kramer. Except for again collecting those copies, yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. When did you collect them? The same day?
Captain Kramer. No, sir. It was in the course of the next few days. I do not recollect exactly.
Mr. Richardson. That was simply the ministerial act of going and getting the copies and getting them back in the file in the regular order?
Captain Kramer. Or their destruction, yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. You had nothing more to do with the receipt of the message, or its explanation, or its delivery?
Captain Kramer. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. All right, now, Captain, so much for the 14-parts message and your connection with it.

Now let me open up the interesting subject of the winds message with you, Captain. I assume, Captain, that you were familiar with the two original winds messages that appear in exhibit 142 here, I think, as 2353 and 2354.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I am familiar with the original set-up of the messages on that winds system.

Mr. Richardson. Was your attention called to those messages when they came in?
Captain Kramer. I would not use the expression "called to my attention." They were handled by my office, so, of course, they got my attention.

Mr. Richardson. I beg your pardon. What was that answer?
(The answer was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Richardson. Did they pass through your hands?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; they did.
Mr. Richardson. Did you have anything to do thereafter with monitoring the stations for an execute on either of those messages?
Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir; with the possible exception that, as was my practice, these two messages, as well as any message bearing on the technicalities of the operations of Commander Safford's section, were promptly called to his attention.

Mr. Richardson. You understood, did you not, Captain, that stations generally that we were in contact with were monitoring for an execute on those messages?

Captain Kramer. I understood that Commander Safford took such action; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And you were in a position, or you were in an expectant condition in your office with respect to intercepting an execute on those messages?

Captain Kramer. Very much so; yes, sir.

[10483] Mr. Richardson. All right. Do you recall, Captain, any message purporting to move under either of the winds-code messages to which I have called your attention coming into your office prior to December 7?

Captain Kramer. None came into my office, to be precise in that regard. My attention was, however, called to a message which was of this character.

Mr. Richardson. Who called your attention to it?
Captain Kramer. The GY watch officer.
Mr. Richardson. Do you remember his name?

Captain Kramer. My best recollection on that is that it was Lieutenant Murray, but I am uncertain.

Mr. Richardson. What time of day was it, if you can recall?

Captain Kramer. My best recollection on that is that it was shortly after normal office hours; I believe about 8:30 in the morning.

Mr. Richardson. What day?

Captain Kramer. That day is something that only in the past week and a half, since Exhibit 142 was prepared, I have completely refreshed my memory on. My present recollection, in the light of that refreshment, was that it was on Friday, the 5th of December.

[10485] Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, you made mention in your testimony a moment ago to an intercept which appears in the exhibit before you, which you characterize as the hidden word message.

Now, that appears on page what of Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer. Page 251.

Mr. Richardson. And the indication there is as to it being received when?

Captain Kramer. There is no indication as to the date of receipt. The date at the foot of the message is December 7, indicating only the date of translation. That, however, as I have previously indicated, was first brought into my section about 10:30 Sunday morning, December 7.

Mr. Richardson. And what, in general language, so that your testimony may be easily read, was the hidden-word message? What was the scheme of it?

Captain Kramer. It was a message first set up by Tokyo Circular 2409 which appears on page 186 of Exhibit 1. There were supplements to that, four or five in number, I believe.

Mr. Richardson. There was a similarity in the purpose of that message, and the purpose of the other messages, 2353 and 2354, was there not?

Captain Kramer. A similarity to an extent; yes, sir.

[10485] But the so-called winds message covered only one phase of international relations of which this other serial, circular 2409 covered dozens of situations.

Mr. Richardson. Then the hidden word message was a broader scheme than the winds message?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, it has been testified here, Captain, that about 8 o'clock on the morning of December 4, 1941, you brought a message in Japanese to Captain Safford, on which you had written certain words, among which were the words “War with the United States,” and said to Captain Safford, “This is it.”

Do you recall any incident about that time with reference to your delivery to Captain Safford of any message which had any relation to the winds code?

Captain Kramer. The message I just referred to as being shown to me by the GY watch officer, which my current best understanding is, was on December 5, not December 4, was shown to me by the GY watch officer only to confirm his interpretation of the Japanese.

Mr. Richardson. What do you mean by that?
Captain Kramer. I mean by that the following:

When this winds system had been set up, a week or 10 days previously, there was considerable interest in it by all the usual recipients of this daily traffic. Special provisions had been made to monitor it not only within the United States, but outside the United States. A day or so after that was disseminated, Admiral Noyes instructed me to prepare a half dozen or so cards, and as I recall they were 3 by 5 cards, which I prepared, having on them the English translation of the terms given in this winds set-up.

Mr. Richardson. On those cards, did the Japanese words themselves appear?

Captain Kramer. They did not, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, what definition of the words, the Japanese words which we reidentified in the winds-code messages, was put on these cards by you?

Captain Kramer. To use your term "definition," the only additional thing besides the English translation of these Japanese terms was the countries to which they referred.

Mr. Richardson. Turning to 1-A in Exhibit 142, which is Circular 2353, you will note in that circular opposite the notations 1, 2, and 3, certain Japanese word phrases.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Under (1) it reads:

In case of a Japan-U. S. relation in danger. HIGASHI [10487] NO KAZEAME.

Captain Kramer. May I correct counsel?

Mr. Richardson. Don't dare do it—yes, go ahead.

Captain Kramer. In the pronunciation of the Japanese it is four words, not three. It is probably better rendered HIGASHI NO KAZE AME.

Mr. Richardson. Captain, you now compel me to reform my entire Japanese repertoire.

As I get you, these cards that you made out under the direction of Admiral Noyes contained the definition of these so-called four Japanese words, that you have just interpreted?

Captain Kramer. To use your term again of "definition" it consisted only of the countries to which those translations of these phrases referred.

Mr. Richardson. Do you know what became of those cards?

Captain Kramer. From first-hand knowledge, I do not. From implication, deduction perhaps, of Admiral Noyes' conversation, I gathered that he intended that they go by himself to the usual recipients of this daily traffic.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Now, do you remember, Captain, what definition, in connection with the United States, you put on those cards?

[10488] Captain Kramer. No definition whatever. I have already completely covered what appeared on those cards.

Mr. Richardson. Well, tell me in letters, or groups of words, if you can, what was on the card as you made it up for Admiral Noyes.

Captain Kramer (reading):

Mr. Richardson. And that was all there was on the cards?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. There was nothing about war?
Captain Kramer. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Or guns?
Captain Kramer. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Or pistols?
Captain Kramer. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Or navies?
Captain Kramer. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Or surprise attacks?
Captain Kramer. Nothing more, sir.
Mr. Richardson. All right.

Now, pick up the incident that I called to your attention with respect to a message coming in, that was called to your attention by one of the watch officers, that you [10489] think occurred on the 5th day of December 1941.

Captain Kramer. I can further substantiate that date later on, perhaps.

Mr. Richardson. Don’t forget to do it, because I would like to have some one thing substantiated in connection with it.

Now, Captain, do you not recall who actually delivered this message to you?

Captain Kramer. I am not positive who the watch officer was. To the best of my recollection it was someone about my height, because I accompanied him through the corridor to Captain Safford’s office. I believe it was Lieutenant Murray.

Mr. Richardson. Do you recall why, or was there any statement made as to why, it was brought to you?

Captain Kramer. It was brought to me to the extent of calling me to my door. It was never brought into my office. It was brought to me by this GY watch officer, who was on his way to Captain Safford’s office. He and all the watch officers had been given a translation of these phrases. At least a week before, perhaps 10 days before, there was executed about the same time a full coverage of all the plain language broadcasts by then Commander Safford, as part of the attempt to get this thing. The watch officers were instructed in case anything with this phraseology came in—that is incidental, what I am testifying to now is what I was told, is not first-hand instructions of my own, but it was my general understanding of the instructions then in effect.

[10490] Mr. Richardson. That was the reason which was in your mind as to why the watch officer came to your door?

Captain Kramer. Came to my door. He need not have come to my door.

Mr. Richardson. That is right.

Captain Kramer. But on his way to Captain Safford’s office he saw that I was in my office and called me to my door to check his interpretation of the phraseology.

Mr. Richardson. Now, you saw a message at that time?

Captain Kramer. I did; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Will you describe what it looked like as you saw it at that time?
Captain Kramer. It was a piece of teletype paper, to my best recollection. I am not certain of its color. There were two colors in vogue, both red and yellow. It was not more than 3 or 4 inches in length, torn at the top and bottom as though it had been torn off of a long strip of teletype coming out of a machine.

Mr. Richardson. How wide was the strip?
Captain Kramer. Approximately 8 or 10 inches wide.
Mr. Richardson. How high?
Captain Kramer. Three or four inches high, to my recollection.
Mr. Richardson. Was it in English or Japanese?

Mr. Richardson. How many words would you say there were in that message as you saw it?
Captain Kramer. My only recollection of the size of the actual text was it was not more than a line or two. It may possibly have been even three lines.

Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection of seeing a message that morning that contained approximately 200 words?
Captain Kramer. No, sir; I have not.
Mr. Richardson. Would 200 words be a fairly large message?
Captain Kramer. I should say it would be something about 10 or 12 inches long.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now was the message handed to you by the watch officer?
Captain Kramer. While I was perusing it at my door, it was; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Did you write anything on it?
Captain Kramer. I would not be positive of that, sir. I have no recollection of writing on it. My rather vague recollection is that the interpretation had already been written on it by the GY watch officer.

Mr. Richardson. Did you read the message?
Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

[10492] Mr. Richardson. Did you agree with whatever interpretation was written on the message?
Captain Kramer. My recollection is that I did, sir. I confirmed his interpretation.

Mr. Richardson. All right. You proceeded then with the watch officer?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Where did you go?
Captain Kramer. Down the corridor past about 8 or 10 offices to Captain Safford's office.

Mr. Richardson. Now it is testified here that you came into Captain Safford's office with the watch officer and that you said, "Here it is," and handed to Captain Safford a message on yellow teletype paper in Japanese, about 200 words, with English writing on the bottom part of it, with the words, "War with United States."

Captain Kramer. If I had written anything on that piece of teletype paper I would most positively have not used the word "war."

Mr. Richardson. Have you examined the winds code messages 2353 and 2354?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I have them in front of me.
Mr. Richardson. Do you, as an interpreter of messages, find in either of those messages any interpretation basis [10493] for using the term "war"?

Captain Kramer. Not the slightest, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything in any message that might have been shown to you on this morning when this message was taken to Captain Safford that would indicate to you that it meant war with the United States?

Captain Kramer. The only interpretation I could possibly put on it is what the Japanese said it meant in this Circular 2353 and also 2354.

Mr. Richardson. That would necessarily be true, would it not, Captain, in view of the fact that the dispatch creating the code gave the definition of what the words were supposed to mean?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. I might further amplify our discussion at this point, sir. While the set-up of the messages themselves was primarily presumably as a means of communication by a news broadcast in case of cutting off of communications, there might, of course, be deduced from that implications of imminent war. Other than that, the question of war is purely one's personal deduction and presumption.

Mr. Richardson. It would be precisely the same thing that everyone in the Navy Department was deducing from the strained relations existing between Japan and the United States [10494] for days?

Captain Kramer. Precisely, sir.

Mr. Richardson. What became of that message?

Captain Kramer. When the watch officer and myself entered Captain Safford's office my recollection is that we met him in the middle of his office, and I may have said—I am not certain—"Here it is", as I walked in. The conversation that took place there was very limited. I do not believe that I stayed there more than 15 or 20 seconds, possibly half a minute. There was little need for conversation.

My recollection is then that the watch officer and myself returned to our offices at the same time that Captain Safford left that office heading for Admiral Noyes' office. At least that was my presumption, that he was heading for Admiral Noyes' office.

Mr. Richardson. You, of course, do not know whether he went there or not?

Captain Kramer. My recollection is based on the further recollection that he indicated he was heading for Admiral Noyes' office.

Mr. Richardson. Did you ever see that message again?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Did you have anything to do with the [10495] preparation of files and documents that were to be turned over to the Roberts Commission?

Captain Kramer. None, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Were any shown to you?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Was any such file made up for delivery to the Roberts Commission shown to you?
Captain Kramer. No, sir; there was not. I can be quite certain on that point because I recollect now that during the course of the Roberts hearings I asked Captain McCollum whether this decrypted traffic was being introduced into the Roberts hearings. I distinctly recollect that request for information of McCollum. I was never called before the Roberts hearings.

In my general interest in the maintenance of security of this traffic I was curious on that point.

Mr. Richardson. It has been testified here that a file was made up, examined by you and examined by Captain Safford, each checking the other to be sure that all the necessary papers were in the file. Do you ever recall of such incident?

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection whatsoever of such an incident, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Did you ever see this message that [10496] we have been talking about in connection with any file that was to be presented to the Roberts Commission?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I did not. I might further state that there was no winds message, during the week December 1–7, 1941, ever written up by section GZ of which I had charge.

Mr. Richardson. Do you know of any winds execute message applying to Circular 2353 that came into that department through your watch officers during the period December 1–7, 1941?

Captain Kramer. I did not get that question.

Mr. Richardson. Read it, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Captain Kramer. I am uncertain as to what you mean by "department," Counselor.

Mr. Richardson. I mean the section that you were in, where you had the watch officers that took the messages off the wire and brought them into your section for translation and then passed them on to Safford.

Captain Kramer. No winds message during the week that you describe was ever brought into my section. The closest a message of that character came to my section was the office door of my section as I have previously outlined.

Mr. Richardson. Now, can you tell us what was on the [10497] message that you saw on December 5?

Captain Kramer. I have had, for the past several years, no positive recollection of what was on that piece of teletype. My present conclusions on it are based on a study of some of these documents which I have first seen in the last several weeks. At no time prior to the last several weeks have I seen any of these documents since the time involved, namely, December 1941.

Mr. Richardson. May it be said, Captain, that you have a very definite present recollection that the message that you saw was a short message of not to exceed three lines?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And that that message was entirely in Japanese?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And that you did not write on that message the phrase "War with United States"?
Captain Kramer. I may not have given a full answer to that. I do not want to imply that I may not have written on that message to the extent of correcting the GY watch officer's interpretation. I most positively state, however, that I would not have used the word "war" in any such correction or writing I may have made.

Mr. Richardson. And you recollect definitely that you [10498] did not assist in the preparation of a record containing that message designed for the use of the Roberts Commission?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now did you ever tell Mr. Safford, or Captain Safford, Captain Kramer, at any time that you showed this winds execute message to Secretary Forrestal and discussed it with him?

Captain Kramer. I cannot be positive what I told Captain Safford on the extremely few occasions that we had contacts throughout 1942 and the spring of 1943. I think we probably saw each other three or four times. We were in separate buildings during most of that period. As I have indicated in reply to an earlier question, I prepared nothing in my section for the Roberts Commission. I did, however, prepare a folder, I believe the day or the day after Secretary Knox left Washington for Pearl Harbor for Mr. Forrestal in which were included a fairly bulky file of the traffic of the previous few weeks.

Among the items appearing in that folder were this hidden word message December 7 on page 251 of exhibit 1.

[10499] At the time that was shown to Mr. Forrestal, it was pointed out to him by me. I believe in the presence of Captain McCollum, who was also there, that the "United States" was omitted from that translation erroneously and should have been included.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, my redoubtable associate calls my attention to Document No. 3, which appears in exhibit 142, following the document identified as 3 (b), the document entitled "Document No. 3" being the letter message from Tokyo dated December 5, 1941.

Have you that before you?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. Richardson. Now, are you able to state, Captain, whether it is your belief that that is the message that you saw on this morning about which you have been testifying?

Captain Kramer. I am almost positive that it could not have been, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Why not?

Captain Kramer. In the first place, there are no communications systems in effect between the Federal Communications Commission the Navy Department GY watch officer by teletype that I am aware of, or was aware of.

[10500] In the second place, to the best of my understanding which is still my understanding, the Federal Communications Commission was primarily monitoring for voice traffic.

My distinct understanding of the apparent winds message that I saw was that it had been received in Morse by one of our intercept stations and sent by teletype in the usual manner.

Mr. Richardson. You have examined, have you not, Captain, the various messages which are set forth in Exhibit 142?
Captain Kramer. I have glanced through that; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Are there any messages in there, that you can identify in any way, as having been the message that you saw this morning, as being the message that was taken into Captain Safford, which he later took to Noyes?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; there is not.

Mr. Richardson. When this message was presented to you by the watch officer at your door, preparatory to taking it to Captain Safford, did you then read and translate the Japanese words in that message?

Captain Kramer. I read them, certainly translated them in my mind, and may have corrected the GY watch officer’s handwritten translation on it.

[10501] Mr. Richardson. Do you recall that the Japanese phrases in that message were those Japanese phrases which are identified in Circular 2353?

Captain Kramer. My recollection, when I testified before Admiral Murfin’s court of inquiry, and my recollection now is that only one country was involved, but I cannot be positive of that.

Mr. Richardson. What country do you recall, if you do recall, was involved, in the one you recall?

Captain Kramer. To the best of my belief it was England.

Mr. Richardson. Captain, was your interest in the subject of a winds execute message sufficiently acute so that you would have been interested in a reference in that message to the United States?

Captain Kramer. Certainly.

Mr. Richardson. Was there any other country that you were as interested in as the United States at that time?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Were there any Japanese words in any message in connection with the winds code that would bring the matter as sharply to your mind as Japanese words in connection with the definition that meant relations to the United States?

[10502] Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Is there anything, Captain, in addition to this subject of a winds code execute message being received that you are able to tell the committee now that you have not testified concerning?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; there is.

May I have counsel’s assistance on finding certain things? I want specifically those series of messages that were sent to our outposts in the Far East on the destruction of our codes, and so forth.

It is briefly, as follows, sir:

The directives from Opnav to our outposts in the Far East, including attaches in Japan and China, and our island possessions in the western Pacific, were drafted by Admiral Noyes at the time he was shown the Japanese directives to diplomatic posts in the Western Hemisphere to destroy part of their systems.

That was on Thursday, if I am correct. In any case, December 4.

In the routine delivery of these decryption folders, when the folder containing this Japanese directive dated December 3 was shown to Admiral Noyes, it was shortly after lunch.

He read through all the other traffic in the folder.

[10503] I was standing by, as was my usual practice, while he read them.
He came back to this Japanese directive, remarked something along the lines, "I think we had better send something to our own diplomatic posts that are in areas under Japanese jurisdiction, or might be endangered by Japanese activity to destroy their systems."

He commenced the draft of such messages in long hand.

My recollection is that two were drafted while I was there. Certainly one was. While he was drafting, certainly one of them, that one being to Tokyo and posts in China, in fact, I had advised him on where some of the assistant attachés were in China. He called Captain Safford on the phone for the purpose of identifying the systems held by those outposts.

[10504] I left a few minutes later, after Captain Safford arrived in Admiral Noyes' office, continuing on my routine delivery of this material in the folders. My presumption was that Captain Safford and Admiral Noyes between them would continue the draft of these dispatches, which apparently became four or five in number. My first-hand knowledge of them is only one, or possibly two.

I can most positively assert that the drafting of those dispatches to our outposts was the result of Admiral Noyes seeing the directives from Japan to diplomatic posts of the Japanese in the Western Hemisphere to destroy some of their systems. There was nothing "winds" whatsoever involved in the drafting of those dispatches.

Mr. Richardson. Have you anything further, Captain?

Captain Kramer. That is in brief the summary of my recent refreshing of memory on this winds problem.

Mr. Richardson. It appears here, captain, that in the Navy file of messages file No. 7001 is marked "Canceled." It so appears in the group of dispatches contained in the Navy Department. Now, was that file, so-called, under your care?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, it was.

Mr. Richardson. Have you anything to advise the committee with respect to the presence in that file of 7001 marked [10505] "canceled"?

Captain Kramer. I believe I can, sir. As I have previously indicated, I saw none of this material, either decryptions or dispatches connected with all this matter, prior to a few weeks ago, with the exception of what was shown me during the course of the two previous hearings at which I testified.

Mr. Richardson. Now, right there: What hearings have you testified in, Captain?

Captain Kramer. Before Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry meeting at Pearl Harbor and last summer before Admiral Hewitt's Board of Investigation.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, proceed.

Captain Kramer. In connection with the cancellation of file No. 7001 I should like to state first that it was not at all an unusual thing to have a canceled file number in that file. There had been frequent previous occasions of such cancellation of file numbers, a number of which appear as a part of this exhibit, I believe 142.

Mr. Richardson. Is there any way you can identify file 7001 as having been connected with any missing winds execute message?

Captain Kramer. Absolutely none, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Is there any significance in connection

[10506]

with those files with respect to the dates of the files preceding 7001 and the files subsequent to 7001?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, there is. Turning to the part of Exhibit 142 headed “Study of JD-1 #’s to determine relationship between date of message, date of translation, and JD-1 #”, there is this listed in sequence: File Nos. 6975 through 7125.

It was the practice in my office commencing, I believe, some time early in 1941 not to stamp file numbers on the messages until just before we were to make delivery in these folders I have described. Before numbers were stamped on these translations all messages were arranged chronologically.

The primary purpose of that chronological arrangement was the fact that oftentimes in the same folder there would appear messages which were referenced in other messages in that folder. It was primarily to facilitate locating in that file those messages that this arrangement was instituted.

At one time earlier, when we were in the habit of assigning a file number as soon as a translation was completed, we added to the folder on the gists which were for many months in use a serial number of that folder, one to the highest numbered messages in that folder, to facilitate precisely that same cross referencing. This numbering of translations just prior to dissemination eliminated that necessity.

[10507] You will note, I think, that in every one of those sequence all numbers which have been blocked out by the office that prepared this study are in chronological order, with the exception occasionally of one or two at the end of that sequence. Because of that chronological arrangement and because, further, of the fact that there was an understanding in effect for a year or more between the Army and Navy on allocation by dates of effort on this material, all the even numbers, with few exceptions, are Army translations, all the odd numbers are Navy translations. They so appear blocked together.

Turning to 7001 that blank file appears as the second number in a block of six other messages—correction, five other messages—dated November 28, Army translation date. From that point alone I am thoroughly convinced that by no stretch of the imagination could that blank 7001 possibly have been any message of December 3, 4, 5, or 6, winds message or not.

Mr. Richardson. What is the significance, Captain, of the absence on 7001 as it appears there of any initials?

Captain Kramer. The initial would appear only if there were a translation. The initial merely means who translated the message identified in this exhibit by date and file number.

Mr. Richardson. The initials, therefore, would give no

[10508] information as to whether or not the particular paper in a particular file was a genuine paper; it would be simply a question—

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir; no, sir. It would be purely an indication in which office, of which office translated that message.

Mr. Richardson. Now, was it your understanding, Captain, that there was in a particular office of the War Department a precise opposite, if I may call it such, of all of the documents that appear in such a file in the Navy offices?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. That is, if there was a document that originally was 7001 that was abstracted from the Navy file, there would still be in the Army at a proper place as an opposite the true 7001 dispatch?

Captain Kramer. If there were a 7001 file number translation it should have been in the Signal Intelligence Section numerical files; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Then if one wanted to delete for any purpose one of these files of a particular number, in order to make the deletion complete there would have to be a corresponding deletion from the Army files?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, one or two further questions. You testified that when this message came on this morning when it was taken to Captain Safford were you asked to deliver any message—deliver that message anywhere that morning?

Captain Kramer. I most certainly was not, sir.

Mr. Richardson. If that had been an execute winds code message as has been contended, would it have been your duty at a proper time during that day to have distributed that message to the proper recipients?

Captain Kramer. If such a message came into my section, it would in the normal routine have been translated, typed in two sets of typing, two books, one for Navy and one for Army, and given the usual distribution; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Should there have been in the office a true copy of the message as it was shown to you?

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily, sir; not at all.

Mr. Richardson. How would a record of such a message have been kept?

Captain Kramer. I doubt very much—I think other people more directly connected with it can give first hand and therefore better, testimony in that regard—that any record was kept of these plain-language intercepts. These plain-language intercepts were instituted on a large scale only after the Japanese set up that system, approximately the end [10510] of November. Those intercepts took an appreciable amount of time, not only of the GY watch officers but of my translators and myself. They were coming in, in yards and yards. I would estimate that the total length of those teletypes that came in during that period may have been a quarter of a mile in length or more. In general, they were destroyed after scanning for anything of this winds execute nature.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, if it had been a real winds-execute message would it have been preserved in any way in the ordinary course of the operation of the office?

Captain Kramer. Every paper that came into my section, GZ, from the GY for translation or code recovery was preserved. Every paper that was translated and disseminated had on the thing that was turned over to my section an indication by my chief yeoman, "Translated date" and my recollection is normally the file number on the smooth translation file.

Mr. Richardson. Did you ever take from or delete from any file or record there any messages of any kind, Captain?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. Richardson. Do you know of anyone else doing it?

Captain Kramer. I not only know of no one else doing it, I cannot conceive of any of the people working in my office having done so.

[10511] Mr. Richardson. Did you ever hear at any time that you had to do with the operation of that office that it was claimed that there had been any abstraction of records from the office?

Captain Kramer. Only during this past year, sir, from newspapers.

Mr. Richardson. In connection with this proceeding?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. The preliminaries to this proceeding.

Captain, there never was the slightest doubt, was there, in the minds of anyone connected with the Navy Department, that every effort was being made to monitor as many stations as possible for the purpose, if possible, of getting an execute on some of these winds codes, or secret word codes or the like?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely my understanding, sir.

Mr. Richardson. So can you conceive of any reason why anyone would want to abstract the notices to the stations to monitor for an execute message?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I cannot. In that regard, however, I must add that I have no first hand knowledge of what instructions were sent to our monitoring stations.

Mr. Richardson. Well, one of the things, Captain, in connection with this file that I discussed with you a moment ago which has interested us is the fact that as we examine [10512] this file, we find on some of them the word "CANCELED" with a date and with initials, which would seem to indicate the date and person who canceled that particular sheet, whereas on this sheet which is JD-1—7001, no such initializing appears at all. Is there any further explanation for that except the one that you have given, that a translator's initials were placed—were supposed to appear upon a sheet where there had been a translation?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I have not given a full explanation of the reasons for canceling file numbers. There are a number of reasons, the two principal ones of which would be a duplication of a message that had been previously translated, that duplication not being noted at the time the subsequent translation was made, presumably intercepted by a separate station and a full check was not made when the message was processed for translation. That was one of the primary reasons. There are a number of messages—there are a number of examples of that, I believe, in this thing.

Another principal reason would be for the reasons I have previously outlined, namely, my system of file numbers.

In the case of multipart messages it was our practice to assign the same file number to all parts. There were frequent occasions when we initially got one part of, for example, a three-part message. We might get part 3 first. [10513] Two or three days later we might get part 1; perhaps a week later we might get part 2, or we might not get part 2. Normally, and in most instances, a check was made before these translations were typed to see whether we had previous parts of that same Tokyo serial. If we did, the same number as had been previously assigned was given to that subsequent part.
Mr. Richardson. In your opinion, might that explain the fact that 7001 in this file is not initialed?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; that does not explain that point.

Mr. Richardson. Is there any other explanation you have to offer for the absence of initials?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. I can finish with my answer. I have not finished with my answer yet.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Captain Kramer. As I recollect, the early part of 1941—it may have been the end of 1940—due to the work load and the fact I had only one yeoman, at my request, Captain Safford furnished me with a young Reserve officer, Lieutenant Harrison, as an assistant to me. He at times made certain deliveries of these folders on my instructions. He, after a period of several months indoctrination in the general files of the section, procedure, and so forth, was given responsibility for preparing a daily gist of files which previously I had done myself, usually dictating to my yeoman while going through that file before delivering it. Turning that job over to him relieved me of 1 to 2 hours' tie-up in that purely clerical work daily to devote to other matters.

Lieutenant Harrison, in the process of preparing these gists, sometimes noted these duplications of file numbers as I have already outlined. While he was preparing these gists also he normally had the numerical file at his desk for reference, all the frequent references appearing in the Japanese dispatches. In that respect he had custody of these files, he had a combination to the safe in which those files were kept; my chief yeoman did also.

When he noted such duplication he would make the correction to the files by removing the duplicate translation of a previous one, or bringing together a later part of a multipart message that had already been assigned a file number, thus canceling the number appearing in the file.

Some time during 1941, I do not recall the exact date, which can be determined, we acquired additional office assistance in the form of a young seaman who was in training for the rating of yeoman. He was already a fairly competent typist. He was given general custody of those files in the latter part of 1941. It would be the most natural thing in the world for him to have typed, as 7001 is, a notation about the cancellation of a file number.

I would like to point out specifically one other point in connection with this blank file No. 7001. That is that all the legends appearing on that blank sheet are not typed. Down in the lower left-hand corner there is a notation in handwriting "7001", which I identify, and I am confident that Chief Ship's Clerk Bryant will so identify, as his handwriting. He normally assigned these file numbers to all translations. I think that covers what I have to say on this.

Mr. Richardson. Now, one further question, Captain. You stated that this message that was taken by Captain Safford and as far as you know was to go to Admiral Noyes—had there been any instructions or arrangements or directions given by Admiral Noyes that any message coming as a possible execute on the winds message was to be delivered to him only, so far as you know.
Captain Kramer. That is not my understanding of the instructions. They were not given to me first-hand. My knowledge of that is from my general knowledge of the instructions in effect for the purpose of monitoring this message and the instructions in effect for the purpose of delivering this message by the GY watch officer if it came in.

Those instructions included instructions to the Navy Department communications office and their watch officers that when the GY watch officer delivered phraseology of the character I have indicated as appearing on those cards to him, without questioning the watch officer on the character of the thing or what it meant the Navy Department communications officers were to deliver; I presume, to the usual recipients of this traffic, presumably the holders of these cards, the English text "East wind-rain" or "West windsnow," whatever it was, and that was all.

Mr. Richardson. Then you know of no instruction that required that those messages go to Admiral Noyes personally with the idea that Admiral Noyes would thereafter take care of distributing them?

Captain Kramer. The primary purpose of those instructions, as I understand them, were to take care of this winds system at night, to insure prompt delivery to the usual recipients of these decryptions. In the daytime there was no special provision but presumably the GY watch officer was carrying out those identical instructions at the time he and I went to Captain Safford's office.

Mr. Richardson. Is there anything further that you would like to tell the committee, Captain?

Captain Kramer. I think it has been fairly thoroughly covered, sir.

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions.

[10517] The Chairman. It is now time to recess, and we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. You will be here, Captain, and resume in the morning.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 5:02 p.m., February 6, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a.m., Thursday, February 7, 1946.)

1 Capt. Kramer's testimony is resumed in Hearings, Part 9, p. 3930.

Part 9—February 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946—follows.

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