Given By

Mr. Rosalie E. Wells + John B. Wells
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 11
APRIL 9 AND 11, AND MAY 23 AND 31, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
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JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman

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JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel

(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
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1 Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
2 Sworn statement presented to committee.
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The joint committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in the caucus room (318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel; and Mrs. Flo E. Bratten, executive secretary to the joint committee.

[13709] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Stark, will you come and take the witness chair?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, U. S. NAVY (RETIRED)—Resumed 2

The CHAIRMAN. You have already been sworn, haven't you? Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, in your former testimony my notes show, about page 5812 and again 6099, you were interrogated on the subject of where you were on the evening of December 6.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And you testified, speaking generally, according to my notes, that your date calendar had been disposed of and that you had no recollection which permits you to say where you were on the night of December 6.

Since you testified in that regard, information has been received that during the afternoon of December 6 there was a party given for the Canadian Minister and his wife, at which, according to the information that we have, a number of naval officials of high rank were invited, and among them, you and Mrs. Stark, Admiral Ingersoll and his wife, Capt. Theodore Wilkinson, and others.

I wanted to ask you, Admiral, whether you have any recollection of about that time, or at that time, attending an affair given for the Canadian Minister?

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I do not. I might say, however, as regards our date calendar, our home engagements calendar, that Mrs. Stark

1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.
2 See p. 5512, infra, for corrections in his testimony submitted by Admiral Stark.
3 Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2183 and 2290, respectively.
finally found it, after a long search back for several years. It shows that Canadian party that afternoon, but it does not show whether we were there. Her remembrance is she did not go. I hardly ever went to those parties. Frequently I asked her to go to represent us, but I have not the slightest recollection of going, and I think I did not go.

I might say also with reference to that calendar, that it shows nothing for that Saturday night, but it does show the Canadian party.

Mr. Richardson. My preliminary idea in asking you about that party was that it frequently happens that an afternoon affair is culminated by some of the group present continuing on at other affairs later in the evening, and there has been testimony offered here that during the evening of the 6th the President sought to contact you and was advised, according to his immediate report as to information he received over the telephone, that you were at the National Theater, giving the number of your box or seat, whichever it may have been, and that he then said that he would not disturb you while you were at the theater but would contact you later.

From that information I gathered that during the evening [13712] of December 6 you had attended the National Theater. Upon inquiry I ascertained that the play produced on that evening was the very familiar musical comedy The Student Prince, which is an operatic production which has been extant for many years, and I think every year or 2 years revived, and embraces the tale of a prince who went to college and tried to keep up his college associations, with the usual feminine interludes.

The Chairman. What do you mean "usual"?

Mr. Richardson. The interludes which you and I recall from our college days, but which the Chairman does not.

There are several very celebrated songs in it, and I refer to those things simply to find out from you, Admiral, whether you have any recollection of ever having seen The Student Prince?

Admiral Stark. I remember very clearly having seen a revival of The Student Prince, but I had not connected it with that Saturday night, and I do not now. When I first heard of it, when someone had said I had seen The Student Prince, my recollection was it was in Philadelphia, and I contacted my daughter and her husband who were there, and they said no. The next I heard of it was in connection with Commander Schulz' testimony. It does not ring any bell with me that I was there that night, but I can only assume, in view of the testimony of Commander Schulz and of others who tried to contact [13713] me, and my remembrance of having seen the revival, that I probably was there.

I found out at the theater that they had no way of telling whether I was there or not. They said not, but they told me it was The Student Prince.

Mr. Richardson. Do you have any recollection, Admiral Stark, of ever having seen The Student Prince more than once?

Admiral Stark. Yes; I think I saw it earlier.

Mr. Richardson. We haven't even that help to help us then, have we?

Admiral Stark. No sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, you were living at that time out in Spring Valley?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I was living in the Chief of Naval Operations' quarters.

Mr. Richardson. That is right on Massachusetts Avenue?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. You had at that time always somebody in your home to answer the telephone?

Admiral Stark. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And if it should be that you attended a performance of The Student Prince at the National Theater on the night of December 6, there would still be someone in your home, according at least to your arrangements, to receive information that might come there over the telephone?

Admiral Stark. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Would that person there be someone directly connected with the Naval Establishment?

Admiral Stark. One of the servants, who would be in the Navy.

Mr. Richardson. When you went to your office on the morning of the 7th—the exact time being uncertain—from your own recollection, is it your recollection now that that is the first time you found out there had been a reply by the Japanese to the earlier Hull message to them?

Admiral Stark. That is my very clear and very distinct recollection.

Mr. Richardson. Now before you arrived at your office on the morning of the 7th, had anyone given you any information that there was in existence such a message, or any part thereof?

Admiral Stark. No, sir; to the best of my knowledge and belief there had not.

Mr. Richardson. Well, Admiral, would you be able to state positively that no one either sent you a message or telephoned to you on the night of December 6 or the morning of December 7 telling you of this message, of its receipt or of its contents?

Admiral Stark. That is my belief; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Your visit to your office on the morning of Sunday, December 7, was a routine visit, was it not, Admiral?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. It was just the same kind of a visit that you were accustomed to make to that office every Sunday?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And had nothing to do with any specific dispatch or any specific information concerning which you were interested in seeing or being advised concerning?

Admiral Stark. There was a dispatch—I have forgotten just when it was received, I think the day before but I am not certain—from Admiral Hart. If you will recall, Admiral Turner stated that I called him to get the answer out to Admiral Hart. I do not have definite recollection whatever.

Now whether that dispatch might have come on that morning and I then called Turner, I am not positive without reference to the record, but I think we had it prior to that.

Mr. Richardson. Now you would be able to state positively, would you not, Admiral, that you did not spend any nights away from your residence on Massachusetts Avenue during November or December 1941?
Admiral Stark. I would not state that without a check-up. I do not recall any.

Mr. Richardson. Have you any information of having spent any night away from your residence on Massachusetts Avenue within 2 or 3 days of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Stark. No, sir; nor within 2 or 3 weeks, but occasionally we went and spent a night with our children in Philadelphia.

Mr. Richardson. According to the procedure that you followed in your staff, Admiral, would it have been the duty of any of your staff, upon being advised of the receipt and contents of an important message connected with magic, for any of them to contact you about it?

Admiral Stark. If they had thought it sufficiently important they undoubtedly would have.

Mr. Richardson. Now it appears here in the testimony that on the evening of the 6th, while Admiral Wilkinson was entertaining General Miles and Admiral Beardall at his home socially, the first 13 parts of this so-called 14-part message were delivered to Admiral Wilkinson by Captain Kramer; that the message was read by all of your officers at that dinner, and that their recollection is that Admiral Wilkinson did some telephoning.

I wanted to ask whether under your procedure it would have been expected that upon reading a message of that kind Wilkinson would have been expected to have contacted you?

Admiral Stark. If he considered it sufficiently important. If he were in doubt he might have contacted Ingersoll or Turner, and I believe he did contact Ingersoll, whose testimony, as I recall it, is to the effect that he considered it nothing but a restatement and unimportant, that is unimportant as regards doing anything about it at that time.

Mr. Richardson. But you have no recollection now of having any telephone or other type of communication from any of your staff in connection with this message until late the next morning when you got to your office?

Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now that includes, does it not, Admiral, no information of any kind on the evening of the 6th or the morning of the 7th from either Secretary Knox or from Secretary Stimson, or from Secretary Hull?

Admiral Stark. That is correct. It is all-inclusive.

Mr. Richardson. And you have no information at all, or you had no information at all, did you, Admiral, until after you reached your office on the morning of the 7th, that a meeting had been called between Hull and Knox and Stimson to consider this particular dispatch?

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I did not know of that meeting.

Mr. Richardson. And you do not know to this day of any effort that anyone made in connection with that meeting to advise you concerning it, or ask you to be present at it?

[13718] Admiral Stark. That is perfectly correct.

Mr. Richardson. When did you find out, if you found out at all, Admiral, that these three Secretaries were meeting on the morning of December 7?
Admiral Stark. I do not recollect having found out about it. I might have, because I saw Colonel Knox later in the day, he may have mentioned it, but as to their being together that forenoon, I have no recollection, except as I learned of it subsequently.

Mr. Richardson. Well, you learned of it first after the contact between you and General Marshall had been completed?

Admiral Stark. Well, it was not prior to that.

Mr. Richardson. Yes, I see what you mean. Now, did anyone tell you, or did you receive any information which would disclose to you, that the 13-part message, which had grown to the 14-part message by the time you got to your office, had been exhibited to the President on the night before?

Admiral Stark. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Did you have any information of any kind that upon an examination of that dispatch the night before the President had characterized it in this language, "This means war"?

Admiral Stark. I never heard of it until I heard of it here.

[13719] Mr. Richardson. As Chief of Naval Operations, would such an expression from the President with reference to an intercepted dispatch have been an important item for you to consider in looking over such a dispatch?

Admiral Stark. I would have said yes, provided that were an opinion held after perhaps a second reading and looking over it more carefully, and if I had had anything of that sort I would have taken some action, I would have gone to the office and gotten out a dispatch and seen my advisers, but I had nothing on that evening.

Mr. Richardson. Let me put it this way, if it is a proper question, Admiral: If you had been advised on the night of the 6th of an examination of this 13-part message by the President and his conclusion within the meaning of the phrase "This means war", acquiesced in by his associate Mr. Hopkins, would your itinerary on the morning of December 7 have been changed, so far as going to your office is concerned?

Admiral Stark. I feel certain I would have gone there that Saturday night, if I had had any such intimation.

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, so far as the evening of Saturday, December 6, is concerned, events leading up to it, what occurred during the evening, your recollection cannot help us?

Admiral Stark. That is right.

[13720] Mr. Richardson. But you would be able to say, Admiral, definitely, that you received no communication from the President of the United States on that night?

Admiral Stark. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the President did not call me that night.

Mr. Richardson. Do you think it would be possible, Admiral, for you to have forgotten such an incident had it occurred?

Admiral Stark. Yes, it would be possible, but I think it would not have been possible that I had had the intimation that there was a dispatch down there which was clear-cut and which meant war. While I felt we had every warning that war was coming, we all felt that, we were practically certain of it, nevertheless if there had been anything definitely clinching it of that nature and any such expression from the President, I think I would not have rested until I had seen that dispatch.
Mr. Richardson. Admiral, the testimony on the President’s use of the phone in order to speak to you and his report that you were at the theatre would indicate that he had received information over the telephone from some source that you were at the theater. Now what would have been your usual routine if you did go to the theater, as to leaving information as to where you were going?

Admiral Stark. With the duty officer at the Navy Department [13721] and my flag lieutenant. They would normally have been acquainted with it, as well as at the house.

Mr. Richardson. Do you think it would have been possible—it would have been possible, but do you think it would be at all probable that you went to the theater, if you did go, without leaving that information as to where you were going?

Admiral Stark. It would have been possible but not probable. I never went out of the house at evening without leaving word as to where I was going.

Mr. Richardson. Well, if you went to the theater on that evening, when the theater was over you expect that you went directly home, do you not?

Admiral Stark. After the theater?

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Then you would remain there during the night?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And there were during that night and every night about that time, people in the house who could have answered the telephone if it had rung?

Admiral Stark. Oh, yes; and I had one right at my bedside.

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Admiral, just one question.

[13722] I believe you stated in your former testimony that you regarded the 13 parts of this message, when you did see them the next morning, as routine, or rather as a rehashing of the attitude of the Japanese towards the situation which had been accumulating over a period of weeks or months?

Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes, sir.

The Chairman. And that the 13 parts by themselves carried no implication to you beyond that, that it was a rehashing, a restatement of their attitude; that was your impression when you saw it the next morning?

Admiral Stark. It was; yes, sir.

The Chairman. You stated, I believe, that based upon those 13 parts you did not regard it necessary to give any additional warning.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Because warnings had been given to all the officers, that you regarded as sufficient. If you had seen the 13 parts of that message on the night before, would your opinion of it have been any different from what it was the next morning?

Admiral Stark. I think not. I think my reaction would have been the same as the testimony of, so far as I know, everyone else who was here indicates, that it was not of any urgency, that it was a restatement.

The Chairman. But if you had been called by the President, [13723] or had been communicated with by him following his re-
cipient of that message, and he had told you that he thought that that was leading to war, or that meant war, you would have taken such steps as that incident might have impelled you to take, in view of the President's opinion of it, and in that case you would have gone to the office, or gone down to look at the message and examine it further and see upon what basis the President thought those 13 parts meant war?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. That did not take place?

Admiral Stark. That did not take place. I had no intimation of the President's reaction. I did not know that the President had read that dispatch that night, until it was brought out here before the committee.

The Chairman. Yes. Mr. Cooper.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, as I recall, the effect of your previous testimony was that the first 13 parts of the so-called 14-part message, the 13 parts having been received on Saturday night, indicated nothing to attract any attention about Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Stark. Absolutely.

The Vice Chairman. And as I recall Commander Schulz' testimony to this committee, Pearl Harbor was not mentioned by the President, or Mr. Hopkins, during their discussions on the first 13 parts of this 14-part message.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. Nor did I ever hear anyone else mention Pearl Harbor in that connection.

The Vice Chairman. And the fact that that might have indicated war, there was nothing there to attract any attention or give any indication that Pearl Harbor was involved?

Admiral Stark. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. I thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark. I have no questions.

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark, on the 27th of November, you had already sent out the war warning, had you not?

Admiral Stark. We had; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And you sent this message, and you said in that message "This is a war warning," you sent it to the different Pacific theaters; that is right, isn't it?

Admiral Stark. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. And then the President, sometime prior to December 1, said that he expected we would be attacked probably by Monday, did he not?

Admiral Stark. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. That was previous to December 1?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

[13725] Mr. Murphy. Now we have a Navy man saying that the President saw the first 13 parts and said "This means war." The fact is most of those in high command, if not all of those in high command, were expecting very definitely the possibility of war at that time, were they not?

Admiral Stark. We were. We had sent out warning messages regarding it. The President himself had directed either one or two messages to be sent in that connection.
Mr. Murphy. Were you present at the White House, Admiral, on December 7?

Admiral Stark. No, sir, I was not in the White House, as I remember, on December 7.

Mr. Murphy. We have here the stenographic report on the words of the President of the United States on December 7 before some of the great men of this country. Mr. Chairman, I think those notes ought to be produced by counsel so they can be made a part of the record in this case.

Mr. Richardson. Has not that already been done?

Mr. Murphy. They have not been made part of the record. They should be.

Mr. Richardson. I will wait until we have a chairman here.

Mr. Murphy. You were not present, at any rate, when the leaders of the Senate and House and others were present at the White House with the President on the evening of Sunday, December 7, at which time he discussed the reactions of those in the White House, the reactions of themselves and others in the days preceding December 7?

Admiral Stark. My recollection is that I did not leave my office from the time I got there Sunday morning until early Monday morning.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, on the evening of December 7, 1941, there were certain persons, leading Americans, at the White House, and as I understand it further, there was a stenographic report of the remarks made by the President at that time. In view of the fact that we have seen fit to have a witness come here to tell what the President said on the 6th of December, I think that the remarks of the President on the 7th of December 1941 ought to be made a part of the record.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest, we are now having that full stenographic report mimeographed for introduction as an exhibit, largely in connection with the Stimson statement, because it much more directly relates to that than it does to this witness’ testimony.

Mr. Murphy. The one I have reference to consists only of about 4 pages, or maybe 5 and maybe 6 at the most.

Mr. Richardson. There is only one and that is the one we are having mimeographed.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, I think that should be made a part of the record. I will not press it now, but I think it ought to be made a part of the record at some time.

The Chairman. That will be presented to the committee for inclusion as an exhibit, as I understand.

Mr. Richardson. Yes; as soon as it is mimeographed.

The Chairman. All right. Is that all?

Mr. Murphy. That is all.

The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, did not your duty officer at your office have a log where he entered all telephone calls if you were not there, so that the next day, or at the time you would come in, the log would indicate who called and if they had a message?
Admiral Stark. I think not. If there had been a message or anything definite to be brought to me he undoubtedly would have told me, but I know of no log kept by the duty officer. There may have been one, but I just do not recall it.

Senator Ferguson. Is not that the ordinary practice in the Navy, that if you have a watch officer he keeps a log?

Admiral Stark. Of anything worth while; yes, sir.

[13728] Senator Ferguson. Would not a communication from the President of the United States on Saturday evening, December 6, to be a worth-while item to enter in a log if you were not there and a telephone call was made to your duty officer to reach you?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I would say so.

Senator Ferguson. You would say that would be worth while, would you not?

Admiral Stark. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever looked for such a log?

Admiral Stark. No; I have not.

Senator Ferguson. Counsel, or Mr. Masten, do you know whether or not there has been a search for such a log?

Mr. Masten. They gave us a list of the people who were in the office, and that is in the record.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I ask you now that counsel request that an examination be made to see if there is such a log.

Did you have naval aides at your home?

Admiral Stark. Have what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Naval aides.

Admiral Stark. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you just have civilian servants working for you personally or were they Government employees?

Admiral Stark. I understood your question to say did I have naval aides.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. I was thinking of that, when you said that, of my flag secretary. The servants were Government servants.

Senator Ferguson. What classification in the Navy would they have?

Admiral Stark. Mess attendants, steward, cook and mess attendants.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a secretary or anyone like that at home?

Admiral Stark. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Anyone to take phone calls?

Admiral Stark. The boys—they were intelligent, good boys, would take a telephone call.

Senator Ferguson. Were they Filipino boys?

Admiral Stark. No, sir, they were colored.

Senator Ferguson. And you do not recall getting any message from any servant?

Admiral Stark. No; I do not.

Senator Ferguson. About a call from the President?

Admiral Stark. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any calls from Kramer?

Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Captain Kramer?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a policy or a plan that you were going to undertake if war actually came? You had one of these cards, did you not, that you could be telephoned on the winds message? Do you recall that?

Admiral Stark. No; I do not recall any card with regard to being telephoned on the winds message.

Senator Ferguson. A memorandum that “East wind rain” meant war?

Admiral Stark. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You never saw such a card?

Admiral Stark. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Or memorandum?

Admiral Stark. No, sir. If anything important on that would have come in I would have been notified, but I was given no card.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you knew that they were alerted to the receipt of a winds message?

Admiral Stark. I know it now, and I testified that my recollection on the winds message was not clear, except to the extent that it was my belief that an implementation of the winds message never came in. We covered that.

Senator Ferguson. I want to go further than that. I want to know what you knew about the fact that your Department was expecting a so-called winds message which would indicate certain things, as set out by the Japanese messages. You are familiar with those messages now that we have had them here?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now will you state to the committee what you knew about that set-up? Did you know anything about it?

Admiral Stark. I know what it is now. I do not recall being familiar with the details of that set-up at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Now if it was important enough for your staff under you to arrange it so that any member could be called on the phone and he would have in his possession information that he could tell what they were talking about without giving away any secret—in other words, the testimony now indicates that if your inferior officers had called you on the telephone and said, “Admiral, East wind rain”, that that had a significant meaning and that you would have known that that was a reply to the wind code message.

Admiral Stark. I do not recall having that at that time. My office was about 10 minutes from the Navy Department and any message could have come up there very quickly. I say 10 minutes, but maybe 15, say, at the outside.

Senator Ferguson. I know, but you also were out of the Navy office at times.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you do not recall any such set-up, as far as you are concerned?

Admiral Stark. No, I do not.
Senator Fergusó. Then I take it you had no policy or plan as to what the Navy would do at the time you received a winds intercept?

Admiral Stark. No, we had no special policy or plan if the winds message had come in showing a break, for example, or strained relations because we already had them.

Senator Fergusó. I see. But the Dutch themselves said that the winds code would mean war. Did you know that?

Admiral Stark. I have heard it since. I do not recall at that time of having any interpretation of the winds message, the meaning war. It has been much discussed since then.

Senator Fergusó. What I am trying to get at is if the President did come to the conclusion Saturday night that, reading the 13 parts and the other messages connected with it, this meant war, as the Dutch had interpreted the winds code message, if it was received, would mean, the Navy Department of the United States of America had no plan as to what they would do upon the happening of that event, is that true?

Admiral Stark. That is true. We had a plan in case of war, which of course, you are all familiar with, and when war [13733] came we simply sent out the execute of that plan.

Senator Fergusó. Now, Admiral, you say that relations were very strained on Saturday and Friday?

Admiral Stark. I certainly would say so; yes, sir.

Senator Fergusó. Yes. Did you have a plan that if you received word, or something that would indicate that America was going to war, that the United States Navy had a plan that you were going to do something, that you would act?

Admiral Stark. Well, we had already sent in the war warning an alert against the possibility of war. Until the clash came we had nothing else. When the clash came we were fully covered.

Senator Fergusó. In other words, you felt that the message of the 27th was your full plan and that you had no part to take, that you had no steps to take until war actually broke out?

Admiral Stark. That is correct. We considered we had fully alerted them with the directives which were given both by the Army and by ourselves.

Senator Fergusó. Well, how do you explain the calling of the meeting Sunday morning in your office of the various officers?

Admiral Stark. I do not recall it.

Senator Fergusó. Was there such a meeting called?

Admiral Stark. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief. [13734] That has also been covered, I believe, in previous testimony.

Senator Fergusó. Were there various officers assembled in your office Sunday morning?

Admiral Stark. Not that I recall, except those that came in on routine business, and with the message, but as for a meeting that morning, a regularly scheduled meeting, I think it did not take place.

Senator Fergusó. Well, do I understand from the testimony that you gave to Mr. Richardson, the counsel, this morning, that your mind is rather a blank on what took place Saturday afternoon and Saturday night?

Admiral Stark. As regards the 13-point message; yes, sir.

Senator Fergusó. Well, as to where you were?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and as to where I was, except that I was in the office Saturday afternoon.

Senator Ferguson. Would it do any good to try to refresh your memory on the people that were at this party? I think we have a list.

Admiral Stark. No, it would not, I can tell you that in advance. My opinion is and my belief is that I was not at that party.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know the naval attaché from Canada, Mr. and Mrs. Brodeur? Do you know them?

Admiral Stark. Yes; I think I knew them.

[13735] Senator Ferguson. Did you know the McCarthys?

Admiral Stark. Well, I knew so many people of slight acquaintance that I would remember their faces and perhaps not their names.

Senator Ferguson. Suppose you look at the society column in the Sunday Star. Admiral (hanging document to Admiral Stark).

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you just look and see whether or not the write-up on that party would in any way refresh your memory?

Admiral Stark. I would like to say as regards parties, Senator Ferguson, that in a very recent important party to which I had been invited, and at which I was not present, but the press having the list put me down as one of the important persons there.

Senator Ferguson. I did not mean to prove by the fact that the press listed you as being there, that you were there, but I thought that the write-up of the society editor would give you some information that would refresh your memory as to being at that kind of party.

Admiral Stark. I will gladly read it, sir.

Mr. Murphy. For the record, the Star you mentioned is the Washington Star?

[13736] Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. You referred to the Star.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; the Washington Star.

Admiral Stark (after perusing document). No, it does not. It says I was there, but my knowledge on reporting things of this sort does not make that at all conclusive.

Senator Ferguson. Would the fact that the Minister from the Commonwealth of Australia, Mr. Casey and Mrs. Casey, are listed there, would that in any way refresh your memory?

Admiral Stark. No, sir. I knew Mr. Casey quite well. I saw him frequently.

Senator Ferguson. So that does not refresh your memory in the least?

Admiral Stark. It does not. There were many such parties, to which I did not go generally.

Senator Ferguson. We have some more information on the question as to what happened Saturday. I want to know whether or not you were consulted by the President in relation to a message received from the Prime Minister, sent to the President of the United States, in relation to a message to be sent by the British Government and the Dominion Government. I will show you that document and let you read it.

(The document was handed to Admiral Stark.)

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel want to offer that in evidence now?
Mr. Richardson. I think it would probably be just as well, if it suits the Chairman, to have it included in the record.

The Chairman. Is this the document on our desks here?

Mr. Richardson. Yes. It might be included in the record instead of making it an exhibit.

The Chairman. Dated December 7, 1941?

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. I will read it into the record, or suppose we let Mr. Masten read it into the record?

Mr. Masten. I think the record should show in addition, Senator, the covering letter from the State Department, which reads as follows:

Dear Mr. Richardson: In further reference to Mr. Masten’s memorandum of February 23, regarding the clearance of certain documents, the British Government has now notified us that clearance has been obtained for documents numbered 6 and 8. We are informed, however, that the Australian Government has requested that document No. 8 should only be released together with a paraphrase of a telegram from the Australian Minister of External Affairs relating to this document. A paraphrase of that telegram as received from the British Embassy is therefore [13738] enclosed herewith.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ Herbert S. Marks
Herbert S. Marks
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Senator, do you want me to read this?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, you may read that.

Mr. Masten. The documents enclosed are as follows, and the first is a memorandum dated December 7, 1941, which appears to have been on stationery bearing the British seal, and reads as follows:

The Prime Minister would be very glad of any comments which the President may have on the attached draft of a declaration to the Japanese Government. The Dominion Governments have yet to give their views on this text. They are being consulted urgently.

The Netherlands Government have been given a copy of the draft.

The next one is:

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have been instructed to make the following communication to the Imperial Japanese Government on behalf of His Majesty’s Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, the Commonwealth [13739] of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa.

His Majesty’s Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa have followed closely in consultation with the United States Government the negotiations in which the latter have been engaged with the Japanese Government with a view to relieving the present tension in the Far East. His Majesty’s Governments viewed with the same concern as the United States Government the rapidly growing concentration of Japanese forces in Indo-China which prompted the enquiry by the United States Government to the Japanese Government on December 2nd. They have found Japanese reply to that enquiry extremely disquieting. However valid the explanations in regard to North Indo-China as to which they expressfully reserve their views the reply entirely fails to explain the fact that the bulk of Japanese forces are stationed in South Indo-China and are being constantly and heavily augmented.

There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-China and this concentration in South Indo-China is only explicable on the assumption that the Japanese Government are preparing for some further aggressive move directed against the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya or Thailand.

Relations between the Governments of the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands Government are too well known for [13719] the Japanese Government to be under any illusion as to their reaction to any attack on terri-
tories of the Netherlands. In the interest of peace His Majesty's Governments feel it incumbent upon them however to remove any uncertainty which may exist as regards their attitude in the event of attack on Thailand.

His Majesty's Governments have no designs against Thailand. On the contrary preservation of full independence and sovereignty of Thailand is an important British interest. Any attempt by Japan to impair that independence or sovereignty would affect the security of Burma and Malay and His Majesty's Governments could not be indifferent to it. They feel bound therefore to warn the Japanese Government in the most solemn manner that if Japan attempts to establish her influence in Thailand by force or threat of force she will do so at her own peril and His Majesty's Governments will at once take all appropriate measures. Should hostilities unfortunately result the responsibility will rest with Japan.

These two documents, Senator, came from President Roosevelt's file.

Senator Ferguson. I asked that they be cleared, and then, as I understand it, before they could be cleared the Australian Government insisted upon attaching the paper that you read now.

Mr. Masten. That is correct.

[13741] Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield for the purpose of making an explanation?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Were those produced by Miss Tully some months ago?

Mr. Masten. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. But we were waiting for clearances until just recently.

Mr. Masten. That also is correct. The final document is the paraphrase of a telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom, which is the telegram referred to in the letter to Mr. Richardson from the State Department, and is as follows:

Subject to conditions that President gives prior approval to text of warning as drafted and also gives signal for actual delivery of warning, we concur in draft as a joint communication from all His Majesty's Governments. I point out that message from Australian Minister at Washington just received notes that,

1. President has decided to send message to Emperor.

2. President's subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by him from the [13742] Emperor by Monday evening,

(a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening.

(b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday morning, i.e. after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, my question on that is: Were you ever consulted by the President of the United States in relation to that document, the one first read?

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that I was, Senator Ferguson. We often talked over the Thailand situation, and that entire area, but as to this specific document, I do not recall that I was ever consulted by the President with reference to it.

Senator Ferguson. You were the Chief Naval Officer and it would be very important. If any steps were to be taken, you were the man that would take them, isn't that true?

Admiral Stark. Well, I would be very much interested, along with the Army. He may have talked that over with me. I recall so much conversation with reference to that whole area that I do not pin
it down to that specific document dated the 7th of December, and to which the reply would be made after the 7th.

[13743] Senator Ferguson. This does not state that a reply would be made necessarily after the 7th, unless you relate it to the last page.

Admiral Stark. I was relating it to the last page; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The first item—now, this would indicate it was prior to 9 o'clock on the 6th of December, because the message to the Emperor was sent at 9 o'clock or shortly after, on the 6th of December 1941, and it appears that the Australian Minister had a message from the President to this effect, "President has decided to send message to Emperor." That would indicate that it was not sent, that he had decided to send it, and prior to sending it he had notified the Prime Minister, or the Australian Minister, which would be Mr. Casey.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the President had decided to send that message prior to its being sent on the night of the 6th?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I recall the talk of the President sending a message to the Emperor. I did not see the message beforehand, as I recall, but it had been discussed when I was present.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long before the 6th—or was it on the 6th—that you discussed it with the President?

[13744] Admiral Stark. I think that message to the Emperor was discussed some days before, as I remember. I have forgotten just when.

Senator Ferguson. The next item, "President's subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by him from the Emperor by Monday evening" that he would do certain things, first, "he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening." Did the President consult you in relation to that?

Admiral Stark. I do not recall it.

Senator Ferguson. That would be a very important matter, would it not?

Admiral Stark. It would be a very important matter.

Senator Ferguson. That he was going to send the message?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And then he was going to wait until Monday evening as to whether or not a reply was made by the Emperor, and if no reply was made, that he was going to issue his warning. That would be a warning to Japan, I take it, on Tuesday afternoon or evening.

Admiral Stark. It would be a very important State Department matter in that sphere, and, of course, we would know of it. We might not necessarily be particularly consulted about it beforehand, although I do recollect the thought of a message to the Emperor.

[13745] Senator Ferguson. When we were on the verge of war a diplomatic move would be very material to the Navy, would it not, and you would not be consulted with relation to that?

Admiral Stark. Not necessarily. It would be very important, but the President's principal adviser in that connection was Mr. Hull, and while we would probably learn of it, we would not necessarily be consulted.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand that you had practically washed your hands of the matter 10 days before and had sent a warning and were just sitting and waiting until something happened?

Admiral Stark. No; I do not mean to convey that at all. We were intensely interested. When you ask me if the President would not consult me as regards that message, he might and he might not have.

Senator Ferguson. Had not Mr. Hull told you and General Marshall sometime before that he was through, that it was up to the Navy and Army?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you do not recall being consulted by anyone, or hearing about “We will wait until Tuesday afternoon or evening before we will reply,” or something of that sort?

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that point at all; no, sir. [13746] I might have known of it, but I do not recall.

Senator Ferguson. Then the (b) “warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday morning, i.e., after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington,” that is the President’s own warning.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I do not think. Senator Ferguson, that because Mr. Hull stated he had washed his hands of it and it was now up to the Army and Navy, that that would in any sense indicate that Mr. Hull would not be the primary adviser of the President on anything of this sort, and would not continue to be until war actually broke.

Senator Ferguson. Was not this to be a military or naval decision, if a warning like this was to be given? I take it from the original, that is, the original memorandum from the Prime Minister of Great Britain, that they were talking about an ultimatum, they were talking about real action, they were going to warn Japan and she could not move any further, and therefore if you wanted to stop the movement by an army or a navy, you would have to stop it not by diplomacy, you would have to stop it by might. You and General Marshall controlled the might of the United States, did you not?

Admiral Stark. Well, we fight for peace after it has been lost by diplomacy and not beforehand. I would consider that the message which went out would be diplomatic and would be a [13747] state matter from the State Department political angle, and that that would be primarily their responsibility.

Senator Ferguson. You were controlling the Navy. Would not you have to be ready that if this warning was sent it might and could possibly mean war, and that war might or could possibly start immediately, and therefore a new alert, something new would be necessary?

Admiral Stark. Not to my mind; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You do not think so?

Admiral Stark. No, sir. We felt we were fully alerted. Our plans were ready, if war broke, in all theaters.

Senator Ferguson. Now I have another item here. I show you a message from OPNAV, which was your Department, to CINCAF, which was sent about noon prior to the attack on the 7th. Would you just read that and tell me if you know anything about it? I received that March 6 from counsel. It was requested prior to that but was sent to me on that day.

(The document was handed to Admiral Stark.)
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield before we go on to another subject?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I wonder if there is anything to show that this suggested paper, which has been read into the record, was ever sent by the British Government?

[19748] Senator Ferguson. Yes; the first sheet shows that the British Government sent it to us.

Mr. Murphy. No; but I mean to Japan. Did the President send that message to Japan?

Senator Ferguson. No, it does not show.

Mr. Murphy. This is just a tentative suggestion, isn't that right?

Mr. Masten. That is correct, so far as we know.

Mr. Murphy. So far as you know, there never was a message sent by the British to Japan?

Senator Ferguson. I would like to say here, Counsel, Mr. Hull nowhere in his statement mentions this item. So far the records have not shown that any message was delivered to the Australian Minister, or that the President had decided to do what is set forth here by the Australian Minister. I wish you would now check the records of the Secretary of State and White House to ascertain what memorandum we have about what the President had determined to do, when he determined to do it, and when the messages were sent, and when this message was sent to the Australian Minister. I think that is very important in this record.

Mr. Masten. We will be glad to do that. I think if there were any further documents in the State Department about that they would have turned it over in response to the numerous [19749] requests we have made to them, and the request which was made originally to them. We can ask them again.

Senator Ferguson. I just cannot conceive of the fact that our Government would send this kind of message to the Australian Minister and keep no memorandum of it. Our State Department functions in the way we have been shown by the record, that of anything that is done a memorandum is made.

Mr. Masten. Senator, this is not a memorandum from our Government.

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that very much. It comes from the Australian Government, but it indicates clearly that the Australian Minister had this information from our Government, and I have never known our Government to give verbal information; they would make a memorandum of what they had given to another Government. Governments do not function along that line. For that reason I ask that the Secretary of State's office again be asked for this information.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield just for the one matter of the insertion in the record?

Senator Ferguson. There would be a memorandum of a conversation, because if they have a conversation they make a memorandum of it.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes: I will yield.

[19750] Mr. Murphy. Don't you think the record should show what you are reading from is a paraphrase of a telegram from the
Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom?

Senator Ferguson. That has already been read into the record.

Mr. Murphy. I do not believe it has.

The Chairman. I would like to ask one question about this. The first paper you read is dated December 7. That is the day on which the attack was made, and it refers to the papers that were read later.

Now obviously that message, that memorandum was made before the attack, otherwise it would have no purpose whatever, and when the attack came of course it vitiated and nullified all this talk of what was going to be done in that suggestion.

Does the record show at what time that memorandum was received or made or sent? It must have been on the morning of the 7th.

Mr. Masten. There is nothing on that shown in the document. We have photostats of the original here.

The Chairman. It is obvious it must have been made before the attack.

Mr. Masten. That is correct.

The Chairman. There would be no point to sending it after [13751] the attack, because the whole situation had changed.

Mr. Masten. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. There is only one date, Mr. Chairman, on this entire photostat, and that is in the first memorandum, the first note of the Prime Minister, that bears the date on the bottom of December 7.

The Chairman. It bears the date December 7, and it refers to these other documents you have read, and it seems obvious to me that all this must have happened on the morning of the 7th before the attack, because there would have been no point in having such documents or making any such suggestions or recommendations after the attack became known.

Senator Brewster. Will the Senator yield?

The Chairman. Yes. I am just trying to straighten this out here.

Senator Brewster. When you say it all transpired earlier, it appears that the message from the Prime Minister of the Dominion Government could have been 1, 2, or 3 days earlier. It does not appear as to the date that message was submitted to our Government on the 7th, and there also appears no time on the paraphrase of the telegram. Do you know why that is? Why should not we have the day and time of that?

Mr. Masten. I understand we asked the State Department for that date.

[13752] The Chairman. This December 7 document, the only one that has any date on it, must have been submitted to the President on that day, because it says the Prime Minister would be glad to have any comments which the President may have on the attached draft. Whenever that other draft was written does not seem to appear.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think it is material if you look at the original photostatic copy, the first sheet, which is a small paper from the British Embassy. It is mimeographed and therefore does not show it. At the top of it it has the seal of the British Government, indicating that they attached the sheet sent to our State Department, or to the President, the next two sheets. But the sig-
significant part of that is that the last page indicates the negotiations were going on with Australia prior to that, because the President had not sent his message to the Emperor until the night of the 6th, and this says, "The President has decided to send a message to the Emperor." It would indicate that he had not sent it, that he had just decided to send it, and that this is what he is going to do after it goes, he is going to wait until Monday.

I think it is very material that we get all these dates.

The Chairman. That was all thrown out the window by what happened at noon Sunday, which must have been not very long after this thing was delivered to the President, because it was delivered to him on the morning of the 7th. There seems to have been a confusion there as to the time. I do not know that it makes much difference when these other papers were drafted. They were evidently submitted to the President on the 7th.

Mr. Richardson. My view, and the interpretation we have made at our office of it was that this proposed dispatch from the British Government to Japan, consisting of two pages here in this photostat, was a document prepared by the British Government without date, for the purpose of being transmitted to the President. That is the idea the British Government had as to what the President might do, and as to its reliance on it. That, in connection with the preparation of this document by the British Government, the Australian Minister for External Affairs put a condition on his agreement to it. Then that added to the other was to be presented to the President.

Now, it seems perfectly clear that it was intended to be presented to the President, and it seems perfectly clear that before the Australian Minister made up his dispatch the President had not yet sent his message to Japan.

The Chairman. He had not received these papers, either.

Mr. Richardson. The Australian Minister must have received the proposal of the British Government, because a part of the Australian Minister's answer is that the President has decided to send a message.

Now, apparently they were not through with contact with the Dominion Government at that time, at the time this first note of December 7 was made, because of the recital that the Dominion governments have yet to give their views on this text. Consequently, it would seem as though the thing was all tentative and was to be crystallized when the President issued his message to Japan.

The important thing about it, from our standpoint, was the second clause, which indicates a knowledge on the part of the Australian Minister of what the President proposed to do if he received no reply from Japan.

Now, the interesting thing is, or was, to us as soon as we saw this, which was recently, and that is where did the Minister from Australia get his authority to state what the President's procedure was to be? Now, if that was a conversation between him and the President, then we have to look in the Presidential files possibly for the basis for that conversation.

If the State Department had anything to do with it I am satisfied we would find in the State Department records a memorandum of the President's procedure, but until this Australian document came in we found nothing that indicated any procedure on the
part of the President at all after his message. Of course, it is true that before any of it could be crystallized into action the attack came about; but that still does not dispose of the question as to whether the President had made up his mind as to what he intended to do.

[13756] Mr. Clark. I would like to ask, counsel, if you have any evidence that the President ever saw these papers before he sent his message to Japan.

Mr. Richardson. These papers came to us from Miss Tully in answer to our request that she take from the Presidential records anything that had any reference to Pearl Harbor.

So they went to the President. There is nothing to indicate here that the President saw them before the Pearl Harbor attack.

Mr. Clark. I mean before he sent his message to Japan, to the Emperor.

Mr. Richardson. There is nothing in these papers to indicate that the President saw any of these documents before he made his address to the Emperor.

Mr. Clark. Then what is the significance of them here?

Mr. Richardson. The only significance—I won't say the only significance—but the sharp significance to us, Mr. Congressman, was that Australia seemed to have learned from the President that if the Japanese did not reply to the prospective message that President Roosevelt was to send to the Emperor, that President Roosevelt had determined that he would issue the Presidential warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening.

Up to now we have had no such information from any source.

[13757] Mr. Clark. But he did actually send it on the 6th?

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Mr. Clark. The night of the 6th.

Mr. Richardson. He sent it on the 6th. Now, did he receive a reply to his message to the Emperor?

Mr. Murphy. Not until after the attack.

Mr. Richardson. Then before he could act on it, under the procedure identified by the Australian Minister, presumably the attack on Pearl Harbor came about.

The Chairman. The message sent on the night of the 6th was not the warning contemplated by these papers.

Mr. Richardson. That is right.

The Chairman. His message was more in the nature of an appeal.

Mr. Richardson. That is right.

The Chairman. Not a warning. These papers indicate that if he got no reply by the following Tuesday, he then would issue to the Japanese Government what was regarded as a warning.

Mr. Richardson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. The attack cut that all off.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I don't think the record should stand as it now stands, that the Australian Minister knew facts and circumstances that the Secretary of State of the United States did not know. For that reason I would like to clear up as to whether it is possible that the Australian Minister in Washington knew these facts set forth which our own Secretary of State didn't know, and which the American people haven't known until this morning.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. I think that we ought to look into the facts in the Secretary of State's office to see whether that is possible.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to inquire whether, since this has been known long enough for us to have clearance from the British Government, if counsel, or anyone has asked the State Department that specific question, or Summer Welles, as to their knowledge as to this particular document.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Welles was examined in detail.

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that we had to wait until counsel got clearance through the State Department.

Since it was known that it was going to be introduced, has the State Department or Mr. Welles, formerly with the State Department, been asked this question, as to whether the American State Department knew about it?

Mr. Masten. That question has not been asked.

[13759] Mr. Murphy. I don't think it is a fair inference to say that our State Department did not know, and that it was not known by the American people until this morning, then.

Mr. Masten. I think perhaps the record should show where the documents came from, and when.

The two British documents were found in the President's file by Miss Tully, and were not found in the State Department files. They were in the papers that were submitted to the committee informally several months ago, and it was decided to request a clearance. That request was made as soon as the instructions were given by the committee.

Clearance was not given until this letter from the State Department was received, last Friday, I believe. It is undated, but I understand that it came in the office last Friday. And the reason clearance was held up was because the British Government advised the State Department that they wanted to submit this document to the Dominions—because the first memorandum says the Dominions were being consulted at the time it occurred. The documents were then mimeographed and were distributed here this morning.

Senator Ferguson. So the record may be clear, I don't purport to state what the Secretary of State knew. I merely stated that our record up to date indicates that he didn't know this, and that is why I think he ought to have a chance [13760] to look into it.

The Chairman. Counsel will inquire of the State Department any further facts relating to these documents that are on record.3

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, we can prove one fact here this morning, can we not, that the Navy, as far as you were concerned had no knowledge of the contents of these documents that we have been speaking so much about this morning?

Admiral Stark. That is correct, to the best of my remembrance; and after hearing the discussion, I don't think I could be expected to have any, in view of the time and date.

Senator Ferguson. All of this discussion has not refreshed your memory?

Admiral Stark. That is correct.

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1 See p. 5567 et seq., infra, for further information in this connection.
Senator Brewster. May I interrupt?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Senator Brewster. What you say as to the timing, Admiral, is not quite relevant, as, if this document of the Australian is correct, and that a decision had been reached on procedure. That must have been, I would assume, prior to December 7, as the clear implication of the document is that the Australian Government had sent this message to the Prime Minister and had received prior thereto word from the Australian Minister in Washington as to what was contemplated would be done. That [13761] must have been a decision at or earlier than December 6, and would, presumably have been the result of consultations between the responsible authorities, among whom you would be included.

So I don't think you can dispose of the matter by saying it was simply relating to December 7. If there were a decision, it must have been certainly some days earlier.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I see your point.

Senator Brewster. You would agree that that was so?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. It seems to me that this illustrates very clearly the necessity of thorough exploration and the tremendous value of cross-examination—not in any hostile sense, but in simply seeking out all of the relevant material, since we have been on this question now for nearly 6 months and here is something which would appear to be the basis for decision relating to this affair which none of us have been previously advised of, and either the Secretary of State did not know about it, which seems unlikely, or didn't consider it material in his review of the situation.

The result is to leave one pondering how many other documents, or material of this character may still have not been developed.

The Chairman. Before you go on to your next matter [13762] Senator Ferguson, there is a question of procedure that has to be settled.

I have got to be on the floor at 12 o'clock on account of the housing bill, and the members of the House tell me that they have to be over in the House.

The other day you indicated to me that you couldn't be here tomorrow.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct.

The Chairman. And I can't be here tomorrow because I have to be before another committee.

Under those circumstances we cannot hold a session this afternoon. It may have to go over until Thursday morning.

Senator Ferguson. On Thursday I couldn't reach Washington until about 11 o'clock.

The Chairman. General Marshall advises me that he is extremely anxious to return to China on account of the situation that we are all familiar with. He is getting daily requests to return immediately. For that reason I don't like to hold him here longer than necessary.

This is off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Come around then, General. Maybe we can finish with you now.

Admiral Stark, you will be available?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.\(^1\)  
The Chairman. It is very essential that we conclude these hearings at the earliest possible date. Time is running against us. We are all hoping that there will not be another request for an extension of time to make a report.  
But that is another matter.  
Go ahead, counsel.

**TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMIES GEORGE C. MARSHALL**  
(Resumed)

Mr. Richardson. General, where were you living on the 6th and 7th of December 1941?  
Mr. Richardson. The evidence that has been taken here indicates, at pages 2930 and 3091,\(^2\) that your records show nothing to indicate that you were not home on the night and evening of December 6th.  
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.  
Mr. Richardson. There was at all times at your home, people who knew your whereabouts?  
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.  
Mr. Richardson. And who could answer telephone inquiries as to your whereabouts?  
Mr. Richardson. You recall when you came to your office [13764] on Sunday morning, the 7th, seeing the message that was referred to as the 14-parts message?  
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.  
Mr. Richardson. When you first saw that message, it was complete was it not, General?  
General Marshall. It was complete.  
Mr. Richardson. With the 1 o'clock p.m., notice in connection with it?  
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.  
Mr. Richardson. That was the first time, as I understand your testimony, which you already have given, that you ever saw that message, or any part of it?  
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.  
Mr. Richardson. Did anyone at any time prior to your seeing that message, tell you the nature of the intercept which constituted the 14-part message?  
General Marshall. Only to the extent that when I came in from a ride on that Sunday morning of December 7, I was told, either after I got in the shower, or as I went into it, that the officer in charge of the "magic," Colonel Bratton, desired to come out right away to show me an important message. But the contents were not mentioned. The fact that it was important was mentioned. And my reply was that I would reach the Department immediately, not to come out to the house.

Mr. Richardson. Were you first contacted by your aide?  
General Marshall. I had no aide. My orderly gave me the message.  
Mr. Richardson. He gave you the message that Colonel Bratton—— General Marshall. Wanted to come out to the house.

\(^1\) Admiral Stark's testimony is resumed on p. 5202, infra.  
\(^2\) Hearings, Part 3, pp. 1110 and 1174, respectively.
Mr. Richardson. Then your reply was, Colonel Bratton testified, to take it to your office, and that you would come to your office.
Mr. Richardson. The only description of what the message was, was that it was an important message?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Was there any attempt, do you know of any attempt prior to Colonel Bratton's contact with your orderly, to engage your attention in connection with any part of this 14-part message?
General Marshall. I know of no such attempt.
Mr. Richardson. Would there, in your opinion, have been any difficulty in reaching you on Saturday night at your home?
Mr. Richardson. Would you be able to testify definitely, General, that no one did reach you with any message in reference to the 14-part message on the night of December 6th?
General Marshall. No one did reach me in regard to that message.
Mr. Richardson. And when you rose in the morning, went for your ride, you were entirely without any knowledge whatever that any such message, any part of the message, had been received the night before, or that the balance of it had already been received on the morning of the 7th?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardson. There was no communication to you that the 13-part message had been presented to the President?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Or that the President had characterized its nature?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And, so far as you know, no one made any attempt whatever to get information to you until Colonel Bratton attempted to on the morning of December 7th?
General Marshall. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. No further questions.
The Chairman. No questions.
Mr. Cooper?
The Vice Chairman. Just one point, if I may, General.
As I recall, Colonel Bratton testified that he called you home Sunday morning, and talked to your orderly there, and was told that you had gone for your horseback ride and that he asked the orderly if he knew how to get in touch with you and he stated that he did; that Colonel Bratton thereupon requested the orderly to get in touch with you and ask you to go to the nearest telephone and call him; and, as I recall Colonel Bratton also stated that his recollection was that you called him about 10:30 and that he told you that he had an important message that he wanted to show you and that you told him you would be at the War Department in a short time.
Do you have any recollection of having called Colonel Bratton that morning, and having such a conversation?
The Vice Chairman. I thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clark. No questions.
The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. No questions.
The Chairman. Senator Brewster?
Senator Brewster. General, there is just one matter that I wanted to have a little more formally established than was before in your evidence.

It seems to have some significance.

[13768] That is, your expression of opinion—I do not know how casual it was, which appears on page 1149 of the printed proceedings now, page 3,028 of the record, concerning the decision of the Japanese, and this was the language which you used:

Had they—

meaning the Japanese—

not attacked on December 7th, had they waited, for example, until January 1st, there is a possibility that they would not have launched the attack.

That, I assume, represents a rather considered judgment as to, at least, what was a possibility?


Senator Brewster. And that was based, as the context shows, on the events around Moscow, where the German attack was going forward, but the turn came at just about that time.


Senator Brewster. In the early days.


Senator Brewster. The Japanese found themselves then committed.

General Marshall. Yes. It also related to what we were going to be able to do in the interim.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

General Marshall. Between, we will say, the 1st of [13769] December, and the 1st of January.

Senator Brewster. Yes. You and Admiral Stark had both concurred in hoping that decision might be deferred for at least 2 or 3 months.

General Marshall. That was our great desire.

Senator Brewster. Yes. That was the occasion of the discussion of the modus vivendi?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Brewster. And the documents in relation thereto?


Senator Brewster. To what extent was there knowledge in our Department here, and your information, if you have any recollection at this time, as to the imminence of any change in the situation around Moscow at that time, do you recall?

General Marshall. I don't recall what the status of that information was on December 6 and December 7. I recall when the cumulative information came in, we became aware that the change of weather had ruined the Germany Army, in addition to the added troop defense of Moscow. But whether that came to us on that date or later, I couldn't say. The newspaper files could tell us a great deal on that.

Senator Brewster. Did we have intelligence operating at that time regarding those events?
That is, what sources did we have?

[13770] General Marshall. Our sources were largely those that came from the Russian Government in its official communiques.

Senator Brewster. From what?


Senator Brewster. Well, didn't the British have additional Intelligence, as a result of their involvement?

General Marshall. I don't recall whether they gave us anything at that time.

Senator Brewster. But whether they would have had it?

General Marshall. They might have had.

Senator Brewster. My question was as to whether they would have any more means, as they were actively involved.

General Marshall. Yes. I don't know how well their system was built up at that time, but they might have had more.

Senator Brewster. Would there be records as to the interchange of information between our Government and the British Government at the military level regarding the developments prior to December 7?


Senator Brewster. Well, presumably there was a great change after December 7.


[13771] Senator Brewster. What I am concerned with is how far you had gone in developing the interchange of the military information regarding enemy movements.

General Marshall. At that time, I am quite certain that the facts of the British source of information was not known to us—I am quite certain of that, naturally, it was not known to us—but in addition they were not giving us the facts. They were not jeopardizing the source.

Senator Brewster. Yes, and they would probably—

General Marshall. It was quite some time after that, quite a long time after that before they took the risk of telling us exactly what they had. They gave us the sense of the reports, but the actual authoritative statements of what it was, and who said it, we did not know.

Senator Brewster. Would it be a fair inference that prior to December 7, the British were in all probability far better informed regarding events around Moscow, in the month of November than was our own Intelligence?

General Marshall. I couldn't give an opinion on that, Senator Brewster, for the reason that I don't know just when the British accomplished the break-down of the German codes. It was not only a question of breaking it down, but the rapidity with which you could pick up the changes. All of which was a tremendous development. I don't know what that was at [13772] that time. They may have been 3 or 4 weeks behind the events.

Senator Brewster. Didn't the British necessarily have some form of liaison with the Russians during that period?

General Marshall. I don't know that they had any better than we had.

Senator Brewster. They were at war and we were not.

General Marshall. Yes; but after we were in the war we still depended largely on the Soviet communiques for a long time. The Soviet Government didn't trust our security.
Senator Brewster. Yes.

General Marshall. And they were very reluctant to open that up to us.

Senator Brewster. Do you think they may have been equally skeptical regarding the British?

General Marshall. Well, the British have a pretty firm law on the question, which we do not have.

Senator Brewster. That is right.

General Marshall. They have the means of maintaining security which we lack.

Senator Brewster. There might be closer coordination between two nations that were actually involved in war on the same side, and another country which was not.

General Marshall. I was judging that through the back side of my knowledge of our relationships with the Soviet Government later on.

Senator Brewster. Yes. What interested me was the dropping of the modus vivendi around November 26, concerning which Secretary Welles testified, which apparently occasioned some surprise to Lord Halifax, who, as he said, came down quite early the next morning, and wanted to know what happened with the modus vivendi, and was simply surprised that London had indicated the day before that they thought it had better be dropped.

That may have been a very important turning point, if your opinion is correct, if the modus vivendi which, apparently was being very seriously considered, and had been approved by you and Admiral Stark on November 25, I think it was, as adequate to protect our interests, had gone into effect for 3 months, then we should have had exactly the situation you envisaged in your opinion, the Japanese having discovered meanwhile that the Moscow retreat was on, and it might have reoriented their entire view. Would that be a fair inference?

General Marshall. That might be, but as I recall—I am trying to think back to the terms of discussion of that day, and the documents—the Chinese reaction was quite pertinent to the occasion; as I recall that was the most vigorous opposition to the affair, and that the real decision was largely based on that, where we dropped the matter; that the Generalissimo was terribly upset over the psychological reaction to China.

Senator Brewster. Do you recall discussion of the decision to drop the modus vivendi around November 25, when that decision was reached? Do you recall, Secretary Stimson's report to us showed, and Colonel Knox's that some 2 days before they carefully considered this modus vivendi, in conference with you and Admiral Stark, and had decided that it would adequately protect us. Then, Secretary Stimson showed, a day or two later, that that had been dropped. This showed it was on November 25.

Mr. Hull. This was a very full day indeed. At 9:30, Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for 3 months truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all of our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic.

Mr. Murphy. I think you said Mr. Hull. Those are Mr. Stimson's words, aren't they?
Senator Brewster. If I said Mr. Hull, I meant to say Mr. Stimson.  

[15775] Mr. Murphy. I think you did.

Senator Brewster. Yes. This is Mr. Stimson's report of his conference with Mr. Hull and with Colonel Knox.

Now, immediately following that, 2 days later, this was dropped and Mr. Hull reported that they decided to drop the modus vivendi, and were going forward with the document which has been variously discussed as to whether it was an ultimatum or not. Do you recall any conversations following the approval of the modus vivendi as adequate, which, I assume, Secretary Stimson had arrived at after consultation with you, do you recall any conversations following that as to the dropping of the modus vivendi?

General Marshall. My recollection is, and I have a fairly clear recollection of our disappointment, that from the military point of view, meaning Army and Navy, that we would not gain any more time; our relationship to these discussions was on the one side the desire to gain as much time as we possibly could and on the other to see that commitments were not made that endangered us from a military point of view.

Senator Brewster. Do you recall the day you went away?

General Marshall. I left, I think, the night of—I wasn't here the 27th—

[15776] Senator Ferguson. The night of the 26th.

General Marshall. I left the night of the 26th.

Senator Brewster. On the 26th, Mr. Stimson records in his diary:

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over—to tell them that he has no other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected to that proposition—when he showed it to them—that is, to the proposition which he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving to the Japanese a small modicum of oil for civilian use during the interval of the truce of the 3 months. Chiang Kai-Shek had sent a special message to the effect that that would make a terrifically bad impression in China; that it would destroy all of their courage and that they (it) would play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies, and that the Japanese would use it.

A few minutes later I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked him whether he had received the paper which I had sent him over last night about the Japanese having started a new expedition from Shanghai down towards Indo-China. He fairly blew up—jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't seen it **.

[15777] The decision by Hull was, apparently, arrived at in a 24-hour period there, but it is not clear as to the considerations other than the objections of the Japanese—

General Marshall. Chinese, you mean?

Senator Brewster. Yes, the Chinese.

The British message, meanwhile, as I recall it, the only cable we have regarding it, the morning of the 26th, to which Secretary Welles referred, said, speaking of the Chinese opposition,

Isn't this a pretty thin diet?

That was the comment. Now, can you recall any conversations in those 2-day periods, the 25th and the 26th, regarding the dropping of the modus vivendi, which was of, certainly, great significance from your viewpoint, because it, instead of giving you the 3 months that you and Admiral Stark desired, it meant that you might have to face the eventualities in the immediate future?
General Marshall. I do not recall the specific conversations. I do recall our disappointment that the objections made by the Chinese Government had caused the matter to be dropped, as I recall, at the time.

Senator Brewster. Counsel reminds me that there was a memorandum to the President from you and Admiral Stark regarding this period. Do you recall that?

[13778] Senator Ferguson. Dated the 27th of November.

Senator Brewster. What was the date of it?

Mr. Masten. The 27th of November.

Senator Brewster. Have you got it there?

(Exhibit No. 17 was handed to Senator Brewster.)

Senator Brewster. Exhibit 17.

Senator Ferguson. There were two messages that were very similar, one of November 5, which is Exhibit 16, and this, which is Exhibit 17.

Mr. Murphy. November 5 was the one at the time they were going to go into Human Province; the 25th was before you went south?


Senator Brewster. That is a matter of record. Undoubtedly it represents your views on the matter at that time. But you do not recall whether you had any conversations regarding the matter with Mr. Stimson or Admiral Stark on the 25th or 26th following your approval of the modus vivendi?

General Marshall. I would be pretty certain that I did discuss it with Mr. Stimson because we were talking every day a number of times a day, on what was going on.

Senator Brewster. My attention is called to this, I don't know what significance it may or may not have, but on December 7, 1941, in the Sunday Star, Washington, in a review [13779] of the war, there appears this report, apparently summarizing the events of the preceding week:

By Friday, Moscow claimed 4,000 square miles re-won. Berlin admitted reverses but minimized their extent and emphasized Russian losses. Although the present phase of this Red counter-offensive is an early one, the immediate effect is to relieve for the present the threat to the Nazi entrance into the oil areas of the Caucasus.

That, apparently, is the information which we had here. Now, to what extent was consideration of the Russian situation entering into your calculations in estimating probable Japanese actions at that time? Did you at that time think of that as a factor?

General Marshall. I would have great difficulty in giving an accurate answer to that. It was quite evident to us, of course, when the German Army was repulsed, and had to retreat, that there had been a tremendous change in the European situation.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

General Marshall. But until we knew that, until that was conclusively established, and not subject to the suspicion of over-propagandized communiques, we were going along, you might say, from day to day in the general battle. The German advances had been consistent throughout and here came [13780] a turning point.

Until we knew that, of course, I doubt if great emphasis was being placed by us on the current situation in Russia, other than the fact that so far as the Japanese would be concerned, the Russian Army
was imperiled, and, of course, their situation was vastly simplified if the Russian Army was out of the picture because of Manchuria.

Senator Brewster. Yes. Well, to what extent were you revising your estimates of the Russian strength in the light of developments? In the earlier case there had been a pretty general opinion that they probably wouldn’t be able to hold out. As the time went on, I assume your respect for their military potential increased.

General Marshall. Respect for their endurance and their prodigious ability to take losses increased. Later on, beginning with the Moscow incident, our respect for their technical, military capabilities rapidly increased and came to a very decided point with the surrender of the German Army before Stalingrad.

Senator Brewster. This is the memorandum which was referred to, of November 27, when, as I understand it, you were out of town. (Refers to Exhibit No. 17.)


[13782] Senator Brewster (reading):

Memorandum for the President.

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

It must have been prepared—

General Marshall. Prepared on the 26th, I think, after a Joint Board meeting.

Senator Brewster. Yes. That would be coincident with Mr. Hull’s advice to Mr. Stimson that he thought he would drop the modus vivendi, that he would drop that arrangement which had been approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the day before, the 25th, and now he thought he would drop it.

General Marshall. Whether or not that is coincident depends on whether or not we knew the minute that thing was being drafted what the Secretary said.

Senator Brewster. You said you thought it was probably prepared the day before.


Senator Brewster. That happens to be the precise time, November 26, when Mr. Stimson records in the diary,

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day, to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over * * *.

And so, on the 27th, this memorandum goes to the President [13782] signed by yourself and Admiral Stark which emphasizes, apparently, the importance of delay. This is a portion of your language:

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time. Consequently Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines, but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps’ convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence.

Precipitation of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base. * * *
And then you conclude:
It is recommended that:
Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counter-action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens the United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined; ***

This is where you used the latitude:

[13783] However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100 degrees East or South of 10 degrees North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.

That is your reference to the threat.

Continuing your recommendations:
In case of a Japanese advance into Thalland, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken; ***

And, finally:
Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

That, apparently, was what may have been a factor in the President’s decision regarding these warnings, but the thing which is of significance, in the light of all that transpired, is the extent of the British expression of viewpoint on that; that is the thing I think becomes of possible significance in the light of Lord Halifax’s apparent surprise on the morning of November 27 that the modus vivendi had been dropped. Apparently he was not informed of the communications. And Secretary Welles said, “Well, that is not the way London [13784] sounded yesterday,” I think, was his comment on it to Lord Halifax.

Now, do you have any recollection as to any emphasis on the British viewpoint in the situation at that time apart from the Chinese?

General Marshall. I have no recollection.

Senator Brewster. Would that have been a matter that would have come to your attention under any normal circumstances?

General Marshall. Normally, I think I would have heard it from the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson.

Senator Brewster. Now, the report of Secretary Stimson to the committee, which is now before the committee, on page 18, reads:

Later, Mr. Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow. General Gerow was Chief of the War Planning Division. General Marshall was absent, having left the Department to attend certain Army training maneuvers which were going on that day. Both Admiral Stark and General Gerow were urging that any crisis be postponed as long as possible, to enable our preparations to proceed. A memorandum had been prepared by General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President on this subject. The opinion of our top military and naval advisers was that delay was very desirable but [13785] that nevertheless we must take military action if Japan attacked American or British or Dutch territory or moved her forces in Indo-China west of 100 degrees east or south of 10 degrees north. I told them, which was the fact, that I also would be glad to have more time but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the United States or of backing down on any of our principles which would show a weakness on our part.

That represents, apparently, a summary of what went on as far as the War Department and your advice was concerned.
Now, to what extent, since you have ventured an opinion on Japanese psychology and action, in connection with your suggestion that if they had delayed until January they might not have attacked, to what extent would Japanese opinion be affected by knowledge of our contemplated action?

General Marshall. What action are you referring to?

Senator Brewster. There are two hypotheses. One indicated by the President's statement to Admiral Richardson that even if the Japanese attacked the Philippines he wasn't certain that we would go to war. The other, the discussions which indicated, apparently, that this Government had reached the point where we had concluded that if there was an attack on the Dutch or British in the Orient we would be obliged to participate. That was the expression of opinion of the Cabinet, that it would be supported by the people, and it was your opinion you could not allow the Japanese to go any further south or west without taking action. Now, to what extent would the Japanese decision be affected by knowledge as to our contemplated action?

Let us assume first that they knew that we were going to go to war if they attacked Malaya or any portion of that land there. Let us assume on the other hand that they knew we were not going to participate unless we were directly attacked ourselves. To what extent would their decisions as to action be affected by that knowledge?

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. You must also take into consideration our note of August 17 to the Japanese. The note we gave to the Japanese on August 17 stating what our position was.

General Marshall. Japanese psychology being what it is and the Japanese Army domination being what it was, their general scheme for the assumption of power throughout the Far East, particularly the Southwest Pacific, being known now, I don't think that would have had any particular effect one way or the other.

Their misjudging regarding us I think was more a question of our willingness, our energy, our ability to fight effectively. They had misjudged us on that. They thought we would be ineffective after we started to fight, that we could not organize sufficiently to fight effectively.

They felt that we were highly dangerous with our fleet, when it was actually in being, but it requires support, it requires defense of its bases at distant points, which means land troops and means sufficient air forces for a real protection. Beyond that I don't think that they would be deterred from their purpose.

To that extent they would have felt that it was vital that we be isolated out of the war in order that they might go ahead with the obstruction of British power and, of course, the British Empire, and the Dutch, in the Southwest Pacific. That is a rather involved statement.

Senator Brewster. I think it is clear. General. That is, you feel that their estimate of our potential military striking force was so low that they didn't care particularly whether we were in the war or out?

General Marshall. Except as to the fleet.

Senator Brewster. Except as to the fleet.
General Marshall. And they recognized with the fleet that we were incapable at that time, apparently, of furnishing the fleet with a base in the Far East, unless we took Singapore, because, as you recall, and I think the testimony showed, that with, I think it was 26 ocean-going submarines sent to the Philippines, we couldn't even give them 1 antiaircraft gun for coverage.

The matter of Russia would have had dominant importance in their minds because that affected the picture.

Senator Brewster. Because of the Manchurian picture?

General Marshall. Because of Manchuria, and because of the effect that would have on the conduct of the war in Europe, which up to that time had been assumed as a certain eventual German triumph.

Senator Brewster. In other words, you think that the elimination of Russia from the war was something of far more significance to them than the possible participation of the United States in the war?


Senator Brewster. That is, of course, interesting, and in a way complimentary to our Russian friends.

General Marshall. It is a humiliating admission but that was the judgment of the Japanese I think. One of their greatest errors was their misjudgment of our fighting capacity.

Senator Brewster. Yet you would agree that, simply from the immediate military situation, that if they had felt at all sure that they would have had 6 months or a year to carry on their conquests in the Orient without intervention by the United States, they would have felt that was a considerable advantage?

General Marshall. Well, I think they would have felt it was an advantage to conduct that campaign without the intervention of the United States because our naval force that remained after Pearl Harbor was sufficient to enable us to establish bases in Australia.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

General Marshall. Now, the Japanese had appeared with their heavy war vessels in the Indian Ocean, which meant that the line to Australia was very definitely threatened from that side. If the line to Australia was also impossible to establish in the Pacific then the problem of the Japanese in the long run was infinitely simpler.

Senator Brewster. Has there ever been any indication that the Japanese did anything in breaking our codes?

General Marshall. We have had no indication of that.

Senator Brewster. That has been explored?


Senator Brewster. Of course, this is all hypothetical and has no particular relation to the primary purpose here except as the object of this inquiry is to keep us out of another difficulty of this kind, but would this be a fair inference that if the Japanese knew that we were going to intervene in the event of attack on Malaya, they would then recognize that they must, if possible, eliminate our fleet on their flank, and, therefore, strike at the only real potential we then had, which was our fleet?

General Marshall. That is a possible assumption.

Senator Brewster. Well, wouldn't that be, from a military standpoint, almost inevitable, that the Japanese would never dare move out of Malaya if they knew it was going to mean our participation in the war, without undertaking to eliminate the fleet on their flank?
General Marshall. It depends on what you mean by the word "eliminate." They had already established themselves in Indochina. They were stretched, we thought, even then, into Siam. The question was whether they would boldly go with their shipping into the Gulf of Siam. They could have dominated the China Sea in any event. They had Korea to the north of the Philippines. They had the whole China coast and the bulge of Indochina all under their control at that time. We had no bases. If we had tried, at least in limited numbers, to take Singapore, which was the only form of base in the Far East, we would have come under the Japanese air out of Indochina and out of Siam.

So there was a very restricted use for our fleet. We had no base in Guam. Manila was hopeless. It would have been suicide to put the base in Manila. So that whatever operation we did would have to be based back on Hawaii, and the fleet would be out, we might say, most of the time, on the end of a plank, as it were, in its operations.

Under those conditions, the Japanese could have gone ahead. Not as freely as they could if we were severely damaged, possibly not spread out so much as they did if we were not severely damaged, but that might have been to their advantage also, because they got too large an extension of perimeter; but they still could have gone ahead with their affairs with the limitations I have just stated.

But it would be a very difficult thing for the fleet to operate in the Western Pacific without any base of any kind unless it was Singapore. That lacked all the essentials necessary to maintain large ships of the character which we had. And also that would have been under air attack from the Japanese air establishments that already were in Indochina and were, apparently, creeping into Siam.

Senator Brewster. You would emphasize then that the only thing for which the Japanese had much respect, as far as we were concerned, was our fleet?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Brewster. That was at least potential. But all of these considerations and factors entered into your estimate of why you did not expect an attack on Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall. I will say as to the attack on Pearl Harbor, we felt that was a vital installation, but we also felt that that was the only installation we had anywhere that was reasonably well equipped. Therefore, we were not worried about it. In our opinion, the commanders had been alerted. In our opinion, there was nothing more we could give them at the time for the purpose of defense. In our opinion, that was one place that had enough within itself to put up a reasonable defense.

MacArthur, in the Philippines, was just beginning to get something. His position was pitiable, and it was still in a state of complete flux, with the ships on the ocean en route out there and the planes half delivered and half still to go.

The only place we had any assurance about was Hawaii, and for that reason we had less concern about Hawaii because we had worked.
on it very industriously, we had a tremendous amount of correspondence about it, and we felt reasonably secure at that one point.

Therefore we felt that it would be a great hazard for the Japanese to attack it.

Senator Brewster. I hadn’t intended to reopen those questions but only to go into the broader question of your estimate of whether the Japanese attack might be logically expected.

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I read Mr. Stimson’s report this morning, and his summary of the conditions, and that expresses my opinion very well. We had these positive conditions, a little by magic and mainly by reconnaissance of the various movements being carried on in the Far East, so it was quite evident that the most serious intentions were there, which was the case in the general campaign.

Senator Brewster. Hindsight is, of course, easier than foresight. Much more convenient.

[13794] Senator Brewster. In the light of your review now, it would appear that if the advice which you and Admiral Stark had given had been accepted, on November 25, 26, and 27, to enter into the modus vivendi which, it was the considered conclusion of the Army and Navy, including the Secretaries of War and Navy, was adequate to protect our interests, we do not know what the course of history might have been.

General Marshall. No, we do not know what would have happened. You might have had a complete collapse in China which might have had a tremendous effect on the balance of the war.

Senator Brewster. It would be interesting when you have concluded your labors, to know. I address myself to this only for posterity. They have got to gather as much wisdom as they can from our conduct.

General Marshall. I might add there, that is what I am engaged in in China now. This war started out there, and now the desire is to try in some way to arrange it so there will not be a recurrence.

Senator Brewster. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. General Marshall, you have read Secretary Stimson’s memorandum. I want to go to page 12 and ask you if you were notified of this—quoting the Secretary of War:

The President at the meeting undertook to take an informal vote of the Cabinet as to whether it was thought the American people would back us up if it became necessary to strike at Japan, in case she should attack England in Malaya, or the Dutch in the East Indies. The Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would support such a move.

That comes from the diary as of November 7.

Were you advised as to that vote?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of it, but I am pretty certain he must have told me, because he was telling me the results of those meetings.

Senator Ferguson. Then I go to page 27 (page 46) of his memorandum. This is on November 25. This is the day before the Secretary of State sent his message to the Japanese. He is quoting the President:

Then, at 12 o’clock, General Marshall and I went to the White House where we were until nearly half-past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President, instead of bringing up the Victory Parade * * *
He says of the Victory Parade:

This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national action in case of war in Europe.

[13796] Going on:

* * * brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition.

Do you recall that discussion with the President?
Senator Ferguson. How was it thought that we could maneuver them into firing the first shot? Was that discussed?
General Marshall. I don't recall the details of that particular phase of the matter.
Senator Ferguson. This takes place before we sent the message of the 26th.
Senator Ferguson. Or before you had sent your message to General Short on the 27th.
Senator Ferguson. What were we going to do to maneuver them into firing the first shot? What was the plan of operation?
General Marshall. You are talking. I take it, about [13797] diplomatic procedure?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Marshall. I am assuming that it is the diplomatic procedure that is being discussed at the present time. We knew our resources. We knew our deployment. It was impossible to change that on any brief notice. We were committed to deployment thousands of miles away from the United States.

So far as the war plan goes, the concern was whether or not the final alert should be given.

I took a discussion of this kind—at least I take it now—was a discussion of the diplomatic procedure involved, having in mind that it was the accepted thought in all of our minds at that time, that if we were forced to take offensive action, immediate offensive action, that it would be a most serious matter as to its interpretation by the American people, whether we would have a united nation, or whether we would have a divided nation in getting into a world conflict.

Senator Ferguson. But this—
General Marshall. The planning they are talking about is the discussion that came later, as I understood.

Senator Ferguson. You would take it that Mr. Stimson has in mind that we were going to maneuver diplomatically into a position where they would be compelled to fire the first shot?

[13798] General Marshall. No, I don't mean to imply that. I mean the expression he is using relates to what would be the diplomatic procedure we would follow, so we would not find ourselves in a dangerous position where we had to do something initiating a fight. He was not trying to provoke the Japanese to fight.
Senator Ferguson. Let's take his language:

The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.

General Marshall. That is exactly what I said, sir. When you are sitting back and the other man is doing all of the maneuvering, you are in a very dangerous position. The question and the desire at that time was to delay in every way possible a rupture in the Pacific.

Now, if they were going to attack, it was very important—

Senator Ferguson. Right there, General, may I interrupt to ask, were we of the opinion at that time that they were going to attack?

General Marshall. That was the general opinion, that they were going to attack, definitely, in the Southwest Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. And we wanted to lay our course diplomatically so that we would make sure that they would fire the first shot?

General Marshall. So that we would make sure that we would not be in such a dangerous position that we would be forced to fire the first shot ourselves. That is another way of putting it, but that is what he is talking about.

Senator Ferguson. That is one of the things that led to this restricted language in the message of the 27th.

General Marshall. So far as the first shot is concerned; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And also as to—well, the first overt act is the same thing as the first shot.


Senator Ferguson. And that was leading up to that message; is that correct?

General Marshall. No, this was leading up, as I understood it, and as I recall it, to what the diplomatic procedure was to be. The alert, to a certain extent, you might say, is a routine. Not in one sense that alert for war is ever routine, but the arranging, the phrasing of that alert to fight. What the diplomatic and political situation was, was another matter.

Senator Ferguson. Now, was this discussed at the same meeting?

Mr. Stimson said, at the bottom of page 47:

I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps toward an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand, she was violating our safety, and that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on preparing that.

Now, I take it he was talking about the memorandum and the conversation he had on the 27th of August. That is when the President returned from the Atlantic Conference.

We had taken, as Mr. Stimson defines it, the first step in an ultimatum, and that if America wanted to, we could rely upon that particular message as saying—

We have warned you. Therefore if you do anything you take the first step and fire the first shot.

Is that correct? Is that a fair analysis?

General Marshall. I think that is the rough idea of the thing; yes.
Senator Ferguson. And it says then:

So Hull is to go to work on preparing that.

What did he mean by "preparing that"? Have you any idea?
General Marshall. You are having me act as both Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull.

Senator Ferguson. Well, the reason I am asking you, General, is that you were supposed to be at this meeting.

[13801] General Marshall. Yes. As I said, they were trying to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than firing off a gun, that would not only protect our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but also that anything they did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we were to do had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not a military order. It was not a military arrangement.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand it correctly then that it was agreed that day among you and Admiral Stark, the two Secretaries, and the President, that this message of the 17th of August was, in effect, a first ultimatum?

General Marshall. I don't recall that that specific thing was discussed other than the statement Mr. Stimson makes here. I am not the judge of that.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. General, did you have one of these messages in the Army that if the winds code came in that you could receive a telephone call—"east wind," and so forth?

General Marshall. I had no such arrangement, that I would receive a telephone call. I knew that they were monitoring to receive this message, to pick up this message if it came, and that would be in the general arrangement whereby anything [13802] of importance was conveyed to me as quickly as possible.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have a plan or a policy as to what steps you would take if such a message had been received?

General Marshall. Once the alert had been given, of course, the commanders were supposed to be in a state of readiness. If such a message as that had come in, showing conclusively its relation to previous magic, that they were going to attack, it is probable that we would have acted toward that in some way as we endeavored to act toward the 1 o'clock Sunday message.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, another alert?


Senator Ferguson. An item of information. Now, the language of the President, as given here by Commander Schulz is:

When the President saw or read the first 13 parts of the message, he said, "This means war."

That would be equally as definite as the winds message, would it not—"This means war"?

General Marshall. You mean the President's statement?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Now, if you had had the President's statement Saturday [13803] evening, "This means war," in relation to the 13-part message, would
you have acted on that the same as you did at 11:35, or whatever the time was, on Sunday, the 7th of December?

General Marshall. I don’t think I could give you an accurate back- sight on that, Senator. There was some discussion over the 1 o’clock message. I thought the 1 o’clock should go in, because that was a new item of information of a very peculiar character.

Now, whether the President, making that statement would have inspired me, as Chief of Staff in the War Department to start off another message, I couldn’t tell you now, as a backsight.

We had given certain definite instructions, which we assumed were being carried out, and which were being carried out, in most places.

Senator Ferguson. General, it is a very significant fact that the President stated: “This means war”; and if that message had been conveyed to you, that language, the President saying, “This means war,”—

General Marshall. Does the record show that the President told the Secretary of War, “This means war”?

Senator Ferguson. Not the Secretary of War.

General Marshall. He didn’t tell me, and he didn’t tell the Secretary of War. So he made a statement offhand on reading the thing.

[13804] Senator Ferguson. But I am trying to get what your action would have been.

General Marshall. I can’t say. I doubt if I would have sent anything on that statement of the President at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Now, this is not clear in the record, General. I don’t know as you can help clear it up, but I would like to ask it.

Do you know how the 13 and the 14 part message, the whole of the 14-part message, got on your desk on Sunday morning? We haven’t any evidence to show how it got there. Do you know? Have you been told?

General Marshall. Well, I know that when I came to the office, it was there. Colonel Bratton was on the heels of it waiting to see me. General Miles came in. I had General Gerow come in. While I was reading the message—I have stated previously, in answering Senator Brewster, how word came to me that they had important information for me, and I went down to the War Department to receive that important information.

I was going anyway, because that was my regular Sunday morning routine, in contrast to Monday or Saturday, when I got down at 7:30. The procedure that they had gone through I don’t know. I think my testimony will show whether it was here or before the Board, that my reaction at the moment was [13805] that they told me that half of the message had come in the evening before, and during the night that the other half had come, sometime in the middle of the night, and had been parcelled out, the War Department, as I recall, to do the translating from Japanese into English having been sent over from the Navy—they having actually deciphered the Japanese message.

Now, that is my recollection of the affair at the time. The other item was that the particular part which affected me and caused me to act was not the 14 parts, it was the one o’clock, which, unfortunately, they put on the bottom of the pile and I read through everything before I came to that.
Senator Ferguson. General, on page 7984 of our typewritten record, under General Short's testimony, we find this language:

* * * Japan had been semiofficially told that:

"If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan."

And the American Government had, and believed, reports that:

* * * Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President, or the coming of Mr. Kurusu will have any effect on the general situation."

Now, my question is, Did you know that the Japanese knew semiofficially—and, as I understand this testimony, it would appear that Postmaster General Walker, or someone operating between the State Department and the Japanese, was conveying certain messages, and that this was one of the messages that was delivered, that if Japan invades again the United States—

General Marshall. If Japan invades again?

Senator Ferguson. Again, the United States will fight with Japan.

Did you know that they were semiofficially notified to that effect, that if she moved south we would fight?


Mr. Murphy. She had official notice in the note of August 17.

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that.

Mr. Murphy. That was official.

Senator Ferguson. But at this late date that he was telling us—this was in November, that she had the notice.

Have you any knowledge as to who wrote Exhibit 17, being the 27th of November?

General Marshall. I have no accurate knowledge. I assume that it was drafted in the War Plans Division under General Gerow's direction. It may be that it was drafted initially in the Navy Department, but my assumption was that it was drafted in War Plans Division, and I assume that because my signature being on the document and its date of November 27, meaning that I possibly signed it on the night of the 26th, but they didn't get Admiral Stark's signature, naturally, until the 27th, and they dated it accordingly.

Senator Ferguson. I think the facts show it was on Navy stationery, but there isn't any doubt that it represents your idea at that time?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, you were sitting here this morning while we were discussing this memorandum from the British Government and the one from the Australian Government?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I heard the discussion.

Senator Ferguson. I now ask you, did the President of the United States or anyone else ever take up with you any of the things mentioned in those memorandums that we discussed here this morning?

General Marshall. Well, I have to answer that this way, Senator. I never heard of those memorandums until this morning, and as to did he ever discuss any of these things, of course, they were related to a good many things, including this document here [indicating].

Senator Ferguson. The reason I put an all-inclusive question was that I wanted to finish as soon as I could.

[13808] When did you first learn that the President had decided to send a message to the Emperor?

General Marshall. I don't recall that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was it before—

General Marshall. Mr. Stimson would have told me, I would have learned it that way, I think.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether you knew it before the 7th?


Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn:

President's subsequent procedure—

That is after he sent the message to the Emperor.

is that if no answer is received by him from the Emperor by Monday evening,

(a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening

(b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday morning, i.e., after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington.

General Marshall. I have no knowledge of that whatsoever. I imagine that was washed out by the actual attack on Pearl Harbor and I was interested in other matters.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you were not consulted [13809] prior to the time of this memorandum?


Senator Ferguson. You were not consulted?

General Marshall. To the best of my recollection I was not consulted.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire, General.

Mr. Keefe. General, the testimony of Commander Schulz indicates that after the President on the evening of December 6th, read the 13-part message, in effect, turned to Mr. Hopkins, and said "This means war," and indicated that he would have to get in touch with Betty, meaning Admiral Stark, immediately.

Now, as one member of the committee, and I speak only for myself, that impressed me, that the President did, or had in his mind, as a result of the conclusion after reading that message, "This means war," did the thing which we would expect the Commander in Chief to do, namely, to immediately contact his Chief of Naval Operations.

The evidence further indicates that he took the phone, called the Navy Department, and was advised that Admiral Stark was attending the National Theater; he hung up the phone and indicated, according to Commander Schulz's testimony that he [13810] wouldn't call Admiral Stark out of the theater because it might cause some public comment, but that he would get him later.

Now, in view of that testimony, which I have sketched without any attempt to state the testimony exactly, we are left in the dark as to whether or not the Commander in Chief contacted you as Chief of Staff that evening of December 6.

Can you state definitely whether or not you have a present recollection as to whether the President did in fact contact you?

General Marshall. I am quite certain that he did not.

Mr. Keefe. Well, could there be any question about it?

General Marshall. There is no question in my mind; no. That is a positive answer.

Mr. Keefe. And you are certain that you did not attend any meeting then, at the White House that night?
General Marshall. I am absolutely certain of that.

Mr. Keefe. I see.

General Marshall. I might say that since I appeared before the committee I learned one little item that I had forgotten at the time, and that is not only had I no dinner engagements of any kind between the 1st of November and the 7th of December, except one family dinner, as a matter of fact with Mrs. Nicholas Longworth, whom I see sitting here, [13811] but that Mrs. Marshall was convalescing from having broken three or four ribs and we didn't go out anywhere; we certainly were not going out under those conditions; and I found out afterwards that that morning, Sunday morning, that I had breakfast with her in her bedroom, by her bed.

So, all the evidence, in my own mind, short of my absolute knowledge of the matter, is that I was home, as was customary.

Mr. Keefe. That is your present recollection, that on the evening of the 6th of December you were at home?

General Marshall. I can't say that is my recollection. I am certain I was at home, but I don't recall anything about it.

Mr. Keefe. But you are certain of one thing and that is that you received no communication from the President on the evening of the 6th of December and that you didn't attend any meeting at the White House that night?

General Marshall. That is correct. I will add that the first information I had of anything unusual was, as I have testified, after I got into my shower, or was going into my shower when this message was relayed to me from Colonel Bratton that he wanted to come out to the house with an important matter.

Mr. Keefe. Now, General Marshall, do you have a clear present recollection as to the meeting at the White House on [13812] Tuesday, November 25?

General Marshall. I have gotten most of my recollection out of reading Mr. Stimson's report, he having the only diary.

Mr. Keefe. In other words, in answer to the questions that have been asked you with respect to that meeting of the 25th, am I to infer that your memory has been refreshed by reason of your having read the memorandum submitted to the committee by former Secretary Stimson?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any independent present recollection of the events that took place or the conversations that took place at this meeting of November 25?

General Marshall. No, sir; I do not. What he is talking about here, had been talked about back and forth through so many combinations that I cannot recollect the events of a particular meeting at this moment.

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any independent recollection of having been told by Secretary Stimson of the Cabinet meeting of Friday, November 7, when a poll was taken of the Cabinet on the question as to "whether the people would back" the Cabinet and the President "in case we struck at Japan down there, and what the tactics should be?"

I am quoting from Secretary Stimson's language.
[13813] General Marshall. I testified a little bit ago, I think, in regard to that, that I had no recollection of it, but I am quite certain Mr. Stimson must have told me that.

Mr. Keefe. Of course, in connection with what took place on the 25th, when you were present with the President, and the Secretaries and Admiral Stark, it would be quite important to have known of the previous action of the Cabinet, when that question was presented, and the unanimous vote was recorded, as recorded in Secretary Stimson's diary, so I ask you now, at the time you met with these people on the 25th, do you have any present recollection now of having known of this meeting on the 7th, and its possible influence on the conversation which took place on the 25th?

General Marshall. I can only say what I said a few moments ago: I have no recollection of being told about the vote, and I assume that I was told.

Mr. Keefe. Do you agree with Secretary Stimson when he sets forth in his diary as follows:

I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps towards an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand, she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already given.

[13814] General Marshall. Yes, sir; I am in agreement with what he is saying. The actual terminology he uses in regard to an ultimatum—if certainly was a very definite notification.

[13815] Mr. Keefe. Now, do I understand you to say, General Marshall—this will shorten the thing up, because I am as anxious to conclude this examination as you are—that you have read the statement of Secretary Stimson and that Secretary Stimson's statement, so far as you are concerned, conforms to your own knowledge and recollection of the events set forth, and you agree with that statement?

General Marshall. I will put it this way, that there is nothing he says in here that I take exception to in my recollection, and his statement has reminded me of a great deal that I had entirely forgotten, and I am in general agreement with all that he states.

Mr. Keefe. Well, to narrow it down one step further, is there anything in this statement that you do take exception to?

General Marshall. I can think of nothing now, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And is there anything in his record, as set forth in his diary, which is appended to his general statement, that you consider not to be in accordance with the facts, in accordance with your present recollection?

General Marshall. There is nothing that I know of, of that character.

Mr. Keefe. So that as a member of the committee I am safe in accepting the statement of Secretary Stimson, together with the memorandum contained in his diary, as being in full accord with your own attitude toward the things and events which he described?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, including that about the War Department General Staff.

Senator Ferguson. You mean by that, the criticism, if it is criticism?

Mr. Keefe. I didn’t have particular reference—

Senator Ferguson. That is what you meant by that?

General Marshall. I didn’t understand.

Senator Ferguson. That there was some criticism.

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I accepted that.

Senator Ferguson. You accepted that.

General Marshall. I don’t take exception to it.

Mr. Keefe. I want to say, General Marshall, that so far as my question was concerned, I was not specifically referring to the conclusions as to responsibility which Secretary Stimson sets forth in his statement.

General Marshall. I was trying to make perfectly clear my agreement with what he says.

Mr. Keefe. I am trying to limit my question to the factual information which is contained in his statement and the matter of conclusions, I assume, will be the prerogative of this committee.

[13,817] But on the factual information set forth in his statement and in the diary, you are in accord?

General Marshall. I noted nothing that I would take exception to.

Mr. Keefe. Do you think of anything that you would add to that statement that Secretary Stimson has excluded?

General Marshall. I suppose if I took a few hours off I might bring up a great many things, but I think he covers the general question of the whole affair very well.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark. General Marshall, I should like to ask you, as a military man, as one who has had at least some contacts with diplomatic activities, as to whether there was, in your opinion, anything in the 13-part message any more indicative of war than what had been received up to that time?

General Marshall. I am sorry, I can’t give you a categorical answer to that, for the reason that I read it that morning very hurriedly, and then I never read it again until just before I came up here, and I tried to time myself in reading it that time, and I was interrupted before I finished, and I never read it since; so there we stand. I have been busy and I just haven’t read it all.

[13,818] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. For the record there has been question after question about Commander Schulz saying the President said “This means war,” and I would like to read Commander Schulz’s exact words, page 12441 of the transcript.

Commander Schulz. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance—I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance—“This means war.” Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps five minutes, the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment and—

Again on page 12443.1

There has been a statement made that the President called the Navy Department.

1 Hearings, Part 10, p. 4663.
Page 12443:

Commander Schulz. There was no mention made of sending any further warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was determined—I do not recall exactly, but I believe the White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theater.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. General, to carry Mr. Keefe's question further, about whether the President had seen the 13-part message, I want to ask you whether or not you had any information that the President had seen this message and made any remarks about it prior to the time of the attack?

General Marshall. I had no such information.

Senator Ferguson. One more question.

On page 53 of the Secretary of War's statement, he has this language—talking with the President:

I told him I could see two. His alternatives were—first, to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again—

Notice he says "ultimatum again".

stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at once. I told him my only two were the last two, because I did not think anyone would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of the other two, my choice was the latter one.

That was to fight at once.

Now, did Secretary Stimson ever discuss with you that language or that idea?

[13820] It doesn't purport to have you in the conversation.

General Marshall. I wasn't in the conversation. I was just trying to think of his conversations with me.

He was very much afraid—he feared that we would find ourselves involved in the developing situation where our disadvantages would be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when the Japanese actually broke peace.

He also felt very keenly that, and thought about this part a great deal more than I did, because it was his particular phase of the matter, that we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned about that.

My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we would be better prepared than we were at that time, that particular time.

So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would be in a hopeless situation before the peace was broken, and mine, which as I say, were much more materialistic, as I think they should have been, that we should get as much time as we could in order to make good the terrible deficiencies in our defensive arrange-ments.
This particular statement that he makes here, that he made to the President, I don’t recall of his ever making it quite so flat-footedly to me, that we would strike first.

Senator Ferguson. At least the substance of this was discussed with you?

General Marshall. Oh, yes; we talked many times about it.

Senator Ferguson. Was it generally agreed between the War Cabinet, as it has been described, that we would not strike first?

That was generally agreed on, was it not?

General Marshall. I don’t recall exactly the time the President enunciated the directive that we must not make the overt act.

Senator Ferguson. That is right. So it was finally agreed, Secretary Stimson’s idea to fight at once was overruled, and we took another course?


Senator Ferguson. Which was carried out.


Senator Ferguson. Your idea was, as you say you were more realistic—

General Marshall. I said “materialistic.”

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Materialistic. You realized what [13822] we had to fight with, did you not, and that is what caused you to hesitate?

General Marshall. Mine was, in a sense, a technical job. I was struggling with the means to fight.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; and you wanted time.

General Marshall. I wanted time, and the question was how much time could be given to us and still maintain the honor of the United States and not get ourselves in a hopeless position.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever get to the point of discussing the point where you would attack if you did attack first, or was that ruled out because the President made a policy?

General Marshall. We went back, of course, to your arrangement with the British, as to the prospective deployment of the fleets, who would assume the burden of responsibility here and who would receive the burden of responsibility there.

As a matter of fact our first issue, undoubtedly, would have been to protect our convoys, and to have continued the reinforcement of the Philippines.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keeffe.

Mr. Keeffe. As I recall the testimony, General Marshall, [13823] with respect to the sending of this message of the 26th, there was some question in your mind, and in the record it was not clear, just what the events and circumstances were with respect to the preparation of that warning message that was sent to General Short.

Now, if Mr. Stimson’s report is correct, and I assume that it is, that question seems to be resolved, because he states that on the 27th, on page 19 of his report:

We then discussed the message that might be sent to the commanding officers of the various theaters, including in particular General MacArthur, who was in the Philippines and in the forefront of the threatened area. We had already
sent MacArthur a warning but I felt that the time had now come for a more definite warning. In talking with the President on the telephone that morning, I had suggested, and he had approved the idea, that we should send out a final alert, namely that they should be on the qui vive for any attack, and explaining the exact situation. Ordinarily, of course, there would be no reason for me to participate in the sending of any such message which was the normal function of the military staff. As the President himself, however, had now actually directed the sending of the message, and as I wanted the message clearly to apprise the commanding [13824] officers in the various areas as to exactly what the diplomatic situation was, I undertook to participate in the framing of this message myself.

So it now appears from his statement that that message was actually framed on the 27th while you were attending maneuvers. Do you so understand it now, General Marshall?

General Marshall. My confusion was with relation to the previous evening. My recollection was that before I left for North Carolina I had discussed with General Gerow the general terms of such a message.

Mr. Keefe. But it was not prepared?

General Marshall. He was in the business of preparing it and I think he brought in to Mr. Stimson the draft. That is my recollection of the procedure. What Mr. Stimson says is accurate. My trouble was trying to orient what I had said before the message was prepared and what my reaction was after they showed me the message on my return.

Mr. Keefe. So you did have a discussion with General Gerow the night before?

General Marshall. I say that was my recollection, that before I left, the afternoon before, I had a discussion with him. I don't know what General Gerow testified. I was in a confused state of mind as to whether that was correct or whether it was my reaction when I saw the message that had [13825] already been sent, and I couldn't remember which was which.

Mr. Keefe. You are in agreement with the thesis that so far as the actual message was concerned it was prepared on the 27th and that Secretary Stimson himself participated in the preparation of that message?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And did the unusual, as he says, in that matter, because it was on what he conceived to be direct orders of the President that such a message be sent?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And he wanted to be sure that it accurately conveyed the necessary information to the commanders in the field?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That clears up that little bit of discrepancy that existed in the other hearings, and I am glad that it has been cleared up in accordance with Secretary Stimson's statement.

That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything further?

Mr. Richardson. No.

The Vice Chairman. Any further questions?

(No response.)

The Vice Chairman. Is there any reason why General Marshall
cannot now be excused?
(No response.)
The Vice Chairman. General, we thank you for your appearance and the additional information you have given the committee and you are excused.

General Marshall. Thank you very much.
The Vice Chairman. The Chair is advised that Chairman Barkley and Senator Ferguson have agreed that we will adjourn at this point until 11 o'clock Thursday morning.

We will ask Admiral Stark to be back at 11 o'clock Thursday morning.
(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 11 a. m., Thursday, April 11, 1946.)
THE COMMITTEE will please come to order.

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have three exhibit numbers that we would like to assign just before the examination proceeds.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Masten. At page 13630 of the record the committee decided that the reports, findings, and conclusions of the various prior proceedings should be made an exhibit separate from the transcripts of testimony in those proceedings. We would like to assign Exhibit No. 157 to a compilation of those reports and findings.

The Chairman. Without objection, that will be done. (The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 157.")

Mr. Masten. As Exhibit No. 158, we would like to offer the additional documents released by the British Government, which have been previously distributed to the committee and which were released for publication yesterday. This exhibit will consist of 14 documents and attachments.

I would like to point out that document No. 9 in this exhibit relates primarily to Exhibits Nos. 16 and 47 but has been included in Exhibit No. 158 due to the fact that the printing of the prior exhibits has proceed past Exhibits Nos. 16 and 47.

The Chairman. Without objection, that will be done. (The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 158.")

Mr. Masten. As Exhibit No. 159, we would like to offer the additional documents released by the Chinese Government, which also have been distributed to the committee previously. This exhibit will consist of five documents and enclosures.

The Chairman. Those will be filed as exhibits, accordingly. (The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 159.")

The Chairman. Admiral Stark, will you come around?
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED)—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, I think you were examining Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would read that into the record, and then I want to ask you some questions about it. It is a message from OPNAV to CINCAF, is it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Before the attack, from OPNAV to CINCAF, on Sunday, December 7; is not that correct?

Admiral STARK. Yes, 7 December, 71722, which is 5:22. That is Greenwich time, however.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK (reading):

The State Department is informing the Japanese Government the SS Madison is enroute to Chingwangtao to arrive about December 19 and depart for Manila 3 days later and requesting that in view of arrangements made for Tatuta Maru now enroute Los Angeles to evacuate [13831] Japanese citizens that Japan direct her sea and land forces to allow Madison to proceed freely and without hindrance and provide her necessary facilities at Chingwangtao. Advise this office of any change in the Madison's schedule.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, had you known about that message before it was sent?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall knowing about it before it was sent. I remember the picture very conclusively on the sending of that ship up there, so distinctly that I wanted to verify my memory and I thought it would be well to get the record on it, so I asked the Department to have copies of dispatches in relation thereto, and they are now available to the committee if they want them.

I think, before giving you my answer, which would be based on those, I might read them, because the dispatches in question, from the record, give a very good picture of this whole affair.

Senator FERGUSON. I would be glad to have you give any information you have on that. My inquiry was going to be as to why that was sent. You knew that war was coming and you wanted to try to get an agreement on the safe passage of two ships, one of ours and one of theirs.

Admiral STARK. It was sent for the reason that we were [13832] worried about that ship. We took a deliberate chance when we told Admiral Hart, in response to a dispatch from him on 1 December, to send her up there. We had left in North China approximately 200 Marines. We had received a dispatch from the Embassy, or rather Admiral Hart sent us word that there were about 6000 Americans up there and he noted that a ship could be made available to go up there. He recognized the risk and put it up to the Department for decision.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you say "the risk," you mean that war would break out while it was enroute?

Admiral STARK. I mean that war might break out.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you just considering it a "might" then?

Admiral STARK. At that time; yes, sir. We felt reasonably certain that war was coming but we could not tell when. It was a matter of timing.
Senator Ferguson. But you were concerned with it and it was a grave question, so grave that you were working on it on Sunday?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We had guaranteed the safety of the Japanese ship which was then enroute to San Francisco, and as I recall, it was to go from there down to the Canal Zone picking up Japanese nationals and taking them back.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Had the Japanese asked for a guarantee of a safe passage of their ship?

Admiral Stark. As I recall, they had asked that she be given free passage, and we had granted it, and we were asking for a similar treatment for the American ship.

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that both countries, at the time this request was made, were anticipating a war, and if that war broke out in the meantime these two ships were to have safe passage? Is not that a correct view?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that is what you arranged for here [indicating dispatch]?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. And then——

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. I do not want to cut off any testimony you may have or any instruments that you may want to refer to that can aid us along this line.

Admiral Stark. They are short, and I think the record should be complete on this, and it would be well to put them in here.

Senator Ferguson. Will you put them in?

Admiral Stark. I will read them if you would like to have them.

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Stark. The first is a message from the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, our forces in the Pacific, which was sent by him on 1 December, and which reads as follows——

Before I read it, it was to OPNAV and it was for information to the Commanding Officer, U. S. Marine Forces in North China.

Embassy advises six one five American nationals in Peiping Tientsin area. Estimate civilian requirements uncertain. President Madison now available for withdrawal Marines from North China. Ship can arrive Chingwanteso about December 10th and depart about three days later. If Department thinks advisable accept attendant risks and attempt this withdrawal request authority to use this vessel. Advise.

Mr. Keefe. The date of that is December 1?

Admiral Stark. December 1, yes, sir.

Now, on the same day we have a dispatch from the Department. We answered it immediately, and the message is from the Secretary of the Navy, released by me. I remember the incident, because we recognized the situation as grave at that time and were taking it up with the Secretary for decision, and the reply is to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic, and information of the U. S. Marine Forces in North China:

Your 619300 approved.

That message is the message that I just previously read from Admiral Hart.

Authority granted charter President Madison [13935] at tariff rate for one trip Chingwantsao to Manila. Inform State Department officials North China of prospective schedule.
The next message is from Admiral Hart, dated 2 December, to the Commanding General of the Marine Forces in North China, and information of the Marine Corps and OPNAV in Washington. This was on the second, and priority:

Withdraw North China Marines via President Harrison due arrive Chinwangtau December tenth expected turn around. Nonmilitary property that cannot be evacuated to be sold or left Peiping. Notify consul Tietsin and Embassy. APL authorized to book civilian passengers in normal manner. Advise exact time of sailing when determined.

Then, there is another dispatch from the Commander in Chief Asiatic to OPNAV on 3 December.

Mr. Richardson. Just a minute, Admiral Stark. Is the reference in the dispatch you just read to the President Harrison an intentional change from Madison?

Admiral Stark. That is what got me looking up this dispatch. The dispatch that Senator Ferguson gave me to read said the Madison, and my remembrance is that it was the Harrison. I started to check up on the Harrison and ran into the rest of the dispatches. They used actually the Harrison [13836] and not the Madison.

Fourth Marines 796 officers and men arrived Olongapo 1 QM clerk 3 enlisted remain Shanghai temporarily. President Harrison vice Madison departing Manila 4 December for Chinwangtau evacuate personnel and such equipment as reaches there by arrival date. Luzon and Oahu well on way Manila successful completion voyage expected.

I might add those were two gunboats which we had left in China. We wanted to leave them until the last minute, and they had arrived.

Senator Ferguson. You mean the last minute before the war started?

Admiral Stark. I mean we had debated a good deal when to bring them out. We were debating for some time on this. We finally decided at this time it was time to get them out.

Senator Ferguson. That you were at about the last minute?

Admiral Stark. Well, it was getting close to it.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. When I say the last minute, I have forgotten just when—

Senator Ferguson. That is near the deadline?

Admiral Stark. I have forgotten just when the dispatch directing Hart to bring those gunboats out was made, but we [13837] thought it was time to get our nationals and our marines out of China.

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember—if I may interrupt—that we had a memorandum here from the British to our State Department and on the end of it Mr. Hamilton said—it was about the 3d or 4th of December—they wanted us to act on a parallel course with them, as I remember the exhibit, if we could get it. It would speak for itself. On the bottom of that it said that that was a matter that would have to be taken up with the President, that it would indicate we were going to war and thereafter they could not pass on it. Do you remember that document?

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I do not particularly at this moment remember that particular document, but I do recall that in evacuating our nationals and in evacuating our marines it was taken up with the White House. Of course, the State Department was as much interested as anybody else in that picture, and more so as regards nationals.
Senator FERGUSON. Did you personally have any conversation with the President or with the State Department—I am talking about prior to the 7th of December—about the removal of our nationals?

Admiral STARK. Oh, yes. Not only our nationals, but we had talked about our marines, and so forth, for some months. We [13838] had evacuated, for example, all naval families out of Manila a considerable period before this.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the policy adopted by the President or the State Department, as far as you knew, about the nationals?

Admiral STARK. We were endeavoring to get them out.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was because you anticipated war?

Admiral STARK. That was certainly because of the possibility, and in the interest of safety to them. We gave them the opportunity to get out, and the State Department, I believe, chartered the ships which we sent over there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anything that was done between the 27th of November and the 7th of December about getting our nationals out?

Admiral STARK. This matter in hand is between that time.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean outside of these, that were taken up directly with the President.

Admiral STARK. At the moment I do not recall anything else. We had been getting them out for some time.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. There is considerable information on the Japanese and what they did for some months before they started to get their ships home, and their nationals, too.

[13839] Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I appreciate that.

Admiral, you may proceed, if you do not recall any of the others now.

Admiral STARK. I recall the earlier incidents.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. As to this ship, we took what we call a calculated risk, in the interest of getting our people out, balanced against the possibility of losing the ship.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

[13840] Admiral STARK. If we got them out, fine; if we did not get them out, we might lose the ship and would not be any better off.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were working for a safe voyage, if possible, even though war had broken out; is not that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We were asking for transit.

Senator FERGUSON. For a safe voyage?

Admiral STARK. For a safe voyage. Whether that would cover the contingency if war actually broke or not, I do not know, because we canceled the massed after the war broke out.

Senator FERGUSON. You were endeavoring to do it?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And did we grant safe voyage to their ship so it would apply after war started?

Admiral STARK. I don't remember any application after war. They had asked us to facilitate this voyage, and we had agreed to it. The details of that would probably better come from the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not familiar with it then?
Admiral Stark. Not on that point, not enough to make a positive statement.

Senator Ferguson. Whether or not it applied in case of war, the instruments will probably speak for themselves, [13841] when you get them all in.

Admiral Stark. I started reading that dispatch and I guess I finished reading it.

The next dispatch is the one which you gave me yesterday.

The State Department is informing the Japanese Government the SS Madison is enroute Chingwangtao due to arrive about December 19 and depart for Manila 3 days later and requesting that in view of arrangements made for Tatuta Maru now enroute Los Angeles to evacuate Japanese citizens that Japan direct her sea and land forces to allow Madison to proceed freely and without hindrance and provide her necessary facilities at Chingwangtao. Advise this office of any change in the Madison schedule.

Then, there was one to Admiral Hart, the text of which was:

Give appropriate instructions to Madison. Cancel my 971722.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, this message sent on the morning of the 7th about the safe voyage, the safe course, was sent after we had canceled our codes, or destroyed our machines in Tokyo, and we knew of their messages in relation to their codes, and you had in your department the full 3 parts, and the 14th part, and 1 o’clock message, and all of these other messages; isn’t that true?

[13842] Admiral Stark. It was after the codes’ destruction. The time group on this is—

Senator Ferguson. Twelve-something, isn’t it? Can you figure it out from the Greenwich time?

Admiral Stark. Yes; it is 1722.

Senator Ferguson. Which would have been 5 hours and a half?

Admiral Stark. Which would have been about 12 o’clock.

Senator Ferguson. About 12 o’clock noon on Sunday?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. It is my impression that the codes were not destroyed by 12 noon in Tokyo. Ambassador Grew said they were not, did he not?

Senator Ferguson. I am speaking more about ordering them destroyed. The record will speak for itself.

Admiral Stark. We had sent the message regarding the destroying of their codes.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. And we had authorized our people in the outlying islands, and Guam and authorized Kimmel to direct them to destroy what he considered necessary.

Senator Ferguson. That all being true, the language [13843] used in this message that I had you read the other day, and question about this morning, would indicate, would it not, that we knew war was coming, and this was to take place after the war came.

Admiral Stark. We felt war was coming; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The language indicates that the armies and navies of Japan were to allow this ship to have a free course, a safe passage.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. At the time when this was initiated, it was the first of December, and that was the first correspondence with reference to it, and it was, of course a matter of timing.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Are there any other messages you have there now?

Admiral Stark. That is all I have on it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire from counsel, if you have a memorandum to Mr. Hull from Admiral Schuirmann on December 4, 1941 in relation to the Dutch?

Mr. Masten. We do not have it here, Senator. Do you want it? It is down in room 201.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have it. I did not like to use a copy of it, I wanted to be exact on its language.

Mr. Murphy. As long as you are sending down there, will you be sure to have the notes of the President on the 7th here too?

Mr. Masten. They will be here this noon. They are being mimeographed.

Senator Ferguson. Until we get that, I will pass this for the moment.

Admiral, since you were on the stand, we have received a memorandum that was sent from the military observer, Captain Creighton, from Singapore to Admiral Hart. Are you familiar with that message about von Papen?

Admiral Stark. I do not know just to what you refer without looking at it.

Senator Ferguson. It is the message from the military observer in Singapore to Admiral Hart. You remember the original memorandum in relation to Admiral Hart, that he sent to your department, that we agreed to give the British support in three or four eventualities?

Admiral Stark. That he had heard that we had?

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Admiral Stark. And he asked us about it?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. Yes, I remember that message; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you are not familiar with the other message that was sent from Captain Creighton, are you?

Admiral Stark. I do not recall it at the moment.

[13844] Senator Ferguson. Would you locate that?

Mr. Richardson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, were you familiar with the fact that the Navy Department had a special file that they kept the communications between Britain and the President, that were sent through the Communications of the Navy, and that the file was kept in the Navy?

Admiral Stark. No.

Senator Ferguson. When the British, Mr. Churchill, and others in the British Government would cable or communicate with the President at times they used your facilities; that is, the Navy facilities, and that there was a special file kept in the Navy Department with those papers, or those coded messages, or decoded messages, but they retained them in the Navy Department.

Were you familiar with that fact?
Admiral Stark. I was not familiar with it, but I would say if that occurred, it would be a very normal procedure to keep the President's messages separate on a thing of that sort. We did in London.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the President had used your communications to communicate with the British? In relation to the Far East I am only talking about now.

Admiral Stark. Well, I know he used our communications.

[13846] Senator Ferguson. That being true, would you not keep copies, or at least the papers in your files in relation to those communications?

Admiral Stark. It would be a very natural thing to keep one copy in a very secret status.

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it true that there was a very secret file, which you now describe, kept under secret orders, so that when Captain Lavender, who is one of the counsel here, made an inquiry he could not even see it, and he has not seen it? Did you know that?

Admiral Stark. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would it be such that no one could see, that it would be super-secret?

Admiral Stark. I do not know.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stark. That is a detail of filing which could be obtained from the Department. So far as my knowledge goes, I thought we could get anything we asked for. I did not know until this minute that anything had been refused at this time.

The Chairman. You do not know it now?

Admiral Stark. I do not know it now; no, sir.

Mr. Richardson. There has nothing been refused. It is all in the record.

[13847] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in view of the Senator's statement about Captain Lavender—

Senator Ferguson. I am asking questions now.

Mr. Murphy. I want to object to the Senator testifying until such time as we know who Captain Lavender is. The Senator stated something that is not in evidence. I think in fairness to the record, and the other members of the committee, if that is true, we ought to find out who this Captain Lavender is, and his connection with the case.

Senator Ferguson. I will find out now.

Do you know Captain Lavender?

Admiral Stark. I do, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Has he been acting as counsel for anyone in this case?

Admiral Stark. He has been associated with Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Murphy. Is he in the room? May we have a look at him?

Senator Ferguson. Is Captain Lavender in the room?

(No response.)

Admiral Stark. I might state that he was up here yesterday, and I think he can be made available if you would like to get him.

Senator Ferguson. Does not counsel have a letter in relation to this file?

Mr. Richardson. All of it is in the Navy. It has been [13848] furnished us by the Navy and it has been in evidence here.
Mr. Masten. We have a memorandum from, I think, Commander Baecher. I think the memorandum was dated sometime in November or December of last year. It states that all of the messages from the President, which were found in that file, are now in the record.

My recollection is, Senator, that the only two messages in it were the two messages to the Philippines.

Senator Ferguson. I just want to find out now about the file. Your statement now is—and I do not think this was put in the record before—that the only two messages in that file are in the record. Are they in the record itself?

Mr. Masten. I think so, Senator. There is a memorandum from Commander Baecher which I think is in the record. If it is not, we will check this noon.

The Chairman. It is my recollection that memorandum was put in the record at the time it was received.

Mr. Masten. At the time the messages were put in, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. There isn’t a question but that Congress ought to know about this thing, because a letter was written, and the request was refused.

Mr. Murphy. My only reason for interposing is if there is some Captain Lavender, this is the first time that his name appears in this hearing, after 13,000 pages, and the statement has been made that he has been refused something.

I do not think the record should go on without knowing who he is.

Senator Ferguson. I think this requires putting the President’s letter in the record.

Would you, Mr. Masten, get a copy of the President’s letter in relation to this file?

Mr. Masten. There was no letter of the President, Senator, that I recall.

Senator Ferguson. Did not the President write a letter to someone, either Rugg, or Kimmel, or Lavender?

Mr. Masten. I have no recollection of that. You mean President Roosevelt?

Senator Ferguson. No, no. President Truman.

Mr. Masten. I have no recollection of that. I will have to look through the file. All the letters that President Truman wrote, or the memoranda, are in the record, that I recall.

Senator Ferguson. The Congressman has made it appear that the Senator from Michigan wanted the record to show that there was a denial. I am trying to ask questions. I am certain there was a letter written by the President of the United States, but I cannot tell you to whom it was addressed.

[3850] The Chairman. There were letters written by the President to the heads of all the departments.

Senator Ferguson. This is a special letter in relation to this particular file that I was making inquiry about. I will try to ascertain it. Is there anyone in the room who represents Admiral Kimmel?

Ensign Phelan. Yes; I am.

Senator Ferguson. Ensign Phelan, do you know of any letter— The Chairman. If he is going to testify, we had better swear him. (Ensign Phelan was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Senator Ferguson. Better give your first name, now.

Ensign Phelan. John Phelan.
TESTIMONY OF ENSIGN JOHN PHELAN, UNITED STATES NAVY

Senator Ferguson. Ensign, will you tell us as to whether or not you had any knowledge in relation to a special file of communications between the President of the United States and the British Government, or any member of the British Government, that was kept in the Navy Department?

Ensign Phelan. I have no personal knowledge of that, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not any letter was written in relation to it, as far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned?


Senator Ferguson. Do you have a copy of that letter, or do you know where we can get a copy of it?

Ensign Phelan. No, sir; I haven't a copy of it here. I believe Admiral Kimmel has a copy of it.

Senator Ferguson. But you do know a letter was written by the President?

Ensign Phelan. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. To whom was it written?

Ensign Phelan. To Admiral Kimmel.

The Chairman. Which President?

Senator Ferguson. President Truman.

Ensign Phelan. President Truman.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. About when was that letter written?

Ensign Phelan. Since these hearings have been in progress.

Senator Ferguson. Captain Lavender was one of the counsel, was he not?

Ensign Phelan. That is right, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not this file was denied to him, and it had to be taken up directly with the President, and a letter was written on it?

Ensign Phelan. I so understand, Senator.

[13852] Commander Baecher. I can explain it.

Senator Ferguson. All I want is an explanation.

Commander Baecher. I know all about it; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Let us get it all, so there will be no mystery about it.

Commander Baecher. I hesitate to inject myself, but as I understand it, Admiral Kimmel desired to get into this file, which is the White House file of the Navy Department.

Under the direction of the President, as we interpreted the directives, the committee alone had the right to go into the departmental files, so Admiral Kimmel was not permitted to do it, so he wrote a letter to the President as a naval officer, which went through naval channels, and asked for that permission, and the President answered and said under his directives only this committee could have access to these departmental files, and this committee could have anything it wished, and this committee has.

That is the entire story.

1 Navy Department liaison officer to the committee.
Senator Ferguson. Was the request made by Captain Lavender instead of Admiral Kimmel personally? I want to get the record straight.

Commander Baecher. I do not know who acted physically, but it was done in Admiral Kimmel's name.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?


Mr. Murphy. Why cannot we get the letters here?

Senator Ferguson. If we can get them, and make them a part of the record, that is all right with me.

Mr. Murphy. Put them in. I would like to see what date they were written, and when they started inquiring about this file, in view of it being several months ago, in December, and it just coming out now.

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything done with the file?

Commander Baecher. It was submitted to this committee.

Mr. Richardson. All of it?

Commander Baecher. There were two dispatches in it, and copies of it have been submitted to this committee along with the letter saying they are all there is.

Senator Ferguson. Could we get now from you, Commander, what dispatches were in this super-secret file?

Commander Baecher. As I recall it—and it is a hazy recollection—they were to the High Commissioner of the Philippines.

Mr. Richardson. We can get them.

Senator Ferguson. They were to the High Commissioner of the Philippines?

Commander Baecher. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. That would not be a message between the British Government and the United States Government?

Commander Baecher. I understand there were none. The record will speak better than I can now. It has been several months. We submitted a box full of dispatches between the Navy and the British Admiralty, which would be intergovernmental, you might say.

Senator Ferguson. I wanted what the Admiral was talking about. When the communications were made from the President, the Navy's communications were used, and the copies ordinarily would be kept in the file and that would be a super-secret file.

Commander Baecher. We wrote a letter in answer to a direct request on that, Senator, and it is here. That letter states that we have submitted all of these dispatches that were in the so-called White House file, and we submitted them along with the letter.

There were no others.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand there were only two papers in this White House file, and they related to the High Commissioner of the Philippines?

Commander Baecher. I think that is the purport of the certification we made, although I prefer you see that certification before you conclude that issue.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have personal knowledge of this, Commander, that when the file was obtained, there were only two papers in it? Are you speaking from personal knowledge?
Commander Baecher. No; I am not. I did not go into the raw material.

Senator Ferguson. It is what someone has told you?
Commander Baecher. Yes. Someone who is very responsible.

Senator Ferguson. Will you state who is very responsible? Who told you?

Commander Baecher. The Director of Naval Communications. The officer in charge has changed in the last several months. Admiral Stone is in charge now, and before Admiral Stone, it was some other admiral.

Admiral Stark. Redman?
Commander Baecher. Redman, yes. It was either Stone or Redman.

Mr. Richardson. When a request is made of you, you send that to the officer that has charge of the papers that you are asked to produce?

Commander Baecher. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Who produces that information and you convey that information to us here? You do not yourself go into the file and handle the papers physically yourself?

Commander Baecher. Very seldom; if I am not satisfied with what I get on it.

[13856] Senator Ferguson. Were you satisfied in this case?
Commander Baecher. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to, if possible, get the letter now of President Truman. I think it ought to go into this record, to make it clear.

The Chairman. I think Mr. Masten has gone down to get that.

Mr. Richardson. I do not think we have the letter from President Truman. I have not seen it.

Senator Ferguson. May I reserve the right to obtain from Ensign Phelan a copy of that letter, or the original, so it will be inserted in the record?

Mr. Murphy. Together with the letter from Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

[13857] Commander Baecher. I can furnish a copy of that letter.

I would not be surprised but that I may have the original in my files.

Senator Ferguson. You will be able to get us copies?
Commander Baecher. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. We will get it for you, Senator.¹ Let us see what we have right here now.

(The documents were handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Mr. Masten. Senator, I think all of those should be read into the record, if they are not in.

Senator Ferguson. These are not the letters we are talking about.

Mr. Masten. They are the memorandum from Admiral Colclough, rather than Commander Baecher, with the two messages from the President. Those are the only things we have had. The two messages are the two messages that are already in the record.

Senator Ferguson. The messages are already in the record?

Mr. Masten. That is my recollection. I am not sure whether the memorandum is.

¹ See p. 5492, infra.
The Chairman. Do you want these read into the record or filed and printed in the record?

Senator Ferguson. They ought to be printed.

The Chairman. It seems to me they might as well be printed at this point instead of read. They are photo- [13858] static copies.

Mr. Richardson. Are they at all significant? It seems to us they were entirely irrelevant.

Senator Ferguson. I do not claim they are, but I certainly do not want to keep them out.

Mr. Richardson. The first one, Mr. Chairman, is with reference to the Philippine matter and the second is also with reference to the Philippine matter. I have examined them and thought they were entirely irrelevant as to our examination here. Unless somebody says they are, why should the record be further encumbered?

Senator Ferguson. But the record still stands, I think I am not commenting on the evidence, except insofar as it relates to what we may inquire about here.

The Chairman. The letters would at least show that it is not claimed the President wrote to Churchill, and for that purpose probably they might as well go in.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

(The documents referred to follow:)

December 1, 1945.

Memorandum to Admiral Colclough:

It is our understanding that there is in the office of the Director of Naval Communications a file designated "White House File", containing communications sent by President Roosevelt to England and other points through Navy communication channels. This is to request that we be furnished, as promptly as possible, copies of all messages contained in this file sent to or received by the President or other White House aides during the period October 1, 1941, to December 7, 1941, inclusive, with reference to Japan or matters pertaining to political or military developments in the Far East. It is probable that the request submitted by us on date of November 28th, emanating from Congressman Keefe, will include some of this material, and in this event it will be sufficient in response to that request.

William D. Mitchell.

Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 10 December 1945.

Memorandum to: Mr. William D. Mitchell.

1. There are forwarded to you herewith copies of two dispatches as follows:
   (1) #261854 of 26 November 1941 from the President to the High Commissioner of the Philippine Islands.
   (2) #286228 of 28 November 1941 from Cincaaf to the President.

2. These dispatches are delivered in response to your request of 1 December 1945 for copies of dispatches in the Navy Department's "White House file" during the period October 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941, inclusive, "with reference to Japan or matters pertaining to political or military development in the Far East."

3. No other dispatches responsive to your request have been discovered.

4. It is requested that you receipt for the above two copies of dispatches on a copy of this memorandum.

/S/ O. S. Colclough,
O. S. COLCLOUCH,
Rear Admiral, USN.
[13861] Naval Message
From OPNAV To: CINCAF
Released by: H. R. Stark
Date: 26 Nov. 1941
26154

From the President. For the High Commissioner Philippines.

ADMIRAL HART WILL DELIVER TO YOU A COPY OF A DESPATCH WHICH WITH MY APPROVAL THE CNO AND THE COS ADDRESSED TO THE SENIOR ARMY AND NAVY COMMANDERS IN THE PHILIPPINES. IN ADDITION YOU ARE ADVISED THAT THE JAPANESE ARE STRONGLY REENFORCING THEIR GARRISONS AND NAVAL FORCES IN THE MANDATES IN A MANNER WHICH INDICTS THEY ARE PREPARING THIS REGION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AGAINST A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON THEM BY US FORCES. HOWEVER I AM MORE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED OVER INCREASING OPPOSITION OF JAPANESE LEADERS AND BY CURRENT SOUTHWARD TROOP MOVEMENTS FROM SHANGHAI AND JAPAN TO THE FORMOSA AREA. PREPARATIONS ARE BECOMING APPARENT IN CHINA FORMOSA AND INDO CHINA FOR AN EARLY AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT OF SOME CHARACTER ALTHOUGH AS YET THERE ARE NO CLEAR INDICATIONS AS TO ITS STRENGTH OR WHETHER IT WILL BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE BURMA ROAD THAILAND MALAY PENINSULA NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES OR THE PHILIPPINES. ADVANCE AGAINST THAILAND SEEMS THE MOST PROBABLE. I CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE [13862] THAT THIS NEXT JAPANESE AGGRESSION MIGHT CAUSE AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE US AND JAPAN. I DESIRE THAT AFTER FURTHER INFORMING YOURSELF AS TO THE SITUATION AND THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF NAVAL AND MILITARY PLANS THROUGH CONSULTATION WITH ADMIRAL HART AND GENERAL MACARTHUR YOU SHALL IN GREAT CONFIDENCE PRESENT MY VIEWS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND INFORM HIM THAT AS ALWAYS I AM RELYING UPON THE FULL COOPERATION OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND HIS PEOPLE. PLEASE IMPRESS UPON HIM THE DESIRABILITY OF AVOIDING PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT OR ACTION SINCE THAT MIGHT MAKE THE SITUATION MORE DIFFICULT. ROOSEVELT XX.

Copy to Op-12 War Plans Div. U. S. Army
No other persons to receive copies

[SECRET]

[13863] Naval Message
From: CINCAF
To: OPNAV
Date: NOVEMBER 28, 1941
286228

From High Commissioner Sayre Personal for President Roosevelt

YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 26TH IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.
I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT QUEZON TO INFORM YOU THAT YOU MAY BE ABSOLUTELY ASSURED THAT TO THE LAST MAN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH, AND THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, WILL STAND BEHIND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
ACTION: WHITE HOUSE.
SS FILE.

[13864] Senator Ferguson. It still remains, Admiral, that there were communications, using the Navy facilities between the President and the British Government in relation to the Far East; is not that a correct statement?
Admiral Stark. I think so; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And the copies would be kept in a supersecret file in the Navy Department?
Admiral Stark. I have no personal knowledge of that, but that would be a perfectly plausible thing to assume.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did you find the message or memorandum to Mr. Hull?

Mr. Masten. This is it (handing document to Senator Ferguson).

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, we have a memorandum for the Secretary of State dated December 4, 1941.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the whole memorandum put in, but I particularly want to question the Admiral about the last several paragraphs.

The Vice Chairman. You want the whole memorandum inserted in the record?

Senator Ferguson. I want the whole memorandum inserted in the record.

The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

[13865]

Memorandum for Secretary of State.

November 22nd the Special Naval Observer London informed the Chief of Naval Operations that Vice Admiral Furstner, Minister of Marine of the Dutch Government in London and Commander in Chief of All Dutch Naval Forces had received information that the Japanese were concentrating an expeditionary force in the Pelew Islands and that the Dutch Government were considering what it should do in case a Japanese expeditionary force should cross the Davao-Waigeo line or the equator east of that line, and that the Dutch Government were inclined to regard such a movement as a direct threat to the territories and interests of Great Britain and the United States, which should immediately be countered by force. The Dutch stated that before making up their minds they would like the views of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The Chief of Naval Operations replied that he discounted the information as to the assembly of an expeditionary force in the Pelew. That he was not in a position to offer advice as the question asked involved political questions, but authorized the Naval Observer London to express his views as to the importance of the Pelew for the protection of the Mandates and for an offense against the Philippines or the Netherland East Indies.

November 4th the Special Naval Observer London reported that he has kept the British Admiralty informed of the above as the same subject has been discussed by the Dutch with the British. He suggested to the British Admiralty that it might be necessary for the Dutch to declare the area south of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator line an area dangerous to shipping, in order that Dutch forces might be free to take prompt action against suspicious vessels crossing from the North and from the East. The British Admiralty concurred that this would constitute a useful defense measure from the naval point of view. However it was essential for political reasons that the zone should be declared in as unprovocative a manner as possible and should be represented as a defense zone rather than as a dangerous zone.

The British Admiralty informed Furstner that they also doubted the accuracy of his information and suggested the Dutch take the matter up with the Foreign Office.

When the Dutch Foreign Minister visited Eden his proposal went beyond that of Furstner as it invited a joint declaration of a defense zone by the United States or Great Britain. After consulting the Admiralty, Eden replied to the Dutch Foreign Minister as follows: (A) That during the continuance of the present negotiations between Japan and the United States, it was undesirable that any declaration be made unless there was the plainest evidence that the Japanese were preparing an expedition against the Netherlands territory, and that until [13867] more definite evidence becomes available that Japanese concentrations are threatening Dutch territory no declaration should be made. (B) That Great Britain recognizes the military value the declaration of a defense zone would have, but that it considers it would be less provocative to
Japan and less prejudicial to the Washington negotiations if it were confined to a unilateral declaration by the Netherlands East Indies of a zone manifestly designed as a defense measure for their own shores. (C) That in similar circumstances His Majesty's Government had been compelled to make a unilateral declaration of a defense zone on the open seas off the coast of Johore when the Japanese concentrations on the border of Indo China began to constitute a threat to Malaya; the declaration of this zone in waters adjacent to British territory was plainly a measure of defense and at the time was accepted as such by Japan without serious criticism.

Mr. Eden therefore suggested that if a declaration should prove necessary the Netherlands Government should declare that certain military and naval defense measures have been taken in the area south and west of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator line and that accordingly all vessels intending to enter this zone must notify the Netherlands Naval authorities of their intention and call at specified ports for routing instructions. Such a declaration would be analogous to that made by His Majesty's Government off Johore and would not be likely to increase existing tension.

On December 4 the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Special Naval Observer in London to transmit to the Dutch and British Admiralties in London, the following views on the military aspect of this subject.

While the Chief of Naval Operations believes the November reports of a concentration in the Pelewes were unfounded, the possibility of a Japanese attack from that region against the Philippines or Netherlands East Indies cannot be ruled out.

In regard to the Dutch project to declare areas south and west of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator line dangerous to shipping in order that Dutch Forces may attack suspicious vessels entering from the North and East, if this were done it would apply to all merchant shipping regardless of nationality and to British and United States Naval vessels as well as those of Japan. It is doubtful if the Dutch could establish promptly a control system which would not cause excessive delay to shipping important to the United States particularly to the shipping carrying reinforcements to the Philippines as all United States shipping between the United States and the Far East is routed via Torres Straits.

The declaration of this large area as a defense zone would hardly be analogous to the British declaration of the Johore area, as the latter area is a small one. The declaration of a large area of the high seas as a defense zone would create a precedent for Japan to close the Okhotsk Sea, Sea of Japan, the western part of the South China Sea, and the Gulf of Siam. If the United States acquiesced in the Dutch declaration, it would be difficult to object to similar declarations by the Japanese.

At present aid to Russia is being shipped via the Okhotsk Sea and Sea of Japan. The Dutch, British and United States are taking reconnaissance measures to cover areas considered dangerous. Shipments to Siberia and patrol measures should continue. The Chief of Naval Operations is convinced that the closing of the area west and south of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator area by the Dutch would be prejudicial to the naval and military interests of all three powers.

If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese the Chief of Naval Operations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if during the current situation Japanese Naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing this line would be attacked.

Ambassadors Winant and Biddle have been informed by the Special Naval Observer London of the contents of the memorandum.

/S/ R. E. SCHURMANN
By Direction.

[13870] Senator Ferguson. I never believed we should take isolated paragraphs out without putting the whole memorandum in. It is a memorandum by Admiral Schuirmann.

I will read you several items in it.

On December 4 the Chief of Naval Operations—that would be you—directed the Special Naval Observer in London to transmit to the Dutch and British Admiralties in London, the following views on the military aspect of this subject.
I am just taking one paragraph.

Mr. Gearhart. Will the Senator state the date?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. The 4th of December, 1941. It is a memorandum for the Secretary of State from R. E. Schuirmann, by direction. R. E. Schuirmann was an admiral, was he not, or a captain?

Admiral Stark. He was a captain at that time. He is a rear admiral now, sir.

Mr. Murphy. May I just ask one preliminary question?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Murphy. How long have we had the memorandum before the committee?

Mr. Masten. That memorandum has been in counsel's office since last November and available to every member of the committee. Yesterday, Mr. Greaves came down to look through various papers and this question I imagine is based on that examination yesterday.

Mr. Murphy. Fine.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the paragraph I want to read to you, and it follows the paragraph I did read and is the second from the last paragraph in this memorandum, is as follows:

If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese, the Chief of Naval Operations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if during the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing this line would be attacked.

Now, this is a message from Captain Schuirmann to the State Department, and it is on your direction, and I read you that part:

If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese, the Chief of Naval Operations—that is you—believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if during the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing this line would be attacked.

Attacked by whom?


Senator Ferguson. Why were you dictating the message that the Dutch were to give to Japan?

Admiral Stark. I remember that. My remembrance is that it came up before, but I am not certain, but we were undoubtedly asked, and that was our opinion.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you can give us the answer, why were you consulted as to what kind of a message the Dutch Government would give to the Japanese Government in a question solely between the Dutch Government and the Japanese Government, as to the Japanese Government moving troops or moving vessels across a certain line?

Admiral Stark. Well, we were—

Senator Ferguson. Were you taking parallel action?

That is the question.

Admiral Stark. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think the witness ought to be given an opportunity to answer the question. It seems like an important question.
Senator **Ferguson**. It is a very important question.  
Mr. **Murphy**. Then, let him answer.  
Admiral **Stark**. No; we were not taking parallel action. We could not take a parallel action.  
Mr. **Murphy**. I submit the question has not been answered, [13873] Senator. The second question was just answered, but the other question has not been answered.  
Senator **Ferguson**. Read the question, please, Mr. Reporter.  
(The question was read by the reporter.)  
Admiral **Stark**. My remembrance of that is that the Dutch asked us for an opinion and we gave it to them. There is much in the record showing an interdependent interest more or less in this whole area.  
Senator **Ferguson**. All right  
Now, I will ask you upon what you based your opinion that you had a right to tell the Dutch that they should give a message to the Japanese Government that if this line was crossed by the Japanese it would be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing this line would be attacked, that you believed that the Dutch should say that if the Japanese crossed that line the Dutch should attack? What did you base that on?  
Admiral **Stark**. I based that on the fact that if they did, it looked like an attack on the N. E. I., on the Netherlands East Indies, and they could consider it such, it was my opinion an attack, and in that event to repel it. I might draw a similar line—perhaps, exaggerate it a little bit—by saying if they attempted to go into Manila Bay——  
Senator **Ferguson**. That was in our territory?  
[31874] Admiral **Stark**. That was in our territory. But they asked me for an opinion, and that was my opinion.  
Senator **Ferguson**. Did you contact the President before you gave this opinion? It is an important opinion, is it not?  
Admiral **Stark**. Yes, sir.  
Senator **Ferguson**. It might have meant war between the United States and Japan? This kind of advice, could it not mean war?  
[13875] Admiral **Stark**. It could have meant war between the Dutch and the Japs. What the ultimate reaction to it would have been, I do not know.  
Mr. **Murphy**. Will the Senator yield?  
Senator **Ferguson**. That is because you had written to Admiral Kimmel that God alone would know what was going to happen? Is that the reason you did not take it to mean war between the United States and Japan?  
Admiral **Stark**. Well, I could not tell whether it meant war or not. Under our Constitution the Congress had to declare war, and we could not take any independent action, so far as hostilities were concerned.  
Mr. **Murphy**. Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to object on the ground that there is a “yes, sir” answer in there, and there were two questions and the record does not show which question the answer “yes, sir” is to. The first was: “Did you ask the President?”, and then there was another question asked and the answer was “Yes, sir.” The record does not show to anyone reading it whether the “Yes, sir” is to the first question or the second question.  
Senator **Ferguson**. One question was: “It is an important message, isn’t it?”
What is your answer to that?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is your answer to the other question the same, "Yes, sir"?
Admiral Stark. As to whether or not I consulted the President?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Admiral Stark. I do not recall definitely having consulted the President on that point, but I would assume that any dispatch of that nature would have been taken up with the Secretary and with the State Department, and probably with the President. It was along a similar line of the line which we had drawn in our memorandum of the 5th and the 27th.

Mr. Masten. Senator, may I suggest something there that would be helpful to you?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Masten. The memorandum which you have is a memorandum which describes the final message which appears in Exhibit No. 79 and which was introduced last December.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I have that here.
Mr. Masten. This exhibit gives the entire background of most of that memorandum, I think.
Senator Ferguson. But it is dated subsequent, is the only thing?
Mr. Masten. It appears that is the telegram referred to in the memorandum, because the language is practically identical with the descriptive language in the memorandum.

Mr. Murphy. For the record, when you said "this memorandum," you had one in your hand?
Mr. Masten. That was Exhibit No. 79.
Admiral Stark. You say you have just taken a paragraph out. I would like to see the dispatch and see the correspondence, what is in it.

Mr. Masten. This is the final dispatch in Exhibit No. 79, Admiral. Admiral Stark. I do recall that myself.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you will notice what you are reading, Admiral, is dated the 5th, which is the day following, and I cannot quite get the record straight in my own mind, how you can rely upon something that came subsequent to the time that you directed this advice to be given. Can you straighten that out?
Mr. Murphy. Now, will the Senator yield?
Admiral Stark. What I would like to see is where we start on this and who asked what.
Mr. Murphy. The record shows the 5th where? The 5th here or the 5th with the Dutch?
Mr. Masten. The final telegram in Exhibit No. 79 bears the date December 5, whereas the memorandum that Senator Ferguson is using is dated December 4. But the fact is that the language of the memorandum and of the telegram are practically identical, so it would seem to be clear that the memorandum is referring to the telegram.
Admiral Stark. This is the memorandum where they started?
Mr. Masten. That is the memorandum under discussion.
Admiral Stark. May I take the time to read it, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, certainly.
Mr. Murphy. I think, Mr. Chairman, the record should also show that the dispatch of the 5th is addressed to our own naval attaché at London.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Is there anything here showing any dispatch directly to the Dutch?

Mr. Masten. The memorandum refers to a dispatch of the 4th. There is a discrepancy on the dates.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield while the Admiral is reading?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I think, Mr. Chairman, the record should show that Exhibit No. 79 consists of 10 dispatches. Exhibit No. 79 was admitted in the record some month ago, and the part on which the Admiral is being questioned now, as to what the Chief of Naval Operations said, is in the dispatch of December 5. It has been in the record for some months.

[13879] Senator Ferguson. Yes, but the record did not show before that this was all under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, which is the witness.

Mr. Murphy. Yes, it does show it. It says,

If Dutch authorities consider some warning should be given Japan CNO believes it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of the current situation Japanese naval vessels, or expeditionary forces crossing the Davao-Waigeo line would be considered hostile and would be attacked. Communicate these views to the Admiralty and the Dutch Naval Command in London.

[13880] Senator Ferguson. It does not cover what I am inquiring about now.

Admiral Stark. I have read these, and to make it clear I would suggest, if they are not already in the record in connection with this questioning, that it would be well to put them in, or refer to them at this point.

Senator Ferguson. They will be referred to now, because through the counsel's statement, the exhibit number has been put in.

Admiral Stark. That shows the entire discussion. This memorandum was a memorandum by Schuirmann at my direction to the Secretary of State, with whom these things had been considered, and then I said if the Dutch were going to do something, I suggested the following.

Now, I may state with regard to this picture in general, that it had been suggested at times that we rule out certain parts of the sea and call them defensive sea areas, that nothing could come in there.

Senator Ferguson. When you say "we," whom are you speaking about?

Admiral Stark. We had to consider the same thing in the Southern Philippine waters.

Senator Ferguson. Do you mean you as the Navy, or the President, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy?


Senator Ferguson. The Navy Department?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

As I recollect, we had had some correspondence with Admiral Hart about it, about making a defensive sea area which would prohibit vessels coming in there except they asked permission to come in, so that we would know what was going through that area.
As noted here, the British had declared one such area. I recollect clearly when the question first came up, as opposing it, because if we did, we could have no complaint of the Japs, perhaps, closing the Sea of Japan, or closing the northern waters where we were sending vessels into Russia.

That is mentioned here, and that was our thought on the subject.

It is all in these dispatches.

Then we went on to say finally—

If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese, the Chief of Naval Operations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if during the current situation, Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act, and the forces crossing this line would be attacked.

[13882] That is very much the same thing as the defensive sea area. They cannot get into what they consider vital waters to them without asking permission, or being attacked.

Senator Ferguson. Would you read just the next paragraph?

Admiral Stark. May I go on just a little further?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. Those questions had been discussed in the Navy Department and in the State Department. This first memorandum is to the State Department, and I think we were all pretty much of one mind with regard to it.

Now as to your question, as to whether this was taken up with the President, I do not recall. The last paragraph that you suggest I read is:

Ambassadors Winant and Biddle have been informed by the Special Naval Observer, London, of the contents of the memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. Do you think today that you described this important matter as to advising the Dutch to do this without taking it up with the President of the United States?

Admiral Stark. No, I do not think I would. I certainly would not do it without taking it up with the Secretary of the Navy, and without a complete interchange with the State Department.

[13883] As I remember the first instance, when we were talking about the southern Philippine waters, of discussing it with the President, but I just cannot say absolutely that I took up that particular paragraph with the President.

I am under the impression I did, but I hesitate, when he is not here, to state positively that I did, when it is not perfectly clear to my mind that I did.

Senator Ferguson. Unless it is your memory that it is perfectly clear, I would not want you to.

Admiral Stark. On things of that sort, we just could not go along by ourselves. It had to involve the State Department, and things of that sort were always taken up with the President, and we were very close to him.

Senator Ferguson. What I want to get at is, in your opinion now, if they had moved across this line, and the Dutch had attacked, would you have said that that meant war also with the United States?

Admiral Stark. No; I would not.

Senator Ferguson. Then I want to read to you out of Mr. Stimson's memorandum.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield before you proceed?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. How does this Davao-Waigeo line compare with the line set forth in the areas described in the memorandum [13884] of November 5?

Senator Ferguson. It was over in the Netherlands East Indies area, and, as I recall, would have put an amphibious Japanese force right on the doorstep.

Admiral Stark. Of the NEI.

Senator Ferguson. Of the NEI?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But it had nothing to do with the line that you had General Marshall establish in your memorandum of the 5th and 27th of November?

Admiral Stark. That is a different line.

Mr. Murphy. Is not there a paragraph in the November 5 memorandum as to what the recommendations of our military authorities were if the NEI were attacked?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I want to bring up next.

Admiral Stark. I think so.

Senator Ferguson. "Friday, November 7, 1941." This is out of Secretary Stimson's diary.

Cabinet meeting this afternoon. The President opened with telling the story of Lincoln and his Cabinet—how he polled the Cabinet and found them all polling "no," and then he said "The ayes have it." With that, he started to have [13885] what he said was the first general poll of his Cabinet, and it was on the question of the Far East—whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there, and what the tactics should be.

Now, he has got a note there, and the note is:

See statement, page 11, as to this Cabinet meeting.

Now, continuing reading from the memorandum:

It was a very interesting talk—the best Cabinet meeting I think we have ever had since I have been there. He went around the table—first Hull and then myself, and then around through the whole number, and it was unanimous in feeling the country would support us.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Don't you think the Admiral ought to have a copy so he can follow you?

Admiral Stark. I brought that up with me.

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 42, Admiral.

Admiral Stark. Thank you.

Senator Ferguson. About half way down.

He said that this time the vote is unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull made a good presentation of the general situation. I told them I rather narrowed it down into a following up the steps which had been done to show what needed to be done in the future. The thing would have been much [13886] stronger if the Cabinet had known—and they did not know except in the case of Hull and the President—what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we are to pitch in.

Now, that is the end of the memorandum.

Mr. Murphy. At that point, Senator, don't you think it is unusual that he did not include Secretary Knox? Certainly, he would know, too.
Senator Ferguson. I can only read from the diary of the Secretary of War. I am not putting any language in it. It may seem strange.

Admiral Stark. I may state Colonel Knox did know.

Senator Ferguson. You say Colonel Knox did know?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; he knew everything I did, and I was perfectly familiar with that program.

Senator Ferguson. And you were familiar with what is contained in the diary of the Secretary of War?

Admiral Stark. I did not recall that vote. It may have been I was told, but I do not recall.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I will go to pages 11 and 12, because it refers to that, and I will keep this record straight.

On Friday, November 7, we had the usual weekly Cabinet meeting. The Far Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our minds. Mr. Hull informed us that relations had become extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for an attack by Japan at any time.

Now, this is November 7.

“Our military advisers”—and you would be one of those would you not, Admiral?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Reading on:

—while desirous of delay, had urged military action if Japan attacked territory whose security was vital to us, and in this connection specified American, British, or Dutch territory.

Now, I will ask you whether or not the Dutch territory was the same territory that was described in the memorandum of Schuirmann on your direction?

Admiral Stark. In effect; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It was?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that you had given the opinion to apparently the President, and apparently to the other members of the War Cabinet, that we should attack if this territory south of this particular—what is the name of it? Davao-Waigeo?

Admiral Stark. Davao-Waigeo.

Senator Ferguson. “South of this particular Davao [13887] Waigeo line, “isn’t that true? That was your opinion as early as the 7th?”

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and on that same 7th, I wrote that war might be delayed a month longer, but I did not see how it could go beyond that.

I might say with regard to that—and I have a remembrance that in my previous testimony I said that—what I was afraid of was one at a time, and then a squeeze play, and I think I am on the record as saying under certain conditions we would have to fight for our own safety.

Senator Ferguson. Coming back to my question, here on the 7th of November, you are of the opinion, and have advised the President and the War Cabinet, as one of our military advisers, that if Japan attacked the territory of the Dutch, which includes the very territory that you are now telling the Dutch to give this warning about, and that they are to attack, you would say then that it did mean war, in your opinion; is that not a correct statement?

Admiral Stark. No, it is not. There is a distinction there.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us what it is?

Admiral Stark. It is this, that while it would mean that Marshall and I, these advisers—which is a matter of record—had advised this, we could not say that our advice [13889] would be followed.

What the Congress would do if this was put up to them, I had no means of knowing. That is why I say it did not mean war, because we thought it ought to.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, did you ever consider on this question of whether or not we would start war with Japan, whether there would be shots from the Japanese side, and, therefore, we would be in war; whether that question would ever be submitted to the Congress of the United States?

Admiral Stark. Our instructions were very clear on not to commit an overt act. So far as I was concerned, I could do nothing in that line without authority higher up.

Unless something had occurred, such as did occur, the normal procedure was for a declaration by Congress, in accordance with our Constitution.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did not you know that Colonel Knox advised the President of three alternatives, and he advised as the last that we should attack?

Mr. Keefe. You mean Colonel Stimson?

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Stimson.

Admiral Stark. That paragraph which is in here—

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 53.

Admiral Stark. In view of the rest of the paragraphs in here where Colonel Stimson states—

[13890] Senator Ferguson. It is on page 53, if it will help you.

Admiral Stark. I want to finish that sentence.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. Where Colonel Stimson states, on page 55 of this memorandum, and I quote:

It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the force as it went by without any warning, on the one hand, which we didn't think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go,

and so forth.

There Colonel Stimson puts himself on record as stating that he could not strike without warning.

Now, I think that there is another paragraph here that bears on that same thing, if I may look for it, while this talk is on this matter.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Mr. Richardson. Look on page 56.

Admiral Stark. I will come right back to it.

On page 28, Colonel Stimson further states:

On the other hand we also decided that we could not attack without a further warning to Japan, and we discussed what form that warning should take. The President suggested a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. After some discussion, it was decided that he would send such [13891] a letter to the Emperor, which would not be made public, and that at the same time he would deliver a special message to Congress reporting on the danger and reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened.

Now, Colonel Stimson, I think, in those two statements, which I have quoted, and there may be others here—clearly states, in my
opinion, that he could not go ahead and make an attack without first warning, and he suggests that the President should go to Congress.

Senator Ferguson. Did not he also advise the President that he believed the message of the 17th of August—he calls it the 19th, but apparently that is wrong—

Admiral Stark. Yes; that is an error.

Senator Ferguson. That the message of the 17th of August was such a warning, that if they crossed that line, we would be justified in attacking without congressional action?

Admiral Stark. I do not gather that he considers that. That message of the 17th of August—and while I have not refreshed my memory on it for a long time, as I recall wound up with some statement to the effect that if the Japs encroached further in southeast Asia, we reserved to ourselves the right to take any action which we saw fit in our national interest.

[15892] Senator Ferguson. Now, would not one of those actions be that we would attack if we would take any action?

Admiral Stark. I would not say it would be to attack without warning. I feel so strongly on that, that my only suggestion is—you are asking me to interpret Colonel Stimson’s thoughts. He is available to answer that question.

Senator Ferguson. I will come back to it.

Did you expect this war to start by the Japanese doing the first shooting, after Congress had declared war upon Japan? Is not that contrary to all of the philosophy of Japan, that they would allow us, if they were going to make war, to declare war first?

Admiral Stark. Again I would like to state this with regard to that: My thought was that the Japs would strike without warning. That was their history.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Admiral Stark. Now, as to the second part of your question——

Senator Ferguson. I think you testified to that before.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

As to the second part of your question, as to our striking after declaration of war on our part, if the situation became intolerable to us, and our national safety, if the Japs had not struck and we thought then that our safety was imperiled, [15893] if we did not fight, I think it would have been done in a constitutional manner.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, you expected Japan to attack without warning?

Admiral Stark. I did.

Senator Ferguson. And that would be before we declared war?

Admiral Stark. At that time; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Therefore, the war would start before Congress declared war, because we would not allow Japan to attack us and not even shoot back, would we?

Admiral Stark. Well, I think your question is just stating what has happened.

Senator Ferguson. Is that what you anticipated? My original question was prefaced, and I am carrying out the idea, by what happened prior to the 7th.

It is exactly what happened, but I want to know whether that is what you anticipated would happen.
Admiral Stark. I did.

I did anticipate an attack without warning. I said so in personal letters for over a year. I stated so unequivocally in dispatches in the latter part of November.

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it true that that was taken up [13894] at the War Cabinet meeting, as related in the Stimson statement?

Admiral Stark. If you will give me the page, I will follow you, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Look at page 47.

Then, at 12 o'clock, we (viz, General Marshall and I) went to the White House, where we were until nearly half-past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President, instead of bringing up the Victory Parade, brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.

It was a difficult proposition.

Now, is that not exactly what the whole War Cabinet expected, that there would be an attack by the Japanese before anything would be submitted to Congress and have America declare war upon Japan?

Admiral Stark. We thought action by Japan attacking us was about to start, and we said so.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

[13895] Now, I come to the question here:

Wasn't it also true that you expected that attack before Congress would declare war upon Japan?

Admiral Stark. Yes, because I thought it was in the immediate offing.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. But I do again make the statement, and I want it clear on the record, so far as my thoughts are concerned, that if Japan had not attacked, and if conditions had become intolerable to our national safety because of what she was doing, it is then my opinion that there would have been only one road for us to take, and that would have been through the Congress.

It did not have to be, because she attacked.

Senator Ferguson. And you expected she would attack, and the President expected she would attack?

Admiral Stark. Yes; at that time there was not any question about it in our minds. I said so at that time, on the 25th.

Senator Ferguson. You did not change your mind, and as far as you know, the President did not change his, at least saying so to you, up to the 7th of December?

Admiral Stark. No one changed their minds, so far as I know.

You will recall on the 6th we sent a dispatch [13896] about codes, to hold on to the last minute. That showed we were still expecting that minute to happen at any time.

Senator Ferguson. Now, he states:

The question was how we should maneuver them—

I take it that means the Japanese—

into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.
Now, did you discuss with the President and those present at that meeting how you would maneuver the Japanese into shooting the first shot?

Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of that. My recollection of that meeting, on which I testified before—and which the record, the written record shows—is that I wrote Kimmel about both the President and Mr. Hull stating that they would not be surprised at a surprise attack.

But as to our maneuvering them, if you take the language boldly, just what it says, that it was trying to get them to shoot at us, I do not recall any such conversation.

I do recall the meat of the thing, and which meant what Colonel Stimson meant, that we should not commit the first overt act, and I heard Marshall’s testimony yesterday when he said he thought this was to keep the record clear; and that it was to be political. Maybe that was it; I don’t know.

Senator Ferguson. Did he say, “political” or “diplomatic”?

Admiral Stark. Diplomatic, perhaps it was.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, is that your own opinion, that we were to keep the diplomatic record in shape so that Japan would shoot the first shot rather than America declaring war?

Admiral Stark. I do not recollect that having gone through my mind at that time. As I said, I did not recollect discussing this, just as it is here, except that we would not commit the first overt act.

I do know, however, that there was a desire to keep the record straight on our offers, for example.

To go back a little bit, I think it was back in July when I was present with Nomura, and with Welles in the White House, when Nomura brought up the subject that what they were concerned with was raw materials, and particularly food, rice; and the President then offered, so far as he possibly could, to guarantee that they would get these things if Japan would stop her aggression.

I remember his remark afterwards, that she probably would not stop her aggression. But that was to keep the record straight, and they were continually trying to prevent war in the Pacific.

I think the record is clean on it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, you do not remember this being taken up at that meeting, and you do not remember that the “maneuver” meant diplomatic maneuver. You do not remember either?

Admiral Stark. No; I do not, Senator Ferguson.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Was Admiral Stark at this Cabinet meeting?

Admiral Stark. Yes; I was.

Senator Ferguson. It was the War Cabinet meeting.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Senator Ferguson. You were present?

Admiral Stark. I was present at that meeting; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I think you wrote to Kimmel advising him that the President had expected the war by Japan attacking by—what was it? Monday?

Mr. Keefe. The following Monday, December 1.
Admiral Stark. That is what the President said. If you recall, when you questioned me about this before, I said I thought we went into all phases of it, but my memory was not clear as to just what we had discussed in detail, but that I had written Kimmel of the President's and Mr. Hull's belief that a surprise attack might come any time, and as early as "next Monday."

There are things in here, of course, from Mr. Stimson's [13900] diary. I kept none.

Senator Ferguson. I think that is all.

The Vice Chairman. Does Mr. Keefe desire to inquire?

Mr. Keefe. May I have the diary?

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire.

Mr. Keefe. I would like to have it perfectly clear, if I can—and I listened attentively to the questions and answers that have been pro-

Admiral Stark—

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. But according to Secretary Stimson's diary, under date of November 7, 1941, in which he described the Cabinet meeting held that afternoon, Friday afternoon, where the President polled the cabinet on the question "whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be," whether the fact that such a vote was taken by the full Cabinet, and they had voted "aye," expressing their respective opinions that the people would back them up if they struck at Japan, whether that was known to you when you attended the meeting of the War Cabinet on Tuesday, November 25?

Admiral Stark. I do not think it was. I do not recall Colonel Knox having given me that information.

Obviously I would not have gotten it from anyone else, unless Marshall had gotten it from Stimson and told me.

I have no recollection of it.

Mr. Keefe. It is obvious from the memorandum prepared by Secretary Stimson and appearing in his diary that that whole question was gone over by the Cabinet.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I think there is no question of that. It states so, from his note made at the time.

Mr. Keefe. But you, as Chief of Naval Operations, state to us now that you had no knowledge that that question was discussed at that Cabinet meeting of November 7?

Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. Keefe. Then, am I to understand that it is a mere lapse of memory that you do not have a recollection; that it may have been discussed and you have forgotten it?

Admiral Stark. It is possible that I might have. In my opinion, I did not know.

After all, that is going on 5 years, and there was an awful lot going on. But I have no recollection of that vote, until I read it here; and I think I did not get it.

Mr. Keefe. Well, the reason I am asking that, Admiral Stark, is because it impressed me, when I read it, that it was a very important matter, reflecting itself on subsequent actions, perhaps, of the Cabinet and subsequent action of the so-called War Cabinet, but your final
judgment before [13901] this committee today is that when you met with the war cabinet on the 25th of November, or at any other time, that the war cabinet met subsequent to November 7, you do not have any present recollection of ever having known of its meeting and its determination and vote on the 7th of November?

Admiral Stark. That is correct. If I had had it, I do not know that it would have affected my independent judgment.

Mr. Keeffe. The thing that impressed me about this memorandum of the former Secretary Stimson is the fact that they apparently were concerned about the imminence of war, and how we were to meet it without being put in the position of having it said that we had fired the first shot, or committed the first overt act. You were concerned about that too, as Chief of Naval Operations, were you not?

Admiral Stark. I was concerned with the imminence of war, and surprise attack by the Japs which we were expecting at any moment at that time.

I say "at that time," my message of the 24th put it down as a possibility; my message of the 27th was positive, and you recall the subsequent messages to the 27th about the codes and so forth. We were expecting such an attack.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, I understand that clearly, but I [13902] gained the impression from reading Secretary Stimson’s statement to this committee, together with the excerpts from his diary which he has submitted to the committee that there was a question in the minds of the Cabinet officers as to whether or not there was such a division among the people of this country with respect to the possibility of war in the Pacific, or whether or not the country was so solidified on that question that they would back up the President and the Cabinet if they did actually, in view of the circumstances, strike at Japan and commit the first overt act, and the Cabinet, when polled on that question, said they thought the country would back them up. Did you share that belief at that time?

Admiral Stark. Well, I certainly would not have had any such unanimity with regard to the country backing them up as was indicated there by the Cabinet poll.

I had recalled when I thought we would get the draft without any question, we got it by one vote, after a good deal of contest, and the sentiment of the country, which is portrayed here by Colonel Stimson—for example, may I quote here, speaking of the officers and what the military was working on at that time, Colonel Stimson said, "Yet they were surrounded, outside of their offices and almost throughout the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief [13903] in danger which now seems incredible."

Mr. Keeffe. You felt that way too, did you not, because you wrote Admiral Hart on that same thing, did you not?

Admiral Stark. I wrote I did not know what we would do and there has been a good deal of comment on that in articles one way or the other, as though it might seem strange that the Chief of Naval Operations did not know what to do under certain conditions.

Mr. Keeffe. You would have good—

Admiral Stark. May I finish?

Mr. Keeffe. Yes.
Admiral Stark. It would have taken a brave man right here in Congress at that time to have predicted what would have to be done, if it was put up to Congress.

Mr. Keeffe. I recall a letter which you wrote, which is in the record here—I cannot quote it exactly—but I do recall a letter which you wrote to Admiral Hart in which you said to him, in substance, that you could not understand the attitude of the people of this country, and especially the people up on the Hill that were debating the question of arming the ships and so on, that they apparently did not realize that the country was already at war, that we were at war in the Atlantic, and you said to him, "You and I know it."

[13904] Do you have that letter?

Admiral Stark. I remember very distinctly a letter in which I stated, "Although the country does not realize, we are in war in the Atlantic."

Mr. Keeffe. Yes.

Admiral Stark. We covered that in the previous testimony.

Mr. Keeffe. You, as Chief of Naval Operations, knew it, but you expressed the opinion at that time, that the people of the country and the Congress itself did not seem to understand and know the facts.

Admiral Stark. That is correct. You remember the testimony, I think, to the effect that we did not have belligerent rights, and so forth, that went with the full declaration of war. There were a lot of things we could not do, but technically, in certain areas, we had given an order to shoot at any Axis craft we saw, and the public had been fully informed on that by the President.

Mr. Murphy. In the speech of September 11, wasn't it?

Admiral Stark. September 11; yes, sir; I think that was the speech. It has all been covered.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, now; in answer to the questions of Senator Ferguson, you indicated that you have very little present recollection of what actually took place at this [13905] meeting of the War Cabinet on the 25th, as described here by Secretary Stimson.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I searched my memory just as carefully as I could. I kept no diary. I have the written record of Kimmel on that, in which I referred to that meeting. The only thing additionally that I want to bring up, and was refreshed on in Colonel Stimson's memorandum was what I knew at the time, that we were not to commit the first overt act. That could be one interpretation of the statement which he makes there, and also the President and Mr. Hull stating unequivocally that they would not be surprised if the Japs attacked us without warning. I immediately transmitted that to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Keeffe. The attack which was in your mind, and the possibility of attack which was in your mind, and in the minds of all the others, as far as you knew it, was an attack down in the Far East, wasn't it?

Admiral Stark. That is where we were looking for it; yes, sir.

We knew the other was a possibility. For example, the dispatches we sent made both the Commanders in the Pacific action addressees; it made King in the Atlantic "information," but we expected the attack in the southeast Pacific, and we were surprised when they struck at the time they did in [13906] Hawaii.
Mr. Keefe. Now, Admiral, I understood you to say when you were here the last time, a couple of days ago, that you had since located an engagement book, or something of that kind.

Admiral Stark. That was Mrs. Stark's engagement book, in which everything of a social nature, or in going out, was kept.

Mr. Keefe. Is it here?

Admiral Stark. No; I haven't got it here, but I would be glad to give it to you, if you want to see it. I will tell you, there was nothing there regarding that Saturday night, at least we could not find that.

Mr. Keefe. When you first testified, you testified you could not find it, it was not available, and you have since located it, since the last hearing?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and I so stated in my testimony here.

Mr. Keefe. Is it available so you can bring it to the committee?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I would like to see it.

Admiral Stark. Aye, aye, sir. I will give it to Baecher.

Mr. Keefe. You told us there was absolutely no entry for Saturday, the 6th of December, did you not?

Admiral Stark. None for Saturday evening, the 6th of December.

Mr. Keefe. Is there anything for Saturday afternoon?

Admiral Stark. Yes, there is for Saturday afternoon, about the Canadian party.

Mr. Keefe. Then, that refreshes your recollection that you were present at that Canadian party, does it?

Admiral Stark. It does not.

Mr. Keefe. That simply was an entry?

Admiral Stark. It simply was an entry. Those parties usually were put down, and our answers to them always were if anything was required I would go if I could, but actually I practically never went. I was too busy. I did not have time to go to cocktail parties.

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any present recollection as to whether you did go to this cocktail party on December 6?

Admiral Stark. My recollection is I did not go, and Mrs. Stark said she did not go. Often, particularly where friends were concerned, I would ask her to go, just as a matter of good will, to represent me. I did not have time.

Mr. Keefe. Your testimony is you did not attend that cocktail party on that afternoon, December 6, is that right?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And that the newspaper statement is simply a list of the guests that were there, and it was just perhaps taken from those that were invited, and so far as you are concerned, you were not at that party?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any recollection as to where you were that afternoon?

Admiral Stark. Well, my recollection, the only recollection I would have of that business, or anything else, is in the office. That is where I usually spent it.

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any recollection as to where you spent the evening?
Admiral Stark. Well, I can only assume that I was at the National Theater.

Mr. Keefe. Now, Admiral, I am not asking you to assume anything, I am asking you whether you have any present recollection as to where you were.

Admiral Stark. No; I do not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, from where do you obtain the assumption that you were at the National Theater?

Admiral Stark. Commander Schulz' testimony.

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any present recollection as to where you were at all Saturday evening?

Admiral Stark. No, I do not. I had been under the impression, as I have previously testified, that I was at home, because I have no other recollection of being anywhere else. The testimony makes it rather clear, I would say, that I was not, and that I was at the National Theater. As I have also testified, I do recall having seen the revival of "The Student Prince," but I did not connect it up with that Saturday night, and I still draw more or less of a blank on it, except I did see a revival of "The Student Prince."

Mr. Keefe. Do I understand your testimony to be that you can state with positiveness and certainty that you did not go to the White House that night, December 6?

Admiral Stark. I am absolutely certain of that.

Mr. Keefe. And are you also absolutely certain that you received no telephone calls from the White House that night?

Admiral Stark. I am certain the President did not call me that night.

Mr. Keefe. And you are also certain that you did not see the first 13-parts of the Jap 14-part message that night?

Admiral Stark. I am; yes, sir; perfectly. I am perfectly certain of that.

Mr. Keefe. Did anyone tell you, or have you any present recollection of any one of your servants telling you that Captain Kramer had called and tried to locate you that night?

Admiral Stark. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Are you certain that you had no telephone message that night from Secretary Knox?

Admiral Stark. Well, I haven't the slightest recollection of it. Yes; I am certain that I heard nothing that Knox said that night.

Mr. Keefe. Did you have any telephone message from Admiral Wilkinson?

Admiral Stark. No, sir. I think Wilkinson has also testified to that same fact, and also Kramer.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I might say, Admiral, it is rather amazing to me that you have a pretty clear negative memory that certain things did not happen, but you cannot recall anything that you actually did that night.

Admiral Stark. That is the fact, Mr. Keefe. Whether it seems strange to you or not, that is the fact.

Mr. Keefe. I understood your testimony, in response to questions asked by Senator Ferguson, that your visit to your office Sunday morning was just a normal, ordinary routine matter and there was no meeting with an extraordinary show-up of naval officers there that morning out of the ordinary.
Admiral Stark. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

Admiral Stark. Mr. Keefe, I will bring that book up to you and show it to you personally.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark, when you were questioned previously about what you would have done, had you known that the President, in substance, uttered some words which the witness interpreted as "This means war," referring to the 13-part message, as I understand it, you said you would have gone to your office. Is that what you said you would have done?

Admiral Stark. If I had known that a message had been [13912] received which caused the President to make any explanation to the effect "This means war," of course I would have been so interested that I might have picked up the telephone and called him. I would not have hesitated to have called him or seen him. My relations were such that I could have at the time, or I would have called Ingersoll, or someone, and I would have followed through on it until I had seen that message. I have read Schulz' testimony since I was up here the other day, and I am not convinced from it that the President did say "This means war."

Mr. Murphy. The witness said that the President said something which, in substance, he interprets "This means war."

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did he use the word "interprets"?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. Let me get his exact words. I will come back to that.

At any rate, if you had known that the President did say something in substance "This means war," about the 13-part message, was there anything you would have done that night except to read the message? Is there anything you could now tell us you would have done, in the way of back sight or hindsight that you would have done that you did not do?

Admiral Stark. It would not be back sight or hindsight, because when I read it on Sunday morning I saw nothing in it to [13913] cause me to take any further action on it.

Mr. Murphy. Now, the actual testimony, at page 12,441, of Commander Schulz was, in the transcript: 1

Commander Schulz. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance—I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance—"This means war." Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed it, for perhaps five minutes, the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment and——

Now, then, if you had known that the President said, in substance, that, you would no doubt have gone and read the 13-part message, would you not?

Admiral Stark. There isn't any doubt in my own mind but that I would have.

Mr. Murphy. Now, is there anything in Commander Schulz' testimony, you having read it, that would have given you the slightest indication that there was to be any attack specifically at Hawaii?

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1 Hearings, Part 10, p. 4662.

79716—46—pt. 11——7
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, there has been some testimony about the Cabinet meeting of November 7. You were not at the Cabinet meeting where the vote of the Cabinet was taken?
Mr. Murphy. As to the attitude of the American people, were you?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Do you know anything of the plans that were made, either at that Cabinet meeting or immediately subsequent to the Cabinet meeting, to have the different members of the Government in high places address the American people on the war question?
Admiral Stark. No, not as a result of or tied up with that meeting. There were talks by—I have forgotten just what the talks were.
Mr. Murphy. It was done by Sumner Welles on November 11, on Armistice Day; do you remember that?
Admiral Stark. I do not remember. I think he stated we might be in the war at anytime, or something to that effect.
Mr. Murphy. Subsequent to the Cabinet meeting there were some talks, I believe, by leading Americans on the possibility of a war coming.
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. You were not, as I understand it, at any meeting where the necessity of having those talks was discussed?
Admiral Stark. The only one that I remember with regard to action of that sort was the one—and I am not sure just [13915] when it came up—was the President's message to the Emperor.
Mr. Murphy. That is on the night of December 6th?
Admiral Stark. Yes, along about then. I am not sure.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, in Colonel Stimson's diary there is a notation—let me see that diary. The entry of November 27, this part about the question of firing the first shot. Was there ever at any time any discussion by anyone in the Government that you know of where there ever was any intention on our part of avoiding doing anything possible to prevent war with the Japanese?
Admiral Stark. No.
Mr. Murphy. Was not that our intention right up to December 7, if it could be done without sacrificing American honor and principles?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and we had been working for months on that, and the record is complete in regard to that.
Mr. Hull stated we tried to avoid war, in his testimony. As you recall, I recorded that over the period of months. I stated in my opinion there was always one stumbling block which we could not get around, and that was the Chinese-Japanese War.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, about the so-called first shot, the fact is the Japanese had fired a great many shots previous to November, 1941, had not they?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
[13916] Mr. Murphy. They had sunk the Panay, they had bombed our missions in China, and they had also attacked another ship and committed a great many acts which would be unfriendly to America; had not they?
Admiral Stark. The Panay incident I remember very distinctly. The bombing or the near-bombing of our diplomatic residence I also
remember. I think there was a near-attack or miss that could not be called an attack on another gunboat. I forget where it was.

Mr. Murphy. There were also attacks on American property on a number of occasions?

Admiral Stark. That had been going on for a long time.

Mr. Murphy. Despite all those acts we were still continuing in a state of peace with the Japanese up until December 7, 1941?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Any further questions?

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark, you recall rather definitely what you were doing during the Sunday upon which the attack occurred; do you not?

Admiral Stark. There are certain things, of course, that [13917] stand out on that Sunday, the 7th, that I am very clear on. One is in regard to the 1300 message and the conversation almost exactly as it took place. The other was the message that came in stating, "This is no drill." That is when the Japanese attacked. And the rest of it was, of course, messages coming in during the afternoon. I was in the office from that morning until about 2:00, as I recall, the next morning. We also went to work immediately, in the late hours, shifting some ships from the Atlantic back to the Pacific.

Mr. Gearhart. Just how long after the news of the attack reached Washington was it before Secretary Knox began to talk about his desire to make a trip to Hawaii, so he could personally inspect it?

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that. He went shortly after, but just when he started talking about it I do not know.

Mr. Gearhart. You were in constant consultation with him; were you not?

Admiral Stark. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Until the time of this tragic event?

Admiral Stark. I was always in touch with him; every day.

Mr. Gearhart. Cannot you recall when he first mentioned his desire to go there?

Admiral Stark. It was shortly after that he said he better go out and take a look himself. That was after he had talked [13918] with the President.

Mr. Gearhart. After he decided he would go to Hawaii did he ask you to make any investigation for him, to inform him of any facts or things that might have happened theretofore?

Admiral Stark. No, sir. He had everything we had which had come in, in the way of dispatches.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, how long was it after the event before you began to hear about the possibilities of a Roberts Commission being organized.

Admiral Stark. Just about the time it happened, just about the time the Commission was formed here.

Mr. Gearhart. That was right immediately, or almost immediately after the bombs fell at Pearl Harbor that there was talk in the United States about creating a nonpartisan national commission to go to Hawaii to make an investigation with respect to the causes and responsibilities involved?
Admiral Stark. There was talk, of course, about an investigation. I could not give you the date, but it was shortly after December 7 that that investigating commission went out.

Mr. Gearhart. It was only a few days until the Congress acted and a commission was authorized, the President made the appointment of Justice Roberts, is that correct?

Admiral Stark. I have forgotten about the Congress authorizing it. It was only a few days.

[13919] Mr. Gearhart. I am in error. It was only a few days that the President made the appointment and made the announcement of the Commission?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I think the record should show that the Congress did not authorize it.

Mr. Gearhart. I did make that correction. It was not necessary for you to interpose.

Now, as soon as it was determined to have an investigation by an impartial board it became necessary to amass testimony and evidence for the benefit of the Commission, did it not?

Admiral Stark. During the process; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And did you assist in the gathering of the information for the Roberts Commission?

Admiral Stark. No, sir, except that I testified.

Mr. Gearhart. And you heard the testimony of General Marshall that he immediately busied himself in getting evidence together for the benefit of the Commission, did not you?

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Then, there were other investigations that were conducted, some informally and some formally, were there not, following in rapid succession, right on down until the Army board was organized and until the Navy Court of Inquiry was organized, and there were investigations after investigations following one after another?

Admiral Stark. I remember of none other except that of the Roberts Commission, unless you call Colonel Knox's trip out there to see what had happened one. I do not recall any other up until the summer of 1944, I think, when the Army and Navy held their—There was one other. Admiral Hart was sent by the Secretary of the Navy, I believe—I did not appear before him, I was in Europe—on an investigating committee, and the Army may have sent someone at the same time, but I am not clear on that. But the only ones I remember were the Roberts Commission and Hart prior to the Regular Army and Navy courts.

Mr. Gearhart. Then, there were investigations following the Army and Navy inquiries?

Admiral Stark. Yes, there was Admiral Hewitt. He was appointed by the Secretary to make a follow-up of the Navy inquiry.

Mr. Gearhart. And the Colonel from San Francisco was appointed to conduct a parallel investigation on the part of the Army, was not he?

Admiral Stark. I have not paid any attention to that. I think they made further investigations.

[13921] Mr. Murphy. Colonel Clausen.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Then after that time, there was a still further investigation, was there not, prior to the beginning of this investigation, the Clarke investigation?
Admiral Stark. I do not remember that.
Mr. Gearhart. In how many of those investigations did you testify?
Admiral Stark. I testified before the Roberts Commission; I testified before the Navy, and I testified before this committee.
I was not interviewed by Admiral Hart, nor was I interviewed by Admiral Hewitt.
Mr. Gearhart. In relation to those investigations that you did not testify in, did you have anything to do with the collection of evidence for the benefit of those investigations?
Admiral Stark. Nothing whatsoever; no sir. I was not here; I was in Europe.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, were you interrogated when you testified before the Roberts Commission as to where you were the previous Saturday night?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that. I think I was not. I do not recall.
[1922] Mr. Gearhart. What?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall.
Mr. Gearhart. You had testified prior to the commencement of this investigation that you did not know where you were on the previous Saturday night, had you not?
Admiral Stark. I have forgotten for the moment whether that came up in the Navy Court, or not. That would be the only one where I was questioned.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, it was generally known, before we came together in this investigating body that you had testified or stated theretofore that you did not know where you were on Saturday night?
Admiral Stark. That would be logical.
Mr. Gearhart. Then you had told some people, some investigating body before this hearing began that you did not know where you were the previous Saturday night?
Admiral Stark. If I did, that would have been in the Naval Court of Inquiry.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, do you remember whether or not that question was asked you in the Roberts Investigation?
Admiral Stark. I think it was not. I have no recollection of it.
Mr. Gearhart. When were you first asked as to where you were on the previous Saturday night?
[1923] Admiral Stark. I would have to check that in the Naval Court of Inquiry. I may have been asked at that time.
Mr. Gearhart. Were you not asked informally by some other people prior to that time?
Admiral Stark. Not that I recall; no, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, this has been quite an old question with you as to where you were the previous Saturday night, has it not? It has been asked you over and over again?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. What effort have you made to ascertain, prior to this investigation, where you were the previous Saturday night?
Admiral Stark. Only to search my memory, Mr. Gearhart, to see if I could recollect anything, which I had been unable to do. When
I heard "The Student Prince" mentioned—and as I testified before, I cannot think of anything which I have not covered on it—I immediately contacted my daughter and her husband in Philadelphia. I have an impression that I had seen the revival there, and they said "no." I let it go at that, until it came up here that I was at the National Theatre that night. You will recall that in previous testimony I said I doubted if they had tried to contact me on Saturday night, because it was not clear to me, from reading Kramer's testimony or Wilkinson's testimony, that they had contacted [13924] me. Kramer said he thought Wilkinson was going to do it.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Now, did you and Mrs. Stark give any theater parties about that time?

Admiral Stark. I do not recall without looking at the record.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, do you—

Admiral Stark (interposing). Now, just for a minute. Perhaps with impropriety, do you recall any parties that you gave about that time?

Mr. Gearhart. No; and that is just the difference between you and me. I have no reason to think about what I did the previous Saturday night until I was appointed on this committee, but you have been working with the evidence in this case constantly, from the very beginning of the case, after the tragic event. Your mind has been constantly kept upon it, and this question has been constantly propounded to you. "Where were you the previous Saturday night?"

Admiral Stark. May I ask what you mean by "constantly?"

Mr. Gearhart. Just as I have pointed out, in these various investigations.

Admiral Stark. I had no reason to stop and recall where I was that Saturday night until the question was propounded to [13925] me by the investigating committee some years after the event.

Mr. Gearhart. You were constantly interrogated in presenting evidence, were you not, and digging up evidence in connection with this affair, until you left for London?

Admiral Stark. No, I was not. I was busy fighting a war up until the time I left for London.

As I previously recorded here, I was not going into post mortems. We were just as busy as we could be looking ahead and fighting a war every minute of the day and night, and on the record, it shows, I think, about 16 hours a day or 18 hours on the job.

Mr. Gearhart. Where should you have been, Admiral Stark, on that night, when an attack was expected any moment? Don't you think you should have been with your Commander in Chief?

Admiral Stark. No. I do not. If that had been maintained as you state, and as Colonel Stimson states, I would have been with the Commander in Chief constantly for several days.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, had you not been as a matter of fact in his company very, very frequently, prior to the 7th of December?

Admiral Stark. I was always able to get in touch with him. Everybody was always able to get in touch with me. I would not say we were placed in confinement.

[13926] Mr. Gearhart. Let us drop this matter.

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment.

What is the wish of the committee about continuing?
Senator Ferguson. I have some questions, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Stark. So far as I am concerned, I could go on indefinitely. The Vice Chairman. We will try to get through with Admiral Stark.

Mr. Gearhart. When did you send Admiral Ingersoll to London to discuss the possible naval cooperation of the British and American Navies?

Admiral Stark. I did not send Admiral Ingersoll to London to discuss such a point. That occurred prior to my tenure of office as Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Murphy. 1938.

Mr. Gearhart. And he was sent by whom?

Mr. Richardson. If you know.

Admiral Stark. Well, Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations prior to my going there. If it was in his tenure of office, he would have been sent undoubtedly by concurrence with the Secretary, or direction of the Secretary, but he was sent previous to my time.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, directing your attention to the year 1940, did you request the British Government to send [13927] naval experts to the United States to discuss the possibility of naval cooperation?

Admiral Stark. Yes, I did. I think it was May of 1940, but those meetings were held in early 1941, as I recall, and completed in March of 1941.

Mr. Gearhart. But it was in 1940, the fall of 1940 that you communicated with Admiral Sir Dudley Pound of the British Navy, requesting that he send his naval experts to the United States to discuss collaboration between the two navies?

Admiral Stark. That is correct, in case of war.

Mr. Gearhart. Upon whose responsibility was that message sent?

Admiral Stark. My own.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you discuss the subject with the President?

Admiral Stark. I sent that on my own, and I did not notify the President until after I had done it.

Mr. Gearhart. After you had sent the message, or after they had arrived for consultation?

Admiral Stark. I think I notified him sometime in January.

Mr. Gearhart. And you want the members of this committee to believe that you opened negotiations with the British first sea lord, requesting him to send a committee of experts from [13928] England to the United States to consult with you in respect to possible naval cooperation without your even telling the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States?

Admiral Stark. I so stated, and I hope the committee believes me.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Gearhart. I yield.

Mr. Murphy. He so stated several months ago in this record.

Mr. Gearhart. Does that help the situation right now?

Mr. Murphy. I mean we covered it then.

Mr. Gearhart. And as the result of that message that you sent to Sir Dudley Pound, a commission did arrive in the United States from England?

Admiral Stark. They did; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And they came in civilian clothes?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And a number of consultations were held at which you were present?
Admiral Stark. Generally speaking, I was not present with the working committee, but of course I was in consultation with them, and was informed as to what was going on.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you attend all of the meetings that were held in the United States?
[13929] Admiral Stark. No, no; very, very few of them.
Mr. Gearhart. Where were those meetings held?
Admiral Stark. They were held in the Navy Department.
Mr. Gearhart. Are you sure they were not held in private apartments?
Admiral Stark. My recollection is that they were held in the Navy Department or the War Department. I consulted Marshall with regard to sending that message. We were in agreement, and I think the meetings were held in the Navy Department. They were not held in private apartments.
Mr. Gearhart. Have you read this little article that appeared in the October issue of Reader's Digest?
Admiral Stark. I think not. That is this year?
Mr. Gearhart. In October of 1944, an article which is from the pen of Frederick Sundern, Jr. Do you recall it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, I have read that. The meetings, which were held quietly, there were one or two Canadian meetings, where Canadians came up to my house.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, I have another appointment. I ask that we adjourn until 2:30.
The Vice Chairman. Without objection, we will stand adjourned until 2:30.
(Whereupon at 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned to 2:30 p.m., of the same day.)

[13930] Afternoon Session—2:30 p.m.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.
Does counsel have anything at this time?
Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have two exhibits, the first of which is a memorandum which has been distributed to the committee, and the first page of which is on White House stationery, dated December 13, 1941. It is entitled, "Remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his Cabinet at 8:30 and continuing at 9:00 o'clock with legislative leaders, on December 7, 1941."

We would like to offer that as Exhibit No. 160.
I should like to point out that at the top of the second page, in parentheses, there is a note to the effect that a series of periods in the memorandum "indicates inaudibility." I call your attention to that note in connection with your reading of the memorandum.
The Vice Chairman. Let me inquire. The first page reads:

Remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his Cabinet at 8:30 and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on December 7, 1941.
Is that a. m. or p. m.?

Mr. Masten. Presumably that is the evening of December 7.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that the context shows clearly that it is in the evening.

The Vice Chairman. It just so happens that I was one of those present. I know they had one at that time. I just wanted to know if it was the same one.

Mr. Murphy. I think you will find your name, Mr. Chairman, mentioned in the contents.

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman, just what the evidence will show as to what time this memorandum was received by counsel?

Mr. Masten. Senator, that was received last October or November, I believe, from Miss Tully, and has been available to the committee members ever since. I think it was last mentioned on the record by Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. I requested that, in view of the fact we have gone into the night of December 6, and what the President’s attitude was, in view of the fact that there was a discussion here as to the mind of the President and what had occurred for the weeks preceding Pearl Harbor, I thought we ought to have the whole picture.

Senator Ferguson. There is no doubt we ought to have it. But I don’t recall this, Mr. Masten. I thought I had seen all the papers that weren’t in evidence.

Mr. Masten. This was in the papers that you looked at.

Senator Ferguson. I don’t recall this.

Mr. Masten. I have the photostat here, which was in the papers you examined.

Senator Ferguson. I don’t recall the “indicates” inaudibility.”

Mr. Richardson. You will notice, Senator, that there are through the whole thing lapses. Evidently the stenographer was a little overcome in the situation.

Mr. Murphy. All the papers have been furnished copies of it, have they not?

Mr. Masten. Yes, they have.

The second exhibit which we would like to offer as Exhibit 161, consists of two documents which are drafts of a proposed message to the President, which drafts were prepared by Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson.

They are referred to in Secretary Stimson’s statement and his notes, at pages 28, 29 and 56. We would like to offer them as Exhibit No. 161. I might add that these drafts are the papers referred to by Secretary Hull on page 2 of Exhibit No. 19 in this proceeding, where he says, in his memorandum to the President “there is attached a draft of a proposed message to Congress, to which draft the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy made material contributions.”

It is our understanding which these two drafts, which we now offer as Exhibit No. 161, are the material contributions referred to in Exhibit No. 19.

The Vice Chairman. The exhibits will be received, as indicated by counsel.
[13933] (The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 160 and No. 161," respectively.)

The Vice Chairman. Is that all from counsel?
Mr. Masten. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Very well.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have anything further you desire to say before your examination is resumed?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, the last exhibit, which is the one from the Secretary of the Navy, dated November 29, 1941 (Exhibit No. 161) contains this sentence on page No. 5:

Unless Japan renounces such purposes and withdraws this threat of further conquest by force, the four nations involved must resort to force to prevent this aggression, since arguments appear to have failed.

Were you consulted by the Secretary in relation to that?
Admiral Stark. No sir; I don't—I don't know what this document is.

Senator Ferguson. Well, it is a memorandum which gives his version as to what should be said to Congress by the President.

Admiral Stark. Well, I know his thoughts on that, and he [13934] talked about it a great deal. In fact, I don't know that there was much of anything we hadn't gone over.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted by Secretary Knox about the fact that a message was to be prepared for Congress and what he should put in it, you being the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Stark. May I read this over, just to reflect a little on it?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.

(Pause.)

Admiral Stark. He states here,

I have had the assistance of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner in the summation of the military situation.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. So it is apparent that we were consulted.

Senator Ferguson. But you don't recall it?

Admiral Stark. I recall having talked over every phase of this situation as it went along, and I have no doubt if he was preparing a memorandum of this sort that he talked to me about certain phases.

Senator Ferguson. It shows that you were present at the meeting. It is on page 55 and 56 of Secretary Stimson's memorandum, where that message is spoken about. Did you discuss the contents at that meeting?

[13935] Admiral Stark. Well, I would just like to look at the record. Page what?

Senator Ferguson. Pages 55 and 56.

(Pause.)

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, you have read over this proposed message or information for a message. You note it is dated November 29th.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It says.
The President—in route to Warm Springs, Georgia.

You also recall, do you not, that the 29th was the final deadline. That is the one where they said, "spell it out." The 29th.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I recall that.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you anticipated an attack immediately following the 29th, isn’t that correct?

Admiral Stark. We anticipated an attack following the 29th. I wouldn’t say immediately. You may recall that on the very day of this deadline a dispatch came in from Tokyo to make one more try.

I think we, as I recall, broke that down on the 30th. And in the case of Italy, I had seen deadlines come and go until I was leary of them. That is why in my first dispatch, instead of putting down the 29th, which, like the 25th, had [13936] passed, I said, "within the next few days." We didn’t know just when.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you remember—and the reason I cite the Secretary of War is that he kept a diary.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You will recall that somewhere—

Admiral Stark. This is Colonel Knox.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. The Secretary of War, I was saying, kept a diary.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You recall that he stated that the President had said an attack by Monday, when you were holding a meeting, immediately preceding the first of December?

Admiral Stark. Yes sir, I recall that.

Senator Ferguson. Now, when did it change, after the President told you an attack would take place any day, and probably by Monday?

Admiral Stark. Well, we——

Senator Ferguson. Which would be immediately following the 29th.

Admiral Stark. We didn’t know, Senator Ferguson, just when that blow would fall. We were expecting it any day. But just when, we didn’t know. And we didn’t know until December 7.

[13937] Senator Ferguson. Well, does this change your opinion of this warning that you anticipated that an attack would be made by Japan rather than America declaring war? Would this message of Secretary Knox have been a request of Congress to declare war? It wouldn’t, would it? As I read it.

Admiral Stark. No, sir. The last paragraph, I think, makes that fairly clear, in which it states:

In a final effort to prevent an extension of hostilities in the Far East, I have addressed an appeal to the Emperor of Japan to join me in my efforts.

Those efforts being toward continued peace in the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson (continuing): She can go no further without seriously threatening the vital interests of Great Britain, the Netherlands Indies, Australia and ourselves. Unless Japan renounces such purposes and withdraws this threat of further conquest by force, the four nations involved must resort to force to prevent this aggression, since arguments appear to have failed.

In a final effort to prevent an extension of hostilities in the Far East, I have addressed an appeal to the Emperor of Japan to join me in my efforts. In the meantime, while I await the result of this latest effort toward peaceful solution, I felt it incumbent upon me to apprise the Congress, and through you, the people of the United States, of the [13938] serious situation with which we are confronted.
Admiral Stark. That, I take it, is Colonel Knox's way, the way he would have put it, had he been President.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct; but it wasn't understood at the meeting that Colonel Knox was to submit a draft, and the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War, that those drafts were to be calling for a declaration of war?

Admiral Stark. I don't quite get your question on that, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. When you held the meeting and it was suggested that the three Secretaries give to the President a rough draft, or a draft of what they thought ought to go into a message to Congress, there was no idea that that message to Congress was to be a declaration, a request for a declaration of war from Congress, it was merely to advise the people of the United States, through their Congress, as to how serious the situation looked to the President of the United States; isn't that correct?

Admiral Stark. It was certainly to show the people of the United States and Congress how serious he considered the situation. Whether or not anything would have been put in there which in certain contingencies the President might request or ask authority to go ahead, I don't know.

[13939] Senator Ferguson. But I am asking you, was there anything discussed at the meeting——

Admiral Stark. I don't——

Senator Ferguson (continuing).—That is was contemplated by the President that he would request Congress to declare war?

Admiral Stark. I don't recall so.

Senator Ferguson. Then it would be fair to say that this was a fair appraisal of what they were to do, at least this was Mr. Knox's part in the situation?

Admiral Stark. That was the way he felt about it. He wrote it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, is that as you understood it?

Admiral Stark. Well, as I have stated before, my recollection of that is that they would make a final appeal to the Emperor and that they would also inform the Congress of the picture. I don't recall particularly that in that address to Congress it was to be mentioned that the President—that it was to be considered a request for a declaration.

Senator Ferguson. That was your understanding of the situation.

Now, I want to call your attention, so that the record may be straight, Mr. Gearhart is not here, but there was some question as to whether or not you had been asked the [13940] question as to where you were on Saturday in the evening, before the Navy board.

Admiral Stark. Yes sir.

Senator Ferguson. On page 166 of the Navy Court of Inquiry transcript, August 11, 1944:

Q. Do you recall two occasions on either the fourth or fifth of December when Captain Wilkinson and Commander McCollum came to your office to confer about intelligence relative to the Pacific and Japanese situation that you considered of such import that you called a conference with Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, and Admiral Noyes?
A. No, I don't recall.
Q. Do you recall the events of Saturday, December 6, 1941?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall what time you left the office after the routine day, the time in the afternoon or evening?
A. No, I do not.
Q. Do you recall what you were doing Saturday evening, 6 December?
A. No, I couldn't say what I was doing that evening. My remembrance is—I think I was home but I couldn't say. I don't recall clearly.
Q. Do you recall receiving at your home, or wherever you were, between 9 and 10 p. m., Washington time, important intelligence information brought by an officer messenger?
A. No, I haven't the slightest recollection of anything of that sort on that evening.
Q. Do you remember whether there was a Lieutenant Commander Kramer stationed in Naval Communications or ONI?
A. Yes, there was.

Then they go to another subject.

Admiral Ferguson. Doesn't that refresh your memory that you were questioned at the 1944 hearing on August 11 in that regard?
Admiral Stark. Yes, it is evident I was.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to straighten the record. This morning there was some question asked about the passing of an act relative to the draft in 1941.
Admiral Stark. Yes sir.

Senator Ferguson. That was the extension of the draft, was it not, so that they would be kept in longer than one year, which was originally called for? The draft bill would have gone on just the same, they would have been drafted and kept in their year, but those that were about to get out would have been retained; isn't that correct?
Admiral Stark. It probably is, if you recall it. I remember that we wanted to extend the time. Marshall did.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. We had a 6-year enlistment at that time.

Senator Ferguson. You had enlistments, so you had a different proposition.

Now, Congressman Murphy asked you whether or not this was the first shot, and I take it that was as to the first shot in the war between America and Japan. Was there any other shooting prior to this, in this war, other than Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Murphy. I don't remember asking him that. I asked him about the Panay and the other boat, and the American missions, and the American property in China. I said that those things had all occurred before Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to get it from the Admiral.

So far as you were concerned, this was the first shot in the war between the United States and Japan, at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Stark. In the war between us?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. There wasn't any shooting at sea, at submarines, Admiral Stark?

Admiral Stark. Well, to be perfectly accurate, and I think it is in the record, there was a submarine attacked by our forces that morning.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I am talking about this Pearl Harbor attack on the 7th.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And I include——

Admiral Stark. That would include that, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But no others that you know of?

Admiral Stark. I don't recall any others, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you recall the so-called gists, when you would receive these messages you would get a gist, that is a memorandum or a flag, saying what was in the various papers that you got?

Admiral Stark. I think—are you referring to magic?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. The word would come in, it wouldn't be a gist, it would be a clip on the messages which were considered of importance.

Senator Ferguson. We have in evidence now a gist which was attached to the October—no, September 29—it is the bomb plot message.

Mr. Murphy. September 29.

[13945] Senator Ferguson. 1941.

Mr. Murphy. Translated on October 9 or 10. October 9 or 10.

Senator Ferguson. The testimony shows that that had a gist attached to it indicating the contents of it.

Could you find that testimony, the testimony on that gist, Mr. Masten?

Mr. Masten. I don't know whether we can put our hands on it immediately. We will try.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Congressman Murphy asked some questions of Captain Kramer at page 11,096 of the typewritten record:

Mr. Murphy. Now, you also referred, in your letter from the South Pacific, to the possibility of certain summaries.

Did you retain summaries, or was that just to meet the situation from day to day in order to explain to the recipients of magic what the developments were?

Captain Kramer. I meant simply the gist that I have just referred to, sir.

But I didn't find the gist.

Does that refresh your memory?

Admiral Stark. No, sir; not at all. I don't know what he is referring to, unless he kept a gist for his own running [13945] information. I kept a gist, what I call a "do list", also, things that I wanted to follow through on.

Senator Ferguson. The testimony showed that these gists were attached.

Now, I asked you the other day, the last day you were here, about the logs at your office?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I have a paper purporting to be the log dated December 6, from "1145—1900, December 6, 1941."

What time of day would that be?

Look at the top of that, Admiral, and tell me.

(The log above referred to, later marked "Exhibit No. 162," was handed to the witness.)

Admiral Stark. That would be from 11:45 in the morning until 7 in the evening, that first one, December 6.

Senator Ferguson. What is the next one?

Admiral Stark. The next one is 061535. That would be on the 6th, 3:35 p.m. And between that and 1730, which would be 5:30.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would that indicate that you were not in between those hours and that message was left for you?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; this is simply the log of the watch officer.

[13946] Senator Ferguson. And—

Admiral Stark. The duty officer. As you mentioned the other day, the duty officer usually keeps a log of any happenings.

Senator Ferguson. I want you to read into the record the log. If I might see it again, I will tell you the part I would like to have.

It begins, "1900, 6 December, to 0200, 7 December."

What is 1900?

Admiral Stark. 7 p.m.

Senator Ferguson. This message: "At 2000"—2000 is 8 o'clock?

Admiral Stark. 8 p.m., yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. 8 p.m.

Would you read that item into the record? I want to ask you some questions about it.

Admiral Stark. "1900, 6 December, to 0200, 7 December."

Senator Ferguson. The next item appears to be "2000". Read that.

Admiral Stark. At "2000", which would be 8 p.m., "Major E. L. Harrison, aide to the Secretary of War, telephoned that the Secretary of War desired the following information by 0900, Sunday."—morning.

Senator Ferguson. What time is 0900 Sunday morning?

[13947] Admiral Stark. 9 a.m.

Senator Ferguson. 9 o'clock Sunday morning. Will you continue?

Admiral Stark (reading):

Compilation of men-of-war in Far East, British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian. Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with locations—

I suppose—well.

with locations, and a list of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations. Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted, and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000—

which would be 10 a.m.—

Sunday, December 7.

Senator Ferguson. Is that the end?

Admiral Stark. That is the end.

The next thing is Sunday, 7 December, at 2030, which would be 8 o'clock that night.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, the Secretary of War of the United States was inquiring from your office through his aide that the Secretary of War desired the following information by 9 o'clock Sunday morning, December 7:

Compilation of men-of-war in the Far East, British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian. Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with locations.

[13948] Now, can you explain the Secretary of War of the United States at 8 o'clock Saturday evening was requesting from your office, OPNAV, all of the warships—and that is what they mean by men-of-war?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. That was the entire strength of the allied fleet in the Pacific.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; with the locations. That would mean that he wanted to know where the ships were, whether they were in Pearl Harbor or where they were; isn't that true?

Admiral Stark. Yes. He also refers to the Far East, Russian, and the whole business.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. But the Secretary of the United States on Saturday evening through his aide was requesting your office to give him the location of every man-of-war of the United States in the Pacific, and that would include where the ships were, whether laying at dock or in Pearl Harbor or what, would it not?

Admiral Stark. Well, it would indicate whether they were in Pearl Harbor or not.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. What was in Pearl Harbor and what was in Manila, and what was in the N. E. I., et cetera.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us why the Secretary of War wanted to know what ships were in Pearl Harbor and wanted it by 9 o'clock Sunday morning?

Admiral Stark. I don't know Senator Ferguson why he wanted it, unless at that time, and whether he did or not, I don't know, the record will show, he had received the 13-point message, or how he considered it—I don't know why he wanted it.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Not yet. I don't want the witness interrupted at the moment.

Admiral Stark. I really don't know why he wanted it.

Senator Ferguson. That is 8 o'clock on Saturday evening.

Admiral Stark. Yes. I have got the thing perfectly, just exactly what he wanted, and the time he wanted it, but I don't recall the incident.

Senator Ferguson. "Admirals Ingersoll, Stark"—and that would be you, would it not?

Admiral Stark. That would be myself.

Senator Ferguson. "and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted"—which was Frank Knox—"were consulted"—and this is prior to 8 o'clock Saturday evening.

Admiral Stark. It doesn't say prior to 8 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. He telephoned it in at 8 o'clock.

Admiral Stark. They came over and contacted our watch officer at 8 o'clock for this information. Why both Ingersoll and myself were to be contacted, I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. No, you hadn't been contacted. You were consulted. "and the Secretary directed"—that is the Secretary of War—"that the information be compiled" and delivered to him prior to 10 o'clock Sunday morning, the 7th of December.

Mr. Keefe. You mean the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Secretary of the Navy.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It is 10 o'clock.

Admiral Stark. I can make an assumption in view of the testimony I have heard since then.

Senator Ferguson. No. You were consulted at least prior to 8 o'clock.
Admiral Stark. I don’t think it states that I was consulted prior to 8 o’clock.
Senator Ferguson (reading):
Admirals Ingersoll, Stark and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted.
Admiral Stark. It doesn’t say prior to 8 o’clock.
Senator Ferguson. This was entered at 8 o’clock. How would the man write in there that you were consulted if you weren’t consulted?
Admiral Stark. I would like to recite on that, because I have a different idea from that what you are stating.

[13951] Senator Ferguson. I was reading.
Mr. Murphy. Are there copies for the other members of the committee?
Senator Ferguson. The surprising thing is, to this member of the committee, that it took almost 4 months to get from the Navy Department this log.
Commander Baecher. It was requested for the first time day before yesterday.
Senator Ferguson. As I understood it, all papers were to be delivered by the Navy to counsel. Counsel has nothing to do with us not getting it because counsel didn’t know it existed. In fact, I do not think the committee knew it existed until the questions were asked the day before yesterday.
Mr. Murphy. Does the record show the request was made day before yesterday.
Commander Baecher. The record shows that, yes, sir. In view of the situation maybe the answer to Mr. Richardson should be produced.
Admiral Stark. “At 2000”, which is 8 p.m., “Major E. L. Harrison, aide to the Secretary of War, telephoned that the Secretary of War desired the following” — Now, I do not read into that, that it was prior to 8 o’clock.
Senator Ferguson. At 8 o’clock, the aide telephoned that the Secretary of War desired it. So the telephone call would be at 8 o’clock.
Admiral Stark. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. I am just assuming that if he telephoned it in that at least a fraction of a second before that the Secretary of War wanted the information.
Admiral Stark. Oh, I see what you mean. It was just a case of construction. I thought you meant he had telephoned prior to 8 o’clock or that I had known prior to that. That is plain.
Senator Ferguson. That the Secretary of War desired the following information by 9 o’clock Sunday morning December 7. What does he want?
Admiral Stark. He wanted the disposition of the fleet in the Pacific and the knowledge of what we had in the Atlantic without reference to location in the Atlantic.
Senator Ferguson. But he wanted the exact location of the ships in the Pacific, every man-of-war, didn’t he?
Admiral Stark. Yes; and I wanted it, too, Senator Ferguson and I kept a running record of it, to show what our strength was in the various quarters, and to get a clear picture of the fleets of the world. That was the most natural way in the world to show it, just as he gave it. I also kept the Atlantic Fleet, complete with the British, French, and Italian.

1 Navy Department liaison officer to the committee.
Senator Ferguson. He wanted to know the exact location of each man-of-war by Sunday morning?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. At 9 o'clock.
Now, I ask you was that information furnished to the Secretary of War by 9 o'clock the next morning?
Admiral Stark. Well, I suppose so. I have no record of that but unquestionably if he wanted it at that time that information was available and he got it.
Senator Ferguson. That would be in writing, would it not?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. I ask that we get that record.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Not now.
Commander Baecher, will you get that information that was furnished by 9 o'clock that morning?
Commander Baecher. If it is available.
Senator Ferguson. What do you mean, if it is available. That is, if you can find it; is that what you mean?
Commander Baecher. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Will the Senator yield on a point of information?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; to the Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. I am not clear on one point. It seems, from what you have read and what the Admiral has said, that the Secretary of War requested this information by 9 o'clock Sunday morning, and it seems, as I caught it, that the Secretary of the Navy asked that the information be furnished him by 10 o'clock.
Senator Ferguson. We will clear that up.
The Vice Chairman. I had assumed that when this request came from the Secretary of War to the Navy Department, that the Secretary of the Navy, naturally being anxious to comply with a request of his Cabinet colleague, the Secretary of War would request that the information be assembled and that it would be furnished to the Secretary of the Navy to be transmitted to the Secretary of War, which would look to me like it obviously should come to the Secretary of the Navy before it went to the Secretary of War, but yet the note read indicates that the Secretary of the Navy requested it to be sent to him an hour after the Secretary of War had requested that he get it. That is the way it reads.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Just a moment until I try to clear something up.
Admiral——
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. There isn't any doubt after you read this that this was a request by the Secretary of War for information relative to the location of each man-of-war in the Pacific by 9 o'clock on Sunday morning?
Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when is the first that you knew that the Secretary of War wanted this information?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall this, Senator Ferguson. It would be unusual for both Ingersoll and myself to be called on this. That
sort of information I had. It was readily available. But this particular thing here, I do not recall.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you knew where every ship, every man-of-war, was in the Pacific on Saturday?

Admiral Stark. When you say where every man-of-war was, we knew, for example, the constitution of the Pacific Fleet, and that it was basing in the Hawaiian area. Just where they were we could not generally have told day by day, because they had their exercises, and so forth.

Now, as to Hart's fleet in the Pacific, we knew exactly what he had. We knew that certain craft he had sent south, because that had been reported. Just what he had out at that time, I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. He wanted the location.

Admiral Stark. Well, we could have said, "basing," for example, "on Manila," but if he had four or five submarines reaching out to the northwest on reconnaissance duty we would not have known it necessarily.

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't you have found it out and told him that you had ships out at sea, the submarines were in certain locations?

Admiral Stark. Not necessarily.

Senator Ferguson. The battleships were in Pearl Harbor, the destroyers were so and so; Halsey's fleet was at a certain location?

Admiral Stark. No. You will recall that some of the movements which were made we did not know of until after Pearl Harbor. That is all in the testimony.

Senator Ferguson. Didn't this chart in your office show the location?

Admiral Stark. Not the exact location. That has been made plain before, that the commander in chief, within his area, moves the ships around. We know the area. We do know where they are, according to our major schemes. When a ship goes into overhaul, where they are holding target practice, the periods for it, and so forth, but just what is in and out we do not know.

Senator Ferguson. Will you get us the records in the office that were used to give this information to the Secretary of War by 9 o'clock the following morning?

What was done by the Navy Department to get the information for the Secretary of War?

Admiral Stark. Well, that, I take it, you want directed to the Navy Department; not to me?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You haven't access to it?

Admiral Stark. No, sir. Commander Baecher is here for that purpose.

Senator Ferguson. I address that through the Chair. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have those.

The Vice Chairman. An effort will be made to supply the information requested.

Admiral Stark. This is off the record. You can get that, Commander Baecher, in Intelligence—or Brainerd might be able to furnish something. The ship movements and foreign business will all be in Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us why the Secretary of War wanted the location of the men-of-war by 9 o'clock Sunday morning?

Admiral Stark. He wanted to know where they were.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why he wanted to know?

Admiral Stark. Except he was interested in it. No; I could not state exactly why he wanted it. He was making his estimates of the picture, and he wanted the entire picture.

Senator Ferguson. Had you discussed this question prior to 8 o'clock with anyone?


Senator Ferguson. Particularly not the Secretary of War?

Admiral Stark. Not that I recall. And I may state that a record of that sort was something that I was always keeping. And periodic reports.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, we come to the "period."—"without locations," as far as the Atlantic Fleet was concerned. That is a "period." And then we start out:

Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000"—

10 o'clock—

Sunday, 7 December.

That would indicate that at least prior to 8 o'clock on Saturday evening you were consulted about this and the Secretary of the Navy was consulted and Admiral Ingersoll was consulted. Will you state whether or not you were consulted prior to this?

Admiral Stark. Well, there is nothing here. again, I would say, to indicate that I was consulted prior to 8 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. Well, if this was written at 8 o'clock and it said you were consulted, it would indicate that you were consulted prior to that, would it not?

Admiral Stark. Not to me; no, sir.

[13959] It states "Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted." This was after the 2000 call, as I make it.

Senator Ferguson. The next—

Mr. Keefe. Right there, Senator: Do I understand Admiral Stark to mean that his contention is that this message came to the watch officer, he made a notation of the request, and then he says that Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and somebody else were consulted, and that they were consulted after the call came in?

Admiral Stark. That is what it says to me; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Below "7 December" at 2030—that is 8:30?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So then you would say that under your reading prior to 8:30 that night you had been consulted, because if this man is keeping proper records he entered the next entry at 8:30.

Admiral Stark. This is something else again.

Senator Ferguson. Sure.

Admiral Stark. This states:

At 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned to the Operations Duty Officer. Commander Feinland read Secret Dispatch 070715. No action taken.

[13960] That is part of his log. Whether it has any bearing whatsoever on the former question I don't know, and I could not tell unless I saw that dispatch.
Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't you say the log officer, when keeping his log, would write them down as they came in?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, his next entry, being at 2030, that which had happened prior to that he put prior to 2030—which is 8:30?

Admiral Stark. That could be an assumption, Senator Ferguson, as I see it, but not necessarily an accurate one.

You may put down a telephone call and try to do something. Perhaps the line is busy. You may have to wait; meanwhile, another call may come in. I don't know.

Senator Ferguson. Then, I will——

Admiral Stark. It might be right; it might not.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you: Did this log officer reach you or anyone representing you between 8 and 8:30 so he could get this information?

Admiral Stark. I don't recall it.

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't you recall if someone was telling you that the Secretary of War wanted to know the location of every one of your men-of-war in the Pacific and he had to have it—or wanted it, at least—prior to 9 o'clock the [15961] next morning and you were consulted?

Admiral Stark. I wouldn't necessarily remember it after a lapse of 5 years, Senator. I had furnished Mr. Stimson data from time to time. He was intensely interested in the broad picture and from time to time we furnished that data to different people, but I do not recall at this particular instance that evening. He may have. I don't deny that he did, but I do not recall it.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

I think there is an answer to what you are looking for right here. Secretary Stimson's diary tells you what he is looking for.

Senator Ferguson. I will take that later. I want to find out what this witness knows.

Do you know why the Secretary of the Navy would direct your office to furnish him this same information as to the location of your men-of-war in the Pacific which would have told them that your fleet was in Pearl Harbor, to be compiled and delivered to him prior to 10 o'clock?

Admiral Stark. No; I do not. Unless he had been in touch with Stimson, and, of course, we do now know from the record that they met together that morning. Whether it was 1000 or 1030, I am not sure. But I did not know it.

Senator Ferguson. You were not consulted about it?

[15962] Admiral Stark. I state that I do not recall, Senator Ferguson, this thing at all.

Senator Ferguson. Have you read the Stimson statement?

Admiral Stark. I have; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. May I see that log, Senator?

Admiral Stark. I will give him this one.

Senator Ferguson. I think there is a difference in them.

Mr. Keefe. What is that?
Senator **Ferguson** (reading):

At 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned—

**Mr. Keefe.** It follows after the 2000 entry.

**Senator Ferguson.** Mine is:

telephoned to report the following.

What does that one say? It is on the third page.

**Admiral Stark.** It starts at the bottom of one of the pages.

**Mr. Keefe** (reading):

Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000 Sunday 7 December.

Then, another notation under 7 December:

At 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned—

**Senator Ferguson.** But read the next line. "telephoned to" what?

**Mr. Keefe.** "Telephoned." It doesn't say.

[13963] **Admiral Stark.** OPDO—operations duty officer; he probably means.

**Mr. Keefe.** Oh, yes. "OPDO—Commander Feinald."

**Senator Ferguson.** That is not in here, if you will compare them. The commander's name is not in the photostatic copy. It may have been torn off the top when they were clipped.

**Mr. Keefe.** The sequence may be wrong.

**Mr. Murphy.** The sequence is wrong. It is a different page. One says "telephoned to report the following."

**Senator Ferguson.** Yes.

**Mr. Murphy.** It is a different page.

**Senator Ferguson.** They just got them clamped together in the wrong order. Yes.

**Admiral Stark.** Yes.

**Senator Ferguson.** Will you turn to Colonel Stimson's statement, Sunday the 7th.

**Admiral Stark.** Page 59.

**Senator Ferguson.** Yes. Do you know of anything in here that will give us any light on what he wanted these locations for?

**Admiral Stark.** No, sir. I saw nothing in here to indicate that until I saw that this morning.

**Mr. Murphy.** Will the gentleman yield?

**Senator Ferguson.** Yes.

[13964] **Mr. Murphy.** On Sunday, December 7, 1941, page 60 of the Stimson papers:

"Well, I have heard the telegrams which have been coming in about the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam." He said, "Oh, no; I don't mean that. They have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii." Well, that was an excitement indeed. The messages which we have been getting through Saturday and yesterday and this morning are messages which are brought by the British patrol south of Indochina, showing that large Japanese forces were moving up into the Gulf of Siam. This itself was enough excitement and that was what we were at work on our papers about.

I read that as an answer to your question.

**Admiral Stark.** May very well be.

**Senator Ferguson.** What did that have to do with the location of the men-of-war?
Admiral Stark. I gather this, from Congressman Murphy, and he can correct—

Senator Ferguson. You tell us what you say about it.

Admiral Stark. I say this would mean that we had been getting messages of the disposition of the Japanese and Colonel Stimson wanted to know what we had in that same area and he wanted to see just what picture we had of the Japanese ships.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield further to read just three or four more lines?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

The observer thought these forces were going to land probably either on the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still in Indochina or on the western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula or possibly Malaya. The British were very much excited about it, and our efforts this morning in drawing our papers was to see whether or not we should all act together. The British will have to fight if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three all thought that we must fight if the British fought. But now the Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us directly in Hawaii.

There are the papers he was preparing on the morning.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what papers he was preparing, Admiral?

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Ferguson. Then, how do you know that this memorandum, request for the location, had anything to do with what they were preparing at the time of the attack?

Admiral Stark. Well, if they asked for them, and if they were preparing something, it might have been they were studying the relative forces. I don't know. I never heard it discussed since. I have no way of knowing.

Senator Ferguson. You haven't heard that an order from the Secretary of War, direction by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, had not been complied with by 10 o'clock Sunday morning?

Admiral Stark. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So you have every reason to believe they had the location of every man-of-war of our fleet?

Admiral Stark. I think unquestionably it was the duty officer's job to get that through to somebody, Ingersoll, or me, or somebody, to get the Secretary of War's request made up, and usually when we got those requests we sat up all night, if necessary, to comply with them.

Senator Ferguson. Now I ask that the man that made this report, I can't tell his name from this—would you be able, Mr. Masten, to tell us who made this report—he called and also that the aide of Secretary Stimson he called as witnesses that we may get a detailed explanation of this log.¹

Commander Baecher. The person who wrote that item in the Navy log is named C. D. Glover. He is now a rear admiral and is in Honolulu.

Senator Ferguson. That is only a few days from Washington. Do you know who the aide is?

Commander Baecher. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Who is in charge of the Army liaison here today? Do you know who the aide is?

¹ See p. 5482, infra.
Captain Nelson. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you notify the committee, please, where the aide is located?

Captain Nelson. I will attempt to locate him.

Mr. Masten. Senator, we have located the page reference to this gist matter.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to see the gist matter. What is the first paper?

Mr. Masten. It begins at the first paper, and the reference you wanted is the second.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, instead of calling two or three witnesses, it might be a good idea to ask Secretary Stimson if he got the memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I have asked the Commander if he would get us what information was furnished to the Secretary. I have directed quite a number of questions to Secretary Stimson and I will be glad to add to that list. We haven't gotten answer to the others, though.

Now, going to page 11,000 of this paperbound volume, 11,207 in this paperbound volume, the Senator from Michigan is asking the question:

[13968] Senator Ferguson. And what was there on that? Read what is on there.

Captain Kramer. The gist of this message is: Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations.

Now, that is a sheet of paper attached to the magic, which was the bomb plot as we describe it here, and the record shows what we are talking about, and the gist was a flag, in other words, from which you would be able to read this language:

Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into 5 areas for the purpose of showing exact locations.

Now, that would point out the significance, would it not? The next question by the Senator from Michigan was:

Now, this particular paper that I have in mind and have shown you with this written on it.

And then I read this report, or part of it. That would be a flag to you, would it not, Admiral, telling you the substance of what the Japanese were trying to find out about our ships in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Stark. It shows very clearly what they wanted.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; what they wanted.


Senator Ferguson. Someone had boiled this down, summarized it, and gave you in a few words, or gave in this gist which was attached to this message, what it was?

Admiral Stark. Well, now, when you say "gave you," which means "gave me"

Senator Ferguson. Do you claim you never got any gists?

Admiral Stark. I do. We have been over this bomb plot thing from start to finish, all of us in the front office, and I still not only have no recollection of having seen it, it is my honest opinion that I did not see it.

1 Capt. C. Roger Nelson, U. S. Army, liaison officer to the committee.

2 Hearings, Part 9, p. 4196.
Senator Ferguson. You say that you have gone over it with people in the front office?

Admiral Stark. No. I say this, that the testimony shows—Ingersoll, as I recall his testimony, stated that he had not seen it. What came to me always came to him in the magic. I have forgotten definitely about Turner but I believe he states he did not see it.

Senator Ferguson. So—

Admiral Stark. The message was—well, go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to add something?

Admiral Stark. No, sir. I was going to say we have covered it in the light of hindsight, and one thing or other indicated in the light of hindsight, that we did not see them; either the Army or Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember seeing any gists on any of the magic that came to you?

Admiral Stark. It is customary and routine in the Navy, frequently, if we get a dispatch that refers to two or three other dispatches, you may have typed on the bottom of it what the other dispatches were, to give you a complete picture without you having to send for those dispatches. If you call that a gist—that was routine.

Senator Ferguson. No, that is not what we are talking about.

Admiral Stark. No, sir. I do not recall, except as from time to time estimates were made—McCullom would sometimes make an estimate.

Senator Ferguson. I would want to read a paper to you and ask you some questions on it.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

From Batavia, dated September 22, 1941, received 10:45 a.m., September 23, 1941.

149, September 22nd, 4 p.m.

The following summary of statements to newspaper correspondents by the Right Honorable Duff Cooper, who arrived at Batavia September 19 and returned to Singapore September 21:

One. His plan is to form a council or body in Singapore to pass on Far Eastern political questions; to discuss the entire political situation with the Governor General and to obtain his views concerning the above-mentioned council which is to function as does that under Lord Lytton at Cairo and which will relieve the military authorities of political responsibility.

Two. An effective liaison exists between the British and the Dutch and Commanders in Chief have a complete understanding. Asked if the British would welcome a Dutch expeditionary force, he said that the British were adequately manned and that Dutch troops would be more effective here. However, if the hub of activity should shift to British territory the understanding between Commanders in Chief would cover any requirements.

This is the part I wanted to read particularly. This is the part I am interested in—

Admiral Stark. That is headed Batavia?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It is signed by "Foote," to our Secretary of State.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. He was one of our State officials there as I understand it.
In response to a question concerning the use of the base of Singapore by the United States he said that there is no "agreement on paper but the answer is obvious," asked if the ABCD front was merely wishful thinking he said "Emphatically no. It is a fact." When questioned by an American newspaper correspondent he was not so emphatic. For example, "I deem the ABCD front to be a fact."

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know about that, Admiral?

Admiral Stark. I don't recall it. I could comment on it easily enough—the ABCD front. If it means that we were tied up with the Dutch, or if it means that we had an approved plan with the Dutch and British out there at that time, we did not.

You will recall in the record exhibits showing the rejection of what has been proposed out there, and that the scheme of working together, between the British and ourselves, was finally not approved, until—I think we sent it out the night of December 7. It came in from Hart and Phillips just about that time, around the 6th.

[13973] Senator Ferguson. But it was written before the attack.

Admiral Stark. We had directed them to find a means of working together so that if and when the thing happened the effort would more or less dovetail. We had done it here in Washington for the entire world, in the spring of 1941, and as I have stated it was my job to do it and we were directing it be done out there, and we had done it in Washington.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I want to get to.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Not this moment. If Duff Cooper was telling the world through a newspaper correspondent, when questioned by an American newspaper correspondent—he was not so emphatic—"I deem the ABCD front to be a fact"; would not that notify the Japanese that in fact there was an ABCD front?

Admiral Stark. It would be a fact to the Japanese that he had said so if they believed it.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Not this moment. Now, have you any doubt that the Japanese did believe that statement?

Admiral Stark. I don't know, Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. If the Japanese believed that statement, [13974] then I want to know, from a military and naval point of view, whether or not you would judge, if there was this threat to attack the Kra Peninsula, and we had a front, between the American and British and Dutch and the Chinese, that we should have considered that Japan would attack the only thing that was the deterrent in the Pacific, that was our fleet? I am talking from a military and naval point of view.

Admiral Stark. Well, that is some question. May I boil it down to see if I have it correctly?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. That assumes that the Japs believed what Duff Cooper stated, that we had a combined front.

Senator Ferguson. That is right. That is what Duff said.

Admiral Stark. Therefore, they assumed that if they attacked the Kra Peninsula, that, in effect, Britain would go to war, and the Dutch, this combined front. We would be involved.
Senator Ferguson. And we would go to war if we had a combined front. You can't have a combined front and have three of them in war and one not.

Admiral Stark. I am working on a premise which I do not admit to be a fact. That is, fighting the problem.

Senator Ferguson. It doesn't make any difference whether it is a fact or not if the British said it and if the Japanese believed it.

Admiral Stark. If the British said it and if the Japanese believed it, if they attacked one they would probably attack the combination so as to do the most damage.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Stark. But there is an "if" in that question.

Senator Ferguson. Is that the way you want to leave the answer?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Do you know this, as to whether or not publicly it was ever denied that there was an ABCD front?

Admiral Stark. I do not know why we should have denied it if we never had one.

Senator Ferguson. The question was: Do you know whether it was ever denied publicly or to the Japanese?

Admiral Stark. I don't recall any specific denial from high authority but I certainly also don't recollect any hint that such a thing existed by high authority.

Senator Ferguson. I understand that. That wasn't the question I was asking you.

Admiral Stark. No; but I think it belongs in the answer.

Senator Ferguson. And it is going to be there. Now, I am going to talk about another subject.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield before going on to another subject?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I think the record should show the official position of Duff Cooper. At the time he was in charge of British propaganda, wasn't he?

Senator Ferguson. I read all I knew about it.

Mr. Murphy. I think you will find that at the time he was in charge, Director of Public Information and Propaganda, for Great Britain, and they were at war. Apparently he was putting forth the strongest possible front he could for his country.

Senator Ferguson. Of course, I am not asking for the Congressman's opinion. I am trying to point out, from a military or naval viewpoint, we didn't anticipate certain things in this attack on Pearl Harbor. Now, going to the next subject. You remember we contemplated an attack upon the Azores?

Admiral Stark. I don't know that the word "contemplated" is a correct one, Senator Ferguson. We were ordered to draw up plans for that. We had, as I previously testified, drawn up plans for Martinique. It is our business to draw up plans for any contingency.

Senator Ferguson. Didn't you even get the ships ready?

Admiral Stark. We brought——

Senator Ferguson. For the Azores?
Admiral Stark. Yes, we brought some ships to the Atlantic, and we brought some Marines to the Atlantic, who were afterward sent to Iceland.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why the plan not to attack the Azores was arrived at?

Admiral Stark. Do I know what, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why we did not attack the Azores? Do you know whether it was decided between the British and ourselves that we would be attacking a neutral, which was Portugal, and therefore we decided not to do it, and we took another tack and went to Iceland?

Admiral Stark. I would say that the occasion for attacking the Azores simply did not arise. It just went on diplomatically there. I may not be completely informed of it, but there was worry and had been worry as to the possibility of the Axis attacking Portugal, going down through the Spanish Peninsula, and possibly compromising the Azores. We couldn't afford to have the Azores in anybody else's possession.

Senator Ferguson. Was it ever contemplated, as far as you know, to come to Congress to declare war on Portugal and take the Azores?

Admiral Stark. I never heard of it, or I never thought of it until this minute.

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you were preparing the fleet, and preparing ships to take the Azores, it wasn't just a drill, was it?

Admiral Stark. We prepared to take the Continent of Europe too.

Senator Ferguson. That early?

Admiral Stark. Sir?

Senator Ferguson. That early? That early, back in 1941?

Admiral Stark. Well, I dare say that the Army was working on plans, and they were asking for men, and so forth, for a big and huge Army. But I mean, I was referring to when you spoke of declaring war on Portugal.

Senator Ferguson. How would you attack and take the Azores without a declaration of war on Portugal? She owned them.

Admiral Stark. I can tell you one way. Suppose the Germans had taken Portugal. Would we have to declare war on Portugal to take the Azores? I don't think we would have.

Senator Ferguson. I assume you are right on that, if it was captured and in the hands of the Germans it would be German territory, and we would have to declare war on Germany.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I always construed that situation, with regard to the Azores, as to have plans ready, and be ready, if an emergency arose there.

Senator Ferguson. Now, let's go to Iceland.

Mr. Clark. You are a long way from Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. No. I am not. My questions will come around to Pearl Harbor. They will come around to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Clark. I didn't mean to interrupt.

Senator Ferguson. We did go and land in Iceland?

Admiral Stark. We did; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you wrote letters and said that we had a shooting war in the Atlantic?

Admiral Stark. In effect; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. You know what Admiral Ingersoll said about it. It wasn't a "legal" war but it was a war.

Admiral Stark. Well, when I think of the term "legal"—

Senator Ferguson. It wasn't a declared war.

Admiral Stark. It wasn't a declared war. What we were doing was a limited defense against German aggression in what had been termed our waters. We didn't, for example, go over to Germany at that time or attack Europe.

Mr. Murphy. The Senator misquoted the witness—unintentionally. Admiral Ingersoll corrected his testimony, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I took his original statement. You know what I am talking about, don't you?

Admiral Stark. I think I know what you are talking about. We covered this same point before.

Senator Ferguson. But I am going to lead up to this question, to show that I am still at Pearl Harbor:

Do you know whether it was ever discussed in the War Cabinet—and you know who that would be—that it would be necessary for Germany to fire the first shot? We had a plan and a policy in the Pacific that Japan—I don't want to quote the Secretary of War again—but it was to be for Japan to fire the first shot and for us not to be harmed too much by it. You said that was the studied plan and the design.

Now, I want to know why, if you know, there was a distinction between the Atlantic and the Pacific about the firing of the first shot.

Admiral Stark. Germany had attacked and sunk one of our ships in June. She had attacked three destroyers in the Atlantic, sinking one of them—I think it was in October or November, along in there, between September and October. And certainly the 1st of December she had attacked and wounded badly one tanker, the Salinas, I believe it was, which got back to the Canadian coast. The Congress of the United States had voted billions for material to go to Britain. We considered it our job to get that material through, not simply to use this money for material and let it be sunk without taking any action on it. There were certain waters defined, and limits established, which, I believe, we called our waters. The President's speech shows it very plainly, in which he stated, if the Germans came within that area they would do so at their peril. They came in and attacked us. As a result, we got together what we called the hemispheric defense plans, which I have outlined previously and which provided for shooting at any German combatant ships which came within that area, and we did do it.

Senator Ferguson. We did shoot?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. But I think that that situation is not comparable to what was going on in the Pacific, where the Japs had not attacked our ships, unless you go back to the Panay incident.

Senator Ferguson. If you go back to the Panay, it is the same situation?

Admiral Stark. No; I don't think so.

Senator Ferguson. Not as bad?

Admiral Stark. I think it is different.
Senator Ferguson. All right, "different."
Is that what was discussed by the war cabinet? Was that discussed by the war cabinet, so that you would have one policy in the Pacific and another policy in the Atlantic?
Mr. Keeffe. You can't be all-inclusive in the Pacific, because I understand the evidence clearly shows that in certain areas, in the Southwest Pacific, this shooting war applied.
Senator Ferguson. It did apply in the Southeast Pacific.
Admiral Stark. Off the west coast, the Southeast Pacific, we made one of the hemispheric defense plans apply to the area which we outlined there.
Senator Ferguson. That is the Southeast Pacific?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Take the other part of the Pacific where this not-firing-the-first-shot policy was.
Admiral Stark. American material was going in a steady stream across the Pacific, I don't know how big a stream, in Russian ships and into Russian territory. I can think of no instance where anything we had commercially going across the Pacific was attacked until the President Harrison was lost after December 7. In other words, our ships were moving freely. However, I took no chance, you know, and in October I directed all our Pacific ships into port and thereafter routed them and kept them on routes where I thought in emergency they could duck for safety or we could give them some protection.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Any other questions?
Mr. Murphy. I have one or two questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark, will you refer to the memorandum of December 13, 1941?
Will you give the admiral a copy of it (Exhibit No. 160)?
I understand these to be notes of the remarks of the President of the United States on the night of December 7, 1941.
Toward the middle of the first page I note the following:

About 2 weeks ago we began to realize that the probability of Japan being in earnest was so slim that it was time to make a final and definite effort to pin them down on the one subject that they had never ever been pinned down on, and that was that they were to agree to cease their acts of aggression, and that they would try to bring the China War to a close.

You know that to be a fact, do you not, from your experience, that they had not agreed to that, and we were attempting to get them to agree on it, in diplomatic negotiations?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. In the next paragraph I read again:

From that time on we were getting more and more definite information that Japan was headed for war, and that the reply to the Secretary of State would be in the negative.

That was the Secretary of State's message of November 26, was it not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, at the bottom of the page:

* * * Geographically Indochina was at a hub, from which any attack can be made in a number of directions. It is only a very short distance from there
to the Philippines in the east. It is a relatively short distance from there down to the Dutch East Indies, which is the most industrial part—southwest there is Singapore—fortified.

Then I skip seven or eight lines.

We are getting a very large proportion of our supplies—rubber, tin, et cetera—\[13985\] from that whole area of Southwestern Pacific * * *

And then again, coming to the next paragraph:

In addition to that, of course, is the fact that if the Japanese did move to the south, to the Dutch East Indies, from Indochina, the Philippines would be virtually surrounded. They would have the Japanese on both sides—Indochina—the mandated islands to the west, this side of the Philippines, and the Dutch Indies and the Japanese possessions in the south. They would be completely encircled by a military power.

Did you have that particular circumstance in mind when you sent this memorandum to Spenavo, about which the Senator from Michigan questioned you this morning, the fact that the Philippines would be endangered by that situation if the Davao-Waigeo line was crossed?

Admiral Stark. Yes. It flanked us on the south; and we were already flanked on the west and north.

Mr. Murphy. It would make the position of the Philippines much more dangerous, would it not?

Admiral Stark. Unquestionably.

Mr. Murphy. That is all.

Mr. Keefe. I have a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. In connection with the questions of the Senator from Michigan, I note in the diary of Secretary Stimson of the conference which was held at the office of Secretary Hull on the morning of December 7, Sunday, where former Secretary Stimson records a portion of the conversations in this manner:

Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture of it, and I made him dictate it to a stenographer and I attach it to the end of this. Knox also had his views as to the importance of showing immediately how these different nations must stand together, and I got him to dictate that and that is attached hereto.

Now, turning to page 67 of the Stimson report you will find the suggestion dictated by Secretary Knox in which he lists six paragraphs. In the first four paragraphs he refers to the possibility of the Japs attacking Singapore and the Dutch. Then, in paragraph 5, he says:

If the above be accepted, then any serious threat to the British or Dutch is a serious threat to the United States; or it might be stated any threat to any one of the three of us is a threat to all of us. We should therefore be ready jointly to act together; and if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be reached immediately. Otherwise we may fall individually, one at a time (or somebody may be left out \[13987\] on a limb).

That indicates that so far as Secretary Knox was concerned, he apparently was in an indefinite mood as to whether or not an understanding had already been reached.

Admiral Stark. That is correct. That is the way I read it.

Mr. Keefe. Between these nations.

Admiral Stark. He says:

* * * and if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be reached immediately.
Which, to my mind—

Mr. Keeffe. It is surprising that he wouldn't know of such an understanding if one had been reached, and that he would express it in that rather indefinite manner.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I have also expressed, several times, the fact that I didn't know of any agreement.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, now, Admiral, I listened attentively to the questions asked you by the Senator from Michigan with respect to this log prepared, apparently, by the watch officer at the Navy Department, and I confess that at the end of it I am very much confused and I would like to get straightened out if I can.

Admiral Stark. I am somewhat confused myself on it.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, when I read it and get it in chronological form—it was all mixed up as it was stapled together—[13988] but when I get it in pamphlet form the confusion, to me at least, seems to vanish, and I wonder if you will agree with me. It reads:

1900, 6 December, to 0200, 7 December. At 2000—

That is 8 o'clock, is it not?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe (reading):

Major F. L. Harrison, Aide to the Secretary of War, telephone that the Secretary of War desired the following information by 0600, Sunday, 7 December: Compilation of men-of-war in Far East; British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian. Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with locations, and a list of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations.

That is perfectly clear as to what he requested?

Admiral Stark. Perfectly clear; yes.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, to depart from the quotation, I understood your testimony to be, in response to questions asked by Senator Ferguson, that it would be the duty of the watch officer, in the event of receiving a request of this kind, to put it through by contacting someone with authority to direct that the compilation be made?

Admiral Stark. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. So that, when Major Harrison called the watch officer and stated the request of the Secretary of War, it was then the duty of the watch officer to attempt to contact someone in authority to put the order through?

Mr. Keeffe. Now, then, if you follow through—and I will read what is further indicated on this statement—the watch officer states this [reading]:

Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted—

That is clear, isn't it?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe (reading):

and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000 Sunday, December 7.

Now, to me that is just as clear as a bell. It means that the watch officer consulted Admirals Ingersoll and Stark and the Secretary of the Navy in order to put through this request, and that the Secretary of the Navy instructed them to deliver the compilation to him before 10 o'clock, the time when he was to meet at the Secretary's office, in Secretary Hull's office, with Secretary Stimson.
Now, the inevitable question arises in my mind, If this watch officer made this written record, stating that he [13990] consulted with Admirals Ingersoll and Stark and the Secretary of the Navy, either he did or he didn’t.

Now, you say you have no recollection of his having consulted with you?

Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, if he did consult with you, as he says he did in this memorandum, he must have consulted with you subsequent to 8 o’clock, the time the request came in.

Admiral Stark. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And you must have been some place where he could contact you.

Admiral Stark. If he did; yes, sir. Assuming, from what he said, that he did.

Mr. Keefe. Well—

Admiral Stark. He says that we were consulted; that he got in touch with us. Why he would have gotten in touch with both me and Ingersoll, I don’t understand. Whether he means he had telephoned, or what, I don’t know. The plain statement is that he did consult me. I don’t recall it. But if he did, it had been sometime subsequent to 8 o’clock.

Mr. Keefe. Being a person who is inclined to accept somebody’s word for something in this hearing, especially when it is written, and there is no reason to assume a man would write something down in a public record that didn’t occur, it seems [13991] to me a reasonable assumption to believe that the watch officer charged with the responsibility of meticulously writing down the information that comes to his attention, wouldn’t say that he consulted you and Admiral Ingersoll and the Secretary of the Navy unless he did.

Admiral Stark. I quite agree with you.

Mr. Keefe. Now, we are in a position, then, if you were not at the theater, you weren’t at home, you don’t remember where you were, somebody ought to be able to trace this down, we finally are on a lead where, if we get this man, we might be able to find out, he might be able to remember where he got you that night; isn’t that true?

Admiral Stark. He might be.

Mr. Keefe. Now, Admiral, let me ask you this simple question—I would like to get through with this thing sometime and pin one of these things down so we have something definite—

Admiral Stark. So would I. I wish I could recall that incident.

Mr. Keefe. I wish you could, too.

Admiral Stark. That has been blank in my mind all through, and when people have stated something, I have accepted it, and I have no reason to doubt what he put down there, but I just don’t recall.

[13992] Mr. Keefe. Yes. You have told us that a number of times. What I would like to know is this—perhaps it appears heretofore, but it won’t hurt to have it appear once more.

As I understand it, it is the fundamental practice in the Navy Department, and had been for a long time, for a man in the position of Chief of Naval Operations to let someone know where he is at every hour of the day.

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Isn't that true?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And if you were going to the National Theater on Saturday evening, December 6, you would, in accordance with your usual custom, practice, and procedure, advise someone in the Navy Department where you could be found; isn't that true?
Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Would this watch officer, who made this report that has just been read into the record, be the one with whom you would leave that information?
Admiral Stark. As a rule, he was always told when I went out; yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. So that the watch officer who made the memorandum which we have just read into the record would be the person with whom you would leave the information where you could be found?
Admiral Stark. Normally; yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Would there be a memorandum or a record made by the watch officer that would be preserved, indicating or showing where the Chief of Naval Operations would be?
Admiral Stark. Well, I don't know about that, Mr. Keeffe. It was the practice to telephone. I don't know that we made any record of that type. He probably put a slip on his desk as to where I could be found.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, now, I don't go to the National Theater very often——
Admiral Stark. I don't either.

Mr. Keeffe. But my recollection is, from the few times I have gone down there, it was about 8:30 or 8:45, that is about the time the show opens.

Admiral Stark. I think that is correct; around 8:30, I think, maybe 8:15; maybe, sometimes 8:45.

Mr. Keeffe. That would have given the watch officer an opportunity to contact you some place before you even got to the theater, wouldn't it, if you did go there?

Admiral Stark. Yes; depending on the time I left the house.

Mr. Keeffe. If the watch officer called your home, wouldn't there be somebody there to answer the telephone?

[1934] Admiral Stark. Yes. I may have been there myself. I may not have left for the theater when he called. I don't recall the incident. If the theater opened at 8:30, it is not over a 10-minute trip from the house down there.

Mr. Keeffe. If anybody called your house and you were away, wouldn't the person that was in charge at your home make a memorandum of it and give it to you?

Admiral Stark. Yes; we always left word in the house with the boys who would answer the telephone, where we were.

Mr. Keeffe. Weren't you told that Commander Kramer called your home and tried to get you that night?

Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of that.

Mr. Keeffe. You have no recollection of anybody having called you at your home?

Admiral Stark. I have not.
Mr. Keefe. And you have no recollection of giving the instructions to this watch officer to furnish this information to Secretary Stimson and to Secretary Knox?

Admiral Stark. No; I do not recall that incident.

Mr. Keefe. Do I understand that this watch officer is now an admiral?

Commander Baecher. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. He is in Hawaii?

Commander Baecher. He is ComAirPac, I am informed. That [33995] is his job. He is a rear admiral. He is stationed in Hawaii.

Mr. Keefe. What was his rank at the time he made this memorandum?

Commander Baecher. He was a commander. I am not certain.

Mr. Keefe. You can't read his signature?

Commander Baecher. Yes. It took me a while.

Senator Ferguson. Would the Congressman yield just for information, not for questions?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have been going over this memorandum that we received today, and that the Congressman has been questioning the witness on, and on which I had questioned the witness previously. There are quite a number of messages indicated in that memorandum. I would like to request of Commander Baecher that they furnish to committee counsel all of these various messages that are indicated.

[33996] Mr. Keefe. I am interested, too, in those messages because there is some rather astounding information contained in the report of this watch officer as to the seizure of certain Finnish ships by the Coast Guard and what disposition was to be made of them, this, that, and the other.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, that effort will be made.

Mr. Keefe. Maybe we will run finally onto something that may help clear up this situation that has bothered you, Admiral, and which I, as a member, have wondered at.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, the Commander will note the request.¹

Mr. Keefe. Is there any way to contact the watch officer?

Commander Baecher. I will do that. I will ask him whether he remembers whether he got in touch with Admiral Stark, if he remembers it at all, and have a positive answer from him shortly.

Mr. Keefe. He ought to be able to remember that. It is in his handwriting. Maybe he can remember that he wrote it.

Mr. Richardson. You are an optimist.

Mr. Keefe. Counsel suggests that I am an optimist. I have done my best to get the facts. That is all.

Admiral Stark. I have done my best to give them to you.

[33997] The Vice Chairman. Are there any other questions?

Mr. Murphy. In this log, Admiral, that has been handed to us, I notice that there are entries made in first one handwriting and then after that the entries are made by Glover, now Rear Admiral Glover, and then there are entries made by a man named Wyatt, on the 6th

¹ See p. 5482, infra.
of December, and then under the date of the 7th of December there is an entry:

The following officers entered 2601.

Then there is a list of names:

Lieutenant Commander—

some name I can't decipher—

Captain Beardall, Lieutenant Kramer, Captain Wilkinson, Captain Schuirmann, Captain Metcalfe, Lieutenant Commander Mason.

And

Captain Griffin, Captain Metcalfe, Captain Wilkinson, Commander Cary, Commander Glover, Commander Alexander.

Then it says:

Action taken as indicated on dispatches.

Would that mean there was some watch officer who was making entries as to who came in at certain times?

Admiral Stark. I don't know what that means. I don't know who occupied room 2601.

Senator Ferguson. Will you yield? Not for a question.

Mr. Murphy. I will be glad to.

Admiral Stark. One of those mentioned is the next witness.

[13998] Mr. Keefe. What is that time, 2601; what time would that be?

Admiral Stark. That is the room number.

Mr. Keefe. I see.

Senator Ferguson. What I wanted—

Mr. Keefe. What is the time specified?

Mr. Murphy. It says something about 11:45., about the Coast Guard called for release of information on Finnish ships. It was advised to call Captain Schuirmann. Then it says: "The following officers entered 2601." The list of names follows. Then, it says: "Action taken as indicated on dispatches."

Senator Ferguson. You read that previously.

Mr. Murphy. There are entries made as to entering a certain room, 2601, for what reason I do not know, and apparently there aren't any entries as to the rest of December 7, as to you being there, and as to Admiral Turner and Admiral Ingersoll, so these notes are certainly not such as to purport to show who went into the Navy Department on December 7, are they?

Admiral Stark. No, sir; oh, no.

The Vice Chairman. Whose room was this, 2601?

Admiral Stark. I don't know; but the Department can furnish that. That is the second floor, 6 Wing. One of the first rooms. But I do not know who was in that office. You [13999] could establish it. You could not do it by going to who is there now, because the people have been shifted a good deal. But if you want that information, the Department can give it to you. Admiral Beardall is here. He may possibly recall.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, that is one of the meetings which one of the witnesses described, some place in the 13,000 pages here, that has
been the unusual assemblage of all the top-flight boys that happened to get down just accidentally on Sunday morning.

Mr. Murphy. The top flight was not there. I ask, Mr. Chairman, that the particular entry in question, in view of the fact that we have read only excerpts, that this particular group of papers be marked as an exhibit and made a part of the record.

The Vice Chairman. Is there objection to the request? The Chair hears none. What will be the number of the exhibit, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. Masten. Exhibit No. 162.

The Vice Chairman. It will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 162."

The Vice Chairman. Are there any further questions? Does counsel have anything further?

[14000] Mr. Richardson. No.

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel for Admiral Stark have anything?

Mr. Obear. No questions.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have anything further?

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I can think of nothing I haven’t covered in any connection in this whole thing.

The Vice Chairman. Is there any reason why Admiral Stark cannot now be excused?

Senator Ferguson. I think it should be understood that when some of these witnesses come in that have been requested it may be the desire of at least one member of the committee to ask more question of the Admiral.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, we thank you for your appearance and the additional information you have given the committee. You are excused.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to present Admiral Beardall.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Beardall, will you come forward, please, and be sworn?

(The witness was sworn by the Vice Chairman)

[14001] TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. JOHN R. BEARDALL, UNITED STATES NAVY

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, will you state your full name, please?

Admiral Beardall. John R. Beardall, Rear Admiral.

Mr. Richardson. You were aide to the President at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. How long had you been such aide?

Admiral Beardall. Since May 1941.

Mr. Richardson. What had been your previous assignment?

Admiral Beardall. Previous to that I was in command of the U. S. S. Vincennes.

Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy up to now, Admiral?

Admiral Beardall. Forty-two years, from the time I entered the Naval Academy.

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1 See p. 5512, infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Adm. Beardall.
Mr. Richardson. What were your duties as naval aide?
Admiral Beardall. The duties of aide are not prescribed by any regulations but are such duties as your chief, who in my case was the President, might give.
Mr. Richardson. Where did you have your office, Admiral?
Admiral Beardall. My office was in the Navy Department.

[14002] Mr. Richardson. Did you have an office in the White House?
Admiral Beardall. No, not regularly assigned.
Mr. Richardson. Was there anyone else there with whom you divided your duties at the time you became naval aide?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Mr. Richardson. Who was later appointed to assist you there in your duties?
Admiral Beardall. Commander Schulz and then later on some other officer. He was one of the first that was detailed to assist me.

Mr. Richardson. Commander Schulz came to assist you just before the attack on Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. At that time did you have any office or place at which you could have a desk in the White House?
Admiral Beardall. We were endeavoring to set one up, and it was a little difficult to get space so they gave us a small space down near the mail room, which is on the west side, on Executive Avenue, just across from the State Department.

Mr. Richardson. If any communication was brought to you physically, to the White House, then that would be the place where ordinarily you would be found?
Admiral Beardall. Not I. The watch officer would be there but I would probably be up in the military aide's office [14003] or the Secretary's office.

Mr. Richardson. You know what we mean when we speak of magic, Admiral?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. You were familiar with the delivery of magic to the White House?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. It has been generally testified here that it was delivered in a locked pouch. You are familiar with that method of delivery, are you, Admiral?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Did you have a key to the pouch—when it was brought to the White House?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. You would, therefore, be entitled to see the magic yourself?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And when that magic was brought there it was for the purpose of giving it to the President?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. What would be done with it in the ordinary routine way if it was brought for delivery to the President?
Admiral Beardall. It would be delivered to him.
Mr. Richardson. By whom?

Admiral Beardall. By me, normally.

Mr. Richardson. Would the pouch be opened by you before it went to the President?

Admiral Beardall. It might or might not be.

Mr. Richardson. Now, you recall the Saturday before the Pearl Harbor attack, December 6?

Admiral Beardall. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. Were you advised in any way during the afternoon of that day that there was expected to be ready for delivery to the White House and the President a dispatch of unusual importance?

Admiral Beardall. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. Do you remember how that information came to you?

Admiral Beardall. I don’t recollect accurately. Probably from Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who usually brought the pouch to me, either in the Navy Department, or wherever I might be.

Mr. Richardson. You were acquainted with Captain Kramer?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection that Captain Kramer at other times had advised you in advance that there would be a message in the near future?

[14005] Admiral Beardall. Yes. In the afternoon, late in the afternoon, in the Navy Department, when it came about time to go home, sometimes he would say, when I would inquire, “There is no magic ready for the President now,” or “There might be something later,” or “Nothing until tomorrow morning.” Something of that sort.

Mr. Richardson. Commander Schulz testified here that he had been advised by you in the afternoon of December 6, Saturday, to remain in attendance, because you had been advised that there would be an important dispatch for delivery to the President; is that your recollection?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir; that is my recollection.

Mr. Richardson. When did you leave the White House that afternoon?

Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection about 5:30 or a quarter to 6.

Mr. Richardson. Did you go back to the White House at any time that day?

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection about it.

Mr. Richardson. You do recall being at Admiral Wilkinson’s house for dinner that night?

Admiral Beardall. I do.

Mr. Richardson. And the evidence indicates that with you were Admiral Wilkinson and General Miles, you recall that?


Mr. Richardson. You spent the evening there?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Was it an evening where you were accompanied by your wives?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Was your wife with you?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Where were you living then?
Admiral Beardall. In Washington, on Phelps Place, Northwest.
Mr. Richardson. Now, do you recall the incident of Captain Kramer coming there?
Admiral Beardall. I do.
Mr. Richardson. And delivering a message?
Admiral Beardall. I do.
Mr. Richardson. Was that a magic message?
Admiral Beardall. Yes.
Mr. Richardson. Was it brought in the pouch, locked pouch, in the way those messages were brought?
Admiral Beardall. I am not sure on that, but I imagine it was. I don't recollect.
Mr. Richardson. Did you read the message there?
Admiral Beardall. I glanced through it.
[14007] Mr. Richardson. Did the other officers there read it?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection of any of you doing any telephoning after the message was read?
Admiral Beardall. I have none. We moved around but I have no recollection of any telephoning, of my telephoning or seeing the others telephone.
Mr. Richardson. Captain Kramer says that Admiral Wilkinson did some telephoning. You couldn't verify that?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir. He may have.
Mr. Richardson. Do you know how long it was after that message was delivered to you there that you left the Wilkinson house?
Admiral Beardall. Well, I should say about a half hour, to the best of my recollection.
Mr. Richardson. Is it your recollection that you went from there to your home?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Do you recall during that evening at all checking up with Schulz at the White House?
Admiral Beardall. I don't recollect that, but I noted he has testified I did, and I accept that, because it was the normal thing to do.
Mr. Richardson. Would it be a routine thing for you to do [14008] to contact him to see what had happened in the White House during that tour of duty?
Admiral Beardall. Yes; in the case of a message like that.
Mr. Richardson. How long would he be expected to remain at the White House?
Admiral Beardall. I think his instructions at that time—this was before we had the situation and map room, before the war—was until after the President had turned in.
Mr. Richardson. Had gone to bed?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Do you recall going to the White House Saturday morning?
Admiral Beardall. I do now, after refreshing my memory. recall going there Saturday morning.
Mr. Richardson. Did you go before you went to your own office in the Navy Building?
Admiral Beardall. Yes.
Mr. Richardson. Would Schulz have been at the White House when you arrived there in the morning?
Admiral Beardall. Not necessarily. I don’t think he had any instructions to come back.
Mr. Richardson. Do you have any recollection of having any conversation with Schulz on Sunday morning at the White House?
[14009] Admiral Beardall. None that I know of.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Richardson, your previous question stated “Saturday.”
Mr. Richardson. I meant Sunday. Admiral, do you recall any conversation of any kind that you had when you came to the White House on Sunday morning on your way to your office in the Navy Building with reference to what had happened the night before with respect to the delivery of any messages?
Admiral Beardall. None.
Mr. Richardson. You then, except for this report which passed between you and Schulz on Saturday night, had no further knowledge of what happened to the magic message that was sent by Kramer to the White House on the evening of Saturday, December 6?
Admiral Beardall. None.
Mr. Richardson. Now, in event the President should desire to send any messages from the White House, would they be sent through you?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Mr. Richardson. Would you have any knowledge of what telephone conversations he might have had out of the White House?
Admiral Beardall. Never.
[14010] Mr. Richardson. Then the only way you would know anything about what the President did there would be when he requested you as his aide to do something for him?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Do you recall the President or anybody for him made any request of you either on the night of December 6 or on the morning of December 7 with reference to the conveying of any dispatches or information or directions?
Admiral Beardall. None.
Mr. Richardson. You had no contact with him at all then from the time you left the White House on the afternoon of December 6 until after the Pearl Harbor attack?
Admiral Beardall. This is Schulz?
Mr. Richardson. This is the President.
Admiral Beardall. The President; I may have gone to see him that Sunday morning after I went to the White House.
Mr. Richardson. Do you have any recollection you did?
Admiral Beardall. I have a hazy recollection I did.
Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection of any conversation with him that had any relation to any messages?
Admiral Beardall. Yes; as I recollect it, I went into his room, early, about 10 o’clock on Sunday morning, with a message or messages, which I presume, to the best of my recollection, was the 14th part of this 13-part message that [14011] came in the night before, which I delivered to him.
Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion or conversation with him when you made that delivery?
Admiral Beardall. No discussion. We never discussed magic. I do recollect him saying though which marks this in my mind, that it looked as though the Japs are going to sever negotiations, break off negotiations.

Mr. Richardson. Was there anybody else present?
Admiral Beardall. None.

Mr. Richardson. Your recollection is it was just between you? Admiral Beardall. Just between us.

Mr. Richardson. Can you recall what the occasion was of your seeing him? Was it simply to inquire whether he had duties for you? Admiral Beardall. Normally that would be the case, but I think on this occasion I must have taken some message to him.

Mr. Richardson. There is a notation here, which has just been referred, the watch officer's log in which he says: "The following officers entered 2601." Do you know what room that would be?

Admiral Beardall. I don't know definitely, but I think, from the people's names mentioned there, it was the watch officer's room there, where they gathered, and since Kramer [14012] was there, where we delivered the magic, or had contact with people who did. That is the best of my recollection.

Mr. Richardson. Do you have any recollection of what the occasion would be for the number of persons who are noted in the log as having come to that room at that time on Sunday morning would be?

Admiral Beardall. I don't except perhaps to keep in contact with what might be coming in in reference to these messages.

Mr. Richardson. Did you see anything of the 14-part message on the morning of December 7 yourself?
Admiral Beardall. Not that I recall, except I may have seen it, if this was the one that I gave to the President.

Mr. Richardson. Did you, yourself, read the 14th part?
Admiral Beardall. My recollection is not clear on that. I may have or may not have.

Mr. Richardson. Do you remember seeing the 1 o'clock delivery?
Admiral Beardall. I don't remember.

Mr. Richardson. Did you have any contact with anyone while the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, was examining the instrument in the Navy Department?
Admiral Beardall. No; no.

Mr. Richardson. Do you have any knowledge as to who [14013] delivered the 13-part or the 14-part message or the 1 o'clock message in the Navy Department on Sunday morning?
Admiral Beardall. None.

Mr. Richardson. You had nothing to do with that?
Admiral Beardall. Nothing.

Mr. Richardson. Then the only knowledge you have of that message is in connection with the event which occurred at the White House that you have testified to?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. No further questions.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, as I understood, you stated you are not certain whether you saw the fourteenth part message or not?
Admiral Beardall. I am not dead certain whether I saw it or not. I sometimes read dispatches and sometimes I didn't. If it was the fourteenth part I probably read it.
The Vice Chairman. You have no present impression that you did read it?

Admiral Beardall. I have a present impression I did.
The Vice Chairman. You did? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Well, is it your recollection that that fourteenth part message was what you delivered to the President Sunday morning?

[14014] Admiral Beardall. That is my impression.
The Vice Chairman. About what time, would you say?

Admiral Beardall. About 10 o'clock, I should say.
The Vice Chairman. And there was no discussion between you and the President?

Admiral Beardall. No discussion at all.
The Vice Chairman. Other than the remark, I believe you said, that he said it looked like Japan was going to break off negotiations?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Something to that effect?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. May I have that last part read?

(The sentences referred to were read by the reporter.)
The Vice Chairman. You say there was nobody else there with the President at the time you saw him?

Admiral Beardall. Nobody else, to the best of my recollection.
The Vice Chairman. Was that the only time on Sunday that you saw him?

Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection that is the only time on Sunday I saw him until after the Pearl Harbor attack, when I joined him.
The Vice Chairman. You did join him after the attack?

[14015] Admiral Beardall. After the attack.
The Vice Chairman. About what time was it? 

Admiral Beardall. About 2 o'clock. I was at home, at lunch, just after lunch, when I got the word that Pearl Harbor was being bombed, "This is no drill," and went immediately to confirm it, and then over to the White House and joined the President.
The Vice Chairman. You stayed there then the rest of the day? 

Admiral Beardall. The rest of the day and rest of the evening; yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right, thank you. Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, when you went to the White House after the bombing, did the President make any comments to you? 

Admiral Beardall. This is after the bombing? 

Mr. Murphy. After.

Admiral Beardall. Yes. When I got there only Mr. Hopkins, Harry Hopkins, was with him, and he was on the phone. To whom he was talking I don't know; but evidently he got some call from Admiral Stark, and he told me, he said, "Take over the [14016] phone to the Navy Department," and so I went out in the lobby and kept on the job, trying to get the news of what was going on in Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Murphy. And you were reporting to him?
Admiral Beardall. And reporting to him.
Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time talk to the President about his reactions on Saturday night when the paper was delivered to him by Commander Schulz?
Admiral Beardall. Never.
Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time on Saturday evening, after you went to Admiral Wilkinson's, talk to the President?
Admiral Beardall. Never.
Mr. Murphy. Between that time and Sunday morning at 10 o'clock?
Admiral Beardall. Never.
Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time on Saturday night or early Sunday morning talk to Admiral Stark?
Admiral Beardall. I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time Saturday night or early Sunday morning make any inquiry or attempt to locate Admiral Stark?
Admiral Beardall. No; I did not.
Mr. Murphy. No other questions.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
[14017] Senator Ferguson. Admiral, going back to Saturday evening—rather Saturday all day—in the morning do you recall any messages being delivered to you as aide to the President?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of it.
Senator Ferguson. Did you handle messages from the Secretary of State?
Admiral Beardall. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Who handled those, to the President, as far as the President was concerned?
Admiral Beardall. I do not know that. I think—I don't know who handled the State Department messages.
Senator Ferguson. Well, the State Department messages were never delivered in a locked pouch, is that correct—or were they?
Admiral Beardall. I am not sure. I don't know the method of delivery of the State Department messages.
Senator Ferguson. Well, we have here in the evidence a message from the Ambassador in London telling us, about 10:40 on Saturday morning, telling us about a movement of ships, and it is addressed, as I understand it, to the Secretary of State's office.
That would not come to you in your regular duty?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any messages, magic [14018] messages, delivered to you while you were on duty on Saturday, and that you delivered to the President?
Admiral Beardall. None; have no recollection of any.
Senator Ferguson. So then you would say, as far as your testimony is concerned, no messages were delivered to you, or through you, to the President on Saturday?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, that we might have the time as to when someone notified you there would be messages after you left, or after the time of notifying you, will you tell us who notified you that there would be messages that evening or that afternoon?
Admiral Beardall. As I previously testified it must have been Lt. Commander Kramer because he was the one who used to bring me
regularly this pouch for delivery. He was the distributor of these messages.

Senator Ferguson. When you say "must" you mean because he was the distributing agency?

Admiral Beardall. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore you assume that that is who gave you that message?

Admiral Beardall. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. Could you place the time?

Admiral Beardall. I should say about 5:30, because normally I stayed at the Navy Department until about that time [14019] and often inquired if there was any magic coming in that might be destined for the White House, for the President, so that I could take it to the President at the end of the day, when it would be delivered.

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understood Captain Kramer's testimony, he indicated that he would take these messages to the White House and deliver them to you, as the aide?

Admiral Beardall. No. He did toward the end, when the watch officer was there. Sometimes Kramer would bring them over, later on, after the war started, but before Pearl Harbor there was no situation room and no map room in the White House; we didn't have one, and he would bring them to me in my office at the Navy Department and I would carry them myself.

Senator Ferguson. And do you know of any occasion when he delivered messages to you as the naval aide to the President in the White House and that you would take them to the President?

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of it.

Senator Ferguson. Prior to Pearl Harbor, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Beardall. I can't recall any.

Senator Ferguson. Well then, as I understand it, Commander Schulz, then Lieutenant Schulz, wouldn't be at the White House while you were on duty on Saturday?


Senator Ferguson. Prior to Pearl Harbor. Now, do you know where Schulz was when you instructed him to go to the White House and wait for the messages that would be delivered later?

Admiral Beardall. Well, he may have been in the Navy Department and he may have been over in that mail room we established.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that?

Admiral Beardall. Well, I don't recall it; no, but I know that was the normal procedure.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall whether or not as your—what did you call him, assistant aide?

Admiral Beardall. He was a communication watch officer.

Senator Ferguson. He didn't classify as an aide?

Admiral Beardall. No.

Senator Ferguson. He was a communication watch officer. Did you at all times have a watch officer in the White House?

Admiral Beardall. No.

Senator Ferguson. When did you start putting a watch officer in the White House?

Admiral Beardall. After Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Well, if Commander Schulz, Lieutenant [14021] Schulz at that time, indicated on this record that he was in the White House from the time he received, at least, this message from you, I mean the message as to the fact that there would be another message delivered, then you would say that he was acting as a watch officer in the White House?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. The watch officers were instructed, if it came in, to take it to the President.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you give him any instructions as to how to deliver this message to the President?

Admiral Beardall. I may have. I am not positive in my mind. But that would have been the normal thing for me to do.

Senator Ferguson. Did anyone tell you that day that this would be important, this message?

Admiral Beardall. No.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever had a man remain on duty to deliver to the President a message, the time being 5:30 that you received this notice, prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of it.

Senator Ferguson. So you would say this was the first time you designated a watch officer to remain so that he could deliver a message to the President?

Admiral Beardall. I would.

Senator Ferguson. Then I take it that there must have been something said indicating that this was an important [14022] message, that it would have to get to the President immediately, or it would have happened as in the case of all normal messages, that it would have remained in the Navy Department until the next morning, Sunday; is that a fair statement?

Admiral Beardall. That is a fair statement, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So we find that the first time in the history of the Navy Department, in your experience as naval aide—and you were naval aide for how many years?

Admiral Beardall. I was naval aide for about 7 months.

Senator Ferguson. During that entire 7 months' period no occasion had arisen that you had placed anyone else—or that you had delivered a message after the ordinary day, which was 5:30 or 6 o'clock; is that a correct statement?

Admiral Beardall. That is a correct statement.

Senator Ferguson. Did you check that evening, this being an unusual situation, did you check with Schulz later that evening, and before the next morning, as to whether or not he ever received and delivered to the President this important message?

Admiral Beardall. I accept his statement that he called me up and told me that he had delivered this 13-part, this message, he didn't know what it was, this part to the President.

Senator Ferguson. Did he say "part" or "13 parts"?

Admiral Beardall. I don't recall what he said but the [14023] message that he received from Commander Kramer.

Senator Ferguson. Well, if it turns out from the testimony that there was more than one message you would say that he probably told you that he had delivered, plural, the "messages"?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir; the messages that were in the pouch.
Senator Ferguson. That were in the pouch. Now, had you any instructions or information that that would be the last delivery that night or evening?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Senator Ferguson. What did you tell Schulz about remaining on duty?
Admiral Beardall. I don’t recall what I told him. I accept his statement that he asked permission to go home and that he did go home.
Senator Ferguson. Then you assume from that that your instructions would be that he could leave?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you received the message, 13-part message. Were there any other messages with that message—when you were at Admiral Wilkinson’s home?
Admiral Beardall. I recollect none with it.
Senator Ferguson. You recollect no other message?
Senator Ferguson. Then as far as the record will show now, no messages were delivered to you, or you had no knowledge of any messages, on Saturday, as far as magic was concerned, or messages to the President, except the 13-part which you read at Admiral Wilkinson’s?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I assume that evening you and Mrs. Beardall left the Wilkinson home and went home?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any idea what time you got home?
Admiral Beardall. I have no clear idea.
Senator Ferguson. Well—
Admiral Beardall. Probably somewhere between 11:00 and midnight, as I recollect.
Senator Ferguson. And during the time you were home that evening did you get any calls?
Admiral Beardall. None at home that I recollect.
Senator Ferguson. Were any messages delivered to you or did anyone come to your home?
Admiral Beardall. Not to my recollection.
[14025] Senator Ferguson. Then the next morning were you on the alert, was your department alerted, so that you anticipated or expected something to happen?
Admiral Beardall. By my department—
Senator Ferguson. What department would you be in at the Navy as aide to the President?
Admiral Beardall. I was aide to the President.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Well, were you on the alert for war?
Admiral Beardall. I was on the alert for the delivery of these messages to the Secretary of State by the American Ambassadors of Japan. I mean, I was concerned about that.
Senator Ferguson. Well, if you had a department, which I assume you did have, as naval aide to the President, one man in it, your department was alerted?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you were alerted; is that correct?

Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were then anticipating a fourteenth part, because of the information you received at Admiral Wilkinson’s?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know a man named Carson, a Navy officer?

[14026] Admiral Beardall. I have heard of him since I have been back to Washington this time.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who he is? What is his rank is? Was he connected with this department of yours?

Admiral Beardall. I understand—he was another youngster that we had got hold of to use as a relief for Schulz. I mean, as an extra watch officer after we established this mail-room communication center.

Senator Ferguson. Now, why did you establish a watch office in the mail room and put Schulz in and have a man named Carson as his relief man?

Admiral Beardall. Well, so that Schulz could be off sometime, acquaint, break this boy in so we could use him.

Senator Ferguson. When did you establish this watch office in the White House?

Admiral Beardall. I should say about; oh, 2 days, 3 days before Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. Two or 3 days before Pearl Harbor is the first we find that a watch place was in the White House. And can you tell us why it was established?

Admiral Beardall. Well, it was established so that there would be someone there to receive this magic who was more or less in the way of officer-messenger so that if I wasn’t available there could be someone there. These messages were [14027] coming in. The situation was getting more tense in the diplomatic relations, and I wanted somebody there in case I was going out for dinner or somewhere else, that could receive this and be trusted to deliver it.

Senator Ferguson. Who advised you that the situation was getting more tense, causing you to come to the conclusion that a watch office should be set up in the White House? How did you come to that conclusion that it was getting more tense?

Admiral Beardall. I just think my own reasoning and—

Senator Ferguson. You had examined all magic that came through you, and, therefore, you drew the conclusion that the situation was changing, rapid enough, at least, that you wanted to establish a watch office?

Admiral Beardall. Correct, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that these messages were so important at that time that they were to be delivered at once to the President instead of having to wait until Admiral Beardall was found, there would be someone on duty, either Schulz or Carson, to deliver these messages; is that a correct statement?
Admiral Beardall. That is a correct statement; and to keep them secure.

[14028] Senator Ferguson. At that time, let's say the 5th, before you established the watch office, what were your hours at the White House, or on duty?

Admiral Beardall. My hours at the White House, I would probably go there in the morning and in the afternoon, unless the President had some other instructions for me, and I would spend the balance of the day in my office at the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson. What were your office hours in the Navy Department and at the White House both?

Admiral Beardall. Well, I should say from 9:30, from 9 in the morning until probably 5:30, and sometimes 6.

Senator Ferguson. About 9 or 9:30 to 5:30 or 6 were your regular hours?

Admiral Beardall. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. When did you establish longer hours for the delivery of these messages either through you or these two assistants?

Admiral Beardall. I don't understand the question, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Schulz goes on night duty at least on Saturday. Had you established this watch for longer hours than daylight hours that you have given us, from 9 to 6?

Admiral Beardall. No, not regularly. As I recollect. Immediately after Pearl Harbor we set up—


Admiral Beardall. Before.

Senator Ferguson. You don't recall. So this would be the first night duty?

Admiral Beardall. First night duty that I can recollect.

Senator Ferguson. Or first special duty; is that correct?

Admiral Beardall. First special duty, yes; to the best of my recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Were you working Sundays prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Beardall. No, not necessarily, because I was perhaps the only aide, or secretary, around the White House on Sunday morning.

Senator Ferguson. I mean, previous. For instance, on the 1st. Did you work Sunday?

Admiral Beardall. I don't recall.

Senator Ferguson. Had you worked previous to the 7th?

Admiral Beardall. On Sunday?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Beardall. If I had something to do, I had some special duty, if I had been directed by the President, I may have gone to the White House or Navy Department on that Sunday depending on what was going on.

Senator Ferguson. Prior to the 7th had you ever remained [14020] on duty Sunday to deliver any messages?

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of doing that.

Senator Ferguson. So, the first time on a Sunday that you were on duty to deliver messages was the 7th; is that correct?

Admiral Beardall. That is a correct statement, sir, to the best of my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, when did you first receive instructions to appear for duty on Sunday the 7th?
Admiral Beardall. I received no instructions.
Senator Ferguson. You never received instructions to go on duty on the 7th?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Senator Ferguson. From no one?
Admiral Beardall. No one that I know of.
Senator Ferguson. How does it come that you got on duty on the 7th?
Admiral Beardall. Well, my own initiative.
Senator Ferguson. Why, what caused you to—well, you being the only man in the department, I was going to say, instruct yourself to be on duty—but you being the only one in that department, and being the superior officer, how does it come that you went on duty that morning?
Admiral Beardall. Well, my recollection is because I had perused those 13 parts that evening at Captain Wilkinson's [14031] and there must have been some indication there was another part coming to be delivered, which might have occasioned me, through a sense of duty, to look into it.
Senator Ferguson. I take it then the reading of the 13 parts caused you to believe there would be another part come in and therefore you went to duty and were on duty Sunday morning?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you go to the White House?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What time did you arrive at the White House?
Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection I would say about 9:30.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see the President before you received any messages?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. No recollection of that?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then when did you first know that another part had come in, and that you were going to receive one for the President?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of receiving any word that another one was coming in.
[14032] Senator Ferguson. Did anyone deliver a message to you, magic, on Sunday morning, to be delivered to the President?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir; they must have, else I wouldn't have had it.
Senator Ferguson. Where were you when it was delivered to you?
Admiral Beardall. I think either in the little mail room or in the office upstairs, in the military aide's room.
Senator Ferguson. Well, not to repeat, but you have given us the hour, about 10 o'clock, and you haven't any reason to state that it was before that, because if you got there about 9:30 it would be about 10 o'clock; is that correct?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And it would come, I take it, in the same pouch. Did you read it before you took it to the President?
Admiral Beardall. I do not recollect that clearly, whether I did or not. I might have or might not.
Senator Ferguson. Don't you think that the fourteenth part of this message would be rather vivid in your memory if you had read it before you took it into the President?
Admiral Beardall. I think it would; yes.
Senator Ferguson. For that reason it would seem that you hadn't read it. You think you hadn't read it?
Admiral Beardall. I don't know. I may or may not have read it.
Senator Ferguson. Was there any message beside that fourteenth part that came to your attention or to your knowledge that morning?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of any.
Senator Ferguson. You have no recollection of any other message, whether it was the 1 o'clock message, or a message that indicated no one was to typewrite the message except the Ambassador himself?
Admiral Beardall. Correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So you have no recollection; that doesn't refresh your memory?
Admiral Beardall. Not a bit, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When you took this to the President, in what room was the President?
Admiral Beardall. In his bedroom.
Senator Ferguson. He was in his bedroom; is that correct?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, prior to the reading of it by the President, did you have a conversation or did he say anything?
Admiral Beardall. I don't recollect him saying anything except "Good morning."
Senator Ferguson. Then did he sit and read whatever was in that pouch that morning?
Admiral Beardall. He did.
Senator Ferguson. And you remained there while he read it?
Admiral Beardall. I did.
Senator Ferguson. Then what would you say he said after, giving us the exact words or the substance.
Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection the substance of his words were: "It looks like the Japanese are going to break off negotiations."
Senator Ferguson. That is the substance of what he said?
Admiral Beardall. That is the substance.
Senator Ferguson. He handed back whatever was in the file and whatever he had read; is that correct?
Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. No other delivery to your knowledge was delivered to him that morning?
Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. Now, what did you do with that pouch and where did you go for the rest of the day up to the time of the attack?
Admiral Beardall. The best of my recollection—
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Beardall. I took the pouch back to the Navy Department.
Senator Ferguson. And remained at the Navy Department?

Admiral Beardall. I remained there until lunch time.

Senator Ferguson. Then went home and were having lunch when the attack came?

Admiral Beardall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other conversations you had, for a week, with the President, other than the one that you state, in relation to the Far East?

Admiral Beardall. Yes; I recollect one very clearly.

Senator Ferguson. When was that?

Admiral Beardall. That was about the 4th or 5th, in connection with the delivery of the magic. I took the liberty of inviting special attention as significant the message about the burning of codes.

Senator Ferguson. Then you had a conversation with the President about the burning of codes; is that correct?

Admiral Beardall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us as near as you can, in substance if you can't give us the exact words, what that conversation was by you and by the President?

Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection the conversation was, I said, "Mr. President, this is a very significant dispatch," which he read very carefully, and he said [14036] "Well, when do you think it will happen?" I said, "Most any time." That was the gist of the conversation.

[14037] Senator Ferguson. What did the President say, did he give you any time when he said, "When do you think it will happen?" and you said, "Most any time," did he reply as to what his opinion was?

Admiral Beardall. Not at all.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you recall any other conversations with him about the Far East?

Admiral Beardall. None.

Senator Ferguson. Now, of course, you knew what he meant when he asked you when it would happen?

Admiral Beardall. Well, I can't state what was on the President's mind, but I understood him to mean——

Senator Ferguson. What did you understand, from what had taken place?

Admiral Beardall. I understood him to mean, When is war going to break out, when we are going to be attacked, or something.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. That is why you said that "almost any time," is that correct?

Admiral Beardall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Because from your knowledge it indicated that war could be at any moment, an attack could be at any minute. Is that correct?

Admiral Beardall. That is correct.

[14038] Senator Ferguson. Admiral, when did you come to that conclusion, when did you come to the conclusion that war was immediately imminent?

Admiral Beardall. I can't exactly say when I came to that conclusion that it was immediately imminent, but I will say that that message of burning codes influenced me very much, that we were getting through with these diplomatic negotiations, and there was going to be war.
Senator Ferguson. You are a graduate of Annapolis?
Admiral Beardall. I am, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Your career is that of a Navy man?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore you had a right to apprise what was going on, to determine whether or not there would be war. I want the record. I want the record merely to show your experience, so that we may value your opinion.

That is correct.

Admiral Beardall. That is correct, that I am a graduate of Annapolis, and a naval officer.

Senator Ferguson. And you have been a naval officer all your life?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Have had a great amount of experience in the Navy.

[14039] (No response.)

Senator Ferguson. You came to the conclusion that, by reading these codes, then, that war was imminent, and you replied to the President "almost any time"?

Admiral Beardall. Correct.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall, Admiral, any other conversations?

Admiral Beardall. Those are the only ones.

Senator Ferguson. With the President, about the Far East?
Admiral Beardall. Those are the only ones I recall.

Senator Ferguson. You can't recall any prior to that now?
Admiral Beardall. No, no; he never discussed it with me.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any with Harry Hopkins?
Admiral Beardall. None.

Senator Ferguson. About the Far East?
Admiral Beardall. None.

Senator Ferguson. I notice in Commander Schulz's testimony, he said, on page 12451:

The first time I was ever in the White House was on the 5th of December.

That would refresh your memory as to when you put the [14040] watch on?

Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you, on the morning, on Sunday morning, while over in the watch room, have a conversation with these other men who were in that room, as indicated by this Watch Log, any conversation about the Far East?

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of any conversation with them. I may have had in regard to the situation, but I have no recollection of it.

Senator Ferguson. Could I see that memorandum. Was it the usual situation for Sunday morning to have eight or ten officers sitting in the watch office, or were they in the watch office, in the Navy Department?

Admiral Beardall. Well, about that time—it previously hadn't been. I would say it was an unusual situation to have that many coming in and going, so far as I can recollect.

Senator Ferguson. You say that would be unusual?
Admiral Beardall. I think so. I don’t know—I mean that is just my opinion.

Senator Ferguson. At least that is the first time you knew of any such experience?

Admiral Beardall. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would you say that you had been back to the Navy Department after the delivery of this message so that you would be in the watch office in a position to deliver any further messages to the President?

Admiral Beardall. Yes; I should say that, along with other reasons for going back, to see what was going on, and a natural interest in the situation.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, this was a very, very tense moment, not only in your life but in the country’s life, and you realized it, as a Navy officer, did you not, that morning?

Admiral Beardall. I think that is a correct statement, yes.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore you were waiting in this office with other Navy men?

Admiral Beardall. Yes. Well, I—yes. I wasn’t waiting in this office.

Senator Ferguson. No; I don’t want to indicate that you were wasting any time, or loafing, or anything like that, but you were on duty there with the other Navy men?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir; but I could have come and gone, I had no special instructions.

Senator Ferguson. I understand that.

There was a Captain Schuirman, Captain Wilkinson, Captain Metcalfe. I think that is all the captains. You were a captain at that time, is that correct?

Admiral Beardall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And you can’t recall any conversation among these men who were in this office No. 2601 at about 11:45 that morning?

Admiral Beardall. I can’t recall any specific conversation with them.

Senator Ferguson. Did they indicate that they were waiting for something to happen?

Admiral Beardall. I don’t know that they indicated they were waiting for something to happen, but they were interested in the situation before us.

Senator Ferguson. They were there because of the very tense situation?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Just as you were there?

Admiral Beardall. Yes sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you see Admiral Stark?

Admiral Beardall. I did.

Senator Ferguson. On Sunday morning?

Admiral Beardall. I did.

Senator Ferguson. Were you in his office?

Admiral Beardall. Yes sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation with him?

Admiral Beardall. No direct conversation. I listened into what might be going on and sat in a while.
Senator Ferguson. What time did you first get to the Navy Department on Sunday morning?

Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection, I should say it was, around 11 or 11:15.

Senator Ferguson. What time would you say you went into Admiral Stark's office?

Admiral Beardall. I think about 11 or 11:30. I am not certain of the time there.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us, to the best of your knowledge, if you can't remember the exact language, the substance of the conversation that took place in Admiral Stark's office?

Admiral Beardall. I have one recollection.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have that.

Admiral Beardall. That the phone rang from General Marshall's office and something was said about "include the Navy" in this message, or that message—is o. k. Some conversation to that effect. That is the best of my recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, first, you would get that from Admiral Stark?

Admiral Beardall. Well, yes; I got that on the phone. I don't know what was coming in.

[14044] Senator Ferguson. From what he said, you took it, it would be all right to include the Navy?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir; or words to that effect.

Senator Ferguson. Was anything said about the kind of a message?

Admiral Beardall. No, sir; not to my recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Who would you say was in Admiral Stark's office during the time that this phone call came in?

Admiral Beardall. Well, I can't recollect who was in there then. There were some officers coming and going. There may have been Admiral Ingersoll. He was in the office next door. May have been Captain Wilkinson. I can't recall now just who did come and go during the time I was there.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall what would take you into Admiral Stark's office, he being the Chief in charge, did you go in to discuss anything with him, or just drop in?

Admiral Beardall. No; I just went in his office.

Senator Ferguson. Because of your rank, you had free access to the Admiral's office?

Admiral Beardall. Correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You weren't called in for consultation?

Admiral Beardall. I was not, sir.

[14045] Senator Ferguson. You don't recall any conference that you had with the Admiral about the situation as it stood?

Admiral Beardall. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you get anything from that conversation that the Admiral had with General Marshall, that things were very serious?

Admiral Beardall. No; I gleaned that they were sending some message to the fleet, sending some message out.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Ambassador Hu Shih of China had called on the President on Sunday morning?

Admiral Beardall. I did not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You had no knowledge of that? I assume, then, that you had no knowledge of anyone calling on the President Sunday morning?

Admiral Beardall. No one.

Senator Ferguson. You can't give us any information on this conversation, any more of this conversation in Admiral Stark's office, than you have?

Admiral Beardall. That is all I can recollect.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Beardall, as I understand it, you did not have other naval officers at the White House until [14046] 2 days before Pearl Harbor. That would be December 5, 1941?

Admiral Beardall. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. So that the only occasion you ever had before December 6 to assign anyone to remain after 5:30 was 1 day, that would be the evening of December 5?

Admiral Beardall. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Before that, do you know whether or not it was true that Captain Kramer sometimes in the evening delivered messages to the White House?

Admiral Beardall. I do; I heard it.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, he himself, without the necessity of having an officer take it from him and deliver it to the President, had delivered it personally?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. To the President, himself?

Admiral Beardall. I think often to the President himself, from what I have learned, and sometimes, if I wasn't there, to General Watson, too.

Mr. Murphy. There was a reference made that this was unusual. The only time before December 6 you had done it was December 5, because you had no assistant up until then?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. On the morning of December 7, you went to [14047] the President with this particular message, and you would state that he said, "It looks as though they are breaking off negotiations." You had observed the President on many previous occasions, had you not?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. In your judgment was there anything in his manner which would indicate to you that he was expecting an attack within a period of hours?

Admiral Beardall. There was not, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will you state for the record why you come to that conclusion?

Admiral Beardall. Well, there was no alarm, or no mention of this, mention of war, or of any actions on his part that would indicate that he was expecting an attack.

Mr. Murphy. Did he say anything at all to you, as his naval aide, at that time, that would indicate to you that he, the President, felt that war was a matter of hours?
Admiral Beardall. Nothing at all.

Mr. Murphy. Now, there was before us as a witness, Commander Schulz. Did anyone make any attempt to inquire from you as to who was your assistant on duty at the White House on December 6, your aide, or whatever naval person was there on December 6, 1941? Do you understand my question?

Admiral Beardall. I don’t quite follow it, sir.

[14048] Mr. Murphy. Strike that question. Did anyone ask you who was with you at the White House on December 6, 1941, by way of other Naval personnel?

Admiral Beardall. No; to the best of my recollection, Commander Kramer, who handled this message, and who would be the one who would deliver anything that came in.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, Admiral, are you the one that submitted the name of Commander Schulz?

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. As a witness for this committee?

Admiral Beardall. Correct.

Mr. Murphy. To whom did you give that name?

Admiral Beardall. To Lieutenant Commander Baecher here.

Mr. Murphy. Did you have anything to do with Commander Schulz when he got to Washington?

Admiral Beardall. No. I haven’t seen him.

Mr. Murphy. Did you have anything to do with shielding that witness from this committee or its investigators?

Admiral Beardall. Nothing at all.

Mr. Murphy. May I ask from Commander Baecher, there has been a national magazine article to the effect that steps were taken to shield Commander Schulz from the investigators and attorneys of the committee and the members of the committee. Did the United States Navy do any such thing?

[14049] Commander Baecher. No, sir; positively not.

Mr. Murphy. Who was it that brought Commander Schulz here?

Commander Baecher. We did; the Navy did.

Mr. Murphy. On whose request?

Commander Baecher. At the request of prior counsel. They enquired, through me, of Admiral Beardall, who his assistants were.

Mr. Murphy. Did you, Commander, attempt to conceal this witness or keep him from any members of this committee, or the investigators of the committee, prior to his going on the stand?

Commander Baecher. Absolutely not. We wrote several memoranda to counsel explaining where Commander Schulz was and the difficulties that might be involved in bringing him here and generally what he would testify to. And I interviewed him personally before he was brought to the committee room and I reported the substance of his testimony to Mr. Richardson, to Senator Ferguson, and to Senator Lucas.

[14050] Mr. Murphy. Did you attempt to conceal him from this committee over the lunch hour so that the committee couldn’t talk to him or the committee investigators couldn’t talk to him?

Commander Baecher. Absolutely not.

Mr. Murphy. One other question, Admiral Beardall. Did you know about the war warning having gone out on November 27?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. You did not know we had sent such warning to the theaters in the Pacific?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir; I had no such knowledge.
Mr. Murphy. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, you weren’t in Washington for the last few months, were you?
Admiral Beardall. No; I have been away.
Senator Ferguson. You have been in Panama?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And Peru?
Admiral Beardall. Panama and Peru.
Senator Ferguson. How long have you been out of Washington?
Admiral Beardall. Since last August.
[14051] Senator Ferguson. You are just returning to testify here and you are returning to Panama?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether the Duty Officer Carson was on duty on Sunday?
Admiral Beardall. I don’t definitely, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. You don’t recall leaving anyone at the White House while you went to the Navy Department?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of it.
Senator Ferguson. The record should show that Schulz was your Deputy Watch Officer at the White House, should it not?
Admiral Beardall. What record?
Senator Ferguson. Well, the records of the Navy should have shown that his duty on Saturday was a deputy or assistant watch officer as aide to the President?
Admiral Beardall. The knowledge would exist there but whether they had a record of it I couldn’t be sure.
Senator Ferguson. Wasn’t it customary to assign the duty of a man?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, but Schulz was on temporary duty in the White House at that time. He was permanently attached to the Navy Department and I made a request on them to send an assistant over there, and whether they made a record of that I am not sure.
[14052] Senator Ferguson. When were you first consulted as to who received and delivered this message to the White House, this 13-part on Saturday night?
Admiral Beardall. When I came back here to see the former counsel. That was in November. Last November.
Senator Ferguson. Were you in the city of Washington last November?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When in November?
Admiral Beardall. I arrived here about the 25th, somewhere around there.
Senator Ferguson. Well, were you then asked as to whom was your associate or assistant at that time?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. I spent a lot of time trying to find out who he was.
Senator Ferguson. You had forgotten who he was?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How did you find out who your assistant was?
Admiral Beardall. Inquiring around with different people and trying to remember his name, and I finally struck somebody who remembered what his name was, and I went to the Navy Department and Lieutenant Commander Baecher here, to find out where he was and see if he was the right man.

[14053] Senator Ferguson. Do you know why he wasn’t brought here as a witness until about the week of the 20th of February?
Admiral Beardall. I haven’t the slightest idea.
Senator Ferguson. Did you locate him back in November?
Admiral Beardall. I think we located him—
Commander Baecher. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Let the Admiral answer.
Admiral Beardall. I think he was located.
Senator Ferguson. Did you talk with him?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You didn’t talk with him?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Senator Ferguson. But you knew he was located.
Admiral Beardall. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. This room, 2601 you say, was the watch officer’s room in the Navy?
Admiral Beardall. I think it was, sir. We can check that. I haven’t any knowledge.
The Vice Chairman. It wasn’t your office?
Admiral Beardall. It wasn’t my office, no.
The Vice Chairman. And all these officers whose names have been read here, they just came in and went out, passed through there?
[14054] Admiral Beardall. Exactly. I take it it wasn’t a regular office which anybody kept, except the watch officer, or some sort of a mail censor, or something of that sort.
The Vice Chairman. The fact that all these names are listed would not indicate that they were all assembled there at any one time?
Admiral Beardall. Not all all.
The Vice Chairman. It would just indicate that they had passed through there sometime during the day?
Admiral Beardall. Correct.
The Vice Chairman. Thank you. Is there anything further? Does counsel have anything further?
Mr. Richardson. No; nothing further from the witness.
The Vice Chairman. Do you have anything further, Admiral, that you desire to give to the committee?
Admiral Beardall. I can think of nothing, sir.
The Vice Chairman. We thank you for your appearance and the information that you have given us. You may be excused.
(The witness was excused.)

[14055] Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that the members of the committee cannot attend for several days, if you could give us another half hour we could clear the record so as to help the printer out on the record. We need but one faithful committee member to remain with us while we put this material in.
The Vice Chairman. Go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. May I ask what it will be?

Mr. Richardson. This is a summation of requests heretofore made, and counsel is now prepared to present the matter. Mr. Morgan will present it.

Mr. Morgan. Mr. Chairman, at page 879 of the record Congressman Gearhart requested the log of the U. S. S. Helena. Commander Baecher has provided the log, which we would like to offer as Exhibit No. 163.

The Vice Chairman. It will be received.

(The log referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 163.")

Mr. Morgan. At pages 8342 and 8346 Congressman Murphy requested reports supplied by General Short with respect to the attack on Oahu. These reports were shown to Mr. Murphy and we have them compiled and will offer them as Exhibit No. 164.

The Vice Chairman. They will be so received.

(The reports referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 164.")

Mr. Morgan. We have a communication from the Army liaison office dated April 10, 1946 reading as follows:

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

In response to Congressman Murphy's inquiry at page 4532 of the committee transcript, there is enclosed a copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a 23 February 1941 conference between German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima. The partial translation was obtained from the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality.

This document was distributed among the members of the committee. We would like to offer it as Exhibit No. 165.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 165.")

Mr. Morgan. Some time ago there was distributed to the members of the committee a copy of the dispatch from Ambassador Winant to the State Department dated November 2, 1941. Instead of offering this as an exhibit we would like to have it spread on the record.

The Vice Chairman. The document referred to will be spread on the record.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14067] TEM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

5213, November 2, noon.

PERSONAL AND SECRET TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

As your Naval people have already been informed, we are sending that big ship you inspected into the Indian Ocean as part of the squadron we are forming there. This ought to serve as a deterrent on Japan. There is nothing like having something that can catch and kill anything. I am very glad we can spare her at this juncture as it is more than we thought we could do some time ago. The firmer your attitude and ours, the less chance of their taking the plunge.

I am grieved at the loss of life you have suffered with Reuben James. I salute the land of unending challenge!

Winant.
Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to the request of Senator Lucas at pages 154-5 of the record, we have a communication, dated November 30, 1945, from Commander Baecher, the Navy liaison officer concerning:

Subject: Time of receipt of the message from the U. S. S. Ward, by Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel.

We would like to have this communication plus the enclosure spread on the record at this point.

The Vice Chairman. The communication and the enclosure will be spread on the record at this point.

(The matter referred to follows:)

Memorandum to: Mr. William D. Mitchell.
Subject: Time of receipt of the message from the U. S. S. WARD, by Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel.

1. Pursuant to your request there is enclosed a report indicating the time the message, from the U. S. S. WARD, was received by Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lt. Comdr. USNR

Acknowledged receipt of the above enclosure.

TIME OF RECEIPT OF WARD'S MESSAGE BY ADMIRAL BLOCH AND ADMIRAL KIMMEL

RECEIPT BY ADMIRAL BLOCH

Robert's Report page 1727:
The dispatch from the WARD was received by Lt. Comdr. Kaminski, the watch officer for the 14th Naval District, at 0712.

Robert's Report page 1747:
Captain John B. Earle, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District, states that he received this message from Lt. Comdr. Kaminski at 0710 or 0712, and that he immediately called Admiral Bloch, Commandant, 14th Naval District.

Murfin Court Vol. 2, page 401:
Admiral Bloch states that he was informed of the WARD'S message at about 0715 by Captain Earle. They discussed the possibility of this report being another false contact, and before the matter had been clarified, the air attack had begun.

RECEIPT BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL

Robert's Report Page 1727:
Lt. Cdr. Kaminski, the watch officer for the 14th Naval District, states that he phoned the message to CincPac's duty officer a minute or two after receiving it at 0712.

Murfin Court Vol. 2, pages 332-3:
Admiral Kimmel (CincPac) states that on receiving the message from his duty officer between 0730 and 0740, he presumed that this report was another false contact, and while waiting for amplification of it, the bombing attack started.

Robert's Report Page 1544:
At 0800, CincPac sent a message to all ships and stations, stating: "Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill."

Mr. Morgan. At page 185 of the record, Senator Ferguson inquired as to why the B-17s which were sent to Hawaii shortly before the attack were unarmed. We have a communication from the Army liaison officer, dated 2 April 1946, in this regard, which we would like to have spread on the record at this point.
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.
(The communication referred to follows:)

[14062] War Department,
Washington, Room 4D757, The Pentagon, 2 April 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:
At page 155 of the Committee transcript, Senator Ferguson asked why the B-17s which arrived at Oahu from the west coast on the morning of 7 December 1941 were without ammunition. Testimony on this subject by General Marshall will be found in the Committee transcript at p. 2960 and in the Army Pearl Harbor Board top secret transcript at pages 20-21, and by General Arnold in the Army Board's secret transcript at page 168.

/s/ CARL R. NELSON,
Cpt., AUS.

[14063] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request made by Senator Ferguson at pages 200-201 of the transcript for all drafts and notes in connection with Admiral Inglis' statement of the attack, we now have a communication from the Navy Department dated January 25, 1946 which we would like to have spread on the record.

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.
(The communication referred to follows:)

[14064] Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson,

1. Reference is made to the request of Senator Ferguson (transcript pages 200-201) that all drafts and notes in connection with Admiral Inglis' statement of attack be furnished the Committee. All of the material involved was destroyed as, in the course of work, it was superseded by more finished drafts, and when the final draft was completed on 24 November, all previous material was destroyed.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

[14065] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request made by Mr. Gearhart at page 276 of the record with respect to a search of the Navy Department files concerning any instructions relative to maintenance of radio silence in effect in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets at the time of Pearl Harbor, we have a detailed memorandum from Commander Baecher in this regard, dated February 19, 1946, which we ask be spread on the record.

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record at this point.
(The detailed memorandum referred to follows:)

[14066] 1083A
R#120

Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 19 February 1946.

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. Pursuant to committee request, a search has been made to determine the conditions of radio silence in effect in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets at the time of Pearl Harbor.

A. ATLANTIC FLEET

In accordance with a directive issued by the CinC, Atlantic Fleet [CINCLANT Op-Plan No. 7-41, dated 1 September 1941, file A-4-3(4)/(00164)] and under which the fleet began to operate about 1 October 1941, radio communication was prohibited except that which was authorized by the following portion of the directive:
(1) "To forward contact and important amplifying reports which it is impracticable to transmit by visual methods."

(2) "All traffic pertaining to operations in progress for which plans are being made, may be transmitted by radio if transmission is impracticable."

(3) "Information considered vital to the accomplishment of the task and of a greater importance than the preservation of communication security may be transmitted by radio to units not within visual communication."

B. PACIFIC FLEET

In accordance with CinCPac directives to individual Task Forces (for example, CinCPac dispatch 280447 of November 1941 to Task Forces TWO and EIGHT), the fleet was operating under Radio Condition 19 which prohibited radio communication except that which was authorized by the following:

(1) "To forward traffic vital to the accomplishment of an assigned task when no other means of transmission would suffice."

(2) "To make the limited transmissions necessary for a parent vessel to recover lost planes."

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lt. Cmdr., USNR

[14068] 1083A
R120

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. By memorandum of 10 February 1946 (1083A R#120) information was forwarded you by the undersigned in respect of the conditions of radio activity and silence in effect in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, including that the Atlantic Fleet was operating under Op-Plan 7-41. In amplification of the information in that memorandum, it is desired to further advise you that Op-Plan 7-41 was placed in effect in the Atlantic Fleet at 1200 hours dated 10 December 1941.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

[14069] Mr. Morgan. At page 299 and again at 780-2 of the transcript, Congressman Gearhart requested records relating to the transfer of ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic, or vice versa, from May to December 1941. This material was rather extensive and detailed, and for purposes of the record we would like to indicate that it was delivered to Congressman Gearhart on April 10, with the request that he advise as to what portions, if any, he desired incorporated in the record.

Senator Ferguson. May I request the Chair that the aide to the military, the Army, furnish us with all logs kept in the Secretary's or Chief of Staff's office for the month of November and the first 7 days up until the 7th of December.

Mr. Masten. What kind of logs?

Senator Ferguson. Any logs like we have seen here today.

Mr. Masten. Telephone operators?

Senator Ferguson. Duty-officer logs and watch-officer logs. And I would like to have the Navy produce their logs for the same period.

The Vice Chairman. The liaison officers will take note of the requests. Proceed.

Mr. Morgan. At page 7844 of the record, Congressman Murphy requested a copy of the order which stopped the formation of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces after they had set up a command.

1 See War Department communication on p. 5506, infra.
This information has been supplied by the Navy. For purposes of the record we would like to indicate that it was presented to Mr. Murphy on April 10, 1946, with the request that he indicate what portions he desired incorporated in the transcript.

At page 7940, Senator Ferguson requested identifying data concerning a message dated November 29, 1941, from the Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaii, which was read into the record at pages 7937-7958. This has been supplied in a communication dated January 22, 1946, from the Army liaison officer, Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe, which we ask be spread on the record.

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.

(The communication referred to follows:)


Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

The Office of the Adjutant General has supplied the following information concerning radio message No. 489, dated 20, November 1941, from the Adjutant General to the Commanding General, Hawaii:

a. “AG 381 (11-29-41) MC-E” in the upper right corner is the file notation for the message. “AG 381” is the designation for “Far Eastern Situation”; “(11-29-41)” is the date of the memorandum directing the preparation of the cable. “MC” shows that the cable was prepared in the Miscellaneous Division, Confidential Section of the Office of the Adjutant General. “E” indicates that the memorandum directing the preparation of the cable was issued by the War Plans Division.

b. “EHB/cdm—1712” shows that Elmer H. Boughton in the Miscellaneous Division, Secret and Confidential Section of the Adjutant General’s Office was in charge of the physical preparation of the cable, that it was typed by Corrine D. Moss, and that the work was done in Room 1712 Munitions Building.

c. The signature is that of Colonel A. P. Sullivan, who at the time of the preparation of the cable was in charge of the Operations Branch, Adjutant General’s Office.

d. The handwritten notation “No. 489” is the number assigned to the message by the War Department Message Center.

e. “BASED ON: WPD 4571-5, 11/29/41” in the lower left shows that the cable was prepared from a War Plans Division memorandum having the file number WPD 4571-5, of 20 November 1941.

f. The stamp “47 AGO DEC 8 1941 Received” in the lower right shows that this copy of the cable was received on 8 December 1941, by Classifier No. 47, in the mail room of the Office of the Adjutant General.

g. “Files Dec 23 1941 BJS” in the lower right corner shows that the cable was received in the classified files of the Office of the Adjutant General on 23 December 1941; the initials are those of Betty J. Sherbourne.

h. “Green cy w/d & destroyed by burning, 12/30/41, CDM—1705” in the lower left shows that the green-paper duplicate copy of this cable retained by the Miscellaneous Division, Secret and Confidential Section of the Office of the Adjutant General was withdrawn and destroyed by burning on 30 December 1941. [14073] “CDM” are the initials of Corrine D. Moss, Room 1705 Munitions Building.

i. “Ro 1-6-42” in the lower left corner shows that this cable was indexed on 6 January 1942 by Rose Coccaro.

Harmon Duncombe, Lt. Colonel, GSO.

[14074] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request made by Senator Ferguson at page 8531 of the transcript for information on the number of priority dispatches sent to Hawaii by the War Department on 7 December 1941, we have a communication, with enclosures from the War Department, dated 27 February 1946. We request that the letter of transmittal and enclosures be spread on the record at this point.
The Vice Chairman: The material will be so spread on the record. (The material referred to follows:)

[14075]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

In response to your 31 January memorandum forwarding Senator Ferguson's request for information on the number of priority dispatches sent to Hawaii by the War Department on 7 December 1941, and to Senator Ferguson's further inquiry (Tr. 8530–1) as to what priority messages were decoded in Hawaii before the 7 December Marshall warning, the following information is submitted:

a. In a search of the War Department records, file copies have been found of four radios to Hawaii, each marked “priority” and bearing the notation “Sent 12/7”. Three (Nos. 524, 525 and 527) are dated 6 December; the fourth, No. 530, is dated the 7th.

b. No. 529, the Marshall warning, which was sent over commercial facilities, carried in its heading the notation “U. S. Govt”, entitling it to priority in transmission in accordance with Western Union and RCA tariffs then in effect (Inclusion No. 1). Testimony concerning additional measures taken to expedite transmission of No. 529 appears at page 195 [14076] of the Army Pearl Harbor Board transcript and page 18–33 of the Roberts Commission transcript.

c. No. 529 was received by RCA Honolulu at 7:33 a.m., delivered to the Signal Office, Fort Shafter, about 11:45 a.m., and decoded at 2:41 p.m. No records are available showing when the four messages mentioned in paragraph a were received and decoded in Hawaii. A delivery book of the Headquarters Hawaiian Department shows that the three, dated 6 December, were delivered (presumably after decoding) as follows: No. 524 at 7:25 p.m. on 6 December; No. 525 at 5:14 p.m. on 7 December, and No. 527 at 9:25 a.m. on 8 December, all Hawaiian time. The delivery book shows that No. 530 of the 7th was delivered at “1002 A”, probably on the 7th (messages entered in the delivery book immediately before and after No. 530 have “12–7–41” in the “date delivered” column; the date space for No. 530 contains initials rather than a date). If delivered at 10:02 a.m. on 7 December, No. 530 must have been decoded before the Marshall warning was decoded. It will be noted, however, that No. 530 could not have been decoded before the attack, since, according to the time stamp on the back of the War Department copy, No. 530 did not leave the War Department until sometime after 2:14 p.m. Washington time (8:44 a.m., Hawaiian time).

/s/ Harmon Duncombe
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

[14077]

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at
DI 56 74/73 US GOVT
DI WASHN DC DEC 7 1941 1201 PM
CG

Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.

529 Seventh

(Note.—Text omitted.)

1217 PM

MARSHALL

[14078]

Signal Corps, United States Army

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in code.

SECRET

1540WS WASHINGTON DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218SP
CG

Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.

529 7th JAPANESE ARE PRESENTING AT ONE PM EASTERN STANDARD TIME TODAY WHAT AMOUNTS TO AN ULTIMATUM ALSO THEY ARE UNDER ORDERS TO DESTROY THEIR CODE MACHINE IMMEDIATELY

79716-46—pt. 11—11
STOP. JUST WHAT SIGNIFICANCE THE HOUR SET MAY HAVE WE DO NOT KNOW BUT BE ON ALERT ACCORDINGLY STOP. INFORM NAVAL AUTHORITIES OF THIS COMMUNICATION.


Received as a SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED communication

Strike out two

Answer should be marked "Answer to Code Message No. 523 71H".

Decoded by:

Lt. J. H. Babcock,
251P Dec. 7, 1941.

[14079]

THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY
TARIFF BOOK NO. 73—1941

LONGRAMS are telegrams accepted at rates lower than telegram or serial rates as a deferred service subordinated to telegrams and serials in transmission and delivery. These messages are identified by the symbol "LG". The service is available between points in the United States only.

The rate for a LONGRAM of 100 words or less between points at which are located Western Union offices or agencies is twice the rate for a ten word telegram between the same points and an additional charge for each group of five words or less in excess of 100 words as indicated in the following table:

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<th>Where the full telegram rate for 10 words is</th>
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<th>Each additional 5 words or less cost</th>
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1 LONGRAMS of 60 words or less take the lower day-letter rates.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MESSAGES

DEFINITION.

1. United States Government messages are those sent by duly accredited representatives of the Federal Government (this includes U. S. Senators and Congressmen) on official business of the Federal Government or its various bureaus and agencies and paid for out of Federal Government funds.

2. Such messages are identified by the symbol "GOVT." The messages of the U. S. Weather Bureau, while actually government messages, are classed separately as weather messages and are identified by the symbol "WEA."

CLASSES OF SERVICE.

3. Any of the following classes of service may be used for government messages:

   Telegram
   Day Letter
   Overnight Telegram
   Serial
   Timed Wire Service
ACCEPTANCE OF MESSAGES.

4. Government messages have priority in transmission and delivery over all other messages of the same class of service.

5. All messages offered for transmission at government rates must be endorsed "Official Business" by the sender. The endorsement shall also include the sender's name and title and the name of the department, bureau, agency, etc. with which he is connected. Such messages not so identified will be charged for at commercial rates.

6. Messages offered by telephone for transmission at government rates will be accepted without prepayment of tolls if telephoned from a subscriber's telephone, but will not be accepted without prepayment of tolls from public telephone stations. The sender of such a message will be required to furnish his full name, title, and the name of the department, bureau or agency with which he is connected and to state that the message is on official government business.

7. Messages of United States Marshals and United States District Attorneys should not be sent "collect" to the Department of Justice at Washington, but should be prepaid by the senders. Other Government messages addressed to Washington, D. C. will be accepted "Collect."

COUNT OF GOVERNMENT MESSAGES.

8. Government messages will be counted at commercial count, address and signature free. Extra words, code signatures, etc., will be counted as in commercial messages.

CHECKS OF GOVERNMENT MESSAGES.

9. The check will show the designation "GOVT.", the number of words according to commercial count, and in the case of day letters, overnight telegrams, serial or timed wire service, the class of service designation.

10. Care should be taken to check all messages sent collect at government rates "Collect Govt." The omission of "Govt." in the check causes serious difficulties.

RATES

11. Government telegraph rates apply to official United States government business exclusively, and no private individual, association, company or corporation should in any way be benefited thereby. In cases where it becomes necessary for a government official to use the telegraph on any business in the special interest of any private person or persons, in which the government has no interest, the party for whom the service is performed will be required to pay for the messages both ways at commercial rates.

12. The this-line charges for government telegrams, day letters and overnight telegrams are 60% of the charges for the same messages at commercial rates.

13. The this-line charges for government serials and timed-wire-service messages are 80% of the charges for the same messages at commercial rates.

14. In calculating the charges on government messages, if the result shows a fraction of a cent, such fraction will be dropped if less than one-half and will be counted as an extra cent if one-half or over.

15. The following minimum charges apply to government messages between points where there are offices of the Company:

For an Intracity Telegram __________________________ $0.20
For all other Telegrams ___________________________ 0.25
For a Serial. _________________________________ 0.54
For a Timed-wire-service message _______________ 0.45
For a Day Letter _______________________________ 0.45
For an Overnight Telegram ________________________ 0.30

16. The government tolls must be computed on each separate message. It is not permissible to bill a series of government messages at commercial rates and then apply the government percentage to the total.

17. Except as indicated below, other-line charges to one-star points in the United States will be computed at sixty per cent (80%) of the commercial other-line rates at commercial count with the same minimum charges as shown in paragraph 15.

18. Exception: On government messages to one-star points in Alabama listed via York; to one-star points in Arizona listed via Holbrook; to one-star points in
Texas listed via Laredo; to points in Minnesota listed as “30-2.5 more than Square 47S, ck. Minneapolis”; to one-star points in Idaho listed via Weiser; to one-star points in Minnesota listed via Duluth; to one-star points in Georgia and North Carolina listed via Cornelia, Ga.; and to one-star points in Idaho and Montana listed via Armstead, Mont., the other-line tolls will be charged for at the full commercial other-line rate shown in the directory of stations.

10. To certain other one-star points government messages are carried by the other-line free or with a special rate. This is shown by special notation in connection with the listing of such one-star points.

20. On government messages going to two-star, three-star or four-star points the this-line rate will be at government rates, and the other-line rate will be the regular other-line rate shown in the directory of stations unless otherwise indicated in connection with the listing of the point in question.

21. In no case shall the rate charged for a government message exceed the amount charged for a commercial message of the same class of service and of the same length between the same points.

22. The rates for government messages between points in the United States and points in Canada, where there are offices of the Canadian National Telegraphs, and points in Newfoundland and Miquelon Island are shown in the table below. For rates to points in Canada other than those where there are offices of the Canadian National Telegraphs, and the other-line rates shown in the directory of stations to the rates computed from this table.

23. The rates for government messages between points in the United States and points in Alaska and Mexico are shown in the directory of stations with the listings for Alaska and Mexico respectively.

F. C. C. NO. 15
6TH REVISED TITLE PAGE
(CANCELS 5TH REVISED TITLE PAGE)
[14081] R. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
TELEGRAPH TARIFF

FOREIGN RADIO-TELEGRAPH AND WIRE-TELEGRAPH RATES

FROM

Baltimore, Md.
Boston, Mass.
Camden, N. J.
Chicago, Ill.
Detroit, Mich.
Los Angeles, Cal.

New Orleans, La.
New York, N. Y.
San Francisco, Cal.
Seattle, Wash.
Washington, D. C.

TO

All Foreign Countries (Except Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Newfoundland and St. Pierre-Miquelon), Guam, Hawaiian Islands, Midway, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and to Ships at Sea

AND FROM

Honolulu, T. H. and San Juan, P. R.

TO

All Countries, Including Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Newfoundland and St. Pierre-Miquelon and to Ships at Sea Applicable to All Classifications of Service Shown Herein and Subject to Rules and Regulations Shown Herein

Transmission by Radio-Telegraph or Wire-Telegraph or a Combination Thereof

Issuing Date: Feb. 28, 1940.
Issuing Officer: C. Sandbach, Manager Tariff Bureau, 66 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.
Effective Date: April 1, 1940 except as otherwise indicated. Original tariff effective February 1, 1936.
The sender of an Ordinary Press telegram must write before the address the indicator "PRESSE" which is counted and charged for as one word. Ordinary Press telegrams take equal rank in transmission with ordinary Full Rate and CDE telegrams.

Press telegrams may, if the sender desires, be sent as Urgent Press telegrams. The sender of such a telegram must write before the address the indicator "URGENT PRESSE" which is counted and charged for as two words. Urgent Press telegrams take equal rank in transmission with regular URGENT and CDE URGENT telegrams.

To certain countries a Deferred Press service is also available. The sender of a Deferred Press telegram must write before the address the indicator "LCPS" which is counted and charged for as one word. Deferred Press telegrams take equal rank in transmission with regular Deferred telegrams.

The supplementary services, Reply Paid (RP), Collation (TC), Notification of Delivery (PC or PCP) are not admitted in Press telegrams.

(f) Government Telegrams

Government telegrams must be properly endorsed to the effect that they are on official business of the Government in whose behalf they are sent.

The telegrams of consular agents carrying on private business are only regarded as Government telegrams when they are addressed to an official person and relate to official matters.

Government telegrams are given priority of transmission over all other classes of telegrams, except telegrams relating to safety of life at sea or in the air, unless they are filed as Deferred rate, or Radioletter rate, or unless the sender renounces the priority privilege at the time of filing.

Government telegrams are repeated back by the receiving office at each stage of their transmission.

Unless special reduced Government rates are in effect, Government telegrams are charged the Full Rate or CDE rate according to the language in which they are written.

Issuing date: April 8, 1941
Issuing Officer: C. Sandbach, Manager Tariff Bureau, 60 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.
Effective date: May 12, 1941

[14082] R. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

SECRET

TELEGRAM

Official Business—Government Rates

From: War Department
Bureau: OCSigO, Signal Intelligence Service
R. W. Minckler
R. W. MINCKLER, Lt. Col., Signal Corps

PRIORITY—SECRET

734 SIGNALS MANILA, PI.
530—FORT SHAFTER, TH.
403—PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
SEND TO WAR BY PRIORITY ENCIIPHERED RADIO ALL JAPANESE CLEAR MESSAGES ENDING WITH ENGLISH WORD QUOTE STOP UNQUOTE SPELLED REPEAT QUOTE STOP UNQUOTE SPELLED COPIED SINCE NOVEMBER TWENTYSEVEN AND HEREAFTER

COLTON, Acting.

SENT NO. 734 to Manila, 12/7
SENT NO. 530 to Hawaii, 12/7
SENT NO. 403 to Pres of S. f., 12/7


DECEMBER 7, 1941.
[14084] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request of Senator Ferguson at pages 8579–80 of the transcript we have the following communication from the Army liaison officer, dated February 21, 1946:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 21 February 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson.

At pages 8579–80 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked what the radar stations at New York City, San Francisco, and Seattle were doing on 6 and 7 December 1941, and whether they were alerted and operating 24 hours a day.

In response to Senator Ferguson's request, there are transmitted herewith:
(1) a paraphrase of a 31 January 1946 radio from the Commanding General Eastern Defense Command (Inclosure No. 1);
(2) an 8 February 1946 memorandum from the Commanding Officer of the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, Bradley Beach, New Jersey (Inclosure No. 2);
(3) an 18 February 1946 memorandum from the Headquarters First Air Force (Inclosure No. 3);
(4) a 4 February 1946 radio from the Commanding General of the Fourth Air Force (Inclosure No. 4).

Incls.—4

(Signed) HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lieutenant Colonel, GSC.

We would like to have these inclosures spread on the record at this point.

The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record.

(The inclosures referred to follow:)

[14085]

RADIO FROM COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEFENSE COMMAND TO WAR DEPARTMENT, DATED 31 JANUARY 1946

(Paraphrase)

On 6 and 7 December Twin Lights, Atlantic Highlands, N. J. (radar equipment not stated) and SCR 270 at Mount Cadillac, Maine were operated by First Interceptor Command 24 hours a day. Foregoing from 1st Air Force historical records. Officer this command, then Arty Eng Ft. Hancock, informally advises that in December SCR-268 sets operated in secret area Ft. Hancock.

ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
HEADQUARTERS, SIGNAL CORPS ENGINEERING LABORATORIES,
Bradley Beach, New Jersey, 8 February 1946.

Refer to: SPSGS-CO
Memorandum for: Major General G. L. Van Deuse, Chief, Engineering and Technical Service.

Subject: Telephone Request of Captain Carl R. Nelson.

1. These laboratories are in receipt of a request for information concerning radar operation on the dates of 6 and 7 December 1941. This information was requested by Capt. Carl R. Nelson, Legislative and Liaison Division, War Department Special Staff, Room 4D761, the Pentagon (Ext. 71470).

[14086] 2. As nearly as may be ascertained from a survey of files currently available at this organization, and from discussion with individuals who were present during December 1941, there were no radar sets in tactical operation manned by employees of Signal Corps Radar Laboratory, presently part of Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories. During the month of December 1941, there were in operation by this organization, one SCR-271 at Twin Lights, Atlantic Highlands, N. J., one SCR-271 at Atlantic City, N. J., an experimental 400 mc unit in the vicinity of Fort Hancock, plus a number of sets which were in varying stages of assembly. All of these equipments were being run only for technical observation, such as: life test of components, performance test of newly assembled equipments, and experimental work on new designs. Data from these tests would be in statistical form only and would not include dates of operation or times of day operated. Accordingly, it is not known what equipments under
control of this organization were in actual operation on the specific dates of 6 and 7 December 1941.

3. Based purely on the memory of individuals present during that period, it appears that some Radar Sets SCR-270 were in operation in Long Island by the First Signal Air Warning Company and some Radar Sets SCR-268 were in operation by Coast Artillery personnel of Fort Hancock. Since there is no organizational tie between these organizations and the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, there is no detailed information available here on location, method, or times of operation of this equipment.

4. It is requested that if you see no objection to the above it be forwarded to Capt. Nelson.

/s/ Victor A. Conrad
Victor A. Conrad,
Colonel, Signal Corps,
Commanding.

In Reply Refer To: J 413.44

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST AIR FORCE,
Mitchel Field, New York, 18 February 1946.

Subject: Photostatic Copy of Logs of Radar Sets in Operation on 6 and 7 December 1941
To: War Department Special Staff, Room 4D761, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. (Attention: Capt. C. R. Nelson)

In accordance with letter of Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command, dated 5 February 1946, above subject, to forward copies of radar logs of radar sets operating in the New York area during 6-7 December 1941, a search was made of records. An SCR-271A set was operated at sites 8A on [14087] dates in question by 1st Air Warning Company (SC) as a training measure. Existing records fail to reveal these logs. It is assumed these records were destroyed along with other confidential material due to lack of storage space and no apparent need for preservation by the New York Air Defense Wing prior to its deactivation.

For the Commanding General:

RAYNOR GAREY,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

WAR DEPARTMENT

Classified Message Center

INCOMING CLEAR MESSAGE

From: CG, 4th Air Force, San Francisco, California
To: War Department
No: 4 AF 6 E 293 4 February 1946
From Hale CG 4th AF to WDGS attn OPD Wash DC 4AF 6 E 293 ref yr WCL 43319

No radar stations were in operation in Seattle area on 6 and 7 December 1941. Stations in San Francisco area were operating during daylight hours on 6 and 7 December but only for testing and calibration in preparation for a proposed maneuver. No stations were alerted prior to 1400 7 December 1941.

End [14089] Action: OPD
Info: L & L Div
MC IN 53328 (6 Feb. 46) DTG 042335Z mec

[14090] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request of Senator Ferguson on page 9550 of the transcript for a copy of a letter written by Admiral Nimitz, then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, dated 25 November 1941, we have now been supplied by the Navy Department a copy of this letter, which we ask to have spread on the record at this point.
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.
(The letter referred to follows:)

[14091] Nav-1-MM
Confidential

November 25, 1941.

My Dear Kimmel: I am enclosing a memorandum which will give you a pretty clear picture of what we are doing in connection with Radar instruction.

This, as you know, is highly important and while we have been working at it for sometime, we have been handicapped by the inability to obtain any Radar material. That is coming along now and we are pushing these schools as fast as possible.

From a morale point of view, we felt that it would be most desirable to take radiomen second class and give them this training, but in view of your strong protest, we are endeavoring to obtain recruits having basic knowledge of electronics. The field has been pretty well combed over by Army, Navy, and British agencies and it is impossible to get men with the necessary qualifications to enlist as seamen second class. We are therefore taking them in as second class petty officers and will send them to the Fleet as first class or chief petty officers. They will be specialists in their particular line and while they will have had no previous seagoing experience, I hope they will be found satisfactory. For such specialists we are creating a new rating as specialist third class, second class, first class, or chief specialist, so as to reduce the discontent that would otherwise be felt by petty officers of long standing at sea if men who have had no seagoing experience were placed over their heads as would undoubtedly have been the case if we would send them out as radiomen first class or chief radiomen.

We are constantly keeping your needs in mind and endeavoring to do everything possible to fill up the Fleet, but we do have problems that are most difficult for solution. With the expanding Navy, our recruiting is not producing sufficient men and we have asked for language in the supplementary appropriation for 1942 and in the appropriation bill for 1943 to utilize men from Selective Service. We had to come to this, but men must be obtained and if we cannot get them by straight recruiting, we will have to go to Selective Service for they have to be produced. The Pacific Fleet, I think, is in many ways fortunate. The percentage of men is greater than in the Atlantic which, at present, is engaged in active operations, and the number of Reserves in the Atlantic Fleet is considerably greater than in the Pacific.

With kindest regards and best wishes to you, I am,

Most sincerely,

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, U. S. S. Pennsylvania,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

[14002] Mr. Morgan. In accordance with a request of Senator Lucas, at page 9917 of the transcript, with respect to a false weather message, we have a communication from the Navy liaison officer, dated February 6, 1946, which we ask be spread on the record.

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.
(The communication referred to follows:)

[14083] “Winds”

Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 6 February 1946.

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. On 4 February 1946 Senator Lucas made a query as to a false weather message (Transcript Page 9017). These were two messages intercepted on 4 and 5 December 1941 by the Federal Communications Commission at approximately 2200 GMT and 2130 GMT respectively.

2. These messages were in NCI Exhibit #65 and the full text of each can be found in the Narrative Statement, Volume II, Page 550 and Pages 573-574. Confirmation of the transmittal of these messages by the Federal Communications Commission to the Navy 20-G Watch Officer may be found in the Federal Communications Commission watch log which is Exhibit 142A in the present investigation.

/s/ John Ford Baecher,
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R.
Mr. Morgan. At page 12996 of the transcript, Congressman Murphy requested that there be incorporated in the record information concerning the organization of lend-lease. We now have a detailed letter from Chester T. Lane, Deputy Commissioner, Office of Foreign Liquidation Commission, Department of State, which we would like to have spread on the record at this point.

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.

(The letter referred to follows:)

Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner
Department of State
Washington
Room 506, 1818 "H" Street, NW

Mr. Seth W. Richardson,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Richardson: 1. This is in reply to your letter dated March 6, 1946, addressed to Mr. Benno C. Schmidt, General Counsel of this Office, requesting a statement, for insertion in the record of the Committee's proceedings, "as to the organization which was set up by this Government (i.e., the United States) for the purpose of determining what distribution should be made under lend-lease and what officials were responsible for such distribution". It is apparent from your letter that our reply may generally be limited to the method of allocating military equipment rather than the method of determining the distribution of non-military items, such as raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption.

2. On December 6, 1939, the President appointed an informal inter-departmental committee for the coordination of foreign and domestic military procurement which became known as the President's Liaison Committee. This Committee functioned as the coordinating body for all foreign military procurement in the United States until it was abolished in April 1941 after passage of the Lend-Lease Act. The membership of this Committee consisted of Rear Admiral Ray Spear, [14096] Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, representing the Navy, Major General James H. Burns, representing the Army, and Mr. Philip Young, representing the Treasury Department. All early requests for lend-lease aid were channeled through this Committee to the appropriate agency of the Government for actual procurement and transfer of defense articles.

3. On May 2, 1941, the Division of Defense Aid Reports in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President was established by Executive Order. The President appointed Major General James H. Burns as Executive Officer of the Division. The Division of Defense Aid Reports was established to provide for the effective administration of the Lend-Lease Act. This Division succeeded the President's Liaison Committee as the channel through which requests for lend-lease aid were forwarded to the procuring agencies.

4. By Executive Order dated October 28, 1941, the President established the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, and transferred to this Administration all the functions previously vested in the Division of Defense Aid Reports and most of the powers conferred on the President by the Lend-Lease Act. Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. was appointed Administrator, a position which he retained throughout the period with which this letter is concerned.

5. Military supplies transferred under the Lend-Lease Act prior to Pearl Harbor may be divided into three categories:

(a) equipment procured by the War and Navy Department with funds appropriated prior to March 11, 1941 (a limit of $1,500,000,000 was placed by the Lend-Lease Act on the value of material transferred out of this category);

(b) equipment in the possession of the Army or Navy, but procured with funds appropriated after March 11, 1941;

(c) equipment procured with funds appropriated to the President for lend-lease purposes, under U. S. contracts placed with suppliers directly in response to requests submitted by foreign governments.

Section 3 (a) (2) of the Lend-Lease Act provides that the equipment described in (a) and (b) above could be transferred to foreign governments only after
consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy. Most of the pre-Pearl Harbor lend-lease transfers were in category (a), and all transfers in that category were personally approved by the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations. Procurement of defense articles covered by (c) above, was effected by means of requests filed with one of the agencies described in [14098] paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above. After approval by one of these agencies, procurement was subject to priorities and controls established by the Office of Production Management, which operated in consultation with the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

6. There was created in the War Department by order of the Secretary of War of April 8, 1941, a Defense Aid Division of the Office of the Undersecretary. This Division was responsible for coordinating and maintaining records on the lend-lease operations of the War Department. The officers in charge of the work of this Division were Colonel Henry S. Aurand, Lt. Col. Edward E. MacMorland and Major John H. Franks. Army Air Force lend-lease activities were under the direction of Lt. Col. Benjamin Meyers. In the Navy, Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, Liaison Officer for the Secretary of the Navy on lend-lease matters, and Rear Admiral Ray Spear, Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, were chiefly concerned with lend-lease operations. The requests of the foreign governments for military supplies, which were first submitted for approval to the agencies described in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this letter, were routed to these officers in the War and Navy Departments for allocation and procurement of such supplies.

7. A special committee handled allocations of aircraft during the period under discussion, known as the Joint [14099] Aircraft Committee, with membership consisting of General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces, Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, two representatives of the Office of Production Management, a representative of the President's Liaison Committee and representatives of the British Air Commission. This Committee controlled the allocation of all aircraft production in the United States prior to Pearl Harbor. The presence of General Arnold and Admiral Towers on this Board assured that no other governments would be allocated any aircraft which in the view of our military authorities was more urgently needed by our own forces.

8. I trust that this explanation will be found to be a satisfactory description of the procedure followed in allocating lend-lease military supplies prior to December 7, 1941. The period in which you are interested was during the formative stages of these operations when the assignment machinery as it ultimately developed was not entirely in operation. However, I believe that it is evident that at all times the allocation of military supplies was subject to the approval of the high officers of the Army and Navy, and this fully safeguarded the interests of the United States Army and Navy in the distribution of valuable equipment.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Chester T. Lane,
Deputy Commissioner.

[14100] Mr. Morgan. We have a series of communications from Admiral Noyes, Mr. Sonnett, former Secretary Hull, Captain Kramer, and Captain McCollum, with respect to certain corrections they would like to have indicated in their testimony.

We would like to have these communications placed in the record at this point.

(The communications referred to follow:)

Enclosure: (A) List of Typographical Errors Found in Record of Proceedings, Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack.

In reading over my testimony I noted that I failed to bring out the following point, which, however, is supported by my previous testimony and by documentary evidence.

In connection with the alleged telephone conversation with me on 5 December to which Colonel Sadler testified and which I did not recall in that form:
On 5 December there was received by the Navy Department the message from Colonel Thorpe in Batavia addressed to General Miles in the War Department. This message was transmitted by the Naval Attaché to Navy Department for delivery to General Miles. As I have already testified, the subject matter was under discussion between me and the War Department during that day. It is very probable that I would have called Colonel Sadtler and notified him of the fact that this message had been received and was being delivered to the War Department [14102] for General Miles on account of its importance. Since discussion took place between me and the War Department during that day on the subject matter of this message and the War Department recommended that we should make no change in our original translation of the setup of the Winds Code (see previous testimony), it would appear that any possible authentic or false execute of the winds message would have also been discussed and settled during that day.

Very respectfully yours,

/s/ Leigh Noyes,
LEIGH NOYES,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Enclosure A

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY,

Memorandum for Lieut. Comdr. Baecher, USNR.


1. The following is a list of corrections to be made [14103] in the testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy:

Page 12,559—line 18: Change Bidell to Biddle.
Page 12,559—line 25: change to read, "Chief of Staff to Commander".
Page 12,560—line 15: change to read, "No, September 1944, in San Francisco."
Page 12,561—line 10: change to read, "What I do now."
Page 12,562—line 1: Witness Noyes.
Page 12,564—lines 13, 14: strike out, "Who acted in my place" insert "or".
Page 12,568—line 18: change to read, "they could not decipher the diplomatic traffic and send it all to Honolulu."
Page 12,571—lines 13, 14: strike out, "or by ML the important ones."
Page 12,571—line 14: "inkling."
Page 12,580—line 12: change "words" to "worries."
Page 12,581—line 19: change to read, "knew what the rules were." 
Page 12,586—lines 20, 21: change to read, "Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff to the Commanding General."
Page 12,589—lines 21, 22: change to read, "Naval Communications."
Page 12,589—lines 20: change to read, "several booklets and the Chief of Naval Communications."

[14104] Page 12,588—line 7: change to read, "I do now."
Page 12,603—line 9: change "mine" to "mind."
Page 12,614—line 6: change "present" to "presented."
Page 12,615—line 9: change to read, "Safford said."
Page 12,625—line 19: change to read, "I believe a reference to forty-six words."
Page 12,643—line 14: change to read, "and it was some time after I got back."
Page 12,656—line 15: change to read, "information to the Naval Attaches."
Page 12,657—line 24: change to read, "At the time when Italy came into the war, which."
Page 12,658—line 14: change "by" to "but."
Page 12,699—line 21: change "warning" to "morning."
Page 12,710—line 6: change "technical" to "tactical."
Page 12,711—line 21: change "Canada" to "Japanese."
Page 12,729—line 1: strike out, "and I supposed the record was supposed to bear on subsequent events".
Page 12,735—line 23: change "execute" to "setup."

Enclosure B.

/s/ Leigh Noyes,
LEIGH NOYES,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.

1Adm. Noyes' testimony appears in Hearings, Part 10, pp. 4710-4792.
Assistant Attorney General,  
Washington, February 27, 1946.

Seth W. Richardson, Esquire  
General Counsel for the Joint Committee on the Investigation  
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Richardson: The Navy Department has made available to me Volumes 66 and 67 of the transcript before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, which contain my testimony along with the testimony of various other witnesses.

In examining the transcript of my testimony I have noted a number of minor typographical and grammatical errors, which I have indicated on the transcript, and respectfully request be corrected.

Very truly yours,  
/s/ John Sonnett.  
John F. Sonnent.

Enclosure A.

The following is a list of corrections to be made in the testimony of John F. Sonnett:

Page 13,330—line 25—add "of Justice" after "Department"  
Page 13,331—line 6—add "a" after "was"  
Page 13,331—line 17—change "investigate" to "review"  
Page 13,331—line 20—add "and in general" after "tion"  
Page 13,331—line 22—change "was was" to "as might be"  
Page 13,332—line 5—change "1941" to "1945"  
Page 13,332—line 16—add "in the Navy" after "where"  
Page 13,333—line 13—change "at tempt" to "attempt"  
Page 13,334—line 16—change "t en" to "then"  
Page 13,335—line 6—change "is" to "was"  
Page 13,335—line 6—add "This was in" after "crazy."  
Page 13,335—line 7—add "and" after "document"  
Page 13,336—line 20—change "Navy" to "Navy,"  
Page 13,337—line 6—change "ation," to "ations,"  
Page 13,337—line 13—change "S. Correa" to "F. Correa"  
Page 13,338—line 9—change "civil" to "civilian"  
Page 13,338—line 13—change "civil" to "civilian"  
Page 13,338—line 10—change "be" to "be,"  
Page 13,339—line 9—change "the Navy" to "Naval matters"  
Page 13,339—line 11—strike out "which I have mentioned"  
Page 13,368—line 3—strike out "which"

Page 13,386—line 4—change "so were set" to "and were so set"  
Page 13,389—line 25—change "Reports" to "Report"

Enclosure B

Cordell Hull  
Wardman Park, Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Richardson: It will be appreciated if you will cause the following corrections to be made in my testimony as it appears in the transcript of the Pearl Harbor hearings:

Volume 9, page 1360  
Line 5: "Explore" should read "expose".  
Line 8: "Money" should read "cotton".

Volume 9, page 1470  
Line 9: Omit "and for 90 days".

Volume 10, page 1594  
In reference to the first sentence of my reply to the Vice Chairman's question I find, upon careful rechecking of the time, that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor occurred at 1:20 p.m., Washington time, so that the telephone message from the White House must have occurred shortly after 1:20, at which time the appointment to see the Japanese Ambassador had already been postponed upon the Ambassador's request to 1:45 p.m.

2 Mr. Sonnett's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 10, pp. 5009-5027.
Volume 10, page 1612

In reference to Senator Lucas' question beginning at line 5, to which I replied, "No," I had in mind the question whether the Army Board had conferred orally with me on this point. As to correspondence, the Secretary of War in a letter [14109] dated September 14, 1944, reciting that it was at the instance of the Army Board, asked me as to the truth or falsity of an allegation that an ultimatum had been delivered to Japan on November 26, 1941. I replied in a letter dated September 28, 1944, stating that my communication to the Japanese representatives on November 26 was in no sense an ultimatum. I added that if I could further assist the Board in its investigation I would be glad to do so. The correspondence was made public by the State Department on August 30, 1945.

Volume 10, page 1614

Line 4: Enclose in quotation marks, "poor, innocent, peace-minded".

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Cordell Hull

The Honorable Seth W. Richardson,

General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States.

Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 11 March 1946.

Memorandum to: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. Forwarded herewith is a letter of Captain Alwin D. Kramer, U. S. Navy, requesting corrections in the reporter's transcript of his testimony before the Joint Committee.

/s/ John Ford Breecher,

John Ford Breecher,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 8 Mar. 1946.

Mr. Seth W. Richardson,
Chief Counsel, Congressional Committee Investigating the Attack on Pearl Harbor,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir: At the request of the reporters, I have checked the transcript of my testimony before the Congressional Committee, [14111] and request that the corrections listed on the attached pages be made in the record.

Very respectfully,

/s/ A. D. Kramer

A. D. Kramer,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

Italics indicates error or omission.

Volume 55, of 6 February 1946

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Line</th>
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<tr>
<td>10432</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>After &quot;San Diego in&quot; add &quot;1935 and&quot;.</td>
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<tr>
<td>433</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>&quot;area&quot; should be &quot;Arear&quot;.</td>
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<td>435</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>should read &quot;known as OP-20-GZ, OP-20-G being&quot; etc.</td>
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<td>436</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>should read &quot;until 9 or 10 or 11&quot; etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>441</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;knowledge of&quot;</td>
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<td>444</td>
<td>4 &amp; 5</td>
<td>Word after .&quot;indicating&quot; should be &quot;punctuation.&quot; Text should therefore read: &quot;three letter code groups, indicating punctuation of various kinds.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>445</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>&quot;stronger in language&quot;.</td>
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1 Mr. Hull's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 2, pp. 463-467, 551-560, and 605-615.
2 Captain Kramer's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 8, pp. 3893-3927; and Part 9, pp. 3930-4221.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

450 8 “believe at”.
451 20 After “folder” add “, i.e. (close quotes).
454 21 Should read: “features required in handling”.
462 17 Should read “heading only, and to”.
464 22 Should read “this code message, because”.

[14113] 467 17 “between “him, Mr. Hull”, etc.
470 10 “about to leave”.
20 Change to “plain language Japanese message,”
21 Change to “that carried”.
471 9 & 10 Should read “(blank) country, (name to be inserted) was in accordance with expectations”.
11 Should read “yeoman the sense”.
10472 6 Change “days” to “months”.
477 20 Insert comma after “interruptions”.
478 22 Change “quarters” to “country”.
484 20 Should read “supplements to that, four or five in.”
488 8 Change “Russian” to “Russia”.
489 22 Comma after “before”.
490 23 Read “there was effected at about”.
1098 20 Read “message of 7 December”.
510 13 Read “the GY section for”.
513 14 Read “Yes, sir, if I can finish, etc.

Volume 56, of 7 February 1946

10524 8 Change “text” to “technique”.
12 Read “cancelled”.
526 17 Read “so indicated”.
536 3 Read “machine. My presumption.”
552 24 Read “called for by”.
553 4 Read “execute”

[14113] 555 5 Read “reference to England. Things more emphatic” etc.
7 Read “been. That is the scheme” etc.
10 Read “Thailand with Japan. We knew” etc.
558 17 “This”.
18 Read “indication”.
21 Comma after “Germans”.
508 6 “Romaji.”
572 9 Comma after “messages”.
583 25 “alone”.
584 6 Read “running to 12 and 15 feet in length”, etc.
16 Read “news broadcast”.
10605 25 Should read “originating an encoded or enciphered message”, etc.
608 23 Should read “in a Division of Naval Operations” etc.
611 13 “subsist out” should be quoted.
613 5 Read “from Alusia, Batavia”.
625 25 Should read “riji yori no tugoo aru ni tiuki”.
627 7 Read “the code indicator “STOF””.
635 19 Read “call KANA Morse,” etc.
654 5 & 6 Read “intercept net and” etc.

[14114] 660 7 Read “designated as J-12, in my” etc.
586 16 & 17 Read “messages 901 to 919”.
589 8 Put the word “beginning” in quotes.
593 11 Should read “That is, presumably other codes intended for distribution.”
602 7 Read “The JD number” etc.
664 10 Read “which I might characterize” etc.
690 9 Read “impression on that point.”
694 22 Should read “Captain Kramer: That is” etc.
706 25 Omit comma.
710 5 Read “particularly certain” etc.
716 19 Omit “must as”.
10728 16 “shirts” should read “shifts”.
730 14 Should read “broadcast, one of”, etc.
731 9 Read “impression of irritation” etc.
733 24 Change “should” to “shall”.
735 2 Read “number for” etc.
4 Read “last night, and there” etc.
736 2 & 3 Read “during the war in interrogation”, etc.
7 & 8 Read “corresponds in Japan to our Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the months preceding Pearl Harbor.”
743 12 Add “of the” at end of line.
746 21 Read “inserted”.
747 17 Insert comma after “down”.
748 6 Omit “and now” to read “at the time presumed”.
755 25 Change “was” to “were”.
775 20 Change “day” to “say”.
789 2 Change to “negotiations, but” etc.

[14115] 780 12 Read “other than that I knew that the Naval” etc.
794 3 Read “approximately 8:15,” etc.
509 3 Change “sited” to “sighted”.
5 Read “contact with it, special” etc.
800 25 Read “Intelligence, deals, perhaps 90 percent is more accurate, is of any-
810 2 thing but a positive nature.”
814 20 Change “At” to “—was the arrival” etc.
816 12 Change “he” to “we”.
837 3 Change “no” to “not”.
837 13 Read “Pearl Harbor at” etc.
838 14 Extend answer to read: “I did, yes, sir, but the matter of the time of
crew’s mess, and of the number of ship’s personnel above or below
decks were simply part of the factors in my mind when I was re-
marking on 7:30 Sunday morning being the quietest time of the
week. These factors were not stated, however, in my present best
recollection.”
844 2 Read “refresh my memory on that point. I do not” etc.
847 7 Change “characters” to “character”.
848 20 Change “hearings” to “hearing”.
875 2 Read “the Japanese word ‘KORYAKU’, which means” etc.
18 Read “Alusna, Batavia”.

[14116] 877 24 Omit comma after “at least”.
879 18 Change “Javorach” to “Jabberwock”.
888 17, 18 & 19 Should read: “translation of the Japanese version, which,
in the light of seeing the work sheet just a few days ago I believe reads: NIHON TO TO NO KANKEI
KITAI NI HAN SU”.
904 12 Read “through 1941, the only” etc.
907 13 Expand to read: “Yes, sir, the original letter.”
912 17 Read “made by me only”.
919 22 Insert comma after “questions”.
927 6, 7, & 9 Change “Wilkinson” to “Kimmel” on these 3 lines.
931 14 Read “and no reply to it”.
937 4 Read “impose on any friendships” etc.
22 Read “what I already had. Not to” etc.

Volume 58, of 9 February 1946

10060 3 Read “Greenwich Mean Time, yes, sir”.
961 19 Read “Those trips, however,” etc.
984 7 Change “confirmation” to “consummation”.
10 Change “know” to “knew”.
990 23 Read “between about 8:15 and 9:30, at” etc.
996 23 Read “Pearl Harbor than” etc.
997 2 & 3 Read “with Admiral Kimmel’s request” etc.
9 Read “hoped that it would not be” etc.
11006 25 Read “numerous”.

Volume 57, of 8 February 1946
010 8 Read "gotten up to it", etc.
012 17 Read "Have no information" etc.
013 2 Read "him only rarely" etc.
18 Read "understanding" etc.
016 11 Read "Thank you. I hope I don't" etc.

Note: The following corrections on pages 11,020 and 11,021 apply to the page numbers as corrected by the Official Reporters in their note of 10 Feb. 1946.

11020 2 Read "Communications. When" etc.
021 5 Read "—by the watch officer" etc.
027 25 Read "A." "On receipt of" etc.
031 9 Read "who presumably would get it".
20 & 21 Read "East Wind, Rain" meaning United States;
"West Wind, Clear" meaning England;
"North Wind, Cloudy" meaning Russia.

051 10 & 11 Change capital to small "I" in the word "Investigation" on both lines.

11052 8 & 9 Read "It was only, incidentally, in" etc.
053 12 Read "and which was subsequently" etc.
077 22 Read "by comparison with days" etc.
078 21 Read "amounted to perhaps 100 feet" etc.
097 22 & 23 The statement: "Senator Barkley informed me of that proposal" should appear as a remark of Senator Brewster rather than of the Vice Chairman.

[11/18] 008 14 & 15 Insert to read "Yes, using the touch system. I have never" etc.

8 Read "Colonel Bales" etc.

Volume 59, of 11 February 1946

11117 10 & 11 Read "classified papers, reading from this: (brown wrapping paper)", originated etc.
119 18 Read "the questions".
121 19 Read "I therefore feel it" etc.
127 8 Read "before that hearing" etc.
129 4 Read "Will show him these later".
131 22 Read "for the past month because" etc.
23 Read "they consist" etc.

133 8, 9, 10, 11 Rearrange to read: "these papers from mid-day 1944 to this moment, other than to glance at the headings or first paragraphs of each on certain days and times last December" etc.

134 22 Read "It was her I was about" etc.
137 22 Read "teletype. Station 2 was" etc.
24 Read "by Army and retained" etc.
138 5 Read "except possibly Christmas" etc.
142 4 Read "for periods varying" etc.
147 20 Read "I most certainly" etc.

160 12 to 17 Repunctuate to read: "I recollect that this was interpreted, I am uncertain of the precise wording of the interpretation, this was considered [11/19] and I believe it was approximately my consideration at the time, as being an attempt" etc.

11160 23 Read "Diplomatic posts were" etc.
25 Read "were usually pared," etc.

165 6 to 9 Read "the Japanese shoehorned, if I may use that term, military men into the delegation conducting those negotiations. The Ambassador, or Special Envoy, as I recall it, was named Yoshizawa."

165 17 Read "in Panama and in all parts of" etc.

170 6 & 7 Read "who, when I was speaking to him, was about ten or fifteen feet away from the conference table, and just outside the closed door of the room, Mr. Hull's office, where the three secretaries were conferring."
Memorandum

Joint of your transcript as subject. There are forwarded as enclosures A and B, respectively, a letter from Captain A. H. McCallum, U. S. N., requesting that certain typographical and grammatical errors be corrected in the transcript of his testimony before the Joint Committee and a list of the items by page and line number.

/s/ John Ford Baecher

John Ford Baecher
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

U. S. S. Helena (CA 75),
Fleet Post Office, New York City, N. Y., March 18, 1946.

The Honorable Alben W. Barkley,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

My Dear Senator: I have but recently had the opportunity of reading over the transcript of the testimony I gave on January 30, 1946, before your committee investigating the Japanese attack on our Fleet at Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, 1941. In reading over the transcript of the record furnished me, I find what appear to be either clerical errors and omissions or errors due to lack of clarity of expression on my part. There are not many of these, and in the interests of clarity and precision I venture to suggest that, subject to the Committee’s pleasure, I may be permitted to correct my testimony as transcribed in accordance with particulars listed on a separate page.
May I again express to you and to the Committee my appreciation for the thoughtful consideration and courtesy shown me during my testimony before you. Respectfully,

/s/ A. H. McCollum,

A. H. McCollum,¹

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

Enclosure A

U. S. S. HELENA (CA 75)

SUGGESTED CORRECTIONS TO TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN A. H. M'COLLUM, USN

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Enclosure B

¹Capt. McCollum’s testimony appears in Hearings, Part 8, pp. 3381–3408.
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record at this point. (The communication referred to follows:)

Memorandum To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
Subject: Time Table of Japanese Attacks—source of material.
Reference:
(a) My memorandum to Mr. William D. Mitchell, dated 20 Nov. 1945.
(b) My memorandum to Mr. Seth W. Richardson, file 1083A (HLB) H#112, dated 22 Jan. 1946.
(c) My memorandum to Mr. Seth W. Richardson, file 1083A (HLB), H#112, dated 24 Jan. 1946.

1. In response to the oral request of 28 March 1946 from Counsel for more specific data as to the information and sources of information which were heretofore forwarded in reference (a) at the request of Mr. William D. Mitchell, in reference (b) at the request of Senator Brewster (Record of Proceedings, page 7625) and in reference (c) at the request of Congressman Keefe, concerning the times of attacks by the Japanese on various places in the Pacific Ocean areas, the information, supplemented as requested, is restated and summarized for purposes of clarity as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Local time</th>
<th>Greenwich time</th>
<th>Washington time</th>
<th>Source of information</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kanso, NAS</td>
<td>7:50 am, 7th...</td>
<td>6:20 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>1:20 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>War Diary of Commandant 14th Naval District.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>7:55 am, 7th...</td>
<td>6:25 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>1:25 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>Report by Admiral Nimitz dated 15 Feb. 1942 of the attack at Pearl Harbor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3:00 am, 8th...</td>
<td>8:00 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>3:00 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>Statement by Captain John M. Creighton, U. S. N., who was at Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khotan Baru</td>
<td>3:40 pm, 8th...</td>
<td>8:40 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>3:40 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>This information obtained by oral inquiry of the War Department, Col. McNall, USA, G-2 MIS File.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daegu Golf, P.</td>
<td>7:10 am, 8th...</td>
<td>11:10 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>6:10 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>War Diary of U. S. S. Wm. B. Preston.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>9:10 am, 8th...</td>
<td>11:10 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>6:10 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>War Diary of Cmtd. U. S. Marine Corps, dated 31 March 1942.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>8:00 am, 8th...</td>
<td>Midnight, 7-8th</td>
<td>7:00 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>This information obtained by oral inquiry of the War Department, Major R. E. Guest, USA, G-3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wake</td>
<td>12:00 noon, 8th...</td>
<td>1:00 am, 8th...</td>
<td>8:00 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>Report of Cmtd. U. S. Marine Corps, dated 31 March 1942.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark Field</td>
<td>9:27 am, 8th...</td>
<td>1:27 am, 8th...</td>
<td>8:25 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>This information obtained by oral inquiry of the War Department.</td>
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<td>Midway</td>
<td>9:30 pm, 7th...</td>
<td>9:20 am, 8th...</td>
<td>4:30 am, 8th...</td>
<td>Log of the Coast Guard Cutter WALT-NUT.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nichols Field (Manila)</td>
<td>3:00 am, 9th...</td>
<td>7:00 pm, 8th...</td>
<td>2:00 pm, 8th...</td>
<td>Report of 16th Naval District Intelligence Officer, file 40207.</td>
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</table>

(sgd) John Ford Baecher

Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

Mr. Morgan. At this point, I would like to read a portion of a memorandum supplied by the War Department, dated January 14, 1946, as follows:

Reference is made to Mr. Mitchell's memorandum of 31 December 1946 forwarding Senator Ferguson's request for any records showing who was in charge of the offices of the Chief of Staff and of General Gerow on the night of 6 December 1941.

General Gerow indicated to the Committee that as of 6 December 1941 War Plans Division had an arrangement whereby a duty officer was designated for the 24-hour period and, though not required to remain at the office throughout the night, was required to stay within calling distance of a telephone (Tr 4320-1). The Office of the Secretary General Staff maintained a similar duty officer arrangement for the Chief of Staff. A thorough search has been made for the duty rosters of War Plans Division and of the Office of the Secretary General Staff for the period including 6-7 December 1941. Those rosters have not been located and apparently it was not the practice to preserve such rosters.
Pursuant to a request made by counsel we have a communication from the War Department dated 21 February 1946 setting forth the authority under which Lieutenant Colonel Clausen administered oaths during the course of his investigation. We would like to have this letter spread on the record.

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.

(The letter referred to follows:)

[14131] Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

With reference to your inquiry concerning Lt. Colonel Clausen's authority to administer oaths during the investigation which he conducted at the direction of the Secretary of War, your attention is invited to U. S. Code, Title 10, Section 1586 (Article of War 114), reading as follows:

1586. Authority to administer oaths (article 114).

Any officer of any component of the Army of the United States on active duty in Federal service commissioned in or assigned or detailed to duty with the Judge Advocate General's Department, any staff Judge advocate or acting staff Judge advocate, the President of a general or special court-martial, any summary court-martial, the trial judge advocate or any assistant trial judge advocate of a general or special court-martial, the president or the recorder of a court of inquiry or of a military board, any officer designated to take a deposition, any officer detailed to conduct an investigation, and the adjutant, assistant adjutant or personnel adjutant of any command shall have power to administer oaths for the purposes of the administration of military justice and for other purposes of military administration; and shall also have the general power of a notary public in the administration [14132] of oaths, the execution and acknowledgment of legal instruments, the attestation of documents and all other forms of notarial acts to be executed by persons subject to military law; Provided, That no fee of any character shall be paid to any officer mentioned in this section for the performance of any notarial act herein authorized (as amended Dec. 14, 1942, ch. 730, 56 Stat. 1050).

(sgd) Harmon Duncome,

Lt. Colonel, GSC.

[14133] Mr. Morgan. At various places in the transcript, particularly at pages 5484 and 11853–11854, information has been set forth concerning the air situation in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war. We have received a communication from the War Department dated February 1, 1946, enclosing additional material in this regard, and we would request that this letter and the enclosures be spread on the record.

The Vice Chairman. The material will be spread on the record.

(The material referred to follows:)

[14134] Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Three memoranda have been submitted by this office in response to requests by Committee members for information concerning the air situation in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war. The first, dated 27 December 1945, forwarded an account of the initial Japanese air attack against the Philippines contained in the Army Air Force narrative entitled "Army Air Forces in the War Against Japan 1941-1942". A second memorandum of the same date transmitted the available information on (a) the total number of planes in the Philippines on 7 December 1941, (b) the number of bombers at Clark Field when the Japanese first attacked, and (c) the number of bombers lost at Clark Field in that attack. The third memorandum, sent to you on 30 January,
forwarded material from the War Department files with regard to Japanese air reconnaissance over the Philippines and other U. S. possessions in the Pacific prior to 7 December 1941.

Transmitted herewith is further information from the War Department files relating to the initial Japanese [14135] attack against the Philippines. Inclosure No. 1 consists of photostats of documents on which the account of the Japanese attack contained in "Army Air Forces in the War Against Japan" was based. Inclosure No. 2 is a memorandum concerning the command organization of the United States Army Forces in the Far East and the Far East Air Force as of 7 December 1941.

/s/ HARMON DUNCONE, Lt. Colonel, GSC.

Incls.—2.

[14136]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS

FAR EAST AIR FORCES

APO 925

HISTORY OF THE FIFTH AIR FORCE (AND ITS PREDECESSORS)

PART I, DECEMBER 1941 TO AUGUST 1942

December, 1941, Instalment

INVENTORY SHEET accompanying package bearing Message Center Registration No. H43.

3. Note: Narrative to which these appendices are transmitted is sent by photomail, title: Narrative, History of the Fifth Air Force, (and its Predecessors), Part I, December, 1941-August, 1942, December, 1941, Instalment.

[14137]

DESIGNATION SHEET

(Official designation, including number of unit and of each echelon in chain of command)

AIR FORCE: FAR EAST AIR FORCES
COMMAND: 
WING: 
GROUP: 
SQUADRON: 
AREA: 
BATTALION: 
CENTER: 
COMPANY: 
DEPOT: 
DETACHMENT: 
DISTRICT: 
DIVISION: 
PLATOON: 
REGIMENT: 
REGION: 
SCHOOL: 
SECTION: 
UNIT: 
ETC.: 

Has Security Classification of material been checked? YES.
EXPLANATORY NOTE TO HISTORY OF THE FIFTH AIR FORCE, PART I, DECEMBER 1941 TO AUGUST (DEC. 1941 INSTALMENT).

This document and its appendices purport to represent only a portion of the story of aerial operations in the Southwest Pacific Theater for December 1941. It incorporates such information as was found during the period of its preparation—namely between January 1944 and June 1944—in the files of Hq. Far East Air Forces (which were the files of Hq. Fifth Air Force until 15 June 1944), Hq. U. S. Army Air Forces in the Far East, and Hq. G. H. Q., S. W. P. A., augmented by personal interviews with several persons who were present in the theater in December 1941. It is expected several additional statements from persons in the latter category will still be obtained at A. P. O. 925.

According to information obtained during the preparation of these documents, and from other sources, the following additional sources of information exist in the U. S.:

1. The office of the Adj. Gen., G. H. Q., S. W. P. A., states that a number of records from the Philippines were transmitted to the War Dept., Washington in October 1942.
2. An oral report states a report on the modification of the P-40E was sent from the Philippines to Washington.
3. Operations reports and unit casualty reports sent from the Philippines to Washington.

4. At the Fighter Command School (later the Army Air Forces School of Applied Tactics), Orlando, Fla., some detailed transcripts of statements by returned pilots, including those of a combat pilot's round table, were taken during the summer, fall and winter of 1942. These included a statement by Lt. Col. Boyd D. ("Buzz") Wagner. The latter also supplied a statement to the A-2 and A-3 offices of Hq., Army Air Forces, Washington.
6. General Eugene L. Eubank, Commanding General of Army Air Forces Board, Orlando, Fla. He was commander of the 19th Bombardment Group in the Philippines.
9. Various members of 19th Bombardment Group in the U. S.

Additionally is Major General Lewis H. Brereton who was commanding General, Far East Air Force, in the Philippines.

HISTORY OF THE FIFTH AIR FORCE (AND ITS PREDECESSORS)

PART I DECEMBER 1941 TO AUGUST 1942

DECEMBER 1941, INSTALMENT

Narrative

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<td>Far East Air Force Dispositions, Dec. 7, 1941</td>
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Maps and charts

Appendix I

Documents

Appendix II
Section I—The Far East Air Force

When the month of December, 1941, opened in the Philippines the Far East Air Force was under the command of Major General Lewis H. Brereton. Units were fully alert. Due to the tense international situation, from November 15¹ "all pursuit aircraft were fully loaded, armed and on constant alert 24 hours each day with pilots available on 30 minutes notice".² Throughout the Air Force intensive training was in progress and a number of newly arrived units were being integrated into the Air Force. Despite this fact, the Far East Air Force had but small forces to meet the attack which was about to be launched.

Organization and Equipment of the Far East Air Force

In the Philippines the Far East Air Force was itself a new organization. The name had undergone two recent changes. The first change had followed the creation of the United States Army Forces in the Far East. Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur had assumed command of USAFFE on July 27, 1941.² Following this he had redesignated on August 4, 1941 the Philippine Department Air Force as the Air Forces, United States Army Forces in the Far East.³ This operated "directly under the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, except for routine administration and supply, which will continue through Headquarters, Philippine Department".⁴ At this date the Commanding General of the Air Forces was Brigadier General Henry B. Clagett, who had arrived in the Philippines on May 4, 1941. Subsequently, on October 7, 1941 (West Longitude Time), the War Department designated Major General Lewis H. Brereton as the air commander.² He brought with him a number of officers, including a new Chief of Staff, Colonel Francis M. Brady. The War Department, on October 28, 1941. (West Longitude Time) redesignated the Air Force as the Far East Air Force. This redesignation became effective on November 16, 1941.⁵

Staff of the Far East Air Force

With the arrival of General Brereton, his staff was organized as follows: (Table I, P. 2).

(Footnotes in original.)

¹ In this narrative all time is given as Philippine Department Standard Time and all dates are East Longitude unless otherwise indicated.
² History of the 24th Pursuit Group in the Philippines (Document I, Appendix II). This document is from Fifth Air Force Files, and is dated October 10, 1942. Lieutenant Colonel Allison W. Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau, and Colonel L. A. Diller, Public Relations, GHQ, SW7A, both state that this history was written by Colonel Orrin L. Grover, who was the Comm. of the 24th Pursuit Gp. in the Philippines.
³ G. O. No. 1, United States Army Forces in the Far East, July 27, 1941.
⁴ G. O. No. 4, USAFFE, Aug. 4, 1941 (Doc. 2, App. II).
⁵ G. O. No. 4, USAFFE, Aug. 4, 1941 (Doc. 2, App. II).
⁶ Chronology of the Fifth Air Force, War Department, Washington, D. C.
⁷ G. O. No. 28, USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3, App. II).
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<td>Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton</td>
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<td><strong>CHIEF OF STAFF</strong></td>
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<td>Col. Francis M. Brady</td>
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<td><strong>GENERAL STAFF</strong></td>
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<td>Maj. Charles H. Caldwell</td>
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<td><strong>SPECIAL STAFF</strong></td>
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<td>Capt. L. Mason</td>
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<td><strong>Adj. Gen.</strong></td>
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<td>Capt. J. R. Mamerow</td>
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<td>Lt. Col. McConathy</td>
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<td>Capt. H. O. Porter</td>
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<td><strong>LINE UNITS</strong></td>
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<td>Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Bomb Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Bomb Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Bomb Group (part of ground echelon only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2d Observation Sq.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5th Interceptor Command</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Henry B. Clagett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Harold H. George</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Far East Air Service Command</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Lawrence Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive, Lt. Col. Maitland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>24 Pursuit Group</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philippine Air Depot</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Air Base Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Air Base Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Air Base Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>805 Eng Bn. (Arm.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Components of the Far East Air Force

Next in chain of command in the Far East Air Force were the Fifth Interceptor Command, Fifth Bomber Command, and Far East Air Service Command. The Fifth Interceptor Command was commanded by Brigadier General Henry B. Clagett, with Colonel Harold H. George as Chief of Staff. The authority for activation of this unit in the Philippines has not been found, but it is listed as operating on December 8, 1941, in the document tracing the chain of command of the Far East Air Force, which is in the USAFFE. The Fifth Interceptor Command also appears on the movement order to Bataan (Doc. 23), and in subsequent General Orders of USAFFE. In the first available strength report this unit is shown as having five officers and fifteen enlisted men.

The Fifth Bomber Command and Far East Air Service Command were activated on November 16, the same day as the creation of the Far East Air Force. Lieutenant Colonel Eugene L. Eubank, also the commander of the 19th Bombardment Group, became the commander of the Fifth Bomber Command. This was only a skeleton unit, and although authorized full Table of Organization strength, had only one officer and twenty enlisted men on December 23. The Far East Air Service Command, under Colonel L. S. Churchill, had eight officers and sixty enlisted men.

Pursuit Units

The pursuit units in the Philippines consisted of the five squadrons of the 24th Pursuit Group, commanded by Major Orrin L. Grover. This unit was an outgrowth of the Fourth Composite Group, which at the start of 1941 had as its components all of the tactical air units in the Philippines. The three pursuit squadrons in this group, the 3rd, 17th, and 20th, were all equipped with P-26's until May, 1941. At that time they were re-equipped with F-55's. Next, in July 1941, one squadron was equipped with P-40B's, and still later, P-40E's were received. On September 16, 1941, the 24th Pursuit Group was activated and the three pursuit squadrons transferred to it from the Fourth Composite Group. In November, two additional squadrons, the 21st and 34th, arrived from the United States. They were a part of the 35th Pursuit Group, but pending the arrival of the rest of its units, were attached to the 24th Pursuit Group.

Training of Pursuit Pilots

In the summer of 1941 "100 new pilots from training schools" in the United States arrived and were used to build up the three original pursuit squadrons to strength. Because these pilots had not received combat training a training unit was formed at Clark Field. In addition it was necessary to train these pilots in gunnery, so a gunnery training camp was established at Iba. In October 35 more new pilots were assigned to the pursuit units and the same program of

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8 REAF Chain of Command. (Doc. 4, App. II.)
9 (Doc. 5, App. II.)
10 GO No. 40, USAFFE, Mar. 14, 1942 (Doc. 6, App. II).
11 Movement Order to Bataan (Doc. 5, App. II). It should be noted that Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron of the Fifth Interceptor Command was under movement orders from the United States when war started. It had been activated from the Second Interceptor Command (under WD letter, 14 October, 1941, AG 820, 2 (10–1–41) MR*M*AAF "Constitution and Activation of Air Corps Units"). Under command of Lieutenant Colonel Willis R. Taylor, this unit, with eight radar sets sailed from San Francisco at 1800 on December 6, 1941 (San Francisco Time) on the Tasker H. Bliss. This ship put back into port on December 6 (San Francisco Time) and the Hq. and Hq. Sq., Fifth Interceptor Command debarked and returned to Seattle. History of the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, II Interceptor Command, II Fighter Command and V Fighter Command. May 1941–December 1942. By Major Edward J. McCormick, Jr., pp. 10–15. This history also states that the 357th Signal AW Battalion, also under orders to proceed to the Philippines, was in the Port of Embarkation at the time, but was also ordered back to Seattle.
12 G. O. No. 28, USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3, App. II.)
13 (Doc. 5, App. II.)
14 (Doc. 5, App. II.)
16 History of 24 Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II.)
17 G. O. No. 10, USAFFE, Sept. 16, 1941 (Doc. 7, App. II.)
18 History of 24 Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II.)
training was started with them. At the gunnery camp at Iba "an extreme amount of difficulty was experienced in the malfunctioning of the guns, due to improper adjustment and mal-installation. In order to properly function it was imperative that all gun installations should be modified."

Bombardment Units

In the fall of 1941, the 19th Bombardment Group (H), with B-17's arrived in the Philippines. This group was commanded by Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank. Prior to its arrival the bombers in the Philippines had been B-10s and B-18's, which were not suitable for combat. These planes had been assigned to the 28th Bombardment Squadron of the Fourth Composite Group. With the arrival of the 19th Bombardment Group the 28th Bombardment Squadron was transferred to the 19th Bombardment Group, re-equipped with B-17s and redesignated from medium to heavy on November 16, 1941. This gave the 19th Bombardment Group a headquarters squadron and a total of four instead of three subordinate squadrons. The group had a grand total of 35 B-17s.

On November 20 the 27th Bombardment Group (D) arrived in the Philippines. This unit was commanded by Major John H. Davies. All of its aircraft (A-20s) were on a later convoy, which was on the high seas at the time war broke out, and had to be diverted to Brisbane, Australia. The non-arrival of the dive bombers left the bombardment component of the FEAF unbalanced, there being no unit specially adapted for use against shipping.

Also in the Philippines was part of the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment Group (H). On December 7 (West Longitude) part of the air echelon, flying from California landed at Pearl Harbor; but none of the air echelon reached the Philippines.

Observation

With the transfer of all units except the 2nd Observation Squadron from the 4th Composite Group, Headquarters squadron of this group was abolished on November 16 and the 2nd Observation Squadron was thus placed directly under Headquarters, FEAF. The squadron was equipped with observation type aircraft and was commanded by Captain J. Y. Parker.

Airdromes

At the start of 1941 there were three major military airfields in the Philippines, Clark Field, near Ft. Stotsenburg about 60 miles north of Manila, and Nielson and Nichols Fields on the outskirts of Manila. These were all extended during 1941. Because of the shortage of suitable fields some had to be used even while under constructions, which increased the accident rate among the pursuit.

[144] By December 1, the following fields were in use, or rapidly nearing completion: (For location see C. I. U. Map, Chart 1, App. I).

Pursuit Fields:
- Nichols Field
- Nielson Field
- Clark Field
- Iba Field
- Rosales Field
- Del Carmen Field

Bombardment Fields:
- Clark Field
- Del Monte Field, Mindanao

Fields Nearing Completion:
- O'Donnel Field
- San Fernando Field
- Ternate Field
- San Marcelino

23 GO, 28 USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3—App. II).
24 Statement of Colonel Ray T. Eisma (Doc. 30a, App. II) and Statement of Colonel Ray T. Eisma.
25 GO, 28 USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3, App. II).
26 FEAF Chain of Command (Doc. 4, App. II).
29 Statement of Colonel Harold Eads (Doc. 3, App. II).
In addition to the fields listed as nearing completion a more extensive air-drome construction program had been started in Luzon, but had not reached a point where it affected the situation prior to evacuation to Bataan. The fields provided did not allow for sufficient dispersion, nor for sufficient mobility of the air force. This was a cause of concern to General Brereton.

South of Luzon, Del Monte in Mindanao was in use as already indicated. Santa Barbara on Panay, and Cebu, Cebu, together with a few other fields in Mindanao were also used after war started. (See Chart 1, App. I).

Co-Ordinated With Other Commands

It was recognized that any defense of the Far East would demand the closest coordination with the British, Dutch, and Australians. Much of the work to this end was carried out by military staff missions of foreign governments in Washington in consultation with the War Department and does not fall within the limits of this narrative. However, a considerable amount of planning was carried on through direct consultation. In the early summer of 1941 General Clagett received instructions to proceed to Singapore and China, where he carried on a number of conferences.

[1417]

Still later, General Brereton, went through the Dutch East Indies, the Australian Mandates, and Australia. He held a number of conferences, concerning the improvement of ferry-routes to the Philippines, and the arrangement of routes for ferrying pursuit aircraft from Australia via Koepang, Kendari, Sandakan, Balikpapan, Tarakan, Del Monte (in Mindanao) and Santa Barbara (on Panay). Before the start of the war supplies of bombs and gasoline had already been sent into Rabaul, Port Moresby, and Darwin. Arrangements were also under way to land such stocks to Singapore and Balikpapan, but the war came first. Also General Brereton arranged future plans for staff coordination with the Australians and the Dutch, which paved the way for later developments. Among the most far-sighted of his arrangements was the development of Projects 1 and 2, which envisioned the use of Australian maintenance facilities, and called for considerable expenditures. These plans were left with Sir Charles Burnett, Chief of The Australian Air Staff in Melbourne. Some work was in progress when the war started. This was then speeded up and proved capable of meeting many of the actual requirements of the situation which developed early in December.

Air warning system and communications

The development of the Air Warning System in the Philippines was based primarily on a system of native observers. These reported in over the lines of the Philippine Telephone System to Interceptor Headquarters at Neilson. Data was then reported to the plotting board at Clark Field and based on it, orders were issued to the various squadrons. Commercial lines of the Philippine Telephone Company were all that existed for receiving reports. Delays were frequent. Clark, Neilson, and Nichols Fields were linked by teletype, and this circuit, supplemented by telephone when necessary, was used for direct communication. The third means of communication was radio, the major fields, each having an SCR 207 which was used for both point to point and ground to air communication.

In addition to the ground observer system the first radar had been installed in the Philippines at Iba. A second was being assembled near Aparri, and a third was enroute to Legaspi. The set at Iba was in tactical use, and operated on a 24 hours per day basis.

Antiaircraft Artillery

Next to the inadequacy of the Air Warning System, was the shortage of AAA. General Brereton in March 1942, stated that before he left Washington in 1941, 21 Radio, General Brereton to General Arnold (Doc. 9, App. II) and History 25 Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II).
23 Radio, General Brereton to General Arnold, March 9, 1942 (Doc. 9, App. II).
24 Annual Report of the Chief of Staff 1941-1942 (War Department), p. —. [No page number in original].
25 Lt. Col. Allison W. Ind (Bataan) (Mss). This book, as an unofficial source, is used only for material where the author was a direct participant, and where the subject discussed falls within his field of military specialty, which is Intelligence. In this case, for example he went on the trip with General Clagett. Permission for use in this official history has been granted by Lt. Col. Ind.
26 Ind, Bataan (Mss), p. 196 ff.
27 Colonel Merle-Smith to General Clagett, Dec. 24, 1941 (Doc. 12, App. II).
he declared that—"To put a bomber force in the Philippine Islands without providing adequate anti-aircraft defense measures was almost certain to mean their destruction." 39 Also General Brereton mentioned the inadequate fighter protection and inadequate air warning system. The amount of anti-aircraft was inadequate. The one anti-aircraft regiment at the airfields was the 200th CA (AA) Regt., a mobile unit of one battalion of 3" and 1 battalion of 37mm guns. This unit was stationed at Clark Field. The remaining anti-aircraft regiment was the 60th CA with units on Bataan and the harbor forts in Manila Bay.40 The remaining airdromes were protected by only a few 50 caliber and 30 caliber machine guns. These offered but slight protection.

[14148]

Japanese Strength

Intelligence estimates showed that the Japanese had overwhelming strength, in comparison with the Far East Air Force equipment in the Philippines. In the R. A. A. F. the air order of battle was given as follows:

Table II.—Japanese air strength, Dec. 8th, 1941

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Air Arm</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. and Cen. China</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandated Is</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil inc. Canton Hainan, Formosa</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total first line strength                                2,860

While this estimate is from Australian sources, similar figures had been made available to General Brereton and his staff when they were in Australia on Nov. 21-23 (40a). Royal Air Force figures for this date placed the size of the Japanese Air Force as around 4,500 aircraft of front line strength, which is now generally accepted as correct.41 The RAAF and RAF figures are cited at this point because no estimates from the War Department, Washington, for the period December 8, 1941, are available here (APO 925).

The estimates shown above indicate that from the Japanese bases in Southern Formosa (430 to 450 miles north of Clark Field) it was possible to throw vastly superior formations against the Philippines. It was also possible for the enemy to increase this superiority by the use of carriers. Finally, the southernmost islands of the Philippines were within range of Japanese air units based on Palau. (Chart VII, App. I).

In the field of Intelligence the Japanese knew the disposition of our units, the location of important stores, the capabilities of our planes. They had excellent maps of the entire area, and objective folders on the important targets. Within the Philippines many of the large Japanese minority were organized as Sakkhadistas, a fifth column under the orders of Japan. In addition to transmitting information, this group even lighted flares at night to designate important targets. In some of the islands in the Far East, the Japanese withdrew their nationals prior to the outbreak of the war. In the Philippines they organized them. Our counter-espionage system was inadequate to cope with this organization; and the security measures around our installations were not great enough to prevent observation of the equipment and installations.

39 Brereton to Arnold, March 1, 1942. (This was actually written over a week earlier)—(Doc. 9, App. II).

40 Lt. Col. Melnik, AAA in Philippines (Dec. 24, App. II). It should be noted that a training program for Filipino AAA was in progress at Fort Wint. The organization of the Filipino Units was in progress and a number of regiments were scheduled to be trained by March, 1942. Equipment was being supplied from the U. S. From this equipment, after war was declared two additional regiments were organized: the 200th Provisional CA (AA) which came in part from the parent 200th, was moved to Nichols Field and areas of Manila on the night of December 8th. It was functioning by December 10th and was equipped with 12-3" and 12-37mm AAA guns, as well as some 50 caliber which were placed at Nichols Field and at the port area on the night of December 8th. Also the 51st CA (AA) was organized and used after war began. It does not appear to have operated on air fields.

41 Central Operational Intelligence Center, Situation Report (now under GHQ SWPA), Dec. 12th, 1941.

42 Figure from Enemy Appreciation Section, Allied Air Forces, A-2, SWPA (S/L Feltham).

43 Ind. (Bataan) (Mss), p. 246 ff.
One of the available estimates of the situation of our forces in the Philippines at the end of November, 1941, was contained in a general intelligence summary used by the Tanaka Force. An exact extract of this document (to which are added translations reports the FEAF as consisting of:

**Unit** | **Type**
--- | ---
24th Kuchiku Sentai (Pursuit Group) | P-35.
3rd Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) | P-36.
17th Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) | P-38.
20th Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) | P-40.
24th Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) | 27 planes at Nichols Field above types included.
19th Bakugeki Sentai (Bombardment Group) 1st Chutai of Kuchiku | P-38 or P-40.
14th Bakugeki Chutai B-17 | 12 planes.
28th Bakugaki Chutai B-18 | 13 planes.
36th Bakugeki Chutai (Type of plane unknown). 2nd Teisatsu Chutai (Reconnaissance Squadron) 0-19, 0-46, 0-47, 0-57. 19 Teisatsu Chutai unknown.

The information above is essentially accurate, as comparison with the following table of our dispositions will show. The chief mistake is in listing part of the pursuit as components of the 19th Bombardment Group and not listing two of the squadron numbers in the 19th Bombardment Group. Also aircraft types are listed which were not in the Philippines. About December 1, the summary was shown by the Japanese to include:

| **Fighters** | 130 |
| **Bombers** | 30 |
| **Naval Patrol** | 20 |
| **Total** | 180 |

This is also substantially correct, if it is assumed that observation be included under fighters. The fact is that this information is more accurate than that sent to the Australians by their Washington sources following the outbreak of war. The Japanese figure is closer to the number of operational aircraft, whereas those of the Australian Attache included obsolete planes to a greater extent, and also those not in commission.

**FEAF Disposition on Dec. 7, 1941**

In opposition to the Japanese Army and Navy Air Services, our dispositions on the eve of war were as follows: (See Chart II, App. I.)

**Table III.—Status and Location of Aircraft**

| C. O. | Unit | Location | Type | Number operat.
|---|---|---|---|---
| Major O. L. Grover | 24 Pur Grp. | Clark | P-40-E. | 18
| Lt. W. B. Putman | Hq. and Hq. Sq. | Iba | P-40-E. | 18
| 1st Lt. Boyd Wagner | 17th Pur. | Clark | P-40 | 18
| 1st Lt. J. B. Moore | 20th Pur. | Del Carmen | P-35 | 18
| 1st Lt. Sam Marette | 21st Pur. | Nichols | P-40-E | 18
| 1st Lt. W. E. Dyess | 34th Pur. | | | 90

This table has been compiled from the History 24 Pur. Grp. (Doc. I) and Journal 19 Bomb Grp. (Doc. I, App. II). Gen. Marshall in his Biennial Report gives the number of P-40s as 107. The discrepancy is due to the fact that Table III above, is of planes operational on Dec. 5th, and excludes planes not erected or out of commission.

There is some question as to who were the commanders of the 21st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons. In G. O. No. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Dec. 18, App. II), 1st Lt. Sam Marette is given as commander of the 34th Sq. rather than the 21st. The Battalion Roster of the 24th Pursuit Group (Doc. 27, App. II), also gives this as the status of the command, and gives 1st Lt. Wm. E. Dyless as the commander of the 21st Sq. In this narrative, however, the History of the 24th Pursuit Group has been followed.

1 Compare the Japanese "No. 3, The Situation of Both Sides Prior to War", ATIS, Current Translations, No. 46 with COIC SITREP for the period after December 8, and through December 30, 1941. Further, the Australian Naval Attache in Washington reported to his government on Dec. 12, that the 52 A-24's were operational in the Philippines (Doc. 13, App. II). Actually these aircraft were unloaded at Brisbane on December 22. Twelve of them were eventually ready for the Java campaign.
The total of Far East Air Force personnel in the Philippines on December 8th was about 8,000 of the total of U. S. Army personnel of 19,000.\(^44\)

\[1451\] Of this air force total, approximately 7,500 was in Luzon. Of the personnel in Luzon, some 1,200 belonged to the 27th Bombardment Group (D) which had no aircraft. Also that part of the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment Group (H) which had reached the Philippines was awaiting the arrival of the air echelon. The 500 air force personnel outside Luzon were scattered throughout a number of bases with the largest concentration at Del Monte, Mindanao. The Philippine Army Air Force had about 1,200.\(^45\) Total air force personnel was therefore around 9,200 including the Philippine Army Air Force.

Events Prior to War

Starting on December 2, the Japanese began a series of night and early morning reconnaissances missions over Clark Field. The plane appeared at 0530 each morning, was sighted visually, and also tracked by the radar at Iba. Following the first sighting "instructions were given to force the aircraft to land or destroy it. On the three succeeding nights it was impossible to make the interception, due to inability to see the aircraft in the dark, or the aircraft not getting close enough to be picked up by the searchlights.” Accordingly, it was agreed that the AAA would have its turn on the night of December 7th. But on that night no plane came over.\(^46\)

December 8th, 1941

December 8th was the first day of war in the Philippines. Being east of the International Date Line, this was the same as December 7th at Pearl Harbor. Also due to this further distance to the east, it was still dark in the Philippines when the attack on Pearl Harbor came. First news of this attack was flashed to all units upon receipt of the report at 0830.\(^47\) The official USAFFE warning was sent out at about 0430. Word was also received at 0630 at the bomber base at Del Monte.\(^48\) War had begun.\(^49\)

\(^{44}\) Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff War Department, p. 10. Gen. Marshall’s report gives the figure as 8,000. This is in agreement with the rosters and reports in Documents 5, 8, 14, 15 and 30a (App. I).


\(^{47}\) Ibid. This news was by commercial radio and no official action was taken except to order units to stations. The official warning was received by the pursuit units at 0445.

\(^{48}\) The message received at Del Monte stated "Hostilities have commenced, govern yourself accordingly." (Interview with Colonel Fry) (Doc. 8, App. II.) Message received at 0630 hrs, according to Major Heald, Communications Officer. He remembers the message as; “Hostilities have begun. All airdromes alert.” (Doc. 17, App. II.)

Pursuit Operations\textsuperscript{46}

[14152] Prior to receipt of official word that war had begun, the radar at Iba reported a large formation over the China Sea headed in the direction of Corregidor. Accordingly the 3rd Pursuit, stationed at Iba, was ordered to intercept. It proceeded to the heading given in its mission order, and the radar plot showed a successful interception. At this date, however, altitude could not be read from the radar. Actually the P-40's did not see the bombers in the darkness. Therefore they returned to their base for refueling. (Chart III, App. I).

The next development occurred at 0930, with the reporting of a large formation over the Lingayen Gulf headed for Manila. The orders issued from intercept headquarters, where Major Grover and Colonel George were operating, called for the 20th Pursuit Squadron to proceed north from Clark Field and intercept in the vicinity of Rosales. Meanwhile the 17th Pursuit Squadron was sent from Nichols to patrol Clark Field and intercept any planes which might pass the 20th. But the Japs were only feinting. From Lingayen Gulf the Japs did not proceed south. Instead, they swung inland directly past, and hit the army installations at Bagnie which was also the summer capital of the Philippines. They also hit airfields at Cabanatuan. At the time of the alert at Clark Field, the B-17's were ordered up, so they might not be caught on the ground. They landed again, however, at 1130, their landing being covered by the 20th Pursuit Squadron. (Chart III, App. I).

The last two moves on the part of the Japanese had run two squadrons out of gas and thus limited the number of squadrons which would be available for the main raids. In this they were successful. At 1130 the 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field was being regassed. The B-17's were back at Clark Field; the 17th Pursuit Squadron was being gassed at Nichols. The scene was set for the main strike. (Chart IV, App. I).

There was not long to wait. At 1130 the Iba radar reported a large formation over the China Sea. For the second time during the day the 3rd Pursuit Squadron at Iba was ordered to intercept. It immediately took off, although apparently eight planes were left on the field. Again, in this attempted interception the Japanese were to show one of their tricks. Taking advantage of the limited gasoline supplies of the P-40, the incoming bomber formation feinted and then withdrew. This type of tactics had also been used in China, but for the first time United States air units came in contact with such tactics. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron remained in the air, with its gasoline steadily diminishing.

Believing that interception might not be made by the 3rd Squadron and fearing a direct thrust at Manila and the installations there, the two squadrons on Nichols Field were both sent off, the 17th Squadron to take station over Bataan, while the 34th Squadron was placed on standing patrol over the city of Manila proper. (Chart IV, App. I).

The next report came in at approximately 1145 of an unidentified formation "over Lingayen Gulf, headed south". This raised a new problem and the situation was met by ordering the 21st Pursuit off Del Carmen to cover Clark Field. At the time the 20th, still regassing at Clark Field was ordered up as soon as refueling was completed. But no planes reached Clark Field prior to the attack. Dust on the field at Del Carmen delayed the take off of the P-35's. The first planes of the 21st Squadron which taxied out raised such a cloud that it was necessary to wait for the cloud to settle. The delay was so great that planes of the 21st Squadron did not reach Clark Field until after the Japanese attack was completed. (Chart IV, App. I). At this juncture communications broke down and no further reports were received at Clark Field or Neilson Field concerning the incoming Japanese bomber formation. At 1215 the 20th Pursuit Squadron on Clark Field completed gassing, and the planes started to take off. Four were off the ground and five more were in process of taking off, while five more were on the ground. At either 1217 or 1220 the first Jap planes arrived. There were 54 to 72 bombers in a very shallow V of Vs and above 18,000' which bombeded with accuracy.\textsuperscript{47} These were followed by a number of dive bombers [14153] and fighters which came in to strafe.\textsuperscript{48} The five planes of the 20th Pursuit Squadron which were in process of taking off and the five which were

\textsuperscript{46} This account follows History 24 Pur. Grp. (Doc. 1, App. II).

\textsuperscript{47} "Sallys" predominated in the early attacks over the Philippines and probably constituted the bulk of this formation.

\textsuperscript{48} These were "Zekes" and possibly "Nates."
still on the ground were all destroyed. The four in the air, led by the squadron commander, Lt. J. H. Moore, went into combat at low altitude and shot down four of the attacking planes. The bomber formation laid a pattern which destroyed most of the hangars and buildings, as well as most of the B-17s and B-18s on the field. The dive bombers (probably Vals) then came in strafing and set fire to most of the planes which were in the blast pens. One of the first bombs made a direct hit on the radio station on the field, so that it was impossible to contact the 17th and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, still on patrol over the area of Manila and Bataan. Finally another radio did make contact with the 17th Pursuit Squadron, but it arrived over Clark Field seventy miles to the north of Bataan, after all enemy planes had withdrawn; the 21st also arrived from Del Carmen after the attack was completed. By this time the 17th Pursuit Squadron was running short of gasoline, so it landed at Del Carmen. (Chart IV, App. I.)

In the absence of effective interception, the defence of Clark Field was left to the AAA. The field was defended by the 200th CA (AAA). Also a number of air corps crew members heroically went to their planes during the attack and fired the machine guns in the grounded aircraft at the attacking strafers. For outstanding heroism in such action, the Distinguished Service Cross was awarded to the following: Pfc. Joseph G. McLoy, T/Sgt. Anthony Holub and Pfc. Greely B. Williams (posthumously). When the hangar in which his plane was located was set on fire, 1st Lt. Fred T. Crimmins of the 19th Bombardment Group taxied his plane into the open, only to have it destroyed by enemy strafing, he being hit and wounded.

Also, despite the continuous attacks on Clark Field many risked the strafing to help the casualties. Among others, several examples will be mentioned. Private Robert J. Endres secured an abandoned truck and through the midst of the bombing and strafing made seven trips between the field and the station hospital, on each trip carrying a load of wounded. The 19th Bombardment Group Flight Surgeon, Maj. Luther C. Heidger, stayed in the open during the attack to treat the wounded. The Chaplain, 1st Lt. Joseph F. LaFleur administered religious rites to the wounded and dying throughout the attack, and helped to treat the wounded. All of these were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Meanwhile, as the 3rd Pursuit Squadron was running low on gasoline, it turned back toward Iba. There it found the formation which it had been unable to intercept. Fifty-four bombers and an unknown number of strafers were attacking the field. Despite being low on gasoline the P-40’s pressed home the attack. They arrived too late to prevent the bombing, but did prevent strafing. Casualties on the field were, however, heavy. All of the installations, including the radar, were destroyed. Five P-40’s were shot down in the air, and eight planes on the ground were destroyed. In addition, it being impossible to land on the field, three P-40’s ran out of gasoline and crash landed on the beach. The remainder of the formation landed at O’Donnell Field. Gasoline and ammunition was dispatched from stores remaining at Clark Field to supply these planes. (Chart IV, App. I.)

Employment of Bombardment

Information on the employment of the bombardment planes still on Clark Field is not complete. One B-17 took off at 1030 for reconnaissance of Eastern Luzon. All that is authoritative concerning the remaining bombardment planes is that at the time of the alert at 0030 “all bombardment was dispatched from Clark Field. The 20th Pursuit Squadron returned to Clark Field and gave the

[14154]
bombardment cover while they were landing." Thus, at 1130, all except the B-17 which was still on reconnaissance over Eastern Luzon, and the twelve aircraft at Del Monte, were on Clark Field.

Of the total of 22 B-17 aircraft on Clark Field at the time of the Japanese attack, fifteen were destroyed. Two or three of those on the field escaped damage and were operational the following day. An additional three or four were repaired and made operational later.

The one B-17 to encounter enemy action in the air on December 8, was a plane which left Del Monte at 0630 for repairs at Clark Field. This plane was piloted by Lt. E. E. Tash. It arrived over Clark Field while the field was under attack, and immediately started back for Del Monte. Three enemy pursuit attacked, and the rear gunner, S/Sgt. Michael Bibin, was severely wounded in both shoulders. The first news of what was taking place to the north reached Del Monte at 1700 when Carpenter called over his radio as he came in to land, "Have been exposed to enemy, have ambulance ready." One Zero was believed shot down.

Summary of Raids on Clark Field and IBA

In these two raids the Japanese had effectively destroyed the striking power of the Far East Air Force, had seriously cut down the pursuit strength, had destroyed most of the maintenance facilities for the B-17's, and had inflicted a number of casualties. Our forces had been on the alert. They had not been caught as at Pearl Harbor, with planes not loaded. But the damage inflicted was great.

Before the conclusion of the first twenty-four hours of the war in the Philippines, one more attack was launched by the Japanese—against Nichols Field and its installations. By Midnight telephonic communication was reestablished from Nelson Field to the plotting board at Clark Field and operation of the air warning system was resumed. Shortly after midnight one flight of the 17th Pursuit Squadron was dispatched to intercept an enemy formation. The dust at Del Carmen again hindered the takeoff and one pilot was killed. The remaining four aircraft did not find the enemy formation in the dark, so no interception was accomplished. Some time later, at 0315 a large enemy force appeared over Nichols Field.

The first Japanese aircraft to be shot down during the war is officially credited to 2nd Lt. Randall D. Kentor of the 80th Pursuit Squadron, stationed on Clark Field. Taking off while the field was under attack, Lt. Kentor's plane was attacked by nine Japanese aircraft. Despite this disadvantage he shot down one of these. Later, during the general combat over Clark Field he shot down another, making his score for the day two.

[14155]

Air Situation on December 9th

At the close of the first day's campaign under constant enemy attack, the Far East Air Force was badly mauled. Costly losses in men and equipment had been sustained. Over a third of the pursuit were lost, while more were out of commission. Of B-17s, the operational aircraft had been reduced from 33 to 15 or 16. Moreover, the planes lost were irreplaceable. Wake Island was under attack, which cut the ferry route for B-17s which had been flown in from Hawaii. The destruction of naval forces at Pearl Harbor ended the chance that convoys might bring in pursuit directly. Finally the destruction of hangars, depot facilities, and parts indicated that maintenance constituted a major problem; but the nearest place with even partial facilities was Australia.

Reorganization

During the night the high command of the Far East Air Force reorganized the tactical units. Lt. Wagner's squadron, the 17th, was transferred to Clark Field.

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69 History 2d Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II). There was a staff meeting of FEAF at the Headquarters at Nelson Field, which was attended by Captain Harold Eads and Captain Allison Jr. and others. General Brehon also went to GHQ. This is stated by Captain Eads. Statement of Colonel Eads (Doc. 10, App. II). GHQ, SWPA, records contain no information on the matter. A letter has been written through channels, Hq. AAF, Washington, requesting Gen. Brehon for any information but no reply has been received, cf. Reg. 30503, FEAF. Registered on 22 April 1944.

60 Journal 19 Bomb Gp. (Doc. 11, App. II).

61 Interview with Colonel Fry (Doc. 8, App. II).

62 G. O. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II).

73716—46—pt. 11—15
and brought to strength by transferring airplanes from the 3rd Pursuit. The rest of the 3rd was absorbed into the 34th at Nichols Field. As already noted, the third had practically been wiped out at Iba. It no longer functioned as a separate squadron from this date. At the same time the ground crews were attempting to repair the pursuit planes, and the B-17s at Clark Field which had not burned. The reaction of ground personnel to the bombing had been good on the whole although some had taken to the hills and did not drift in until night. Most were working feverishly to salvage planes and parts. Gun crews had stuck to their posts.

On December 9th the bombardment squadrons at Del Monte were employed as follows: One plane went on reconnaissance of the Davao Area, and then went up to Luzon, landing on the airstrip at San Marcelino. The plane was damaged by fire of our ground forces while landing. At 1430 seven other aircraft took off from Del Monte for San Marcelino, and also were fired on by our ground forces while landing, but no damage resulted. Six aircraft took off on a reconnaissance mission for Catanedans Islands, off Southern Luzon, found no enemy action, and then flew into Clark Field at 1430 to be prepared for a mission the next day. Immediately upon landing they took off because of air raid alarm, and landed after dark. From Clark Field, at 0800, one plane attempted the reconnaissance mission to Formosa, but turned back because of engine trouble, and then stayed up until after dark to avoid enemy attack on the field.

On the night of December 9/10, reports were received of a large enemy convoy off Vigan and another off Aparri. It was accordingly planned to hit them with all the available air power on the following day.

[14156]

SECRET

HISTORY

OF

30TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (I)

19TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (II)

PERIOD COVERING

DECEMBER 7TH, 1941 TO DECEMBER 31ST, 1942

[14157] On the morning of 8 December 1941 (Philippine Time), word of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was flashed to members of the 30th Bomb Squadron, then stationed at Clark Field, Manila.

Major David R. Gibbs, the 30th’s Commanding Officer, immediately ordered all crews to report to the flight line, and upon the disposal of preliminary preparations, the Squadron’s B-17s, geared for action, took to the air.

Ground crews likewise were on the alert, for the Japs were expected to attack Clark Field within the next 20 minutes, according to reports received by the 30th, and everything was considered in readiness to repel the enemy when he struck.

For more than 3 hours, the 30th’s planes circled Mt. Aryat, flying in and out of cloud banks, soaring over the plains of Luzon, unsuccessfully seeking traces of the enemy. At approximately noon, Major Gibbs ordered the planes to land, and as they did, they were dispersed around Clark Field. Some crews were requested to stand by their ships, with the remainder instructed to obtain a hasty meal and report to Group Headquarters for briefing.

Shortly thereafter—about 12.30 p.m.—came the Japs! A low, whistling noise, resembling wind through the trees, grew louder and louder with devastating crescendo, and a deafening explosion rocked Clark Field, signalizing the beginning of the attack. Blast after blast shattered the earth and nearly everything upon it. The initial Jap formation of 54 bombers unloosed tons and tons of high explosives, following with merciless strafing.

The entire attack lasted about 40 minutes, with casualties heavy, the field torn and wrecked, and only one or two of the 30th’s B-17s remaining for service. Brilliant, individual deeds of heroism characterized the efforts of officers and enlisted personnel, but they could not stem the Japs in their relentless assault.

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64 Colonel Ind’s Bataan Mss., pp. 260 ff.
Follow-up attacks were naturally expected, and that evening, Major Gibbs moved the 30th from the barracks on Clark Field, establishing headquarters on a small knoll in a cane field about a mile and one-half away. It was shortly thereafter that Major Gibbs, on a mission in a B-18, did not return, and the Squadron lost the first of its several war-time commanding officers.

[14158]

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS 3RD AIR FORCE
Office of the Commanding General
Tampa, Florida

Lt. Col. LUCIUS P. ORDWAY
A-2 Section Army Air Force, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL:
In closed is a summary of operations in the Southwest Pacific Area as I saw them. After reading over the interview which is on file there in Washington, it appeared to be a good idea to clarify and add to the report. The form admittedly is not so good, but in general includes everything that I could remember that might be of interest.

Sincerely,

W. P. FISHER
W. P. Fisher
Major, Air Corps Asst. G-3

[14159]

SECRET

REPORT OF PHILIPPINE AND JAVA OPERATIONS

By W. P. Fisher, Major, Air Corps

I was assigned as a flight commander in a provisional squadron of nine combat and maintenance crews, equipped with 9 B-17D Airplanes, which was formed at Hickam Field, Hawaii, in August of 1941. This was composed of personnel and equipment drawn from the two tactical groups stationed there. Training of this provisional squadron was carried out until the first of September at which time it was designated as the Fourteenth Heavy Bombardment Squadron and the ground component of the Fourteenth added to the combat echelon. The air echelon left Hickam Field on September 5th with orders transferring it to Clark Field in the Philippine Islands. The first stop was made at Midway Island. The flight remained overnight continuing on to Wake Island the following day. The departure from Wake Island to Port Moresby, New Guinea, was made about midnight the following night under conditions of radio silence, arriving at the destination the following afternoon. After a one-day lay over for maintenance, the squadron continued on to Darwin, Australia. Another day's lay over was made there for maintenance and awaiting weather information before the final hop to Clark Field in the Philippines. This was the first squadron of B-17's to arrive in the Philippines. Following arrival at Clark Field, we immediately began intensive unit tactical training in high altitude formation flying, navigation, bombing, and gunnery. Missions at this time were scheduled from 20,000 to 30,000 feet.

About a month after our arrival, the 19th Group stationed at Albuquerque, New Mexico, was transferred to the Philippine Department and, following the same route, arrived about the middle of October with two combat and one Headquarters Squadron and equipped with 25 B-17D Airplanes. Following arrival of the air and ground echelons of the 19th Group, all Philippine Bombardment units were consolidated into the 19th Group. The organization then consisted of the 30th, 83rd, 14th, and 28th combat squadrons and a Headquarters Squadron. All airplanes and equipment were evenly divided among them, giving 8 B-17's to each combat squadron and 3 in the Headquarters Squadron. At this time, I was relieved from assignment to the 14th Squadron and given command of the 28th Squadron which had been stationed at Clark Field prior to our arrival.
By the first of December the international situation was quite grave and reconnaissance patrols were being run by both ourselves and the Japanese between Formosa and Luzon. Visual contact by the aircraft had been made several times. At about this time, the air echelon of the 93rd and 14th squadrons, consisting of the combat crews, some maintenance men, and all airplanes were sent to Del Monte on the island of Mindanao, our alternate Heavy Bombardment Base; the 28th, 30th and Headquarters squadrons remaining at Clark field. This was the situation that existed on December 7, when the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred. The training of the entire group was at a high state; all personnel was experienced and our equipment in good condition.

The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred about 3:00 O'clock the morning of the 8th, Philippine time. The report of the attack was received first, of course, by radio news broadcast and all personnel were aware of it by dawn or shortly thereafter. All airplanes at Clark Field had been dispersed and in revetments for some time prior to this and the entire group was prepared to perform missions at any time. While awaiting orders, the first air warning was received about 3:00 o'clock that a formation of enemy bombers was proceeding in the direction of Clark Field. Immediately all flyable airplanes were taken off and flown away from the vicinity of the field to avoid their destruction. Several warnings were received during the morning of enemy formations but no attacks were made on Clark Field. At about 11:00 o'clock, we were all called back in as no further enemy aircraft were reported. After landing, orders were received to attack Air Bases on Southern Formosa at dusk. Preparations for this mission were being made when at about 12:30 a formation of 54 Heavy Japanese Bombers was seen approaching the field. No warning had been received from our radio locator stations of any enemy aircraft in the vicinity, so our entire strength of aircraft was caught on the ground in their dispersed positions with the exception of one B-17 on patrol. It was later found that all communications to Clark Field had been cut by saboteurs and radio communications jammed by radio interference. The formation had been detected by the radio locators, but they were unable to get warning to Clark Field.

Numerous zigzag trenches approximately 2' wide and 5' deep had been constructed by Colonel Maitland, the base Commander, in previous months in the vicinity of the hangars and working area. Also additional trenches had been constructed near the dispersed positions of the airplanes. Upon sighting the approaching formation, warning was given and most of the personnel were able to take cover in these trenches. There was approximately 5 minutes between the time the formation was first seen and the attack on Clark Field. The attack was made diagonally across the quarters and hangar area by two formations of 27 Heavy Bombers. Each 27 plane formation was in the form of a giant Vee. The bombs used in the attack varied from 100 # bombs down to smaller fragmentation bombs and were dropped in train covering the field from the quarters area through the hangar and shop area. I estimate that approximately 500 bombs were dropped in this attack. Following the bombing attack, a formation of 18 fighters came in, individually attacking the dispersed B-17's and other aircraft with machine guns and cannon fire. This attack lasted approximately 40 minutes. Very few airplanes had been destroyed by the bombing attack which was conducted from approximately 23,000' but all air planes were completely destroyed or filled with bullet holes by the fighter attack. During this attack approximately 6 P-40's of the squadron stationed at Clark Field were able to get off and engage the attacking fighters. The 200th Coast Artillery (an anti-aircraft regiment) was in position to defend Clark Field and also took the fighters under fire with 30 cal., 50 cal., and 37 mm. gun fire. The damage to Clark Field from this attack was great as the hangars, shore, supply buildings, and other installations were struck by bombs and numerous fires started. Personnel casualties were approximately 100 men and officers killed and 200 wounded. Nearly all of the casualties were persons who were taken by surprise and were unable to take cover in the trenches which had been provided. The Japanese intelligence apparently had been complete as they had attacked only the tactical airplanes and installations.

Operations were begun immediately and missions carried out against enemy surface vessels and convoys by the two squadrons stationed at Del Monte. Japanese landings were made at Aparri, Legaspi and Vigan and were successful. These landings were made from a small number of transports accompanied by surface vessels and under the protection of gun fire from the vessels. . . .
Subject: Activity of the 24th Pursuit Group in the Philippines.

On or about November 1, 1940, the 4th Composite Group in the Philippine Islands was reinforced by the 17th Pursuit Squadron of the 1st Pursuit Group, commanded by K. J. Gregg, Major, Air Corps, and the 20th Pursuit Squadron of the 35th Pursuit Group, commanded by OL Grover, Captain, Air Corps. At this time, the 4th Composite Group commanded by L. S. Churchill, Colonel, Air Corps, was based at Nichols Field. It consisted of the 28th Bombardment Squadron detached at Clark Field, the 2nd Observation Squadron detached at Clark Field, and the following Squadrons at Nichols Field: Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 3rd Pursuit Squadron, 17th Pursuit Squadron and 20th Pursuit Squadron, all equipped with obsolete P-26 type aircraft. During the month of May, 1941, Colonel Churchill assumed command of Nichols Field, and K. J. Gregg, Major, Air Corps, assumed command of the 4th Composite Group. The 28th Bombardment Squadron and the 2nd Observation Squadron were assigned to Clark Field.

In May, 1941, the Group was re-equipped with P-35 type aircraft destined for Sweden, but diverted to the Philippine Islands. During July, 1941, due to the conditions at Nichols Field, i.e. east-west runway undergoing construction, and north-south runway being unusable due to lack of drainage, the 4th Composite Group (less 17th Pursuit Squadron) was transferred to Clark Field. The 17th Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Iba to undergo gunnery training at that station. During the month of July, 1941, one Squadron was re-equipped with P-40B type aircraft, the other squadrons still being equipped with P-35s. At the same time, one hundred new pilots arrived from the training school in the States, and were assigned to the Group. It became necessary to train these pilots. A training unit was instigated at Clark Field and pursuit training was given. On or about August 1, Major Gregg was transferred to the F. E. A. F., and O. L. Grover, Major, Air Corps, assumed command of the Group. During September the 17th Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Nichols Field and the 3rd Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Iba for gunnery training. This movement was necessary in order to make room for contemplated bombardment reinforcements at Clark Field. Nichols Field's construction was not complete and was not satisfactory for operations. These conditions occasioned a high accident rate for the 17th Squadron.

On October 1, 1941, the 4th Composite Group, less 3rd, 17th and 20th Squadrons was transferred to Clark Field and the 24th Pursuit Group was activated at Clark Field. The 24th Pursuit Group consisted of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 3rd Pursuit Squadron, 17th Pursuit Squadron and 20th Pursuit Squadron. During the month of October, 35 new pilots just graduated from the training schools in the States arrived and were assigned, bringing the Group to full T/O officers' strength. It was necessary to train these pilots for duty in combat units.

During the month of November, 1941, the 21st Pursuit Squadron and the 34th Pursuit Squadron arrived from the United States. They were part of the 35th Pursuit Group. They were attached to the 24th Pursuit Group for duty and administration pending the arrival of the remainder of their Group. On December 1, 1941, the Pursuit units were as follows:


b. 3rd Pursuit Squadron, Iba, commanded by Lieutenant H. G. Thorne, equipped with P-40Es.

c. 17th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Boyd D. Wagner, equipped with P-40Es.
d. 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant J. H. Moore, equipped with P-40Bs.

c. 21st Pursuit Squadron at Del Carmen, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Sam Marrett, equipped with P-35s.

f. 34th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant W. E. Dyess, partially equipped with P-40Es.

Airdromes available to pursuit were: Nichols Field, Nielson Field, Clark Field, Iba, Rosales, Del Carmen; under construction O'Donnel, San Fernando, Ternate. Other commercial fields in the Islands were unsuitable for fully loaded pursuit aircraft.

Communications for aircraft warning: The aircraft warning system consisted of native air watches, who relayed their reports over the telephone to the 5th Interceptor Headquarters at Neilson. The reports were then relayed via teletype to the plotting board at Clark Field. One R. D. F. set was installed at Iba, one set in process of installation 60 miles west of Aparri and the third set was en route to Legsapi for installation. Delay in time for the relaying of messages due to telephone communications was from five to twenty-five minutes.

From November 15, due to the tense international situation, all pursuit aircraft were fully loaded, armed and on constant alert 24 hours each day with pilots available on 30 minutes notice. On December 6, General Brereton held a conference and stated that war was imminent. At this time all units were placed completely on the alert with all combat crews, enlisted men and officers constantly ready for duty.

On the night of December 7, the status report had shown:
The 3rd Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission;
The 17th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission;
The 20th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission;
The 21st Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-35s in commission;
The 34th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission,
giving the Group a total of 54 P-40Es, 18 P-40Bs and 18 P-35s in commission.
The 34th Squadron received their last P-40E from the Depot on the evening of December 7. This squadron was unable to slow time all of the engines, boresights or check guns.

During the period November 30 to December 6 all squadrons were undergoing intensive training in interception and gunnery. The squadrons were doing training in conjunction with bombardment in day and night interception in coordination with the anti-aircraft.

Throughout the gunnery camp at Iba an extreme amount of difficulty was experienced in malfunctioning of the guns due to improper adjustment and mal-installation. In order to properly function it was imperative that all gun installations should be modified.

During the period December 2 to December 6, for four consecutive nights an enemy aircraft was sighted over Clark Field at approximately 5:30 a.m. After the first sighting, instructions were given to force the aircraft to land or destroy it. On the three succeeding nights it was impossible to make the interception, due to inability to see the aircraft in the dark or the aircraft not getting close enough to be picked up by the searchlights. On the fifth morning all aircraft were kept on the ground and the anti-aircraft alerted for the interception; however, no aircraft were located. During the same period enemy aircraft were tracked over Iba by the radar set.

[11163] On December 8th approximately 3:30 a.m. the commercial radio station at Clark Field intercepted a message from Pearl Harbor, reference the attack there. Unable to verify this interception no official action was taken other than notifying the Base Commander. However, all units were ordered to constant stations.

At approximately 4 a.m. the radar at Iba reported a formation of unidentified aircraft approximately 75 miles off the cost heading towards Corregidor. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron was dispatched for the interception. No interception was accomplished. However, the tracks on the plotting table showed that the interception was successful and the formation of unidentified aircraft swung off to the west going out of range of the radar. This interception was hampered by darkness and a lack of altitude data from the radar, i.e. it is thought that the pursuit went underneath the formation of unidentified aircraft. At approximately 4:45 official confirmation that a state of war existed was received. The 3rd Pursuit squadron returned to Iba, landed, regassed and went to Stations.

At approximately 9:30, a large force of bombers over Lingayen was reported heading towards Manila. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was immediately dis-
patched for the interception over Rosales. The 17th Pursuit Squadron was immediately dispatched from Nichols Field to cover Clark Field. The interception was not successful. The bombers proceeded on a course until approximately 30 miles north of Rosales then made a turn to the northeast and proceeded to Baguio, bombed Baguio and Tagagarau and departed for the north. At the time the 20th took off all bombardment were dispatched from Clark Field. The 20th returned to Clark Field and gave the bombardment cover while they were landing. Both the 20th and the 17th then landed, regassed and went on the alert.

At approximately 11:30 a large formation of bombers was reported over the China Sea headed for Manila. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron was dispatched for the interception. Uncertainties of time and place factors, due to the delay in communications, making it doubtful whether the 3rd would accomplish the interception, the 17th was dispatched to cover Bataan, and the 34th was placed on standing patrol over Manila. At approximately 11:45 an unidentified report was received of a bombardment formation over Lingayen Gulf, headed south. The 20th not having completed gassing was not able to take off to investigate. At approximately 11:45 the 21st Pursuit Squadron was dispatched to cover Clark Field. At 12:15 the 20th completed gassing and was ordered to cover Clark Field. At 12:20 54 bombers and an undetermined number of dive bombers attacked Clark Field. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was in the process of taking off when the attack came. Four of their aircraft had cleared the ground. Another five were destroyed in the process of taking off by the bombardment. The remaining five were destroyed by strafing after the bombardment attack. The unidentified plot mentioned above proved to be the bombardment formation approaching Clark Field. Communications break down prevented proper identification. At the time of the attack on Clark Field, four squadrons of pursuit were in the air and the fifth in the process of taking off. Due to a direct hit on the center of communications at Clark Field, ground-to-air control was destroyed and thus no control could be maintained of the fighters in the air.

The 3rd Pursuit Squadron, which had been dispatched for the interception over the China Sea, failed to make the interception and was notified of another raid approaching Iba, by the ground station at Iba. The radar set at Iba was plotting the attacking raid and relaying to the central plotting room at Neilson airport. However, due to a breakdown in communications these plots were never received at Neilson. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron returned to Iba and as they were circling the field 54 enemy bombers and an unknown number of dive bombers accompanying them approached the field. These were immediately attacked by the 3rd Pursuit Squadron. In the ensuing engagement one bomber and a number of strafers were claimed to have been destroyed. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron lost in the air five P-40s and although not preventing the bombardment of Iba, did prevent the strafing. After the withdrawal of the enemy, three additional aircraft (P-40s) were forced to crash land on the beaches due to their gas supply being exhausted. The remainder of the squadron proceeded to O'Donnell airport and landed; they remained there until ammunition and gas were dispatched from Clark Field to reload and regass this squadron. The installations and aircraft on the ground at Iba were completely destroyed by enemy bombardment. There were approximately eight airplanes on the ground at the time of the attack which were out of condition due to maintenance, engine change etc.

The 17th Pursuit Squadron over Bataan proceeded towards Clark Field but upon arrival there the enemy had withdrawn. The 17th, unable to contact the ground station, proceeded to Del Carmen and landed. The 21st Squadron was greatly delayed in taking off due to the excessive amount of dust on the field, and made no interception. The 34th Squadron patrolled Manila area and landed at Nichols Field at the completion of the mission.

[14164] Chron No. 10-41-6-44 D-1052 Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Historical Record

Subject Class: Communications.
Title of Document: Record of an interview with Major Heald, Communications Officer, Fifth Air Service Command.
Date of Document: 15 May, 1944.
File No.: Interview.
Type of Document: Statement. Pages ....... Imp. ....... Pub. S.
From ____________________________ To ____________________________
Extract: Typed by C. Lutton. Checked by ____________________________
When the Fifth Air Base Group came to the Philippines about 15 November 1941, it was transferred from Manila to Mindanao where it established an air-drome at Del Monte. Lieut. Heald with nine men from the 19th Bombardment Group Hdq. Sq., and a large mobile radio truck, proceeded to Del Monte with the Fifth Air Base Group arriving at that base 1st December 1941. Base communications were set up and radio communications established from Del Monte back to Clark Field and Nielson Field during the week from 1 December to 8 December 1941.

At the time of the attack upon the Philippines, Lieut. Heald received the first message radioed to Del Monte from General Headquarters, which he immediately related to Captain Gee (now Lieut Col) then adjutant of the Fifth Air Base Group. This was signed "MacArthur" and was received at approximately 0630 and it read: "Hostilities have begun. All Airdromes alert". Five minutes later another message arrived from Lieutenant Colonel Eubank with about the same wording.

During the latter part of December 1941 and all of January 1942, Lt. Brownwell made daily reconnaissance flights in a P-40 over Davao harbor which fell to the Japanese the first week of the war.

This information (visual only as he had no photographic equipment) was sent by radio to General MacArthur—Great quantities of supplies and ships of all sorts were visible on the bay and in the harbor. At the time of the naval battle in Macassar Sts., 1 February to 6 February 1942, approximately fifty ships were in Davao Harbor—i.e., destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers, and cargo vessels. Several attempts were made by the enemy to follow Lt. Brownwell and locate the strip from which he operated, but he always managed to elude them and land on a strip that could not be found.

There were no radio communications between strips on Mindanao. The only means of communication was over the Philippine Commonwealth telephone lines which were very unsatisfactory.

Memorandum for Lt. Colonel Duncombe.
Subject: Organization of the Far East Air Force

1. Inclosed herewith is the material you requested concerning the organization of the air force in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war.
2. Inclosure No. 1 is a copy of a 4 August 1941 order stating that the Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East "will operate directly under" the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East. Inclosure No. 2 is a 14 November 1941 order merely changing the name of the Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East to "Far East Air Force."
3. Inclosure No. 3 is a chart showing the relationship of the principal air and ground commanders in the Philippines to General MacArthur. Inclosure No. 4 is a chart giving in more detail the organization and location of the various air units in the Philippines. Inclosure No. 5 is a list of air force commanders in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war. The inclosures referred to in this paragraph have been recently prepared on the basis of records on file in the AAF Historical Office, Headquarters Army Air Forces and records in the possession of the Adjutant General.

/s/ JOSEPH R. MITCHELL
Lt. Colonel GSC.

[14166] 5 Incls
1. Cy of order dtd 4 Aug 41
2. Cy of order dtd 14 Nov 41
3. Chart air & gd comdrs in the Phil
4. Chart Orgn of FEAF
5. List of Air Force comdrs.
GENERAL ORDERS, No. 4.

The Philippine Department Air Force as now constituted, Brigadier General Henry B. Clagett (O-2152), United States Army, Commanding, and such other units and installations as may be assigned to it, are hereby constituted as the Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East. It will operate directly under the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, except for routine administration and supply, which will continue through Headquarters Philippine Department.

By Command of Lieutenant General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Official:

/s/ CARL H. SEAL
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Acting Adjutant General.

True Copy

/s/ MANNING J. DAUER
Capt. Air Corps.

Chron No. 41-11-14 D-1051

HEADQUARTERS,
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST,
Manila, P. I., 14 August 1941.

Subject Class—Organizations—Units
Title of Document—General Order
Date of Document—14 November, 1941
File No. USAFFE—G. O.
(Typed by C. Lutton)

[14168]

General Orders No. 28

1. Pursuant to authority contained in letter, War Department, October 28, 1941, File AG 320.2 (10-20-41) MR-M-AAF, to this headquarters, effective November 16, 1941, the following changes in Air Force Units of the command are announced:

a. The Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East is effective this date, redesignated as "Far East Air Force".

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, United States Army Forces in the Far East, effective this date, is redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Far East Air Force.

By command of Lieutenant General MacARTHUR

E. K. SUTHERLAND
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

Official:

CARL H. SEAL
Colonel, A. G. D.
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
FAR EAST

AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

5th Interceptor Command (Nielson Field)

5th Bomber Command (Nielson Field)

24th Pursuit Group (Clark Field)

19th Bombardment Group (M) (Clark Field)

27th Bombardment Group (L) (Nielson Field)

20th Pursuit Squadron (Del Carmen Field)

21st Pursuit Squadron (Clark Field)

23rd Pursuit Squadron (Nielson Field)

28th Bomb Squadron (Clark Field)

30th Bomb Squadron (Clark Field)

91st Bomb Squadron *(No planes)*

Far East Air Service Command (Nielson Field)

20th Air Base Group (Nichols Field)

26th Air Base Group (Nielson Field)

34th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field)

17th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field)

26th Pursuit Squadron (Clark Field)

21st Pursuit Squadron (Clark Field)

44th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field)

14th Bomb Squadron (Del Monte Field)

9th Bomb Squadron (Clark Field)

3rd Bomb Squadron (Clark Field)

91st Bomb Squadron *(No planes)*

2nd Observation Squadron (Nichols Field)

*Planes en route, did not arrive. Diverted to Australia.*

19215--40--pt. 11 (Pages 5338)
1. Far East Air Force (Nielson Field)—Maj. Gen. L. H. Brereton
2. 5th Interceptor Command (Nielson Field)—Brig. Gen. H. B. Clagett
3. 24th Pursuit Group (Clark Field)—Maj. O. L. Grover
   3rd Pursuit Squadron (Iba Field) 1st Lt. H. G. Thorne
   17th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field)—1st Lt. B. D. Wagner
   20th Pursuit Squadron (Clark Field)—1st Lt. J. H. Moore
   21st Pursuit Squadron (Del Carmen Field)—1st Lt. W. B. Dyess
   34th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field)—1st Lt. S. H. Marett
4. 5th Bomber Command (Nielson Field)—Lt. Col. E. L. Eubank
5. 19th Bombardment Group (H) (Clark Field)—Lt. Col. Eubank
   14th Bombardment Squadron (Del Monte Field)—Maj. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr.
   28th Bombardment Squadron (Clark Field)—Maj. W. P. Fisher
   30th Bombardment Squadron (Clark Field)—Maj. D. R. Gibbs
   93rd Bombardment Squadron (Del Monte Field)—Maj. C. E. Combs
6. 27th Bombardment Group (L) (Nielson Field)—Maj. J. H. Davies
   16th Bombardment Squadron—Capt. W. G. Hipps

17th Bombardment Squadron—1st Lt. H. F. Lowery
91st Bombardment Squadron—1st Lt. W. E. Eubank
2. 2nd Observation Squadron (Nichols Field)—Capt. J. Y. Parker
8. Far East Air Service Command (Nielson Field)—Col. L. S. Churchill
10. 5th Air Base Group (Del Monte Field) Maj. R. T. Elsmore
11. 20th Air Base Group (Nichols Field)—Maj. W. H. Maverick
12. 36th Air Base Group (Nielson Field)

It is believed that this was only a small detachment. The bulk of the group and its equipment went to Australia and never reached the Philippines. The detachment commander is believed to have been Capt. Waller.

13. Clark Field—Maj. M. J. Daly
14. Del Carmen Field—1st Lt. S. H. Marett
   (Lt. Marett is also listed above as the Commanding Officer of the 34th Pursuit Squadron of the 24th Pursuit Group.)
15. Del Monte Field—Maj. R. T. Elsmore
   (Maj. Elsmore is also listed above as the Commanding Officer of the 5th Air Base Group)
16. Iba Field—1st Lt. H. G. Thorne
   (Lt. Thorne is also listed above as the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron of the 24th Pursuit Group)
17. Nichols Field—Maj. W. H. Maverick
   (Maj. Maverick is also listed above as the Commanding Officer of the 20th Air Force Group)
18. Nielson Field

(This field was not an operational field. It will be noted that only headquarters units, or units which did not have their planes or equipment are listed as being stationed at this field.

Mr. Morgan. We have a series of communications from the Federal Communications Commission, dated February 11, 14, and 18, 1946, concerning the matter of monitoring by the Federal Communications Commission at Hawaii for a "winds execute" message. Inasmuch as this question came up during the interrogation with respect to this matter, we would like to have these communications, which are from Mr. G. E. Sterling, Assistant Chief Engineer, together with enclosures, spread on the record at this point.

The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record at this point.
(The communications referred to follow:)


Mr. Seth Richardson,
General Counsel, Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee,
Washington, D. C.
(Attention: Mr. Morgan.)

Dear Sir: Replies have been received from all officers who were in charge of the Commission's activities in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, in which they all state that they were not requested by any representatives of the military authorities in Hawaii to monitor for the "winds" execute message prior to December 7, 1941.

Copies of their statements are attached to this communication.

Sincerely yours,

(sgd) G. E. Sterling
G. E. Sterling
Assistant Chief Engineer.

Attachments

February 7, 1946.

Radio Intelligence Division,

From: Supervisor H. A. M. A.
[To: Chief, R. I. D.
Subject: "Winds Messages"

My memorandum dated February 4, 1946, contained a blanket denial that any request to monitor for the so-called "Winds Messages" was received from the Army or the Navy prior to December 7, 1941.

This is a repetition of that denial with the added statement that Col. Bicknell did not contact me (or any member of my staff) between November 28 and December 7, 1941, to request that we monitor for the "winds Messages" by making intercepts of Japanese radio transmissions.

/s/ Lee R. Dawson.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of February, A. D. 1946.

/s/ Elbert D. Kwashigl.
Notary Public, Third Judicial Circuit, Territory of Hawaii.

My commission expires June 30, 1949.

From: Earl A. Nielsen, Kekalakekua, T. H.
To: Chief, R. I. D.
Subject: "Winds" Messages.

I, Earl A. Nielsen, affirm and state that to the best of my knowledge and belief no request to monitor for "Winds" messages was received by me from the Army or the Navy prior to December 7th, 1941. I was employed as Assistant Monitoring Officer at HA–2, Hawaii National Park from July 1st, 1941 thru December 7th, 1941.

Earl A. Nielsen.
Mr. George E. Sterling,

DEAR MR. STERLING: I am writing to confirm our telephonic conversation of
last night regarding matters pertinent to the Pearl Harbor Investigation. As
you know, I was Inspector in Charge of the Engineering Department's Field
Division office in Honolulu from November 1940 to December 1945. At no time
prior to December 7, 1941, was I contacted by G-2 of the Army, or by any other
government office, with a request that my department make recordings or
monitoring runs of radio broadcasts for the purpose of intercepting the so-called
"winds" message from Japan.

As I now recall, I was told by one Frank Santos, who operated a pleasure
fishing boat out of Honolulu, that he had aboard a fishing party on the morning
of Dec. 7, 1941. Amongst the fishermen were some Army officers who became
exasperated when their craft was strafed by the Japs because they thought
the planes were our own and they were making their practice runs a bit too
realistic. I was personally monitoring the 2638 ke band that morning and
heard Santos ask the the Coast Guard station NMO for permission to enter the
harbor. It was apparent from the conversation from NMO that personnel
at the station did not realize that we were being attacked at the time.

Yours truly,

[14179] (sgd) JOHN H. HOMSY.

P. S. I trust that you can read this letter which is written at my bedside.
73
JHH

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Radio Intelligence Division,
Honolulu 1, T. H., February 7, 1946.

Via Clipper Airmail

Secret
From: Assistant Supervisor, HA-P, Honolulu, T. H.
To: Chief, Radio Intelligence Division
Subject: February radiogram 072007 BUSY SHIP

In your message of February 7, 1946 it was requested that a written state-
ment be prepared by Mr. Dawson, Mr. Wagner and Mr. Klima concerning a
"so called" request to the Honolulu office of the FCC for intercepts of Japanese
transmissions containing "winds messages" between November 28, 1941 and
December 7, 1941.

I make the following statement: I, Tom B. Wagner, Assistant Supervisor,
HA-P, can not recall any request made by Col. Bicknell, G-2, Honolulu, Hawaii,
or other military personnel between November 28, 1941 and December 7, 1941
to the FCC for Japanese intercepts [14180] containing "Winds Messages". No
written record can be found in the HA-P files for such a request.

Such a request as this would require a clearance from the FCC office in Wash-
ington, D. C., before such information could be furnished Col. Bicknell. No record
of such a request can be found.

TOM B. WAGNER.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Engineering Department,
Radio Intelligence Division,
February 6, 1946.

To: Chief Radio Intelligence Division
From: Monitoring Officer in Chg. Unit HA-3, Koloa Kauai TH
Subject: Army/Navy monitoring requests re: Japanese winds message prior
Dec 7 1941.

Ref: Relative information requested Chief's Radiogram.

This unit was placed in service March nineteenth 1941. The unit was located,
temporary set up, at Lihue Kauai. Relocation of the unit to the National Guard
Armory Hanapepe Kauai was completed April first 1941.

The only office of military representation on the island of Kauai known by
this unit was that of the U S Army.
[14181] The commanding officer was contacted in person by myself, and information given as to our location, our aim and purpose in monitoring, and service rendered. As officer in charge of this unit between the dates of March nineteenth 1941 and that of December eighth, 1941, and cognizant of all requests made for service at this unit by either the U. S. Army or Navy during this period, can state, that to the best of my knowledge neither the U. S. Army or Navy made a request for the monitoring of Japanese broadcasts for the interception of “winds message”. This unit’s official case record file substantiates the above statement.

/s/ Theodore H. Tate
THEODORE H. TATE
Monitoring Officer.

WAR DEPARTMENT
FOREIGN BROADCAST INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
FIELD DIVISION
February 5, 1946.

From: Waldemar M. Klima, P. O. Box FF, Kekaha, Kauai, T. H.
To: Mr. George E. Sterling, Chief, RID, Washington 25, DC
Subject: Your request re the Winds message.

This afternoon I received the following message by telephone from the HA-3, RID, unit near Koloa, Kauai, T. H.

[14182] “Chief wants airmail statements from you and Klima regarding whether Army and Navy requested you to monitor for winds message from Tokyo prior to December 7th”

The message was apparently a paraphrase by King (Wagner of HA-P) of Busy’s message received from Washington.

My statement follows: I am sufficiently certain to state that I personally did not receive a written, telephoned, or verbal request from any representative or any of the military agencies (Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, or Marines) on Oahu to monitor for a “Winds message” or any other specific or general monitoring request in the period of a week prior to December 7, 1941. Neither am I aware of any such request having been received by any one of the other HA-P or HA-1 staff members. No announcement of such a monitoring request was made verbally or in written posted form by the officers in charge of monitoring activities in the Punchbowl in Honolulu, T. H. (signed) Waldemar M. Klima

WALDEMAR M. KLIMA

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Mr. Seth Richardson,
[14183] General Counsel, Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, Washington, D. C.
Attention: Mr. Morgan

Dear Sir: I have previously furnished you with statements received from responsible representatives of the Federal Communications Commission, who were on duty in Hawaii prior to December 1941, in which they stated that they had not been contacted by Colonel Bicknell for the purpose of engaging in monitoring Japanese broadcast transmissions for the purpose of intercepting the “WINDS” message.

I now enclose an affidavit made by an employee of the Federal Communications Commission, Mr. A. Prose Walker, in which he states that Colonel Bicknell on two occasions approached him for the purpose of ascertaining if he had any knowledge of Japanese radio stations under surveillance by the FCC, one of the inquiries being directed specifically to the “WINDS” message.

It is very difficult for me to understand why Colonel Bicknell should make affidavit to the effect that he did contact FCC representatives for the purpose of intercepting the “WINDS” message when our own employees in responsible positions indicate they have no knowledge of such a contact.

It is also difficult for me to understand why Colonel [14184] Bicknell endeavored to ascertain information from Mr. Walker on the same subject on two occasions.

I am also enclosing the original sworn statement made by Mr. Lee R. Dawson, a copy of which was furnished you with the other papers. Mr. Dawson was,
prior to December 7, 1941, and continues in charge of our Monitoring Activities in Hawaii.

Very truly yours,

G. E. Sterling
/s/ G. E. Sterling
Assistant Chief Engineer.

Enclosures.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Sterling
From: Mr. Walker

I recall that on two occasions I was approached by Army personnel relative to any interceptions which the FCC had made of Japanese transmissions prior to or on December 7, 1941. Before the departure of Colonel G. W. Bicknell, Assistant A. C. of S., G2 C. I. D., from the Hawaiian Department, I have a vague recollection that he asked me if I had any knowledge of the Japanese radio stations under surveillance at FCC monitoring stations in Hawaii. My reply was that I had no knowledge of the matter inasmuch as I was not present in Hawaii at that time, having arrived on March 2, 1942. I probably referred him to Mr. Dawson. I do not recall that any mention was made of the "WINDS" message.

I entered on duty as Chief, Technical Operations Section, RID, on July 7, 1944. Sometime during either July or August of that year, I had lunch with Colonel G. W. Bicknell and he again mentioned the subject of the FCC intercepting any messages on or prior to December 7, 1941. I recall that during this conversation he specifically mentioned the "WINDS" message. Having no knowledge whatever at that time of such a message, my answer to Colonel Bicknell was that I knew nothing about it.

/s/ A. Prose Walker.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 13th day of February, 1946.

[seal]

/s/ Helen A. Marston
Notary Public

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Washington 25, D. C., February 18, 1946.

Mr. Seth Richardson

General Counsel, Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: There is submitted herewith additional information received from the Supervisor of the Hawaiian Monitoring Area of the Radio Intelligence Division, relative to Colonel Bicknell's affidavit relating to the "WINDS" message.

Very truly yours,

/s/ G. E. Sterling

G. E. Sterling
Assistant Chief Engineer.

Enclosure

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

RADIO INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Honolulu 1, T. H., February 11, 1946.

From: Supervisor, Hawaiian Monitoring Area
To: Chief, Radio Intelligence Division
Subject: Col. Bicknell's Affidavit.

Following my return this date from an exploratory survey trip around the island of Hawaii I have reviewed the correspondence between your office and HA-P during my absence and I believe the following remarks will shed some light on this controversy.

In the first place, there is absolutely no evidence on hand to bear out Col. Bicknell's statement that he (1) contacted the local FCC intercept station in Hawaii, (2) requested them to monitor for "winds messages" and (3) that intercepts were furnished him but were not what he was looking for. If Col.
Bicknell had contacted HA–P he would normally have talked to either Mr. Wagner or myself. Neither one of us remembers any such call. If a request had been received by any of the HA–P staff to monitor for “winds messages” it would certainly have been brought to the attention of either Mr. Wagner or myself and such an unusual request would certainly have remained in our memories.

Furthermore, if such a request had been received calling for the release of intercepted material, authorization would first have been obtained from your office before such release was made. Attention is called, in this regard, to the fact that the Navy made a request that HA–P participate in a direction finder problem during the latter part of November 1941 and that your office was immediately notified and authority requested before bearings were released to the Navy.

With regard to the third point, I should like to ask what kind of intercepts we are supposed to have furnished him. I believe that we could show quite clearly that no intercepts were furnished Col. Bicknell. I suspect that, if pressed on this point, he would describe the translations of the JZ1 intercepts which we furnished the Office of Naval Intelligence from May through December 1941. I refer to the Japanese propaganda broadcasts which we recorded and which were translated by ONI translators. Copies of these intercepts were furnished the FBI and the Office of Military Intelligence. No request for special monitoring with regard to these intercepts, or any other, was received from either the ONI or the MID during the period between November 28 and December 7, 1941.

One other point comes to mind. You will remember that when I arrived in Washington during July 1943 on special detail, I reported verbally to you that Lt. Col. Henry Christian Clausen of the Judge Advocate General’s Department, Army of the United States, had contacted me in Honolulu just prior to my departure and had specifically asked if Col. Bicknell had not requested us to do some monitoring just prior to December 7, 1941. Lt. Col. Clausen was very vague as to just what monitoring Col. Bicknell asked us to do and made no claim that the request had been to monitor specifically for the “winds message”. Both Mr. Wagner and I answered Lt. Col. Clausen in the negative and said then, as we do now, that we could recollect no such request from Col. Bicknell.

That is all I can add to the story. I believe it was [14188] during July 1943 that I first learned that there was any such thing as a “winds message”. I am absolutely certain that no request to monitor for such a message was received at HA–P prior to December 7, 1941.

/s/ Lee R. Dawson.

[14190] Mr. Morgan. We have a telegram, dated August 16, 1941, in five sections, from former Ambassador Grew, to the State Department. This telegram includes the substance of telegrams sent to the British Foreign Office by the British Ambassador reporting his conversation on August 11 with the Japanese Foreign Minister. The release of this document has been cleared with the British, and we request that it be spread on the record at this point with the observation that in a note from the State Department liaison officer, dated January 9, 1946, he indicates:

The British Government has agreed to the use of the attached telegram No. 1235 from Tokyo August 16, 1941. It points out an error in section 2, paragraph (A), fourth line from the bottom, where “Germany’s policy” should read “Japan’s policy.”

As indicated, we would like to have this telegram spread on the record.

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record at this point. (The telegram referred to follows:)

[14190–A] TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 16, 1941. Rec’d 9:20 p. m. 17th.
SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington.
1235, August 16, 3 p.m. (section one).
Following is the (?) telegrams sent to Foreign Office by the British Ambassador reporting his conversation on August 11, with the Japanese Foreign Minister.

"The strong representations to Minister for Foreign Affairs today in regard to spokesman's statement impugning the veracity (?) assurances as to the absence of any British aggressive designs against Thailand. The statement is that such assurances could not be accepted "(? )" was not only calculated to inflame opinion in Japan, but was definitely offensive and I trusted that His Excellency would warn the spokesman of the need of greater (?) in making public statements in the present delicate state of Anglo-Japanese relations. I added that after a public statement of this kind, it was clear from what source the Japanese press received its inspiration for its attacks on my country.

[14190-B] Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to pass on my remarks to Director General of Bureau of Information.

Grew.

WSB

[14190-C] TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CORRECTED COPY

LET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A), Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 14, 1941. Rec'd. 11: 10 p.m., 17th.
SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington.
1235, August 14 3 p.m. (Section Two).
I proceeded to say how regrettable it seemed to me to be that the Japanese Government should continue to place more reliance on reports (probably emanating from interested quarters) in preference not only to my own assurances but also to the public declaration made by yourself in the House of Commons. Assuming that the Japanese Government were sincere in their desire to avoid trouble over Thailand, such rumors appeared to me to be fantastic and I made an earnest appeal to His Excellency to place his cards on the table and give me some idea of the nature and the source of the reports on which they were acting. If His Excellency would deal with the matter thus frankly I was prepared to be equally frank in explaining the point of view and intention of His Majesty's Government.

Two, Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that if things were to be prevented from going from bad to [14190-D] worse, a frank interchange of views was essential and he then mentioned several examples of the reports which were creating so much concern in Japan and invited my comments:

(A) Concentration of British troops on Thai frontier. Japanese reports were to the effect that large bodies of British troops had been concentrated ready for an immediate incursion onto Thai territory. I replied that this was a gross exaggeration: such British units as were on the Thai frontier were there purely for defensive purposes—as indeed were all our forces in Malaya and Burma—with Germany's policy steadily pushing southwards, it was an elementary precaution that the British border defences should be adequately manned.

B) Report that the WARSPITE was in the Gulf of Slam.

Grew.

NPL

[14190-E] TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A), Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 14, 1941. Rec'd. 11: 45 p.m., 17th.
SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington.
1235, August 14, 3 p.m. (Section Three).
This report, which he believed had originated with British journalists in Thailand, had received wide currency plausible if untrue, it was unfortunate that they allowed the rumor to spread. I replied that the report in the form in which it had appeared in the press was nonsense on the face of it and I thought it much more likely to have originated in Japanese than British journalistic circles in 79716—46—pt. 11—14
Thailand (c) Alleged Russo-Japanese clash on Manchukuo front. This report had been spread with particular persistence from Singapore although there was no truth in it whatsoever. No such clash had occurred. I suggested to His Excellency that the report had originated in Manchuria and had received wide currency, so that it was unfair to saddle Singapore with it.

(D) Speeches by Commander in Chief Far East and other high officers in Malaya. The reiterated public assertion of our growing military and air strength in [14190-F] Malaya conveyed an impression of aggressive intentions and had proved most disturbing to the public mind in Japan. Their effect was simply to increase the pressure on the Japanese Government to hasten and augment their own preparations to defend the sphere in which Japan had a vital interest. He made a strong plea for the adoption of a calm and unprovocative attitude on the part of all concerned in handling the present delicate situation, promising to do his best in this direction if the British authorities would do their part. I explained that our authorities in Malaya had to think of the morale of the local population, which might well be affected by Japan's steady advance towards our frontiers were it not for public assurances that all necessary measures had been taken for the defense of British territory. Nevertheless I shared the opinion expressed by His Excellency that in such matters "silence is golden" and promised to impart his representations on this point to you.

GREW.

HSM

[14190-G]

Corrected Copy

TK

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 14, 1941. Rec'd 10:50 a.m., 17th.

Secretary of State, Washington.

1225, August 14, 3 p.m., (Section Four).

Three. I then reverted to the signs of Japanese pressure on Thailand, quoting reports of concentration of Japanese troops along the Thai border and giving him recent examples of mendacious Japanese press attacks and allegations against us. His Excellency replied that only quite weak Japanese units had proceeded to the Thai frontier and that I would be surprised if I knew how small was the Japanese force which had landed in Indochina. (I abstained from asking for figures for fear of a request referring to our strength along Thai frontier).

Four. A long conversation then ensued on the economic position as regards Thailand, particularly as regards rice, rubber, and other materials which it was now more vital than ever for Japan to secure from that country. His Excellency observed that Netherlands East Indies under British influence had [14190-H] decided to join in the freezing of Japanese assets, with the result that it is now more than ever essential for Japan to satisfy her urgent needs in such markets as were open to her. Japanese-Thai trade had recently showed a natural tendency to increase owing to the difficulties of trade with third powers and the Japanese Government felt that they had a serious grievance against us for our attempts to induce Thailand to stop the export to Japan of even such a vital foodstuff as rice. I was able to show that in this respect His Excellency was laboring under a complete misapprehension, adding, however, that we were equally determined that our own right to purchase reasonable supplies of rice, rubber, et cetera, in Thailand, should not be interfered with by Japanese agencies. On His Excellency's charge that the surest way to ease the economic situation as regards Thailand would be to induce the Netherlands East Indies to lessen the restrictions on exports to Japan. I suggested that he was putting the cart before the horse and that the allaying of British and Netherlands East Indies apprehensions in regard to Japan's intentions in Thai

GREW.

CSB

[14190-I]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 16, 1941. Rec'd. 10 a.m., 18th.
SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington.

12:25, August 16, 3 p.m. (Section five).
should be the prelude to any overhauling of the economic restrictions imposed in the Netherlands East Indies or elsewhere.

Five. I took the opportunity to say that the main point of our economic restrictions on trade with Japan was, I believed, to bring home to the Japanese Government the fact that in our view Japan's successive southward advances had now reached a point at which words and protests were useless and deeds were necessary to bring it home to the Japanese Government and public how close they were to the danger zone. In denying that Netherlands East Indies action in this matter had been due to British pressure or influence I said that I assumed that the above considerations had also weighed with the Netherlands East Indies Government who must feel themselves threatened equally with us by the Japanese action in Indochina. I did not need to inform His Excellency that the lifeline of our communications with Australia and New Zealand ran through the Netherlands East Indies thus creating a common problem of defense. When he inquired "defense whom" and I replied "against Japan" His Excellency merely smiled and shook his head.

Six. In conclusion we agreed that the main difficulty lay in the suspicions which each power entertained of the intentions of the other, though I did not fail to ridicule the apprehensions of a power which had been steadily advancing southwards until it had reached a point 1500 miles from Tokyo. Minister for Foreign Affairs reasserted that this advance was necessitated solely by Japan's determination to bring her war with China to a successful conclusion and he could only regret our apparent inability to accept his formal assurances that the advance into South Indochina was neither directed against us nor connoted any Japanese intention of attacking Thailand. We also agreed that our conversations might have been useful as tending to dissipate unnecessary misunderstandings and that it would be desirable to have similar frank discussions from time to time.

Seven. While apologizing for the length of this telegram I am anxious to convey to you as correct an impression as I can of the character and views of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs. The conversation lasted for an hour and a half and touched on many subsidiary points which were useful for our mutual understanding though perhaps unnecessary to report by telegram.

Sent Department, via air, mail to Shanghai.

(End of message.)

Grew.

[14191] Mr. Morgan. At various places throughout the transcript requests have been made for information with respect to "water-tight integrity of major vessels" located at Pearl Harbor. In order to bring together at one place all communications relating to this matter, we would like to have spread on the record at this time the following communications from the Navy Department:

11 December 1945.
Another one dated 11 December, 1945.
One dated 3 January 1946.
And a final memorandum dated 29 January 1946.

This will enable us to have at one place all of the communications with respect to the condition of "water-tight integrity of major vessels."

The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record at this point.

(The communications referred to follow:)

[14192]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY,
Washington, 11 December 1945

Memorandum to: Mr. William D. Mitchell.

1. With further reference to my memorandum to you dated 11 December 1945 the subject of which was "Conditions of water-tight integrity of major vessels",...
there is attached hereto a table showing the scheduled inspection of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941. It will be noted that this table does not contain all of the ships which were at Pearl Harbor on December 7; the explanation for this is, the ships which are not shown were not scheduled for inspection during the period October-December 1941.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

[14193]
R-#16

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Under Secretary
Washington, 11 December 1945

Memorandum:
To: William D. Mitchell.
Subject: Condition of water-tight integrity of major vessels.

1. Pursuant to your request concerning the above matter, the following information has been obtained and is submitted:
   (a) An examination of the logs and records of the major vessels at Pearl Harbor indicates that one yone vessel did not have an equivalent of the condition “all water-tight openings below the third deck closed” at the time of the attack. That vessel, the USS California, had ten inner and outboard voids open for maintenance work. Its remaining water-tight openings below the third deck were closed.
   (b) The logs of the USS Oklahoma and USS Arizona were destroyed. However, information has been obtained through Commander Fujima, the Damage Control Officer of the Arizona, that on his ship all water-tight doors below the third deck were closed. This was also the condition that prevailed in the USS Oklahoma, according to information stated by the Commanding Officer of that ship.
   (c) Material conditions of readiness referred to as conditions “Baker” or “X-ray” or “Yoke” are higher than the minimum. The minimum requirements are considered to be those prescribed by Navy Regulations, that is, that all water-tight openings below the third deck be closed from 1600 to 0800.
   (d) According to the best available analysis in the Navy Department, the USS California is the only ship that might have been saved from sinking by the closing of manhole covers that had been left open for maintenance.
   (e) The USS Pennsylvania was in dry dock and is not included within the above general statement concerning the conditions of water-tight integrity that prevailed at that time.

2. If more specific and detailed information on these matters is desired, an attempt will be made to locate and have present necessary witnesses.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lt. Comdr. USNR.

[14195]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Secretary
Washington, 3, January 1945

Memorandum:
To: Mr. William D. Mitchell

1. With reference to your memorandum of 11 December 1945 referring to the memorandum to you of the same date from Lt. Comdr. John F. Baecher entitled “Conditions of Water-tight Integrity of Major Vessels,” it is believed that the further memorandum to you from Lt. Comdr. Baecher of the same date (11 December 1945) with enclosure “Compilation of Inspection Schedules Applicable to Vessels Present at Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941,” together with the first mentioned memorandum constitutes the desired response to the inquiry concerning the “inspection charge.”

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1 The table referred to appears in Hearings, Part 4, p. 1678.
2. There has also been compiled a statement dated 20 December 1945 from the logs of the various ships of inspection that occurred on 5 and 6 December 1941. A copy of this compilation is enclosed herewith since it bears on the same question.

3. With reference to the inquiry concerning the names of persons from the various ships "who could testify about each vessel," it is believed that the best witnesses would be the Senior Surviving Officer from each vessel along with that ship's Damage Control Officer. In addition to those officers, the names of whom are listed on the "Report of Senior Surviving Officers and Damage Control Officers," also enclosed herewith, Captain Leslie A. Kniskern, attached to the Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., who made a study and analyzed the damage to vessels at Pearl Harbor, may have something to contribute in the way of testimony, if the same is desired. Many of these prospective witnesses are located at points far distant from Washington and none of them have as yet been interviewed since the scope of any preliminary interview has not yet been determined.

4. It will be appreciated if you will give advance notice in the event you desire to call any of these individuals as witnesses, or if you desire them to be preliminarily interviewed by the Navy representatives.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

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A. Arizona
1. SSO: Ellis H. Geiselman, Capt., USN.
2. DCO: Samuel G. Fuqua, Capt., USN.

B. California
1. SSO: Joel W. Bunkley, R. Adm., USN.
2. DCO: Marion N. Little, Capt., USN.

[14197] C. Maryland
1. SSO: John M. Haines, Capt., USN.
2. DCO: Wm. S. G. Davis, Capt., USN.

D. Nevada
1. SSO: Francis W. Scanland, Commodore, USN.
2. DCO: George C. Miller, Capt., USN.

E. Oklahoma
1. SSO: Thomas D. Cullins, Capt., USN.
2. DCO: W. M. Hobby, Lt. Comdr., USN.

F. Pennsylvania
1. SSO: C. M. Cooke, Jr., Vice Admiral, USN.
2. DCO: Wm. E. Stock, Comdr., USN.

G. Tennessee
1. SSO: Charles E. Reordan, Capt., USN.
2. DCO: Robert R. Moore, Comdr., USN (Ret.)

H. West Virginia
1. SSO: R. H. Hillenkoetter, Capt., USN.
2. DCO: J. S. Harper, Capt., USN.

* DCO deceased.

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20 December 1945.

Inspections made on U. S. Battleships which were at Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec. 1941. These inspections occurred on 5 or 6 Dec. 1941 as designated.*

[14198] USS Arizona
No log received for Dec. 1941.

USS California
5 Dec. 1941
1149 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.
6 Dec. 1941
1020 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.
Made monthly inspection of all indices of smokeless powder on board; conditions normal.

*See Hearings, Part 3, p. 2677.
USS Maryland
5 Dec. 1941
0710 Food inspection.
6 Dec. 1941
0800 Made daily visual examination of all smokeless powder samples, violet paper, and test for local heating of magazines on board ship; conditions normal.
1330 By order of the Commanding Officer, Lt. (jg) Nelson H. Randall, C-V(S) USNR, was suspended from duty for a period of five days from and including this date for improper performance of duty as Communication Watch Officer failing to deliver a despatch to the Commander Battleships Battle Force. The Commanding Officer further ordered that, due to the exigencies of the service [14199] Lt. (jg) Randall is restored to duty for the duration of the Annual Military Inspection and Damage Control Practice of this vessel on December 8, 1941 and December 9, 1941.

USS Nevada
5 Dec 1941
No inspections.
6 Dec 1941
0705 Food inspection.
0900 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

USS Oklahoma
No log received for Dec 1941.

USS Pennsylvania
5 Dec 1941
0800 Food inspection.
1150 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.
6 Dec. 1941
0833 Landing force left the ship to be inspected by Commander Battleship Division TWO. 1045 Landing force returned.

USS Pennsylvania
6 Dec 1941
1155 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

[14200] USS Tennessee
5 Dec. 1941
1010 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.
1445 Secured boiler number 8 after having conducted tests on safety valves.
6 Dec 1941
0745 Commenced embarking Landing Force for Annual Military Inspection.
1130 Landing Force returned aboard. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

USS West Virginia
No log received for Dec 1941.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Washington, 29 January 1946

R #16
Memorandum:
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. In response to the suggestion in the Record of Proceedings page 7236 that the Navy would make a further check in respect of the logs of certain battleships that were at Pearl Harbor concerning water-tight integrity, it is thought advisable to first refer to the several memoranda previously [14201] forwarded counsel on that subject.

Three previous memoranda with enclosures on this subject have been forwarded to counsel, two being dated 11 December 1945 and one 3 January 1946. The enclosures were dated October, November and December 1941 and 20 December 1945.

2. One of the 11 December 1945 memoranda forwarded as an enclosure a table showing the schedules of inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October,
November and December 1941. This memorandum was referred to in the Record of Proceedings at pages 4436-4439 and the enclosure became Exhibit #69 your investigation.

The second memorandum dated 11 December 1945 referred to information which had been obtained regarding water-tight integrity of major vessels, including that only one vessel, the U.S.S. California, might have been saved from sinking if certain manhole covers had not been left open for maintenance work. This memorandum was quoted in the Record of Proceedings at pages 7233-7235, and the enclosure at pages 7237-7239.

It is noted that the memorandum of Mr. William D. Mitchell to Admiral Colelough dated 11 December 1945 which is quoted in the Record of Proceedings at page 7235, referred to only one of the two Navy Department memoranda to him of that date, and dealt with the question of the names of prospective [14203] witnesses concerning the "inspection charge". This memorandum of Mr. Mitchell was a response to one of the Navy memoranda of 11 December 1945, quoted in the Record of Proceedings at pages 7234-7235, in which the Navy had previously volunteered to furnish the names of witnesses if such were desired by the committee or counsel, and it did not refer to the other Navy memorandum of 11 December bearing on the "inspection charge".

The Navy memorandum of 3 January 1946 referred to the Navy memoranda of 11 December 1945, and enclosed a statement of mention in the logs of the major vessels at Pearl Harbor of inspections on 5 and 6 December 1941 and also a list as prospective witnesses of the names of Senior Surviving Officers and Damage Control Officers of the several major ships sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor.

A perusal of the Record of Proceedings does not disclose that the Navy memorandum of 11 December 1945 forwarding the schedule of inspections which became your Exhibit #69, or the Navy memoranda of 3 January 1946, or the list of prospective witnesses enclosed therewith in response to the memorandum of Mr. Mitchell printed in the Record of Proceedings at page 7235, have been incorporated in the record. Such incorporation may be appropriate in order to make the record complete.

3. With respect to the further check to be made by the Navy referred to in the Record of Proceedings at page 7236, [14204] and supplementing the 20 December 1945 enclosure forwarded with the memorandum of 3 January 1946, the logs of the U.S.S. California, Maryland, Nevada and Tennessee have been examined for any record of any inspections, and for any references concerning water-tight integrity precedent to or in preparation for any inspections on 5, 6, and 7 December 1941, with negative results.

/S/ John Ford Baecher

[14204] Mr. Morgan. We have a communication from Commander Baecher dated April 8, 1946, directed to Mr. Richardson, as follows:

Memorandum:

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. In response to your request for the information, official notification to the Navy Department of the air raid on Pearl Harbor was received by Radio Washington from Radio Honolulu at 1850 GCT (1350 EST), 7 December 1941, by dispatch as follows:

NPM 1516
A0F2 1830 OF3
FROM CINCPAC
ACTION CINCLANT CINCAF OPNAV
AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NOT DRILL

2. At 1930 GCT (1430 EST), 7 December 1941, an ALNAV message was sent by the Secretary of the Navy to all ships and stations reading "Execute WPL-46 against Japan."

/S/ John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.

Mr. Morgan. We have a further communication from the War Department with respect to reels of microfilm received from General MacArthur's headquarters, and we ask that this communication, dated 28 February 1946, be spread on the record.

(The communication referred to follows:)

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

In addition to the 12 reels of microfilm previously received from General MacArthur's headquarters (see Committee transcript pages 7874 and 13,662), there have now been received two more reels containing material from the Japanese file on United States-Japanese negotiations prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. From an examination by qualified Japanese linguists, it appears that of the 80 items in these two reels all were intercepted by the United States at the time of transmission in 1941, except the following:

1. A message from Berlin to Tokyo dated 22 May 1941, giving the substance of an article published in Pravda.
2. A message from New York to Tokyo dated 10 July 1941, giving the substance of an article published in Newsweek.
3. A message from Rome to Tokyo dated 15 September 1941, giving the substance of two United Press dispatches.
5. A memorandum related to the "draft" submitted by Ambassador Nomura to the Secretary of State on 12 May 1941. The draft itself appears at page 420 of Volume 2 of Foreign Relations.

Although none of the above items would appear to be helpful to the Committee, the War Department will of course furnish them if the Committee so requests.

/s/ Harmon Duncombe
HARMON DUNCOMBE
Lt. Colonel, GSC

Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request made by Senator Ferguson at page 522 of the record we have the following pertinent portion from a communication received from the Navy Department dated April 5, 1946:

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Page 522), which is referred to in Item 4 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there is forwarded herewith a copy of the document containing information of the Japanese plans leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor based on information obtain subsequent to 7 December 1941, that was presented to the Secretary of State, the Honorable James F. Byrnes, during the latter part of October.

We request at this point that the entire memorandum be spread on the record.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so spread on the record.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)


(Based upon information obtained subsequent to 7 December 1941)

The following summation has been prepared on the basis of reliable information obtained from various sources subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although this summary does not represent a resume of Japanese Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1, it will be apparent that heavy reliance has nevertheless been placed upon that document, a translation of which is submitted under separate cover.

The Japanese Naval High Command completed preparations during the summer and fall of 1941 to carry out a projected 2-phase plan of conquest and consolidation in the Asiatic-Pacific theatre. The essence of the plan lay in the element of surprise in a sudden attack which at one fell swoop would cripple
the major potential opposition—the American Fleet maintained at Pearl Harbor. Following the crippling of this opposition weapon, coincident with the seizure and occupation of land masses desired for the economic, political, and military reasons that together determined the borders of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Phase 1 of the campaign would be completed, and Phase 2—the consolidation of these gains by the seizure or neutralization of outer areas, together with the continued attrition of the enemy forces and his lines of supply—could be carried out to ensure the permanence of the new Empire.

The Japanese fleet, which had been in training over a period of years for combat fleet operations, was in a state of readiness by the summer of 1941. By late August of 1941, there is evidence based on information believed to be reliable, that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet ordered all fleet commanders and their key staff members to Tokyo for war games preparatory to a final formulation of operation plans. The final games reportedly got underway on 2 September 1941, with most of the high ranking officers participating on one of the three teams that were organized: the “N” (Nippon) Team, “A” (America) Team, and “E” (England) Team.

During the afternoon of 3 September, 50 copies of an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held were prepared and contained the heart of Operation Order No. 1. These plans must have been under development for several months, as extensive preliminary planning was indicated.

On 5 September, it is known that Pearl Harbor plans were under discussion and the Japs apparently expected to catch all major U. S. Fleet units in the Pacific in Pearl Harbor, as well as units which they believed were recently transferred from the Atlantic. “N” Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on Hawaii and one Akagi-class aircraft carrier and one Soryu-class aircraft carrier were estimated as sunk.

On 6 and 7 September, “X” Team debated the best means of assaulting Pearl Harbor. Captain Kurojima (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral Ito (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on Hawaii. Ito was in favor of an early landing but Kurojima won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistic problems.

These early sessions apparently were confined primarily to two general problems: first, the details for a surprise raid on Pearl Harbor; and second, a schedule for occupying, Malaya, Burma, N. E. I., the Philippines, the Solomons, and Central Pacific Islands, including Hawaii. The conferences and games were ended about 13 September. At the end of September, the Main Body of the Jap Fleet moved to Saeki and four revisions of Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 were made while Nagato (Flagship) was at Saeki, although no major changes are indicated.

The actual operation plan itself—Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1—has since been recovered and is reproduced in its entirety under separate cover. The objectives of the campaign strategy, the outline and sequence of operations planned, and the organization of the naval forces allotted to each phase of the operations were set forth in the Operation Order, and are analyzed below.

[14212] Objectives:
The general aims of the entire campaign were predicated on the desires for military conquest and security, and enhancement of the Empire by the occupation of areas rich in natural resources:

“1. In the east, the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of operation and supply lines to the Orient will be cut.

“2. In the west, British Malaya will be occupied and British lines of operation and supply lines to the Orient, as well as the Burma Road, will be cut.

“3. Enemy forces in the Orient will be destroyed, bases of operations will be seized, and areas with natural resources will be occupied.

“4. Strategic areas will be seized and developed; defenses will be strengthened in order to establish a durable basis for operations.

“5. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated.

“6. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will to fight.”

Outline of operations:
For the accomplishment of the objectives stated above, it was contemplated that operations would be carried out in two phases—the First Phase, comprising

* See Appendix 1.
conquest of the American Fleet and occupation of areas desired, in large part, [14213] for economic reasons (the Philippines, British Malaya, Netherlands East Indies); the Second Phase, comprising consolidation of these gains by mopping-up operations, establishment of advance bases for defense of the occupied territory, and the continued attrition of enemy forces and lines of communication. The conquest or neutralization of areas deemed of strategic importance primarily from the point of view of military security was to occur during the Second Phase, no definite plan being provided initially for the chronology of those operations. Apparently both the precise timing of that portion of the campaign and the determination of which of these strategic areas (listed as Eastern New Guinea, New Britain, Fiji, Samoa; Aleutians and Midway; Andaman Islands, strategic points in the Australia Area) would be seized and which merely neutralized, were problems to be worked out in detail following the completion of the occupation of the areas desired for their economic value as integral portions of the new Co-Prosperity Sphere, and to be solved “as quickly as operational conditions permit.”

A. Occupation: “First Phase Operations”:

Basically, at this initial stage of the war, the Imperial Navy had four missions to fulfill:

[14214] (i) The destruction of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian area.

(ii) The maintenance and extension of control over the Central and South Pacific, to deny to others any force which might menace the flank of the forces driving southward.

(iii) The support of army invasion of the Philippines-N. E. I.-Southeast Asiatic areas and the destruction of Allied naval forces therein.

(iv) The protection of the North, both against threats by the United States from the Aleutians and also against a possible attack by the U. S. S. R.

Aside from the considerably inferior air power and the relatively few scattered surface fleet units possessed by the Allies in the Asiatic-N. E. I. area, the only obstacle of consequence was the American Fleet and air-power based at Hawaii. While Japanese land-based air and surface task groups could suffice to support the amphibious landings in the Philippines-N. E. I.-Asiatic area, a major Japanese task force, built around a carrier striking group, was essential to conduct a surprise attack on the American Fleet. Accordingly, the following general allocation of Japanese forces* was planned for the first Phase operations.

(i) For the Pearl Harbor Attack:

[14215] The Striking Force under the Commander in Chief, 1st Air Fleet, comprising 2 fast battleships, 6 first-line carriers (with a maximum of 400 planes of all types), 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 16 destroyers plus.

The Advance Expeditionary Force under the Commander in Chief, 6th Fleet, comprising 1 training cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 20 fleet submarines, and 5 midget submarines.

(ii) For the Invasion of Wake and Guam (and of Rabaul if conditions warranted):

The South Seas Force under the Commander in Chief, 4th Fleet, comprising 4 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 1 training cruiser, 12 destroyers, 16 submarines.

(iii) For the Invasion of the Philippines-N. E. I.-Malaya:

The Southern Force under the Commander in Chief, 2nd Fleet, comprising 2 battleships, 2 small aircraft carriers, 11 heavy cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 52 destroyers, 16 submarines.

(iv) For the protection of the High North:

The Northern Force, under the Commander in Chief, 5th Fleet, comprising 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers.

(v) In Reserve:

The Main Body under the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, comprising 6 battleships, 2 light cruisers, 8 destroyers.

The operations of these forces during the First Phase were to be divided into three periods:

(a) First Period Operations:

Operations from the outbreak of war until the main body of the invasion army had been landed in the Philippines. To end about X plus 20.

(b) Second Period Operations:

Operations after (a) and until the main body of the invasion army had been landed in British Malaya. To end about X plus 40.

* See Appendix 2 for allocation of Japanese Task Forces.
(c) **Third Period Operations:**
Operations after (a) and until the completion of the occupation of the Netherlands East Indies.

(i) **Central Pacific Operations:**
(a) **Attack on Pearl Harbor—Assumptions by the High Command:**
It is clear from a study of the operation plans that the Japanese High Command made the following assumptions about the American Fleet:

(a) That the main body of the United States Pacific Fleet would be at anchor within Pearl Harbor, or at least in the Hawaiian area.

(b) That a fast carrier force could be moved from the Empire across the Pacific to the north of Midway, within striking distance of the main islands of the Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by American defensive reconnaissance.

(c) That should assumption (a) or (b) be in error, a reserve group of heavy units could sortie from the Inland Sea to give support to the carrier striking force in a decisive engagement against the American Fleet. The other task forces of the Japanese Fleet—the Southern Area Force, Northern Area Force, South Seas Force—would also be available. Implicit in the plan is the assumption that in the event of such an engagement, the combined strength of the bulk of the Japanese major fleet units could defeat the American Fleet.

(d) That a powerful carrier air strike directed against the American forces based in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were effected, achieve the strategic result of crippling the American Fleet, and the tactical result of destroying the American land-based air to permit the Japanese striking force to withdraw without damage. While the latter assumption does not appear explicitly in the copy of the Japanese Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 recovered in the Philippines, it is logically implicit in the plan, and probably was a feature of the specific Operation Order issued by the Striking Force Commander. The seizure of air superiority is part of the classic Japanese naval doctrine.

The four assumptions outlined above were well grounded. An espionage network in the Hawaiian Islands, together with uninterdicted cable communications between Hawaii and Japan undoubtedly aided the Japanese in establishing their basic hypothesis—namely, that the bulk of the American Pacific Fleet would be waiting at anchor at Pearl Harbor at the time of their surprise attack. The feasibility of a surprise attack prior to a declaration of war was, of course, borne out by events.

(i) **Diplomatic Deception:**
The operation plan providing for the outbreak of war and the attack on Pearl Harbor was published on 5 November 1941 as Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, and Y day (8 December, Japanese time) was set in Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 2 on 7 November 1941. At the same time, the Japanese envoy Mr. Kurusu was on route to Washington to join the Japanese Ambassador in conducting conversations with the American Government. On 7 November—the date that Y day was set—a "leading Japanese and reliable informant" visited the American Ambassador in Japan reportedly at the request of Foreign Minister Togo and urged repeatedly that, whether or not Japanese concessions were deemed inadequate by the United States, it was of the highest importance that the Washington conversations be continued and not permitted to break down." These conversations were continued throughout November and until the actual launching of the surprise attack. While it is true that Operation Order No. 2, setting Y Day, was not sufficient by itself to effect the launching of the attack on that day, it was sufficient to despatch the various Japanese task forces to their scheduled pre-invasion rendezvous points (Tankan Bay in the Kuriles for the Pearl Harbor Striking Force; Mako in the Pescadores for the main body of the Philippines Force, etc.) and have the Fleet complete its basic preparations for an attack on that day. And it seems evident, from a study of such available subsidiary orders as were issued during November 1941 by certain of the task forces involved in the plan, that the supplementary orders that were to cause the task forces to move forward to their attack positions and were to specify precisely the time for the outbreak of war, were to be issued almost as inevitable concomitants of the initial decision embodied in Operation Orders Nos. 1 and 2. While a radical change in the diplomatic situation might have caused the plan to be abandoned, it seems probable that nothing short of complete American acceptance of the Japanese terms in their note of 20 November 1941 would have been regarded as sufficient to cancel the plans already set in motion. In any event, the continuation of diplomatic negotiations by the Japanese after
their task forces were already [14220] en route to their final goals must be deemed nothing short of deception.

(ii) Radio Silence:
The Striking Force, as it moved north to the sortie point in the Kuriles, and thence, to the eastern Pacific, was operating under strict injunctions to maintain radio silence to help assure the secrecy of its movement and mission.

(iii) Radio Deception:
The 1st Combined Communications Unit was directed to maintain deceptive traffic to simulate the presence of the main strength of the Japanese Fleet in the Inland Sea. At the same time, the early December movements of the Japanese units en route to the south were not conducted under complete radio silence—possibly because the element of surprise for that part of the campaign could not be preserved by silence since Allied visual observations could be made of those movements and possibly because of the belief that the ability of Allied intelligence to trace the southwest movements of the Southern Force, and only those movements, would further bolster the effectiveness of the strategic surprise desired for the operations of the Striking Force.

Composition of the Forces Attacking Pearl Harbor:

Striking Force
Commanding Officer: Commander in Chief, 1st Air Fleet—Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo.
Battleship Division #3 (1st section) (Hiei, Kirishima), 2 battleships.
Carrier Division #1 (Kaga, Kaga).
Carrier Division #2 (Hiryu, Soryu).
Carrier Division #5 (Shokaku, Zuikaku), 6 aircraft carriers.
Cruiser Division #8 (Tone, Chikuma), 2 heavy cruisers.
Destroyer Squadron 1 (Abukuma, 4 destroyer divisions) 1 light cruiser; 16 destroyers, plus 11 train vessels.

Advance Expeditionary Fleet
Commanding Officer: Commander in Chief, 6th Fleet—Vice Admiral Mitsumi Shimizu. Isuzu, Yura), 2 light cruisers; (Katori), 1 training cruiser; I-class submarines (including Submarine Squadrons #1, #2, #3: (I-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22-24, 68, 60, 74), 20 submarines. Midget submarines, 5 midget submarines, plus 6 train vessels.

Execution of the Operation:
The Striking Force assembled at Tankan Bay in Etorofu Island (Kuriles) during late November 1941, and sortied for [14222] the attack on or about 27 November, following a course to the eastward and then southward, as indicated on the captured track chart appended (see Appendix 3). Of the 11 train vessels allotted in the Operation Plan, reliable information suggests that only 3 tankers and 1 supply ship actually accompanied the Force. Apparently also, 3 submarines of the Advance Expeditionary Force (submarine fleet) accompanied the Striking Force—the other submarines having proceeded from the Inland Sea independently of the Striking Force. During the fast voyage to their destination 200 miles due north of Oahu, the vessels of the carrier force were kept fueled successfully, albeit with considerable difficulty in many cases. Upon arrival at their destination, about 200 miles due north of Oahu, the carriers launched their aircraft, which rendezvoused further south and then flew in for a coordinated attack. Three waves of these carrier aircraft were employed, commencing at 0747 and ending at 0936, local time; the first attack was on various airfields, followed by attacks on the warships in Pearl Harbor. Following the successful completion of these surprise attacks, the carrier force withdrew to the Empire, taking a circuitous route to Hashirajima and arriving on 23 December. En route, Carrier Division #2 (Hiryu, Soryu) and Cruiser Division #8 (Tone, Chikuma) were detached as a small reinforcement group for the Wake Island operation. Losses sustained by the Striking Force during the Hawaiian operation reportedly [14223] totalled 29 aircraft.

Until the completion of the surprise attack on Hawaii by the Striking Force, the “Advance Expeditionary Force” of submarines was under the command of the Striking Force Commander. The precise movements of the participating submarines prior to the actual attack are not clear, although some information suggests that the bulk of those units left the Empire in late November. So far as is known, the functions allotted the submarines in Operation Order No. 1 were carried out as planned, viz:
(a) Until X—3, submarines were to reconnoiter important points in the Aleutians, Samoa, Fiji, and Tutuila, and were to observe and report on any powerful American forces discovered.

(b) One element was to patrol along the route of the Striking Force in advance of the movement of that Force—ensure the undetected approach of the carrier group to its destination.

(c) Until X—5, the remaining submarines were to surround Hawaii at extreme range while one element approached and reconnoitered without being observed.

(d) On X day, the function of the submarines would be to "observe and attack the American Fleet in the Hawaii Area; make a surprise attack on the channel leading into Pearl Harbor [14224] and attempt to close it; if the enemy moves out to fight he will be pursued and attacked."

Prior to the attack on X Day, the force of I-class submarines took up scouting positions in several allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, while the 5 midget submarines were launched as a Special Attack Force to conduct an offensive attack against American warships within the Harbor and to prevent the escape of the fleet through the Harbor entrances during the scheduled aerial strike. Available data indicates that only one of the five subs penetrated into the Harbor; none of the five inflicted any damage on American units, and none of the five rejoined the Japanese Fleet. American naval units accounted for 3, possibly 4, of the total, and the 5th beached itself at Oahu.

During and after the attack, submarines outside of the Harbor area remained on patrol to oppose any possible sortie of American warships. The following is a translation of an extract from the "Report of the I-60's Operations off Pearl Harbor, 8–10 December 1941" (Tokyo time), written by the Commanding Officer of the I-60 (flagship of Submarine Division 12) and presents a picture of the operation as experienced by one of the Japanese units on patrol:

"During daylight on December 8 (December 7 Honolulu time), the I-69 was cruising submerged, engaged in surveillance in Scouting Sector D (about 17 miles southwest of Pearl [14225] Harbor). Immediately after the attack upon the enemy by the Striking Force and the Special Attack Force, we were able to hear easily, by means of submarine sound detectors, explosions of bombs and torpedoes, and upon hearing the sound of depth charges, I judged that the Special Attack Force was engaged in heavy fighting.

"At 1400 radio orders from the Commander of Submarine Forces were received, assigning the I-69 to a surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area (a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the center). The orders further specified the annihilation of the remaining enemy forces.

"After sunset we surfaced, in an attempt to assist as much as possible, but during the night we sighted five destroyers. While submerging, we received a close-range depth-charge attack. At 0015 on the 9th (Tokyo time) we surfaced, making certain that no enemy patrol boats were within close range. On a course obliquely to the west, and at battle speed, we hurriedly recharged batteries.

"We sighted 2 patrol vessels on our port quarter and beam respectively, each about 5 kilometers away, and in about 30 minutes we reversed course. Pearl Harbor shone red in the sky, like a thing aflare. It was already dawn."

In the post-attack phase, the I-class submarines maintained their patrols for some time, and at least one of the [14226] group—the I-7—launched its aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain the status of the American fleet and installations. The operation plan had provided, in the event of the virtual destruction of the American Fleet at Pearl, that one Submarine Division or less would be placed between Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic and in fact at least one submarine—the I-17—was despatched for the Oregon coast about 14 December.
### Appendix 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval general staff</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Official duties</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Umpires</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagano, Osami</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>Head of First Section (War Planes and Operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukutome, Shigeru</td>
<td>Rear Admiral</td>
<td>Member First Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uozumi, Jisaku</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Head of Sub-Section, First Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yamamoto, Chikao</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Member Sub-Section, First Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mayuzumi, Harue</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Member Sub-Section, First Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tamura, Saburo</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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**Head of First Section (War Planes and Operations)**

**Member of Military Affairs Bureau**

**Member of Office of Military Supply**

**Private Secretary to Navy Minister (Admiral Shimada, Shigetaro)**

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**CinC Combined Fleet**

**Chief of Staff**

**Deputy Chief of Staff**

**Staff Adjutant**

**Staff Engineering Officer**

**Staff Gunner Officer**

**Staff Air Officer**

**Staff Communication Officer**

**Staff Navigation Officer**

**Staff Operations and Plans Officer**

**Staff Torpedo Officer**

**Staff Supply Officer**

**Meteorologist Attached to Staff**
APPENDIX 2

Japanese Task Forces

Main Body (Commander in Chief Combined Fleet) (Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto); (6 Battleships, 2 Light Cruisers, 8 Destroyers); Battleship Division #1 (2 Battleships) (Mitsu, Nagato); Battleship Division #2 (4 Battleships) (Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro); Cruiser Division #9 (2 Light Cruisers) (Kitagami, Oi); 8 Destroyers (Names uncertain)

Striking Force (Commander in Chief 1st Air Fleet) (Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo); (2 Battleships, 6 Aircraft carriers, 2 Heavy Cruisers, 1 Light Cruiser, 16 Destroyers); Battleship Division #3 (1st Section) (2 Battleships) (Hiei, Kirishima); Carrier Division #1 (2 Aircraft carriers) (Kaga, Akagi); Carrier Division #2 (2 Aircraft carriers) (Hiryu, Soryu); Carrier Division #5 (2 Aircraft carriers) (Shokaku, Zuikaku); Cruiser Division #8 (2 Heavy Cruisers) (Tone, Chikuma); Destroyer Squadron #1 (1 Light Cruiser, 16 Destroyers) (Abukuma, Destroyer names uncertain)

Southern Force (Commander in Chief 2nd Air Fleet) (Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo); (2 Battleships, 2 Small Aircraft carriers, 12 Heavy Cruisers, 7 Light Cruisers, 52 Destroyers, 16 Submarines); Battleship Division #3 (2nd Section) (2 Battleships) (Kongo, Haruna) Carrier Division #4 (1st Section) (2 Small Aircraft carriers) (Probably Shoho and Ryujo); Cruiser Division #4 (4 Heavy Cruisers) (Atago, Takao, Maya, Chokai); Cruiser Division #5 (3 Heavy Cruisers) (Haguro, Myoko, Nachi); Cruiser Division #7 (4 Heavy Cruisers) (Mogami, Mikuma, Kuma, Suzuya); Cruiser Division #16 (1 Heavy Cruiser, 3 Light Cruisers) (Ashigara, Kuma, Kinu, Nagara); Destroyer Squadron #2 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (Jintsu. Destroyer names uncertain); Destroyer Squadron #3 (1 Light Cruiser, 16 Destroyers) (Sendai. Destroyer names uncertain); Destroyer Squadron #4 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (Naka. Destroyer names uncertain); Destroyer Squadron #5 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (Natori. Destroyer names uncertain); About 16 Submarines (Names uncertain)

APPENDIX 2

Japanese Task Forces—(continued)

South Seas Force (Commander in Chief 4th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inoue); (4 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 12 Destroyers, 16 Submarines) Kashima (Light Cruiser); Cruiser Division #6 (4 Heavy Cruisers) (Aoba, Furutaka, Kinugasa, Kako); Cruiser Division #18 (2 Light Cruisers) (Tenryu, Tatsuta); Destroyer Squadron #6 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (Yubari. Destroyer names uncertain); About 16 Submarines (Names uncertain)

Northern Force (Commander in Chief 5th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Boshiro Hosokaya); (2 Light Cruisers, 2 Destroyers); Cruiser Division #21 (2 Light Cruisers) (Tama, Kisso); 2 Destroyers

Advance Expeditionary Force (Commander in Chief 6th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Mitsumit Shimazu); 3 Light Cruisers (Katori, Isuzu, Yura); About 26 Submarines

Attached Forces (Training) Carrier Division #4 (2nd Section) (2 Small Aircraft carriers) (Probably Hosho and Zuiko); Miscellaneous Vessels.
Appendix 3

Above [opposite] is shown a captured track chart of Jap carriers, covering the period from Pearl Harbor to Midway. During the operations noted, this Jap Carrier Force was commanded by the late Vice-Admiral Nagumo as CinC First Air Fleet. The approximate approach of the Carrier Task Force to Hawaii is indicated. According to another document, recovered from a crashed enemy plane shortly after the raid, Jap aircraft flew off their carriers about 200 miles due north of Oahu, rendezvoused further south, and then flew in for a coordinated attack. From 0755 to 0825 (Honolulu Time), VT and VD attacks were made on U. S. installations. After a 15-minute lull, these were followed by horizontal VB strikes and recurrent VD attacks.

[14233] Mr. Morgan. Consistent with a request made by Senator Ferguson for information regarding reports of Japanese air reconnaissance over the Philippines, or other U. S. possessions in the Pacific prior to December 7, 1941, we have from the Navy Department a communication dated February 8, 1946, concerning this matter transmitting enclosures. We would request that the letter of transmittal and the enclosures be spread on the record at this point.

The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record at this point.

(The letter of transmittal and enclosures follow:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Washington, 8 February 1946.

1083A
R. #119
Memorandum:
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. In response to Senator Ferguson's request for information regarding reports of Japanese air reconnaissance over the Philippines or other U. S. Possessions in the Pacific prior to December 7, 1941, the following references are given:

a. " * * * Rear Admiral Toshio Matsumago, Retired, in [14234] interview published in Hochi States Japanese should face future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over Guam total sixteen times this year without sighting single American plane x American air power Far East negligible x prior retirement Matsumaga served twelve years as aviator Commander Ryujo Acagi Tatsyama Air Station now Di-rector Japan airways." (Narrative Statement, page 239; NCI exhibit 12).

b. Dispatch from Marine detachment, Wake Island to ComFOURTEEN, dated 25 November 1941, stating that on 24 November 2115 hours the Pan-American clipper sighted four Japanese sea planes about 1,000 miles east of Guam, flying south at an altitude of 10,000 feet. Narrative statement, page 392; Hewitt exhibit 27, page 127).

c. Dispatch from GovGuam, 240610, dated November 24, 1941. Copy attached.

d. Extract from the interrogation of Captain Takahashi. Copy attached.

2. It is possible that support was given to the belief that Japanese air reconnaissance was being made throughout the Pacific (over all Allied Island possessions) by a report of such reconnaissance over the Gilberts, given in a dispatch originated by the naval attaché at Singapore [14235] on 22 November, paraphrase of which is made in the Hewitt exhibit 27, page 14T. Copy of dispatch #220228 is attached.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

79716—46—pt. 11—15
[14236] Naval Message

From: ALUSNA Singapore
To: OPNAV (Action) CINCPAC, CINCAF (Info.)
Date: 23 November 1941
230228

Routine Dependable reports here of reconnaissance flights over Gilbert Islands on November 15 by monoplane with tapered wings, single tailfin, twin engines. Next day repeated by monoplane flying boat silver color number of engines unobserved. Top secret.

[14237] Naval Message

From: Governor Guam
To: OPNAV (Action) CINCPAC, CINCAF (Info.)
Date: 24 November 1941
249610

Deferred At 1217 local time today unidentified two-engined plane sighted, circling southern end of island. Altitude approximately 15,000 feet. At 1226 local time plane passed out of sight to southwest. Top secret

[14238] INTERROGATION OF CAPTAIN TAKAHASHI ON 20 OCTOBER 1945

I. Positions held by Captain Takahashi

May 1941–December 1942: On staff of Eleventh Air Fleet in Philippine Islands and Dutch East Indies. This was the duty period on which Captain Takahashi was questioned.

January 1943–June 1945: Senior member of Navy Aeronautical Bureau, Tokyo. July 1945–August 1945: Senior Staff officer of Fifth Air Fleet and senior staff officer of Third Air Fleet.

20 October 1945: Chief of Sendai Naval Personnel Bureau.

II. Summary

* * * The primary mission of the Japanese Force in FORMOSA, composed of about 300 fighters and bombers, was the annihilation of the American Air Force in the PHILIPPINES. In this, it was successful partly because complete information relative to the American Air Force [14239] was obtained by Aerial Reconnaissance prior to commencement of hostilities.

III. “Q” What gave the Japanese impression that there were 900 planes in the area and how did you discover that there were 300 instead of 900?”

“A” The Navy received on 20 November 1941, a report from the Foreign Affairs Department that there were about 900 planes in the LUZON area. A photographic reconnaissance plane conducted a search on the 24th or 25th of November over that area and discovered that there were only 300 planes. One reconnaissance plane made flights at that time.”

[14240] Mr. Morgan. We have here a letter from Commander Baecher, dated 7 March 1946, setting forth a request by Mrs. T. S. Wilkinson, the widow of Admiral Wilkinson, that certain information with respect to her husband and his testimony, and also a letter from Admiral Ingersoll to Admiral Wilkinson dated 26 December 1945 be placed in the record. We request that this letter from the Navy Department of March 7, together with the enclosures be spread on the record at this point.

The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record at this point.

(The letter and enclosures referred to follow:)

Memorandum:

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. It will be recalled that during the course of his interrogation Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson testified concerning the duties of his office which, at least in part, was transcribed at pages 4576-4577 of the Record of Proceedings.

2. It further appears that at the request of Vice Admiral Wilkinson there were read into the Record of Proceedings, at pages 5100-5104, a memorandum of Vice Admiral A. G. Kirk, and two dispatches exchanged between Vice Admiral Wilkinson and Rear Admiral James, pertaining to matters referred to in the testimony of Vice Admiral Wilkinson at said pages 4576-4577 of the Record.

3. In connection with the same matter Vice Admiral Wilkinson wrote a letter to Admiral R. E. Ingersoll on 20 December 1945, in which he referred to his own and Admiral Turner's testimony, and forwarded as the first enclosure a copy of the memorandum of Vice Admiral Kirk referred to above and as the second enclosure a copy of his own testimony as transcribed at said pages 4576-4577 of the Record of Proceedings before the Joint Committee, and inquired as to Admiral Ingersoll's recollection of the matter. Admiral Ingersoll answered Vice Admiral Wilkinson's letter by letter of 26 December 1945.

4. Mrs. T. S. Wilkinson states that her lately deceased husband, Vice Admiral Wilkinson, refrained at the time from forwarding to the committee the exchange of correspondence with Admiral Ingersoll because he thought the subject matter would be covered when Admiral Ingersoll appeared as a witness. She feels that it now appears that the interrogation of Admiral Ingersoll did not cover the particular question, and has found the letters among Vice Admiral Wilkinson's effects. Accordingly Mrs. Wilkinson, having first obtained the permission of Admiral Ingersoll to such use of his letter, requests in behalf of her husband that the pertinent parts of the exchange of correspondence between Vice Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Ingersoll be read into and made a part of the stenographic record of the committee's proceedings. Accordingly there are attached hereto, marked Enclosures A and B respectively, copies of the second enclosure to Vice Admiral Wilkinson's letter of 20 December 1945 to Admiral Ingersoll and of Admiral Ingersoll's letter dated 26 December 1945.

/s/ John Ford Baecher,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

ENCLOSURE A

Admiral Wilkinson. I said that the text of the regulations which you introduced read "Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable."

I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate and spread abroad all types of basic information, what General Miles has termed static information, such as the defenses of the country, its economics, the diplomatic relations, the characters and activities and previous careers of its military and naval men, the location of its fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and everything other than the enemy probable intentions, and such specific information as in itself might give rise or might require action by our fleet, or by our naval forces.
In the latter case before dissemination I would consult higher authority, either the Assistant Chief, the Chief of Naval Operations, or my Colleague, Chief of War Plans, in order that this information which I sent out would not be in conflict with his understanding of the naval situation, and the operations for which he was responsible.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, you had the responsibility to disseminate, but where you reached a situation which led you to feel that the information disseminated might approach the area of a directive, or an order to take some specific action to the recipient then you felt you were required to consult War Plans, or the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly.

Enclosure B:

Staff Headquarters
Western Sea Frontier
Federal Office Building
San Francisco, California, 26 December, 1945.

My Dear Wilkinson: I have your letter of 20 December regarding your testimony before the Committee and also the two enclosures.

My understanding of the instructions given to Naval Intelligence in 1941 is exactly in accord with your testimony as you gave it in the hearings, and as embodied in the second enclosure of your letter.

I remember that discussions took place sometime in '41 although I had forgotten that Kirk took part in the discussions. I remember it more as a discussion with you. I do remember distinctly, however, pointing out that our organization was not like military intelligence and that the Estimate of the Situation should be prepared by the War Plans Division, although the data for the part "Enemy Intentions" naturally would have to be based on data and information gathered by Naval Intelligence.

With kindest regards and all best wishes for the New Year, I am

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Ingersoll.

Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, USN.,
3043 "X" Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Morgan. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. There being nothing further, the committee will stand adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 5:40 p. m., the Committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, MAY 23, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in the committee room of the Committee on the District of Columbia, United States Capitol, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), and Murphy.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Richardson.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lane wants to offer, with the permission of the committee, a number of answers to requests which have been made in the record, in order to clean up that part of the record.

The Chairman. I might state before you start that the Senate meets at 11 o'clock today and the House also meets at 11 o'clock. We will have to work pretty fast here to get through before the two Houses meet.

I just wanted that to be understood, so that we wouldn't waste any time.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I suggested to Senator Ferguson and counsel, while talking informally, that in view of the fact that the Senate is meeting at 11 o'clock today and the House is also meeting at 11 o'clock, that probably the best thing to do would be for us to receive these documents for the record, close the record, and then adjourn subject to call of the Chair, with the idea that as early next week as can be conveniently arranged we could have another meeting of the committee.

The Chairman. Senator George cannot be here this morning as he is presiding at a Finance Committee meeting; and Mr. Clark is away, as is also Mr. Gearhart. So it would be my purpose to call an executive committee meeting the first [14249] day of next week that is available.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark will in all probability be back next week.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, it would be my suggestion that we hold this record open to put these things in. I would like to have time to go over them after they are in the record.
The Chairman. The Chair wishes to state this, Senator, that the committee voted last week to close the record today, and I wouldn’t feel at liberty to hold the record open unless the committee reverses its action taken last week.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I received the answers to questions put to Mr. Hull yesterday. As the Chair knows we have had very important sessions. We had a very important session yesterday and finally voted. It was necessary that I stay on the floor. I haven’t had time to properly analyze the material to see whether or not other questions should be submitted. Those I analyzed were very unsatisfactory, so far as I personally was concerned.

I feel that we have failed utterly to get information by the system of using interrogatories. It was difficult enough to get testimony from the witnesses in the hearings. I feel that it has failed and that we should have some time to submit interrogatories.

For instance, I asked many questions of Mr. Stimson. He didn’t see fit to answer the first set of questions at all. Personally I don’t feel that he even answered the second questions, but he did at least give us some answers to those.

Now, if we spend months, and we have spent months, on this matter, I feel that we should have a complete record. I certainly want to have a complete record of the Pearl Harbor facts. I feel that by closing this record today, without the right to submit further questions, without the right of getting the Stimson diary, that we are not getting all of the facts.

The Chairman. Well, the committee will have to pass on that.

Senator Ferguson. I realize that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. We will go ahead. We don’t want to argue that now.

Senator Ferguson. I am not arguing it.

The Chairman. No; but we have taken time, which is very short and very precious. I will be perfectly frank to state that unless the committee itself orders it, reverses the action that it took to close the record today, that is what the order was, with only two votes against that motion, made by Mr. Keefe, unless the committee desires otherwise I am going to adhere to the action taken by the committee.

I don’t see how I can do otherwise as chairman of this committee. If the committee wants to take a different action when it meets again, that is its business, but so far as the orders of the committee are at present, the hearing of evidence and the record was to be closed today.

Whether you or I, or the committee, or anybody else, could get any additional information from Mr. Stimson than his reply to interrogatories, I do not know. It is unfortunate that Mr. Stimson’s health has been such that he couldn’t appear in person. I think that we all have the greatest respect for Mr. Stimson and that the country has the greatest respect for Mr. Stimson. I haven’t had a chance to read his replies, but I don’t think it is necessary for me to read them in order to determine whether there should be any more hearings or any more questions asked of him. I presume he gave us the best information he could in reply to the questions. If he hasn’t, I don’t know whether additional questions sent to him would elicit anything further or not.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, it is only that I think we ought
to be given that opportunity. At least I would like to have made a part of this record the questions that I submitted and a showing that he did not answer.

The Chairman. I presume that the questions submitted are a part of the record, that they were made a part of the record, as much as the answers. Without seeing the questions and the answers, I assume the questions would be made a part of the record just as if they had been asked in open hearing.

Senator Ferguson. I didn't know. That is the reason I asked.

The Chairman. I assume so. Isn't that true, Counsel?

Mr. Richardson. My idea would be that whatever we got from Mr. Stimson would appear in this record.

The Chairman. Yes, and the same with regard to Mr. Hull. Let's go ahead.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire if the Hull answers are here ready to be put in the record today?

Mr. Lane. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I presume all members received them and that they are here ready to be put in the record today. Go ahead.

Mr. Lane. The Committee sent certain interrogatories to former Secretary of State Cordell Hull on April 5, 1946. We have received his answers to the interrogatories, and ask that the interrogatories, the answers thereto, and their letter of transmittal dated May 16, 1946, be spread on the record.

The Chairman. Without objection, that will be done.

(The answers given by Mr. Hull to interrogatories submitted to him by the Committee follow:) ¹

MAY 16, 1946.

The Honorable Alben W. Barkley, Chairman,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MY DEAR MR. BARKLEY, Reference is made to your letter of April 5, 1946, enclosing a set of 169 interrogatories which the committee desired me to consider and make such reply thereto as my recollection of the facts might warrant.

In pursuance of your request I enclose my replies to the interrogatories. I feel that most of the matters covered in my replies have already been set forth in the record of the Department of State or in my prepared statement to the committee. I trust that my replies satisfactorily dispose of the questions concerning which the committee has inquired.

Sincerely yours,


Enclosure:
Replies to interrogatories.

REPLIES TO INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY THE HONORABLE HOMER FERGUSON, MEMBER OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1. Question: Is it correct to say, Mr. Secretary, that the first specific point in the 10 points of the American note of November 26, 1941, proposed that Japan enter a seven-power nonaggression compact? (See For. Rel. vol. 2, 769.)

¹ Mr. Hull was sworn by the Chairman at the time of his appearance before the Committee on November 23, 1945. See Hearings, Part 2, p. 403 et seq.
Answer: In this Government's outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan communicated to the Japanese Government on November 26 there were listed in section 2 under 10 headings steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan of which the first heading reads as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States.

2. Question: [14255] Is it correct to say that, in your conversation with the Japanese Ambassadors on November 22, 1941, you broached the matter of proposing to Japan SOMETIME a broad comprehensive plan involving the collaboration of other nations? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 761.)

Answer: On November 22, 1941, I told the Japanese Ambassador that I had in mind taking up with him sometime a general and comprehensive program which we had been engaged in developing and which involved collaboration of other countries. Our broad approach was toward a world objective, not a local, regional, or bilateral objective. While the initial step was bilateral as between the Japanese and ourselves, what we were trying to do was to get Japan to adopt a peaceful program on world-wide lines. Had we been successful Japan would have been able to satisfy all her needs by taking advantage of the principles, for example, of the Nine-Power Agreement and the Good Neighbor policy. We envisaged, of course, the assumption by Japan of obligations along with the acquisition by her of rights.

3. Question: Did the Japanese Ambassadors reply that Japan was interested in a bilateral agreement with the United States? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 762.)

[14256] Answer: The Japanese Ambassador said that the Japanese had in mind negotiating a bilateral agreement with us to which other powers could subsequently give their adherence. The Japanese, throughout the conversations, had shown apparently little thought for the rights and interests of countries in the Pacific area other than Japan and the United States. From the outset of the conversations I had endeavored to make it clear to the Japanese that this Government could not join with Japan in disposing of questions affecting the rights and interests of the other concerned powers without consulting them prior to entering into formal negotiations on these matters with the Japanese. There could not have been, however, any doubt in the mind of the Japanese Ambassador that our conversations looked to our entering into a bilateral agreement with Japan as our immediate objective even though we held to the view that other powers should be consulted.

4. Question: Did the Japanese Ambassadors say to you, after reading the note of November 26 and the oral statement of the 26th, that the American proposal was unacceptable and was to be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 766.)
Answer: \([14257]\) After the Japanese Ambassadors had read the documents handed to them on November 26 containing an outline of the proposed basis of an agreement between the United States and Japan and an explanatory oral statement, Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end. Neither Mr. Kurusu nor Ambassador Nomura stated that the American proposal was unacceptable.

5. Question: Is it correct to say that the position of the State Department has been that the American note of the 26th was a necessary restatement of American policy as the only logical and practical means by which peaceful conditions might obtain in the Pacific Ocean? \((\text{For. Rel. 767 et. al.})\)

Answer: In answer to this question, I refer to my statement before the joint committee on November 19, 1945, in which I said:

Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either Government was free to offer.

In that same statement I also said:

\([14258]\) The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals.

That confusion prevailed both in Japan and the United States. We knew from Japanese acts and utterances that the Japanese proposal of November 20 was their last word and it was obviously desirable that the record of the American Government's position throughout the conversations be made crystal clear. Therefore, the proposals of November 26 were directed toward making our position utterly clear and toward keeping the door open for further conversations notwithstanding the ultimate character of the Japanese proposal of November 20. The principles set forth in our November 26 proposal were in all important respects essentially the same principles we had been proposing to the Japanese right along. Had the Japanese had the least disposition to pursue a peaceful course, a more desirable program could not have been offered to them. All Japan had to do to take advantage of our offer was to abandon her course of aggression and to adopt the accepted rules of peaceful international conduct. In the explanatory statement which accompanied the proposal there was reviewed \([14259]\) briefly the objective sought in the exploratory conversations, namely, that of arriving at an agreement regarding Pacific questions on a basis of peace, law and order, and fair dealing among nations.

6. Question: It was stated, was it not, by the American Government to Japan in the note of the 26th that the Japanese proposal of November 20 fell short of the objectives desired? \((\text{For. Rel. vol. 2, 767.})\)
Answer: In this Government's communication to the Japanese Government of November 26 it was stated:

The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order, and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

The Japanese asked in their proposal of November 20 that the United States [14260] agree to cease giving aid to China; that the United States desist from augmenting its military forces in the western Pacific; that the United States help Japan obtain products of the Netherlands East Indies; that the United States undertake to resume commercial relations with Japan; that the United States undertake to supply to Japan "a required quantity of oil"; while Japan on her part would be free to continue her military operations in and against China and to keep her troops in Indochina and to attack the Soviet Union, would have her funds unfrozen, would be able to buy with comparative freedom from the United States, would be assured adequate supplies of oil, and would be under no obligation to remove her troops from Indochina until she should have completed her conquest of China or conditions of peace satisfactory to her had been established "in the Pacific area."

Before and after presenting that proposal, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu talked emphatically about the urgency of the situation and intimated vigorously that this was Japan's last word and if an agreement along those lines was not quickly concluded ensuing developments might be most unfortunate.

What Japan asked in that proposal would, had it been agreed to by the United States, have meant condonement by the United States of Japan's past aggressions, assent by [14261] the United States to unlimited courses of conquest by Japan in the future, abandonment by the United States of its whole past position in regard to the most essential principles of its foreign policy in general, betrayal by the United States of China, and acceptance by the United States of a position as a silent partner aiding and abetting Japan in her effort to create a Japanese hegemony in and over the western Pacific and Eastern Asia.

Acceptance by us of the Japanese proposal of November 20 would have placed Japan in a commanding position in her movement to acquire control of the entire western Pacific area; would have destroyed our chances of asserting and maintaining our rights and interests in the Pacific; and in its final analysis would have meant a most serious threat to our national security. She also clung to her vantage point in Indochina which threatened the security of the countries to the
south and menaced vital trade routes. Their conditional offer to withdraw troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina was meaningless as they could have brought those troops back to southern Indochina within a day or two, and furthermore they placed no limit on the number of troops they might continue to send there.

7. Question: Did our Government reject the Japanese note of * [14262] November 20, 1941, which you described as an ultimatum?

Answer: The Japanese proposal of November 20, which I have described in response to question No. 6, was of so preposterous a character that no responsible American official could ever have dreamed of accepting it. Nevertheless, I felt that I should not be violent in my comment to the Japanese in regard to it so as to avoid giving them any pretext to walk out on the conversations.

Therefore, despite the ultimative character of the Japanese proposal, and despite the slim possibility that Japan would elect to continue the conversations, we proposed to keep alive that possibility while restating our fundamental principles. The Army and Navy were asking for more time, as they had for months past, and I had that situation very much at heart. Moreover, we wanted to show our interest in peace up to the last split second and at the same time to expose the bad faith of the Japanese. Everything we said or did was with those considerations in mind. In drawing up a full restatement of our principles, we gave exemplifications of their application to the situation in the Pacific area, and we invited the Japanese to continue the conversations with that statement as a basis.

8. Question: It was stated, was it not that, therefore, the United States was setting forth to Japan a broad and comprehensive program under which the desired objectives could be attained? * (For. Rel. vol. 2, 767.)

Answer: In this Government's oral statement to the Japanese Government of November 26 it was stated:

* * * the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

As I said in my statement before the joint committee of November 19, 1945, in reviewing what I had told press correspondents on the day following the date of delivery to the Japanese of the communication under reference,

I found there had been so much confusion and so many collateral matters brought in along with high Japanese officials in Tokyo proclaiming their old doctrines of force, that I thought it important to bring the situation to a clear perspective. So I had recounted and restated the fundamental principles and undertook to make application of them to a number of specific conditions such as would logically go into a broad basis peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

[14264] There had been every kind of suggestion made as we had gone along in the conversations. I said that I had considered everything in the way of suggestions from the point of view whether it would facilitate, keep alive, and if possible carry forward conversations looking toward a general agreement, all the while naturally
preserving the fullest integrity of every principle for which we stood. I had sought to examine everything possible but always to omit consideration of any proposal that would contemplate the stoppage of the conversations and search for a general agreement for peace.

9. Question: When did you prepare the message which President Roosevelt was to send to the Japanese Emperor the night of December 6, 1941?
Answer: The idea of a message from the President to the Emperor had been under consideration by the President and myself as far back as the middle of October, as is clear from the record before the committee. The message as actually sent was prepared in final form on December 6, and included contributions made in the White House as well as material contained in drafts prepared in the State Department during preceding weeks.

[14265] 10. Question: For the purpose of a question I shall quote from the President's message to the Emperor: "Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indochina would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area"—end of quotation and I ask: Is it correct to say that the withdrawal of the Japanese from Indochina, under a neutral guarantee of the integrity of Indochina by the interested parties, was the single specific proposal of the message of the Emperor, sent by President Roosevelt on December 6? And fulfillment of it would have assured peace in the southwest Pacific, in the opinion of the President?
Answer: In the President's message to the Japanese Emperor the President stated that "both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat." The President was seeking to make a broad appeal. The withdrawal by Japan of its armed forces from Indochina would have assured the creation of an atmosphere which would have rendered possible resumption of conversations looking to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Conversely, Japan's refusal to accept the President's proposal would expose her real purpose. Indochina was the logical and by far the most feasible jumping-off place for a Japanese movement to the south. The President by his proposal for the neutralization of Indochina on July 24 had already strongly tested Japan's purposes in her continued movement south by proposing that she get out of Indochina—and the Japanese Government by its clear-cut refusal betrayed its military designs on the South Sea area. This proposal also served to expose Japan's intentions not to consider peaceful arrangements with us unless we were prepared to make all the concessions. The President was now making an additional last-minute appeal. He, of course, knew that the huge Japanese armada had already left the jumping-off place in Indochina, which, from our viewpoint, meant that the danger of attack could not have been more imminent. Nevertheless, the President believed that he should not neglect even the slim chance that an additional last-minute appeal might save the situation. It also served to make clear
to the American people and to the world our interest in maintaining peace up to the very last minute.

11. Question: Was there anything in the December 6 message proposing a Japanese withdrawal from China—a pledge not to interfere should the United States be drawn into war by Germany—or a proposal for Japan's adherence to a seven-power nonaggression pact?

Answer: [14,267] Inasmuch as the November 26 proposal of this Government was already before the Japanese, the appeal to the Emperor was made specifically applicable to the critical situation created by the Japanese military movement from and within Indochina which we had very much in our minds. Indochina was the seat of the most acute and imminent danger at that moment. The other subjects at issue with Japan mentioned in your question had been thrashed out over and over again during 6 months of conversations.

Throughout the conversations we had vainly urged on Japan that she abandon conquest, including the conquest of China. We also had asked the Japanese to give up her alliance with Germany and Italy which was directed against us, but they clung to that alliance like they clung to their very life. We had fully demonstrated the utter impossibility of getting Japan to budge on these questions.

Questions 12, 13, and 38 are grouped in a single answer.

12. Question: The intercepted diplomatic messages of the Japanese show that on November 26 Nomura and Kurusu requested permission of Tokyo to request that President Roosevelt wire to a Japanese official, Premier Tojo, I presume, and ask that peace be maintained for the sake of posterity and that Japan replied with a cordial message, were you aware, on November 29, that this document was in the possession [14,268] of the American Government as decoded on November 28? (Intercepted messages, exhibit 1, p. 180.)

13. Question: The intercepted Japanese messages show that, on November 28, the Japanese Ambassadors received from Tokyo a message that was secretly intercepted and decoded by the American Government on the same day, and which said: I quote: "I contacted the man you told me to in your No. 1180 and he said that under present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable" end quotation; were you aware of the existence of this document on November 30? (Cf. Intercepted messages, exhibit 1, p. 195, last two sentences of No. 844.)

38. Question: You saw the intercepted Japanese messages, did you not?

Answer: I was at all times intensely interested in the contents of the intercepts. I instructed my secretaries to show me promptly any and all intercepts of material value and importance to the State Department. This, it seemed to me, they did. So far as I was able to judge, all of such intercepts were shown to me. The State Department was on a 24-hour basis and messages received in the Department after office hours in whatever form when important were delivered to
me at my home. At this late [14269] date, in 1946, I cannot be certain whether I received and read at the time all important intercepts or whether it might be possible that some of those I have read since that time or recently are confused in my mind with what I read at the time. I kept no records as to when particular messages reached me.

Questions 14, 82, and 83 are grouped in a single answer.

14. Question: It is proved by the intercepted messages, is it not, that Japan on November 28 had rejected the proposition of an exchange of peace messages between the heads of their respective states? (No. 844, p. 195, exhibit 1.)

82. Question: Will you please look at message No. 844, page 195, exhibit 1, and state as to whether or not that message relates to a message from the President to the Emperor?

83. Question: If your answer to the last question is "yes," then will you explain why the message was sent on the night of the 6th of December 1941, when you and the President had knowledge of the message of exhibit 1, message 844, page 195?

Answer: The intercepted message cited (No. 844, exhibit 1, p. 195) seems to refer to a suggestion by the Japanese [14270] Ambassador for a Japanese initiative in proposing to this Government an exchange of messages between the President and a Japanese official, presumably the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Japanese Foreign Minister, after consulting with the Navy Minister, apparently did not approve of that suggestion. In the situation in which we found ourselves grabbing at straws to save the peace, this Government believed that no possibility should be overlooked even at the last minute to appeal for peace. In any case, there was no reason why the President should not send a message to the Emperor regardless of the attitude of any particular subordinate Japanese official.

15. Question: On November 29, 1941, you rejected, did you not, as useless a suggestion of the Australian Minister that he try to mediate through Kurusu?

Answer: On November 9, 1941, the Australian Minister called on me and brought up the question of his conferring with the Japanese representative, Mr. Kurusu, and suggesting to Kurusu that Australia would be glad to act as a mediator. I offered no objection to his taking such a step, but merely stated my opinion to the Minister that the diplomatic stage was over and that nothing would come of such a move.

16. Question: [14271] On November 30, or around that date, did you recommend to the President that he deliver a message to Congress on the subject of American-Japanese relations?

Answer: On November 29, I sent to the President a draft message to Congress, which Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox had helped to prepare, together with a draft message from the President to the Emperor. In my memorandum to the President I said:

If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable to defer your message to Congress until we see whether the message to the Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we
agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached.

17. Question: What did the President say?
Answer: I have no specific recollection as to what President Roosevelt said regarding a message to Congress. But the record is that he did not send the message to Congress.

18. Question: Why did he not send it to Congress?
Answer: The President and I had for some time been communicating to various Members of Congress our views on the imminent dangers in the situation in connection with such matters as neutrality legislation and extension of selective service. A message to Congress during the last few days would have contained very little that was new without giving to the Japanese leaders material which would have enabled them to arouse their people against us all the more, a thing we wished to avoid so long as there was even the slightest possibility of keeping the discussions alive.

Furthermore, the powerful isolationist groups in this country would probably have renewed their oft-repeated charges of "war-mongering" and "dragging the nation into foreign wars." The Japanese leaders would then have been in a position to play up the situation as evidencing disunity in the United States in order to gain support in Japan for plunging ahead.

19. Question: Did it occur to you, in making such a recommendation that, either in wording or by precedent, there applied in the situation of November 30, 1941, that clause in the Constitution of the United States which provides that, from time to time, the President shall inform the Congress of the state of the Union?
Answer: I would say that among the considerations which led to the drafting of the message to Congress was the Constitutional clause you cite, but there was also the consideration whether sending such a message at that particular time would have been helpful or otherwise in the critical situation then existing.

20. Question: Did you tell a press conference on or about December 3, 1941, that the Japanese Government on November 12 had taken the position that these talks were not informal and exploratory, rather that they constituted real negotiations, which were in their final stages and that in the event of their failure a critical and dangerous situation would result? (Cf. For. Rel. p. 75.)
Answer: The question whether the conversations with the Japanese in 1941 constituted real negotiations was not a matter of unilateral determination. This Government had made it clear to the Japanese from the outset that our conversations must remain on an exploratory basis until we could determine whether there existed a basis for negotiations. That point was never reached. Later, the Japanese Government advanced the contention that we were in negotiation, with Ambassador Grew at Tokyo on November 12 and with us
here on November 13. On that day, I made the position of this Government quite clear to the Japanese representatives, as follows:

The Secretary, after asking the Japanese Minister to make accurate note of what the Secretary was about to say, replied that if we were to work out a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area he could do this only on the basis of carrying on exploratory conversations until we reached a stage when he could go to Great Britain, to China and to the Dutch and say to them that he believes that the attitudes of Japan and the United States are such as to afford a basis for negotiation and that we could call what took place thereafter a negotiation. (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, pp. 731-732.)

Inasmuch as the Japanese Government did not subsequently refer to this point, it was to be assumed that it had accepted this Government's position. There was no occasion for referring to this point in conference with the press. I did, however, make clear to the representatives of the press on November 27 and again on December 3 the seriousness of the situation.

Questions 21 and 22 are grouped in a single answer.

21. Question: From page 43 of your statement, I quote: "On November 30, I was informed by the British Ambassador that the British Government had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and that this attack would include a seaborne expedition to seize strategic points in the Kra Isthmus" and quotation—I ask if you recall having any information on that day from the First Lord of the British Admiralty indicating a Japanese attack upon the United States?

Answer: I do not recall receiving any information or messages on or about November 30 from the First Lord of the Admiralty or from any other official source indicating a Japanese attack on the United States or pledging support to the United States if attacked; nor has there been found in the Department of State any record of such information having been communicated to the Department of State.

23. Question: Was it a fact that, on November 30, and thereafter, the predominant opinion in the War Council was that the attack would come against others rather than the United States?

Answer: While it was my judgment that the Japanese were likely to attack in widely separated areas, all observable indications pointed to the likelihood that the attack would occur in the Southwest Pacific area. The most threatening activities known to our Government, so far as I saw or heard, were the Japanese movements near the jumping-off place in Indochina.
Malaya, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, and Siam were well within range of attack from that jumping-off place. The competent and appropriate military officials, I believe, have spoken for themselves on this subject.

24. Question: When did you first see the cablegram from Ambassador Winant, dated December 6, and received in the State Department December 6, as to the movement of the Japanese fleet toward the Kra Peninsula?

Answer: The telegram in question, No. 5018 from the American Embassy in London, England, was received, according to the records, in the State Department at 10:40 a.m. [14277] December 6. In view of the message's character, of the notation that it was "most urgent," and of the fact that it was headed "Personal and Secret to the Secretary and the President," it must have been shortly after its receipt that I saw it.

25. Question: In your prepared statement to this committee, Mr. Secretary, I find no reference to your conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on August 16, the day preceding the delivery of two notes to Japan by the President; and I ask if it is correct to summarize that conversation of August 16 in these words: to the Ambassador's "pointed" request for a resumption of the conversations you stood by your position of July 23 in which you stated that because of Japan's violation of the basis of the conversations by its seizure of Indochina you saw no basis remaining; and after you had suggested that the Ambassador might see the President, if he desired, Nomura replied that he would be in no position to talk to the President until his Government had wired him concessions which he, as previously stated, believed his Government was willing to make in order to have the conversations resumed? (Cf. Foreign Relations II, pp. 553-554.)

Answer: The conversation of August 16 with the Japanese [14278] Ambassador is correctly summarized in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, volume II, pages 553-554:

The Ambassador of Japan called at his request. He proceeded to say that he had again read over the documents that he and I had had under discussion, that he had been in communication with his Government, and that he believed there were grounds for progress in the conversations. He said that his Government was very desirous of working out peaceful relations between our two countries and he elaborated further along this line and against the idea of war. He stated that he would favor concessions in order to avoid war and that from what he heard from his Government, it would make concessions in order to avoid war. He said that in fact it would be glad to have a high Japanese official meet a high American official half way between the two countries in order to take up the matter in its final form.

The Ambassador then pointedly inquired of me whether conversations such as he and I had been conducting could be resumed between our two Governments. I proceeded to reiterate and repeat the circumstances leading up to the cessation of our conversations and the reasons which I set forth through Mr. Welles for their discontinuance. I did not pass further on the question which he propounded [14279] but left it as it was. The Ambassador remarked that the
situation was critical and it was very important in his judgment for suitable steps to be taken to avoid serious developments but I still revealed no sign whatever of saying anything favorable about his request for a resumption of conversations. I said that as the matter stands Japan with her Army, Navy, and air forces was establishing many bases in and about French Indochina under her continued policy of conquest by force, that this would mean about the last step prior to a serious invasion of the South Sea area if it should be decided upon by Japan, that such an invasion would be a serious menace to British success in Europe and hence to the safety of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, and that, therefore, this Government could not for a moment remain silent in the face of such a threat, especially if it should be carried forward to any further extent. The Ambassador remarked that the people of Japan did not have enough foodstuffs and went to Indochina to secure such needed commodities as rice. To this I promptly replied that if Japan had been willing to go forward with a peaceful settlement of the Pacific area in line with the principles and policies the Ambassador and I had discussed, Japan would have been able peacefully and without the use or threat of force to have equal access with every other nation to world [14289] markets for rice and all other foodstuffs.

The Ambassador repeatedly said that his country was very desirous of peaceful relations with this country in the future as well as now and that he believed his Government would make some concessions in order to resume conversations to this end. I expressed interest in this and again referred to Japan's continuing policy of conquest by force and of bitter denunciation of this country by the Government controlled press which is loudly supporting such a policy, and again I said that I would not be in a position to say anything relative to his request in addition to what I said some days ago when he first brought up the matter.

I suggested to the Ambassador that the situation was very serious and that if he desired to talk to any others on this subject or to the President it would be perfectly agreeable with me and I would not consider it as in any way going around me, et cetera. The Ambassador said that he would not be in a position to talk to the President until he first telegraphed his country for instructions as to what concessions it might be willing to make in connection with a resumption of conversations.

26. Question: In your memorandum of the conversation in the White House among the President, Ambassador Nomura and [14287] yourself on August 17, you state that the President requested the Ambassador to come to the White House (cf Foreign Relations 11, p. 554): my question is: Had the President been informed that on the previous day, August 16, the Japanese Ambassador had stated that he did not wish to see the President until he had received concessions from the Japanese Government which he, the Ambassador, believed his Government would make?

Answer: I find from the records that I informed the President prior to the White House conference on August 17 of the substance of my conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on the previous day. I refer to President Roosevelt's
telegram to Prime Minister Churchill, of August 18, 1941, which is a committee exhibit.

27. Question: Is it correct to state that the State Department records show no offer of concessions by Japan on August 17, 1941?

Answer: This Government at no time in the course of the conversations of 1941 talked to the representatives of the Japanese Government in terms of "concessions" to be made by Japan as condition for an agreement. It made known to the Japanese Government that its willingness to [14383] enter into an agreement with Japan was contingent upon Japan’s adopting consistently peaceful courses. At no time did the Japanese Government give any practical evidence on which this Government could rely or dependable pledges that the Japanese Government intended to pursue policies of peace.

28. Question: When did the war with Japan become inevitable?

Answer: The question of the inevitability of war with Japan involved two factors, the factor of Japanese plans and objectives and the factor of time.

With regard to Japanese objectives, it is clear from the record that following the advent in 1927 of the Cabinet of General Tanaka, who inaugurated the so-called positive policy toward China, Japan had consistently been pursuing only one fixed policy—that of expansion by aggression. In 1931 Japan occupied Manchuria by force; in 1933, Japan seized Jehol, penetrated Chahar and extorted from China a demilitarized zone in north China. The truculent statement of Amat, spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, on April 17, 1934, in which Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan’s dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed, made crystal clear [14383] Japan’s policies of aggression. In 1937 Japan embarked upon military operations in north China which soon developed into an all-out attack on the whole of China. On September 21, 1938, I told the Canadian Minister that I had been proceeding on the theory that Japan definitely contemplated domination, by any and every kind of means, of East Asia and the Western Pacific area. In furtherance of these objectives Japan in September 1940 entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, Japan’s program thus being merged into a far-flung drive for world domination of which Japan’s share was to be East Asia. On January 15, 1941, in a statement in support of the lend-lease bill before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, I pointed out that Japan was out to establish herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific and that her leaders had openly declared their determination to make themselves masters of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. In the light of Japan’s steady course of expansion by force, it was manifest that she would attack in her own good time unless we surrendered our principles.

As I have repeatedly stated, this Government had fully taken into account Japan’s record when it entered into the
conversations with the Japanese in 1941. [14284] Nevertheless, the American Government responded favorably to the Japanese request that we enter into conversations looking to a settlement of Pacific questions even though it realized that there was but a slight chance that thereby Japan could be brought around to adopt peaceful courses.

The second factor, that of time, was considered by us in the light of contemporary developments. Through the years that the Japanese Government was standing for policies of aggression, this Government was standing for policies of peace and of law and order with justice, as is clear from the record. These opposing policies were utterly irreconcilable. We knew that would not surrender at any time our basic principles. As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese, we could not escape the conclusion that Japan would not abandon her policy of aggression. Our long-standing appraisal of Japanese policies and purposes of aggression and of attacking us and other countries in the Pacific area in furtherance of those purposes, was supported by Japanese utterances and acts. As regards the element of time, I was satisfied by early October from the evidence of feverish Japanese military activities and movements, the bellicose pronouncements of Japanese spokesmen and of the Japanese press, reports of growing political tension [14285] in Japan, as well as from what was disclosed by the intercepted Japanese messages that the time when they would attack us was rapidly approaching.

In looking back upon the developments in their entirety during the last weeks and months prior to Pearl Harbor it can be clearly seen that our judgments and our methods of dealing with Japan as we did were overwhelmingly vindicated by Japanese acts and utterances as they later unfolded.

At any time prior to Japan's attack it lay within her power to avert a war in the Pacific by abandoning her policy of aggression, just as a bandit might avert a clash with his intended victim by suddenly becoming law-abiding. Up to that time there was always open to her an honorable and reasonable alternative to the courses of aggression which she was pursuing—an alternative which would have given her all she professed to seek in the way of access to raw materials and markets, as well as other rights and opportunities enjoyed by all nations. It lay solely within Japan's disposition to adopt a peaceful alternative and to revoke the decisions reached at the Imperial Conference of July 2, which reaffirmed Japan's purpose of subjugating China and which called for military advance to the south to establish "the great East Asia sphere of co-prosperity", that is to say, to establish Japanese [14286] domination in Southeast Asia and the islands of the Western Pacific area.

Questions 29 to 33 and 45 to 47 are grouped in a single answer.

29. Question: When did you decide that further negotiations were useless and that you were going to turn the matter over to the Army and Navy?
30. Question: When did you advise either the Army or the Navy that you were turning the matter over to the Army or Navy or both?

31. Question: What had happened that you told Secretary Stimson you were turning the matter over to the Army and Navy?

32. Question: Had you conferred with the President on the matter of turning the matter over to the Army and Navy?

33. Question: Give date and conversation with the President on this.

45. Question: Do you recall having a conversation with the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, about the negotiations with Japan being terminated and that you were turning the matter over to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, or the Army and Navy?

[14287] 46. Question: Will you state the date and the conversation.

47. Question: If such a conversation took place, did you consider that such conversation turned the matter over to the Army and Navy?

Answer: After this Government had received and studied the Japanese proposal of November 20, which has already been described, together with Kurusu’s representation to me on November 21 that Japan had nothing more to offer, it became obvious, especially in the light of Japan’s menacing military movements and of the indisputable proof derived from intercepted Japanese messages that the November 20 proposal was their last word, that the chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished. From November 22 on it was my individual view that Japan was through with any serious conversations looking to a peaceful settlement. From that day I and my associates had reached a stage of clutching at straws in our effort to save the situation. We groped about for anything that might offer any possibility for keeping serious conversations going. We gave consideration to possible choices in an effort to determine the wisest and most feasible course.

[14288] From November 22 on I did not conceal my conclusions on these points. It was on November 25 at the meeting of the War Council that I again emphasized the critical nature of the situation and stated more formally that, “the matter is now in the hands of the Army and the Navy.” My most accurate recollection of my conversations along this line with the President and the War and Navy officials was contained in my statement of December 30, 1941, to the Roberts committee. I rely upon that statement to refresh my present recollection. The portion of that statement dealing with this point is as follows:

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan; I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the
Japanese might make [14289] the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

The expression, "the matter is now in the hands of the Army and the Navy," as applied in the situation which then arose, does not imply any idea of a transfer from the Department of State to the Departments of War and of the Navy of any part of the Department of State's functions or responsibilities. Nor do I think that there was any misunderstanding on the part of the President or of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy as to the sense in which this expression was used. It seemed self-evident that the Army and the Navy would be our chief reliance in the light of the critical situation known to all of us. It was, of course, the understanding of each of us that the Department of State would continue to function and coordinate its action with that of the Army and Navy, but I emphasized that we could no longer be expected materially to control the situation.

Questions 34 and 35 are grouped in a single answer.

34. Question: Other than the Winant message, dated December 6, received by the State Department about 10:40 a.m., December 6, 1941, did you have any other information as to the [14290] Japanese Fleet movements as indicated in the Winant message?

35. Question: If so, will you state what the information was and when you received it?

Answer: According to State Department records, similar information was received from the Navy Department (from the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet) and from the War Department (from the United States military observer at Singapore). The Navy report was available in Washington at 10:57 a.m., December 6, and I am informed that the War Department report, so far as the records indicate, came in December 6 followed by a lengthy conference on the morning of December 7 between Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox and myself. These conversations on December 6 and 7, according to my best recollection, comprised discussion of the Japanese convoys and other information regarding Japanese military movements which we had previously received.

Questions 36 and 37 are grouped in a single answer.

36. Question: [14291] I show you a memorandum, exhibit 40, and ask you if there was any discussion with you or anyone else to your knowledge on this subject of armed support?

37. Question: Who assured the British of American armed support as mentioned in their instructions to Singapore as shown by the message of our naval observer at Singapore to Admiral Hart?

Answer: There was no discussion with me or with anyone else to my knowledge on the subject of advance assurance to Britain of armed American support which would have served
as a basis for the telegram from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Navy Department quoted in exhibit No. 40, or for the message from Singapore referred to in question 37. I do not know who, or whether anyone, assured the British of American armed support. However, after witnessing the suicidal experiences of countries like Belgium and Holland which had failed to confer with the Allies before they were invaded, it seemed to me but natural and necessary that the three or four governments deemed in imminent danger of attack by Japan may well have had conversations before the attack, subject, so far as we were concerned in the matter of commitments, to our constitutional limitations.

[14392] 38. See answer to questions 12 and 13.
Questions 39 and 40 are grouped in a single answer.
39. Question: Do you recall the one of November 7—"all arrangements must be completed by the 25th?"
40. Question: Did that message cause you to give the warning to the Cabinet?
Answer: I recall the message of November 5 (exhibit No. 1, p. 100) that, "all arrangements for the signing of this agreement must be completed by the 25th." I do not definitely recall whether the message referred to in question 39 was before me when I warned the Cabinet of the dangers in the situation on November 7. The record shows that the message in question was available on November 5, and presumably I saw it. I would say that my statement to the Cabinet was prompted by conclusions derived from a number of sources.

Questions 41 and 42 are grouped in a single answer.
41. Question: Mr. Secretary, you were familiar with our exhibit 16 and exhibit 17, wherein both Admiral Stark and General Marshall requested time?
42. Question: [14393] Prior to your sending the note of the 26th, were you familiar with the contents of the memorandum to the President, dated November 27, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall?
Answer: I was familiar with the joint memoranda of Admiral Stark and General Marshall of November 5 and November 27. I do not know just when those memoranda were brought to my attention, but I am satisfied that I did not see either memorandum prior to its date. I was, of course, familiar with the views of General Marshall and Admiral Stark in regard to their desire for time, and I myself was animated by a desire to do everything I could to gain time.

Questions 43 and 44 are grouped in a single answer.
43. Question: What did you do to obtain the time as asked for by Marshall and Stark in their memorandums of November 5 and 27?
44. Question: Did you discuss this question with the President and what was said by the President and you in that discussion?
Answer: Generally speaking, our entire 8 months of conversations involved gaining time. There was no conflict between this objective and our intensive efforts to persuade
the Japanese to pursue policies of peace. After
the Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2, 1941, the
Japanese in pursuance of the decision to move south, pro-
ceeded rapidly with the necessary preparations for a military
movement on a large scale.

It was obvious that the time of such attack as Japan would
make would be of Japan's own choosing, and would depend
upon Japan's own estimate of her readiness and of favoring
circumstances. It was not within the power of this Govern-
ment otherwise than by abject submission to Japan's terms,
to halt Japan in her course. However, I endeavored at all
times to treat with the Japanese in a spirit of open-minded-
ness, patience and goodwill. I sought from the outset of
the conversations to explore thoroughly every possibility of
bringing about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement of
the situation in the Pacific, and I spared no effort to keep
always open a door to the continuation of the conversations.
At the same time I had to be on guard against any manifes-
tation of weakness which might have encouraged the Jap-
anean to be more precipitate than they were in their action.
In this way, I believe that we gained months of valuable time.
It became clear, however, in October, as I saw it, that the
Japanese had decided to strike in their own time unless this
Government should be willing to yield abjectly [14295]
to Japan's terms. I constantly discussed with the President
the question of gaining as much time as possible and we had
the subject very much in mind throughout the conversations
with the Japanese.

45-47. See answer to questions 29 to 33.

48. Question: Did the Secretary of State's office prepare a final draft,
one ready for delivery to the Japanese, of a modus vivendi?
Answer: A draft of the modus vivendi dated November 25 which
was labeled "Final draft," meaning that that was the last
draft that was made of that document, has been furnished
the committee. It cannot be accurately said that that draft
was "ready for delivery to the Japanese," as it is impossible
to tell what further revision might have been made if a deci-
sion had been made to offer the Japanese a modus vivendi.

49. Question: Did you show such a draft to the Ambassadors of
Britain, China, and the Netherlands?
Answer: The latest draft of the modus vivendi shown to the
British, Chinese, and Netherlands diplomatic representatives
was the draft of November 24. There were only [14296]
minor differences between the November 24 and the Novem-
ber 25 drafts.

50. Question: I call your attention to exhibit 19, page 1, where you
used the following words: "My personal view continued as
out yesterday, November 28, to be that its sending will be of
doubtful efficacy. Except for the purpose of making a rec-
ord, it might even cause such a complication as Colonel Stim-
son and I referred to on yesterday." I ask you, Mr. Secre-
tary, to explain what conversations you and Colonel Stimson
had with the President and what was said by each of the
parties in that conversation?
Answer: I do not recall precisely what conversations Mr. Stimson and I had with the President on or about November 28 in regard to the proposed message to the Emperor other than the points mentioned in my memorandum which you cite. We all realized, of course, that the Emperor at that time was powerless before the military leaders. I recall very clearly that I had in mind that the sending of a message to the Emperor might have prejudiced the situation owing to the probability that such an appeal would be likely to arouse resentment among the real leaders of Japan, because of our having gone over their heads, and moreover might have been interpreted as weakness, since the Japanese themselves do not normally shift from a bold front attitude to one of pleading until the situation with them is desperate. These points, to the best of my recollection, were all brought out in the discussions I had with the President and Mr. Stimson.

51. Question: What did you mean by the expression “for the purpose of making a record”?
Answer: The expression, “for the purpose of making a record,” has reference to the matter of making perfectly clear to both the American and Japanese peoples then and for the future that all the efforts of this Government were directed toward maintaining peace to the very end.

52. Question: When did you first know that the President had sent a message to the Emperor?
Answer: I was in consultation with the President at all stages of the drafting of the message to the Emperor and the message, of course, was sent through the State Department. I, therefore, was aware of the message being sent at the time of its sending, about 9 p.m., December 6, 1941.

Questions 53 to 56 and 84 to 87 are grouped in a single answer.

53. Question: [14298] Was it before or after you learned of the pilot message, being message 901, exhibit 1, page 238?
54. Question: Was it before or after you learned that Japan was replying to your November 26 message?
55. Question: Was it before or after you knew the contents of any part of the 14-part message, a reply to your November 26 message?
56. Question: Had you learned of the receipt of any of the 13 parts of the 14-part message, being message 902, page 239, exhibit 1, before it was decided by the President, or by you, to send a message to the Emperor?
84. Question: When did you first learn that the Japanese were replying to your note of November 26?
85. Question: When did you first see any of the parts of the 14-part message 902, exhibit 1, page 239?
86. Question: When did you first learn that the message was to be delivered in accordance with a time later to be determined?
87. Question: When did you first see the message No. 844, page [14299] 195, exhibit 1, which contained the language: “therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This
is inevitable. However, I do not wish to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off.

Answer: I cannot recall definitely the exact time when any of the messages referred to were seen by me.

During the period in which those messages were being received and distributed, my attention was focused on reports of the extremely menacing movement made manifest by the sailing of the large Japanese armada from the jumping-off place in Indochina. Those reports thus were of more serious and urgent import than any threatening phase of intercepted messages relating to Japan's reply to our communication of November 26. As I made clear in my conversations and statements during those last days prior to Pearl Harbor, I felt that war would break out at any time and that the Japanese had given clear indication as to the course they would take. Notification through the intercepts of a forthcoming Japanese communication announcing that the Japanese would not continue the conversations was only confirmatory of the judgment which I had been passing on to my colleagues in the Government during the previous fortnight.

Even had the intercepted messages clearly indicated immediate war, they could only have referred to attack by the gathering Japanese forces whose movements we had been watching for days.

From the time the Japanese presented their drastic ultimatum on November 20, no intimations were given us that the Japanese would make the slightest concessions in their demands, but, on the contrary, they drove steadily forward to the attack with their armed forces, while, at the same time, misrepresenting the attitude of this Government. The Japanese reply of December 7 was a false and fraudulent statement in the worst of bad faith of Japan's case and a monstrous misrepresentation of our position in what turned out to be a brazen attempt to shift from themselves to us responsibility for their attack upon us.

Questions 57 to 60 are grouped in a single answer.

57. Question: Did you discuss with the President the modus vivendi message?

58. Question: If so, what was said about it by the President and what did you say to the President?

59. Question: Did you ever discuss with the President the fact that you were not going to send the modus vivendi but were going to send the note of the 26th?

60. Question: If you had such a conversation or discussion with the President about that date on the modus vivendi will you give us the conversations?

Answer: I was in constant touch with the President and consulted him fully at all stages of our consideration of the modus vivendi proposal. It is impossible to recall the details of the discussion, but the trend of our thought was indicated in my statement before the committee on November 19, 1945. The President at no time expressed any dissent from views expressed by me. On November 26 I recommended to the President—and he approved—my calling in the Japanese
representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the modus vivendi plan.

Questions 61 and 62 are grouped in a single answer.

61. Question: Was it usual for the President to confer with Ambassadors on Sunday?

62. Question: Can you state why the meeting was held between the [14302] Japanese Ambassador and the President on Sunday, August 17, 1941, the day the President returned from the Atlantic Conference?

Answer: Although, during the conversations with the Japanese in 1941, August 17 was the only Sunday occasion on which the President had received them, I had conversations with them by appointment made at their request on four other Sundays: namely, May 11, June 15, June 22, and December 7. I, therefore, attached no special significance to the President's receiving them on Sunday and I do not know the reason, other than possibly the President's convenience, why the President received them on August 17 rather than an early subsequent weekday. It is true, of course, that the President did attach great importance to the communications which he made to the Japanese Ambassador on that occasion.

63. Question: Would you say that only an extraordinary matter required that the President on a Sunday, and at the hour of his return to Washington from a conference with the head of another Government should deliver to a third Government a note which he said, "he regretted the necessity to deliver but which he felt compelled to deliver"?

Answer: [14303] I would not conclude that otherwise than as indicated in reply to your question No. 62, only an extraordinary matter required the President on a Sunday, and at the hour of his return to Washington, to receive the Japanese Ambassador. The world was then on fire and the aggressor nations, including Japan, were wholly untrustworthy and treacherous, capable of undertaking a desperate stab at any time. Those of us in charge of foreign policy during this critical period were accustomed to spend most Sundays in our respective offices, including Sunday conferences involving both the President and foreign ambassadors.

64. Question: Was the situation between the American and Japanese Governments on August 17, the following: Because of Japan's violation of the basis of the conversations, by the seizure of Indochina, the American Government had broken off informal, exploratory conversations looking to the reestablishment of traditional relations and, because of the aggression against Indochina, the American Government had broken economic relations with Japan?

Answer: An accurate description of the situation between the American and Japanese Governments on August 17 will be found in the two oral statements handed by President [14304] Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941.

I think I should add that it was my strong opinion that the Japanese had convinced themselves that we were inade-
quately prepared and that therefore we would make sacrifices of our principles before undertaking to fight in their defense. It was incumbent on us, in justice to the Japanese as well as to ourselves, to tell them that if they pushed us too far, we would resist. I repeatedly and pointedly made this clear to the Japanese representatives in my conversations with them. President Roosevelt did likewise when he conferred with Ambassador Nomura on August 17 and agreed to resume the conversations. These representations were calculated to sober somewhat the Japanese militarists bent on aggression. But the Japanese did not take them as a threat, as the record of subsequent events shows.

65. Question: In your memorandum of the White House conversation of August 17, you say: "The President thereupon said that this Government should really bring the matters between the two Governments literally up to date and that he would therefore, offer certain observations about the position of this Government; he added that he regretted the necessity of so doing but that he had no other recourse;" (cf. Foreign Relations, vol. 2, p. 555). Will you give the interpretation in the terms of diplomacy of the statement by the head of one nation to another nation, with whom relations are critically strained, that he regrets the necessity of a note which he is about to deliver but that he has no other recourse but to deliver it?

Answer: It seems perfectly clear to me that what the President regretted was that the Japanese should have created a situation which rendered necessary a message of the import of the one which he at that time delivered to the Japanese. The President was endeavoring, in friendly fashion, to impress upon the Japanese Government our attitude as I have described it in answer to question 64.

66. Question: Do you know of any agreement with another power which had fixed the date of delivery of this note, and the second note, to be August 17?

Answer: I do not know of any agreement with any other power which called for delivery on August 17 of the two communications which were made to the Japanese on that date. The official record shows, however, that President Roosevelt told Prime Minister Churchill at their Atlantic meeting that he, the President, planned to see the Japanese Ambassador immediately on his return to Washington.

Questions 67 and 68 are grouped in a single answer.

67. Question: Do you know on what date that other power took the same action as the President took in line with their agreement for the making of parallel representations to Japan?

68. Question: Have you ever seen the text of the representations which were made by the British Government on August 17, or any subsequent or preceding date, agreed upon to be made parallelly with those made by the President on or about August 17?

Answer: The Department has no record of any parallel action taken by the British Government corresponding to the action taken by the President vis-a-vis the Japanese on August 17, and I know of no parallel action taken by the British
other than the radio address of the British Prime Minister on August 24, 1941.

69. Question: The President by his action of August 16 was deciding ipso facto, not to await a bid which you had every reason to believe was coming from Japan. Did you suggest waiting?

Answer: Our judgment as to potentialities of Japanese policy [14307] had to be formed in the light of Japan's actions toward implementation of the decision of the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941, which called inter alia for a military advance south, of Japan's rejection of the President's proposal of July 24 to neutralize Indochina, and of 3 months of searching conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. With these in mind, it was idle to expect that the "concessions" which the Japanese Ambassador suggested might be forthcoming from his Government would be addressed to the fundamentals of the situation, which from our point of view called for Japan's removal of the menace she was creating to the United States and other peaceful nations and for her desisting from her aggressive courses. If Japan had in fact any intention of revising her position and adopting peaceful courses, there was nothing in the President's communication to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17 which would have tended to discourage Japan from adjusting her position; on the contrary, what the President said on that occasion was calculated to help rather than hinder reconsideration by Japan of her policies. There was therefore no advantage whatever in awaiting a further Japanese initiative.

Questions 70, 71, and 72 are grouped in a single answer.

70. Question: I find no reference, Mr. Secretary, in your prepared [14308] statement, to a communication from the Japanese Foreign Minister and an accompanying commentary by Ambassador Grew received by the State Department soon after midnight on August 18, 1941: Do you recall such documents which the State Department published in Foreign Relations 11, pages 560–565?

71. Question: They establish, do they not, that at the time the President was delivering the first and then the second note of August 17, the Japanese Foreign Minister was delivering to Ambassador Grew a lengthy overture for the resumption of the conversations looking to a restoration of traditional relations? (N. B. Tokyo time, 14 hours later.)

72. Question: And in transmitting the Japanese message, Ambassador Grew quote: "With all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without every prayerful consideration . . ." also that the proposal was "unprece-dented in Japanese history" and had been made with the approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities of the land; that is correct, is it not?

Answer: [14309] There is no controversy about the contents of the documents referred to in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–41, volume II, pages 560–
565, containing an account of the approach made by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Grew in regard to a proposal for a meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and the President and a statement of Ambassador Grew's reaction. That Japanese proposal is discussed and analyzed at some length in my prepared statement to the committee, which it is unnecessary to repeat here. The President and I, together with our Far Eastern advisers, were looking at the situation with the benefit of all the worldwide information available to us in Washington. We judged that the Japanese Government had no serious expectation of reaching an understanding at the proposed meeting unless the American Government surrendered its basic position while Japan rigidly adhered to and went forward with its policy of aggression and conquest. We had fully tested out the Japanese Government by preliminary inquiries and found it adamant in its position.

Nothing in the record of subsequent developments has contradicted our judgment at that time, but on the contrary, events have vindicated it. For example, the memoirs of Prince Konoye subsequently published in serial form in the Asahi Shimbun, a leading Tokyo newspaper running from December 20 to December 31, 1945, state that the Japanese army leaders agreed, in writing, on August 4, 1941 to Konoye's proposal for a meeting with the President only on condition that Japan adhere firmly to its fundamental policy and that in the event the President did not see eye to eye with the Japanese, Konoye would leave the meeting place determined to make war on the United States. Konoye also disclosed in his memoirs that at an Imperial Conference on September 6, 1941, the Japanese Government decided, in case there was no expectation within the first 10 days of October to gain her demands on the United States by diplomacy, to go to war with the United States, and accordingly to parallel diplomatic efforts with military preparations.

These disclosures by Konoye show conclusively that the Japanese would attack in their own chosen time unless we should surrender abjectly to the drastic Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and that if we had made no reply instead of delivering our communication of November 26, the 10-point proposal, the Japanese would have attacked just the same.

73. Question: On November 7, 1941, you warned the Cabinet they might look for an offensive by Japan at any time. What did you base that warning on?

[14311] Answer: My warning to the Cabinet on November 7 was based upon the acceleration of Japanese military activities and disquieting military disposals, especially in Indochina, the growing agitation in the Japanese press and among Japanese spokesmen for positive action, the pressure tactics employed by the Japanese Government toward forcing acceptance by this Government of the Japanese proposals, as well as the corroborative evidence of the intercepted Japanese messages.
74. Question: When did you draft the 10-point note of November 26? 
Answer: Under the modus vivendi proposal the Japanese would have been committed to affirming that their national policies were directed toward lasting peace throughout the Pacific area and that they had no territorial ambitions therein. Its acceptance was also subject to the understanding that during its life (of 3 months subject to a further extension) there would be further conferences looking to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. There was attached to the modus vivendi proposal a plan of a comprehensive settlement as one practical exemplification of what we had in mind. This plan, consisting of two sections, a draft of a mutual declaration of policy and a statement of the steps to be taken by the two Governments, was common to both the modus vivendi proposal and the communication of November 26. Some of the material in section 1 was drafted months earlier, the remainder, including the material in section 2, in the course of a few days preceding November 26, and the latter part of the accompanying explanatory statement, which was not contained in the modus vivendi draft, on November 26.

Questions 75 and 76 are grouped in a single answer.

75. Question: At any time before it was sent, did you show it to the President or call the contents to his attention?

76. Question: If so, what was your conversation?
Answer: In the light of the foregoing explanation, it is clear that as the President was thoroughly familiar with the entire proposal, all that was called for was to consult with him about dropping the modus vivendi feature of the proposal. This I did by presenting to him a memorandum on November 26, a copy of which is in the hands of the committee, and obtained his prompt approval. I do not recall the details of any conversation on this.

Questions 77 and 78 are grouped in a single answer.

78. Question: If you saw such a note, when was its contents called to your attention?

Answer: I have no recollection that I saw before the publication of the Roberts Report the substance of General Marshall's message to General Short of November 27, 1941.

Questions 79 and 80 are grouped in a single answer.

79. Question: Did you the diplomatic relations between Japan and America grow worse after November 27?

80. Question: If they did grow worse how do you account for no other message being given to the commanders in the field?

Answer: Diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States could scarcely grow worse after November 27, except in the sense that the crisis foreseen by us and planned by the Japanese approached closer at hand. There was nothing fundamentally new in the diplomatic situation. That situation as we viewed it, especially from November 21 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, was that Japan...
might strike at any time and that the diplomatic establishment could not be expected to preserve national security.

81. Question: Will you explain in detail if you were consulted in connection with the message to Short which contained the phrase “If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act” and also in regard to not arousing the citizens?

Answer: I have no recollection of having been consulted in connection with the considerations which entered into inclusion in General Marshall's message to Short of the phrase, “If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act,” or in regard to the caveat against arousing the citizens. This was primarily a military question.

82, 83. See answer to question 14.
84, 85, 86, 87. See answer to questions 53-56.

88. Question: Did not that message 844, exhibit 1, page 195, indicate to you that your note of the 26th was not acceptable and, therefore, that war was imminent?

Answer: I was already satisfied that the Japanese would not agree to anything short of complete yielding by the United States to Japan's demands. The intercepted Japanese message to which you refer did no more than confirm what we already knew. As I have pointed out repeatedly Japan was bent on attacking us unless we made abject surrender to her demands as an aggressor. We had no serious thought that Japan would accept our proposal of November 26. I said at the time that there was only the barest possibility of her accepting. She would have proceeded to attack us whether we had presented that proposal or any other proposal—unless it had been one of humiliating and abject surrender—or whether we had offered no proposal at all. Furthermore, while a number of us in the State, War and Navy Departments were desirous of grabbing at any straw and therefore hoped for favorable action on the modus vivendi, most of us agreed that the chances of its acceptance were very slim. The testimony of Army and Navy officials on this point is in the record.

The November 26 proposal was another test of whether Japan was willing to abandon conquest and to adopt peaceful policies; if she were so willing she would have seized upon our ten-point program as highly desirable.

89. Question: Where were you on the night of December 6, 1941?

Answer: I was most invariably at home at night working on Departmental matters. While it is possible that I might be mistaken, my best recollection is that I was at home on the night of December 6, 1941.

90. Question: When did you first see or obtain information as to the contents of the following messages in exhibit 1:

- #904—page 245.
- #907—page 248.
- #908—page 248.
- #909—page 240.
- #910—page 249.
Answer: I do not recall the exact times that I first saw or learned of the contents of the messages you cite.

Questions 91 to 96 are grouped in a single answer.

91. Question: Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese messages with the President?

92. Question: If so, give us the conversations.

93. Question: Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese messages with General Marshall?

94. Question: If so, give us the conversations.

[14317] 95. Question: Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese messages with Admiral Stark?

96. Question: If so, give us the conversations.

Answer: At this late date in 1946 I do not recall whether I discussed any particular messages or the details of the discussion with the President, with General Marshall, or with Admiral Stark. It is true that in many of our conversations, including those with Secretaries Knox and Stimson, and some with the President, some of us would bring up one or another of the intercepted messages. But I have no recollection of discussions of specific messages.

97. Question: Who called the meeting in your office on the morning of December 7?

Answer: As I recall it, the meeting in my office on December 7 was the result of a mutual agreement on the part of Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, and myself. It might have been suggested in the first instance by any one or two of us three. According to my best recollection, the proposal for a meeting grew out of a desire to continue our discussion of the situation created by the movement of the huge Japanese armada southward and westward of the southernmost point of Indochina.

98. Question: Tell us with whom you talked personally, by phone, or messenger, about this meeting and what was said.

Answer: I cannot recall material details beyond what I have given in reply to question 97.

99. Question: Please state in detail what was said by the persons attending the meeting in your office on December 7, 1941.

Answer: As I indicated in my prepared statement to the joint committee as well as in my oral testimony, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and I in our conference of December 7, 1941, discussed the critical situation created by the large-scale Japanese military movement from the jumping-off place in Indochina. I cannot recall details of that discussion. Secretary Stimson has described the discussion in his statement to the Committee and that statement speaks for itself.

Questions 100 to 102 are grouped in a single answer.

100. Question: Our record shows that the President saw the 13 parts [14319] of the 14-part message at about 9:30 p.m., December 6, 1941. Did you see or talk to the President from that time until after the attack at Pearl Harbor?

101. Question: If so, give us your conversations.

102. Question: If you did not see him or talk to him or contact him—were you available?
Answer: I have no record of nor do I recall having seen or having talked with the President between 9:30 p. m. on December 6, 1941, and the moment of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. According to my best recollection, I was available during all of that period.

Questions 103 and 104 are grouped in a single answer.

103. Question: Did anyone from the Army, Navy, or State Departments, or executive offices contact you on Saturday, December 6, and/or Sunday, December 7, up to 2 p. m. Sunday?

Answer: I was in constant contact during Saturday, December 6, and Sunday, December 7, with officers of the State Department and of the Army and Navy. As recorded in annex A [14520] of my statement to the committee, I had on those 2 days conferences, consultations and telephone conversations—as entered in engagement books—with representatives of the Army and the Navy, as follows:

December 6 10:45 a. m.: Telephone call from Secretary Knox.
11:50 a. m.: Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.
1:00 p. m.: Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.
1:15 p. m.: Telephone call from Admiral Stark.
1:50 p. m.: Captain Schuirmann.
5:15 p.m.: Telephone call to Admiral Stark.
8:45 p. m.: Telephone call to Secretary Knox.

December 7 10:30 a. m.: Telephone call to Admiral Stark.
10:30 a. m.: Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox.
2:10 p.m.: Telephone call from Admiral Stark.

In addition, I had many conferences on those days with officers of the Department of State. It would be [14521] impossible to recall the details of all the conversations which took place, but I might say that the Japanese large-scale military movement from the jumping-off place in Southern Indochina was very much in the minds of all of us who were called upon to consider that situation. We were striving to ascertain the full significance of those military movements, their probable destination, etcetera.

Questions 105 and 106 are grouped in a single answer.

105. Question: Mr. Secretary, will you agree that the official records of American-Japanese relations from August 28, 1941, until December 7, 1941, show that the Secretary of State never considered that the Japanese Government was bluffing in its assertions that, should no agreement be reached with the United States, Japan would strike?

106. Question: In this connection, Mr. Secretary, will you agree that the records established that the Secretary of State accepted at face value the statements in diplomatic exchange wherein
Konoye on August 28, Toyoda on September 27, Togo on November 12, Nomura on November 12, and Kurusu on November 17 and 18, indicated or said that a rupture of the conversations would mean war in the Pacific? (Cf. Foreign Relations 11, pp. 572-3, 642, 719-22, 726, 740, 747.)

[14322] Answer: My view, as set forth in the record of American-Japanese relations over several years, was that Japan was not bluffing but was on a steady and fixed course of conquest which would reach us in Japan's own chosen time. I believed that Japan was playing the role of an international desperado, and it is the principal business of a desperado—whether a nation or an individual—to fight. During that period Japan believed that she was exceedingly well armed for the purpose of achieving her intended conquests in the Pacific area. She likewise knew that at that time we were by no means sufficiently armed in the Pacific to resist successfully a Japanese attack. Therefore, at the time, to which your inquiry related, I was satisfied that Japan was not bluffing but rather was giving us a last chance to yield our basic principles which would enable her to continue her course of aggression and conquest without further serious risk of successful resistance.

When we realize that Japan was carrying on flagrant aggressions and ruthless invasions of peaceful countries, that the United States was pleading with her from the beginning to cease her course of military conquest in close partnership with Hitler, and that all problems in the Pacific would practically settle themselves at once [14323] when Japan adopted a policy of peace, it becomes apparent that she had no more right to make demands on the United States—as though we too were an aggressor, instead of a law-abiding country pleading for peace—than an individual gangster has to assume a like attitude toward his intended victim. It is in the light of these circumstances that we must view all the arguments which the Japanese used in trying to browbeat the United States into yielding, such as those described in the reference cited in your question.

Questions 107 to 109 are grouped in a single answer.

107. Question: In this respect was the Secretary's evaluation of the situation at one with Ambassador Grew's, namely that the Japanese were not bluffing but could be expected to strike suddenly and dramatically?

108. Question: Did the Secretary, with the information from Ambassador Grew that the Tojo cabinet had advised the Emperor as to how far it would go with the United States, and, with the information from an intercepted Japanese message that a deadline had been fixed for November 25, tell the American Cabinet on November 7 that a new and sudden Japanese aggression was to be looked for? (Cf. Foreign Relations 11, pp. 700-1, Intercepts, [14324] ex. 1, p. 100, Peace and War, pp. 135-7.)

109. Question: Did the Cabinet thereupon vote unanimously that Secretary Knox and Under Secretary Welles should deliver
addresses on Armistice Day to the end of informing the nation as to American-Japanese relations? (Cf. Peace and War, pp. 136-7; 776-87.)

Answer: In reply to these questions, I quote the first paragraph of page 29 of my prepared statement to the committee:

On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.

I also quote a paragraph from Peace and War, pages 136-137:

Four days later, on November 7, Secretary Hull stated at a Cabinet meeting that relations between Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was "imminent possibility" that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force. It thereupon became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible be better prepared for such a development. Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world—on the far side of the Pacific"; that the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense. On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, carrying out the cabinet suggestion in an address, stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject servitude and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking high both in the East and in the West," he said, and were threatening, more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our own shores." He warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917; that "at any moment war may be forced upon us."

110. Question: Subsequent to November 7, will the witness agree that the official records and his testimony here show that he advised high military officials of the Government and also the British Ambassador that a sudden attack anywhere in the Pacific by Japan must be anticipated?

Answer: In reply I quote from Peace and War, 2 paragraphs appearing on pages 144-145:

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of high officials of this Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan. He stated that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with
a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

On November 29, 1941, Secretary Hull conferred with the British Ambassador. The Secretary said that, "the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy." He said further that it would be "a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the [14328] peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited conquest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risk."

Furthermore, I and my associates were in daily consultation with the Army and Navy officials throughout the period after November 7, exchanging information and views as to the critical character of the situation.

111. Question: Is it correct to say that the intercepted dispatch from Tokyo on November 28 (No. 844, p. 195, Ex. 1) giving the reaction to the American notes of November 26, and also the intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin on November 30 (No. 985, p. 204, Ex. 1) informing Hitler of Japan's intentions, confirmed the judgments you had been stating in official councils since November 7?

Answer: During this period all the information we received made clearer Japan's purpose to attack unless the United States yielded to them. In other words, Japan had no intention of yielding any part of her plan of conquest by force, but was giving the United States, by its proposal of November 20, a last opportunity to choose between yielding or fighting. Insofar as the intercepted Japanese messages cited in the question indicated that in consequence of the refusal of the United States to yield to Japan's unreasonable demands the Japanese intended to take forcible measures to gain their ends, those intercepted messages served to confirm my judgments as expressed by me in official councils, especially during those last few weeks.

112. Question: Did not the fact that Japan, without a declaration of war, attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, confirm, in their entirety, the judgments you had been offering in official councils since November 7?

Answer: Japan's attack on a number of points over a sweep of thousands of miles, one of which points was Pearl Harbor, at about the same time confirmed our judgment as to the critically dangerous character of the situation.

113. Question: Do you recall, Mr. Secretary, your meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors in your apartment on the night of November 22 in which they pressed for a reply to the Japanese note of November 20? (Cf. How War Came, p. [14330] 304, also For. Relations 11.)

Answer: I do recall my meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors on November 22 when they pressed for a reply to the Japanese proposals of November 20. During the month of No-
yember the Japanese representatives were insistently worry-
ing me with their importunities for a quick understanding,  
intimating that otherwise something awful would happen.  

114. Question: I quote in full a secret message from Tokyo to the 
Ambassadors, under date of November 22, intercepted by 
the Army at Washington and translated on the same date:

(Secret)  
From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
November 22, 1941  
(Urgent)  
#812  
To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in 
my No. 736. You should know this, however, I know you are working 
hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts 
and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond  
[14331] your ability to guess why we wanted to settle 
Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next 3 or 
4 days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the 
signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you— 
twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get 
an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in 
short if everything can be finished we have decided to wait until that 
date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be 
changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please 
take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you 
ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you 
two Ambassadors alone.” (Cf. Intercepts No. 812, p. 165, exhibit 1, 
our record.)

Did you telephone the President on the night of the 22 concerning this 
intercepted message?  (Cf. How War Came, p. 304.)

Answer: To the best of my recollection I did not telephone to the 
President on the night of the 22d of November in regard to 
the intercepted message quoted in the question, and I find no 
record of having made such a call.

115. Question: Did you on November 26 hand the Japanese Ambassa-
dor [14332] an oral statement which rejected the Japan-
ese note of November 20?

Answer: Please refer to my replies to your questions Nos. 6 and 7.

116. Question: Did you, at the same time, hand them a tentative 10-
point proposal for a broad settlement of the Pacific situation?

Answer: Please refer to my reply to your question No. 8.

117. Question: Did the Japanese Ambassadors say that their Govern-
ment would throw up its hands because of these American 
documents and that their nature was tantamount to meaning 
the end of the conversations?

Answer: What the Japanese representatives said is covered 
in the memorandum of my conversation of November 26, 
1941, with the Japanese representatives. (Foreign Rela-
764–766).

As I saw the situation at that time, the Japanese had 
in fact already “thrown up their hands;” and, as subsequent 
disclosures show, their fleets and armed forces [14333] 
were then moving for an attack on some five points extending 
over a vast space. The attitude evinced by the Japanese
on the occasion under reference was confirmatory of their fixed purpose of requiring us to surrender our basic policy while they maintained intact their policy of aggression and force.

118. Question: Did the reports of the Japanese Ambassadors to their Government concerning the meeting of November 26, reports known to you by the interception of the messages to Tokyo, coincide in the main with your understanding of what had taken place on November 26?

Answer: The published record of this Government (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, pp. 764-765) contains a full account of the substance of the conversation which I had with the Japanese representatives on November 26. The accounts in the Japanese intercepted messages of that conversation in order to be correctly evaluated must be considered in the light of the background of the situation. It is my understanding that the main object of the Japanese Government in pressing for a reply to their November 20 proposal was to ascertain beyond any doubt whether this Government would yield to the Japanese or whether this [14334] Government was going to stand firm, and if the Japanese had learned that we were standing firm they would continue forward with the attack. Our position of not yielding was as clear as crystal to the Japanese Ambassadors, and all their talk of being “dumb-founded” at the nature of our November 26 proposal was a prelude to an attempt, by outrageously false statements uttered in the utmost of bad faith, to shift to this Government responsibility for what they were planning. As showing this thought was specifically in their minds, I quote from the Japanese message 1190 of November 26, appearing on pages 182 and 183 of exhibit 1, especially that portion which reads as follows:

The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French [14335] Indochina. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counterpropaganda against us.

The foregoing is a virtual admission that the Japanese Ambassador recognized that responsibility for a rupture would be Japan’s and of a purpose to attempt to shift that responsibility.

119. Question: There is, in the record, an intercepted message from Tokyo, No. 823, page 173, which advised Nomura and Kurusu that the deadline fixed for November 29 was to be reckoned in Tokyo time; thus when the President left Washington for Warm Springs at 3 p. m. on November 28, the time in Tokyo
was 5 a.m. of November 29; do you know if there were any coincidence in the fact that the President was leaving Washington at the time of the expiration of the deadline set by Tokyo?

Answer: I do not myself recall anything on this point. The fact was that for some days the President and I believed that the chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished.

On the day the President left for Warm Springs, November 28, he told the press that he was leaving on a vacation that had twice been postponed, and that while he did not know when he would return, he hoped that it need not be before December 2, adding that he might have to return because of existing conditions in the Pacific. Asked how long he expected these conditions to exist, the President referred the inquirer to Tokyo rather than to Washington.

120. Question: In a talk at the Thanksgiving Day dinner at Warm Springs on the night of November 29 the President said, speaking in terms of the Thanksgiving of the following year; "It is always possible that our boys at the military and naval academies may actually be fighting for the defense of these American institutions of ours" (cf. N.Y. Times, November 30): in the circumstances would you say that the limitation to the boys of the military and naval academies was intended to have particular significance to the Japanese or to the American people?

Answer: I, myself, would not be a party to giving the President's statement the narrow construction suggested. The statement, directed toward national defense and made to an American audience, speaks for itself.

Question 121 and 122 are grouped in a single answer.

121. Question: I have found, Mr. Secretary, a discrepancy in the date given by you in your statement to the committee as to an address by Premier Tojo of Japan and your telephoning the President concerning that address and other developments; on pages 43-44 of your statement the date is fixed as of Sunday, November 30; the New York Times of the morning of November 30, fixes both occurrences as of November 29 and gives this authorized statement by the President's secretary, Mr. Early, issued at Warm Springs on the night of November 29: I quote Mr. Early's statement: "As soon as the President returned to the cottage following the dinner this evening he found a call waiting from the Secretary of State, and they held a lengthy conversation. In view of the reported statement—an Associated Press dispatch by the Premier of Japan—the President tonight is of the opinion that he may have to leave Warm Springs tomorrow afternoon, arranging the railroad schedule so as to arrive in Washington Monday before noon": In view of this record would you say that the Tojo speech was delivered on November 29 and that you telephoned the President concerning it on November 29?
122. Question: Will you give the conversation between you and the President?
[14338] Answer: I seem to have telephoned the President on November 29, instead of on November 30 as, by inadvertence, was inaccurately stated in my prepared statement to the Committee. The statement of Premier Tojo was, according to State Department records, delivered in the form of a message to a Japanese meeting held on November 30. (See Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. II, p. 148.) The apparent discrepancy in time may have resulted from the fact that Japanese time is about 14 hours later than Washington time, or perhaps the message may have been available to the press prior to its delivery.

I have no record of exactly what was said in that telephone conversation. As I told the committee in my prepared statement, in that conversation I advised the President to advance the date of his return to Washington.

Questions 123 and 124 are grouped in a a single answer.

123. Question: From page 195 of the record of the Intercepts, exhibit 1, I quote:

(Secret)
From Tokyo
To Washington
November 28, 1941
[14339] # 844
Re your file # 1180

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off: Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions, and that, although the opinions of your Government are not clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your No. 1180 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best [14340] you can.

The record is that this intercepted message had been decoded and translated on November 28; do you recall discussing it with the President before his departure for Warm Springs on the afternoon of the 28th?

124. Question: Did you discuss this intercepted message in your telephonic conversation with the President at Warm Springs on the night of November 29?

Answer: I do not recall discussing with the President the intercepted Japanese message quoted by you.

125. Question: Would you say that it was the Tojo address which alone prompted your call and the President’s return?
Answer: The gravity of the situation was evident from many sources. As Tojo’s statement reflected the extreme acuteness of the situation, in that sense it may be said that the statement prompted my telephone call and the President’s return.

126. Question: Did the intercepted message of the 28th constitute the first official knowledge you had of the Japanese Government’s reaction to the notes of the 26th?

[14342] Answer: As I have already stated, I kept no record of when particular messages reached me. I can therefore only presume that the intercepted Japanese message in question was the first knowledge I had of what purported to be the Japanese Government’s reaction to this Government’s proposal of November 26. This reaction was fully expected in the light of the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum on November 20 and of subsequent developments.

127. Question: The message said definitely, did it not, that the American note was unacceptable, that a rupture was inevitable within a few days, and that Nomura and Kurusu were to make a pretense of carrying on the conversations until the official word came to them of the break?

Answer: The message indicated among other things that the Japanese Government would not accept as a basis for negotiations the American communication of November 26, that the “negotiations” would be de facto ruptured within 2 or 3 days and that the Japanese ambassadors were to avoid giving the impression the “negotiations” were broken off. I have heretofore pointed out that I considered serious conversations over after the 20th or 21st barring the very slight possibility that the Japanese might come back. When the full facts later came out they further confirmed our appraisal of the situation.

128. Question: Did you have in mind, in any way, the secret Tokyo message of the 28th when, on the day following, you told Lord Halifax that the diplomatic phase was over and that the situation was now in the hands of the American Army and Navy? (Peace and War, pp. 816–817.)

Answer: I do not recall whether I had the message in mind when I talked to the British ambassador on November 29. What I told the British ambassador was substantially what I had been saying to the President and to representatives of the Army and Navy for some days previously, based on conclusions derived from various sources.

129. Question: In line with your convictions as to the intentions of Japan did you accept at full value the statements expressed by Tokyo to Nomura and Kurusu on the 28th?

Answer: I considered this message in the light of previous instructions to Nomura and Kurusu to do their utmost to induce the Government of the United States to surrender its basic policies. In the message of November 28 the Japanese Government, realizing that the effort had ended in failure, was thanking the Japanese representatives for their efforts; secondly the Japanese addressed themselves to framing up a cloak to cover their attack already under way,
which cloak included what was in effect the fantastic and monstrously false charge that this Government was treating the Japanese outrageously by refusing to surrender to them.

130. Question: You have testified that on November 29, you prepared for the President’s consideration a draft of a Presidential message to Congress advising that body of the American-Japanese situation?

Answer: Please refer to my reply to your question No. 16.

131. Question: Did you, on the evening of November 29, in your telephonic conversation with the President, discuss such a proposed message to Congress?

Answer: I do not recall whether I discussed the proposed message to Congress in a telephone conversation with the President on November 29.

132. Question: In the preparation on the 29th of a proposed Presidential message to Congress did you have in mind, in any way, that provision of the Constitution which provides that from time to time the President shall give to Congress information as to the state of the Union and recommend to the Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient? (Cf. art. 11, sec. 3.)

Answer: Please refer to my reply to your question No. 19.

133. Question: If your answer to the previous question is “no” I ask you why such a course was considered even to preparation of a message.

Answer: In the critical situation which then existed it was deemed important to give consideration to any and all lines of action that might in the least be helpful in meeting the situation.

134. Question: You have testified that on Sunday, November 30, Lord Halifax told you that the British Government had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and the Kra Peninsula; did Lord Halifax tell you that the British had obtained this information through interception of a Tokyo message intended for Hitler, personally?

Answer: [14344] I do not recall that the British Ambassador informed me of the source from which the British Government had had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and the Kra Peninsula, and I find nothing in the record indicating that he mentioned the source.

Questions 135 and 137 are grouped in a single answer.

135. Question: A message from the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin to Tokyo, dated November 29 and decoded in Washington on December 1, has the Japanese Ambassador advising his Government that Ribbentrop had informed him that Germany had information that America’s stiff front had practically ended the Washington conversations; whereupon the Ambassador had told Ribbentrop that he had no official word from Tokyo as to the conversations or as to Japan’s intentions; my question is: Did this intercepted message from Berlin to Tokyo fit in with the evidence of previous intercepts, and of Ambassador Grew’s reports, that Japan had
been keeping Hitler in the dark as to the Washington conversations? (Cf. Intercepts, exhibit 1, p. 200.)

137. Question: Is it not clearly indicated, if not established, by the intercept from Berlin of November 29 that on that day neither the Japanese Ambassador nor Hitler had definite information as to Japan’s intentions toward the United States?

Answer: It would seem clear from the message under reference that the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin had not communicated from his Government to the German Government at that time a report on the current situation regarding the Japanese-American conversations. The Germans had more than one way of keeping in touch with Japan. The possibility is not excluded that Hitler and also Ribbentrop had received reports from the German Ambassador at Tokyo of the progress of the conversations. Therefore, I would not wish to undertake to interpret the message.

136. Question: November 29 was the day of the Japanese dead line?

Answer: Tokyo’s message to the Japanese Ambassador No. 812 of November 22, 1941, of which a translation appears on page 165, exhibit 1, contains the following passage:

There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next 3 or 4 days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—[14347] twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot be changed.

The foregoing bald confession by the Japanese Government of its plan and patent movement to attack unless the United States surrendered to the demands in Japan’s ultimatum fits in with all that I said and did following that date.

138. Question: Also intercepted, and decoded in Washington on December 1, was a message from the Japanese Government to its Ambassador at Berlin, dated Tokyo, November 30; therein the Japanese Ambassador is informed that American-Japanese conversations now “stand ruptured—broken”; the Japanese Government instructs the Ambassador to see Hitler and Ribbentrop immediately and to say “very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms” and to “add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams”; my question is: Did this message and the attendant circumstances of it strengthen your [14348] convictions as to Japan’s intentions? (Cf. Intercepts, exhibit 1, p. 204.)

Answer: The message to which you refer was cumulative evidence of the conclusions which I had already reached in regard to Japan’s intentions, and which were overwhelmingly supported by the surrounding facts and circumstances. Questions 139 and 140 are grouped in a single answer.
139. Question: In fixing the deadline for November 29, Tokyo had secretly advised Nomura and Kurusu that after that date things would happen automatically, had it not?
140. Question: Did you consider the message to Hitler on November 30, a portentous automatic happening in the crisis?
   Answer: On November 22 the Japanese Government instructed Nomura and Kurusu in regard to the extension from November 25 to November 29 for the deadline for the conclusion of an agreement and stated that: "After that things are automatically going to happen" (exhibit No. 1, p. 165). The message from Tokyo to Berlin of November 30, 1941 (exhibit No. 1, p. 204), was, of course, in harmony with what the Japanese had in mind as revealed through numerous sources.

141. Question: Did the President return to Washington on December 1?
   Answer: The record shows that the President returned to Washington from Warm Springs on December 1.
142. Question: Did he direct the preparation of a strong note to Japan asking of that Government an explanation for its concentration of forces in the southern part of Indochina?
143. Question: Did the President on December 2, direct the State Department to hand the Japanese a communication in which the President stated that Japanese concentrations in southern Indochina implied the utilization of these forces by Japan for aggression against the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya or Thailand? (Cf. For. Rel. 11, pp. 778-779.)
144. Question: Was such a communication handed to the Japanese?
145. Question: Did that communication state that the Hitleresque nature of the Japanese concentrations and the broad problem of American defense had prompted the President's representations? (Cf. For. Rel. 11, p. 779, last paragraph of text of note.)
   Answer: The President on December 2 simply directed that inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the reasons for the continued Japanese troop movements in Indochina. On the same day the Under Secretary of State, in compliance with the President's instruction, informed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu of the President's inquiry. The record of the matter appears in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, volume II, pages 778-781.
146. Question: Did the Japanese military concentrations and military movements, known to the American Government in the period November 30-December 6, 1941, constitute threats to American Pacific possessions, to the countries neighboring Japan in the Pacific, and to the American sources of vital materials?
   Answer: The Japanese military concentrations and military movements known to the American Government in the period November 30-December 6, 1941, so far as I could judge as
Secretary of State, did constitute serious threats to American
Pacific possessions, to the countries neighboring Japan,
and to American sources of vital materials.

Questions 147 and 148 are grouped in a single answer.

147. Question: Did such threats require that the United States immediately take any and all steps to meet them in conformity with the statement of the American Government to Japan on August 17, 1941, to-wit:

* * * this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force OR THREAT OF FORCE of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

(Cf. For. Rel. 11, pp. 556-7.)

148. Question: Did the Japanese military concentrations and movements of November 30-December 6 constitute a challenge to the Government of the United States to implement the position it had taken in its note of August 17 to Japan?

Answer: The purpose of the United States, in making the statement of August 17 under reference, was to tell Japan in a friendly way that if she kept encroaching upon our rights and interests, we would defend ourselves. This Government at that time was acutely concerned over Japan's refusal to agree to our proposal for the neutralization of Indochina, to abandon her jumping-off place there, and otherwise to desist from the menace she was creating to us and other peace-minded nations. It wholly misrepresents the attitude of the United States in the period after August 17 to allege that this Government was planning any step other than that of pure defense in the event the Japanese should attack. Other aspects of this question, for example, where, when and how we would resist the Japanese, were essentially a military matter.

149. Question: Had the Secretary of State, in September 1940, informed Lord Lothian that American actions towards Japan in the Pacific would be predicated upon a policy of doing everything legitimately possible to help England win the war? (Cf. Peace and War, p. 575.)

Answer: What I said to Lord Lothian on September 30, 1940, in regard to this matter is accurately described in my memorandum of conversation with him appearing on pages 574-575 of Peace and War. My comments to Lord Lothian had to do with the broad aspects of the situation created by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact but also had special reference to the winning of the war by Great Britain against Germany. At that moment Germany had already overrun much of the Continent of Europe and the British and the entire Allied cause was virtually hanging by a thread. Every rational person realizes what would have happened to this country if Hitler and his allies had succeeded in their
program. It was in these circumstances that I had my conversation with Lord Lothian. I said:

The relations between Germany, Italy, and Japan, each having a common objective of conquering certain areas of the world and each pursuing identical policies of force, devastation and seizure, have been during recent years on a basis of complete understanding and of mutual cooperation for all purposes mutually desirable and reasonably practicable, with the result that the recent announcement was part and parcel of the chain of related events.

I then proceeded to say that this Government has pursued a definite and somewhat progressive line of acts and utterances in resisting Japanese aggression and treaty violations during recent years; that these acts and utterances have comprised repeated aid to China, suc-

cessive moral embargoes, abandonment of the commercial treaty, actual embargoes under law, the sending of our Navy to Hawaii, together with appropriate statements and notes of strong remonstrance against Japanese steps of aggression and constant repetition of the basic principles of world order under law. I added that I did not undertake to predict, much less to make commitments, as to how fast and how far this Government may go in following up the various acts and utterances in which it has been indulging; that, of course, the special desire of this Government is to see Great Britain succeed in the war and that its acts and utterances with respect to the Pacific area would be more or less affected as to time and extent by the question of what course would, on the part of this Government, most effectively and legitimately aid Great Britain in winning the war.

150. Question: Had the Secretary of State in August 1941, informed Lord Halifax that a Japanese movement into the South Pacific would constitute a danger to England second only to a German invasion across the English Channel? (Cf. Peace and War, pp. 710–711.)

Answer: What I said to Lord Halifax on August 9 in regard to this matter is accurately described in my memorandum of conversation with him appearing on pages 710–711 of Peace and War which reads as follows:

The Ambassador made some inquiry about the amount of aid this Government might give in case Singapore or the Dutch East Indies should be attacked. I replied that I myself visualized the problem and issue in the broader way and that issue is presented by the plan of the Japanese to invade by force the whole of the Indian Ocean and the islands and continents adjacent thereto, isolating China, sailing across probably to the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil area, to the Cape of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a military despotism the trade routes and the supply sources to the British. I added that this broad military occupation would perhaps be more damaging to British defense in Europe than any other step short of the German crossing of the Channel. I said that this Government visualizes these broad conditions and the problem of resistance which they present; that the activities of this Government in the way of discouraging this Japanese movement and of resistance will be more or less affected by the British defensive situation in Europe and hence by the question of the number of American naval vessels and other American aid that may be needed by Great Britain at the same time. I said that in the event of further Japanese movements south this Government and the British Government should naturally have a conference at once and this Government would then be able to determine more definitely and in detail its situation pertaining to resistance, in the light of the statement I had just made.
151. Question: Had the Congress, on November 13, 1941, at the solicitation of the President and the Secretary of State, committed the nation to keeping open the sea lanes so that Lend-Lease might fulfill its function? (Cf. New York Times, November 14.)

Answer: My view of the significance of the measure passed by the House of Representatives on November 13, 1941, providing for the amendment to the Neutrality Act is contained in a letter I wrote to Speaker Rayburn and Representative McCormack on that same day.

In that letter I stated:

The breadth of our self-defense must at all times equal the breadth of the dangers which threaten us. In the circumstances of today, we must be free to arm our merchant ships for their own protection; and we must be free, in the event of particular and extreme emergency, to use these ships for the carriage of supplies to nations which are resisting the world-wide movement of conquest headed in our direction. This Government would, of course, use caution in carrying out the power which it could exercise upon the passage of the bill.

I also stated:

The greatest intermediate objective of Hitler's armed forces is to capture Great Britain and to gain control of the high seas. To this end, Hitler has projected his forces far out into the Atlantic with a policy of submarine ruthlessness. By intimidation and terror he would drive our ships from the high seas, and ships of all nations from most of the North Atlantic. Even in the waters of the Western Hemisphere he has attacked and destroyed our ships, as well as ships of other American republics, with resulting loss of American lives.

The action of Congress in amending the Neutrality Act was only one factor in promoting the broad problem of self-defense, the necessity of which at that time was urgent and compelling.

152. Question: In addition to the physical threat to the Philippines as stated in the President's communication to Japan of December 2, did the Japanese military movements constitute a danger to the commitments made by Congress in authorizing lend-lease and in re-establishing the American policy of freedom of the seas?

Answer: I would say that the Japanese military movements constituted a danger to the defense of free nations resisting the world-wide movement of conquest. The intent of lend-lease was to assist in that defense. The broad question of danger to this and to all peaceful countries was Japan's military partnership with Hitler for conquest. A material factor in the situation was Japan's flagrant violations of American rights and interests and the jeopardizing of American lives in China, which portended the extension of such violations over a much wider area. This Government could not afford to be deluded by Japan's false claims and pretensions which masked her designs of conquest, and to be oblivious to our own serious dangers.

153. Question: You have testified, have you not, that the decision of the Executive, in the period November 29–December 6, was not to advise Congress in a message of the state of American-Japanese relations?
Answer: In my testimony on November 29, 1945, in reply to questions by counsel as to "what the facts and circum-
stances were which led to the decision not to deliver that message to the Congress prior to December 7, "I set forth various considerations which influenced the President and myself against acting prematurely in that matter. I have also discussed this in answer to your questions Nos. 18 and 19. The issue between isolationists and nonisolationists was then at fever heat and its line of cleavage extended through the Congress. The sending of a message to Congress at this critical juncture would have greatly accentuated that issue and would have correspondingly encouraged the Japanese militarists. The fact was that we had been doing our best to acquaint the Congress and the public with the critical dangers in the situation, and at the same time to avoid precipitating the crisis which the military people were anxious to defer as long as possible.

Questions 154 to 156 are grouped in a single answer.

154. Question: As one reason for this decision not to send a message to Congress, you have testified that Congress only a few weeks before November 29, had by only one vote, sustained the Selective Service. Are you aware that the vote in question was in the House on August 13, 1941, 3\(\frac{1}{2}\) months before November 29, 1941?

155. Question: Are you aware that the vote had to do with the matter of releasing at the end of a year's service those whose service had been limited to one year in the original bill?

156. Question: Are you aware that the House took this vote in ignorance of the fact that, a day or two before, the President, at the Atlantic Conference, was agreeing with the British Prime Minister on a course of American action with relation to Japan?

Answer: Without discussing the technicalities of the selective service extension bill under consideration in August 1941, it is still my conviction that the close vote in the House on that bill, 203 to 202, indicated the violently divided character of national opinion at the time. Furthermore, had the bill been defeated, the forces of aggression would have been greatly encouraged and the nations resisting aggression correspondingly discouraged.

In his message to Congress on this subject, July 21, 1941, President Roosevelt said:

Today it is imperative that I should officially report to the Congress what the Congress undoubtedly knows: That the international situation is not less grave but is far more grave than it was a year ago. Occasional individuals, basing their opinions on unsupported evidence or on no evidence at all, may with honest intent assert that the United States need fear no attack on its own territory or on the other nations of this hemisphere by aggressors from without.

Nevertheless, it is the well-nigh unanimous opinion of those who are daily cognizant, as military and naval officers and as Government servants in the field of international relations, that schemes and plans of aggressor nations against American security are so evident that the United States and the rest of the Americas are definitely imperiled in their national interests. * * *
I told the press on August 11, 1941, in response to a question whether failure of the bill would have any effect on Japan, that "the psychological effect alone on many phases of the international situation would be exceedingly bad, to say nothing of the actual results."

With regard to the President's communication to the Japanese Ambassador of August 17, 1941, the President had nothing in mind except a friendly approach to discourage Japan from attacking us. Having participated in that interview, I received no impression from the President's tone or demeanor of any suggestion of a threat. The President in the same friendly tone agreed that the two Governments should resume amicable conversations looking to a peaceful understanding. Such conversations were then continued in a friendly way for nearly four months. I, therefore, do not see how the attitude of this Government could in any way be construed as offensive or unfriendly or how there can be any warrantable basis for criticism of the President.

Questions 157 and 158 are grouped in a single answer.

157. Question: Were you advised by anyone as to when the Army would be ready for war in the Pacific?

158. Question: Were you advised by anyone as to when the Navy would be ready for war in the Pacific?

Answer: The views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations on the need of more time for preparedness as set forth in their memoranda of November 5 and November 27, 1941, were known to me at the time. Furthermore, the Army and Navy heads for some time had been representing to me their need of more time in which to strengthen the defense of the United States.

Questions 159 and 163 are grouped in a single answer.

159. Question: [14363] Will you advise the Committee as to who saw the final modus vivendi as prepared by the State Department?

163. Question: Will you advise the committee as to who saw your November 26, 1941, message to Japan?

Answer: The November 25 draft of the modus vivendi was of course, seen, as were all previous drafts, by the far-eastern advisers of the Department of State. It contained nothing of material substance that was not contained in the November 24 draft and the revisions it represented were largely refinements in the interests of precision. The November 24 draft was seen by the diplomatic representatives of the British, Netherlands, and Chinese Governments, and to the best of my recollection by the President and the representatives of the War and Navy Departments. I do not know who outside the Department of State saw the November 25 draft, and in any case there would hardly have been time for it to have any wide circulation before the decision was reached on the following day to withhold, in delivering our reply to the Japanese, the modus vivendi feature. On this point I refer to the three successive drafts of the modus vivendi which are a part of the record. With regard to the 10-point proposal,
it is clear [14364] from my reply to your question No. 74 that the contents of the 10-point proposal were seen by all who saw the modus vivendi drafts. However, I cannot say who, other than the far-eastern advisers of the State Department, saw the 10-point proposal in the exact form in which it was set up for delivery to the Japanese. To all of the modus vivendi drafts, the 10-point proposal was attached, as the modus vivendi was intended only to facilitate conversations with the proposals in the 10-point communication as a basis. Japan could not have accepted our modus vivendi draft without being prepared to take as a basis for further conversations a program along the lines of the 10-point proposal, nor could she have avoided declaring at the outset of the conversations that she would pursue a peaceful course, such declaration being set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the modus vivendi in language as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein.

2. They undertake reciprocally not to [14365] make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat or force into any areas in southeastern or northeastern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.

Questions 160, 161, 164, and 165 are grouped in a single answer.

160. Question: Will you advise the committee as to who opposed the sending of this modus vivendi?

161. Question: Will you tell us who favored the sending of this modus vivendi?

164. Question: Will you advise the committee as to who opposed the sending of this message (the November 26 message)?

165. Question: Will you advise us who favored the sending of this message?

Answer: While I, of course, consulted the military and naval authorities of this Government and with the far-eastern advisers of the Department of State on all plans for dealing with the critical situation in relation with Japan, the responsibility for decisions, except in matters which I felt should be referred to the President, rested [14366] with me, and I took no poll of "ayes" and "nays." So far as I am aware, however, among the top officials whose function it was to make decisions, there was no dissent at any stage of our intensive consideration in the days between November 22 and November 26 of the modus vivendi proposal or the 10-point proposal.

The situation with which we were called upon to deal between November 22 and November 26 was briefly as follows: We had the indisputable evidence of the intercepted Japanese message of November 22, referred to in my reply to your question No. 136, that the Japanese Government had instructed its representatives that there must be acceptance of its terms without any possibility of further concessions and within a definite time limit—November 29. I and my associates could not escape the conclusion from a reading of the
Japanese message that the Japanese had decided to attack unless the United States made basic concessions.

In our clutching at straws to see how far we could go toward tiding over the situation we got up the modus vivendi plan for possible inclusion as a part of our reply along with a plan for a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area. The modus vivendi plan called for the participation of the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands in connec-

tion with the provisions in the plan for the modification of the freezing measures. We consulted those Governments and also the Chinese Government which was vitally concerned. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's reaction to the modus vivendi plan as communicated to this Government was that if there was any relaxation of the embargo by this Government, or even a belief on the part of the Chinese people that such action would be taken, Chinese morale would be shattered, Chinese resistance would collapse, and the Japanese would be able to gain their ends. In the light of this serious development and of the chances being overwhelmingly against Japan's acceptance of the modus vivendi proposal, especially as we had convincing evidence that Japan was already moving forward with her military forces and had reached the jumping-off place in Indochina, consideration of all the surrounding circumstances relating to the difficulties and the imminent dangers in the situation led to a conclusion not to propose our modus vivendi draft to the Japanese.

In any event the modus vivendi plan would not have enhanced appreciably the chances of Japan's adopting our counterproposal, for what we would have offered the Japanese in the modus vivendi was mere chicken feed compared with what they were asking for, as set forth in their ultimatum of November 20. The view that Japan would not accept our counterproposal, even with the modus vivendi feature, was, to the best of my recollection, shared by all the high officials in the Government who are known to have expressed any views on the subject, as, for example, the following instances: On November 24 Admiral Stark, in a circular message, addressed, among others, to the Commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, pointed out that the chances of a favorable outcome of the negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese in any direction was a probability. On November 25 Admiral Stark followed up that message with a letter to Admiral Kimmel. In the letter he stated that he had held up dispatch of the letter pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull. Admiral Stark stated that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack and that they had confirmed the view expressed in the previous message regarding the gravity of the situation. Secretary Stimson in his diary entry for November 25 stated that at a meeting at the White House the President expressed the view that, "We are likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday."
Some persons, in attempting to reconstruct the situation which then existed, seem to have been misled by Japanese charges misrepresenting the character of the 10-point proposal. They seem to have completely over [14369] looked the fact, which was subsequently disclosed, that by November 26 when our proposal was delivered to the Japanese, orders had already been given to their fleet to sail preparatory to the attack which was later made according to schedule. It was this movement to attack which prompted the Japanese to start preparing their utterly false and fraudulent misrepresentations, which amounted to the monstrous charge, made in the worst of bad faith, that they had been forced to fight because our statement of policy as contained in our November 26 proposal was harsh and humiliating. Neither the Japanese leaders who falsely pretended to be “dumb-founded” over our proposal of November 26, notwithstanding the fact that it was along lines we had been discussing for months, nor those who supported this Japanese contention had at any time claimed that the Japanese would make the least concession beyond their proposal of November 20, nor have they advanced any suggestion as to what further concessions the United States would have to make, short of complete acceptance of the Japanese proposal of November 20.

There was no reason for the Japanese to have come to us at any stage with their demands, nor was there any need for a new agreement between the United States and Japan. All that was necessary was for Japan to [14370] abandon her course of aggression and adopt one of peace, and the situation in the Pacific area would have adjusted itself almost automatically by the observance on the part of Japan, along with other signatory powers, of the Nine-Power Treaty, of the Kellog-Briand Peace Pact, and other treaties and commitments, including a commitment to respect the “open door” in China, to which Japan was a party. Nor must also the fact be overlooked that while Japan was repudiating these solemn treaty obligations by taking the aggressive and moving her armed forces toward us and other peaceful countries, we were pleading, as a peaceful and law-abiding nation, with Japan to abandon her course of conquest and likewise become law-abiding and peaceful.

Our position, as summed up in the 10-point program, was really nothing new to the Japanese. We had been discussing with them throughout months of conversations broad-gaged principles, practical applications of which were along the lines of the 10-point proposal. The proposal was not presented to them in the form of demands, but merely as an example of a kind of settlement we would like to see worked out in the Pacific area. We were not bargaining with the Japanese as if we ourselves had been offenders. The only issue or question to be settled was whether we could prevail upon Japan to abandon [14371] her increasingly dangerous movements of conquest and agree to become law-abiding and to adopt a peaceful course. This was the all-
important issue which the Japanese in the end sought to cover up and dodge.

The 10-point program also summed up, so the general public might understand, many of the general and special benefits which might accrue to Japan if she renounced a course of aggression; such as, enhancement of her national security through participation in a multilateral nonaggression pact and through measures calculated to stabilize the situation in the Far East, including the abrogation by the powers of extra territoriality in China and the giving of mutual pledges regarding respect for the integrity of Indochina; and an advantageous exonomic program: A generous trade agreement with the United States, removal of the freezing regulations, an agreement upon a plan for stabilization of the dollar-yen rate. What Japan was asked to do in return was to give practical application to the professions she had made of her peaceful intent by agreeing to withdraw her armed forces from China and Indochina, to support no regime in China other than the National Government of China, and to agree not to interpret any agreement to which she was a party in such a way as to conflict with the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. Surely, these latter were reasonable and necessary conditions for the privileges that were offered to Japan. The 10-point proposal would have been highly welcome to Japan if she had had any intention of adopting peaceful courses. It would be a monstrous travesty of the facts and an unspeakable libel on this country if the Japanese war lords in their effort to disclaim responsibility should be permitted to screen and shift their guilt in the face of all the facts to the contrary.

162. Question: Did you agree with Ambassador Grew and others that the placing of the embargo upon Japan would mean war?

Answer: The general proposition regarding the effect of embargoes upon Japan, especially as applicable to the situation from 1938 to 1940, is set forth on page 88 of Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy. The important fact, however, which had to be taken into account in the situation at the time when this Government applied freezing measures to Japan in July, 1941, was the advance of Japan's armed forces so as seriously and immediately to imperil the security of this and other countries. At that stage, Japan was in effect brazenly demanding military supplies with which to attack this and other countries to the south. The question of our self-defense had by that time become supreme with us and impelled us to refuse to furnish the invader with military supplies.

Questions 166 to 169 are grouped in a single answer.

166. Question: Were you or anyone in the State Department to your knowledge consulted in regard to the military plan being drawn up by America, Britain, the Netherlands, and China, sometimes known as the ABCD block?

167. Question: If you were so consulted will you state who consulted you and what was said at the conference?
168. Question: Did representatives of the State Department participate in any of these conversations?
169. Question: If so, state the name of that representative.

Answer: From time to time I participated from the political angle, in discussions with the President and the leaders of the Army and of the Navy in regard to the subject of the military conversations with the British and the Dutch for joint defensive plans. No representative of the Department of State participated in those staff conversations, but there was a Department of State representative who participated in the conversations regarding defense which were held with the Canadians. There was no Chinese participation in the foregoing conversations.

In the discussions which I held with the President and the leaders of the Army and of the Navy in regard to those conversations, as made clear above, I did not pass upon the military aspect of questions, but occasionally offered comments and suggestions as a layman. The views that I expressed were along the lines I had expressed publicly as well as in talks with diplomatic representatives. I refer you to what I said in that regard in an address on March 17, 1938 (Peace and War, pp. 412–413), as follows:

Prudence and common sense dictate that, where this and other nations have common interests and common objectives, we should not hesitate to exchange information and to confer with the governments of such other nations and, in dealing with the problems confronting each alike, to proceed along parallel lines—this Government retaining at all times its independence of judgment and freedom of action. For nations which seek peace to assume with respect to each other attitudes of complete aloofness would serve only to encourage, and virtually invite, on the part of other nations lawlessly inclined, policies and actions most likely to endanger peace.

In the present Far Eastern emergency, we have consistently collaborated with other peace-seeking nations in the manner I have just described. I have said often, and I repeat again, that in this collaboration there is not a trace of alliance or involvement of any sort. We have scrupulously followed and we intend to follow the traditional policy of our country not to enter into entangling alliances or involvements with other countries.

On November 25, 1940, I gave my views to the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, in commenting upon his expressed view that there should be conferences between the naval experts of our two governments with respect to what each would or might do in case of military outbreaks on the part of Japan. I said that, of course, there could be no agreements entered into in this respect, but that there should undoubtedly be collaboration with a view to making known to each other any and all information practicable in regard to what both might have in mind to do, and when and where, in case of a military move—[14376]—ment by Japan in the south or in some other direction.

There was no suggestion on the part of any of us in this Government, so far as I knew, that in the military staff conversations our representatives could go beyond, at the very most, making recommendations which, of course, would have been subject to congressional approval.
Mr. Lane. The committee received a sworn statement dated March 1946 from former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. This statement was in response to inquiry by committee counsel for certain portions of a diary kept by Mr. Stimson. We ask that the statement and appendix thereto be spread on the record at this point.

The Chairman. It is so ordered.

(The statement referred to follows:)

[14377] STATEMENT BY HENRY L. STIMSON, FORMER SECRETARY OF WAR, TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, S. CON. RES. 27, WITH APPENDIX, MARCH 1946

[14378—p. 11] STATEMENT OF FACTS AS SHOWN BY MY CURRENT NOTES AND MY RECOLLECTION AS REFRESHED THEREBY

The committee already has before it my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. At that time I undertook to give the board the answers to the questions which were asked me as fully as I was then able, having in mind certain limitations on what I then felt was proper to discuss, including particularly any matters the revelation of which might in any way have jeopardized the safety of our then pending military operations. I am now able, however, to amplify in certain respects the testimony which I gave before the board.

The evidence which I am able to give the committee comes not only from my recollection of the events which transpired preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, but I am able to refresh my recollection from a contemporaneous record which I kept from day to day for my own personal use. As I explained to the Army board, I had a dictograph at my house at which I dictated these memoranda each morning before going to the War Department. I read many excerpts from these to the Army Pearl Harbor Board. This committee last autumn asked me for my notes covering the dates of November 5, 6, 7, 10, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and December 2 and 7, 1941. [p. 2] I am attaching to this statement an appendix copies of my notes covering these dates, of matters relevant to the Far Eastern situation and the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although these extracts speak largely for themselves, they were made roughly and hastily and were not revised when dictated. They therefore naturally need some addition to tie them in as a connected story and to give the whole picture as I saw it. It is for this reason that I am accompanying them with this statement.

No accurate understanding can be had of the situation which existed in the weeks preceding the Pearl Harbor attack or of the conduct of the various individuals concerned unless they are viewed in the light of the historical events which had been going on for some time and which ultimately led to the crisis that occurred in December and the war of the United States with the Axis powers. From some of the comments which have been made and given wide publicity, one receives the impression that many people have already forgotten the trend of events

1 Additional numbers in italics enclosed by brackets represent original pages in the statement submitted by Mr. Stimson, which pages were frequently referred to during the examination of certain witnesses.
which were coming to a head in the autumn of 1941 and the threat to our own safety which had unmistakably developed in the actions of the two great aggressor nations, Germany and Japan, who already in the preceding months and years had begun spreading destruction and terror throughout a large portion of the civilized world.

[p. 3] Japan had started on her current path of aggression in the Far East as early as September 1931. She then attacked the Chinese in Manchuria and overran that territory, flouting her obligations under the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty. There then followed her attacks on the Chinese in Shanghai. She invaded China in 1937, after the conclusion of the Anticomintern Pact with Germany. The brutal and barbarous type of military aggression for which she stood was typified by the outrages committed by her Army in the occupation of Nanking and similar incidents, which by 1941 had become notorious events of history. In September 1940, after Germany had set out on her temporarily triumphant path toward the subjugation of the nations of Europe, Japan concluded a military alliance with Germany and Italy and placed herself formally in the camp of the Axis powers.

By the summer of 1941, the Japanese intentions in the Far East became very clear. After Germany attacked Russia in June of that year, Japan began extensive military preparations—among other things, calling an additional 2,000,000 men to the colors. The utterances of her war lords became increasingly threatening. She extended her military operations into southern French Indochina. That she was headed toward the ultimate occupation of Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, and thence the domination of the entire Southeast Asia, was evident not only from her overt act and announcements but from certain of her intercepted diplomatic messages in which her intentions were expressed in more detail.

All of this presented a great threat to our safety and interests. If Singapore and the Netherlands Indies should be occupied, Japan would be strengthened by the acquisition of a great fortress and a great source of natural resources in rubber and oil, which would help her greatly to carry on her program of depredation. The Philippines, which lay between Japan and these British and Dutch targets, would inevitably be the next victim, and at her mercy. China might easily be forced to capitulate and taken out of the war. Our military advisers had given the President their formal advice that, if Japan attacked British Malaya or the Dutch East Indies or moved her forces west of a certain line in Indochina, we would have to fight for the sake of our own security.

On the other side of the world, we were faced with a situation which was even more critical. Hitler, having seized Norway, France, Belgium, Denmark, and Holland, had just attacked Russia in June of 1941 and the Russians were fighting a desperate battle to stop the German Army from overrunning a large portion of her territory and her capital. [p. 5] In the meantime, the Germans were maintaining large forces deployed on the north coast of Europe as a continual threat of an invasion of England which, as we know, was ill prepared to meet it. As we now know from the evidence presented at the trial of the German war criminals in Nuremberg, Hitler was planning ultimately to attack the United States and was conspiring
with the Japanese to aid them while they attacked us in the meantime. It was then very apparent to everyone who had carefully followed the course of events that we would sooner or later have to meet the threat to civilization which these aggressor nations were presenting to the world, and the great danger was that the nations who were then fighting desperately and gallantly to stem this threat would be knocked out of the war one by one before our turn came and that we would ultimately be left to face the onslaught alone.

The American people had been slow to recognize the danger, but by the autumn of 1941 it was beginning to be understood more clearly. Early in 1941, Congress, in the Lend-Lease Act, had authorized the furnishing of munitions to the nations fighting the Axis and the shelter of our ports to their warships. In August 1941 the Congress passed a bill extending the draft. In November 1941, Congress voted to repeal important sections of the neutrality law, thus permitting the arming of our ships and their sailing into any combat zone or belligerent port in the world. On November 23, 1941, Representative Gearhart of California, in a broadcast on the “American Forum of the Air,” after pointing out Japan’s breaches of treaty obligations and her subsequent aggression in China, stated:

Japan’s ruthlessness makes her an enemy not only of China but also a common foe of all nations.

From some of the comments quoted in the public press, one would get the impression that the imminent threat of war in October and November 1941 was a deep secret, known only to the authorities in Washington who kept it mysteriously to themselves. Nothing could be further from the truth. At least one of our destroyers had been attacked by German war vessels. Aside from the war warnings which were sent to our military and naval commanders in the various theaters of danger, the imminence of war with Japan was a matter of public knowledge and the people were being warned time and time again of the danger which was approaching. One need only read the headlines of the newspapers during this period. For example, on October 17 the Navy ordered all American merchant ships in the Pacific to put into safe ports. On October 24 Secretary Knox publicly warned of a “clash” with Japan and the “seriousness” of the situation.” On November 11, 1941—Armistice Day—the President himself warned the people that the Nation was facing a world war again. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, declared on that day that “our people realized that at any moment war may be forced upon us.” During this period, day after day, the headlines warned of the approaching crisis with Japan. On November 26 there appeared on the front page of the “New York Times” the notice that the United States consulate in Tokyo had warned Americans to get out of Japan promptly. On Monday, December 1st, appeared the headline that “Roosevelt Hurries Back in the Crisis.” In Honolulu itself the papers were carrying equally sensational headlines. For example, on November 30 appeared the headline “Japanese May Strike Over Weekend.”

Meanwhile we had been doing what we could to get ready for war if and when it came. After the long period necessary to lay the foundations of our ultimate enormous production, the output of war materials in this country was beginning to increase
rapidly; but we were still using large quantities of it under the Lend-Lease Act to satisfy the demands of the nations who were already in the battle and holding off the enemy. We were shipping all we could spare to England and in particular to Russia, which was then in the forefront of the fight.

[p. 8] In the meantime, the War Department was doing what it could to fortify the Pacific. We were giving all the material and effectives that we could spare to Hawaii in particular, which was in fact prior to the time of the Pearl Harbor attack reported to me by the Staff as the best manned and equipped of all our outposts on the Pacific, including the Panama Canal. We were also doing our best to reenforce the Philippines. The effectiveness of the airplane against a navy in narrow seas had been recently demonstrated in the Mediterranean by the German air attacks on British naval forces, as well as by the success of the British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto. We decided that if a sufficient number of our bombing planes, which would be able to proceed to the Philippine Islands under their own power, could be gathered there, this would present a very effective nucleus of a defense against the advances of the Japanese Navy or convoys in South Asiatic waters. Accordingly, in August we started sending out to the Philippines as many four-engined [14385] bombers as we could spare, and by December 7 we had in fact gathered there some 35 of these ships. This was the largest group of such American bombers yet in existence anywhere. We felt at the time that these presented a strong striking force which could be used with great effect in operations against the Japanese Navy. We underestimated, as did everyone else, the effective power of Japanese aviation, which [p. 9] asserted itself at Pearl Harbor and 1 day later in the Philippines by its attack on our installations there, including the destruction of many of the bombers themselves.

In mid-October the Japanese Konoye cabinet fell and a new cabinet under General Tojo came into power, which all expected would be even more aggressive and warlike.

To sum up, the salient features of the situation, as they appeared to me early in November 1941, were as follows:

1. War with Germany and Japan would ultimately be inevitable.
2. It was vitally important that none of the nations who were then desperately fighting Germany—England, Russia, or China—should be knocked out of the war before the time came when we would be required to go in.
3. While we very much wanted more time in which to prepare, nevertheless we felt we had a fair chance to make an effective fight against Japan for the Philippines [14386] even if we had to enter the war at that time, in view of the air power that we were building up in the Philippines.
4. If war did come, it was important, both from the point of view of unified support of our own people as well as for the record of history, that we should not [p. 10] be placed in the position of firing the first shot, if this could be done without sacrificing our safety, but that Japan should appear in her true role as the real aggressor.
During this entire period I kept in constant and close touch with Mr. Hull and Mr. Knox, as well as having frequent meetings with the President. In 1940 Messrs. Hull and Knox and I had inaugurated regular weekly meetings in Mr. Hull's office so that there would be close liaison between the three of us. These meetings were held on Tuesday mornings at 9:30 whenever we were present in Washington and able to go. They were being held during this period, in October and November 1941, as well as meetings between us on other occasions.

Early in November we received word that the Japanese were sending an additional special envoy, Kurusu, to Washington to participate in the conversations that were being held. I had little hope that anything would come of his proposal, in view of all the information which we had been receiving as to the Jap's determination to proceed with their program of aggression.

On November 6, I had an hour's talk alone with the [14387] President with regard to the Far Eastern situation and his approaching conference with Kurusu, who was coming from [p. 17], Japan. The thing uppermost in his mind was how we could gain more time. I quote from my notes:

The President outlined what he thought he might say. He was trying to think of something that would give us further time. He suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for six months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis.

I personally did not approve of a truce on such a basis and told him so. I felt that it would tie up our hands just at a time when it was so important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of the Philippines and our military advisers then felt that if we could accumulate enough of them there it would place us in a favorable strategic position, and I did not approve of any arrangement that would prevent our continuing this program. Secondly, it was still very important that we keep the Chinese in the war, and I believed that they would feel that such a truce was a desertion of them, and that this would have a very serious effect on Chinese morale.

On Friday, November 7, we had the usual weekly Cabinet meeting. The Far Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our minds. Mr. Hull informed us that relations had become [14388] extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for an attack by Japan at any time. Our military [p. 12] advisers, while desirous of delay, had urged military action if Japan attacked territory whose security was vital to us and in this connection specified American, British, or Dutch territory. The President at the meeting undertook to take an informal vote of the Cabinet as to whether it was thought the American people would back up up if it became necessary to strike at Japan, in case she should attack England in Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies. The Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would support such a move. The Cabinet voted this way even though only Mr. Hull and the President knew of the efforts which we had been making to reenforce the Philippines with the big bombers and which we in the Army felt could be effective support in case any attack should be made on the British or Dutch in southeastern Asia. On November 10 at a staff meeting,
General Marshall, among other things, read us a long letter from General MacArthur in the Philippines, telling us of hopeful progress in the reorganization of the Philippine Army and the construction of airports throughout the islands.

Between November 10 and 21, talks were commenced in Washington between Nomura and Kurusu on the one hand, and the President and Mr. Hull on the other. During this period a very serious crisis developed by reason of the threatened [p. 13] strike of the coal miners, which would have been a most serious obstacle [14380] to our preparations for defense. Not only was the President occupied with this but we in the War Department during this period were obliged to make preparations for taking over and operating the coal mines in case the strike should eventuate. Much of my personal time was occupied during these days with these preparations. Fortunately, the strike was ultimately averted and the matter resolved shortly after November 20. My notes contain no reference to any developments in the Japanese situation during this period. It was during this period, on November 20, that Kurusu presented the Japanese proposals to Mr. Hull which, among other things, demanded that we should withdraw all material and moral support to China and at the same time resume supplying to Japan the oil she required to assist her in carrying on her war with China.

My notes recall to me the fact that on November 24 I had a good talk with General Olmstead, who had recently been promoted to be Chief Signal Officer. This department was of particular interest to me because I had been giving a great deal of personal attention during the past months to the development of radar by the Army. I had for some time become convinced of the importance of radar, both as an antiaircraft protection as well as its uses for [p. 14] installation in planes and ships for combat purposes. We had made every effort to get as much radar equipment to Hawaii as possible, particularly for antiaircraft protection; and, as the committee has undoubtedly heard, [14390] substantial amounts of this equipment of the movable type were in Hawaii and capable of operation.

On Tuesday, November 25, Secretary Knox and I met in Mr. Hull's office for our usual Tuesday morning meeting. Mr. Hull showed us a proposal that he had prepared, which he was considering laying before Nomura and Kurusu for a 3 months' truce.

At 12 o'clock on the same day, we three went to the White House, where we met with the President and also General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The President at once brought up the relations with the Japanese. Mr. Hull said the Japanese were poised for attack—that they might attack at any time. The President said the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning and stated that we might even be attacked, say next Monday, for example.

One problem troubled us very much. If you know that your enemy is going to strike you, it is not usually wise to wait until he gets the jump on you by taking the initiative. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that [p. 15] in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors. We discussed at this meeting the basis on which this
country's position could be most clearly explained to our own people and [14391] to the world, in case we had to go into the fight quickly because of some sudden move on the part of the Japanese. We discussed the possibility of a statement summarizing all the steps of aggression that the Japanese had already taken, the encirclement of our interests in the Philippines which was resulting and the threat to our vital supplies of rubber from Malay. I reminded the President that on August 19 he had warned the Japanese Ambassador that if the steps which the Japanese were then taking continued across the border into Thailand, he would regard it as a matter affecting our safety, and suggested that he might point out that the moves the Japanese were now apparently on the point of making would be in fact a violation of a warning that had already been given.

When I got back to the War Department after this meeting on that same day, I found news from G-2 that was very disturbing. It indicated that the Japanese were embarking a large expeditionary force of 30, 40, or 50 ships at [p. 16] Shanghai and that this expedition was proceeding along the China coast south of Formosa. I at once telephoned Mr. Hull and also sent copies of the report to the President.

The next morning, November 26, Mr. Hull told me over the telephone that he had almost decided not to make the proposition of the three months' truce that he had discussed with Knox and me on November 25. The Chinese, for one thing, had pointed out strong objections to the proposal, particularly the effect on the [14,392] morale of their own people. Mr. Hull stated that he felt the best thing to do was simply to tell the Japanese that he had no further action to propose.

I telephoned the President shortly thereafter and asked him whether he had received the news of the new expedition from Shanghai proceeding down the China coast toward Indo-China. He had not received it. He was shocked by it, and at once took it as further evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese, that while they were negotiating with him—negotiations in which we were asking for a withdrawal of their invading troops in China—they should be sending a further expedition down to Indochina.

On Thursday morning, November 27, the news was still coming in of the movement of the large Japanese expeditionary force south from Shanghai and eventually [p. 17] headed toward Indochina, with a possibility that it might be proceeding to the Philippines or to Burma to cut off the Burma Road, or to the Dutch East Indies. It seemed probable, however, that it was a concentration to move over into Thailand, from which they could be in a position to attack Singapore at the proper moment; or, as the President later pointed out, it might develop into an attack on Rangoon and thus effectually stop the Burma Road at its beginning.

Early that morning I had called up Mr. Hull to find out what his final word had been with the Japanese—whether he had [14393] handed them the proposal for 3 months' truce, or whether he had told them he had no other proposition to make. He told me that he had broken the whole matter off. His words were: "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and the Navy." I then called up the President, who gave me a little different view. He said that it was true that the talks had been called off, but that they had ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by
Mr. Hull. I found out afterwards that this was the fact and that the statement contained a reaffirmation of our constant and regular position without the suggestion of a threat of any kind. I personally was relieved that we had not backed down on any of the fundamental principles on which we had stood for [p. 18] so long and which I felt we could not give up without the sacrifice of our national honor and prestige in the world. I submit, however, that no impartial reading of this document can characterize it as being couched in the terms of an ultimatum, although the Japanese were of course only too quick to seize upon it and give it that designation for their own purposes.

 Shortly after this General Arnold came in with proposed orders for the movement of two of our biggest planes from San Francisco out across the Mandated Islands to Manila. We were to arrange to have these fly high over the Mandated Islands, beyond the reach of their pursuit planes, and photograph them with the idea of trying to detect any naval concentrations [14394] that might be going on there.

 Later Mr. Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow. General Gerow was Chief of the War Plans Division. General Marshall was absent, having left the Department to attend certain Army training maneuvers which were doing on that day. Both Admiral Stark and General Gerow were urging that any crisis be postponed as long as possible, to enable our preparations to proceed. A memorandum had been prepared by General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President on this subject. The opinion of our top military and naval advisers was that [p. 19] delay was very desirable, but that nevertheless we must take military action if Japan attacked American, or British, or Dutch territory or moved her forces in Indochina west of 100° east or south of 10° north. I told them, which was the fact, that I also would be glad to have time but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the United States or of backing down on any of our principles which would show a weakness on our part.

 We then discussed the messages that might be sent to the commanding officers of the various theaters, including in particular General MacArthur, who was in the Philippines and in the forefront of the threatened area. We had already sent MacArthur a warning but I felt that the time had now come for a more definite warning. In talking with the President on the telephone that morning, I had suggested, and he had approved [14395] the idea, that we should send out a final alert, namely that they should be on the qui vive for any attack, and explaining the exact situation. Ordinarily, of course, there would be no reason for me to participate in the sending of any such message which was the normal function of the military staff. As the President himself, however, had now actually directed the sending of the message, and as I wanted the [p. 20] message clearly to apprise the commanding officers in the various areas as to exactly what the diplomatic situation was, I undertook to participate in the framing of this message myself. In order that it should be strictly accurate, I called up Mr. Hull myself on the telephone and got his exact statement as to the status of the negotiations, which was then incorporated in the first sentence of the message. My papers
also indicate that I inserted in the second sentence the words “BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT.”

This same message was sent to commanding office, Hawaiian Department, and to the three other commanding officers of our Pacific theaters or outposts, viz: Panama, the Philippines, and the west coast which included Alaska, except that in the case of the message to General MacArthur in the Philippines there were omitted from the third sentence from the end the following words: “BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT COMMA REPEAT NOT COMMA TO ALARM CIVILIAN POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT.” The message as sent to General Short read as follows:

[14396]

COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period. If hostilities [p. 21] cannot com-
ma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan com-
mit the first overt act period. This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these meas-
ures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil popu-
lation or disclose intent period. Report measures taken period. Should hos-
tilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan period. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

MARSHALL.

This message has been criticized as ambiguous and described as a “do-don’t” message. The fact is that it presented with the utmost precision the situation with which we were all confronted and in the light of which all our commanding officers, as well as we ourselves in Washington, had to govern our conduct. The [14397] situation was admittedly delicate and critical. On the one hand, in view of the fact that we wanted more time, we did not want to precipitate war at this moment if it could be avoided. If there was to be war, moreover, we wanted the Japanese to commit the first overt act. On the other hand, the matter of defense against an attack by Japan was the first consideration. In Hawaii, because of the large numbers of Japanese inhabitants, it was felt desirable to issue a special warning so that nothing would be done, unless necessary to the defense, to alarm the civil population and thus possibly to precipitate an incident [p. 22] and give the Japanese an excuse to go to war and the chance to say that we had committed the first overt act.

All these considerations were placed before the commanding officers of their respective areas, and it was because they were thought competent to act in a situation of delicacy requiring judgment and skill that they had been placed in these high posts of command. One of the basic policies of the Army command, which has been adhered to throughout the entire war, and in most instances complete success, has been to give the local commander his objective and mission but not to interfere with him in the performance of it. When General Short was informed on November 27 that “Japanese action unpredicta-
ble" and that "hostile action possible at any moment," and that the policy directed "should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your [14398] defense," we had a right to assume that he would competently perform this paramount duty entrusted to him. We assumed that when he had been warned that hostile action was possible at any moment, it would not be necessary to repeat that warning over and over again during the ensuing days. The fact was of course that General Short did receive, not [p. 23] only from Washington but from other sources, repeated intelligence of the impending crisis.

You will notice that this message of November 27 specifically mentions that reconnaissance is to be undertaken. This to my mind was a very important part of the message, not only because of its obvious desirability but also because we had provided the Hawaiian Department with what I regarded as a most effective means of reconnaissance against air attack and one to which I had personally devoted a great deal of attention during the preceding months. I refer to the radar equipment with which the Hawaiian Department was then provided. This equipment permitted approaching planes to be seen at distances of approximately 100 miles; and to do so in darkness and storm as well as in clear daylight. In the early part of 1941 I had taken up earnestly the matter of securing such radar equipment for aircraft protection. I knew, although it was not then generally known, that radar had proved of the utmost importance to the British in the Battle of Britain, and I felt in the beginning of 1941 that we were not getting this into production [14399] and to the troops as quickly as we should, and put on all the pressure I could to speed up its acquisition. By the autumn of 1941 we [p. 24] had got some of this equipment out to Hawaii, and only a few days before this I had received a report of the tests which had been made of this equipment in Hawaii on November 19, which indicated very satisfactory results in detecting approaching airplanes. I testified at considerable length with regard to this before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (A. P. H. B., 4064, et seq.). When we specifically directed the commanding officer at Hawaii, who had been warned that war was likely at any moment, to make reconnaissance, I assumed that all means of reconnaissance available to both the Army and Navy would be employed. On the same day a war warning was dispatched to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations. The standing instructions to the theater commanders were that all messages of this character were to be exchanged between the Army and Navy commands.

I repeat that my participation in the drafting of this message of November 27 was unusual, since I do not believe it is advisable for the Secretary of War to meddle with military staff matters. As already stated, I did so on this occasion because I felt I was conveying a message from the President. The President had taken a [p. 25] momentous decision that day, namely to send what I call a final alert. The Chief of [14400] Staff was away for the day, and I wanted to make certain that the President's orders were carried out accurately.

You will note that my notes speak only of the message to General MacArthur. This is evidence of what was the fact—namely that we all felt in Washington that the first and most likely danger was an
attack on the Philippines and that such an attack would be most
difficult to meet. Such information as we had been able to gather as to
the movements of the Japanese forces indicated a movement toward
the south, which might easily be diverted either to Indochina, Malay
Peninsula, Dutch East Indies, or the Philippines. We were correct
in this inference. Such an attack on the Philippines was being pre-
pared and immediately followed the attack on Pearl Harbor. The
movements of the fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor were entirely
unknown to us.

When the replies to these messages came in from General Mac-
Arthur and General Short, they were checked to me by General Mar-
shall, undoubtedly for the [p. 26] purpose of reassuring me
that our messages had been duly received. The original documents
bear my initials, indicating that they were noted by me.

The first thing in the morning of the next day—Friday, November
28—I received information from G-2 of such a formidable character
with regard to the movements of the Japanese forces along the Asiatic
coast that I decided to take it to the President before he got up. I
saw him while he was still [14401] in bed, and we discussed
the situation. He suggested that there were three alternatives, as my
notes show: First, to do nothing; second, to make something in the
nature of an ultimatum, stating a point beyond which we would fight;
or, third, to fight at once. I said that I felt that to do nothing was
cut out of the question and the President agreed with me. As to the other
two alternatives, the desirable thing to do from the point of view of
our own tactics and safety was to take the initiative and attack without
further warning. It is axiomatic that the best defense is offense. It
is always dangerous to wait and let the enemy make the first move. I
was inclined to feel that the warning given in August by the President
against further moves by the Japanese [p. 27] toward Thai-
lancl justified an attack without further warning, particularly as their
new movement southward indicated that they were about to violate
that warning. On the other hand, I realized that the situation could
be made more clean-cut from the point of view of public opinion if a
further warning were given.

I went at 12 o’clock that day to a meeting of the so-called War
Cabinet—that is to say, the President, Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox, Admiral
Stark, General Marshall, and myself. The President had been
studying the latest report of G-2 as to the movements of the Japanese
expeditionary force, and we discussed the various possibilities as to
what it meant. The various [14402] alternative mentioned
were that it might develop into an attack on the Philippines, the
landing of further troops in Indochina, an attack on Thailand, on
the Dutch Netherlands, or on Singapore, or that it might develop
into an attack on Rangoon and thus cut off the Burma Road at the
beginning. The possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor was not
discussed at the meeting, since our thoughts were all focused on this
movement toward southeast Asia, which indicated a crisis in that
direction. All agreed that if the expedition were permitted to land
in the Gulf of Siam it would place a strong Japanese force in such
a strategic position as to [p. 28] be a severe blow at all three of
the powers in southeast Asia—the British at Singapore, the Nether-
lands in the Indies, and ourselves in the Philippines. We all agreed
that it must not be allowed; that, if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight; and, if the British fought, we would have to fight. We realized that if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot.

We decided, therefore, that we could not just sit still and do nothing. On the other hand, we also decided that we could not attack without a further warning to Japan, and we discussed what form that warning should take. The President suggested a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. After some discussion it was decided that he would send such a letter [14403] to the Emperor, which would not be made public, and that at the same time he would deliver a special message to Congress reporting on the danger and reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened. The President left after the meeting to keep his engagement at Warm Springs, where he was going to have Thanksgiving with the children. The rest of the week end was largely taken up with preparing [p. 29] a suggested draft of a message for the President to deliver to Congress, in which Secretary Knox and I cooperated with Mr. Hull and his associates in the State Department.

On Monday morning, December 1, the President returned to Washington. I recollect that in the meantime we had received evidence that the Japanese expedition which we had been watching was landing in Indochina in the neighborhood of Saigon, rather than going on to the Peninsula and up into the Gulf of Siam. This appeared to give us a little respite, since it indicated that perhaps they were not going to invade Thailand at once. The Russians had also made a new counter-attack against the Germans at Rostov, and we thought that possibly this had given the Japanese some pause.

On Tuesday, December 2, Secretary Knox, Sumner Welles, and I met with the President, as Mr. Hull was laid up with a cold. The President went step by step over the situation, and I felt sure that he had made up his mind to go ahead with the message to Congress and possibly the message to the Emperor. [14404] We also learned that he had asked the Japanese through the State Department what they intended by this new occupation of southern Indochina and had demanded a quick reply. We were watching the situation in the Far East very carefully. I was in frequent [p. 30] conference with General Marshall and with General Miles of G-2 and also General Gerow of the War Plans Division of the General Staff. We were particularly concerned with supplies which were on the way to the Philippines and additional big bombers which we were trying to fly over there, some of which were scheduled to start at the end of the week. I gave up another engagement in order to stay in Washington over the week end.

On Sunday, December 7, Mr. Knox and I went to Secretary Hull's office at 10:30 in the morning and talked the whole matter over. This was the day on which we knew the Japanese were going to bring their answer, and Mr. Hull said he was certain that the Japanese were planning some devilry; and we were all wondering where the blow would strike. The messages we were receiving now indicated that the Japanese force was continuing on in the Gulf of Siam, and again we discussed whether we would not have to fight if Malaya or the
Netherlands were attacked and the British or Dutch fought. We all three thought that we must fight if those nations fought. We realized that if Britain were eliminated it might well result in the destruction or capture of the British Fleet. Such a result would give the Nazi allies overwhelming power in the Atlantic Ocean and would make the defense of the American Republics enormously difficult if not impossible. [p. 31] All the reasons why it would be necessary for the United States to fight, in case the Japanese attacked either our British or Dutch neighbors in the Pacific, were discussed at length and at my request Mr. Hull and Mr. Knox dictated their views. These views are attached to my notes of that day as submitted herewith.

I returned to lunch at my home. At just about 2 o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me on the phone and told me that the Japanese were bombing Hawaii. My notes for the remainder of December 7 speak for themselves and need no comment.

SUMMARY OF MY VIEWS AS TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMY

My views as to these responsibilities are stated at length in my final official report made under the Joint Resolution of Congress approved June 13, 1944, after the Army Board and the Judge Advocate General had made their investigations and reports to me. Many of the discussions on this subject indicated a failure to grasp the fundamental difference between the duties of an outpost command and those of the commander in chief of an army or nation and his military advisers. The outpost commander is like a sentinel on duty in the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and precise. He must assume that the enemy will attack at his particular post; and that the enemy will attack at the time and in the way in which it will be most difficult to defeat him. It is not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to make the best possible fight that can be made against him with the weapons with which he has been supplied.

On the other hand, the Commander in Chief of the Nation (and his advisers), particularly of a nation which has been as habitually neglectful of the possibility of war as our own, has much more difficult and complex duties to fulfill. Unlike the outpost commander, he must constantly watch, study, and estimate where the principal or most dangerous attack is most likely to come, in order that he may most effectively distribute his insufficient forces and munitions to meet it. He knows that his outposts are not all equally supplied or fortified, and that they are not all equally capable of defense. He knows also that from time to time they are of greatly varying importance to the grand strategy of the war.

[p. 33] For all these reasons he is compelled to give constant and close attention to the reports from all his intelligence agencies in order that he may satisfactorily solve the innumerable problems which are constantly arising in the performance of the foregoing duties.

[14407] During those days in November 1941 we at the War Department had been informed and believed that Hawaii had been
more generously equipped from the Nation’s inadequate supplies of men and munitions than either of the other three important Pacific outposts, and we believed that with the fleet at hand there it was more capable of defense. We also knew that the Philippines was by far the least capable of defense, although we were working vigorously to get it into a position to put up a hard fight. We also knew that a disaster there would have an incalculably bad moral effect on account of our relations to the Filipinos—well known throughout the Far East—and our pledges given for their protection. Finally, we had received these specific warnings of a Japanese expedition being on its way to a commanding position from which it would attack the Philippine Islands.

From the foregoing I believe that it was inevitable and proper that a far greater number of items of information coming through our Intelligence should be [p. 34] collected and considered and appraised by the General Staff at Washington than those which were transmitted to the commander of an outpost. General Short had been told the two essential facts: (1) A war with Japan is threatening. (2) Hostile action by Japan is possible at any moment. Given those two facts, both of which were stated without equivocation in the message of November 27, the outpost commander should be on the alert to [14408] make his fight.

Even without any such message, the outpost commander should have been on the alert. If he did not know that the relations between Japan and the United States were strained and might be broken at any time, he must have been almost the only man in Hawaii who did not know it, for the radio and the newspapers were blazoning out those facts daily, and he had a chief of staff and an intelligence officer to tell him so. And if he did not know that the Japanese were likely to strike without warning, he could not have read his history of Japan or known the lessons taught in the Army schools in respect to such matters. Under these circumstances which were of general knowledge and which he must have known, to cluster his airplanes in such groups and positions that in an emergency they could not take the air for several hours, and to keep his antiaircraft [p. 35] ammunition so stored that it could not be promptly and immediately available, and to use his best reconnaissance system, the radar, only for a very small fraction of the day and night, in my opinion betrayed a misconception of his real duty which was almost beyond belief.

In the next place, having made these mistakes and disregarded the whole tenor of the warning message to him, he then sent a reply message to Washington which gave no adequate notice of what he had failed to do and which was susceptible of being taken, and was taken, as a general compliance with the [14409] main warning from Washington. My initials show that this message crossed my desk, and in spite of my keen interest in the situation it certainly gave me no intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was not being carried out. Although it advised me that General Short was alert against sabotage, I had no idea that being “alerted to prevent sabotage” was in any way an express or implied denial of being alert against an attack by Japan’s armed forces. The very purpose of a fortress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was the commander of that fortress. Furthermore, Short’s statement in his
message that "liaison" was being carried out with the Navy, coupled with the fact that our message of November 27 had specifically directed recon-naissance, naturally gave the impression that the various reconnaissance and other defensive measures in which the cooperation of the Army and the Navy is necessary, were under way and a proper alert was in effect.

With the aid of "hindsight" I believe now that to a staff officer whose specific duty was to make dead sure that the warning order was being intelligently and thoroughly put into effect, the lack of detail in the reply should have suggested the importance of a follow-up inquiry and I have so stated in my final official report of August 1945.

With the further aid of such "hindsight" and in the same official report, I also reached the opinion that the War Plans Division of the General Staff would have placed itself and the safety of the country in a sounder position if it had transmitted to General Short more information than it did. The novelty of the imminence of war and the fact that our outpost commanders were untried in their positions now indicate that more details and repeated emphasis would have been a safer policy. Also there seems to have been a lack of coordination in the General Staff in respect to the method in which the warnings against sabotage were sent, which would not have occurred later in the war after the staff was fully organized.

Yet none of these things in my opinion alter in any material degree the responsibility of General Short for the complete absence of a real alert, which he had been directed to take in the message of November 27, and for the placing of his defense in a more helpless position than it was before that alert message was sent. After all, he was the man upon whom the country had a right to rely for the defense of Hawaii, and he had been sufficiently warned.

I have tried to review these various responsibilities with fairness to both the outpost commander and the staff officers at home. I am particularly led to do so because of the difficulty of reproducing now after the lapse of more than 4 years the background and atmosphere under which the entire Army was then working. Our general staff officers were working under a terrific pressure in the face of a global war which they felt was probably imminent. Yet they were surrounded, outside of their offices and almost throughout the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief in danger which now seems incredible. A single incident gives striking evidence of this. During the very last week before the Pearl Harbor attack there was made a most disloyal and almost unbelievable attack on the chief work of the staff. For months the general staff had been laboring over the construction of a strategic and tactical plan for the fighting of a global war in case it should eventuate. The making of such a plan is the highest and most important duty of a general staff—the chief purpose for which it exists. It is also naturally the most highly secret paper in the possession of the Government. On December 4, 1941, the Chicago Tribune published practically in full a copy of that plan. The impact of such a blow was very severe. It involved implications which stretched far and suspicions (happily not fulfilled) of disloyalty in the Army itself. The officers of the Army were then trying to do their duty in the deadening, if not actually hostile, atmosphere of a nation that was
not awake to its danger. We are now engaged in passing judgment
upon their actions in the wholly different atmosphere of a nation
which has suffered some of the horrors of the greatest and most
malignant war in history. In my opinion, it would be highly unjust
to them if this complete difference of atmosphere was not given the
weight which it deserves.

(S) Henry L. Stimson.

[14412—p. 38-A] State of New York,
County of New York, ss:

Henry L. Stimson, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
I have prepared the foregoing statement, and the same is true and correct to
the best of my recollection, information, and belief.

Sworn to before me this 19th day of March 1946.

(S) Henry L. Stimson.

[seal]

(S) Thomas DeRosa,
Attorney and Counsellor at Law.

Office address: 32 Liberty Street, New York City; Residence: Bronx County.
Bronx County Clerks No. 3, Reg. No. A-33D7; New York County Clerks No. 9,
Reg. No. 439D7;

[14413—p. 39] Mr. Stimson's Notes—Appendix to Statement
of Henry L. Stimson


Matters are crystallizing on both sides of us now and the Navy is
meeting with big losses in the Atlantic and Japan is sending somebody
to us, who, I think, will bring us a proposal impossible of acceptance.
I spent part of the morning reading matters—secret reports—on the
latter matter.

[p. 41] Thursday, November 6, 1941.

Then I left for the White House conference and had about an hour's
talk with the President—on the whole a good talk. He was apparently
in very good feeling. We talked about the Far Eastern situation and
the approaching conference with the messenger who is coming from
Japan. The President outlined what he thought he might say. He was
trying to think of something which would give us further time. He
suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no move-
ment or armament for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese
had not settled their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on
on the same basis. I told him I frankly saw two great objections to
that: first, that it tied up our hands just at a time when it was vitally
important that we should go on completing our reinforcement of the
Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would feel that any such
arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him that it has
always been our historic policy since the Washington conference not
to leave the Chinese and [14415] Japanese alone together, be-
cause the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the
Chinese know it. I told him that I thought the Chinese would refuse
to go into such an arrangement.
Friday, November 7, 1941.

Cabinet meeting this afternoon. The President opened with telling the story of Lincoln and his Cabinet—how he polled the Cabinet and found them all polling “no” and then he said, “the ayes have it.” With that he started to have what he said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on the question of the Far East—whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be.\(^1\) It was a very interesting talk—the best Cabinet meeting I think we have ever had since I have been there. He went around the table—first Hull and them myself, and then around through the whole number and it was unanimous in feeling the country would support us. He said that this time the vote is unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull made a good presentation of the general situation. I told them I rather narrowed it down into a following-up the steps which had been done to show what needed to be done in the future. The thing \(^{14416}\) would have been much stronger if the Cabinet had known—and they did not know except in the case of Hull and the President—what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we are to pitch in.

Monday, November 10, 1941.

In the second place he (General Marshall at a staff meeting) read us a long letter from General MacArthur in the Philippines, telling us of the progress of the reorganization of the Philippine Army and the construction of airports throughout the Islands. This was very interesting to me.

Friday, November 21, 1941.

I talked to the President about the question (danger) of poison gas in the Philippines. We have learned that the Japanese have used it on the Chinese at Ichang, where they killed some 700 Chinasmen and disabled about \(^2\)—I don’t want to be caught without gas in the Philippines. And yet we have been afraid to send it for fear it would leak out and be misconstrued during these negotiations. But I thought the time had come when we ought to not delay any longer and I told the President so quietly and privately after the conference and he \(^{14417}\) agreed with me. So when I got back I called in General Gerow in the absence of General Marshall and told him to look up all the facts and get ready for the possible shipments with the idea that it should be done so that it would not come out in the press.

Monday, November 24, 1941.

I had a good talk with General Olmstead, whom I have recently promoted to be the chief signal officer on General Mauborgne’s retirement. He is doing very well and outlined to me the work of

\(^1\) Note.—See statement, p. 11, as to this Cabinet meeting.

\(^2\) Note: Blank in notes.
reorganization of his office which he has accomplished. It was very good.

Note.—This conference was on the subject of the use of radar as a defense against surprise attacks. See statement p. 13.

[p. 46]

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1941.

This was a very full day indeed. At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull’s office for our meeting of Three. Hull showed us the proposal for a 3 months’ truce, which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought as we read it, but I don’t think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic. In return for the propositions which they were to do: namely; to at once evacuate and at once to [14418] stop all preparations or threats of action, and to take no aggressive action against any of her neighbors. etc., we were to give them open trade in sufficient quantities only for their civilian population. This restriction was particularly applicable to oil. We had a long talk over the general situation.

Then at 12 o’clock we (viz, General Marshall and I) went to the White House, where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President, instead of bringing up the Victory Parade,\(^3\) brought up entirely the relations [p. 47] with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition.\(^4\) Hull laid out his general broad propositions on which the thing should be rested—the freedom of the seas and the fact that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy of world aggression. The others brought out the fact that any such expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps towards an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation [p. 48] of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on preparing that. When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that an (a Japanese) expedition had started. Five divisions have come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had embarked on ships—30, 40, or 50 ships—and have been sighted south

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\(^2\) This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national action in case of war in Europe.

\(^3\) See statement, pp. 11 and 14. Our military and naval advisers had warned us that we could not safely allow the [14419] Japanese to move against British Malaysia or the Dutch East Indies without attempting to prevent it.
of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the President of the message from G-2.

[p. 49] 

[14420] Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over—to tell them that he has no other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected to that proposition—when he showed it to them; that is, to the proposition which he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving to the Japanese the small modicum of oil for civilian use during the interval of the truce of the 3 months. Chiang Kai-shek had sent a special message to the effect that that would make a terrifically bad impression in China; that it would destroy all their courage and that they (it) would play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies and that the Japanese would use it. T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has asked to see me and I called Hull up this morning to tell him so and ask him what he wanted me to do about it. He replied as I have just said above—that he had about made up his mind to give up the whole thing in respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no further action to propose.

A few minutes later I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked him whether he had received [p. 50] the paper which I had sent him over last night about the Japanese having started a new expedition from Shanghai down toward Indochina. He fairly blew up—jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't seen it and that that changed the whole [14421] situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire truce—an entire withdrawal (from China)—they should be sending this expedition down there to Indochina. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2 and through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got another copy of the paper I had sent last night and sent it over to him by special messenger.

[p. 51] 

[14421] 

[14420] 

Thursday, November 26, 1941.

A very tense, long day. News is coming in of a concentration and movement south by the Japanese of a large expeditionary force moving south from Shanghai and evidently headed toward Indochina, with a possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma, or to the Burma Road or to the Dutch East Indies, but probably a concentration to move over into Thailand and to hold a position from which they can attack Singapore when the moment arrives.

The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his finale had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on 2 or 3 days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday he would, he broke the whole matter off. He told me now that he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and
Knox—[14422] the Army and the Navy.” I then called up the President. The President gave me a little different view. He said they had ended up, but they ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterward that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular position.

General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of two of our biggest planes out from San Francisco and across the Mandated Islands to Manila. There is a concentration going on by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands and these planes can fly high over them, beyond the reach of their pursuit planes and take photographs.

Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I didn’t want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part. The main question has been over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi alert, or the first signal for an alert, and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert; namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack and telling him[14423] how the situation was. So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully; finally got it in shape and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull, I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was.

Friday, November 28, 1941.

Pursuant to my instructions G-2 had sent me a summary of the information in regard to the movements of the Japanese in the Far East and it amounted to such a formidable statement of dangerous possibilities that I decided to take it to the President before he got up. I told him there was an important coalition of facts and that I thought he ought to read it before his appointment which he had made for us at 12 o’clock, when the so-called War Cabinet was to meet him—Hull, Knox, myself with Stark and Marshall. He branched into an analysis of the situation himself as he sat there on his bed, saying there were three alternatives and only three that he could see before us. I told him I could see two. His alternatives were—first, to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at once. I told him my only two were the last two, because I did not think anyone would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of the other two my choice was the latter one.

[14424] When we got back there at 12 o’clock he had read the paper that I had left with him. The main point [p. 54] of the paper was a study of what the expeditionary force, which we know has left Shanghai and is headed south, is going to do. G-2 pointed out that it might develop into an attack on the Philippines or a land-
ing of further troops in Indochina, or an attack on Thailand or an attack on the Dutch Netherlands, or on Singapore. After the President had read these aloud, he pointed out that there was one more. It might, by attacking the Kra Isthmus, develop into an attack on Rangoon, which lies only a short distance beyond the Kra Isthmus and the taking of which by the Japanese would effectually stop the Burma Road at its beginning. This, I think, was a very good suggestion on his part and a very likely one. It was the consensus that the present move—that there was an expeditionary force on the sea of about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing somewhere—completely changed the situation when we last discussed whether or not we could address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops which she already had on land in Indochina. It was now the opinion of everyone that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indochina and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, [p. 55] and ourselves in the Philippines. It was the consensus of [14425] everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of going.

It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the other, which we didn't think we could do—that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem to me to be the right thing now, and I pointed them out to the President. In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be couched in terms which [p. 56] contained an explicit warning. One does not warn an Emperor. In the second place it would not indicate to the people of the United States what the real nature of the danger was. Consequently I said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the United States, and I thought that the best [14426] form of a message would be an address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this idea of a message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way; that he had better send his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, and then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was the final decision at that time, and the President asked Hull and Knox and myself to try to draft such papers.
Dr. Alfred Sze and Dr. T. V. Soong came in to see me on their own request. I think Soong was anxious to have someone present as a witness to get me to corroborate what I said to him sometime ago about our intentions to fortify the Philippines. I told him simply that I knew what a difficult situation the Generalissimo was in and it was very presuming for me, sitting here in comfort, to ask him to be patient when he was in the middle of such anxieties and responsibilities there. Nevertheless I told him that that was, I am sure, the course that he should take. I said, I can only say that there is no change in the American policy from what I said to Dr. Soong some- [14427] time ago, and he can report that to the Generalissimo and tell him that I also counsel him to have just a little more patience and then I think all things will be well. Apparently that was all they wanted, for they at once got up and thanked me and went away. I warned them, of course, that they should not in any way make public or leak about what I had said to them. I called in Marshall and told him what had happened and asked him to remember what I said.

I left for the White House conference at 12 o'clock, and there were present there just Knox, Sumner Welles [p. 8] and myself, as Hull is laid up with a cold. The President went step by step over the situation and I think has made up his mind to go ahead. He has asked the Japanese through Sumner Welles what they intend by this new occupation of southern Indochina—just what they are going to do—and has demanded a quick reply. The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will send a message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. He said that he was going to take the matters right up when he left us.


Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hull, and everything in MAGIC indicated that they had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some devilry and we are all wondering where the blow will strike. We three stayed together in conference until lunch time, going over the plans for what should be said or done. The main thing is to hold the main people who are interested in the Far East together—the British, ourselves, the Dutch, the Australians, the Chinese. Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture of it, and I made him dictate it to a stenographer and I attach it to the end of this. Knox also had his views as to the importance of showing immediately how these different nations must stand together and I got him to dictate that and that is attached hereto. Hull was to see the Japanese envoys at 1 o'clock but they were delayed in keeping the appointment and did not come until later—as it turned out, till 2
o'clock or after. I returned to Woodley to lunch and just about 2 o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me up on the telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me, "Have you heard the news?" I said, "Well, I have heard the telegrams which have been coming in about the Japanese advances [14429] in the Gulf of Siam." He said, "Oh, no. I don't mean that. They have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii." Well, that was an excitement indeed. The messages which we have been getting through Saturday and yesterday and this morning are messages which are brought by the British patrol south of Indochina, showing that large Japanese forces were moving up into the Gulf of Siam. This itself was enough excitement and that was what we were at work on our papers about. The observer thought these forces were going to land probably either on the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still in Indochina, or on the western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula, or probably Malay. The British were very much excited about it and our efforts this morning in drawing our papers was to see whether or not we should all act together. The British will have to fight if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three all thought that we must fight if the British fought. But now the Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us directly in Hawaii.

As soon as I could finish my lunch, I returned to the office and began a long conference which lasted until 6 o'clock. The news coming from Hawaii is very bad. [p. 61]. They seem to have sprung a complete surprise upon our fleet and have caught the battleships inside the harbor and bombed them severely with losses. They have also hit our airfields there and have destroyed a great many of our planes, evidently before [14430] they got off the ground. It has been staggering to see our people there, who have been warned long ago and were standing on the alert, should have been so caught by surprise. At 4 o'clock McCloy had the chiefs of the arms of the services in his room and I went in there and made them a little pep-up talk about getting right to work in the emergency but most of the time was spent in conference with Marshall, Grenville Clark, Miles, Patterson, McCloy, and their assistants, Lovett and General Gullion, the Provost Marshal General. The main subject that we were talking about was the form of a declaration of war. Grenville Clark had drawn up a copy based largely on the Woodrow Wilson one. We all thought that it was possible we should declare war on Germany at the same time with Japan, but that, of course, is an open question. There will be no doubt about declaring war on Japan now, I think. The President has set a conference at the White House at 8:30 this evening, in which the Cabinet had a conference and then a conference at 9 to which the leaders of the House were coming.

[p. 62] When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. For I feel that this country united has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred up by unpatriotic men have [14431] been hitherto very discouraging.
Our meeting with the President in the evening was in the Oval Room in the White House. He sat behind his desk and we in a semi-circle in front of him. He opened by telling us that this was the most serious meeting of the Cabinet that had taken place since 1861 and then he proceeded to enumerate the blows which had fallen upon us at Hawaii. Before he got to that, Knox who sat next to me told me with a rather white face that we had lost seven of the eight battleships in Hawaii. This, however, proved later to be exaggerated. Steve Early sat near the President and dispatches were brought in every few minutes during the meeting. The President had hastily drawn a draft of a message to Congress which he then read to us slowly. It was a very brief message, presenting the same thoughts which he actually presented the following day in his finished message to the Congress.

[p. 63] After the talk with the Cabinet which lasted for at least three-quarters of an hour, the leaders of Congress who had been waiting below came in. I can remember the following as being present: The Vice President, Senators Barkley, Connally, Austin, Hiram Johnson, perhaps George; Representatives: Speaker Rayburn, Sol Bloom, Eaton of New Jersey, Joe Martin; possibly others. The President began by a very frank story of what had happened, including our losses. The effect on the Congressmen was tremendous. They sat in dead silence [14432] and even after the recital was over they had very few words. The President asked if they would invite him to appear before the Joint Houses tomorrow and they said they would. He said he could not tell them exactly what he was going to say to them because events were changing so rapidly. We didn't finish until after 11 o'clock, when I returned to the office and stayed there until after 12.

On my return to the office from lunch I had started matters going in all directions to warn against sabotage and to get punch into the defense move. Marshall had sent out word of the attack to all of the corps area commanders and all our people throughout the world, particularly in the Philippines. I ordered all the officers thereafter to appear in uniform and I found that others [p. 64] had ordered the armed guards out over the War Department Building and additional guards over my house. We offered a guard to the White House but it was thought better there to have the FBI. This same activity went on during the intervals of my visit to the White House.

[14433—p. 65] Proposed Statement for President by Hull—
(See Record, December 7)

The Japanese Government, dominated by the military fireeaters, is deliberately proceeding on an increasingly broad front to carry out its long proclaimed purpose to acquire military control over one-half of the world with nearly one-half its population. This inevitably means Japanese control of islands, continents, and seas from the Indies back near Hawaii, and that all of the conquered peoples would be governed militarily, politically, economically, socially, and morally by the worst possible military despotism with barbaric, inhuman, and semi-
slavery methods such as Japan has notoriously been inflicting on the people in China and Hitler on the peoples of some 15 conquered nations of Europe. This would virtually drive and force all free and peaceful peoples off the high seas.

At this moment of serious, threatened, and imminent danger, it is manifest that control of the South Sea area by Japan is the key to the control of the entire Pacific area, and therefore defense of life and commerce and other invaluable rights and interests in the Pacific area must be commenced within the South Sea area at such times and places as in the judgment of naval and military experts would be within sufficient time and at such strategic points as would make it most effective. In no other way can it be satisfactorily determined that the Pacific area can be successfully defended.

[14434] More than ever is the cohesive, closely related world movement to conquer and destroy, with Hitler moving across one half of the world and the Government of Japan under the military group moving across the other half of the world by closely synchronizing their efforts and collaborating and cooperating whenever to their individual or their mutual advantage.

This at once places at stake everything that is precious and worth while. Self-defense, therefore, is the key point for the preservation of each and all of our civilized institutions.

[14435—p. 67] Suggestion by Knox—(See Record, December 7)

1. We are tied up inextricably with the British in the present world situation.
2. The fall of Singapore and the loss to England of Malaya will automatically not only wreck her far eastern position but jeopardize her entire effort.
3. If the British lose their position the Dutch are almost certain to lose theirs.
4. If both the British and the Dutch lose their positions we are almost certain to be next, being then practically Japanese surrounded.
5. If the above be accepted, then any serious threat to the British or the Dutch is a serious threat to the United States; or it might be stated any threat to any one of the three of us in a threat to all of us. We should therefore be ready jointly to act together and if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be reached immediately. Otherwise we may fall individually one at a time (or somebody may be left out on a limb).
6. I think the Japanese should be told that any movement in a direction that threatens the United States will be met by force. The President will want to reserve to himself just how to define this. The following are suggestions to shoot at: Any movement into Thailand; or any [p. 68] movement into [14436] Thailand west of 100° east and south of 10° north—this in accordance with the recommendation of the British and Dutch and United States military authorities in the Far East; or any movement against British, Dutch, United States, Free French, or Portuguese territory in the Pacific area.
Mr. Lane. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I ask to have spread on the record those interrogatories submitted to former Secretary Stimson by Senator Ferguson which were not answered as explained in former Secretary Stimson’s letter of transmittal covering the interrogatories which he did subsequently answer. The letter of transmittal, the interrogatories and answers thereto will be in our next offer.

The Chairman. It is so ordered.

(The interrogatories [unanswered] referred to follow.)

March 6, 1946.

The Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack being advised that the former Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, is unable to appear before the committee because of illness, I submit the following questions to Mr. Stimson to be answered fully, completely, and under oath, and it is to be understood that the questions and answers are to be made part of the official record as if taken in open hearings.

Homer Ferguson,  
Homer Ferguson,  
United States Senate.

1. In your testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board, you stated that you had memoranda and records of what took place at certain meetings relating to Japan and American relations during 1941. Will you please furnish for the committee copies of these memoranda and records so far as they disclose the Far East situation between November 1 and December 8, 1941?

2. Did the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, have knowledge of what was taking place between you and other Cabinet members and the President in relation to the Far Eastern situation?

3. On the 25th of November 1941, you had a conversation with the President wherein he stated that hostilities with Japan might start perhaps next Monday, and that you had a discussion with him at that time as to what we should do in relation thereto. Will you please give us in detail what was said by you and by the President at that time?

4. Having appointed a board under the statute to investigate the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, how do you account for the fact that after the Board had completed the examination of witnesses you appointed Major Clausen to complete the investigation?

5. Will you give us the details as to those with whom you discussed this matter and the conversations?

6. Did you have Major Clausen investigate our policy in the Far East as far as the Secretary of State’s office was concerned?

7. If not, will you tell us why not?

8. Did you have Major Clausen investigate our policy in the Far East as far as the White House was concerned?

9. If not, will you tell us why not?

10. Why did you not have the Board appointed to investigate this matter consider the so-called Clausen affidavits?

11. Were all Magic, that is, intercepted Japanese messages, furnished to you?

If not all Magic, were the messages furnished to War Plans and Chief of Staff delivered to you?

Will you tell us what Japanese messages you did discuss with the President?
[14439] Will you state what discussion you had with the President on the following Japanese messages:

- No. 985----------------- Page 204, Exhibit 1.
- No. 986----------------- Page 206, Exhibit 1.
- No. 865----------------- Page 208, Exhibit 1.
- No. 844----------------- Page 195, Exhibit 1.

12. Did you discuss these Magic messages with the President?
13. I call your attention to the message in exhibit 2 and ask if you saw these messages prior to December 7, 1941.
14. I call your attention to the message on page 12 of exhibit 2 and ask if you saw that message.
15. I ask you what evaluation you placed on the messages on pages 12, 13, 14, and 15 of exhibit 2.
16. Did you discuss the messages asked about in the previous 3 questions with any person? If so, give us the details of the discussion.
17. Did you ever discuss with Secretary Hull why he decided not to send the modus vivendi?
18. Did he ever tell you why he decided to send the note of November 26, 1941, and not the modus vivendi? If so, will you state what he said?
19. Upon what conversations was it based and what was the reason for it?
20. I show you exhibit 45 and ask you to explain in detail why this language was used in that memorandum: “be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations.”

21. I call your attention to exhibit 45 and ask you whether it was originally intended to send this message discussed in this exhibit to General Short?
22. Isn’t it true that a message was only to be sent to General MacArthur and that you had discussed with the President this message only to General MacArthur?
23. Did you ever discuss with Secretary Hull the modus vivendi? Give us the details of your conversation.

24. Did you advise for or against sending that proposal? If so, tell us what was said.
25. Did Secretary Hull ever tell you why he sent the note of November 26 and not the modus vivendi? If so, give us the conversation.
26. Exhibit No. 36 in the present investigation entitled “Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff), subject: Far Eastern Situation,” signed by L. T. Gerow, Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, contains the following statement: “The Secretary of War directs that the following secret, first priority, message be despatched by cable, radio, or telegraph (whichever method is the most secure from the viewpoint of secrecy) to each of the following:

[14440] Commanding General, Hawaiian Department
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command”

There then follows the message sent by the War Department to General Short on November 27, 1941, signed “Marshall” being No. 472, which is set forth on page 7 of exhibit 32.
When you directed that this despatch be sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, did you intend to cause him to alert the Hawaiian Department against hostile Japanese attack in the Hawaiian area?

27. Exhibit No. 46 in this investigation is a copy of General Short's reply to the message from General Marshall referred to in the preceding interrogatory. This reply reads as follows:

Report department alerted to prevent sabotage period. Liaison with Navy re URAD four seven two twenty seventh.

This exhibit containing General Short's reply bears the notation:

Noted H. L. S. (Stimson)

the "H L S" appearing to be your initials placed on the original War Department radiogram in your handwriting.

When you read General Short's reply did you consider that it was an adequate and responsive answer to the War Department's message of November 27th signed: "Marshall," No. 472, [14442] referred to in question 26?

28. If your answer to the preceding question is in the negative, what, if any, action did you take to cause the character of alert in the Hawaiian Department to conform to the type of alert you considered to be required by the message of November 27, 1941, to General Short from the War Department?

29. Did you discuss General Short's reply to the War Department message from General Marshall described in question 26 with any officer in the War Department during the period from November 28, 1941, to and including December 7, 1941.

30. After November 27, 1941, up to and including December 7, 1941, did the President address any inquiry to you as to the condition of alert maintained in the various overseas departments of the Army, and, specifically, as to whether in the Philippines and Hawaii, the Army was prepared to meet any type of Japanese attack?

31. If your answer to question 30 is in the affirmative, what was the nature of the inquiry made to you by the President, and your response thereto?

Please state in complete detail, as you now recall, what was said by the President and by you in any such conversation.)

32. I am informed that you suggested to the President, and he approved the idea, that a final alert should be sent to General MacArthur. Will you give us the details of your [14443] conversation with the President on this matter?

33. I call to your attention a message sent by General Miles to the Commanding General at Panama dated December 5: "U. S.-Jap relations strained. Stop. Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.—sgd. Miles," and ask you if you ever knew that that was sent?

34 (a) If you knew of this message referred to in the last question, will you explain when it was drawn up and sent to the Commander in Panama?

(b) Why was it sent?

(c) Why was the same message not sent to General Short at Pearl Harbor?
35. Were you familiar with the reply that the commander in Panama made to the order of the 27th of November?
36. You have spoken in your testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board that the President had made a momentous decision on the 26th or near that date. It appears to be in connection with sending the final alert as indicated in your diary. Will you state what that decision was and all the conversations you had with the President in relation to it?
37. In that message the following language was used: “negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible [14444] at any moment.” Is this your language and, if so, did you discuss it with anyone before the message of November 27 was sent?
38 (a) If the language used in the previous message is not your language, will you tell whose it was and what discussions you had in relation to it?
(b) Did you discuss this language with the President? If so, will you give us the details of the conversation?
39. Isn’t it true that the Japanese did come back for discussions and that the newspapers carried accounts of further discussions on December 1, 2, and 5?
40. Would not the reports in the newspapers that negotiations had been resumed tend to make General Short feel that the situation was less critical, especially when he had been given no further information by the War Department?
41. You used the following language in the message:
If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.
Whose language is this?
411/2. You having directed the preparation of the message of November 27 to General Short in General Marshall’s absence, if that message was subject to more than one interpretation was it not your responsibility to check up on the reply to it under “report action taken”?
42. Tell us as to the discussions you had concerning [14445] whether it should be put in the message to General Short?
43. Did you ever discuss this first overt act as used in the Marshall message to Short on November 27 with the President? Tell us what was said and when you had the conversation.
44. (a) Did you ever discuss this first overt act language with Secretary of State Hull? Tell us what was said and when you had the conversation.
(b) You knew that the message from Marshall to Short required Short to report measures taken?
45. Do you know whether any follow-up was made by the War Department on the report of measures taken made by Short to this message?
46. For the purpose of this question let us assume that General Short misinterpreted the Marshall message. If the answer is “no” to the previous question, is the fault that Short misinterpreted the message or that Washington failed to follow up his reply and see
he misinterpreted your message? Was the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor caused by Short’s misinterpreting the Marshall message of November 27 or Washington failing to see that he had misinterpreted your alert and not sending a new alert calling this error to his attention.

47. On the morning of November 28, you went to see the President, as you describe it “before the President got up.” You had with you a November 28 G–2 report, or some other report from G–2. Will you tell us the conversation you had with [14446] the President—what was said by each of you.

48. (a) If this was important to discuss with the Commander in Chief, the President, why did you not think it was also important to discuss it with General Short or to give him notice of it?

(b) Did you discuss the same thing with General Marshall or General Gerow?

(c) Did you discuss it with anyone else—if so, give names and conversation.

49. You have described the decision as “momentous.” If this is true, should it not have been transmitted to General Short?

50. Where did you expect the Japanese to strike on December 7, 1941?

51. Did the President say or intimate that he did not desire Short or Kimmel to fire the first shot or commit the first overt act?

52. Did you concur without question in that attitude—that the first overt act should not be committed by Admiral Kimmel or General Short?

53. If so, will you give us the reasons for such concurrence?

54. Had not the military movements of the Japanese clearly indicated that Japan was not coming back and not going to offer to continue the conferences?

55. Did you ever see the message of November 26, 1941, sent by Secretary Hull to the Japanese?

56. If your answer to the last question is “yes”, did you know the contents of that message at the time it was sent or shortly thereafter? Will you explain as to whether or not you believed it broke off relations with Japan?

57. Will you state the full conversation you had with Secretary Hull in relation to the fact that he was through and that it was then up to the Army and Navy?

58. Did Mr. Hull explain why he was sending that message?

59. Are you conversant with an official document of the State Department of the United States wherein it is to be found these two sentences: “He (the Secretary of State) said that our proposed agreement (that is, the agreement proposed by Hull on the same day, the 26th) would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation which, however, were not referred to in the outline for fear that this might give rise to some misunderstanding. He (that is Mr. Hull) also referred to the fact that he had earlier in the conversations acquainted the Ambassador (that is, Nomura) of the ambition that had been his of settling the immigration question but that the situation had so far prevented him from realizing that ambition.”

60. Do you understand that these are Secretary Hull’s own words, contained in a memorandum, transcribed for him by Assistant Secre-
tary Ballantine who was present at the meeting?  [14448]  Do you understand that this is what Secretary Hull says he said to the Jap Government in the person of its ambassadors?

61. Do they represent what is known as an unnamed consideration in the event of the American note of the 26th being accepted by the Japanese?  [14449]  62. Were you acquainted, when you reviewed the Army board's definition of the nature of the note of the 26th, with the fact that having read the note and having heard the Secretary's supplementary propositions, Ambassador Kurusu said "that when they reported our answer to their Government it would be likely to throw up its hands?" (of Public Relations, vol. 2, p. 765) and that "Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end * * *." (of Foreign Relations, vol. 2, p. 766).

63. Your diary shows that Secretary Hull stated at the meeting on December 7 at the meeting between you, Secretary Knox, and Secretary Hull that the Japanese are planning some deviltry and that he wondered where the blow would strike. Did you discuss Hawaii, or any other American possession at that time?

64. If so, will you state what was said and by whom?

65. (a) Did anyone at that meeting bring up the question of 1 p. m. Washington time being dawn or morning in Pearl Harbor?

(b) Did you three Secretaries on December 7, 1941, discuss the 1 p. m. time of delivery and what was said by each of you?

66. Did anyone suggest or bring up the fact that this might or could mean an attack upon Hawaii or Pearl Harbor?

67. If so, give us the details of that discussion. Give us the detailed conversation that took place in the Secretary of State's office on Sunday a.m., December 7, 1941.

[14450]  68. On December 6, 1941, was an appointment arranged for a meeting between you, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Navy, to be held at the State Department on December 7, 1941, at or about 10 o'clock a.m.?

69. (a) Who arranged the meeting referred to in the preceding question and at what time? What was to be the purpose of the meeting?

(b) Why was not General Marshall and/or Admiral Stark invited or in attendance?

(c) If the meeting was to consider Japan’s reply to the Secretary of State’s note of November 26, why was the President not also conferred with?

70. What was the occasion for arranging the meeting referred to in question 68?

71. (a) Who attended the meeting at the State Department on December 7, 1941, at or about 10 o’clock a.m.?

(b) What intercepted Japanese messages were before you at that meeting?

72. What discussion or discussions took place at the meeting held at the State Department on the morning of December 7, 1941, which you attended in company with the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox?  (Please state in complete detail what was said by you and by the other participants in the discussions at the meeting referred to.)
[14451] 73. What action did you take, or direct to be taken, on the morning of December 7, 1941, (a) when you learned of the existence and tenor of the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26, 1941, which appears on page 245 of exhibit 1; and (b) when you learned that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was directed to present the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 at 2 p. m., Washington time?

74. Was there any discussion between you and any individual on December 7, 1941, prior to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as to the significance of the Japanese message directing the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to present the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26, 1941, at 1 p. m., Washington time?

75. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, what was said by you and any other individual in connection with the subject matter of the significance of the hour fixed for the delivery of the Japanese note to the United States on December 7, 1941?

76. After you learned of the existence of the fourteenth part of the Japanese message and the additional message fixing the time of delivery as 1 o'clock p. m., Washington time, did you discuss either of these messages with the President, with General Marshall, or with Admiral Stark or any officer of the State Department, the Navy Department, the War Department?

[14452] 77. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, what was said by you and what was said by the person or persons with whom you had any discussion or conversation referred to in the preceding question?

78. Did you talk with the President personally or by phone or contact him through a messenger on Saturday, December 6 or 7 from 4 p. m. to the time of the attack?

79. If you did communicate in any way with the President, personally or otherwise, give the details of that conversation.

80. Did you at any time on December 6, 1941, receive the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26, which appears on pages 239, 240, 242, 243, and 244 of exhibit 1 in this investigation?

81. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, at what time and from what individual, did you receive the message referred to?

82. When on December 6, 1941, did you learn that the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 had been intercepted and translated by the Army and Navy?

83. From whom did you receive the information referred to in the preceding question? (Please state in complete detail, as you now recall, what was said by any person or persons informing you of the receipt of the 13-part message, and your response thereto.)

84. Exhibit 58 of this investigation (item 2) contains a list of "telephone calls made from outside through White House switchboard on December 6, 1941, and December 7, 1941, as compiled from operators' notes available." The following calls appear among others with the following notations as to time on December 6:

830 p. Secy Knox eld Secy Stimson------------------------OK
845 p. Secy Knox eld Secy Hull--------------------------OK
847 p. Secy Knox eld Secy Stimson-----------------------OK
(a) What was said by you and by Secretary Hull in the course of your telephone conversation at 12:58 p.m. on December 6, 1941?
(b) What was said by you and Secretary Knox in the course of your telephone conversation at 8:30 p.m. on December 6, 1941?
(c) What was said by you and Secretary Knox in the course of your telephone conversation at 8:47 p.m. on December 6, 1941?

85. Did you have any conversation or conversations with Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox on 6 December 1941, other than those referred to in the preceding question?
86. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, what were the time or times of any such conversation or conversations, and what was said by you and the other party to each such conversation?
87. This question not used.
88. This question not used.
89. This question not used.
90. At any time on December 6, 1941, did you discuss the "pilot message," so-called or the 13-part message referred to in question 80 with any of the following individuals:
(a) The President.
(b) Secretary of State Hull.
(c) Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox.
(d) Mr. Sumner Welles.
(f) Admiral H. R. Stark.
(g) General Miles—G-2.
(h) General Gerow.
(i) Col. Rufus Bratton.

(Please specify in your answer to this question the name of the individual or individuals referred to, with whom you had such discussion or conversation, and the time or times of such discussions or conversations.)

(See question 94 for description of the pilot message.)
91. What was said by you and by any of the individuals referred to in question 90 in the course of any conversations or discussions on December 6, 1941, with reference to:
(a) The meaning of the so-called "pilot message" (see question 94).
(b) Any action to be taken by the War and Navy Departments, or the State Department, in connection with the so-called "pilot message";
(c) The meaning of the 13-part message referred to in question 80;
(d) Any action to be taken by the War and Navy Departments or the State Department with respect to the 13-part message.
92. Where were you on December 6, 1941, from 4 p.m. to 12 midnight?
93. Did you learn of the contents of the thirteenth part of the 14-part message before you saw it? If so, relate the circumstances.
94. Your attention is directed to pages 238 and 239 of exhibit 1 of this investigation, and specifically to the message appearing on such pages from Tokyo to Washington, No. 901, on December 6, 1941. This message has been described in the course of this investigation as the
"pilot message" because it informs the Japanese representatives in Washington that Japan has prepared a memorandum in reply to the American note of November 26 to be sent in 14 parts, and that the time of its presentation was to be specifically fixed [I4456] in a later message. Col. Rufus Bratton has testified before this committee (record, p. 12050) that he disseminated this so-called "pilot message" around 3 o'clock of the afternoon of December 6, 1941, to "Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of the War Plans Division, G-2, and my own section."

What action did you take upon receipt of this message?
95. With whom did you discuss the so-called "pilot message" referred to in the preceding question?
96. What was the nature of your discussion of the so-called "pilot message" with any person or persons on the 6th of December 1941? (Please state in complete detail what you said in any such discussion, and what was said by the person or persons with whom you discussed the "pilot message")
97. When did you see the pilot message which is No. 901, page 238 of exhibit 1?
Had the contents of the pilot message been called to your attention before you saw it? If so, relate the circumstances.
98. When did you first see or obtain information as to the contents of the following messages in exhibit 1:
   No. 904----------------------------------------------- Page 245.
   No. 907----------------------------------------------- Page 248.
   No. 908----------------------------------------------- Page 248.
   [I4457] No. 909----------------------------------------------- Page 240.
   No. 910----------------------------------------------- Page 249.
99. If you made plans at this meeting on the 7th between the three Secretaries as to what was to be said or done (the words said and done were used by you in your testimony before the Army board) did you discuss with anyone that this information should be sent to the field, particularly to Short?
   Give us the conversations on what was to be said.
   Give us the conversations on what was to be done.
100. At what time did you first get the fourteenth part of the 14-part message? Give hour if possible.
101. Did you see General Marshall on December 6? If so, give us detailed conversations between you.
   Did you see General Marshall on December 7 prior to the Japanese attack? If so, give us detailed conversation.
   Did you see General Gerow on December 6 or 7 up to the Jap attack? If so, give us detailed conversations between you.
102. Did you talk with any Army officer after 4 p.m. on December 6, 1941, up to the time of the attack on the 7th of December? If so, give us the conversations.
103. I quote from exhibit 16 dated November 5, 1941, memorandum from Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff to the President:
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:
I4458 a. The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany
remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an
unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a
war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany;
the most dangerous enemy.

b. War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building
up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly
threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great im-
portance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or
more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory
or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or
the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of the
100° East or south 10° North; or into Portugese Timor, New Caledonia, or
the Loyalty Islands.

14459 c. If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should follow the
strategic lines of existing war plans, i.e., military operations should be primarily
defensive, with the objective of holding territory, and weakening Japan’s economic
position;

d. Considering world strategy, a Japanese Advance against Kunming, into
Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify
intervention by the United States against Japan.

e. All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the
Chinese Central Government.

f. In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated
action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields should be undertaken in
common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands
East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the
United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the need of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

104. Did you discuss the above (question 103) with first the President? If so, give us the details of the conversation; secondly, the Secretary of State? If so, give us details of the conversation; third, with General Marshall? If so, give us details of the conversation.

105. Following is the fourteenth part of the 14-part message:

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
7 December 1941
#902 Part 14 of 14

(Note.—In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this
part, appeared the plain English phrase “VERY IMPORTANT”)

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s efforts toward the establish-
ment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially
to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Gov-
ernment to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the
peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has
finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov-
ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotia-
tions.
106. How do you account for the delay from 5 o'clock a. m., the date of the receipt of the fourteenth part of the 14-part message, until you did receive it?

107. If any of the delay was caused by delay in decoding and translation, it seems clear it was translated by 8 a. m. or 8:15 a. m. on the morning of the 7th of December 1941. How do you account for the delay from 8 a. m. until you did see it?

108. Did you at any time prior to the attack discuss with the President the contents of any part of the 14-part message?

109. If so, what was the discussion?

110. Did you discuss with General Marshall any of the Japanese messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7, 1941, and set forth in our exhibit 1? If so, state the time; give the number of the message and page of exhibit 1, also the details of what was said by each of you.

111. If you discussed with the Secretary of State any of the Japanese messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7, 1941, and set forth in our exhibit 1 at any time other than at the meeting in his office at 10 or 10:30 a. m. on Sunday, December 7. State the times and give the number of the message, page of exhibit 1, and also the details of what was said by you and Mr. Hull.

112. Did you discuss with anyone in the Army and Navy any of the Japanese messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7 and set forth in our exhibit 1? Give the names of persons, time of discussion or conversations, and conversation by you and the other party or parties.

113. At the meeting of the three Secretaries on Sunday, December 7, 1941, at 10 or 10:30 a. m. You, Mr. Stimson, were familiar with the message sent to General Short on November 27. Did you not consider with the information you had received here in Washington from that date until your meeting time on December 7 that a new alert was necessary to General Short?

114. You had seen on November 28, 1941, the reply from General Short to the message of November 27 which was as follows:

Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD Four Seven Two Twenty Seventh.

having in mind that reply showing his interpretation of the message of November 27 that a new alert was necessary.

Your findings as to General Short indicate you believed he was subject to criticism for his interpretation of the message from General Marshall to him on November 27; is not the same thing true of the failure to properly evaluate his reply to that message.

115. When did you first learn that General Marshall and General Gerow had failed to note what General Short had replied to their note of November 27?

116. Did not the failure of the responsible Army officers in Washington to properly evaluate General Short's reply to General Marshall's message of November 27 contribute to the Pearl Harbor disaster?

117. Did you know what messages were sent from Washington to General Short between November 27 and the 8th of December 1941? State the message you knew had been sent between November 27 and December 8, 1941.
Did you believe that General Short was getting all decoded Japanese diplomatic messages?

118. Did you believe that Pearl Harbor had the means to intercept, decipher, and translate Japanese diplomatic messages?

119. Did you know that General MacArthur had access to the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages through the Navy in the Philippines?

120. Did you discuss with the President the 1 o'clock message, exhibit 1, No. 907, page 248?

121. If so, give time and what was said by you and by the President.

122. Why did our Government adopt the policy of leaning over backwards to keep from advising Japan that we were ready for any attack that they might make?

123. If such was the plan, or our policy, who was responsible for its adoption?

124. With whom did you discuss it and give us the contents of the discussion.

125. Do you know why General Marshall did not use the telephone to advise General Short of an anticipated attack or give [14465] him an alert?

How could the fact that we were alerted to air attack (if known by the Japs) been detrimental to the United States?

126. You have made a statement that there was a preliminary alert given prior to the 27th and a full alert given on the 27th. As time went on, and the deadline date of the 29th passed, new developments arose as to the destruction of the codes, and other information came to our Government here in Washington. Did you discuss with anyone the sending of a new message to keep parties alerted and, if not, why not?

127. The fact that General Marshall did send a message at 12:18 on the 7th of December 1941, to General Short would indicate, would it not, that General Marshall did not consider the message of the 27th as sufficient considering the further information that was obtained as to Japan’s intentions?

128. This being true, can you tell us why, if a new alert was to be given at all, it was not given earlier than 12:18, December 7?

129. Was your Secretary of War’s office alerted to war on the 5th or on the 6th or on the 7th of December 1941?

130. If not, can you explain why not?

131. If it was, will you explain just how it was alerted and who was on duty in the office?

132. When, in your opinion, did war between Japan and America become imminent?

133. Did you make any effort to contact General Marshall on the afternoon or night of December 6, or on the morning of December 7, 1941?

134. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, were you successful?

135. If your answer to question 133 is in the affirmative, what was said by you and by General Marshall?

136. Did you during the time, the 6th of December, contact Admiral Stark?

137. If so, give us the conversations and what was discussed.
138. This question was not used.
139. This question not used.
140. Did you contact the Secretary of State, or did he contact you, or were you in communication with him either personally or by message on the 6th?
141. If so, give us the details of the conversation and the time of contact.
142. When did you receive notice or information concerning a message from Ambassador Winant purporting to come from Churchill to the President, received in the State Department at 10:40 on December 6?
143. If you had a conference with the Secretary of the Navy about a meeting the next day, and were familiar with the fact that a 13-part message was in, and 1 part part had not been [14467] received, can you explain why the meeting was held as late as 10 or 10:30?
144. When did you learn that the President was preparing a message to the Emperor?
145. When did you first know or hear that that message was sent?
146. If you had any conversations with the President about that message to the Emperor will you give us the conversations?
147. Did you have a conversation at any time in November or December 1941, with the President about a message to Congress concerning the Far Eastern situation? If so, give us details of that conversation.
148. Were you aware that the President, in informing the press on December 2, that he was asking Japan about the Indochina concentrations, was asked by a reporter if any time limit had been set for a reply and that the President had said that the question was silly, had answered in the negative, and said that those tactics were used in the last century not in this, and had said that the United States was at peace with Japan and that the two nations were perfectly friendly?
149. Were you aware of the Jap Ambassador telling Under Secretary Welles, on delivery of the December 2 note, that it was apparent that both sides were preparing? (See Foreign Relations, p. 780.)
150. Were you aware on December 4 that the Japanese [14468] movements in Indochina alone as represented in the President's note of December 2, constituted actions which the President in his note of August 17 had formally pledged the United States to resist?
151. Do you have any evidence that that commitment on August 17 had been made known to the American people or to the American Congress before December 7, 1941?
152. Will you state your conversation with General Marshall, or any other military authority, in relation to the fact that negotiations were ended so far as the Secretary of State was concerned and that it was up to the Army and Navy?
153. When the President returned from the Atlantic Conference, did you discuss with him his conversations or negotiations with Prime Minister Churchill in relation to the Far East?
154. I refer you to Foreign Relations, volume 2, page 556, at the bottom of the page, the last paragraph, which continues on page 557. Did you know that that message was given by the President to the Japanese and did you discuss with him the message, or the contents thereof, and will you state your discussions, what he said and what you said?
155. Did you know what our Government policy was in giving armed aid or support to Britain or the Dutch if there was an attack made by the Japanese upon the Malay Peninsula or any other British or Dutch possession and no direct attack against American possessions?

156. Why were you concerned with the movement south of the Japanese to Thailand or the Malay Peninsula if we had no policy as to what we intended to do in case of any attack on the British and/or the Dutch?

157. Did you ever discuss with the President and/or Secretary of State Hull the question of our policy in case of an attack upon the British and/or Dutch and no attack by the Japanese upon America or American possessions?

158. If you had such a discussion, give us the dates and details.

159. At the meeting on December 7, 1941, with Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox, during that meeting or from the time of that meeting up until the attack, did you or anyone to your knowledge present at that meeting, or in that conference, communicate with the President and, if so, what were the contents of the conversation?

160. At the meeting between you and the other Secretaries and Cabinet members, you have stated that you stayed in conference until lunch time going over the plans for what should be said and done. Will you give us the details of that conversation or, if you do not remember the exact words, then the substance of the conference, particularly what you meant by “plans for what should be said” and what is meant by that. Also in regard to “as to what should be done,” will you tell us what [14470] was said by each on “as to what should be done.”

161. I refer you to a memorandum, exhibit 40, and ask you if there was any discussion with you or anyone else to your knowledge on this subject of armed support.

Who assured the British of American armed support as mentioned in their instructions to Singapore as shown in the message of our naval observer at Singapore to Admiral Hart?

162. As Secretary of War on December 5, 1941, had you prepared or acted in any way to implement the declaration of the President to Japan on August 17 that the United States immediately would resist a Japanese threat or move into the Southwest Pacific?

163. You were certain, if only from the President’s note of December 2, were you not, that Japanese concentration in southern Indochina, constituted a threat within the meaning and letter of the declaration of August 17, 1941?

164. As Secretary of War, on December 5, had you anticipated that American resistance to a Jap attack against some other nation would follow the pattern of American resistance to Germany’s attacks on Great Britain in the Atlantic Ocean?

165. Was it ever called to your attention that the Secretary of Interior was holding up the installation of the permanent radar sets? If so, what was done to expedite these installations?

166. What evidence was before you when General Short was relieved of his command?

Whose decision was it to relieve General Short of his command?
167. It is true, is it not, that in late November and early December 1941 you and General Marshall shared with General Short the belief that Japan would not attack Pearl Harbor? (See par. 19, Stimson statement August 29, 1945.)

168. It is true, is it not, that the American General Staff "completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particularly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft"?

169. Do you still think that "It is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage in several War Department warnings and the Department's caution against alarming the civilian population, coupled with the failure to comment on Short's report of November 27, confirmed him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and might disregard all others, as you stated in your official report regarding the Pearl Harbor disaster, released to the press on August 29, 1945?"

170. If there was, in the opinion of the War Department General Staff, any "threat from without," in an overseas command, and the reports from that area showed only an alert against sabotage, who, if anyone, had the duty or authority in the War Department to transmit a message to correct the situation?

[14472] 171. In your public report of August 29 you stated that G-2 "had duties of collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information * * * to the theater commanders"; it is true, is it not, that neither G-2 nor the War Department sent any information to General Short between November 28, 1941, and December 7, 1941?

172. In your opinion, was the War Department on a sufficient alert on December 6, 1941 so that the Chief of Staff could reasonably assume that information such as was received indicating a breach of diplomatic relations would get to him before the next morning, or do you regard the delay in getting this information to General Marshall as an unusual circumstance which he could not have reasonably foreseen?

173. Do you believe that in early December 1941 the War Department had an efficient functioning system to get important intelligence promptly to the Chief of Staff?

174. It is true, is it not, that neither you nor Colonel Clausen, your investigator even asked General Short about his knowledge of the "winds" code, but that, nevertheless, you made a finding in your official report that "this information was available to General Short or his command prior to December 7, 1941?"

175. Were you consulted and did you have anything to do with the appointment of the Roberts Commission?

176. Did you see the Roberts Finding of Facts prior to its [14473] signing and submission to the President?

Mr. Lane. As just previously referred to, subsequently the committee submitted certain additional interrogatories to Mr. Stimson. His reply has been received and we request that the interrogatories, the answers thereto, and the letter of transmittal dated April 23, 1946, be spread on the record at this point.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

[14474]

Law Offices of
Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts
Mutual Life Building No. 32 Liberty Street
New York 5, N. Y.

Henry L. Stimson, Counsel

April 23, 1946.

Hon. Allen W. Barkley,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

My Dear Senator Barkley: I have received your kind letter of April 4th enclosing the two sets of interrogatories which Senator Ferguson has submitted. I confess to disappointment that my previous effort to give your Committee a fair and full statement of what I could recollect in regard to the Pearl Harbor attack, based upon such effort and investigation as my health would allow, should now be followed by no less than 257 interrogatories submitted by Senator Ferguson. In preparing my statement I went to the very margin of the rules imposed upon me by my physicians.

The interrogatories which you now send me are divided into two lists. The first dated March 6th must have been prepared before my statement sent to the Committee on March 13th could have been received by them. While I have not been able to examine [14475] it carefully, it must have been in large part answered by that statement of mine.

Senator Ferguson’s second list by its title is related to my statement and is in substance a cross-examination of that statement. This second list I have now tried to answer to the best of my recollection and belief.

I assume that the committee will be satisfied with my original statement as an answer to the first list and, if there are any questions in that list directed to matters not in the statement, it will assume that my recollection does not extend to that question. I really cannot in my present condition of health undertake the very heavy burden which would inure to another reexamination of all papers, documents, and evidence herefore submitted. I did the best I could in that respect in my first statement. I hope you will find my answers to Senator Ferguson’s supplemental questions satisfactory. I enclose them herewith.

With many thanks for your courtesy and personal good wishes.

I am, very sincerely, yours,

(Signed) Henry L. Stimson.


1. Mr. Secretary, you state in your statement to the Pearl Harbor Committee that our military advisers had given the President their formal advice that if Japan moved beyond certain lines we would have to fight for the sake of our own security. Are you referring to the memoranda to the President, dated November 5 and November 27, 1941, and signed by Admiral Stark and General Marshall?

Assuming this statement is addressed to the sentence on page 4 of my statement, my answer is “yes.”

2. Was this advice on the request of the President?

I have no recollection as to this.

3. Was that advice accepted and did it become our Government policy prior to the Pearl Harbor attack?

It has always been the fixed and permanent policy of the United States Government to defend itself and its possessions. The Congress itself reaffirmed and endorsed this policy on numerous occasions as the
dangers to this country from the war which was starting across the world became more acute. It reaffirmed it when the regular size of our ordinary military appropriations were enormously increased by the Congress in May and June 1940, at the time of the fall of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. It reaffirmed it in September 1940, when it passed the draft law, and by the joint resolution in August [14477] 1940, which authorized the total mobilization of the National Guard for large scale maneuvers or training. It reaffirmed it by its passage of the lend-lease legislation to assist in arming the nations who were fighting in the front line against aggression by the Axis and in opening our ports for the repairs of their warships. Each of these extraordinary congressional enactments indicated beyond peradventure a policy to prepare the United States against an immediate impending attack by the Axis nations.

It is the President of the United States who is charged with the execution of that policy, both as Chief Executive and as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. It was his duty to make the decisions as to how this policy of defense should be best carried out. The adoption of plans for defense are ultimately for his decision and if the adoption of a particular strategy is to be termed policy at all, it is executive policy the decision of which it entirely a matter for the President. In making this decision, the President receives the advice of numerous advisers, including his military advisers and the members of his Cabinet. Their views and recommendations, however, are purely advisory, and the final policy and strategy is for the decision of the President and it is his alone.

As I have already pointed out in my statement, and as my contemporaneous notes indicate, it was the consensus of [14478] opinion of the President's advisers that if the Japanese in the latter part of November should advance beyond a certain point the security of this country demanded that we would have to fight. It was also the consensus of opinion that a further warning by us to Japan should be given. The President was in fact during the early part of December engaged in preparing an address to the Congress which would incorporate such a warning, and was also considering a special telegram to the Emperor of Japan. Before the address to the Congress was delivered, however, the Japanese struck on December 7. I do not recollect that the President prior to December 7 formally announced any decision on his part to fight if the Japanese passed the point in question, but he was undoubtedly considering such a decision most seriously, because it was the advice of his best qualified advisers.

4. If so, what plans were promulgated to carry out that advice? See answer to question 3.
5. Did you have information from the President that we would fight for the sake of our security upon the happening of that event mentioned in question 1? See answer to question 3.
6. If so, did you convey that information to General Marshall? See answer to question 3.
7. Will you state if the Secretary of the Navy had such advice and if he conveyed it, or caused it to be conveyed, to [14479] Admiral Stark? I have no information as to this.
8. On page 9 of your mimeographed statement to the committee, you have set forth four salient features of the situation as they appeared to you in November of 1941. Were any or all of these discussed with any other person?

All of these points were discussed many times and with numerous persons. I have already indicated in my statement the discussions that took place with the President, at Cabinet meetings and at meetings with the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Navy and with the chiefs of staff, all of whom shared my views, to the best of my information and belief.

9. If so will you state with whom they were discussed and if anyone else shared your views on these features? Will you give their names?

I have nothing to add beyond what I have already said in my statement of March 1946, and in my last answer.

10. On page 12 of the mimeographed statement you speak of the vote of the Cabinet as to whether or not it was thought that the American people would back you up if it became necessary to strike Japan in case she attacked England in Malay or the Dutch East Indies, does this mean that it became the policy of this Government at that time to take such steps?

See answer to question 3.

[14480] 11. If so, to whom was this policy communicated?

See answer to question 3.

12. Did you advise General Marshall and was he to advise others in the field of this policy?

See answer to question 3.

13. Did you, Mr. Secretary, keep in close touch with the program of installing permanent radar in the Hawaiian Islands?

I took a very active interest in insisting that proper installations of radar, both mobile and permanent, be installed in Hawaii as promptly as possible, but I, of course, left the details as to how and where the permanent apparatus should be installed to the military members of the staff and the local military commander. I have no recollection at this time as to how much detail I knew with regard to the permanent installations at Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941. I do remember distinctly the very favorable report of the test of the mobile apparatus that was made shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack, and that that report indicated that the mobile apparatus was in operation and was capable of detecting the approach of enemy planes at a distance of at least 80 miles.

14. Will you state specifically what was done to expedite the installation of permanent radar in Hawaii?

I have no recollection at the present time.

15. Was it not called to your attention that there were many delays in the installing of radar equipment in the Hawaiian Islands?

I have no recollection at the present time.

16. On pages 14 and 15, you tell of a conversation between the War Cabinet—the President, Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, and the Secretary of State—on page 15 you state that certain things were discussed at the meeting. Was there any policy formulated by virtue of that discussion?

See answer to question 3.
17. If so, will you state what the policy was and how it was to be carried out? On page 15, you state that you reminded the President of his warning of August 19. I ask you if the correct date of that is not Sunday, August 17, when the President returned from the Atlantic Conference with Mr. Churchill?

See answer to question 3. I believe the correct date of the warning which I described as of August 19 should be August 17, 1941.

18. I also ask you what the President replied to you when you made the statement to him as stated by you on page 15 as to the warning that he had given Japan?

I do not recollect.

19. Will you state what the President said about this warning and your suggestion?

I do not recollect, except that I do remember that the final view was that an additional warning to Japan should be given.

20. When did you first become familiar with the warning that the President gave to Japan on August 17, 1941, as related in the White Paper (vol. 2, Foreign Relations of the United States, pages 556-557)? I do not recollect. See answer to question 52 below.


22. Was it not important that you, as Secretary of War, be advised as to our policies in the Far East and that you advise General Marshall of that policy and that he, in turn, advise General Short and other officers in the field?

I think it was important that the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff should be advised as to our policies in the Far East. As to what extent and in what detail the commander of the individual theater should be so advised depends on the circumstances of the particular situation.

23. Was it not important that if our Government had a policy that if England or the Netherlands were attacked that we would consider it as an unfriendly act and an attack upon us, that our military authorities be fully advised as to that?

See answer to questions 3 and 22.

24. Was it not important that if Japan was to make an attack upon the British and/or the Dutch and our policy was that we were to treat that as an attack or unfriendly act upon us that the commanding officer at Hawaii be fully informed as to this in order that he might guard against an attack upon our fleet and possessions which were on the flank of the Japanese?

See answer to questions 3 and 22. The commanding officers of the individual Pacific theaters were advised on November 27 that hostile action was possible “at any moment.”

25. On page 17 of your statement, you speak of the conversation with Mr. Hull and state that he had washed his hands of it and that it was in the hands of the Army and the Navy, and that you had called the President who gave you a different view, do I understand that the President did not agree with Mr. Hull?

I think my statement and my notes of November 27 adequately cover the answer to this question.

26. Will you give us the entire conversation you had with the President in relation to this?

I have nothing to add to what I have already said in my statement.
27. Did you discuss with the President on or about November 27, 1941, the sending of a message to General MacArthur?

I did.

28. Will you give us this conversation?

I have nothing to add to what I have already said in my statement, page 19, and to what is contained in my notes of Thursday, November 27, 1941.

29. At that time, or on the 27th, did you discuss with the President the sending of a message to General Short?

I do not recollect. The sequence shows that such a message was sent to Short as well as the two other Pacific outposts; viz, Panama and the Pacific coast including Alaska.

30. Will you give us the conversation with the President about sending General Short a message?

See answer to question 29.

31. When did it first come to your attention that the Japanese were treating our note of November 26, 1941, as an ultimatum?

I do not recollect. I do not know that it ever came to my knowledge until after December 7.

32. Was it not important that we understand the way the Japanese were treating it—as to what their acts would be rather than what our intentions were?

I have nothing to say as to this. See answer to previous question.

33. On pages 24 and 25 of your mimeographed statement you make the statement that the President had made a momentous decision that day; that is, to send what you called a final alert. I wish you would explain why you refer to this as a momentous decision. The word "momentous" is perhaps not strictly accurate. It is a fair sample of the rough and hasty character of my daily notes as described in my original statement to your committee. The thought I intended to convey was that the President had himself directed that a final warning should be sent out and that as this decision had emanated from the Commander in Chief it was very important that it should be done.

34. Why was it a momentous decision to advise our armed forces to be on the alert for an attack by the Japs?

See answer to question 33.

35. Did you consider this a declaration of war with Japan and for this reason it was a momentous decision?

I did not consider this a declaration of war with Japan.

36. State what was said between you and the President on this occasion so we may be advised as to why this was a momentous decision. I have already answered this in my statement of March 1946, at page 26.

37. On page 26 of your mimeographed statement you say that our Government had decided not to attack without a further warning, and that the President suggested a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. Was it decided as a policy of our Government that we would attack after sending of that message if the Japanese continued their aggression further to the south?

See answer to question 3.

38. On the same page you state that a special message would be delivered to Congress. Will you state if you ever knew why that message was not delivered to Congress?
It was not delivered to Congress because the Japanese struck first.
39. Why was Congress allowed to adjourn from December 4 to December 8 at a time when our Government knew of the movement of the Japanese to the south?
I have no recollection as to this.
40. On page 28 of your statement you use the following language:
On the other hand, we also decided that we could not attack without a further warning to Japan, and we discussed what form that warning should take. The President suggested a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. After some discussion it was decided that he would send such a letter to the Emperor, which would not be made public, and that at the same time he would deliver a special message to Congress reporting on the danger and reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened.
Will you please explain as to whether this proposal involved coming to Congress in advance or whether the proposal was to strike Japan first then report to Congress what had been done?
The proposal was to go to Congress in advance, and through the address to Congress to give the Japanese a final warning.
41. Was it the intention of our Government, through the President, to notify Congress that certain things had happened which caused us to strike Japan, and that the report to Congress was to obtain Congress' ratification and approval?
No. See answer to Question 40.
42. Will you state why no action was actually taken upon this proposal?
See answer to Question 40.
The fact that information coming in around the first of December indicated that the Japanese expedition was landing in Indochina in the neighborhood of Saigon rather than going on into the Peninsula and up into the Gulf of Siam may have prompted the President to think that perhaps the Japanese were not going to invade Thailand at once or attack the Malay Peninsula and may have delayed his address to Congress.
43. On pages 29 and 30 of your message to the committee you go from Tuesday, the 2d of December to Sunday, the 7th, why is there this gap when we consider the crisis that was then pending?
The gap in my statement occurs primarily because of the fact that my notes of those days do not contain memoranda relevant to this inquiry. I remember that we were very busy on Wednesday, December 3. I participated in a large staff conference in which we discussed at length maneuvers that had recently been held and the lessons to be learned from them. I left in the late afternoon to go to New York to keep a dentist appointment on Thursday morning, December 4. I returned to Washington on Thursday afternoon. When I arrived there I was greeted by the news of the publication by the Chicago Tribune on December 4 of our most secret war plans, which had caused great concern to the members of my staff. On Friday, December 5, my time was largely occupied in discussion of this matter and in determining what action should be taken. On Saturday, December 6, I was in frequent conference with General Marshall, and also with General Miles of G-2 and General Gerow of the War Plans Division, which concerned chiefly the supplies which were on the way to the Philippines and the additional big bombers which we were trying to fly over there.
44. Will you state what took place during these 5 days of the crisis with Japan?
   See answer to previous question.
45. Did you leave Washington on December 5 and go to New York?
   No; I was in Washington all that day and until long after December 7.
46. If so, had you fully advised General Marshall of the situation, or had you advised your under secretary, so that they could proceed in an emergency?
   See answer to previous question.
47. On page 30 of your mimeographed statement you use the words "and we were all wondering where the blow would strike," will you explain to the committee who you include in "we"?
   By "we" I referred to Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox, and myself.
48. On page 35 of your mimeographed statement, will you state as to whether or not you made inquiry from any military personnel as to what was meant by an alert against sabotage, or being alerted to prevent sabotage?
   I made no such inquiry.
49. Were you at any time acquainted with various alerts of the Army?
   I was not acquainted with the various alerts, the details of the strategic and tactical plans for the defense of the various theaters, nor was it my duty to be familiar with them.
50. If not, was it not your responsibility, you having sent the message of November 27, under General Marshall's name, to acquaint yourself with the meaning of the reply?
   There is nothing to add to what I have already fully covered in my original statement to your committee. See pages 35 and 36.
51. Did the Marshall message of the 27th of November not call for General Short to reply to the measures taken?
   It did.
52. On page 47 you use the language "I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first step toward an ultimatum," are you there referring to the message of August 17, 1941, delivered to the Japanese Sunday morning, August 17, 1941, and was not that message an ultimatum if the United States desired to use it as such?
   I believe I am referring to the message of August 17, 1941. I have not before me the text of that message, nor have I any recollection of having ever seen that text. I had heard such a warning discussed, but I do not even recollect with whom such discussion or discussions took place. They were nearly 5 years ago.
53. Is it not true that that message having been delivered that the Japanese had violated it in their movements south?
   See answer to previous question.
54. Is it not true that the Japanese had violated the terms of the President's message of August 17, 1941, on Saturday, December 6, 1941, Washington time?
   See answers to the previous two questions.
55. On page 56 of your memorandum to the committee, under date of November 28, you state that the final decision at that time was to send a speech to Congress and that the President asked Mr. Hull, Secretary Knox, and you to try to draft such papers. Did
you aid him in the drafting of these papers, and, if so, will you tell us where we might get copies, or can you furnish us with copies?

I worked on the drafting of some paragraphs, but I have no copies in my possession, nor do I know whether any such copies still exist. Such drafts as I made were not used.

56. With the situation gradually growing worse from November 28 to and including the 6th, what happened that the message was not given to Congress and the message to the Emperor of Japan was not sent until after we had received the 13 parts of the 14-part message indicating a rejection by the Japanese of our proposals of the 26th of November?

See answer to questions 38 and 42.

57. Referring to page 60 of your memorandum, you state the British were very much excited about it—will you state as to whether or not you had any contacts with the British on the 6th or 7th of December 1941?

I do not recollect that I personally had contacts with the British on either the 6th or the 7th of December 1941.

58. If so, state what information you received, or what information you gave to the British.

See answer to question 57.

59. On page 67 of your memorandum, being part 5 of Secretary[14492] Knox's suggestion, I call your attention to the statement "we should therefore be ready jointly to act together and if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be reached immediately." Do you know whether or not any understanding had been reached?

I know of no such understanding. The fact that Mr. Knox in his paper proposed the making of such an understanding confirms me in the belief that none existed.

60. State whether such an understanding was attempted and, if so, what was done toward arriving at such an understanding.

See answer to question 59.

61. Was such an understanding ever reached and, if so, when?

To answer such a question would require an examination of the minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff throughout the war. It was not my duty to follow such minutes and I have with me no other basis for refreshing my recollection. The long and harmonious cooperation throughout the war by our staff and the British staff would indicate that such an understanding was reached soon after we entered the war.

[14493] State of New York,

County of New York, ss:

Henry L. Stimson, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I have prepared the foregoing answers to interrogatories. The same are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

(Signed) Henry L. Stimson.

Sworn to before me this 23d day of April 1946.

(Signed) Thomas de Rosa,

THOMAS DE ROSA,

Attorney and Counsellor at Law.


[14494] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether or not all we are going to do this morning is to put these things in the record? If so, there will be no necessity of my staying, and I have another committee meeting.

The Chairman. That is my understanding.

Senator Ferguson. I have another hearing.

I do want the record to show how I feel, that the record should not be closed until we have had time to fill in the gaps, so as to make a complete record.

The Chairman. All right. Your statements on that subject will be a part of the record.

Go ahead, Mr. Lane.

Mr. Lane. Mr. Chairman, we have a draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in a memorandum by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in Exhibit No. 161.

We ask that this draft be marked "Exhibit No. 161-A" and spread in the exhibits of the committee record.

The Chairman. So received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 161-A").

Mr. Lane. The log of the watch officer, Officer of Chief of Naval Operations, on the night of December 6, 1941, as shown in Exhibit No. 162, contains references by serial numbers to certain naval communications. Copies of these [14495] messages have been obtained from the Navy Department and we ask that they be received and marked "Exhibit No. 162-A."

The Chairman. So ordered.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 162-A").

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt again, because of my inability to be two places at once, I will ask to be excused.

The Chairman. Do you intimate that you prefer the other place to this one? (Laughter.)

Senator Ferguson. No, Mr. Chairman. I have done all I can do on this committee but I still have a great interest in it. It is only because the hearing is for the purpose of putting in records that I ask to be excused.

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I did write a letter on May 20, after our last meeting, in relation to certain facts that I thought we should get from the official records in the War Department. I wrote the letter to Mr. Richardson on May 20. He has the letter now and if we might consider that letter at the present time I would appreciate it.

(The text of the letter referred to by Senator Ferguson follows:

United States Senate.

May 20, 1946.

Mr. Seth W. Richardson,

General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Senate Office Building.

Dear Mr. Richardson: I have gone over the book The Case Against the Admirals, and it appears to me that we should have, for the record, the report on the bombing of the Utah in the fall of 1937. We should also have the program which was prepared by General Andrews and Colonel Knerr. The book states they prepared a program to submit to the War Department
calling for 108 B-17’s for enlarging the Pacific Fleet so it would operate in the Pacific and also provided for training of men to cost $21,000,000.

We should also have a copy of the budget of the Air Corps providing for this. We should also have the evidence showing why the War Department refused to submit the $21,000,000 item to Congress.

I believe we should also secure copies of the letters from Colonel Knerr to the Senate on the B-17 program.

On page 64 of the book is this quotation:

“The War Department cannot approve the program for developing the B-17’s. Instead of the B-17 you are ordered to build a light, responsive, less-expensive type of bombardment plane with a range not to exceed 300 miles.”

We should put this evidence from the War Department into the records.

Sincerely,

(8) Homer Ferguson.

The Chairman. What is it you want Mr. Richardson to produce?

Mr. Richardson. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, at our last meeting a question arose with reference to the possible [14496] interrogation of General Knerr with reference to matters alleged to have taken place subsequent to 1937 in connection with the preparation of long distance bombers known as B-17’s. This letter is the communication we received the 21st, I think, the day following the day it was written, requesting that this information be secured and put in the record.

The facts that are involved in the question are:

1. A request for the report on the bombing of the Utah.
2. The program referred to which was prepared by General Andrews and General Knerr.
3. Copy of the Budget which asked for 21 million dollars for training.
4. The evidence why the War Department refused to submit the item covering these long distance bombers to Congress.
5. The Knerr letters to the Senate recommending the B-17 program and
6. The War Department statement disapproving the B-17 program.

I am inclined to think that five of these six requests are documentary and probably could be furnished by a request appropriately submitted to the War Department. The fourth one, evidence of why the War Department refused to submit the item to Congress, would be directly controversial, of course, and would require the calling of witnesses.

[14497] Senator Ferguson. I didn’t mean to call witnesses on that; if there was anything in the files.

Mr. Murphy. Wasn’t the Utah incident in 1938?

Senator Ferguson. 1937.

Mr. Richardson. 1937 is the recital here.

Mr. Murphy. Where was it bombed in 1937, in Pearl Harbor?

Senator Ferguson. It was a test bombing on this whole B-17 idea.

Mr. Richardson. The point of this request is, as stated before, the question of how far the committee wants to go into the question of why the military services were short of B-17 bombers, and it would be expected that this evidence, if it was developed and put in the record, would disclose that, who was responsible for opposing the building of those bombers, and thereby would have the responsibility for failure to have them in our air force during 1941 when the situation with Japan grew more tense.
That is the question involved in this picture.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think that, in all fairness, if that were to go into the record that it would be necessary to go into a study of the defense strategy of the United States from 1937 on. We have a statement from General Marshall as to how much we actually had in the way of large bombers in the Service at December 7, 1941.

This letter purports to be based upon a book which was written by William Bradford Huie. Mr. Huie makes certain statements in this book that are open to challenge. I noticed a number of them that I think could be very easily refuted.

But at any rate, questions arise out of a reading of this particular book, which is one placed on the market in 1946.

He says, at page 162:

I suppose an objective discussion of the Marines is about as difficult to achieve as is an objective discussion of religion or Roosevelt.

That is the kind of a book it is.

The Chairman. What is the name of it?

Mr. Murphy. The Case Against the Admirals.

The Chairman. The committee discussed this book at its last meeting in executive session in connection with the suggestion that certain people mentioned in the book be called as witnesses which, the committee felt, I think, in view of its action, would involve the committee going into a controversy that was raging in 1937 as to whether these B-17's should be ordered and an appropriation made for them.

The action of the committee in ordering the record and the hearings closed today seems to preclude the calling of these witnesses and, obviously, if the theory in this book is to be exploited, or explored, everybody mentioned in the book would have to be called here as a witness, or at least a certain number of them. Those against whom the book is written, being The Case Against the Admirals, would certainly have a right to be heard in defense of their own theory, and it is my feeling, and I think it was the feeling of the committee, by their action, that that not be gone into.

I don't think the committee can take any action based upon what is in that book.

I stated at the time that the writer of the book was not under oath, as was everybody else who testified here, and if any statements or any things mentioned in it, are to be brought in as evidence, certainly those making the statements would have to be sworn, like everybody else, and that would make impossible, and be utterly inconsistent with the order of the committee that the record should be closed today. That is what I am going by.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, it wasn't my desire to make this book a part of the record. I never even suggested that it be made a part of the record.

The Chairman. No, no; I appreciate that.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I did read the book and I found some facts in it, which I checked with officials in the War Department, and I found one particular fact, that the War Department could not approve the program for developing the B-17's, and instead of B-17's, were ordered to build a light, responsive, less expensive type of bombardment plane, with a range not to exceed 300 miles.
Now, it is my contention that on this record as it now stands that when our fleet was moved to Pearl Harbor, someone, somewhere, should have developed a defense for that fleet. If it had been properly developed and if it had been properly taken care of, then Pearl Harbor could not have happened. I take that as being one of the things that we were to look into.

Now, I did find in this book certain information which I thought should be brought to the attention of the committee to fill in certain gaps. We had a lot of testimony, it is no new subject, about taking the fleet to Pearl Harbor, and whether or not it was defended at Pearl Harbor. There was a lot in the record about who was to fly bombers out—whether they were to be flown out. The record shows that the reconnaissance was to be had. There is some doubt in the record as to who was to carry on that reconnaissance. Was it the fault of the Navy, was it the fault of the Army, or who in the Navy or who in the Army, or who somewhere else.

I merely want to get information for the record officially. I am not taking Huie's language. I don't want to put his language in. I want official files in the record so that the committee when it gets up its report may give to the American people all of the facts.

The Chairman. What is it you are asking to be done now?

Senator Ferguson. I am asking that the War Department furnish these particular things which Mr. Richardson read. I understand that the committee has ruled against me, that they are closing the record, but I did write this before the hearing came on, so that we could get these official records and put them in the record. That is all.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Masten just suggested to me, it would be possible, if the committee approves, to get whatever official records are involved in these inquiries presented to us, put them in shape, and that could be introduced in the record before the record was finally closed, without the necessity of additional testimony, or taking any particular time, except that at some time the committee would have to go in session, and do what they are doing this morning with reference to the exhibits. That could be done and it would only involve official records, apparently, from this request.

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, couldn't you close the record today with permission to insert those at a later date?

Mr. Richardson. Whatever the chairman thinks advisable.

The Chairman. The committee ordered the record closed today. I have to be governed by that action. If the record can be closed as of today I personally have no objection to these official documents being put in, as a part of today's record; but if they are to be brought in before another session of the committee and then be the basis for further requests, that is something else. We couldn't close the record on that basis.

The definite action of the committee last Thursday or Wednesday, whenever it was that we met, was that today would close the record and it would come to an end.

Mr. Richardson. I would like to ask the chairman whether he and the members of the committee would think it would be proper to close the record today as including these documents with the right to physically present the documents and put them in the record at some future date?
Senator Ferguson. That would solve the problem.

The Chairman. Not some future date; that they be put in the record as of today.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

The Chairman. Because if we ever get to the point where we can meet to consider a report we have got to have the record completed. And we have got to ask for another extension of time, up to July 1, I am not going to ask it beyond that, to make this report.

But that would not, I suppose, violate the order of the committee. Any objection to it? 1

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether or not counsel is going to offer in evidence the letters of Colonel Stimson and the letters of Mr. Roosevelt in regard to the bomber program and the planes at Hawaii?

[14503] The Chairman. I don't know.

Mr. Richardson. I have no anticipation of offering them.

Mr. Murphy. I ask that they be introduced, Mr. Chairman. We have had them for 6 months.

Mr. Masten. Senator Ferguson has requested that all the papers in the President's file that have not heretofore been put in the record, be included.

The Chairman. Without objection that will be ordered.

Senator Ferguson. The letters would be part of that. 2

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Lane. Exhibit No. 21 contains two dispatches dated December 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to the State Department. The dispatch dated at 3:05 p.m. that day refers to State Department Dispatch No. 5682, dated December 5, 1941, to the American Embassy, London. Copy of dispatch No. 5682 has been obtained from the State Department and we ask that it be received and marked "Exhibit No. 166."

The Chairman. It is so ordered.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 166.")

Mr. Lane. The State Department file copy of the document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941; statement to the press on that date, by the State Department, relating to delivery of the [14504] document; the State Department press release No. 585, dated December 7, 1941, concerning delivery and text of the document; and a memorandum dated December 2, 1941, concerning the President's remarks as his press conference on that date, relating to delivery of the document, have been compiled, and we ask they be marked and received as Exhibit No. 167.

The Chairman. So ordered.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 167.")

Mr. Lane. A compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed modus vivendi, which documents supplement those introduced as Exhibit No. 18, has been prepared. We ask that these documents be received and marked "Exhibit No. 168."

1 The information requested was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 183."
2 See "Exhibit No. 179," subsequently introduced.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 168.")

Mr. Lane. A compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between August 6 and December 8, 1941, has been prepared, and we ask that they be received and marked "Exhibit No. 169."

The Chairman. So ordered.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 169.").

14505 Mr. Lane. Exhibit No. 140 contains certain documents introduced in connection with testimony relating to the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short. At the request of the committee at page 8594 of the transcript, a comprehensive review of the War Department file has been made and a compilation of documents concerning the retirement of General Short, and related matters, has been made, and we ask that this material be received and marked "Exhibit No. 170."

The Chairman. So ordered.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 170.")

Mr. Lane. Pursuant to committee request at page 8649 of the transcript, the Navy Department has furnished a compilation of documents from departmental records concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. We ask that this compilation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 171."

The Vice Chairman. So received.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 171.")

Mr. Lane. At page 12991 of the transcript, reference was made to material handled under lend-lease to foreign countries. Additional compilations have been made by the War and Navy Departments on request of counsel, concerning planes and guns produced and their distribution from February 1 to November 30, 1941. We ask that this compilation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 172."

The Vice Chairman. So received.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 172.")

Mr. Lane. The War Department has furnished a translation of the memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan. These documents are reported to have been turned over to a representative of the United States Army in Japan by Prince Konoye, subsequent to the Japanese surrender. We ask that this translation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 173."

The Vice Chairman. So received.
(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 173.")

Mr. Lane. From numerous documents submitted by the State Department and examined by some members of the committee, a number of miscellaneous documents were requested for inclusion in the record. A compilation of these documents has been made, they are somewhat voluminous, and we ask that the compilation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 174."

The Vice Chairman. So received.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 174.")

Mr. Lane. The Secretary of Navy by memorandum dated December 5, 1941, and the Secretary of War by letter dated 14507
December 6, 1941, submitted estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State, for delivery to the President. We ask that this compilation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 175."

The Vice Chairman. So received.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 175.")

Mr. Lane. At pages 13953 and 13956 of the transcript request was made for the compilation of data reported to have been requested of the Navy Department by the Secretary of War to be delivered to the Secretary of War on the morning of December 7, 1941. This data reportedly concerned the location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific and the Far East. The War Department Liaison Office has obtained a copy of such a compilation dated as of December 7, 1941, which is apparently the document in question.

We ask that this document be received and marked "Exhibit No. 176."

The Vice Chairman. So received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 176.")

Mr. Lane. Senator Ferguson has requested that documents obtained from the State Department, dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding, be made a part of the record. This compilation has been made and we ask that it be received and marked "Exhibit No. 177."

The Vice Chairman. So ordered.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 177.")

Mr. Lane. A compilation of documents from Ambassador Grew to the State Department and the President, and attached memoranda has been made, and we ask that it be received and marked "Exhibit No. 178."

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit 178.")

Mr. Lane. A selection of documents from the files of the late President Roosevelt, which were forwarded to the committee by Miss Grace Tully last November, in response to committee request for all material in the late President's files relating to Japan and the Far East, in 1941, has been obtained.

At the request of Senator Ferguson, we ask that these documents be received and marked "Exhibit No. 179." It should be noted that in addition to these documents there are some 500 pages of other documents from the President's files already in the record. With the introduction of this material, everything furnished by Miss Tully will be in the committee record. We ask that this material be marked "Exhibit No. 179."

[14509] The Vice Chairman. So received.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 179.")

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record show that the committee is aware of the fact that about three-fifths of this material has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor but is only being introduced because it was a part of the sum total of material furnished by Miss Tully. It has to do with elections in the Philippines, about differences with the Commissioner and Mr. Quezon, and about some
matters in connection with General MacArthur, and about who is going to be named Governor in Hawaii, none of which data has any pertinence to this inquiry, and the only reason I do not object is that they are part of the files furnished by the White House.

The Vice Chairman. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. Lane. The Army and the Navy have presented to the committee organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington and Hawaii. They are large charts, and we ask that they be received and marked "Exhibit No. 180."

The Vice Chairman. So received.

(The charts were marked "Exhibit No. 180.")

Mr. Lane. With reference to Exhibits Nos. 117 and 117-A, which have been introduced, we wish that a letter dated February 4, 1941, from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, [14510] to various officers under his command, be spread upon the record at this point.

The Vice Chairman. Be so ordered.

(The letter referred to follows:)

[14511] A4-I/VZ
A4-3/VZ/(0195)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., Feb. 4, 1941.

Confidential
From: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander Battle Force.
Commander Scouting Force.
Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
Commander Aircraft Battle Force.
Commander Patrol Wing TWO

Subject: Aircraft in Hawaiian Area, maximum readiness of.

1. Many matters of Fleet material readiness are susceptible of improvement. I heartily endorse all effort, past and future, to obtain approval of and accomplish expeditious action on these things. Meanwhile, the Fleet must be prepared at any given time to employ, with maximum effectiveness, all components as they actually exist.

2. There is a definite line of demarcation between this objective and longer range planning. The latter has its proper sphere and must be continued as an essential basis for determining and stressing improved readiness requirements. This planning will naturally include the more effective schemes of employment that improved readiness, when attained, will permit.

3. Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on any recommendation for, or expectation of, improved conditions [14512] or facilities. Such plans must be based only on hard fact. They must be so developed as to provide for immediate action, based on facilities and materials that are now available.

4. A subject emphatically calling for attention in line with the foregoing is maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor defense, of all available aviation components. As is well known, much remains to be done for adequate future effectiveness in this respect. Much, however, can now be done with means now available, to make arrangements for local employment of aviation more effective than they now are.

5. I propose, as a first step in direct action on this subject, to call a conference at an early date with the addressees of this letter. I desire that appropriate preliminary studies be initiated at once; discussion may be had with Army authorities subject to the understanding that preliminary agreements must be confirmed by the senior officers of the respective services in this area. As a guide in such studies, intended in no way to exclude consideration of any other proposals that may occur to those concerned, a brief outline is appended. I consider these features to be the most obvious steps toward making the best use of everything that is now available for the purpose:
(a) Joint Air Exercises. Desirability of intensified attention to this subject. Frequency and scope. Degree of coordination. Improvement along practical lines.

(b) Communications. Fully satisfactory communications between all Army and Navy air activities, both in the air and on the ground. Direct and instantaneous communications, in particular, between all Army and Navy air fields. Continuation of and renewed stress upon joint communication exercises.

(c) Air Command. Determination of responsibility and degree under various conditions. Arrangements between the two services for such direct exercise of air control as may be necessary.

(d) Landing Fields, Mutual Use. "Scattering" plans, including dispersion of patrol planes. Familiarization of Navy and Army aircraft personnel with one another's landing fields and facilities, including actual practice in mutual use and servicing.

(e) Aircraft Recognition and Familiarization. Recognition signals between air and ground. Familiarization of all personnel—air, ground and ship—with all local Navy and Army types.


(h) Alarm and Detection. Effective and instantaneous air alarm arrangements. Detection by RADAR (and otherwise) and tracking of enemy planes. Possible restriction of own planes to specific operating areas for this purpose. Similarly, control of air traffic approaches.

P. C. Crosley, Flag Secretary.

Mr. Lane. We have four documents from the files of the State Department which we desire to add to the record. They consist of:

A memorandum of conversation dated December 5, 1941 between Secretary of State and the British Ambassador concerning cooperation with the Dutch East Indies against the Japanese;

A dispatch dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to the State Department;

A dispatch dated December 6, 1941 from the State Department to the American Ambassador to Chungking; and

A dispatch dated December 7, 1941 from the State Department to Ambassador Grew.

The Vice Chairman. So received.

[14515] (The matter referred to follows:)

Department of State
Memorandum of Conversation

Date: December 5, 1941

Subject: Cooperation with Dutch East Indies against Japan.
Participants: Secretary of State Hull and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax.
Copies to:

The British Ambassador called at my apartment by his request. He said he had a message from Eden, head of the British Foreign Office, setting forth the British view that the time has now come for immediate cooperation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. This of course relates to the matter of defense against Japan.

I expressed my appreciation.

S CH: MA

C. H.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before communicated to anyone. (br)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Triple priority.
1906, December 8, 1 a.m.
Confidential.

Department's 818, December 6, 9 p.m., was received and decoded late this evening and I was able to see the Foreign Minister immediately thereafter at 12:15 a.m., when I requested an audience with the Emperor at the earliest possible moment in order to communicate the President's message directly. The Minister said that he would present my request to the throne and would communicate with me thereafter. I read to him and left with him a copy of the message.

Grew.

[Telegram sent]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 6, 1941. 9 p.m.

AM. EMBASSY,
Chungking (China).

[14517] 286
Triple priority.
Confidential.

Please communicate, in person if feasible, at the earliest possible moment to Chiang Kai-shek for his confidential information a copy of a message which the President is sending to the Emperor of Japan, reading as follows:

QUOTE (Telegraph Section: Insert here the text of the attached message from the President to the Emperor of Japan beginning with the words SUBQUOTE Almost a century ago END SUBQUOTE to the end of page five including the President's name) UNQUOTE.

In communicating copy of this message to Chiang Kai-shek, please state orally as from the President that the quoted message has already been sent by the President to the Emperor; that this message, as the situation now stands, would seem to represent very nearly the last diplomatic move that this Government can make toward causing Japan to desist from its present course; that if the slender chance of acceptance by Japan should materialize, a very effective measure would have been taken toward safeguarding the Burma Road; and that it is very much hoped that Chiang Kai-shek will not make or allow to be spread in Chinese Government circles adverse comment.

/s/ Hull.
SKH

[Telegram sent]

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 7, 1941, Midnite.

AM. EMBASSY,
Tokyo (Japan).

Triple priority. 823

The Department has been informed by the War Department that at 8:00 a.m. today (Honolulu time) fifty or more Japanese dive-bombing planes, presumably from an aircraft carrier, dropped bombs in and around Honolulu. According
to unconfirmed radio reports, the Japanese Government has declared war against the United States and Great Britain.

At 1:00 p.m. on December 7 the Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment with the Secretary of State. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu were received at 2:20 p.m. The Ambassador opened the conversation by saying that he was sorry that he had been delayed as his instructions were to deliver the paper which he then handed the Secretary at 1:00 p.m., but that owing to inability to decode the message he had been delayed. After reading two or three pages of the paper the Secretary asked the Ambassador whether it was presented under instructions of the Japanese Government. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative. The Secretary thereupon read the remainder of the paper after [14519] which he made to the Ambassador a brief statement emphatically critical of the contents of the document.

The Japanese representatives then took their leave without comment.

/s/ Hull.

SKH

Mr. Lane. In the testimony of Captain Zacharias at page 8734, a question arose as to certain purported orders to Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey. The Navy has responded to our request by a memorandum dated May 3, 1946, and we ask that the Navy reply be spread upon the record, together with the request.

The Chairman. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14520] 1083A; R #145

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson, referred to and forwarded in your memorandum of 31 January 1946, that there be obtained a copy of the orders purporting to delay the return to Pearl Harbor in December 1941 of Task Force Eight under Admiral Halsey, as mentioned in the testimony of Captain Zacharias (Record of Proceedings Page 8734), careful and thorough searches for the period 28 November to 7 December 1941 have been made of the files of the Navy Department and of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Task Force Eight was required by order to be off Wake on 3 December 1941, but there were no orders to it to reduce speed nor any other directive to it to delay its return to Pearl Harbor.

(S) John Ford Baecher,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.

January 31, 1946.

Memorandum to Admiral Colclough
In the course of his testimony at page 8734 of the Committee transcript, Captain Zacharias refers to the fact that [14521] Halsey's Task Force was originally scheduled to arrive back in Pearl Harbor on the fifth of December, 1941, but was delayed by fueling and weather and "now I know because of certain orders which did not speed us up."

At the request of Senator Ferguson, it would be very much appreciated if you would secure the orders to which Captain Zacharias refers to above.

S. W. Richardson, Counsel.

Mr. Lane. In response to a request of counsel of the Navy Department concerning a memorandum prepared regarding the dissemination of Magic material and the submission of the raw material to the
President, the Navy Department under memorandum dated May 23, 1946, has replied to counsel's request and we ask that the reply be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of the first and second paragraph of your memorandum on 17 May 1946, a search has been made of the pertinent official files of the Navy without success to find the memorandum dated 12 November 1941, prepared by Captain A. D. Kramer, U. S. N., entitled "Dissemination to White House," which you state was referred to by Captain L. S. Safford in his testimony or digest in the so-called Clarke Investigation conducted by the Army of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. A copy of the paper obtained from Captain Safford is forwarded herewith, though because of the failure to find the original, it has not been possible to check its accuracy.

The memorandum in question was a rough handwritten paper by Captain Kramer for his possible future reference and not an official document of the Navy of or concerning the events or conclusions referred to therein. (S) John Ford Baecher, John Ford Baecher, Commander, USNR.

Confidential

Dissemination to White House

7 Nov. '41 Gen. Sherman Miles (G2) at 1600 called Capt. Wilkinson (DNI). I was called in on the subject question. In reply to Miles' inquiry I explained as follows:

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<tr>
<th>G-2</th>
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<th>MAY</th>
<th>JULY</th>
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A. Through spring of '41 (G-2) (Bratton) and ONI had followed the signed agreement of Jan. '41.
B. A combination of the following factors led to G-2 not sending anything to the White House after May '41:
1. Loss of Memo #9 by State in March.
2. German report to Japs of leakage in April and the resulting clampdown on security.
3. G-2 lack of confidence in Gen. Watson's ideas of security, particularly due to the absolute necessity thereof after 1 and 2 above, and because of the fact that earlier in the spring one Memo to the White House was found by Col. Bratton in Gen. Watson's wastebasket.
4. The feeling of G-2 that almost without exception the subject of the Memos and traffic was State business anyway, and the matters should therefore be properly taken up with the White House by State, rather than being sent directly.
C. During June, when the new Naval Aide to the President (Beardall) came, he had taken the O. N. I. memos over as per agreement. In July I continued to show things to him in original form to keep him informed and also because he specifically requested this, since the President at times was asking him about points appearing in this material.
D. Toward the end of September (G-2 having sent nothing to the White House) Beardall stated the President wanted to see the material I was showing him (Beardall). I informed DNI, explaining that G-2 permission must be
obtained in accordance with the agreement. With DNI’s permission I contacted Col. Bratton and got his O. K.

E. During October (ONI dissemination duty), only the “memos” went.

F. Several times between 1 Nov. and 7 Nov. (today) Capt. Beardall was shown original material. On Friday noon, 7 Nov., he asked to have a number of them to take. I reminded him that November was Army’s month for dissemination. He acknowledged this and stated he had so informed Mr. Roosevelt, but Roosevelt had directed him to bring it anyway. I told him I would get DNI and G-2 permission.

General Miles then said G-2 was beginning again to disseminate to the White House. I indicated that my concern was to comply with the agreement, and particularly to avoid duplicating via the Naval Aide anything which G-2 might send. This could be done by keeping in daily touch with Col. Bratton on what he was sending to the White House. In fact, the Naval Aides could be entirely eliminated during G-2’s months and adhere strictly to the agreement, by having ONI request G-2 to send anything Capt. Beardall felt should go. Gen. Miles agreed and stated that he [14526] would confer with Gen. Watson on the matter.

7 Nov. 1630 I saw Capt. Beardall, to show him today’s material, and explain what had developed in the above talk. He elucidated further by saying that when he had informed the President, in reply to a request for material, that it was Army’s month for dissemination, the President said he understood that, and was in fact either seeing or being told about the material through Hull. However, he desired to see the material via Beardall anyway. Beardall expressed the opinion to me that President grasps things more rapidly visually than orally, and therefore, wanted to see the material in addition to getting it from Hull.

7 Nov. 1700 I informed Capt. Wilkinson of the above. He indicated he was going to pass it on to Miles.

10 Nov. 1230 I saw Beardall with today’s material. He informed me that a conference between him, Miles, Watson (and another?) had agreed to Beardall alone handling [14527] dissemination to the White House.

10 Nov. 1630 Saw DNI with today’s material. He had already been informed of the above and directed that I comply therewith.

12 Nov. 1615 Started routine of giving Beardall the day’s material for transmission to the President, in compliance with the above outlined modification to the signed agreement of Jan. ’41 between G-2 and ONI.

A. D. Kramer.

12 Nov. 1941.

Mr. Lane. By memorandum dated May 23, 1946, the Navy Department has furnished a reply to the inquiry appearing at pages 271-273 of the transcript and at page 6144 of the transcript regarding orders issued to Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson as noted in the October 10, 1942, issue of the Saturday Evening Post. We ask that that reply be spread upon the record.

The Chairman. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Secretary
Washington, 23 May 1946.

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Gearhart (Record of Proceedings, pages 271-273, and 6144), referred to in Item 2 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, in respect of statements made by Lieutenant Clarence E. Dickinson in the 16 October 1942 issue of The Saturday Evening Post, concerning orders under which he flew an airplane from the U. S. S. Enterprise while it was engaged in the mission of Task Force 8 from Pearl Harbor to Wake Island and return, 28 November-7 December 1941, it has been ascertained that on 28 November 1941,
the date the Task Force departed Pearl Harbor, then Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander, Task Force S, sent to his command the following signal:

"Current operations involve necessity readiness for instant action."

This signal was received by the U. S. S. Enterprise, which was the flagship of Task Force S. It would be usual Navy practice, and may be assumed, that the substance of the signal [14,539] was communicated to all of the pilots who flew planes from the Enterprise during the mission.

[8] O. S. CoLCOUGH

Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

Mr. Lane. Under date of May 22, 1946, the Navy Department has furnished a reply in response to the request of Senator Ferguson at pages 12792 and 12793 of the transcript concerning the so-called History written in 1942 of the activity of the Communications Unit of the Navy, which was testified about by Admiral Hart in connection with conversations between Captain Safford and himself.

We ask that this reply be spread upon the record.

The Chairman. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14,530]

1070/JFB: ms

R. #179

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Pages 12792-12793, 12862 and 12875), referred to in Item 18 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there is enclosed a copy of all of the references to and of all messages quoted concerning the Winds Code in the compilation or so-called "history" written in 1942 of the activity of the Communications Unit, which Admiral Hart testified was seen by him in connection with the incidents involving or conversation between Captain Safford and himself in respect of the Winds Code or any execute thereof.

The references in the commentary or explanatory paragraphs in the enclosure to Japanese messages are to only those intercepts which are also quoted therein, viz: JD-1: 6875, JD-1: 6850, JD-1: 6985 and JD-1: 7148.

The statement in the last commentary or explanatory paragraph, which is that preceding the quotation of JD-1: 7148, that there were "other reference to the United States in [14,531] texts not available now," is an obvious confusion of the Winds Code and the Hidden Word Code. It was made in connection with the "Hidden Word" Japanese message of 7 December 1941 (Tokyo Circular No. 2494) JD-1: 7148, in the first translation of which there was omitted the reference to the United States conveyed by the Japanese code word "Minami." A thorough search of the files of the cognizant activity of the Navy has failed to reveal any other message received prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor containing any reference to the United States in the Winds Code or the Hidden Word Code.

All of the messages referred to and quoted in the enclosure appear in Exhibit 1 of the Congressional Investigation, at pages as follows:

Tokyo Circular #2353 (JD-1: 6875) Page 151.
Tokyo Circular #2354 (JD-1: 6850) Page 155.
Tokyo Circular #2409 (JD-1: 6985) Pages 186-188.
Tokyo Circular #2494 (JD-1: 7148) Page 251.

(S) JOHN FORD BAECHER,

John Ford Baecher,

Commander, USNR.

Encl (1).

[14,532]
"instructions for secret broadcast signals to indicate critical relations with the United States, Russia, and Britain, were sent out from Tokyo."

"A plain Japanese weather broadcast on December 7 indicated that Japanese relations with England and the United States would be broken off."

"Secret codes for emergency messages in the regular short wave broadcasts from Tokyo were now issued by the Japanese. All of them dealt with the rupture of relations between Japan and other countries."

From: Tokyo Circular #2353, Nov. 19, 1941.
To: Washington, J19.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In the case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger—HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East wind rain).

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI—[14533] (North wind cloudy.)

(3) Japan-British relations: HISHI NO KAZE HARE—(West wind clear.)
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and last sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

JD-1: 6875 Navy Translation

11-28-41

From: Tokyo Circular #2354, Nov. 10, 1941.
To: Washington, J19.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI."

(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA."

(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI)—"NISHI."
The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

JD-1: 6850 Navy Translation

11-26-41

An interesting dispatch, which contained much valuable information for the decryption purposes of U. S. Navy Radio Intelligence was the subsequent one. Note the tone of finality in all the special messages.

From: Tokyo Circular #2409, Nov. 27, 1941.
To: Washington, J19 (in 4 parts—complete).

(Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324).

(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogata, Caracas, Havanna, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.)

(Part I)

Handle as Chief of Office Routing.

With international relations becoming more strained, the following Ingo Denpo (hidden words, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

Example. A message meaning:

"Japan and USSR military have clashed", will read "HIJIKATA and KUBOTA. Clerks, have been both ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) STOP (end spell.)"

[14535] In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word STOP will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

(Left)

Code word and meaning:

ARIMURA: Code communications prohibited.
ASAI: Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA: Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.
ASIKAGA: Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.
ASUMA: Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTY: Prepare for evacuation.
HANABUSA: Preparations for evacuation have been completed.
HANAZONO (?): Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or Consul) there.
HATAKEYAMA: Relations between Japan and ________ have been severed.
HATTORI: Relations between Japan and ________ are not in accordance with expectations.

(Left)

HIZIKATA: Japan's ________ and ________ 's military forces have clashed.
HOZINO: Japan and ________ are entering a full fledged general war.
IBARAGI: Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.
INAGAKI: Have you ________ the ________ matter?
ISHIKAWA: I have ________ the ________ matter.
KASHIWAGI: We are commencing military action? against ________.
KOBAYAKAWA: Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to persons of ________ nationality.

KODAMA: Japan.
KOMIYAMA: China.
KOYANAGI: England.
KUBOTA: U. S. S. R.
KURIBARA: France?
KUSONOKI: Germany.

[14537] MATUTANI: Italy.
MIWATA: Canada.
MINAMI: U. S. A.
MIYAZAKI: Mexico.
MOROKOSI: Brazil.
MOTIZUKI: Panama.

NAGAMINE: Argentina.
MAKAZATO: Thailand.
NANGO: French Indochina.
NEGI (?): Netherlands East Indies.
OGAWA: Burma.
OKAMOTO: Malaya.
OKUMURA: Australia.
ONIZOKA: Union of South Africa (?).
ONODERA: Enemy country.
OTANI: ? (Possibly: friendly or allied country?).
ONISI: Year.
SIMANAKA: Day (?).
SANTARO: 3.
YORI: 4

Masaroku: 6.
Simetaro: 7.
Yasokiti: 8.
Hisanatu: 9.
Atumi: 0.

JD-1: 6985

Navy Translation
12-2-41

* * * * * * * *
"The first one (Dispatch on 7 December) was in plain Japanese, but used the weather code, which signified the breaking off of diplomatic relationships. Though this refers to England, other references were made to the United States in texts not available now.

From: Tokyo Circular #2494, Dec. 7, 1941.
To: (Circular telegram.)

(Plain Japanese language using code names.)

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

JD-1: 7148
Navy Translation
12-7-41"

[14539] Mr. Lane. By memorandum dated May 16, 1946, the Navy Department in compliance with the request of Congressman Cooper at page 10738 of the Record of Proceedings has furnished a smooth copy of a study made by Captain Kramer of certain translations of Japanese intercepts.

We ask that this be spread on the record at this point.

The Chairman. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14540] Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 16 May 1946.

1083A(HLB)
Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In compliance with the request of Vice Chairman Cooper at page 10738 of the Record of Proceedings, referred to in item 14 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, Captain Kramer has prepared, and there is forwarded herewith, a smooth copy of the study made by him of the times of delivery to the White House of certain translations of Japanese intercepts.

/s/ John Ford Baecher,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JD #</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Tran.</th>
<th>Page in Ex. 1 or Transcript</th>
<th>Subject &amp; Army Number</th>
<th>Delivered by Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7137</td>
<td>B-T #1421</td>
<td>12/5</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>11215</td>
<td>Gave Germans dope on U.S. negotiation. Think we should tell them re Konoye note.</td>
<td>First message of block delivered about noon 6 December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7138</td>
<td>B-T #1408</td>
<td>12/3</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>11217</td>
<td>(Re 7132) Re-Rostov and Rommel.</td>
<td>Eve 6 December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>W-T #1261</td>
<td>12/5</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>Hull-Kurusu-Nom talk on 5th.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>T-W #896</td>
<td>12/5</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>(Re 7061) Have Terasaki etc. leave in next few days. **My footnote re Terasaki (Re 7140) Want to keep Terasaki for present.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>W-T #1292</td>
<td>12/5</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>11225</td>
<td>Re code machines, keep one I meant (2535).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>T-W #897</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/6 A</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>Jap Note parts 1-13 (25843).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>T-W #902 (Parts 1-13)</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>Jap Note part 14 (25843)</td>
<td>0815-1000 7 December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>T-W #904</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/6 A</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>Re Typist (25844)</td>
<td>1030-1100 7 December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>T-W #900</td>
<td>12/7</td>
<td>12/7 A</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>1 P M msg (25800)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>T-W #908</td>
<td>12/7</td>
<td>12/7 A</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>Thanks to 2 Amb. (25853)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>T-W #910</td>
<td>12/7</td>
<td>12/7 A</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>Destroy all codes and papers (25854)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>T-W #901</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/6 A</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>Pilot Msg (25838)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>T-W #905</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/7 A</td>
<td>10745</td>
<td>AP-UP reports re FDR msg to Emperor (25857)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>T-W #999</td>
<td>12/7</td>
<td>12/7 A</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>Thanks to Emb staff (25858)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7152</td>
<td>Rio-T #460</td>
<td>11/15</td>
<td>12/7 N</td>
<td></td>
<td>Re planes to Africa.</td>
<td>PM 7 December.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**No footnote in original.
Mr. Lane. The request of Senator Ferguson at page 13966 and Congressman Keefe at page 13996 concerning data appearing on the log dated December 6, 1941, kept by the Navy Department operations watch officer, now Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover, USN, has been replied to by the Navy Department, and we ask that the information contained therein be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Be so ordered.
(No other business having been presented, the Committee concluded the meeting.)

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to the requests of Senator Ferguson and Congressman Keefe (Record of Proceedings), Pages 13966 and 13996, respectively) inquiry was made of Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover, U. S. Navy, by dispatch #152019 of April 1946 to ascertain his recollection in respect of the item (read into the Record of Proceedings at Pages 13946-13947) written by him in the log of the Operations Watch Officer on the night of 6 December 1941 at 0000, and his reply by dispatch #100636 of April 1946 has been received. Photographic copies of each of these dispatches are forwarded herewith.

Rear Admiral Glover is not the holder of any records in respect of the incident noted in the log. It will be noted that while he remembers contacting Admiral H. R. Stark at the latter's home between 0000 and 0200 concerning the southern movement of the Japanese convoy that ultimately landed near Kota Baru yet he states he is unable to recall the 0000 of 6 December 1941 incident noted in the log, but that he suggests a possible additional source of information in the form of a "log kept by the Ship Movement Division." [14544] A search has been instituted to identify and locate any such "log," and also to obtain the other information in respect of the incident noted in the log which would be responsive to the further requests of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13953 and 13956), referred to in Items #2 and #3 of your memorandum of 19 April 1946. As of the present time these searches have not been successful but they are not yet completed. You will be advised by subsequent memorandum of such event and of the ultimate results.

John Ford Baecker,
Commander, USNR.

NAVAL COMMUNICATION

From: SECNAV (JAG)
To: COMAIRPAC
Date: 15 APR 1946
1523919
Restricted

For Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover USN X in congressional investigation of Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor question has arisen as to whereabouts of Admiral H. R. Stark on night 6 December 1941 and Admiral Stark cannot recall that detail X Log of OPNAV duty officer for 6 dash 7 December 1941 indicates you stood watch from 1900 to 0200 X This log contains over your signature the following entry quote at 2000 [14545] Major F. L. Harrison comma aide to the Secretary of War comma telephoned that the Secretary of War desired the following information by 0900 Sunday 7 December comma compilation of men of war in Far East comma British comma American comma Japanese comma Dutch comma Russian comma also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific fleet comma with locations comma and a list of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations X Admirals Ingersoll comma Stark and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000 Sunday 7 December comma unquote X This entry does not recall to Admiral Stark any recollection as to his whereabouts X He accepts the item but think it may possibly be inaccurate because he cannot see why it would have been necessary to have consulted all three paren Ingersoll himself and Knox paren in the matter referred to X
Advise by dispatch as soon as possible whether you recollect consulting Admiral Stark as indicated comma as well as the manner in which and the approximate time you contacted him and where he was located when reached by you X

From: COMAIRPAC 169636
To: SEQ
P (JAG) WASHN D C
Restricted X

[14546] I regret that I am unable to recall the incident referred to in your 152010 X. Information of the nature requested by the Secretary of War was normally compiled by the so-called quote War Room unquote which was then a new section of the Ship Movements Division of OPNAV X. This section was headed by Captain Frank Leighton now deceased X. Events of importance originating from the War Room were entered in the log kept by the Ship Movement Division X. It is possible that Capt Leighton was the consultant X. I do remember very definitely having telephoned Admiral Stark during the night concerning the movements of a Japanese convoy which was west of the Philippines headed south X. This was the convoy that made the initial landing on the Malay Peninsula near Kota Bharu X. I am certain that this call was made after midnight as it was toward the end of the watch and that Admiral Stark was then at his home X. From Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover X

1083 A
R. #173

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 7 May 1946.

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to the requests of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13,933 and 13,956) referred to [14547] in Items #2 and #3 of your memorandum of 11 April 1946, a thorough search, as heretofore indicated in the memorandum to you from the undersigned dated 26 April 1946 (1083A R #168), has been made of the pertinent files of the Navy Department to locate the data or document in respect of the compilation of ship locations requested by the Secretary of War on 6 December 1941 as noted in the 2000 entry in the log of the watch officer of Naval Operations and for the records used to give that information to the Secretary of War. The search has now been completed but with negative results.

There was found, however, a copy of a statement of locations of U. S. Naval forces and foreign naval forces as of 7 December 1941, which on comparison is found to be in part the same as or a copy of and in other parts to contain information substantially identical with that stated in the similar document found in the files of the War Department on the outside sheet of which there appears the notation “Secnav (2) 1009.” 1 A study of the two documents indicates that the one found in the files of the Army is most probably a copy of that which was prepared in pursuance of the request noted in the watch officer’s log, and which probably was delivered in duplicate to Secretary of the Navy Knox and by him a copy to Secretary Stimson at their conference at 1000 on 7 December 1941, while that now found in the files of the Navy was either a subsequently typed document of the same date or more probably [14548] the rough draft on which was based the final draft of the document delivered to the Secretary of the Navy. A copy of the document which has been found in the files of the Navy is forwarded herewith.

Information of the nature reflected in ship location summaries such as those referred to above is based on dispatches and other internal Navy intelligence as to the locations and movements of United States ships, and on Intelligence Reports and Estimates such as are in the Record of the Congressional Investigation as to foreign ships.

(Sgd) John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

1 See exhibit No. 176 for document from War Department files.
Mr. Lane. Congressman Murphy, at page 7496 of the transcript, requested copies of any report that, after a trial, a plan for readiness of aircraft at Hawaii was abandoned due to wear on planes and crews. Under date of May 8, 1946, the Navy Department has replied to this request and we request that the reply be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14549] 1070/JFB: ms R. #182

Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 8 May 1946.

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In compliance with the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings, Page 7496), referred to in Item #7 of your memorandum of 20 March 1946, a thorough search has been made of the pertinent files of the Navy Department for a report submitted by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to the effect that because of the wear and tear on airplane crews and planes there was abandoned after a few days trial at some indefinite time prior to 7 December 1941, a plan whereby all Army and Navy planes, including pursuit planes but excepting search planes, should be warmed up, manned, and ready to take off before sunrise to 0800, and for one hour before and after sunset. No such report could be found.

(Sgd.) John Ford Beacher,
John Ford Beacher,
Commander, USNR.

[14550] Mr. Lane. Senator Ferguson at page 13527-13529 of the record requested copies of any message sent by Capt. John Creighton, Naval Observer at Singapore, to Admiral T. C. Hart, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 4, 5, or 6 December 1941, concerning the sighting of a Japanese convoy south of Siam.

Under date of May 10, 1946, the Navy Department has replied to this request and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14551] 1070/JFB: ms R. #180

Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 10 May 1946.

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13527-13529), referred to in Item #20 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, a thorough search has been made of the files of the cognizant activity of the Navy Department for the message which Captain John Creighton testified was sent by him on 4, 5, or 6 December 1941 from Singapore to Admiral T. C. Hart in respect of information received from the pilot of a British reconnaissance plane that a Japanese convoy had been sighted south of the south point of Siam, headed west, and that Japanese fighter planes had taken off from a Japanese carrier in the escort to prevent the British plane from approaching the convoy. No message containing such information could be found in the files of the Navy Department.

(Sgd.) John Ford Beacher,
John Ford Beacher,
Commander, USNR.

[14552] Mr. Lane. A request of Senator Lucas, at page 152 of the transcript, concerns long distance reconnaissance from Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, 1941. The Navy Department, under date of May 2, 1946, has replied to that request, and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.
The Chairman. Be so ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

1083A, R #101, R #122.

Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington 2 May 1946.

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to the request of Senator Lucas (Record of Proceedings, Page 152), the regular air search including the dawn patrol of the fleet operating areas from Oahu was first prescribed on 15 February 1941, by Paragraph 3 (B) (1) of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 of that date, and was put into effect on 25 February 1941, by Paragraph 2 of Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1CM-41, of that date.

There are enclosed photographic copies of (1) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, dated 15 February 1941, and (2) Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1CM-41, dated 25 February 1941.

(s) John Ford Baecher,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.

Cinepac File No. A211/FF1/A4-3/QL/(0271).

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., February 15, 1941.

Confidential

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Fleet.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference: (a) U. S. Fleet Conf. Letter No. 8CL-40.
(b) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
(c) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 9L-40.
(d) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
(e) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
(f) Section 4, Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may reasonably be based on two assumptions:

(1) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

(a) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor.

(2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(b) that a declaration of war might be preceded by; (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.

(c) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.

(d) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part or in their entirety as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) Maintain continuous patrols:

(1) Channel Entrance plus a ready duty destroyer moored near coal dock.

(2) Boom.

(3) Harbor.

(B) Intermittent patrols:

(1) Patrol Wing TWO shall search assigned operating areas and vicinity prior to entry therein by operating forces and in early morning on subsequent days.

(2) An off-shore destroyer patrol of three destroyers beginning twelve hours prior to the sortie and/or entry of heavy ships to search that part of the circle of a [14555] radius of ten miles from the entrance buoys not patrolled by the Channel Entrance Patrol. This patrol shall be furnished by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, on request of Task Force Commander.
(3) An air patrol shall be established at least two hours prior to the sortie of the first heavy ship to search that part of the circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is South of latitude 21° 20' N. This air patrol shall be furnished for sortie, from ship or carrier-based aircraft by the Senior Office Present Afloat of unit remaining in the Harbor on the request of the Sortie Task Force Commander; for entry, by the Task Force Commander entering; when a sortie and entry occur in succession, by the Task Force Commander entering.

(4) Daily sweep. Sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

(C) Operating areas:

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (e).

(2) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and patrol aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port [14557] and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available in the priority:

Priority 1—BBs.
Priority 2—CVs.
Priority 3—CAS.
Priority 4—CLs.

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to cooperate with Patrol Wing TWO and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(D) Sortie and Entrance:

(1) Comply with instructions in U.S.F. 10.

(2) Patrols outlined in (B) (2) and (B) (3) above, shall be established and commanded by the Sortie Commander except when forces are entering only, in which case they shall be established and commanded by the officer commanding the Task Force entering. When forces sortie and enter consecutively the command of the patrols will be turned over to the entry Task Force Commander on completion of the sortie by the Sortie Task Force Commander. These patrols shall continue until released [14558] by the Task Force Commander of the sortie in case of sortie only, or by the Task Force Commander entering in case of entry or successive sortie and entry.

(3) Degaussing coils, if calibrated, shall be energized in water of less than sixty fathoms. Unless the Entrance Channel has been swept for magnetic mines, Commander Base Force shall furnish a tug, minesweeper, or small ship without protection to precede the first heavy ship in which the degaussing gear is inoperative. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(E) Conditions of ships at sea:

(1) Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului may be considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and ships are moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(2) Task Force, or Task Group Commanders, if directed by the former, shall maintain inner air patrol for disposition or formations, when in assigned operating areas.

(3) Maintain inner anti-submarine screens insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(4) Maintain condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness [14559] in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

(5) Maintain material condition XRAY, or equivalent, in all ships.

(6) Steam darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(7) Restrict use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.
(8) Maintain horizon and surface battle lookouts.
(9) Submarine shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.
(10) Submarine operations, except (9) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarines squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian Area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they will maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.
(11) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (9) and (10) above, shall be on the surface.
(12) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.
(13) Commanders of surface task forces, when they have been designated, shall be furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. Commanders of surface task forces shall ensure that all air patrols are properly notified thereof.

(F) **Condition of ships in port:**
(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures, outlined in references (b), (c) and (d).
(2) **Defense against air attack:**
(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.
(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(14631) (3) As a basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire, berths in the harbor are assigned to air defense sectors as follows:

Sector I—Berths F2–F8, K2, C1 to C5. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 045° to 190° true from assigned berths).
Sector II—Berths F1, F9, B1–3, Dry Docks, DG Calibrating Buoys, T1–4, WL–2–3, D2–7, X22, X23. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 190° to 270° true from assigned berths).
Sector III—Berths D1, D9, F10–13, X2, X15, X18. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 270° to 000° true from assigned berths).
Sector IV—Berths X3, X4, X5, X6 to X14, X17, C6. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 000° to 045° true from assigned berths).

Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships moored at that sector's berths. But ships at other sector berths may be used to augment fire outside their sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-In-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. [14632] He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and will be responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N.B.D.O.). As such he will—
(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.
(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.
(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for co-ordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Co-ordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by—
(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.
(2) Holding necessary drills.
(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.
(4) Informing the Task Force Commander [14563] at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.
(5) Arranging communication plan.
(6) Notify all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.
(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

| Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer. |
| Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer. |
| Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer. |

(8) Searchlights of ships will not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure will be followed by the task forces:

(a) Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.
(1) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

[14564] (2) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(3) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.
(4) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea advised.

(b) Task Force Commander operating at sea.
(1) Despatch striking unit.
(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require.
(4) Direct commander of operating submarines of action desired of him.
(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks, or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) Naval Base Defense Officer.
(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit will execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.
(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

[14565] (4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) Action to be taken if submarine attacks in operating area:
(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

(a) Ship Attacked. Proceed in accordance with Article 500, F. T. P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details and addressed to all ships present in Hawaiian Waters. To insure rapid delivery this despatch should be transmitted by the attacked ship to the Task Force Commander, to all ships present in Pearl Harbor on the harbor circuit in effect, and to Radio Honolulu (NPM) on 355 kcs. for Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, and relay on schedule. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.
Ships other than one attacked.

(b) **Battleships.** Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) **Carriers.** Same as for battleships, [14566] except all aircraft will be placed in Condition ONE, armed. Aircraft for initial inner patrol may be launched unarmed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available). Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) **Cruisers.** Same as for battleships, except that one-half available aircraft (armed) will be used for own inner air patrol. The second half will be sent to scene of attack, armed, to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) **Destroyers.** Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on orders of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) **Submarines.** Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) **Minecraft.** Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) **Base Force.** If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas slip tows and join her at best speed, prepared to tow. Report in code positions of rafts. [14567] abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) **Patrol Wing Two.** Assume readiness for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) **Shore-based Fleet Aircraft.** Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instruction issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) **Naval District.** Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) **S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor.** Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) **Task Force Commander at sea.** Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplish, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the [14568] Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines awaiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

H. E. KIMMEL

Distribution: (List II, Case 1) : O; X; AA1; AAA1; EN1; EN3; NA12; ND11AC; ND11-12-13-14.

P. C. CROSLEY,
Flag Secretary.
CONFIDENTIAL

Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. ICM-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Fleet.
Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas—Measures to be effective.

Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, directs that the following security measures of reference (a) be effective as of the date of this letter.

2. Paragraph numbers herein correspond with those in reference (a).

(A) (1).
Channel Entrance and ready duty destroyer—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(A) (2).
Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3).

(B) (1) (2) (3).

(B) (4).

(B) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13).

The provisions of reference (b).

(C) (1).
(C) (2) (a) (b) (c) (d).

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(D) (1) (2) (3).


(F).

The provisions of reference (b).

(G).

Entire article, except subparagraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General Hawaiian Department.

(H).

Entire article.

3. Force Commanders and Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will issue the necessary orders to make these measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL

DISTRIBUTION: (List II, Case 1).

O; X; AAA1; EN1; EN3; NA12; ND11AC; ND11-12-13-14.

(s) P. C. Crosley,
P. C. CROSLEY,
Flag Secretary.

Mr. Lane. On the last page of Exhibit No. 160, reference is made to a statement by the late President Roosevelt concerning a report
from a Captain Smith. The Navy Department was asked to identify this Captain Smith, upon request of Senator Ferguson, and under date of May 9, 1946, the Navy Department has advised that this officer was then Lt. Comdr. (now Commander) C. D. Smith, U. S. N. R., Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Wake, and we ask that the full reply of the Navy Department be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14572] 1070/JFB: ms
R#174

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Office of The Secretary,
Washington, 9 May 1946.

(Memorandum)
To Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson of 16 April 1946, forwarded by your memorandum of 19 April 1946, the Captain Smith referred to on the last page of the 13 December 1941 memorandum of the remarks made by the President on 7 December 1941, on the occasion of the meeting of the cabinet was then Lieutenant Commander (now Commander) C. D. Smith, U. S. N. R., Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Wake (River Gunboat). The U. S. S. Wake was captured by the Japanese at Shanghai, China, and Captain Smith was taken prisoner. He escaped from a Japanese prison camp in China and returned to naval jurisdiction in November 1944.

The phone call from the Japanese received by Captain Smith, which President Roosevelt mentioned, was reported to the State Department in a message filed by Consul General Stanton with Radio Shanghai at 2210 (10:10 p. m.) 7 December 1941 (Greenwich Civil Time), which was 1710 (5:10 p. m.), 7 December 1941, Washington local time and 6:10 a. m., 8 December 1941, Shanghai local time. The message was received in Washington at 1913 (7:13 p. m.) 7 December 1941, Washington local time. A photostatic copy of the message is enclosed herewith.

[14574] The following is a chronological summarization of the events surrounding the phone call and receipt of knowledge of it in Washington.

Local time and date

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>In Greenwich</th>
<th>In Washington</th>
<th>In Hawaii</th>
<th>In Shanghai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack on Pearl Harbor started</td>
<td>071820</td>
<td>071320</td>
<td>070720</td>
<td>080220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elapsed time between attack and phone call: 1 hour, 55 minutes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call received by Captain Smith</td>
<td>072015</td>
<td>071515</td>
<td>070945</td>
<td>080418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elapsed time between call and filing message: 1 hour, 55 minutes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Message filed in Shanghai</td>
<td>072210</td>
<td>071710</td>
<td>071140</td>
<td>080610</td>
</tr>
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<td>elapsed time between filing message and receipt in Washington: 2 hours, 3 minutes</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Message received in Washington</td>
<td>080018</td>
<td>071913</td>
<td>071343</td>
<td>080813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elapsed time between receipt in Washington and mention by President: 2 hours, 17 minutes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phone call mentioned by President</td>
<td>090230</td>
<td>072130</td>
<td>071600</td>
<td>081030</td>
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<td>elapsed time since phone call: 2 hours, 30 minutes</td>
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</table>

(S.) John Ford Baecher,
Commander, U. S. N. R.
Mr. Lane. The request of Senator Ferguson at page 11220 of the transcript, concerns time of interception and translation of a message from Berlin to Tokyo, serial 1405, mentioned in a series of dispatches by Captain Kramer in his testimony before the committee. The War Department under date of May 1, 1946, and the Navy Department under date of April 15, 1946, have replied to this request, and we ask that their replies be spread upon the record.

The Chairman. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

With reference to the question raised by Senator Ferguson on page 11220 of the transcript as to whether Message No. 1405 from Berlin to Tokyo was received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, a search of the files of the Signal Intelligence Service discloses that the message was dated 2 December 1941, was received by the Signal Intelligence Service on 5 December 1941, but was not decoded and translated until 10 December 1941.

(S) Robert M. Diggs, Robert M. Diggs, Capt., AUS.

1083A(JFB) R#148

Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 15 April 1946.

(Memorandum)
To Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings p. 11220), referred to in item 16 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, it has been ascertained that the Berlin to Tokyo message # 1405 was intercepted and translated by the Army, and therefore the files of the Navy do not indicate whether it was received before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

(S) John Ford Baecher, John Ford Baecher, Commander, USNR

Mr. Lane. At page 9671 of the transcript Congressman Murphy requested monthly reports from the Intercepter Station at Winter Harbor, Maine, and Cheltenham, Md., for November and December 1941. Under date of May 3, 1946, the Navy Department replied to this request and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

The Chairman. So ordered.
MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings Page 9671), referred to in Item #13 of your memorandum of 20 March 1946, the November and December 1941 Monthly Reports of the Navy Intercept Stations at Winter Harbor, Maine and at Cheltenham, Maryland were taken on several occasions by the undersigned to the regular daily hearings of the Joint Congressional Committee.

At one such time it was explained to Congressman Murphy that in addition to the material referred to in the testimony of Captain Safford (Record of Proceedings Page 9672) those reports contained considerable technical and operational data which were pertinent to the Pearl Harbor inquiry and which the Navy desired not to be disclosed for important reasons of security. On receiving that information Congressman Murphy quickly acceded to the request of the Navy and stated that he was desirous of cooperating to the fullest extent to preserve the security of the data referred to and that he would be satisfied to obtain for the Record a statement that the Monthly Reports were physically present in the Navy Department and available to authorized persons at that time and had been since 1941. The desired statements in the affirmative were made by the undersigned in behalf of the Navy Department in answer to questions put by Congressman Murphy on 16 February 1946 (Record of Proceedings Pages 12,640-12,641), and, to the extent it may be deemed necessary, those statements are confirmed.

In view of the above it is believed the request of Congressman Murphy has been complied with to his satisfaction. If this assumption is not true please advise and any further desired information will be supplied.

(S) John Ford Baecher,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.

Mr. Lane. Requests of Senator Ferguson and Congressman Murphy, appear at page 13856 of the transcript, for copies of correspondence between Admiral Kimmel and President Truman concerning the examination of certain Navy Department files. Under date of April 26, 1946, the Navy has furnished the information requested and we ask that the material be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. In response to the requests of Senator Ferguson and Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13,856 and 13,857), referred to in Item #1 of your memorandum of 19 April 1946 for copies of the exchange of correspondence between Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Retired) and President Truman there are enclosed copies of the following:
   (1) Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to the President dated 13 November 1945.
   (2) Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of the Navy dated 29 November 1945.
   (3) Letter from the President to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 29 November 1945.

(S) John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been informed that there are in the files of the Director of Naval Communications of the Navy Department copies of despatches forwarded by the White House to London and other cities, in 1941. I submitted a request to the Chief of Naval Operations under date of 8 November 1945 that I be given access to these files for examination, with the view to selecting individual despatches in those files that relate to Pearl Harbor and to the events leading thereto, and this for the purpose of obtaining photostat copies thereof for use in the hearings of the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee. I have been orally informed today that this request to you is necessary for your approval before I may be given access to these files. I am, therefore, submitting this request to you through the Secretary of the Navy.

Very respectfully,

Husband E. Kimmel, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.)

To the President of the United States, The White House, Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of the Navy:

Replying to your memorandum dated 23 November 1945, forwarding a request from Rear Admiral Kimmel for access to confidential files of the Navy Department for use in hearings of the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee, access to files that are material to the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack is made available to the Congressional Committee by my memorandum of October 23, 1945, to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I have found it necessary to lay down a policy that confidential files of the Department may not be available for examination by individuals.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have sent to Admiral Kimmel.

(S) Harry Truman.

DEAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL: Replying to your letter dated 13 November 1945, requesting access to certain confidential files of the Navy Department for your use in hearings of the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee, you are informed that access to files in the Navy Department that are material to the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack is permitted to the Congressional Committee by my memorandum of 23 October 1945 to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.

I have found it necessary to lay down the policy that confidential files in the Navy Department may not be made available for examination by individuals.

I am sure that if you made application to the Congressional Committee, it would obtain for you the information which you are seeking.

Very sincerely

Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN (Ret.) Room IN90 Navy Department, Washington 25, D. C.

MR. LANE. On request of Senator Brewster, page 8208, for any report made by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy on the report of the Roberts Commission, the Navy Department has replied under date of April 26, 1946, to this request and we ask that the reply of the Navy Department be spread on the record.

The Chairman. So ordered.
MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

Response to the request of Senator Brewster (Record of Proceedings, Pages 8208–8211), referred to in Item #10 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, was made by prior memorandum to Counsel for the Committee dated 21 January 1946 (File 1083A R#109), which advised that no record had been found in the Navy Department of any report made by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy on the report of the Roberts Commission. Further search has not disclosed any such report.

However, there was prepared by an officer on the working level in the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy a rough draft from which were typed smooth copies constituting what that officer conceived as a statement of possible charges and specifications in respect of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Retired), but as to which no record has been found indicating it was ever approved or passed on by either the Judge Advocate General of the Navy or the Secretary of the Navy and which, therefore, never became a part of the official records nor a document of the Navy. In the event this paper may be considered at all responsive to the [14587] request of Senator Brewster, or in case either you or the Committee may have any interest in it, a carbon copy is forwarded herewith.

(S) John Ford Baecher, Commander, USNR.

NAV JAG–G3–B
OO–Kimmel, Husband E./A17–20

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

To: Judge Advocate, General Court-Martial.
Subject: Charges and specifications in case of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

1. The above-named officer will be tried before the general court-martial of which you are judge advocate, upon the following charges and specifications. You will notify the president of the court accordingly, inform the accused of the date set for his trial, and summon all witnesses, both for the prosecution and the defense.

CHARGE I. CULPABLE INEFOCIENCY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

SPECIFICATION

In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S. Navy, and it being the duty of the said Kimmel while so serving as the said commander in chief to take all practicable steps to keep the ships of his command ready for battle, did, in Hawaiian waters, from about 1 February 1941 to 7 December 1941, while so serving as aforesaid, fail to issue and see effected such timely orders as were necessary to keep the ships of his, the said Kimmel’s, command ready for battle, as it was his duty to do, by reason of which inefficiency an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in a number of the said ships being damaged and destroyed.

CHARGE II. NEGLIGENCE IN OBEYING ORDERS

SPECIFICATION

In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S. Navy, having, in Hawaiian waters, on or about 27 November 1941, been lawfully ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations to execute a defensive
deployment of forces under his command in preparation for carrying out war tasks, did, during the period from about 27 November 1941 to about 7 December 1941, at the place aforesaid, neglect and fail to make appropriate, adequate, and timely defensive deployment of naval forces under his command preparatory for carrying out war tasks [175] as required by the imminence of hostilities and in obedience to the aforesaid orders, and as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.

**CHARGE III. NEGLECT OF DUTY**

**SPECIFICATION 1**

In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S. Navy, and it being the duty of the said Kimmel, while so serving as said commander in chief, to protect the territory within the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier against hostile expeditions, and he, the said Kimmel, well knowing of the possibility of an attack by Japan on the United States, did, in Hawaiian waters, during the period from about 10 October 1941 to about 7 December 1941, neglect and fail to protect the territory within the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier against hostile expeditions, as it was his duty to do, by neglecting and failing to provide and cause to be provided a proper and sufficient distant reconnaissance although means were available for such reconnaissance, as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.

**SPECIFICATION 2**

In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S. Navy, and while so serving, being jointly responsible with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier and well knowing of the possibility of a surprise attack by Japan on the United States, did, in Hawaiian waters, during the period from about 27 November 1941 to about 7 December 1941, neglect and fail to consult, confer and cooperate with the aforesaid commanding general with respect to measures to be taken under the then existing plans for joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier and the adaptation of the said plans in whole or in part as required by the imminence of hostilities, as it was the duty of the said Kimmel to do, and as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.

**SPECIFICATION 3**

In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, United States Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in [175] Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, United States Navy, and while so serving, being jointly responsible with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, having been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch on or about 24 November 1941 that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility, and on or about 27 November 1941, that negotiations with Japan had ended and Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within a few days, and on or about 29 November 1941 that Japanese action was unpredictable and hostilities on their part were momentarily possible, did in Hawaiian neglect and fail to consult and confer with the said commanding general with respect to the meaning and intent of the warnings issued by the said despatches and the appropriate measures of defense required by the indicated imminence of hostilities, as it was the duty of the said Kimmel to do, and as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces of 7 December 1941, resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.
In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in [14592] Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S. Navy, and while so serving, being jointly responsible with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, having on or about 27 November 1941 been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch that negotiations with Japan had ended and that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within a few days and that said despatch was to be considered a war warning, did, in Hawaiian waters, between said date and 7 December 1941 neglect and fail to put into effect within his command a state of alert and of readiness such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the said despatch, as it was the duty of the said Kimmel to do, in that a distant reconnaissance was not inaugurated and maintained and shore batteries of the Navy and antiaircraft artillery on board vessels of the fleet were not manned and supplied with ammunition, and as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.

[14593] Mr. Lane. In response to the request of Congressman Keefe, page 11033 of the record, the Navy Department has replied, concerning the location of certain cards in respect to the winds code, and we ask that the Navy Department reply be spread on the record.

The Chairman. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14594]

Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 23 April 1946.

1083A (HLB)
R#165
Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Keefe (Record of Proceedings, page 11033), referred to in item 15 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, a thorough search of the pertinent files of the cognizant activity of the Navy Department has been made to find the cards in respect to the winds code which were prepared at the direction of Read Admiral Noyes, and no information or material of the type described has been found.

/s/ John Ford Bacheer,
Commander, USNR.

[14594-A] Mr. Lane. In respect to the request of Senator Ferguson for information as to the number of airplanes sent to Hawaii and the Philippines during the period February 1, 1941, to December 7, 1941, in the transcript at page 12997, by reply dated April 22, 1946, the Navy Department has furnished this information and it has been included in Exhibit No. 172 of the committee.

Mr. Murphy. In connection with that I would like for the record to show that there are letters in the President's file that are pertinent to that very question, letters from Secretary Stimson to the President and from the President to the Secretary, in regard to the planes to be sent to Hawaii.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Lane. In response to Senator Ferguson's request at page 13995, for the various messages noted in the operations watch officer log, the Navy Department, under date of April 22, supplied this material, and it has been made Exhibit 162-A.

At page 14064 of the transcript, a memorandum from the Navy Department concerning the notes and drafts of Admiral Inglis' statement before this committee was spread on the record. A correction of
the Navy Department memorandum has been received under date of April 18, 1946. We ask that the correction be spread on the record.

The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In respect of the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, pages 200-201) concerning the drafts and notes assembled in connection with the preparation of the statement of Admiral Ingris, my previous memorandum (dated 25 January 1946, R #101, 123) (Record of Proceedings, page 14065) erroneously advised as to the date when the final draft was completed and the work material destroyed. The date of the occurrence of those events was 14 November 1945 and not 24 November 1945.

/s/ John Ford Baecher, Commander, USNR.

MR. LANE. We request that a memorandum from the War Department liaison officer dated December 13, 1945 to committee counsel concerning production and distribution of B-17 bombers as of September 1, 1941 be spread on the record.

The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Mitchell.

With reference to your letter of December 10, 1945, forwarding a copy of Senator Brewster's request dated December 5, 1945:
1. As of September 1, 1941, 133 B-17's had been produced.
2. Of the 133 B-17's produced as of September 1, 1941, 113 had been delivered to the Army Air Forces and 20 to Great Britain.
3. On September 1, 1941, the United States possessed 109 B-17's, disposed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental United States</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(S) Harmon Duncombe, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff Corps.

MR. LANE. Senator Ferguson requested whether or not the OpNav dispatch 061743, December 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, was a priority message. The Navy Department has replied to this request and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of proceedings, page 7812) referred to in Item 8 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, Dispatch 001743 of December 1941 from OpNav to CinCPac for action to CinCAP for information, was sent with deferred precedence.
This message, as indicated in part in my memorandum (1083A (HLB) R#105 dated 29 January 1946) to you, was transmitted from Washington to radio Honolulu on 6 December 1941 at 2254 Greenwich Time, which was 1754 Washington Local Time and 1224 Hawaiian Time (10:54 p.m. Greenwich Time, 5:54 p.m. Washington Local Time and 12:24 p.m. Hawaiian Time) all of 6 December. Since this message was transmitted by radio, it was received in Honolulu at the moment of transmission. No record has yet been found at Pearl Harbor indicating the exact time of delivery of the message to Admiral Kimmel.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

[14597] Mr. LANE. Senator Ferguson’s request, at page 207 of the transcript, for records relating to the phrase “provide necessary escort” in the dispatch marked “Exhibit No. 3” of this committee, has been answered by a reply of the Navy Department dated the 17th of April 1946. We ask that this reply be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14598] R #124
(1/2F3–efb)
(1070)

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Page 207), referred to in item 1 of your memorandum of 20 March 1946, the direction in dispatch 252203 of November 1941 from OpNav to CinCaf for action and to CinCPac, CinCaf, Coml4 and Coml6 for information (Cong. Inv. Exhibit 3), reading “CinCPac and CinCaf provide necessary escort”, which follows the instruction for the routing of all trans-Pacific shipping through the TorrEst Straits, is usual Navy phraseology whereby it was indicated to the Fleet Commanders that they should detail as a protective escort such ships as in their discretion they considered necessary to accomplish the purpose of guarding the trans-Pacific shipping in question from any unfriendly action or aggressive attack.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

[14599] Mr. LANE. In reference to page 14127 and page 14129 of the transcript, information was recorded as received from the Navy Department concerning the time of Japanese attacks in various Pacific locations at the outbreak of war. This additional information has been received from the Navy Department and we ask that it be added to the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14600] 1083A(HLB)
R #112

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson,
Subject: Time Table of Japanese Attacks—source of material.

Reference is made to my memorandum file 1083A R#112 dated 4 April 1946 (Record of Proceedings, pages 14127–14129), in which the times of the Japanese attacks at Clark Field, P. I., and Nichols Field, Manila (Record of Proceedings, page 14129) were reported to be 9:27 am (December 8th, local time) and 3:00 am (December 9th, local time).
Further and later information received from the War Department now places the times of the attacks at these places as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Local time</th>
<th>Greenwich time</th>
<th>Washington time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clark Field, P. I......</td>
<td>Between 12:17 and 12:20 p. m.</td>
<td>Between 4:17 and 4:20 a. m.</td>
<td>Between 11:17 and 11:20 p. m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nichols Field, Manila</td>
<td>3:15 a. m., December 8th.</td>
<td>7:15 p. m., December 8th.</td>
<td>2:15 p. m., December 8th.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/s/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

[14601] Mr. Lane. Congressman Murphy requested at page 12635 of the transcript and the Navy has supplied four intercepted dispatches, mentioned in the statement before the committee of Capt. L. F. Stafford. Opnav dispatch No. 282301, also requested at that time, has been included as a part of Exhibit No. 142 of this committee. We ask that the four intercepted dispatches be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows):

[14602]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington 15 April 1946.

1083A (JFB)
R #172
Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings, page 12635), referred to in Item 17 in your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there are enclosed herewith copies of the following documents:

(a) No. 843, Tokyo to Washington, 27 November 1941.
(b) Serial 1197, Washington to Tokyo, 27 November 1941, (JD-1 No. 6908).
(c) Serial 482, Rio to Tokyo, 30 November 1941, (JD-1 No. 6982).
(d) Serial 768, Rome to Tokyo, 29 November 1941, (JD- No. 6881).

/s/ John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

Encls. (4)

To: Washington.
27 November 1941
(Purple)
#843

Broadcast schedule as follows:

6 p. m. To Pacific Coast______________________________ JVJ 12275.
6:30 p. m. To Western Hemisphere____________________ JUO 9430 and
7:00 p. m. To the Coast______________________________ JVJ 12275.
8:00 p. m. To the Coast______________________________ JVL 12275.
9:00 p. m. To the Coast______________________________ JHL 5160.
10:00 p. m. To the Coast_____________________________ JHP 11980.
10:30 p. m. To Europe_______________________________ JHL 5160.
JD-1: 6899 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 11-2S-41 (S-FT) Encl (A)
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
27 November 1941.
(Purple) #1197.
Re your #798* and #843**.

Due to reception of JUO and JVJ (general intelligence [14604] information—Morse code—broadcast) being weak, we desire that you change these to JAV (27,327.5 kilocycles) and JUP (13,065 kilocycles), the change to be made immediately.

Reception is also very weak on JHL (Domei news broadcast) so arrange to use above wave length for this, too.

Due to static, the JAP (European broadcast) cannot be heard at all.

*JD-1: 6658—Instructions concerning talks on withdrawing troops from Southern Indochina.

*JD-1: 3899—Tokyo broadcast schedule.

JD-1: Secret Navy Trans. 11-29-41 (X) Encl (B)

From: Rio (Ishii).
To: Tokyo.
November 30, 1941.
Purple. #482.

I am making a general test of the reception of dispatches, and find that at present we cannot receive the 10:30 P. M. (Japanese time) transmission at all. At present the only one we can hear is the 6:30 P. M. (Japanese time) transmission from JVJ to the United States, so please bear this in mind. Argentina [14605] reports the same.

As I would like to find out whether conditions are favorable here for reception between 4:00 and 6:00 A. M. (Japanese time), it seems best to send to South America at that time over a wavelength of from 10 to 15 megacycles.

25571 Army 6082 Secret Trans. 12-2-41 (7) Encl (D)

From: Rome.
To: Tokyo.
29 November 1941.
(Purple) #708.

Re my #762*.

In regard to, the Japanese language radio broadcasts to Europe recently, JLT cannot be heard at all and while JVJ can be heard fairly well still there is interference from other wave lengths during the news broadcasts and static, etc. Added to this is the fact that the announcer apparently speaks in a low tone, very rapidly and swallows the ends of his words, and the occasions when we do not get good reception are numerous. There is great danger that we may miss some important announcement such as was referred to in your telegram. Please take up the following points that I am going to mention and [14606] please arrange to do something about it, temporarily at least.

1. Select an announcer who can speak slightly louder than the present one and who can enunciate clearly, one who does not intone and who can pronounce even the last syllables of his words correctly and clearly.

2. In selecting the news please continue to place the most important news first followed by items of lesser importance. However, as some time is usually consumed in adjusting the machine, sometimes the important news is missed so please repeat this again at the end of the broadcast even if this requires cutting down on the entertainment features.

3. Before the Japanese news broadcast please be sure to always play several minutes of Japanese patriotic music by way of introduction.

Relayed to Berlin.

*Not available.

JD-1 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (G-TT) Encl (C)

Mr. Lane. Senator Ferguson requested at page 6374 a memorandum attached to a letter dated 4 April 1941 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel. The Navy Department replied under date of May 1, 1946, and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

[14607] 1083A R#131

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
WASHINGTON, 1 May 1946.

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Page 6374), referred to in Item # 6 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, a careful search has been made of the files of the Navy Department for the memorandum mentioned in the letter dated 4 April 1941 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel. Neither the memorandum nor a copy can be found.

(S) John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

Mr. Lane. Congressman Gearhart requested, at page 299 of the transcript, orders transferring ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic and vice versa from May to December 1941.

Under date of May 1, 1946 the Navy Department replied and we ask that their reply be spread on the record.

The Chairman. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14608] 1083A R#47B

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
WASHINGTON, 1 May 1946.

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. In response to the request of Congressman Gearhart, (Record of Proceedings, Page 299), referred to in Item #3 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, for copies of orders transferring ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic and vice versa from May to December 1941, reference is made to the following documents:

(a) CNO Secret letter, Serial 06538, dated 7 April 1941 which lists battleship Division THREE; either the Lexington or the Enterprise; Cruiser Division EIGHT; Destroyer Squadron EIGHT (DesDiv 3 and 15), and Destroyer Squadron NINE (DesDiv 17 and 18) as the units which are to be transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic “because of the existing and prospective strategic situation in the Atlantic Ocean.”

(b) CNO Serial 152153 dated 15 April 1941 (Narrative Statement, Page 156; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document [14609] 122) which modified item (a). This dispatch orders that transfers indicated in item (a) are to be held in abeyance until the international situation clears; that the Enterprise or the Yorktown are to be substituted for the transfer of the Enterprise or the Lexington; that when the carrier is ready she is to proceed accompanied by the McDougall and DesDiv 18.

(c) CinCPac Serial 162346 dated 16 April 1941 (Narrative Statement, Page 167; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document 123) which reports the Yorktown and the destroyers specified in item (b) ready to depart approximately 21 April.

(d) CNO Serial 132019 dated 13 May 1941 (Narrative Statement, Page 167; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document 125) which modifies item (a) and orders that three groups, each consisting of one battleship, one light cruiser and three destroyers from the units specified in item (a), be organized, as well as a fourth group consisting of one light cruiser and DesDiv 3. This dispatch specifies the intervals between departures for these groups.

(e) OPNav Serial 242155 dated 24 May 1941 (Narrative Statement, Page 168; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document 127) which orders two destroyers of the Cimaron [14610] class to the Atlantic Fleet.

(f) CNO Confidential letter Serial 023638 of 22 May 1941 (forwarded with memorandum of the undersigned R#47B dated 8 February 1946) which outlines the reorganization of DesRon’s 2, 8, 9, 11 and 13 by individual ship name. All of the ships named in this letter with the exception of the Livermore, Eberle,
Kearney, Erickson, Gwin, Meredith, and Grayson were at the time of the writing of the letter in the Pacific.

(g) CNO Confidential letter Serial 021938 dated 16 May 1941 (forwarded with memorandum of the undersigned R\#47B dated 8 February 1946) reporting the intention to transfer the USS Bridge and the USS Antares to the Pacific Fleet.

2. With the exception of CNO Secret letter Serial 06538 dated 7 April 1941 (item (a) above) all of the above references have previously been forwarded to the Committee, and, therefore, a copy of only that letter is forwarded herewith.

(S) JOHN FORD RAECHER, Commander, USNR.

APR. 7, 1941.

[14611] Op-38-MG 4/5

Serial 06538

SECRET.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Transfer of Units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet.


1. Two battleships of the Atlantic Fleet are now under Navy Yard overhaul, one a routine overhaul and the other of an emergency character. Both these battleships will be absent from the Fleet until about the middle of May; thereafter, a certain period of time will be required for training before they would be ready to undertake their assigned duties if the United States were then in the war. The Ranger is scheduled for Navy Yard overhaul from July 1st to September 1st for essential alteration of arresting gear and for routine work. The Chief of Naval Operations considers that this overhaul cannot be indefinitely postponed.

2. Because of the preceding circumstances and the existing and prospective strategic situation in the Atlantic Ocean, it has now become apparent that the Atlantic Fleet must have a greater initial strength in order to perform effectively the tasks that will be assigned it in war. It has therefore been decided to transfer certain units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet.

3. The following is a list of the units which will be ordered to the Atlantic:

- BattleShips Division 3.
- Either the U.S.S. Lexington or the U.S.S. Enterprise, as may be later directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

[14612] Cruiser Division 8.

Destroyer Squadrons 8 (Desdivs 3 and 15) and 9 (Desdivs 17 and 18) as now constituted.

Vessels under overhaul are to be dispatched as soon as ready.

4. The movement of these units to the Atlantic must be accomplished with the utmost possible secrecy. In order to promote secrecy, it has been decided not to transfer all vessels at once but to make the transfer in several groups, with about two weeks elapsing between departures of groups. The Chief of Naval Operations will instruct you by secret dispatch as to the final dates for departure of each group from the Hawaiian area.

5. The groups and tentative dates of departure will be as follows:

- **Group 1.** Tentative date of departure from Hawaii April 15, 1941.
  - 1 battleship of Battleship Division 3.
  - 2 cruisers of Cruiser Division 8.
  - All available 1500 ton vessels of Destroyer Squadron 9.

- **Group 2.** Tentative date of departure from Hawaii May 1, 1941.
  - 1 battleship of Battleship Division 3.
  - 2 cruisers of Cruiser Division 8.
  - Destroyer Division 17.

- **Group 3.** Tentative date of departure from Hawaii May 15, 1941.
  - 1 battleship of Battleship Division 3.
  - Lexington or Enterprise, as may later be directed.
  - Flagship of Destroyer Squadron 8 and Destroyer Division 15.

[14613] 6. After passage of the Canal, all groups will proceed to Hampton Roads, unless otherwise directed.

7. You will direct that all vessels of the Atlantic detachments maintain radio silence, except in emergency, from the time of departure from Hawaii until
arrival in Hampton Roads. During transit of the Canal, the commander of each group will report by dispatch, through the shore communication organization, to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, for duty.

8. With regard to Item (19) of paragraph one of reference (a), in which you recommend that Destroyer Division 12 remain with the Pacific Fleet instead of being assigned to the Southeast Pacific Force, you are informed that in a forthcoming revision of WPL-44, Table USF-2 will be changed to require one destroyers division, of the long range type, having five guns and two torpedo tubes. After the transfers directed by this letter, two such divisions will remain in the Pacific Fleet, viz., Destroyer Divisions 1 and 2.

9. Acknowledge receipt by dispatch, referring to the serial number of this letter.

Copy to:
CinClant 147/89.

[14614] Mr. Lane. Congressman Murphy requested at page 9525 of the transcript, information concerning identity of a ship located to the north of Hawaii on a chart dated 6 December 1941, which chart is a part of Exhibit No. 109. Under date of April 30, 1946, the Navy Department has replied to this request identifying the ship.

We ask that the reply be spread on the record.
The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

[14615] R#144

MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In response to the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings, Page 9525), referred to in Item #12 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, the ship indicated on the chart labeled “Secret, 5 Dec. ’41” (one of the documents of Exhibit 109 of the Congressional Investigation) as located northward of the island of Oahu at 27° North Latitude and 153° West Longitude is the Royal Canadian naval vessel Prince Robert (XCL-38).

The chart in question, and the others of similar nature that are parts of Exhibit 109 of the Congressional Investigation, are copies of photographs of a wall chart which was maintained in the Navy Department for the purpose of plotting the approximate locations of naval vessels of the United States and of friendly foreign powers. The position of the Prince Robert stated above as shown on the chart is only approximate, and it has been ascertained that at noon G.C.T. 5 December 1941 this ship was located at the position 25° 30 minutes North Latitude and 152° 30 minutes West [14616] Longitude. There is attached hereto a further chart on which are indicated the two locations which have been mentioned, that is (1) 27° North Latitude—153° West Longitude, and (2) 25° 30 minutes North Latitude—152° 30 minutes West Longitude.

The Prince Robert departed from Pearl Harbor at 2030 Greenwich Civil Time on 4 December 1941 for Esquimalt, Vancouver, B. C., where it arrived 11 December 1941.

(S) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

Mr. Lane. Congressman Gearhart requested, pages 780–782 of the transcript, a list showing ships transferred from the Pacific to Atlantic or vice versa between May 1, 1940, and February 1, 1941. The Navy Department replied to this request under date of April 29, 1946, and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.
The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.
MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Gearhart (Record of Proceedings, Pages 780-782), referred to in Item #5 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there are forwarded herewith two tables showing (1) Ship transfers from the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleets and from the Atlantic to the Pacific Fleets between 1 May 1940 and 7 December 1941, and (2) Ships, new or re-commissioned, that were sent (otherwise than by transfers from Fleet to Fleet) to the Pacific to augment the forces of the Pacific Fleet between 8 October 1940 and 7 December 1941.

(S) John Ford Baecher, Commander, USNR.

Enclosure: (a) Twelve (12) copies of tables (1) and (2).

Table 1.—Transfers of ships from the Pacific and Asiatic fleets to the Atlantic fleet and vice versa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>From 1 May 1941 to 1 Feb. 1941</th>
<th>From 1 Feb. 1941 to 7 Dec. 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pacific to Atlantic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Atlantic to Pacific</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pacific to Atlantic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battleships.</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air-craft carriers.</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cruisers.</strong></td>
<td>Louisville, Chester, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Omaha, Memphis.</td>
<td>Louisville, Chester, Trenton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Submarines.</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Auxiliary vessels.</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.—Augmentations in ship strength of Pacific fleet other than by transfers from other fleets during the period 8 October 1940–7 December 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New ships sent to the Pacific Fleet</th>
<th>Older ships sent to the Pacific Fleet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>None.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>None.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>Helena.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>None.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>Car, Cudgen, Tamber, Tainog, Thresher, Tulon, Trout, Tuna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary vessels</td>
<td>Aldebaran, Cuxo, Curtiss, Fulton, Harris, Kuala, Pellas, Procyon, Sabine, Solace, Tangier, Zeilen.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 All classified as ODD (old destroyer, recommissioned) on Dec. 7, 1941.

Mr. Lane. Senator Ferguson requested, page 14069 of the transcript, all duty officer logs kept for the Office of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff between 1 November and 7 December 1941.

The reply of the War Department has been received to this request, and we ask that the reply, dated April 23, 1946, be spread on the record.

The Chairman. So ordered.

The matter referred to follows:

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

At page 14,069 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked for all duty officer logs kept for the offices of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff between 1 November and 7 December 1941. Inclosed herewith is a letter from Major General John R. Deane, who was an Assistant Secretary of the General Staff during the period mentioned, describing the duty officer system of the office of the Secretary of the General Staff in the months preceding Pearl Harbor and stating that no logs were maintained by the duty officers of that office. The foregoing duty officer arrangement served both the office of the Chief of Staff and the office of the Secretary of War.

(S) CARL R. NELSON,
Captain, AUS

Headquarters, Army Air Forces
Washington, 19 April 1946.

Capt. Carl R. Nelson

DEAR CAPTAIN NELSON: In reply to your telephone request this date the following represents to the best of my recollection, knowledge and belief the system that was employed concerning duty officers in the Office of the Chief of Staff just prior to Pearl Harbor.

There were 6 or 8 officers designated as Assistant Secretaries of the General Staff, all of whom were on a roster as night and weekend duty officers. When acting as duty officers they were required to remain within reach of a designated telephone so that they might be called by the Adjutant General's Office in case anything unusual occurred outside of the regular hours.

I was Assistant Secretary of the General Staff during the few months preceding Pearl Harbor and was one of the officers on the roster referred to above. I do not recall ever having been called by the Adjutant General's Office because no unusual situation had arisen. There was no log kept of the activities of the duty officers. If anything arose that called for immediate action such action would be taken at once; otherwise the circumstances would be re-
ported to the Secretary of the General Staff upon his arrival at the office on the following day.

(S) JOHN R. DEANE, Major General, USA.

Mr. Lane. In response to the request for information concerning Japanese estimates of the United States air strength in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the War Department by memorandum dated May 21, 1946, has furnished information obtained from the Chairman, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, and we ask that this information be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14625]

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

In response to your request for information concerning Japanese estimates of United States air strength in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, there is enclosed herewith a memorandum dated 21 May from the Office of the Chairman, United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

(S) ROBERT M. DIGGS, Captain, USA.

[14625]

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY,
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN,
21 May 1946.

CAPTAIN ROBERT M. DIGGS, A. U. S.,
Room 4D 757, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CAPTAIN DIGGS: In reply to your question concerning Japanese estimates of United States air strength in the Hawaiian area prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the Survey can offer the following.

Last November in Tokyo Admiral Yonai, the last Japanese Navy Minister, gave the Survey a document, the translated title of which is "Estimation of Japanese Strength at the Outbreak of the Greater East Asia War (December 1941)." This paper which was used by the Japanese Cabinet for planning purposes during the late fall of 1941 has the following estimated disposition of United States air strength in the Pacific:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hawaii area</th>
<th>Wake—Midway</th>
<th>Philippines area</th>
<th>Aleutian area</th>
<th>Available for transfer to Far East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter planes</td>
<td>About 200</td>
<td>Wake, about 12</td>
<td>About 10</td>
<td></td>
<td>About 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[14,687] Large planes (4 engines)</td>
<td>About 40</td>
<td></td>
<td>About 40</td>
<td>About 60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium planes (2 engines)</td>
<td>About 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>About 200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small attack planes</td>
<td>About 120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance and patrol planes</td>
<td>About 35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>About 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance seaplanes</td>
<td>About 110</td>
<td>Wake, about 6; Midway, about 9</td>
<td>About 55</td>
<td>About 12</td>
<td>About 250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yours very truly,

(S) WALTER WILDS, Commander U. S. N. R.

Mr. Lane. We have received answers to inquiry at page 13760 of the transcript for further information regarding the proposed British warning to Japan sent to President Roosevelt on December 6, 1941, which involved the reply of the Australian Government.

We ask that this material now be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.
Masten's papers.

April prompt from President Roosevelt, enclosing a draft of a proposed declaration by the British Government to the Japanese Government:

1. The basis for the assertions made in the message from the Australian Minister at Washington, mentioned in the telegram from the then Australian Minister for External Affairs enclosed with your letter, regarding the procedure to be followed by the President. It is requested that, if necessary, appropriate inquiry be made of the then Australian Minister at Washington as to the basis for these assertions.

2. All information in the State Department files concerning (a) the above-mentioned document No. 8, and (b) the above-mentioned telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs.

3. The date and hour of dispatch of (a) the above-mentioned telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs, and (b) the above-mentioned message from the then Australian Minister at Washington.

These matters were discussed at the Committee's hearing this morning, and a prompt reply will be greatly appreciated.

(s) S. W. Richardson,
General Counsel.

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: I refer to your memorandum to Mr. Marks dated April 9, requesting information concerning a British memorandum of December 7, 1941 to President Roosevelt and an Australian telegram regarding that memorandum, a paraphrase of which the Department recently furnished to you.

In regard to point 2 of your memorandum, the files of the State Department have again been searched, but no material has been found relevant to these papers.

In regard to points 1 and 3, your request has been communicated to the Australian Government. While, under ordinary circumstances, the Department of State does not feel it should request other governments for documents in their files, an exception has been made in this case because of the fact that the Australian telegram in question was placed in the record at the request of the Australian Government.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE,
Special Assistant to the Secretary.

The Honorable Seth W. Richardson,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: In further reference to your letter of April 9, there are enclosed two copies of a letter received from Mr. L. R. McIntyre of the Australian Legation which contains information requested by you.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Joseph W. Ballantine (per ONC)
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

Enclosure

Mr. Seth W. Richardson,
General Counsel, Joint Committee for the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.
DEAR MR. RICHARDS: I refer to Mr. Acheson's letter of April 16th, 1946, to Mr. Oldham, transmitting a request from the Joint Committee for the Investigation of the Pearl Harbour Attack for further information regarding the telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom which has been inserted in the record of the Joint Committee's hearings.

The telegram contains the substance of a message which the Minister for External Affairs had received from the Australian Minister at Washington. This message was despatched from Washington at 9:30 P. M. on December 6th, 1941. The information contained therein regarding the procedure to be followed by the President had come orally from the President late in the afternoon of December 6th.

There is no record of the exact time of despatch from Canberra to the Secretary of State for [14632] Dominion Affairs beyond the fact that it was despatched in the evening of December 7th, Canberra time.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ L. R. McIntyre.

Mr. Arthur L. Richards,
Room 377, State Building,
United States Department of State, Washington, D. C.

APRIL 10, 1946.

DEAR Miss TULLY: There are enclosed with this letter mimeographed copies of two documents which you furnished the Committee from the files of the late President Roosevelt. The first document is dated December 7, 1941 and appears to be a memorandum from Prime Minister Churchill to the President, and the second document is the draft declaration attached to the first. There is also enclosed a mimeographed copy of a paraphrase of a telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in the United Kingdom. Permission to use the first two documents was granted the Committee by the British Government only upon the condition that the third document be released at the same time.

At the public hearing last Tuesday, the Committee asked that a further check of the records and files of President [14633] Roosevelt be made to ascertain whether any further information or documents are available concerning the enclosures. You will note the description of the "President's subsequent procedure" in the third document and the assertion that "he will issue his warning" on Tuesday afternoon or evening. The Committee desires to know whether the records and files of President Roosevelt contain any memoranda relating in any way to the three documents mentioned above, and to the basis for the assertion made by the then Australian Minister at Washington in the third document regarding the intentions of President Roosevelt. In particular, the Committee would like to know whether President Roosevelt's records and files contain any memoranda of conversations between the President and the then Australian Minister at Washington, Mr. Casey, or copies of memoranda or messages from the President to Mr. Casey which might have served as the basis for the Australian Minister's assertions.

We will greatly appreciate your usual prompt attention to the Committee's request.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ S. W. Richardson,
General Counsel.

Miss Grace Tully,
3000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C.
Mr. LANE. At page 34 of the committee transcript Senator Brewster requested that the final draft of a memorandum from the committee for the President, which the committee proposed the President send to the various executive departments and agencies, be spread on the record. It was ordered by the committee Chairman. We request that a copy of the letter dated November 2, 1945, from the committee Chairman to Hon. Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President, which letter quoted the committee's proposed memorandum, be spread on the record, together with a copy of the reply dated November 7, 1945, from Mr. Connelly to the committee Chairman, which enclosed a copy of the memorandum the President sent to the executive departments and agencies that day. This latter memorandum appears in the full in the committee transcript at page 30. However, the letter of transmittal does not appear at that point. We ask that this material be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

Honorable MATTHEW J. CONNELLY, Secretary to the President, The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CONNELLY: The Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack respectfully asks that the President approve the following memorandum:

Memorandum for: The Chief Executives of all executive departments, agencies, commissions and bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to assist the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack in its desire to make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events leading up to or following the attack, and to supplement previous directives and arrangements for full disclosure to and cooperation with the Joint Committee, and to add to the protections given in that provision in Section 3 of the Concurrent Resolution creating the Joint Committee, which reads as follows:

Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

You are directed to authorize every person in your respective departments or agencies whether in the armed services or in a civilian status, and whether or not called to testify before the Joint Committee, if interrogated by the Committee or any of its members or counsel, to volunteer any information of which they may have knowledge bearing on the subject of the Committee's investigation, and whether or not so interrogated, to come forward voluntarily and dis-
close to the Committee, or to any of its members or its counsel, any information such persons may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think may not already have been disclosed to the Committee.

Respectfully,

CHAIRMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 7, 1945.

MY DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: This is to acknowledge your letter of November second, written on behalf of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

I am enclosing a copy of the memorandum the President [14638] is today sending to the Chief Executives of all Executive Departments, Agencies, Commissions and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) MATTHEW J. CONNELLY,
MATTHEW J. CONNELLY,
Secretary of the President.

HONORABLE ALLEN W. BARKLEY,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

[Enclosure.]

Mr. Lane. The committee has received, under date of April 23, 1946, certain corrections requested by Captain Zacharias to be made in the transcript of his testimony. We ask that his request be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14639]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY.
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 23 April 1946.

1083A (HLB)
MEMORANDUM.

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. Captain Zacharias has reviewed the transcript of his testimony before the Committee and has requested that the following typographical errors be corrected:

Page 5717, line 13, change "Jacinto" to "isidro".
Page 5718, line 15, change "come" to "came".
Page 5720, line 5, delete "then".
Page 5723, line 19, delete "for".
Page 5724, lines 12 and 13, at end of line 12 change period to comma, and at beginning of line 13 change capital "T" to small "t".
Page 5788, line 2, change "made" to "make".
Page 5743, line 23, change "nand" to "and".
Page 5755, line 3, change this line to read: "Why, here I am a Reserve Intelligence Officer in G-2 and".

Page 5755, line 6, delete "I said,"
Page 5760, line 6, change "thatin" to "that in".
Page 5763, line 24, delete "Vice".
Page 5763, line 25, change "of" to "on".

[14640] Page 5865, line 19, insert "not" between "by" and "having".
Page 5886, line 23, change "said" to "said".
Page 5898, line 3, change "1924" to "1926".
Page 5907, line 22, change "from" to "into".
Page 9014, line 4, change "defer" to "refer to".
Page 9014, line 7, change "If you knew" to "In view of".
Page 9023, line 1, change "it" to "these".
Page 9024, line 4, change "Tmayer" to "T. Mayer".
Page 9024, line 21, before "Juno" insert "It says".
Page 9039, line 12, change "ability" to "a billet".

(S) JOHN FORD BAECHER.
Commander, USNR.
Mr. Lane. Under date of April 25, 1946, we have received a list of corrections suggested in the testimony of Admiral H. R. Stark, by the admiral. We ask that his request be made a part of the record.

The Chairman. It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. There is forwarded herewith as enclosure (A) a memorandum from Admiral H. R. Stark requesting that certain typographical and grammatical errors be corrected in the transcript of his testimony before the Joint Committee. These items are listed by page and line number.

(S) John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

Enclosure: (A) Memo from Admiral H. R. Stark to Commander J. F. Baecher dt 19 Apr 46.

Memorandum
To: Commander John Ford Baecher.

1. Referring to the recent hearings, I have read them over and I see no corrections for us in Volume 68. However, on Page 13712 in the question by Mr. Richardson in the paragraph at the top of the page next to the last line, the word “Price” should be “Prince”.

2. In Volume 68, page 13897 in the paragraph near the bottom of the page starting “I remember her remark”, change “her” to “the” so that it would read “I remember the remark”.

3. On page 13927, paragraph 1 at top of page, “May” should be “December”. If I said “May” it certainly was a mistake. I had meant and thought I had said “I think it was December”, etc.

4. Page 13948, line 19–20, insert “based” at the end of line 9 so that the answer would read “they were based in”.

(a) Page 13912, line 2, change the last two words “any explanation” to “an explanation”.

5. Going back to my former testimony, I note the following and which Dave may have corrected but I think it might be well to check up:

Volume 35:
(a) Page 6395, line 6 after the word “out” insert “except through” and eliminate the word “of”. It would then read “they couldn’t get out except through Intelligence”.
(b) Page 6397, line 13 insert “the” between the words “when” and “King”. It would then read “when the King went back”, etc.
(c) Page 6433, line 13 insert the word “not” between the words “did and have.” It would then read “so we did [14643] not have.” This is obviously a clerical error.
(d) Page 6463, line 6 change “200” to “0200”.
(e) Page 6502, line 20 change the word “transport” to “task force.”
(f) Page 6505, line 11 change the word “report” to “support.”
(g) Page 6524, line 20 change the word “we” to the word “he.”

H. R. Stark,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

(S) H. R. Stark.

Enclosure (A)

Mr. Lane. Under date of May 20, 1946, we received a request from Admiral Beardall of certain corrections he would like to have made in his testimony. We ask that his request be made a part of the record.

The Chairman. It is so ordered.
Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

Admiral Beardall has checked the transcript of his testimony before the Joint Committee and requests that the typographical errors listed on the enclosure be corrected in the transcript.

/S/ John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.

Italics indicates error or omission.

Volume 69, of 11 April 1946

Page 14014
Line 24
Change "Harbor attack when I joined him."

Page 14020
Line 2
Should read: "No, not necessarily so. At that."

Page 14025
Line 12
Change "American" to "Japanese."

Page 14025
Line 13
Omit "of Japan."

Page 14038
Line 6
Should read: "the conclusion that it was immediately."

Page 14039
Line 15
Read "No, he never discussed it with."

Page 14054
Line 4
Read: "or some sort of a mail center, or something."

Mr. Lane. We have received suggested corrections from Henry C. Clausen to make in his testimony before the committee, and we ask that his request be spread on the record.

The Chairman. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

Mr. Lane. Mr. Chairman, interrogatories were sent by the committee upon the request of Senator Ferguson, to Vice Admiral William A. Glassford, U. S. N., in Germany, and to Brig. Gen. Francis
G. Brink, U. S. A., in Shanghai, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not they have information concerning matters under review by the committee. Inquiry was made by the Navy Department of Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover, U. S. N., Honolulu, and his reply was furnished to committee counsel, as were the replies to interrogations by Admiral Glassford and General Brink. Brig. Gen. E. L. Harrison was interviewed by counsel for a similar reason. The results of all of these inquiries were presented in writing to each member of the committee. It is the view of counsel that none of these officers has information material to this inquiry, and unless the committee desires otherwise, counsel does not contemplate them as witnesses.

Mr. Murphy. Are you offering, however, the interrogatories?

The Chairman. You want that statement made a part of the record?

Mr. Lane. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I think, in view of the fact that there are statements made in the record which would intimate that those gentlemen have vital information, and in view of the fact that the interrogatories do not so indicate, I think that those interrogatories ought to be made a part of the record.

The Chairman. So ordered.

[14647] Mr. Lane. Mr. Chairman, we would like to have permission to furnish those to the reporter because we don’t have them with us.

The Chairman. You will do it today?

Mr. Lane. Yes, sir.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14648] INTERROGATORIES AND REPLIES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL FRANCIS G. BRINK

Request is made by Joint Committee investigating Pearl Harbor attack that Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink answer the following questions:

1. Did you know Brooke Popham, British Air Marshal, head of the Royal Air Force in Malaya?

Answer: Yes.

2. Did you ever talk to him concerning what our policy would be should the Japanese attack the British or Dutch?

Answer: No.

3. A. At 3:26 p.m. on 6 December 1941, Singapore time, Capt. John Creighton sent the following message in code to Admiral Hart at Manila:

On Saturday Brooke Popham received from War Department London:

American armed support has now been assured us in following cases:

a. We have to execute our plans to prevent landing Isthmus of Kra by Japs or counteract Jap invasion elsewhere in Siam.

b. Attack is made on Dutch Indies and we proceed to their defense.

c. Japs attack US the British. Accordingly, put plan in action without reference to London if you have good
information that Jap expedition is advancing apparently with [14649] intention of landing in Kra, or if any part of Thailand is violated by the Japs. Should NEI be attacked, put the plans agreed upon between Dutch and British into operation.

B. Were the contents of this message discussed by you with Brooke Popham?

Answer: No.

C. Was any or all of the information contained in the message conveyed by you to Captain Creighton?

Answer: No.

D. Were the contents of the above message known to you before it was sent?

Answer: No.

E. If not, when did you first learn of the contents?

Answer: In above cable received 15 April.

F. To your knowledge were the contents of that message given to you or anyone by Brooke Popham before it was dispatched?

Answer: No.

4. At what time did you first have knowledge that the Japs would attack the Kra Peninsula?

Answer: Unable to say accurately from memory without consulting my reports between 3 and 8 December 1941 to the War Department. Two convoys were reported off Cochin China, traveling south, [14650] at least one day before the Kra Peninsula landing; they turned west, then in darkness turned south. The RAF observed the convoys and attacked them at the time the landings in Malaya and South Thailand were made. Possible landings on Kra and North Malaya were a definite Japanese capability on the previous day when the convoys were reported in the Gulf of Siam. To the best of my recollection the time of the actual landing was on or about the 8th of December.

5. When did you first learn that they were going to attack any territory of the British?

Answer: Answer to question 4 applies. I learned of landings at Kota Bahru in Malaya at 0100, 8 December, Singapore time.

6a. Was anyone connected with the armed services of the American Government advised by you of an expected attack?

Answer: Yes. I furnished the data given in reply to question 4.

b. If so, who was so advised and when?

Answer: I notified the War Department and the Philippine Department of the Japanese movements toward the Kra Peninsula noted [14651] in the answer to question 4. The precise time would have to be obtained by reference to the War Department message file.

7. What did you know from the British or the United States about our policy should the Japanese attack the British and/or the Dutch?

Answer: Concerning the United States policy covering this matter, I have no knowledge.
8. Do you know of any policy that the United States had as to our action in case the Japanese attacked the British and/or the Dutch but not the Americans?

Answer: Same answer as in No. 7.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Reference is made to the reply of Brigadier General Francis G. Brink to cabled questions from the Joint Committee concerning his knowledge of the general situation in the Far East just prior to December 7, 1941.

In reply to Question No. 4 and Questions 6A and 6B, it is noted that General Brink refers to a dispatch he sent to the War Department concerning Japanese movements toward the Kra Peninsula.

It is noted that at page 5507 of the Joint Committee transcript there appears a paraphrase of a message sent by General Brink from Singapore on December 5, 1941, reporting [14652-4] this incident, and the War Department liaison office has advised that this message is the only report received by the War Department between December 3 and December 8, 1941, from General Brink.

A copy of the paraphrased message sent by Brink, as it appears in the transcript, is attached.

In answer to Question No. 5, Gen. Brink says he learned of the landings at Kota Bharu at 0100, 8 December, Singapore time. That is equivalent to 7:30 AM December 7, Honolulu time, and 1:00 PM December 7, Washington time.

(S) LOGAN J. LANE, Counsel.

A PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET MESSAGE RECEIVED AT WAR DEPARTMENT AT 4:20 P. M.

December 6, 1941

From Singapore; Filed 5:13 P. M., December 5, 1941
Received in I. B.: 1:35 A. M., December 7, 1941 No. 96

Brink advises that at one o'clock in the afternoon, following a course due west, were seen a battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-five merchant ships; these were seen at 106°S E., 8° N.; this was the first report.

The second report was that ten merchant ships, two cruisers and ten destroyers were seen following the same course at 106°20' E., 7°35' N.

Both of the above reports came from patrols of the Royal Air Force.

[14655]

The Secretary of the Navy,

Washington 6, 1946.

The Hon. Alben W. Barkley,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, U. S. Senate.

Dear Senator Barkley: Reference is made to your letter dated 3 April 1946, which forwarded interrogatories to be submitted to Vice Admiral William A. Glassford, U. S. Navy, which was acknowledged by letter dated 10 April 1946 from the Acting Secretary of the Navy.

The written replies of Vice Admiral Glassford to the interrogatories have now been received, and I am enclosing for you the original signed by him.

Sincerely,

(S) JAMES FORRESTAL.

[14656]

United States Fleet,
United States Naval Forces, Germany,
% Fleet Post Office, New York, N. Y., 20 April 1946.

Enclosure (A) to Letter of Vice Adm. William Glassford, U. S. Navy.

WRITTEN REPLIES TO QUESTIONNAIRE OF SENATOR BARKLEY 1

Question 1. Admiral Glassford, were you commanding U. S. Naval Forces in Chinese waters in October 1941 and was your su-

1 Questions by Senator Ferguson for submission by Senator Barkley as Chairman of the Committee.
perior officer Admiral Thomas A. Hart who had headquarters at Manila?

Answer: Yes.

Question 2. Did your flag lieutenant, at that time Lieutenant Chenault on the U. S. Gunboat Luzon, advise you that Karl H. von Wiegand had important information and that you were to call him in regard to it?

Answer: I have no recollection. However, I saw Mr. von Wiegand often by prearrangement.

Question 3. Did you on or about the 17th of October 1941 go to the office of Karl H. von Wiegand in Shanghai and did he tell you the following:

I have information through what hitherto have been reliable channels, that the general staffs of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, together with the Japanese Government, have set December 6, 1941, as the "deadline" for the negotiations in Washington. If no settlement has been reached by that date, between the Japanese and American Governments, war may start any hour after midnight December 6.

Answer: I saw Mr. von Wiegand frequently over a period of time. I cannot therefore state whether or not I saw him on or about the 17th of October 1941; but neither the statement quoted nor its substance was communicated to me by Mr. von Wiegand at any time.

Question 3 (continued). If you do not answer that question in the affirmative, did he give you the substance of what was stated in the previous question? Or what do you now say that you recall that he stated to you in regard to the above conversation?

Answer: At no time did I have a conversation with Mr. von Wiegand in which such information or its substance was given to me.

Question 4. Did Karl H. von Wiegand tell you that he could not reveal to you the source of his information since a leak might involve the lives of several persons, but that he had reasons to believe that it came from a very high source in Tokyo?

Answer: See my reply to question 3.

Question 4 (continued). Did you not know at the time that Karl H. von Wiegand was careful in making statement to you?

Answer: That was always my impression.

Question 5. Is it not true that Karl H. von Wiegand had given you other information and that you had remarked that it had proven better and more correct than information from Naval Intelligence in Shanghai?

Answer: Over a period of time Mr. von Wiegand gave me much valuable information. I do not recall making the particular remark mentioned.

Question 6. Did you, Admiral, state on or about October 17, 1941, that you would immediately make a report on the information that he had given to you about: "If no settlement has been reached by that date between the Japanese and the American Governments, war may start any hour after midnight, December 6, 1941 ("), or any conversation similar or containing that statement?

Answer: No; since I did not receive the information.
Question 7. To whom did you report the conversation you had with Karl H. von Wiegand on or about the 17th of October 1941?
Answer: To no one, since I had no conversation with Mr. von Wiegand of the nature referred to in questions 3, 6, and 8.

Question 8. To whom did you communicate the information that you received from Karl H. von Wiegand relative to:

I have information through what hitherto have been reliable channels that the general staffs of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy together with the Japanese Government have set December 6, 1941, as the deadline for the negotiations in Washington. If no settlement has been reached by that date, between the Japanese and American Governments, war may start any hour after midnight December 6.

Answer: No one, since I did not receive such information.

Question 8 (continued). Did you report this conversation or the substance of it or any part of it to Admiral Hart in Manila?
Answer: No; since the conversation did not take place.

Question 9. Did you send a report of this information (quotation in question 8) or the substance of it or any part of it to any official in Washington?
Answer: No; since I did not receive such information.

Question 10. If your answer to the previous question is “yes,” to whom did you report in Washington and give us the substance of that report.
Answer: My answer to the previous question is “no.”

Question 11. Did you ever advise anyone the substance of the quotation contained in question 8 or any part of it?
Answer: No; since I did not receive such information.

Question 12. On or about December 7, 1941, Philippine time, did you dine with Karl H. von Wiegand and another or others at which time you discussed information that he had given you about December 6 and that it might not come true and that you had made the cryptic remark: “We may take the initiative”?
Answer: I did dine with Mr. von Wiegand, To the best of my knowledge I did not make the remark attributed to me.

[14660] Question 12 (continued). Admiral, will you please explain in detail what was meant by the remark, “We may take the initiative,” and where did you obtain that information?
Answer: I cannot explain a remark which, to the best of my knowledge, I did not make.

Question 13. Do you recall a telephone conversation on Monday morning Philippine time, with Karl H. von Wiegand and that you stated to him: “The war is on. Your information was correct.”? Also that you related to him the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor and that you were waiting to see Admiral Hart and would be off to your flagship by seaplane?
Answer: I did telephone to Mr. von Wiegand. I did tell him that Pearl Harbor had been attacked by the Japanese. However I could not have referred to information which I had not received.

(S) William Glassford,
William Glassford.
For Rear Admiral Cato D Glover USN X In congressional investigation of Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor Question has arisen as to whereabouts of Admiral H R Stark on night of 6 December 1941 and Admiral Stark cannot recollect that detail X Log of OPNAV duty officer for 6 dash 7 December 1941 indicates you stood watch from 1900 to 0200 X This log contains over your signature the following entry quote At 2000 Major F L Harrison comma Aide to the Secretary of War comma telephoned that the Secretary of War desired the following information by 0900 Sunday 7 December colon compilation of men of war in Far East comma British comma American comma Japanese comma Dutch comma Russian comma also compilation X of American men of war in Pacific Fleet comma with locations comma and a list of American men of war in the Atlantic without locations X Admirals Ingersoll comma Stark and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000 Sunday 7 December unquote X This entry does not recall to Admiral Stark any recollection as to his whereabouts X He accepts the item but things it may possibly be inaccurate because he cannot see why it would have been necessary to have consulted all three paren Ingersoll himself and Knox paren in the matter referred to X Advise by dispatch as soon as possible whether you recollect consulting Admiral Stark as indicated comma as well as the manner in which the approximate time you contacted him and where he was located when reached by you X

FN COMAIRPAC 160636
To SEC
P (JAG) WASHN DC
RESTRICTED X

I regret that I am unable to recall the incident referred to in your 152019 X Information of the nature requested by the Secretary of War was normally compiled by the so called quote X war room unquote which was then a new section of the Ship Movements Division of OPNAV X This section was headed by Captain Frank Leighton now deceased X Events of importance originating from the war room were entered in the log kept by the Ship Movement Division X It is possible that Capt Leighton was the consultant X I do remember very definitely having telephoned Admiral Stark during the night concerning the movements of a Japanese convoy which was west of the Philippines headed south X This was the convoy that made the initial landing on the Malay Peninsula near Kota Bharu X I am certain that this call was made after midnight as it was toward the end of the watch and that Admiral Stark was then at his home X From Rear Admiral Cato D Glover X 9717/16 Apr. CH 160636Z 152019

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make one other request?

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy. During the course of the hearings, on countless occasions each member of the committee referred to the United States News, to quote from the different reports. In view of the great use that was made of that volume I ask that it be made an exhibit.

The Chairman. United States News?

Mr. Murphy. United States News. 1

1 The United States News, extra number, September 1, 1945.
The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. It was referred to time and time again. We ought to have the source in the record.

Mr. Chairman. You want it made a part of the record?

Mr. Murphy. I would like to have it made an exhibit, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lane. I ask that it be given Exhibit No. 181, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. So ordered.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 181.")

The Chairman. Proceed, Counsel.

Mr. Lane. By letter dated May 6, 1946, Senator Ferguson asked that Gen. Hugh Knerr be called as a witness before the committee. This request was reported to the committee on May 14, 1946. We have not been advised by the committee [14665] that General Knerr should be presented as a witness. We would like to have that statement appear in the record.

The Chairman. It will be noted in the record.

Senator Brewster. Was there any action by the committee?

The Chairman. We had that up last week. The matter was discussed and the committee in effect denied the request by ordering the hearings and the record closed today. There was no understanding, as I recall, of the committee that he would be called as a witness. It would involve the calling of other witnesses.

Mr. Lane. By letter dated November 15, 1945, Senator Ferguson requested copies of all intercepted messages between January 1 and July 1, 1941. Messages printed in Exhibit No. 1 were selected from those sent during the period July 2, 1941, to December 8, 1941. Present counsel have not pursued this request and, therefore, has not available such intercepts.

Senator Brewster. What is the reason you didn’t pursue it?

Mr. Richardson. As a matter of fact, Senator, it was a request which was made of Mr. Mitchell early in the hearings and he turned it over to Mr. Hannaford and it came to light when we started preparing to close this record, and we just paid no further attention to it.

Senator Brewster. I think we did get some of the messages during that period, which had a very illuminating bearing on this matter of the knowledge of the Japanese, as [14666] to their knowledge of the intercepted communications, warning the Japanese Embassy to look out because they thought we were breaking the code.

You recall those episodes. Those communications were not furnished to us earlier, which, we thought, was unfortunate. It wasn’t until we went into their earlier period. How those were selected and what was the basis of this earlier period, January to June, I don’t know.

Mr. Richardson. We are subject, of course, to whatever the committee wants to do. It came up from the bottom of the basket.

Senator Brewster. Do you know what the volume is?

Mr. Richardson. I don’t know.

Senator Brewster. Unless they are very extensive I think it would be a good idea to have them in. We had these few in May and June, as I recall it, which showed these communications between Tokyo, Berlin, and Washington, and they revealed very valuable information.

Now, how many intercepts there were during the 6 months’ period I don’t know. Unless they are very extensive I think it would be a good idea to have them.
Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, it is my impression that the volume is enormous.

The Chairman. I thought the intercepts which we had secured, and made Exhibit 2, I believe it was, contained all the pertinent intercepts.

Senator Brewster. No one has ever looked at these.

Mr. Richardson. Have you any idea, Mr. Masten, as to how extensive the intercepts are that would be responsive to this request?

Mr. Masten. The only information I have on that, Mr. Richardson, is that Mr. Hannaford spent about 3 weeks over there, but what he went through I don’t know. I believe there is a memorandum in the file which discusses what he did in examining the intercepts. I, myself, know actually nothing other than that about it.

Mr. Richardson. It would be possible, still closing your record today, to include all of these intercepts by reference. It would be physically possible to ask to have the intercepts put into a document and introduced in the record if you feel it is necessary, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Brewster. I think it is.

The Chairman. Just to grab up all the intercepts between January and July might mean producing a lot of highly immaterial stuff.

Mr. Richardson. The request covers that, just that, all of the intercepts in that 6 months period.

The Chairman. This printing bill is going to be something enormous as it is, as everybody knows. I do not use that as an argument against putting anything of value into the record, but if they are very voluminous it is obvious that they might contain a lot of items that have nothing to do with the inquiry.

Senator Brewster. Would it be possible to have counsel find out about that and get a decision this afternoon?

The Chairman. If the committee is willing to say that as of today counsel shall examine these intercepts and include in the record what counsel regards as pertinent, I would have no objection to that.

Senator Brewster. Could we leave it this way, that if it is found they are not extensive, that they may go in. That would be easier—to put them in.

The Chairman. That is a rather vague way of doing it.

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, as I just said to Mr. Richardson, Mr. Hannaford spent, I believe, 3 weeks over there, and the material that was included in Exhibit No. 1 was what he regarded as relevant to the inquiry. Now, whether or not he went behind July 1, my impression is that he did, although I do not actually know, as I never discussed it with him.

Senator Brewster. Is there a memorandum?

Mr. Masten. There is a memorandum in the files describing the procedure followed. I think the thing to do is to put the memorandum in the record.

The Chairman. Why not put the memorandum in the record. Would that be agreeable?

[14069] Senator Brewster. Subject to further check as to whether he went into this period before July 1. In the first instance he did not because that was what occasioned our later desire when we got word that there were these earlier communications in May and June.
The Chairman. After all the time we have spent on the intercepts, it seems a little haphazard to come in on the last day and ask to go back over another period, although I have no objection if it is pertinent.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Masten tells me that it will be an enormous task and will take a month. I don't know what the source of that information is. I know nothing about this. The request came up and rather than do anything about it I thought I would present it, as we did.

The Chairman. We examined everybody who appeared for days and days and days. I don't intimate that anybody was guilty of laches in not bringing up these prior ones, but it is unfortunate that on the last day we are requested to go back over those intercepts for 6 months.

Mr. Masten. There is this memorandum in the file, Mr. Chairman, showing the basis on which the selection was made. I haven't looked at it recently. I think that would be the thing to put in.

The Chairman. I suggest that the memorandum be printed as a part of the hearing today. Can you get it for the record?

[14670] Mr. Masten. Yes.

The Chairman. I will withdraw the other suggestion.

(The matter referred to follows.)


Memorandum for the Files re Exhibits 1 and 2

Exhibits 1 and 2, containing intercepted Japanese messages, were prepared by counsel from War Department records. Counsel examined the War Department's file of Japanese intercepted messages from July 1 to December 31, 1941. No examination was made of the Navy Department file of intercepts because counsel was assured by both the Army and the Navy that the Navy's file is a duplicate of the Army's. With respect to intercepts prior to July 1, 1941, the War Department's files have not been examined completely, although earlier messages on particular subjects have been examined after they had been dug out by the War Department pursuant to request of counsel.

Exhibit 1 is intended to include the most complete picture of the Japanese-United States negotiations from the Jap point of view that could be prepared without producing an exhibit that was too bulky. In preparing the exhibit, the following types of messages were eliminated:

1. Messages relating purely to administrative matters, such as salaries of embassy clerks, etc.

2. Messages transmitting the text of United States or Japanese notes which are printed in full in the State Department document entitled "Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941."

[14672] 3. Certain messages relating to the negotiations which were exchanged during the months of July, August, and September. In these early months selections were made to highlight the course of the negotiations, but as the negotiations approached the critical stage—i.e., in the months of October, November and December—practically all messages were included.


Exhibit 2 includes all intercepts that could be found which were transmitted after August 1, 1941, and which dealt with ship movements, etc., except that messages of particular interest transmitted prior to that date are included in Section 7 and that all messages relating to Hawaii that were decoded in 1941 are included in Section 1.

In both of the exhibits all reference to the type of code—i.e., purple—were eliminated because at the time the exhibits were prepared it was contemplated these matters would not be referred to in the hearings. These were the only deletions from the War Department copies of the messages except that three
paragraphs giving detailed instructions for the destruction of code machines were deleted from circular No. 2330 which appears on page 137 of Exhibit 1.

[14673] Senator Ferguson's letter of November 15th, a copy of which is attached, asked for all intercepted Japanese messages between January 1 and July 1, 1941. Intercepted Japanese messages between those dates relating to Japanese espionage activities have been included in Exhibit 2 and those showing that the Japanese suspected we were breaking their codes, have been inserted in the record. Due to the press of other work, no steps have been taken as yet to answer the request completely.

HONORABLE WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.
Room 201, Senate Office Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MITCHELL: I have received the printed copies of the intercepted messages sent by the Japanese Government between July 1 and December 8, 1941.

I would greatly appreciate it if you would send me another copy of this material, as well as a copy of all such intercepted messages between January 1 and July 1, 1941.

With all good wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HOMER FERGUSON.

[14674] MR. LANE. With reference to a letter dated November 3, 1945, from Senator Brewster requesting that all State Department reports and inquiries between Washington and London on the Tyler Kent affair be produced, by memorandum dated November 8, 1945, the then general counsel, Mr. Mitchell, advised Senator Brewster that the request had been forwarded to the State Department.

On November 20, 1945, by letter, Under Secretary Dean Acheson stated:

Mr. Tyler G. Kent, formerly a clerk in the Foreign Service employed as a code clerk in the American Embassy in London, was arrested in London in May 1940 and convicted by a British Court in October 1940 for violation of the British Official Secrets Act. He was convicted of obtaining and communicating documents which might be useful to the enemy for a purpose prejudicial to the interests and the safety of Great Britain and of stealing one of those documents.

The letter concluded:

This Department does not understand how the facts concerning the arrest and conviction of Kent, or correspondence between the Department and the American Embassy in London in regard to the matter, could be considered material to the committee's investigation within the meaning of the President's order of October 23, 1945. Therefore, the Department is unable to comply with the request of Senator Brewster.

In subsequent conversations, according to [14675] the files of counsel's office, between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Marks, assistant to Mr. Acheson, it was understood that counsel might examine documents in the Tyler Kent file for relevancy after the committee specified what aspect of the case was considered pertinent.

The file has not been examined as the committee has not advised counsel what aspect of the case was considered pertinent.

Senator Brewster. This is the first I ever heard of that. I never heard of the Acheson letter and I never heard of this point that they wanted to know what was pertinent. We repeatedly discussed it in the committee and stated the pertinency when the matter came up.

The CHAIRMAN. I had a letter from Mr. Tyler Kent stating that he had no information that he regarded as of value to the committee in regard to Pearl Harbor. If I can find that letter I think it might be well to put it in the record.
(The letter referred to follows:)

[14676]

Hon. Alben W. Barkley,
Chairman, Pearl Harbor Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

Sir: Various recent newspaper references, and within the last few days some expressions attributed to Members of Congress, seem to imply that I am expected to testify before the Pearl Harbor Committee of which you are the chairman.

To clarify my position, may I respectfully state that since my arrival in America from England on December 3 last, I have remained ready at all times to present any information that I have to your committee or to any other official body.

I can think of nothing within my own knowledge that would throw light on events directly connected with our country's disaster at Pearl Harbor. But I shall gladly submit upon request, for whatever significance you may attach to them, any of the facts with which I happened to become familiar in Europe, and because of which, to prevent my imparting them to the American Congress in 1940, I was secretly, and I think very unjustly and illegally, tried and imprisoned in England.

Respectfully,

(s) Tyler Kent,
2112 Wyoming Avenue, N. W.
Washington 8, D. C.

[14677-78] Senator Brewster. I have never asked for Tyler Kent. I am not interested in Tyler Kent. I am interested in matters of our State Department which, in my judgment, may have a relevancy. And I am still disturbed and concerned at the handling of this matter.

The Chairman. Did you ask that this communication be made a part of the record?

Mr. Lane. I didn't ask, but we have it.

The Chairman. Let it go in as part of the hearings today.

(The document referred to follows:)

[14679]

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
Of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
November 3, 1945.

Hon. William D. Mitchell,
Room 201, Senate Office Bldg., Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Mitchell: Would you kindly secure for me copies of all State Department reports and inquiries between Washington and London on the Tyler Kent affair?

Thanking you for this courtesy, I am
Sincerely yours,

(s) Owen Brewster
Owen Brewster, U. S. N.

[OB: rg]

Memo to Senator Brewster:

Your request of November 3 for logs of ships has been presented to the Navy Department.

Respecting your request of November 3 as to summaries of "off the record" testimony before the Army board, we instituted inquiry about that some time ago, with the hope that someone made some notes about it, but so far we have not found that anyone did so.

As to the Admiral Hewitt testimony, our only copy was loaned to Senator Ferguson and has not been returned.

Your request for State Department reports and inquiries between Washington and London on the Tyler Kent affair has been presented to the State Department.

William D. Mitchell.
November 20, 1945.

My Dear Mr. Mitchell: I refer to your letter of November 9, 1945, referring to this Department a letter dated November 3, 1945, to you from Senator Brewster, in which Senator Brewster requested that you secure for him copies of all State Department reports and inquiries between Washington and London on the Tyler Kent affair.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 27, establishing the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, provides that the committee "shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, * * *." The President's order of October 23, 1945, addressed to this and other departments instructs the Secretary of State to make available to the joint committee, for such use as the committee may determine, any information in his possession "material to the investigation." In pursuance of this order, this Department has made available to the committee counsel all information in its possession which is material to the investigation.

Mr. Tyler G. Kent, formerly a clerk in the foreign service employed as a code clerk in the American Embassy in London, was arrested in London in May 1940 and convicted by a British court in October 1940 for violation of the British Official Secrets Act. He was convicted of obtaining and communicating documents which might be useful to the enemy for a purpose prejudicial to the interests and safety of Great Britain and of stealing one of those documents. There is enclosed herewith for your further information, a copy of a release to the press dated September 2, 1944, concerning the Kent case.

This Department does not understand how the facts concerning the arrest and conviction of Kent, or correspondence between the Department and the American Embassy in London in regard to the matter, could be considered material to the committee's investigation within the meaning of the President's order of October 23, 1945. Therefore, the Department is unable to comply with the request of Senator Brewster.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Dean Acheson,
Under Secretary.

(Enclosure: Press release No. 405, September 2, 1944.)

The Honorable William D. Mitchell,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States.

(Handwritten note on letter:) In subsequent conversations with Mr. Marks, it was understood that counsel might examine documents in the TK file for relevancy after the committee specified what aspect of the case was considered pertinent.

Department of State

For the press.
No. 405

September 2, 1944.

The Department of State has taken note of recent inquiries and newspaper reports regarding the case of Tyler Kent, former employee of the American Embassy at London, and the Office of Foreign Service Administration has been instructed to review the matter thoroughly and prepare a comprehensive report. The following is the text of the report:

[T14683] Tyler Kent, American citizen, an employee of the American Foreign Service assigned to London, was tried and convicted under the Official Secrets Act (1911) of Great Britain before the Central Criminal Court at the Old Bailey, London, in October 1940. The charges against him were the obtaining and delivering to an agent of a foreign country (Germany) copies or abstracts of documents which might have been directly or indirectly useful to the enemy, and which were, at the same time, prejudicial to the safety or interests of Great Britain. Incidental to the proceedings against him, it was brought out that he had violated the Larceny Act of 1916 of Great Britain by the theft of documents which were the property of the Government of the United States in the custody of the American Ambassador, London. The above-mentioned were found proven by a jury on the basis of evidence presented during the trial. Kent had worked through a confederate who was allegedly anti-Jewish and pro-Nazi.

The background of the case and the circumstances leading up to Kent's arrest and trial were as follows: Kent, at the age of 22, had entered the foreign service as a clerk, his first assignment having been to the American Embassy at Moscow.
He was later transferred to the American Embassy, London, arriving there in October 1939. He was assigned to the code room as a code clerk, where his duties were to encode and decode telegrams. Before entering the service he had attended Princeton University, the Sorbonne (Paris), the University of Madrid, and George Washington University. He had acquired several foreign languages, including Russian, French, German, and Italian.

On May 18, 1940, a representative of the London Police headquarters at Scotland Yard called at the Embassy to report that Kent had become the object of attention by Scotland Yard through his association with a group of persons suspected of conducting pro-German activities under the cloak of anti-Jewish propaganda. Prominent in this group was Anna Wolkoff, a naturalized British subject of Russian origin, the daughter of a former admiral of the Imperial Russian Navy. Miss Wolkoff had resided in Great Britain since emigrating, with her father, from Russia following the Bolshevist revolution, had been hospitably received and had made a considerable circle of friends among Londoners of standing, some of whom had assisted in setting up the Wolkoff family in a small business. After the outbreak of the present war, the British police had become interested in Miss Wolkoff's activities, believing that she was in sympathy with certain of Germany's objectives, that she and some of her associates were hostile to Britain's war effort, that she was involved in pro-German propaganda, that she had a channel of communication with Germany and that she was making use of that channel of communication.

Kent had been observed by Scotland Yard as having been in frequent contact with Anna Wolkoff and in touch with others of a group known to her. Among other things, it had been noted that Kent and Miss Wolkoff were sharing an automobile and that Miss Wolkoff frequently drove this car using gasoline allegedly supplied by Kent. Scotland Yard was now convinced that Anna Wolkoff was receiving confidential information from Kent and stated that she would be arrested on May 20. The police added that on the same day they considered it highly desirable to search the rooms occupied by Kent. In reply to an inquiry made by British authorities, Ambassador Kennedy with the approval of the Department, informed such authorities of the waiver by this Government of the privilege of diplomatic immunity. Scotland Yard thereupon indicated that a search warrant would be issued and that Kent's rooms would be searched on May 20, 1940.

The possibility that an employee of the Embassy having access to the confidential codes, was making improper use of the material entrusted to him in the course of his work was of the utmost concern to Ambassador Kennedy and to the Government of the United States. Preservation of the secrecy of this Government's means of communication with its establishments abroad is a matter of fundamental importance to the conduct of our foreign relations. In the circumstances described, it was imperative that Ambassador Kennedy ascertain, and ascertain immediately, whether Kent was guilty of a violation of trust. There was every reason, in the interest of the American Government, for the waiving of diplomatic immunity and for allowing the British authorities (who alone had the means of obtaining the evidence) to proceed in an effort to prove or disprove their suspicions. In this connection it may be noted that it is well established in international law that the so-called immunity of an employee of a diplomatic mission from criminal or civil processes may be renounced or waived by the sending state at any time.

The search of Kent's room was conducted according to plan, an officer of the Embassy being present throughout. It revealed that Kent had in his possession copies of Embassy material totaling more than 1,500 individual papers. He also had two newly-made duplicate keys to the index bureau and the code room of the Embassy, these being unauthorized and in addition to the keys furnished him officially for his use as a code clerk. He explained that he had had these keys made so that in the event he should ever be transferred from code work to another section of the Embassy he would still have access to the code room. Also found in his possession were two photographic plates of Embassy documents believed to have been made by confederates for the purpose of endeavoring to transmit prints thereof to Germany, and certain printed propaganda material which was prejudicial to the British conduct of the war. The police also established that some of the papers found had been transmitted to an agent of a foreign power.

An examination of the documents found in his room indicated that Kent had begun classifying the material by subject, but this work was far from completed. They covered practically every subject on which the Embassy was carrying on
correspondence with the Department of State. As may be supposed, they included copies of telegrams embodying information collected by the Embassy which otherwise would not have been permitted to leave Great Britain without censorship. As may be likewise supposed, they contained information which would have been useful to Germany and which Great Britain would not have permitted to reach Germany. It is of interest to note, in this connection that Kent had, during his service in London written to the chargé d'affaires of the American Embassy in Berlin asking his assistance in arranging for his (Kent's) transfer to Berlin. When questioned as to what he would have done with the documents in his possession had he been transferred to Germany, Kent replied that he could not state what he would have done with them; he regarded the question as a hypothetical one.

Regardless of the purpose for which Kent had taken this material from the Embassy, he had done so without authorization, in violation of the most elementary principles governing the rules for the preservation of the secrecy of the Government's correspondence. By his own showing he had, while occupying a very special position of confidence, within the Embassy, displayed a shocking disregard for every principle of decency and honor so far as his obligations toward the United States were concerned. The removal of so large a number of documents from the Embassy premises compromised the whole confidential communications system of the United States, bringing into question the security of the secret ciphers. It was obviously impossible to continue his services, and Kent was dismissed from the Government service as of May 20, 1940. Thereafter the question of diplomatic immunity naturally did not arise.

So far as the British police were concerned, the evidence found in Kent's room was such as to convince them of the necessity of detaining him at Brixton Prison pending investigations of the use he had made of the documents in his possession and the true implications of his connection with Anna Wolkoff. Ambassador Kennedy, with the consent of the Department of State, agreed to Kent's detention.

On May 28 a representative of Scotland Yard informed the Embassy that investigations were proceeding, that the case became progressively more complex, and that it could not be cleared up quickly. It was believed, however, that there would be a case for prosecution against Kent and Anna Wolkoff under the Official Secrets Act of the United Kingdom.

Kent's trial eventually commenced August 8, 1940, and was attended by the American Consul General. It was held in camera because of the harmful effects to British counter-espionage efforts which were to be anticipated if certain of the evidence became public. Prior to the trial the American Consul General in London had called upon Kent (July 31, 1940) at Brixton Prison. The Consul General informed him that he would be taken to court the following day and formally charged with offense under the Official Secrets Act of the United Kingdom. i. e., obtaining documents for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom which might be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy. The Consul General inquired whether Kent had a lawyer to represent him, to which Kent replied that he had not, and that he had not given the matter any thought. The Consul General advised him that he should be represented by a lawyer and agreed to assist in getting in touch with a suitable solicitor. Kent was subsequently placed in touch with a lawyer, whom he engaged to represent him during the trial.

On October 28, 1940, the jury found Kent guilty of violating the Official Secrets Act. The sentence was postponed until completion of the trial of Anna Wolkoff. On November 7, 1940, Kent was sentenced to 7 years' penal servitude and Anna Wolkoff was sentenced to 10 years. Kent's attorneys applied for permission to appeal. On February 5, 1941, this application was rejected by a panel of judges which included the Lord Chief Justice.

In reviewing the Kent case it is important to bear in mind the circumstances surrounding it. At the time of Kent's arrest and trial Great Britain was at war and the United States was not. The case involved a group of people suspected of subversive activities. The evidence relating to individuals of the group was inextricably mixed, and the activities of no single suspect could be separated from the activities of the others. The interest of Great Britain in such a case, at a time when it was fighting for its existence, was therefore preeminent. Deep as was the concern of the Government of the United States over a betrayal of trust by one of its employees, it is hardly conceivable that it would have been justified in asking the Government of Great Britain to waive jurisdiction over an American citizen in the circumstances described. Kent was within the jurisdiction of
the British courts, and all the evidence, witnesses, et cetera, were available to the British courts. Moreover, it was, as has been mentioned, in the interest of the United States to have determined immediately on the spot, where the evidence was available, whether or not one of its employees in a position of trust was violating such trust. The question whether the United States will prefer additional charges against Kent will be decided after his release from imprisonment in Great Britain and he again comes under the jurisdiction of our courts.

[14692] Senator Brewster. What is the disposal of the matter?

Mr. Richardson. It leaves the Tyler Kent business like Mohamet's coffin, halfway between heaven and earth. A request is made of the State Department and they reply that they don't think it relevant. It was discussed three or four times in the committee in detail that that was the position of the State Department. We have never received any committee direction as to what it wanted to do with respect to the position taken by the State Department and it stands there now and we offer it so that the record will show that it, at least, was not overlooked.

The Chairman. As counsel says this matter was brought up time and time again and no action was taken in the committee. As I recall, nobody ever made a motion to take action. It was left that way.

Senator Brewster. If the chairman will permit, each time I brought it up the chairman requested me to defer it and said that the matter would be taken up subsequently.

The Chairman. I don't recall that.

Senator Brewster. Several times you asked me to defer, not to press it.

The Chairman. I haven't talked to the Senator from Maine about it or in his presence for at least 3 months. The conversations were always in the committee.

Senator Brewster. That is right.

[14663] The Chairman. Not as individuals.

Senator Brewster. They were always in the committee. Every time the matter was taken up I stated why I felt it was important for us to have access to this information. And the last time was when we were trying to complete the record, I think some time in February, and we had two or three other matters, the Hull and Stimson matters up, and the chairman suggested that we defer further consideration, that we would take it up subsequently, and I deferred it.

The Chairman. I don't recall that. But if there is a record of it the record will show it.

Senator Brewster. It was an executive session; I don't think we had a record.

The Chairman. The Kent matter was brought up in open session several times, as I recall. Whatever the record shows I stand by.

Senator Brewster. Am I to understand that this matter is now to be ignored? I certainly do not accept the State Department's judgment as to what is relevant after the revelations we had from them on various matters, and I think the record is left in an awkward position, when they are willing for counsel to look at the record and that has not been done, as a result of the committee not taking action.

I now move that counsel be requested to look at the record and report to us whether or not there is anything of relevancy. [14904]
The Chairman. If that will involve any further hearings and involves an extension of this hearing, so that we cannot complete this record today, as far as I am concerned, as an individual member, I vote against the motion.

Senator Brewster. I make that motion.

The Chairman. In favor of the motion?

Senator Brewster. Aye.

The Vice Chairman. No.

The Chairman. No.

Senator Brewster. That makes the record very clear. One more count in the indictment.

The Chairman. We are not indicting you.

Mr. Lane. Mr. Chairman, with respect——

Senator Brewster. I would like to have a roll call on that.

I move that the counsel shall comply with the suggestion of the State Department that the counsel may examine the Kent records in the State Department and report to us whether or not it would appear that they are relevant.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement on that, as I wasn't here before.

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to state that Congressman Keefe and Congressman Gearhart, members of this committee, spent several hours with Tyler Kent, discussed the matter thoroughly, and reported to the committee in executive session that Tyler Kent himself, as well as each of the said members who discussed the matter with Tyler Kent, stated that he knew nothing about Pearl Harbor and couldn't contribute anything.

Senator Brewster. I would like to make a little statement.

I do not think that the gentleman from Pennsylvania, or the other members of the committee, saw any evidence as to make us think that statement completes what the situation is.

It was thoroughly understood in executive committee discussions, and I think in the record as well, that there were some twelve to fifteen hundred messages between a certain naval person, otherwise known as Winston Churchill, and Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, which were items about which a great deal of the preliminaries to this world war evolved, and it is a fair presumption that in connection with this affair and the alleged theft of certain of these documents that the State Department records will disclose these communications which never have been made available to this committee.

Whether or not they have a relevancy to the preliminaries to our becoming involved in the war could only be determined by investigation. That has been clearly and repeatedly stated as the reason why I felt this record should be looked over.

I have never been interested in Mr. Tyler Kent or in his evidence. I have been offered an opportunity to talk with Mr. Tyler Kent and I have not been interested. But I am interested in what the record of the State Department shows as to these communications. And I think that this committee is making very clear their desire to leave certain dark recesses unexplored in their continued refusal to even permit counsel to examine this record and the other records of the State Department in this connection.
Mr. Murphy. Senator Barkley?
The Chairman. No.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Cooper?
The Vice Chairman. No.
Mr. Murphy. Senator Brewster?
Senator Brewster. Aye.
Mr. Murphy. No.
Affirmative one; negative three.
The Chairman. The motion is lost.
Go ahead.
Mr. Lane. With reference to the requests which have been made on the record by members of the committee throughout the hearings and with reference to the requests they have made in writing, counsel is in a position to state that except for those brought to our attention just prior to this time, in this meeting, all of the requests have been answered by the various departments, one way or another. Those in writing from the various members were in general answered in [14697] writing by the counsel to the various committee members, transmitting the replies of the Department. Those that were on the record we tried to answer by putting the material either in the record itself or advising the member who asked the question and asking whether he desired that the information be placed in the record.

Senator Brewster. I understand your statement on the Kent affair was in the record, was it; your statement of the discussions and the letter was put in?
Mr. Lane. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, in continuation of making the record complete, I should like to call the committee’s attention to a letter from the War Department under date of April 29, 1946, with reference to a request of Senator Brewster of April 16; a letter of April 30, 1946, to me from Grace G. Tully, which is self-explanatory; together with a letter of May 3, 1946, to me from the Secretary of State, signed by Herbert S. Marks, which is self-explanatory; letter of May 13, 1946, from Commander Baecher of the Navy Department in response to my request of April 25, 1946, which is self-explanatory.

May they be extended on the record?
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

[14698]

War Department,
Washington,
Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 29 April, 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

With reference to your memorandum of April 25 forwarding Senator Brewster’s request of April 16 for all communications between the British Government in London and our Government in Washington on November 25, 26 and 27, 1941, a search of the War Department files discloses no such communications.

/s/ Robert M. Diggs,
Captain, AUS.

Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to your request dated April 25, 1946, for “copies of communications concerning Japan and/or the Far East which were transmitted between the British Government in London and our Government in Washington on November
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25, 26 and 27, 1941, and which now appear in the Navy Department files", [14700] you are advised that a search of the pertinent files of the Navy Department reveals no dispatches of this nature. 

There are, however, in Navy files, messages between the Navy Department and the British Admiralty for 25, 26 and 27 November 1941, copies of which were furnished prior counsel on 14 November 1945, as follows: 

November 251005Z  Admiralty to OpNav
November 251114Z  Admiralty to OpNav
November 251205Z  Admiralty to CNO
November 251733   OpNav to Admiralty
November 252229   Admiralty to Spenavo
November 261722A  Admiralty to OpNav
November 262251   OpNav to Spenavo for Admiralty
November 270015Z  Admiralty to OpNav
November 271250Z  Admiralty to OpNav

You will probably recall from our conversations and the correspondence of the undersigned with prior counsel, that in view of the understanding between the Navy Department and the British Admiralty, none of the messages referred to above, nor any others between the Navy and the Admiralty, should be made public until first there has been obtained the consent of the British Admiralty. The obtaining of such consent may possibly require a considerable period of time. Since it is not known whether you desire that there be obtained the consent of the [14700] British Admiralty to the publication of the above mentioned messages, no proceedings will be initiated by the Navy toward that end unless and until further advice is received from you.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER,  
Commander, USNR.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: I refer to your letter of April 25, 1946 requesting "copies of communications concerning Japan and/or the Far East which were transmitted between the British Government in London and our Government in Washington on November 25, 26, and 27, 1941".

Enclosed are photostatic copies of four documents which are being furnished in accordance with your request. After a careful search of the Department of State files, these documents, other than those already furnished to the Joint Committee, appear to be the only communications between the United States and the British Governments relating to Japan and/or the Far East covering the three days specified. The documents which have already been furnished are the following:

(1) Conversation between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador, which attached memorandum [14701] from the British Embassy, November 25, 1941 (Exhibit 18);
(2) Message "For the President from the Former Naval Person", November 26, 1941 (Exhibit 23); and
(3) Conversation between Under Secretary of State and the British Ambassador, November 27 1941 (Exhibit 18).

Sincerely yours,

/s/ HERBERT S. MARKS,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

The Honorable Seth W. Richardson,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States.
Memorandum of Conversation

November 27, 1941.

Subject:
1. British parallel action desired re our export policy to French Indo-China.
2. Desire of French ship in Philippines for bunkers.

Participants:
Mr. Thorold—British Embassy
Mr. Hallett Johnson—Department of State

Copies:
DE Mr. Bunn
A-A Mr. Reinstein

I referred to Mr. Thorold’s letter to Mr. Reinstein of November 19, 1941, and said that Mr. Reinstein was studying all possible means to prevent the shipment of cotton to French Indo-China and that a communication would soon be prepared in this regard.

I then informed Thorold that our authorities in the Philippines have been informed that we do not desire that any commodities other than foodstuffs be licensed for export to French Indo-China and said that we would be glad if the British can see fit to take parallel action.

Thorold gave the following background with regards to British exports to Indo-China:

Before the Japanese went into Indo-China, the British made what is known as the Decoux Agreement. Under this agreement Indo-China agreed to export its commodities through normal trade channels and to normal destinations. In return, England agreed, apart from certain strategic commodities to maintain normal trade with Indo-China. The purpose of this agreement was to prevent the diversion of Indo-China exports from Hong Kong, Singapore, and France, to Japan and to make possible a continuance of rubber shipments to this country. The chief value of the agreement to the British was that through it rice was secured for British possessions. The agreement has not, however, been adequately carried out since the export of rubber has been diverted from the U.S.A. to Japan or to North Africa. The British have now cut off the export of oil to Indo-China and have gradually whittled down other exports.

Thorold will convey our suggestion regarding parallel action to London and let us know upon receipt of reply. He believes that the reply will be favorable except that the British will probably desire to continue to export to Indo-China sufficient jute sacks for the rice still being exported from Indo-China to Hong Kong and Singapore for the Straits Settlements and the Dutch East Indies.

In conclusion Thorold brought up another question. A French ship has applied in the Philippines for sufficient bunkers for the voyage to Shanghai and back to Indo-China. This ship is carrying coal from Indo-China to Shanghai for the use of a public utilities corporation, the Shanghai Power Company. Thorold said he understood the State Department was interested in the British viewpoint as to the propriety of the ship being bunkered in the Philippines and added that the British have no objection but wondered whether the question had been studied in the Department from the point of view of the desirability of facilitating the export of coal from Indo-China.

DE: HJ: FBS

/s/ HJ Hallett Johnson.

Memorandum of Conversation

November 25, 1941.

Subject: Aid Needed by Thailand

Participants:
British Ambassador, the Viscount Halifax;
Under Secretary, Mr. Welles.

Copies to: S, AA, PA/D, Eu, PA/H, FE

The British Ambassador called to see me this evening at his request.
The Ambassador said he wished to discuss with me an urgent instruction he had received from his Government concerning Thailand. A message received by the
British Foreign Office from Sir Josiah Crosby, the British Minister in Bangkok, gave as the opinion of the latter that the Thai Government was again becoming very shaky and that unless some practical action were taken by Great Britain and the United States, the Japanese influence would again become preponderant.

The Ambassador said that the aviation gasoline and the artillery given to the Thai Government by the British had been regarded by the former as completely insufficient and had had no appreciably beneficial effect. He stated that the Thai Government was urgently desirous of obtaining airplanes. I replied that it was that the case it would seem to me that the British might use some of the planes allocated by the United States to Great Britain which are now in Singapore and make these available to the Thai Government without publicity by flying them in at night. The Ambassador said that the trouble was that the British Government urgently needed all the airplanes they could get from us. I said that that was the situation with respect to the United States since, as the Ambassador knew, we were building up as rapidly as possible our air strength in the Philippines, and I had been informed by both General Marshall and Admiral Stark that the planes we had in the Philippines are infinitely more valuable to us there than they would be in Thailand.

The Ambassador then suggested on behalf of his Government that the situation might be ameliorated by a credit of $10,000,000 to Thailand by the United States. I said that this matter would be given immediate consideration.

U: SW: GES

[Telegram received]

ALH This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

London
Dated November 27, 1941.
Rec’d 8:30 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington,
5727, November 27, 12 p.m.

Department’s telegram 4222, October 3; Embassy’s despatch 2127, November 19. Ministry Economic Warfare is now making a special study of Japan’s war potential and as a part of a much larger work on Japan’s economic and industrial position has completed a preliminary survey, copies of which are being forwarded with Embassy’s despatch No. 2195, November 27. Ministry feels that this preliminary survey fails to answer the main question of how far Japanese industry is in a position to maintain military forces under blockade conditions and would greatly appreciate Department’s cooperation in assembling any information already available in Washington on the following points:

1. Iron and steel production Japan, Korea, Manchukuo and North China.
3. Details of blast furnaces, steel furnaces, rolling mills and coke ovens. (a) Installed during recent years, (b) under construction.
4. Position of coke supply for iron and steel industry. Are deposits of reputedly good coking coal at Tungpientao being exploited and what is the production and planned production? When is this coal shipped to (*)?
5. What quantities of iron ore being obtained from China—Tayeh mines in Central China and from North China?
6. Synthetic oil production. (a) present and estimated future output, (b) difficulties in obtaining the necessary coal, (c) any interference with development through stoppage of German machinery supplies.
7. Is there any shortage of mining labor? Are there difficulties in securing Northern Chinese and Korean labor for coal and iron mines in Manchukuo and Korea?
8. To what extent has morale been affected by (a) shortages of goods for civilian consumption and of the increasing restrictions thereon, (b) the rationing of rice and enforced mixing with other cereals, (c) any shortages of oil affecting the fishing industry?
9. Transport. (a) Is the railway system being overworked and is the equipment showing any signs of deterioration, (b) is the transport of essential goods being unduly delayed?
(10) Japanese mining activities in Indochina or Thailand particularly as regards exploitation of manganese deposits and phosphates in Tonkking (urgently required).

(11) Stock position. (a) What stocks of war materials especially nonferrous metals have been accumulated, (b) what is the public warehousing position. Are there difficulties in finding storage space?, (c) have large stocks of scrap iron been accumulated in recent years? If so where is it stored and what area cover?

(12) Production of explosives. British officials believe better information is available in United States on the phenol position and suggest that the Monsanto Chemical Company might be helpful as regards synthetic phenol.

(13) Automobile industry. (a) estimated production, (b) extent of assistance in production of tanks and aircraft.

These questions have also been discussed with Military Attache who is advising G-2 War Department.

WINANT.

[Copy]

Mr. R. J. Stopford,
Financial Counselor, British Embassy.

My Dear Mr. Stopford: I refer to Mr. Hall's letter of October 2 regarding exports of cotton to Japan.

No licenses for the exportation of raw cotton to Japan were issued by the Treasury Department in October. As has been previously indicated to the Embassy, no such licenses were issued in September.

Official figures for exports of cotton to China are not available as yet. Preliminary figures obtained from the Treasury Department indicate shipments to all of China during September of 155,120 pounds, values at $27,037. No division of this figure between occupied and unoccupied areas is available. Shipments of cotton to occupied China during October are tentatively estimated at 300,537 pounds, valued at $50,045.

Sincerely yours,

WINANT.

DEAN ACHESON.

3000 CONNECTICUT AVENUE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 30, 1946.

Dear Mr. Richardson: After receiving your letter of April 25th, I again went through the files of the late President Roosevelt and I find the only communications between our government and the British Government on the dates you mention were sent to your Committee. They are as follows:

[14702] Message from the Former Naval Person to the President, dated November 26, 1941, and signed by Ambassador Winant. I quote the beginning of the message—"Your message about Japan received today. Also full accounts from Lord Hallifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments."

Copy of a "Memorandum of Conversation", dated November 25, 1941—Subject "Suggested changes in Modus Vivendi" which Secretary Hall had with the British Ambassador, and attached to it a memorandum given to Secretary Hull by the British Ambassador.

Also, I find a message from the President to the Former Naval Person, dated November 24, 1941, which starts as follows: "On November 20th the Japanese Ambassador communicated to us his proposals for a Modus Vivendi".

I hope the above information will be of some help to you.

Very sincerely yours,

(S) Grace G. Tully.

Honorable Seth W. Richardson,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,

291 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

P. S. I am sorry but I have no record of any telephone communications which might have taken place on any of these dates.

[14703]
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
May 20, 1946.

Senator Owen Brewster
Room 248, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator: Reference is made to your letter of April 16, 1946, in which you suggested that the Committee should have available all communications between the British Government in London and our Government in Washington on November 25th, 26th and 27th of 1941, including any trans-Atlantic telephone communications during those days. Reference is also made to my memorandum to you dated April 17, 1946, concerning your request. There are enclosed herewith the following replies to your request:

1. Reply of Miss Grace G. Tully concerning the files of the late President Roosevelt.
2. Reply of the Department of State, with attached photostats of documents.
3. Reply of the War Department.
4. Reply of the Navy Department.

Unless you desire that some of this material should become a part of the committee record, I do not contemplate offering it in evidence. I shall depend upon you to advise me as to your wishes in the matter.

Yours very truly,

(S) Seth W. Richardson,
General Counsel.

Mr. Richardson. A request was made of me to ascertain from the War Department whether any copy of the Stimson diary, so-called, was in the possession of the War Department, and on May 22, 1946, I contacted the War Department and I have here the written statement of Capt. Robert N. Diggs, representing the War Department, as follows:

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

With reference to your oral request today for a copy of Secretary Stimson's diary, I am advised by the Office of the Secretary of War that the diary was not regarded as an official War Department record, and that the War Department has no copy of it.

That, I think, completes all of the record that we have. That would complete all requests and all other sources which are identified in the record except as we had the discussion [14705] this morning.

I have this to say to the committee, that we have received from the Printing Office two copies of the page proofs of the exhibits. They are the only two copies we have to date in our office. These two copies of all exhibits to date have been placed in folders, and are plainly marked for the purpose of facilitating examination of them. They are available for any member of the committee who wants to use them. That, of course, is preliminary to the final copies of all.

The Chairman. That is all counsel has to submit by way of evidence?

Mr. Richardson. That is correct.

Senator Brewster. When will the printed copies, do you think, be available; what is the latest estimate?

Mr. Lane. We have the entire transcript up to today's hearing in page-proof form. It has to be footnoted to take care of the requests and the answers, to tie them together. That has been done but it hasn't been revised by the Printing Office. We have in page-proof form all of the exhibits up to those introduced today and it is anticipated that as soon as the Printing Office can handle the material introduced today they will be in shape to furnish a final print.

1 Printed immediately preceding this document.
The Chairman. How many bound volumes will the testimony and the exhibits all make up when finally printed?

Mr. Lane. We estimate 39 volumes, Senator.¹

[14706] The Chairman. I hope we can adjourn Congress sometime during July so I can spend the rest of the year reading them. Senator Brewster. I still am not clear as to when you think those might be available.

Mr. Lane. It probably won't be before 3 weeks from today.

The Chairman. You mean all of them?

Mr. Lane. All.

The Chairman. There will be some available?

Mr. Lane. The prior proceedings have been set in type and page-proofed. There is a copy in the office of each member of the committee and the entire transcript.

The Chairman. The committee doesn't have to wait until they are bound up in printed form to have them available.

Mr. Lane. No, sir. However the committee doesn't have all copies of the exhibits. We have these two copies that are complete.

Senator Brewster. There was some question about the military intelligence reports. Do you know about those that were requested? I have a copy of it here. I don't know whether this has been put in the record.

Mr. Richardson. I don't know about that.

Mr. Lane. I don't believe that is in the record. I have never seen it before.

Mr. Richardson. I have no objection to putting these in the record as an exhibit.

The Chairman. What are they?

Mr. Richardson. It is entitled "Military Intelligence Estimate, January 1 to July 1, 1941," prepared by G-2 of the War Department.

Senator Brewster. We have the last 6 months in. I thought this should be in. Those are not complete. On what basis they were selected I do not know. I don't know whether those relate to the Far East. Do you know what the basis was?

Mr. Masten. I have never seen them before, Senator. I understood they had been gotten through a request of yours.

Senator Brewster. They skip around.

The Chairman. How long has this been available?

Mr. Masten. Either Mr. Hannaford or Mr. Gesell had them and sent them to Senator Brewster, about 3 or 4 months ago.

The Vice Chairman. Apparently Mr. Greaves ² presented it here. Where did he get it?

Mr. Richardson. From Senator Brewster's office, undoubtedly.

The Chairman. I thought where a Senator made a request through the committee that the document came back to the committee, not just to the member who made the request.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, it has happened that where a committee member made a request for some documentary evidence, the moment it came in, for facility, it was transmitted to that member. Now, this has undoubtedly come in under the earlier regime and I have never seen it or had my attention called to it. Since this is all official I see no reason for not putting it in the record.

¹ The complete record of this Committee comprises 39 parts.
² Percy Greaves, an assistant to Senator Brewster.
The Chairman. I have no objection to it being put in. I was curious as to why a document like that would come in months ago and show up on the last day.

Mr. Richardson. I can't help you on that. The Chairman. All right. Without objection let it be printed. Mr. Lane. We ask that be given Exhibit No. 182. The Chairman. So ordered.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 182.")

The Chairman. Is that all counsel has to offer?

Mr. Richardson. I think that completes the record. Just one moment. Let me be clear on this matter of Senator Brewster's request.

If those documents that are asked for in his letter to me are included in the record as of this date——

The Vice Chairman. Do you mean Senator Brewster or Senator Ferguson?

Mr. Richardson. Senator Ferguson.

[14709] If they are to be included in the record we will then endeavor to get the documents and see that they go in physically.

The Chairman. They are, as I understood it, to be included in the record as of today.¹

Of course, there is this disadvantage about that, and it applies to everything else that goes in, that we haven't had a chance to see it, none of the committee knows what the documents contain, or what statements are made. We are rather blind on that subject. But in order that nobody can be prejudiced by it, it was understood that that would go in as of today and be a part of today's record.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to whether or not all of the interrogatories, some 238 of Senator Ferguson to Secretary Stimson, are now a part of the record?

Mr. Masten. You mean those not answered?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Lane. They are all in the record.

The Chairman. All asked, whether answered or not, all are made a part of the record.

Mr. Lane. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. That also holds true of Secretary Hull?

The Chairman. The same applies.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I want to make a speech.

The Chairman. Here?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

[14710] The Chairman. This is not the proper time. [Laughter.]

You have something you want to say?

Senator Brewster. Yes. I will not tax the time of the committee unduly.

I think the unusual if not irregular character of the situation is illustrated by the comment of the chairman when he spoke about having this material go into the record which none of the committee members have seen. We have sat here and seen a vast stack go in, which, so far as I know, no member has seen, or had opportunity to

¹ Exhibit No. 183.
see. I think that officially illustrates the somewhat unjustical character of the termination of this. I would not call it a legislative divergence of the minority, but it certainly departs very considerably from the original program of the committee and from the scope of the investigation, which has covered a lot of ground, had a lot of latitude, and brought to light a lot of things.

On the other hand there have been certain twilight zones and brownouts into which the committee has not been permitted to penetrate under the policy pursued by those who control the action.

Before the record closes I want to make it clear that I do not feel that we have covered the ground we should have. We have gotten 75 or 80 percent of what we went after and it has been a matter of great interest and value to the American people and has carried out to that extent the very lofty purpose [14711] which the chairman outlined when he presented his original resolution some time ago.

On the other hand we have faced these problems, and I want to just enumerate three or four of the items which it seems to me leave us still not in a sufficiently good position to pass finally on the matters which we were authorized and directed to carry out.

One is the matter of the Philippine situation, which was clearly within the scope of the committee as stipulated by the chairman and the Senator from Illinois in colloquy at the time the resolution was introduced; and outside of the discussion with Admiral Hart when he appeared in connection with certain other matters that has not been at all explored.

In my judgment it has a vitally important bearing on the circumstances surrounding Pearl Harbor.

The refusal to have the Grew diary and the Stimson diary available for examination of the committee I feel is a further unfortunate aspect of the matter as it seems to me clear from what excerpts we have been permitted to see, that they had a vitally important bearing, and I do not believe that this committee can fulfill its functions by permitting any other individuals, either inside or outside of Government, to determine what is and what is not relevant. I believe that is a matter for the determination of the committee.

The unfortunate aspect of Mr. Hull's illness is something [14712] which is clear and we have done the best we could to meet that.

The telephone communications between London and Washington during the period before Pearl Harbor is something which we have not been able, apparently, to run down. Miss Tully advises she has no record. It seems to me incredible that communications of that importance between the heads of state were not made a matter of record. If they were not made a matter of record it seems to me there was serious dereliction. If they were made a matter of record I believe that this committee should have knowledge regarding them.

I think that covers some of the items. There are many other unexplored fields in the higher echelons which it seems to me most unfortunate that the committee has not been able to explore and expose.

I want to conclude by saying that I do not feel this investigation should be terminated at this time or at this point and I have so voted consistently in the committee. I wanted this to be a matter of public record at this time.
The Chairman. The Chair wishes to state in connection with what the Senator from Maine has stated that he thinks that this committee has made as exhaustive, meticulous, careful, an investigation of the pertinent or related facts connected with the Pearl Harbor attack as any committee ever made of anything in connection with an episode, incident, or the [14713] official conduct of men in any branch of our Government.

At the time this resolution was introduced by me I was interrogated by Senator Lucas as to whether it was broad enough to include an inquiry into the Philippine situation, which involved an attack the following day after Pearl Harbor, and I stated that it was, and I still maintain that the resolution was broad enough to do that.

The committee has never taken any action to follow up that. Nobody on the committee ever made a motion that we go to the Philippines or that we investigate the Philippine end of it.

Evidently the committee felt that after going into the immediate related facts pertaining to Pearl Harbor that it was not essential or necessary that we go into the Philippine end of it, which may or may not have involved somebody who happened to be in charge in the Philippines at the time.

So far as these records of telephone conversations are concerned, I think this committee, and counsel, have felt, and the President of the United States, who issued orders with reference to the examination of documents in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and other departments, and in the White House, realized that Miss Tully, who had been in charge of those documents, was a reputable, responsible woman of long experience and high character, I think the committee felt that she had brought to the attention of counsel everything [14714] in the President's papers that had any relationship to this investigation.

So far as the diaries of Mr. Grew and Secretary Stimson are concerned, when Mr. Grew was on the stand he was asked by the committee with respect to his diaries kept in Japan consisting of some 13 volumes, many of which contained private comments and private entries that had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor, and the question was raised, although the committee never took a vote on it, whether the diary should be requested, as I recall now, but the Chair would say, speaking for himself, that he would not have voted, and would not now vote, to require Mr. Grew to give his diary, his private diary, kept over a long period of years, in his capacity as a diplomat, to make it public and exhibit it before this committee.

The same applies to Mr. Stimson. If he had been able to appear as a witness members of the committee might have examined him about entries in his diary or about statements that he was able to refresh his mind on from reading his diary. But my attitude about compelling him to make public his private diary, from which he has taken anything that has a pertinency or relationship to this investigation, I certainly would not have voted, as a member, to require him to make that diary public.

I am perfectly willing to take full responsibility as an individual member for that attitude. That is my attitude. I [14715] think that we have made a thorough, complete, broad investigation of this whole matter. I have no doubt that we have, as part of the evidence
in this record, voluminous as it is, many things that really have no bearing upon the attack on Pearl Harbor, because they have gone in because members requested them. If they had any relationship to it, well and good, and if they didn’t, why, no harm was done.

I feel that this committee has devoted itself assiduously, in the midst of great work in other fields of legislation, to the task set for it by the Congress of the United States, and personally I feel that it has fulfilled its duty to the fullest extent expected or required by the country.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman—

The Chairman. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to state that Ambassador Grew, former Ambassador Grew, stated that if his complete diary were to be placed in the record that it would seriously impair the work of every American diplomat and Ambassador or representative in the foreign field, and that it would seriously interfere with the protection of American security in future years, and for that reason I would have voted, had it come to a vote, against insisting upon the presentation of the diary.

Senator Brewster. I would not want anything I have said to infer a lack of appreciation of the amount of time which the chairman and the other very busy members and very responsible members of both bodies have given.

In my experience I have never witnessed more time and diligence given to a specific matter than in this case and I think that should continue to be a matter of record.

On the other hand, I do feel, as I stated, about this unexplored field. I am a little disturbed at the chairman making a point of the fact that this has not been made an issue or a matter of a motion, so in order to correct the record I would like to complete the record and to make the three motions which, apparently, are essential in order to leave no doubt as to the position of the members.

So I move that the committee should further explore the occurrences at Manila and Clark Field and the Philippines on December 7 and December 8, 1941.

The Chairman. I suppose from a technical standpoint, in view of the action the committee has taken about closing the hearings today, I could declare that motion out of order, but I will not do so.

Senator Brewster. The hearing and the record has not been closed. The Chairman. The hearing and the record has been closed. We will vote on it. Do you want a roll call?

Senator Brewster. No.

The Chairman. As many in favor of the motion say “aye”; [14716] opposed, “no”; the motion is lost.

Senator Brewster. I move that the committee request that the Grew diary be made available for examination of the committee and counsel to determine the relevant portions which can be made a part of the record without detriment to the public interest.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I state that means asking Mr. Grew to produce 10 volumes.

The Chairman. As many in favor of that motion say “aye”; opposed “no.” Motion lost.

Senator Brewster. I move the same request be made for the Stimson diary, under the same circumstances and conditions.
I point out I do not contemplate the publicity which the other gentleman has mentioned, but it shall be a matter for the committee to determine as to the relevancy and importance.

The Chairman. As many in favor of the motion say "aye"; opposed "no." Motion lost.

I should have said a while ago when I was responding to the suggestions of the Senator from Maine, that the committee feels very grateful to counsel, who have, in all cases, abandoned their legal pursuits, their law practice, and the peace and quietude which they would have otherwise enjoyed, to assist this committee; first, in the case of Mr. Mitchell and his assistants, Mr. Hannaford, Mr. Masten, and Mr. Gesell who, I think, in the gathering of evidence and in going through the records and the comprehensive preparation of this investigation, did as magnificent a piece of work as was ever done by any counsel for any committee in the Congress of the United States.

Unfortunately, Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell were compelled to retire from the investigation because of their private interests, and the probability, as has turned out to be the fact, that the hearing would drag on beyond the time which they could devote to it; and in January, I think it was, we secured the services of Mr. Seth Richardson, and Mr. Kaufman, of New York, and others, to take up where Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell and others left off, to pursue this investigation to its ultimate conclusion. It was a difficult task which they assumed in stepping into the investigation, in the midst of it, and grabbing up the loose threads and the continuity of the testimony, in order to move on with it, and they did that in a manner which I feel sure is eminently satisfactory to the committee, with a devotion to duty that has never been excelled to my knowledge; and, as a matter of fact, notwithstanding the change of counsel we lost very little time by reason of that. So that the testimony went on continuously and has now been completed.

I want to thank the counsel, all of them, from the top to the bottom, both sets and all sets, and all their assistants, the girls that worked with them and for them. I want to thank the Federal Bureau of Investigation who were assigned to us by Mr. Hoover for the very efficient and outstanding work they have done.

I wish also to take advantage of this opportunity to thank the press who have been diligent in their attendance upon the hearings, who have been fair in reporting the hearings. Obviously, in a long-drawn-out hearing like this, over months, it is impossible for the newspapers to carry the testimony in full so that the people who read can get a full account of the testimony and what really happened. That is perfectly obvious and it is inherent in the newspaper field. It isn't possible that they could print every day all that everybody said. But the press has been diligent, it has been fair, it has been, I think, constructive, and I want to, on behalf of the committee, thank the press and the reporters who have set with us here since last September in undertaking to make the public aware of what we were doing and let the public make up its own mind about this episode out in the Pacific Ocean, which they may have done by now or will do when the final conclusion is reached.

I think one of the valuable things, whatever else may happen, or whatever else may be said about the investigation, whatever the report may contain, one of the valuable things and maybe the most
valuable of all is the fact that all these people involved in this unfortunate affair have had an opportunity to tell their story in public and to have it reported so that the people could read it, hear it, and make up their own minds with respect to it.

That has been a real service for which I am sure the committee in its entirety is grateful.

I was about to include another group. The liaison representatives from the War, Navy, and State Departments who have from the beginning worked with counsel and with the committee in finding and sorting the official testimony and records which we have called for. They have been very efficient and always at the beck and call of the committee and its counsel. We are very grateful to them.

I also wish to include in what I said about the press the radio. That is a new field of intelligence and information. It is so important that we have set apart the radio press, and they are recognized as a part of the informational set-up in the United States.

All, radio, press, liaison, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and everybody who has assisted the committee, have our everlasting gratitude; and if I have left out anybody, consider yourself included.

Senator Brewster. As a representative of the minority, and since we have had some matters on which we haven't agreed, I wish to associate myself with the expressions of appreciation of our distinguished chairman and particularly wish to thank the press who I think have done an extraordinary job and have given the American public a fair analysis.

I also wish to thank our distinguished counsel and his associates who have labored in season and out of season in what was sometimes seemingly an impossible situation.

The Vice Chairman. Now that we are all in accord, it would be a good time to close.

The Chairman. Yes.

The Chair will announce that today officially closes the record of this hearing, and the committee will now stand adjourned, subject to call by the Chair, and I hope we will be able to call you early next week.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 312, Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, and Lucas and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; John E. Masten, Logan J. Lane, and Edward P. Morgan of counsel, for the joint committee.

[14723] The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, will you come around? Admiral Stark.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I want to explain for the record why I called this meeting. It was called rather suddenly. I regret that it had to be that way because some of the members are away on account of Memorial Day and haven't returned.

Senator Ferguson and Senator Brewster are both away. Congressman Murphy, Congressman Clark. Congressman Gearhart is out in California. Congressman Keefe is here. He told me to go ahead, that he would come over as soon as he could, but not to wait for him.

The reason I called this meeting is that 2 or 3 days ago Admiral Stark called over to the Capitol and gave me a letter, which I will read for the record:

26 MAY 1946.

HON. ALBEN W. BARKLEY,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack (S. Con. Res. 27), Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: I have testified before the committee that the President did not call me on the night of 6 December (preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December). I also [14724] stated that it was of course possible that I might be mistaken on this after over 4 years lapse of time, but that I recalled no such call.

I am now informed that I did talk to the President over the telephone on 6 December, and hasten to put this before the committee in order to set the record straight.

The circumstances are as follows: Last night (Saturday 25 May) Capt. H. D. Krick, USN, now on duty in the Bureau of Ordnance (Captain Krick had been my flag lieutenant in my last sea command) and his wife made a social call on Mrs. Stark and me. During the course of the evening Captain Krick asked me if I recalled the evening of 6 December—when I replied "No" he recalled
that he and his wife had dinner with Mrs. Stark and me at my quarters, and that we had then—the four of us—gone to see The Student Prince.

Captain Krick also recalled that on returning to my quarters after the theater to pick up his car they, the Kricks, had come into the house for a while and that I was told by one of the servants that the White House had called me; that I then went upstairs to talk to the President (the White House phone was in my house on the second floor). Krick further stated that when I came downstairs after the phone call I said to him in substance that the situation with Japan was very serious.

I felt I should put this matter before the committee immediately. I have again searched my memory for this phone call and I can only repeat that I do not recall it.

Very truly yours,


The Chairman. Now, Mr. Richardson, you may proceed.

I might state before you start that Admiral Stark advises me that he is leaving this afternoon for a long delayed important engagement in London and that he will be gone 3 or 4 weeks; therefore it seemed desirable that we get this in the record before he leaves, in order to accommodate him as well as the committee.

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, your arrangements for this trip abroad long antedated the discovery of the knowledge of Lieutenant Krick of this episode of Saturday evening, December 6, did it not?

Admiral Stark. Yes; months ago.

Mr. Richardson. So that your trip away has no reference whatever to any of the transactions in connection with Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Stark. Not the slightest. I had been asked for this trip last October and I refused, not being able to leave at that time, and the date was then set the latter part of June which I accepted months ago.

Mr. Richardson. Does this episode which the lieutenant refers to in your letter refresh your recollection at all today, Admiral?

[14726] Admiral Stark. No, sir; it does not.

Mr. Richardson. You still have no recollection whatever of any events of that evening?

Admiral Stark. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And you have no recollection of going upstairs and using the White House phone in response to any report made to you by any of your servants?

Admiral Stark. No; I do not.

Mr. Richardson. The evidence, as you know, indicates here that at an earlier time on that evening, when the President was made familiar with the first 13 parts of this now celebrated 14-part message, he characterized the message and then sought to get in touch with you, received a report that you were at the theater, and said he would contact you later.

From that if we assume that he wished to talk to you about this 13-part message, it would be reasonable that any message to you from the White House that night would have communicated to you the existence of that message, wouldn't you think so?

Admiral Stark. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. You will recall the last time you were on the stand you suggested that your visit to your office on Sunday morning was in accordance with your practice to go to your office on Sunday morning, while you were uncertain as to the precise time, being of
the opinion yourself that it might have been a little later because it was Sunday morning—


Mr. Richardson (continuing). That you didn't go to your office for the purpose of seeing a 13-part message because you had no recollection of having known there was such?

Admiral Stark. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And the first time you saw the message, or the fact that it existed came to your attention, is when you found it in your office when you went there that morning?

Admiral Stark. That was my recollection.

Mr. Richardson. This discussion, with your letter, the detailed report he gives you, doesn't refresh your recollection with reference to any of those particulars?

Admiral Stark. It does not.

I might say in that connection that I talked very frequently with the President. I think you will all be surprised to know how much, how minutely he was following every detail, and how fully I kept him acquainted with anything going on that was of any interest that came to my attention in connection with naval matters and international matters at that time. I frequently called the President along about a quarter after 6 in the evening, which I knew was about the time he was likely to be finished signing his mail, and I frequently called him, and I mean frequently, not only at that time but after the war was on, in the late evening, perhaps around half past 11, after I had gone over the contents of [14728] my brief case, because at that time the President was likely to be free. I would call and ask if he were free and talk to him over any items of interest.

That went on continuously. So there was nothing unusual in my talking to the President that time of night, not the slightest. I can only assume that when the President called me that he mentioned this note that we had received from the Japanese, that he did not, certainly did not, impress me that it was anything that required action; I took none. I am certain that he gave me no directive or I would have carried it out. It would have been the simplest matter in the world for me to have called up the Department and said to send out that message if it had been anything that I should have seen. The President, of course, knew that I was going to the office the next morning; I was always there; he called me up Sunday mornings, and I called him up. And in connection with that also it is my recollection that every witness who testified as to the material which the President had before him that evening, the 13 points, has stated that it was nothing but a rehash and nothing which required any action.

I think that was the testimony of both Army and Navy. I remember Ingersoll's particularly, and in talking to him about it later, that there was nothing to it that required any action. I am certain that nothing was indicated to me. [14729] I also testified that when I did see that message, that had I seen it the night before I would have taken no action on it. That was in response to a question by one of the members of the committee. Not only the 13 points but even the fourteenth point, which was different from the rest, and which struck me in particular because it was almost a paraphrase of what I had
included in our message of the 27th and confirmation of what I had sent.

The President was familiar with every move we had made. I kept him fully informed. We were all intensely aware of the seriousness of the situation, watching it just as closely as we could. Even on the 6th we had sent a message authorizing destruction of certain codes to the commanders in the Pacific, stating "Hold on to some," in winding up the message, "until the last minute." Everything we had seen, in our opinion had indicated the tenseness of the situation, that anything might break at any time. In fact, we said so specifically.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, you remember when you were last on the stand the question was asked you whether if you had received any intimation from the President that he thought the 13-part message meant war, that would have been a very important statement to you and one that would have stirred you into action, based on the President's statement? ¹

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; if he had said anything to me about the imminence or anything new, or indicated any action, it would have stirred me into immediate action.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, the testimony indicates that when the President read this message he said, "This means war," or used equivalent language. Would you, from your knowledge of the President and the detail, as you say, with which he followed the events which were transpiring, would it be your presumption now that the President made no such statement to you if he talked to you on the night of December 6?

Admiral Stark. It would be, decidedly. We had, of course, and I think my letter of the 25th indicated that, both the President and Mr. Hull had stated in my presence that they would not be surprised if the Japanese attacked at any time, and I think if the President had made any such statement to me on the night of the 6th that I would have recalled it.

I also remember Beardall's testimony when the fourteenth point was presented the next morning and in which, I believe, he testified to the best of his recollection that the President merely said, well, it looked like a rupture of negotiations. That fourteenth point, of course, was in much stronger, more definite language than the preceding 13.

Mr. Richardson. Now, the subject of this message and any discussion with reference to it would be within the limitations of magic, would it not?

¹ See p. 5157, supra.
Mr. Richardson. Then, the fact that you didn’t say anything to Captain Krick as to the details of your conversation would be entirely in accord with the way you would have to handle any information that had anything to do with magic?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Was Captain Krick one of those who would have any knowledge of magic or transactions that were passing, magic interceptions?

Admiral Stark. I think not.

Mr. Richardson. Well, it turned out, did it not, Admiral, that this 14-part message was a very significant and important message?


Mr. Richardson. And there were significances with respect to it which if fully appreciated made it of startling importance?

Admiral Stark. Well, we had come to the conclusion previously that we considered Japan likely to attack at any time in any direction. I wouldn’t say that it changed any of our previous conceptions. It was a confirmation, if anything.

Mr. Richardson. Would you include in that estimate any of the significances of the use of the 1 p. m. date?

Admiral Stark. The 1 p. m. date, and again in the light of hindsight—

Mr. Richardson. Yes; I realize that.

Admiral Stark (continuing). Was different. It set a time and, as you will recall, I was discussing the matter when General Marshall called me, and my first reaction was that we had sent so much, and we had assumed that what we had sent out there was, I previously testified, enough to have everybody fully alerted, it was questionable whether to send anything more, including the message, you remember, which I recalled we sent on the 6th; then, after only a little further reflection I told Marshall to go ahead and send it and to be sure that our people were notified.

I put that in a different category because I think there was nothing in the 14-point message which in one way or another we had not previously covered.

Mr. Richardson. Then, it would be your conclusion as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral, that the fact that the President made no mention to you that in his opinion this message meant war, deducing that—he couldn’t have, because of the fact you have no such recollection in your memory—

Admiral Stark. That is the assumption, yes.

Mr. Richardson. Plus the fact that when Admiral Wilkinson saw the message, General Miles saw the message, and Beardall saw the message—

Admiral Stark. Admiral Ingersoll.

Mr. Richardson. Beardall saw the message the night before, I mean.

Admiral Stark. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. And Secretary Knox saw the message the night before. The fact that nothing immediately was done with reference to that message is because you feel that the message itself was simply a rehash of information which had come before and of which you were already aware?

Admiral Stark. I feel that very definitely; yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And that if any of those high officers had any different view there would have been a different attitude toward this message?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I think we all felt the same about it.

Mr. Richardson. Then, the first expression of anything unusual about this message in point of action came with the suggestion of General Marshall with reference to a message that he proposed to send?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Did you have any, when you were examining the message, when you went to your office—I have forgotten your testimony, I am sure you testified on it—were you informed as to any of the possible significance of this 1 o'clock date, from either Kramer's report or the report of any of your aides?

Admiral Stark. No, I was not.

Mr. Richardson. And as soon as Captain Krick told of this incident, of his knowledge of this situation, you immediately prepared this letter to the chairman of this committee in order to inform him of this much light, at least, on what happened on Saturday night?

Admiral Stark. I did; yes, sir. When Captain Krick first mentioned this to me, about our having been to the theater that night together, and about my having gone upstairs and talked to the President, which was the natural way for it to have followed through, that the White House had called, my first thought was, well, I can't add anything to this testimony, it doesn't bring up anything which I haven't covered so far as I can, goodness knows I have racked my brains on that evening—why report it—and the more I thought about it the more I realized that this indicated that my testimony was incorrect, the impression of it, and it was quite definite that I had not talked to the President that night; the more I thought of it the more disturbed I became that the committee should have this, the record should have it straight, and I got up around 2 or 3 in the morning, thinking this thing over, and wrote this letter in longhand and had it typed the following day, I sent it for typing on Sunday, got it Monday, and brought it up to Senator Barkley, Monday.

Of course, I am extremely glad it came up. If it had come up after everything was over I never would have felt comfortable about it, I wouldn't have known how to get it before the committee, and I would have felt I couldn't rest until I squared this away.

You may recall—I think you were not here on my first hearing—when I stated that if anything whatsoever came up with regard to Pearl Harbor, that I thought of anything of interest to this committee, that I would report it immediately. That was on the conclusion of my hearings. And this is the only thing that has come up which I have thought any different from what I have previously testified to.

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, if the President had told you in his talk with you that night, assuming that you talked to him, and had told you that it was his opinion that this thirteenth-part message meant war, thereby impressed you with his very serious estimate of it, what would have been, in accordance with your custom, the action for you to have then taken, with that information?
Admiral Stark. I don’t know, sir, that I would have, that we would have sent anything more. I think that I should have gotten in touch with Ingersoll and with Turner. We had had a conference a few days previously, going over the seriousness of the situation, if there was anything more we could have sent, and, as I say, we practically repeated this fourteenth point, repeated, some days earlier we had sent the same thing. We thought, and the President knew every move that we had made, that we had sent everything possible, on that premise, that war was in the immediate offing.

I don’t know that I would have done anything. I couldn’t say.

Mr. Richardson. Would there have been any customary acceleration of getting the completed message? The evidence indicates that the message was completed around 4 or 5 o’clock in the morning; it then lay without attention until Kramer came down about 7:30, and it passed out of Kramer’s hands along about [14737] 9 or 9:30, somewhere in there.

Admiral Stark. At 10:30—Well, the 1 o’clock part.

Mr. Richardson. What I am wondering is whether if you had been apprised it would have been proper and usual to have taken steps to see to it that someone was waiting and ready to receive the full message for the purpose of effectuating such action as might be necessary.

Admiral Stark. Well, I think it might have, sir, if I had had any feeling as you have just represented, I think I should myself.

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, let me ask you another odd question. Are you able to state from your recollection of Saturday the 6th that there was not at the White House an extensive conference between the heads of the Army and the heads of the Navy in discussion of matters and things which in part had to do with this fourteenth part message?

[14738] Admiral Stark. I never had heard of such a conference, I know of nothing now regarding such a conference, I was not present at it, I had never even heard anyone suggest such a thing until it was mentioned here in previous hearings.

My honest opinion is that nothing of the sort took place. It was a complete surprise to Marshall that even the question came up. It was to me. I am certain that I didn’t leave the house after the Kricks left. I just can’t think of any such thing as happening. Certainly I was not present, and Colonel Knox never mentioned any such thing to me.

Mr. Richardson. And despite your inability to recollect detail, such a conference at the White House, under those circumstances, would be so extraordinarily unusual, that don’t you think that would at least stand out in your memory, even though you don’t remember the details of this evening?

Admiral Stark. I think so, unquestionably.

Mr. Richardson. That is all the questions I have.

The Chairman. Admiral, had Captain Krick ever said anything to you about this matter that he mentioned last Saturday night, until last Saturday night, when his wife and he were guests of Mrs. Stark and you?

Admiral Stark. No, sir; never. It was out of a clear sky to me.

The Chairman. You realize that it might seem strange that [14739] a thing like that would escape your memory altogether.
What is your explanation or interpretation of the reason why, if all this happened as he said, that it still doesn’t register in your mind?

Admiral Stark. Well, lapse of time, I would say, was certainly an important factor. The immediately following events, which stand out crystal clear, as to some other events; and an awfully busy time since then probably has simply wiped it out.

And I might say there was nothing unusual about the Kricks being with us for any entertainment or otherwise. One’s flag lieutenant gets very close to one, and we had been together afloat just previous to my coming ashore for a couple of years, attending many, many functions together, and coming ashore about the same time, and they were often with us.

The Chairman. Would the fact that you had, as you have testified, frequent White House talks over your direct line with the President, maybe night after night for a period, or as often as several times a week, would that have anything to do with your ability to identify this particular night as against any other night when you had a conversation with the President over the telephone?

Admiral Stark. I think so, because it wasn’t something unusual which might stand out. I mean, my talking to the White House. I would pick up the phone and talk just as freely to the President as I would, almost, pick it up and call my own home.

The Chairman. Any questions?

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt at this point. As I told you on the phone when I called I had just then received notice that this meeting was to be held, just a few minutes before 10 o’clock, and I hurried to get here.

The Chairman. I explained the reason for the sudden call was that Admiral Stark is leaving tonight for London to fulfill a long-delayed engagement, and upon the receipt of this letter I felt that whatever pertained to it ought to go in the record and not simply have the letter filed with the committee.

Mr. Keeffe. I raised the question because I had understood that the hearings had, by action of the committee, been closed, and that the testimony had been closed, and I want to keep the record clear, in the absence of my colleagues, none of whom are present here this morning.

I assume that the chairman felt that it was due propriety that the action heretofore taken by the committee in closing the testimony in this matter should be vacated and set aside in order to permit this testimony to go in, but I wonder if we have established a precedent now that may plague us in the future, because I understood very definitely that the testimony in this case was closed, definitely closed by vote and action of the committee.

Now, if it is to be reopened for this purpose, it may be perfectly proper to reopen it for some other purpose, and this committee will go on and on.

I want the record to show that I have raised this question. I do not know, I haven’t had any notice of action by the committee vacating the previous action closing the testimony, but it seems to me that we ought to keep our record clear, Mr. Chairman.

I don’t know whether this testimony amounts to anything or not. I didn’t hear the first part of it. I don’t know what it is, except what
I heard since I came in, and that doesn't seem to cast very much light on the testimony as it heretofore appears.

Unless Admiral Stark knows when he talked to the President and what the President told him, what they talked about, I don't know that it makes much difference to now confirm the fact that he attended The Student Prince that night.

The Chairman. All you say is true now, Congressman, that the hearings were closed.

Mr. Keeffe. I am not criticizing the chairman.

The Chairman. This situation was brought suddenly to my attention. The admiral was on the verge of leaving the country for 3 or 4 weeks, and I felt that in view of what Captain Krick had said to him about it, and will say here in a few minutes when he is called, that it was the part of wisdom to get the committee together, even though all of them couldn't be here, and make this matter of record by public testimony, instead of simply filing Admiral Stark's letter with the committee.

I don't think it sheds any light on it, but Admiral Stark felt, having been told this by Captain Krick, as late as last Saturday night, that he ought to bring it to the attention of the committee, and he having brought it to my attention, I felt whatever was done about it ought to be done publicly and not just hand the letter in to the committee and simply file it.

Mr. Keeffe. I take it, Mr. Chairman, that if the testimony means anything, it means that Admiral Stark now says his memory has or has not been refreshed by reason of his conversations with Captain Krick.

Now, if his memory has not been refreshed by reason of his talks with Captain Krick, his whole testimony, it seems to me, is utterly inconsequential and immaterial.

I am not interested in the fact that Captain Krick comes in and now says that he was at the dinner with Admiral Stark and that they went to the theater and saw The Student Prince, and then went home and had a lunch and Admiral Stark went to the telephone and talked to someone, and then he left. I don't see that that is of any particular probative value unless those facts related to him will recall to Admiral Stark's mind those facts and the fact that the President did talk to him and what the President said and what was the discussion.

I understand that it doesn't click with him, he doesn't remember any such situation. So under those circumstances, I feel compelled to object to any further repetitious testimony going into this record on a matter that is not of any probative force or value, in view of the fact that the committee has definitely voted to close the testimony, and it would establish a precedent which would clearly offer the opportunity for my colleague, Mr. Brewster, or Senator Ferguson, or somebody else, to plague the committee with offers of testimony that will continue this thing on and on and on.

I have made my statement. That is the way I feel.

The Chairman. The Chair appreciates your statement and cannot controvert it. I mean, all you have said about the matter is undoubtedly accurate.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I want to subscribe to the statements made by the Congressman from Wisconsin. He has said exactly what I was about to say. As he has said, if we are going to continue hearings on this matter, there is no question but what somebody will continue to bring something forward, and cause delays.

I know that the chairman has been tremendously busy with legislation on the Senate floor, and I think, perhaps—I am not criticizing him—but I think if we had discussed this in executive session we might have accomplished something without this testimony.

I didn't know that we were going to have hearings this morning. The Chairman. I will state this, that I conferred with counsel of the committee in respect to the proceedings that ought to be had in view of the admiral's letter to me. If we had had all the time that might be available we might have had an executive session and decided it wasn't worth while to even put the letter in the record.

The admiral felt compelled to address the letter to me, in order not to be in a position of holding back something that somebody had told him, and I called the hearing this morning because the admiral is leaving the city and might not be back until we have made our report, or were on the verge of doing so.

Mr. Richardson. Might I make this suggestion, Mr. Chairman. Suppose we take the Captain's testimony, which will be very brief, and then if the committee later decides not to use any of this testimony, all right; on the other hand, if they allow it to go in, we have it.

I would like to state for the record that one of the issues that I think is involved in the record is the fact that about 9:30 on Saturday evening the President sought to get in touch with Admiral Stark. He was unable to do so. There, up to this morning—

The Chairman. If you will permit, it was about 10:30 when Commander Schulz delivered the message.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Whenever that time was.

It, therefore, would stand upon the record as though the President paid no more attention to contacting Admiral Stark, because Admiral Stark remembered nothing of any message from the White House that evening. Apparently, from Captain Krick's testimony, it now becomes definite that there was a communication after Admiral Stark came home from the theater, between Admiral Stark and the President on that evening; so that, so far as the President is concerned, his statement that he would later contact Admiral Stark was accomplished.

I advised the chairman that I thought that that fact should be in the record.

Senator Lucas. Well, it just shows one thing, that the President was more alert than anybody else.

Mr. Keeffe. Does Admiral Stark recall what the conversation was?

The Chairman. No.

Senator Lucas. He doesn't recall a thing.

Mr. Keeffe. He doesn't recall that they even had a conversation, or that he was called, or anything else?

Senator Lucas. That is right.

The Chairman. Nor that he went to see The Student Prince.

Senator Lucas. I don't see how Admiral Stark can go to London this afternoon, in view of the fact that this has been reopened, and in view of the fact that Senator Brewster and Senator Ferguson are not
here; they are the individuals who voted not to close the hearings, and they are the two individuals who are going to have much to say if when they return they don’t have a chance to examine Admiral Stark, notwithstanding the fact that he doesn’t know anything about the conversation.

I have observed Mr. Brewster, and I say this not because he is absent, but from beginning to end, trying to make—well——

The CHAIRMAN. I might say that I asked Senator Ferguson after the vote in the Senate Wednesday at 5 o’clock if he would be here this morning. He was rushing to catch a plane. And he said he would be here. I learned from his office that he wouldn’t be here until this afternoon. And Senator Brewster may be here this afternoon.

The committee can do what it wants to do. I did what I [14747] thought was my duty in calling the meeting, under the circumstances. If the committee wants to postpone the meeting in order to get all the members present, to let them examine into this matter as much as they please, it suits me. I did what seemed to me to be the best thing to do. I didn’t feel that, with Admiral Stark on the verge of leaving for London for 3 or 4 weeks, the matter should be withheld from the committee.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I have not talked to Captain Krick, I don’t know what he is going to say, but from what has been stated, and what appears in Admiral Stark’s letter, there must have been conversation between Admiral Stark and Captain Krick which would inform Captain Krick that the President had called and that the telephone conversation was between Admiral Stark and the President.

Admiral Stark. That is right.

Mr. Keefe. Now, then, Admiral Stark doesn’t remember a thing. He can recall nothing. Therefore the statement of Captain Krick hasn’t prodded his recollection at all. I don’t see how any great help is being given to the record to have Captain Krick testify that he was out at Admiral Stark’s house and that Admiral Stark went to answer the telephone and came back and said “I talked with the President,” or something of that kind.

[14748] Admiral Stark. Mr. Chairman, I may state that my feeling is that I couldn’t add anything to the record, except to show, as counsel has suggested, that I did talk to the President that night. The record as left showed that, too.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you assume you talked to him from what Captain Krick said?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you don’t remember anything about it you are no better off than you would be if Captain Krick didn’t say that.

Admiral Stark. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are assuming that you talked to the President inasmuch as he, Captain Krick, did say that to you?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. And I thought that that fact should be in the record, along the line of thought which counsel has suggested. I don’t know of another thing that I could give the committee.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I shall have to insist upon my point, because it seems to me perfectly obvious that it is so unfair to the other members of this committee, in view of the action heretofore taken by the committee, to now reopen this case, without the other
members of the committee being present and given an opportunity to ask any questions that they see fit to ask.

The chairman will recall, as will the other members, that it has been my purpose to close these hearings and to get on with the report and finish our obligation, and I don't think that this little bit of second-hand testimony would be, on the part of Captain Krick, very important.

The Chairman. Assuming that, and I don't dispute it, I am sure that you will agree, all members will agree, that having received this letter from Admiral Stark, if I had stuck it in my pocket and suppressed it and not brought it to the attention of the committee, I would have been pilloried not only by certain members of the committee but by others for withholding something that the committee was entitled to.

I have presented the letter. The committee may take such action as they see fit. If it wants to have another meeting, maybe this afternoon, when the other members can be here—I can't assure that.

Senator George. Mr. Chairman, I think the suggestion made by counsel is not an unwise one, that we might have Captain Krick now make a statement and subsequently, in executive session, decide whether any of it would go into the record, beyond the bare letter of the admiral, if he wishes it to go into the record.

The Vice Chairman. I agree with that statement, Mr. Chairman. I think that probably would be the best course, to hear what Captain Krick has to say, and just suspend the question until a full attendance of the committee can be had.

The Chairman. Captain Krick is here in the Department in Washington. He can be obtained if the committee wants him at any time. Is that agreeable?

Admiral, we thank you for your appearance.

Senator Lucas. May I ask the Admiral one question before he leaves?

The Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Admiral, do I understand now from your conversation with Captain Krick that it appears you had dinner together that night?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Then following the dinner you went to the show?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Then from there you went home?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. Captain Krick drove his car to my quarters, we went to the show in my car, and he came back to my quarters to get his car.

The Chairman. Do you remember any of that or are you saying what he told you?

Admiral Stark. I am saying what he told me. That would be the normal course.

Senator Lucas. You don't remember any thing of that kind?

Admiral Stark. I do not remember that evening and I have stated so. My original impression was that I was home, which I know to be incorrect, but I do not recall it. I stated that I recalled having seen a revival of The Student Prince but I did not connect it with the night of December 6. I still do not.
Senator GEORGE. You have no independent recollection except what you have given the committee?

Admiral STARK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you have no independent recollection?

Admiral STARK. I have not. I don't have any independent recollection. My sole purpose was the fact that a conversation took place that should be in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

Well, if it is agreeable we will let Captain Krick make his statement and then the committee can decide what course it wishes to take.

Admiral STARK. May I ask whether or not I shall be free to go on?

Senator LUCAS. What time do you leave, Admiral?

[14752] Admiral STARK. I am sailing tomorrow morning. Have to be aboard ship between 8:30 and 10:30.

Senator LUCAS. You will leave here tonight for New York?

Admiral STARK. I was leaving this afternoon. I could leave on a midnight train and make it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral, it is rather difficult for me to say. If the other members wish to be called into session I would be glad to call a session this afternoon and let them decide.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I can't see any conceivable possible statement that Admiral Stark can give the committee that he hasn't already given them and he could go to London to perform his service and perhaps be performing a greater service than sitting around here and telling us that he doesn't remember anything.

Admiral STARK. I quite agree.

Mr. KEEFE. That is, in substance, the picture as I see it.

Admiral STARK. I thought of that when I wrote the letter, that I couldn't add anything, but I couldn't leave without giving you this letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it the feeling of the committee, in view of the situation and suggestion, that Admiral Stark need not delay his trip?

Mr. KEEFE. That is my opinion.

[14753] The Vice CHAIRMAN. I agree.

Senator GEORGE. That is my opinion.

Senator LUCAS. I will agree but you will hear plenty about it afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we can't help that.

Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral STARK. I am grateful to you, sir, for permitting me to say what I have.

Senator LUCAS. Don't find any more friends, please. When friends come in say nothing about Pearl Harbor. [Laughter.]

(Admiral Stark was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Come up, Captain Krick.

[14754] TESTIMONY OF CAPT. HAROLD D. KRICK, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the chairman:)

Mr. RICHARDSON. State your full name, Captain.

Captain KRICK. Harold D. Krick, United States Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy, Captain?
Captain Krick. I will be in the Navy 28 years on the 7th of June 1946.

Mr. Richardson. How long have you known Admiral Stark?

Captain Krick. I have known Admiral Stark since 1933 when he commanded the U.S.S. *West Virginia*, to which ship I was attached.

Mr. Richardson. What was your last assignment with him?

Captain Krick. My last assignment with Admiral Stark was as his flag lieutenant when he was commander of the cruisers of the battle force.

Mr. Richardson. When did you come to Washington to live?

Captain Krick. I came to Washington to live in July 1939.

Mr. Richardson. Since your coming to Washington, has there been a continuation of social relations between your family and Admiral Stark's family?

Captain Krick. Yes, sir; there has been a very close relation.

Mr. Richardson. Socially?


Mr. Richardson. Frequently at his house?

Captain Krick. Yes, sir; frequently at his house.

Mr. Richardson. Were you familiar, from your acquaintance with his house, whether Admiral Stark had a White House phone in his house?

Captain Krick. Yes, sir; Admiral Stark did have a White House phone in his house.

Mr. Richardson. What floor was it on?

Captain Krick. It was on the second floor, in his study.

Mr. Richardson. Do you recall your whereabouts on Saturday night, December 6?

Captain Krick. On Saturday night, December 6, 1941?

Mr. Richardson. That is right.

Captain Krick. I was with Admiral Stark and Mrs. Stark.

Mr. Richardson. Who was with you?

Captain Krick. My wife.

Mr. Richardson. Just the four of you?

Captain Krick. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. When did you meet that evening, first?

Captain Krick. We assembled at Admiral Stark's house about 6:30 or 7 o'clock in the evening.

Mr. Richardson. Did you have dinner?

Captain Krick. We had dinner at the Stark residence.

[14756] Mr. Richardson. Were there any other guests?

Captain Krick. No other guests.

Mr. Richardson. Where did you go after dinner?

Captain Krick. After dinner we attended a performance, I believe it to be the *The Student Prince*, at the National Theater in Washington, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Did you stay for the entire performance?

Captain Krick. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Were did you go after the performance?

Captain Krick. Subsequent to the performance we returned to the Stark residence in order to pick up my transportation.

Mr. Richardson. Whose car did you go to the theater in, and from?
Captain Krick. In the admiral's car.
Mr. Richardson. And you left your car at the Stark house?
Captain Krick. That is correct; yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And you returned for it after the theater?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Did you go in the Stark residence upon your return?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir; we did go into the Stark residence, as was the custom, for a few moments, before returning to our home.
Mr. Richardson. To get something to eat and drink?
[14757] Captain Krick. There were usually refreshments; that was the usual custom.
Mr. Richardson. Do you recall the occasion of going into the house on that evening?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir; I do recall that evening.
Mr. Richardson. What occurred when you went in the house?
Captain Krick. One of the admiral's servants advised the admiral that—
Mr. Richardson. What did he say?
Captain Krick. That there had been a White House call during the evening, sir.
Mr. Richardson. What happened then?
Captain Krick. The admiral excused himself and retired to his study on the second floor and returned.
Mr. Richardson. How long was he there?
Captain Krick. I would say approximately between 5 and 10 minutes.
Mr. Richardson. Did he come downstairs again?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir; he did come downstairs.
Mr. Richardson. Did he say anything to you?
Captain Krick. Only to the extent that the conditions in the Pacific were serious; that was the substance of it, that conditions with Japan were in a critical state, something of that sort, sir.
[14758] Mr. Richardson. Did he say anything to you, as near as you can recall, that he had had a telephone message, on the second floor?
Captain Krick. That is my inference. There is absolutely no doubt in my mind about it, sir. But I do not recall the exact statement. I do not recall that he stated "I have talked with the President of the United States". But I heard, of course the statement of the servant that there had been a White House call, and the admiral retired immediately, and he may have stated that he was going to call the White House; but I have the distinct impression that the conversation was with the White House.
[14759] Mr. Richardson. Do you have any impression that upon his return from upstairs Admiral Stark made any statement then that his talk had been with the White House?
Captain Krick. My impression very definitely was that; yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. That was the end of the conversation?
Captain Krick. That was the end of the conversation. The admiral never talked over any of his affairs in that connection with me, sir.
Mr. Richardson. How long did you stay after that statement?
Captain Krick. Approximately not more than 15 minutes.
Mr. Richardson. Then, you and your wife went home?

Captain Krick. Yes sir; I would say that it would be not later than 11:30 on the night of the 6th.

Mr. Richardson. When did you first relate to anyone the details of what you have just told us?

Captain Krick. That was the night, I believe, of the 25th of May 1946, at the admiral’s home; this conversation came up very casually.

Mr. Richardson. Who was there?

Captain Krick. The admiral and Mrs. Stark and my wife.

Mr. Richardson. And yourself?

Captain Krick. That is correct.

[14760] Mr. Richardson. What was the conversation then?

Captain Krick. The substance of the conversation was referring back to the night before Pearl Harbor on the 6th of December 1941, that I had noticed a headline to the effect that the admiral hadn’t known where he was, I had not followed this case closely, and I then informed the admiral that we were his guests that night, and I informed him what I have just said, to the effect that as usual he had left with his boy the number of the National Theater, so that he could be called in the event any calls came in.

Mr. Richardson. Wait just a moment. Was there any such conversation in your presence that evening before you went to the theater between Admiral Stark and any of his servants?

Captain Krick. I am quite sure that there was; sir.

Mr. Richardson. And what was the admonition which he gave to his servants?

Captain Krick. The custom was, sir, to give to the boy a slip of paper with the number of the telephone where the admiral could be contacted.

Mr. Richardson. Are you of the opinion that occurred that evening?

Captain Krick. Yes, sir; I am quite sure of it.

Mr. Richardson. When you reached the theater what was done with respect to advising the theater officials?

[14761] Captain Krick. As I recall it, either the admiral or I notified the head usher in that respect, where the admiral was sitting, where we would be during the entire evening, and no call came for the admiral during that time.

Mr. Richardson. What statement did the admiral make when you told him what had happened on the night of December 6?

Captain Krick. The admiral was very disturbed. He said, in effect, "You realize that I have testified to the contrary," and I told him that I hadn’t followed his testimony in the newspapers, and that I, therefore, didn’t realize what he had done, and he implied that it should be laid before the committee, which has now been done, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Did you tell this incident to anyone else before you recalled it to Admiral Stark?

Captain Krick. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Richardson. When this hearing was going on and the newspapers were referring to Admiral Stark’s knowledge, had you made any statement to anybody that you had any knowledge with reference to where Admiral Stark was on the 6th?

Captain Krick. Possibly only conversation in the family, sir. Certainly, to no one about the 6th.
I just didn't give this thing very much importance in my own mind, sir.

Mr. Richardson. There was no attempt on your part to conceal it?

Captain Krick. Definitely not.

Mr. Richardson. Or not to advance the testimony?

Captain Krick. Definitely not. I just had not followed the testimony.

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions.

The Chairman. You never, between that night, the 6th of December 1941, and last Saturday night, the 25th of May this year, you never attempted to remind Admiral Stark of the events of that night which you have detailed here and which you detailed to him last Saturday?

Captain Krick. Never, sir.

The Chairman. Any further questions?

Mr. Keefe. No questions.

Senator Lucas. One question.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. What was the exact time, Captain, that you saw Admiral Stark first on the evening of the 6th?

Captain Krick. That I saw him first on the evening of the 6th?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Captain Krick. I would say in the neighborhood of 7 or 7:15, sir, at dinner. He came in from the office, as I recall, about that time, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you have any conversation with him as to where he might have been previous to the time you saw him?

Captain Krick. No, sir; I did not, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did he say anything to you at that time about having any conference of any kind or character with the President and Cabinet officers before that dinner took place?

Captain Krick. No, sir. As I previously testified, the admiral never made any mention of his business at the office in my presence, sir.

Senator Lucas. So you were with him from about 7 o'clock, then, until about 11 that night?

Captain Krick. 11 or 11:30; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. That night?

Captain Krick. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, when he came away from the telephone after having this purported conversation with the President, was there anything unusual about his appearance or demeanor, as a result of that conference?

Captain Krick. Absolutely not, sir; I was not in a position to know, I was not in a position to know that, because his telephones were in his study.
Senator Lucas. I mean after he came down?
Captain Krick. After he came down, no, sir.
Senator Lucas. And he stayed with you until you left?
Captain Krick. Yes. Not to my remembrance did he make any additional calls.
Senator Lucas. How do you remember this so well, Captain?
Captain Krick. Because I was a very small fish, and great things were transpiring, and you don't forget that sort of thing. It is not like looking down, when you look up at something.
Senator Lucas. You were looking up, and the Pearl Harbor disaster struck the following day, and the entire evening was definitely impressed upon you?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir; and it will be there for a long time to come.

Senator Lucas. Always will be.
Captain Krick. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. I am glad we found out where Admiral Stark was.
The Chairman. I thought until now I was the only man in the United States who knew where he was on Saturday night, the 6th of December, but I find that I am not. I know where I was and why I was there.
Senator Lucas. Even though Admiral Stark doesn't know.
The Chairman. Anything further?
Senator George. No.
The Chairman. Mr. Cooper.
The Vice Chairman. No.
The Chairman. I believe you stated, Captain, that having served with Admiral Stark as his flag officer, that you were friends, and you and your wife were frequent visitors at their house?
Captain Krick. That is correct, sir, particularly was that true from 1939 until the admiral left for London in 1942, the spring of 1942, sir.
The Chairman. I don't think there is anything further. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)
The Chairman. The committee will adjourn, subject to call.
(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the committee adjourned subject to call of the Chair.)

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