PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27 and 49
(79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 16
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 88 THROUGH 110

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Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
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UNITED STATES
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WASHINGTON : 1946
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>3188 1-26-46</td>
<td>3203</td>
<td>Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>3311 1-28-46</td>
<td>3254</td>
<td>File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled “Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>3324 1-29-46</td>
<td>3302</td>
<td>Compilation of Material Relating to so-called “Winds” code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142-A</td>
<td>3324 1-29-46</td>
<td>3318</td>
<td>(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (b) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142-B</td>
<td>3674 2-4-46</td>
<td>3321</td>
<td>Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142-C</td>
<td>3741 2-5-46</td>
<td>3322</td>
<td>Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called “winds” messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a “winds execute” message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142-D</td>
<td>3780 2-5-46</td>
<td>3323</td>
<td>Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called “winds” code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>3929 2-7-46</td>
<td>3332</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)</td>
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<td>144</td>
<td>3929 2-7-46</td>
<td>3332</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)</td>
</tr>
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<td>145</td>
<td>3929 2-7-46</td>
<td>3332</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339. 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)</td>
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<td>147</td>
<td>3929</td>
<td>2-7-47</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148</td>
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<tr>
<td>149</td>
<td>3929</td>
<td>2-7-46</td>
<td>Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)</td>
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<td>4083</td>
<td>2-8-46</td>
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<td>152</td>
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<td>153</td>
<td>5009</td>
<td>2-19-46</td>
<td>3351</td>
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<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>5013</td>
<td>2-20-46</td>
<td>Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, &quot;General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941&quot;, prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
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<td>155</td>
<td>5068</td>
<td>2-20-46</td>
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<td>157</td>
<td>5201</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit No.</td>
<td>Hearing, page and date introduced</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>158--------</td>
<td>5201 4-11-46</td>
<td>3441</td>
<td>Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159--------</td>
<td>5201 4-11-46</td>
<td>3488</td>
<td>Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>160--------</td>
<td>5240 4-11-46</td>
<td>3502</td>
<td>Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o’clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
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<tr>
<td>161--------</td>
<td>5241 4-11-46</td>
<td>3508</td>
<td>Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161-A------</td>
<td>5464 5-23-46</td>
<td>3520</td>
<td>Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.</td>
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<tr>
<td>162--------</td>
<td>5269 4-11-46</td>
<td>3534</td>
<td>Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
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<td>162-A------</td>
<td>5464 5-23-46</td>
<td>3543</td>
<td>Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.</td>
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<td>163--------</td>
<td>5292 4-11-46</td>
<td>3557</td>
<td>Log of the U. S. S. Helena from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.</td>
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<td>164--------</td>
<td>5292 4-11-46</td>
<td>3593</td>
<td>Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
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<tr>
<td>165--------</td>
<td>5292 4-11-46</td>
<td>3643</td>
<td>Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166--------</td>
<td>5468 5-23-46</td>
<td>3648</td>
<td>State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>File No.</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>5468</td>
<td>3652 (a) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (a); (c) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (a); and (d) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (a) and general Far East matters.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>168</td>
<td>5468</td>
<td>3666 Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed <em>modus vivendi</em>, which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>169</td>
<td>5469</td>
<td>3696 Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
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<td>170</td>
<td>5469</td>
<td>3789 Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.</td>
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<tr>
<td>171</td>
<td>5469</td>
<td>3942 Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
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<td>172</td>
<td>5469</td>
<td>3978 Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.</td>
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<tr>
<td>173</td>
<td>5469</td>
<td>3985 Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.</td>
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<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>5469</td>
<td>4030 Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>5470</td>
<td>4115 Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176</td>
<td>5470</td>
<td>4121 Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177</td>
<td>5470</td>
<td>4132 Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
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<td>178</td>
<td>5470 5-23-46</td>
<td>4209</td>
<td>Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>5470 5-23-46</td>
<td>4241</td>
<td>Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>5471 5-23-46</td>
<td>4551</td>
<td>Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
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<td>181</td>
<td>5520 5-23-46</td>
<td>4565</td>
<td>The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.</td>
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<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td>5537 5-23-46</td>
<td>4702</td>
<td>Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.</td>
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<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td>5468 5-23-46</td>
<td>4766</td>
<td>Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the Utah by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXHIBIT NO. 88

WAR PLANS DIVISION (OP 12)

12-1. Duties:
   (a) Policy and Projects Section:
   (1) Development of policies and projects in support of war plans.
   (2) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of current plans for joint action of the Army and Navy, and in the solution of current problems.
   (3) Collaboration with other Government departments on policies and projects affecting national defense.
   (4) Study of subjects referred to the War Plans Division by the Chief of Naval Operations.
   (5) Action in advisory capacity in current administrative matters referred to the War Plans Division.

   (b) Plans Section:
   (1) Direction of war planning.
   (2) Preparation of designated war plans.
   (3) Review of Operating Plans and Principal Contributory Plans.
   (4) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of Joint Basic War Plans.
   (5) Collaboration with other Government departments on plans affecting national defense.

12-2. The Director of the War Plans Division is a member of the Joint Board (General Order No. 7).

12-3. The War Plans Division has membership on the following committees:

   Joint Board.
   Joint Planning Committee.
   Joint Aeronautical Board.
   Joint Air Advisory Committee.
   Shore Station Development Board.

12-4. The War Plans Division is nonadministrative.

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EXHIBIT NO. 89

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK IN HAWAII

[1] 1. The broad responsibilities of the Army and Navy in Hawaii were contained in Army and Navy war plans prepared and issued to the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii. These responsibilities were expressed in the various plans in terms of joint missions and separate Army and Navy missions. With the exception as indicated below, these missions are stated identically in all war plans current in 1941 as follows:

JOINT MISSION

To hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

NAVY MISSION

To patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.
ARMY MISSION

To hold Oahu against attack by land, sea and air forces and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

2. In the most recent plan the phrase in the Army Mission "to support the Naval Forces" was deleted and the following was substituted: "Support Naval Forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases."

[2] 3. It should be noted that in all cases the missions called for mutual support.

4. Based on these broad missions the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Navy Commander in Hawaii agreed to accept certain responsibilities for defense against air attack. These agreements are to be found in the various local joint plans and the separate plans of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. The basic current plans in Hawaii on Dec. 7, 1941 were: The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941, and the Army and Navy Operations Orders and agreements based thereon. These plans and agreements contain the following major provisions pertaining to defense against air attack:

(a) Antiaircraft Defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>(1) &quot;Shall provide for: a. The * * * antiaircraft defense of OAHU&quot;</td>
<td>Par 17, Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Army Antiaircraft, &quot;supported by Naval Units placed under the tactical control of the Army, will operate to defend Oahu from attacks by hostile aircraft.&quot;</td>
<td>Par 36 (3), FO No. 1 NS (Naval Security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) The Army, &quot;Arrange for such coordination of the antiaircraft artillery fire of naval ships in PEARL HARBOR and the Army antiaircraft defense as may be practicable.&quot; &quot;The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District * * * are taking certain security measures, which include: * * * (d) The organization of four air defense groups for the control and distribution of the antiaircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.&quot; &quot;In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.&quot; * * * &quot;The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District * * * shall: (a) exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack. (b) Arrange with the Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced.&quot; * * * (d) Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft fire with the base defense,&quot;</td>
<td>Par 18 FO No 1 NS (Navy Security) Hq. Hawaiian Dept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td></td>
<td>Par 3g. (2) (6) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion: The orders and agreements on the part of the local Army and Navy Commanders lead to the conclusion that primary responsibility for antiaircraft defense rested with the Army but that the Navy had a secondary responsibility in connection therewith.

(b) Aircraft Warning Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>(1) The Army &quot;shall provide for: * * * b. &quot;An antiaircraft * * * intelligence and warning service.&quot;</td>
<td>Par 17, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>“During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR, and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.”</td>
<td>Par 11, Annex VII Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion: The Army had primary responsibility for the establishment of an aircraft warning service. The Navy, however, agreed to furnish such means as it had, pending the installation of the Army facilities then under construction.

(c) Aircraft

(RECONNAISSANCE PHASE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>(1) “Shall provide for:                                                           Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the Oahu DCA in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol.”</td>
<td>Par 17, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan HCF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>(1) Navy &quot;shall provide for: a. An inshore patrol. b. An offshore patrol * * * i. Distant reconnaissance.&quot;</td>
<td>Par 18, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. HCF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) &quot;When naval forces are insufficient for long distant patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.”</td>
<td>Par 2c, Annex VII, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. HCF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(DEFENSIVE AIR)

| Army          | “b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army.” | Par 2b, Annex VII Joint Coastal Frontier Defense  |
| Navy          | (1) "Each commander will * * * make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant." | Par 2 Annex VII |
|               | (2) "With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable." | Par 2b, Annex VII |

(OFFENSIVE AIR)

| Army          | “g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea within range of Army bombers.” | Par 17g, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan |
| Navy          | (1) “Shall provide for * * * j. Attacking enemy Naval Forces.” | Par 18, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan. Par 2a Annex VII |
|               | (2) “Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy.” | |
[7] Conclusion: The Navy was primarily responsible for close and distant aerial reconnaissance and offensive air operations against hostile surface craft. The Army was primarily responsible for defensive air operations. Regardless of the service primarily responsible, the opposite service was charged with supporting the operation within the means available to it.

To summarize, it will be seen from the above analysis that:
(a) Definite plans and agreements existed in Hawaii for defense against aircraft;
(b) Although the Army had the primary responsibility for antiaircraft defense, aircraft warning service and defensive air operations and the Navy had the primary responsibility for close and distant reconnaissance, and offensive air operations, each service was charged with augmenting the forces of the other with the means available to them in order to provide the maximum effective defense.
Telegram Sent

Department of State

Washington, December 18, 1941

AMERICAN LEGATION

BERN

3:09

AMERICAN INTERESTS.

Please express to Swiss Government this Government's appreciation of its message expressing willingness to undertake the representation of American interests in Japanese-occupied territories and, when necessary, in other regions of the Far East.

Department would be grateful if Swiss Government would by telegraph circularize to its representatives in the Far East, for the information of such American diplomatic or consular offices as may by reason of the present situation find it impossible to carry on their functions or to communicate with the Department, the following message (in substance already communicated to Embassy Chungking, which endeavored without [Repeat without] success to repeat it to the offices concerned):

QUOTE One. In the event of a sudden emergency, when communications with the Department are broken
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington.
is charged), the expenditure, hence to
authorised shall be made by the Treasury
as, Il-1942 and authorities. On application to
funds and render any rate assessments. At it
in this paragraph shall be strictly
the Japanese government of the United
forces, in international trade, to provide
the official report, to transmission
from their office to point between the
frontiers, and the provisions of this a
are not (except in) liable to consuma-
tion between this and other than the
occupied or controlled by such in
exceed any draft or claim or want, and
obligation,

In the other time, to that
leave, leave to leave a previous
calendar year, the services of him
should be terminated (except in cases
provided in other cases."

Enciphered by
Sent by operator

Washington,

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Charge to

Collect
Day letter
Night letter
Charge Department
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Plain
Telegram Sent

Department of State

Washington

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M. 19
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M 19
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M. 19
Department of State

Dr. [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], C.S.

Swiss workers charged with the representation of workers in the Far East might be authorized to make a presentation on their own behalf. Please let me know.

[Signature]

Sent by [illegible]
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, December 15, 1941.

SUBJECT: DESTRUCTION OF CODES, CIPHERS AND CIPHER DEVICES.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith for the Division of Communications and Records a list of the codes, ciphers and cipher devices which were burned or destroyed under standing instructions on December 6, 1941 on the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan. This list comprises all the codes.
codes, ciphers, cipher devices and other material pertaining to codes in possession of the Embassy.
As provided by regulation, this statement is signed by the two officers in whose presence they were burned. The true readings of all telegrams in confidential codes were likewise burned on December 8, 1941 in the presence of the same two officers.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Crew.

Enclosures:
1/ List of codes, ciphers and cipher devices.

110.2
CEN: sgh
Original and two copies to Department.
The American Chiefs of Staff and other high military and naval officers met in December 1941.

Charles J. Nolte
Second Secretary

James Loy
Third Secretary
Tokyo, December 19, 1941.

SUBJECT: 

Embassy of the United States of America

117-255

Strictly Confidential

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that just prior to the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan the embassy received, by pouch from the Department, two registered sealed envelopes addressed to the American Consulate...
1954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Handwritten notes and signatures]

[Paragraphs and text]

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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

HEADQUARTERS

Dec., 1861.

[Signature]

JOINT COMMITTEE

[Signature]
THE HONORABLE

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Sir:—

I have the honor to submit herewith a statement by the Commercial Attache relative to the destruction of the files of the recording Section of this Embassy.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph J. Brow.

File no. 104.2
FSW/zp

Enclosure: as stated
Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 913
Dated February 13, 1942 from the
Embassy at Tokyo

Proposition of Section's

Committed, etc., at the direction
of the Service of the Embassy, etc., were taken
to destroy all confidential material in our files.
A short note of the material so selected for
the lot. In addition to the usual files in
hand, there were instruments which
were in a state to be moved to
the Embassy vaults. The departure
of the lot will require the usual
precautions. A letter
with a copy of the instruments
attached hereto.

[Signature]

[Date]
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a list of the strictly confidential material in the files of the Embassy which was burned in accordance with Section 7 of the Department's undated "Instructions to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers in Japanese Occupied Territories and other Regions of the Far East" received in January 1942 through the Swiss Legation in Tokyo.

In addition to the strictly confidential material listed on the enclosure to this despatch, all true readings of telegrams in confidential code were burned on December 8, 1941, as reported in my unnumbered despatch dated December 15, 1941.
In conformity with the Department's instruction, non-confidential bound and current correspondence was not in general destroyed, but was stored in the Embassy vault for safe keeping in custody of the Swiss representative, and only such material contained therein which might have proved compromising to any individuals in areas under Japanese control was removed and burned.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

Enclosure:

1/ as indicated.

CEB: gh
BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Attlee): I beg to move:

That the rules do not permit any Motion for a Adjournment of the House that may be moved by a Member of the Crown at this House, and which is excepted from the provisions of the standing order relating to the House.

I think it would meet the convenience of the House if we extended the sitting this day.

Mr. Timmer: Can that also apply to Sunday at the Debate?

Question put and agreed to.

WAR SITUATION.

Mr. Stephen: Mr. Churchill, may I ask if the House do now adjourn.

Mr. J. S. Sore:

The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): I will put the next Sitting Day.

There is another aspect. We at the meeting were alone, half-ashamed. We are now at the centre and among these 20 Nations, comprising more than three-quarters of the population of the globe. Whenever we speak for Britain at the moment must be known to speak, not only in the name of the people—and of that I feel pretty sure I may—but in the name of Parliament and, above all, of the House of Commons. It is genuine public interest that requires that these facts should be made manifest afresh in a formal way.
The Prime Minister: A vote under all the conditions which hitherto have made the conduct of Parliamentary government possible. Surely the hon. Gentleman is not the man to be frightened of a Whip? The House of Commons, which is at present the most powerful representative Assembly in the world, must also—I am sure, will also—bear in mind the effect produced abroad by all its proceedings. We have also to remember how oddly foreigners view our country and its way of doing things. When Rudolf Hess flew over here some months ago he firmly believed that he had only to gain access to certain circles in this country for what he described as 'the Churchill clique'! —

Mr. Thorne (Plaistow): Where is he now?

The Prime Minister: Where he ought to be—to be thrown out of power and for a Government to be set up with which Hitler could negotiate a magnanimous peace. The only importance attaching to the opinions of Hess is the fact that he was fresh from the atmosphere of Hitler's intimate table. But, Sir, I can assure you that since I have been back in this country I have had anxious inquiries from a dozen countries, and reports of enemy propaganda in a score of countries, all turning upon the point whether His Majesty's present Government is to be dismissed from power or not. This may seem silly to us, but in those mouths abroad it is hurtful and mischievous to the common effort. I am not asking for any special, personal favours in these circumstances, but I am sure the House would wish to make its position clear; therefore I stand by the ancient, constitutional, Parliamentary doctrine of free debate and faithful voting.

Now I turn to the account of the war, which constitutes the claim I make for the support and confidence of the House. Three or four months ago we had to cope with the following situation. The German invaders were advancing, blasting their way through Russia. The Russians were resisting with the utmost heroism. But no one could tell what would happen, whether Leningrad, Moscow or Rostov would fall, or where the German winter line would be established. No one can tell now where it will be established, but now the boot is on the other leg. We all agree that we must aid the valiant Russian
The Prime Minister.]

Arms to the utmost limit of our power. His Majesty's Government thought, and Parliament upon reflection agreed with them, that the best aid we could give to Russia was in supplies of many kinds of raw materials and of munitions, particularly tanks and aircraft. Our Forces at home and abroad had for long been waiting thirstily for these weapons. At last they were coming to hand in large numbers. At home we have always the danger of invasion to consider and to prepare against. I will speak about the situation in the Middle East presently. Nevertheless we sent Premier Stalin—for that I gather is how he wishes to be addressed; at least, that is the form in which he telegraphs to me—exactly what he asked for. The whole quantity was promised and sent. There has been, I am sorry to say, a small lag due to bad weather, but it will be made up by the early days of February. This was a decision of major strategy and policy, and anyone can see that it was right to put it first when they watch the wonderful achievements, unhoped for, undreamed of by us because we little knew the Russian strength, but all the more glorious as they seem—the wonderful achievements of the Russian Armies. Our munitions were of course only a contribution to the Russian victory, but they were an encouragement in Russia's darkest hour. Moreover, if we had not shown a loyal effort to help our Ally, albeit at a heavy sacrifice to ourselves, I do not think our relations with Premier Stalin and his great country would be as good as they are now. There would have been a lack of comradeship, and the lack of comradeship might have spread repercussions on all sides. Far from regretting what we did for Russia, I only wish it had been in our power—but it was not to have done more.

Three or four months ago, at a time when the German advance was rolling on, we were particularly concerned with the possibility of the Germans forcing the Don River, the capture of Rostov and the invasion of the Caucasus, and the reaching of the Baku oil wells before the winter by the Poeyr spearheads of the German Army. Everyone who has been giving careful study and independent thought to this war, knows how deep an anxiety that was in all our breasts three or four months ago. Such an advance would not only have given the Germans the oil which they are beginning seriously to need, but it would have involved the destruction of the Russian Fleet and the loss, of the command of the Black Sea. It would have affected the safety of Turkey, and it would, in due course, have exposed to the gravest dangers Persia, Iraq, Syria and Palestine, and beyond those countries, all of which are now under our control, it would have threatened the Suez Canal, Egypt and the Nile Valley. At the same time as this menace defined itself with hideous and increasing reality as it seemed, General von Rommel, with his army of 10 German and Italian divisions entrenched in his fortified positions at and behind the Halfaya Pass, was preparing to make a decisive attack on Tobruk as a preliminary to a renewed advance upon Egypt from the West. The Nile Valley was therefore menaced simultaneously by a direct attack from the West and by a more remote but in some ways more deadly attack from the North. In such circumstances it is the classical rule of war, reinforced by endless examples—and some exceptions—that you prepare to fight a delaying action against one of the two attacks and concentrate, if possible, overwhelming strength against the other and nearer attack. We therefore approved General Auchinleck's plans for building up a delaying force in the vast region from Cyprus to the Caspian Sea, along what I may call the Levant-Caspian front, and preparing installations, airfields and communications upon which larger forces could be based, as time and transport allowed. On the other flank, the Western flank, we prepared to set upon Rommel and try to make a good job of him. For the sake of this battle in the Libyan Desert we concentrated everything we could by our hands on, and we submitted to a very long delay, very painful to bear over here, so that all preparations could be perfected. We hoped to recapture Cyrenica and the important airfields round Bengazi. But General Auchinleck's main objective was more simple. He set himself to destroy Rommel's army. Such was the mood in which we stood three or four months ago. Such was the broad strategical decision we took.

Now, when we see how events, which so often mock and falsify human effort and design, have shaped themselves, I am sure this was a right decision.
General Auchinleck had demanded five months' preparation for his campaign, but on 18th November he fell upon the enemy. For more than two months in the desert the most fierce, continuous battle has raged between scattered bands of men, armed with the latest weapons, seeking each other down after dawn, fighting to the death throughout the day and then often long into the night. Here was a battle which turned out very differently from what was foreseen. All was dispersed and confused. Much depended on the individual soldier and the junior officer. Much, but not all; because this battle would have been lost on 24th November if General Auchinleck had not intervened himself, changed the command and ordered the ruthless pressure of the attack to be maintained without regard to risks or consequences. But for this robust decision we should now be back on the old line from which we had started, or perhaps further back. Tobruk would possibly have fallen, and Rommel might be marching towards the Nile. Since then the battle has declared itself. Cyrenaica has been regained. It has still to be held. We have not succeeded in destroying Rommel's army, but nearly two-thirds of it are wounded, prisoners or dead.

Perhaps I may give the figures to the House. In this strange, sombre battle of the desert, where our men have met the enemy for the first time—I do not say in every respect, because there are some things which are not all that we had hoped for—but, upon the whole, have met him with equal weapons, we have lost in killed, wounded and captured about 130,000 officers and men, of whom the greater part are British. We have in our possession 36,500 prisoners, including many wounded, of whom 10,500 are Germans. We have killed and wounded at least 11,500 Germans and 13,000 Italians—in all a total, accounted for exactly, of 61,000 men. There is also a mass of enemy wounded, some of whom have been evacuated to the rear or to the Westward—I cannot tell how many. Of the forces of which General Rommel disposed on 18th November, little more than one-third now remain, while 852 German and Italian aircraft have been destroyed and 326 German and Italian tanks. During this battle we have never had in action more than 45,000 men, against enemy forces—if they could be brought to bear—much more than double as strong. Therefore, it seems to me that this heroic, epic struggle in the desert, though there have been many local reverses and many ebbs and flows, has tested our manhood in a searching fashion and has proved not only that our men can die for King and country—everyone knew that—but that they can kill.

I cannot tell what the position at the present moment is on the Western front in Cyrenaica. We have a very daring and skilful opponent against us and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great General. He has certainly received reinforcements. Another battle is even now in progress, and I make it a rule never to try and prophesy beforehand how battles will turn out. I always rejoice that I have made that rule. [AN HON. MEMBER: "What about the Skaggerak ?"] That was hardly a battle. Naturally, one does not say in a case like that that we have not a chance, because that is apt to be encouraging to the enemy and depressing to our own friends. In the general up-hor, the fact remains that, whereas a year ago the Germans were telling all the neutrals that they would be in Suez by May, when some people talked of the possibility of a German descent upon Assuit, and many people were afraid that Tobruk would be stormed and others feared for the Nile Valley, Cairo, Alexandria and the Canal, we have conducted an effective offensive against the enemy and hurled him backward, inflicting upon him incomparably more—well, I should not say incomparably, because I have just given the comparison, but far heavier losses and damage—than we have suffered ourselves. Not only has he lost three times our losses on the battlefield, approximately, but the blue waters of the Mediterranean have, thanks to the enterprise of the Royal Navy, our submarines and Air Force, drowned a large number of the reinforcements which have been continually sent. This process has had further important successes during the last few days. Whether you call it a victory or not, it must be dubbed up to the present, although I will not make any promises, a highly profitable transaction, and certainly is an episode of war most glorious to the British, South Africa, New Zealand, Indian, Free French and Polish soldiers, sailors and airmen who have played their part in it. The prolonged, stubborn, steadfast and successful defence
[The Prime Minister.]
of Tobruk by Australian and British troops was an essential preliminary, over seven hard months, to any success which may have been achieved.

Let us see what has happened on the other flank, the Northern flank, of the Nile Valley. What has happened to Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Persia? There we must thank Russia. There thevalour of the Russian Armies has warded off dangers which we saw and which we undoubtedly ran. The Caucasus and the precious oilfields of Bakú, the great Anglo-Persian oilfields, are denied to the enemy. Winter has come. Evidently we have the time to strengthen still further our Forces and organisations in these regions. Therefore, sir, I present to you, in laying the whole field open and bate and surveying it in all its parts, for all are related, a situation in the Nile Valley, both West and East, incomparably easier than anything we have ever seen, since we were deserted by the French Bordeaux-Vichy Government and were set upon by Italy. The House will not fail to discern the agate points upon which this vast improvement has turned. It is only by the smallest margin that we have succeeded so far in beating Rommel in Cyrenaica and destroying two-thirds of his forces. Every tank, every aircraft squadron was needed. It is only by the victories on the Russian flank on the Black Sea coast that we have been spared the overrunning of all these vast lands from the Levant to the Caspian, which in turn give access to India, Persia, the Persian Gulf, the Nile Valley and the Suez Canal.

I have told the House the story of these few months, and hon. Members will see from it how narrowly our resources have been strained and by what a small margin and by what strokes of fortune—for which we claim no credit—we have survived so far. Where should we have been, I wonder, if we had yielded to the clamour which was so loud three or four months ago that we should invade France or the Low Countries? We can still see on the walls the inscription, "Second Front Now." Who did not feel the appeal of that? But imagine what our position would have been if we had yielded to this vehement temptation. Every ton of our shipping, every flotilla, every aeroplane, the whole strength of our Army would be committed and would be fighting for life on the French shores or on the shores of the Low Countries. All these troubles of the Far East and the Middle East might have sunk to insignificance compared with the question of another and far worse Dunkirk.

Here, let me say, I should like to pay my tribute to one who has gone from us since I left this country, Mr. Lees-Smith, who, I remember, spoke with so much profound wisdom on this point at a moment when many opinions were in flux about it. His faithful, selfless and wise conduct of the important work which hedischarged in this House was undoubtedly of great assistance to us all, not only to the Government but to us all, in the various stages of the war. His memory as a distinguished Parliamentarian will long find an honoured place in the recollection of those who had the fortune to be his colleagues.

Sometimes things can be done by saying "Yes," and sometimes things can be done by saying "No." Yet I suppose there are some of those who were vocal and voluble, and even clamant, for a second front to be opened in France, who are now going to come up bland and smiling and ask why it is that we have not ample forces in Malaya, Burma, Borneo and the Celebes. There are times when so many things happen, and happen so quickly, and time seems to pass in such a way that you can neither say it is long or short, that it is easy to forget what you have said three months before. You may fail to connect it with what you are advocating at the particular moment. Throughout a long and variegated Parliamentary life this consideration has led me to try and keep a watchful eye on that danger myself. You never can tell. There are also people who talk and bear themselves as if they had prepared for this war with great armaments and long, careful preparation. But that is not true. In two and a half years of fighting we have only just managed to keep our heads above water. When I was called upon to be Prime Minister, now nearly two years ago, there were not many applicants for the job. Since then, perhaps, the market has improved. In spite of the shameful negligence, gross muddles, blatant incompetence, complacency and lack of organising power which are daily attributed to us—and from which chilings we endeavour to profit we are beginning to see
our way through. It looks as if we were in for a very bad time, but provided we all stand together, and provided we throw in the last spasm of our strength, it also looks, more than it ever did before, as if we were going to win.

While facing Germany and Italy here and in the Nile Valley we have never had any power to provide effectively for the defence of the Far East. My whole argument so far has led up to that point. It may be that this or that might have been done which was not done, but we have never been able to provide effectively for the defence of the Far East against an attack by Japan. It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged. We even had to stoop, as the House will remember, when we were at our very weakest point, to close the Burma Road for some months. I remember that some of our present critics were very angry about it, but we had to do it. There never has been a moment, there never could have been a moment, when Great Britain or the British Empire, single-handed, could fight Germany and Italy, could wage the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of the Middle East—and at the same time stand thoroughly prepared in Burma, the Malay Peninsula, and generally in the Far East against the impact of a vast military Empire like Japan, with more than 70 mobile divisions, the third navy in the world, a great air force and the thrust of 80 or 90 millions of hardy, war-like Asians. If we had started to scatter our forces over these immense areas in the Far East, we should have been ruined. If we had moved large armies of troops urgently needed on the war fronts to regions which were not at war and might never be at war we should have been altogether wrong. We should have cast away the chance, which has now become something more than a chance, of all of us emerging safely from the terrible plight in which we have been plunged.

We therefore have lain—I am putting it as bluntly as I can—for nearly two years under the threat of an attack by Japan with which we had no means of coping. But as time has passed the mighty United States, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, from reasons of its own interest and safety but also out of chivalrous regard for the cause of freedom and democracy, has drawn ever nearer to the confines of the struggle. And now that the blow has fallen it does not fall on us alone. On the contrary, it falls upon united forces and united nations, which are unquestionably capable of enduring the struggle, of retrieving the losses and of preventing another such stroke ever being delivered again.

There is an argument with which I will deal as I pass along to pursue my theme. It is said by some, "If only you had organised the munitions production of this country properly and had had a Minister of Production (and that is not a question which should be dogmatised upon either way) it would have made everything all right. There would have been enough for all needs. We should have had enough supplies for Russia, enough well-equipped squadrons and divisions to defend the British Islands, to sustain the Middle East and to arm the Far East effectively." But that is really not true. As a matter of fact, our munitions output is gigantic, has for some time been very large indeed, and it is bounding up in a most remarkable manner. In the last year, 1941, although we were at war in so many theatres and on so many fronts, we have produced more than double the munitions equipment of the United States, which was arming heavily, though of course a lap behind on the road. This condition will naturally be rapidly removed as the full power of American industry come into full swing. But, Sir, in the last six months, thanks to the energies of Lord Beaverbrook and the solid spadework done by his predecessors and the passage of time—he particularly asks me to say that—[An Hon. Mem- ber: "Who did?"]—Lord Beaverbrook; I should have said it anyway—our munitions output has risen in the following respects: We are producing more than twice as many far more complicated guns every month than we did in the peak of 1917-18 war period, and the curve is rising. The guns are infinitely more complicated. Tank production has doubled in the last six months. Small arms production is more than twice what it was six months ago. Filled rounds of ammunition have doubled in the last six months. I could go on with the catalogue, but these are not doublings from early very small totals, they are doublings from the totals we boasted about, as far as we
The War Situation

[The Prime Minister.]... dared, six months ago. There has been an immense leap forward. In aircraft production there is a steady increase not only in the numbers but also in the size and quality of the aircraft, though I must say there has not been the increase which I had hoped for.

But all this has nothing to do with the preparations it was open to us to make in Malaya and Burma and generally in the Far East. The limiting factor has not been troops or even equipment. The limiting factor has been transport, even assuming we had wished to take this measure and had had this great surplus. From the time that this present Government was formed, from the moment it was formed I may say, every scrap of shipping we could draw away from our vital supply routes, every U-boat escort we could divert from the Battle of the Atlantic, has been busy to the utmost capacity to carry troops, tanks and munitions from this Island to the East. There has been a ceaseless flow, and as for aircraft they have not only been moved by sea but by every route, some very dangerous and costly routes, to the Eastern battlefields. The decision was taken, as I have explained, to make our contribution to Russia, to try to beat Rommel and to form a stronger front from the Levant to the Caspian. It followed from that decision that it was in our power only to make a moderate and partial provision in the Far East against the hypothetical danger of a Japanese onslaught. Sixty thousand men, indeed, were concentrated at Singapore, but priority in modern aircraft, in tanks, and in anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery was accorded to the Nile Valley.

For this decision in its broad strategic aspects, and also in its diplomatic policy in regard to Russia, I take the fullest personal responsibility. If we have handled our resources wrongly, no one is so much to blame as me. If we have not got large modern air forces and tanks in Burma and Malaya to-night no one is more accountable than I am. Why then should I be called upon to pick out scapegoats, to throw the blame on generals or airmen or sailors? Why, then, should I be called upon to drive away loyal and trusted colleagues and friends to appease the clamour of certain sections of the British and Australian Press, or in order to take the edge off our reverses in Malaya and the Far East, and the punishment which we have yet to take there? I would be ashamed to do such a thing at such a time, and if I were capable of doing it, believe me, I should be incapable of rendering this country or this House any further service.

I say that without in the slightest degree seeking to relieve myself from my duties and responsibility to endeavour to make continual improvements in Ministerial positions. It is the duty of every Prime Minister to the House, but we have to be quite sure that they are improvements in every case, and not only in every case but in the setting. I could not possibly descend to, as the German radio repeatedly credits me with, an attempt to get out of difficulties in which I really bear the main load by offering up scapegoats to public displeasure. Many people, many very well-meaning people, begin their criticisms and articles by saying, "Of course, we are all in favour of the Prime Minister because he has the people behind him. But what about the muddles made by this or that Department; what about that general or this Minister?"

But I am the man that Parliament and the nation have got to blame for the general way in which they are served, and I cannot serve them effectively unless, in spite of all that has gone wrong, that is going to go wrong, I have their trust and faithful aid.

I must linger for a moment on our political affairs, because we are conducting the war on the basis of a full democracy and a free Press, and that is an attempt which has not been made before in such circumstances. A variety of attacks are made upon the composition of the Government. It is said that it is terrors upon a party and political basis. But so is the House of Commons. It is silly to extol the Parliamentary system and then, in the next breath, to say, "Away, with party and away with politics." From one quarter I am told that the leaders of the Labour party ought to be dismissed from the Cabinet. This would be a return to party Government pure and simple. From opposite quarters it is said that no one who approved of Munich should be allowed to hold office. To do that would be to cast a reflection upon the great majority of the nation at that time, and also to deny the strongest party in the House any proportionate share in the National Government, which
again, in turn, might cause inconvenience. Even my right hon. Friend the leader of the Liberal party—[An Hon. Member: 'Who is he?']—the Secretary of State for Air, whose help to-day I value so much and with whom, as a lifelong friend, it is a pleasure to work, even he has not escaped unscathed. If I were to show the slightest weakness in dealing with these opposite forms of criticism, not only should I deprive myself of loyal and experienced colleagues, but I should destroy the National Government and rupture the war-time unity of Parliament itself.

Other attacks are directed against individual Ministers. I have been urged to make an example of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who is now returning from his mission in the Far East. Thus, he would be made to bear the blame for our misfortunes. The position of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster at the head of the Council which he had been instructed to form at Singapore was rendered obsolete by the decision which I reached with the President of the United States to set up a Supreme Commander for the main fighting zone in the Far East. The whole conception of a Supreme Commander is that, under the direction of the Governments he serves, he is absolute master of all authorities in the region assigned to him. This would be destroyed if political functionaries representing the various nations—for it is not only this country which would be represented, others would have to be represented as well as ours—were dusted round him. The function of the Chancellor of the Duchy was therefore extinguished by the appointment of General Wavell to the Supreme Command. I may say that regret was expressed at his departure by the New Zealand and Australian Governments, and still more by the Council he formed at Singapore, which, in a localised and subordinate form, it has been found necessary to carry on. When I am invited, under threats of unpopularity to myself or the Government, to victimise the Chancellor of the Duchy, and throw him to the wolves, I say to those who make this amiable suggestion, I can only say to them, 'I cannot regret that I am unable to gratify your wishes,' or words to that effect.

The outstanding question upon which the House should form its judgment for the purposes of the impending Division is whether His Majesty's Government were right in giving a marked priority in the distribution of the forces and equipment we could send overseas, to Russia, to Libya, and, to a lesser extent, to the Levant-Caspian danger front, and whether we were right in accepting, for the time being, a far lower standard of forces and equipment for the Far East than for these other theatres. The first obvious fact is that the Far Eastern theatre was at peace and that the other theatres were in violent or imminent war. It would evidently have been a very improbable use of our limited resources—as I pointed out earlier—if we had kept large masses of troops and equipment spread about the immense areas of the Pacific or in India, Burma and the Malay Peninsula, standing idle, month by month and perhaps year by year, without any war occurring. Thus, we should have failed in our engagements to Russia, which has meanwhile struck such staggering blows at the German Army, and we should have lost the battle in Cyrenaica, which we have not yet won, and we might now be fighting defensively well inside the Egyptian frontier. There is the question on which the House should make up its mind. We had not the resources to meet all the perils and pressures that came upon us.

But this question, serious and large as it is by itself, cannot be wholly decided without some attempt to answer the further question—what was the likelihood of the Far Eastern theatre being thrown into war by a Japanese attack? I have explained how very delicately we walked, and how painful it was at times, how very careful I was every time that we should not be exposed single-handed to this onslaught which we were utterly incapable of meeting. But it seemed irrational to suppose that in the last six months—which is what I am principally dealing with—the Japanese, having thrown away their opportunity of attacking us in the autumn of 1940, when we were so much weaker, so much less well-armed, and all alone, should at this period have plunged into a desperate struggle against the combined Forces of the British Empire and the United States. Nevertheless, nations, like individuals, commit irrational acts, and there were forces at work in Japan, violent, murderous, fanatical and explosive forces, which no one could measure.
On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East, and thus make final victory sure, seemed to allay some of these anxieties. That expectation has not been falsified by the events. It fortified our British decision to use our limited resources on the actual fighting fronts. As time went on, one had greater assurance that if Japan ran amok in the Pacific, we should not fight alone. It must also be remembered that over the whole of the Pacific scene brooded the great power of the United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii. It seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt the distant invasion of the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet. However to strengthen the position as the situation seemed to intensify we sent the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" to form the spear-point of the considerable battle forces which we felt ourselves at length able to form in the Indian Ocean. We reinforced Singapore to a considerable extent and Hong Kong to the extent which we were advised would be sufficient to hold the island for a long time. Besides this in minor ways we took what precautions were open to us. On 7th December the Japanese, by a sudden attack, delivered while their navies were still negotiating at Washington, crapped for the time being the American Pacific Fleet, and a few days later inflicted very heavy naval losses on us by sinking the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse."

For the time being, therefore, naval superiority in the Pacific and in the Malaysian Archipelago has passed from the hands of the two leading naval Powers into the hands of Japan. How long it will remain in Japanese hands is a matter on which I do not intend to speculate. But at any rate it will be long enough for Japan to inflict very heavy and painful losses on all of the United Nations who have establishments and possessions in the Far East. The Japanese no doubt will try to peg out claims and lodgments over all this enormous area, and to organise, in the interval before they lose command of the seas, a local command of the air which will render their expulsion and destruction a matter of considerable time and exertion.

Here I must point out a very simple strategic truth. If there are 1,000 islands and 100 valuable military key points and you put 1,000 men on every one of them or whatever it may be, the Power that has the command of the sea and carries with it the local command of the air, can go around to every one of these places in turn, destroy or capture their garrisons, ravage and pillage them, ensconce themselves wherever they think fit, and then pass on with their circus to the next place. It would be vain to suppose that such an attack could be met by local defence. You might disperse 1,000,000 men over these immense areas and yet only provide more prey to the dominant Power. On the other hand, these conditions will be reversed when the balance of sea power and air power changes, as it will surely change.

Such is the phase of the Pacific war into which we have now entered. I cannot tell how long it will last. All I can tell the House it that it will be attended by very heavy punishment which we shall have to endure, and that presently, if we persevere, as I said just now about the Russian front, the boot will be on the other leg. That is why we should not allow ourselves to get rattled because this or that place has been captured, because, once the ultimate power of the United Nations has been brought to bear, the opposite process will be brought into play, and will move forward remorselessly to the final conclusion, provided that we persevere, provided that we fight with the utmost vigour and tenacity, and provided, above all, that we remain united.

Here I should like to express, in the name of the House, my admiration of the splendid courage and quality with which the small American Army, under General MacArthur, has resisted brilliantly for so long, at desperate odds, the hordes of Japanese who have been hurled against them by superior air power and superior sea power. Amid our own troubles, we sent out to General MacArthur and his soldiers, and also to the Filipinos, who are defending their native soil with vigour and courage, our salute across those wide spaces which we and the United States will presently rule again together. Nor must I fail to pay a tribute, in the name of
the House, to the Dutch, who, in the air and with their submarines, their surface craft, and their solid fighting troops, are playing one of the main parts in the struggle now going on in the Malaysian Archipelago.

We have to turn our eyes for a moment to the hard-fought battle which is raging upon the approaches to Singapore and in the Malay Peninsula. I am not going to make any forecast about that now, except that it will be fought to the last inch by the British, Australian and Indian troops, which are in the line together, and which have been very considerably reinforced. The hon. Member for the Eye Division of Suffolk (Mr. Granville) had a very sound military idea the other day, when he pointed out the importance of sending reinforcements of aircraft to assist our ground forces at Singapore and in Burma. I entirely agree with him. In fact, we anticipated his suggestion. Before I left for the United States, on 12th December, the moment, that is to say, when the situation in Singapore and Pearl Harbour had disclosed itself, it was possible to make a swift redistribution of our Forces. The moment was favourable. General Auchinleck was making headway in Cyrenaica; the Russian front not only stood unbroken but had begun the advance in a magnificent counter-attack, and we were able to order a large number of measures, which there is no need to elaborate, but which will be capable of being judged by their results as the next few weeks and the next few months unfold in the Far East.

When I reached the United States, accompanied by our principal officers and large technical staffs, further important steps were taken by the President, with my cordial assent, and with the best technical advice we could obtain, to move from many directions everything that ships could carry and all air power that could be flown transported and serviced to suitable points. The House would be very ill-advised to suppose that the seven weeks which have passed since 7th December have been weeks of apathy and indecision for the English-speaking world. Odd as it may seem quite a lot has been going on. But we must not nourish or indulge light and extravagant hopes or suppose that the advantages which the enemy have gained can soon or easily be taken from him. However, to sum up the bad and the good together, in spite of the many tragedies past and future, and with all pity for those who have suffered and will suffer, I must profess my profound thankfulness for what has happened throughout the whole world in the last two months.

I now turn for a short space—I hope I am not unduly wearying the House, but I feel that the war has become so wide that there are many aspects that must be regarded—to the question of the organisation, the international, inter-Allied or inter-United Nations organisation, which must be developed to meet the fact that we are a vast confederacy. To hear some people talk, however, one would think that the way to win the war is to make sure that every Power contributing armed forces and every branch of these armed forces is represented on all the councils and organisations which have to be set up, and that everybody is fully consulted before anything is done. That is in fact the most sure way to lose a war. You have to be aware of the well-known danger of having "more harness than horse," to quote a homely expression. Action to be successful must rest in the fewest number of hands possible. Nevertheless, now that we are working in the closest partnership with the United States and have also to consider our Alliance with Russia and with China, as well as the bonds which unite us with the rest of the 26 United Nations and with our Dominions, it is evident that our system must become far more complex than hitherto.

I had many discussions with the President upon the Anglo-American war direction, especially as it affects this war against Japan, to which Russia is not yet a party. The physical and geographical difficulties of finding a common working centre for the leaders of nations and the great staffs of nations which cover the whole globe are insuperable. Whatever plan is made will be open to criticism and many valid objections. There is no solution that can be found where the war can be discussed from day to day fully by all the leading military and political authorities concerned. I have, however, arranged with President Roosevelt that there should be a body in Washington called the Combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee, consisting of the three United States Chiefs of the Staff, men of the highest distinction, and three high officers representing and acting under the general instructions
[The Prime Minister.]

of the British Chiefs of the Staff Committee in London. This body will advise the President, and in the event of divergence of view between the British and American Chiefs of the Staff or their representatives, the difference must be adjusted by personal agreement between him and me as representing our respective countries. We must also concert together the closest association with Premier Stalin and Generalsissimo Chiang Kai-Shek as well as with the rest of the Allied and Associated Powers. We shall, of course, also remain in the closest touch with one another on all important questions of policy.

In order to wage the war effectively against Japan, it was agreed that I should propose to those concerned the setting-up of a Pacific Council in London, on the Ministerial plane, comprising Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch Government. Assisted by the British Chiefs of the Staff and the great staffs organisations beneath them, I was to try to form and focus a united view. This would enable the British Commonwealth to act as a whole and form part of plans—plans which are at present far advanced—for collaboration at the appropriate levels in the spheres of defence, foreign affairs and supply. Thus the united view of the British Commonwealth and the Dutch would be transmitted, at first, on the Chiefs of the Staff level, to the Combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee sitting in Washington. In the event of differences between the members of the Pacific Council in London, dissentient opinions would also be transmitted. In the event of differences between the London and Washington bodies, it would be necessary for the President and me to reach an agreement. I must point out that it is necessary for everybody to reach an agreement, for nobody can compel anybody else.

The Dutch Government, which is seated in London, might be willing to agree to this arrangement, but the Australian Government desired and the New Zealand Government preferred that this Council of the Pacific should be in Washington where it would work alongside the Combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee. I have therefore transmitted the views of these two Dominions to the President, but I have not yet received, nor do I expect for a few days to receive, his reply. I am not, therefore, in a position to-day to announce, as I had hoped, the definite and final arrangements for the Pacific Council.

I should like to say, however, that underlying these structural arrangements are some very practical and simple facts upon which there is full agreement. The Supreme Commander has assumed control of the fighting areas in the South-West Pacific called the "A.B.D.A." area—A. B. D. A.—called after the countries which are involved, not the countries which are in the area but the countries which are involved in that area, namely, America, Britain, Dutch and Australasia. We do not propose to burden the Supreme Commander with frequent instructions. He has his general orders, and he has addressed himself with extraordinary buoyancy to his most difficult task, and President Roosevelt and I, representing, for my part, the British Government, are determined that he shall have a chance and a free hand to carry it out. The action in the Straits of Macassar undertaken by forces assigned to this area apparently has had very considerable success, of the full extent of which I am not yet advised. The manner in which General Wavell took up his task, the speed with which he has flown from place to place, the telegrams which he has sent describing the methods by which he was grappling with the situation and the forming of the central organism which was needed to deal with it—all this has made a most favourable impression upon the high officers, military and political, whom I met in the United States. This is all going on. Our duty, upon which we have been constantly engaged for some time, is to pass reinforcements of every kind, especially air, into the new war zone, from every quarter and by every means, with the utmost speed.

In order to extend the system of unified command which has been set up in the "A.B.D.A." area—that is to say, the South-West Pacific—where the actual fighting is going on, in order to extend that system to all areas in which the forces of more than one of the United Nations—because that is the term we have adopted—will be operating, the Eastward approaches to Australia and New Zealand have been styled the Anzac area, and are under United States command, the communications between the Anzac area and
America are a United States responsibility, while the communications across the Indian Ocean and from India remain a British responsibility. All this is now working, while the larger constitutional, or semi-constitutional, discussions and structural arrangements are being elaborated by telegrams passing to and fro between so many Governments. All this is now working fully and actively from hour to hour, and it must not, therefore, be supposed that any necessary military action has been held up pending the larger structural arrangements which I have mentioned.

Now I come to the question of our own Empire or Commonwealth of Nations. The fact that Australia and New Zealand are in the immediate danger zone reinforces the demand that they should be represented in the War Cabinet of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We have always been ready to form an Imperial War Cabinet containing the Prime Ministers of the four Dominions. Whenever any of them have come here they have taken their seats at our table as a matter of course. Unhappily, it has not been possible to get them all here together at once. General Smuts may not be able to come over from South Africa, and Mr. Mackenzie King could unfortunately stay only for a short time. But Mr. Fraser was with us, and it was a great pleasure to have him, and we had a three months' visit from Mr. Menzies, which was also a great success, and we were all very sorry when his most valuable knowledge of our affairs and the war position, and his exceptional abilities, were lost. For the last three months we have had Sir Earle Page representing the Commonwealth Government at Cabinets when war matters and Australian matters were under discussion and also, in similar circumstances upon the Defence Committee. As a matter of fact this has always been interpreted in the most broad and elastic fashion. The Australian Government have now asked specifically "that an accredited representative of the Commonwealth Government should have the right to be heard in the War Cabinet in the formulation and the direction of policy." We have of course agreed to this. New Zealand feels bound to ask for similar representation, and the same facilities will of course be available to Canada and South Africa. The presence at the Cabinet table of Dominion representatives who have no power to take decisions and can only report to their Governments evidently raises some serious problems but none, I trust, which cannot be got over with good will. It must not, however, be supposed that in any circumstances the presence of Dominion representatives for certain purposes could in any way affect the collective responsibility of His Majesty's Servants in Great Britain to Crown and Parliament.

I am sure we all sympathise with our kith and kin in Australia now that the shield of British and American sea power has, for the time being, been withdrawn from them so unexpectedly and so tragically and now that hostile bombers may soon be within range of Australian shores. We shall not put any obstacle to the return of the splendid Australian troops who volunteered for Imperial service to defend their own homeland or whatever part of the Pacific theatre may be thought most expedient. We are taking many measures in conjunction with the United States to increase the security of Australia and New Zealand and to send them reinforcements, arms and equipment by the shortest and best routes. I always hesitate to express opinions about the future, because things turn out so very oddly, but I will go so far as to say that it may be that the Japanese, whose game is what I may call "to make hell while the sun shines," are more likely to occupy themselves in securing their rich prizes in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and the Malayan Archipelago and in seizing island bases for defensive purposes for the attack which is obviously coming towards them at no great distance of time—a tremendous onslaught which will characterise the future in 1942 and 1943. [An Hon. Member: "1944 and 1945?"] No, I do not think we can stretch our views beyond those dates, but, again, we must see how we go. I think they are much more likely to be arranging themselves in those districts which they have taken or are likely to take than to undertake a serious mass invasion of Australia. That would seem to be a very ambitious overseas operation for Japan to undertake in the precarious and limited interval before the British and American navies regain—as they must certainly regain, through the new building that is advancing, and for other reasons—the unquestionable command of the Pacific Ocean. However, everything in human power that we can do to help Australia, or persuade America
to do, we will do; and meanwhile I trust that reproaches and recriminations of all kinds will be avoided, and that if any are made, we in Britain will not take part in them.

Let me, in conclusion, return to the terrific changes which have occurred in our affairs during the last few months and particularly in the last few weeks. We have to consider the prospects of the war in 1942 and also in 1943, and, as I said just now, it is not useful to look further ahead than that. The moment that the United States was set upon and attacked by Japan, Germany and Italy—that is to say, within a few days of December 7, 1941—I was sure it was my duty to cross the Atlantic and establish the closest possible relationship with the President and Government of the United States, and also to develop the closest contacts, personal and professional, between the British Chiefs of Staff and their trans-Atlantic deputies, and with the American Chiefs of Staff who were there to meet them.

Having crossed the Atlantic, it was plainly my duty to visit the great Dominion of Canada. The House will have read with admiration and deep interest the speech made by the Prime Minister of Canada yesterday on Canada’s great and growing contribution to the common cause in men, in money, and in materials. A notable part of that contribution is the financial offer which the Canadian Government have made to this country. The sum involved in one billion Canadian dollars, about £225,000,000. I know the House will wish me to convey to the Government of Canada our lively appreciation of their timely and most generous offer. It is unequalled in its scale in the whole history of the British Empire, and it is a convincing proof of the determination of Canada to make her maximum contribution towards the successful prosecution of the war.

During those three weeks which I spent in Mr. Roosevelt’s home and family, I established with him relations not only of comradeship, but, I think I may say, of friendship. We can say anything to each other, however painful. When we parted he wrung my hand, saying, ‘We will fight this through to the bitter end, whatever the cost may be.’ Behind him rises the gigantic and hitherto unmobilised gigantic power of the people of the United States, carrying with them in their life and death struggle the entire, or almost the entire, Western hemisphere.

At Washington, we and our combined staffs surveyed the entire scene of the war, and we reached a number of important practical decisions. Some of them affect future operations and cannot, of course, be mentioned, but others have been made public by declaration or by events. The vanguard of an American Army has already arrived in the United Kingdom. Very considerable forces are following as opportunity may serve. These forces will take their station in the British Isles and face with us whatever is coming our way. They impart a freedom of movement to all forces in the British Isles greater than we could otherwise have possessed. Numerous United States fighter and bomber squadrons will also take part in the defence of Britain and in the ever-increasing bombing offensive against Germany. The United States Navy is linked in the most intimate union with the Admiralty, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. We shall plan our Naval moves together as if we were literally one people.

In the next place, we formed this league of 26 United Nations in which the principal partners at the present time are Great Britain and the British Empire, the United States, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of Russia, and the Republic of China, together with the stout-hearted Dutch, and the representatives of the rest of the 26 Powers. This Union is based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It aims at the destruction of Hitlerism in all its forms and manifestations in every corner of the globe. We will march forward together until every vestige of this villainy has been extirpated from the life of the world.

Thirdly, as I have explained at some length, we addressed ourselves to the war against Japan and to the measures to be taken to defend Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and India against Japanese attack or invasion.

Fourthly, we have established, a vast common pool of weapons and munitions, of raw materials and of shipping, the outline of which has been set forth in a series of memoranda which I have intimated with the President. I had a talk with him last night on the telephone, as a result
of which an announcement has been made in the early hours of this morning in the United States, and I have a White Paper for the House which will be available, I think, in a very short time. Many people have been staggered by the figures of prospective American output of war weapons which the President announced to Congress, and the Germans have affected to regard them with incredulity. I can only say that Lord Beaverbrook and I were made acquainted beforehand with all the bases upon which these colossal programmes were founded, and that I myself heard President Roosevelt confide their specific tasks to the chiefs of American industry and I heard these men accept their prodigious tasks and declare that they would and could fulfil them.

Most important of all is the multiplication of our joint tonnage at sea. The American programmes were already vast. They have been increased in the proportion of 100 to nearly 160. If they are completed, as completed I believe they will be, we shall be able to move across the ocean spaces in 1943 two, three or even four times as large armies as the considerable forces we are able to handle at sea at the present time.

I expect—and I have made no secret of it—that we shall both of us receive severe ill-usage at the hands of the Japanese in 1942, but I believe we shall presently regain the naval command of the Pacific and begin to establish an effective superiority in the air, and then later on, with the great basic areas in Australasia, in India and in the Dutch East Indies, we shall be able to set about our task in good style in 1943. It is no doubt true that the defeat of Japan will not necessarily entail the defeat of Hitler, whereas the defeat of Hitler would enable the whole forces of the united nations to be concentrated upon the defeat of Japan. But there is no question of regarding the war in the Pacific as a secondary operation. The only limitation applied to its vigorous prosecution will be the shipping available at any given time.

It is most important that we should not overlook the enormous contribution of China to this struggle for world freedom and democracy. If there is any lesson I have brought back from the United States that I could express in one word, it would be "China." That is in all their minds. When we feel the sharp military qualities of the Japanese soldier in contact with our own troops, although of course very few have as yet been engaged, we must remember that China, ill-armed or half-armed, has, for four and a half years, single handed, under its glorious leader Chiang Kai-shek, withstood the main fury of Japan. We shall pursue the struggle hand in hand with China, and do everything in our power to give them arms and supplies, which is all they need to vanquish the invaders of their native soil and play a magnificent part in the general forward movement of the United Nations.

Although I feel the broadening swell of victory and liberation bearing us all and the tortured peoples onwards safely to the final goal, I must confess to feeling the weight of the war upon me even more than in the tremendous summer days of 1940. There are so many fronts which are open, so many vulnerable points to defend, so many inevitable misfortunes, so many shrill voices raised to take advantage, now that we can breathe more freely, of all the turns and twists of war. Therefore, I feel entitled to come to the House of Commons, whose servant I am, and ask them not to press me to act against my conscience and better judgment and make scapegoats in order to improve my own position, not to press me to do the things which may be clamoured for at the moment but which will not help in our war effort, but, on the contrary, to give me their encouragement and to give me their aid. I have never ventured to predict the future. I stand by my original programme, blood, toil, tears and sweat, which is all I have ever offered, to which I added, five months later, "many shortcomings, mistakes and disappointments." But it is because I see the light gleaming behind the clouds and broadening on our path, that I make so bold now as to demand a declaration of confidence of the House of Commons as an additional weapon in the armory of the united nations.

Mr. Pethick-Lawrence (Edinburgh, East): The Prime Minister has drawn, in his own inimitable manner, a comprehensive picture of what has been happening all over the world during the last six weeks while he has been away from us, and of all the dispositions that have been made for the major control of the war. I have no intention of attempting to embellish, still less to repudiate, that picture. What I propose to do is to attempt to
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See Page 2
18 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MITCHELL:

Pursuant to your request there are inclosed herewith the Magic messages from the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, transmitting the documents handed to him by the Secretary of State on 26 November 1941.

Harmon Duncombe
Lt. Col., GSC

Incls.
From: Washington (Nomura)  
To: Tokyo  
November 26, 1941.  
Purple. (English text)  

1192. (Part 1 of 4)  
Oral.  
Strictly confidential.  

November 26, 1941.  

The representatives of the government of the United States and of the government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months [informal] and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relative to the entire Pacific area based upon principles of justice and fairness which would enable them either to accept the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equal access to commercial opportunities and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and coordination. For all these purposes and others not controverted by the representatives of the nations concerned and

ARMY  
SECRET
From: Washington (Nemuru)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple (English Text)
(Extremely Urgent)


It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary "modus vivendi" could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purpose above indicated.
SECRET

From: Washington (Nemuro)  
To: Tokyo  
November 28, 1941  
Purple (English Text)  
Extremely Urgent

§1102. Part 3 of 4.

To be handled in government code.

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each government has declared that it is committed.

The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of view in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.
From: Washington (Nemura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

§1192. (Extremely urgent) (Part 4 of 4)

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers
for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but
simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exempli-
fication of a program which this Government envisages as something to be
worked out during our further conversations.

The plan herein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap
between our draft of June 21, 1942 and the Japanese draft of September 25th
by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehen-
sive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the
practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in
our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international
relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of
minds between our two Governments may be expedited.
From: Washington (Secret)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
(Part 1 of 2)

Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States
and Japan.

Section 1.
Draft mutual declaration of policy.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national
policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the
Pacific area, that they have no territorial design in that area, that they
have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force
aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in
their national policies they will actively support and give practical ap-
lication to the following fundamental principles upon which their rela-
tions with each other and with all other governments are based:

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and
sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs
of other countries.

(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial
opportunity and treatment.

SECRET

ARMY

Trans. 11-29-41 (1)
From: Washington (Yamaura)  
To: Tokyo  
November 26, 1941.  
Purple. (English text)  

¶193. (Part 2 of 2)  

4. The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and peaceful settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes; the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

(2) The principle of internal economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lead aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit
payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.
From: Washington (Nomura)  
To: Tokyo  
November 26, 1941.  
Purple. (English text)

#1194. (Extremely urgent) (Part 1 of 4)

Secret file.

To be handled in government code.

Section 2.

Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan:

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement whereby each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.
SECRET

From: Washington (Knowles)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

File 194. (Extremely urgent) (Part 2 of 4)

Secret outside the Department.
To be handled in Government Code.

Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support — militarily, politically, economically — any Government or regime in China other than the national government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
SECRET

From: Washington (Nemura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.
From: Washington (Manara)  
To: Tokyo  
November 26, 1941.  
Purple. (English text)

\#1194. (Extremely urgent) (Part 4 of 4)

Secret outside the department.

To be handled in Government Code.

8. Both Governments will agree upon applying the stabilization
of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose,
half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has con-
cluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to
conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment
and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments
to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political
and economic principles set forth in this agreement.
Hornbeck is anxious to have you read this. The high ranking officer mentioned is Adm. Richardson.
I think the paper is slightly Academic.

I have read.

I feel that in the evolving of the thought of which record is made in this memorandum, I have brought into clearer light than any in which I had seen it before a point which is, I feel, of fundamental importance in connection with any and all of our deliberations regarding courses to be taken in the field of major policy in regard to the Far East: a point which has to do with something that is definitely and inescapably fundamental. I am sure that you will not begrudge the time which it will take for you to read the memorandum.

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

(Hand printed note:) Return to Op-13.

JULY 12, 1940.

In the course of a conversation yesterday with a high ranking officer of the Navy, there was put to me this question: Is there an irresolvable conflict of interests and policies between the United States and Japan?
I replied to this effect: There is today a fundamental conflict between the United States and Japan as regards major objectives and the policies which prevail, respectively, in consequence thereof and in regard thereto. This conflict can be resolved only by an abandonment on the part of one country or the other of those objectives and policies which it envisages and by which it proceeds at the present time. The United States has as its objectives: prevalence within and between and among nations of peace; prevalence of rules and provisions of law; prevalence of practices of justice; prevalence of practices of order; procedure by commitments and respect therefor; prevalence of equality of opportunity in terms of fair treatment; respect for rights of nations and of individuals; and due regard for interests of nations and [2] of individuals. Japan (the Japanese military leadership) has as its objectives today; spread and extension of Japanese political authority and economic control into and over areas outside of and beyond the boundaries of the present Japanese Empire (some of which areas are inhabited by independent nations and some of which are dependencies of other independent countries—but in none of which there is a Japanese population at present of more than a comparatively insignificant minority); a setting up by whatever means, positive or negative, may seem likely to contribute thereto, of a Japanese hegemony in eastern Asia and the western and southern Pacific; the working out of a "divine Destiny" which in the minds of not a few Japanese envisages first a vast Japanese empire in the Orient and ultimately a world supremacy for Japan's "Divine Emperor". These objectives are in fundamental conflict, globally and in detail.

In the case of the United States, the objectives stated are the objectives of the whole American people. In the case of Japan, the objectives stated are those of an essentially feudal leadership, the "military element", which comprises probably less than ten percent of the nation, which includes probably a majority of those Japanese who are descendants of the fighting men (the Daimyo and the Samurai) of the pre-restoration (1867) era, the spearhead among which is a considerable number of chauvinists among [3] the Army officer personnel and to a less extent among the Navy officer personnel, which leadership makes the nation's decisions and carries the nation with it.

The policies which are those of the United States are representative of the fundamental thoughts and beliefs and attitude of the people of the United States during the whole century and half of our national existence. Their roots run far back into the past. They run back to the days of Magna Charta, the days of John Hampden, the days of Oliver Cromwell, the days of the Pilgrims and the Cavaliers, the days of the Boston Tea Party and the Declaration of Independence, the days of Washington and Jefferson and John Paul Jones and James Monroe and Andrew Jackson; the days of the French Revolution; the days of emigration from Europe of the German liberals; the days of the Civil War; the days of our
liberation of Cuba; the days of our participation in the World War with popular enthusiasm for the ideas of fighting to end wars and to make the world safe for democracy: they are policies which in a general way express the thought and the aspirations, inherited by and developed under conditions of freedom in the minds of practically all of the 130 million persons who constitute the people of the United States. The policies which are those of Japan have no such universal and no such [4] deep-rooted acceptance in and among the 90 million persons who constitute the people of the Japanese Empire.

There is warrant for a belief that the conflict between American and Japanese objectives and policies is not irresolvable. There is warrant for belief that one or the other of the countries might in course of time give up its present objectives and policies.

Where does the greater possibility, as regards relinquishment, lie? In giving consideration to that question, thought should be given to the comparative qualities of the two sets of objectives and policies. Which of the two is the more sound? Which of the two is more fundamental from points of view of human nature, of morality, et cetera? Then, consideration should be given to historical facts. It is a fact that the attitude, the objectives and the policies of the American people are a product of a long course of forward-looking evolution. It is a fact that the Japanese nation made in 1867 a substantial break with its own past, and that during the last eight decades has looked upon life of the Japanese people and matters of the practical politics of the Japanese State have undergone substantial change. To make a long matter short, is there not warrant for believing that a change in objectives and in policies by and on the part of Japan would be much easier and is much more readily conceivable than would be and is a change of the objectives and policies of the United States?

[5] How would (could) a change on Japan's part be brought about? If Japanese armed forces succeed in conquering China, taking Indochina, taking the Netherland East Indies, taking the Malay States, taking Thailand (Siam) and Burma, ultimately taking the Philippines, et cetera, et cetera, no change is likely. The conflict between Japanese interests and objectives and policies and those of the United States would continue and become intensified. But if Japan's efforts in China were to fail, if Japan's efforts to establish a great empire in the Far East were to be thwarted, if Japan's military leadership were to be in course of time discredited in the eyes of the middle classes and the common people of Japan, it is conceivable that the Japanese nation might work out a modification or even a reversal of Japan's objectives and policies.

It should be remembered that three centuries ago a great Japanese leader started out to conquer China and that ultimately the Japanese nation gave up that idea. It should be remembered that not long after the Japanese Army and Navy had withdrawn from Korea, another great Japanese leader decided to make Japan an isolated and secluded hermit nation: be forbade, to all intent and purposes, political, economic or cultural intercourse between Japan and the outside world.

[6] The present conflict between Japanese and American objectives and policies is not irresolvable. There is little possibility, however, that the objectives and policies of the American people will be given up. Moreover, an abandonment of them would not resolve the conflict—for, an adoption, by the United States, in substitution for them, of objectives and policies similar to or identical with those of Japan would be impossible, and, if not impossible and if made, would merely create greater conflict. But an abandonment of Japan's present objectives and policies is a thing by no means impossible; is a thing which, if made, would admit of an adoption by Japan of policies similar to those of the United States, which adoption, if made and if lived up to, would resolve the whole conflict.

Surrender of the American objectives and policies in favor of Japan would serve no useful purpose. Maintenance of the American objectives and policies, patient but unremitting resistance by the United States and by other countries to Japan's efforts at conquest, has within it the possibility of an ultimate resolving of the conflicts between the objectives and policies of Japan and the objectives and policies of the United States (and those of several other countries).
EXHIBIT NO. 96

JULY 16, 1940.

It is my thought that you might find interesting the papers here attached. If so, and if you should feel so disposed, perhaps you would care to send the memorandum on to the Chief of Naval Operations.

You will note that there are on these papers no identifying marks. I think that it would be well to give no indication of source. The material stands or falls on its own merits without reference to authorship or location of the authors.

(Stamped :) CONFIDENTIAL

(Hand printed :) Return to Op-13 Room 2058.

REFLECTIONS ON CERTAIN FEATURES OF THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION AND CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF U. S. FAR EASTERN POLICY. JULY 4, 1940.

I. General Observations.

The situation in the Pacific is one in which, on the one hand Japan and China are engaged in armed hostilities in the course of which Japanese armed forces have been and are doing violence to American lives and property and the Japanese Government by official acts is impairing American rights and interests, while on the other hand there is constant, though not now acute, tension in relations between Japan and the United States; it has been and is the policy of the United States to discourage and to oppose the course which Japan is following; it is generally agreed that diplomatic representations by the American Government, together with the termination of the treaty of 1911 upon this Government's initiative, and the moves which this Government has made in disposal of its naval forces, have exercised some restraining influence upon Japan; it is now notorious that a strong element in Japan's leadership advocates a move by the Japanese armed forces toward seizure of French Indo-China and/or the Dutch East Indies, and that the said element has strong support among the Japanese populace; it is the estimate of various observers that the presence of the U. S. Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor weighs heavily in Japan's deliberations with regard to the question of the Dutch East Indies and other new moves of aggression; the most effective opposition at the present moment to Japan's program of imperialistic expansion is the resistance which is being made by the Chinese; the Government and the people of the United States desire that the Chinese resistance be not overcome and the Japanese effort to gain control of China be not successful; and the policy and the acts of the United States during recent years have given encouragement and support to the Chinese policy of resistance, have strengthened Chinese morale, and have contributed to the facts that the Chinese have refused to negotiate a compromise settlement and the Japanese have not been able to gain an undisputed control of China or any part of China.

For seventy-five years the Germans, acting politically and as a nation, have given evidence that those elements which exercise decisive leadership of the German people believe in and rely upon force as the most effective and the conclusive instrumentality in international relations. For forty-five years the Japanese, acting politically and as a state, have given evidence that those elements which exercise decisive leadership of the Japanese people believe in and rely upon force as the most effective and the conclusive instrumentality in international relations.

[3] Modern Germany was brought into existence in 1870 through Bismarck's success in pursuing his policy of "Eisen und Blut". The present Japanese Empire has been developed since 1867 by a process of accumulation under threat of force and/or application of force: first, seizure of nearby islands; next, war upon China and acquisition of Formosa and the Pescadores; next, war upon Russia and occupation of South Manchuria; next, gradual occupation followed by sudden annexation of Korea; next, seizure of Shantung and the now Japanese Mandated Islands in the Pacific; next, the occupation of all of Manchuria and Jehol; and now the effort to conquer China.

During the last ten years Japanese leadership has given ample evidence, for all who are willing to divest themselves of preconceived theories and natural prejudices, of their high regard for force and low regard for moral principles.
legal precepts, and/or constructual obligations, in international relations. Since 1933 Nazi leadership has done the same—but with greater intensity.

In 1931 the Japanese resorted to the use of force against China. Neither the League of Nations nor any of its members were willing to take any forceful effective steps toward stopping the Japanese. Nor was the United States willing to take any such steps. The Japanese went ahead, and, by use of force, attained not only their objective but more than what they had had in contemplation at that stage. In 1934 the Italians resorted to use of force and found that neither the League of Nations nor any of the world powers, including the United States, were willing to use force to stop them. The Italians achieved all that they had set out to achieve. In 1937 the Japanese decided to take the next step in a program to which their leadership has long been committed in principle, another step in a program which envisages many more steps extending far into the future. They attacked China. They occupied considerable portions of China. Neither the League of Nations nor any great power has seen fit forcefully to oppose them. The only resistance by force that has been made to Japan's program of use of force is that which has been and is being made by the Chinese.

In 1932 the British Government asked the Japanese Government for a pledge that the Japanese Government would respect the principle of the "open door" in Manchuria, and, having been given by the Japanese Government that pledge, the British Government declared itself satisfied. In 1935 certain British and French statesmen collaborated in secret and were prepared to make to Italy a proposal for a compromise in regard to Ethiopia. World opinion ruled that proposal out. Had that proposal been made to Mussolini, there is little reason for anyone believing that it would have been accepted. Had it been made and been accepted, there is little warrant, in the light of subsequent events, for any supposition that Mussolini would later have been restrained by his acceptance of it. In 1938 Mr. Chamberlain made an agreement with Herr Hitler. Almost immediately Hitler completely disregarded his part of the agreement and went forward with steps in a program which is conceived in terms of force and is being carried out in terms of force.

The Government and the people of the United States are committed by a long tradition to the principle of opposing conquest. They are likewise committed to the principle of supporting international law. They are committed by a considerable number of treaties to the principle of respecting the sovereignty and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. They are committed both by treaty and by unilateral declarations (of several Administrations) to the principle of respecting the rights and interests of all concerned in and with regard to China. They are committed by declarations of the last preceding and the present Administration to the principle of refusing to recognize (i.e. to give technical recognition to) certain types of change brought about by certain specified methods in the situation in the Far East.

The situation in the Far East, as between Japan and China, has for some months past been developing along the lines which tend to confirm the estimates upon which United States policy in this period has in large part been based. Chinese resistance has been maintained; the Japanese have been unable to bring matters to a conclusion at any point; processes of attrition have been affecting the Japanese more adversely than the Chinese; the Japanese people have developed doubts; Japanese resources have become constantly more slender; the possibility of a gradual dissolution of the Japanese effort to conquer China has constantly increased. If the United States and the British Government will but permit "Nature" to take its course, with a little help by giving some assistance to China and withholding some assistance from Japan, there is more than an even chance that the present Japanese effort to conquer China will be brought to an end, adversely to Japan, by processes of attrition and concomitants thereof.

II. Retention of U. S. Fleet in the Pacific.

The Battle Fleet is at present in the Pacific. It is based in major part on Pearl Harbor. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet is in the Far Eastern Waters.

An order by the American Government for the U. S. Battle Fleet to leave the Pacific would be equivalent to a notification to the Japanese and the Chinese that the United States substantially abandons, for the time being at least, its effort to influence the course of events as between Japan and China. It would tremendously strengthen Japanese morale and (probably disastrously) weaken Chinese morale. It would give assurance to the Japanese Army in China that opportunity exists for it to go as far as it may be able with not only the Chinese
but also American and other foreign nationals, foreign properties, foreign rights and foreign interests in China. It would give assurance to the Japanese Navy that opportunity exists for it to go as far as it may be able with foreign terri-
torial possessions in the Pacific. It would encourage the Japanese toward thinking seriously even of closing in upon Singapore and of stirring up trouble in India. It might resolve such doubts as many Japanese entertain of the advisability of a closer association with Germany. It would make Japan the one and only great power exercising effective influence in the area of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, in the whole area westward from the Panama Canal and east-
ward from Suez and the Cape of Good Hope. It would leave the United States exposed on the West Coast; it would leave Mexico and Central America exposed; it would leave the whole west coast of South America exposed. It would make it difficult if not impossible for any countries other than the United States to venture upon exerting of economic pressures against or in resistance to Japan; and it would increase such dangers to the United States as are or might be
involved in the exerting by the United States of such pressures or resistance.

But, assume the order to have been given, assume the Fleet to have left the Pacific (with the flow of consequences which its departure would have), assume that the transit of the Canal to have been made successfully.—What disposal would be made in the Atlantic of this Fleet, and what necessary and useful purposes would that disposal be expected to serve? Would the expectation be that the Fleet be sent to European waters? Would the expectation be that, if sent there, it would be used for combat purposes? Would the expectation be that, the Fleet being kept in American waters, the mere presence of the Fleet in the Atlantic would in any way deter the Germans and Italians from the courses which they are pursuing in Europe or would in any way be of assistance to the British in their resistance? Would the expectation be that the pres-
ence of the Fleet in the Atlantic would deter the Germans and Italians from launching attacks in the near future upon some part or parts of the Western Hemisphere? Would the expectation be that the Fleet would soon be needed for the purpose of defending this Hemisphere against such attacks definitely launched?

It would unquestionably be detrimental to the interests in the Pacific of the Allied Powers and their benevolent associate (the United States) for the United States to withdraw its Battle Fleet, at this early moment, from the Pacific. But mere transfer by the United States of its Battle Fleet to the Atlantic would in no way benefit the cause, at this moment, of the Allied Powers and the United States in connection with and in regard to the present phase of the armed conflict between the British and Germany. The German menace to the United States, while very real, is not yet direct, and it cannot short of several weeks or months become a physical reality. The United States Fleet has been and is needed in the Pacific; it is not yet needed in the Atlantic; and, if moved from the Pacific to the Atlantic at this moment, it could not in the Atlantic serve purposes equivalent to or more important than those which it has been and is serving in the Pacific.

Hitler still has some fighting to do in Europe. It is possible that within a short time England may, following the fate and the example of France, have to sue for peace. It is possible that the British Navy will be sunk. At the worst, Hitler may possibly gain complete control of Great Britain and acquire what remains of both the French and the British fleets. That, however, will not have happened by tomorrow morning and is not likely to have happened by the morning of a week from tomorrow.

The logical course for Hitler and Mussolini to follow is: Pursue to the end their armed conflict with Great Britain; make sure, either by diplomacy or by armed force, of the security of their rear, that is, make solid their relationships, for better or for worse, with the Soviet Union; consider and deal with what-
ever problems may remain as regards Sweden, Switzerland, the Balkans, Turkey and the Mediterranean; meanwhile, reorganize and improve their battered though victorious armed forces; consolidate administratively their position in and over the areas which they have conquered; recondition whatever implements and munitions of war they may capture; take care of various economic and social problems which are already acute and bound to be more so, such as the feeding and the clothing of the people of Germany and the peoples of the con-
erquered territories; make adequate preparations for an ultimate attack upon points in the Western Hemisphere, which attack, if prematurely made, would be almost sure to be challenged by the United States and would absolutely ensure
embarkation by the United States upon an enormous program of armament; meanwhile, wage a diplomatic and propagandist campaign, based upon and centered in assurances that Germany and Italy are satiated and are satisfied, have no further territorial objectives, are prepared to maintain peace in Europe and to be at peace with the rest of the world, and are in no way whatever a menace to the security or the prosperity or the general welfare of the Western Hemisphere and least of all to those of the United States.

Neither Hitler nor Mussolini nor both are going to [10] attack Latin America or the United States in the near future—certainly not within the next few weeks. If by any chance they should send over some sort of an expedition, their having done so would be "all to the good" so far as effect upon public opinion in this Hemisphere, and especially in the United States, is concerned. It would help to wake up a lot of people who are still only half awake and some more who are still sound asleep. From the point of view of general and particular political effects, we should welcome the making by Hitler or Mussolini of such a mistake. They will not make it.

Unless we are prepared to take the offensive, in support of Great Britain, in Europe, against Hitler, or unless we would expect to be so prepared before or by the time that our Fleet could arrive in the Atlantic, there does not exist today any good reason, in terms of use to be made of our Battle Fleet, for moving that Fleet today or tomorrow from Pearl Harbor.—Should an unforeseen and unforeseeable emergency develop, the Fleet could be moved from Pearl Harbor to Panama, at a practicable speed, in 13 days. And transit of the Canal requires two days.

If and when Hitler and Mussolini finish off England, and if and when the British fleet is sunk or is surrendered, the moment will then have arrived for reconsidering, urgently, the question of a better (than now) disposal of [11] our Fleet. Meanwhile, our Fleet stands on guard, as it has for some time past stood, in the Pacific—at Pearl Harbor, a highly strategic point. The presence of that Fleet there has exercised and is exercising a restraining influence upon Japan, discouraging new adventurings by Japan which would be adverse to American and British and French and some other countries' interests and encouraging continuance by the Chinese of their resistance to Japan. Whenever that Fleet leaves the Pacific, its departure will not only remove an obstacle to further adventuring by Japan but will actually encourage embarkation by Japan upon such adventuring; it will give Japan free rein in the Western Pacific, in the Southern Pacific and in the Indian Ocean; it will give Japan opportunity to place herself in full possession of vastly important natural resources and highways; it will enable the Japanese to complete their blockade of China; it will vastly strengthen Japanese and vastly weaken Chinese morale; it will probably mark the beginning of the end as regards China's resistance to Japan; it will enable the Japanese to send vast amounts of material to Germany and Italy; it will prepare the way for full cooperation by Japan with her Axis associates.

We may have to move our Fleet from the Pacific, and take those consequences— in due course. We do not have [12] to do it today. To do it now when there has not yet come real need for doing it would be to indicate that we are in a state of panic, not to say hysteria, that we are driven into that state by the mere thought of a possible risk of a possible attack upon some point in "our" Hemisphere; that we, not having gone to the aid of democracy in Europe, are ready to abandon the one country (China) which is "opposing force" in Asia; that, although we may be able at sometime in the future to fight, we are not able now to hold even a diplomatic position. If we were ready, now, to fight, and if we would, now, fight—to prevent the destruction of the British Fleet—we should at once move our Fleet, move it at full steam toward Europe. Not being either ready or willing, now, to do that, we should still leave our Fleet where it is until there comes a time when we can do more with it elsewhere than we are doing with it now where it now is.

If and when we do move the Fleet out of the Pacific, we should simultaneously do something substantial in the line of giving further assistance to the Chinese. We might well do some more of that momentarily and frequently. The Chinese Government has for several months past been urgently asking us for assistance. The President, in his Charlottesville address, said: "* * * we will extend to the opponents [13] of force the material resources of this nation . . . " We can no longer give assistance to France. We should be all the more in position, so far as our resources are concerned, to give assistance to China. Only Great Britain is opposing force in Europe today. Only China is opposing force in eastern Asia today. In assisting Great Britain—in whatever way—we
work for our own security. In assisting China—in whatever way—we work toward the same end. There is little that we can do about Europe now. But we can still, if we but will, do a good deal about the Far East. Unless we are prepared to fight Hitler in Europe, now, we practically abandon our position in Europe, now, because of our not being prepared to act toward safeguarding it. Our abandonment of Europe is automatic. Question then comes: Not, shall be abandon our position in Asia in order to defend our position in Europe, but, our position in Europe already having been abandoned automatically, shall our position in Asia be abandoned by our own deliberate action—for the sake of safeguarding and strengthening our position in the Western Hemisphere.

Defense of and strengthening of our position in the Western Hemisphere does not require abandonment of our position in Asia, and the objective of defending and strengthening \[14^\] of our position in the Western Hemisphere would not be best served by such an abandonment.

The unanswered question which this country must consider today is not the question what will Hitler do in regard to the Western Hemisphere after he has made himself supreme in Europe. It is what will Germany and Japan do, if and after Germany has become supreme in Europe and Japan has become supreme in the western Pacific and eastern Asia.

It is an axiom of military strategy that “the best defense is offense”. The soundness of this axiom is being demonstrated on an unprecedented scale in what has gone on in Europe recently and what is going on in Europe today; in their war plans, the Germans have built for offense; the British and—even more—the French built for defense; the Germans have taken the offensive and the British and the French fought a losing defensive battle—on French soil and with terrific defensive losses.

The vital problem which the people and the Government of the United States should be considering today is that of ways and means whereby Germany and Italy and Japan can be \[14^a\] stopped rather than that of ways and means whereby the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere may become prepared to defend this Hemisphere in a world in which, Germany and Italy and Japan not having been stopped, those three powers and their satellites will begin (in due course) directly to make assaults upon the economy, the political setup, et cetera, et cetera, of this Hemisphere—with each of those three countries feeling that it cannot be secure as long as the United States remains a great power and feeling that the common objective of the three should be to render impotent or to destroy the United States.

We should keep in mind the fact that for practical purposes the world’s great powers are today divided into two camps: on the one side are three aggressor nations—in combination: Japan, Germany, and Italy; on the other side are China, Great Britain—and the United States (Russia is in a sense a not disinterested and not unbiased bystander, temporarily associated with but not very actively assisting the three active aggressors, and capable of becoming a liability or even a belligerent enemy to them.) The United States has not become a belligerent, but it also is not an impartial neutral; its interests lie on the side of Great Britain—and China; it will more and more give assistance to Great Britain—and should do the same for China; it is opposed to the three aggressors; it will be regarded more \[14^b\] and more by each and all those aggressors as definitely and distinctly an enemy state; if the aggressors win, the United States—whether actively a belligerent or not—will thereafter be considered by the winners as having been for practical purposes an ally of the defeated powers and as a power remaining to be dealt with and disposed of (adversely) as such.

The United States has not been able by diplomacy nor by measures—including gestures—short of war to restrain Germany or Italy; but it has thus far exercised some restraining influence upon Japan and it is capable of continuing to exercise such influence.

The United States is not today in position to take the offensive (with use of force)—in the Atlantic. The United States is today in position to discourage, and to render difficult if not impossible, a move by one of the aggressors which, if attempted and if unchallenged, would place that aggressor (which is closely associated with its fellow aggressors) in undisputed control of a huge area in which there are very substantial British and French and Netherland and American political and economic interests and very substantial resources—in the Pacific.

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If the United States wishes to contribute with maximum effectiveness, within the limitations under which we now work, toward stopping Germany and her aggressor associates, and thereby toward assisting the British and improving our own position as regards long swing security, the one area in which we might operate at present by disposal or use of force is the Pacific.

A course based on the principle of merely conserving and adding to our stock of weapons—while and notwithstanding the fact that the Nazis and the Italians win in Europe and the Japanese take possession of the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean—in order that we may now guard and later defend the Western Hemisphere, will not make the world safe for the United States. It will merely mean, if the British are defeated, that we, not having gone to their aid in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, and not having safeguarded their position and ours in the Pacific, we, having let the rest of the world go under to Germany and Italy and Japan, will in the not distant thereafter have to take up arms by ourselves (with possibly some aid from some Latin American states) on the defensive, against assaults by one or two or three—but all working together—of the successful aggressor nations, those nations having then at their disposal unlimited resources, vast matériel, and a combined population of their own of 200,000,000 men and reservoirs of supplementary man power in the countries which they would have subjected.

The best defense is offense. The next best defense is preparedness to use such weapons as one may possess toward preventing one's enemies from being strengthened and preventing one's friends from being weakened. The poorest strategy of defense is that of simply building fortifications while permitting one's position to be completely encircled by a hostile combination the various units in which are daily becoming stronger and the combined forces of which will ultimately be overwhelming as regards resources and man power.

The United States could today either throw its forces in on the side of the British toward defeating the enemy combination in Europe or stand guard in the Pacific and prevent Japan from gaining control of the western Pacific, eastern Asia, and the Indian Ocean. If it does neither of these things, and if Germany, Italy and Japan win, the victorious aggressors will have before them and will give their attention to three tasks: they will have Russia to dispose of; they will have Latin America to dispose of; and they will have the United States to dispose of. If they attack Russia first, the United States will do nothing about that. If they begin assaults upon Latin America first, the United States will not be soon enough and full enough prepared to ensure against aggressor successes there. If they attack the United States first, we will be poorly equipped to stop them without initial and substantial losses to ourselves—and we would have practically no help from Latin America; we would be fighting alone against a combination which can attack both from the east and from the west; and we have only a one-ocean Navy.

This country could today make a substantial contribution toward making the world safe for the United States—and for other democracies. The United States can do little today toward preventing Hitler from becoming supreme in Europe. The United States could do much today toward preventing Japan from becoming supreme in eastern Asia. The United States can (may), of course, fall back upon and fortify its position within the Western Hemisphere. If it chooses to do this, and only this, the probability will be that, before long, weakened economically and cut off from valuable markets, especially those from which various essential raw materials are derived (in the Far East), the United States and its American associates will be confronted by material pressures, including those of armed force, not from the east alone but from the east and from the west—not by Germany alone but by Germany and Japan.

Not being ready and willing now to fight toward stopping Hitler in Europe, we surely should refrain from giving him the aid and comfort of making to him a free gift of assured access, through Japan, to the natural resources of the Far East.

III. "Making Friends" with Japan.

On May 30 the Chicago Daily Tribune published an editorial entitled "How to Double the Fleet in a Week" in which the idea was advanced that the United States and Japan can and should "come to a friendly understanding". In this editorial the Tribune said: "The best defense policy of the United States could be written within a few weeks in a renewed trade treaty with Japan. . . . In effect the strength of the fleet would be doubled by cutting half its problem away."
On June 3 the New York Daily News published an editorial under the same title as that of the Chicago Tribune's editorial of May 30. In this editorial the News stated that, while it by no means always agrees with the Chicago Tribune, the latter's editorial under reference "interests us greatly". It expressed the opinion that "by making friends with Japan" the United States can avert finding itself "menaced with urgent trouble in the Atlantic and Pacific at the same time" and "would in effect double the strength of our (its) fleet".

[16] On June 6, Mr. Lippmann in an article of that date advanced the view that the United States and Japan should "enter immediately into friendly and conciliatory and candid negotiations . . . for the avowed purpose of preserving peace in the Pacific."

On July 1, Rear Admiral Yates Stirling (Retired) expressed in an article of that date the view that the interests of the United States "lie in reaching a friendly understanding with Japan, if one can be attained." Admiral Stirling said that "history would indicate that they (the Japanese) can be stopped only by superior military force". He advocated the beginning by the United States of "negotiations for a new basic treaty with Japan" and an attempt by the United States "generally to normalize Japanese-American relations". He concluded the article with the statement that "it would seem but the part of wisdom to assure the safety of our Pacific flank if we can do so with honor."

The fallacy in the line of reasoning which leads to the conclusions thus advanced in terms of suggestion or proposal by such analysts of international relations as propose that the United States should pursue a policy of appeasement toward Japan lies in the assumed—but not stated—major premise. What such analysts assume is that a country which is bent upon and is engaged in a major [17] program of predatory acquisitive activity (Japan) and a country which is opposed to and is menaced by that kind of activity (the United States) can merely by the conclusion by their governments of an agreement become "friends"; and, further, that if the United States and Japan would thus "become friends" the United States could expect Japan to respect and to safeguard American interests (and principles) in the Far East and the Pacific.—The authors of this suggestion—and assumption—apparently believe that two strokes of a pen on one piece of paper by two diplomats will transform a predatory nation overnight into a contented, peace-loving and peace-supporting power; also, that a treaty can take the place of and do the work of a Battle Fleet.—In the case of Mr. Lippmann, we find a writer who on June 4 had expressed regarding "the conquerors" (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) the view that "... we cannot buy their good will by trying to appease them" expressing two days later with regard to Japan the view that we can not only gain Japan's good will but can make of Japan a friendly and to-be-relied-upon associate by a process of appeasement. Query: Do any of these protagonists really believe that Japan's objectives and methods are today so unlike those of Germany that the United States and Japan could be "good friends" whereas and while the United States and Germany [18] cannot possibly be friends; that the United States must in the interests of its own security oppose Germany but at the same time not only should not oppose but should aid and support Japan?

Mr. Lippmann affirms that "Japan and the United States have nothing to gain and a very great deal to lose by going to war—or even by standing opposed as if they might be going to war" and that "it follows that there is no conflict between Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy", whence—that the United States has nothing to gain by opposing Japan. By the same tokens, there were not long ago those who, notwithstanding all of the evidence which was available to the whole world regarding the objectives and the methods of the Nazi leaders of Germany, contended that Great Britain and France had nothing to gain by standing opposed to Germany. By the same tokens, all conflict between Nazi Germany and Great Britain could be reconciled by diplomacy. (An effort based on that principle was made at Munich.) By the same tokens, all conflict between any "have" nation or nations and any "have not" nation or nations could be reconciled by diplomacy. By the same tokens, all conflict between capital and labor, and all conflict between political parties, and all conflict between the law-abiding members and the predatory members [19] of any community could be settled by diplomacy; the conflict between Japan and China could be settled by diplomacy; Japan's desire to possess the Netherlands East Indies could be disposed of by diplomacy; and "fifth column" activities anywhere and everywhere could be disposed of by diplomacy.
The essence of Mr. Lippman's proposal is that the United States should enter upon a "negotiation which might lead through a new commercial treaty to a political understanding", which would leave the American and the Japanese navies "free to maintain order and stability in their respective spheres of influence".

From 1911 to January 26, 1940 the United States and Japan had a commercial treaty and they had a number of other treaties—including the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact—which collectively were intended to regulate contacts, to ensure fair and equal treatment, and to maintain peace. Notwithstanding the existence of these treaties, Japan embarked upon a procedure of conquest and did all sorts of violence to American nationals, American property, and American rights and interests in general. The American Government protested and pled. Japan went right on. Finally the American Government denounced the commercial treaty in order that it might have its hands free to take, [20] if and when it saw fit, retaliatory action by measures short of war. For the first time, the Japanese became alarmed and began to show some respect for American rights in the Far East. Treaties had proved ineffective. Entreaties had proved ineffectual. Fear of possible material pressures finally had, and has been having, some influence. What the Japanese leadership today wants now above all things is to be relieved of all possibility of pressure from the United States—in order that Japan may "go the limit" toward completing her conquest of China and taking possession of various great storehouses of natural resources in eastern Asia and the western Pacific. The conclusion of a new commercial treaty at this time would be of tremendous advantage to Japan and would give the United States nothing comparable in diplomatic or economic value.

A division of the Pacific into a United States "sphere of influence" on the east and a Japanese "sphere of influence" on the west would, it is true, leave the Japanese Navy "free" in the thus-created Japanese "sphere", but it would not in any way ensure that the said navy would "maintain order and stability" in the said "sphere" or that Japan would respect in that area American, or British, or French, or Netherland, or Soviet, or Chinese rights and interests.

In passing, attention may be called to the fact that [21] the Japanese Navy was "free to maintain order and stability" in the Far East in 1931; the Japanese Navy has been "free" to do that thing ever since; it is "free" to do it today; and it has not done that; it has done just the opposite.

The Japanese have today no higher regard for a diplomatic arrangement, an international commitment, or a treaty provision than have the Germans. Some of the Japanese leaders may talk of or may make commitments, their Foreign Office may negotiate treaties, but the objective of their real leaders, the Army and the Navy within the "military element", is expansion of Japanese political authority and economic power—and Japanese armed force will move on and will take where it can, when it can, and as it can, being checked only by opposition to it of material obstacles which are or which it fears to be too great for it to overcome.

It is not "the truth" that "there is no conflict between Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy". The United States stands for peace on a basis of law, of order, of security, of justice, et cetera. Japan is bent today upon driving occidental interests out of eastern Asia and the western Pacific, and is bent upon establishing in eastern Asia and the western Pacific by whatever processes may contribute thereto a Japanese hegemony or a great and constantly greater Japanese political empire.

[22] There is no need or occasion for the European war to come to the Pacific—unless Japan chooses to bring (put) it there and the United States permits Japan to do so. There is no need or occasion for war to come between the United States and Japan—unless Japan goes further than she has already gone (which is too far) in moves of aggression and of general disregard and destruction of the rights and interests of the United States (and of the world at large). While the United States is in position to use economic pressures against Japan and to use a Fleet against Japan, there exist material obstacles which tend to restrain Japan's leaders. If the United States were to conclude with Japan, now, a new treaty ensuring Japan against economic pressures, and/or if the United States removes its Battle Fleet from the Pacific, one or both of those obstacles will thereby have been removed, and the temptation to Japan's effective leadership ("the military") to make the most of the opportunity thus presented will have been increased. Mere concluding of agreements at this moment will not suffice to convince the Japanese leadership that "friendly
relations" [23] with the United States henceforth are preferable to the gathering in of spoils rendered, by the concluding of agreements, the more readily available now and immediately available.

We should, of course and by all means, try to prevent consummation of a closer association by Japan of herself with the axis powers. But, we should do more than that, we should try to prevent advance by Japan toward further acts of aggression and acquisition by herself on her own account, and for her own advantage—all of which acts, when and as engaged in, will contribute toward the working out of the plans of Nazi Germany. We have already done much toward restraining Japan. Simultaneously, ourselves exercising a great measure of self-restraint, we have been endeavoring to lead the Japanese to see that a course of aggression will in the long run be not profitable whereupon a course of procedure by peaceful means could be highly profitable. We have talked—consistently and constantly of the importance of principles. Should we now make a wholesale abandonment of the said principles—thereby concealing that, not force, but mere fear of force is mightier than principles and mightier than professed devotion to principles?

Reduced to simplest terms, what the advocates of an appeasement propose is that we abandon our Far Eastern policy [24] of a hundred years' standing, that we abandon the idea of the integrity of sovereignties in the Far East, that we abandon such responsibilities as were and are ours under those which remain in effect of the Washington Conference treaties, that we give up the idea of befriending China toward resistance to Japan and thus toward defense of various of our principles and interests, and that we accord Japan, deliberately and by process of agreement, what would amount to a free hand in the western Pacific and eastern Asia. Now, if we wish to make these various abandonments, and if we wish to give Japan a free hand, we can do both very easily and without going to the trouble of or incurring the disadvantages which would accrue from doing so by concluding an agreement; all that we would need to do would be to announce on our own part that we abandon the field, to withdraw by our own orders the few ships that we have in Far Eastern waters and the few marines that we maintain at three points in China, and to move our Fleet from the Pacific into the Atlantic.

Assume, for the sake of thorough exploration, that it were granted in principle that we should negotiate some kind of an agreement with Japan. What might the provisions of that agreement be? What should they be? By answers to these two questions the appeasement thesis might be and [25] should be tested. These two questions should stand at the beginning of Mr. Lippmann's statement of that thesis. They should be answered before he proceeds with the contention that the problem of Japanese-American relations can be solved by diplomacy alone and that the action for which he contends would produce the solution.

The whole of the appeasement contention rests—for whatever else it may be worthwhile—upon an assumption that, promises having been given by the United States and promises having been given by Japan, the United States could thereafter assume and expect that Japan would live up to or perform within the limits of her promises. In the light of the history of the past forty-five years, no such assumption could with warrant be made, and reliance upon any such assumption would be folly.

Japan has it within her power to ensure the peace of the Pacific. The United States does not have that within its power. Japan needs only to desist from certain courses in which she is engaged and to refrain from certain courses toward which she is inclined—and there will be peace in the Pacific. This means that the problem is a problem not of giving pledges, It is a problem of action, a problem [26] of behavior, a problem of performance. Action gives evidence and proof of Intention. Assurances of intention constitute neither evidence nor proof.

The conflict which is raging today is between two great groups of major powers, is between two ideologies, is between those nations which have and which wish to hold and those nations which are out to "take"—and this conflict is world-wide. On one side are China, Great Britain, and the United States: on the other side are Japan, Germany, and Italy. The conflict is raging not alone in Europe but also in the Far East. The three powers of the to-have-and-to-hold group are menaced not alone in Europe, and on the Atlantic but in eastern Asia and on the Pacific. Whatever any one of the to-have-and-to-hold group loses is a loss for all members of the group; and whatever any one of the "take" group gains is a gain for all members of that group.
The United States, as a party to this conflict, must function not on one front only but on two fronts. In the event of our “abandoning” any angle of our western front (that is, the western Pacific and the Far East)—and of Japan’s gaining thereby, and of China, Great Britain, et cetera, losing thereby—by just so much will the position [27] of the “have” group of which the United States is a member be weakened and the “take” group (Japan, Germany and Italy) be strengthened.

“We cannot buy . . . (the) good will” of the Nazis or the good will of the Fascists. Nor can we buy the good will of the Japanese military leadership. “We can (could), however, earn their (the Nazis’ and the Fascists’) contempt” and we can (could), by like efforts of attempt to “appease” them, “earn the contempt” of Japan’s military leadership. And more, we could also earn the contempt of the British, the contempt of various of our own “neutral” associates, the contempt and resentment and bitterness of 400 million plus Chinese, the contempt of the whole world of today and of tomorrow.

IV. Encouraging China to Make a Compromise or Adverse Settlement with Japan.

The Chinese do not wish today to make peace with Japan on the basis of any compromise which would leave Japanese armed forces in China. The Chinese are war weary, but no more so than are the Japanese. The Chinese are not confronted with any imminent necessity of making an early peace with Japan. Given a free field, the Chinese have at least even chances of outlasting the Japanese in a struggle which is highly burdensome to each of the two countries. It has been demonstrated during the past three years that the Japanese belief and representation that Japan is capable of creating in China conditions of peace, law, order, and stability are not well founded: the Japanese have shown themselves psychologically unqualified for the performance of that task. A “peace” settlement concluded between China and Japan now and under existing circumstances would have no solid foundations or anchorage. It would be inconsistent with American relationships and with U. S. objectives in relationships with the Far East, and it would not on balance profit the United States.

[29] Excerpt from letter by a Chinese business man to Mr. Walter Lippmann, dated June 6, 1940

“Carried to its logical conclusion, your thesis undoubtedly means that China should surrender and, like Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Norway cooperate with the aggressor. It would also signify that China’s three years of desperate resistance in the name of democracy, with its unprecedented sacrifice of human lives and property, should be halted because of a European conflict which may affect America. In case any Chinese leader follows your logic and leads his people into the arms of Japan, what assurance would America have that the Japanese war machine, with the cooperation of 450,000,000 Chinese who have proved themselves sterling fighters, would not wage war on all Pacific countries? Does such an eventuality relieve America?

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“As I view the desperate world situation, there is no easy short-cut to a peaceful settlement. Short-cuts no matter how sincere and well-intended, as amply demonstrated by the Munich agreements, only prolong the agony. The United States cannot fight aggression in one ocean and condone it in the other. To do so, simply destroys America’s traditional foreign policy to no practical purpose.

“The Chinese during the past few years have successfully [30] resisted the aggressions of a mechanized army considered second only to Hitler’s in striking power. They have done this with little else but their human flesh, indomitable spirit and courage. Thus far, they have demonstrated that vitality and spirit can count for just as much as mechanized material in modern warfare. They have kept the Japanese so occupied and exhausted that Japan today dares not move as rapidly as she would like in the direction of the Allied and American possessions in the Pacific. Japan, I assure you, cannot be placated by momentary measures of appeasement, and she fears nothing more than the Chinese will to continue their unyielding resistance. America’s greatest assurance in the Pacific is the maintenance of this Chinese will to resist.”

[31] Excerpts from Chicago Daily News editorial, June 10, 1940.

“A DEAL WITH JAPAN?

“In order to make a deal with Japan today, we would have to condone, openly or covertly, its treaty-breaking invasions of China. We would have to betray not only our Chinese friends, but also more than a hundred years of American
policy in the Far East. We would be imitating, in effect, the worst and most
dangerous aspects of Britain's 'appeasement' efforts.

"And once we had made the deal, of what use would it be? Japan has de-
liberately broken one solemn treaty with us. Why should it keep another, any
longer than its own interest required? What guarantee would we have that, at
the first opportunity, Japan would not gang up against us with the rest of our
enemies?

"No, there is only one way for us to be secure. We must make ourselves able,
by combined sea and air power, supported by a sufficient army, to wage war, if
need be, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. No diplomacy, no scheming, no
wishful thinking, no device, nothing whatever can save us now from this painful
necessity, short of a miracle—the miracle of an Allied victory over Hitler."

[32] Excerpts from article by Raymond Clapper, published June 13, 1940.

**NO DEAL WITH JAPAN**

"Because we are afraid, we should try to appease Japan. How? By selling
out now. By turning adrift to the tender mercies of the yellow race Australia,
New Zealand, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and all way stations.

"In order to buy Japan's friendship and support, we would put the seal of our
approval upon such a betrayal. We would settle on every international ideal.
For our treachery we would gain nothing but a Munich, to last until the day
when Japan wanted something else that had not been included in the bargain.
Then Japan would take whatever it was that she wanted and pay no more heed
to her deal with us than she paid to her treaty pledges when she went into
Manchukuo, into China proper, or when she fortified the mandate islands in the
Pacific.

"If Japan is determined to extend her domination in the Far East, at least
let it not be done with our approval, as part of a deal with us. Let us not be a
party to it in a craven act that would instantly be a tip-off to the totalitarian
powers that we had lost our nerve as completely as the British lost theirs in the
early 1930s, when [33] Japan went into Manchukuo, or as the French
lost theirs when they permitted Hitler to reoccupy the Rhineland.

"Don't think that a deal with Japan would not be recognized as a tip-off to all
Latin America, a tip-off that the third great democracy also was on the run.
Are we to invite every Latin American country to begin saying of us, as the
little nations of Europe did of Britain, that they cannot depend upon us? Are
we to give them that encouragement to rush into deals with Hitler as the new
rising force that is to replace the United States as the protector of the Western
Hemisphere?

* * * * *

"When France and England have been crushed, only the United States and our
system on the Western Hemisphere, plus what we may take over from the
British Empire, will be left standing in the way.

"In this situation we can trust nobody but ourselves. We can trust only our
own force. We want none of the false sense of security that a deal with Japan
would give us, a deal that might prove as treacherous as Munich. Japan is
playing the same game as the other crowd and we should be foolish to deceive
ourselves. We must make busy being the strong neighbor in the Western
Hemisphere. No neighbor now is a good neighbor unless he is strong. We need
guns, not treaties."

[34] Full text of Chicago Daily News editorial, June 17, 1940.

"THE APPEASERS"

"The agitation for appeasement of Japan's ambitions in Asia by American
concussions is growing among those who seem determined to force the United
States into the fatal course taken by Britain under Neville Chamberlain.

"The proponents of this idea seem to think that Japan would be reasonable
in its demands, and that, having signed an agreement with the United States,
Japan would abide by it. Chamberlain had the same delusions about Germany
and Italy. We have had agreements and treaties with Japan before. But they
have been honored in the breach rather than in the observance.

"The philosophy behind this agitation is exemplified by a thoughtful editorial
that appeared in the Chicago Tribune of May 30. Excerpts from it are cited here-
with. Accompanying them in italics are excerpts from the speeches of Neville Chamberlain:

"The United States and Japan can come to a friendly understanding. There is no obstacle in the way except the determination of some Americans to dominate Japan's policy in China.

"And yet whatever differences there may be between us and other nations on that subject, do not forget that we are all members of the human race... There must be something in common between us.

"Japan needs peace with the United States.

"There is not a country or government that wants to see a European war.

"Japan would be disposed to be more reasonable if Chinese ports and forts were not in European hands.

"If we can bring these four nations into friendly discussion, into a settlement of their differences, we shall have saved the peace of Europe for a generation.

"The Japanese are more willing now than ever to come to settlement in China.

"Before saying farewell to Herr Hitler he repeated to me with great earnestness what he had already said at Berchtesgaden, namely, that this was the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe and that he had no wish to include in the Reich people of other races than Germans that he wanted to be friends with England.

"America may be able to aid China a great deal more effectively if it isn't quarreling with Japan than it can by keeping up a futile bombardment of threats and hard words.

"What we did was to save her (Czechoslovakia) from annihilation and give her a chance of new life as a new state. Therefore I think the government deserves the approval of this House for their conduct of affairs in this crisis which has saved Czechoslovakia from destruction and Europe from Armageddon.

"The italicized paragraphs exemplify the Chamberlain philosophy of appeasement and delusion. The alternate paragraphs exemplify the philosophy of those who would follow the Chamberlain program here. We know how fallacious the Chamberlain philosophy was in the case of Britain. We should know how fallacious it would be if applied to our own affairs."


"No sensible person can disagree with the argument of Mr. Walter Lippmann that peace between the United States and Japan is highly desirable. But in his contention that we should hasten to conclude an amicable arrangement because of the dangers which threaten us Mr. Lippmann ignores consideration of facts which must be better known to him than to most Americans.

"The most important of these is that, as has so often been emphasized by Japan, the only basis of friendship she will recognize is based on approval of her policy in East Asia, involving the conquest of China. Unless we are prepared to do that anything else we might do would be as futile as Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy at Munich. Any move we might make toward the conclusion of a new trade treaty would be interpreted by the war lords who rule Japan as an evidence of weakness and instead of making relations better would only make them worse. It would only encourage them to further aggressions and would be a disservice to the Japanese people whose progress is halted by their own war lords.

[37] Mr. Lippmann appears momentarily to have forgotten that Hitler's attack on Europe, Japan's invasion of China and Mussolini's sword rattling were all preceded by the so-called "anti-Comintern pact" whereby the three became partners in a program which was not officially disclosed but has been made clear by actions. It was as a result of that pact and supplemental agreements that Mussolini is helping Hitler. The only reason Japan is not playing the same part is that she is bogged down in China and the American fleet is in the Pacific. Give Japan a free hand and she would at once abandon her policy of non-involvement—a policy that has been forced on her by her inability to carry out any other. With the open or secret aid of Japan to Hitler the chances of
an Allied victory would be greatly lessened. Indeed we might face much graver dangers than those which inspire Mr. Lippmann's fears—a victorious Germany on the Atlantic, a victorious Italy in the Mediterranean and a victorious Japan on the Pacific, all bound together by a secret agreement and each inspired by the same conviction that democratic government should be crushed.

"Faced by a menace of that seriousness, what further measures of appeasement could Mr. Lippmann suggest?"


"MAJOR ELIOT TAKES SHARP ISSUE WITH MOVES TO APPEASE JAPAN"

"There are some voices in this country now raised in favor of an American 'understanding' with Japan, as a means for freeing our hands in the Atlantic. Why there should be any more virtue in a Japanese signature on a treaty today than there was on certain previous occassions of historic note it is difficult to understand.

"If we are compelled temporarily, or permanently, to abandon certain of our Pacific or Far Eastern interests by the necessity of concentrating our strength in the Atlantic, then we must do so. But let us be perfectly clear in our minds about what we are doing. Let us be sure that what we are abandoning is not worth more than what we can save by making any drastic changes in our dispositions.

"We must do the best we can, with a critical situation and inadequate military force, but let us not commit the crowning folly of again putting our faith in scraps of paper bearing totalitarian seals and promises."

[40] Excerpts from Oakland, California, Tribune editorial, June 19, 1940.

"FIRMNESS IN THE FAR EAST"

"What the United States' policy will be in the event of new Japanese aggression we do not know. But this much is potent on the basis of past experience: Any appeasement of Japan on the part of this country will defeat its ends by encouraging the Tokyo chauvinists, by giving the impression that we are weak, and by undermining our prestige with South American States who look to us for protection. It also is clear that we cannot stop Japan unless we are prepared for a protracted naval warfare in the Pacific and unless we use the great British naval base at Singapore. Whatever happens, we must be uncompromising in our opposition to the pilfering of Franco-British territory in the Far East."

[41] Excerpts from article by Barnet Nover, published June 28, 1940.

"CHINA FIGHTS ON"

"The spirit of appeasement is not dead; it has merely shifted its habitation. It is being urged that the United States come to terms with Japan in order that our fleet might be free for any eventualities that might occur on this side of the hemisphere. It may be that, faced by threats from both Asia and Europe, we shall have to abandon Asia and concentrate our force to resist incursions from the other side of the Atlantic.

"But let us be under no illusions as to what that would mean; it would be a capitulation to Japan and a capitulation which, in no sense, would add to our security.

"At the moment when she is still very vulnerable we would be permitting Japan to become invulnerable; at the moment when Japan is still at our mercy we would, by a policy of appeasement toward her, be placing ourselves at Japan's mercy. And at no time can we for a moment forget that the German threat from the East is paralleled by the Japanese threat from the West.

"As long as Great Britain fights on, the Nazi danger to us is limited; as long as China fights on, we have relatively little to fear from Japan. But China, like Great Britain, is fighting our battles which is why out of selfishness no less than out of sentimental considerations, we must give whatever aid we can to both and desert neither.
"It is always the counsel of wisdom when facing grave emergencies to limit one's risks; but nothing is gained and much is lost when, in an attempt to limit risks, we stand a real chance of multiplying them."

[43]  Excerpts from La Crosse, Wisconsin, Tribune editorial, June 22, 1940.

"NO APPEASEMENT HERE"

"Loss of prestige is one of Great Britain's chief liabilities at the present moment. With each concession, with each step backward, with each attempt to stave off danger, England lost face. In the case of the island empire, ill prepared as events proved, there was little else to do.

"But the United States is not now in a situation where it need proclaim to the whole world it is afraid. The nation is unprepared admittedly to fight in two oceans. But there is no doubt that if this country gears itself for defense—and it is gearing itself for defense—it can meet any challenge.

"It will not do to announce to the world that the last great democracy has lost its nerve. South America must have faith in the integrity of the United States and in this nation's ability to back up the Monroe doctrine. Japan will be less a menace if she fears America that if America fears her. Any agreement with Japan which revealed this nation's desire for protection would be tantamount to an invitation to attack.

"The Fascist nations put practical considerations before [44] ideals or principles. A treaty based on the fright oof the United States would remain in effect only so long as Japan found it profitable.

"The world has been shown with terrible clarity the effects of such a peace as the Munich peace. Let not this nation make Great Britain's mistake."

[45]  Excerpts from an article by Robert North in Amerasia, July 1940.

"AN AMERICAN-JAPANESE AXIS IS PROPOSED"

"Appeasement of Japan and withdrawal of the United States naval forces from the Pacific is urged by the Chicago Tribune, the New York Daily News and Walter Lippmann's column in the New York Herald Tribune. They propose negotiation of a new commercial agreement and diplomatic alignment with Japan.

"'Be nice to Japan now, and we may well be able to double our fleet's effective strength by making friends with the Japanese Navy,' says the News. 'It seems to us the time has come for us to try to shut our back door, so to speak, before sending our best fighting men, guns, planes and ships out our front door to try to win another war for the Allies,' it says editorially. So it recommends that we 'insure ourselves against a two-front war if we can, by renewing our trade treaty with Japan and soft-pedaling the moral indignation over Japan's aggressions in China for a while.'

"These proposals, if carried into effect, would leave the defense of our Pacific coast to the Japanese Navy, instead of our own. San Francisco, Seattle, Los Angeles, Portland would be protected by Japanese promises. So would Hawaii, the Philippines, and our trade and investment position in [46] the Far East, not to speak of Alaska and the Pacific approaches to Canada, Mexico and all points south in this hemisphere.

"These newspaper strategists give us for defense against Japanese aggression the Japanese Navy. On its decks will stand Japanese admirals, beaming friendship because civilians at home have signed another treaty.

"Why not go the whole way, gentlemen, and shut the front door on the Atlantic, also, by making a similar agreement with Hitler? Let bygones be bygones with him, as with Japan, and while we are at it treble our navy by adding the German and Italian fleets to ours along with the Japanese. Then with Hitler protecting us against Hitler on the East, and Japan protecting us against Japan on the West, we could get away from all this bother about national defense. We could use our new trade agreements to strengthen our new allies for our own protection. We could build them up economically, just as the Allies built up Hitler, and hope for the best."

"If Japan should emerge from this war with her industrial machine intact, she would no longer be a competitor merely in knick-knacks, toys, light bulbs and other small consumers' goods. She has shifted the center of gravity of her pro-
duction from light to heavy industry. The capacity of her heavy industrial plant has more than doubled since 1931".

[47] "Chinese resistance has not only prevented the proposed development of Chinese cotton, but has compelled importation of foreign growths for Chinese mills. But if, with the help of a new American trade agreement, Japan should succeed in subjugating China, or even in establishing a firm foothold in North China alone, the first condition for complete independence of American cotton will have been met. China is the third largest cotton producer.

"Success of the New Order means not only that Japan would be lost as our third largest customer by obtaining new sources of supply of the things she buys here; it means that she would be equipped for cut-throat competition in those very price markets, Latin America and Asia, which offer us the only opportunity for substantial expansion. At a time when the European market appears about to be closed to our goods, this would lead toward American export strangulation. The effects on our entire economic structure are incalculable."


TOWARD A PEACE WITH JAPAN

Although the attentive of the Americas is fixed upon Europe, they must never forget that the American continents are a great island set amidst the oceans of the world. On the west the ocean washes the coasts of Asia and of the island empires of the east.

The only Navy which the American hemisphere possesses is now in the western ocean. In that same ocean there is the Japanese navy. As between the United States and Japan, two nations which have never been at war, there has developed in recent years a growing opposition of policies, interests and diplomatic principle. Their relationship today is obviously unstable. The naval treaty has lapsed. The commercial treaty has been abrogated. In respect to China the two countries have taken positions which are in theory irreconcilable. In respect to the Netherlands Indies their public declarations promising respect for the status quo are ambiguous, and in the light of conceivable developments, exceedingly precarious.

To put the matter more plainly, the two countries confront each other across the vast expanse of the Pacific, each having taken a position where untoward circumstances or an uncalculated overt act might plunge both of them into a prolonged and exhausting struggle. In such a struggle [48a] neither Japan nor the United States would be serving its vital interests. Both nations would be sacrificing them. The Japanese, already suffering from the Chinese war, would by engaging and exhausting themselves still further make themselves vulnerable to the only great power, namely Russia, which can strike by land and by sea and by air at the very heart of the Japanese empire. The United States, by drifting into such a war, would be engaging the Navy for years to come in a confused and indecisive campaign on the other side of our world; yet at that very moment the security of the American continents may require the use of the whole Navy to guard those strategic points in the Atlantic Ocean which must be held if this hemisphere is to be defended.

It is now a kind of suicidal madness for the two nations to contemplate even the possibility of letting the existing tension and the existing conflicts of interest and principle develop into a war. For in such a war both would be sacrificing much greater principles than they were upholding and both would be jeopardizing fatally interests which are infinitely more important than those they were defending.

Some, perhaps, will feel that to express this candid view of Japanese-American relations is to display a deplorable weakness at a time when only strength and firmness are good currency in international affairs. I do not think it is weakness to make the plain truth the basis of national [48b] policy. The Japanese know their own strength and their own weaknesses and they know our strength and our weaknesses; and we know the same of them and of ourselves. Neither they nor we can afford to bluff. Neither we nor they can afford to provoke the other. This is the truth. And on the truth we shall both do well to found our policies.
Lest this opinion be ascribed to a sudden fear engendered by the critical state of Europe, I hope I may be pardoned for saying that many of us have held and expressed this view for a long time, ever since the outbreak of the European war was manifestly inevitable. For it has been clear to us that whatever our sympathies and interests in the Far East, a great European war for the domination of the Western World would affect directly and vitally the security and the independence of this hemisphere. We have held that, by comparison, our interests in the Far East would prove to be secondary, however important they might under more normal circumstances appear to be. We have, therefore, held that it was perilous and in the highest degree unstatesmanlike to let develop an irreconcilable conflict with Japan, to conceal from ourselves the immense gravity of such a conflict, to exacerbate the tension by threats and by declarations that are too absolute to be negotiable.

We have held that this provocative attitude was downright folly especially at a time when the country was doped and duped by a notion of "neutrality" in Europe which might compel it to stand by and risk the collapse of Allied sea power. We have argued that the policy of the majority of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate during the month of July a year ago was a classic example of how misguided men can imperil the security of a nation.

For in that fatal month the committee challenged Japan in the Pacific by supporting, and even by inciting to, the abrogation of the commercial treaty, and by brandishing the threat of an embargo; in the very same weeks when it was proposing to risk a war with Japan, the same committee was refusing to lift the embargo on the sale of arms to the Allies on the ground that what happened to them was no concern of ours. It was a most awful case of not letting your right hand know what your left hand is doing, an almost incredible case of being blindly provocative in one ocean and blindly supine in the other ocean. And unhappily the Administration, which knew better, acquiesced in this utterly unstatesmanlike policy of challenging Japan in Asia while we were forbidden to support the Allies in Europe.

The situation today is, of course, worse than it was then. But still the fundamental interests involved are the same. It is still true that Japan and the United States have nothing to gain and a very great deal to lose by going to war—or even by standing opposed as if they might be going to war. It is still true that our interests in the Far East are secondary to our interests in this hemisphere; because this is true, it follows that there is no conflict between Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy. We should, therefore, recognize this truth and shoul'd, I submit, enter immediately into friendly and conciliatory and candid negotiations with the Japanese for the avowed purpose of preserving the peace in the Pacific.

This is not a time for bluffing and this is not a time for indulging that false pride which causes men to cling to an untenable position. We know that we must defend our security and our very independence in this hemisphere and in the Atlantic Ocean. We know that Japan has a greater interest in Asia than we have. Let us recognize the fact. On the other hand, the Japanese position in the Far East is at least as difficult as is our position in the Western Hemisphere. Japan is at war with China. Japan has Soviet Russia for her nearest neighbor. Her commerce with this hemisphere is of critical importance to the standard of life of the Japanese people.

In these considerations there are the essential elements of a negotiation which might lead through a new commercial treaty to a political understanding based on the principle that the European war, which is also a European revolution, is not to be extended to the Pacific. We should aim high and aim far—at a new order of things in the Pacific in which, having adjusted our secondary conflicts, the two navies will cease to confront each other as potential antagonists and will be free to maintain order and stability in their respective spheres of influence.

I have no way of knowing whether the Japanese nation will respond to such a change of American policy. My belief is that they might, that they do not regard themselves as our enemies, that they respect the power we are capable of developing and that the best of the Japanese leaders and the mass of the
Japanese people desire peace with the United States. Even if this is not the fact, we shall never, I believe, regret having tried wholeheartedly to preserve the peace in half the world.


"JAPAN'S appeasement"

It is rather amazing at this juncture, when the character of the totalitarian response to Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy is so familiar to every American, and seems so inevitable in retrospect, to note that there is some agitation in Washington and elsewhere for the appeasement of Japan. It is suggested that we make concessions to the Japanese point of view and negotiate a new commercial treaty with Japan, so that we can turn our backs on the Pacific and give all our attention to the menace from Europe. These suggestions, which have had Senator Vandenberg's support, must be borne of ignorance of the Japanese point of view, of the workings of the Japanese military mind and of Japan's record of bad faith.

It can be stated, without condition or reservation, that no price in terms of appeasement which this country could pay would buy Japanese good will or good behavior in the Pacific.

To get even an empty promise of security from a Japan whose policies are completely controlled by the uniformed expansionists, this country would have to recognize the justice of Japan's alienation of Manchuria and the martyrdom of China; recognize the legality of whatever position Japan can acquire in China through a campaign of indiscriminate slaughter and bestial savagery; recognize her police rights and special interests throughout eastern Asia, the adjacent waters [49a] and the East Indies; and agree to withdraw all armed forces from that part of the world and leave to Japan's discretion what access we should have to markets and sources of supply between Hawaii, Singapore and the Aleutian Islands. And what would the pledges bought with such concessions be worth in a crisis, if the fleet were withdrawn from the Pacific and if Nippon's militarists discovered that it was Japan's heaven-appointed destiny to expand in this direction? All pledges would then become as "in applicable" to Japan's mission in Hawaii, California, Alaska, or withersoever weak defenses invited her, as the nine-power treaty of 1922 is to continental expansion. Remember that among Asiatic totalitarians, as among Europe's Asiatic-minded despots, a leaning toward appeasement is irrefutable evidence of weakness and fear; and remember that, when the gods have delivered the weak into the hands of the strong, it is a breach of faith with divinity to keep faith with weakness.

Those who contend that we should buy security from Japan contend that the President, Mr. Hull and the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee have made a bungle of our relations with Japan. This is untrue. The powers of the United States government to check Japanese aggression and to resent flagrant breaches of faith have been limited, because of the nation's aversion to overseas entanglements and its fear that strong measures would bring reprisals, war. [49b] With such powers as it has had, however, it has put the only effective check on Japan's intense craving to profit by British, French and American preoccupation with the European situation.

The denunciation of the commercial treaty a year ago brought to an end the campaign of persecution against Occidentals in China, just when it was being extended to American citizens. Japanese preexistence in that campaign would have meant war. The Administration's refusal to renew the treaty, since its expiration in January, and its retention of the right to impose disabilities upon Japanese trade which would have hamstrung the Japanese Army have kept the militarists in as placatory a mood as any influence could have short of the presence of an overwhelmingly superior army. The presence of the fleet in the Pacific has been the only sedative in the world that has restrained Japan's naval expansionists from adventures that would have brought the war into the Pacific.
We are talking excitedly of armaments and congress is voting the money in billion dollar bills. War material is coming out of the mills on Capitol hill, but it is not coming out of the factories, and for a long, long time it will not be coming out of them. In the meantime we are neglecting to improve a situation affecting our Pacific frontier. The opportunity is there, and if this nation would make use of it could double the power of its fleet and do more in a short time to increase the strength of its defenses than it can do in a year of production, even on a 24 hour day and a 7 day week.

The United States and Japan can come to a friendly understanding. There is no obstacle in the way except the determination of some Americans to dominate Japan's policy in China. Japan needs peace with the United States. Japanese statesmen may be looking at the future with as much uncertainty as prudent Americans. In a world rapidly changing from its old historical trends and whispering off its old historical foundations, Japan may feel quite as dubious as the United States. Many overtures have been made by Japan for an understanding which would deal with what is real in the relations of the two countries and avoid what is superficially conflicting.

The United States at this time cannot afford to conduct its foreign relations wholly on moral preconceptions. America may be able to aid China a great deal more effectively if it isn't quarreling with Japan than it can by keeping up a futile bombardment of threats and hard words which have done the Chinese no good and can do America a great deal of harm.

This country cannot afford to have an enemy in the Pacific. It is not necessary to have one there. Peaceable trade can be resumed and a peaceable understanding can be had. That understanding would rest upon material advantages which Japan would obtain from friendship with the United States and therefore would have the promise of an enduring understanding.

Japan need not be driven into the German-Italian camp. If events progress as they have been doing in Europe the British and French interests in China will be canceled out. Japan then will have won a major campaign. Its policy has been, in a way, a duplicate of our Monroe doctrine. Japan has objected to the entrenchment of powerful European nations off its coast, just as we would object to the same thing in relation to our national life.

Japan would be disposed to be more reasonable if Chinese ports and forts were not in European hands. China itself will be better satisfied to know that the foreigner is out. The Japanese are more willing now than ever to come to a settlement in China which will relieve them of a protracted and expensive war. That may not be possible at once, but an understanding between the United States and Japan might do more to conciliate the Chinese question than can be expected from the present bellicose attitude of the American government.

If we intend to keep our Pacific front bristling with threats the Japanese will look for their associations in other quarters and we know exactly where that will be. If the people in Washington who are rushing to arms in fear of a danger to the eastern front are sincere, if they mean to take precautions and provide against the future, they'll protect the western flank by making a friendly arrangement with the power which controls the far east. They won't so manage American affairs that trouble in the Atlantic will be accompanied by trouble in the Pacific. While they are passing a billion dollar appropriation for the American navy they won't continue to make it necessary to keep the battle fleet on its Honolulu base.

By accepting the Japanese overtures they can double the strength of the fleet immediately. The best defense policy of the United States could be written within a few weeks in a renewed trade treaty with the Japanese. That peaceable treaty would immediately enable the United States to use its fleet in the Atlantic if that's where it is needed. It would not be tied as now to the Pacific. In effect the strength of the fleet would be doubled by cutting half its problem away.
Mr. Welles: You state that both you and the Secretary feel that at this moment it would be undesirable for the Department to oppose the plans of the Navy to which the underlying memorandum relates.

You ask for my reaction.

The proposal is susceptible of discussion from two points of view: (a) policy in foreign relations or (b) policy in relations between this Department and the Navy Department.

There arises in my mind at once the question of which is more important, service of our objectives in the field of foreign relations, or service of some objectives particularly regarding which are not known to me in relations between this Department and the Navy Department.

On the face of Mr. Chapin's memorandum it appears that the Navy Department is advancing merely a tentative proposal and that it is seeking in good faith our opinion of the proposal on its merits. If there exists some particular and good reason why we should regard this as a definitive "plan" of the Navy and why we should advance no expression of view unfavorable to it, I am not aware of such fact. Again reverting to Mr. Chapin's statement [2] of the problem, I am compelled to assume that Admiral Stark will wish to discuss the matter with you on its merits.

The proposal calls for a withdrawal of the Fleet from Hawaiian waters and its engagement in maneuvers southward from San Diego for a period of approximately 60 days. The objective is stated to be Fleet training. The problem involved would be apparently a problem of defending the Panama Canal against a naval attack.

As you know, I have contended constantly and consistently during recent months that, the situation in the Far East having been and being what it is, the most advantageous point at which to hold our Fleet is Pearl Harbor. I believe that the presence of the Fleet at that point has rendered the Fleet more useful that would have been its presence at any other point, so long as disposal of the Fleet is simply for guard duty and general defense. I do not today share the view which I heard expressed a few days ago that the presence of the Fleet at Honolulu no longer exercises any restraining influence as regards the situation in the Far East. I believe that withdrawal of the Fleet eastward would diminish our diplomatic influence as regards that situation—even though it be announced that the withdrawal is only temporary, et cetera, et cetera.

That the Fleet must have training exercises is axiomatic. Announcement that the Fleet is engaged in a problem relating to defense of the Panama Canal against a naval attack would tend to emphasize the fact that our policy is essentially a policy of defense in our own waters (only). The suggestion is made that the problem be kept very secret. I do not believe it would be so kept. Whether there be or not be an announcement, and whether there be or not be secrecy, the Japanese would learn enough about the Fleet's whereabouts to enable Japanese naval experts to draw inferences, and their inferences would be that, as always suspected by them, we have no intention of having our Fleet operate in the western Pacific.

I doubt the need at this time for training on a problem of defense of the Panama Canal against a naval attack. In my opinion the Japanese have no thought whatever of any possibility of a launching by them in any near future of a naval attack against the United States or the Panama Canal or any part of South America.

In Mr. Chapin's memorandum it is stated, presumably as an observation advanced by the Navy Department, that there might be an alternative: "a minor Fleet problem could be conducted if necessary in waters adjacent to Hawaii".—In my opinion it would be preferable at this time that training of the Fleet be achieved through such [4] an exercise than through the Pacific Coast exercise under reference.

The Navy is at present engaged in an operation involving the sending of the vessels of the Fleet, one-third at a time, from Pearl Harbor to San Diego and return. There arises in my mind the question why, in the light of that fact.
contemplate at this time a bringing of the whole Fleet again back to the West Coast at about the moment when that operation will have been completed.

In principle, I would always doubt the advisability of sending the whole pack of one's watchdogs to a hospital or to a training school at a time when there are an unusual number of ugly prowlers in one's neighborhood or in the neighborhood of one's outlying estates. My mind reacts adversely to suggestions which seem to me to involve such a procedure, just as it does to suggestions for the making of gestures without the accompaniment of definite and decided-upon objectives and at least tentatively decided-upon intentions.

In these days, we have almost ceased to give consideration to questions of expense. I would point out, however, that Fleet movements cost money. I for one would rather see such money as may be spent upon the Navy and its operations spent in greater proportion upon construction of new planes [5] and of new ships than upon maximum possible expansion of training operations.

/s/ SKH.

PA/H: SKH: ZMK
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

September 20, 1940

PA/H - Dr. Hornbeck:

The Secretary and I both feel that at this moment it would be undesirable for the Department of State to oppose the plans of the Navy which are obviously based on what is required by national defense.

Please let me have your reaction.

U:SW:IJ
Frank Hamilton

The busy week shall shortly call upon you and Dr. Hombrock to discuss the attached.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
2012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
November 26, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:
Subject: Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China.

About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by previous agreement.

Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from ten to thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as 50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is already under way and ships have been seen south of Formosa.

The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government.

I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field.

(Signed) **Henry L. Stimson**,
Secretary of War.
EXHIBIT NO. 99

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
OFFICE OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
September 26, 1944.

Top Secret

There is attached a page from the Congressional Record of September 21, 1944, in which there is a statement by Congressman Church in respect to the delivery of a message to the State Department on December 7, 1941, by Lieutenant Commander Kramer of the Navy Department.

Our recollection of the matter is as follows: At about 10:00 a.m. on December 7 Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine came to the outer office of the Secretary of State to discuss the general situation of relations with Japan. They were shown by Mr. John Stone, a Foreign Service officer then serving as an assistant in the office of the Secretary, a document the contents of which were pertinent to the subject of what they were going to discuss with the Secretary and which had then been delivered to the outer office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, then on duty in the Navy Department. Lieutenant Commander Kramer was present in the room. The document contained no reference to any Japanese military movement. Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine are positive that no statement was made in their presence by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, as alleged, to the effect that "this looks like a surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor and a midnight attack upon the Philippines."

The conversation in the Secretary's outer office was intermittent and scattered among those present in the room. In other words, each person was not a party to all of the conversation. Mr. Hornbeck has a distinct impression that there was brought up Japanese naval disposition with specific mention of most recent advices of Japanese naval movements in the Gulf of Siam.

Mr. Hamilton recollects also that Lieutenant Commander Kramer remarked on that occasion, in reference to the matter of an appointment for the Japanese Ambassador to see the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. on December 7, that the naming of the hour might mean that it was the hour for some Japanese movement. No mention was made of Pearl Harbor or of Hawaii or of the Philippines.

With regard to the statement that Lieutenant Commander Kramer then went to the White House and delivered the message, they have no knowledge whether this was a fact.

/s/ JWB
FE: Ballantine: HST

/s/ M. M. H.
REPORT OF PRISONER NUMBER ONE

Detailed information concerning this report will be submitted today. Preliminary report indicates the prisoner a Japanese Sub-Lieutenant, aged twenty-four years. Was pulled out of the water off Bellows Field this morning. Has taken prisoner by the Army and is held at Fort Shafter by Colonel Fielder. The officer refused to talk concerning the enemy's composition or disposition and at the present time the only information present is as follows:

1. He saw others from a reef one mile off Bellows Field.

2. We and another officer were the only members of a ten-man submarine. The reason for his capture was that he was sneaking up on what he thought to be a capital ship and in order to navigate he had to open the hatch of the submarine - whereas upon water came into the hatch and swamped the motor. He then upon being upon the reef. This officer was Captain and Navigator. The other officer has not been recovered. Information indicates that there are more of these small submarines in the vicinity and that they were brought here from some type of a mother ship. The prisoner did state that he had to navigate a distance of a hundred miles before running aground upon the reef. At the time of his capture the officers were a stop watch around his neck which stopped running at 0210. It is not known whether this is OGT or LGT. Although he did not give the enemy's forces or disposition he stated that so far as he knew the attack was a disappointment in that they expected a paralyzing blow to our fleet.

3. In accordance with the samurai code this prisoner has requested that he only be allowed to commit suicide.

It is evident that the officer appreciated the treatment afforded him by the naval questioners to that of the Army, and it is felt that with proper handling, further information might be derived from this officer.

Respectfully,

E. T. LATTON.
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
District Intelligence Office
20th Floor, Young Hotel
Honolulu, Hawaii

December 8, 1941

INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Fleet Intelligence Officer

1. Young, adult Japanese male—muscular build, crooked black hair—exactly in perfect health. Save his eyes as 24, sub-lieutenant in the Japanese Navy and a graduate of the Imperial Naval Academy.

2. He was in a chair wrapped in an army blanket. Before questioning was started he was learned that this prisoner was taken on the beach at Bellows Field. His eyes were closed and had around his neck, on a lanyard, a watch which had salt water inside of it. The watch was stopped at 10:00. The watch was inscribed on the reverse in Japanese characters—translated as follows: "Watch 2nd class, Type 1, Navy Seiko. Love of America, 1941." The man stated that he was an officer of the Japanese Navy and his name as Kazuo Ishioka of Ogasawara Prefecture. He had been one of a crew of two in a submarine which had run aground approximately one mile off Bellows Field. He stated that he was the firing officer of the submarine and the navigator and that his subbase was the submarine—entire crew consisted of one ace and the submarine. He admitted that the submarine was a small subchaser operated from a rubber boat and refused to give the name or tonnage of the mother ship or the distance at sea of his disembarkation from the mother ship. When questioned as to whether the submarine was diesel or electric propelled he refused to answer. He stated that he had navigated "more than a hundred miles" when asked if the distance was as far as one hundred miles. Too much evidence would not be placed in this answer as he obviously realized he was being interrogated. He stated that he wished to commit suicide and said that at the time of landing on shore because of the possibility of anyone recognizing his escape and rejoining the Japanese Navy. He stated that he had not been diagnosed and did not want his name or his rank mentioned sent back to Japan. When complimented on the success of his craft, he stated that it had been much less successful than they had anticipated. He expressed surprise at this and he was asked what they originally expected. He replied, in effect, a knock-out blow to your Navy.

3. He stated that off Bellows Field this morning he was a prisoner in a rubber boat but that the darkness was so complete that he was forced to open his cabin door and stand in
December 8, 1941

in the open water while running half submerged towards his target. As a result of the maneuver in the choppy sea, he shipped a great deal of water down the hatch which crippled his motor and this motor failure resulted, of course, in the loss of control of the submarine and his being dashed into a reef over one mile from Bellows Field. He and his fellow officer stripped, dived into the ocean and attempted to swim ashore. He stated that he last saw his shipmate in the heavy surf. He admitted the possibility that the Navy might examine the submarine, which had run on the reef (because he was not aware that naval planes had subsequently bombed and sunk his submarine). He stated that there were no papers in the submarine and admitted that this type of submarine represented essentially a sort of enlarged variation of a one-man torpedo. He stated "my greatest mistake was being captured. This is the first time I have failed. Please do not advise Japan about this. Please kill me." During the course of this questioning, which was begun by the aid of two competent interpreters, it developed that this young officer had some knowledge of English, which he at first did not disclose. Later on he explained his inexperience in this language by saying that, while in the middle school, he had studied it, but in the Academy, in expectation of duty in the China Seas, he had selected Chinese.

4. A drawing of a petty officer's hat, Pilot's insignia was made by Mr. and he explained the significance of the various details of this device.

5. There remains the possibility, if the Naval authorities so desire, that this submarine may yet be located and raised for examination of its critical details, etc.

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM: Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Subject: Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay.

1. The submarine when first sighted was about six hundred yards from the beach, off the end of the run-way at Bellows Field. At the time of my arrival at the Field, three Navy Utility planes were engaged in dropping what appeared to be either twenty-five or fifty pound bombs, the bombs being dropped in pairs. No direct hits were made, but out of about twelve bombs dropped six appeared to land within fifty feet of the submarine. After the bombing the submarine did not appear to have been disturbed or to have altered its position.

2. The pilot who first sighted the submarine was interviewed and stated that when he picked it up there was a large oil slick around its stern, then its position had not changed any since the first sighting of it.

3. The operations officer at Bellows Field sent me in a plane to get a closer view of the submarine and I was able to observe it from one hundred feet of it. The color was dull black with no distinguishing marks, between thirty and forty feet in length, and about four feet in breadth. There was a small periscope projection about three feet from which appeared to be periscope shears. The contour followed the general line of all submarines and there was a basket-like projection on the bow. At the time, the submarine was drawn by the stern with the bow and periscope shears coming out of water from time to time due to the action of the waves. Judging from its location of the bomb hits on the coral bottom, which could be seen from the plane, the submarine appeared to be drifting in towards the beach.

4. It is believed that with the minimum amount of effort, the submarine can be towed in and beached.

To a Commanding Officer:

From Japanese Naval Officer
KAZUO SAKAMAKI

I thank you for the kindly visit of yesterday. Now I will write down your request of yesterday in Japanese. Please pardon my poor writing and composition.

1. BRIEF PERSONAL HISTORY

In August 1940 I was graduated from the Naval Academy and became a midshipman. In April of this year I was commissioned a sub-lieutenant in the navy, my present rank.

2. RECORD OF BATTLE

Your honorable "have" country instituted an economic blockade of Japan, a "have not" country, refusing to sell us oil, cotton, and the like, until we had no choice but natural collapse. Because of this we began diplomatic negotiations with your country, but these ended in failure. Therefore, with a friend, I set out for Pearl Harbor with the purpose of sinking a battleship, but due to an accident, although we were able to reach the mouth of the harbor by creeping underneath your bombs falling like rain, since the accident was fatal to the submarine, we determined to proceed without hesitation on the surface of the water, and climbing into the harbor, and climbing the gang-way ladder, we leaped to the deck and die simultaneously with blowing up the enemy warship just as in olden times, during the Morai Transient, our Tatsuk Kawano lowered the mast and boarded the enemy ship with it. However, because of the accident suffered at the harbor mouth, we struck a reef which given ten seconds we would have safely cleared. My first strategy failed. With this difference of ten seconds the fate was decided, and one of the warships of your country was saved. Seeing the success of our sister submarines and the splendid achievements of our air force, I left the mouth of the harbor, compelled to do so due to my submarine being disabled. Later, finally being unable to do anything with the submarine, I swam through the ocean and reached an enemy airport. Due to my exhaustion, I was captured without having time to even fight. And thus my sad fate began.

Due entirely to my inexpert navigation and strategy, my honor as a soldier has fallen to the ground. Thus I betrayed the expectations of our 100,000,000 people and became a sad prisoner of war disloyal to my country.

C. Int'il
8. The talk I had with an understanding naval officer in the house of an army man in "Honolulu" was very pleasant. Because I thought about the trouble I would cause your country later on, and because I was unable to endure my shame, committing suicide or being shot to death became impossible, and then began my sad life as a prisoner of war. Now that this slave came to such a pass, I have started the life a peaceful Japanese naval officer abiding by the rules of international law.

In olden times, Hakai and Kauai of Japan, refusing to eat millet of a foreign land, went into the mountains and ate grass (?) until they starved, but I, since I began eating your country's bread, have thought what a cause for shame and sorrow it is.

Although I have caused you much annoyance, I have done things right also, according to righteousness. However, such incidents as that which happened yesterday which is from the standpoint of your country a sad thing has been continued. My righteousness has made scores of men of your country with tears all day long, with their hands pointed at me and made too afraid, but as a result of this, I must face a death which to me is not too pleasing. My willingness to die need not be mentioned: I am killed by one of your bullets of your country shall make me very happy. I pray for your country's lasting military success.

An ungracious pistol has been aimed at me. This is my end. Good-bye.

4. To the Japanese people, especially to officers like ourselves, becoming a prisoner of war is inexplicable. Of course, whether or not there is a record of the incident or not, I will commit suicide upon a return to my native land. Even though we are unarmed, to live with truth and right to the last is the Japanese spirit.

I pray that my death will not be a rebuke to all my failures and I pray that my spirit will be examined by the Yasakuni (Shrine).

Please forward the following to the Japanese navy department.

Yours in respect.

I arrived at Hawaii on 28th of April, 1941. I arrived in the capital city and I have not expected to have the opportunity of being a prisoner of war, but I am glad to have the opportunity of the grace of the island of Hawaii.

I have written the above to express my regret to the very highest officer of the island of Hawaii.

I am

[Signature]

E. Inoue

Naval Sub-Lieutenant

[1941], 14th day of April, 1941
POEM COMPOSED AMONG THE ENEMY (ON THE UNFORTUNATE DAY THAT I BECAME A PRISONER OF WAR)

When cherry blossoms fall,
Let them fall!
Drenched are the its branches and leaves
With the sorrow of today!

8. I like best "DOWN THE TORPEDO" and "AMONG THE SHOTS THROUGH THE MARGARIT." I experienced all these things in this current battle which is the goal of all naval men's ambition, and I manifested the Yamato Damashii (Japanese spirit). Last night, again scores of bayonets and missiles were pointed at me from the front door and from the window and from above my head. However, righteousness won. And although as a result of this a regrettable situation came about, I hope that all would be forgiven with my death. On the eve of my "fairly death" lamenting the many sacrifices of your country due to my "call of righteousness", I earnestly hope that this will be clearly understood, that supreme desire and joy in dying as a soldier by your country's bullets.

I appreciate your many kindness shown me up to now, and I pray for your success in the war.

Respectfully,
Kasso Sakamaki

COPY

C. Intel
UNITED STATES SHIP  EXHIBIT NO. 101

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

REMARKS

0 - 4

Cored starboard side to berth E-3, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with
12 canvass lines, 5 wire breaths and 2 wire cables. Receiving fresh water and
telephone services from the dock. No. 4 boiler steaming for auxiliary purposes.
Accl. is in reserve in submarine base; BOA is Squadron in this vessel. Ships
present are various units of U.S. Pacific Fleet. 013 the following day reported
ahead having completed temporary duty as shore patrol in the Honolulu area
SAIL, P.R., E. 10, U.S.S.; PERHIZA, R., E. 15, U.S.S.; CARRIE, O.S., V. 1, X.
13, and ENSIGN, E. A. 54, U.S.S. 0850 P.M., 14th, Pte. U.S.M.C.,
reported on board A.O.I. since 0100 this date, a period of 1 hour, 50 minutes.
Made T.A.P. by order of Commanding Officer.

E. A. DICKSON, Ensign, U.S.M.

4 - 8

Cored as before. WOOLTENHURST, R., Pte. U.S.M.C. was arrested by civil
police at 0230 for creating a disturbance and was returned to the ship at 0440.
Made T.A.P. by Order of Commanding Officer. Patrol Officer's report to follow.
0800 received on board for use in the general area the following provisions:
From Dairyman's Association, Ltd., 70 gallons fresh milk. In addition as to
quantity by Sec. T.J. Byrnside, U.S.M. and as to quality by Lieut.[jg] D. J.
Scheer. 0030 0200, 0245 0320, 0358 0440, 1245 0500, 1250 0500, 1245 0500,
0530 0545, 0530 0515 to 0600, 0550 0645, 0655 0715, 0700 0730, 0730 0745,
1100 1130, 1200 1300, 1330 1330, 1400 1400, 2000 2000. 0200, 0245, 0320, 0358,
0440 to 0500, 0530 to 0545, 0550 to 0645, 0655 to 0715, 0700 to 0730, 0730 to
1100, 1100 to 1130, 1200 to 1300, 1330 to 1330, 1400 to 1400, 2000 to 2000.
Made T.A.P. by order of Commanding Officer.

J. SHAW

11 - 12

Cored as before. 0640 Started crew on stations. Absentees: CAROL, A.R.,
Sec. 10, U.S.M.C. A.D. from 0100, 11 November 1944; and STAPES, T.C.,
Sec. 10, U.S.M.C. A.D. from 0100, 14 November 1041. 0640 received 00-44
alongside to port. 0830 commenced fueling from tank lines. 0040 A.D. underway
and standing out. 1025 Discontinued fueling gasoline, having received 32,500
gallons of 170 octane aviation gasoline. 1043 00-44 cast off. 1100 pursuant to orders of Com-
manding Officer. ARIZONA, C.W.W., 495 48 54, A.O.I. 30, U.S.M.C., reported as
ordnance. 1120 Held quarters for physical drill. 1140 pursuant to orders of the
Commanding Officer, Ensign R.G. Bissman, U.S.M.C. returned aboard with Camp
Andrew recreation party. Held daily visual examination of all magazines and
machine gun power samples. Conditions normal.

I.

9 - 12

Cored as before. 0640 Started crew on stations. Absentees: CAROL, A.R.,
Sec. 10, U.S.M.C. A.D. from 0100, 7 November 1944; and STAPES, T.C.,
Sec. 10, U.S.M.C. A.D. from 0100, 6 November 1941. 0640 received 00-44 alongside to port.
0830 commenced fueling from tank lines. 0040 A.D. underway and standing out.
1025 Discontinued fueling gasoline, having received 32,500 gallons, 170 octane avia-
tion gasoline. 1043 00-44 cast off. 1100 pursuant to orders of Command-
ning Officer, ARIZONA, C.W.W., 495 48 54, A.O.I. 30, U.S.M.C., reported as
ordnance. 1120 Held quarters for physical drill. 1140 pursuant to orders of the
Commanding Officer, Ensign R.G. Bissman, U.S.M.C. returned aboard with Camp
Andrew recreation party. Held daily visual examination of all magazines and
machine gun power samples. Conditions normal.

I.

11 - 16

Cored as before. 1800 pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, the
following men left the ship with orders to report to the senior patrol officer at
Old Navy Yard, Honolulu, T.H., for temporary duty as shore patrol: LEWIS, H.R.,
237 03 29, L. 30.5, K.S., LION, H.R., 207 00 09, A. 538, H.R., JACOB IN, J.A.,
475 30 15, J. 16, F.C.; SMITH, A., 325 70 6, S. 10, U.S.M.C. 1300 MURLIN,
J.G., J. 16, J.9, T.M., was transferred to the U.S. Naval Hospital, Pearl Harbor, f.
Dysentry: rectum recurrent, after operation. 1300 HAYDEN
holstered "Viking" at starboard main arm. 1310 FROSTON underway. 1325 OVERTON
underway. 1350 CUFY standing in. 1350 completed fueling. Received 4,911.01 bbl.
fuel. Ship's draft md. 28' 8", aft 28' 11".

A. H. KILL

I. H. ASMILY, Lieut. [jg], U.S.M.

Approved

Examine I. W. BURGH

U.S.N., Psychiatrist

(Original Killen copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation records)
## LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP \textit{EVASTATE BLUE}

**Date:** November 25, 1941

**From:** Naval Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H.
**To:** Pearl Harbor, T.H.

### Zone Description

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### Drills and Exercises

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### Additional Information

- **Event:** Pearl Harbor Attack
- **Date:** December 7, 1941
- **Location:** Pearl Harbor, T.H.

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**Note:** This log entry details the event leading up to and during the attack on Pearl Harbor, providing a record of the weather conditions and activities on the ship at the time.
ADDITIONAL SHEET

June 25, 1941

12 - 16

As before.

16 - 18


18 - 20


20 - 22


22 - 24

As before.

Approved.

S. C. ARTHUR, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

S. C. RORIE, Acting, U.S.N.

79716 0—46—pt. 16—8

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
### LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE

**ZONE DESCRIPTION**
- **Date:** November 26, 1941
- **Captain:** O. D. Murray
- **Commander:**

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**DRILLS AND EXERCISES**
- Before Launching Point
- Draft for
- Draft
- Draft

**Weather Data-Observations**

### OBSERVATIONS

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<th>Greatest depth</th>
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ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S. ENTERPRISE

Date: 26 November...

12 - 16 (Continued)

of Commanding Officer, LEICHTON, the followingnamed men reported aboard for duty:
transportation and temporary duty on LEICHTON in connection with general court
martial is completed. STAPLEY, J.W., 301 90 ft.; SEACO, R.W., and COOPER, W.F.,
32 29 04, Sec. 26, U.S.N.

M. T. LEONARD, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

16 - 20

Fooded as before. 1655 SADDLE underway. 1700 received on board for use in
ral case the following fresh provisions: from Harden Co., Ltd., Honolulu,
., 275 lbs. fruit mix. Inspected as to quality by Acting Pay Clerk J. H.
Eisner, U.S.N. and as to quality by Lieut(jg) B. E. Highower, (MC), U.S.N.
140 FISHER and FEAN standing in. 1623 DRAYTON standing in.

J. C. ROSE

V. C. ROSE, Ensign, U.S.N.

20 - 24

Fooded as before. 2200 HOLDEN, R.L., Bn. 20, U.S.N., was returned to the
ship by the beach guard under charges of creating a disturbance, fighting at
the Fleet Landing. Charges to follow. Male prisoner at large by order of the
Commanding Officer. 2200 KING, R.B., Fakeo, U.S.N., reported aboard upon completion
of seven days leave, on time.

J. E. HENDRICKSON

V. E. HENDRICKSON, Ensign, U.S.N.
UNITED STATES SHIP \textit{Enterprise} Wednesday, 20 November, 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION: \textit{plus 10\%}

REMARKS

0 - 4

Removed starboard side to berth B-3, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.I., with 12 manila lines, 5 wire breasts, and 2 wire cables. Receiving fresh water and telephone service from the dock. Bo. 4 boiler in use for auxiliary purposes. Ships present, various units of the U.S. Fleet, district and yard craft. SOA is commander in this vessel. SCP is Omao at the Submarine Base. Completed the following named men reported aboard upon completion of temporary duty with the shore patrol in Honolulu, T.I.: CANNOX, C. S., A.M.6.c., U.S.N.; HAMBUDD, A. L., jr., B. E., 2c., U.S.N.; BALL, P. A., B. E.10., U.S.N., and PERRECA, \ldots, E. M. 10., U.S.N.

7 - 8

Rerouted as before. 0620 received on board for use in general mess the following provisions from Dairymen's Association, Ltd., Honolulu, T.I., inspected as to quality by acting Pay Clerk J. H. Whittier, U.S.N., and as to quality by Lieut(jg) U.S. Rightower, (EC), U.S.N., 70 gallons grade \textit{AA} milk, 65 gallons ice cream. 0720 Lieut(jg) M. W. Stewart returned from nine days leave. 0740 SCLEF underway.

J. C. Ross, Ensign, U.S.N.

9 - 12


31 - 13

W. J. Strong, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

12 - 16

Rerouted as before. 1300 pursuant to orders of Commanding Officer of Nov. 26, 1941, 076/PL9-4/(10-41), Buoy despatch 241218 of Nov. 26, 1941, Ensign R. H. Carrington, U.S.N. was this date detached, with orders to proceed to Commandant 11th. Naval District, San Diego, California for temporary duty and further transfers to Commandant 12th. Naval District, San Francisco, California for duty, at Armed Guard Center, Treasure Island, California, authorized delay Dec. 15, 1941 to report Comdt. 11. Delay consents as leaves. 1315 Cut in degaussing cable. 1322 pursuant orders of Commanding Officer GVE/C 3K 179/17 of Nov. 17, 1941, the following men left the ship for temporary duty as shore patrol in Honolulu area: KENNEDY, A. S., 36E 79 2E, E.L.1c., U.S.N.R.; GODSHIP, P., 2EE 52 18, A.2c., U.S.N., 1300 FORKLAND stood in. Pursuant to orders of Commanding Officer, U.S.N.T.S., Norfolk, Va. of October 20, 1941, ref. Buoy ltr. Nov.322-PHD-1901 of September 24, 1941, OBBLE, E.W., 295 52 56., Sea.1c., U.S.N. reported on board with orders to report to Commanding Officer, VS Squadron 5 for duty. Transportation via SHOMAN completed. 1345 secured degaussing cables. 1352 SCLEF underway and standing out. 1445 pursuant orders of Commanding Officer, ENTERPRISE, O27/116-4/121, Ref.(a) verbal orders

CONCLUDED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET

Approved: M. W. PHELPS

Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Examined: M. W. PHELPS

Lieut-Command., U.S.M.C., N.Y., Capt:. (Original (red/or) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP "ENTERPRISE"

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

EXHIBITS
OF
JOINT
COMMITTEE

2033

6 - 20

Scored as before. 1605 GRAVEN underway, shifting berths. 1613 PARSAMG underway and standing out to sea. 1625 GRIDLEY underway and standing out. 1630 TRACER underway. 1735 CUSHINGS underway. 1745 pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer dated 27 November 1914, CHAVES, J. T., Jr., 265 98 09, M. Attache, U. S. N., was released from confinement and placed under armed guard for transfer to H. O. C., F.T. to Naval Prison, Navy Yard, Mare Island, California for confinement. 1800 The following men were left the ship with orders to report to the Commanding Officer, LEXINGTON, F.T. to West Coast for re-sultant leave:

ADAIR, J. M., 337 17 69, C. Ph. M., (PA), U. S. N.
MC KEAN, C. H., 316 31 61, En. 1c, U. S. N.
LEE, T., Jr., 266 29 56, M. Attache, U. S. N.
GRIEVE, A. H., 337 02 10, C. M. Z., U. S. N.
SPENCER, E. L., 262 24 69, F. 1c, U. S. N.
LEHMAN, P. A., 272 19 30, E. A. M. M., U. S. N.
MATTHEWS, J. B., 295 33 60, M. Attache, U. S. N.
JOHNSON, J. L., 295 39 60, E. M. 6c, U. S. N.
MARKS, F. E., 352 61 80, S. Y. 2c, U. S. N.
GAGE, C. D., 265 37 64, F. 1o, U. S. N.
CHURCH, W. F., 207 12 20, C. M. Z., U. S. N.
SULLIVAN, W. P., 288 27 21, C. M. Z., (AA), U. S. N.
LEWIS, B. C., 237 01 90, A. M. 2c, U. S. N.
PHILLIPS, J. B., 274 63 00, T. W. 2c, U. S. N.
WEDNESDAY, G. E., 274 31 68, J. S. P., U. S. N.
KNIGHT, L. W., 297 12 52, C. W. T. (PA), U. S. N.
WHITE, W. R., 221 70 52, C. W. T. (PA), U. S. N.
MC CARR, W. A., 341 66 18, C. M. Z., (AA), U. S. N.
LILLER, W. T., 340 68 10, C. M. Z., (PA), U. S. N.
JENKINS, W. B., 243 68 46, M. Attache, U. S. N.
REED, A. F., 403 36 74, M. Attache, U. S. N.
DUFFY, W. J., 236 28 72, M. Attache, U. S. N.
FORD, R. L., 254 26 45, M. Attache, U. S. N.
LASSNOW, W. H., 245 26 18, C. M. Z., U. S. N.

The following men left the ship with orders to report to the Commanding Officer, LEXINGTON, F.T. as indicated:

MARTIN, W. H., Jr., 265 98 09, M. Attache, U. S. N. to Navy Prison, Nyc, Mare Island, California for confinement.

MACLEAN, C. J., 267 14 90, R. E. N., to LEXINGTON for duty.


BRADY, E. L. R., 312 35 02, A. M. 2c, C. M. Z., to K. A. S., San Diego, Calif. for course of instruction.

CARTER, W. J., 418 51 60, F. 1c, U. S. N., to MACOM detail, Boston, Mass.

SMITH, W. G., 299 06 54, A. M. 2c, s. N., to Advanced Carrier Group, K. A. S., San Diego, California.

All pursuant to the Commanding Officer's orders OTS/612-4/M(11-24) of 27 Nov. Flagship R. O. P., U. S. N. left the ship on temporary guard duty to deliver prisoner to LEXINGTON and returned aboard having completed duty at 1930.

R. H. MAYS, Adjutant (g), U. S. N.

2033

requs as before.

[Signature]

R. G. SHERR, Lieutenant, U. S. N.
UNITED STATES SHIP

TUESDAY 27th November 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION 10-10

REMARKS

0 - 4

Ordered starboard side to berth E-X, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with 18 manila lines, 8 wire breasts and 8 wire cables. Receiving fresh water and telephone service from the dock. No, a boiler in use for auxiliary purposes. Military and Medical guard in this ship. Ships present are various units of U.S. Fleet. New to CINCPAC in Submarine Base. CONA is Comdr Sub base in this vessel. 0100 the following named men reported aboard having completed temporary duty as shore patrol in Honolulu area, T.H.: LOUD, J.E., BED CO SE, A.M.M.,U.S.N.; ZIMMERMANN, A., 32377 6K, S.N.,USN.; LCTCH, I.E., 359 02 22, S.N.,USN.; JACOB, J.A., 259 30 15, W.T.,US.N.

M.T. LEONARD/ Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

0 - 8

Ordered as before. 0630 received order on board for use in general mess the following fresh provisions: from Dairymen's Association, Ltd., Honolulu, T.H., 66 gallons butter, 115 lbs. cottage cheese. Dispatched as to quantity by Acting Pay Clerk R. M. Whitmer, U.S.N., and as to quality by Lieut(jg) D.F. Nightingale, U.S.N., 0630 lighted fires under No. 1 boiler.

J C. COFFEE

C. BOFFET, Ensign, U.S.N.

8 - 12

Ordered as before. 0600 mustered crew on stations. Absentees: FIEN, C.L., S.S.E., USN since October 14 and CARROLL, C.A., S.S.E., USN since October 15, Nov. 14, 1941. 0600 sailing down military and medical guard flag. S.T.A.D.A.M assumed full control. The summary court martial of which Lieutenant Commander C.L. Elyshih, U.S.N. is senior member met in the case of KING, R., M.A.T.L., 10-10. 0645 Tested steering gear. Conditions normal. 0935 fires secured under No. 1 boiler. 1100 Captain's mast was held on the below named men and the ship was awarded as follows: COALITION, 20 Pts; U.S.S. Iris for disorderly conduct, Punishment 2 weeks restriction. MAG, S.L., Off. U.S.N., Disorders conduct, Punishment Deck Court. 1105 BAIL, F.E., D.K., U.S.N. left the ship on temporary duty with the shore patrol in Honolulu, T.H. 1145 Commander A.R.Cenn, (NE), U.S.N. returned aboard upon completion of a days leave of absence. Daily inspection of smokeless powder samples and magazines made. Conditions normal.

M. H. ROBERTSON, Ensign, U.S.N.

12 - 16


J C. LOWE

V. B. BROOKS, Ensign, U.S.N.
## LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE

### AT Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. U., TO Passage

**S. P. B. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.**

### ZONE DESCRIPTION

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### DRILLS AND EXCISES

- Morning: 0
- Afternoon: 0

### GYROSCOPIC LOG

- Easting: 0° 10' E
- Northing: 0° 10' E
- Aver. Deviation: 1° 10' E

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### WEATHER DATA—OBSERVED

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### WIND AND BAROMETER

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### SCHEDULE FOR WEATHER DATA

- Wind
- Barometer

### REFERENCES

- Normal Data
- Storm Data

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<tbody>
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<td>9-18</td>
<td>Steaming as before. 1704 changed course into the wind preparatory to landing aircraft. 1900 landed first plane. 1718 landed last plane. Changed course to 270°T. and pps. 227°5.5 ppe, and 329°6.3 ppe. Changed speed to 16 knots. 12:27 darkened ship. Average steam 410. Average rpm 154.1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. R. OVER</td>
<td>Lieutenant, U.S.N.</td>
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<td>9-20</td>
<td>Steaming as before. 1821 secured boilers No. 1 and No. 2. 1854 cut No. 3 heater in on main steam line. 1855 sighted Haula light, bearing 315°, distance about 15 miles. 1900 set clocks back 1/2 hour. 1915 Radar reported plane bearing 304°, distance 16 miles. 1941 Radar reported plane bearing 004°, distance 15 miles. Average steam 410. Average rpm 160.</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. O. DORSEY</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-24</td>
<td>Steaming as before. Average steam 410. Average rpm 160.</td>
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<tr>
<td>W. C. HARRINGTON</td>
<td>Lieutenant (lg), U.S.N.</td>
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES SHIP

REMARKS

- 4, 10, 12

4, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16

- 4, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16

WILLIAM W. T. 12, 14, 15, 16

- 4, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16

WILLIAM W. T. 12, 14, 15, 16

[Signature]

Approved

Examiners:

[Signature]

[Signature]

(Original (handwritten) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
# LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

## ZONE DESCRIPTION

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| 4 | Latitude | 29° 48' 30" N | 150° 59' 00" W | Received | 0 |
| 5 | Longitude | 150° 48' 30" W | 29° 59' 00" N | Expended | 2 |

| 6 | Latitude | 29° 48' 30" N | 150° 59' 00" W | Drafted | 1.5 |
| 7 | Longitude | 150° 48' 30" W | 29° 59' 00" N | Reserved | 1.5 |

| 8 | Current | 4 knots | 0 knots | Drafted | 2.0 |
| 9 | Draft | 4.5 knots | 4 knots | Drafted | 3.0 |

| 10 | WATER LEVEL | 50.75 feet | 50.75 feet | After Entering Port | 50.75 feet |
| 11 | MACHINERY TEMPERATURE | 120° F | 120° F | Machinery | 120° F |
| 12 | DEVIATION | 0° | 0° | Deviation | 0° |

### DRILLS AND EXERCISES

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### SHIP'S DUTY LOG - SUBMARINES

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</table>
16 - 18. As before. 1650 the Navy Court Martial of which Lieutenant T. A. Nation, U.S.N., is senior member adjourned in the case of FLINT, U.S.N., while, U.S.N., to await the action of the supervising authority. 1610 Plane was made ready to drop message. 1650 sounded flight quarters. 1658 was ready preparatory to landing aircraft. 1657 first plane landed. 1711 last plane landed; required some course and speed. 1720 sounded general quarters.

Average, Plane 410. Average rpm 148.7.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.


O. R. OBER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.


C. P. BORGWITZ, Lieutenant, U.S.N.
UNITED STATES SHIP... CAPTAIN... Saturday 2 (Dec) October 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION... Plus 11 REMARKS

0 - 4


J. A. Holker, Ensign, U.S.N.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0445 lighted fires under No. 6 boiler. 0454 out in No. 6 boiler on main steam line. 0530 steaming at various courses and speeds preparatory to launching aircraft. 0643 launched first plane. 0657 launched last plane. Changed course to 270°T. and psc. Changed speed to 15 knots. Average steam 410. Average rpm 180.2.

R. R. Gaff, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0640 counted flight quarters. 0915 changed course into the wind preparatory to launching aircraft. Using various courses and speeds. Approximate course 060°T. approximate speed 17 knots. 161 rpm. 0930 first plane launched. Wind last plane launched. Came left to course 270°T., 16 knots. 160 rpm. 0934 steamed on course 270°T. Changed course right into the wind preparatory to landing aircraft. Approximate course 030°T. Approximate speed 16 knots. 162 rpm. 0950 first plane landed on board. 0941 changed course left momentarily, waiting for planes to return. 0943 changed course back into wind. 0934 last plane landed on board. Changed course left to join fleet on course 270°T. Changed speed to 15 knots, 100 rpm. 0950 steamed on course 270°T. 1000 mustered crew on stations. Absentees: CARL, E.R., Deck, U.S.N. 426 from 0100, November 7, 1941, and STACY, T.L., Bea.2G, U.S.N. ACL from 0100, November 6, 1941. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. 1151 lighted fires under No. 7 boiler. Average steam 410. Average rpm 158.3.

C. F. Dobie, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

15 - 16

Steaming as before. 1200 lighted fires under boiler No. 1. 1300 flight quarters. 1340 boiler No. 9 secured. 1348 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch and land aircraft. 1402 landed last plane. Changed course to 270°T. and psc. 285° psc. 285° psc. Changed speed to 10 knots. 1453 NO. 1 relieved ELMS on station in inner anti-submarine screen as planeguard. 1500 the summary court martial of which Lieutenant W. A. Watson, U.S.N., is senior member, met in the cases of MILL, W.F., and MILL, L.I., Sees.1d, U.S.N., and FLINT, R.R., Sees.1d, U.S.N. Average steam 410. Average rpm 157.5.

W. J. Harsbury, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

(Continued on additional sheet)

Approved: Examined:

C. W. Reid

Captain, U.S.N. Navy,
Commanding.

R. W. Ruba

Lieut.-Comdr., U.S.N.,

Original (Official) copy of this page to be sent on Board of Navigation mailing.
**LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE**

**BY**

**C.V.A.**

**At Passage**

Pearl Harbor, T.G. to Wake Island Sunday 30 November 1941

**Crossed Equator**

Nov 23 1941

**Zone Description**

Plus 110°

**G. D. Murray**, Captain

**U.S. Navy Commanders**

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**Drill and Exercises**

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**Note**

During the passage from Pearl Harbor to Wake Island on Sunday, 30 November 1941, the ship ENTERPRISE maintained a steady course and speed. The weather conditions were generally calm, with occasional light winds. The barometric pressure remained relatively stable, indicating fair weather. The ship's crew continued regular drills and exercises, ensuring readiness for any emergencies. The captain, G. D. Murray, oversaw the passage, and the ship's command structure remained in place throughout the journey.

**Sundries**

- **Run No.** (111)
- **Time to submerge**
- **Greatest depth**

**Original Gibson copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly**

2044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.S. * * * * * * * * * * * *

Date

20 - 14

Steaming as before on course 270°T. and rpm. Speed 24 knots, 224 rpm.

Average steam 410. Average rpm 224.

C. R. CVSS

ratings

lieutenant, U.S.N.

Approved

J. C. USN

Capt. U.S. Navy

Coxswain

(To be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

J. C. HUMMERS, Lieut.(jg), U.S.N.

4 - 6  Steaming as before. 0615 sounded flight quarters. 0634 maneuvering preparatory to launching aircraft. 0639 launched first plane. 0645 launched last plane, resumed base course and speed. 0647 secured from general quarters, set Condition of Readiness Three, watch II, in ship's fire control. Average steam 410. Average rpm 152.8.

F. A. THIES, Ensign, U.S.N.

6 - 12  Steaming as before. 0950 changed course into the wind preparatory to launching aircraft. Steaming at various speeds. 0944 launched first plane. 0948 launched last plane. 0957 landed first plane. 1006 last plane landed. Changed course to 270°T. and pg, 257° S. pso, 256° petro. Changed speed to 18 knots, 160 rpm. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions found to be normal. Average steam 410. Average rpm 152.5.

B. R. MEYER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

12 - 16  Steaming as before. 1245 sounded flight quarters. 1250 published the findings and sentence in the case of STENSON, A.D., Sea.lie. U.S.N. Finding: Guilty. Sentence: Confinement for five days and to lose $2 a month of his pay for one month; DEMAY, J. L., Cox, U.S.N. Finding: Guilty. Sentence: to lose $60 of his pay a month for a period of one month; SINCLAIR, A.H., A. So, U.S.N. Finding: guilty. Sentence: to lose $20 of his pay a month for a period of one month; STEVENS, J.C., Seade, U.S.N. Finding: guilty. Sentence: to be confined for five days and to lose $9 a month of his pay for a period of one month. 1330 by order of Commanding Officer, STEVENS, J.C., Sea.lie. U.S.N. and STENSON, A.D., Sea.lie. U.S.N. were confined for a period of five days in execution of sentence of Code Court. 1336 changed course right into wind preparing to launch airplanes. Approximate course 068°T. Ave. speed 15 knots. 1342 landed first plane. 1348 landed last plane. Changed speed to 18 knots, 160 rpm. resumed base course 270°T. 1353 changed course to right into wind preparing to land aircraft. 1356 first plane landed. 1400 last plane landed. Changed speed to 16 knots, 160 rpm. resumed base course 270°T. Average steam 410. Average rpm 153.7.

C. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

16 - 18  Steaming as before. 1633 Boiler No. 3 cut in on main steam line. 1608 commenced steaming on various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1725 last plane landed. Changed course to left to 270°T. and pg, 260° pso, 258° petro. Changed speed to 18 knots. 1735 changed speed to 24 knots. 1740 General quarters. 1750 darkened ship. Average steam 410. Average rpm 152.5.

J. C. HUMMERS, Lieut(Jg), U.S.N.

18 - 20  Steaming as before. 1855 secured from General quarters. Set Condition of Readiness III, watch II, ship control and fire control. Live at most one hour to zone plus 12 hours. Average steam 410. Average rpm 152.5.

C. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

(Original Signature: copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.)
### LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE

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### DRILLS AND EXERCISES

- **Morning**
  - Deck Drill: 2:30 PM
  - General Quarters: 4:00 PM

- **Afternoon**
  - Drafts for D:
    - General Quarters
  - Drafts for M:
    - General Quarters

### Nautical Data

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10 - 12

Steaming as before. 1558 changed fleet course to 264° T. and 20° E. 250° pse. 1640 sounded flight quarters. 1654 changed course left into wind preparatory to landing aircraft. Approximate course 088° E., approximate speed 25 knots. 1702 first plane landed. 1706 last plane landed. Changed course right to 264° T. Changed speed to 15 knots. 160 T.P.M. 1705 sounded General Quarters. 1718 darkened ship. Cut in degaussing gear for half hour test. 1740 secured the degaussing girders. Test completed. Average steam 410. Average R.P.M. 160.5.

J. D. Bissett, Lieutenant, U.S.

12 - 20

Steaming as before. 1817 secured from General Quarters. Set condition of Readiness III, ship control and fire control. Average steam 430. Average R.P.M. 160.0.

W. O. Coon, Lighter, U.S.

20 - 24

Steaming as before. 2400 date changed to Wednesday, December third, zone description (-) 12. Average steam 410. Average R.P.M. 160.0.

J. A. Holmes, Ensign, U.S.
UNITED STATES SHIP

SUSQUEHANNA

REMARKS

1. BLACKEN darkened with Task Force Flight, in special operating area west of J.V. on course 240°T, and pgd. 280°, 280° pace. Standard speed 17 knots. 1,850 r.p.m., steaming at 16 knots, 1,844 r.p.m. on bellows logs. 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8. First course of 69°, axis 270°T, steamed 24 hours, 208 r.p.m.

2. Vigilant and CALL and FAIRMONT in inshore anti-submarine screen 1-A. First plane was C.C. and C.O.P.L. In take vessel. Task force in condition of readiness 1A. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 1,850.

3. J. F. DOREST, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

4. At sea as before. 0900 flight quarters. 0910 general quarters. 0945 witnessed take off at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 0954 landed first plane. Changed course to 290°T, and pgd. 280°, 280° pace. Passed to E.A., 0937 sourced from general quarters. Set condition II in flight control and fire control. Lighted ship. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 1,850.

5. W. C. HAMPTON, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

6. At sea as before. 0617 rounded flight quarters. 0616 changed speed to 14 knots, 1,840 r.p.m. 0631 maneuvering preparatory to launching aircraft. 0655 launched first plane. 0638 launched last plane; changed speed to 16 knots, 2,040 r.p.m. changed course to 290°T. 0655 changed speed to 15 knots, 1,898 r.p.m., course 120°T, and pgd. 0705 landed first plane. 0710 landed last plane; changed speed to 7 knots, changed course to 120°T, and pgd. 0715 preparing to receive first call for fueling. 0755 passed first line to EM CALL. 0745 sent provisions to CALL. 0746 received fueling from CALL. 1000 EM CALL cast off. All aircraft preparing to receive FARK 2 for fueling. 1111 passed first line to FARKING. 1300 sent stores to FAIRING. 1130 commenced fueling FARMING. 1143 FARMING cast off. Same routine daily inspection of all magazines and smokeless powder samples, conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 1,840.

7. J. D. BARKER, Ensign, U.S.N.

8. At sea as before, refueling the FARMING on starboard side. 1238 changed speed to 20 knots, 2,040 r.p.m. 1245 pgd. 06°, 06° pace. 1339 disconnected forward refueling hose. 1240 bowline parted, 1241 EM CALL cast off. Total amount of fuel received by FARK 2 was 98,600 gallons. 1503 changed course to 06°T, and pgd. 06°. 1504 to 030°E. 1504 to 230°E. 1504 to CALL, located "downwind" wing. 1531 continued flight course 230°E. 1531 EM CALL received position circling only. 1537 disconnected after 25 miles, 1300 pace cast off, bow line received 65,571 gallons fuel off. 1600 changed course to land the wind to launch aircraft. 1600 launched first plane. 1605 launched second plane. 1636 launched third plane. 1643 last plane landed. Changed course to 06°T, 1500 r.p.m. 1554 changed course to right to 06°T. 1543, 12°N. 1530, 1500, 1400, 1300, 1200, 1100. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 1,800.

9. R. R. O'NELL, Lieutenant, U.S.N.
U.S.S. *Enterprise* Date: 3 December 1941

18 - 20
Steaming as before. 1647 secured from General quarters. Jet condition of readiness three, watch four. 1900 set clocks back one hour to 1800 Zone (-)l time. Average steam 410. Average rpm: 103.4.

S. O. F. DORSEY, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m: 146.0.

S. C. BIXBEY, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

Approved.

R. E. MAHAN
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

This page to be sent to the crew of the ship by daily with log sheets.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES SHIP

EXHIBIT 12

REMARKS

0 - 4
Storm darkened in all areas with Task Force right, except 20°N 16°W and
00°N 20°E. Current causing dislocation N-V, on course 045°T. and 244° pop.
320° and 200°. Standard speed 15 knots, 105 r.p.m. Steaming at 14 knots. 100° r.p.m.
BEARING 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 on line. Fleet course and axis 66°T. Fleet
steam 10 knots. 156 r.p.m. Forest guards CASSAW and FASHIER. Rip in condition
of reported three. Fleet wide and T.C. in this vessel. 0205 sighted NORTH-
20°W and 01°N bearing 071°T, approximate distance 10 miles. 0245 NORTH-
20°W and 04°N bearing 071°T. Average steam 15C. Average r.p.m. 156.0

J. H. VICK, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

04 - 10
Steaming as before. 0600 manned all flight quarter stations. 0630 went to
flight deck quarters. 0630 changed speed to 15 knots. 156 r.p.m. 0630 changed
course to the wind to launch aircraft. Approx. course 310°T. and 244° pop.
Approx. speed 18 knots. 0600 launched first plane. 0632 launched last plane.
Changed course to right to 244°T. and 244° pop. Changed speed to 18 knots. 105 r.p.m.
and lighted ship. 0603 secured from general quarters. Not condition of readiness
more. 0547 shifted steering unit to port unit. Average steam 120. Average r.p.m. 155.0

J. F. DAVIS, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

06 - 12
Steaming as before. 0615 Flight quarters. 0935 commenced steering at various
courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 1000 last plane landed. Changed
course to right to 244°T. and 244° pop. 244° pop. 245° pop. Changed speed to
10 knots. 1515 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 12. 1551 Changed
flight speed to 15 knots. Changed speed to 16? knots. Made daily inspection
of magazines and machinery. Average steam 110. Average r.p.m. 155.0

J. C. LADSON, Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.

10 - 12
Steaming as before. 1210 sighted PBS patrol plane bearing 149°T. 1300 around
flight quarters. 1310 ceased zigzagging. Changed course right into wind prepa-
ready to launch aircraft, approx. course 120°T, average speed 19 knots. 1330
in sight first plane. 1345 launched last plane. 1411 first plane landed. 1414
last plane landed. Changed course to 314°T. and commenced zigzagging in accordance
with plan No. 12. 1415 changed to 10 knots. 1430 r.p.m. Made daily inspection of magazines
and general order samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 120. Average r.p.m. 114.0

J. J. EICHER, Ensign, U.S.N.

11 - 12
Steaming as before. 1710 changed course and speeds preparatory to landing
plane. 1720 first plane landed. 1725 last plane landed. Changed course to
180°T. 040°T. 180°T. 144°T. Changed speed to 10 knots. 1730 sounder
not clear. 1740 changed zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1810
last plane. 1540 r.p.m. Average steam 120. Average r.p.m. 155.0

W. O. GREGG, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

(U.S. NAVY V. M. SBK7)

Examined

P. W. TAYLOR, Navy

Lient. 3. Mr.

(Handwritten copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation, month and year: 1941)

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<td>08:00</td>
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<td>Machinery Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>Drill Exercise</td>
<td>Control Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00</td>
<td>Drill Exercise</td>
<td>Quarterdeck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:00</td>
<td>Drill Exercise</td>
<td>Mess Deck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:00</td>
<td>Drill Exercise</td>
<td>Sick Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:00</td>
<td>Drill Exercise</td>
<td>Navigation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- All drill exercises were conducted flawlessly.
- No unexpected incidents occurred during the day.

**Order of the Day:**
- Drill Exercise on the Main Deck
- Drill Exercise on the Deckard
- Drill Exercise on the Machinery Room
- Drill Exercise on the Control Room
- Drill Exercise on the Quarterdeck
- Drill Exercise on the Mess Deck
- Drill Exercise on the Sick Bay
- Drill Exercise on the Navigation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 - 18</td>
<td>Steaming as before. 1200 JULVAN, C.D., Sen.1b, U.S.N. was treated for fracture, comnminated right and left radius, sustained in fell from ladder at 700 m. Amputated at sick list, 1217 Flight Quarters. 1305 ceased zigzagging. Steamed base course, 004°. Changed speed to fleet speed 7 knots. 1356 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch and land aircraft 1325 last plane landed. Commenced zigzagging in accordance with plan No. 2. Changed speed to 28 knots, 100 r.p.m. Changed fleet speed to 10 knots. 1340 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1350 last plane landed. Commenced zigzagging in accordance with plan No. 2. Base course 004°, and 100. Changed speed to 20 knots, 100 r.p.m., fleet speed 10 knots. 1530 Flight quarters. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 175.9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 18</td>
<td>Steaming as before. 1600 changed course last to 004°T. 1602 ceased zigzagging. Resumed base course of 004°T. 1604 commenced landing operations. Various courses and speeds while landing planes. Average course 004°T. Average speed 11 knots. 1608 first plane landed. 1615 last plane landed. 1618 commenced zigzagging in accordance with zigzag plan No. 2. Changed speed to 15 knots, 150 r.p.m. 1645 sounded general quarters. 1740 secured ship. 1940 secured ships general quarters. Set condition of readiness three, watch ships control and fire control. 1600 ceased zigzagging. Changed speed to 20 knots, 150 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 161.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 - 20</td>
<td>Steaming as before. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 155.6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 - 24</td>
<td>Steaming as before. 2000 set clocks ahead one hour to zone [-]ximus 18 T.I. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 155.6.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approved:

[Signature]

Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.
C - 4

in company with Task Force 74.8 in meeting disposition 27 (night formation). Veer course and speed in 28°T. Fleet speed 16 knots. Task force is

standing in accordance with plan No. 8. Ship in steering at 25 knots, 180 r.p.m.

deploy five officers, or 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8.}\n
\textit{General Order} 3.3 planes guard are the

\textit{Falkland Islands.} All ships in task force are assuming darkened and maintaining

condition of readiness III, in ship control and fire control. U.S.P.A. and U.S.S.

in vocal order in twin vessel. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 124.0.

\textbf{J. A. Kibbe, Design, U.S.N.}

04

1000. Cloods very heavy. 0800 sound General Quarters. 0800 ceased zigzagging.

0830 course 18 knots, 180 r.p.m. 0830 changed course right to 334°T. and ppc.

as a result of various courses and speed preparatory to launching aircraft.

0830. CDS launched first plane. Changed speed to 15 knots, 150 r.p.m. Continued to

1000 east. 1000 launched second plane. Continued course and speed preparatory to launching aircraft.

0930 R.A.S. launched third plane. 0930 changed course 180°T. and ppc. 0945 changed speed to 16 knots, 190 r.p.m. 0945 Task Force appears in meeting disposition 27-7. Fleet course 215°T. Fleet

speed 16 knots. 1130 isCOMINCH in this vessel. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 124.0.

\textbf{G. R. Guile, Lieutenant, U.S.N.}

\textbf{EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2061}

\textbf{Remarks}

\textbf{12}

\textbf{as before. 0600 CDS} continued east - west stations. Absentees: GARC. 3-8, 21-11,

\begin{itemize}
  \item 21-10 from 0600. November 9, 1941, and FASST, 1-1, 2-2. 9-6.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{as before. 0600 CDS} continued east - west stations. Absentees: GARC. 3-8, 21-11,

\begin{itemize}
  \item 21-10 from 0600. November 9, 1941, and FASST, 1-1, 2-2. 9-6.
\end{itemize}

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\end{itemize}

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\begin{itemize}
  \item 21-10 from 0600. November 9, 1941, and FASST, 1-1, 2-2. 9-6.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{as before. 0600 CDS} continued east - west stations. Absentees: GARC. 3-8, 21-11,

\begin{itemize}
  \item 21-10 from 0600. November 9, 1941, and FASST, 1-1, 2-2. 9-6.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{as before. 0600 CDS} continued east - west stations. Absentees: GARC. 3-8, 21-11,

\begin{itemize}
  \item 21-10 from 0600. November 9, 1941, and FASST, 1-1, 2-2. 9-6.
\end{itemize}

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\begin{itemize}
  \item 21-10 from 0600. November 9, 1941, and FASST, 1-1, 2-2. 9-6.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{as before. 0600 CDS} continued east - west stations. Absentees: GARC. 3-8, 21-11,

\begin{itemize}
  \item 21-10 from 0600. November 9, 1941, and FASST, 1-1, 2-2. 9-6.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{as before. 0600 CDS} continued east - west stations. Absentees: GARC. 3-8, 21-11,

\begin{itemize}
  \item 21-10 from 0600. November 9, 1941, and FASST, 1-1, 2-2. 9-6.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{as before. 0600 CDS} continued east - west stations. Absentees: GARC. 3-8, 21-11,

\begin{itemize}
  \item 21-10 from 0600. November 9, 1941, and FASST, 1-1, 2-2. 9-6.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{as before. 0600 CDS} continued east - west stations. Absentees: GARC. 3-8, 21-11,
### LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

**HUNCHBACK**

**Lt.** Hawaiian Operating Area  
**To:** Capt. G. D. MURRAY  
**Friday, 13 December 1941**

### POINT DESCRIPTION

**1200**

### DRILLS AND EXERCISES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>13 Dec</td>
<td>0815</td>
<td>Drill</td>
<td>Flight Quarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Dec</td>
<td>0815</td>
<td>Drill</td>
<td>General Quarters</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec</td>
<td>0815</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Overcast</td>
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### TEMPERATURE:

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<th>Temperature</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec</td>
<td>0815</td>
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<td>72°F</td>
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### OCEANS:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec</td>
<td>0815</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Depth:

- Draft:
  - 0815: 00 ft

**Source:** Original (machine) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

ADDITIONAL SHEET

1:05-12:15

About 100 yards, 1° northeast, changed course into wind to recover altered course at speeds as necessary. Approaching shortly 0° wind, after recovering, began last plane landing. Changed speed to 100 m.p.h. 11:30 p.m. Ordered right to 0° east, and pgs. 1343 west to 0000 quarters. 1345

Time 1743. Ordered from general quarters, set condition 0000, 100 m.p.h. 1345. Average r.p.m. 15.73.

C. L. F. (3)

As before. Average speed 110, Aver 11, 0.6 p.m. 1355.

(Original)

Time 1344. Ordered 15000 pgs. on course 1° 10' north to 0°, 1400. Average speed 110. Average 10' east. Aver 11. 1° 10' east. 1° 10' east.

(Original)

As before. Average speed 110. Aver 11. 0.6 p.m. 1355.

(Original)

Time 1400. Ordered 15000 pgs. on course 1° 10' north to 0°, 1400. Average speed 110. Average 10' east. Aver 11. 1° 10' east.

J. L. F. (3)

As before. Average speed 110. Aver 11, 0.6 p.m. 1355.

(Original)

Time 1400. Ordered 15000 pgs. on course 1° 10' north to 0°, 1400. Average speed 110. Average 10' east. Aver 11. 1° 10' east.

J. L. F. (3)

As before. Average speed 110. Aver 11, 0.6 p.m. 1355.
UNITED STATES SHIP

EXHIBIT 328

Friday, 5 December 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION

 Remarks

Zone 0 - 4

Steaming on course 064°T. and pgo. 076°30' psc, 079° pgo, at 12 knots, 186 r.p.m. in company with Task Force Eight in special cruising disposition 6-7 (night), course and axis 064°T. Plane guards P A M I N G and C R A V E N in inner anti-submarine screen. Dullers nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 in use. Ship darkened. Ship control, fire control and air control in condition of readiness III. Condition "B" set below second deck. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 156.0

J. C. HARBURY, Lieut.(g), U.S.N.

Zone 4 - 8

Steaming as before. C500 sounded flight quarters. 055° sounded general quarters. C600 changed course into wind to launch aircraft, steaming at various courses and speeds. Approx. course 095°. C606 first plane launched. C616 last plane launched. Changed course to 064°T, speed 10 knots, 186 r.p.m. C635 secured from general quarters. Set condition of readiness IX, watch 2, ship control and fire control. Lighted ship. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 162.7

J. A. HOLLIG, Ensign, U.S.N.

Zone 8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0922 steaming on various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. C623 launched first plane. 0924 launched last plane. Changed speed to 15 knots, 155 r.p.m. C632 landed first plane. C640 landed last plane. Changed course to 080°T and 080° psc, 064° psc. Made daily visual examination of all magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Made weekly test of magazine and shell room flooding and sprinkling system. Conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 164.2.

J. A. VEE, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

Zone 12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1315 secured degaussing coils. W. BURKE, Lieut.(g), Sea.Sg, U.S.N., 3rd. Division was injured while standing in mess line for dinner, when he fell down unguarded hatch. Diagnosis: Hematoma left shoulder; was admitted to sick bay. 1350 went to flight quarters. 1355 changed speed to 20 knots, 69 r.p.m. Changed course into wind preparatory to launching aircraft. Approximate course 060°T. Approximate speed 10 knots, 69 r.p.m. 1341 launched first plane. 1346 launched last plane. Changed course right to 090°T and pgo. 1350 changed course right into wind to land air group. Approximate course 080°T. Approximate speed 10 knots, 69 r.p.m. 1353 first plane landed. 1354 last plane landed. Changed course right to 090°T and pgo. Changed speed to 20 knots, 165 r.p.m. 1413 C R A V E N and D U L L E S exchanged stations in disposition. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 161.8.

J. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

Zone 16 - 20

Steaming as before. 1632 commenced steaming on various courses and at various speeds preparatory to landing aircraft. 1654 first plane landed. 1640 plane 6-3-4 missed into barrier, no injuries to personnel. 1654 last plane landed. Changed speed to full speed, 20 knots, 169 r.p.m. Changed course to 090°T. 1640°T and pgo. 060° psc, 064° psc. 1310 sounded general quarters. 1715 darkened ship. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 175.7.

J. C. HARBURY, Lieut.(g), U.S.N.

Zone 20 - 24

Steaming as before. 1717 secured from general quarters, set condition of readiness three, watch two. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 169.0.

J. A. HOLLIG, Ensign, U.S.N.

Approved: Captain, U.S. Navy
Co-Aiding

Examined:

G. B. KIMBALL, Lieut.-Comdr., C.E.N. Navigator

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Temperature</th>
<th>Wind Direction</th>
<th>Wind Force</th>
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### Logs and Exercises

- **Morning**: Flight Quarters, General Quarters
- **Afternoon**: General Quarters

### Current

- **Before Leaving Port**: Draft fore 4 1/2, Draft aft 4 1/2
- **After Entering Port**: Draft fore 4 1/2, Draft aft 4 1/2

### Standard Max. Compass

- **Compass No.**: 69294
- **Error**: 0 00 32
- **Variation**: 14 27 00
- **Deviation**: 4 27 00

---

**Suggested Sun Data - Oahu**

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<th>Surf</th>
<th>Time to Submerge</th>
<th>Greatest Depth</th>
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</table>

*(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)*

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*Page 1 of 3*
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES SHIP

F.S. MEMO

Friday, 5 December 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION PLUZ 12

REMARKS

C - 4

Steaming on course 090°T. and ppc, 007° ppc. 013°0 patc. Standard speed 15 knots, 130 L. P. C. Steaming at full speed, 20 knots, 109 r.p.m., under boilers Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8; boilers Nos. 1, 6 and 9 available on one hour notice. Comm. to Pearl Harbor,... in company with Task Force Eight. Disposition of CV, Commeal in this vessel, S. E. and S. E.; quit in 17000000; steaming extended Condition III set in fire control, air control and ship control. 0800 changed time to Zone plus 12. (Comm. date to 5 December 1941). Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 199.0.

J. C. M. DORSET, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0430 flight quarters, 0450 general quarters. 0505 Sighted light of unidentified vessel bearing 106°T., distant 10 miles. 0536 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 0546 last plane launched. Changed course to 000°T. and ppc, 09°30' ppc, 009°0 patc; changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 0606 launched ship. 0604 secured from general quarters. Set condition of readiness III in ship control and fire control. 0745 flight quarters, Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 166.2

W. E. LEHMAN, Lieut (jg), U.S.N.

8 - 10

Steaming as before. 0600 sighted UK SAIL bearing 232°T., distance 15 miles. 0630 maneuvering preparatory to launching aircraft. 0650 launched first plane. 0655 entering rain squall; ceased launching planes. 0657 changed course to 000°T. and ppc; changed speed to 20 knots, 10 r.p.m. 0691 maneuvering to resume launching of aircraft. 0704 resumed launching aircraft. 0710 launched last plane; preparing to land last patrol. 0914 first plane landed. 0930 last plane landed. 1016 published findings of Summary Courtartial of which Lieutenant ... Nation, ... is senior member, in case of ... . I regret for B.A.C.B. from 0700, 27 October 1941 to 0700, 28 October 1941. Sentenced to reduction to next inferior rating and loss of pay amounting to ninety dollars. Payment of sentence of 300 struck out by Commanding Officer, and approved by Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. 1030 sounded flight quarters. 1030 maneuvering to launch aircraft. 1039 launched first plane. 1055 launched last plane; preparing to land aircraft. 1058 recovered first plane; ceased landing to prepare for emergency landing. 1108 made emergency landing. 1120 landed last plane; changed course to 060°T. and ppc; changed speed to 20 knots, 169 r.p.m., made daily visual examination of magazines and anchorless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 400. Average r.p.m. 158.5

J. A. MCMILLAN, Ensign, U.S.N.

18 - 16

Steaming as before. 1530 PBY sighted bearing 256°T., approximate distance twelve miles. 1505 maneuvering at various courses and speeds preparatory to holding flight operations. 1515 launched first plane. 1515 INTake 2. A. B. Genajo, J. 6.N. and STEVENS, F. 2. Genajo, J. 6.N. were released from confinement by order of the Commanding Officer. 1519 launched last plane. 1530 landed last plane. Changed course to 060°T. and ppc, 078° ppc, 060° patc. Changed speed to 20 knots, 187.5 r.p.m. 1530 sounded flight quarters. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 176.6.

R. R. COWEN, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:...

Examined:...

Original ribbon copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time (Local)</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Weather</th>
<th>Tide</th>
<th>Sea</th>
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<tr>
<td>1941-12-07</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>Calm</td>
<td>2 feet</td>
<td>Calm</td>
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</table>

**ZONE DESCRIPTION**

- At: Hawaiian Operating Area
- To: Pearl Harbor

**ZONE DESCRIPTION**

- Day: Saturday 6 December 1941
- Captain: C. D. Murray

**DRILLS AND EXERCISES**

- Morning
  - General Quarters
  - Flight Quarters
- Afternoon
  - General Quarters

**SUBMERGED BUN DATA—SUBMERGED**

- Run No. Serial:
- Time to submerge:
- Greatest depth:

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
ZONE DESCRIPTION

11408

REMARKS

0 - 4
Steaming darkened in company with task force eight in special cruising disposition 9°F on course 060° T. and pgo.0975 ppg, and 060° pgo. Speed 15 knots, 120 r.p.m., using boilers Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. Fleet course and axis 090° T. fleet speed 15 knots. Fleet guide, J.C.F.A., and O.C.C. in this vessel. Task force in condition of readiness three. Average steam 410.0. Average r.p.m. 127.0.

9 R. Query, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

4 - 8
Steaming as before. 0625 went to general quarters. 0630 lighted ship; secured from general quarters; set condition three watch four. 0740 shifted steering units. Fort unit now in use. Average steam 410.0. Average r.p.m. 129.0.

F. O. F. Jorgsett, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

8 - 12
Steaming as before. 0650 watch quartered on stations. Absentees: 2450, E.R., Sea.20, V.C., ACL from 0100, November 7, 1941, and STACEY, R.J., Sea.50, U.S.N.. ACL from 0100, November 6, 1941. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples, conditions normal. Average steam 410.0. Average r.p.m. 126.0.

C. E. Hembry, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

12 - 16
Steaming as before. 1200 sounded flight quarters. 1245 maneuvering preparatory to launching aircraft. 1246 launched first plane. 1304 launched last plane. 1340 US CALL coming alongside starboard side for fueling. 1343 passed first line to US CALL. 1349 commenced pumping fuel oil to US CALL. 1448 stopped pumping fuel oil to US CALL. 1448 US CALL cast off; all engines ahead standard 15 knots, 1330 r.p.m. 1505 maneuvers to regain position in center of formation. 1616 changed course to 095° T. and pgo; all engines ahead 2/3 (10 knots, 85 r.p.m.). 1530 sounded flight quarters. 1532 all engines ahead standard, 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. Average steam 410.0. Average r.p.m. 96.3.

J. A. Holmes, Ensign, U.S.N.

16 - 18
Steaming as before. 1800 sounded flight quarters. 1940 maneuvering preparatory to launching aircraft. 1955 launched first plane. 1034 launched last plane. 1846 US CALL coming alongside starboard side for fueling. 1343 passed first line to US CALL. 1349 commenced pumping fuel oil to US CALL. 1448 stopped pumping fuel oil to US CALL. 1448 US CALL cast off; all engines ahead standard 15 knots, 1330 r.p.m. 1505 maneuvers to regain position in center of formation. 1616 changed course to 095° T. and pgo; all engines ahead 2/3 (10 knots, 85 r.p.m.). 1530 sounded flight quarters. 1532 all engines ahead standard, 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. Average steam 410.0. Average r.p.m. 96.3.

J. R. Over, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

18 - 20
Steaming as before. 1818 secured from general quarters; set condition four. 1835 Stationed fire watch for blowing tubes. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 126.0.

F. O. F. Jorgsett, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. 2000 changed to zone plus ten and one-half time. 2200 changed speed to 16 knots, 149 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 164.3.
## LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

### AT PASSAGE

<table>
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<th>ZONE DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
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<th>TEMPERATURE</th>
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### CLOSED | STA |

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### DRILLS AND EXERCISES

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<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Morning</th>
<th>Afternoon</th>
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### VARIATION | DERIVATION |

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### DEPARTURE |くん | 27th |

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### MASTAGE TEMPERATURES:
- Maximum: 20°F
- Minimum: 2°F

### TOTAL RATES IN KNOTS—SUBMARINES

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### (Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
### ADDITIONAL SHEET

#### U.S.S. ENTERPRISE

<table>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>7 December, 1941</th>
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#### Page 1209

**16 - 18**

Steaming as before. 1610 sighted unknown vessel bearing 071°T, distance 18 miles. 1018 sighted Conv Task Force 3, 3-SA, 1 CL and 12 DD's, broad on port bow. 1631 sounded flight quarters. 1640 observed anti-aircraft fire on port beam. 1041 changed course left into wind preparing to launch aircraft, approx. course 061°T. average speed 16 knots. 1646 first plane launched. 1659 last plane launched. 1702 first plane landed. Submarine reported bearing 365°, distance approx. 6,000 yards. Changed course right to 120°T. All engines ahead flank. 1704 changed course left to 090°T. 1706 all engines ahead standard, 15 knots. 1720 sounded general quarters. 1721 set material condition Affirm. Task Force flight less ENTERPRISE and plane guard DD's joined Task Force Three. 1723 first plane landed. 1736 last plane landed. 1736 resumed landing aircraft. HMS BALE joined this vessel for screening. 1742 all engines ahead 1/3, 5 knots. 47 r.p.m. 1744 changed course left to avoid tanker. 1747 all engines ahead full, 20 knots, 169 r.p.m. Changed course left to 270°T. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 146.9.

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### Page 1204

**18 - 20**

Steaming as before. 1803 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1609 landed one plane. 1810 changed course to 270°T. Changed speed to 15 knots. 1018 changed speed to 15 knots. 1227 secured from General Quarters. Set condition of readiness II. Set material condition Baker. 1904 changed course to 180°T. and pgo, 1921 changed course to 090°T., and pgo, 09°30' pto. 1946 planes sighted bearing 260°T, distant 5000 yards. 1951 flight quarters. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 161.9.

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**20 - 24**

Steaming as before. 2004 turned on lights required for flight operations. 2009 changed course left into the wind to recover aircraft. Steaming at various speeds as necessary. Approx. course 075°T. 2010 turned on breakdoun lights. 2017 first plane landed. 2036 6-T-13 crashed into No. 1 barrier, no damage to plane or personnel. 2044 sighted HMLL bearing 142.8°T. 2046 HMLL joined formation. 2133 last plane landed. Changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 2115 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 6. 2116 changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 2116 changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 2116 stopped all engines. 2118 changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 2133 turned off running lights. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 122.7.

---

Approved: 

Captain U.S. Navy, 

Commanding.

Examined: 

J. P. Skeale, 

Lieut.-jg., U.S.N., Navigator.

Exhibit 39 of Joint Committee.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)
UNITED STATES SHIP

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10°

REMARKS

04 - 08
Steaming in company with Task Force 9-7 on course 093°. and pse. 060°.5 psc. 062°.5 psc. under boilers number 2. 3. 4. 5. 7 and 8. at 16 knots. 149 r.p.m. Fleet course 095°. fleet axis 060°. and guards 12 CALL and DUNLT in inner-anti submarine screen. Fleet guides. C.7.C. and S.O.P.A. in this vessel. Task force in condition of readiness three. All vessels of this force steering darkened. 0615 changed speed and fleet speed to 15 knots. 109 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 185°5.

J. A. ROLES, Ensign, U.S.N.

08 - 12
Steaming into the wind preparatory to launching aircraft. 0800 launched first plane. 0855 launched last plane. 0840 landed first plane. 0819 0820 reported ship bearing 30°. distant 76 miles. 0822 ship reported bearing 60°. distant 25 miles. 0834 last plane landed. 0835 changed course to 060°. Changed speed to 12 knots. 0847 Changed course to approx. course 075° to land aircraft. 0850 first plane landed. 0851 last plane landed. 0855 changed course to 060°. 0900 On radio orders from Seavvy. executed war plan against Japan in view of unprovoked air raid on Pearl Harbor at 0800 this date. 0900 commenced zigzagging. 0900 changed speed to 15 knots. 0932 sighted smoke bearing 010°. 0938 0938 and JANIVS joined formation. 1020 ceased zigzagging. Steamed on course 00°T. approx. to launch aircraft. 1029 launched plane. 1038 changed to course 060°. 1049 commenced zigzagging. 1055 ceased zigzagging. Changed course to 060°T. to launch aircraft. 1101 launched first plane. 1103 launched last plane. 1126 landed first plane. 1128 landed last plane. 1151 changed course to 190°5. 076° psc. 078°.5 psc. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 185°5.

C. F. DOREtti, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

12 - 16
Steaming as before. 1229 commenced steering at various courses and speeds to 1254 last plane landed. 1257 changed course to 120° and psc. 1311 changed course to 170°T. and pgo. Changed speed to 15 knots. 1321 changed course to 120°. and psc. Changed speed to 15 knots. 1343 commenced steering at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1347 changed course to 090°. 1350 commenced course to fleet course 120°T. 1358 commenced steering at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1400 last plane landed. Changed course to 070°T. 1414 Changed course to 107°T. 093° 30° psc. 097° 30° psc. 1434 secured from General Quarters. Set condition of readiness II. 1500 changed course to 070°T. 1507 commenced steering on various courses and speeds to launch and land aircraft. 1509 launched last plane. 1556 set material condition Baker. 1538 last plane landed. Changed course to 120°T. and pgo. 1540 changed course to 107°T. and pgo. 095° psc. 069° psc. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 141°8.

W. C. CHBURY, Lieut(3), U.S.N.

Approved:
C. B. Macdonald
Captain, T.C. Navy

Examined:
E. H. Robin
Lieut-Jonvcr
C. S. N. Navigation

(Original ribbon copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
12 - 16 (Continued)
1430 last plane landed. All engines ahead to CMO'T. and prec. All engines ahead full, to knots, 109 r.p.m., 1430 sounded general quarters. 100 lamp light fleet speed to be knots. Overall signing according to plan no. 1. 1500 ceased signing, returned to base course CMO'T. 1550 ceased course left to 080'T. Average stea 410. Average r.p.m. 154.5.


ADDITIONAL SHEET

Page

12 - 16 (Continued)
1430 last plane landed. All engines ahead to CMO'T. and prec. All engines ahead full, to knots, 109 r.p.m., 1430 sounded general quarters. 100 lamp light fleet speed to be knots. Overall signing according to plan no. 1. 1500 ceased signing, returned to base course CMO'T. 1550 ceased course left to 080'T. Average stea 410. Average r.p.m. 154.5.


F.S. GLENVEAGH

12 - 16 (Continued)
1430 last plane landed. All engines ahead to CMO'T. and prec. All engines ahead full, to knots, 109 r.p.m., 1430 sounded general quarters. 100 lamp light fleet speed to be knots. Overall signing according to plan no. 1. 1500 ceased signing, returned to base course CMO'T. 1550 ceased course left to 080'T. Average stea 410. Average r.p.m. 154.5.


ADDITIONAL SHEET

Page
UNITED STATES SHIP

REMARKS

0-4. Steaming darkened in company with U.S.S. BAYERN, U.S.S. CALYPSO, and CAMILLO. Zigzagging according to plan No. 6 along base course, 260° T., and ppc., 266° 30' psc., and 268° 30' psc., at 15 knots. Sifters Nos. 1 to 9 inclusive in use. Ship in condition of readiness 11, in material condition AIRM. C015 ceased zigzagging, resumed base course, 260° T., and ppc. 0620 changed base course to 160° T., and ppc. 0845 resumed zigzagging according to plan No. 6. 0215 ceased zigzagging and resumed base course 160° T.

0600 changed base course to 100° T. and ppc. 0845 resumed zigzagging according to plan No. 6. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 129.0.

4-6. Steaming as before. 0405 changed course to 350° T. and ppc., 337° psc., and 339° psc. 0430 changed course right to 110° T. and ppc. 0654 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 6. 0455 sound ed flight quarters. 0515 sounded general quarters. 0610 set material condition AIRM. 0645 Task Force; steaming 190° T., distant 10 miles. 0655 changed course left into wind to launch aircraft. Approx. course 068° T. 0559 first plane launched. 0559 last plane launched. Commenced zigzag course. 0650 changed course to right to 120° T., speed 20 knots, and ceased zigzagging. 0656 sighted destroyer bearing 230° T. 0610 sighted destroyer bearing 240° T. 0650 changed course left to 100° T. and ppc. 0709 psc., and 079° 30' psc. All engines ahead standard, 15 knots, 140 r.p.m. 0622 launched ship. 0630 secured from General quarters. Set condition of Readiness Two. Watch two. Set material condition AIRM. 0655 joined Task Force 6.4, formed cruising disposition 6-7, fleet course 090° T. and ppc. Fleet speed 16 knots, A.W.R. 0.13. 0746 changed course and fleet course to 060° T. and ppc. 0750 out in the DeGaussing gear. 0755 changed course into wind to launch aircraft. Approx. course 074° T. Approx. speed 14 knots. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 142.7.

8-12. Steaming as before. 0603 last plane launched. 0634 last plane landed. 0635 changed speed to 12 knots. Changed course to 090° T., 345° psc., 336° psc. 0647 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 0651 last plane landed. 0655 changed course to 200° T., and ppc. 266° psc., 269° psc. 0904 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 15 knots. 0938 H.M.T. and JAYFLY joined formation. 1022 ceased zigzagging. Changed course to 060° T., 049° 30' psc. 045° psc. 1003 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 1103 last plane launched. Changed course to 260° T. and ppc. 266° psc., 269° psc. 1049 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1056 changed course to 060° T. 1057 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 1105 last plane launched. Changed speed to 15 knots. Changed course to 060° T. and ppc. 1151 changed course to Course 060° T. 04an. 1200 made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 129.8.

12-16. Steaming as before. 1210 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1226 all engines ahead full, 20 knots, 169 r.p.m. 1236 ceased zigzagging. Changed course left to 090° T. and ppc. 1241 changed speed to 15 knots, 169 r.p.m. 1247 changed course into wind to launch aircraft. Approx. course 063° T., using various speeds. 1449 first plane launched. 1217 last plane landed. Preparing to steam paravanes, using various speeds. 1413 streamed paravanes, starboard paravane streamed unsatisfactorily. 1442 changed course right into wind to launch and recover aircraft. Approx. course 076° T., using various speeds. 1455 first plane landed. 1444 set material condition AIRM. 1447 cut in DeGaussing coils.

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Approved:

LIEUT. J.G., U.S.N.

Examined:

CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY, COMMISSIONING.

LIEUT.-COMDR., F. B. N. NAVIGATOR.

Page 55
# LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP AT U.S.S., Pearl Harbor, T..., TO

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## DRILLS AND EXERCISES

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(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE

Date: 2 December

Page 1

10:16

Steaming as before. 1206 ceased zigzagging. Assumed base course 000° T. 1235 submarine reported sighted bearing 030° T. 1237 ENTERPRISE attacked with two depth charges. 1238 all engines ahead full, 20 knots, 9.9 r.p.m. 1239 all engines ahead full power. 1239 all engines ahead 13.5 knots, 180 r.p.m. 1239 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2., speed 15.1 knots, 140 r.p.m. 1315 submarine reported dead ahead. 1316 changed course emergency left to 355° T. All engines ahead full, 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1317 all engines ahead emergency. Ceased zigzagging. 1320 changed course left to 020° T. and ppc. All engines ahead standard, 15.1 knots, 140 r.p.m. 1330 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1340 HOBBS dropped a depth charge bearing from the ENTERPRISE 159° relative. 1537 sounded flight quarters. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 190.9.

J. A. HOLCOMB, Ensign, U.S.N.

16:16

Steaming as before. 1605 changed course right into wind to recover aircraft. Approx. course 000° T. 1606 first plane landed. 1607 2nd plane landed. Changed course left to 340° T. and ppc. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1617 changed course to 11 knots, 199 r.p.m. 1631 changed course to 335° T. and ppc. 1636 ATTACKED reported subarine contact. 1631 changed course left emergency to 000° T. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1635 changed course right to 045° T. Changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 1645 returned to base course, 000° T. and ppc. 1655 ceased zigzagging. Steadied on base course 020° T. 1700 Task Force One left formation. Task Force Eight formed special cruising disposition 9-7. 1710 sounded General quarters. 1711 darkened ship. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 131.0.

J. A. HOLCOMB, Ensign, U.S.N.

18:20

Steaming as before. 1812 secured from general quarters, set condition of readiness 11. 1823 secured boilers Pos. 2 and 4. 1823 secured boiler No. 9. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 126.

W. C. HOBBS, Lieut(j.g.), U.S.N.

20:24

Steaming as before. 2030 Observed long oil slick close aboard port side. 2052 warning report surface craft bearing 230° T. distance 3.5 miles. 2233 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 126.9.

J. A. HOLCOMB, Ensign, U.S.N.

Approved: C. E. CHILTON, Capt., U.S. Navy, Commanding.

UNITED STATES SHIP  

ZONE DESCRIPTION  

REMARKS  

0 - 4  

Hooved starboard side to north F-9, Pearl Harbor, T.I.; with 5 cables, 4 breast wires. Boiler No. 2 in use for auxiliary purposes, with boilers on two hours notice. Ships present: various units of the U.S. Fleet. 30% is Cinese at Submarine Base. 0615 commenced fueling ship. Draft forward 23' 7", aft 23' 5". 0655 commenced receiving gasoline. 0700 started preparations for getting underway. 0735 stopped fueling, amount received 483,000 gallons fuel oil and 61,000 gallons of gasoline. 0353 NZCOD underway from alongside.  

4 - 8  

Hooved as before. 0405 boiler No. 1 cut in on main steam line. 0416 boiler No. 6 cut in on main steam line. 0453 target raft removed from along port side. 0450 underway from north F-9, Pearl Harbor, T.I., for operations as directed. Sectors No. 1 to No. 8 inclusive in use. Standard speed 15 knots. Captain, Executive Officer, Navigator and pilot on bridge. Captain coming. Material Condition maker set. 0425 tugs cast off. Commenced steaming on various courses and speeds, conforming to channel to clear harbor. 0500 torpedo defense. 0530 pilot left ship. 0538 passed entrance channel buoy No. 1 beam to port. Changed course to 154°T. Changed speed to 28 knots. 0600 changed course to 140°T. 0605 General quarters. 0625 changed course to 040°T. 0659 righted ship. 0632 secured from General quarters. Set condition of readiness 12. 0635 changed course to 0710°T. 0642 changed course to 156°T. 0648 changed course to 070°T. 0707 changed course to 020°T. 0745 Flight quarters. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 121.2.  

8 - 12  

Steaming as before. 0602 Destroyer on starboard quarter reported a submarine sighted bearing 190° from them. 0615 changed course right into wind to recover aircraft. Approx. course 000°T, steaming at various speeds. 0625 first plane landed. 0630 last plane landed. 0631 formed special cruising disposition 9-7. 0637 changed course, fleet course and fleet axis to 003°T, and pgp. 0637 changed speed to 10 knots, 97 r.p.m. 0638 changed course right into wind to launch aircraft in various speeds as necessary. Approx. course 036°T. 0640 first plane launched. 0641 last plane launched. 0642 first plane launched. 0647 ceased landing aircraft. Changed speed to 20 knots, 169 r.p.m. Changed course to right to 170°T, and pgp. Submarine contact reported by FAMENG. 0649 changed course to left into the wind to resume recovery of planes. 0652 FAMENG contact reported false. 0658 last plane landed. Changed speed to 20 knots, 169 r.p.m. Changed course left to 036°T. 0656 GRIDLEY reported submarine contact. Changed course left to 280°T. 0659 changed course left to 015°T. 0703 changed course left to 338°T. 0704 SE. At reported sighted torpedo. 0707 changed course left to the wind to launch aircraft. Steaming at various speeds as necessary. Approx. course 301°T. 0716 AIRC reported a submarine on her starboard bow. 1017 AIRC awaited report. 1018 launched first plane. 1019 last plane launched. Changed speed to 20 knots, 169 r.p.m. Returned to base course 003°T, and pgp. 1028 changed course to right into wind to recover aircraft, at various speeds as necessary. Approx. course 023°T, 1027 first plane landed. 1034 observed plane zooming on port beam 1000. Changed speed to 15 knots, 1384 r.p.m.). Changed course to right to 175°T. 1041 changed speed to 20 knots. Changed course to right to 210°T. 1042 changed course into the wind to resume recovery of aircraft. 1043 6-3-1 dropped message on deck. 1046 Sky Control reported alighting a white plane (army bomber) bearing 346°T, distance approx. 40 miles. 1059 first plane landed. 1058 last plane landed. Changed speed to 20 knots, 169 r.p.m., 0607°T, and pgp. 1053 changed course to 15 knots, 190 r.p.m. Changed course to 072°T, 0727 changed course to 15 knots, 190 r.p.m. 1105 sighted dark force one bearing 355°T, distance 14 miles. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 139.7.  

Approved:  

Capt. J. A. CONNOLLY, Ensign, T.J.S.  

Examined:  

Capt. J. A. CONNOLLY, Ensign, T.J.S.  

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DRILLS AND EXERCISES:

Morning
- Physical quarters
- General quarters
- Squadron arms
- Squadron under
- Physical quarters
- General quarters

Afternoon
- Physical quarters
- General quarters

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

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18 - 16 (Continued)
1358 ceased zigzagging and returned to base course of 300°T. 1400 E.L.T. reported hydroplane contact of submarine. 1401 changed course left to 320°T. all engines ahead flank, 25 knots. 1404 changed course to 310°T. 1406 came right with hard left rudder to course 300°T. Changed speed to 16 knots. 1414 Changed course and fleet course to 300°T. and fleet speed to 16 knots. 1415 secured from General quarters. Set condition of readiness two, watch two. Set aerial condition Baker. 1421 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. All engines ahead full, 20 knots. 1520 R.P.M. 1508 surface lookouts aft reported periscope bearing 107°T. All engines ahead flank speed. Changed course right to 270°T. and pgc. 1512 changed course left to 260°T. and pgc. 1526 changed speed to 18 knots. 1538 ceased zigzagging. 1527 changed course right to 020°T. and pgc. 1534 changed course right into wind to recover aircraft. Average course 090°T. using various speeds. 1539 first plane landed. 1543 HALF LACE CITY, on starboard quarter of marching, sighted submarine bearing 080°T. All engines ahead flank, 25 knots. Changed course left to 45°T. and pgc. HALF LACE CITY opened fire on submarine. 1601 changed speed to 18 knots, 1610 R.P.M. 1652 changed course into wind to recover 2-18. Steaming at various courses and speeds. 1656 6-18 landed. All engines ahead 16 knots, 168 R.P.M. 1759 changed course left to 300°T. Average steam 413.4. Average R.P.M. 164.4.

J. A. Holmes, Lt. Com. U.S.N.

16 - 18
Steaming as before. 1600 submarine sighted dead ahead. All engines ahead emergency full. Changed course left to 230°T. and pgc. 1606 all engines ahead full, 20 knots, 168 R.P.M. 1608 changed course left to 300°T. and pgc. 1623 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1640 ceased zigzagging, resumed base course, 060°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 18 knots, 168 R.P.M. 1653 changed fleet axis to 300°T. and pgc. 1700 sounded General quarters. All engines ahead 1/6, 10 knots, 93 R.P.M. 1705 changed course right into the wind and commenced steaming at various courses and speeds preparatory to recover aircraft. 1700 distant ship. 1747 sky control reported torpedo 1,000 yards on port beam. All engines ahead emergency flank. Changed course left to 090°T. 1709 set aerial condition after. 1710 changed course into the wind to recover aircraft. 1715 first plane landed. 1716 last plane landed. All engines ahead full, 20 knots. Returned to base course 300°T. 1721 changed fleet speed to 20 knots. 1723 E.L.T. reported a submarine sighted submarine bearing 156°T. 1726 all engines ahead emergency flank, full right rudder. Came to course 030°T. 16 CALM fired depth charges, oil came to surface. 1727 ceased zigzagging to avoid submarine. 1729 all engines ahead full, 16 knots, 168 R.P.M. Came left slowly to 300°T. Average steam 413.3. Average R.P.M. 165.9.

W. G. Mesbury, Lt. Com. U.S.N.

18 - 20
Steaming as before. 1811 secured from General quarters. Set condition of readiness two, watch two. Set aerial condition Baker. 1850 cut 1, 2 and No. 9 boilers off the main steam line. Average steam 416. Average R.P.M. 169.

J. A. Holmes, Lt. Com. U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. 2040 changed course and fleet course right to 000°T. and pgc. Changed speed and fleet speed to 16 knots, 168 R.P.M. Average steam 410. Average R.P.M. 168.

W. G. Mesbury, Lt. Com. U.S.N.

Approved:

L. A. Gonski, Capt., U.S.N.

Examinced:

UNITED STATES SHIP

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

ZONE DESCRIPTION

REMARKS

0 - 4

4 - 8

5 - 10

12 - 10

(Approved:)

Examined:

J. A. KEILIS, Capt., U.S.N.

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
## LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

### ZONE DESCRIPTION

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### WIND, BAROMETER, TEMPERATURES

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### CLOTHES

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### DRILLS AND EXERCISES

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### LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

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### SCHEDULED BAY DRY-DIVE

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(Original ribbon copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
13 - 16
Steaming as before. 1323 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1329 changed course to 090° T. and pps. 1331 changed speed to 10 knots. 1333 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1441 changed course to 090° T. and pps, 17.3° psc, 55° psc. Changed speed to 10.5 knots. 1335 changed speed to 10 knots. 1336 commenced zigzagging according to plan no. 2. 1345 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1346 changed course to 090° T. and pps. Changed speed to 10 knots. 1352 commenced zigzagging according to plan 2. 1359 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1443 changed course to 090° T. and pps. Changed speed to 10 knots. 1446 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid destroyer submarine contact. 1500 changed course to 090° T. and pps. Changed speed to 10 knots. 1507 commenced zigzagging according to plan no. 2. 1524 unloaded 1.1 in./75 cal. counts by firing. 1533 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 177.7.

16 - 16
Steaming as before. 1608 changed speed to 16 knots, 1600 r.p.m. 1608 6-8-10 reported contact with aircraft, later reported friendly. 1605 commenced zigzagging according to plan no. 2. 1650 sounded flight quarters, 1656 ceased zigzagging. Steamled on course 125° T. and pps. 1705 changed fleet speed to 16 knots, 16 r.p.m. 1250 sounded general quarters. Set material condition A113. Changed speed to 16 knots, 16 r.p.m. Changed course into wind to recover aircraft, approx. course 121° T. 1650 first plane landed. 1702 darkened ship. 1700 last plane landed. Changed speed to 16 knots, 16 r.p.m. Changed course to 125° T. 1707 changed course to 090° T. 1725 DALL and RD CALI reported submarine to starboard of 10 DALL. RD CALI attached with depth charges. Changed speed emergency flank. Commenced zigzagging to avoid possible torpedoes. 1739 returned to base course 090° T. Changed speed to 18 knots, 16 r.p.m. 1900 secured from general quarters. Set condition of readiness Two, watch one. Set material condition A113. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 176.8.

16 - 20
Steaming as before. 1600 secured from general quarters. Set condition of readiness Two and material condition A113. 1907 secured boilers Nos. 4 and 9. 1018 secured boiler No. 1. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 166.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. 2100 changed front of disposition right to 16°00 T. and pps. 165° psc and 165° psc. 2300 changed front of disposition right to 250° T. and pps. 22° psc, and 250° psc. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 166.
UNITED STATES SHIP

REMARKS

0 - 4
Stowing: Darkness in company with Task Force in night in special cruising disposition, 9-26(Blight) on course 000°T. and pgs. 045° psc. and 040° psc. on all before, except C. C. T. H. E. in standby status. Steaming at 18 knots, 190 r.p.m. Plane yard 02/9. 2 SAIL and 3 WAVE in 1 new Anti-submarine plane 1-A. Fleet course 000°T. and pgs. Fleet axis 300°T. Fleet speed 19 knots, 196 r.p.m. Fleet guide, T.W. and 3 WAVES in the vessel. Task Force in condition of readiness two. 0404 changed fleet axis right to 000°T. 0410 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.1

J. A. (Abnews, Design, F.D.

4 - 8
Steaming as before. 0410 flew quarters. 0525 aileron 5 and 9 cut in on main plane line. 0634 aileron 5 cut in on main plane line. 0636 aileron 5 cut in on main plane line. 0636 continued steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 0618 last plane launched. Changed course to 000°T. and pgs. Changed speed to 16 knots. 0638 changed speed to 15.6 knots. 0640 changed course to 000°T. and pgs. 0645 changed course to 300°T. Changed course to 30 knots. 0648 received from General quarters. Set condition of readiness II. Set material condition alert. 0653 changed course to 130°T. and pgs. Changed to flank speed. 0702 changed course to 300°T. and pgs. Changed speed to 16 knots. Required zigzagging. 0730 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.4

J. A. (Abnews, Design, F.D.

0 - 12
Steaming as in Force. 0804 first plane landed. 0911 last plane landed. Changed speed to 10.6 knots, 154 r.p.m. Changed course to base course, 000°T. and pgs. 0849 changed course right into the wind to recover aircraft. Steamed at various speeds as necessary. Approx. course 000°T. 0854 first plane landed. 0855 changed speed to 10.6 knots, 154 r.p.m. Changed course left to 300°T. and pgs. 0904 SALT LACE CITIZN reported sighting submarine in 200°T. off course. 0904 changed speed emergency flank. SALT LACE CITIZN opened fire on submarine. Changed course left to 290°T. Midship attached with depth charges. 0906 SALT LACE CITIZN reported submarine bearing 130°T. from Salt LACE CITIZN. Changed course right to 010°T. 0941 changed speed flank speed, 22 knots, 230 r.p.m. 0804 changed course left to 300°T. and pgs. Changed speed to 15.6 knots, 154 r.p.m. 0906 changed course, to fleet course and axis right to 090°T. and pgs. 0915 SALT LACE CITIZN reported submarine to starboard to port twenty yards astern of ship. Changed speed emergency flank. 0900 changed speed flank speed, 22 knots, 230 r.p.m. 0904 changed speed to 10.6 knots, 154 r.p.m. 0911 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 3. Changed course left to 16 knots, 196 r.p.m. 1004 ended General quarters. 1110 ceased zigzagbing. Changed course left into wind. 1006 changed course on various courses. Approx. course 110°T. 1118 first plane launched. 1135 last plane launched. Changed speed to 10.6 knots, 154 r.p.m. Changed course left to base course, 090°T. 1141 commenced landing aircraft to recover aircraft. Approx. course 110°T. 1149 changed speed to 10.6 knots, 154 r.p.m. Change course right to 000°T. 1147 selected 00-19 and came into wind to recover. Plane recovered on approx. course 105°T. 1144 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 3. Changed speed to 18 knots, 196 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 171.1

J. A. (Abnews, Design, F.D.

(Continued on ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:
J. D. (Abnews, Design, F.D.

Examined:
J. A. (Abnews, Design, F.D.

(Original ribbon copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

79718 O—46—pt. 16—12
## LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

### AT PASSAGE

**ZONE DESCRIPTION**

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### DRILLS AND EXERCISES

**Morning**

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*Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.*
ADDITIONAL SHEET

1091 - 13
1091 - 14
1091 - 15
1091 - 16
1091 - 17
1091 - 18
1091 - 19
1091 - 20
1091 - 21
1091 - 22
1091 - 23
1091 - 24

(Approved)

J. A. Ellis, Capt., 119, Navy.
Off duty.

This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with log sheets)

69
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2093

UNITED STATES SHIP INTERCESS 13 December 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION

REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming on course 190°, and ppc. 27°8 pac. 27°5 pspe, in creasing dispor- 9°7 in company with Task Force Eight. Nine and 10°2 in INTERCESS. Fleet course and axis 285°. Steaming at 16 knots, standard speed 15 knots. Bullets Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 in use. Ship in condition 21 and material condition later. Steaming decreased. 0054 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 18.0.

W. F. Butting, Lieut.(jg), USS.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0050 sounded General quarters. Set material condition affirm. 0059 out in No. 1 boiler on the main steam line. 0058 changed course right into the wind to launch aircraft. Steaming at various speeds as necessary. Approx. course 060°. 0045 first plane launched. 0015 last plane launched. Cold changed speed to 16 knots, 16°0 r.p.m. Changed course right to 280°. and ppc. 0038 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 0043 H.M.M. reported a submarine to her starboard. Changed speed to 28 knots. 23°0 r.p.m. Maneuvering to avoid submarine. Changed course right to 20°. 0035 changed course to 290°. 0030 lighted ship. 0037 changed course to 14°0. 0041 returned to base course 060°. Changed speed to 20 knots, 16°0 r.p.m. Set Condition 2 as general quarters. Set Condition of watch. Two, watch two. Set material condition alarm. 0054 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 0733 ceased zigzagging, resumed base course. 0726 changed front of disposition right to 240° and ppc. 27°5 pac. and 327°5 r.p.m. 0737 changed front of disposition right to 26°0. and ppc., 27°5 pac. 16°0 r.p.m. 0745 H.M.M. reported torpedoes were to her starboard. Emergency flank speed, 23°0 r.p.m. Changed course to left to 270°. 0746 changed speed to 10°5 knots, 15°4 r.p.m. Changed course left to 060°. and ppc. 0750 male routine shift of steering units. Port unit now in universal zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 16 knots, 16°0 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 191.9.

J. A. LeBlanc.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0854 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 0856 changed course to 060°, and ppc. 0916. 20° pac. 015° psppe. Changed speed to 16 knots. 0946 changed course to 280°. 0950 planed course to 24°. 0854 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 0902 changed course to 14°0. and ppc. Commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 0916 changed course to 24°. 0916 changed speed to 16 knots. 0952 changed course to 14°0. and ppc. 1007 pac. 10°8 r.p.m. 0953 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 0955 ceased zigzagging, planed course to 060°, and ppc. 016° 30° pac. 017° psppe. 0957 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1001 flight quarters. 1023 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1025 changed course to 060°. and ppc. 10°8 pac. 017° psppe. Planed speed to 16 knots. 1055 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1055 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1056 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid submarine contact. 1056 resumed landing aircraft. Steaming at various courses and speeds. 1114 last plane landed. Changed course to 280°. 1120 changed speed to 16 knots. 1135 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1141 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1145 changed speed to 16 knots. Changed course to 060°, and ppc. 1100 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 16 knots. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 177.1.

(Continued on opposite sheet)

Approved:

R. W. Hulse, Executive.

Examined:

G. C. Williams.

E. J. Miller, U.S. Navy.

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## LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

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### WIND
- **Force**: 0
- **Direction**: Calm

### BAROMETER
- **Reading**: 29.92

### TEMPERATURE
- **Reading**: 80.6°F

### CLOUDS
- **Type**: Clear

### DRILLS AND EXERCISES
- **General Quarters**
- **Condition after**
- **Condition Dead**
- **Night Quarters**

### GYROCOMPASS IN USE
- **Standard Deviation**
- **Error**
- **Variation**

### MAGNETIC TEMPERATURE
- **Mean**: 8°F
- **Maximum**: 10°F
- **Minimum**: 6°F

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(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.S. U.S.S. U.S.S.

10 - 21

1st. 2nd. 3rd.

The exhibit as before. Have noted weight here to get lock. Lock has been cleared. Have seaplane to land. Work, etc. Noiy. 1913. Have sent to lock at 10 a.m. Sept. 1913. Have noted water in lock. Have seaplane to lock as 10 a.m. Lock has been cleared. Lock has been noted. Have noted weight here. Lock has been cleared. Have noticed weight here. Lock has been noted. Have noted weight here. Lock has been cleared. Have noted weight here. Lock has been noted. Have noted weight here. Lock has been cleared. Have noted weight here. Lock has been noted. Have noted weight here. Lock has been cleared. Have noted weight here. Lock has been noted. Have noted weight here. Lock has been cleared. Have noted weight here. Lock has been noted. Have noted weight here. Lock has been cleared. Have noted weight here. Lock has been noted. Have noted weight here. Lock has been cleared. Have noted weight here. Lock has been noted. Have noted weight here. Lock has been cleared. Have noted weight here. Lock has been noted.

J. L. Holmes

J. L. Holmes

Approved

Filed

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with log sheets)
UNITED STATES SHIP

ZONE DESCRIPTION PLUS 10.

REMARKS

6 - 11 Steaming as before. 0623 PA. 1612 and GREELY left formation to investigate probable submarine. 0627 sighted 374° bearing 140°, crossing from starboard to port. 0624 PA. 1612 and GREELY rejoined. 0635 GREELY reported hydrophone indicated submarine in zone one. Changed speed flank, 25 knots, 23.8 r.p.m. Returned to base course 000° T., and psc. 0642 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 3. 1002 ceased zigzagging to base course 000° T., and psc. 1056 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1117 23 CALL reported sighting a submarine in zone two. Changed speed to flank speed, 25 knots, 25.8 r.p.m. Changed course right to 113° T., and psc. 1152 changed speed to 16 knots, 165 r.p.m. Changed course right slowly to base course, 000° T. 1156 commenced zigzagging a course to plan No. 2. 1310 cruiser plane dropped depth charge bearing 290° T., distance approx. 3 miles. Changed course to right to 160° T., speed 35 knots, 236 r.p.m. Rejoined proceeding to investigate. 1258 changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Returned to base course 000° T. 1255 plane dropped smoke tube bearing 352° T. 1256 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 4. A3 DAME steam 410. Average r.p.m. 172.4.

13 - 10 Steaming as before. 1424 commenced sanaeving at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1425 changed speed to 16.9 knots. 1426 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 16 knots. 1521 shifted steering control to conning tower. 1523 shifted steering control to bridge. 1530 PA. 1632. 1425 ceased zigzagging. Changed course to 000° T., and psc. 1426 commenced zigzagging at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 1440 changed course to 119° T., and psc. 072° T. 075°, psc. 1445 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1335 ceased zigzagging. 1457 commenced zigzagging at various courses to conform to movements of cruisers recovering aircraft. 1525 PA. 1632. Commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land plane. 1611 plane landed. Changed speed to 16 knots. Changed course to 000° T. 1550 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Average r.p.m. 176.7.

Approved:

Examined:

Date: 15 December 19...
## LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

**Name:** Enterprise  
**Model:**  
**Commissioned:**  

### ZONE DESCRIPTION
- **plus 10°**

### WIND
- **Direction:**  
- **Speed:**

### BAROMETER
- **Reading:**

### TEMPERATURE
- **Inside:**
- **Outside:**

### CLOUDS
- **Description:**

### SEA
- **Description:**

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### DRILLS AND EXERCISES

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### COMPARISON IN USE
- **Standard Ind. Comp.**
- **Error:**

### MEAN TEMPERATURES
- **Maximum:**
- **Minimum:**

### SUBMITTED NEW DATA—SUMMARY

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE

Date 14 December 1941

20 - 24 (Continued)

l00° pac, 191°30' psfge. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.

W. S. HUBBARD, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

Approved: Captain, U.S. Navy,

Lieut-Comdr., F.S.N., Analyst.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)
**ZONE DESCRIPTION** | **REMARKS**
---|---

5 - 6 | Steaming as before. 0515 sounded flight quarters. 0540 secured general quarters. Set material condition Arm. 0635 changed course left to 200°T. and pgo. 0646 executed signal "fuel designated." 0646 lighted ship. 0650 secured from general quarters. Set condition of readiness Two, watch two. Set material condition Baker. 0653 commenced zig-zagging to hold position on cruisers during fueling preparations. No definite plan used. 0740 changed course into wind to launch aircraft. Approx. course, 305°. Speed 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 159.

6 - 12 | Steaming as before. 0644 changed speed to 12 knots; 11° r.p.m. 1077 changed course left to 210°T. and pgo. Close daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples, condition normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 153.

12 - 16 | Steaming as before. 1044 secured No. 9 boiler. 1249 secured No. 1 boiler. 1356 secured No. 9 boiler. 1351 changed course left into the wind to recover aircraft. Approx. course 340°T. and pgo. Approx. speed 12 knots, 112 r.p.m. 1352 landed first plane. 1357 DNLAF, seven miles astern, reported contact with submarine. Leased landing aircraft. 1358 changed speed to 10 knots, 96 r.p.m. 1352 sent the two remaining airplanes in the air to aid the DNLAF in attacking reported submarine. 1305 commenced zig-zagging. 1305 changed speed to 12 knots, 112 r.p.m. 1351 ceased zig-zagging. Changed course left into wind to resume landing and speed. Approx. course 320°T. Approx. speed 12 knots. 1355 resumed landing aircraft. 1359 last plane landed. Changed course right to 066°T. 1347 changed course left to 160°T. 1358 executed signal "cease present exercises." Changed course left to 150°T. and pgo. 1405 formed special cruising disposition 9-7. 1407 changed from front of disposition right to 160°T. and pgo. 162°T. and 14°T. psc. Changed speed and fleet speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 1455 secured No. 6 boiler. 1526 changed speed and fleet speed to 16 knots, 156 r.p.m. 1544 changed speed and fleet speed to 15 knots, 159 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 156.

16 - 18 | Steaming as before. 1700 general quarters, set condition Arm. 1704 darkened ship. 1706 changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 162.

18 - 22 | Steaming as before. 1806 secured from general quarters, set condition of readiness Two, watch two. Set material condition Baker. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.

22 - 24 | Steaming as before. 2000 changed course to fleet course, 204°T. and pgo.

(Continued in redaction below)

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**Approved:**

**Examined:**

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
### ADDITIONAL SHEET

**U.S.S. [Redacted]**

**Date:** 15 December, 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event and Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Steaming as before. 1716 changed course left into wind to recover aircraft. Approx. course 090°, and current speed 13 knots, 112 r.p.m. 1915 steamed General Quarters, all motors stopped. 2200 first plane landed. 1737 darkened main. 1731 last plane landed. Changed speed to 16 knots, 126 r.p.m. Changed course right to 215°, and ran. 1934 changed speed to 26 knots, 169 r.p.m. 1735 changed fleet speed to 26 knots, 169 r.p.m. Average steam 416. Average r.p.m. 176.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>Steaming as before. 1936 secured from General Quarters, set Condition 2 as watch one. Set Material Condition, 0906 secured 0, 1 boiler. 0929 secured 0, 9 boiler. Average steam 416. Average r.p.m. 160.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Steaming as before. 2030 F.A. DEMO cut sharply across our bow from port to starboard. Stopped engines. Changed course hard right to 240°. Maneuvering on various courses and various speeds to avoid F.A. DEMO. 2034 returned to base course 215°. Changed speed to 26 knots, 166 r.p.m. 2040 changed front of disposition to 180°, and pce, 126 psc, and 124° psc. 2300 changed front of disposition left to 136°, and pce, 126 psc, and 124° psc. Average steam 416. Average r.p.m. 167.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Signatures:**

J. A. Hobbs, Ensign, U.S.N.  
J. A. Rohnes, Ensign, U.S.N.  
W. C. Leunberg, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

---

**Approved:**

[Signature]

**Examined:**

[Signature]

---

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES SHIP

REMARKS

We departed in company with Task Force Eight in special cruising position to-day (1133) on course 204°T, and ppe's on call No. 6, 3, 5, 7, and 8. At 12, 4, 6, and 9 in stand-by status to be on the main steam line in the notice. Steaming at 16 knots, 165 r.p.m. Fleet course and axis first aged 18 knots, Fleet Code, O.T.C. and S.O.R.A. in this vessel.

Average speed 20°T and 40°T, in inner anti-subsmarine screen 24°T. Task condition of readiness Twc. Average speed 4°T. Average r.p.m. 165.

J. A. ROLLINS, Ens, U.S.N.

79716 O—46—pt. 16—13
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Number of Ship</th>
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<th>Longitude</th>
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**Navy Yard**

**Before Fueling**

**After Entering Post**

**Draft Left**

**Draft aft**

**Normal**

**Extracted Text:**

- The document appears to be a log of the United States ship Enterprise, detailing its voyage from Hawaii to various locations.
- The log includes entries for dates, number of ships, vessel name, number of ship, latitude, longitude, depth, temperature, pressure, weather conditions, and current.
- The log also includes entries for before fueling and after entering post, as well as draft left and aft.
- The log is marked as being normal.
# EXHIBIT NO. 102

## LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

### AT
Ford Island, Penitentiary, W.H.I.

### ZONE DESCRIPTION
10A 31° 03’ N. 119° 41’ W.

### WIND

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### EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

### DRILLS AND EXERCISES

- ARMED PARALLELS:
  - 3. Flight quarters.

### STANDARD MAN COMPASS

- Compass No.: 270
- B. B.: 5
- Error: 0° - 0.2°
- Variation: 11° - 15°
- Deviation: 5° - 15°

### E.A.

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</table>

### AT sea:

- Minimum: 64°F/6°C
- Maximum: 80°F/24°C
- Minimum: 72°F/22°C

### ADDITIONAL EYE DATA:

- Rear No.: 102
- Time: 24 hours
- Current depth: 23 fathoms

(Original unsigned) copy of this page to be used only by: Chief of Navigation Department

[Signature]

[Date: 23 Dec]
REMARKS

00 to 04
Moored port side to mooring platforms F-9-N, and F-9-S, Ford Island, Pearl Har- 
bour, 7.9 N; in 7 fathoms of water; with the following lines in use: air 10° manifold 
hawsers, one 8° manifold hawser, four 1-5/8" wire hawsers, and three 1-5/8" wire 
hares for boiler No. 3 and forward machinery spaces in use for unitary purposes. 
Ships present: CALIFORNIA (OGP*ComBatFor) and various units of the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet and yard and district craft. Fresh water and telephone services being re- 
served from the shore. 0030 Disconnected fresh water line from shore. 0030 The 
following men returned aboard having completed temporary duty with shore patrol 
detail at Honolulu area: HELLY, J.A.; Tolu; DOLER, W.O.; EDEE; COUGHERY, B.N., 
S2c., and GILL, S.K., Albz. 0130 REJO, J.T. Scales, having returned from liberty 
in a drunken and disorderly condition, was placed in confinement for safekeeping. 
0035 KELLY, W.B., Cox, was returned to ship under arrest by shore patrol and was 
made a prisoner at large by order of the Commanding Officer. Charge: Disobedience 
of safety orders of bench guard patrol.

04 to 08
0005 BRUNO, P.T., Secy, returned absent over leave since 0030, this date, made 
a prisoner at large by order of the Commanding Officer. 0010 Pursuant to orders 
insw. 7 November, 1941, modified, Lieutenant C.G., MARSHALL, L.E.M., was de-
tached and ordered to duty at Naval Air Station, Aheash Point, Rhode Island. 
0435 Lighted fires under boilers Nos. 1, 6, 10, 12, and 15, commenced warming up 
“A” and “C” units; commenced preparations for getting underway. 0445 Tested main 
engines, all departments ready for getting underway. 0530 Pilot OTTERSON came 
aboard. 0705 Energized degaussing coils. 0728 Got underway in accordance with ap- 
proved operating schedule. Captain coming, Executive Officer, and Navigator, and 
Pilot on the bridge. 0735 Commenced steering various courses at various speeds, 
standing out of Pearl Harbor channel. 0750 Wanted to torpedo defense quarters. The 
following ship movements occurred during the watch: stood out: POWER, L tet- 
HOPKINS, SOUTHARD, BAXTON, CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. LOUIS, PORTLAND, and INDIAN-
APOLIS. Average steen: 25. Average r.p.m. 54.0.

08 to 12
0806 Passed channel entrance buoys abeam to port and starboard. 0810 Changed 
speed to 6 knots, 55 r.p.m. 0812 Streamed paravanes. Steaming on various courses 
at various speeds to clear defensive sea area at channel entrance. 0827 Secured 
from torpedo defense, set condition III in the anti-aircraft battery. 0837 Re-
trieved paravanes and secured for use. 0930 Want to flight quarters. 0901 All 
engines stopped, shifted to low speed. 1/8 pole combination. All engines ahead 1/3, 
5 knots, 55 r.p.m. Steaming on various courses at various speeds for flight oper- 
ations. 0937 All engines stopped, cut out the two inboard shafts, all engines 
ahead 1/3, 6 knots, 55 r.p.m. 0940 Landed eighteen WBM planes of Marine Scouting 
Squadron 24 off wing I. 1000 (Local) All engines ahead 1/3, 6 knots, 61 r.p.m. 1030 LEXINGTON joined Task Force 12 in disposition 12C as for- 
mation guide with the following units of the Pacific Fleet: CHICAGO (ComSCOFOR), 
PORTLAND, AYAL, and Destroyer Division Nine plus PORTLAND on fleet course 270° 
speed 16 knots, 954 r.p.m. 1103 Increased formation to land all aircraft. Komenced 
covering on various courses at various speeds for flight operations. 1121 2-17-45 
created into the barrier: ALLARD, O., AE(MC), pilot of the plane received slight 
facial lacerations.

12 to 16
1202 Changed speed to 6 knots, 58 r.p.m. 1210 Having completed landing LEXINGTON 
Air Group changed course left to 270° T., 23.5° east, 253° west. Changed speed to 17 
knots, 140 r.p.m. 1220 All engines stop, cut out “G” unit. 1221 All engines ahead 
162 knots, 145 r.p.m. 1222 Commenced zigzag in accordance with standard zigzag 
plan. 1238 Changed speed to 17,6 knots, 154 r.p.m. Average speed 285. Average r.p.m. 
443.4.

Approved:
FREDERICK C. SHUMAN, Rear Admiral, 
Captain, U.S. Navy, 
Commanding.

Original (official) copy of this report to be sent to Bureau of Aeronautics.
ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.S. LEUTZEN

Date: December 5, 19--

16 to 18
Chanced speed to 16.5 knots, 145 r.p.m. 1638. Changed fleet axis to 285° T., 1637
Commenced zigzagging in accordance with standard plan, base course 270° T. Chanced
speed to 17.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. 1732. Darkened ship. Average steam: 285, average
r.p.m. 152.6.

H.W. HOWARD, Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

18 to 20
1800. Ceased zigzagging and resumed base course. Chanced speed to 16.5 knots,
144 r.p.m. 1930. Changed course to 285° T., and p.t.s., 274° p.s., 274° p.s. 1935
Recorder, commenced zigzagging; chanced speed to 175 knots, 163 r.p.m. At 1400
this date FISTERTEN, L.E., 250-40-31, Fls, suffered a compound fracture, third
finger, when the roll of the ship caused a door to close on the finger. Treated
with Scott's solution, vaseline gauze dressing and splint. Patient was not admitted
to the sick list. Average steam: 285, average r.p.m. 146.8.


19 to 24
Passed through intermittent light rain squalls. Average steam: 285. Average
r.p.m. 153.1.

C. HOLLAND, Ens., U.S. Navy.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2109
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

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<td>28</td>
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<td>124° 17'</td>
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<td>121° 43' 29&quot;</td>
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<td>124° 17'</td>
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DRILLS AND EXHIBITS

- Morning
- Afternoon

GEODETIC LINES AT PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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UNITED STATES SHIP

REMARKS

*10

12 to 16
1940 Changed zigzagging, resumed starboard course 015° T., and pg. 270° psc, and pg. 105° psc, and fleet speed 10.5 knots, 15r.p.m. Changed course to 035° T., and pg. 270° psc, 105° psc, 1819 psc. 1500 Changed course to 285° T., and pg. 270° psc. 1500 Secured from flt. quarters. 1520 Changed fleet speed to 6.5 knots, 15r.p.m. steaming at fleet speed. Average speed 285. Average r.p.m. 155.

18 Local
1200 Remarks. Average speed 285. Average r.p.m. 155.

20-22
1200 Remarks. Average speed 285. Average r.p.m. 155.

Approved:

FREDERICK C. SHUMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Navy.
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(continued...)

**LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP**

**DATE**

**29th**

**TIME:**

**04:00**

**05:00**

**06:00**

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(continued...)
00 to 04
Steaming in company with Task Force XII in special cruising disposition 128, under boilers Nos. 1,3,6,11,14, and 15, Starboard unit, at standard speed. 131 r.p.m., on course 283° T., 271° POC. LEXINGTON in formation guide at center of formation. OTC and COM Task Force XII is in CHICAGO (GOF-A-Com Cru Sec For).
Ships darkened, condition of readiness III set in the anti-aircraft batteries and damage control. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 133.

04 to 08
0619 Went to general quarters. 0645 O'BRYAN, P.M., 287-26-76. SG2c received conclusion ri at fourth finger while working on powder holst in No. II turret, when finger was caught between two powder cans. X-ray showed no fracture. Tenture of merthiolate antiseptic and dry dressing applied. Was not admitted to sick list.
0710 Set condition of readiness III in the anti-aircraft batteries and damage control steam 285. Average r.p.m. 133.

08 to 12
0815 Mustered crew on stations, no absentees. 0821 Went to general quarters in order to set condition II, on signal from OTC. 0830 Received signal from CinPac, "Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl". Commenced zigzagging in accordance with standard zigzag plan on signal from OTC. 0835 Went to flight quarters on 30 minutes' notice. Set condition II, stand by, starboard watch. 0915 Lighted fires under boilers Nos. 2,4,9,10,5,7,11,13, and 14. 0931 Maneuvering on various courses at various speeds into wind launching scouting group and combat air patrol. 0925 Cut in "0" unit and boilers Nos. 2,4,9,16, on the main steaming line. 0936 Completed flight operations, resumed zigzagging. 0951 Went to general quarters, on signal from OTC. 0953 Cut in "0" and "P" units, boilers Nos. 5,7,11,13, and 14 on the main steaming line. 1012 Changed speed to 1 knot. 20 knots, 210 r.p.m. on signal from OTC. 1013 Maneuvering on various courses at various speeds launching air group 1020 Completed flight operations, resumed zigzagging. 1043 Maneuvering on various courses at various speeds launching air group. 1059 Completed flight operations, changed fleet course and axis to 102° T. 099° POC, 093° STG, on signal from OTC. 1115 Secured from general quarters, set condition III, section III. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 174.7.

12 to 16
1216 Increased speed to 20 knots. 175 r.p.m., full speed. 1604 Commenced maneuvering at various speeds on various courses to launch aircraft. 1610 Flown course was flight deck and right leading gear gave way. Pilot ejected. Completed flight operations and went ahead full speed, 20 knots, 175 r.p.m. On course 102° T., 094° POC, 093° POC. 1320 Flashed left formation to investigate oil spots, resulted in new course. 1515 All engines stopped. Commenced maneuvering at various speeds on various courses astern for stern aircraft operations. 1557 Completed launch of relief and combat patrol and went ahead on course 136° T., etc., 093° POC, at 20 knots. 175 r.p.m. 1400 Secured boilers Nos. 3,4,8,10,12,13, in 10 minutes standby. 1627 Slowed to 15 knots, 130 r.p.m. on maneuvering air group. 1924 Completed aircraft operation, having launched second-day search planes and went ahead full speed 20 knots. 175 r.p.m. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder stowage. Conditions normal, Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 162.9.

16 to 18
1620 Changed course to 210° T., 199° POC, 195° POC. 1623 Commenced steaming at various speeds on various courses in connection with resuming air operations. 1624 Completed flight operations, came to course 210° T., 197° POC, 195° POC, speed 22 knots. 1920 ESTEP, E.L. 381-27-98. 2030, Received fracture, distal fourth metacarpal. Injury sustained when patient fell from box while leaving hangar and caught finger in lock door. Treatment: immobilized in dry dressing. X-ray showed fracture. ESTEP not admitted to sick list. 1752 Commenced steaming on various courses at various speeds for recovery of aircraft. 1752 Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 181.9.

18 to 20
2000 Secured all aircraft. Conditions normal, Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 162.9.

20 to 22
2045 Secured aircraft. Conditions normal, Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 162.9.

22 to 24
2245 Secured all aircraft. Conditions normal, Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 162.9.

24 to 00
0015 Secured all aircraft. Conditions normal, Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 162.9.
ADDITIONAL SHEET

Date: December 7, 1941

I am compelled to submit the following statement with respect to the conditions of the Pearl Harbor attack.

[statement]

I, [Signature], Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,

[signature]

Approved by:

FREDERICK H. SHEBA, Captain, U.S. Navy,

[signature]

Commander, U.S. Navy.
## LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP SS Lexington

**Assigned Area: North Pacific.**

### ZONE DESCRIPTION
- **104**

### Weather
- **Visibility:**
- **Temperature:**
- **Wind:**
- **Barometer:**
- **Clouds:**
- **Sea:**

### Drill and Exercises
- **General Quarters, Flight Quarters.**
- **Flight Operations, War Matches.**
- **Drones Wae Yankee.**
- **Set clocks to zone +11 time.**

### Locations
- **Latitude:**
  - **Longitude:**
- **Current:**
- **Error:**

### Measurements
- **Compass:**
- **Variation:**
- **Deviation:**

### Observations

### Summary of Data - Navigation

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*Restricted*
UNITED STATES SHIP  

LEXINGTON  

Sunday 8  December  1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION  
-r-  

REMARKS

00 to 04  
Steering as part of Task Force XII, OTC [ComResGo or-SCOA] in CHICAGO. LEXINGTON 

on course 190° T., 16° knots. 16° knots, 10° p.m. Boilers 

28° 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, and 16 and units "A", "C", "E", and "F" on the line. 

Ship in condition of readiness II. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 193.

04 to 08  
0515 Lighted fires under boilers Nos. 3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 15, and put them in on the main 

steam line at 0530. 0530 Went to flight quarters. 0111 Went to general quarters. 

0646 Commenced steering on various courses and speeds in connection with launching 

aircraft. 0700 Caaned flight operations and set course 170° T., 16° 

knots, 10° p.m. 0715 Secured from general quarters; set condition of readiness III. 

section I. 0728 Commenced maneuvering on various courses and speeds to recover 

aircraft. 0735 Ceased flight operations and set course 170° T., 16° 

knots, full speed 22 knots, 193 r.p.m. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 193.0.

08 to 12  
0800 Mustered crew on stations, no absences. 0846 Changed speed to 24 knots, 

210 r.p.m. and course to 174° T., 17° ste. 108° p.m. 0840 Planes 2-2-7, SHD-3, 

Lieutenant (Je) J. C. HUNTER, USN, pilot and LANG, L.C.M., 135-01-58, 

struck the sea. Latitude 15° 30' North, Longitude 50° 30' West. Pilot and passenger 

took to rubber collapsible boat. BAUTZM left formation to their assistance. 0935 

secured INDIANAPOLIS, distant 15 miles, 196° T. 1010 INDIANAPOLIS joined formation 

and took command of Task Force XIII. 1050 Set all clocks back 1 hour to zone 11, time 

1027 Slowed speed to 22 knots, 193 r.p.m. and commenced zigzagging according to 

standard plan. 1028 Course 170° T., 16° ste. 1100 Secured zigzagging and 

allowed speed to 15 knots, 130 r.p.m. 1115 Commenced maneuvering on various 

courses for launching aircraft. 1142 Completed launching aircraft and prepared to 

land aircraft. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. 

Conditions normal. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 193.0. 

12 to 16  
1235 Completed flight operations, all planes returned except 2-8-7. This plane 

was reported down 200 miles from the ship, pilot and radioman were reported 

safely in rubber boat by accompanying planes. Came to course 006° T., 055° ste. 

056° p.m. 1250 PERIOD and PORTLAND left the formation and took course to westward. 

1330 On signal from O.T.C. commenced zigzagging in accordance with standard 

zigzag plan. 1352 MASH reported submarine. INDIANAPOLIS left formation to search for 

submarine. Went to flight quarters, manned all returning stations. Executed emergency 

power signal from O.T.C. 1403 Secured boiler No. 5. 1405 On signal from O.T.C. resumed 

flight course 006° T. 1406 Fleet speed 15 knots. 1411 On signal from O.T.C. resumed 

flight plan. 1420 Underway. 1420 Underway. Plan to practice various stations at 

various speeds launching anti-submarine patrol and planes of VB-2 to assist in 

search for personnel of 11-7. 1505 MASH rejoined formation. 1540 Completed Flight 

operations, resumed zigzagging at 18 knots. 1529 Changed zigzagging on signal from 

O.T.C. 1539 Formed cruising disposition. 1600 Secured flight operations. 1615 Changed 

flight course to 280° T., 16° ste. 1615 Secured from general quarters; set condition of readiness II. 1722 Set condition 

Yoke below the second deck except for ventilation. 1741 Completed maneuvering for 

launching and landing aircraft. Changed course to 006° T., 056° ste. 059° p.m. 

and speed to 15 knots, 190 r.p.m. 1747 PORTLAND and PORTER adopted bearing 225° T., 

approaching the formation. 1750 ATTACK, INDIANAPOLIS, and CHICAGO left the formation 

and disappeared bearing 250° T. The search conducted by LEXINGTON aircraft 

for the survivors of 2-8-7, Lieutenant (Je) J.C. HUNTER and L.C.M. LANG, was 

unsuccessful. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 193.0.

Approved:  
CAPTAIN, U.S. Navy, 
Commanding.  

Commander, U.S. Navy, 

Killed:  

J. C. HUNTER, Lieut., U.S. Navy.  

Commander, U.S. Navy, 

C.O. N., Navigator.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

ADDITIONAL SHEET

WASHINGTON, D.C., October 8, 1948

The American, Japanese, and Chinese last positions, 1948, were as follows:

- American: Last position received, 1948, was at 0730, 10 miles east of the area.
- Japanese: Last position received, 1948, was at 1015, 5 miles north of the area.
- Chinese: Last position received, 1948, was at 1200, 7 miles south of the area.

The approximate positions of the American, Japanese, and Chinese vessels at the time of the losses are

- American: At 0730, 1948, approximately 10 miles east of the area.
- Japanese: At 1015, 1948, approximately 5 miles north of the area.
- Chinese: At 1200, 1948, approximately 7 miles south of the area.

Estimates of the number of casualties for each vessel:

- American: 50 casualties.
- Japanese: 10 casualties.
- Chinese: 20 casualties.

The total number of casualties for all three vessels is approximately 80 casualties.

I, Henry B. Vose, Assistant, U.S. Navy

Captain, U.S. Navy

30 November 1948
From: The Commander ENTERPRISE Air Group.
To: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ENTERPRISE


Reference: (a) Articles 712 and 874, U.S.N. Regulations.

1. At 0615 December 7, 1941 I took off from ENTERPRISE, whose position at that time was approximately 215 miles due west of Oahu, with a mission of searching a sector 058°-095° true for a distance of 150 miles, and then to proceed to Ford Island. Ensign P. L. Traff, USN in airplane E-5-2 accompanied me. My passenger was Lieut.-Comdr. Breffield Michol, USN. Tactical Officer attached to the staff of Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, who had been ordered to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet immediately after my arrival at Ford Island.

At about 0720 I sighted a tanker to starboard, proceeding on an easterly course, which upon investigation proved to be the "PAT DOMENY" of Los Angeles, belonging to the Richfield Oil Co. Continuing on my track of 090° I sighted and passed the U.S.S. THRESHED accompanied by the U.S.S. LITCHFIELD at about 0740. At about 0810 I passed Kaena Point about 20 miles. At 0820 passed Barbary Point to seaward and at this time I noticed approximately a squadron of planes circling Ewa Field in column. Believing them to be U.S. Army pursuit planes I gave them a wide berth, decreasing my altitude to about 800 feet and continued toward Ford Island Field. At a point midway between Ewa Field and Ford Island I noticed considerable AA fire ahead. At almost the same instant I was attacked by Japanese planes from the rear without warning. Recognizing the insignia of one plane that had completed a dive on me I immediately dove toward the ground zig-zagging. My passenger did not have sufficient time to man the true guns. My fixed guns were loaded and charged but I had no opportunity to use them. The planes that attacked me appeared to be low-flying monoplane fighters with retractable landing gear. My wing man was attacked at the same time but was not hit and stayed with me, circling low over a cane field to the North of Pearl City. It was immediately evident that I was under AA fire regardless of which direction I went. I did not have sufficient fuel to return to the ship had I been able to get away from the island. Hoping that I would be recognized as friendly I decided to make a low approach to Ford Island Field.
Let's begin.

Shortly after this, I witnessed a dive bombing attack on the heavy yard which appeared to be in the vicinity of Ten-Tom dock and the dry-dock. The attacking planes came in down-sun attack, shallow dives (about 35° - 50°). The average release height being about 200'. Although in some cases releases were made as low as 300 - 400 feet, indicating that their bombs were aimed the instant they left the rack. Approximately 18 planes participated in this attack. Following each other from the same direction with a considerable lower altitude and drop than is our custom, however, the attack was well delivered and none of the planes were seen shot down during their dive. After releasing their explosive tactics were sound, keeping low and constantly changing course. They were subjected to heavy AA fire during the attack. These planes were of a yellowish-silver color, having none, planes, with fixed landing gear and I feared to be similar to the Italian "Martin" A.11, as illustrated in "Japan's all the Worlds Aircraft". The bombs appeared to be 500 pounders. In my own opinion, these particular aircraft was that they came in from the same direction instead of making a divided attack, however, the ineffectiveness of our AA fire, lack of air opposition and the manner in which they pressed their attacks home in this particular instance combined to make the attack practically perfect. No further attacks were made.

I was then ordered to report to Commander Patrol Two or Ford Island. Upon ascertaining the number of planes from the ENTERPRISE Group that had landed safely at this time (13 planes of VS-6 and VS-6) I was ordered to send 9 planes out to search a section 330° - 030° distance 175 miles, and the remaining planes to investigate reports of hostile surface and anti-sub-pans south of Barber's Point.
and if found, to attack with bombs and gunfire. I soon obtained permission to station myself in the Ford Island Field Control Tower in order to be in direct communication with the planes and the ENTERPRISE as a Coast Guard officer was the only officer detailed to duty there. Due to the low-power of the transmitter in the tower I could at no time communicate with either. The lack of proper communication facilities, telephone and radio, were contributory causes to the loss of 4 airplanes of VF-6, which were shot down by our own AA fire, during the night. I attempted to transmit last minute instructions to them via the tower, but they were unable to hear. It was necessary for them to land due to the lack of fuel. Two of the six landed safely. I then attempted to communicate with the ENTERPRISE via the tower voice set in order to recommend that no more planes be sent in to Ford Island, without success. I then learned that the remainder of the group that had been launched had returned to the ship.

5. Lack of information that hostilities had started with Japan. proper communications, the inability of our ground and shipboard forces to recognize friendly planes, or know the proper recognition signals were the contributory causes for the loss of personnel and airplanes of the ENTERPRISE Air Group.

6. No planes were equipped with self sealing tanks or armor - all guns were fully armed.

7. The suddenness and magnitude of the enemy attack caused such a stunning effect upon ground and ship personnel that all aircraft were fired upon regardless of their being friendly. I was under fire until my wheels touched the ground on Ford Island - some of the guns being not more than 50 yards distant from me. The importance of some means of positive identification of our airplanes, other than visual signals cannot be over emphasized. The loss of the four fighters of VF-6 that night is a good example of what happens unless proper communications and means of controlling and identifying aircraft in the air is available.

8. I then received orders to rejoin the ENTERPRISE at sunrise the next morning with our remaining planes. Just prior to the time of our scheduled take-off, a utility plane (JRS) took off, and was immediately fired on by ships and other shore batteries. I had previously arranged that every means available be taken to notify all hands of our scheduled
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Subject: Report of Action at Pearl Harbor

Departing the route to be taken to the B-17 at 6:30 A.M., it was necessary to delay take-off for nearly one hour because of continuous heavy AA fire. At 8:00 the remaining fourteen B-17 planes took off, armed with 500-pound bombs and returned to the air without further incident.

9. All personnel of this group conducted themselves in accordance with the highest traditions of the service and under the circumstances did all that they could possibly do.

10. Lt. J. E. Dickerson, U.S.N., Scouting Squadron Six, after being attacked by superior numbers of Japanese planes and under constant AA fire from the ground was forced to bail out, his plane having caught fire. In the midst of the third attack on Pearl Harbor, he made his way to Ford Island Field and immediately upon arrival there manned another plane and participated in the 175 mile search flight. At this time his ordeal of having been shot down was not known to his superiors and no mention of the same was made to him by anyone at the time, he thus displaying a superb courage, stamina, devotion to duty, unexcelled logic and coolness in action. It is requested that this officer be given an official commendation for his performance of duty.

H. L. Young
U.S. LEXINGTON  a LEX
December 7, 1941

At 0622 the T.A. was at sea proceeding as part of Task Force T.
1VE, Commander (Rear Admiral J. W. Deyton) in command, from Pearl Harbor, T., to a point bearing 120°9 distant 400
miles from Midway. Task Force T.VE included IC\NAGO (Flagship), JUNO, AMERICA, BATES, KITTYHAWK, LITTLE, CALIFORNIA, and LEXINGTON. In addition to LEXINGTON Air
Group, there was embarked Marine Aircraft Squadron 231
(15 SBD-5) under command of Major Guglielmo at station
Midway. The ship was keeping zone plus 10° time, the 0600
position was latitude 24°0-40 N., longitude 170°-00' E.,
course 235° and speed 172 knots.

At 0622 a message was received from Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet "Air raid on Pearl. This is no drill!" Commenced zigzagging and prepared to launch combat patrol. At 0900 a message from Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet to all
aircraft in Hawaiian waters advised that hostilities with Japan
commenced with an air raid in early Harbor.

At 0940 went to general quarters; started raising steam
on all boilers, and warming up all units. These were ready at
0950.

At 0912 received Allied 142 to execute N.S. against
Japan. The Force Commander and the force to be prepared
to proceed to intercept the enemy. At 0920 launched 6 VP as
combat patrol. At 1116 launched 14 VP. A message was
intercepted from Commander Task Force 16VE (Vice Admiral
Telfair in N.H.I.) to Commander Task Force 1VE (Vice
Admiral Brown in N.H.I.) and Commander Task Force
16VE to proceed toward rendezvous in Latitude 22°-00' N.,
Longitude 163°-00' W.,

At 1050 the formation changed course to 102° and the
flight of the marine scouting squadron to "Scout" was cancelled.
Aircraft armament and ship ammunition details were put in war
readiness. At 1051 launched 15 SB5 to search a 350° sector to
155 miles. Results of search negative. At 1216 increased
fleet speed to 20 knots. A contact by radar bearing 268°
distant 43 miles was investigated as the "combat patrol and
identified as a friend."

At 1247 a message from Commander Task Force T.VE
advised his present intentions were to rendezvous with Task
Force T.VE at 1320 tomorrow in Latitude 21°-00' N.,
Longitude 163°-00' W.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

U.S.S. I.AXINGTON WAR DIARY

DECEMBER 7, 1941 (Cont'd)

Maintained combat patrol until dusk. At 1200 launched 17 VSB armed with 500 lb. bombs on search between bearings 043° and 162° to 175 miles. No hostile forces were sighted. Scouts sighted one unidentified and unidentified freighter in Latitude 22°-07' N., Longitude 169°-32' W. on course 260° at estimated speed of 9 knots bearing marks letter "K" on stack with a red burgee with blue margin on the bow.

A message from Commander Task Force THIRTEEN indicated the most probable position of the Japanese raiders was 200 miles south of Pearl at noon possibly withdrawing toward Jaluit At maximum speed of 27 knots and direct on Task Force THIRTEEN to intercept and destroy them.

At 1630 changed formation course to 210° at 22 knots.

At 1840 (dusk) completed landing all planes. At 1844 formation course was changed to 170°.

FRIGER C.C. SHERRAN, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

DECEMBER 8, 1941

Steaming as before as part of Task Force THIRTEEN under orders to intercept and destroy enemy vessels raiding force, assumed the heading toward Jaluit at maximum speed 27 knots, approximate course, 343° (T) from a position 200 miles south of Pearl Harbor.

At 0845 launched nine VF (fighter patrol) and sixteen VS Scouts. Scought a relative sector 084° to 170°, to 315 miles. At 0730 landed 5 VF. At 0832 received message that scout "257" is making a forced landing. At 0840 plane "257", pilot Lieutenant (Jr) Hunter, U.S. Navy and passenger, E.W. Lane, R.N., 2C, USN, made a forced landing in the water. Pilot and passenger reported safe in a rubber boat. The
SECRET

December 7, 1941 (Cont'd)

At 2413, the leading elements of Task Force 143, 200 (T) from Pearl Harbor, were ordered to proceed to the location of the search area at midnight, as per joint ad in CINCPAC.

At 0415, a second Task Force, 193° (T) distant 100 miles, which had moved from the first 1600 when Commander South Pacific Fleet was directed to move to Task Force 143.

At 0510, another Task Force 193° (T) to move.

At 0615, recommendations were made to OTC that search start at 1130 between bearings 120° and 190° (T) to a distance of 315 miles, points west this center enemy's speed from measured position of JCR 1850, 10° between 20 and 27 knots, west of a bearing 190° (T) from Pearl Harbor.

A message from Commander Task Force 143 intercepted at 0600 described an enemy unit drawn from Pearl Harbor noon yesterday, was directed Task Force 143 to return at reasonable speed toward Pearl Harbor, it was sent was not made by 1000.

At 1140 relieved current patrol.

At 1218 completed landing 3 VS planes of first search group.

At 1230 set course 060° at 15 knots.

At 1345 lost sight of PORTLAND and PORTER bearing 266° (T), PORTLAND being delayed while dropping ordnance aircraft.

At 1245 was informed by OTC that CinCPac had ordered search discontinued and retirement toward Pearl.

At 1428 launched two VF combat patrol, fifteen scouts to search for survivors of 237° (T) crash, and one VS to act as inner air patrol.

At 1618 launched 4 VS armed with delay-action fuses in 500 lb. bombs for anti-submarine patrol.

At 1630 received a report by Radar from CHICAGO "Many Bandits, bearing 235° (T) distance 30 miles, closing."
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT: BATTLE FORCE
U.S.S. LEXINGTON

"U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY"

December 9, 1941

INDIAPOLIS, CHICAGO, ASTORIA, PORTLAND, and PORTER
were about 25 miles west southwest of LEXINGTON. DRANTON
and LEXINGTON were searching for survivors of crash of 257 to
south southwest of LEXINGTON. LEXINGTON's course was
070° speed 20 knots.

At 0617 launched 4 VF as combat patrol. Sighted
INDIANAPOLIS, CHICAGO, ASTORIA, PORTLAND and PORTER
bearing 260°
At 0624 launched 10 VSB and 6 VF. Scouts to search a circle to 180 miles radius.

At 0755 INDIANAPOLIS and cruisers previously sighted joined LEXINGTON and the force took cruising disposition 12V, course an axis 070°, fleet speed 15 knots, zigzagging.

At 1211 launched 4 VF relief combat patrol and 14 V3B of Bombing Squadron TWO to search a sector from 1230 position bearing 023° to 117° to 180 miles.

At 1230 landed 4 VF of combat patrol, and 12 V3B of first scout group one of which (2317) went over the side to starboard and crashed, sinking immediately in Latitude 19°-00'15" N. Longitude 163°-40.8' W. Pilot Ensign R.J.H. Weinzapfel, U.S.N.R., not recovered. Passenger recovered by U.S.S. FLUGGER.

At 1325 landed last of first search. Results of search negative.

At 1610 landed 14 V3B of second search group. Results of search revealed only one ship; the Coast Guard vessel EXPLORER.

At 1830 landed combat and anti-submarine patrol

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

December 10, 1941

Continued steaming as part of Task Force TWELVE, operating to southwest of OAHU. With instructions to intercept and destroy any enemy ship in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor.

At 0130 set all clocks ahead 1 hour to zone plus 10½ time.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2127

December 10, 1941 (Cont'd).

At 0500 launched 4 VF as outer air patrol, 4 VT as inner air patrol, 1 TF and 4 VS of esc. group between 350° (T) to 60 miles; 12 TF and 4 VS of esc. group between 150° (T) to 30 miles; 2 TF and 4 VS of esc. group between 231° and 0° (T), for radar duty. 4 VS of esc. group between 10 and 60 miles. 4 TF and 4 VS of esc. group between 90° and 270° (T), for air patrol. At 0600 changed fleet course to 290° (T) which was held until midnight.


December 11, 1941.

Continued as at Task Force 78, operating to southwest of Oahu between 100 and 300 miles.

At 0300 DRAFT and LANDER in radar station in anti-submarine screen on line 270°. The radar was out of commission due to fault in anti-reflective device for the antenna.

At 0345 changed fleet course to 000° (T) and at 0415 to 000° (T).

At 0600 launched 4 VS as inner air patrol.
Always #149, 150, and 151 were received advising Germany and Italy had declared war on the United States and that the Navy was to execute U.S. 40 against Germany and Italy in addition to Japan.

At 0626 NZOSO C, PHLEPS and DesRon ONE less AVU V were sighted bearing 070°. Formation guide was shifted to CHICAGO and fueling disposition "12F" was taken with aids O5C and course 070°.

At 0646 launched 14 V3A for inner and intermediate air patrol, landing the down patrol of 4 V3A at 0707.

At 0713 took course 080° and NZOSO maneuvered to come alongside. The sea was very rough and wind's force of 36-38 knots from 080°. A speed of 2 knots on course 080° was taken and, although 4 attempts were made to pass the tow lines, the weather prevented completion. Three times the bow anchor parted and on the fourth attempt the towing line was parted but the towing block tumbled and could not be righted.

At 1140 orders were received to postpone fueling efforts. NZOSO cast off towing line and ships separated. Took speed 12 knots. Orders were intercepted from CinCPac to proceed toward Midway pending more favorable weather.

At 1247 launched the relief air patrols, 4 V3A for inner and 1C V3A for intermediate.

At 1321 landed the forenoon patrols (14 V3A) and changed course to 290° (T) at 15 knots.

At 1600 CHICAGO reported sighting two submarines. Increased speed to 22 knots while LEXINGTON and WORLDE proceeded to investigate.

At 1832 resumed fleet speed.

At 1908 changed fleet course to 000° and at 1928 LEXINGTON and WORLDE rejoined from the southeast.

At 2000 changed course to 290° (T) from 2130 to 2147 received Radar reports of one aircraft which passed to eastward of the force on reported course about 220 at 155 knots.

FREDERICK C. EVERETT,
Capitán, U.S. Navy,
Commanding
Continued operating as part of Task Force TWELVE in a general southwesterly direction from OAHU, withdrawing toward Midway while seeking suitable weather and sea conditions to refuel the force from NEOSHO.

At 0547 changed fleet course to north.

At 0618 launched 14 VSBI to form inner and intermediate air patrols while fueling. Fueling course 050° speed 8 knots, took radio direction finder bearing on a patrol plane reported landed on the water southwest of Barbers Point. At 0745 ASTORIA and DRAYTON left the formation proceeding toward south southeast. At 0913 CHICAGO commenced refueling from NEOSHO. 1006 launched relief air patrols, 12 VT, and landed first patrols at 1100. At 1151 INDIANAPOLIS reported sighting a torpedo wake, maneuvered to east at flank speed for 9 minutes when resumed station. At 1210 PORTLAND reported sighting a submarine bearing 200° from LEXINGTON. Headed to east at flank speed for 5 minutes to avoid area. A search of areas by destroyers and aircraft failed to locate any submarine. At 1235 attempts to refuel the force were discontinued due to temporary damage to fueling gear when CHICAGO cast off hurriedly upon report of submarine activity.

At 1334 launched relief intermediate and inner air patrols and at 1350 landed second patrol groups. At 1530 FORER, LAWSON, and MAHAN proceeded toward Pearl Harbor. At 1749 landed all planes (14 VSBI) of third air patrol group, the force withdrawing to southward and southwestward. At 2310 course was changed to 135° and at 2335 to 080°.

FREDERICK C. SHEPHERD,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.
Continued as a unit of Task Force TWELVE operating to southwest of GMT. Proceeding toward Pearl Harbor at 20 knots.

At 0615 launched 14 V4'S for inner and outer air patrol.

At 1138 commenced launching the air group armed with 500 lb. bombs on V4, torpedoes on V2, and 100 lb. bombs on V4 for ferry to Ford Island, completing launch at 1211.

The LEXINGTON was about to enter the swept channel to the entrance when orders were received not to enter and to remain to southward. The force proceeded southward and westward until 1430 when the approach to enter was commenced at 25 knots.

At 1621 a plane on patrol indicated a submarine about 2 miles to eastward of LEXINGTON. Destroyers dropped 6 depth charges in this area while LEXINGTON continued at 25 knots to entrance.

At 1849 passed entrance buoy to Pearl Harbor, proceeded to berth F-9 where completed moor, port side to at 1853.

At 1930 a submarine alarm in harbor caused some disturbance but logistic refueling, and replenishing gasoline tanks, and revictualing continued.

FREDERICK C. SCHUMAN, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding
At 1357 (Jutc, Jul 10) got underway from north F-9, Pearl Harbor to join Task Force ELEVEN under orders to radi Japanese forces in Jaluit Island in order to relieve Japanese pressure on Nii Island and to cover operations of Task Force KURTZEN (G.A.A.63A) which was to escort supplies and reinforcements to Nii.

After clearing harbor approach channels, landed all planes of the LEXINGTON Air Group. Available planes included 21 P3A, 32 SBD, and 16 TBD. All planes were on board by 1745 when the ship proceeded to southwestward joining the following ships to form Task Force ELEVEN:

INDIANS (ComsoCruFor, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, USN, commanding Task Force ELEVEN),
CHICAGO (ComCruCruFor, Rear Admiral J. H. Newton, USN),
PORTLAND, PHILIPS (ComDesRon 18E), A. L. MAR (ComDesDiv 24),
OVERY (ComDesDiv 18E), DRAKE, CAMDEN, FARMOUTH,
NORTH, N. J., ALK, and the Fleet oil tanker NEOSH.

The force proceeded southwestward at 16 knots during the remainder of the night.

FREDERICK C. EMMAN, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

December 14, 1941.

Continued with Task Force ELEVEN to southwestward at 16 knots. During the night attacked two air patrol of 6 TBD planes at 18:10 with one TBD hit, comb fused with A.C. fade. Landed 10 planes at 1000.

FRANCES C. EMMAN, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.
Continued operating with Task Force E W F, proceeding to the southwestward from 0450. Strong wind from northeast with intermittent rain squalls and variable visibility. At 0618 launched 12 VS to search the semi-circle ahead of the formation to a distance of 100 miles between bearings 160° and 330°.

At 0730 a contact report was received from plane 359, Ensign Whittier pilot, that enemy carrier bore 210° distant 95 miles from the 0745 position of point option. No amplifying reports were received and it was assumed that plane in contact had been shot down. At 0813 launched 10 VF combat patrol and at 0924 launched attack group composed of 13 VS, 7 VF and 13 VT. At 0930 landed 252 and 277. He reported the course about 205° at very slow speed. Both planes dropped 500 lb. bombs but both missed. The position was Latitude 12°06' S. Longitude 135°40' W. Further questioning brought out that there was no anti-aircraft fire that no personnel were sighted and the ship seemed dead in the water. It was then concluded that the object reported was probably a barge loaded with dynamite reported adrift on December 8, 322 miles to windward of the contact. The attack group failed to locate the object, returned and was recovered at 1225. A scouting group of 10 VSB were launched to locate the object previously contacted but were unable to locate it. A further combat patrol was maintained until 1540. The 252 and 277 were ordered by visual to take intermediate air patrol from 1600 until they were landed at 1700.

Upon contact the NEUCC had been ordered to continue on course 240° at 15 knots while the remainder of the Task Force operated on northwest and southwest courses. A course to rejoin the NEUCC was taken at 20 knots.

FREDERICK C. WILKIN, Captains, U. S. Navy, Commanding.
December 19, 1941

Continued with Task Force L.V.E.N toward southwestward. At 0416 started N.C.S.O on the horizon bearing 010°. At 0710 launched 12 V.S.O to search the western semi-circle between bearings 180° and 220° to 100 miles. At 0830 two planes reported to search the position of the "N.C.S.O". The O.C.T.C. was advised that there was 220° (T) distance 41 miles. The 10 V.S.O took up intermediate air patrol.

At 1300 launched 15 V.S.O to search a 300° sector to 50 miles for the N.C.S.O. At 1717 landed the search group but reported no sight of N.C.S.O.

FREDERICK C. PHEGAN, Captain, U. S. Navy, Comman Ind.

December 19, 1941

Continued with Task Force N. C. S. O toward southwestward. At 0616 started N.C.S.O on the horizon bearing 010°. At 0710 launched 12 V.S.O to search the western semi-circle between bearings 180° and 220° to 75 miles. At 0700 took course 110° into wind for refueling and at 0800 N.C.S.O came alongside starboard side for refueling. At 0920 the search group returned and took up intermediate air patrol. At 1322 launched 13 V.S.O as intermediate air patrol to search western semi-circle to 100 miles, returning hourly on the same. Flight operations took place while refueling from N.C.S.O. At 1338 the N.C.S.O cast off having delivered gasoline and fuel oil. The afternoon patrol was landed at 1602. An O.P.H. report was received that Japanese forces had occupied Febb Island in the Gilbert Island Group and had a "Yokahama" seaplane group with 6000 ton "Y" was based at Kwajalein. Also that a "Kamikaze" had been occupied; that the Japanese submarine commander was at Fubuki and that the commander of N.I.T. 24 with CruDiv N.I.T. and CarDiv 3 was based at Kinko in the Marshalls.

Received a despatch to the effect that Vice Admiral H. Kimmel was relieved.
Continued with Task Force ELEVEN to southwestward from Hawaiian Islands. Launched 11 VSB to search the western semi-circle to 100 miles. Thereafter maintained intermediate air patrol. At early daylight took course 100° into wind while PORTLAND and CHICAGO refueled from EOSHO. At 1300 launched 12 VSB to search the western semi-circle to 100 miles. The radio operator of one plane reported sighting what he thought was a strange plane in latitude 70°-50', N, Longitude 170°-50' W. At 1400 zone plus 11 time on course about 285°. This report was unconfirmed by the pilot and was considered unreliable. At 1553 discontinued air patrols and landed all planes. At 2030 refueling of the force having been completed, proceeded to west-southwestward at 17 knots; EOSHO left formation.

Received warning as to fishing vessels rendering aid to enemy forces, with directions to examine, seize or sink vessels engaging in such activities. A message was received that Task Force EIGHT (ENTERPRISE) left Pearl Harbor at 1000 to proceed to westward of Johnston Island as a support group.

FREDERICK C. JERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy.
Commanding.

Continued with Task Force ELEVEN proceeding to west southwest for conducting raid on Japanese forces in Marshall and/or Gilbert Islands. At 0616 launched 12 VSB to search to westward between bearings 150° to 230°, to 150 miles, and to act as intermediate air patrol. At 1340 launched afternoon flight to carry out intermediate air patrol and search of the western semi-circle to 150 miles.

At 1600 a message from Commander Task Force ELEVEN indicated his intentions to carry out attack plan "A" at 0500 zone plus 12 time on Monday, 22 December 1941. This involved an attack on Japanese forces at Makin and Tarawa Islands by LEXINGTON Air Group. At 1620 orders were received that present
mission was cancelled and that present attack orders were no longer in effect. A later despatch advised that CincPac reported strong air reinforcements possibly including two carriers were being sent to the Marshalls; that the possibility of surprise attack by this force was improbable, and that CincPac had directed this force to proceed to a position to support Task Force FOURTEEN (S.aratoga).

The afternoon search group was recovered at 1754. Fleet course was set 350°(T) speed 16 knots at 1736. Changed clocks to zone plus 12 time at 1900.

FREDERICK C. S. LEXINGTON, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

December 21, 1941

Continued with Task Force ELEVEN to north-northwestward to reach a position to support Task Force FOURTEEN.

Weather at dawn was unsuitable for extended search. The usual 150 mile search was modified to an intermediate air patrol which was maintained throughout the day.

FREDERICK C. S. LEXINGTON, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.
Continued as before. At 0400 a message from Commander-in-Chief Pacific advised that no attack by carrier type aircraft was detected at 1300 on December 22. At 0544 fleet course was changed from 326° to 297° and speed was increased to 18 knots. At 0622 twelve VSB were launched to search the western semi-circle to 15° miles, results negative.

At 0850 a message was received from the Task Force Commander that the Force was directed to retire toward Pearl. Upon the return of the forenoon search group at 1000 the Force changed course to 004° heading for a rendezvous with the force tanker, NEOSHO, and escort WORDEN, in latitude 16°00' N, longitude 177°00' W.

A six-plane combat patrol was maintained between 1030 and 1400. At 1340 twelve VSB were launched to search the northern semi-circle to 150 miles. These returned and were landed at 1700, results of search: NEOSHO and WORDEN located to ENE.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding
Continued with Task Force X 45' to northward to rendezvous with fleet tanker, LST. At 0610 LST, ordered fleet to stop for search, first to locate and report 2curves, then to cover the northern semi-circle to 10 miles, and on return to search the southern semi-circle to 100 miles. At 0700, NCO130 joined. Weather being too rough to operate cruiser seaplanes, launched 2 VSs as inner air patrol at 0722. Fleet fueling course 080° was set at speed 4 knots. At 0920 NCO130 approached and by 1030 towing was secured. At 1100 wind had fallen to ten degrees left, changed course to 070° to launch and land planes. Launched 8 VSs as intermediate and 7 VSs as inner air patrol and landed the morning search and patrol crews. At 1400 towing to NCO130 parted due to rough weather. Discontinued efforts to refuel.

At 1310 received report that plane had done a crash about fourteen miles to north of LEXINGTON. Pilot, LIEUT. JAG J. A. Davis, Jr., U.S.N. and passenger V. J. Schmidt, R.N.3c., U.S.N., were not seen to leave the plane which sank. Position of crash latitude 16°-41' N., Longitude 177°-33' W. Accompanying plane on its return reported that 2/16 was testing its machine guns by firing into the water on a dive; that apparently on its pull-out, one wing touched the water. The plane went down on its back and sank in a few minutes with no signs of life of its occupants. LEXINGTON with 15 knots reached at full speed scene of crash, found nothing and continued formation.

At 1400 set Fleet course 060° LST. Launched 8 VSs for intermediate and 7 VSs for inner air patrol, and at 1440 landed mid air patrols.

At 1640 landed afternoon patrols.

FREDERICH C. SHERRILL
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.
Aircraft were favorably located by radar and ECM. Launches were made to search a circular area 100 miles from fleet center. Aircraft and remained in air for another 12-13 miles. Aircraft then turned for after being located. Aircraft was able to return without incident. An estimated 30 knots. Aircraft were 0-00 10 knots was maintained. At 1000 launched SP for search air and 1 airliner with search radar. At 1200 the force took an evasive course to the north for 4 miles. Aircraft reported several objects located at supersonic. Aircraft was able to search area. Aircraft was then launched at 1600 for search of circular area 100 miles, for 4 miles. Aircraft reported several objects located by supersonic. Aircraft was able to search area and no submarine. At 1700 landed the afternoon search and patrol area.
December 25, 1941

As before cruising with Task Force 61 on 0850° approaching Pearl Harbor. At 0830 set 140° plus 11° time. At 0844 launched 12 VSB to cover area to 100 miles. At 1028 a HBY was sent to 10, 11° westward proceeding from south to north. Firing intermediate air patrol using VP from 1030 to 1200, FIF and search group at 1100. A message from Commander-in-Chief to OpNav was intercepted announcing the arrival of Rear Admiral C. W. Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. At 1240 took eva in action 4 miles north due to a submerged contact reported. At 1830 fleet course was changed to 190°.
London. Filed 19:20, October 21, 1941.

JAPAN

1. It is thought that Japan will not advance southward, except possibly into Thailand, because of the danger of becoming embroiled with the United States and Britain, especially in view of the firm stand taken by the U. S. However, Japanese troops will be strengthened in Indo-China as follows: 36,000 there now; an estimated 20,000 enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Japanese plans.

2. Agreement among all previously divergent opinions in the army and navy in order to make certain of their assistance in any future projects launched is one aim of the new cabinet, which is unquestionably geared for war. The new Premier is wholly pro-German. It is believed that the Japs will advance on Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces the minute Soviet disintegration appears imminent. In the mean time, speeches by the new cabinet should be viewed as obscuring their real intent. The Russians are still believed stronger in Siberia in spite of possible transfers of troops to the other theaters, but the Maritimes and Vladivostok unquestionably could be captured by the Japs.

3. The above comments were received from the Chief of the British Far East Intelligence.

RUSSIAN THEATER

1. The head of the British Mission is now stranded in Kuibishev and is not well in touch with the situation.

2. Budyenny is apparently relieved of command in the Ukraine if news that Marshal Kulik has been made commander at Rostov is true.

3. The Germans have extended their front approximately 12 miles north of Taganrog. An advance from Kalinin toward the north has been begun by the Germans, possibly directed at Vologda and the railroad running south from Archangel, according to dependable secret reports. Otherwise, there are no important developments in this theater which have been verified by British official sources.

4. The above cable is for General Miles' personal attention.

Distribution:

Under Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Assistant Secretary of War
Chief of the Air Corps (3)
Chief of the Army Air Forces
A. C. of S., G-3
A. C. of S., WPD
G. H. Q.

State Department (2)
Director of Naval Intelligence (2)
Record Section
Section File
Situation Section
EE
CE
FE

Paraphrase of Code radiogram received at the War Department at 14:09 November 9, 1941.

London, November 9, 1941 (filed 5:10p) (1045)

The most likely spot where Japanese may be expected to strike is in the Netherlands East Indies. This opinion, from the British Ambassador to Tokyo, holds that as Japan already controls what she needs of the resources of French Indo-China and Thailand she will not proceed against the latter country. To attack British Malaya would be a difficult operation and the rumored Burma Road drive would also be too much of an effort. The Netherlands East Indies could be assaulted secretly from the Mandated Island, and would provide the oil which Japan needs. The source reverses his previous view and now believes
Japan no longer feels that she must make every effort to avoid war with the United States and this contemplated operation would confront the United States and the British with an accomplished fact.

LEE.

Distribution:
- Secretary of War
- Under Secretary of War
- Assistant Secretary of War
- Assistant Secretary of War for Air
- Mr. Lauchlin Currie
- Chief of the Army Air Forces
- Director of Naval Intelligence
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.
- Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD

China Mission
Office of Lend-Lease Administrator
G. H. Q.
State Department
Chief of the Air Corps
Situation Section
British Empire Section
Far Eastern Section

G-2 Comment on November 9 Cable From London
(IB #4 11/10/41)

1. G-2 is of the opinion that while an attack on the Netherlands East Indies is a possibility, it is by no means probable in view of: (1) the action to be expected of the United States and Britain before even a surprise attack could be driven home; (2) the great danger to Japan of trying to by-pass the Philippines and Singapore; (3) the knowledge Japanese must have that the Dutch have prepared their oil installations for immediate demolition, so that it would be a year or more before they could get the oil anyway.

2. It is significant that the Ambassador has reversed his former view and no longer believes that Japan will do everything possible to prevent war with the United States. Such a development is not unexpected.

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram Received at the War Department at 22:42, November 21, 1941

London, November 21, 1941 (filed 0045 p.m.)

In order that the source may be protected do not reveal to the British that you have received the following information.

The estimate given below represents the consensus of all British intelligence services as to Japan, on the basis of all information available up to November 18:

Whether or not the government at Tokyo has decided once and for all to take the chance of war with America and Great Britain is still not certain, but Japan's economic situation is making it necessary to come to such a decision. By initiating the present talk, Japan had hopes of discovering some solution to the problem. Now that she has sent her special envoy, the conversations are coming to a head and the chances are that she will make a basic decision of the policy she will follow.

As things stand now, the only action she can take without danger of war with America and Great Britain is to settle the China incident and her alternatives here are (1) block the Burma Road; (2) come to a peaceful settlement with Chungking. From the best available information at present, it does not appear probable that Japan will launch an offensive against the Burma Road.

In the event the current talks come to nothing and if she then makes a decision to go ahead without regard to the consequences of war with the ABD powers, Japan has the alternatives of offensives against (1) Thailand. The tin and rubber producing areas are in the vicinity of the Kra Isthmus which would no doubt be defended by the British so that economically, Japan would not get much by occupying Thailand, and she stands to lose much of what she is already getting from that country.

(2) Malaya. Japan will certainly occupy Thailand before attacking Malaya, but any drive on the latter country would certainly involve Japan in war with Great Britain and very likely with America also.
(3) **Netherlands East Indies.** It is estimated that Japan has enough oil supplies to last for only nine to twelve months of large scale operations, so that seizure of the Netherlands East Indies would solve a most urgent problem for her. But such a move would not be sound naval strategy and furthermore Japan must know any such attack would bring on war with America and Great Britain. The British believe Japan would occupy Thailand before moving on Netherlands Borneo anyway.

(4) **Soviet Siberia.** Here the main consideration is that Japan is not yet strong enough to start an attack which would undoubtedly cost her plenty in casualties and matériel, and might take a long time. In spite of her offensive preparations, including increase of troops in this area from eleven to 29 divisions, Japan will probably not attack the Maritime Provinces unless and until Russian strength is considerably diminished there.

The estimate concludes that:

1. In the event of failure of her last attempt to get America to come to a general agreement, Japan will have to make up her mind as to whether she should chance the war which would likely follow further aggressive action on her part;
2. Japan will probably not attack Siberia at present; she will wait until Soviet strength is decreased;
3. Japan will continue the war with China except in the event of a general agreement with the United States;
4. Japan's movement of troops from Tongking to the south indicates that she does not intend at present to try cutting the Burma Road;
5. From the Japanese viewpoint, her best move, the one with least chance of bringing on a general war, would probably be occupation of Thailand. Securing bases in Siam would also pave the way for later movement against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies. Furthermore, a Japanese drive into Thailand is indicated by her recent movements.

**LEE.**

**Distribution:**

Assistant Secretary of War  
Assistant Secretary of War for Air  
Chief of the Army Air Forces  
Chief of the Air Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD  
G. H. Q.  
4th Army  
China Mission

**State Department**  
Mr. Lauchlin Currie  
Office of Lend-Lease Administrator, O. E. M.  
Director of Naval Intelligence  
Situation Section  
Air Section  
British Empire Section  
Far Eastern Section.

[**Pencilled notation:**] Return to C of S. HLS.

[**Pencilled notation:**] To Secretary of War. GCM.

**British Embassy Annex,**  
Observatory Circle, Washington, D. C., 22nd November, 1941.

**Subject:**—Japanese Intentions.

**SIR:** The Joint Staff Mission has received from the British Chief of Staff the following telegraphic summary of an estimate by the Joint Intelligence Committee in London of Japan's probable intentions.

We are instructed to invite you to draw the attention of the United States Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations to this appreciation.

Respectfully,

(Signed)  
R. D. Coleridge,  
Commander, R. N.  
R. F. G. Jayne,  
Major.  
Joint Secretaries,  
British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.

Commander L. R. McDowell,  
U. S. Secretary for Collaboration,  
Room 2724, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Summary of Estimate by J. I. C., London, of Japanese Intentions

1. It is not certain that Japan has reached a decision to risk conflict with Britain and U. S. A., but events are driving her to early decision. Japan hopes that present conversations in Washington may provide a way out. The climax of the conversations now reached by KURUSU’S arrival and fundamental decision on policy is likely to follow their outcome. Meanwhile only course open to Japan which she may think would not involve a risk of war with us and United States is to try to finish war in China.

2. To end China war Japan must either make peace with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK or stop his supplies by cutting BURMA ROAD. Two routes of attack possible. Shortest is from TONGKING to KUNMING, but terrain makes this a very difficult operation. Longer route westward of KWANSI province feasible but operation would take longer time than Japan prepared to give. Latest intelligence indicates that southward movement of forces from TONGKING and CANTON suggest major operation against BURMA ROAD unlikely at present.

3. If Washington conversations fail and Japan decides to proceed irrespective of risk of war with Britain, U. S. A. and Netherlands East Indies, she may attack—

(a) THAILAND,
(b) MALAYA,
(c) NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES,
(d) MARITIME PROVINCES.

4. THAILAND. Japan’s infiltration into THAILAND and building of communications in Indo China, construction of aerodromes, work on Naval base at CAMRANH BAY, indicates preparation for move into THAILAND. Japan would consider this move least likely to involve action by ourselves and U. S. A. Main strategic advantage only gained if KRA ISTHMUS occupied simultaneously with land move from INDO CHINA. Little economic advantage to Japan in occupation of THAILAND but object of attack would be to secure important bases for further move south.

5. MALAYA. Occupation of THAILAND leads logically to attack on MALAYA. This would be certain to involve ourselves probably U. S. A.

6. NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Capture of Dutch BORNEO would remedy Japan’s most urgent shortage i. e. oil. Operation would however be strategically unsound from naval point of view and Japan would think it would involve conflict with us and U. S. A. We believe attack would be preceded by occupation of THAILAND.

7. RUSSIAN MARITIME PROVINCES. Since beginning of Russian campaign Japanese forces facing Russia increased from 11 to 29 Divisions. Only interest Japan would have in attacking Russia would be the removal of traditional enemy. Operation would be long and expensive if Russian resistance were maintained. Japan now lacks sufficient superiority to make offensive operations against Russia probable unless Russian forces are weakened.

8. Conclusions.

(a) Japan will make last effort at agreement with U. S. A. Decision whether or not to take aggressive action involving major powers would follow failure of conversations.

(b) If such decision is taken THAILAND will be first probable objective involving least risk of major conflict. Occupation of bases in THAILAND including KRA ISTHMUS is a sound strategic preliminary culminating in operation against MALAYA or NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Recent military movements support opinion that THAILAND is next objective.

(c) Action against Russia likely to be deferred until position of Russia in Far East is seriously weakened.

(d) Operation in China will continue in absence of a general agreement with U. S. A.

(e) Early attack on BURMA ROAD is unlikely in view of latest information of diversion of forces southward from NORTHERN INDO CHINA and CANTON.
EXHIBIT NO. 106

Section A: Admiral H. R. Stark’s Letters to Admiral H. E. Kimmel (Pages 2144 to 2225).
Section B: Admiral H. E. Kimmel’s Letters to Admiral H. R. Stark (Pages 2225 to 2257).

Section A

Confidential

DEAR MUSTAPHA: There are things to be said in here which are strictly entre nous and therefore I suggest you destroy this letter after reading.

I have given you a few days to let sink in the news of your becoming CinC, U. S. Fleet. I would have given my eye teeth to have seen your expression and to have heard your exclamation when it happened, but instead I was just sitting behind the scenes congratulating you and the Navy. I confess it came sooner than I had anticipated but that it should come, I have long had in the back of my head and while rejoicing with you I realize fully the enormous responsibilities placed on your shoulders in one of the most critical periods in our history, and where the Navy more than any other branch of the Government is likely to have to bear the brunt.

I would give a good deal to sit down and have a chat with you. I am hoping J. O. will turn over the personal letters I have written him. They give all the slants here that I know and they show the urgency as I see it. In my humble opinion, we may wake up any day with some mines deposited on our front door step or with some of our ships bombed, or what not, and find ourselves in another undeclared war, the ramifications of which [2] call for our strongest and sanest imagination and plans.

I have told the Gang here for months past that in my opinion we were heading straight for this war, that we would not assume anything else and personally I do not see how we can avoid, either having it thrust upon us or of our deliberately going in, many months longer. And of course it may be a matter of weeks or of days. I would like to feel that I could be perfectly complacent if some day some one opens the door of my office and reports that the war is on. I have been moving Heaven and Earth trying to meet such a situation and am terribly impatient at the slowness with which things move here. Even though I know much has been accomplished, there still remains much to be done.

My estimate of the situation—J. O. R. can give you this—McCrea also has a copy—which I presented to the Secretary and Rainbow 3, both of which you should have, will give you fairly clearly my own thoughts. Of course I do not want to become involved in the Pacific, if it is possible to avoid it. I have fought this out time and time again in the highest tribunals but I also fully realize that we may become involved in the Pacific and in the Atlantic at the same time; and to put it mildly, it will be one H— of a job, and that is one reason why I am thankful that I have your calm judgment, your imagination, your courage, your guts and your head, at the seagoing end. Also your can do—rather than can’t.

In King, I believe you have the very best possible man to handle the situation in the Atlantic and that we can give him a free rein. He will lick things into shape and he knows the game from every standpoint and of course in this war it will be [3] fought from every standpoint. On the other side—in Tommy Hart—I feel equally confident.

I believe in Walter Anderson you have a good man to handle the Battleships but I do not commit myself one inch beyond that. Any future advancement beyond that position will depend largely on your recommendation but he should fight a good fight right there, whether or not he goes up. It is unfortunate in some ways that we could not get the additional stars and rank we wanted in the Atlantic but we could not and consequently the accommodations had to be made in the Pacific. With this you are familiar. Of course Andy feels disappointed but he is a good soldier. However, when we mentioned the possibility of his relieving Snyder next June, I informed him that I would not commit myself and that I could not think of committing you, and incidentally, and very incidentally, and in all cases, the White House finally decides. This, of course, is White House prerogative and responsibility, and believe me, it is used these days.

I hope Wilson Brown does well. He is fine fiber, as you know. Frankly, I had some misgivings about his health and had him brought to the Navy Department for a thorough checkup by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. It is not
necessary that anybody, beside you, should know this. Medicine and Surgery gave him a perfectly clean bill of health but I do think he should be watched while under strain and if there is any sign of his not being able to stand it, he should be relieved. Again, I am giving just you my thoughts. The President knows that I initiated this physical checkup because of my doubts, but beyond just a few of us, it is not known.

[4] What Peck Snyder’s final reactions will be, I don’t know. We wanted to run this whole schedule differently but our hand was forced. I have always regarded him with a good deal of admiration because of a feeling that above all things he was loyal and would play the game in the last analysis as it had to be played and as you and I have to do. Here’s hoping.

I am sending you Savvy Cooke and I feel like I am losing one of my arms. That boy has one of the best brains I have ever run into. I put on his efficiency report that I would make him an Admiral immediately, if I had the authority and believe me, if he were one, I would not consent to his going. I am sending him to sea to protect his promotion chances and am sending him to the Fleet Flagship because of his intimate knowledge and personal handiwork in all that we have done in War Plans and in all that we have been thinking. I feel that he should have a year in command, although were I going to see myself I would be strongly inclined to take him on my staff. Where we put him he should be available to you in both capacities. His capacity for work is almost unlimited and in addition to all his other fine attributes, I have formed a very strong affection for him, as we all have. He is just as likeable as he can be. Should his ship go to the Navy Yard and you would like to keep him with you during any such periods, it could be arranged.

I am also enclosing a letter to you which I wrote to Tommy Hart and which I am pleased to say he stated gave him a clearer picture of his own situation than even he himself had formed on the spot. That is my excuse for sending it.

Murphy, who is on Richardson’s staff, has been with us on three different occasions and is likewise pretty familiar with [5] our thoughts hack here. I have directed McCrea to stop and see you on his return from the Philippines although he can probably add little to what Murphy can tell you. On the other hand I would be glad to have you have a long talk with McCrea that we may get from you any first-hand material you want to send.

Nimitz has written J. O. with regard to several matters which explain themselves so there is no need for repetition on my part.

J. O. has been thoroughly acquainted with the personnel situation. He knows that there has been one of my first thoughts ever since I have been there, as well as Nimitz, and that I have put more time and struggle on it in the White House and on the Hill than on any other one subject.

I am home at the moment laid up with “flu” and have been busy with Mrs. Hull a good share of the afternoon, it now being ten minutes of six and Charlie Wellborn just came in with the mail so I will close. Were I to write you volumes and I feel like it, I doubt if I could add much that you will not realize without my writing.

Just remember that I consider the only reason for my being alive and kicking at the present time is to do everything within my power to serve the Fleet, and I want you to write me fully, frankly, critically, and just think out loud on all subjects wherein the Department can be of help. Nimitz and I are absolutely at one in our common desire to serve and I wish you all the luck in the wide world.

[6] Finally you will be glad to know that there is a great deal of fine and favorable comment on your selection from all sides. I have had letters from Admiral Senn and Admiral Craven among others, not to mention the reaction here in Washington.

Again good luck and keep cheerful and God Bless You.

Betty.

You know how I believe in conferences—keeping your key people informed—taking them into your confidence, and thrashing out common problems—no bulk-heads—and here again, I know you will accomplish much.

Again good luck.

Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN,

USS HONOLULU,

c/o Postmaster Fleet Post Office,

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
DEAR MUSTAPHA: The following is a telephone call to one of my Aides when I happened to be out:

"Admiral Train said that the Navy Relief has received no money from the Fleet during the Year 1940. He wondered if it might not be a good idea for you, as President, to ask CinC whether or not a sum may be expected, in view of the necessity of making up the Society's Annual Report."

Can you give me the answer?

Of course you probably have all the "ins" and "outs" by this time of Snyder's stand with reference to his being detached and on which he insisted.

It is over the dam and I won't say anything more about it.

However, you have Pye in his place. I hope the change is an acceptable one to you. Personally I think he may be of even more assistance to you and I told the President you might even want to keep him on after July.

I have always thought Pye one of the soundest strategists we have and when I worked under him during my last cruise, which I often did at one end or the other of the line, I thought his handling of tactical situations outstanding. Particularly were his orders a model of clearness, brevity and effectiveness.

Who gets the Battle Force next June will be largely dependent upon your recommendations. Of course Andy is much interested but I told him flatly that I would promise him nothing, that he was getting a great job where he was going and that the future was largely in the lap of the Gods and Admiral Kimmel.

It always sort of hits me with a thud when people are planning ahead and looking for something in advance rather than giving all they have to the job in hand. Andy happens to be one of those fellows who does give all he has to the job in hand, but my feeling has always been that the job should seek the man rather than the reverse. Thank the Lord that Nimitz agrees with me and if people understood that it has to be that way in the last analysis, it would save a lot of correspondence and delicate situations here.

One of the biggest kicks I got out of your present job was that it was a complete surprise to you and has the overwhelming approval of the Service.

I confess my own job here was something I had not dreamed of. Incidentally, I told Bloch when I expected to stay at sea and he was talking to me about getting three stars or more, that if I was of use anywhere it would be another year right in the billet where I had trained for a year, and as far as I was concerned the only thing that should count was the best interest of the Fleet, which was also would be my best interest, and that I would serve cheerfully anywhere under anybody. That is the kind of a gang I hope you have around you.

Started this just to send you Train's remarks and have gone into something else. Lord, I wish I could see you, or better still, that I could be with you. I would take most any old job down to the lowliest division in the outfit.

Every good luck in the wide world and "keep cheerful."

As very sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 29 January 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is really a P. S. to my note of this morning.

I just want to let you know I am pressing all I can to take over the Coast Guard and that at last pressure is beginning to tell and I am hopeful I may be able to after the Lend-Lease Bill is out of the road. Please don't mention this to anyone but just keep it in the back of your head as one of those things which might be coming along.

The above is incidental to what I did want to tell you and which you might mention to Bloch and that is I have asked Waesche to exert unusual and continuing vigilance in searching all fishermen, both on home coasts and in the islands, under the guise of looking for narcotics — —; actually to insure against any secreted Japanese mines.
Am still fighting for personnel—I shouldn't have to—but I am—
When I think what I have to go through for almost every additional man for the Navy—and the Army building up to 1½ millions—it just doesn't make sense—

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

/S/ Betty.

Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 30 January 1941.

Dear Kimmel: Take it for what it is worth.
Copies also to Admiral Bloch, Blakeley, Hepburn, Freeman, King, Hart.

KD

Secret
In reply refer to Initials and No.

Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 10 February 1941.

Dear Kimmel: Thank God for Sundays. It is my only day for quiet study and work, and even then I have to kick somebody out of the office, because they long since have learned my habits.

First I want to congratulate you and J. O. on your perfectly splendid letter of 28 January, serial 0140. It is extremely helpful to us all and I hope you will continue in future communications of our similar searching analyses. Just for a moment refresh on your paragraph 3; and permit me to say "check and double check."

I continue in every way I possibly can to fight commitments or dispositions that would involve us on two fronts and to keep from sending more combatant ships to the Far East. I had a two hour struggle (please keep this absolutely secret) in the White House this past week and thank God can report that the President still supports my contentions. You may be amused to know that the Secretary of War, Colonel Stimson, has been of very great assistance to me in this connection in recent conferences. Mr. Hull never lets go in the contrary view and having fought it so many times I confess to having used a little more vehemence and a little stronger language than was becoming in fighting it out this last week for the nth time. Present were the President, Stimson, Knox, Marshall and myself. I mention this just to show you that the fight is always on and that some day I might get upset. But thank God, to date at least, the President has and continues to see it my way.

Here's hoping. Replies to your letter of the 28th (0140) and to J. O.'s letter of the 25th (0129) are just signed.

I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. You now know that he is sending out 81 fighters to Oahu, which will give that place 50 fairly good ones and 50 of the latest type. I jumped to give him the transportation for them in carriers when he requested it. I hope too, you will get the Marines to Midway, Johnson and Palmyra, as soon as you can. They may have to rough it for a time
until barracks are built, and the water supply, if inadequate, will have to be provided somehow just like it would be if they had captured an enemy atoll.

Speaking of Marshall, he is a tower of strength to us all, and I couldn’t conceive of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He will go to almost any length possible to help us out and sometimes contrary to his own advisors.

I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possible could, the President just has his own ideas about men. I usually finally get my way but the cost of effort is very great and of course worth it. I feel that I could go on the Hill this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from the White House. As a matter of fact what we now have, was obtained by my finally asking the President’s permission to go on the Hill and state our needs as I saw them at that time and his reply was “go ahead, I won’t veto anything they agree to”. However, the struggle is starting all over again and just remember we are going the limit, but I cannot guarantee the outcome.

Regarding the MK VI Mod I Exploder; we have distributed them to the outlying stations and will leave the decision up to you as to whether or not they should be put aboard ship.

Every good wish in the world.

As ever sincerely,

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. I just realized that a letter I had roughed out in reply to yours of the 27th had not been sent so here is just another Sunday cleanup job along with one or two other things.

First, I had another hour and a half in the White House today and the President said that he might order a detachment of three or four cruisers, a carrier and a squadron of destroyers to make a cruise to the Philippines; perhaps going down through the Phoenix and Gilbert or the Fiji Islands, then reaching over into Mindanao for a short visit and on to Manila and back.

I have fought this over many times and won, but this time the decision may go against me. Heretofore the talk was largely about sending a cruise of this sort to Australia and Singapore and perhaps the N. E. I. Sending it to the Philippines would be far less objectionable from a political standpoint but still objectionable. What I want you to do is to be thinking about it and be prepared to make a quick decision if it is ordered.

Spent an hour this afternoon going over your personnel situation with Nimitz and Kilpatrick and the Doctors and you will hear from Nimitz on this. A couple of weeks ago, even before I got your letter, the President told me I was overcrowding our ships and that they would be neither healthy, happy or sanitary with increased complements so we may have to ask for the doctors’ opinion regarding the new complements.

Regarding your setting up a place on shore where your staff can do planning work; anything that you can arrange with Admiral Bloch will be perfectly satisfactory to me. I don’t know just what the Submarine Base facilities are but you may be able to put up some additions which would eventually be needed because of the expected increase in the number of submarines. I will have Moreell go into these additions if you will forward to me a sketch lay-out in case you need our help. No one could say just what the public or political reaction might be to your shore arrangements, because it might be misrepresented and might be misunderstood. That is the reason I suggest any additional facilities be labelled additional facilities for the Submarine Base. It would not actually be a misnomer because undoubtedly they will be when the Fleet some day bases back on the West Coast.

I also take it that you can arrange satisfactory communications with Admiral Bloch.

Regarding a set of quarters for yourself, it would seem that the best solution and perhaps the only one would be for Admiral Bloch to divert one of the new
sets of five houses now building to your use. Will you please communicate this to Admiral Bloch?

I want you to know that we are doing everything possible to reach full agreement with possible Allies. If and when such agreements are concluded we will inform you of them.

I wish we could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces for the 14th Naval District but we simply haven’t got them. If more are needed I see no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving Heaven and Earth to speed up a considerable program we have for small craft and patrol vessels for the Districts but like everything else, it takes time and “dollars cannot buy yesterday”.

I think I previously wrote you that I hope to be able to take over the Coast Guard after the Lend-Lease Bill is on the Statute Books. Of course if war eventuates Admiral Bloch can commandeer anything in the Islands in the way of small craft and I assume he has a full list of what would be available.

All good wishes.

Keep cheerful,

/S/ Betty.

Secret

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

Navy Department,  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,  

Dear Kimmel: I suppose by this time your staff is working smoothly on the beach. It is most important, as I have indicated previously, that as soon as possible you get your Operating Plan for Rainbow III in the hands of Admiral Hart and your own subordinate commanders, including those in command of the Pacific and the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers. Then we can get ready the subordinate operating plans and the logistic requirements, the latter being of special importance to you in your advanced position.

Particularly in connection with your logistic planning, some of us here have wondered as to whether or not you might also put the Commander Base Force and his staff ashore in a status more or less similar to your own. However, this is your job and I just mention it en passant.

Even if we fight this war according to “Plan Dog,” we have so designed Rainbow III that a shift to “Dog” (see my despatch of January) will (at least at first) require only minor changes in the tasks of either the Basic Plan or your Operating Plans. The force we would move to the Atlantic possibly would not go at once, and the force left with you will still be great enough to perform both the offensive and defensive tasks assigned you. Of course we all could wish for more.

In making your plans for the more important offensive raids. I hope that you will not fail to study very carefully the matter of making aircraft raids on the inflammable Japanese cities (ostensibly on military objectives), and the effect such raids might have on Japanese morale and on the diversion of their forces away from the Malay Barrier. Such adventures may seem to you unjustified from a profit and loss viewpoint—but, again, you may consider that they might prove very profitable. In either case (and this is strictly SECRET) you and I may be ordered to make the, so it is just as well for you to have considered plans for it.

I hesitated to take the chance of upsetting you with my despatch and letter concerning a visit of a detachment of surface forces to the Far East. I agree with you that it is unwise. But even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my view has prevailed, but the time might come when it will not. I gave you the information merely as a sort of advance notice.

Secret

The difficulty is that the entire country is in a dozen minds about the war—to stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate against Japan in the Pacific and the Far East—I simply can not predict the outcome. Gallup polls, editorials talk on the Hill (and I might add, all of which is irresponsible) constitute a rising tide for action in the Far East if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department
recommendations, you would have to implement Rainbow III, and forget my later despatch concerning "Plan Dog". This would mean that any reinforcement to the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be reduced by just so much as we would send to the Asiatic. And that might be a very serious matter for Britain.

I am perfectly delighted over getting some modern Army airplanes in the Hawaiian area and jumped at the opportunity to transport them. I wish they would make me a similar offer for the Philippines, in which case I would also make available a carrier, properly escorted, for the duty.

I know little of further interest to bring up for the moment. Our staff conversations (and thank the Good Lord there has been little no public leak that they are taking place) are nearing their conclusion and we hope will be finished in about ten days. Of course we will make you acquainted with all decisions reached just as soon as we can.

I am sending copy of this letter to Tommy Hart, whose mind you now know pretty well with reference to his job in the Far East. I have been out of the office for a few days and I haven't seen Hart's "Estimate of the Situation", but I do know that War Plans is delighted with what he has sent, and of course I always have been because of his grasp of the entire picture.

I am enclosing copy of a memo which is self-explanatory showing you our best estimate of the Far Eastern present situation. Please note the governing sentences where it is stated that a reestimate may have to be necessary at any time, but it still looks to us as though this estimate, at least for the moment, were sound.

Keep cheerful.
All good wishes and Good Luck
Admiral H. E. KIMMER, U. S. N.
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,

[8] BETTY

[1] Sent to W. H. by Capt. Callaghan

Draft

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

11 February 1941.

Since your thought yesterday morning of the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines via the southern route consisting of approximately 4 cruisers, a squadron (9) destroyers and carriers and perhaps to permit a leak that they were going out there just for a temporary visit and then to return, I confess to having pondered a good deal on it last night during the wee small hours because, as you know, I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested this and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers (we have 2 out there now), but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6. Frankly, I breathed a great sigh of relief and thought the issue pretty definitely closed.

You also called it a "bluff" and questioned it from that standpoint. Obviously, if we permitted a leak about their coming back, there would be even less, if any, bluff, and again if we did not permit a leak with regard to their coming back, we would then certainly look like turning tail and running if something happened and we did come back. I believe it pretty thoroughly agreed that we do not want that force in the Philippines in case of sudden attack, and that even were we to consider in emergency increasing our forces in the Far East, we would not send them to Manila Bay but rather to the southard or into Dutch East Indies where they would be better supported and not so open to attack.

[2] As I reported yesterday, recent letters from Hart state he is simply up against it for facilities to care for what he has and only recently have we acquired a vessel to make available to him later on to help take care of his
submarines which are in urgent and immediate need of a Mother Ship. Likewise he is taxed to take care of his Air Force but we are improving these facilities. Sometimes after July I want to send him another squadron of bombers. We expect to send four minesweepers (bird class) out in March.

Specifically:

Sending a small force would probably be no deterrent to Japan and would not increase Japanese difficulties in advancing southward. I feel we would be exposing our force without compensating results.

There is a chance that further moves against Japan will precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in in case we are forced into hostilities with Germany who we all consider our major problem.

The Pacific Fleet is now weaker in total tonnage and aircraft than the Japanese Navy. It is, however, a very strong force and as long as it is in its present position it remains a constant serious and real threat to Japan’s flank. If any considerable division is sent to Manila it might prove an invitation to Japan to attack us in detail and thus greatly lessen or remove our serious naval threat to her for a considerable period to come. I believe it would be a grave strategical error at this time to divide our Pacific Fleet. We would then have our Fleet divided in three parts, Atlantic, Mid-Pacific, and Western Pacific. It is true we only contemplate a visit out there but we might find recall of this additional detachment [3] exceedingly embarrassing or difficult.

If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should at least at first remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains quiet, or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously attack the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan’s attack on the British and Dutch. We would also then be able to support spare forces for the Atlantic.

Right now, Japan does not know what we intend. If we send part of the Fleet to the Asiatic now, we may show our hand and lose the value of any strategic surprise. We might encourage Japan to move, rather than deter her, and also we might very well compromise our own future operations.

I feel we should not indicate the slightest interest in the Gilbert or Solomon or Fiji Islands at this time. If we do, the Japanese might smell a rat and our future use of them, at least so far as surprise is concerned, might be compromised. The Japanese could take steps to occupy some of them before we could because she has had long training and is ready for amphibious operations; we are not. If we lose the element of surprise or begin to show interest, for example in the Gilberts, such previous warning may delay our later operations because Japan would well consider nullifying our efforts in this direction.

I just wanted to get this off my chest to you as I always do my thoughts and then will defer to your better judgment with a cheerful Aye, Aye, Sir, and go the limit as will all of us in what you decide. I do think the matter serious.

[4] The establishment of Marine Defense Battalions at Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston and Midway is now in progress. I have not authorized any leak on this because I have questioned such a procedure but if you feel it advisable we could, of course, do so. If Japan occupies Saigon, I am considering recommending we plan our mines in Manila, assume a full posture of defense in the Philippines and send the Fleet Marine Force from San Diego to Hawaii.

Finally I want you to know I am notifying Kimmel to be prepared to send a force such as we talked about yesterday to the Philippines, in case your final decision should be to send them.

I have just read a paraphrase of a telegram of 7 Feb. from the American Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears the following:

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such risks constitute, the risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities."

You undoubtedly have seen the entire despatch and obviously I am picking out that portion which supports my view.

[s] H. R. S.
Memorandum for the President.
Subject: Analysis of the Situation in Indo-China.

1. The despatches from the Naval Attache in London concerning prospects of an immediate crisis in Indo-China and Singapore seem to be a re-hash of the story by Douglas Robertson in the New York Times of February 2d. I have been watching this situation with extreme care and see no present reason for alarm. We knew in advance the Japanese were sending some ships to Thailand and Indo-China to enforce cessation of hostilities between those states. This has been accomplished. The transfer of peace negotiations on the NATORI to Tokyo indicates to me two things.

(1) The demands by Japan will be far-reaching and
(2) The February 10th date is too soon for an attack, as the negotiations are likely to be rather long-drawn out in Tokyo.

2. A careful study, including an evaluation of information from many sources, leads me to believe that the following is the general plan of Japan:

(a) She has some fear that the British and the United States will intervene if she moves into southern Indo-China and Thailand. Therefore, she wishes first to obtain a full legal right to enter those countries, by getting the consent of the governments to give her concessions in the ports and on shore.

(b) The size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and Hainan is insufficient for occupying Indo-China and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use against the Philippines. So far as I can tell, an insufficient number of transports is assembled for a major move.

Upon a successful conclusion of the peace negotiations she will assuredly occupy Thailand and southern Indo-China, establish defended naval, land, and air bases, and get ready for further eventualities. She may build up her land forces in Indo-China in readiness for action against Malaya and British North Borneo, or may retain them in Formosa and Hainan. I question her readiness to attack the British before June, but this belief is subject to revision.

(c) Japan desires to move against the British, the Dutch and the United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a time. At present, she desires not to go to war with the United States at all, in order that she can continue her imports of materials useful for war and for her general economy. If Japan gets a favorable opportunity, and believes the United States has then definitely decided to remain out of war altogether, she will move first against Malaya and possibly Burma, hoping the Dutch will not participate. Her present economic conversations with the Dutch indicate she may be playing for time, and even may intend to conquer the Dutch primarily by economic and political penetration.

(d) Japan is unlikely to undertake hostilities against Britain until she sees the results of Germany's next attack on the British Isles, and of Germany's success in the Balkans. If the Germans succeed in conquering the British Isles, Japan will at once move into Malaya, and possibly into the Netherlands East Indies. If the German attack against the British Isles fails, I believe Japan may await a more favorable opportunity before advancing beyond Indo-China.

3. The above are my present views. They will change if we get information that will warrant change. So far, everything leads me to believe that Japan is playing for a secure advance without too great an expenditure of military energy. The recent reinforcement of her defense in the Mandates indicates the seriousness with which she views the threat by the Pacific Fleet, so long as it remains strong and apparently ready to move against her eastern flank.

H. R. STARK.

Original set by Clipper Lock Box—Confirmation by Capt Lammers 2/28/41

DEAR ADMIRAL HART: Admiral Stark is leaving Washington today for a short trip to the Caribbean, expecting to be back on the job about 13 March. I have just brought to his attention certain information which he has asked me to give to you.

27 FEBRUARY 1941.
As you know, we are having Conversations here in Washington which we hope will be completed in from two to four weeks. Upon completion of these Conversations Rear Admiral V. H. Danckwerts, R. N., one of the participants, will proceed, I expect by air, to Singapore and possibly Australia and New Zealand to inform officials there and also British CinC, China, of the results of the Conversations.

Admiral Danckwerts has expressed a willingness to stop in Hawaii to talk to Admiral Kimmel and in Manila to talk to you in regard to the same. Admiral Stark thinks this is an excellent plan. He wants me to inform you of this fact and to say that I think Danckwerts is very clever but honest. Ingersoll says he thinks it best for you to listen and talk little.

The Department will inform you of Admiral Lanckwerts' movements and prospective date of arrival in order that suitable arrangements can be made for meeting him.

I expect to return to London as soon as Conversations are finished. Will you therefore acknowledge by radio to Admiral Stark receipt of this letter? With kindest regards, I am, Sincerely,

Admiral T. C. Hart, USN
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet
USS Houston
(Duplicate to Adm. Kimmel)


Personal and Confidential

DEAR KIMMEL: Your letters—references—

(a) Confidential, official—#P16-3/(0217), of 7 February 1941, subject—Recommended Complements.

(b) Secret, personal, of 18 February, 1941, to Stark, on various matters, and

(c) Confidential, personal, of 16 February 1941, to Nimitz, re Ordnance P. G. and various matters.

have been read carefully considered in the light of the situation which confronts the Bureau of Navigation. No enclosures were received with Bunav copy of Reference (a), nor have such enclosures been received in C. N. O. office so far as I know.

The Bureau of Ordnance is so far behind the requirements of ordnance materials, and is continuing to fall further behind, that drastic measures are necessary if our fleets, even at present strength, are to have the necessary ordnance supplies to carry on a war. That drastic measures have already been initiated may be surmised from personnel changes already made.

Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance problems through the administration of the Lend-Lease Bill is the task of procurement, inspection and delivery of enormous—almost astronomical—quantities of ordnance supplies for the British Navy and any allies which may survive to fight the Dictators. I do not know if you have been informed of all the new ordnance plants that are being erected in various parts of the country to start from scratch the manufacture of various items of ordnance.

Furlong can give you some idea of these developments when he reports. He should have had the help long ago of many of the Ordnance postgraduates in the Fleet, and he endeavored to obtain their services but was denied by my Bureau on the well-founded theory that even though many of the Ordnance P. G.'s in the Fleet were not working at their specialty, they were usefully employed, and the Fleet should be saved as much as possible from changes.

With the appointment of a new Chief of Bureau of Ordnance the Secretary directed me to give Blandy all practicable aid in the form of competent officers to assist in producing ordnance supplies. The Secretary is fully aware of Blandy's requirements in personnel and the necessity for taking a considerable number of ordnance post graduates from the Fleet. I will add also that Stark is fully informed on this subject.

In a recent dispatch to you I informed you that Crawford would soon be ordered to the Bureau of Ordnance. He is specially needed to speed up torpedo production, and it is unfortunate that Pye must lose this office from his staff. The designation of the remaining forty or so officers is being left to you with
the idea that you will so arrange detachments and re-allocations to minimize the damage to fleet efficiency. I will be glad to approve such reassignments within the fleet as you consider necessary. The Atlantic Fleet also gives up a number of Ordnance P, G's.

I note your warning against the detachment of considerable numbers of qualified officers from the fleet and the enormous risk therefrom. I yield to no one in my anxiety to have the fleet ready at the proper time and you can rest assured that I am always ready to bear full responsibility for my acts. I am fully cognizant of the great responsibility which you bear and it is my firm intention to support you to the maximum extent possible.

As you well know, this country is confronted with a most difficult problem—that of determining just how much of our total output shall go to Britain and her allies, and how much to keep for ourselves. A wrong guess may well make our own problem insoluble. The minimum help needed by Britain is, of course, that which will keep her actively fighting while we are building up our strength. No help at all or too little help to Britain resulting in her defeat will greatly increase and complicate our problems of the future.

The situation regarding aviators is not unlike that of Ordnance P, G's. In order to build up our aviation we must of necessity have the services of qualified aviators to get all our air training stations going. We know the new aviation officers lack a great deal of being ready to serve the fleet when they first report, and we also know you will do your best to provide the additional training and experience needed.

If you will grope backward through your memory as a budget officer you will realize that the serious shortage of aviators which now confronts us can be charged largely to our failure to operate Pensacola at maximum capacity during those years when we used only a fraction of that station's capacity to fill the pilot seats in the Fleet. I remember also our efforts to obtain funds to give active duty to a few hundred naval R. O. T. C. ensigns. While it is idle to speculate on what might have been, the present situation is not without its ironical aspects.

Now for a discussion of the enlisted personnel problem. You are no doubt aware that Stark and I have fought stubbornly and constantly to increase the authorized number of men in the Navy and to bring ships' complements not only to 100% but to 115% in order to train in advance of the readiness of new or acquired ships the key men for them.

[3] Just about the time we thought we were well underway to that objective, the President received information from several sources that our ships were being seriously overcrowded. It was obvious that his informants were in or had been in the Fleet. Recently, the Captain of the TUSCALOOSA reported that his ship was overcrowded and asked for detachment of about 50 extra marines which had been placed on board. His Division Commander, Pickens, by endorsement confirmed this opinion and further stated that the same comment applied to all heavy cruisers.

As the President had cruised in the TUSCALOOSA fairly recently, both he and his private physician, Rear Admiral McIntyre, were definitely of the opinion that there were too many men on the TUSCALOOSA for health and comfort. I have taken steps to ascertain how many men were on board during the President's cruise and at the time Pickens recommended the removal of the extra marines.

Recently some bluejacket wrote Senator Downey, of California, a complaint of intolerable conditions in the PORTLAND due to overcrowding. When the matter was referred to me I asked CINCUS to investigate and give me data upon which to base a reply. CINCUS's, reply, which you should get from your files and read, confirmed the overcrowding in the PORTLAND and further stated that the number of men in the PORTLAND at the time of the complaint was less than was being proposed by the Fleet Personnel Board.

You will agree that if the President also receives such comments (and no doubt many bluejackets or their families write him) Stark and I will have a hard time selling him the idea that ships' complements should be increased as you recommend in reference (a).

Our recruiting may be prejudiced by similar letters from afloat as indicated by the following quotation from a letter written by an Inspector of one of our Major Recruiting Divisions:

"From underground sources it appears that the ships are so crowded that men hesitate to ship over. I have had personal letters and contacts from good men to that effect. A relative of mine—a farmer boy from Maryland whom
I advised to join the Navy six years ago—is a patternmaker first class on the ALTAIR. He writes me for advice about shipping over as living conditions on the ship are almost unbearable. I mention this because it seems to me a matter of concern even though it's none of my personal business."

However, to offset the above unfavorable picture of overcrowding, Commander R. W. Cary, U. S. N., recently executive officer of the CHICAGO, gave me a memorandum of changes made in that ship to increase her living accommodations without apparent overcrowding. I enclose a copy of his memorandum, marked "A", and I will urge on the C. N. O. and Chief of Bureau of Ships to [4] provide the funds and equipment you ask in paragraph 11 of reference (a), not because I believe the President will approve increased complements to fight your ships, but primarily because I believe that every combatant ship should be ready to carry on board as many excess men as possible for training for new construction.

The President now feels so strongly that we will make our ships unhappy by overcrowding that Stark and I will need every bit of assistance and assurance that you can give in order to obtain his consent to carrying more than the present 100% complement on board.

I recently sent you a draft of a proposed letter which should help a little in reducing unexpected detachments. I enclose another copy, marked "B" and request your suggestions.

The failure of many of our men to reenlist when discharged from ships in Hawaiian waters is understandable but very disturbing. While many men may leave that area with the intention of reenlisting after leave in the States, I am afraid we lose a large number of trained mechanics to industry when they come home. The remedy for this is both your problem and mine, and I welcome your suggestions for increasing reenlistments afloat.

I appreciate receiving your letter re broadening the employment of negroes aboard ship. Your suggestions are sound and will be followed here as long as we can withstand the pressure. Two negroes have been appointed to the Naval Academy for the class entering next summer.

Legislation has been initiated asking for 292,000 men in the Navy during normal times, with a limit of 300,000 for emergency. Prospects for passage are favorable. Stark and I wanted to ask for about 500,000 but were turned down by the President who insists on a year by year program. Present Operating Force plan for 1942 will require about 290,000 men.

Legislation has been initiated for going to three-year Naval Academy course, commencing with the class of 1943, which will be scheduled to graduate in June 1942. The Class of 1942 will graduate in February 1942. Prospects for passage favorable.

Before closing this already too long letter, let me assure you that when we get the report of your Personnel Board with its recommendations for increased complements, we will give it serious and sympathetic study, particularly if your Medical Board of Survey of Living Conditions on board indicates that more men can be accommodated without prejudice to health and comfort.

Referring to the large numbers of young Reserve Ensigns being ordered to duty afloat, I know that you will do all in your power to continue their naval education and training. These young men will be useful and valuable in direct proportion to the effort made by our regular officers to train them. [5] We must lean very heavily on them to help meet the requirements of new construction.

In order that the Fleet may comprehend the personnel problem confronting the Navy as a whole, I shall publish to the service in the near future a circular of information as to how we plan to meet the personnel needs of our two-ocean Navy. In spite of anything we may attempt to do ashore we realize that it is on board ship that the most important training must take place.

If you or any of your officers have a formula for manning new construction with nuclei of ship-trained men without getting them from the Fleet,—by all means, let me have it!

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ C. W. Nimitz.

Encl.

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Navy Department,
Bureau of Navigation,
Washington, D.C., 28 February 1941.

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
    Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet.
Subject: Transfers to Shore Duty.
Reference: (a) BuNav Manual.

1. The Bureau will furnish to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
   Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet, and
   Commander Train, Atlantic Fleet, the waiting lists for shore duty maintained
   in accordance with reference (a), Articles D-7024(6), (7), and (8).

2. The shore duty waiting list will be revised and issued quarterly. It will
   contain only the top men on the list whose transfer ashore may normally be
   expected during the succeeding twelve months. Fleet Reservists will appear
   separately on this list as the Bureau will continue to give preference to Fleet
   Reservists for transfer to shore duty.

3. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief,
   Atlantic Fleet, are requested to place men in training as reliefs for men on the
   shore duty lists so that the latter can be transferred on short notice.

In reply refer to
Initials and No. Op-30C-MD

Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, February 20, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
Subject: Accommodations for Increased Complements of Heavy Cruisers.

1. In accordance with your request, I am supplying the following information
   gained from my experience as Executive Officer of the CHICAGO in regard to
   accommodating the increased complements of heavy cruisers.

2. When I left the fleet on December 29, 1940, a complement required for heavy
   cruisers of the CHICAGO class had not been worked out to the last man, but
   it appeared to be very close to 1100 men necessary to man the additional batteries
   installed, and maintain the rate of fire required by modern war conditions. I
   note, since my arrival here, that the Fleet Personnel Board recommends 1099 men
   for this class of cruiser.

3. To meet the berthing, messing and other accommodations necessary to
   accommodate our estimated number of 100 men, the CHICAGO obtained addi-
   tional bunks and lockers while at the Navy Yard—a sufficient number to bring
   the total up to 906. This installation was done principally with the ship's force.
   The arrangement for installing these bunks and lockers was done entirely by the
   ship's personnel under the supervision of the First Lieutenant who gave it his
   careful attention and succeeded in getting these in without violating the standard
   spacing between berths in any one tier of 21’, and without finding it necessary
   to utilize any of the messing compartments. To accomplish this it required an
   almost complete rearrangement of berths and lockers in each compartment.
   When this installation had been completed, it was found possible by utilizing office
   space and other miscellaneous spaces large enough to take from one to three or
   four berths plus what space was left available in the berthing compartments, to
   install 113 additional bunks and lockers. This number had been requested from
   the Bureau of Ships, but I am advised that no action [2] as yet has been
   taken on that request. If it is approved, and the bunks and lockers are installed,
   there will be a total of 1,109 bunks and lockers on the CHICAGO.

4. Up to the time that I left the ship, we had had a peak load of some 1,050
   men on board. The cafeteria system of feeding this large number of men has
   proved to be satisfactory. The over-all messing time for this number of men
   was less than it had been under the old messing system for a lesser number of
   men, but the actual serving time was slightly longer, amounting in all from
   30 to 35 minutes. The mess hall space required was reduced to two messing
   compartments in place of three as previously used, by the fact that the rate of
   serving corresponded very closely to the rate of eating by the men, so that
   as the latter part of the line was served, the earlier part of the line had eaten
   and cleared the tables. The important feature of the satisfactory operation of
the cafeteria system on any ship, but particularly ships with complements considerably larger than originally designed for, is the organization for the service of the food.

5. Additional washroom and toilet facilities are also required for an increase in complement. This was accomplished in the firemen's washroom, while the ship was at the yard last summer, by a rearrangement of existing installations which permitted the installation of two additional showers, two additional bucket troughs (accommodating about 8 men each), two additional head troughs (approximately 5 seats each), one additional urinal. A similar effort was underway in the deck force wash room at the time I left the ship, but I do not know the extent of the additional facilities this would provide.

6. We found it essential in the tropics to take steps to increase the ventilation of some of the berthing compartments and the mess hall where the steam tables were located. This was accomplished by the ship's force, but it is probable that additional ventilating equipment will have to be installed in view of the recent decision to blank off all air ports on the second deck and below, as well as some on the main deck.

7. The effect of the increased number of men in the berthing compartments on the health of the crew was considered by the medical officer not to be a serious menace, up until the time I left the ship, provided that we were a little more meticulous in the observation of sanitary measures. This involved a careful watch for the appearance of bedbugs, cockroaches and other germ carrying pests and special care in the sterilization of mess gear after meals. It also included the prompt segregation of personnel showing signs of colds, flu and other nose, throat and chest diseases. Although there were two mild epidemics of flu in the fleet during the past Fall, the CHICAGO had comparatively few cases in spite of the fact that I believe it was more crowded at the time than any other ship in the fleet.

8. From my observation of other ships which have had additional berthing facilities installed together with information received from the First Lieutenant, before I left the ship, we were of the opinion that they had not been as successful in the arrangement of their berthing space as we had been on the CHICAGO. This appeared to be due to a failure to plan the arrangement with the same care that the CHICAGO had used.

/s/ R. W. Cary,
Commander, U. S. N.

*CHICAGO Complement 872
TUSCALOOSA Complement 876


NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, March 22, 1941.

Secret

Dear Kimmel: Your letter of February 18th was handed to me upon my return from an inspection of N. O. B., Norfolk, Fajardo, Vieques anchorage, Pillsbury Sound, St. Thomas, San Juan, Guantarnamo, various Bahama Islands, Key West, Miami, Jacksonville, Pensacola, Charlestown, and Parris Island;—literally, a flying trip.

Ingersoll wrote you to acknowledge receipt of your letter. We have now received answers from the interested individuals here in the Department to the questions you asked. I will take up your letter, paragraph, by paragraph, here goes:

The Checks for the Navy Relief and Red Cross have been received. You must have had acknowledgments by this time.

Chester Nimitz in his letter to you of March 3—a copy of which I have—seems to have answered all your questions on personnel so that I need not comment any further on that subject; except that, with regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for post-graduate ordnance officers, I can fully understand your point of view in not wishing to have those officers detached from the Fleet. The procurement situation in the Bureau of Ordnance is critical. We made the best decision we could with the picture confronting us. You may expect a similar effort to get legally trained officers in legal jobs.
With reference to the Marines at Palmyra and Johnson you must, by now, have received my confidential serial 019612 of February 26th on the subject of permanent Marine defense force at Johnson, Midway and Palmyra Islands. Of course personnel stationed at Johnson and Palmyra Islands should not exceed the number provided in paragraph 4 of the letter of the 26th until satisfactory arrangements are made for providing the minimum requirements of food, water, and other essential supplies. We concur in your recommendation to send 100 Marines to Palmyra and none to Johnson for the present.

No comment seems necessary on paragraph 8 in view of the fact that the detachments have already gone to Australia and New Zealand.

[2] In paragraph 9 you request one Squadron of PT's and one of the new PTC's at the earliest possible date. At the present moment I can not give you an answer to this question because the demands of the British are such right now that I can't even make an estimate of the number of PT's and PTC's which might be available to be sent to you. I have an order now to give them 25 immediately.

You also speak of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over shortly. I hope to do that as soon as the 7 billion dollar appropriation is passed by the Congress and signed by the President.

Completion of the quota of small craft allocated to the 14th District is being pushed as rapidly as their conversion and readiness for service can be accomplished. You probably know the TAMAHA and an Oil Barge are now en route to Hawaii in tow of the KANAWHA.

With respect to paragraph 10: Admiral Blandy furnished in his letter to you of March 5th, the shipment dates of the remaining bombs to be supplied to the Oahu area. It will be noted from Blandy's Letter that all requirements will be completed either in the May, 1941, voyage of the U. S. S. LASSEN, or the ammunition trip about October, 1941. With respect to the bomb supplies in Oahu, a letter is about to be signed increasing the bombs designated for that island and asking you to assist in transporting them from the mainland to Oahu. Dump storage of bombs in Oahu has already been authorized in advance of the availability of magazines.

I believe you have received information on the incendiary bomb situation; 5,000 are being procured from the Army and delivery is expected shortly.

The answers to paragraph 11 of your letter are contained in our confidential serial 05038 of March 18, to the effect that it is the present intention to substitute PYRO for LASSEN upon the conclusion of PYRO's next voyage to the Fleet.

As you know, the Department has taken steps to acquire two more vessels; Class C-3 cargo ships (Now building at Tampa, Fla.), for conversion into ammunition ships but it is impossible to tell at this date when these vessels may be ready for service.

Referring to paragraph 12 of your letter, need for destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet right now is such that we probably will not be able to help you with additional destroyers for some months, if then; in fact we may have to take some away soon.

[3] In connection with your comments in paragraph 14 and 15 relative to complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board, the following pertinent comment from the Director of Fleet Maintenance is quoted:

"(a) The Bureau of Ships for some time has been calling attention to the continued weight increases, which have been taking place on all types of ships since commissioning, having reached such proportions that effect on military characteristics is now serious. The recent weight additions, made necessary by improved A. A. defense, D. G. equipment, splinter protection and increased ammunition which could not be compensated for by weight removals in accordance with the policy established several years ago, have greatly accentuated the overweight situation to such extent that no further uncompensated weights should be added until the results of the weight removal survey now under way are obtained.

(b) The Bureau of Ships estimates that for each additional man and his personal effects 300 lbs additional weight. To provide bunk, locker, mess gear, sanitary and other requirements, the total additional weight per man is approximately one-half ton. The average increases recommended by the Fleet Personnel
Board over the Force Operating Plan represents rather sizeable weight additions as shown by table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Increase in Men</th>
<th>Resulting Added Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBs</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>143 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>114 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLs</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>78 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDs</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28.5 tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) While the decision against recommended increases was based on weight and stability conditions more than on space and cost, the further restrictions on berthing space introduced by scaling of airports on the lower decks has made the space component of more importance than formerly.

(d) The Operating Force Plan has taken into consideration and has allowed increased complements for the additional AA batteries installed.

(e) The Operating Force plan represents the policy of the Department on the number of men which can or should be assigned to the various ships by types.

(f) On a comparative basis the complements now allowed are 10-15% greater than those assigned by the British on similar types of ships.

(g) Correspondence is at present before the Bureau of Ships requesting comment on the maximum number of men which can be accommodated on the various types of ships within acceptable limits of space, weight and stability considerations. The reopening of the case depends largely on the Bureau of Ships reply.

P. S. The report of the Fleet Personnel Board is now in. It is anticipated that it will be recommended for approval to maximum extent permissible within space, weight and stability recommendations of BuShips.

Paragraph 18 of your letter referred to the supply of modern types of planes throughout the Fleet. In this connection Towers states the impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is relegating fleet aircraft needs to a position of lower priority than the general expansion program, is in error. He says that the Bureau of Aeronautics has exerted and continues to exert every possible effort to provide the Fleet with new replacement airplanes for the old models at a rate only limited by the productive output of the contractors and diversions instituted by specific directives to the Bureau of Aeronautics. It is believed appropriate to point out that the Navy Department in the face of long and determined opposition has been successful in establishing the highest priority for the following types and models of naval airplanes now on order for the Fleet. This priority (A-1-3) is higher than that accorded any Army aircraft, except the temporary priority given the P-40B's which are being sent to the Hawaiian area.

VP
VSB
VF
VSO
VSB
VTB

PBY5
SBD-2 & 3
F4F
S03c
S82c
TFB

197
202
324
260
70
108

1,221

Your paragraph 18 recommends acquisition of two more "sea-train" vessels. Acquisition and conversion of 4 APV's, 2 New Jerseys, 2 Manhattans, was recommended. The President cut out the Manhattans. Acquisition of the 2 New Jerseys as you probably know was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on January 15, 1941, but funds have not yet been made available. The New Jersey type is now used for ferrying loaded freight cars from the East and Gulf Coast ports to Havana. The conversion contemplates the removal of numerous [5] stanchions and use of three decks for the loading of aircraft. Capacity of this type after full conversion is estimated to be approximately 90 assembled air-planes of the scout bomber size. No flying on or flying off facilities are involved. I might add that "plans" for the conversion of the Manhattan type contemplating the installation of hangar and flying off deck with an offset island bridge and stack arrangement are being prosecuted. No provisions will be made for airplane landings aboard the Manhattans. Estimated carrying capacity for the Manhattans is 80 planes of the scout bomber class when the entire flight deck is loaded; under these conditions the planes could not, of course, be flown off.

In answer to your comment in paragraph 20 on the necessity for additional stores ships and transports, the following obtains:
On 15 January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy approved recommendations for three additional store ships (AF). The President cut it to two. The status of legislation authorizing and appropriating money for these two vessels is indeterminate at the present moment. It is hoped these vessels will be acquired sometime during the current fiscal year.

The six transports intended for assignment to Base Force are being converted and made ready for use on the West Coast. It is expected that all of these vessels will report for duty by June or July, 1941. In addition to their intended employment for training Marines in landing operations, it may frequently be necessary for forces afloat to use one or more of these transports to meet transportation requirements between Hawaii and the Island Bases. In addition to these ships, negotiations are being completed now for the charter of the Matson Line ship WEST CRESSEY. She should be available within a short time and ComTwelve is being instructed regarding her loading. It is planned to keep her under charter for transportation of supplies to Hawaii until the CAPE LOOKOUT is completed and ready for service.

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to OinicUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent by despatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of shipping which moves over each route.

[6] This chart was corrected in the Spring of 1940. The date appearing on the chart is the date 1939, which was the last complete year for which export and import data on commodities was available at the time the chart was revised.

Every good wish as always.

Keep Cheerful.
Unload all you can on us.
Give us credit for doing the best we can under many conflicting and strong cross currents and tide rips—just as we do you—and.

Best of luck,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, 4 April 1941

DEAR KIMMEL: It has been sometime since I have dropped you a line, but like you, have been literally sawing wood seven days a week and there has been nothing of real importance that I could tell you until the Staff Conversations were over. Yesterday I sent an official letter to you and to King and to Tommy Hart covering this subject.

I made a two weeks inspection trip in the West Indies and our activities in the United States South of Washington, and just about as I got back the President shoved off, so I had had no close liaison with him until his return this week. Spent over three hours with him day before yesterday and another hour yesterday. My official letter on the staff conversations had some thoughts in it as a result of that Conference. I may tell you and Hart and King, in the strictest confidence, and I mean by that, nobody but you and Hart and King, that I read to the President the official secret letter which I mailed you three yesterday and received his general assent to it.

I realize that you all, just as much as I, are vitally interested in the matter of "timing". Something may be forced on us at any moment which would precipitate action, though I don't look for it as I can see no advantage to Mr. Hitler in forcing us into the war unless, of course, Matsuoka agrees to fight at the same time. On the surface, at least, the Japanese situation looks a trifle easier, but
just what the Oriental really plans, none of us can be sure. I have had several long talks with Admiral Nimitz and unless I am completely fooled, he earnestly desires to avert a Japanese crisis with us. We have been extremely frank with each other.

I am enclosing a memo on convoy which I drew up primarily to give the President a picture of what is now being done, what we would propose to do if we convoyed, and of our ability to do it. It concerns you directly in the detachment from your command of what I believe to be necessary for King to have, to do the job. I feel it is only a matter of time before King is directed to convoy or patrol or whatever form the protective measures take.

You may not agree with me on this move. I can only hope that I am right. The situation is obviously critical in the Atlantic. In my opinion, it is hopeless except as we take strong measures to save it. The effect on the British of sinkings with regard both to the food supply and essential material to carry on the war is getting progressively worse. Without our giving effective aid I do not believe the British can much more than see the year through, if that. The situation is much worse than the average person has any idea.

Our officers who have been studying the positions for bases in the British Isles have returned, and we have decided on immediate construction of 1 destroyer base and one seaplane base in Northern Ireland. We are also studying Scotland and Iceland bases for further support of the protective force for shipping in the northward approaches to Britain.

I am also enclosing a memorandum, which I regard as vitally secret and which I trust you will burn as soon as you have read it, covering the President's talk with Ghormley and me yesterday.

I hope and I believe that the foregoing gives you the picture pretty much as I have it to date without going into the Balkan situation, labor troubles, bottle-necks and the million other things which you undoubtedly can glean quite well from the press.

I might add that I am thoroughly in accord with your recent letter to Nimitz, can assure you of Nimitz' support, and that the letter was helpful from every standpoint.

We handed the State Department and the Attorney General something to unravel when we took over the German, Italian and French ships last weekend. I had about as busy a 24 hours and about as interesting as I have had for sometime. I find that I stuck my neck out only in taking over the four Danish ships in the Philippines, but at least we have them and even if there was no law to support my action, I am glad I did it and the Big Boss, when I "fessed" up, approved. As a matter of fact, most of it was in hand before he knew about it. This letter is really long enough or I would tell you how we started the ball rolling and what a splendid job the Coast Guard did on short notice. Of course, the pity of it is that we could not have done it months ago before the sabotage took place. We have been pressing to do it for sometime and when I got word Saturday afternoon of the sabotage on a couple of ships, we jumped the gun.

Am sending copies of this letter to King and to Hart, although King is pretty familiar with affairs here because of his proximity and an occasional visit which is a great help.

I just realized I had not touched on what we refer to as "practice cruises" which detachments from your force have recently made to Australia and New Zealand. I think there will be more of this to come; my hope is they will be confined to positions on the Jap flanks and that they will have some of the benefit which the President and the State Department expect from them. Of interest to you is that we are directing King to make similar visits to Cape Verde, the Canaries and the Azores; of course with a very few units.

Coast Guard has just been directed to turn over to the British 10 of its 250 foot cutters.

Rainbow 5 should be on its way to you all shortly.

Keep cheerful. All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Betty.

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
HALIFAX CONVOYS BEFORE FEBRUARY 15, 1941

Usual British Escort: 1 XCL—occasionally augmented by 1 BB or 1 CC or 1 C.
Last Summer British occasionally augmented the 1 XCL by 1 large SS.
Westbound traffic has had no ocean escort.
Ships over 12 knots go it alone.
Ships under 12 knots put in 9 or 6 knot convoys.

BERMUDA CONVOYS BEFORE FEBRUARY 15, 1941

Without escort until they join Halifax convoys some hundreds of miles East of Halifax.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

About February 15th British Chiefs of Staff stated that hereafter all convoys from Halifax must be escorted. Minimum strength of ocean escorts either:
- 1 BB or
- 1 CC or
- 1 CA or
- 1 XCL plus 1 large SS

This statement was made before the recent cruise of GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST changed the picture.

U. S. NAVY PLAN

Our concept for the minimum strength of ocean escorts, so long as danger from GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST or similar vessels remains, is:
- 1 BB plus XCL plus 2 to 4 DDs.
  - If BB be not available substitute 2 CAs.
Obviously this escort might be weaker than German attackers, and therefore covering operations in the general area by heavy ships and carriers are necessary at times.

To keep present flow of traffic moving, 2 to 3 convoys a week, 7 escort units are necessary.

In the Staff Conversations the British stated they will make available to the United States for assisting in the above work:
- 10 XCL
- 2 DD (Old)
- 8 SS

The proposed war deployment of the Atlantic Fleet, as at present constituted, is:

(a) Northwest Escorts, based in Northern Ireland (Admiral Bristol):
- 9 DD
- 18 ODD
- 42 VPB (possibly 54)

(b) Ocean Escorts, Western Atlantic:
- 3 BB
- 2 CA
- 2 DL
- 7 DD
- 4 ODD
- 4 DMS

(c) Striking Force, based Bermuda:
- 2 CV
- 2 CA
- 4 DD
- 6 VPB

(d) Southern Patrol, based Trinidad:
- 4 CL (7500 ton)
  - Several 327 Coast Guard cutters

(e) Gibraltar Submarine Force:
- 12 OSS

(f) Bay of Biscay Force, based England:
- 9 OSS
(g) North Atlantic Coastal Frontier:
12 VPB plus Canadian corvettes of an unknown number.
(h) Caribbean and Panama Coastal Frontiers:
1 PG
9 DD
24 VPB
8 OSS

At the present time 1 BB is under regular navy yard overhaul, and one is under emergency repairs; these are due for completion respectively 19 May and 28 April. The RANGER must go under three months overhaul April 17th. From 5 to 10 DD and 1 or 2 cruisers must remain under overhaul most of the time.

Consideration of the above shows that the Atlantic Fleet is unable to provide the minimum ocean escort considered necessary. Shortages will be especially bad until June first. With the GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST at large, I consider 2 carriers, at least 2 cruisers, and 4 destroyers the minimum for an effective striking force.

To provide a proper degree of safety for convoys in the Western Atlantic, and to provide an important striking unit for catching raiders, the following reinforcements in the Atlantic are necessary:
3 BB (IDAHO, NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI)
1 CV (preferably LEXINGTON)
6 DL
12 DD
4 CL (new), (although this Division might come later).

If this movement is made, it should be done with the utmost possible secrecy.

The possible effect of this transfer as regards Japan is realized, but must be accepted if we are to take an effective part in the Atlantic.

Secret
In reply refer to Initials and No.

Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Washington, 19 April 1941.

Dear Kimmel: Recent correspondence regarding cruise to the Northwest; Detachments for the Atlantic; Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1; etc., etc.—well I can sort of visualize and hear you saying "Why the Hell doesn't Betty make up his mind on what he wants to do?"

First, I will put at this point rather than at the end of this letter.
"Keep cheerful" and help me to keep my sense of humor which is a little taxed sometimes.

And again:—
Just remember "We are doing the best we can."

I wrote you about the Australian Detachment. The President said (and incidentally when I open up to you this way I don't expect you to quote the President and I know there is nobody who can keep things secret better than you can): "Betty just as soon as those ships come back from Australia and New Zealand, or perhaps a little before, I want to send some more out. I just want to keep them popping up here and there, and keep the Japs guessing." This, of course, is right down the State Department's alley. To my mind a lot of State Department's suggestions and recommendations are nothing less than childish (don't quote me) and I have practically said so in so many words in the presence of all concerned, but after 13 months they finally got it going. Of course I recognize some merit, if exercised with some discretion—and that is where Navy has to count on F. D. R. for reserve; so we did not have to send ships into Singapore and we did keep them on a flank to be in position to go to work or to retire if something broke.

Interdiction—The thought just flashes across my mind that Savvy Cooke is now with you. He has much background. I know you will talk to him freely, just as I always have.

To that extent, namely, more or less in position if something broke, I acquiesced in the Australian Cruise with far more grace than I would have otherwise. I am not insensible to the advantages of a cruise of this sort, as well as to the disadvantages of interdiction in training.

Now when the question of "Popping up everywhere" came and having in mind keeping on the flank, I said to the President: "How about going North?" He said: "Yes, you can keep any position you like, and go anywhere."
There was a little method in my madness as to the Northern cruise; I thought for once, if I could, I would give the State Department a shock which might make them haul back, and incidentally, that Northwest cruise has many good points. It still conforms to the flank, and a detachment on an occasional sortie up in an unexpected direction might be good ball, and if you ever want to make such a cruise yourself on your own initiative, don't hesitate to ask. Of course you can see what a striking force of the composition I gave you, and known to the Japs, would mean to them, in view of their unholy fear of bombing. This striking detachment would have been right in position for most anything.

I had a broad inward smile when the State Department in effect said; "Please, Mr. President, don't let him do it"; or words to that effect. It was a little too much for them.

The above very briefly touches the high points of this episode and gives you its inception and its calling off.

I realize sometimes it might be less upsetting to you mentally not to tell you these things and then have them called off. On the other hand, I never can prophesy just what will come and in order that you may be prepared, I endeavor to keep you informed as we go along. You can just assume, or begin to guess, what goes on sometimes in between drinks.

Now let's take up the letter we sent you regarding the Detachment coming to the Atlantic and without checking up, I believe it was 3 BB, 1 CV, 4 CL and 2 squadrons of destroyers. This was the first echelon for the "Battle of the Atlantic." The entire world set-up was gone into very carefully and this detachment was one of the first means of implementing what we had every reason to anticipate here. It was agreed to, authorized and directed in its detail by the President. It was also cancelled by the President, and he gave the specific direction to bring only the one CV and 1 division of destroyers, with which you are now familiar. The reason for the change was that the President did not want, at this particular moment, to give any signs of seriously weakening the forces in the Pacific, and it is my opinion that this will hold until there is some further clarification, incident to Matsunaga's return to Tokyo and this further illumination on the Russo-Japanese Treaty. Don't interpret this in any sense as a change in the general idea of Plan Dog which the President again recently reiterated to me, and which still holds. He does not, however, even while adhering to that Plan, want to give Japan any encouragement or lead right now as to our intentions. I am telling you, not arguing with you.

You have received the word with regard to the minesweepers. We are starting the "T" Class submarines, now in the Atlantic, into the Pacific. You will have to look out for them some way or other until a Tender is ready, which we anticipate will be sometime in August,—the USS PELIAS.

The foregoing is just to give you a little inside information on recent events. I have really nothing new to add. The situation here is a little more hectic than usual, particularly because of the effect on the public of the situation in the Balkans, and the Near East. Your estimate of this situation probably will, differ little from ours; that it is critical is obvious.

For months I have been making recommendations along some lines now much in public discussion. To those who have final authority and responsibility the time seems not yet ripe for their adoption.

Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 specifically implements the President's thoughts which he has been debating in his own mind for sometime. Whether or not it will actually be put into effect, or altered, I cannot say. King is in this morning. His order is ready. The President is examining this situation further today as a result of conversations with Mr. Hull, who is counselling something less aggressive. I will add a P. S. when this is typed Monday.

I had hoped that with the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill we could look forward to some unity on Capitol Hill but just at present there seems to be far from that desired unity on vital issues. What will be done about convoy and many other things, and just how much a part of our Democratic way of life will be handled by Mr. Gallup, is a pure guess. From that you might think I am getting a little bit cynical, but believe it or not, that is not the case, and I am sawing wood as usual and am still cheerful.

The President has on his hands at the present time about as difficult a situation as ever confronted any man anywhere in public life. There are tremen-
dons issues at stake, to which he is giving all he has got. I only wish I could be of more help to him.

Hoping you are cheerful and with all good wishes, Sincerely,

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA.

P. S. I am sending copy of this letter to Tommy Hart, King returned from Hyde Park and as a result Hemispheric Plan No. 1 goes by the board, and a substitute, with no teeth, is being prepared today.

Betty.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op–10–Dy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, April 26, 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is just to get you mentally prepared that shortly a considerable detachment from your fleet will be brought to the Atlantic.

You will recall from my last letter what that detachment was and what the President cut it to, but only for the time being, awaiting some further clue to the Japanese situation.

Not only do I anticipate the reinforcing of the Atlantic by the 3 BBs, 1 CV, 4 CLs and 2 squadrons of destroyers, but also by further reinforcements.

King has been given a job to do with a force utterly inadequate to do it on any efficient scale.

I am enclosing a copy of his last order which implements the changed Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 and is now known as Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 2 or WPL–49.

Even the Press and those who wanted to go all out in the Pacific are now rounding to and clamoring for an all out in the Atlantic. You know my thoughts with regard to this which were set down in my Memo about what is now known as Plan Dog and which will shortly be covered by Rainbow 3.

Action on the above, that is transfer to the Atlantic, may come at any time and in my humble opinion is only a matter of time.

No other news for the moment and this letter is the result of a long conference yesterday in the White House.

I am sending a copy as usual to Tommy Hart.

I am just in receipt of your letter. We will send you the Public Relations Officer. I shall also go over the personnel situation again with Nimitz. I think we all see eye to eye in what we want to do and I agree with you that key men just should not be removed short of extreme emergency.

Sincerely,


Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op–10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 15 May 1941.

Confidential

DEAR KIMMEL: This is in reply to your letter of May 5, 1941, which it was a pleasure to receive.

The present plans for the Secretary’s trip are briefly as follows: The party will consist of the Secretary; Captain Frank E. Beatty, U. S. N., Aide to the Secretary; Mr. Rawleigh Warner of Chicago, Illinois, a personal friend of the Secretary’s; and Mr. John O’Keefe, private secretary to the Secretary. It is expected that the party (if Secretary can get away) will leave here May 24, 1941, and, accompanied by Rear Admiral A. W. Fitch, U. S. N., will depart from San Francisco at near dawn in XPD–2Y–1 on May 26, 1941, reaching Pearl Har-
The Secretary is looking forward with much anticipation to the trip. As you know, he is keenly and intelligently interested in the entire Naval Establishment, and the Fleet in particular. I am sure that both the Secretary and you will profit from the visit.

The above arrangements are, of course, only tentative. I am informed that the President will speak to the country on May 27, 1941. In view of this, I have a mild suspicion that some change in the Secretary’s plans may be necessary.

All of us here are aware of your difficulties in connection with the loss of so many of your experienced men. Our proposal to automatically extend enlistments during war and national emergency was introduced in the Senate by Chairman Walsh on January 14, 1941, but has not been introduced in the House, as Mr. Vinson is apparently opposed to it. The matter is not as simple as it appears on the surface. The Selective Service Act provides that a man inducted in the Service for a year’s training must be discharged at the end of that period, unless the Congress meanwhile “has declared that the national interest is imperiled.” Nimitz feels, and I agree, that Congressional action to freeze our enlisted personnel can best be accomplished by basing our demands on the same grounds provided for in the Selective Service Act, i.e., when “the national interest is imperiled.” Accordingly, we are introducing legislation which will provide that whenever the Congress shall declare that the national interest is imperiled, all enlistments in the regular Navy or Marine Corps which are in force at that time and which will terminate during such emergency shall continue in force during the emergency, and that men detained in the Service in accordance with the above shall, unless they extend their enlistment, be discharged not later than 6 months after the date of termination of the emergency. At the same time, the legislation, as proposed, [2] provides for a suspension of Section 1422 of the Act of March 3, 1875, which provides for pay and a quarter for men retained in the Service beyond the normal expiration of their enlistment.

Meanwhile, you have by this time the Department’s dispatch about the provisions of revised statutes of Section 1422, Act of March 3, 1875. It is hoped that this will help relieve the situation to a certain extent.

On May 6, the Bureau of Navigation issued circular letter No. 55–11, having to do with the subject of transfer of enlisted personnel in forces afloat. In this letter, it was stated that, until further notice, the transfer of enlisted personnel from forces afloat will, in general, be by rating and not by name. This contravenes Navigation’s policy, which has been in effect for some time—that of ordering men from sea to shore duty, using length of Sea Service as a basis for such transfers. The change will permit you to retain your experienced men and transfer those whose service can best be spared.

As to nucleus officer personnel, Navigation advises that it is often difficult, on account of urgency in issuing orders, to request nominations from forces afloat, but every endeavor is being made not to detach experienced officers where it can be avoided. We will be glad to receive your ideas on the subject of nucleus crews when they have been prepared, as you suggest, “in a more definite form.”

Your plans for the landing at San Clemente have been received in the Navy Department. Fleet Training has studied them with interest. I have had a brief of the intended operations submitted to me, and I think the exercise will be of much value to all concerned. Needless to say, we are pressing preparations to the end that our landing forces will be well equipped; shortages remedied, etc.

Your remark about the use of AKs in connection with landing operations is concurred in. We have been able to get two craft suitable for this purpose from the Maritime Commission. Unfortunately, the conversion of these ships cannot be completed until the fall of 1941.

As suggested, I have informed the material bureaus of your ideas about availing themselves of shipping facilities between the coast and Pearl Harbor. I have done this by furnishing personally each of the Chiefs of Bureaus concerned with a copy of your letter. I am sure you can count on their active cooperation in this important matter. Yards & Docks, for one, shares your concern about the matter of transportation, particularly to the outlying bases. Two old Panama Railway Steamships—the Ex-ANCON and Ex-CRISTOBAL—have already recently been acquired and are to be operated for our account by the Matson Line. They will help but not solve the problem. How do you feel about facilities of our personnel (and Army) continuing to remain in Hawaii.

At the moment, there are no additional patrol craft that can be furnished the Fourteenth Naval District. As you no doubt know, effort is now being made to acquire a number of sampans, which should be of assistance in this regard.
DesDiv Eighty (S0) is at Pearl Harbor, and 4 AMCs are going forward from San Diego under escort of the TIPPECANOE. We are also giving consideration to supplying some 165' coast guard bots for this duty. I must confess that our preliminary survey in this regard does not appear to be promising. I am keenly aware of your anxiety to save wear and tear on your destroyers, as well as releasing them from patrol duties for the more important duty of perfecting themselves in other phases of their training.

All of us in the Department are benging every effort to be prepared for war when and if it comes. I know you are likewise using your best effort to make the Fleet seady for all eventualities. Acquaint me with your troubles—I will do what I can—always wishing it were more.

All good wishes—keep cheerful.

Sincerely,                              [S] Betty.

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 14 May 1941

MEMORANDUM

For Commandant, First Naval District
Third Naval District
Fourth Naval District
Fifth Naval District
Sixth Naval District
Eighth Naval District
Tenth Naval District
Eleventh Naval District
Twelfth Naval District
Thirteenth Naval District
Fourteenth Naval District
Fifteenth Naval District

You will recall my previous letter of 3 October 1940, in which I stressed readiness and not to be taken aback should somebody suddenly start depositing mines on our front doorstep, etc. etc.

I might add that I have no inside information as to what is going to happen or when, but it seems to me now, as it did then, that it is a case of only

WHEN?

The trend of events, and public opinion certainly all tend increasingly this way.

If and when we do get in, my hunch is that Hitler would certainly, if one way or another, attack our shipping wherever he thought it would be profitable, either from a material or psychological standpoint.

I am cognizant of how the sweeper-small craft-net program has lagged, am doing what I can about it; but it never seems enough.

This is just again to remind you all of the seriousness of the present situation and of the necessity of our being ready, to the utmost extent, to use what we have or what we can improvise, should the issue suddenly be drawn.

Plans and machinery for convoy are pretty well in hand but here, too, there may be hitches or slips which, in the last analysis, may only be found by actual practice. However, convoy games on paper by those who must handle the details should be good mental exercise, and may bring to light certain correctable deficiencies.
What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess; but here, too, there is only one safe course; that is to be prepared, so far as humanly possible. Though the danger of mines, raiding and diversions, and even of sporadic or stunt air attack, may be more remote in the Eastern Pacific, we cannot discount it, and hence should likewise be bending every ounce of effort of which we are capable not to be caught napping in that area. Japan may come in the second Germany does—possibly preplanned joint action. Russia is still a ?

I might add that some months ago (and less than that) our studies here in the Department indicated that if we did not get into this war by March we would be fairly well off in the local defense picture; later it was put at April with assurances that in any case I could feel fairly comfortable by the first of May. Now I am told the latter part of May or maybe some time in June or the first of July. It continues to be just “Around the corner.” I think the time is here now for even more personal strenuous effort by all of us, in responsible positions.

Keep cheerful. Heap all the abuse you want to on my head, if it will help any to achieve our common objective.

I trust you are all constantly checking ways for speeding up readiness in every department.

[8] H. R. Stark
H. R. STARK.

Copy to Admiral King, Kimmel, Hart

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10-Dy.

(Received 2 June)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, May 24, 1941.

Secret

DEAR KIMMEL: I recently saw your letter with regard to ammunition. Regret the holiday in training caused by non-delivery and hope we can prevent recurrence.

We appreciate fully your personnel troubles. I have gone over them with Nimitz and trust your thoughts regarding non-disturbance of key personnel can be complied with.

I am sending you a secret despatch this afternoon with regard to occasional visits by small units of your Fleet to the west coast in the interests of morale. While you have not suggested this, my hope is that it will be conducive to contentment. Of course how closely an approved schedule for this could be followed in these times I do not know. I have just finished talking to the President about it and you can rest assured that so far as possible we will see it through. We would leave any press releases on this subject to you, as it is something for which your gang should look to you.

You have probably been surprised over the movements of transports, Marines, hospital ships, etc., to the east coast, which you have, or will have shortly received. Please keep the following with regard to it highly secret, known only to your trusted few whom I assume you keep informed regarding such matters. In this I include Bloch.

Day before yesterday afternoon the President gave me an over all limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the job particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly reinforced. The Army of course will be in on this but the Navy and the Marines will bear the brunt.

I know your reaction will be “Why didn't we get the transports and assemble such a force months and months ago.” My only answer to that is that such thoughts are water over the dam, and I am confronted with the problem as is and not one as I would like to have had it, and for which I would like to have been ready long ago. I simply could not get authority to acquire and prepare the necessary train.

King of course is active and operating in connection with Atlantic problems—our own and the British. He has nothing like what he would like to have or what we would like to give him if we had it to give. I do not contemplate for the moment ordering anything additional to the Atlantic except auxiliaries
in connection with the Azores task and except possibly later four CA's as per Rainbow 5. However, I am not the final "Boss of this show".

In the last 48 hours we have been following the situation closely in Crete; and yesterday and last night the Naval situation to the eastward and southwest of Greenland.

My personal feeling is that it is only a matter of time until the British hold on the eastern Mediterranean is very much confined or non-existent.

Only history will throw a full light on the Crete incident. Criticism will be rife but without full knowledge of the facts or at least more than we have at present I am withholding final judgment.

German raiders (as you probably will have learned before this) both surface and sub-surface are now working well inside the generally accepted limits of the Western Hemisphere, in fact to the westward of the 40th meridian. The British escorts therefore get thinner and thinner. The situation is not good. Last night's naval engagement and its train of events will come out in due time.

We are immediately confronted with taking over a considerable number of merchant ships for the Azores task—something I wanted to do as long as over a year ago. Also the Army is asking me to man 26 of their ships. I have been in touch with Admiral Waesche for the last 24 hours and that fellow has come across 100% and is agreeing to furnish 1500 men and 100 officers, which is literally a God-send from our standpoint. These men will include surfmen. The lot should man about 5 transports depending of course on the size of the transports selected.

We have an expedition of flying boats going to Iceland for temporary basing and for reconnaissance of the east coast of Greenland.

In addition we are sending three arctic ships to the Scoresby Sound area to look for German meteorological or radio stations and to remain there during the Summer, besides two other vessels and an Army contingent which are proceeding with the construction of an air field and plane base on the southeast coast of Greenland.

The Army also has an expedition studying Labrador with a view to the possibility of flying planes to that point then to Britain via Greenland.

The ammunition situation on which we are depending on the Army for supply, is bad. Even getting enough for the Azores is a problem. It promises not to get better before Fall.

The Force which we are preparing to go to North Ireland and Scotland on the outbreak of war is coming along in good shape so far as the Navy is concerned but the Army has neither the equipment, the ammunition nor the aircraft to defend these bases; fall again being the earliest date when they can do this for us. Meanwhile we will try and find some way of solving it with Marines and British help if we are in the war before that time. God knows what will happen if we are not in by that time though personally I give the British a longer time than do most people here in their ability to hold out. I most emphatically do not believe they can hold out indefinitely without effective aid from us. We are being pressed for ammunition and material from the South American Republics:—not a happy situation—and not to mention British requests for more DD's etc.

The above are rambling thoughts for a few minutes conversation with you, Tommy Hart and Admiral Bloch. I will not try to put them in more logical sequence or dress them up further, simply assuming that you can straighten out the picture yourself as we more or less see it here.

Keep cheerful,

Sincerely,

P. S. When I last wrote to you I indicated by doubts as to the Secretary leaving at this time. Personally I couldn't see how he could. He came to that same conclusion himself and you have been informed.

Tell Bloch that I knew it would raise "H" with towing barges to Palmyra and other islands when we ordered the two tugs to the Canal Zone but that they are essential for the Azores operations.

Referring to your letter of 15 May to Admiral Nimitz of which I have a copy:—I am quite in agreement with your thoughts. The despatch about holding men over-time was not with the idea of telling you to do it but with the idea that if you found it necessary you would have department backing. I think your own estimate is quite correct.

As regards freezing men for the duration—this is something which for years I have thought the Country should have on the statute books and during the
present emergency I have brought the point up many times but without success. I am not through trying but I doubt if we can get in a period short of war.

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.

Dear Admiral: At my conference this morning with Admiral Stark he said that he knew just as soon as you left he would think of something which he meant to tell you while you were here.

I think what he wanted was simply to plant the thought in your mind of smoke screen around Pearl Harbor in case of an air attack such as has been used by the British around some of their Scotland shipyards or closed harbors.

From what I understand it is something similar to the California smudge pots and leaves a black blanket and a very uncomfortable one, according to Captain Kirk, over the area immediately concerned.

The German did this at Brest, thereby preventing any accurate bombing or even vision of the targets.

The Admiral asked me to get this off as he had to go to conference and wanted to catch you before you left San Diego; also to give you his best wishes in which all of us here join.

Respectfully,

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
% Commandant, 11th Naval District,
San Diego, California.

In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/elp

Dear Kimmel: Colonel Maas is going to report for duty with you shortly.

He was just in to say goodbye.

He was one of our staunchest supporters and strongest friends, particularly in opposition to a single air force, for the United States.

He will fly from San Francisco to Hawaii in one of our 4-engine bombers. We were all glad to have him do it and give him a good picture of that-type of craft which he has so strongly supported.

He is not asking for any favors because of his Congressional importance. Nevertheless, I wanted to let you know he is coming and feel that his services with the Staff to Comairbatfor may be very helpful from many standpoints.

We had a very interesting talk yesterday afternoon from Jimmy Roosevelt. All agreed it was well done. As you may know, he just completed a thirty-five thousand mile flying trip with Major Thomas of the Marine Corps.

This afternoon Wellings is talking.

Am asking Lee to take down the interesting points of both talks to send to you. Some of them, I feel, will be useful and you should know.

You were made an information addressee on our despatch to Tommy Hart with reference to the next move which Japan might make. We feel strongly here that her attitude, at the moment at least, will continue to be one of 'watch and wait'.

Our information on the German-Russian operations are so uncertain at the moment that it would be useless to give them to you. We feel it will take at least a few more days to give any sort of picture.

Every good wish, as always,
Sincerely,

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA.
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

/s/ Betty.
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

(Received 9th July)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 3 July 1941.

Secret

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Have just written a letter to Tommy Hart and think the following from it might be of interest to you:

"I am still hoping you will be able to put over your thoughts about denying passage of the Japanese through the Eastern part of the Malaya Barrier; but I know from experience in the last War, as well as in this one, that what you say about 'trade and raider consciousness' is very pertinent.

"After a careful study of the ADB report we find that we are unable to approve it. Army and Navy War Plans are drawing up a letter to the British rejecting it, and requesting a new conference be held that will give a practical and realistic operating plan to carry out the purpose of ABD-1. The report has all the faults you mentioned, both in your official and your personal letters, and I do not believe it necessary for us to accept any such ineffective plan. Of course, I will forward you a copy of our joint letter to the British, which should be ready within a few days."

Have just finished a Budget session and am hoping to give you some of the things you want.

I really have no interesting news other than has been communicated to you by radio.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. It looks to us at the moment as you will judge by a despatch you will receive ere this as though the Germans had persuaded the Japs to attack Russia within the next month. It is anybody's guess and only time will tell.

/8/ HRS.

Secret

Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 7 July 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Referring to the last sentence, paragraph 4-E:

I think if I were the skipper of our cruiser and a foreign man-o-war told the Dutchman to stop I would tell the Dutchman to disregard the order of the foreign man-o-war. Moreover I would lay my ship fairly close to the Dutchman and between the Dutchman and the foreign man-o-war, and let the latter do his worst.

This is not an order; it is just a thought which I wanted to transmit to you.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA.
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. Your imagination may produce something better. I hope it can. My imagination just now is almost beyond the elastic limit. It was working overtime last night in the White House conference, and will again before the night is over.

Keep cheerful.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL HART, ADMIRAL KIMMEL, ADMIRAL KING, COMMANDANTS OF ALL NAVAL DISTRICTS

In an excellent paper which I recently read, I was struck by the paragraph quoted below and am sending it to you for further circulation or such use as you care to make of it.

"It is to be noted that the unity and effectiveness of effort that has characterized German operations has been due not only to the organization of the Higher Command and to careful planning and training. In a large measure, it appears to be due to the fact that the personnel of all ranks, including the highest, is imbued with a spirit of soldierly submersion of self in the accomplishment of the common undertaking. It is suggested that it might tend toward the removal of some sources of friction in our Services if a secret letter on the subject were issued to officers of the higher ranks, down to and including the grade of Colonel in the Army and Captain in the Navy."

The lines italicized particularly struck me.

I am not aware of sources of friction in our Services at the present time. While differences of opinion are bound to crop up, not only between the different Services, but between forces of our own Service, they are, so far as I know, being ironed out. Certainly there is the will here in Washington to pull together which is bearing fruit, and which should ever grow stronger in purpose and effectiveness.

There are many leaves which we can take out of the German book—as well as many not to take.

H. R. STARK

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
WASHINGTON, 24 JULY, 1941.

Secret

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Have'n't much to write about; as a matter of fact the letter I dictated to Tommie Hart this morning contains what little I have and it is darned little I admit.

This is more just to let you know I am thinking about you than anything else. We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can and for budgetary purposes you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 553,000 enlisted men and 105,000 marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But what a struggle it has been. If we could only have gone full speed two years ago but that is water over the dam and I am only hoping and praying we can take care of what we have in sight to man.

I have asked Blandy to acquaint you with the trouble Tommie Hart has had with his mines firing after having been down several hours.

Believe it or not, except for a day or two of scorching heat, we are having delightful summer weather in Washington. However, my fingers are crossed as it is only July.

Am sending under separate cover a copy of the August number of "Coronet". Be sure to unfold the picture of the mountain mirror on page 86. Mrs. Hull said I should make sure you did not overlook it.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,


/S/ BETTY.
Dear Tommie: Things are happening out your way and according to schedule from dope we have had in the last couple of weeks.

Yesterday, before Nomura went to the State Department, I had a two-hour talk with him; very interesting, as my previous talks with him have been, and of course he is worried. I believe him to be genuinely sincere in his desire that Japan and the United States do not come to an open rupture. Of course, I have that same desire, but there are many flies in the ointment, and in my talks with him I have not minced matters one particle, or minimized the difficulties, or in any way conditioned Japan's present course of action, or hesitated to discuss perfectly frankly the shallowness of some of the reasons she is putting out in defense of her actions. We have had very plain talk. I like him and, as you know, he has many friends in our Navy. Nomura dwelt at length on his country's need for the rice and the minerals of Indo-China. My guess is that with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being, consolidate their positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No doubt they will use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. Of course, there is the possibility that they will strike at Borneo. I doubt that this will be done in the near future, unless we embargo oil shipments to them. This question of embargo has been up many times and I have consistently opposed it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that they will do nothing in regard to the Maritime provinces until the outcome of the German-Russian war on the continent is more certain. If Russians are well beaten down, I think it highly probable that they will move into Siberia. Meanwhile, they are merrily going their way and just where it all will end I do not know.

I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing an appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate such a possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse. However, we can still struggle for something better, and I want you to know that I am.

[2] Your people who have been laying mines must have had an interesting time, but just what the Devil the cause is is a conundrum still. BuOrd want to work on it and did not stop for several hours. I hope the despatch sent you might give some clue but, of course, we shall be very apprehensive until we know. I mentioned it to Admiral Moore of the British Navy who was in here yesterday, and he said that they had the same trouble some time back and found the cause in a defective joint which permitted salt water to set up electrolytic action with sufficient current to fire the mine, and had to recall all the mines that were made in that particular lot. Of course, our mines had not previously had that trouble, and I hope the trouble will be found in faulty assembly which can be readily cured. Any way, here's hopin'.

I was disturbed no end to learn that some of your net equipment had not arrived at Cavite. As soon as we got your despatch, I immediately put Ray Spear on the job. He got in touch with Johnny Greenslade and found that eight (8) carloads of the flotation barrels had been loaded in the Navy Cargo Ship HERCULES (This ship is being operated by the Matson Lines as agents for the Navy Department.), due to depart from San Francisco July 20. He also found there were seven (7) carloads of barrels en route, by rail, due to arrive in the San Francisco area on July 20. Arrangements were made to delay the sailing of the ship a day in order to load this additional shipment on board. This has been done, and the ship sailed on July 21 and is due to arrive at Cavite on August 10.

With the arrival of these barrels, you will have all but 250, which are destined for the 16th Naval District. The Bureau of Ordnance is doing its utmost to get these moving. The contractor (a firm in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania) has fallen down on deliveries. They undertook to deliver 100 per day. So far, they have only been able to deliver about half that number. Ordnance informs me that the 250 drums will leave Conshohocken some time this week.

You are now undoubtedly familiar with the Iceland situation, and I am glad to say the Force is back, and just when the next contingent will go has not yet
been decided. In both the Far East and the Atlantic, there is plenty of potential dynamite.

I may say that the State Department still agrees about the gunboats remaining in China, but of course, it is my understanding that they could not well be removed at this season anyway.

I wish I had more small craft to send you for District service, and that goes for practically every District we have. The small boat program was one of the most difficult I had to get authorized and to get money for. We have several hundred District craft under construction but, like everything else, time is a vital factor. We are just doing the best we can with this proposition. The craft we have converted have been expensive, costly of upkeep, and not too satisfactory, though I am hoping they will get by until replaced by better material.

[3] I think I previously told you I have been pressing for months to take over the Coast Guard, but Morgenthau has successfully resisted until finally he has given away in certain spots; for example, he has just consented to turn over the Coast Guard in the Hawaiian Area to our control. Also, we hope to get seven of their large cutters, which will help a great deal in the Atlantic where King is pressed to the limit to perform the tasks given him. I am trying to get their 165-foot craft which also should be of assistance in the 14th Naval District. Waesche, Head of the Coast Guard, sees everything from our standpoint and is a great help. Mr. Morgenthau in many ways has been more than helpful to the Navy Department, but when it comes to letting go of the Coast Guard, he draws in. However, we shall keep on trying.

I am late now for a conference, and I don’t know if I had a lot of time I could really give you anything worth while, but I feel a little remiss if I don’t drop you a line.

Harry Yarnell is here and said he saw Caroline recently and that she is fine. My little brood are all well.

With every good wish in the wide world to you as always.

Sincerely,

Admiral T. C. Hart, USN,
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
USS Houston,
c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10-MD Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, July 25, 1941.

Dear Kimmel: I forgot to mention to you yesterday that you may be called upon to send a carrier load of planes to one of the Asiatic Russian ports. I don’t know that you will, but the President has told me to be prepared for it, and I want you to have the thought.

We spent a great deal of time on the letter which you will shortly get, relative to the training of pilots. Before sending it, I had King’s complete Okay. As a matter of fact, he didn’t change a word of it. I hope it will be equally satisfactory to you.

Sincerely,

Admiral H. E. Kimmel,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Rec’d. 8 Aug. 1130

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 2 August 1941.

Dear Kimmel: I am grateful for your letter of the 26th of July. We shall go after it paragraph by paragraph but it may take a little time. It is a good summary and we are glad to get an occasional check of this sort.
Also would be glad if you could give us occasionally a little personnel interest as well as material and I would more than welcome a little conversational "thinking out loud" on how the morale of the Fleet is holding, how the visits to the West Coast are working out from that standpoint, how the target practices are coming along, etc.

We nor the British have no one at the front in the Russian-German war though both the Army and Navy have made every effort to this end. From the press, therefore, you have about as much information as we have. There is no doubt they are willing to pay the price where the stakes are worth it. The next month or six weeks should clarify the picture.

I have written to Savvy Cooke who has been good enough to write me occasionally giving me his ideas which, as you know, I value so highly having gotten the habit when he was heading War Plans here. I am always glad to hear from him. I have asked Savvy to show you my letter if he thinks there is anything in it worth while. Am enclosing copy Bloch might find something interesting. Good luck

Keep cheerful.

Admral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Tell Ad. Bloch—I have just directed sending him 12 P. T's—40 knot-craft.

HRS.

Copy Adm. Kimmel
Secret
Op-10 Hu

DEAR SAVY: I am grateful to you for your letters and hope that regardless of the unsatisfactoriness of my answers or my failure to answer, you will continue to write;—it seems like old times.

This is going to be short and general. I think you should burn it after showing it to Kimmel.

Some of the things that you have asked, and some of the things which Kimmel has recently asked, and which I will answer as soon as I can, are things for which I have been striving to get answers in Washington. The press on many of these points really gives you as much information as I have.

Within forty-eight hours after the Russian situation broke, I went to the President, with the Secretary's approval, and stated that on the assumption that the Country's decision is not to let England fall, we should immediately seize the psychological opportunity presented by the Russian-German clash and announce and start escorting immediately, and protecting the Western Atlantic on a large scale; that such a declaration, followed by immediate action on our part, would almost certainly involve us in the war and that I considered every day of delay in our getting into the war as dangerous, and that much more delay might be fatal to Britain's survival. I reminded him that I had been asking this for months in the State Department and elsewhere, etc. etc. etc. I have been maintaining that only a war psychology could or would speed things up the way they should be speeded up; that strive as we would it just isn't in the nature of things to get the results in peace that we would, were we at war.

The Iceland situation may produce an "incident". You are as familiar with that and the President's statements and answers at press conferences as I am. Whether or not we will get an "incident" because of the protection we are giving Iceland and the shipping which we must send in support of Iceland and our troops, I do not know. Only Hitler can answer.

The Far Eastern situation has been considerably changed because of the entrance of Russia into the picture.

Personally, I threw into the arena that we consider along with the British a point protectorate over the Dutch East Indies, as a move calculated to prevent further spread of war in the Far East. It is a debatable question. Certainly there can be no joy in our camp over the occupation of Indo-China. I think it is fairly safe to say [2] opinion here in general holds that Japan will not go into the N. E. I. Incidentally, we are not nearly so dependent on raw materials from the Near East as the Public envisages. The real problem is a British one—and hence our consideration.
As you probably know from our despatches, and from my letters, we have felt that the Maritime Provinces are now definitely Japanese objectives. Turner thinks Japan will go up there in August. He may be right. He usually is. My thought has been that while Japan would ultimately go to Siberia, she would delay going until she had the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there is some clarification of the Russian-German clash. Also she may concentrate on the China "incident". Of course, embargoes or near embargoes may cause any old kind of an upset and make a reestimate of the situation necessary.

Regarding the Philippines, as you know, even since I came here I have urged increasing their defenses. The Navy’s contribution has not been great, but it has been about all Hart can handle with the facilities he has or which we have been able to make available. Still, the increase is a factor, namely 28 PBYs and 11 modern submarines.

We are delighted with the Army move putting the Filipinos in harness; we recommended this. Also it is being supplemented by a considerable number of planes, fighters and bombers. The Philippines are not too easy a proposition to crack right now, and in a couple of months the Army will have 50,000 odd men there under arms. But that is two months away.

As for sending the Fleet to the Far East, I still have literally to fight for every auxiliary ship I get. Tonnage now making the British Isles is less than they need for their maximum effort. There just isn’t enough shipping in the world to go around. If we cannot properly support the Near East and the British Isles, it is obvious we could not support our Fleet in the Far East, unless we very greatly slowed up in the Atlantic.

Our trade with South America has been greatly restricted and the pressure from there is another thing I have to contend with.

Recently we asked for some small ships of very moderate draft to supply our forces in Iceland. We simply had to get them, but were told we would have to give up an equivalent tonnage from our recent acquisitions with which I think you and Kimmel are familiar and among which, for example, are the four transports to train marines on the West Coast plus AKs, AEIs, AFs, etc., etc. Thank the good Lord, I was able to get the President to hold this in abeyance pending a chance for Jerry Land and me somehow or other, to work it out without taking anything away from the Navy.

Whenever we have a tanker available for ten days or so, we immediately try and help Maritime out. If we send something anywhere and the ship is coming back with any space available we offer Maritime the spare cargo space. The world shipping situation is plain rotten. Sometimes I wonder that with the opposition we have had, (and it is good, intelligent opposition) that we have gotten as far as we have. If any of our cargo ships are coming from Hawaii to the Coast light, we should offer the space to Maritime.

The pressure, incidentally, to give what we have in ships, guns, ammunition, material, and what not, to those actually fighting is constant, and increasing. Several times recently I have been approached for destroyers and the Lord knows what not. Marshall’s troubles in this respect are legion and of course the fellow at the front wants frequently what we most lack, particularly such things as 50 caliber ammunition, anti-aircraft weapons, patrol vessels, fire control, guns for merchant ships, etc., etc.

Do not think for a minute that I am not terribly disturbed about our lack of Radar on which I started pushing the scientific gang before I had been here a month, and also the production gang, so that I should think they would hate to hear me mention the subject.

Mike Robinson called me up this morning and said he was sending me a twelve page explanation of what they have done in the last year. From the Fleet standpoint and mine, and of course from Mike's too, we all want more tangible evidence. The fact that our new aircraft carriers will not be available until 1944 is something that is awfully hard to stomach, and I confess to considerable indigestion because of it, but whether or not there is a suitable remedy, I do not know.

The converted LONG ISLAND is promising for her size, in fact better than we had hoped for. We have six more converting which will have much longer decks and be superior in every way. We are keeping at this as a stop-gap but here again it was not easy to get the ships. They will, in all probability, go to the British, if we are not in the war when they are completed. In fact we are doing the work on Lend-lease.
I have been much distressed over the operating troubles we have had with our new planes. Of course they are gradually being eliminated but it takes time. I still am glad for the 200 PBY repeats we early made and which are coming along. Of course they haven’t got what the later ones will have in range and performance, etc. Also, performance will be handicapped by armor and protective features; but we will have them, and they have not delayed the newer models.

Towers will have given you all the picture on the air game. He went out a good deal at my insistence. With regard to the air, I know also that the training situation has been a good deal of a nightmare. If anybody can convince us of a better solution than the one we recently sent out, we would be glad to get it.

To some of my very pointed questions, which all of us would like to have answered, I get a smile or a “Betty, please don’t ask me that”. Policy seems to be something never fixed, always fluid and changing. There is no use kicking on what you can’t get definite answers. God knows I would surrender this job quickly if somebody else wants to take it up and I have offered to, more than once. Some [4] generous souls have been charitable enough to ask me to stick. I shall, as long as I think I can be of use, or rather that they think so.

We are doing what we can for China and taking unheard of chances on neutrality; or rather unneutrality. This along with sanctions on Japan make her road certainly not less easy.

Reverting to Japan again and to her holding off in Siberia until the Russian-German situation somewhat clarifies, I also think it possible, if not probable, that one of the reasons for Indo-China, and her pressure on Thailand, is a better position for an “all out” to clean up in China. I take my hat off to the Chinks.

As to the war and what people in this country are thinking; I hesitate to say. However, I believe that the proportion of our population which feels we should enter this war is relatively small, and that with the majority it is still more or less an academic question, perhaps largely because of its distance from us. Whether or not that sentiment might change over night, I don’t know.

We are somewhat of a volatile people but I am afraid that the many events which have happened with no resultant definite action on our part, are having their effect. Had the Tutuila been hit and sunk it might have created a wave of public opinion which would have meant something. As it is, nobody seems to give much of a damn about it, although the principle involved is the same, even though there was no loss of life, or sinking. On the other hand, I believe the people would follow the President in any positive action—such as escort—which he might take.

We shall give aid to Russia. However, nothing, to date, has shaken my original estimate that the Germans will take their limited objectives. She is having much more difficulty than she anticipated. Of course I could hope the cost will be crippling. Only time will tell.

I have urged propaganda wherever we could use it, particularly in South America, in France and in Africa. French Africa still has a semblance of independence against anyone who may attack it. There is no doubt in my mind that the Germans could have cleared up in the Near East had they gone in that direction instead of to Russia. What will follow the Russian campaign is still a question mark. Certainly British strength is far from what it should be in the Near East area.

Believe it or not, I am still keeping cheerful, doing the best I can; chafing that I can not do more and wide open to suggestion.

Before you destroy this letter I would be glad, if you [5] think there is anything of interest in it, to have Admiral Bloch as well as Admiral Kimmel look over it; in fact I was going to write Kimmel, so will let this partly serve.

Will not attempt to edit this “thinking out loud” on a busy morning. Please be charitable as to its lack of continuity—etc. etc.

With all good wishes and good luck.

Sincerely,

Captain Charles M. Cooke, Jr., USN,
USS Pennsylvania,

% Postmaster San Francisco, California.

P. S. I apologize for the “short” in the second paragraph. Just got to rambling.

P. S. #2. On second thought, I am enclosing an extra copy of this for Kimmel which he can show to Admiral Bloch, though I confess one fellow’s estimate is as good as another and I really wonder whether this letter is worth while, but anyway, as you know, it comes with all good wishes and good luck to you all.
Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual.

Keep cheerful.

One more P. S.—I am sending Kimmel the copy of this letter. When I got to thinking out loud I was really talking to you all including Admiral Hart, to whom I am also sending a copy.

H. R. S.

[1] In reply refer to Initials and No.

Personal & Confidential

DEAR KIMMEL: I have your despatch giving your reaction to the personnel requested from you for the commissioning of two new squadrons of patrol planes and the squadrons for the HORNET, plus certain additional men required for Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. This picture is set down on the enclosed sheet.

We know how tight the personnel situation is; also the seriousness of the Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate. We have tried to look at the whole situation as it exists at present and as it will continue to confront us, war or no war, with the expansion now taking place in planes for the Fleet (or if you will, call them replacements, because losses are bound to occur once we get in).

The training problem we have already gone over with you.

The greater part of the burden of supplying personnel for the squadrons now forming has been placed on the Atlantic Fleet. We have the Atlantic Fleet practically at the elastic limit with the demands just made on it which are greater than the demands made on you, and in a situation where they are now operating, in many respects, on a war time schedule—keeping the routes to and from Iceland under surveillance as one example.

As we see it here, after complying with Bunav’s despatches, you would be left with 112% of your allowance of aviation machinist mates, 119% of aviation metalsmiths, 118% of aviation ordnance men and 105% of all radiomen. This is an overall picture of numbers in each rating group from the Base Force report of 30 June. We realize that the distribution of ratings in each rating group leaves considerable to be desired.

[2] The shore establishments, including four main flight training centers, have only 61% allowance of aviation ratings, including radiomen. Further reduction there is just not practicable. Rather must the complements of the flight training centers be increased to approximately 100% in numbers, by January, in order to maintain the training schedule of those stations, and to permit the stations to function at maximum capacity, which they must do to meet their pilot production schedule necessary for your needs.

To man new squadrons we recently called on the existing units in the Atlantic for 298 aviation ratings. In addition the Atlantic Fleet is supplying 105 aviation ratings for advanced bases.

Manning these new squadrons is of paramount importance and we feel must take precedence over duplicate flight crews for existing squadrons. Duplicate crews will come in due time, provided we do not neglect training now, but will never came if we continue to curtail the training program. Intensive training in aviation ratings and radiomen (qual-air) must be undertaken afloat to assist in supplying trained personnel for the expansion program. The same is true of all ratings.

Now here’s another shock: Patrons 91, 92, and 93 will be formed the last of this calendar year and additional rated men will have to be supplied for them. Tuck it in the back of your head.

Taking up Comairscodfo’s despatch of 18 August:

1. We are complying with his recommendation (a) that insofar as possible we recruit from Patronings Atlantic.

2. We will not reduce your qual-air radiomen below one per patrol plane. In making this concession it is necessary to ask that you increase the rate at which radiomen are qualified for duty in patrol planes in the Pacific Fleet.

3. Due to the installation of special blind landing instruments it is considered that radiomen with aircraft experience should be assigned to Dutch Harbor and to Kodiak.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

4. Comairsofor's recommendation (d) applies with equal force to either coast. Inasmuch as Patron 84 will be stationed in the Atlantic, we thought it better to organize it in the Atlantic. Of course this picture might change. We can only handle it as far as we can see.

I wanted to give you the above and then ask you to transfer yourself to my seat and what I am up against here, and tell me whether or not you think our original order the best all-around solution to an obviously vexing and difficult problem.

The Atlantic Fleet is worse off in aviation ratings than the Pacific due to the greater demands which we have made on it. The Atlantic continuously fighting fog, long hours, and night work. Many of the Atlantic units are operating from advanced bases along the northern route—Iceland, Newfoundland and New England, with some operations in Greenland.

Nimitz is sending you a despatch today holding up execution of Bunav's serials 1450, 1394, 1397 and 1406 of August 11th until September 15th.

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by despatch. I would be glad to get your reply at the earliest practicable moment. We shall endeavor not to renew demands on you prior to 15 September.

It is a time when a "feller needs a friend", no matter where he is sitting, in the Atlantic, in the Pacific or in Washington.

I am just back from the meeting in the Atlantic. Am wading into a mass of mail which accumulated during my two weeks of absence. Will drop you a line giving you the best picture I can in a day or two. Meanwhile, many thanks for your letters which I found waiting, which were extremely interesting, and which I shall circulate to all concerned. Particularly did I enjoy the interesting news in your letter of 12 August.

[4] I have just dictated the above in the presence of and with the help of Nimitz, Forrest Sherman, Brainard and Ramsey (Towers being away). Ingersoll, I am glad to say, is getting a much-needed vacation. All join me in sending you good luck and best wishes to all hands.

Keep cheerful!

Sincerely,

/s/ Betty

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.
## Congressional Investigation Pearl Harbor Attack

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Legend:
- P: Pacific Fleet
- A: Atlantic Fleet
In reply refer to Initials and Nos. HRS/mjf

Secret

DEAR KIMMEL: When I left I asked Ingersoll to reply to your letter. The enclosed draft I have just inherited. In order to get it off to you in the next clipper, I am sending it along as is, except for some pencil notes (both red and black) which I have just added.

I know you want results, not excuses. So do I. I am doing everything from pleading to cussing with all the in-between variations and hope the picture presented is not too unsatisfactory.

I realize that in addition to this letter I have two more of yours to answer which I shall try to get at the first of the week, if I can clear up urgent, current material now on my desk. Still wading into the pile I found on my return.

There is much doing in the Atlantic in the formative stage. Thank God we should have things in full swing before long and with plans fairly complete. It has changed so many times—but now I think we at last have something fairly definite—may-be.

To your own situation I am giving every thought I know how. You may rest assured that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire it along.

My best to your fine District mate, (Admiral Block) and to all with you, and as always—

Best of luck—wish you were close by

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N.
USS Pennsylvania, Flagship, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
SECRET

August 16, 1941

Dear Mustapha:

Your letter of 26 July 1941 arrived in the Navy Department on the eve of my departure for distant parts. It was fine to hear from you, and I appreciate your laying before me so frankly the thoughts that are going through your mind.

My reply to you has been delayed for two reasons:

1. There was unsufficient time between the receipt of your letter and my departure to prepare a reply, and

2. So many of the points you raised I had hoped to have the answers upon my return to the Navy Department.

I can readily understand your wish to kept informed as to the Department's policies and decisions and the changes thereto which must necessarily be made to meet the changes in the international situation. This, we are trying to do, and if you do not get as much information as you think you should get, the answer probably is that the particular situation which is uppermost in your mind has just not jelled sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative.

So far as the Russian situation is concerned, and the degree of cooperation that will prevail between that country and ourselves if and when we become active participants in the war, little can be said at the moment. Some slight aid is being sent to Russia. Five bombers and 200 P-40's have already been allocated. The bombers will be flown to Russia via Iceland and the British are supplying bottoms for the fighters and naval escorts for same. On 11 August 1941, the Russian Mission, headed by Ambassador Oumansky, and assisted by a Lieutenant General of their army and a Captain of their Navy, was received by Secretary Knox. The Ambassador stated that his country had pressing need for all manner of military supplies, planes - and anti-aircraft guns in particular. He announced that "quantities" of bombs, ammunition, and machine tools were needed. The Secretary explained to the Mission that the material they needed was largely of Army origin, and that there
were no reserve stocks in the country from which to draw. The Secretary summarized his remarks by saying that, since the President had made the decision to give aid to Russia, the Navy could be counted upon to cooperate to the utmost.

You are correct in stating that "the new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored." This will be done. The conversations which took place between the Chiefs of Staff on 11-12 August somewhat helped to crystallize thought on the matter. Specifically, no decision was reached as to whether or not England would declare war on Japan if the Japanese attack the Maritime Provinces. Neither can I forecast what our action would be if England declared war on Japan as a result of the latter's attack on the provinces in question. I have done my best now while here in London to get a decision. It is not forecast.

Of course, Japanese action against the Maritime provinces remains a decided possibility. The results of such aggressive action, of course, lies in the realm of conjecture. However, it is my own thought that if Japan gets embroiled with Russia over the Maritime provinces, such action could hardly react other than to somewhat relieve the pressure now being exerted by Japan to the southward.

If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, I very much suppose that we would follow a course of action similar to the one we are now pursuing in the Atlantic as a neutral. It is, of course, conceivable that we would lay down a Western Hemisphere Defense plan with reference to the Pacific. I have not done so. Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Secretary Stimson have done it.

We are in complete agreement about developing Guam and bolstering the defenses of the Philippines. The Army is sending everything it can out there. As you know, we are sending Tommy some PTs. More aid would be sent him if it were possible to do so. I fear, however, that it is pretty late to start on Guam anything more than we already have in hand. We will make all the progress we can, remembering that "Dollars Cannot Buy Yesterday."
SECRET

In discussing the priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific War, for your convenience, I shall quote the paragraphs in order, follow each with from your letter and a comment.

Paragraph 2(a) of your letter. Transports and Light Destroyer Transports. During the Commander-in-Chief's visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is recognized. Nevertheless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even greater now (in point of view of time particularly) because most of our trained marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training problem in addition to a possible war situation. The Department has initiated action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILLIN and to acquire and convert four more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about replacing the light destroyer transports (APD's). These vessels were originally conceived and developed for a Pacific campaign. They are especially suitable for use in attacks on Atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking those positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atlantic, the need for them in the Pacific is paramount. If at all possible, they could be returned to this ocean at once. If this cannot be done, and only if it cannot be done, additional destroyers must be converted as soon as possible. Work on the large transports must also be expedited and completion dates anticipated if possible.

Comment. We all recognize that the APD's were developed with a Pacific campaign in mind. We withdraw them to the Atlantic with great reluctance, and you can count on their being returned to the Pacific at the earliest opportunity. Likewise, work is being pushed on the HARRIS and ZEILLIN. I must confess that progress on these ships has not been wholly satisfactory.
Paragraph 2 (b) of your letter - Marine Equipment. The Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its full equipment, particularly .51 guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripped of much of their equipment to fit out the reinforced regiment that went East. There is practically no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that these units will fight before the Army will and their needs must be given priority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for the marinos.

We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five thousand marinos. When they come, they should be fully equipped for amphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our planning.

Comment. In reference to the 3" .51 guns, and the .30 caliber machine guns of the Sixth Defense Battalion, reports received at Headquarters, Marine Corps indicate that that organization has had all of its initial allowances in those weapons since 7 July 1941; that is, 12 - 3" .51 guns, and 30 - .30 caliber machine guns. The shortage in .50 caliber .51 machine guns should be remedied by September, 1941.

An outline of the present situation in reference to Marine equipment and related matters, as well as an estimate as to when this equipment will be available is contained in CNO Serial 283312 which was forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet about 25 July 1941. It is believed that this presents as complete a picture as is possible at this time. The bulk of the shortages in equipment and ammunition lies in items which must be procured from the Army. Existing stocks in the United States are at present much too low to meet the requirements of all Services. Proportionate allocations of new equipment for all Services have been made by the Joint Board, and the Navy and Marine Corps may expect their proportion to be delivered from the manufacturers more steadily and consistently in the future than heretofore.

The general shortages in ammunition for the Marine Forces are likely to exist for some time, however, mainly due to the fact that quantity production will not obtain until late in the present calendar year. In the event of an acute emergency, it is believed that sufficient ammunition to fill immediate requirements of the Second Division.
as it exists today may be specially obtained from the Army.

The present outlook indicates that sufficient personnel will be available by 1 October 1941, to form for expeditionary duty a reinforced regiment from the Second Marine Division, and also leave within the Division a nucleus for training of its remaining units. It is hoped that the Second Division can be completed in personnel by January, 1942.

Paragraph 2 (c) of your letter - Ammunition Facilities. The condition of ammunition handling and stowage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Stowage facilities have been completed, are in the process of construction, or are about to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now under construction at West Loch and at Lualualei.

New construction authorized and about to be undertaken includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei, and barricaded stowage for live mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at West Loch.

New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes extension of West Loch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at West Loch to accommodate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we have no word yet on what action he has taken.

Comment. The Bureau of Ordnance has had all ammunition storage items requested by the Commander-in-Chief provided, except:

(a) Extension of ammunition pier at West Loch. Funds have been obtained to extend the ammunition pier from 600 feet to 1500 feet. Since no authorization will be required to extend the pier from 1500 feet to 2000 feet, the Bureau of Ordnance expects to divert the necessary funds temporarily from other projects for this extension, to avoid delay. The funds required are $250,000, which will eventually be obtained from Congress to repay the project robbed.

(b) No funds are available for the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at West Loch. No authorization has been obtained for the construction of these magazines. The Bureau of Ordnance will have these magazines included in the next authorization bill presented to Congress and will have the necessary funds requested for their construction. The funds required are estimates as at $210,000.
The following was supplied by the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks:

"The construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch is a new item not previously presented to the Department and we are awaiting word from the Commandant as to his recommendation. The construction of these buildings will necessitate the purchase of additional land."

Paragraph 2 (d) of your letter. The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availability" yard. Overhaul of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.

Comment. Building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. The Bureau of Ships shortly expects an appropriation from Congress (Supplemental 1942) to take care of, among other things, all navy yard facilities necessary to repair and maintain the 1946 fleet in war. Pearl Harbor is funded in the amount of $20,000,000 for this purpose, which includes the cost of an additional major battleship dock. This dock, together with the other facilities which will be accomplished with the money, will bring the yard up to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board Report. The time involved in expanding Pearl Harbor to the extent indicated above is as follows:

12 months for 50% of the facilities.
16 months for the remainder of the facilities.
22 to 24 months for the dry dock.

Note: The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Fleet Maintenance - Operations controls making ships available for overhauls and set the priority for work at the Navy Yard Pearl Harbor.

The Bureau of Ships has increased the special stocks at this Yard of spare propellers and shafting - it has under procurement, additional stock in tubing for boilers, condensers, superheaters and heat transfer apparatus; additional stock of generators and ice machines.
SECRET

The Shore Establishments Division intends to augment the working force as the capacity and work load are increased.

Relative to the repair facilities at the Pearl Harbor Yard, the Bureau of Yards and Docks has issued instructions to expedite all of this work to the greatest practicable extent.

The recommendation to confine the activities of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to emergency and low priority overhauls can be accomplished by transferring regular overhauls of Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, and Destroyers to West Coast yards but this recommendation is not concurred in for the following reasons:

(1) The Greenslade Board report, approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 14, 1941, recommended that the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard be built up to take care of 20 per cent of the fleet in the Pacific when the two-ocean navy was in existence and that the yard be capable of handling "full overhauls and damage" with simultaneous drydocking facilities for 2 Battleships, 1 CB, 1 CB, 1 CA, 1 twin DL and a DL marine railway. Pertinent to this is a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shore Establishments Division) dated June 26, 1941 in regard to building up the facilities at Pearl Harbor and noting that no Battleships or Carriers were scheduled for overhaul at Pearl Harbor in 1943. The third paragraph of this letter is quoted herewith:

"It is believed it is necessary that capital ships be overhauled at Pearl Harbor if that Yard is expected to perform the war task that has been assigned.

It is, therefore, recommended that in the next revision of the availability schedule, a start be made toward an equitable diversion of the overhaul of Battleships and Carriers from Puget Sound to Pearl Harbor."

The Director, Fleet Maintenance Division, believed that only by actual overhaul and repair of Capital Ships, Destroyers, and Cruisers can the Pearl Harbor organization be trained and made capable of requiring
those ships in an emergency, together with development of necessary facilities.

(2) Repairs to British naval vessels, particularly the larger types of ships, is absorbing a large percentage of the repair facilities of continental U.S. yards and it is expected that the demands will increase. East Coast yards are being used primarily for this work but it has been found necessary - due to full schedules of these yards - to send some British ships to Puget Sound and Mare Island.

If these latter yards are fully scheduled with our own ships (as can be expected if all Battleship, Carrier, Cruiser, and Destroyer overhauls are transferred to them from Pearl Harbor) it is problematical whether British ships can be repaired and overhauled at the rate that this is now being undertaken.

The foregoing comment by YOUR Sen.ence is substantially in accord with your letter 19-5 (50) over 19-3 Serial 01176 of 1 August 1941.

Paragraph 2 (c) of your letter. Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced personnel for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train them intensively at once. I realize that recruiting has fallen off and that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use 20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now. - 9 Knew it - and God knows I wish we could send men -

Comment. The present rate of recruiting is about 2,300 men a month. According to the best estimates, about 12,000 recruits are required in order to meet the requirements of the service on June 30, 1942 based on present allowances. (This estimate is subject to variables such as changes in dates of commissioning ships and stations.) Therefore the Navy will lack approximately 32,000 men necessary for Navy requirements on June 30, 1942. It is estimated that this will be enough men to
fill complements and allowances on that date to an average of about 92%. The fleets are now filled to about 92% of complements. This percentage will drop due to large recent increases in aviation squadron allowances. It is estimated that Navigation can replace losses in the fleets with recruits to maintain them at about the same percentage of men aboard to complements as at present.

The recent large withdrawals from the fleets have been due to the necessity of supplying the crews for the large number of auxiliary vessels recently acquired and for the assembly of men for advanced Destroyer, Submarine, and Aviation Bases. These demands were superimposed upon the demands for the regular building and usual purchasing program.

The above estimates are based on a monthly rate of recruiting of 9,300. Recruiting is now on the increase and additional men over the 9,300 monthly will be furnished to the fleets. Paragraph 2(f) of your letter. Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new hospital at Pearl Harbor.

Comment. It is contemplated assigning the SOLACE (AHS), EX- IROQUOIS, to the Pacific Fleet upon readiness for service, which should be in the latter part of August, 1941. Further, it is contemplated transporting Mobile Base Hospital No. 2 from New York to Oahu in the U.S.S. PROCYON (AK19) departing New York early in October; she is a 15-knot ship and will call at San Diego to debark some personnel and stores there on route.

So far as the new hospital is concerned, the contract for this has been let and presumably the work is underway.

Paragraph 2(g) of your letter. Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers.

Comment. The project is now underway to send twelve PT's to the 14th Naval District as soon as the boats can be prepared and transportation provided. This shipment will follow the six LTB's going to the 16th Naval District via the GUADALUPE scheduled to depart from New York Yard about 15 August or as soon thereafter as practicable.

Wish I had more - they will be coming - I know House is too - but we are doing the best we can. And I am riding all the time.
Paragraph 2(h) of your letter. The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at Mare Island.

Comment: The project of assembling advanced base material has been raised to an A-1-a priority, and the assembling of this material is going ahead satisfactorily.

our highest priority
SECRET

Paragraph 2(i) of your letter. Correspondence has gone forward urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important.

Comment. In this connection, I quote verbatim the remarks of the Fleet Maintenance Division in order that you may have the entire picture:

"The status of placing depth charges and under-water sound equipment on light craft is as follows (taken up by classes):

**DI's and DII's -** These vessels have depth charges and echo-ranging equipment authorized; some have the equipment installed and those ships that have not yet received their echo-ranging equipment will get Model QC Series commencing in September 1941. Ten days out.

**AVDs -** Stability conditions on these ships are not good and the addition of depth charges, racks, or Y-guns, and echo-ranging equipment will necessitate compensating weight removal. It is understood that the desired equipment can be installed providing the towing reel on the fan tail is permanently removed. A lightweight echo-ranging and listening gear equipment, Model #23, has been developed which weighs about 1300 pounds, with deliveries commencing in October 1941.

The following are the requirements for the VEA equipment:

(a) Power supply 115 volts D.C.
(b) Head room required for hoist train equipment about 70 inches.
(c) At least 24 inches between frames of ships to accommodate pedestal.
(d) Remote control of train by means of cables and sheaves, using hand wheel at operating position.

The above equipment is suitable for any installation in AVs (Bird Class) and in most converted yachts. Additionally, this equipment can be installed in any other type of ships having adequate space and power supply.

A lightweight listening equipment (Model XI-9), about 1300 pounds, has been developed and contract awarded for 230 sets; delivery
commences in August 1941 at a rate of 10 each week. The following are the requirements for installation of the JK-9 equipment:

(a) Power supply 115 volts D.C. or 24 volts D.C. (Two types of motor generators available, producing 115 volts, A.C. Overall dimensions of motor generator set 29\frac{1}{2} \times 13\frac{1}{2} \times 11\frac{3}{4} inches.

(b) Maximum head room required for hoist train mechanism about 96 inches.

(c) Only limitation or frame spacing is that is pass the 4-inch projector shaft.

(d) No remote control - hand hoist and train directly connected to projector shaft.

This equipment is for listening only (no echo-ranging feature) and is suitable for use in any type of ship having adequate space and power supply. Space allotted to the equipment must provide for the hoist-train equipment (overall dimensions 7'-9" x 26\frac{1}{2} x 20\frac{3}{4} inches), receiver (overall dimensions 19" x 12" x 15-1/8") and sufficient space for the operator.

APDs - The APDs have the depth charge tracks installed and now carry 24 - 300 pound depth charges. The stability conditions of these ships is so unsatisfactory that they will require 50 tons of fixed ballast. The installation of the WEA echo-ranging equipment, described under AVDs, above can be accomadated in these ships.

MIs and AVPs - The question of installing depth charge and echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment on these types has been referred to the Bureau of Ships for study and recommendation as to the practicability of accomplishment.

It should be pointed out that draft and stability conditions of these vessels is critical and instructions are about to be issued limiting their displacements. Informal information from the Bureau of Ships indicates that compensatory weight reduction must be made on practically a pound-for-pound basis in order to install the desired equipment. The installation of echo-ranging, or listening equipment is dependent upon the delivery schedule as outlined above under AVDs.
It is to be noted that the lightest depth charge rack now developed (carrying six 300 pound depth charges) weighs about 1500 pounds. As each depth charge with its equipment weighs 220 pounds, the total weight of depth charges and track to be compensated for will be about 4000 pounds. The weight of the lightest underwater sound equipment is about 1300 pounds as is explained above under AVDs.

PEs, PCs, PYs, and YPs. All these vessels have depth charges, the number depending upon the size of the vessels. Some of these vessels are equipped with both depth charge racks and Y-guns.

Echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment has been authorized and will be installed as soon as the equipment can be provided.

Paragraphs 3 and 3 (a) of your letter. Communications. The supply of communication, radio, and sound equipment to the fleet and the Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvement has been noted in the last year.

Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from its intended advance base use.

Comment. Here is quoted in their entirety the remarks of the Chief of the Bureau of Ships:

"During the fiscal year 1941 the Bureau of Ships placed contracts for radio and sound material amounting to approximately $110,000,000. The material contracted for included all of the material listed in the 1941 and 1942 Communication Improvement Plans issued by the Chief of Naval Operations and a large amount of additional material required to meet previously unanticipated needs. The funds included in the regular 1941 budget were made available in an appropriation bill which became law on June 11, 1940, but the bulk of the funds utilized during the year did not become available until passage of a supplemental appropriation act in mid September 1940. Considering the time when the necessary funds became available, and the tremendous increase of procurement effort necessary, it is felt that the prosecution of the entire program has been as rapid as could reasonably be expected under the circumstances. However, it is recognized that many needs of the service are of great urgency and that any delay
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at all in effecting deliveries after needs have been determined is objectionable. Difficulties in obtaining critical materials and components have in some cases caused serious delays in deliveries under contracts but by use of increased facilities all contractors involved have increased rates of production to a considerable extent. It is expected that most of the serious needs for radio and sound equipment will be taken care of within the next few months.

Funds for the initial allowance of radio equipment for the Kaneohe Air Station were included in the regular 1941 appropriation act, which became law on June 11, 1940. Initiation of procurement of radio material for Kaneohe was commenced immediately after the funds became available. Funds for items later added to the allowance became available in September, 1940.

The tabulation below indicates the present situation as regards radio equipment for the Kaneohe Air Station:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allowed equipment</th>
<th>Installed</th>
<th>To Be Shipped</th>
<th>Expected Date</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 TBM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jan.1941</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 TBP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 TBU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mar.1941</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 TBR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sept.1941</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan.1942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 TCA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sept.1941</td>
<td>1 TBR-1 in use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 TCE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov.1941</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 TCC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug.1941</td>
<td>1 TBR-1 installed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 R/B/RBB/RBC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indefinite</td>
<td>New type-other receivers available if urgently required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 RLS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 DY</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>11 Aug.1941</td>
<td>from NY Wash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 DP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>11 Aug.1941</td>
<td>LDI from NYL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Inst. LDG Equip.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sept.19412#10</td>
<td>on priority list; deliveries start Sept.1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 RAU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct.1941</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 YA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan.1942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are available in the Pearl Harbor pool several more TBR-1 portable equipments which may be utilized to take care of immediate needs at Kaneohe if required. These TBR-1 equipments are not necessarily reserved or intended for advanced base service, but are available for any use at the discretion of the Commandant or the Commander in Chief."
SECRET

Paragraph 3(b) of your letter. It took BuEng two years to put "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships.

Comment. Here follows the remarks of the Bureau of Ships and the Director, Naval Communications Division in order named.

"The Model X1F RADAR equipment developed by Naval Research Laboratory was installed in USS NEW YORK 12-18 December, 1938, and was tested at the same time as the Model CXZ Radar equipment developed by RCA Mfg. Co., and installed in USS TEXAS. These tests continued through March 1939. Report of tests was received from Commander Atlantic Squadron 8 April 1939. As a result of these tests, the equipment was returned to Naval Research Laboratory for modifications indicated as necessary. For example, the equipment had no calibrating feature installed. A conference was held with representatives of all interested officers of the Department as a result of which it was decided to proceed with the procurement of a limited number of these equipments. The size and weight of the equipment were at the time important factors in the decision. Conferences were held with contractors without delay and a specification was prepared. The requisition was issued 28 July 1939 and the contract was awarded 16 October 1939 to RCA Mfg. Co. The time between the date of requisition and date of contract was utilized by the RCA Mfg. Co., to inspect the model, work up estimates, submit bid and by the Bureaus of Ships and Supplies and Accounts to make award. The first equipment was shipped by factory May 21, 1940. It will be noted that the time for delivery of the first equipment by contractor was approximately 13 months from the date of completion of tests in USS NEW YORK and 7 months after date of contract. The last equipment was shipped by contractor on June 20, 1940. The dates of installation of this equipment were dictated by the dates of availability of the vessels concerned. A matter over which this Bureau does not have control. According to the records of this Bureau, however, installation of the first equipment was completed August 24, 1940, and the last on October 14, 1940, and the last date being approximately 18 months after the receipt of the report on NEW YORK tests.
"The Model XAF Radar, built by Naval Research Laboratory, was tested afloat during the late winter and early spring of 1939. This test indicated that additional equipment should be purchased for trial. A study was made to determine the practicability of installing the equipment afloat; this study disclosed that only ten (10) ships could accommodate the large antenna array without first making extensive alterations to ships or without experiencing serious interference to the radio beam from the ships' structures. Chief of Naval Operations requested procurement of ten (10) production models of the XAF. The earliest that funds could be obtained to manufacture the Model XAF (copy of NRL Model XAF) was during fiscal 1940. Due to the higher unit cost of the equipment and the extraordinary expenditures of radio funds in connection with "neutrality enforcement", the Bureau of Ships could manufacture but six (6) complete units. Then additional funds were made available by emergency appropriations, fourteen (14) Model XAF's were ordered as "stop-gap" equipment pending completion of development of an improved detector - the Model SC."

Paragraph 3(c) of your letter. For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still without it though it is under manufacture.

Comment. In this connection, the Chief of the Bureau of Ships states:

"The need for a satisfactory recognition device in the fleet has been recognized by the Bureau of Ships as being the single greatest one since the time of the last war and every idea advanced by the fleet, the Naval Research Laboratory or other laboratories that appeared to offer promise has been thoroughly investigated. This research has fully covered the fields of ultra violet, visible, infra red, radio and sound spectrums. Many systems which were developed to a point which warranted service tests have been tested in the fleet and all have been reported unsatisfactory by the fleet even after modification by NRL and other..."
SECRET

laboratories in accordance with the wishes of the fleet. There has been no lack of funds in this connection. The NRL has been engaged continuously since its establishment in efforts to develop a recognition system. That portion of the statement relating to the preventing of research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device is not one of fact."

It can be concluded that very substantial additions to Fleet Radar installations will be made before the end of the calendar year.

Paragraph 3(d) of your letter. We must have the IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) for aircraft at once. The program lags and on June 14th only 56 were on order from Canada with indefinite delivery date. See "Aviation" below.

Comment. In regard to the foregoing, the Bureau of Aeronautics remarks as follows:

"Currently, the Bureau of Aeronautics is concentrating on the earliest practicable development and procurement of suitable RADAR equipment for aircraft. Recognition equipment will be installed in all service aircraft at the earliest opportunity. One hundred (100) ABA (American recognition) sets are now due for delivery, and they will be distributed to the fleet in the most effective manner possible. Material is being assembled for 1500 American ABA sets which will be put in production by General Electric as soon as a satisfactory service test is completed. Rush

356 British I.F.F. sets have been requested; 56 of these sets are being delivered to the Atlantic Fleet and delivery is rapidly being completed."

The tentative plan for initial RADAR installations in aircraft is as follows:

A brief summary of nomenclature is:

a. ASV I/K II - British search equipment suitable for VPBs.
b. ASA - American search equipment including high altitude altimeter, suitable for VPB's.
c. ASB - American search equipment, expected to be suitable for 2 and 3 place planes.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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d. ASV - MKII (Fleet Air Arm modified), British search equipment for use in large single engine planes.

d. ASB - American recognition equipment.

e. IFF - British recognition equipment.

f. LY - American high range altimeter.

h. LYB - American low range altimeter.

i. .VI - MK IV - British Interception equipment - multi-place airplanes.

Search equipment (long range British ASV or American ASB) will be installed in all PBY-5 and subsequent VPB models. Initial installations are being made.

It is expected to install ASB (small search equipment) with a low range altimeter in one plane of each section of VT3's. All TBF airplanes will have space reserved for this. It is expected to reserve space in all new VSB and VSO airplanes for the American ASB, and where practicable install this equipment in current types.

Initial installation is now being made of the experimental model of the ASB in an SBD airplane. If successful, a number of these planes will be made available as soon as the equipment is provided.

Steps have been taken to obtain models of the British MK II ASV equipment (modified for Fleet Air Arm) for reproduction purposes. It is expected to supplement manufacture of American ASB equipment with an American version of the modified MK II.

Radio Altimeter (high altitude) will be installed as part of the American search equipment in all VPB airplanes. It is planned to equip one airplane of each section of VT3's with high altitude altimeters and another airplane of each section of VT3's with a low range altimeter for use with the ASB equipment (as indicated in paragraphs above re search equipment.).

Recognition equipment will be installed in all service airplanes at the earliest opportunity. The first 100 American ASB equipments are now due for delivery.
Interception equipments. Provision for these equipments will be made in a certain number of P2U airplanes as soon as the development in the United States and abroad of models suitable for use in single engine, single place airplanes permits. Pending this development, a test installation is being made of a British IX IV equipment in an SBD airplane. If successful, a number of these planes will be made available for use as interceptors as soon as this equipment can be obtained from either British or American source.

Projects have been initiated to design search and interception antenna structures which are most readily dismantlable and which are streamlined as much as practicable. Development of American search and interception equipment will stress ready removal provisions in order to result in maximum of operational flexibility.

Plans for further installation of Radar in carrier and cruiser airplanes are dependent on installation difficulties and initial performance. "A more comprehensive plan may be expected to be published about January, 1942."

Deliveries have begun on 104 Model BE IIITT equipments for aircraft together with 32 model BE/B7 equipments for shipboard use. These will be given service tests in the fleet together with 3 Model BI equipments for shipboard use. The first BI equipment is due at NRL September 22, 1941. The contractor is assembling material for 1500 additional BE equipments and further production will be authorized just as soon as tests justify the step. All of the above is of American design but because of design and operational features it will not operate with corresponding British ship, shore or aircraft types. To provide for this contingency two each of the latest British ship, shore and aircraft equipments are being flown to the United States and will be modified for production in the United States and supplied to all forces likely to operate with British forces. These sample equipments are due within a few days according to advice from the Naval Attaché, London. The 56 equipments mentioned in the paragraph to which this comment is directed are for Support Force aircraft and eight are now in the process of being installed."
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Paragraph 3(e) of your letter, Radar equipment for submarine is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar.

In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have typo plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job.

Comment. An omni-directional aircraft detection equipment was tested in GRAYLING on 2 August 1941. Although the results of the test were somewhat discouraging, the equipment showed sufficient promise to warrant its manufacture. It is believed that the development of a directional antenna system will greatly improve the performance of the submarine equipment; this project will be prosecuted.

Contracts have been awarded for the manufacture of 10-cm surface-ship detection equipment for submarines. This equipment is due for delivery about January 1942. The equipment which is being designed for making night attacks while the submarine is surfaced, is expected to be capable of taking accurate ranges and bearings on capital ships at distances in the order of 10,000 yards.

In order to expedite the manufacture of radio and sound equipment, the Bureau of Ships has frozen on current designs. The delay in procurement of radio and sound equipment is not entirely due to the "elaborate" design; the "priority ratings" for raw materials that the Navy Department is assigned greatly affects the production of equipment. The Bureau of Ships also is procuring modified commercial radio equipment.

It has not been conclusively determined that the German submarines are equipped with Radar. It is, however, highly probable that they are so equipped because it is known that these craft operate with much facility at night.

Paragraph 4(a) of your letter. Pre-Fleet Training. Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat readiness of active squadrons.
SECRET

Comments. In this connection, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics remarks:

"On 28 July, I signed a letter that embodied measures for the improvement of aviation training of pilots and other members of flight crews in the intermediate stage that occurs between primary school and fleet squadrons. I hope the effect will be salutary and beneficial in the immediate future. VP-13 will be held at San Diego to launch an intensive transitional training program in combination with the Training Test and Acceptance Unit already in operation for patrol planes. It is recognized that further drains on combatant squadrons are undesirable but the training centers must continue to function or the supply of pilots for the organization of new squadrons will not be adequate. Every experienced aviation officer in the training establishment ashore will be released for duty in fleet squadrons as soon as he can be replaced. The majority of the expansion of the aeronautical organization afloat will be accomplished without disturbing pilots already in fleet squadrons.

Aside from transitional training in the larger patrol planes, pilots and enlisted members of flight crews must be trained in fleet patrol squadrons whose primary task is their preparation for duty in active combatant squadrons. Although every squadron on the West Coast may be assigned this duty, it will be necessary for Patrol Wings ONE and TWO in the Hawaiian area to absorb any excess in personnel that cannot be trained effectively because of insufficient numbers of aircraft and qualified personnel.

There will be an advanced carrier training organization at San Diego in accordance with my letter of 28 July. Additional new VO/VS pilots will commence reporting to the Fleet during August. Any of these pilots who cannot be trained expeditiously on board ship should be retained in the advanced carrier training squadron at San Diego for more flying, particularly gunnery, at the discretion of the Fleet."
SECRET

The priority accorded to the Army and British heavy bomber programs has been the cause of our most urgent attention. The final action on priorities was decided at a conference between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War which was attended by representatives of the Army Air Corps, the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Office of Production Management. The net result was an A-1-b award to approximately 2,000 (plus or minus 500) additional naval aircraft, and brings a total of 3,596 naval aircraft into the highest priority classification given to aircraft. One hundred per cent spare aircraft are now planned for fleet carrier and ship-based squadrons, and fifty per cent spare aircraft have been requested for petrol squadrons.

In connection with the foregoing, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation remarks:

"The Chief of Naval Operations in his confidential letter, Op-22-BS,(SC) P11-1, Serial 081322 of July 28, 1941, directed Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet to establish as quickly as practicable within their respective fleets, the following units:

(a) Advanced Carrier Training Group, Pacific and Advanced Carrier Training Group, Atlantic—for the Pacific Fleet, in San Diego and for the Atlantic Fleet, in Norfolk, Virginia—Purpose of these groups is to give advanced carrier training to newly graduated naval aviators, fresh from training centers, prior to assignment to carrier units in the two fleets.

(b) Transition Training Squadron, Atlantic and Transition Training Squadron, Pacific—Purpose of these squadrons is to give advanced patrol plane training to newly graduated naval aviators, fresh from the training centers, prior to assignment to Patrol plane units in the two fleets. These squadrons also train experienced aviators in the operation of the model F22Y airplanes in the Pacific Fleet and the model P3M airplanes in the Atlantic Fleet."
SECRET

Experienced Naval aviators have already been ordered to report to these training groups and squadrons when they are formed by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic. These aviators will oversee and administer the training of the personnel ordered to these units.

By the letter referred to above, Chief of Naval Operations has indicated that during the months of August to December, 1941, inclusive, a total of 130 additional pilots for battleships and cruisers will be ordered to both fleets. Also, for the same period, 334 carrier pilots and 598 patrol plane pilots will be ordered to the above mentioned training units for assignment to each fleet.

After January, 1942, the training centers will be turning pilots out at such a rate that at all times thereafter, we will always have sufficient pilots under advanced and transition training or in the operating aviation units to meet all the fleet requirements, including double complements of patrol squadrons.

Based on present estimates, the output of Class "A" Group IV Schools training aviation ratings and radio men (qualair) will be approximately 27,096 enlisted men (Navy) from August 1941 through June 1942.

Sixty-five (65) percent of the graduates of these Class "A" Schools have been marked for Pensacola, Corpus Christi, Jacksonville and Miami, until about 8,170 graduates have been fed into the flight training centers, filling their allowances (in total numbers) by about January 20, 1942.

This will leave an estimated balance of 18,926 Class "A" School graduates for the Forces Afloat and other shore establishments by June 30, 1942.

The allowances of patrol plane squadrons have been increased 220% over the 1941 allowances.

Paragraph 4(b) of your letter. New Torpedo Planes. Highest priority — A-l-a — instead of present priority which is A-l-b. There are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater naval importance.
SECRET

Comment. The A-1-a rating for torpedo planes was not satisfactory to the War Department and the Office of Production Management without unacceptable reduction in priority of other novel aircraft. There is good reason to question whether a higher priority for torpedo planes would have expedited their delivery. The Navy Department will continue to exert maximum effort to expedite the production of VTZ for the Fleet.

Paragraph 4(c) of your letter. Conversions for Carrier Landing Training. Auxiliary aircraft carrier conversion was dropped because of time and cost factors. These can be greatly reduced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing training. The need for these ships is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be used for this purpose, while new pilots must be properly trained before joining active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized.

Comment. The conversion of the U.S.S. WAKEFIELD and U.S.S. H.T. VERNON to auxiliary aircraft carriers with landing features incorporated is contemplated. Steps are now being taken to procure material and equipment. The actual conversions will be initiated whenever present services of these vessels as transports can be concluded. It is probable also the the U.S.S. WEST POINT will be included in the above category.

Paragraph 4(d) of your letter. A.S.V. (Anti-Surface Vessel) Equipment. This is of the highest potential value. Apparently none will be available for petrol planes until December. It can be carried by other planes, as shown by reports of British torpedo plane operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much earlier deliveries are essential.

There is an aircraft RADAR project set up in the Bureau of Aeronautics with the objective of providing all necessary equipment that can be carried and operated efficiently in aircraft with due consideration for other essential equipment. The training of RADAR operators is underway so that by the time the equipment arrives there will be trained personnel who are essential for its successful operation. A.S.V sets will be provided as alternate installations in all carrier planes that can accommodate them and all patrol planes will be A.S.V.-equipped. Every possible source of supply, including British and Canadian, is being investigated to accelerate the program. Three hundred Canadian A.S.V equipment sets are expected at the monthly rate of one hundred sets commencing 1 October, 1941.
SECRET

Paragraph 4(a) of your letter. Identification, Friend or Foe Equipment. This is absolutely complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for aircraft defense of the Fleet, without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay whatever is acceptable.

Comment. This subject has been discussed elsewhere in this letter. However, it should be remarked that the Interior Control Board is setting up essential requirements for RADAR equipment on board ship. The Board has been advised to incorporate the identification feature in ship control and fire control sets since there is good reason to believe that identification is a very necessary part of the RADAR installation.

Paragraph 4(f) of your letter. Engines for New Patrol Planes (PBY-5a). Nose section failures have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can.

Comment. The Bureau of Aeronautics and the engine manufacturer have been advised of the nose section failures in the engines of VP-14. The loose-coupled shaft in these engines will eliminate the restrictions on operating the engine within the present critical speed range. However, this does not apply to VP-14 but this squadron is being supplied new heavier nose sections which the bureau believes will correct present deficiencies if engine speeds are kept outside the critical range. Only three planes outside VP-14 have encountered failures in the light nose sections. The heavy noses will be shipped from the factory at the rate of ten per week beginning August 11, 1941, with first deliveries to VP-14.

Paragraph 4(g) of your letter. Landplane Field at Johnston Island. This was removed from the project by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to local defense but, more importantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions headed eastward and as a stepping stone for landplane support of expeditions headed westward.

Comment. Funds in the amount of $750,000 for this project are available and the necessary construction work has been authorized.

Paragraph 4(h) of your letter. Kashi Lagoon Development. This will be of very great value to patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this development should be undertaken immediately.
Comment. The Navy Department has included Keahi Lagoon as one of the Navy-sponsored developments for commercial seaplanes in the Hawaiian area in its recommendations to the Department of Commerce. The War Department has an appropriation of approximately $3,300,000 for this project and arrangements are being made for additional funds for the dredging which is expected to commence very soon. Navy patrol plane facilities are not included in the prospective plans for this location. Any special facilities for naval patrol planes for the present at least must be of a temporary nature.

Paragraph 4(1) of your letter. Development of the M.A.S. Barber's Point. This approved development is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to burn down many aviation shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available when Barber's point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandatory to expedite the work.

Comment. Your comment on the need for this development is supported whole-heartedly in the Department and will receive the most careful attention until it meets the Fleet's need. Funds for Barber's Point in the amount of $18,605,000 will be available in August and work begun immediately if the bill, now pending in Congress, is passed by the Senate and signed by the President. The bill has already passed the House and has been approved by the Naval Affairs Committee of the Senate.

I have gone into the subjects you raised in some detail because I want you to be fully advised. Don't hesitate to tell us how you think we can help. We want to be of all assistance possible, and helpful criticism is always in order.

You no doubt have seen in the press about our conference at sea. Aside from being a most historic occasion, it was most helpful. It is to my deep regret that time and distance precluded your being present.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Betty
Secret

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Have been trying to get a letter off to you for a week, although what I have already sent you covers fairly well our situation to date. I do, however, want once again to thank you for your splendid letter of August 12th which has been so thoroughly enjoyed by everybody. It gave us a great close-up of the Fleet which was more than welcome.

As of today we have about 262,000 men. Reenlistments for the year to date average something over 70% and the same is true for the month of July. Our advertising campaign for men is bearing fruit and we hope next month to get at least 10,000, and our best hopes might realize 11,000. Our goal is not less than 12,000. Tommy Holcomb expects to reach his allowed 75,000 in March. The goal for enlisted men (Navy) is all I can get, regardless of deficits or what not.

I shoved off the letter on RDF just as it came to me and with the rough notes I had made, and I really should apologize for its form, but the substance was there and that letter, together with the previous table which had been sent out by BuShips will, I believe, give your people the best picture we have.

I note what you say about not resting until you get the patrol vessels you have requested in official correspondence. I might add "neither will I". You know I am keenly alive to your needs. At present we are constantly fighting material shortage and priorities. You are thoroughly familiar with the building program and the dates of completion so no need to comment on it. We are ahead of schedule at present but the steel situation grows more critical daily and at last I believe the blocks are going to be put on unnecessary civilian needs. Our small ship program was the most difficult to get started. I was perfectly delighted the other day when some one told me they had tried to buy an electric refrigerator but it could not be had. Another example; I ordered an electric heater for the cottage at the Lake direct from the Westinghouse wholesale people here in Washington, who inform me it is well I got my order in when I did because it was the last one and no more would be manufactured. It has taken a long time to get the psychology started. I say started, because the country still is to a considerable extent, asleep to the efforts required.

[2] I am perfectly delighted with your reaction to the recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training relative to target practices. Of course, Lee was tickled to pieces over your enthusiastic comment.

I have talked not only to Nimitz but also to Carpender, who came down to see me after I had given Nimitz your notes with regard to personnel. You will have heard from Bunav direct.

I am delighted also over your comment about the reaction facilities and hope the good work in this connection may continue to expand until the situation is satisfactory.

I am told an official letter was sent to you on the Defense Battalions situation so will not repeat here.

Once again, thanks for the human side of the news.

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific about all I can say is the Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them but just what they are going to do I don't know.

I told one of their Statesmen this morning that I felt another move, such as one into Thailand, would go a long way towards destroying before the American public what good-will still remained. As you know, I have had some extremely frank talks with them.

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender.

There is much talk of the Japanese barring ships carrying arms to Russia. I am delighted that when Admiral Hart asked us to make the Sulu Sea a closed area we did not do it although there was some pressure here for it. One of my principal reasons against doing it was because of the precedent which it might establish, and thus give the Japs something to hang their hat on if later they wanted to make a similar pronouncement regarding the Sea of Japan. We have to go through one of those holes in the wall to get to the Russian
Maritime Provinces. This also brings up the case of the so-called neutrality zone encircling the Western Hemisphere. But that, like the recent closing of the Canal to Japanese ships, is water over the dam and I won’t bother you with my troubles on those pronouncements.

Regardless of the will to do all you want in the line of permanence of personnel, please keep in mind the tremendous expansion we are up against, and the many ships which have to be commissioned. Notwithstanding the fact that at least some of us foresaw that, regardless of our efforts, there just has to be considerable compromise in the arduous task of building up and manning the so-called Two-Ocean Navy, not to mention all the other stuff from AKs and APs to AMs and ATs.

[3] Not in the way of an excuse, because I am not making any, but just giving reasons, I checked up on one of the battleships in the last war which had been in commission about a year. It has a complement of 66 officers, but of this number had only 13 regulars, including paymasters and doctors, in the entire outfit. The other 52 were all Reserves and temporaries. Nevertheless, I am told those 52 filled their billets very well and that they had a fine ship. I think history has got to repeat itself, and the only thing I see to do is loyally to attempt to solve our present situation and do the best we can with what we have, and I know of no one better than yourself to tackle the job. That is why you are where you are.

I expect all the kicks and forceful reasons you can send me for change and help and I will go just as far as it is humanly possible to do and so will everybody else in the Department.

We all know that Naval personnel will rise up and do better under great difficulties than they will when things are easy and serene (if they ever were).

You will be glad to know that the vibration troubles which, to put it mildly, were cause for concern in the WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA are nearing solution.

I am delighted the West Coast visits are proving so helpful. I hope they will not have to be stopped but only time will tell.

I do not recall for the moment whether or not in previous correspondence I acknowledged receipt of your letter of 30 July regarding using one of your carriers for ferrying planes to the Russians. This is just one of the headaches we have here.

Mrs. Hull ought to be reminding me that she has a mother for whom she has to get dinner because it is 1830. My day is just beginning.

Keep cheerful and as always every good wish in the wide world to you all and best of luck.

Sincerely,

/s/ Betty

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

Op-10-MD
Secret

DEAR TOMMY: Considerable has happened since I last wrote to you.

So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The President’s speech of September 11, 1941 put the matter squarely before the country and outlined what he expected of the Navy. We were ready for this; in fact, our orders had been issued.

In addition to the incidents cited by the President, other and probably equally compelling reasons lay behind his decision. For some time, the British have found the problem of getting supplies across the Atlantic a difficult one. They have never had enough ships suitable for escort duty. Their forces are thinly spread and, as a result of casualties, the spreading has had to be thinner and thinner as the campaign has progressed. If Britain is to continue, she has to have assistance. She will now get it openly. King’s forces, too, are thinly spread, working as he is from 20 South to the Iceland area.

In a nutshell, we are now escorting convoys regularly from the United States to points in the Iceland area, where these convoys are picked up by the British and escorted to the British Isles. In addition to our own escort vessels, the Canadians
are participating. Both forces (Canadian and our own) are operating under King's direction.

This will be a boon for the British. It will permit them to strengthen their forces elsewhere, both with heavy and light ships, particularly in critical areas through which convoys for the Near East, via the Cape of Good Hope, must pass. It will further help the British to meet the ever-present threat of a raid on troop or merchant ship convoys by heavy units, in that it will narrow the area in which the British heavy units will be required to be responsible. Moreover, ships for other possible activities, such as duty in the Mediterranean, etc., will thus be released.

[2] The area which we regard as "our ocean" is roughly outlined as follows: all west of a line 10° West Longitude to Latitude 65° North, thence by rhumb line to a position 53° North, 26° West, thence south on 26°. Unless the Axis powers withdraw their men-of-war from this area, contacts are almost certain to occur. The rest requires little imagination.

The GREER incident created quite a stir. Senator Clark (Missouri) pushed a resolution through the Senate which called for the log of the ship. This, we will not furnish. Mr. Nye (North Dakota) submitted a resolution calling for an investigation by the Naval Affairs Committee into the whole incident. The enclosed is a statement I propose to make—and pretty well gives you the story.

Iceland has, of course, in recent months, taken on much significance for us. Since the President's speech, it has taken on added significance. Since July, we have had 4500 marines there, and on Monday last we landed some 6000 Army. While this Army convoy was enroute, the Germans had by far the strongest concentration of U-boats that they have ever had in the North Atlantic. It was so strong and so active that it raised the very devil with a British-escorted convoy, the Germans claiming 28 ships sunk. About half that number is more nearly correct, and admitted by the British. Our own Army troop convoy was in the immediate vicinity of the attack and had to be re-routed by despatch several times in an effort to avoid the area of action. At that, seven SS contacts were had. We should have gotten at least one SS, which was attacked under favorable circumstances.

As to conditions in your part of the world, Mr. Hull has not yet given up hope of a satisfactory settlement of our differences with Japan. Chances of such a settlement are, in my judgment, very slight. Admiral Nomura is working hard on his home government and, while he appears to be making some progress, I am still from Missouri. It looks like a dead-lock; but I suppose as long as there is negotiation there is hope.

The press is making much at the moment of the way the Far Eastern situation has apparently quieted down. One cannot help being impressed with the optimistic note of the editorial writers and columnists in this regard. For my own part, I feel that false hopes are being raised. While on the surface the Japanese appear to be making some effort at reaching a satisfactory solution, I can not disregard the possibility that they are merely stalling for time and waiting until the situation in Europe becomes more stabilized. If Russia falls, Japan is not going to be easily pried away from her Axis associations. [3] She will no doubt grab any opportunity that presents itself to improve her position in Siberia. If Russia can hold out (which, at the moment, hardly appears possible), I feel that there might be more hope of some sort of an agreement with Japan.

The same sort of false hopes are being raised in our press with reference to the German-Russian situation. There is no question but that the Greece and Crete incidents delayed Germany's move on their Eastern front. I think it quite probable that they intended to move against Russia earlier in the year. If the delay incident to the two campaigns noted above have introduced sufficient delay in their time table, which, coupled with Russian resistance, will permit the Russians to carry on some sort of a front this winter, then possibly those two debacles were not entirely without compensation. The Hun is after the Russ Army. It has proved far more of a stumbling block than Hitler had imagined. However, the Germans are making steady progress. The Russian losses in men and material are great, and production of essential war materials is being much lessened. *When the Harriman mission returns from Moscow (Admiral Standley is our senior Navy member), we will probably get some real news. Harry Hopkins saw only Stalin. The Russians Military Mission that is now in the United States has presented very large requests for war materials, and it makes our own planning an ever changing affair.
You now have our reply to your official recommendation concerning the withdrawal of the Marines from China. We recognize the soundness of all your arguments, pro and con, and we put some weight on those questioning withdrawal. We feel that a complete withdrawal of our forces from China would create a reaction in that country and in Japan and in our own, that would be bad. So, for the moment at least, we will hang on. I know you will open it up again by letter or despatch if you consider it should be again reviewed; and it very well may be—there is little that is static in this old world at present.

I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that I am not fully supported in the above view. Tommy Holcomb wants to withdraw, lock, stock, and barrel. I can easily see his point of view. He wants to avoid, if at all possible, "blood letting". In this, he is supported by Colonel Peck. That officer feels that all or none of the marines should come out. Peck is against leaving a "token force". He feels that to do so, we are inviting trouble and that the "token force" can be of little support to the local police. In that, I agree. But, something bigger is at stake. So far as China is concerned, we have "our foot in the door"—the door that once was "open", and if I had the say to, it would remain there until I was ready to withdraw [4] it—or until the door opened to such a point that I could gracefully withdraw if and when I saw fit. I agree that proper timing may be extremely difficult. You may be right that they should come now. I hope I am right in holding on. Ultimately, I hope we may both see alike. I don't enjoy not being 100% with you.

You know how I have long felt about reinforcing the Philippines. The enclosed memorandum shows what is in the wind. Personally, I am delighted, and I am sure you will be, too. I think it should have a pronounced effect in prevention—or, if not, then in execution.

We are awaiting with interest your reply to our despatch about additional aircraft for you and our proposition about giving you some additional long-range submarines. It is, I take it, largely a question of your upkeep facilities.

Take care of yourself. Keep cheerful! And every good wish in the wide world.

Sincerely, [8] Betty

Admiral T. C. Hart, USN
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet

% Postmaster, Asiatic Station,
San Francisco, California.

Secret

Memorandum for Admiral Stark:

DEAR BETTY: You asked me about what we are doing for the Philippines:

August 26: There sailed from San Francisco part of a regiment of antiaircraft troops and some reserve supplies.

September 8: There sailed from San Francisco the remainder of the antiaircraft regiment, a tank battalion of 50 tanks, 50 of the latest pursuit planes, and the personnel to man them, which brings the modern pursuit planes in the Philippines up to 80.

September 18: 50 self-propelled mounts for 75 cannon to be shipped from San Francisco, and 50 more tanks.

Today: The squadron of nine Flying Fortresses landed in Manila after successfully flying the route Midway, Wake, New Britain, Dutch East Indies.

September 30: Two squadrons (26 planes) of Flying Fortresses will leave San Francisco for Hawaii en route to the Philippines.

October: A reserve of pursuit planes will have been in process of shipment, about 32 in October, rising to a total of 130 by December.

November: Probably a reserve of six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses, B-24 type planes will be transferred to Manila. These planes will have an operating radius of 1,500 miles, with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means that they can reach Osaka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load. They have pressure cabins and can operate continuously 35,000 feet for bombing.

December: Another group of Flying Fortresses, some 35 planes, goes to Manila.

A group of dive bombers, some 54 planes, also goes.
A group of pursuit, some 130 planes, along with two additional squadrons to build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatched. A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes.  

G. C. M.  
Chief of Staff.  

You may have had word of this already: I gave original to Mr. Stimson.  

(Red'd 4 Oct.)  

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, 23 September 1941.  

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu  

Secret  

DEAR KIMMEL: This is in reply to your letter of 12 September. I have sent you a copy of my letter of 22 September to Tommy Hart which gives some of the picture as I see it up to that date.  

At the present time the President has issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-area.  

The situation in the Pacific generally is far different from what it is in the Atlantic. The operations of raiders in the Pacific at present are not very widespread or very effective. Most of the merchantmen in the Pacific are of United States or Panamanian flag registry. Instituting any steps toward eliminating raiders outside of waters close to the continents of North and South America, might have unfavorable repercussions, which would not be worth the cost to the United States in the long run. The longer we can keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned.  

One of the things you did not mention is what action the United States and the United Kingdom would take were Japan to attack Siberia. The policy of either government under such circumstances has not yet been clarified. In the meantime we are preparing an agenda for staff conversations with the Russians.  

In reply to question (a) your existing orders to escorts are appropriate under the present situation. They are also in accordance with Art. 723 U. S. Navy Regulations; no orders should be given to shoot at the Present Time, other than those clearly set forth in this article. I believe there is little possibility of an Italian or German raider molesting a naval ship, but there might be another "Robin Moore" incident in the Pacific, in which case the President might give orders for action in the Pacific similar to those now in effect in the Atlantic; but that is something for the future.  

Art. 723, U. S. N. R. reads as follows:  
"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal.  

The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, [2] whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already committed."  

Regarding question (b), we have no definite information that Japanese submarines have ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska or our Pacific Coast. They may have been near Wake recently. The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next stop. Keep us informed.
We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year.

The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the Far East. Furthermore, the Japan-Soviet situation requires considerable attention from Japan's naval forces. While offensives by the Pacific Fleet in the Central Pacific may not draw important Japanese naval forces in that direction, they ought to have an important effect in pinning the Japanese Navy to northern water, or to bases in the Western Pacific, and thus divert them away from the Philippines and the Malay Barrier. By copy of my letter to Admiral Hart you now know that the Army is building up its Philippine Garrison, and plans important increases in Army air forces in the Philippines. Dutch and British air and land forces are also gradually increasing in strength. We are now informed by the British that they plan to send the Battleships ROYAL SOVERIGN, RAMILIES and RESOLUTION to arrive on the East Indian Station by late December; to retain there the REPULSE until relieved by the RENOWN in January; and to send one or two modern capital ships to the East Indian Station early in the new year. These, with one carrier, and a total of four eight-inch cruisers and thirteen six-inch cruisers (seven modern) ought to make the task of the Japanese in moving southward considerably more difficult. It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time.

[3] I may be mistaken, but I do not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet is likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under circumstances that now seem possible.

The NORTH CAROLINA and the WASHINGTON are not as yet finally completed and have had no target practice. We ought to put aside any thought that these two battleships will be of any practical use to us before the end of next March, and I would consider it most unwise to reach any final decision now as to which Fleet they ought ultimately to be attached. At present, the need for them is far greater in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, particularly if we are to make possible the movement of British naval forces from the Atlantic to the Far East Area.

With regard to the first and last paragraphs on page two, I believe that, in all probability, the Pacific Fleet can operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly can be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

The following despatch has just been brought to my attention. You no doubt have seen it but I will quote it as a reminder.

"Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga Retired in interview published in Hocchi States Japanese should face future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over Guam total sixteen times once this year without sighting single American plane x American air power Far East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served twelve years as aviator Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Director Japan airways."

In connection with the foregoing would it not be possible for your force to "carefully" get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?

Keep Cheerful.

c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

P. S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse. As I see it we can get nowhere towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some agreement between Japan and China—and just now that seems remote. Whether or not their inability to come to any sort of an understanding just now—is—or—is not—a good thing—I hesitate to say.

Copy to Admiral Hart.

29 September 1941.

P. S. #2: Admiral Nomura came in to see me this morning. We talked for about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his
rope; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.

Our transports which recently landed a contingent of Army in Iceland will, God willing, in another day be clear of the submarine concentration through which they have had to run and we will breathe easy with regard to them. However, it is a continuous game now and yesterday I am glad to state we delivered our first big convoy to the British after having gone through safely from Newfoundland well into the Eastern Atlantic. We also have a combatant force going up to strengthen the Iceland situation for the next few weeks because of the British situation and the possibility of a sortie of a German contingent which is under surveillance.

I saw a photograph of your picture. It looks great and I think it is a fine thing to have it recorded; the boys will be proud of it always.

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**Secret**

Op-10 Hu

**DEAR KIMMEL:** Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our despatches you know about all that we do.

Personnally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the “possibility”; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura and gave the dope as I saw it.

You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, I said my own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together.

With regard to merchant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly.

We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it can be kept going I don’t know, but the President and Mr. Hull are working on it.

The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personally without going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude, civil attitude and Navy attitude I hardly see any way around it. I think we could settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the stumbling block. Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan before they get through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way anywhere. A nice setup for not sounding the gong.

Kitts was in this morning and I shall have a long talk with him before he goes back.

Off hand without going into the “ins” and “outs” I see no reason for your stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self-contained task forces. We have left it up to you and I am just giving you my reaction.

We have no other news yet regarding the torpedoing of the KEARNY except that she was hit and is proceeding slowly to Iceland. She was deflected from an American escorted convoy to a Canadian escorted convoy which was being hard pressed. Of course losses are bound to be in order. My hope is that they can be kept to a minimum with the curve ever favoring our end.

In August for the first time there was a slight net gain in shipping. Our effort, of course, is to have that confirmed in subsequent months for two reasons—accelerated shipbuilding and better protection to convoys with results—decreased sinkings.
I know how you and Admiral Hart must be pleased with the Army increased air in the Philippines. The Island of Wake is a vital link in this connection. If it is put out of commission it stops Army air reinforcements. I hope we can maintain the integrity of these Island bases and push as fast as possible their completion. You have all the dope that I have on this and know the studies that are being made for alternate routes. You will be glad to know that recruiting is still on the increase and I can assure you I have your personnel situation always on my conscience as well as most every other situation affecting everything afloat.

Keep cheerful!

Sincerely,

Will add a P. S. in the a : m, want this to make the clipper.

P. S. Very little news from the Kearny and we are asking her nothing, feeling that she will notify us as soon as she can. Radio silence may be essential. All we do know is that she was torpedoed in the forward fire room and is now making 8 knots. Not a thing on casualties or beyond the bare facts given above. I will release everything to the press as soon as I can, so you should know almost as soon as I do.

Pinky Schuirmann made up an estimate for me yesterday on the Jap cabinet situation, which sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to set them down. He and I see very much eye to eye on this. I am enclosing copy of what he gave me.

Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability and my advice to him was not to worry.

He also thought it advisable that I release him at this time from the aerial photographs I gave him to get of the mandates, stating that they might be detected and might complicate the international situation. I agreed, and he stated that he would endeavor to make them later.

I have nothing else for the moment.

I will send copy of this to Tommy Hart as usual, and I assume also, as usual, that you will show Bloch.

H. R. S.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, October 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the C. N. O.

I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought or action.

The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic manoeuvring, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties.

Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in office for the most of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have expressed disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial action has not been taken.

Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees.
The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it may have restrained the extremists among the military not that it has opposed Japan’s program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the coming months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they will be seized.

At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depending on the course of the war in Russia.

The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some concession to the “moderates” in order to enable them to cope with the “extremists” has been offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador.

Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power.

/s/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN.

CW/vt

Secret

October 27, 1941.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL: During Commander Kitts recent visit here, he and Admiral Stark discussed the enclosed secret memorandum for the Secretary of State. Admiral Stark wished the enclosed copy to be forwarded to you and has directed me to do so because of his own absence from the city in connection with the observance in Chicago of Navy Day.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES WELLBORN, JR.,
Commander U. S. N.
Aide to Admiral Stark.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA.
% Postmaster, San Francisco, Cal.

[1] Secret

HRS/HU

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This morning you asked me what I thought would be the advantages and disadvantages of abolishing the combat zones around the British Isles and elsewhere. You also inquired as to the possibility of United States naval craft escorting all the way across the Atlantic; also as to the disadvantages and advantages that would occur should Hitler declare war on the United States.

The chief advantages to abolishing the combat zones, would, as I see it, be:

(a) It would permit American flag vessels to enter British ports. This would be of some importance now but of much greater importance as the United States Merchant Marine increases in size. The United Kingdom is handicapped for man-power. Any great increase in their Merchant Marine might mean reduction in their output of munitions. Therefore, there can be no question but that it would be advantageous from the war effort standpoint if the United States flag vessels, manned by American crews, could increase the shipping both to the British Isles and to other military areas. Moreover since our ships, particularly those which we are now building, are generally faster than British cargo ships, submarine losses might be expected to decrease.

(b) It is impracticable for the ocean escorts based in North America, whether United States or British, to make the entire trip across the Atlantic under normal circumstances. Furthermore, due to the fact that a large number of submarines have been operating in the Western Atlantic Area, no United States escort vessels could now be sent to the British Isles unless they were replaced in the Western Atlantic Area by British escort vessels. Were some of our ships to operate in British waters it would have the advantage of raising British
Morale, encouraging resistance to the Germans by subjugated peoples and peoples in fear of subjugation, and would give the American people a stake in the decisive war area.

(c) A special feature of the situation discussed in subparagraph (b), would probably be the deterring effect on Italy with relation to a further war effort, and the encouraging effect on the French to resist German demands.

[2] (d) The effect on the German people might be to lower their morale and thus reduce their war effort. This, of course, might be offset to considerable extent, if, in the near future, they were to succeed in completely defeating the Russian Armies.

(e) It seems probable that Germany would declare war on the United States. The possible disadvantages of this are referred to in the succeeding paragraph. The advantages of declaration of war would be that the United States would be given a free hand in the operation of its armed forces; it would gain important belligerent rights over neutral shipping and commerce; and is would permit the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets to be employed for eradicating German raiders in the Pacific Ocean. It would give encouragement to resistance to the Germans by subjugated peoples and peoples in fear of subjugation. The United States could take appropriate action against enemy subjects, spies and agents within its borders. It would also permit specific offensive plans to be made by the United States Army and Navy. It would tremendously enhance the war effort put forth by this country and we could plan well into the future for the defeat of Germany with some assurance which we cannot now do.

The disadvantages would be:

(a) Until the present strength of the armed forces is materially increased by the programs now under way, the results which would be immediately apparent might be disappointing to the American and other peoples.

(b) A declaration of war by the United States against Germany unless Germany had previously declared was against the United States, might bring Japan into the war as an active belligerent. This would be without question a decided disadvantage because the United States would then be engaged in actual hostilities on two fronts; something we may have to accept, but every effort should be made to avoid this situation. I might add that I believe efforts in this behalf will best be served by our continued strong stand against Japanese aggression.

(c) It is questionable if sentiment in South America will actively support the United States until this country is in a position to make a much stronger effort by land and sea than it is now able to do and until the results of its participation are apparent.

(d) A declaration of war would cause the loss of many of our contacts for information which we now have in Germany, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe. This, however, should not be a determining factor. I simply set it down, as one of the disadvantages.

[3] It has long been my opinion that Germany cannot be defeated unless the United States is wholeheartedly in the war and makes a strong military and naval effort wherever strategy dictates. It would be very desirable to enter the war under circumstances in which Germany were the aggressor and in which case Japan might then be able to remain neutral. However, on the whole, it is my opinion that the United States should enter the war against Germany as soon as possible, even if hostilities with Japan must be accepted.

It must be recognized that if Germany declares war on the United States and if the United States in consequence declares war on Germany, the United States must at the same time declare war on all nations who are Allies of Germany. This is particularly true in the case of Italy, as no distinction could be made at sea between German and Italian vessels. Such action probably would have a very marked effect on the morale of the Italian people. It might be possible not to declare war on such nations as Finland where the possibility of United States forces coming in contact with Finnish forces are remote. However, there are Finnish merchant vessels in operation in the Atlantic Ocean. I do not include Japan as an Ally of Germany—at least—Not Yet.

The foregoing has been hurriedly set down following your call. I thought it better to write it than to give it to you over the phone.

I might finally add that I have assumed for the past two years that our country would not let Great Britain fall; that ultimately in order to prevent this we would have to enter the war and as noted above I have long felt and have stated that the sooner we get in the better.
P. S. I did not set down in the attached notes what I have mentioned to you before, namely, that I do not believe Germany will declare war on us until she is good and ready; that it will be a cold-blooded decision on Hitler's part if and when he thinks it will pay, and not until then.

He has every excuse in the world to declare war on us now, if he were of a mind to.

He had no legitimate excuse in the world (except to serve his own ends) to invade the countries he has.

When he is ready, he will strike, and not before.

Secret
Op-10-MD

Memorandum for—
Admiral King.
Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Hart.

I am just about to get out something like the enclosed and thought you might be interested.

With regard to the Salinas, she was hit by two torpedoes, one fairly well aft and one about half way between the first hit and the bow. The submarine then came up on her quarter and fired three more torpedoes, two of which went astern and one ahead. At this time the Salinas fired at her—thinks she hit her—and the Dupont is believed to have finished off the submarine. This information came by despatch. Detailed reports are not yet in. We are, of course, cut pedaling any matériel news and have mentioned nothing regarding any sinking or alleged sinking of submarines. We are constantly making submarine contacts, they having concentrated in our part of the northern passage for some time past.

One of the destroyers reported getting a great deal of oil to the surface after a bombing of a submarine, but her written reports likewise are not yet in.

Regarding the Reuben James, she went down so quickly that we know little. A despatch states that she was hit forward about abreast No. 1 stack. The explosion was so violent that it is possible a magazine was set off. The whole forward end of the ship was detached and sunk almost immediately—and the aft part about 5 minutes later.

When the stern sank, a number of depth charges let go, adding to the number of casualties. Rescue operations were greatly hampered by oil, darkness, presence of submarine, and cold. We published the casualty list this morning.

[2] We have a report that the safety pins on the depth charges had previously jarred loose. This, of course, is being looked into by the Bureau of Ordnance. The above is about all I know at present.

Lessons learned will, of course, be communicated after reports are in and study made.

My best to all hands.
Keep cheerful!

H. R. Stark.

November 4, 1941.

A release announcing the torpedoing of the Salinas has just been made, she having safely arrived at St. Johns.

The Salinas was torpedoed on 29–30 October 1941, the day before the Reuben James was torpedoed. Initial reports showed her speed to be reduced to 5 knots and she had a long voyage to make the nearest port. Obviously, to have made public her damaged condition would have meant a direct invitation for further attack on her in the submarine infested waters through which she had to pass. Secrecy, therefore, was essential and every effort was made to maintain it.

Relative to the above, the following incident occurred:

One of the girls employed in the Navy Department reported to the Officer in Charge of the Office where she worked that she heard two officers telling about the torpedoing of a naval vessel, the Salinas. She said she could not help but hear them and wondered if it were true.

It should be unnecessary to elaborate on this. Loose talk in public places, over the telephone, in the home, at a party, or anywhere else, except in strictly official circles, may bring disastrous results, the magnitude of which could only be weighed by what happened to be at stake.
It should not be necessary to add that this must stop. Any one worth his or her salt must realize the potential danger of carrying outside his or her office to anyone, whose business it is not, anything regarding naval plans or operations, movements or damage to ships, etc.

This memorandum has been intentionally withheld until the SALINAS arrived in port.

(Mimeographed and distributed to Department.)

Secret
In reply refer to Initials and No Lp-10D-MD

Received via clipper
14 Nov

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, November 7, 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in reply to your letter of October 22, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are in a fine fettle.

Ok on the disposition which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is—What next?!

I note the great desirability of many things for the Pacific Fleet—particularly destroyers and cruisers. We just haven’t any destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you with a recital of King’s troubles, but he is up against it for DDs for escort—and defense against raiders.

The NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON are not expected to be available before March. As pointed out in my letter of September 23, 1941, I do not think any permanent assignment of either, or both of these ships can be made at this time. We are assigning them to King now in the interest of training—arriving etc.

With the possible exception of one division, it is our intention to send the long-range submarines to the Pacific as they come along. As you no doubt know, twenty-seven (27) of the 1525-ton SS are due for completion in calendar 1942.

Due to the urgency for providing the destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet with high-speed anti-submarine searching equipment, 27 of the 29 Model QC retractile domes and projectors have been diverted from mine craft of the Pacific Fleet and Local Defense Force destroyers in the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet. Inasmuch as the power stacks, controls, etc., for the 29 QC equipments need not be installed in the Atlantic Fleet, it will be necessary for the manufacturer to produce only 27 additional retractile domes and projectors in order to complete the QC equipments required for the ships from which the equipment has been diverted. The Bureau of Ships is being requested to expedite procurement of the additional domes and projectors. This additional procurement should not require a great deal of time since the manufacturer is tooled for this production.

Two of the original order of 29 complete QC equipments will be delivered to the Pacific Fleet. Additionally, two preliminary models (one at Mare Island and one at Norfolk) can be made available to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as soon as installation plans for this new type of retractile dome equipment can be completed by the Navy Yards concerned.

I note your criticism of the Gunnery Radar. The Model FA fire control RADAR is the first production equipment for the Navy. This equipment is unsatisfactory because of its low-power output and the short life of the vacuum tubes. Only ten production models were manufactured; these were manufactured for the purpose of tooling the shops for later and improved models could be developed and manufactured. The FA equipment was installed in eight HONOLULU Class C1s, WICHITA, and Radio Materiel School, Bellevue.

The improved fire control equipment is the Model FC. This equipment employs magnetron generators and has a very much higher powered output. It should be understood, however, that because of the high frequencies used by fire control RADAR, long ranges on aircraft cannot be obtained. The long range aircraft detection equipment is intended to be used for the purpose of tracking aircraft until the aircraft are within range of the fire control RADAR. Fire control RADAR will detect and range on aircraft at ranges greatly in excess of the ranges of the antiaircraft guns.
Relative to the two Seatrain vessels which we recently acquired and which are now undergoing conversion for use in transporting Aircraft, they now have readiness dates of December 2nd and December 16th. It is our present intention to assign one to the Train of the Atlantic Fleet and one to the Base Force, Pacific, but if we have to send planes to the Near East, we may have to use these ships for this purpose. We are also going to take over the remaining other 3 vessels of this type and propose to use them un-converted for anticipated transport of planes to Europe-Russia-China—? May have to charter them rather than take them over—in order conserve Navy personnel.

You asked about merchant ship conversions for carrier landing training operations. The field from which to get ships for this purpose is, as you know, extremely limited. However, the best of these have been earmarked for conversion to AVG's as soon as they can be made available. Right now the ones we have in mind are engaged in an important duty. Conversion will take 12 to 15 months.

Your study of the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra arrived in the Department yesterday. It is being routed to War Plans for study. I had an opportunity to skim through it hurriedly, and it looked like a very good paper. It will be of much help to us.

In connection with the aircraft routes to the Orient via a southerly detour, I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I write to Admiral Bloch.

Admiral Lyster, the Fifth Sea Lord, recently visited us. He is quite a chap and impressed us as knowing his job, and being a very able officer. I am enclosing, as being of possible interest to you, copies of the notes which he gave to us as a result of his observations on the manner in which we employ our aircraft.

In addition, I am sending a copy of the notes made by Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten as the result of his observations in the fleet. He, too, impressed me as being a very capable officer. I am sure much good will result from the observations of both of these officers.

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worser and worser"! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go on forever—particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look good.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

/S/ Betty.

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N.,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

British movement of BB to far east area—I hope—will be completed in December.

Secret
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10D-MD

22915 received Clipped 20 Nov.

Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, November 14, 1941.

removed conf. letter 182 on Fortification Guam

Dear Mustapha: This is in answer to yours of October 29, November 6 and 7, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are going strong.

I have not been able to get very much definite information about Mr. Hallet Abend. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum which Public Relations had given me about him. I am told by an officer who recently returned from the Asiatic Station that he enjoyed a good reputation as a correspondent out there. This same source stated that the Japs had beaten him up in Shanghai and destroyed a manuscript of a book he was about to submit to his publishers.

I had previously seen the clipping from the New York Times, which you sent me, the authorship of which is credited to Mr. Abend. The way the yarn was written, one could easily spot it as a "phoney".

Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our Estimate, which was recently submitted by General Marshall and
me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be followed remains to be seen.

If Mr. Churchill’s speech of Monday last, given at the Lord Mayor’s house, is the expression of British policy, it would seem there might be considerable truth in the information given to you by Mr. Abend.

Your estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates has been received in the Department. It will be carefully studied. From a hasty examination, it appears to be a very complete paper.

I have taken up with Van Keuren the subject of the listening gear for ships you listed in your letter of November 6. Like Radar, the delay in getting this gear was caused by getting or, rather, not getting into production. At last, we are “over the hump” and [2] listening gear is coming on rapidly. Deliveries are underway, and four (4) or five (5) sets will go to Pearl Harbor by each ship from now on. By mid-December you should have received about 22 sets.

Of course, you can divert these for installation as you see fit.

With regard to the VSO’s going to the Asiatic. These will go out, crated, in a merchant ship. Instructions to do this have been issued to Com. 12. You should receive a copy of the order to do this in due time.

Regarding your comments about the desirability of having fight deck merchant ships for use in training aviators for carrier duty: — I agree with you 100%.

The trouble is that we just can’t get the ships to convert into carriers. The converted SS MORMACMAIL (now the USS LONG ISLAND) is far from satisfactory. She should have twenty (20) knots and actually hasn’t sixteen (16) knots. She just doesn’t have speed enough. She can be operated if conditions of wind are such as to give her the required apparent wind across the deck. Unless this condition prevails, she is almost worthless as a carrier.

Incidentally, five (5) of this type are being converted in our yards for the British under Lend-Lease. The large fast ships which we now have and which could be converted for the duty you have in mind are currently engaged in an important mission (transporting British troops to the Middle East—obviously most secret) and will be so engaged for a number of months. I would give a lot if we had those ships now converted to carriers and fully equipped for combat purposes.

The only other ships under U. S. registry out of which we could get twenty (20) knots (if we had them) are the four (4) Matsons and the three (3) Moore-McCormicks now engaged in the South American run. We have had our eye on the NORMANDIE. Thus far, State Department and President are adamant.

I suppose they think that to take her over would, in some way, drive Vichy closer to Germany. All in all, a dismal picture for the converted carrier idea prevails.

The General Board has recently completed a study on Guam. I am enclosing a copy of this paper for your study. I would appreciate getting your reaction to it.

Of course, if Guam were fortified and developed at the moment, we could make much use of it. One item to which I have been giving much thought and upon which I would like your advice—what do you think of going ahead now with the construction of a landing field out there? The thought I have is that we could construct such a field which might be of service to us. To be sure, we might lose it, but we could build into it provisions for its at least temporary destruction.

[3] The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu’s arrival in Washington has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his visit. I note this morning in the press despatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was necessary for the “solution of the Pacific Crisis.” Complete capitulation by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view.

With all good wishes! Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

/S/ Betty.

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N.,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.
Memorandum for the President:
Subject: Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai-Shek’s belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the “China incident.” If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided these troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of Naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The United States Naval air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defense strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:
[4] (a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or South of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

(3) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i.e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan’s economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.


That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

____________________
Chief of Staff.

____________________
Chief of Naval Operations.

Secret

In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/Hu Sec #6

received 3rd Dec
#23598 Clipper

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn’t appreciate your needs as well as Tommy Hart’s and King’s I would not be working almost literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you.

We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. It was on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 were predicated and which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compromise we could get out of the situation actually confronting us.

I agree with you for example that to cruise in Japanese home waters you should have substantial increase in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC-1 or Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity for
raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the exception rather than the rule.

It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking the destroyers which we now have in our West Coast ports, and the Secretary was sold on it; however it has been successfully resisted to date. King said that if they were out with you on the firing line he would not make such recommendation, but where they were he thought they were legitimate prey. He, too, you know is up against it for sufficient forces to perform his tasks. Just stop for a minute and realize that into his heavy routine escort work he has added at the moment large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on the one hand, British on another in Northern waters, and still another of 20,000 which have been brought over and are now on their way to Cape Town and possibly to Durban because of submarines operating off Cape Town. Obviously these troop movements are highly secret. We are at our wit's end in the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely thin and the job continuously increasing in toughness.

Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in getting the President to authorize our use of draftees. I have been after this for months. Now that I have got permission it will take some time to get it through the Congress as we have to have special legislation to use our funds for this purpose. It has been my hope to use draftees wherever possible in District work and Air Stations, tugs, net layers, mine layers, mine sweepers, etc. etc. Navigation is working to see just how many such men can be replaced, thus releasing men to the Fleet.

Believe it or not, the REUBEN JAMES set recruiting back about 15%. We are increasing our advertising campaigns extensively; not only that, but Navigation is hiring civilian managers to assist in recruiting. Draftees however constitute something sure and I only wish I could have gotten them months ago. The President in giving final approval said he just hated to do it; but sentiment is fast getting out of my system, if there is any left in it on this war.

Regarding permanence of personnel I have been over with Nimitz in detail some to the recent changes and he will write you the details. There is a problem here as well as elsewhere; and while we expect you and want you to hammer away on your own difficulties, just occasionally remember that we fully realize our only existence here is for the Fleet and that we are doing the best we can with increasingly vexing problems.

Your letters at least give us ammunition, if not much comfort.

I asked Nimitz last week to give me the figures showing the percentage of men now on board on the basis of the old complements. Enclosed is a table he has just handed me. It may be poor consolation but at least it is something to know that the Fleet has more men now than at any time since the last war. I do not have the data for the last war. This does not mean that we are at all satisfied with it, but it is something I have been following. I assure you every effort is being made to improve it. It is steadily improving, but all too slowly to satisfy any of us.

One thing I forgot to mention was your "the Pacific Fleet must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the Shore Establishment." I'll hand that one to King. Once in a while something happens which gives real interest. I think I'll have a gallery ready to see King when he reads that, particularly after a recent statement of his that he noted he was getting fewer men and had less percentage of complement than did the Pacific Fleet, etc. etc.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,


Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
o/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

[9] P. S. I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From
many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

I won’t go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that’s the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be “anything”.

/S/ HRS.

Summary—Nov. 25, 1941

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Section B

Commander Cruisers, Battle Force

United States Fleet

Confidential

U. S. S. Honolulu,
Pearl Harbor, P. H., January 27, 1941.

Dear Betty: I received your letter of 13 January. You may be sure that I will keep you fully, frankly and probably even critically informed of the situation out here.

During even the brief time that I have had to survey the situation, I am particularly impressed with the lack of Army equipment, for the task of defending this base. This matter has been fully covered in recent official correspondence. I think the supply of an adequate number of Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority. I will expand on this later. It is sufficient at this time to state that a secure base here is of paramount importance. I have discussed this matter fully with McCrea and he has taken notes on my ideas, and I am sure that he will present them fully.
We have been together long enough so that I am sure you are quite familiar with my methods of doing business. You know how I appreciate the value of conferences. I agree that it is essential to keep the principal subordinates within the command, fully informed of the circumstances as they develop. I shall follow such a policy.

As you know, the Fleet Personnel Board, with Theobald at the head of it, has been giving long and careful study to the personnel requirements of the ships of the different types. I shall probably be required to make recommendations on this subject shortly after I take over. It appears wise to now fill all ships with personnel to capacity, both on account of the needed increase in complement to man the ships, and to train men for new construction.

[2] I now come to a point which I have discussed fully with Joe and with which we are in complete accord. Richardson believes and recommends that under present conditions I should move ashore with my staff. I believe, from my conception of what a campaign in the Pacific under present policies will amount to, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and his staff should be quartered ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, at least in the initial stages of the campaign. Facilities on the Fleet flagship are not sufficient to provide living and working accommodations for the personnel required on the staff. It is neither desirable nor practicable to scatter the staff through other ships of the Fleet. As I see it, the only solution lies in having them assembled ashore in the district. I have looked into this matter to a certain extent and believe that existing facilities within the district, particularly at the Submarine Base, are such that the staff can be quartered there. It appears that certain modifications and additions to the present communication set-up will have to be provided, in order that a complete communication set-up will be available. Facilities for office space, quarters for officers and enlisted men of the staff can be made available with little rearrangement of what now exists in the Submarine Base. Of course, that would be of a temporary nature. As soon as I have investigated this whole thing more fully and have had an opportunity to visualize the picture more completely, I believe that the correct solution to the whole problem will lie in the erection of a separate building to house the complete requirements of the Commander-in-Chief’s staff ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District. I am not prepared to give you the details of this at this writing. Incidentally, in connection with the requirements of the Commander-in-Chief, I believe that he himself should be assigned to one of the official quarters now in the Fourteenth Naval District.

You appreciate, of course, that this question of housing the staff ashore, has not passed much beyond the preliminary investigations. As you know, however, I have already obtained quarters for the War Plans Section in the Submarine Base and that section of four officers and all the files necessary for their work will be moved into those quarters very soon after 1 February. If further study of the Pacific set-up, as I visualize it, [3] substantiates my present ideas, and if the quarters I have in mind in the Submarine Base show that they can take my staff, I shall move from the PENNSYLVANIA to those quarters as soon as they can be made ready. In that connection, of course, you understand that the present facilities on board the PENNSYLVANIA will remain intact and that I shall arrange matters ashore so that my entire staff and myself can move on board the PENNSYLVANIA within a few hours. I shall, of course, be on board the PENNSYLVANIA whenever tactical exercises are conducted and during any other times when I feel the necessity for it. My staff battle organization will require training on the PENNSYLVANIA, and I shall embark on that ship for enough fleet work to keep them trained for any emergency.

If I move ashore and find that the arrangement as I now visualize it is the correct one, I shall have plans drawn up for a permanent Fleet Center ashore. I shall submit the plans to the Bureau and request funds for its immediate construction.

Things are buzzing around here, and I am taking every opportunity and a lot of Joe’s time, to get his points of view on many vital questions that are involved in this job. I was sorry to hear that you had an attack of the flu, but happy to know, from the press reports of the arrival of the KING GEORGE V, that you were able to get to sea in the Chesapeake to greet the new Ambassador.
That seems to be about all for this time; but I am sure that I shall have a lot more to tell you in our continued correspondence.

My kindest regards and best wishes to you and your good wife, as always.

Most sincerely yours,

s/ H. E. Kimmel.

H. E. Kimmel

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.


Secret

United States Fleet

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 18 February 1941.

Dear Betty: Your letter of 29 January reached me on 14 February, and your letter of 10 February arrived on board on 16 February. You will note that the delays were due to interference with clipper schedules.

A check has already been sent to the Navy Relief for $39,000.00 and one to the American Red Cross for $9,900.00. This was done by Richardson just prior to his detachment. I trust that the Navy Relief has received it by now.

I will inform Bloch in regard to the search of fishermen and think it an excellent idea. I believe this search has been in effect here for some time.

Nimitz has written me to put not more than 100% complement on any type of ship. I will pass this along to Calhoun, but with the present rates of supply and attrition I see small chance of exceeding 100%.

I wrote Nimitz today in regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for post graduate ordnance officers to be employed on shore, and asked Nimitz to show you the letter when he receives it. You will note that I took occasion in this letter to reiterate the need for additional enlisted personnel in all types of ships. From my standpoint there is every urge to train just as many men as is possible. This is in addition to the need for men in existing ships. The new construction program will, in a reasonable time, make inordinate demands on the Fleet. I would repeat here what I said in my letter to Nimitz, that the condition of the Fleet within the next few months may be of much greater importance to the Nation than the completion of the two-ocean Navy in 1946.

I was delighted to learn about the Army fighters. The first contingent is now on its way, together with certain equipment for the outlying islands. In addition to the fighters I believe it of the highest importance to send just as many Army bombers and adequate supplies of bombs to Oahu as the Army establishment can support with the greatest effort. The need for Army anti-aircraft guns should also be stressed. Active and immediate steps are being taken to coordinate the Army and Navy air effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl Harbor.

I had a couple of interviews with Short and find him fully alive to the situation and highly cooperative. I recommend that you keep continuous pressure on this question of Army reinforcement of Oahu.

The full complement of Marines has landed at Midway. We utilized Crudiv EIGHT, Desdiv ELEVEN, and the ANTARÉS to transfer troops, baggage, equipment, etc. You will have received our statement of the conditions existing at Johnson and Palymra. In this I tried to give you a complete picture, together with the only possible solution I see with the forces available. The transfer to these islands of the maximum numbers you indicated may carry with it very difficult complications, as a sudden call in the midst of the operation might involve serious consequences. As I gather from researches, the orders involve a drastic change from the original conception of the forces to be supported at Johnson and Palymra. I think our recommendation to send 100 Marines to Palymra and none to Johnson for the present, should be accepted.

Will study, prepare plans, and be ready for a quick decision in case orders are received for a detachment of cruisers, destroyers, and a carrier to make the proposed cruise to Manila or elsewhere. From my standpoint this appears to be a most ill-advised move. Our strength in destroyers and cruisers is already limited. A carrier can ill be spared if we are to carry out other proposed plans. While my political horizon is limited, I believe we should be prepared for war when we make this move.
The detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District will have to be made from the Fleet. This is a further drain on our small craft. In this connection I am recommending in separate correspondence that you send out one squadron of PTs and one squadron of the new PTC sub-chasers at the earliest possible date. I presume Bloch has his plans for commandeering local craft, but I will check with him and also inform him of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over shortly.

Bill Halsey has been bombarding the Bureau of Ordnance in an attempt to get an increased supply of bombs. The copy of their reply, which I think you should read, leaves us with very little hope for early alleviation of this most unsatisfactory condition. In separate correspondence, which will go forward at the same time as this letter, we are recommending the shipment of these bombs to Oahu in advance of the preparation of regulation proof stowages. I think we must accept the hazard and possible [3] deterioration which may ensue from shelter stowage. The total lack of incendiary bombs should be remedied at the earliest date.

The subject of reserve ammunition for the Fleet has been covered in various letters. I feel that the number of ammunition ships in commission and being converted is still entirely inadequate to handle the situation.

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces,—DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive.

After a thorough investigation, we are proceeding to fit existing facilities at the Submarine Base to permit shore basing my staff and myself. Just when I will move ashore depends upon the supply of essential equipment. I have only one object, that is to so place myself and my staff that we can best accomplish the task before us.

To revert once more to the question of enlisted personnel, Theobald's board, in my opinion, has contributed more to the Fleet than any single factor in a very long time. It did a most excellent job and, in the absence of positive evidence that they are wrong, we should accept their recommendations. I have ordered the Medical Board, the members of which represent all types of ships, and have told them to expedite their proceedings. I propose to give you their findings by despatch.

Before the report of the Fleet Personnel Board reached your office, I sent you a despatch outlining the minimum complements prescribed by the Board for each type of ship. In reply I was informed by despatch that the complements recommended exceeded those assigned in the Force Operating Plan for 1942, and was instructed not to install bunks, lockers, and messing facilities in excess of the complements already arrived at by the Department. I am so convinced that the complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board are the minimum required to serve the ships in a campaign, and that the findings of the Medical Board will not declare the larger complements to be contrary to standards of health and comfort, that I sent another despatch last night asking for a reconsideration of your decision. Bunks [4] and lockers do not add greatly to the weight of a ship and are not unduly expensive. It is my frank opinion, as stated in the most recent despatch on this subject, that even if complements are not increased immediately to the limit recommended, it is better to install bunks and lockers now rather than do so in the confusion of mobilization, for I am convinced that if we take part in this war we shall most certainly have to build up our complements as recommended by the Fleet Board.

The Bureau of Navigation has forwarded me a long list of officers of post graduate training, now afloat, wanted by the Bureau of Ordnance for duty ashore. These officers occupy important command, gunnery, and staff positions. I realize the necessity for expediting ordnance projects and I want to help in every way I can. But the number of experienced officers in the ships at the present time is dangerously low. I can not view the detachment of additional experienced officers but with the greatest concern. I have asked the Bureau of Navigation to give me an opportunity to comment on the detachment in each case of officers with ordnance experience, prior to final action.

I also hope that drastic steps can be taken to stop the continuing turnover of personnel, particularly qualified personnel. The detachment and changes of qualified enlisted men concerns me almost as much as the detachment of qualified and experienced officers.
I come to another question of the highest importance,—the supply of modern type planes throughout the Fleet. I am forwarding under separate cover a copy of a letter written to the Bureau of Aeronautics on this subject. I have gathered the distinct impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is primarily concerned with the expansion program and that the supply of planes and personnel to man the Fleet takes a secondary place. Obstacles are offered to most of Halsey’s recommendations. I cannot subscribe to these views. We must have the most modern planes in our carriers and other surface vessels, in fact in all the aeronautical organization afloat. I realize of course the necessity for personnel ashore, particularly in the aeronautical organization, to train new personnel and to produce the material. But the balance should be maintained, and in any event the latest type planes should be supplied the Fleets. The forces afloat have repeatedly recommended the acquisition of two or more “seatrain” vessels to transport airplanes. I am not familiar with the technical difficulties involved, but if it is at all possible to do so—and Halsey in—[5]—sists that it is—I think this work should be undertaken at once. The recent required use of carriers to transport Army planes to Oahu illustrates the necessity for providing some means for airplane transport. Transporting planes and equipment by carrier is highly expensive, both in lost training of flyers and non-availability of carrier for other duty.

We are going ahead with Plan Dog and RAINBOW THREE. Prior to the receipt of the letters received in the mail yesterday we had given priority to Plan Dog, but as you state you wish priority to be given RAINBOW THREE, we will do so.

The necessity for additional store ships and transports is accentuated by placing Marines on the outlying islands and I hope nothing will stand in the way to promptly supply those now planned, and to further increase them as soon as practicable.

I shall decide upon the distribution of the exploders after consultation with Withers and Dramel.

With kindest regards and best wishes.


Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy.
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

P. S. We receive through radio and other intelligence rather reliable reports on the positions of Japanese merchant ships, but we have no definite information on the important Japanese trade routes. Can you send us the latest information you have on this? I am initiating separate correspondence on this topic.

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?

HEK.

[ ] CinC File No.
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
U. S. Submarine Base,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 22, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: So far I have not felt the need for a Public Relations Officer on my Staff. Situated as we are, the majority of this work has been very successfully handled by the District under Admiral Bloch. We have been in perfect accord as to what should and should not be released. From the standpoint of the newspaper and publicity men the situation may not be as satisfactory as it is from my standpoint. I can see where the services of a man like Waldo Drake could be of great value to the Service. So my answer is that if you can
send Waldo Drake out here to serve on my staff, I will be very glad to have him. An individual with less experience might do more harm than good.

We have been very much gratified at the responses to the items I enumerated in my letter of February 18. However, there is one outstanding deficiency that still exists in the Fleet—namely, permanency of personnel. The detachment of officers and men continues. I have written at length to Nimitz on this subject. I understand in some degree the personnel problem that confronts you and Nimitz. I feel that the establishment of a nucleus of trained and experienced officers and men in each ship of the Fleet is vital. This nucleus should include the Captain, Executive Officer, Heads of Departments and as many other key officers as the Bureau feels they can retain in the ship for the duration of the emergency. For the enlisted personnel the same principle should govern, particularly as regards Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers First Class. We cannot produce a satisfactory state of battle efficiency unless we have some degree of permanency in this nucleus of personnel. We must have on board a certain number of officers and men who know the ship, know the organization and who can whip the new personnel into shape by guiding their efforts. I know that you and Nimitz are doing all that you can but I cannot refrain from calling your attention to it once more.

Is it not possible to obtain legislation which will stop the discharge of qualified men and permit them to remain in their present billets?

I have now been established in my office on shore for some little time and things are working very smoothly. I am of course prepared to move aboard ship on very short notice.

[2] I know you are cognizant of the condition in the Carriers, as I have detailed it in various official correspondence. The effect of detachment of a carrier or any light forces from this command will affect the operations out of all proportion to the apparent fighting strength of the forces detached. This I know you will understand and in anything that you do I know you will carefully weigh all the factors involved.

Admiral Danckwerts spent a couple of days with us and gave me considerable information which is of value. I did not, however, commit myself in any way and tried to avoid talking too much.

My kindest regards and best wishes to you.

We are all cheerful.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. Kimmel.

P. S. I must urge you once more to do all in your power to fill the ships with enlisted personnel to the limit of their capacity. Our ideas on this subject have been submitted in great detail. The last submitted about two weeks ago was the report of our medical board on this subject.

/s/ Kimmel.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

[1] Confidential
Via Clipper Air Mail

Commander-in-Chief
United States Fleet

U. S. Submarine Base,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., May 5, 1941.

Dear Betty: I have your despatch in regard to the proposed visit of the Secretary. I am forwarding an official letter on this subject in this same mail. I think we will be able to give him an interesting time out here. I indicated the time that he might spend at sea if he so desires. I imagine, however, when we make up the final schedule he will probably want to spend more time in port than I have indicated in my official letter. There are a great many developments in and around the Pearl Harbor area that he should see and in which I am sure he will be very much interested. A perfectly enormous amount of work has been accomplished in this district and it is all going ahead full blast at the present time.

We had planned rather extensive tactical maneuvers for Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE which involved a trip to Midway by Task Force ONE and to
Palmyra by Task Force TWO. When I received your letter in regard to certain ship movements we decided to curtail these operations and to maintain Task Forces ONE and TWO in the immediate vicinity of Oahu. I do not want to be caught short in the event of any sudden demands.

Tell the Secretary that I will be very pleased indeed to see him. I am endeavoring to keep you informed primarily by official correspondence of the needs of the Fleet. I believe you are fully cognizant of all the problems. As you know, our principal problem out here is one of supply, particularly to outlying bases. Our food ships, store ships, oilers and ammunition ships are barely adequate now and this would be the cause of concern in the event of hostilities. I know you are doing all you can along this line. The transports are coming along very slowly. Brown goes to the Coast with a minimum force, starting in a few days to look over the progress of the landing force needs and to conduct the scheduled exercise at San Clemente. It looks now as though King's estimate that an AK will be required to accompany each division of transports to transport equipment, particularly landing boats, is absolutely correct. I feel that in any landing exercises that we may undertake, it should be done only when we have ample equipment and personnel to pursue our objectives to a successful conclusion, even in the event of the loss of very important units. In other words the landing should not be attempted until we have what amounts to an overwhelming force capable of a simultaneous landing.

[2] We are losing quite a percentage of experienced enlisted men who, upon the expiration of their enlistment, go into civil life to accept the high wages now prevailing. This is a cause of concern and I repeat again something should be done to retain these men. The only method I can see is by congressional legislation of some kind. We are attempting to use every bit of Fleet transportation from the West Coast to Honolulu to bring personnel and supplies out here. I believe you might help things if you would indicate to the material bureaus the shortage of shipping in order that they might go out of their way to meet our demands as to cargo such as bombs and ammunition. The type of incident I have in mind is the shipment of the supply of bombs from N. A. S., San Diego, which we finally straightened out with the Bureau of Ordnance after the exchange of several despatches.

I hope Nimitz is taking our idea of nucleus crews seriously. This applies to officers as well as men. We must have sufficient experienced men in key positions in the ship who know the ship in order to properly train the young reserve officers and the recruits. Of course, this is over and above the urgent necessity to keep these ships in a condition to meet an emergency. Briefly I think if some twenty percent of the complement could be considered permanently assigned to the ships that it would help things enormously. I shall send forward our ideas on this subject in a more definite form shortly.

I know the demands upon you for patrol craft of all descriptions but I must again bring to your attention the urgent need in this area for some patrol craft fitted with listening gear and carrying a few depth charges. The demands upon destroyers would then be somewhat relieved and they could have time to perfect themselves in other phases of their training.

My kindest regards and best wishes to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

/s/ Kimmel.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Air Mall

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET


Confidential U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship PEARL HARBOR, T. H., May 16, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: The ammunition situation continues unsatisfactory and is a source of concern to me in regard to gunnery school and target practice ammunition as it effects training, and mobilization and reserve service ammunition as it effects the general readiness of the Fleet. The problem as we see it here is
chiefly one of transportation, since in general the ammunition is available but not where we can get at it.

Late in the winter I asked that gunnery school ammunition be delivered to the Hawaiian Area not later than 2 June, 1941 and that certain target practice ammunition be delivered here for use early in the gunnery year. Action on this request was an order to assemble gunnery school ammunition at N. A. D. Mare Island by 15 May 1941, with the request that it be delivered to Pearl Harbor by vessels of the Fleet since no other transportation was available, and an order for shipment of a large part of the required target practice ammunition by PYRO and LASSEN from the East Coast by loading various vessels of the Base Force with gunnery school ammunition as it is assembled at Mare Island during this month, we are in a fair way of getting enough of it here by 2 June to commence gunnery school firings.

In view of the fact that PYRO and LASSEN were not scheduled to arrive before the end of July I requested by despatch that target practice ammunition be shipped by rail across country so that it too could be transported here by vessels of the Fleet, stating that we could use this ammunition as soon as delivered. This request was not approved for reasons best known to the Department. Since the LASSEN is now scheduled to arrive here about 21 July, with a part of this ammunition, and the PYRO about 11 August, with the remainder, there will be a period of approximately two months during which the Fleet will be deprived of gunnery training except for gunnery school firings.

Since PYRO and LASSEN are already loading on the East Coast no further action to expedite shipment of target practice ammunition appears feasible, and we shall have to accept the handicap in training imposed by the lack of this ammunition. This is already water over the dam and I mention it only because I feel the time has come when the long haul of ammunition between the East and West Coasts by ammunition ships should cease and full use be made of rail transportation to place needed ammunition at West Coast ports where we can get at it. Obviously in the event of hostilities water transportation of ammunition from the East to the West Coast will be too slow and risky.

The shortage of machine gun ammunition, particularly .50 caliber, has placed us in a very serious position. Upon the urging of the Department I recommended a cut to the minimum possible allowance per gun for annual training and proposed to transfer all type gunnery school machine gun allowances to the Fleet Machine Gun School. Type gunnery [2] school allowances of machine gun ammunition have since been eliminated entirely, and we now find ourselves in the position where the Fleet Machine Gun School has only enough ammunition to last until 10 June. On that date we shall be forced to close down the Fleet Machine Gun School unless more ammunition is made available.

I stress the urgent need for early delivery of target ammunition in ample quantities because the turnover of personnel continues high and I can see no improvement in the near future. The only way we can counter this and give adequate training to large masses of green personnel is to provide ammunition for frequent firings.

I have stressed gunnery school and target practice ammunition because up to the opening of hostilities they may be considered our first requirement, and we can only hope that the later increments of mobilization supply, which are on their way, arrive in time. So far as mobilization supply is concerned the battleships and heavy cruisers are well fixed. The light cruisers and destroyers are still short, particularly in 6", 5" anti-aircraft and depth charges, although ammunition orders indicate that by midsummer deficiencies will be made up. In this connection it is suggested, when forces are moved from the Pacific to the Atlantic, that the Bureau of Ordnance be informed as early as it is practicable to do so, in order that final increments of mobilization ammunition, and target practice ammunition for that matter, loaded in ships for delivery to Pearl Harbor may be diverted at West Coast ports and not brought out here.

The situation in regard to reserve service ammunition is entirely unsatisfactory. Here again I realize it is largely a matter of transportation and that reserve service ammunition must come after mobilization ammunition. When PYRO becomes available as a ship of the Base Force she can be used in shuttle trips to the coast to bring up our reserve supply. We are making every effort to transport ammunition of all kinds in vessels of the Fleet, and I am happy to note that the Naval Air Station San Diego was permitted to give up some aircraft bombs for transportation out here in ENTERPRISE. Also an order to ship 1,000 depth charge from Howthorne was a great help. These will be transported in ships of the Fleet.
Once we are over the midsummer hump we shall be in a much better position, provided the inevitable does not happen first. Even then, however, the supply of reserves will be critical and the use of rail transportation urgent.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

H. E. Kimmel.

Copy to Rear Admiral Blandy.

United States Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship

CinC File No. A16/0828
Secret
From: CinC
To: OpNav
Subj: Survey of Conditions in Pac. Ft.

I. PERSONNEL.

(a) Stability. A most important, perhaps the most important factor in the day by day readiness of the Pacific Fleet is the question of stabilizing personnel—both officers and men. The Fleet is doing all it can, and is making good progress, in absorbing new men and training new officers, but facts are facts and neither the Fleet nor the individual ships can be a coordinated war machine if the present rapid turnover of personnel is continued.

(b) Permanency of Officer Personnel. Regular and experienced officers have been detached at an alarming rate. Cooke, for example, who came to the Pennsylvania the latter part of February, is fourth on the list of twelve battleship captains in time on present billet. Executive officers are going, if anything even more frequently. The situation is no better in cruisers. There appears to be a tendency to give priority in importance to shore duty over sea duty; witness, transfer of officers skilled in fire control and gunnery to production and inspection jobs ashore, and the all too frequent detachment of commanding and executive officers and heads of departments from ships of all types. Expansion of the Forces Afloat does call for sacrifice in permanency of assignment in the Fleet, but we cannot afford to replace our experienced officers with reserves, most of whom are untrained, if we are to be ready for serious business. It does seem that much can be done toward stabilizing the experienced personnel we now have. Ordering captains, executives and heads of departments of the various types, well knowing that they will be eligible for selection and promotion within six months is an example of a condition readily susceptible of correction.

(c) Permanency of Enlisted Personnel. The situation is well known to the Department, as indicated by a recent directive to take full advantage of the law and retain men whose enlistments expire outside the continental limits of the United States. The drastic trend in reduction of reenlistments in the Navy as a whole in the month of April is of serious import to the Fleet. Even in the Pearl Harbor area the wages offered ashore are so attractive and the jobs are so many that skilled men whose enlistments expire are tempted not to reenlist. A recent survey of Battleship Division THREE indicates that of the men whose enlistments expire between 1 June and 31 August 1941, 68.9% do not intend to reenlist. This is in line with a recent report of the Bureau of Navigation showing a reduction in reenlistments for the month of April from 88.6% to 68.53%. The Commander-in-Chief has requested the Bureau of Navigation to initiate legislation to hold for the duration of the war all men now enlisted in the Navy. He does not look with favor upon the directive mentioned in the first sentence of this sub-paragraph. It is discriminatory and does not apply equally to all Fleets or even to all ships of the Pacific Fleet, since some ships overhaul on the Coast while others overhaul at Pearl Harbor. The Fleet must and gladly will train and provide men for new construction and outlying stations to the limit of its capabilities, but it should be unnecessary to assign to shore duty so many experienced petty officers as we now find ashore. There is an urgent necessity that a continuous supply of recruits be furnished for training. It should be pointed out that since September, with new men started coming in in large numbers, all vessels have had to absorb recruits in a large proportion. In the Fleet as a whole, complements are now made up of over 25% of men with the maximum of a year's service, and in some ships the
figure approaches 50%. In the case of newly acquired transports, cargo ships, tankers and the like, the complements are almost 100% reserve, with little previous Naval training. Present conditions are worse rather than better when new ships in large numbers are added to the Navy. The situation will be extremely acute if we are then at war. It is obvious that there are limitations on the capacity of active ships for supplying the large numbers of officers and men required to man the Navy now building, unless the immediate fighting capacity of the ships is seriously crippled.

Long range planning, with reasonable foresight as to future needs, is an imperative necessity. It would appear that training activities ashore must be greatly expanded, as the physical capacities of the ships limit the number that can be trained in the Fleet. The possibility that we may have to provide and quarter, ashore, a pool of trained men for new construction should be carefully examined, and provision now made for it, if found necessary.

A problem of immediate importance is brought about by a recent letter from the Bureau of Navigation which states that between now and September some 3,080 men, more than half of whom are rated, will be taken from the Fleet for new construction and for this purpose allocations are made in the ratio of 72% Pacific Fleet to 28% Atlantic Fleet. Unless a readjustment is made in these figures to correspond to the recent readjustment in the relative strengths of these Fleets, the Pacific Fleet will be seriously stripped of experienced men and may be unable to furnish some of the ratings demanded.

(d) Health and Morale. The desirability, if international conditions permit, of health and recreation trips to the Coast by Task Forces, each of which shall be no more than one-fourth the strength of the Pacific Fleet as now constituted must be given serious consideration.

(e) Assignment of Flag Officers. It is particularly desired that Vice Admiral Pye be retained as Commander of the Battle Force. Admiral Pye is able, vigorous, and loyal; and is an officer whom I would select, above all others, as Commander Battle Force.

(f) Uniform. There is too much change and experimentation at this time. It is not important whether rank is shown on the sleeve or on the shoulder of a khaki uniform, nor is it important whether the eagle of the cap device faces to left or to right. As for the khaki working uniform the Commander-in-Chief is convinced that it lessens the dignity and military point of view of the wearer and has a tendency to let down the efficiency of personnel. Reports from the aircraft squadrons are to the effect that from any considerable altitude they are unable to detect the color of the uniform on ships at sea.

II. AVIATION.

(a) Aviation Training. The following requirements for aviation have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:—

(1) Newly graduated pilots for carriers, battleships and cruisers should first be ordered to San Diego for indoctrination in Fleet squadron work and familiarization with latest types of planes.

(2) Replacement carrier groups should be built up at San Diego, for indoctrination of new graduates and for rotation with groups already in carriers.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Radioman should be established.

The following requirements are in process of correction but progress is too slow:

(1) The level of experience of pilots in the Fleet is very low and the total number is too low.

(2) The level of experience of aviation ratings in the Fleet is low and the allowances are not filled.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Bomber, though approved, has not yet been established.

(b) Aviation Material. The following items which apply to aviation are in process of correction but progress is too slow:

(1) Carrier torpedo planes are obsolescent and spare carrier torpedo planes are too few.

(2) Replacement of other carrier planes with more modern types is not yet completed and the replacement planes are not yet fully modernized.

(3) There are not yet enough spare carrier planes of the new types and the stock of spare parts and engines is too low.

(4) Deliveries of ordnance and radio equipment for new planes have been too slow.
(5) Cruiser planes are obsolescent and deliveries of replacements have been too slow.

(6) Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area and there is no early prospect for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area.

(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol planes, corresponds to RADAR for ships, which will enormously increase the potentialities of these planes.

(8) There is a serious shortage of aircraft machine gun ammunition.

(9) No armor-piercing bombs, antiaircraft bombs or aerial depth bombs are yet available.

(10) There is a very serious shortage of aircraft torpedoes and of equipment for their maintenance and overhaul.

(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow.

(12) Provision for bombs and for refueling planes at outlying bases is sketchy.

(13) There has been serious delay in deliveries of equipment under the cognizance of other Bureaus than Yards and Docks in connection with the construction of new air stations and bases.

In addition to the afore-mentioned items the following have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:

(1) Aircraft overhaul at N. A. S., Pearl Harbor, now limited to patrol planes, should be expanded to provide for all planes now based in this area. Transfer to and from West Coast for overhaul is impracticable.

(2) Additional barracks should be established at N. A. S. Pearl Harbor.

(c) Separate Air Force. This ever present question is again being brought to the fore, in view of Mr. Scrugham’s recent utterances. It is vital that the Navy’s air service remain as it is. Our naval aviation is generally recognized, throughout the world, as being the best equipped, best trained, and most advanced of any naval air service. This has been brought about by the mutual recognition of the intimate relationship between air and surface sea forces, particularly in far-flung operations distant from established bases. Effective cooperation, in naval operations, between air and surface craft requires the closest kind of coordination, predicated upon precise knowledge of each other’s capabilities, limitations, and tactics. This can only be attained by day-by-day operations, association, and exchange of ideas as an integral part of one organization. It is vital that this relationship continue, even at the expense (though this feature is greatly exaggerated) of some duplication of effort between the Army and the Navy.

Mr. Scrugham’s chief complaint, which deals chiefly with duplication of facilities at coastal air stations and the proximity of those stations to each other, is not a valid one. The services perform separate functions; the Army in extending the range of coastal batteries and the Navy in extending the mobility and coverage of ships in off shore search. The proximity of the fields to each other is largely a matter of the vagaries of Congress and the availability of land. The United States, due to its physical separation from its most probable enemies, has less need for a concentrated, offensive, air striking force than other nations. The present GHQ air force, however, amply supplies this need. It may be noted, in passing, that, in spite of the fact that the Air Corps is a part of the Army, the strong tendency within that Corps for separation, has prevented the development of effective cooperation between ground and air forces. A separate air corps would make the situation much worse—for the Navy it would mean the death of naval aviation.

The British have found it necessary to place their coastal air command under the direct control of the Navy. Aside from discoordination of operations, this command was suffering from lack of proper types.

III. MATERIAL, GENERAL.

(a) Priorities. The Navy is at present suffering from a shortage of material and is experiencing difficulty in having this shortage corrected. The principal items, and those that directly affect our early readiness, are (1) small arms and machine gun ammunition for airplanes and the Fleet Marine Force; (2) airplanes, especially those equipped with modern armor and armament; (3) close-range antiaircraft guns, especially a 1.1" Bofors, and Oerlikon; (4) ammunition in general, particularly adequate reserves, and bombs of all kinds. Our ability to correct these deficiencies is limited by two factors, (1) aid to Great Britain, and (2) rapid expansion of the Army. Both of these limiting factors are admittedly of great importance and are entitled to proper weight in any system of
priorities, but, from the point of view of the Fleet, it appears that there is a tendency to overlook the time factor. A priority system based on relative quantities needed by the three competing agencies, Britain, Army and the Navy, will prove fatally defective, if the time of beginning active operations is overlooked. As the situation appears now, the Navy may be called on for active operations in contact with well equipped opposing forces, yet is prevented from obtaining vitally necessary needs by the magnitude of the needs of Britain and the Army. If we are going into action first, our needs must be filled ahead of the Army's and those "sine qua non" needs such as small arms and machine gun ammunition, modern airplanes, and modern close-range antiaircraft guns, must be filled ahead of Britain's. There is a minimum need for the Navy without which it can not fight at all. Irrespective of how small that need may be relative to the quantitative demands of others, it must be filled first.

It is important to bring out this point now, since it is understood that the Army is basing its procurement program on a 4,000,000 man Army. If allocation be based on relative quantities, under such a program, the Navy will get little consideration. The [11] imminence of active operations should be the criterion. Of course, the Navy Department is in a better position to judge that than we are, but we've been led to believe we were pretty close to war on several occasions, but we still didn't get the items we need.

(b) RADAR Equipment. Such excellent results are being obtained from the few RADAR's furnished that we should install now the equipment which will work, and not wait for something better to be developed. Delivery of RADAR should be accelerated.

IV. COMMUNICATIONS.

The need for establishment of confidential call signs is urgent. With the present system of calls the text of a message may sometimes be inferred from the radio calls used. The danger of the present system is that codes may be compromised, as well as information disclosed. The cryptographic aid section of opNav should immediately get out confidential call signs and more cryptographic aids.

V. OPERATIONS.

(a) Fleet Operations. With the recent detachment of many of the most modern and effective units, the adequacy and suitability of the forces remaining to accomplish the tasks to which they may be assigned is very doubtful.

In the Pacific, our potential enemy is far away and hard to get at. He has no exposed vital interests within reach of Pearl Harbor, and has a system of defense in the Mandates, Marianas, [12] and Bonins that requires landing operations, supported by sea forces, against organized land positions supported by land-based air. This is the hardest kind of opposition to overcome and requires detailed preparation and rehearsal. It also requires a preponderance of light force and carrier strength, in which we are woefully deficient in the Pacific. Our present strength is in battleships—which come into play only after we have reduced the intervening organized positions. They (battleships) will have to be used to "cover" the intervening operations and prevent interference therewith, but their real value can not be realized until the intervening opposition has been overcome and a position obtained from which solid strength can be brought to bear. The Japanese are not going to expose their main fleet until they are either forced to do so by our obtaining a position close enough to threaten their vital interests or it is advantageous for them to do so by our having "broken our backs", so to speak, by going up against their land positions and attrition operations.

The foregoing discussion is brought out to emphasize that the role of light forces, and particularly carriers, in the Pacific, is far more important than a casual evaluation of relative strength would suggest. Under RAINBOW 5, the Pacific Fleet (perhaps justifiably, in view of the Atlantic situation) is so reduced in light force and carrier strength that its capabilities for offensive [13] operations of a decisive nature are severely crippled. Quick results may only be hoped for—common sense dictates that it is largely hope, based principally upon the idea that Japan will make a fundamental mistake, and that bold action may be able to take advantage of it.

In the Pacific, with enemy vital interests so far away, and no bases of our own within striking distance, the logistic problem is acute. We have not, at present, sufficient ammunition, provisions, cargo ships or tanks to support active operations in the Western Pacific—where the real battleground will be. We are having
difficulty, even now, supporting the construction and defense activities of our own outlying bases. More auxiliary vessels are needed, now, for that purpose, and future needs must be anticipated to allow for acquisition and conversion of the ships. Our past-experience, in this regard, has not been a happy one—the lag between acquisition and entrance into service being six months to a year. Repair and maintenance facilities at advanced bases can not be created overnight, nor can the Fleet remain long without them.

(b) **Fourteenth Naval District.** The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more antiaircraft guns, airplanes, and RADAR equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over Continental and expanding Army needs.

[14] The naval forces available to the Commandant are meager to the point of non-evidence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resuscitation and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be employed for its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive operations is seriously curtailed—possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and other small craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent. The Fleet must be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the District. The Fleet does not have the destroyers or other vessels to take over those duties. The situation has been brought to the Department's attention by letter. It is now much more serious as many destroyers have been detached from this Fleet.

c) **Marine.** The necessity for closely coordinated training of Marines and the ships which will support their landing operations is readily apparent. Operations of this character require detailed training and realistic rehearsal. At present, the Marines and their training ground (San Clemente) are in one location and the ships in another, 2000 miles away. We need a training ground for landing operations and a camp for a substantial portion of the Fleet Marine Force in the Hawaiian area. This need will be worse, if we get in war in the Pacific, because we will not only need a training ground and [15] large camp site for Marines, but also must train and rehearse, as the campaign progresses, Army forces as well.

Kahoolawe is practically undeveloped and can be used as an Hawaiian San Clemente. A camp site for 5,000 Marines has been selected and recommended for acquisition. This program should be pushed.

The Sixth Defense Battalion should be brought to Hawaii now in order to relieve the Seventh Defense Battalion at Midway where the latter has been stationed for some months. Equipment for this battalion should be provided as soon as possible. Other defense battalions now in the Hawaiian area are being used for other outlying bases.

d) **Logistic Support.** Ships to transport men and materials to and from the Coast and to supply the outlying islands is urgent.

There is similar urgency in the need for ships to transport aircraft. Aircraft carriers should not be used for this purpose in peacetime and cannot be so employed in war. Action has repeatedly been requested.

VI. NATIONAL POLICY.

(a) Although largely uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in [16] principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for example, made strong expressions of our intention to retain an effective voice in the Far East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer, as a diplomatic gesture, but almost simultaneously detached heavy cruisers to the Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet by wholesale changes in personnel.

We should decide on what we are going to do about the Philippines, now, and provide for their defense, if retained. It is easily conceivable that 50,000 troops and 400 airplanes on Luzon, might prove a sufficient deterrent to Japan to prevent direct action. We should develop Guam and provide for its defense commensurate with its state of development. It is foolish to develop it for some one else to use.
The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplomatic branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the means available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant weight.

Our Hemispheric Defense policy must comprehend the fullest cooperation between participating nations and our commitments limited by our available force. A strong component of that force is bases. No Hemispheric Defense policy that does not provide for our free use and development of South American bases (and local military and logistic support) can be effective.

VII. INFORMATION.

(a) The Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

VIII. PUBLIC OPINION.

(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To back into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion, is to court losing it. A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution.

/5/ H. E. KIMMEL,

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
WASHINGTON, 4 JUNE 1941.

Confidential

Memorandum for Admiral Stark

The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.
(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships and when located in the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in its use.

There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so.

There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands.

[8] H. E. KIMMEL.

[7]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 26, 1941.

Dear Betty: When the proposed visit of the Under Secretary was announced my staff prepared a list of topics which might be of interest for discussion while Mr. Forrestal and his party are here. Not knowing the purpose of Mr. Forrestal's visit or whether he is informed concerning the general nature of our war plans and our problems I decided it better to combine these notes into a letter to you and believe quicker action can be obtained in that way. Following are the principal items of which I have been thinking:

(1) The importance of keeping the Commander-in-Chief advised of Department policies and decisions and the changes in policies and decisions to meet changes in the international situation.

(a) We have as yet received no official information as to the U. S. attitude towards Russian participation in the war, particularly as to the degree of cooperation, if any, in the Pacific, between the U. S. and Russia if and when we become active participants. Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communication systems and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored and full advantage taken of any opportunities for mutual support. Pertinent questions are:

(1) Will England declare war on Japan if Japanese attack Maritime Provinces?
(2) If answer to (1) is in the affirmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively provided in case of attack on N. E. I. or Singapore?
(3) If answer to (2) is in the affirmative, are plans being prepared for joint action, mutual support, etc.?
(4) If answer to (1) is negative, what will England's attitude be? What will ours be?
(5) If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, what is attitude in regard to Japanese shipping, patrol of Pacific waters, commerce raiders, etc.?

(b) Depending upon the progress of hostilities, the Russian situation appears to offer an opportunity for the strengthening of our Far Eastern defenses, particularly Guam and the Philippines. Certainly, no matter how the fighting goes, Japan's attention will be partially diverted from the China and Southern adventures by either (1) diversion of forces for attack on Russia or (2) necessity for providing [2] for Russian attack on her. It is conceivable that the greater the German success on the Eastern front, the more Russia will be pushed toward Asia, with consequent increased danger to Japan's "New Order" for that area. In my opinion we should push our development of Guam and accelerate our bolstering of the Philippines. The Russo-Axis war may give us more time.

(2) Priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific war:—
(a) Transports and Light Destroyer Transports.—During the Commander-in-Chief's visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is recognized. Nevertheless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even greater now (in point of view of time particularly) because most of our trained marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training problem in addition to a possible war situation. The Department has initiated action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILIN and to acquire and convert four more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about replacing the light destroyer transports (APD's). These vessels were originally conceived and developed for a Pacific campaign. They are especially suitable for use in attacks on atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking those positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atlantic, the need for them in the Pacific is paramount. If at all possible, they should be returned to this ocean at once. If this cannot be done, and only if it cannot be done, additional destroyers must be converted as soon as possible. Work on the large transports must also be expedited and completion dates anticipated if possible.

(b) Marine Equipment: The Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its full equipment, particularly AA guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripped of much of their equipment to fit out the reinforced regiment that went East. There is practically no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that these units will fight before the Army will and their needs must be given priority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for the marines.

[3] We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five thousand marines. When they come they should be fully equipped for amphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our planning.

(c) Ammunition Facilities: The condition of ammunition handling and stowage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Stowage facilities have been completed, are in the process of construction, or are about to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now under construction at Westloch and at Lualualei.

New construction authorized and about to be undertaken includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei, and barricaded stowage for live mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at Westloch.

New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch to accommodate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we have no word yet on what action he has taken.

(d) The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availability" yard. Overhaul of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.

(e) Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced personnel for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train them intensively at once. I realize [4] that recruiting has fallen off and that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use 20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now.

(f) Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new hospital at Pearl Harbor.

(g) Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers.
(h) The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at Mare Island.
(1) Correspondence has gone forward urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important.
(3) Communications. The supply of communication, radio, and sound equipment to the Fleet and the Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvement has been noted in the last year.
(a) Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from its intended advance-base use.
(b) It took BuEng two years to put "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships.
(c) For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still without it though it is under manufacture.
(d) We must have the IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) for aircraft at once. The program lags and on June 14th only 56 were on order from Canada with indefinite delivery date. See "Aviation" below.
(e) Radar equipment for submarines is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar.
[5] In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have type plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job.
(4) Aviation Requirements. These items, all of which have recently been taken up with the Department, are summarized briefly:
(a) Pre-Fleet Training. Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons, More pilots for battleships and cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat readiness of active squadrons.
(b) New Torpedo Planes. Highest priority—A-1-a—instead of present priority which is A-1-b. There are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater naval importance.
(c) Conversions for Carrier Landing Training. Auxiliary aircraft carrier conversion was dropped because of time and cost factors. These can be greatly reduced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing training. The need for these ship is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be used for this purpose, while new pilots must be properly trained before joining active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized.
(d) A. S. V. (Anti-Surface Vessel) Equipment. This is of the highest potential value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December. It can be carried by other planes, as shown by reports of British torpedo plane operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much earlier deliveries are essential.
(e) I. F. F. (Identification, Friend or Foe) Equipment. This is absolutely complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for aircraft defense of the Fleet. Without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay whatever is acceptable.
[6] (f) Engines for New Patrol Planes (PBY-5's). Nose section failures have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can.
(g) Landplane Field at Johnston Island. This was removed from the project by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to local defense but, more importantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions headed eastward and as a stepping stone for landplane support of expeditions headed westward.
(h) Keahi Lagoon Development. This will be of very great value to patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this
area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this development should be undertaken immediately.

(1) Development of the N. A. S. Barber’s Point. This approved development is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available when Barber’s Point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandatory to expedite the work.

My kindest regards and best wishes always.

Most sincerely yours, /S/ H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Cincpac File No.
Secret

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 30, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: In acknowledging receipt of your letter of 25 July as to the possibility of using a carrier for transporting a load of planes to one of the Asiatic Russian ports, I want to give some of my own views as to such an undertaking.

Whether or not planes are to be supplied to the Russians may be outside my province, but I do remain keenly aware of our own deficiencies in aircraft. It is quite an undertaking for the United States to supply planes to any quarter of the globe in which fighting against Axis Powers may occur.

My views against diversion of carriers from their proper duties to act as aircraft transports are well known. If planes must be sent from the United States to Russia, the question of flying them out via Alaskan and Eastern Siberia fields should be most fully inquired into. That appears to be the most logical method of effecting delivery.

Should it be finally determined to use one of our carriers as a transport, the time chosen should be one in which all three Pacific Fleet carriers are available for operation. This is essential in order to minimize the danger to the carrier transport.

The port of destination should certainly not be to the westward of the Japan-Kurile-Kamchatka line.

I entertain no doubt that such an operation, if discovered, (as is highly probable), will be tantamount to initiation of a Japanese-American War. If we are going to take the initiative in commencing such a war, I can think of more effective ways for gaining initial advantage.

A carrier sent on such an operation manifestly must be protected. After careful consideration, I am constrained to feel that the minimum escort and covering force provided should be the entire Pacific Fleet. I also feel that combatant air or naval forces of a potential enemy encountered should be engaged at once rather than wait for them to gain an initial advantage through destroying any part of my own fighting strength.

In short, it is my earnest conviction that use of a carrier to deliver aircraft to Asiatic Russian ports in the present period of strained relations is to invite war. If we have decided upon war, it would be far better to take direct offensive action. If for reasons of political expediency, it has been determined to force Japan to fire the first shot, let us choose a method that will be more advantageous to ourselves. Certainly an operation such as that proposed is far less likely to bluff Japan into acquiescence or inactivity than it is to disturb her to the point of hostile use of bombs, torpedoes and guns.

Sincerely,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear Betty: Your news about the approval of 533,000 men and 105,000 Marines for the Navy is good news. I agree with everything you said in your letter on the subject and I certainly give you and Nimitz full credit for getting them under the conditions which exist. We should lose no time in getting our ships filled up. I am ready to accept draftees if we cannot get them by voluntary enlistments quickly.

I forwarded to Furlong all the information you gave me about Tommy Hart's trouble with mines. We are waiting for Blandy's report, which I have not yet seen. I should like to have it at an early date.

Thanks very much for the copy of Coronet which you sent to me. I turned to page 86 and was somewhat shocked at the appearance of the photograph on that page. However, I sent it on to Dot and know that she will be pleased as I was to receive it. Please give my regards to Mrs. Hull.

I note Ghormley's views on the importance of RDF, or RADAR as we call it. I think I can assure you that the officers of the Fleet are fully alive to the importance of this development. We have stressed its use in every exercise and are constantly drilling and training with it. We have had men transferred to the ships so equipped to the limit of the capacity of ships having them. Army personnel have been trained aboard ships. I think you understand from our letters as well as from my verbal remarks to you on this subject how important we feel this development to be. I believe the numbers of the equipment in the Fleet is far behind what it should be. I shall permit nothing to interfere with its installation in the ships as we receive the gear. It should be given the highest priority in manufacture, supply and installation. We have not yet received any purely gunnery RADAR. In this connection, stress should be laid upon what the British call "IFF" (Identification, Friend or Foe) for installation in ships and planes; to the ASV (or RADAR in a plane to spot surface vessels); to the AI (RADAR in a plane to spot other planes). I don't know when we can expect these various types of RADAR but I do know that we need no urging in the Fleet to do anything within our power to get and use all the various types of RADAR that have been developed.

Many thanks for the news about the detail of the twelve PT's to the Fourteenth Naval District. This is a good start but neither Bloch nor I will rest easy until we get the various patrol vessels we have requested in official correspondence. I do hope you will impress on the Secretary the vital importance of this matter. We need more ships of all types for a successful Pacific campaign but I believe we need submarines, destroyers, carriers and cruisers even more than we need battleships. This is a vast ocean.

You have approved our plan for putting guns and Marines on Wake. The first detachment of 165 Marines, one battery of 5" and one battery of 3" are now on their way. We will send the additional guns when transportation becomes available. A recent survey of the men required to man the defenses of Wake plus the other outlying islands indicates the desirability of forming another defense battalion for service in this area. I feel that there is no doubt that an additional defense battalion to provide periodic reliefs and replacements will be necessary. We will give you an official letter on this subject shortly.

We have received the Department's plan in regard to the Marine Division and transports and your ideas as to the composition of the 5,000 men to be stationed in Oahu. We agree in general with all the plans but we would like the men, equipment and transports now. I know that you also would like them and will get them just as quickly as it is humanly possible to do so. I find that some of the defense battalions already out here are shy in equipment. The anti-aircraft guns for Wake are not equipped with directors. The battalions are short in .30 caliber and .50 caliber machine guns and ammunition. I do think that the few machine guns required by these battalions should be spared from other activities and I hope that the ammunition situation will be remedied very shortly.

The recreation facilities at Pearl Harbor are coming rapidly to a state where they can and are being used by the men of the Fleet. Baseball, softball and football fields, though by no means entirely adequate have been commissioned and
we have large numbers of men who occupy these fields daily. The swimming pool at Aiea is filled to capacity at all times. We can use at least two more pools of this same size. The Fleet Recreation Center was partially commissioned on the first of August and will be in full operating condition within another week. It has been crowded with men from the day it was opened. The facilities include a very large soft drink and sandwich stand, an enormous bar where beer is served, and a large number of chairs and tables in a very pleasant surrounding. It includes ten bowling alleys, eleven pool tables, a reading and writing room, all of which have been in commission from the first of August. The stadium will be in commission within the week. It is suitable for boxing and wrestling tournaments or ship's entertainments and for the movies. It will seat approximately 6,000 men and movies can be shown to approximately 4,000 men at one time. About a thousand families are now living in the houses built for that purpose. All of the [3] remainder will be in commission by the first of January. These houses are being finished daily and are occupied as soon as completed. Bloch is going a great job.

The visits to the West Coast have been very successful and have, I believe, helped all hands. The are worth while and I believe should be continued as long as the international situation permits. I have watched the international situation in relation to the cruises to the West Coast and shall not hesitate to cancel them if, in my opinion, the situation so warrants. You will probably have information sooner than I do which will warrant the cancellation of such cruises and I shall of course expect advice or orders from you on this subject.

The Honolulu people have been very fine in their continued efforts to entertain the officers and men of the Fleet in their homes and on their plantations. The entertainment of enlisted men by the Honolulu people has been on a scale which taxes their capacity and is still going on. They deserve great credit for everything that they have done, except the increase in rentals.

We recently submitted a letter dealing with the permanency of detail of Captains and Executive Officers of battleships. This letter was prepared by Admiral Pye at my instigation. I forwarded it with my hearty approval. The letter strongly recommends that no officer be assigned as Captain or Executive Office of a battleship unless it is reasonably certain that he will remain in that billet for not less than two years. Specifically, it recommends that no officer coming up for selection within the period of his detail be assigned to either of these two billets. I consider this a matter of first importance. If you read the letter to the Bureau of Navigation you will see that no Captain or Executive Officer now in these ships has been there for as long as a year. The exact times are set forth. We cannot expect satisfactory progress unless we make the tours of duty of our officers sufficiently long for them to give something to the job. I know this is an old story but it is an old story which is much to the discredit of our service. The recommendations from battleships apply with equal force to heavy and light cruisers. In these ships the Captains in general comply with the specifications set forth because they are taken from the more junior ones. In the case of Executives I fear the situation is about the same as it is in battleships. Brown is now making a survey of the Captains and Executives in cruisers and I expect to forward that shortly to the Bureau of Navigation.

In another recent letter to the Bureau of Navigation we made specific recommendations in regard to the Commanding Officers of destroyer divisions and squadrons. I am happily to say that Nimitz has informed me that he will carry out our recommendations in regard [4] to the destroyer division and squadron commanders. I wish to add that I have not yet had time to hear from the Bureau of Navigation in regard to the battleship Captains and Executives.

I feel that Gunnery in the Fleet is better than we have any right to expect considering the enormous changes in personnel and the lack of permanency of the officers. We have of course stressed battle procedures above everything else and you well know how much more experience and training it takes to be prepared for battle than for a target practice. Recent reports that have come to me on the firing of SRP "B" are very encouraging. The reports are fragmentary and I hear about the ships that have made high scores. For example, the LOUISVILLE has three "E" turret, six "E" five-inch guns and one "E" three-inch gun. I know this because I went aboard the LOUISVILLE a couple of days ago. Other ships are doing very well indeed.

Recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training have put our target practices on a much more realistic and practical basis. We feel that in the event of hostilities we will be forced to make very few changes, if any, in these directives. We are scheduling our services and area assignments in accordance with these
directives now and I hear from all sides that it is considered much more satisfactory than anything we have ever had before.

To summarize, I feel that the morale of the officers and men of the Fleet is very satisfactory, that everyone is working to the limit of his capacity, that we are never going to be satisfied; but that we all feel that we are making progress and beginning to get some dividends from our efforts.

What we need more than anything else right now is men. I have recently written Nimitz that this Fleet can use 20,000 additional men today. I will not go into that further at this time because I know that both you and Nimitz know this just as well as I do.

Keep cheerful. We are ready to do our damnedest.

Yours as always,

H. E. Kimmel.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,  
Chief of Naval Operations,  
Navy Department,  
Washington, D. C.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA (Flagship)

Personal  
Secret  
Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,  
Chief of Naval Operations,  
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BETTY: I mailed today an official letter on the condition of the material readiness of the fighting squadrons in the Pacific Fleet. I wish to call your attention particularly to the unsatisfactory conditions disclosed in this letter.

We now have on hand and operating from carriers 41 F4F-3 and F4F-3A fighting planes (of which 6 are currently under overhaul or major repair) and 17 obsolescent fighting planes. This makes a total of 52 fighting planes available for 3 aircraft carriers and 2 Marine fighting squadrons in the Pacific Fleet. Our operating allowance, not counting spares, is 90.

I think you should take some drastic action to remedy this deplorable condition.

My kindest regards as always.

Most sincerely yours,

/S/  H. E. Kimmel.

12 September 1941 Admiral Stark wrote the following note on above letter and returned to Admiral Kimmel.

DEAR MUSTAPHA:

See our serial 0136723 of 12 sept.

Best we can do.

Keep cheerful.

/S/  BETTY.

United States Fleet  
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., August 26, 1941.

CinC File No.  
P16-1/MM/(96)  
Serial 01342  
Confidential

From:  Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To:  The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject:  Expansion Program—Personnel for.  

References:

(a)  CinCpac Conf. disp. 182351 of August 1941.
(b)  BuNav serials 1386, 1394, 1397, 1406 and 1450 of August 11, 1941.
(c)  BuNav Conf. disp. 201824 of August 1941.

1. Transfer orders dated August 11, 1941 from the Bureau of Navigation to Commander Base Force Subordinate Command, as enumerated in references (b),
require a total of 222 rated men from the Pacific Fleet for transfer to U. S. S. HORNET squadrons, two new Atlantic patrol squadrons and the Naval Air Stations, Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. The Pacific Fleet has only a bare minimum of such ratings to meet present operating requirements. Similar ratings are needed for advanced training groups now in the process of being formed in the Pacific. The Commander-in-Chief has had no previous warning of this heavy demand upon the Pacific Fleet. As indicated in reference (c), transfer of these ratings is being held in abeyance pending departmental reconsideration.

2. Of these 222 rated men a total of 88 radiomen qualified in aircraft is required and a total of 61 aviator machinist’s mates in the experienced class namely chiefs, first and second class is required. In order that a bare minimum of one qualair radioman be assigned each operating plane requiring such a rate for the performance of its mission, a total of 487 such ratings is required in the Pacific Fleet. According to the latest available figures there are a total of 324 such ratings in the Pacific Fleet and the transfer of 88 in accordance with reference (b) will leave a total of 236 or 54% of the minimum needed for safety and ability to carry out the mission of all operating planes requiring such ratings. Figures in regard to aviation machinist’s mates indicate a total of 988 chief, first and second class allowed, whereas there are only 722 now holding these rates in the Pacific Fleet or 73%. Removal of 61 such ratings as required in reference (b) will reduce the percentage to 67%. These percentages will be further reduced by the transfer of such ratings to the advanced training groups now forming in the Pacific. These ratings of qualair radioman and chief, first and second class aviation machinist’s mates must be considered key personnel in the aeronautical organization. Safety of operations and ability to carry out the mission depend on such ratings. The reduction of the percentage of these key men will adversely affect readiness for war of Pacific Fleet aviation.

3. The Commander-in-Chief has repeatedly pointed out to the Bureau of Navigation the increasingly serious situation which is resulting from rapid expansion of all phases of Naval activities without sufficient increases in available men in the Fleet to train for purposes of meeting the personnel requirements of this expansion. The current practice of constantly withdrawing trained men from the Fleet cannot continue if the Fleet is to remain in a satisfactory state of readiness. The huge building program, both aircraft and surface vessels, will require more trained personnel for manning than can possibly be obtained under the current program of draining already under-complemented Fleet units. At least two years are required to train acceptable petty officers. The consequences of continuing along the present apparently unplanned path will be dire. The critical shortage with which the combatant air units of the Fleet will be faced if the subject transfers are made is merely the beginning of a deplorable situation which will certainly develop unless there is adequate planning for training personnel to meet the demands of expansion. The Pacific Fleet can and will train the required ratings if given the material. Class “A” schools must be immediately enlarged to cover the entire program. Induction of recruits must be enormously increased.

4. The Commander-in-Chief is convinced that the building program and the training program are not synchronized. Unless intra-departmental coordination and review of the entire question of supplying personnel for the expanding Navy are effectively undertaken, the current condition cannot be sensibly improved.

5. It is therefore most urgently recommended:

(a) That, in meeting the immediate demands of expansion, the distribution of available personnel in the Navy be reviewed and a program be established for the acquisition of required ratings from the forces both afloat and ashore in such a manner as to avoid the depletion of any ratings below an acceptable minimum in any combatant organization; this review to form the basis for the reconsideration, requested in reference (a), of current orders for transfer of aviation ratings.

(b) That the entire expansion program be reviewed in order to determine in detail the rate at which personnel will be required properly to man the new units.

3 (c) That, through the immediate and adequate expansion of Class “A” service schools and the supply of additional recruits to the Fleets and shore stations, the training of men be undertaken now in sufficient numbers to meet the maximum demands as they occur.

/s/ H. E. Kimmel

Copy to:
BUNav
BuAer
Combasefor Subcom
Dear Betty. I have your letter of 21 August dealing with the question of aviation personnel required to man new patrol plane squadrons and the squadrons for the HORNET plus certain additional men required for Kodiak and Dutch Harbor.

I have some appreciation of the problem which confronts you and I wish to state that I yield to no one in my desire to be of the maximum assistance to the Navy as a whole, but my immediate responsibility is the Pacific Fleet. You must bear with me if I present the viewpoint and opinion as viewed from where I sit. I know that you have never wanted anything else and you can rest assured that you will never get anything else from me.

In the first place, the orders for the transfers directed in the various Bunav serials left no time for consideration and to make the best distribution of transfers. The situation changes so rapidly in personnel and almost invariably for the force that I can see no answer except to make my protest and gather the facts based on the very latest figures. As we set forth in the official letter which is now on its way to you, we now have in the ratings of aviation machinist's mates: chiefs, first class and second class, just 73% of complement. When transfers directed by the serials in question are completed we will have 67% of complement in these ratings. The excess is entirely in third class ratings. We can spare these ratings with least resultant harm to the organizations. We have been trying to build up these ratings against the time when we could look forward to double crews. You know full well that the chiefs, first class and second class, are the men that bear the brunt of maintaining the planes and insuring their safe and efficient operation. I think when you lump the third class ratings into a picture to indicate an over-complement the picture is not accurate. We make no protest on the transfer of third class ratings and will be glad to comply under the existing circumstances.

[2] On the basis of one (qualair) radioman for each plane, we now have 74% of the number required. After transfers are completed we will have 54%. I note in the directive for transfers to the HORNET that 16 (qualair) radiomen are required for the Utility Unit.

Transfers required take long-time men, leaving us with all the short-timers which is an added handicap. We are now attempting to organize our pre-Fleet training units at San Diego who require most of all the ratings I have just mentioned.

Our percentages deduced from the Base Force reports of 30 June vary by some 11 to 16% from the figures given in your letter and they are uniformly lower than your figures.

If after you have read this letter you still feel that we should make the transfers required by Bunav serials 1386, 1394, 1397, 1406, and 1450, we can complete the transfers from the Pacific Fleet by 30 September, with the bulk completed considerably earlier than that and at the same time insure the ratings are taken from activities which will result in the least harm in the various organizations.

If you can assure me that we wont be fighting the Japs within the next six months I will gladly make the transfers without the least protest. We can, will, and have been, training men in this Fleet just as rapidly as the existing facilities, including the number of recruits supplied, permit. I will not say anything further about the need for additional men because you have my views in a great many communications on the subject and I know you are doing everything within your power to improve the situation.

I will take steps to insure the preliminary planning necessary to an expeditious execution of the orders contained in the various serials and will give the order to go ahead just as soon as you indicate by dispatch or otherwise what your judgment dictates.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

H. E. Kimmel.
Dear "Betty": We all listened to the President's speech with great interest. With that and King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in the Atlantic is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific?

I noted that Bidwell's Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for surface raiders east of 100° West, which seems to clear that up as far as raiders are concerned, but just how significant was the restriction, limiting offensive action to "surface raiders"? Of course I know that the possibility of German or Italian submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improbable, but the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action. This uncertainty, coupled with current rumors of U. S.-Japanese rapprochement and the absence of any specific reference to the Pacific in the President's speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Specific questions that arise are:

(a) What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them have been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible, but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, preclude taking the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive measures against German and Italian raiders? In view of the delicate nature of our present Pacific relations, with particular reference to their fluidity, I feel that you are the only one who can answer this question.

(b) Along the same lines, but more specifically related to the Japanese situation, is what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity. As you know, our present orders are totrail all contacts, but not to bomb unless you are in the defensive sea area. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?

The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan—a weaker one may be an invitation. I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "status quo" out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must be reduced, and, in event of actual hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold offensive.

Our present shortage of carriers, cruisers and destroyers gives me much concern, as it is these types that must bear the brunt of our early operations. Later, we'll need a superiority in all types, as, according to reports, new Japanese BB's, CV's and CA's are coming out and the balance is going against us. We cannot carry the war very far into the Pacific until we are able to meet the Japanese Fleet on at least equal terms. Pertinent to the maintenance of the "status quo" and, if necessary, later hostilities, is the disposition of the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON. I feel that their movement to the Pacific, now, would have a tremendous effect on Japan and would remove any impression that all our thoughts are on the Atlantic. If we can't do it now, we should at least be prepared to do it later if the situation deteriorates.

When we get into a shooting war with Germany there will be an increased demands for escorts in the Pacific. In view of the immense distance involved and the character of probable opposition, this, in the main, means cruisers. We may need additional cruisers and I cannot see how we can handle the job properly if our cruiser strength is reduced. We now have three cruisers on escort duty to Manila. My orders are to escort to Manila but not to escort on the return trip. Bidwell in the Southeast Pacific has two cruisers.

I feel better now that we have gotten something at Wake. The success of the Army flight has re-emphasized its importance, and, while by no means "impregnable", its present defensive strength is considerable and will require the exposure of quite a force to capture it. It is even possible that should its capture be an early objective of Japan, such an effort might be supported by a substantial portion of their Combined Fleet, which would create, for us, a golden opportunity if we have the strength to meet it. Do not misunder-
stand me—I don't discount the Atlantic problem—but from where I sit, I discount the Pacific problem even less. Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific—and the Pacific is still very much a part of the world situation.

I know you have these thoughts in mind and share my concern, but I am not sure that there are some in Washington who might be inclined to overlook them.

Please let me have your views on the questions raised herein. With regard to offensive action against raiders in the Pacific and submarines off Hawaii, etc., I presume I will get official orders, if any change in present policy is desired.

Sincerely,

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 22, 1941.

#1

Secret

Dear Betty: On receipt of your despatches following the change in the Japanese cabinet we made the following dispositions:—

Continued to maintain the patrol of two Submarines at Midway.

Despatched twelve patrol planes to Midway.

Despatched two submarines to Wake. They will arrive there on 23 October.

Despatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional mines, ammunition and stores.

The CURTIS arrives at Wake on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs.

Prepared to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, replacing the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor.

Despatched additional mines to Palmyra.

Placed Admiral Pye, with the ships making a health cruise, on twelve hours notice after 20 October.

Had six submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice.

Put some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

Delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA until about 17 November when she is due to go for an overhaul to Puget Sound and deferred final decision until that time.

With minor changes I propose to continue the health cruises to the Pacific Coast until something more definite develops. The despatch in regard to the submarines for Manila went forward to you today.

I previously pointed out to you the great desirability of many things in the Pacific Fleet. If you will bear with me I want now to repeat some of them once more. The urgency for additional patrol craft in this area is as great as ever. Such craft are not [2] worthwhile unless they can operate in trade wind seas which result from winds from 15 to 35 knots blowing almost continuously. The 12 PT's which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use in this area. We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Oahu to Molokai. The reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were practically useless in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of them had to turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from being thrown about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use out here. In this connection I noted that the Department diverted the listening gear allocated to the four-stackers (DM's) in this Fleet to Atlantic destroyers and we will get no listening gear for these craft until a new contract is made. I had fondly hoped that all these craft would be fitted with listening gear by the first of December.

In order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships of this Fleet made effective we require at least two more squadrons of destroyers. Every exercise we plan we find the destroyers are lacking. You can well understand of course, that two squadrons is, in my opinion, a very modest request. We can use many more.

I have been struggling with the availability of battleships and am concerned about the long interval between overhauls that will result if we continue to have only one battleship overhaul at one time. I am loath to reduce the operational
forces by more than that particularly as the interim availability further reduces the number available for operations. Two more battleships out here, particularly if they could be the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON, would ease the situation enormously. We have indications that one new battleship has been commissioned by the Japanese and rumors that an additional one will soon be placed in commission. Such a contingency will further disturb the balance of power in the Pacific.

We can use all the Jong range submarines that you can send us. They can be most effective in keeping destroyers and other patrol craft occupied near the Japanese bases, homeland, and trade routes.

We should have more cruisers because we can expect that Jap raider activities will result from employment of a considerable number of converted merchant types as well as old cruisers in this work. Then, too, our own planned offensive operations require cruisers and more cruisers. The least you can do for us is to leave us with the cruisers we have. I can easily keep three or four more divisions profitably occupied when war breaks.

The type of operations we have planned in the early stages of the war puts a premium on aircraft operations from carriers. We [3] have only three. One of them is occupied part-time in training activities at San Diego. I note in a letter signed by Ingersoll and received today that the chances of getting a merchant ship converted to a carrier for training purposes at San Diego are very poor. I feel that this matter should be pushed; that we should have at least one such vessel in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. Until we do get such a ship we are required to occupy a considerable time of a carrier at greatly increased cost, diversion from active operations and reduction in the efficiency of the carrier. These carrier training vessels will be useful so long as the war lasts and will pay for themselves many times over.

We had information some time ago that you were converting two sea train vessels for use in transporting aircraft. What has become of them? Are they operating in the Atlantic and so you propose to send a carrier to San Diego to ferry planes.

I feel that the training in the Fleet is coming along very well. The shooting so far has been very good by any standards. We are developing the use of radar and our principal handicap at the present time is lack of material and lack of trained personnel. Both are being remedied at a satisfactory rate. We have had no experience yet with the use of gunnery radar. The first sets are now being installed. The gunnery radar installed in the HONOLULU Class is a bitter disappointment. They have been able to get surface ships at ranges not in excess of twenty thousand yards, on a big ship, and around twelve thousand on a destroyer. This radar is apparently useless for the detection of aircraft. Luckily, this type is being installed in the HONOLULU Class only. It is useful only for short range work against surface craft at night or in low visibility. I presume steps are being taken to eliminate or radically improve this type of radar.

The radar installed in the battleships and carriers is well worthwhile and we have got highly creditable results from its use.

The new big drydock here has been pumped out and the contractors' forces are now in process of cleaning it out preparatory to finishing off the bottom. I am informed that an emergency docking will be possible any time after about the 15th of November, although the dock will not be entirely completed until sometime later than that.

The recreation facilities are being added to and I believe the men are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The shooting has, I believe, served to increase their confidence in themselves, to a considerable degree.

[4] I sent forward to you today an exhaustive study on the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. I hope it will be of assistance in deciding what you want done out here. I feel that a comprehensive plan is essential if we are to get coordinated results in the shortest time. This we tried to give you.

You will note that we recommend two full defense battalions over and above the requirements of the Islands now occupied in order to provide two balanced forces to occupy any desired location on short notice. Until such time comes these personnel can be used to rotate the defense battalions at the various permanently garrisoned islands.

The investigation of an alternate land plane route to the Eastward of the Marshalls and on to Australia has my hearty approval. We may be able to get some quick results from the expedition to Christmas Island sufficient to permit the routing of four-engine land plane bombers from Oahu to Christmas to Suva to
Noumea and on to Australia. Additional stepping stones are, of course, highly desirable. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that there are not enough ships now available to handle our own island developments. Without greatly augmented shipping facilities we cannot possibly assume the additional burden for the Army.

My best regards to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNIVERSAL STATES PACIFIC FLEET—FLAGSHIP

Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 29, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: I had Mr. Hallet Abend for lunch with me today. He has just completed a tour for the Reader’s Digest and his travels took him to Singapore, Manila, Java, Dutch East Indies, Australia and New Zealand. He gave us some very interesting information. The most vital information was information which he had received from officials in Australia and New Zealand that if Japan attacks Russia the British Empire will declare war on Japan. He was also assured that the Dutch East Indies would follow Great Britain and that the Dutch are anxious that the war start. They feel that the present set-up in the world gives them a better chance now than they will ever have again, so long as Japan has her bases in Indo China.

At the present writing it appears that the most probable direction for Japanese adventures is to the Northward. If they do embark on such an adventure and Britain and the Dutch East Indies declare war on Japan, what will we do?

I have no means of knowing the accuracy of the statements. It may be that the idea was planted with Mr. Abend as a propaganda measure and he was told by the officials who informed him that he could publish it after he got to the United States. I am informing you in order that you may run it down, and also in the hope that you may give me some inkling of what we will do in such a contingency.

My kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

[s] H. E. Kimmel

P. S. The officials told Mr. Abend that this information came from the Privy Council but he was not privileged to use this.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

[1]

JOINT COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 6, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: I have just signed a communication to you setting forth our estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates. This estimate represents meticulous observations, principally by radio, over a long period of time with what we conceive to be reasonable deductions therefrom. I think there can be no doubt that the Japanese have expanded very large sums and much effort in their attempt to strengthen the Mandates and provide numerous operating bases for submarines and aircraft. The numbers of aircraft are of necessity an estimate, but with adequate operating bases for both submarines and aircraft, additional forces can be very quickly moved into the Mandates, depending upon the situation.
You will note, of course, that our estimate differs considerably from the one prepared in the Navy Department. I doubt very much if the Navy Department's effort has had the care expended upon it that we have given to the one we submitted.

I must call your attention again to the anti-submarine effort that will be required in this area and at sea if our operations are to be carried on with reasonable security. You have approved installation of sound gear in the DM's, in the AM's, the AVP's, certain AT's, and the AVD's. At the present writing, the following vessels of these classes are lacking in sound gear and we have been furnished no date from the Department on which we can expect deliveries of same.

DM's: PRUITT, TRACY, PREBLE, SICARD, DORSEY, LAMBERTON, BOGGS and ELLIOT.
AVP's: TEAL, PELICAN, SWAN and AVOCET.
AM's: BOBOINK, GREBE, KINGFISHER, RAIL, ROBIN, SEAGULL, TERN, TURKEY, VIREO.

[1] In other words, we have in this area 29 ships which can be fitted with sound gear and which are not so fitted. This is a very large number of potentially useful submarine hunters.

I note that you plan to send 24 VSO's to the Asiatic Fleet in January. I presume that you now plan to send those VSO's crated, in cargo vessels. Unless the situation changes materially I strongly recommend against sending them in a carrier.

I have frequently mentioned the very great desirability of having a flight deck merchant ship for use in training aviators for carrier duty. On reflection, I have changed my mind to the extent that instead of providing one carrier of this type for each coast, we should provide about ten such carriers for each coast. Such ships operating in conjunction with cruisers or even destroyers, have a very great potential value. Of course, the mercantile aircraft carriers I am now recommending should be fully equipped for combat purposes—something that I did not contemplate when we recommended the carrier for flight deck training only.

My kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL

P. S. I have forwarded today by air mail the comments of Com-14, the Commanding General, and myself on the subject of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Oahu. You will note that we have presented several objections and feel that in any event the Commander-in-Chief, Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, and Commander Base Force have no place in such an operating center. I feel that the quarters and buildings we have requested for these agencies should be proceeded with forthwith; no matter what decision is finally made in regard to an operating center the buildings we have requested will be necessary.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

[1] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No. Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 15 November, 1941.

DEAR "Betty": In repeated correspondence I have set forth to you the needs of the Pacific Fleet. Those needs are real and immediate. I have seen the material and personnel diverted to the Atlantic. No doubt they are needed there. But I must insist that more consideration be given to the needs of the Pacific Fleet.
In case of war in the Pacific we shall have a problem difficult of solution under any circumstances; one requiring a major effort to bring the war to a successful conclusion. During preparation for such an effort we must be in a position to make Japanese operations costly and of limited effectiveness. The strength of this fleet limits our freedom of action and lack of modern equipment in ships we now have limits their effectiveness.

We must be in a position to minimize our own losses, and to inflict maximum damage to Japanese fleet, merchant shipping, and bases. We should have sufficient strength in this fleet for such effective operations as to permit cruising at will in the Japanese Mandated Island area, and even on occasions to Japanese home waters. We should have the strength to make any enemy operations against Wake a highly hazardous undertaking. To do these things substantial increase of the strength of this Fleet is mandatory.

Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain that ship, unit and fleet efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a minimum especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of officers and men has already dangerously reduced efficiency of this fleet and they continue. Well qualified officers are in many instances, detached to fill billets much less important, in my opinion than those filled in this fleet. Battleship Captains must be chosen for proficiency regardless of seniority.

This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements; it can utilize an additional 10,000.

If this fleet is to reach and maintain a satisfactory degree of readiness for offensive action, the foregoing requirements must be met; and it must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the shore establishment.

With best wishes,

H. E. Kimmel

Commander-in-Chief

United States Pacific Fleet

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship

Ser. #8

Pears Harbor, T. H., December 2, 1941.

Dear Betty: We had your despatches in regard to reinforcing the outlying islands with Army pursuit planes and Army personnel. With regard to the use of Army pursuits on the island bases, some time ago we investigated the feasibility of putting some kind of fighters on the outlying islands and decided at the time that our best chance of quickly reinforcing the islands and to make the minimum demands upon the supplies in the island that we should send a minimum number of ground crews to Wake and Midway in order when the time came, to be in a position to fly off the Marine planes from a carrier or to send them direct from Pearl to Midway in the case of the SBD's. At the time your despatch in regard to Army pursuits was received we had the Wright at Wake discharging the Marine ground crews and she arrives at Midway tomorrow, December 3, to discharge Marine ground crews there.

Halsey, in the Enterprise, with three heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, will fly off 12 Marine fighting planes for Wake tomorrow morning after which he returns to Pearl. We have been covering his advance by 2 VP squadrons operating from Johnston, Midway and Wake. Upon the completion of the movement we now plan to return one VP squadron to Pearl and leave the other one at Midway awaiting further developments. I will hold the Marine SBD's at Pearl awaiting further developments as they can fly under their own power from Pearl to Midway.

During all the period that I have been in command the question of the development of supply and defense of these outlying bases has been a very difficult one. We cannot expect to supply Wake quickly and expeditiously until we have a space to put a ship alongside for loading and unloading. The Commandant of the District has been and is exerting every effort to obtain this objective. As you know, ships have been delayed in unloading at Wake for as
long as 28 days, due to bad weather, and it is not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 or 8 days. This, in the face of any opposition, presents an impossible situation. Present facilities at Wake must be improved, particularly as to storage of fuel oil, aviation gas, food and ammunition. This work should not stop and the 1,000 defense workers at Wake are essential to keep this work moving as rapidly as material can be supplied. A recent estimate by Bloch sets the time for the completion of the ship channel to about the first of May. I hope, and so does he, that this date can be anticipated. At the present time we cannot support more personnel on Wake than we now have there. As you will remember, we put six 5" guns and twelve 3" [2] anti-aircraft guns, together with a number of machine guns on the island, well knowing that we did not have sufficient marine personnel to man them. However, I think good progress has been made in organizing the defense workers to assist in the manning of the battery at Wake. If in case the present situation should ease, we can readily withdraw the Marine fighters from Wake in order to decrease the demands upon the facilities there and also in order to keep up the training of the pilots of these planes.

The situation at Midway is somewhat better than at Wake. You will note from our report of the defenses submitted today that we have shipped three of the four 7" guns to Midway. Also we have shipped, or are shortly shipping, four of the 3"-50 anti-aircraft guns to Midway. These, in addition to the batteries already installed there, which comprise six 5"-51's and twelve 3" anti-aircraft. You will also note from our official letter submitted today that the defenses of Johnston and Palmyra, while not what we would like to have, are nevertheless not entirely inadequate.

Your despatches in regard to the use of Army personnel and the organization of Army defense forces to be used in outlying islands is being given earnest consideration. I know you appreciate the difficulties of mixing Army, Marine Corps and Navy personnel in a small island base. I believe you will subscribe to the principle that all these outlying bases must be under Navy command and the forces there must be subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief without any qualification whatsoever. I anticipate some difficulties along this line when Army personnel is injected into the picture unless a very clear directive is issued jointly by the War and Navy Department. On inquiry and conference with the Army I find that the Army in Hawaii has no guns, either surface or anti-aircraft, available for outlying bases. They can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing but .30 caliber machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu with no suitable equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment now in the islands. The Marines in the outlying islands are trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards immediately obtainable by the Army even if they took over the present Marine equipment. We cannot appreciably increase the number of military personnel in the outlying islands unless we remove the defense workers. We cannot afford to remove the defense workers if we expect ever to reach a satisfactory condition in the islands. Essential items include, as I have previously stated, [3] provisions to berth a ship at Wake, completion of air fields at Palmyra and Johnston and completion of fuel, gasoline, food and ammunition housing at all bases. I am proposing in official correspondence that: (2) the Army organize 3 defense battalions of approximately 800 men each; that steps be taken in Washington to supply them with guns, both surface and anti-aircraft; supply them with 37mm or .50 caliber machine guns; to make up a well balanced defense battalion; that prior to the time the equipment of these organizations is supplied that they drill with the five inch guns of the Fourth Defense Battalion now at Pearl as long as the equipment is available here. If it is decided to supply these battalions with some other caliber of guns, that sufficient number of guns of the type to be used be shipped to Oahu to be utilized for training purposes. (b) that these Army defense battalions be held in readiness to (1) furnish replacement to presently occupied islands (2) to relieve battalions in presently occupied islands (3) to garrison islands to be occupied.

The Marine garrison's now at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra should be retained there for the present. They will not be withdrawn until arms and equipment for the Army defense battalions have been received and the Army trained. At this time a decision can be made according to the situation then existing.
That the Army organize three 18-plane pursuit squadrons and keep them in an expeditionary status; maintain the ground crews organized and ready to man them; maintain the planes ready to be transported by carrier when ordered.

The Army has orders to defend Canton and Christmas. We are turning over to them two five-inch 51 guns for use at Canton. These they will man with Army personnel and supplement with some obsolete anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. The expedition is now due to leave here on December ninth.

The Army is also sending some obsolete guns and a garrison to Christmas. I will let you know more definitely what they sent when I find out exactly.

I feel that we cannot determine the defenses of Canton and Christmas until we find out how much personnel can be maintained there. Meanwhile the Army is sending some forces there.

4) In view of the foregoing I am unable to understand the reason for the despatches from the War and Navy Department directing us to utilize the Army in the defense of the outlying bases, as we can hope for no relief from this quarter until they have been supplied with suitable equipment.

I feel the wiser course is to continue to organize Marine defense battalions and supply them with the necessary equipment. I believe we can train Marine defense battalions just as rapidly as the Army can do so and probably as rapidly as the equipment can be supplied. If there is any prospect of the immediate supply of considerable quantities of suitable equipment I can see some reason for injecting the Army into the picture.

I think it would be well for you to read the despatch sent by the War Department to the Commanding General on this subject. It differs considerably from the one you sent to us in that the War Department says they will take over the defense of some outlying bases from the Navy in accordance with an agreement to be reached by the Commanding General and myself. Your despatch left me with the conviction that the Army was to reinforce the Naval and Marine forces on the outlying bases in case of necessity. I feel that this should be clarified.

We have one transport in commission which, due to a delay in the sailing of the WHARTON we are now obliged to use for one trip to transport essential Naval personnel from the West Coast to the Fleet. The other transports, to a total of six, are in various stages of completion. The Marines at San Diego are in urgent need of transport training and will not be ready to come to Hawaii until some time in February. I can see very little chance for any overseas expedition even on a small scale until that date. Eventually this war will require a much greater number of transports and supply ships in the Pacific. We are working on an estimate of the requirements. This estimate, in addition to some thirty or forty transports and an equal number of supply ships must also include a thirty to fifty percent increase in the fighting strength of the Fleet before we can occupy the Marshalls and Carolines in an advance across the Pacific.

With these considerations in mind I am at loss to understand the considerations which injected the Army into the picture.

5) My kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL

P. S. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment made the statement in conference that his pursuit planes could not operate farther than 15 miles from land. If this be the case, I can see very little use for Army pursuit planes in an outlying island. This, added to the inability of this type plane to land on a carrier, makes them practically useless for an overseas expedition of any kind. Except for the four-engined Army bombers, we must depend upon Navy and Marine Corps planes to support any overseas expedition and to man outlying bases. This is and has been one of my reasons for urging the supply of all types of carrier planes.

P. S. You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area.

H. E. K.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

6) P. S. In connection with the development of outlying bases by the Army, I must invite your attention to the fact that when the War Department issued orders to the Commanding General out here to develop these bases they authorized him to charter ships and to take all other necessary steps to insure
the early completion of the project. He has already taken over three large inter-island vessels and has caused some army transports and other shipping to be diverted to the supply of Christmas and Canton. He has also chartered a number of smaller vessels such as tugs and sampans.

I feel he has done an excellent job. I feel that the Navy personnel in this area with equal authority would have their efforts much facilitated. I do not know the considerations which prompted the Navy to turn over the development of the island bases to the Army I do know that it has complicated our problems considerably.

The Commanding General is keeping me informed of what he is doing but frequently the information is so late that I have been unable to plan adequate protection. I am sure it is no fault of his because he informs me as soon as he himself is informed. I have nothing but the highest praise for the way General Short has taken hold of this problem which dropped in his lap.

H. E. KIMMEL

[7] P. S. From correspondence which General Short has furnished me I note that the Army is engaged in developing air fields in Fiji and New Caledonia. This will involve questions of supply and protection both of shipping and the fields themselves. The Australians I understand are both to assume the protection of the field in New Caledonia. The Navy is bound to be involved in these affairs. I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive.

With regard to the escort of convoys by using a single cruiser to escort not to exceed 8 ships, we endeavor to limit the number of cruisers so occupied at one time to four. We now find that routing via Torres Strait to Manila, we are going to have seven cruisers continuously occupied with convoy duty. This without any consideration for such protection as may eventually be required from San Francisco to Oahu. I realize of course that the demands for trans-Pacific escorts may decrease if it becomes impossible to route ships to Manila but it will still be necessary to supply the Asiatic Fleet and our allies in the Far East.

/S/ H. E. KIMMEL

[1] Ser. #9

Secret

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 12, 1941.

Dear Betty: Thanks for your letter. The Secretary is here and I have given him verbally as complete an account of the action last Sunday as I could. Pye, Bloch and General Short were present during the interview. "Briefly, we had considered an air raid on Hawaii as a very remote possibility, particularly at the time that it occurred. There were 10 VP's in the air that morning but they of course could not adequately cover 360° of arc and their primary effort was directed against the submarine menace which everyone fully recognized. In our endeavor to avoid wearing out both personnel and planes, we had made periodic sweeps to the Northward and Westward but none were made on the morning in question. You, of course, are familiar with the exchanges of VP squadrons and the teething trouble that such new squadrons always experience.

Full precautions were taken by all ships at sea and I am happy to state that no casualties were incurred by any of them. The submarines were promptly and I hope effectively, dealt with. We believe that since the action started we have accounted for several submarines. A task force commanded by Newton, including one carrier, was between here and Midway and about 400 miles from Midway, South of the line of islands. This task force included 1 carrier, 3 CA's and a squadron of destroyers. Brown, in the INDIANAPOLIS, with 4 DM's was in the vicinity of Johnston Island. Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with 3
CA's and 9 DD's was about 200 miles west of Oahu. The MINNEAPOLIS, with 4 DVM's, was in the operating area to the Southward of Oahu.

The approximate locations of these forces are shown on the chart and in the statement enclosed herewith. The Army anti-aircraft guns were not manned. The condition of readiness of their planes is being reported by General Short.

The ships in harbor opened fire very promptly but the first attack wave was practically unopposed. The fact that all ships were able to open fire so promptly during the breakfast hour indicates that the ships in harbor were alert and prepared.

No amount of explanation can alter the results which are included in a letter which I am sending along to you today, giving in such detail as is now possible, the damage sustained. Prompt and vigorous action was taken in an attempt to intercept and destroy the attacking force. The Fifth Column activities added great confusion and it was most difficult to evaluate the reports received.

[2] We gave Halsey, Brown and Newton our best information and estimates. Our first estimate, based on very meager information indicated a carrier might be to the Northward. Halsey had hardly steadied on a course in that direction when he intercepted a message as to strong enemy forces approaching Barber's Point and promptly diverted his ship and search to the Southward. A false report of a transport landing troops at Barber's Point was picked up by an enemy ship and rebroadcast.

For a time, indications seemed to point more definitely to a carrier to the Southward than to the Northward and I advised the forces at sea that enemy carriers might be in both directions. Radar information was conflicting; but that indicating planes to the Southward was strongly supported by R. D. F. bearings (not bilateral) of two Japanese calls showing carriers in that direction. Probably they were made by enemy ships planted there for the purpose; although some possibility still exists that a carrier may have been there.

We will endeavor to give you a complete account of our efforts when time permits. Up to now we have been far too busy in handling matters of the moment and planning for the future to collate and analyze the vast amount of conflicting matter that came in at the time.

I am enclosing an estimate of the situation, which will show you our present ideas on what we hope to accomplish. Needless to say we have been up to our ears in getting re-oriented; so much so that we have scarcely had time to feel the terrific shock.

The Secretary is taking with him photographs of the type of submarine which entered the harbor. This submarine 74' x 5½', bolted together in 3 sections and capable of 24 knots submerged, can pass under or around most nets. The Pearl Harbor anti-submarine net was down at the time the raid started. The submarine carried photographed silhouettes of Oahu from every angle of approach; and, among other things in its locker, it had an American Ensign. I shall forward shortly, considerable detailed information of this vessel.

Charts and other things from crashed planes, as well as information gained from the submarine prove that this raid was planned for months. Details had been worked out with the greatest care. Each pilot, judging from material from unburned or partially burned planes, carried a book of silhouettes of our ships. The charts of Pearl Harbor in planes were as good as anything we have. [3] They showed the berths for all types of our ships. I entertain no doubt that the loss of the OGLALA was entirely due to the fact that she was in the PENNSYLVANIA's normal berth.

The inspiring thing in all this business is the conduct of officers and men. During the action it was magnificent and their efforts since have been untiring and effective. As destroyers were clearing the harbor, they were boarded by men from sunken ships anxious to do their part. Numerous instances have been reported to me of mass volunteering from sunken ships to go to sea in ships that were left. Marines, hearing of attacks on Midway and Wake, have insisted on being sent there.

Moral of all officers and men is high. They have but one thought and that is to be able to get at the enemy.

My kindest regards and best wishes to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

/s/ H. E. Kimmel.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX TO NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE AT NAVY PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS

(Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to the Secretary of the Navy in Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations. See Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations, Vol. II, for official Navy action (formerly Top Secret) on the reports)

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES FLEET, THIRD ENDORSEMENT TO REPORT OF FURTHER PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION BY ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT, U. S. NAVY

[1]

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Navy Department, Washington 25, D. C.

FF1/A17
Serial: 002008
Top Secret

Third Endorsement to Adm. Hewitt's Report to SecNav dated 12 July 1945.
From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:

(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that the evidence will not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy.

(b) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously expressed, that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency, due to the lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties.

(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment may not result in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.

[2] (d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one of them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, nor are court martial or other proceedings (prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan) advisable because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to national security measures.

2. I concur in the opinion of Judge Advocate General that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to trial before a General Court Martial, should Admiral Kimmel so insist. However, this action should not be taken until after the completion of hostilities with Japan.

3. I concur in the suggestion of the Judge Advocate that this record be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to security; that if Admiral Kimmel insists, a General Court Martial will be convened to try him for alleged offenses he may have committed on or before December 7, 1941.
4. As to Admiral Hewitt's deductions from war experience—paragraph 28, page 180—I am unable to concur fully with (a) thereof but do concur fully with (b) thereof. Nor am I able to concur fully in his paragraph 29 (page 180)—which parallels his paragraph 28 (a)—for the reason that he himself sets forth in substance at various places in his "findings" and "conclusions", namely, that while the system of command was that of mutual cooperation it was, in reality, incomplete and inadequate implementation of that system which was at fault. There is the further fact that, given the information which was available in Washington, it is reasonable to assume that the system of mutual cooperation would have been fully alerted and made to function effectively.

[8] E. J. King
E. J. King.

THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
SECOND ENDORSEMENT
ON
THE REPORT OF FURTHER PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION
BY
ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT, U. S. NAVY

[1]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., 10 August 1945.

Top Secret
Second Endorsement

From: The Judge Advocate General.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and
Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Report of further Pearl Harbor investigation by Admiral

1. Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies omissions in the earlier
investigations. It is considered that this and former investigations, taken
Together, present as clear a picture of the pertinent facts as will ever be adduced.
With this report, therefore, I believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack
should be considered completed.

2. Admiral Hewitt's report brings out and confirms a distinction which
impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a distinction
which does much to clarify thinking on the question of placing responsibility for
the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that there was no lack of appreciation
on the part of any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming
quickly, during the critical period immediately preceding 7 December 1941:
The point on which those officers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment
to be expected from officers occupying their positions, was their failure to
appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a
likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to
prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of these officers, in estimating
the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in
that he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese
might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific.

3. I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and
co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any
great affect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that they each
entertained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding would most
likely merely have strengthened those views. Likewise, I submit that the impor-
tance of information from Japanese sources has been overemphasized; for had
more basically sound principles been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would
not have occurred. The security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our
Pacific strategy, a fact which did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic concept of responsible officers.

4. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:

(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not believed that there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to naval law.

(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses which are worthy of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to define the duty of the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty to follow a course of action other than the one he did. In my opinion this would be impossible, as the acts of omission of these officers do not rise above the status of errors of judgment. No clearly defined duty can be established which was neglected or improperly performed. As stated by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on the findings of the Court of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the fact that the acts of the officers in question "indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency."

"Lack of Superior Judgment" is not an offense triable by general court-martial.

(c) The charges and specifications for any court-martial proceedings must be filed not later than a date "six months after the termination of hostilities in the present war with Japan as proclaimed by the President or as specified in a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, whichever is the earlier." Public Law 77—79th Congress, approved June 25, 1945. There are serious doubts as to the constitutionality of this and the earlier extensions of the Statute of Limitations enacted by the Congress since 7 December, 1941 and applicable to trials arising out of the Pearl Harbor disaster as a violation of the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Admiral Kimmel has executed a waiver of the Statute of Limitations for a period of six months past the end of the present war, and therefore the question of the validity of the Congressional extensions is not controlling in his case. However, as it has become apparent since the time that Admiral Kimmel was requested to execute this waiver that other officers are also blameworthy, it is my opinion that the Navy Department would be acting in an inequitable manner in instituting any proceedings against Admiral Kimmel on his waiver, unless Admiral Kimmel himself so requests.

3. (d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members of a general court-martial will make it most difficult to constitute a court for the trial of the officers here concerned during war time or during a period of six months after the cessation of hostilities. Many of the officers of appropriate rank, both on the active and the retired lists, would be disqualified because of interest in the subject matter, the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue of having been connected with one of the investigations into the matter. If more than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an entirely new court would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried a former case arising out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to challenge. The Summoning of the necessary witnesses would result in temporarily removing from their duty stations many of the key officers in the naval organization. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the naval service.

5. Notwithstanding the difficulties pointed out above, I am of the opinion that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel tried by general court-martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist. In August 1943, Secretary Knox sent Admiral Kimmel a memorandum from which the following is quoted, "I feel that it would be to the best interests of all concerned if you should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial upon my assurance that the trial will be had at the earliest practicable date." And in Admiral Kimmel's waiver he agreed, "I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court-Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7th, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter."
6. I suggest that this record be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his
counsel; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything
contained in this record and prior records as soon as that may be done without
prejudice to the public interests; that if he insists, a general court-martial will
be convened to try him for alleged offenses he may have committed on or before
December 7, 1941; and that his decision be abided.

/s/ T. L. Gatch.
T. L. GATCH.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY'S FIRST ENDORSEMENT ON THE REPORT OF FURTHER
PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION BY ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT, U. S. NAVY

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Washington

First Endorsement.

To: The Judge Advocate General.
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Record of proceedings and Report of further Pearl Harbor investiga-
tion by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN.

1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.

2. The endorsement by the Judge Advocate General will include his opinion
(a) as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant court-martial or other
proceedings, (b) as to the offense or offenses which might be made the subject
of court-martial or other proceedings, assuming the sufficiency of the evidence
concerning such offense or offenses, (c) as to the date prior to which any such
court-martial or other proceeding must be instituted, and (d) as to the practic-
ability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination
of hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the regulations concerning the
composition of a court and in view of the necessity of obtaining testimony from
witnesses engaged in operations against the enemy.

3. The endorsement by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations will include his opinion (a) as to the sufficiency of the
evidence to warrant court-martial or other proceedings, (b) as to the practic-
ability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination of
hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the regulations concerning the
composition of a court and in view of the necessity of obtaining testimony from
witnesses engaged in operations against the enemy, and (c) as to the advisa-
bility of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination of
hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the possibility of disclosure of
information relating to current and prospective military operations and to
national security.

FORRESTAL.

REPORT OF FURTHER INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE JAPANESE
ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR, 7 DECEMBER 1941, BY ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT,
U. S. NAVY

12 JULY, 1945.


To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Report of further investigation in the facts surrounding the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

Reference:

(a) Report of Commission appointed by the President to investigate and
report the facts relating to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7
December, 1941.

(b) Record of examination of witnesses having knowledge of the facts in con-
nection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, conducted by
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret.).

(c) Public Law 339, 78th Congress.

(d) Precept appointing Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, 13 July 1944.
(e) Record of proceedings and report of Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
(g) Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944.
(h) Letter 3 December 1944 from Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, to the Secretary of the Navy, on report of Army Pearl Harbor Board.
(i) Precept 2 May 1945 appointing H. Kent Hewitt, Admiral, U. S. Navy, to conduct further Pearl Harbor Investigation.
(j) Memorandum 18 May 1945, concerning the scope of the further investigation and approval thereof by the Secretary of the Navy.
(k) Precept 6 July 1945 amending reference (i).

Enclosure:
(A) Report of further investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
(B) Record of proceedings of this investigation and exhibits therein.
1. The precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 2 May 1945, reference (l), as amended by reference (k), directed that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, make a study of the previous investigations, that such further investigation as might appear to be necessary be then conducted, and, that upon completion of the investigation a report be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy setting forth the findings and conclusions reached.
2. Review of the previous investigations disclosed that various matters of importance, principally concerning intelligence, had not been investigated thoroughly. The subjects proposed for further investigation were approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 21 May 1945.
3. Counsel in this investigation was John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting were Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, VII, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The reporters were Supervisory Clerk Ben Harold, USNR, and Chief Yeoman Raymond E. Reese, USNR. These men took a special oath to maintain the security of the information developed during the investigation.
4. During this proceeding, which commenced 14 May 1945, the testimony of 38 witnesses, some of whom had testified previously, was taken on 26 days, at Washington, D. C., at San Francisco, and at Pearl Harbor. 81 exhibits were received.
5. Delivered herewith are the report of this further investigation (Enclosure A), and the record of proceedings and exhibits therein (Enclosure B). In preparing this report, an effort has been made to present, in one document, the essential facts within the scope of this inquiry which have been developed by this and preceding investigations.

H. Kent Hewitt.

REPORT BY ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT ON FURTHER PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

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1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[1] INTRODUCTION—PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS AND SCOPE OF THIS INVESTIGATION

A. The Roberts Commission.

Pursuant to Executive Order dated December 1941, a Commission, headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts, conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942 and concluded:

“1. Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential to success in war and requires: First, the coordination of the foreign and military policies of the Nation; and, second, the coordination of the operations of the Army and Navy.”
"2. The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan.

"3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.

"4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled their obligations by consulting and cooperating with each other and with their superiors, respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier; and each knew of, and concurred in, the warnings and orders sent by the other to the responsible commanders with respect to such defense.

"5. The Chief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his command responsibilities by issuing a direct order in connection with his warning of probable hostilities, in the following words: 'Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.'

"6. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his command responsibility by issuing a warning and by giving a direct order to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, in the following words:

"This despatch is to be considered a war warning.'

and

"Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned.'

[2] "7. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area, in fulfillment of their obligation to do so, prepared plans which, if adapted to and used for the existing emergency, would have been adequate.

"8. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was to confer upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their joint defense plans.

"9. These commanders failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use existing plans to meet the emergency.

"10. The order for alert No. 1 of the Army command in Hawaii was not adequate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.

"11. The state of readiness of the Naval forces on the morning of December 7 was not such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.

"12. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations November 27, 1941, been complied with, the aircraft warning system of the Army should have been operating: the distant reconnaissance of the Navy, and the inshore air patrol of the Army, should have been maintained; the antiaircraft batteries of the Army and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well as additional antiaircraft artillery located on vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, should have been manned and supplied with ammunition; and a high state of readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon the warnings and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands in Washington.

"13. There were deficiencies in personnel, weapons, equipment, and facilities to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time, but these deficiencies should not have affected the decision of the responsible commanders as to the state of readiness to be prescribed.

"14. The warning message of December 7, intended to reach both commanders in the field at about 7 a. m. Hawaiian time, December 7, 1941, was but an added precaution, in view of the warnings and orders previously issued. If the message had reached its destination at the time intended, it would still have been too late to be of substantial use, in view of the fact that the commanders had failed to take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its anticipated receipt which would have been effective to warn of the attack or to meet it.

[3] "15. The failure of the officers in the War Department to observe that General Short, neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief of Staff's message of that date, nor otherwise, had reported the measures taken by him and the transmission of two messages concerned chiefly with sabotage which warned him not to resort to illegal methods against sabotage or espionage, and not to
take measures which would alarm the civil population, and the failure to reply to his message of November 29 outlining in full all the actions he had taken against sabotage only, and referring to nothing else, tended to lead General Short to believe that what he had done met the requirements of the warnings and orders received by him.

"16. The failure of the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to confer and cooperate with respect to the meaning of the warnings received and the measures necessary to comply with the orders given them under date of November 27, 1941, resulted largely from a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military and naval circles, and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the Pacific Fleet and our most important outpost.

"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a derelection of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that the was not required to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department.

"19. Causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were:

Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration of war by the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such laws and customs,

Restrictions which prevented effective counterespionage.

Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive action in the Far East, and on antisabotage measures.

Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the antisabotage measures instituted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Nonreceipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the warning message of December 7, 1941.

"20. When the attack developed on the morning of December 7, 1941, the officers and enlisted men of both services were present in sufficient number and were in fit condition to perform any duty. Except for a negligible number, the use of intoxicating liquor on the preceding evening did not affect their efficiency.

"21. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors' orders without question. They were not responsible for the state of readiness prescribed."

B. Admiral Hart's Investigation.

Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses having knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.

C. Naval Court of Inquiry.

Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.

A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Blesemeier, USN, as Judge Advocate, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its...
findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944.

[5] The Court of Inquiry concluded:

"Based on finding II, the Court is of the opinion that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules.

"Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the Constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, prevented the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking offensive action as a means of defense in the event of Japanese vessels or planes appearing in the Hawaiian area, and that it imposed upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which might be construed as an overt act.

"Based on Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations between Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., and Lieut. General Walter C. Short, U.S. Army, were friendly, cordial and cooperative, that there was no lack of interest, no lack of appreciation of responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the part of either, and that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by the other for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree required by the common interest.

"Based on Finding VI, the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in personnel and material which existed during 1941, had a direct adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December.

"Based on Finding VII, the Court is of the opinion that the superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the U.S. Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, and the ability of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantage not attainable by the United States up to 7 December 1941.

"Based on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. The Court is further of the opinion that the defense should have been such as to function effectively independently of the Fleet, in view of the fundamental requirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that of the vessels within its limits.

[6] "Based on Findings IV, VIII and IX, the Court is of the opinion that the duties of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U.S.N., in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor, were performed satisfactorily.

"Based on Finding IX, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed Naval Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed upon were complete and sound in concept, but that they contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning.

"The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer in view of the need for their employment with the Fleet.

"Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea and in the operating areas, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet, and that the steps taken were adequate and effective.
"Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated neither the possibility nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and bearing in mind that he had not knowledge of the State Department’s note of 26 November, the Navy’s condition of readiness on the morning of 7 December, 1941, which resulted in the hostile planes being brought under heavy fire of the ships’ anti-aircraft batteries as they came within range, was that best suited to the circumstances, although had all anti-aircraft batteries been manned in advance, the total damage inflicted on ships would have been lessened to a minor extent and to a degree which is problematical; and that, had the Fleet patrol planes, slow and unsuited for aerial combat, been in the air, they might have escaped and the number of these planes lost might thus have been reduced.

"The Court is of the opinion, however, that only had it been known in advance that the attack would take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects, and that, beyond the fact that conditions were unsettled and that, therefore, anything might happen, there was nothing to distinguish one day from another in so far as expectation of attack is concerned.

[7] "It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned. The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is considered that it could not be known when an attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have been necessary to impose a state of tension on the personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7 December.

"Based on Finding XII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no information of any sort was at any time either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that Japanese carriers or other Japanese ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, the attack of 7 December at Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and that when it would take place was unpredictable.

"Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine, long-range reconnaissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of Fleet patrol planes for daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available, and was not justified in the absence of any information indicating that an attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time.

"Based on Finding XIV, the Court is of the opinion that the shore-based air warning system, an Army service under the direct control of the Army, was ineffective on the morning of 7 December, in that there was no provision for keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile and that, because of this deficiency, a flight of planes which appeared on the radar screen shortly after 0700 was confused with a flight of Army B-17s en route from California, and that the information obtained by Army radar was valueless as a warning, because the planes could not be identified as hostile until the Japanese markings on their wings came into view.

"Based on Finding XV, the Court is of the opinion that by far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to specially designed Japanese torpedoes, the development and existence of which was unknown to the United States.

"Based on Finding XVI, and particularly in view of the Chief of Naval Operations’ approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made by Admiral Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October 1941, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel’s decision made [8] after receiving the dispatch of 24 November, to continue the preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information then available to him.

"Based on Finding XVII, the Court is of the opinion that, although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise, there were good grounds for the belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere, and that the same considerations which influenced the sentiment of the authorities in Washington in this respect, support the interpretation which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the “war warning mes-
sage" of 27 November, to the effect that this message directed attention away from Pearl Harbor rather than toward it.

"Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, 1941 he did not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent; and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.

"The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken.

"Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service."

[9] Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, commented in detail on the findings of the Court of Inquiry in the Second Endorsement thereto. He concluded, in part:

"Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God", beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.

"(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, particularly in the following respects:

"(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.

"(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain intercepted Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.

"(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it [10] did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.

"(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the '1:00 p. m. message' received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this message been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.
"(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.

"(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the 'war warning' message on 27 November, the 'hostile action possible at any moment' message on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:

"(1) He could have used patrol craft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.

"(2) He could have rotated the 'in port' periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.

[II] "(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been fully operational.

"The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency."

D. Army Pearl Harbor Report.

Pursuant to Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, an Army Board conducted investigation into the Japanese attack, and on 20 October 1944 submitted its report to the Secretary of War. The Army report discussed, among other things, various matters involving the Navy, such as the Navy's command relationships at Hawaii, the "tapping" of the telephone wires of the Japanese consul in Hawaii by Naval Intelligence, information secured by Navy radio intelligence as to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces, the Navy's responsibility for long range reconnaissance ("The heart of the defense of Oahu"), and the entrance of Japanese submarines into Pearl Harbor on and allegedly prior to 7 December 1941. The Army report commented critically as to (a) the Navy's failure to conduct long range reconnaissance, (b) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of the presence of a Japanese task force in the Jaluit Islands in late November 1941, (c) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of certain messages, relating to the destruction of codes by the Japanese during the first week of December 1941, and (d) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of the sinking of a Japanese submarine on the morning of 7 December 1941, prior to the air attack. The Army report included a finding that relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not satisfactory, as a practical matter, although cordial. Concerning intelligence generally, the Army report stated, at page 292:

"The Japanese armed forces knew everything about us. We knew little about them. This was a problem of all our Intelligence agencies. This should not come to pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with the part which we are to play in world affairs.

"We must know as much about other major world powers as they know about us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent planning by those charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our security. Our Intelligence service should be second to none in its efficiency. It must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M. I. D. It is a national problem."
"In the past our intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds, lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to correct all of these."

After consideration of the Army Pearl Harbor Report, Fleet Admiral King, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 3 December 1944, stated in part:

"The Army Board finds it difficult to understand the relations between the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the local Air Commander (Rear Admiral Bellinger). The Board makes the comment 'The Army had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility.' My comment as to this is that there are some unavoidable complexities in the Command relations between a fleet, a frontier, and a fleet base in the frontier. However, in this case, there was no possibility of misunderstanding the fact that all naval forces were under Admiral Kimmel. He and General Short should have been able to work out better arrangements for cooperation than they did. The reasons why they did not have been discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5 above.

"The Army Board stresses the point that General Short was dependent upon the U. S. Navy for information as to what the Japanese Navy was doing and for estimates of what the Japanese Navy could do. This view is obviously sound. It was a naval responsibility to keep not only General Short but also the War Department fully acquainted with the estimate of the Japanese naval situation. There was some failure to pass on to General Short and the War Department information which should have been given to them by the Navy, but the basic trouble was that the Navy failed to appreciate what the Japanese Navy could, and did, do.

"The Army Board reports on three matters which should be further investigated by the Navy. These are:

"a. It was stated that the War Department received information from some naval agency that on or about 25 November radio intercepts had located a Japanese task force, including carriers, in the Marshall Islands. About 1 December it was reported that this force assumed radio silence. It is noted in the Record that this information never got to General Short. There is some reference to this incident in the Record of the Naval Court, but it was not followed up, presumably because the officer who was Director of Naval Intelligence at the time was not called as a witness. The matter is probably not of importance, since even if there actually was a Japanese force in the Marshalls it apparently had nothing to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, for the sake of completing the naval Record, this matter should be pursued further.

"b. The Army Board is of the opinion that Japanese midget submarines operated freely inside of Pearl Harbor for several days prior to the 7th of December, for the purpose of obtaining information. This opinion is based on the testimony of an official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who apparently reached his conclusions by a study of certain captured Japanese charts which were made available to F. B. I. by Naval Intelligence. So far as is known, there is no real ground for the supposition that Japanese submarines were able to roam around Pearl Harbor at will, but since the allegation is made in the Army Record, it is advisable to clear up any doubt that may exist by further naval investigation.

"There is reference in the fact that information was obtained from naval and F. B. I. espionage over telephones and cables in Hawaii, but no record of what this information was. This should be cleared up.

"The Army Board finds that the Chief of Staff of the Army was at fault in that he failed to keep General Short informed of the international situation and that he delayed in getting critical information to General Short. In these respects, the Army Report parallels the Naval Court findings as to the Chief of Naval Operations. The Army Board further finds that General Marshall was at fault and that he failed to keep his Deputies informed of what was going on, so that they could act intelligently in his absence; in that he did not take action on General Short's report on 28 November that he had established 'Alert No. 1'; and in that he lacked knowledge of conditions of readiness in the Hawaiian Command.

"The Army Board finds that General Short was at fault in that he failed to place his command in an adequate state of readiness (the information which he had was incomplete and confusing, but it was sufficient to warn him of tense relations), in that he failed to reach and agreement with local naval officials for
implementing joint Army and Navy plans and agreements for joint action, in
that he failed to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnais-
sance being conducted by the Navy, and in that he failed to replace inefficient
staff officers.
"I find nothing in the Record of the Army Board to cause me to modify the
opinions expressed in my endorsement on the Record of the Naval Court of In-
quiry, except in relation to the cooperation between Admiral Kimmel and Gen-
eral Short. In view of the extensive and explicit discussion of this phase of the
matter by the Army Board, I am no longer of the opinion that cooperation be-
tween these two officers was adequate in all respects. The cordial, but informal,
contact which they maintained evidently was not sufficient to coordinate the
means at their disposal to the best advantage. However, as already pointed out,
this fault was part and parcel of the [14] general blindness to Japanese
potentialities in the Central Pacific which was the basic cause of the Pearl Harbor
disaster. The many details discussed by the Army Board and the Naval Court
are useful in showing how this blindness redounded to our disadvantage, but
they do not, in my opinion, prove anything more than that the two naval officers
in the high commands concerned—Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel—failed
to display the superior judgment they should have brought to bear in analysing
and making use of the information that became available to them.
"I recommend that the Secretary of the Navy cause further investigation to
be made in the matter referred to in paragraph 8 above; namely, the alleged radio
contact with a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands, the alleged presence of
Japanese midget submarines inside Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December, and the
substance of information obtained by naval and F. B. I. telephone and cable in-
tercepts. I do not think it necessary to reconvene the Court for this purpose.
The proposed investigation could be made by another Court, or by an investigat-
ing officer, for attachment to the Record of the original Court of Inquiry."

E. Findings of the Secretary of the Navy and Further Investigation.
Upon review of the previous investigations, the Secretary of the Navy found
that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval
Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington. The Secretary further found
that the previous investigations had not exhausted all possible evidence and that
the investigation directed by Public Law 330 of the 78th Congress should be con-
tinued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts should
be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. The Secretary stated that his
decision would be reviewed when the investigation was finally complete, in the
light of the evidence then at hand.
The precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 2 May, 1945, and amended 6
July, 1945, directed that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, make a study of the previ-
ous investigations, that such further investigation as might appear to be necessary
be then conducted, and that upon completion a report be submitted to the Secre-
tary of the Navy setting forth the findings and conclusions reached.
Review of the previous investigations disclosed that various matters of im-
portance, principally concerning intelligence, had not been investigated throughly.
The subjects proposed for further investigation were approved by the Secretary
of the Navy on 21 May, 1945.
Counsel in this investigation was John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting were Lieutenant Commander Benjamin
H. Griswold, III, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The re-
porters were Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR, and Chief Yeoman Raymond E.
Reese, USNR. These men took a special oath to maintain the security of the
information developed during the investigation.

F. Witnesses in this Investigation.
At Pearl Harbor in 1941:
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet. (R. 182)
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, In charge of Communications Intelligence
Unit, Fourteenth Naval District. (R. 43; R. 541)
Vice Admiral William W. Smith, USN, Chief of Staff, CinPac. (R. 335)
Vice Admiral Charles H. McMorris, USN, War Plans Officer, CinPac. (R. 298)
Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, USN, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations,
CinPac. (R. 163)
Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellingham, USN, Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings, Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Commander, Task Force Nine, Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. (R. 471)

Captain John B. Earle, USN, Chief of Staff, 14th N. D. (R. 451)

Mr. George Street, Manager, RCA, Honolulu. (R. 411)

Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN, District Intelligence Officer, 14th N. D. (R. 554)

Captain Thomas H. Dyer, USN, Cryptanalytical and Decrypting, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 418)

Captain Joseph Finnegan, USN, Translator, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 554)

Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN, Assistant Communications Officer, CincPac, on temporary duty with Com 14 Communications Intelligence Unit. (R. 442)

Lieutenant (jg) Farnsley C. Woodward, USN, Cryptanalyst, Communications Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R. 541)

[16] Colonel Alva B. Laswell, USMC, Translator, Communications Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R. 541)

Captain William W. Outerbridge, USN, Commanding Officer, USS WARD. (R. 87)

Lieutenant Commander Monroe H. Hubbard, USNR, Commanding Officer, USS CONDOR. (R. 428)

Richard W. Humphrey, RM3c, USNR, Bishop's Point Radio Station.

Lieutenant Oliver H. Underkoffler, USNR, Communications Office, 14th N. D. (R. 465)

Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, USNR, District Intelligence Office, 14th N. D. (R. 376)

Commander Harold S. Burr, USNR, Com 14 Liaison Officer at General Short's Headquarters. (R. 376)

Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department. (R. 387)

At the Philippines in 1941:

Captain Redfield Mason, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet. (R. 68)

Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, USN, Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, Corregidor. (R. 68)

At Washington, D. C. in 1941:

Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, USN, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence. (R. 389)

Captain Arthur H. McCollum, USN, In charge of Far Eastern Section, Foreign Branch, ONI. (R. 10)

Captain Laurence F. Safford, USN, Communications Security Section. (R. 97; R. 529)

Captain Alvin D. Kramer, USN, ONI and Communications Security Section. (R. 128)

Mrs. Dorothy Edgers, Research Analyst, ONI. (R. 511)

[17] Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Brotherhood, USNR, Communications Security Section. (R. 143)

Lieutenant Frederick L. Freeman, USN, Communications Security Section. (R. 149)

Lieutenant Commander Allan A. Murray, USNR, Communications Security Section. (R. 433)

Lieutenant Commander George W. Linn, USNR, Communications Security Section. (R. 140)

Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, USNR, Communications Security Section. (R. 148)

Other witnesses:

Captain William R. Smedberg, III, USN, now Assistant Combat Intelligence Officer, Staff, Cominch. (R. 4)

Lieutenant Commander Leo Reierstad, USNR, now in charge of a translating unit in Op–16-FE. (R. 158)

Lieutenant (jg) Joseph M. Conant, USNR, Translation sub-section head in Op–16-FE. (R. 158)

Commander Walter Karig, USNR, Lieutenant Welbourn Kelley, USNR, authors of “Battle Report.” (R. 80)

Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Boone, USNR, head of Op–20–GL. (R. 554; R. 607)
### EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

#### [18] G. Exhibits Received in this Investigation.

Received in this investigation were the following exhibits:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Record Page</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Precept convening investigation</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Modification of precept, directing report of findings and conclusions</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Narrative statement by counsel of previous Navy investigations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>CinCPAO Weekly Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 1944, relating to the attacking forces.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>A translation of a captured Japanese submarine chart, showing courses and location of U.S. ships in Pearl Harbor.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>CinCPAO Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 20 October 1944, containing description of Japanese midget submarines.</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>ONI document &quot;ONI 220-J, Japanese Submarines&quot;</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Berthing plan at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941 (Ex. 60 of Naval Court).</td>
<td>9</td>
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THE WAR AND DEFENSE PLANS

A. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five.

On 26 July 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Exhibit 35) was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibit 36). The plan provided in part:

"INTRODUCTION"

CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

"0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day."

"CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS"

"1311. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

"a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

"1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

"2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

"Note: As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan." * * *

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION"

"1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:

"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East."

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION,"

"Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action"

"1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

"1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

"a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

"b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

"c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

"d. The principal defensive efforts to be:
"1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

"2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

"3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

"1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

a. Capture of Guam.

b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

"1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.

b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.

c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main base in Halmahera).

d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.

e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.

f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area." * * *

[26]

"Part II. Outline of Tasks

"Chapter I. Tasks Assigned by Navy Basic Plan—Mission

"2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;

c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as longitude 155° east;

e. Defend Samoa in Category 'D';

f. Defend Guam in category 'F';

g. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;

h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;" * * *

"Chapter II. Tasks Formulated to Accomplish the Assigned Missions

"2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

[27] "a. Phase I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.
"b. Phase IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.
"c. Phase II, etc,—Succeeding tasks.
"2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:
"a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
"b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
"c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
"d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
"e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific southern and a similar force to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier, on M-day.
"f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier on M-day.
"g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the equator as far west as longitude 155° East.

"h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
"i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
"j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
"k. Continue training operations as practicable.

"l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.
"m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

[28]

"Phase IA

"2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:
"a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
"b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.
"c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the northern Pacific.
"d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering operations.
"e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
"2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
"f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
"g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.
"h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian Area and the West coast.
"i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
"j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier as necessary.
"k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.
"l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island area."

"Part III. Task Assignment"

"Chapter 1. Phase I"

"Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force)

"3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.
[29] "3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific southern and Pacific northern naval coastal frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.
"3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I)."
"Part V. Special Provisions"

"Chapter IV. Tentative Operation Plans, Phases I and IA"

"Section I. Phase I"

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

"Operation Plan No. 1-R5." * * *

"I. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan." * * *

"Annex I"

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

"Patrol and Sweeping Plan." * * *

"1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

[30]

Phase I.

"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.

(c) Covering.

(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.

(e) Routing shipping." * * *

"3. (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).

(I) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and unkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereon and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

[31]"(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaisance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1)."

* * *

B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange 14ND-JCD-42

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and FOURTEENTH Naval District (14ND-JCD-42), was signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit). The plan was based on the Joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans,
and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by mutual cooperation which was to apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy would operate in coordination until and if the method of unity of command were invoked. The tasks assigned were as follows:

"14. TASKS.

"a. Joint Task. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

"b. Army Task. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

"c. Navy Task. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces."

The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Costal Frontier" (Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu.)

The plan provided that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for the following:

"17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

"a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS—WHEELER FIELD—LUALualei area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

"b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

"c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

"d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

"e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

"f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.a.), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

"h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18.e.

"i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by 'Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'.

"j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"1. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

"n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

"18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

"a. An inshore patrol.

"b. An offshore patrol.

"c. An escort force.

"d. An attack force.
"e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

g. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

"g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i., a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

34) "p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto."

C. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated 28 March 1941, and approved by Admiral Bloch and General Short 2 April 1941, (Exhibit 47), dealt with joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobilization for war, there were adopted the following agreements:

Paragraph II, in respect of joint air operations, provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things, that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations.

Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, the arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, Marine Corps anti-aircraft artiller, and Army Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and, "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable."

On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph I of the estimate included a “Summary of the Situation,” which indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained, uncertain, and varying; that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action; and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service.

Paragraph II of the estimate embraced a “Survey of Opposing Strengths,” indicating, among other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.

Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with “Possible Enemy Action.” It stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two; that it appeared the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack, most likely launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. It was further pointed out that a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust; that: “(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier”; and that in a dawn air attack there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using.

Paragraph IV of the estimate considered “Action Open to Us.” It was stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period, and, as a practicable measure, could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence [36] indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was made to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred.

Paragraph V contained “Decisions.” The primary decision was that the Naval Base Defense Air Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. A number of subsidiary decisions were made, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and, in accordance with current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons.


Admiral Bloch, as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation Plan No. 1-41, on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit 53 of the Naval Court). The Task Organization prescribed was: (a) Destroyer Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol) consisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, and an A/B boom
and minesweeper, (b) Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two) in conjunction with the Army, (c) Antiaircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) in conjunction with the Army, (d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer) in conjunction with the Army. This plan directed attention, among other things, to the Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, and stated:

"By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as necessary for the Joint protection of Pearl Harbor Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

"In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.

Assumptions.

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.

(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.

(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.

(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.

(3) A combination of these two—possible."

Annexed to Operation Plan 1-41 were: A detailed Inshore Patrol Plan, called Annex "A;" a detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, called Annex "Baker;" a detailed Anti-aircraft Defense Plan, called Annex "C;" a detailed Harbor Control Post Plan, called "D;" and a detailed Communications Plan, known as Annex "Easy."

Annex "Baker," the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, dated 9 April 1941, was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. It divided the Task Organization into (a) Search and Attack Group, consisting of patrol squadrons and other planes, including Army reconnaissance squadrons, and (b) an air combat group. This plan was made in accordance with the Joint Estimate, dated 31 March 1941, which is digested above. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was, according to this plan, to [38] locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against Oahu or Fleet units in the operating areas. The plan was effective upon receipt and became operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness, prescribed in Addendum Two to this plan, would be taken as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (ComFOURTEEN) for Navy units. The condition of material readiness was to be signified by a letter, such as "E," signifying that all aircraft were conducting routine operations and none were ready for the purposes of this plan, and the condition of operational readiness by a number, such as "5," signifying that all types of available planes would be ready in four hours. It was also required that a dispatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day, be made by each unit assigned by this plan to a task group, stating the number of planes and readiness.


Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in February, 1941 and reissued in revised form on 14 October 1941.

This order provided that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.
Security measures were prescribed covering:

A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.
B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships, other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed by Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

C. Sortie and entry.
D. Operating areas.
E. Ships at sea.
F. Ships in port.

The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the principal Army anti-aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense battalions would assist the Army in manning them; and provided that in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; it prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further provided that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire; and that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval [40] Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclusive of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding drills, etc.

Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:

"Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."

The procedure to be followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack was also set forth: the Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie order, sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc.; and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.

The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. It was provided that the ship attacked was, among other things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details; various actions were to be taken by other ships; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It was further provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack," that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."

[41] G. Execution of Plans Prior to 7 December 1941.

(1) The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow 5 provided that the day of execution of the plan was to be designated as W-Day, and that the day upon
which hostilities opened with Japan would be J-Day, which might or might not coincide with W-Day. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, W-Day had not been designated.

(2) The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan had been signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. It will be recalled that under this plan the method of coordination of Army and Navy effort was "by mutual cooperation" and not "unity of command." It will be recalled further that under this plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the Naval forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and protect shipping therein; and to support the Army forces; and, that the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.

(3) Annex VII, Section 6 of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which provided for joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations and for the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when Navy forces were insufficient), was to become effective when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action. No such agreement was made prior to the attack on December 7th.

(4) The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, which provided for an Inshore Patrol consisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, and an A/B boom and minesweepers, a Base defense air force, anti-aircraft defense, and a harbor control post, although effective as to the inshore patrol was not in operation as to the base defense air force.

(5) The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, dated 9 April 1941, which was an annex to the Naval Base Defense Force Plan and which had been made in accordance with the joint estimate of Bellinger and Martin, dated 31 March 1941, was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without a signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu and it might have been made operative by dispatch. It was not made operative until the attack on 7 December 1941.

(6) The Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which recognized the possibility of a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor and which set forth security measures including patrols to be conducted both by destroyers and by aircraft, was in effect during 1941, and in revised form after 14 October 1941.

[42] H. Admiral Kimmel's Views as to the Possibility of a Surprise Air Attack.

It appears from the War and Defense Plans, above summarized, that it was believed that prior to a declaration of war there might be a surprise attack by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor or a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas. The possibility of a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor had been expressed as early as 24 January 1941 by the Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of War (Exhibit 64), a copy of which was received by Admiral Kimmel shortly after he assumed command of the Pacific Fleet. In that letter, the Secretary of the Navy wrote:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor . . . The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probabilities are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."

In his testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel indicated some confusion as to his agreement with and his evaluation of the above letter by the Secretary of the Navy. He testified that he had felt that the most probable form of attack on Pearl Harbor was by submarine, and that a bombarding attack was the second most probable, but that he had been of the view that there was no danger of an air torpedo attack because the water was too shallow. He then corrected his testimony, characterizing his previous testimony as erroneous, and stated that he had regarded an air attack as no more than a possibility.

It appears clearly that Admiral Kimmel at all times during his command of the Pacific Fleet was of the view that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility. Thus, in a letter by Admiral Richardson, prepared in collaboration
with Admiral Kimmel, on 25 January 1941 (Exhibit 70, Naval Court), it was stated in part that the security of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated on certain assumptions, including an assumption that Japan might attack without warning and the further assumption that Japanese attacks might be expected against shipping, outlying positions, or naval units, and that surprise raids on Pearl Harbor were possible. Again, in a letter of 18 February 1941, concerning the adequacy of local defense (Exhibit 30, Naval Court), Admiral Kimmel stated, "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility." And, as previously pointed out, the Fleet Security Letter, reissued on 14 October 1941, predicated the security of the Fleet on two assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. This, Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court, referred to a surprise air attack.

In connection with Admiral Kimmel's statement before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he thought there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor because the water was too shallow, several letters from the Chief of Naval Operations should be noted:

On 15 February 1941 (Exhibit 49, Naval Court), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac regarding anti-torpedo baffles for protection against attacks on Pearl Harbor. This stated that the shallow depth of water limited the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor and the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles. The letter indicated that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed necessary successfully to drop torpedoes from planes and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. There were various other considerations stated. The recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief were especially desired. A similar letter was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of various Naval Districts, including the Fourteenth, on 17 February 1941 (Exhibit 54, Naval Court).

The reply to the request for recommendations and comments was made on 20 March 1941, in a letter by Admiral Bloch, stating that the depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet, and for that and other reasons, he did not recommend anti-torpedo baffles. CincPac agreed, until such time as a light efficient net were developed.

In June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter to the Commandants of Naval Districts, copy to CincPac and others, referring to recent developments, and to experience at Taranto, which stated that no minimum depth of water could be assumed safe as regards torpedo attack if there were sufficient water around a ship to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo, but that such an attack in 10 fathoms or more was more likely than in shallow water (Exhibit 55, Naval Court). The torpedoes at Taranto, it was said, were launched in thirteen to fifteen fathoms although some may have been in eleven.

Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion that there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor—and that even after the June letter, he did not think that torpedoes would run in such shallow water. He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl Harbor. He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be made because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and did not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason.

The adequacy of forces assigned to the Pacific Fleet for carrying out the tasks assigned in the war plans was the subject of testimony before both Admiral Hart and the Naval Court of Inquiry. From the testimony it appears that although there were shortages concerning which Admiral Kimmel had extensive correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations, there was general agreement by the witnesses to the effect that the Fleet was considered adequate to carry out the initial tasks assigned in the war plans. The initial tasks, it will be recalled, were primarily defensive in nature. As will appear subsequently in this report, the number of fleet patrol planes in the Hawaiian area was not sufficient to enable a 360 degree reconnaissance to be flown daily from Oahu for more than a few days, but was sufficient for air reconnaissance of the more dangerous sectors to have been flown for at least several weeks. To this extent, therefore, the patrol planes assigned to the Pacific Fleet were a limiting factor as to the Fleet's ability to carry out one of the initial tasks assigned in the war plans, namely, to 'maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches of Oahu..."
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan stated that the Navy through ComFORTHEEN, would provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu. Admiral Bloch had no air forces assigned to him and had to rely upon the Fleet planes, which were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, for the accomplishment of this task. Thus naval patrol planes could be and were used for long distance recon-
naissance from Oahu only when they were made available by Admiral Kimmel for that purpose.


(1) Methods of Coordination Between Army and Navy Commands.

According to "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935," (Exhibit 6, Naval Court), the operations of Army and Navy forces were to be coordinated by one of two methods:

(a) Mutual cooperation, or,
(b) The exercise of unity of command.

(2) Coordination Between Army and Navy Commands in Hawaii.

The command organization in the Hawaiian area was designed to function through "mutual cooperation" between the Army and Navy. This was the normal method of coordination according to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy (Exhibit 6, page 5), and applied to the defense of Pearl Harbor as well as the entire Hawaiian area.

(3) Desirability of Unity of Command.

(a) Unity of Command for Hawaii considered in Washington. Admiral Stark testified before the Naval Court that, prior to 7 December 1941, he had given much thought to the question of unity of command in Hawaii but that no satisfactory solution or decision had been reached as far as the Navy Department was concerned. It had been the topic of many conversations with the Chief of Staff of the Army, but it was anticipated only for amphibious operations (page 29, Naval Court). He and the Chief of Staff of the Army could have placed unity of command into effect at Hawaii, subject to the approval of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy (page 39, Naval Court). However, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy" (Exhibit 6, Naval Court) does not indicate that the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy would have been required.

(b) Unity of Command for Hawaii considered at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in mutual agreement with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, could have placed unity of command in effect in Oahu (Naval Court, page 39; Exhibit 6, page 5). Admiral Kimmel testified (Roberts Commission, page 538; Naval Court, page 268) that he had never had any discussion with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the desirability of putting unity of command into effect in the Hawaiian area, but did state that where command is vested in one agency, much better results can be obtained than when responsibility is divided.

Admiral Kimmel testified that so far as the authority of ComFORTHEEN to accomplish unity of command was concerned, ComFORTHEEN did not have the authority without reference to him and that he would not have approved this nor accepted the responsibility for Army action without reference to the Navy Department.

[46] Under the Naval Base Defense Plan (Exhibit 53, NC), unity of command was vested in the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force over all offensive air operations and under the Army Air Commander for all defensive air operations, but only after the plan had been activated.

(c) Weakness of "Mutual Cooperation."

(i) Air Command. Admiral Bellinger testified that the weakness of the air defense plan was that there was no one officer in command until after the plan was activated. The Bellinger-Martin estimate (Exhibit 49) he believed to be sound, but said that it lacked sanction and that the missing sanction was unity of command.

(ii) Recommendation of Joint Command Center. In an endorsement dated 6 December 1941 from the Director, Radio Liaison Division, to the Director, Naval Districts Division, advocating a combined operating center for the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor (which was not established prior to the attack), Admiral Hooper stated "The most perfect set-up for command is one in which the supreme commander is exercised by one officer best equipped of any for the task . . . Because our defense is under two officers, Army and Navy, we must try and arrange matters so that when component parts of the commands are
interwoven these two can function as nearly as possible as one.” (Exhibit 77.)

The recommendation for a Joint Command Center in Hawaii was originated by a dispatch from OpNav to ComFOURTEEN on 15 October 1941 (Exhibit 77), requesting that consideration be given to the construction of a combined operating center sufficient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and Navy in Hawaii. An informal joint working committee had been formed in Washington to endeavor to improve cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities by the formation of joint command centers. A reply to the above-mentioned dispatch strongly recommending against such a move is contained in a letter from ComFOURTEEN to CNO, via CincPac, enclosing a letter from General Short to ComFOURTEEN and an endorsement by CincPac.

General Short stated that while he was strongly in favor of combined operating centers for equivalent units of Army and Navy forces, he did not believe that all of the operating centers should be combined into one single building, because it was necessary that Army headquarters be located in separate command posts for efficiency of individual operation. It was also undesirable from communication and security standpoint. He suggested that, as an alternative, additional space for Navy units be constructed adjacent to the existing command posts for equivalent Army units.

In the basic letter (Exhibit 77) ComFOURTEEN recommended that no steps be taken to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building and believed that the best interests of the CinC Pacific Fleet would be served by one building with only agencies of the Fleet therein.

The CinC Pacific Fleet in his endorsement to this letter stated that the mission of the Army and the Fleet were considerably different, the operation of one being defensive and local, while the operations of the other were offensive and far-flung. Strategic, rather than tactical, cooperation was indicated and therefore the necessity for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick decision was of less importance. He was of the opinion that the establishment of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii was not only unnecessary, but definitely undesirable.

(4) Disagreement concerning Unity of Command at the Outlying Islands.

The evidence in the previous investigations and in this investigation indicates that there was some consideration of unity of command at outlying islands during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. This occurred as a result of dispatches by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac on 28 November 1941 (Exhibits 18 and 40, Naval Court), in which it was advised that the Army had agreed to reinforce Midway and Wake with Army personnel and to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and 25 at Wake provided that Admiral Kimmel considered this feasible and desirable. It was stated that it would be necessary for Admiral Kimmel to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to Midway and Wake on aircraft carriers, that the planes would be flown off at destination and that the ground crews would be landed in boats. Admiral Kimmel was directed to confer with the Commanding General concerning this matter, and to advise as soon as practicable.

It appears that this subject was considered at some length in conferences held by Admiral Kimmel on and after 27 November 1941. The discussion of unity of command as to these islands was summarized by Vice Admiral Smith in his testimony in this investigation. He said that Admiral Kimmel asked the Army what he could expect of Army fighters at Wake, and that General Martin of the Army Air Force replied that the Army did not allow such planes to go more than 15 miles offshore. Admiral Kimmel then stated that the Army planes were, therefore, no good to him.

General Short stated that if he manned those islands, he must command them and “Kimmel replied, ‘Over my dead body. The Army should exercise no command over Navy bases.’ General Short replied, ‘Mind you, I don’t want these islands. I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I must put planes and troops on them, then I must command them.’” (Page 352, record of this investigation).

Admiral Kimmel’s concern over the question of command at the outlying islands was indicated by his dispatch of November 28th to the Chief of Naval Operations, advising of the proposed reinforcement of Midway and Wake with Marine fighter planes and that he would investigate more thoroughly the feasibility and practicability of relieving them with Army planes. In this dispatch he stated, “All outlying forces must be exclusively under Naval command.”
Findings

1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or excluding Japan.

2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and raids on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, including the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.

3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases, at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory of the Associated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the establishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding against surprise attack by Japan.

4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, which, it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hostilities opened with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack.

6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans. The method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until and unless unity of command were invoked.

7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol the coastal zone (which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu), and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support the Army forces.

8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for distant reconnaissance.

9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.

10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.

11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided, among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations.

12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan also provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its aircraft warning service, and that prior to the completion of that service the Navy, through the
use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as might be practicable.

13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take steps to make available to the other the air forces at his disposal, in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the plan.

14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect any agreement prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI, in operation.

15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided among other things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of the assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there might be a surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a combination of both forms of attack was possible.

16. The Joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of [51] fast ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.

17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex "Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provision for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The Plan was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime conditions of readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, for Navy units.

18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that a single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, including provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.

20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of 7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

[52] 22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of threatening naval forces"; that initial action would include "possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other outlying United States positions"; and that the initial Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation..."
forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and that submarines in the Hawaiian area..." (Underscoring supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.

23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility. Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a serious probability.

24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial. However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operating setup which could ensure the constant and timely exchange of information, decisions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the establishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.

25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in connection with a proposal for reinforcement of Wake and Midway by Army planes. General Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, the command must be his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases must remain with the Navy. The islands were reinforced with Marine planes.

II

JAPANESE ESPIONAGE AT HAWAII

The center of Japanese espionage at Hawaii was the Japanese Consulate General located in Honolulu. As a matter of regular routine, information was collected by the Consulate General concerning the location and movements of United States ships in and around Pearl Harbor and concerning defense preparations. This information was forwarded by the Japanese Consulate General to Tokyo and elsewhere in coded messages sent via commercial communication companies. A collection of such messages, which has been decrypted and translated, appears in Exhibit 13 of this investigation and in Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court. This collection of messages does not include every such message, but does fully illustrate the type of espionage reports which were made. Subsequent to the attack, the incoming and outgoing message log of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was recovered and translated. These logs indicate the nature of all of the communications to and from the Japanese Consulate General and show the frequency with which espionage reports were sent by the Consul during 1941. A copy of the log is set forth in Exhibit 62.

It is to be noted that the espionage reports submitted during 1941 by the Japanese Consulate General became increasingly more detailed and, in the first week of December, 1941, indicated the likelihood of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The possession of all of those messages by the American intelligence services prior to the attack would have been of inestimable value. Some of them, as will appear later, were obtained prior to the attack. Those obtained, however, although indicating Japanese interest in the location and movements of ships in and from Pearl Harbor, did not include those messages, particularly during the first week of December, 1941, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. It may also be noted at this point that those Consulate messages which were obtained prior to 7 December 1941 were decrypted and translated in Washington but not at Pearl Harbor.

Illustrative of the type of message sent earlier in 1941 is a report from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 10 March 1941, which describes various vessels seen in Pearl Harbor (Translated by Navy, April 5—Document 1, Exhibit 13). The Japanese interest in the location of ships in particular areas of Pearl Harbor is demonstrated by a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 24 September 1941, requesting reports of vessels in five sub-areas of Pearl Harbor, and
requesting reports of warships and aircraft carriers at anchor and tied up at wharves, buoys and docks. Particular request was made for mention of the fact when there were two or more vessels alongside the same wharf (Army translation, October 9—Document 2, Exhibit 13). The Japanese Consul at Honolulu established a code to refer to the location of vessels in particular areas (Navy translation, October 10—Document 3, Exhibit 13). Tokyo on 18 November 1941 requested a report on vessels anchored in certain areas and it directed that the investigation be made with great secrecy (Army translation, December 2—Document 9, Exhibit 13). A report was sent by Honolulu to Tokyo on 18 November 1941 setting forth the warships in the harbor in certain areas, commenting on the presence or absence of aircraft carriers, and describing in detail the course of certain destroyers which were observed entering the harbor (Army translation, December 6—Document 10, Exhibit 13). On November 20th, Tokyo requested a comprehensive investigation of the Fleet bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation (Army translation, December 6—Document 7, Exhibit 13).

On 24 November 1941, Honolulu reported to Tokyo concerning the Fleet practice of leaving Pearl Harbor, conducting maneuvers, and returning, that the Fleet had not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers at Lahaina Road, that destroyers and submarines were the only vessels anchored there; that battleships seldom entered the port of Hilo, Hanalei or Haneo; that virtually no one had observed battleships in maneuver areas; and, stated that the Fleet maneuvered for one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest and pointed out that aircraft carriers maneuvered by themselves. This also mentioned the times when cruisers and other ships left Pearl Harbor and how long they were away, and generally how long they remained at Pearl Harbor when anchored there (Army translation, December 16—Document 23, Exhibit 13).

On November 28th, Tokyo requested intelligence, which was described as being of major importance, concerning the movements of battleships out of the harbor, pointing out that if such movements were reported but once a week, the vessels could have traveled far, and that Honolulu was to use its own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements. As to capital ships, it was requested that reports of the entrance or departure and length of time at anchor from the time of entry into port until departure be made (Army translation, December 8—Document 13, Exhibit 13). On November 28th, Honolulu reported to Tokyo concerning the B-17 planes at Midway and range of anti-aircraft guns, observations of maneuvers by troops, prospective reinforcements of troops at Honolulu during December or January, and advised of the presence of a carrier usually about 15,000 feet south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance of the harbor (Army translation, December 8—Document 16, Exhibit 13).

The messages sent by the Japanese Consul during the week of 1 December to 7 December 1941, are of particular significance. A message of December 1st reported on ship maneuvers and described the place where maneuvers were held as about 500 nautical miles southeast of Oahu, and stated the reasons why that conclusion had been reached. This message set forth the “usual” schedule for departure and return of the battleships and stated that they left on Tuesdays and returned on Fridays, or left on Friday and returned on Saturday of the following week, and that all ships stayed in port about a period of one week. In view of their importance, five other messages sent during the first week in December, 1941, are quoted in full:

From: Tokoyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 2, 1941 (translated by Army 30 December 1941)
J-19
#123 (Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with antminer nets.
From: Honolulu (Kita)  
To: Tokyo  
3 December 1941 (translated by Navy 11 December 1941)  
(PA-K2)  
#245 (in 2 parts, complete)  
(Military Secret).  
From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.  
I. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:  
I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Signal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A number of carriers</td>
<td>Preparing to sortie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleship divisions</td>
<td>Preparing to sortie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>All departed between 1st and 3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>Several departed between 1st and 3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleship divisions</td>
<td>All departed between 1st and 3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>Several departed between 4th and 6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>All departed between 4th and 6th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Signals.  
I. Lanikai Beach House will show lights during the night as follows:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[56] One light between 8 and 9 p.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[56] One light between 9 and 10 p.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[56] One light between 10 and 11 p.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[56] One light between 11 and 12 p.m.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II.  
Two lights between 12 and 1 a.m. | 5 |
Two lights between 1 and 2 a.m. | 6 |
Two lights between 2 and 3 a.m. | 7 |
Two lights between 3 and 4 a.m. | 8 |

(Part 2)  
III. Lanikai Bay, during daylight.  
If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.  
If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.  
IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House will indicate the following:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Times</th>
<th>Signal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-2000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2100</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2100-2200</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2200-2300</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2300-2400</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000-0100</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. K.G.M.B. Want Ads.  
A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.  
B. CHIC. CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.  
C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.  

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium at a point halfway between Lower Kulu Road and Haleakula Road (latitude 20°40' N., longitude 156°10' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Times</th>
<th>Signal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From 7-2</td>
<td>3 or 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 8-9</td>
<td>4 or 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 9-10</td>
<td>5 or 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941 (translated by Navy 10 December 1941)
(PA-K2)

#252

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239 arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.
(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.
(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:
   8 battleships.
   3 light cruisers.
   16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and_________were in dock.

From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941 (translated by Army 8 December 1941)
PA-K2

#253 Re the last part of your #123.

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually [58] made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

From: Honolulu.
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941 (translated by Army 8 December 1941)
PA-K2

#254.

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were — and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

   9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.)

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

Findings.

[59] 26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the frequent transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations.

27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indicated the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.
28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C. prior to the attack; that others which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were, with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be decrypted there before December 7th; and, that three messages intercepted by Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department for decryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States Intelligence services had been able to obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage reports sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.

[60]

III

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE AND EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO THE ATTACK

A. The Organization of Naval Intelligence in General; Sources of Information, and Relations with the Pacific Fleet.

The Office of Naval Intelligence, which was under the Chief of Naval Operations, consisted of two main branches—Domestic and Foreign. The Domestic Branch had to do with internal espionage and other subversive activities of foreign nationals or organizations inimical to national and particularly naval welfare. It maintained branch offices in various of the principal cities of the United States, including Honolulu. The Foreign Branch was organized into a number of sections, of which one was the Far Eastern Section. The Director of Naval Intelligence was Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Jr. The officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Branch was Commander Arthur H. McCollum.

The primary sources of information which the Far Eastern Section had were Naval Attache reports from Japan and China, observers' reports from various ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet and from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, including reports as to radio intelligence, and reports of investigations conducted by the domestic branch of ONI, particularly from Honolulu, and State Department reports at Washington. A most important part of the information provided to the Far Eastern Section was supplied by a unit at Washington known as OP-20-G. This was under the command of Commander Laurence F. Safford and supplied information obtained from communication or radio intelligence. This section was staffed both by Communication officers and Intelligence officers. The information received by OP-20-G was supplied to Lt. Comdr. Alvin D. Kramer of ONI, who was working with that section, and was transmitted by him to the head of the Far Eastern Section and to the Director of Naval Intelligence.

The section known as OP-20-G was concerned with the interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese messages. In addition it was responsible for furnishing the Navy's own codes and ciphers and for the supervision of the security of the Navy's own communications. Japanese messages were intercepted by various methods, including radio interception by a number of radio intercept stations located in the United States, which transmitted the Japanese communications, as intercepted by them, to OP-20-G for decryption and translation. In addition to reports from intercept stations located in the United States, this section received reports from communication intelligence units located at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. This unit was concerned with the plans and intentions of foreign governments, principally Japan, and with intelligence relating to naval operations in the Atlantic. The communications intelligence organization at Pearl Harbor, which had subsidiary stations at Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor, was concerned primarily with the dispositions and plans of naval forces in the Pacific and with surveillance of Japanese naval communications. The communications intelligence unit in the Philippines, which was located at Corregidor, was concerned with Japanese naval communications and Japanese diplomatic communications. The Officer in Charge of the communications intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was Lt. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort. The officer in charge of the communications intelligence unit at Corregidor until September, 1941 was Lt. Comdr. Rudolph J. Fabian. He remained thereafter assisting that unit.
Japanese diplomatic communications were in various codes, such as the code known as "purple" code, the "red" code, the "J-19" code, the "PAK 2", and the "La." code. The so-called "purple" code contained the most important Japanese diplomatic messages. Messages in this and other diplomatic codes were intercepted and read at the Philippines primarily for the purpose of local information. They were sent, as intercepted, to the Navy Department in one of the Navy's own codes. All intercepted diplomatic traffic was sent to Washington whether or not it was deciphered and read at the Philippines. None of this information was sent from the Philippines to Pearl Harbor. The unit at Pearl Harbor was intercepting and decrypting no Japanese diplomatic traffic. It had been directed to concentrate on Japanese naval systems. The unit at Washington was charged with the general control of the units at Corregidor, Pearl Harbor, and at Washington, and handled the Japanese diplomatic systems and also handled some Japanese naval systems.

Intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic received by the Washington unit was pooled with similar traffic intercepted by the Army and was decrypted and translated by the Navy and the Army on an alternate day basis. The resulting information was distributed daily by ONI to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to others in the Navy Department. The President and the State Department similarly were furnished this information daily.

It appears that, although the Navy enjoyed considerable success in decrypting Japanese diplomatic communications, the Japanese naval codes were not being read. Information obtained by radio intelligence, therefore, from Japanese naval traffic was based almost entirely on so-called "traffic analysis" and not upon reading of the message themselves.

The units at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines advised the Washington unit of the results of their traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and of the estimated location and movement of Japanese naval forces, and also exchanged information with one another on that subject. The units also exchanged information on technical subjects, that is, pertaining to codes and ciphers and keys for deciphering codes.

Information developed from the reading of the "purple" messages was not sent to the Pearl Harbor unit as such. It does appear, however, that various of the warning messages and other dispatches sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based upon information derived from the Japanese diplomatic messages.

Thus it appears that the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as to the status of diplomatic relations with Japan depended primarily upon the messages sent to him by the Chief of Naval Operations. The information received by the radio intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, however, brought directly to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet daily by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, as was other material of an intelligence nature.

B. The Approach of War: Intercepted Communications Available at Washington, and Messages Sent by CNO to Admiral Kimmel.

It should be noted that the Japanese communications which were intercepted and decoded and translated by the War and Navy Departments, as set forth in this section, were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. Various of the messages sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Chief of Naval Operations were based on these Japanese communications.

(1) The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and October 16th dispatch.

On 16 October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to Cinclant, CincPac and CincAF (Exhibit 13, Naval Court), reading as follows:

"The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation X
If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X
If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X
In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X
Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X
In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X
Second and third adies inform appropriate army and naval district authorities X
Acknowledge"

On 17 October 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 38, Naval Court). In this letter, Admiral Stark advised that things had been "popping"
here for the last twenty-four hours, but from the dispatches Admiral Kimmel knew about all that they did. He said, "Personally, I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the 'possibility'; in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably. Perhaps I was wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."

[63] Admiral Stark continued that Admiral Kimmel would recall that in an earlier letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, Admiral Stark had said that his own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. In this letter he said that he thought this whole thing worked up together. He stated that efforts would be made to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it could be kept going, he did not know, but the President and Mr. Hull were working on it. To this letter was annexed a postscript, stating in part, "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships as far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."

Also annexed was a memorandum of 17 October 1941, by Rear Admiral Schurmann, estimating the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet. The substance of this analysis was that the military would determine Japanese action whether to attack Russia or move southward, and would make this decision on the basis of opportunity and what they could get away with, and that it would not be determined by the cabinet in power.

(2) Japanese messages concerning German attitude; Nomura's desire to resign.—On 18 October 1941, the Navy translated an intercepted Japanese communication from Berlin to Tokyo, dated 1 October 1941, which stated that the Germans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japan's position, particularly because Japan was not advising Germany of the negotiations with the United States, although the United States was advising England (Document 4, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

A Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 16 October 1941, was intercepted and translated on 17 October 1941. In this Toyoda advised Nomura that although he had been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-United States negotiations, he had, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early in October, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent revival of the movement for revision of the neutrality act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message that if the Roosevelt Administration continued to attack the Axis powers, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany, Italy, and the United States, which, under the Three-Power Agreement, might lead Japan to join immediately the war against the United States. It was indicated that such a message was being considered and there were reasons which would not permit of postponement (Document 3, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

[64] On 22 October 1941, Nomura sent a message to Tokyo which was intercepted and translated on 23 October 1941, in which he said that he was sure that he, too, should go out with the former cabinet; that he knew that the Secretary of State realized how sincere he was and yet how little influence he had in Japan; that there were some Americans who trusted him and who said that things would get better for him, but that their encouragement was not enough; that among his conferees in the United States there were some who felt the same way, but they were all poor deluded souls; that the instructions could be carried out by Wakasugi; that Nomura did not want to be the bones of a dead horse; that he did not want to continue "this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people;" that he was not trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor, that was the only way open for him to tread; and that he sought permission to return to Japan (Document 5, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

On 23 October 1941, a message from Tokyo to Washington of the same date was intercepted and translated, which stated that the efforts Nomura was making were appreciated; that, as he was well aware, the outcome of those negotiations
had a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government would proceed; that as such it was an exceedingly important matter; that they were placing all of their reliance on Nomura’s reports for information on this matter; that for these reasons they hoped that he would see fit to sacrifice his personal wishes and remain at his post (Document 6, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

(3) Action taken by Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Kimmel advised, in a letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 14, Naval Court), that the action taken included maintaining two submarines for patrol at Midway, dispatching twelve patrol planes to Midway, preparing to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, and to replace the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor, sending two submarines to Wake, and sending additional Marines and stores there, dispatching additional Marines to Palmyra, placing Admiral Pye and his ships on twelve hours notice, getting six submarines ready to depart for Japan on short notice, putting some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

On 7 November 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 74, Naval Court) in reply to Admiral Kimmel’s letter of October 22nd. He stated, among other things, “O. K. on the dispositions which you made in connection with recent change in the Japanese cabinet. The big question is—what next?” Also, “Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets ‘worse and worse’. A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever—particularly if one party cannot live with the setup. It doesn’t look good.”

[65] (4) The first Japanese deadline message; Japanese interest in American ships.

On 5 November 1941, the Navy translated a message from Tokyo to Washington, reading as follows:

“Of utmost secrecy).

“Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

“This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.”

During the first half of November, there were translated in Washington various intercepted Japanese communications concerning ships and planes at Manila and Seattle (Documents 1-5, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). According to one of these messages, which was dated 5 November 1941, the Navy General Staff wanted investigation done at Manila as to the conditions of airports, types of planes and numbers of planes there, warships there, machinery belonging to land forces, and the state of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

(5) Arrival of Kurusu; Stark and Marshall recommendations as to ultimatum.

The situation existing early in November was summarized by Nomura, in a report to Tokyo, dated 10 November 1941, intercepted on November 12th (Document 8, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) by reference to a report from the legal adviser to the Japanese Embassy, who had conferred with Senator Thomas and Secretary Hull, that the United States was not bluffing, that if Japan invaded again, the United States would fight with Japan, that psychologically the American people were ready, that the Navy was ready and prepared for action. Nomura also reported that he had a conversation with “a certain Cabinet member” who had said that Nomura was indeed a dear friend, that he would tell him alone this: that the American government was receiving reports that Japan would be on the move again and did not believe that Nomura’s visit to the President or the coming of Kurusu would have any effect on the general situation. Nomura said that he had explained how impatient the Japanese had become since the freezing, how eager they were for a quick understanding, how they did not desire a Japanese-American war, and how they hoped for peace until the end. The Cabinet member replied, however, that the President and Secretary of State believed “those reports.” [66] Nomura also said that his friend had stated that the United States could not stop because if Japan moved, something would have to be done to save the “face”, of the United States.

Admiral Stark was not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan would come from Kurusu’s
visit. His opinion was that it would be impossible to reconcile the Japanese and American views. Admiral Stark so advised Admiral Kimmel by letter dated 14 November 1941 (Exhibit 39, Naval Court). With this letter, Admiral Stark also sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of a memorandum, dated 5 November 1941, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall, for the President. This was concerned with the belief of Chiang-Kai-Shek that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent and that outside military support was the sole hope for the defeat of that threat. The memorandum considered whether the United States would be justified in undertaking offensive operations against the Japanese to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. The memorandum stated that the Fleet in the Pacific was inferior to the Japanese Fleet and could not undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. It pointed out that by the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines would become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The recommendations were in general that all aid short of war be given to China and that no ultimatum be given to Japan.

(6) Further and Final Japanese "deadline messages."

At this time, information was received in Washington that the Japanese Government had established a further and final deadline for the completion of diplomatic negotiations. This consisted of two messages from Tokyo to Washington, which were intercepted and translated by the Army, as follows:

(a) A translation on 17 November 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), of a dispatch, dated November 16th, the highlights of which were:

"The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

"What you say is of course so * * * but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725 (in which Togo says that conditions within and without Japan will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States) * * * try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient * * * the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how [67] short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution."

(b) On 22 November 1941 (Document 11, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), a translation of a dispatch of the same date, reading in substance:

"To both you Ambassadors.

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."

(7) The November 24th dispatch to CinCPac and others.

On 24 November 1941 (Exhibit 15), a dispatch (which before the Naval Court Admiral Stark said was based in part on the "deadline" intercept—page 775), was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, CinCaf, ComELEVEN, ComTWELVE, ComTHIRTEEN, and ComFIFTEEN for action, reading:

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately"
On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 47, Naval Court), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel in response to his letter of 17 October 1941, on the inadequacy of local defense forces in Hawaii (Exhibit 46, Naval Court). Admiral Stark stated that CincPac had taken cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and that the forces available in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and local defense forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile forces would indicate the numbers of Fleet Vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks. Admiral Stark's letter continued by summarizing the situation in regard to increasing the local defense forces and, among other things, pointed out that the Department had no additional airplanes available for assignment to the FOURTEENTH Naval District. A marginal note on a copy of this letter, apparently written in Hawaii, stated, "In other words, look to the Fleet. They seem to forget that the Fleet has offensive work to do."

On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 16, Naval Court), Admiral Stark also wrote a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel stating, among other things, that Admiral Stark agreed with Admiral Kimmel that, for example, to cruise in Japanese home waters, Admiral Kimmel should have a substantial increase in the strength of his fleet, but pointed out that neither ABC-1 nor Rainbow-5 contemplated this as a general policy; after the British strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious occasions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters might present themselves, but this would be the exception rather than the rule. A postscript to this letter stated that both Mr. Hull and the President confirmed the gravity of the situation indicated by the message which Admiral Stark sent a day or two before.

It stated further that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack; that from many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us; and there were some who thought it likely to occur. Admiral Stark further stated: "I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not the time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely. I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be anything."

(8) Dispatches concerning reinforcement of Wake and Midway.

On 26 November 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 40, Naval Court) was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac stating that the Army had offered to make available some units of infantry for reinforcing defense battalions now on station, if Admiral Kimmel considered that desirable; also, that the Army proposed to prepare, in Hawaii, garrison troops for advances bases which Admiral Kimmel might occupy, but was unable to provide any antiaircraft units. Admiral Kimmel was instructed to take this into consideration and advise when practicable the number of troops desired and recommended armament.

Also on 26 November 1941, another dispatch (Exhibit 18) was sent to CincPac which stated that in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use, OpNav had requested the Army, and the Army had agreed, to station twenty-five Army pursuits at Midway and a similar number at Wake, provided CincPac considered this feasible and desirable; that it would be necessary for CincPac to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on aircraft carriers, and that the planes would be flown off at destination; that ground personnel would be landed in boats and essential spare parts, tools and ammunition would be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels; that the Army understood that these forces must be quartered in tents; that the Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies; that the stationing of these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to the Philippines; and, that additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. A question was raised as to whether or not Navy bombs at outlying positions could be carried by Army bombers which might fly to those positions in order to support Navy operations. CincPac was directed to confer with the Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable.

(9) Intercepted Japanese communications of November 26th and 27th.

On November 26th and 27th, there were available in Washington additional intercepted Japanese messages, all of which had been sent from Tokyo, as follows:
(a) A Navy translation on 27 November 1941 (Document 14, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message to Nanjing, dated 15 November 1941, in the so-called "Purple" code, addressed to "Naval authorities" which stated:

"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while."

(b) A Navy translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 13, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, stating that:

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

"(1) if it is Japan-U. S. relations, 'HIGASHI',

"(2) Japan-Russia relations, 'KITA'.

"(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), 'Nishi'.

"(4) Japan-Russia relations, 'Ichizoku'.

"(5) Japan-British relations, 'Nichi'."

[70] "The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco."

(c) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 9, Exhibit 68, Naval Court), of a message to Manila, dated 20 November 1941, in the "purple" code, marked "Strictly Secret" and stating:

"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of draft—presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay." (Near Manila, P. I.)

"Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo."

(d) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 12, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 26 November 1941, in the "purple" code, which stated:

"To be handled in Government Code.

"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your request to him. At that time we will use the following code:" (Codes were then set forth.)

(10) The State Department note of November 26th and Japanese reaction thereto; the war warning of November 27th.

The diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese representatives, Nomura and Kurusu, came to a head on 26 November 1941. At that time, the State Department presented a proposal to the Japanese and that Department reported to the Navy Department, among others, that it had no further hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Japanese reaction to this proposal appears from dispatches which were subsequently decrypted and translated. They are as follows:

(a) An Army translation (Document 17, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message from Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, dated 26 November 1941, in the "purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," which stated:

"At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

"HULL said, 'For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th.' So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

"A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called 'four principles.'

"B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggressive treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

"(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

"(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

"(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK.

"(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

"(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands, and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

[72] (b) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message from Washington to Tokyo, dated 26 November 1941, in the "purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," message #1180, reading:

"From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

"In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire back instantly."

(c) An army translation (Document 18, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 28 November 1941, in the "purple" code, reading:

[73] "Re your #1180.

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering
and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.” (Note: The man is the Navy Minister.)

On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from CNO, which has been termed the “war warning.” It read:

“This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, “That”) or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 X Inform District and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa direct take appropriate measures against sabotage”

(11) The dispatch of November 28th:

On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th (Exhibit 19, Naval Court), which repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:

[73] “Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps area re subversive activities in the United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers”

The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further:

“Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur”

(12) Intercepted diplomatic communications. November 29 to December 6, 1941.

On 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message from Tokyo to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated 29 November 1941 (Document 19, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), requesting that they make one more attempt to discuss the situation with the United States, and to state that the United States had always taken a fair position in the past; that the Imperial Government could not understand why the United States was taking the attitude that the new Japanese proposals could not be the basis of discussion, but instead had made new proposals which ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government; that the United States should be asked what had become of the basic objectives that the United States had made as the basis for negotiations for seven months; and that the United States should be asked to reflect on the matter. The emissaries were directed in carrying out this instruction to be careful that this did not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.

[73] Also on 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation from Kurusu in Washington to Yamamoto in Tokyo, in which a telephone code was used (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). This indicated that Kurusu expected a long message (“probably Tokyo’s reply to Mr. Hull’s proposals”); that the President was returning apparently because of the speech of the Japanese Premier which Kurusu said was hav-
ing strong repercussions here; that Kurusu said that unless the Premier and others used greater caution in speeches, it would put the Japanese emissaries here in a very difficult position; that care should be exercised, that Yamamoto said that they were being careful; that Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister told that the emissaries here had expected to hear something different—some good word—but instead got this (the Premier’s speech); that the Japanese-American negotiations were to continue; that Yamamoto wanted them to be stretched out; that Kurusu needed Yamamoto’s help to do this, and that both the Premier and the Foreign Minister would need to change the tone of their speeches and that all would have to use some discretion; that Yamamoto said the real problem that the Japanese were up against was the effect of happenings in the South.

There were four significant Japanese communications intercepted on 1 December 1941, as follows:

(a) Navy translation—(Document 21, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
1 December 1941
(Purple CA)

#865 Re my #857

"1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)

"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

"3. There are reports here that the President’s sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo’s statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter."

[76] Army translation—(Document 22, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941

Purple

#886 (Strictly Secret (To be handled in Government Code)

Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)

"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire’s existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States.
was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Party Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer [77] continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause."

(Part 2 of 2)

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

(c) On 1 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, dated 30 November 1941 (Document 6, Exhibit 13), which in substance stated:

The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. . . . Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

(d) Army translation—(Document 25, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 28, 1941
Purple
#1214 To be handled in Government Code.
"Re my #1190.

"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like [78] this are appearing in the papers: 'Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese', and 'America Scorns a Second Munich.' The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

"This we must carefully note."

On 3 December 1941, there was available the Army translation of a report by Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated 2 December 1941 (Document 25, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which stated:

"Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. Thereupon we said: 'Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th.' The Under-Secretary then said: 'I want to to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world.' Thereupon we replied: 'The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than
forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights or wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China: the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation. Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny,' Under-Secretary WELLES said: 'I am well aware of that.' I continued: 'We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals preferred on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offering, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in [79] the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve,' The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: 'The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here.' Then he continued: 'In regard to the opinion that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary.' I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233.'

There were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest available on 4 December 1941, as follows:

(a) Navy translation—(Document 26, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Toyko
To: Hsinking
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#893

"* * * In the event that Manchuria participates in the war * * * in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that the country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

"1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan."

[80] "2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

"3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

"However, the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

"4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukou shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia."

(b) Navy translation—(Document 27, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1227
(This raised the question of a possibility of a conference between persons in whom the leaders have confidence to have the make one final effort to reach some agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway point, such as Honolulu. It was said that this last effort might facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.)
(c) Navy translation—(Document 29, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#875 Chief of Office routing.

"Re your #1232

"Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

"There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have [81] increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement."

(d) Navy translation—(Document 31, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1243

"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the consuls."

On 5 December 1941, there were available translations of additional intercepted Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic negotiations, as follows:

(a) Army translation—(Document 33, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1243

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."

(b) Navy translation—(Document 34, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1225

(This is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives with Secretary Hull on December 1st, which referred to the Japanese Premier's speech, the President's return, Japanese troop movements, and apparent agreement as to the impossibility of reaching an agreement.)
During this period there were available to the Navy and to the Army in Washington translations of intercepted Japanese espionage reports concerning Manila, San Francisco and Honolulu. From these it appeared that the Japanese were interested in the movements of ships to and from those ports. The messages relating to Honolulu were as follows:

(a) On December 3rd, the Navy Department translated a communication from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 15 November 1941 (Document 24, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which stated that since relations between Japan and the United States were most critical, the "Ships in the harbor report" should be made irregularly but at the rate of twice a week and that extra care should be taken to maintain secrecy.

(b) On December 5th, there was available at the War Department a translation of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 18 November 1941, requesting reports on vessels in certain areas of Pearl Harbor, and directing that the investigation be made with great secrecy (Document 37, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

(c) Also available on December 5th at the Navy Department was a translation of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 29 November 1941, stating that reports had been received on ship movements, but in the future Honolulu was also to report even when there were no movements (Document 36, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

(d) On December 6th, there was available at the War Department a translation of a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 18 November 1941, (Document 40, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), reporting on ships anchored in Pearl Harbor and in certain areas of the harbor, and pointing out that the Saratoga was not in harbor and that the Enterprise or some other vessel was in a particular area. This message also reported on the course of certain destroyers which had been observed entering the harbor.

(14) Intercepted message advising of fourteen-part reply by Japanese and first thirteen parts of reply—6 December 1941.

On 6 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese communication (Document 38, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), from Tokyo to Washington, which read:

"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

[83] "2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."

Also on 6 December 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which had been sent from Tokyo to Washington in the Japanese diplomatic code. It may be noted that the translations of parts 8 and 9 of the reply which were originally indicated as Navy translations were corrected so as to indicate that they were translated by the Army. These 13 parts which are not set forth here, but particularly part 13, disclosed that the Japanese were of the view that the American proposal, viewed in its entirety, could not be accepted by the Japanese as a basis of negotiations.

The message concerning delivery of the Japanese reply, and the first thirteen parts of that reply, were received in the Navy Department by 3 p. m. on 6 December 1941. After decryption and translation by about 9 p. m. on December 6th, they were distributed by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to the White House and to the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of War and Secretary of State apparently also received copies and a meeting was called of the three Secretaries for ten o'clock on the following morning.

(15) Communications intercepted on 7 December 1941.

The Japanese communications which were translated and available on the morning of 7 December 1941 included the following:

(a) From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
December 3, 1941
Purple (Urgent)

#1256. Re your #875

"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending [84] upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once."

(b) From: Washington

To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)

#1272

"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report :

"(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the 'introducing' at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.

"(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us—(MESSAGE INCOMPLETE)—"

(c) From: Budapest

To: Tokyo
December 7, 1941
LA

#104 Re my #103

"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

"Relayed to Berlin."

[85] (d) Navy translation—(Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
7 December 1941
(Purple-Eng)

#902 Part 14 or 14

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."

(e) Army translation—(Document 41, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington.
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent—Very Important)
#907 To be handled in government code.

Re my #902.

"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time."

(16) Delivery of Part 14 and the 1 p.m. message and action taken.

The evidence indicates that Part 14 of the Japanese reply, which required decoding but not translation, was received between 0305 and 0700 on 7 December 1941, and that it and the first 13 parts were distributed [86] by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to Admiral Stark's office between 0600 and 0930, and then to the White House and to the State Department. The "1 p.m. delivery message" was not distributed at this time. Kramer testified that he returned to the Navy Department at about 10:20 and found that message and certain other messages, such as a message which directed the destruction of Japanese codes, still on hand and another which thanked the Ambassador for his services. This material, Kramer testified, was delivered to Admiral Stark at about 10:30, and then to the White House and to the State Department.

The evidence indicates that the "1 p.m. message" was decrypted and was available in Japanese in the Navy Department prior to 0700 on 7 December 1941, and that because there was no Japanese translator on duty it was sent to the Army for translation at about 0700. It is not clear when the Army returned the translation of that message. Kramer stated that it was not in the Navy Department when he left to distribute the fourteen-part reply between 0900 and 0930 that morning, but that he found it upon his return to the Navy Department at about 10:20. It would appear, therefore, that the Army returned its translation of the "1 p.m. message" some time between 0800 and 1020 on 7 December 1941. It further appears that several hours' advance notice of the contents of that message may have been lost because there was no Japanese translator on duty at the Navy Department on that Sunday morning, and because it was necessary to wait for an Army translation.

Prior investigations developed the fact that, after consultation with Admiral Stark that morning, General Marshall sent a message to various Army commands, including the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. The message read:

"Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

The prior investigations also developed the fact that the Army radio was unable to raise Hawaii that morning and accordingly sent that message by commercial cable in code. The message, according to General Short's prior testimony, was received by the Signal Officer at Hawaii at 1145, and decoded some four hours after the attack.

Whether or not the Army message would have reached the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, prior to the attack if a Navy translator had been on duty on the morning of 7 December 1941, or if the Army had immediately translated and returned the "1 p.m. message," is speculative. It is, moreover, also speculative as to what action might have been taken by General Short or Admiral Kimmel had they received that Army message prior to the attack.

[87] (17) Messages sent to Admiral Kimmel between 29 November and 7 December 1941.

The messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel during this period dealt primarily with the destruction of codes by the Japanese and with the advisability of destruction of United States codes at Guam. The messages are discussed subsequently in this report.
Admiral Kimmel's failure to transmit information to subordinate commanders.

It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his investigation that Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor on 5 December 1941 with a powerful force consisting of the Lexington, Chicago, Portland, and five destroyers, to deliver a squadron of planes to Midway. He testified that on that mission he gave no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding preparation for war, other than the ordinary routine. He said that he never saw, nor was he ever informed of the contents of the October 16th dispatch, concerning the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, of the November 24th dispatch advising of the possibility of a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, or the November 27th war warning. He said that except for what he read in the newspapers, he did not learn anything during the period November 26th to December 5th which indicated the increased danger of hostilities with Japan.

Admiral Bellinger, who was commander of Task Force Nine, consisting of the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified in this investigation that he never saw nor did he learn the contents of the October 16th, November 24th, or November 27th dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations.

C. The Interception of Japanese Telephone and Cable Messages.

It appears that in Washington, D. C., the Navy was receiving information obtained from intercepted Japanese telephone and cable messages. For example, on 30 November 1941, the Navy decrypted and translated a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation in code between Kurusu in Washington and Yamamoto in Tokyo (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). And, on 10 October 1941, the Navy decrypted and translated a cable message from Honolulu to Washington, in which a code was established for reporting the location of vessels in Pearl Harbor, which message had been photographed in the cable office in Washington and thus obtained by the Navy (Document 3, Exhibit 13).

For many months prior to the attack, the Office of Naval Intelligence at Honolulu had been tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul and of the Japanese Vice Consul. For a period of time also the home telephones of these officials had been tapped. The taps on the lines of the Consulate were removed on 2 December 1941 by direction of Captain Mayfield, who was then the District Intelligence Officer. The evidence indicates that he took this action because he was fearful that the existence of such telephone taps would be discovered by the Japanese Consul. His fear arose from the fact that an FBI tap on the lines of a Japanese official of the NYC Line had been detected by a telephone company employee who had advised the District Intelligence Office of this. A representative of the District Intelligence Office subsequently had informed the local FBI office. It was learned that the FBI office had complained to the telephone company concerning the disclosure of its tap. In light of this situation, Captain Mayfield directed that the Navy taps be removed.

It appears that no important military information was intercepted by means of the Navy Intelligence taps on the lines of the Japanese Consulate General. Exhibits 38A and 38B of this investigation consist of photostatic copies of the notes made of the telephone conversations over the Japanese Consul General's line and the Japanese Vice Consul's line during the period 1 October 1941 to 2 December 1941.

Subsequent to 2 December 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation apparently continued its telephone taps and in this fashion on or about 5 December 1941 learned the contents of a telephone conversation between a man named Mori in Hawaii and a person in Japan. The fact of this conversation was brought to the attention of the District Intelligence Officer, and on 6 December 1941, a transcript of the conversation was furnished to him and arrangements were made for a representative of the District Intelligence Office to listen to the recording of the telephone conversation; this, however, was not done until after the attack. A transcript of the telephone conversation, with marginal notes made by the District Intelligence representative after the attack, in Exhibit 39 of this investigation. It may be noted that it appears from prior investigations that this conversation was brought to the attention of General Short [89] on the evening of 6 December 1941, and apparently nothing could be made out of it and no action was taken concerning it. There is no evidence indicating that this telephone conversation was brought to Admiral Kimmel's attention prior to the attack.

In the conversation, there was mention of the flights of airplanes daily, the number of sailors present, the attitude of local Japanese, the local construction
projects, the size of the local population, the precautionary measures taken at night time, the use of searchlights at night, the emphasis in Honolulu newspapers on the southern advance of Japan into French Indo-China, the visit of Kurusu, the local climate, the visit of Litvinoff, the Russian Ambassador, the recent return of a Japanese from Honolulu to Japan, and the number of Japanese in the United States Army. The person in Japan inquired for information about the United States Fleet. Mori stated that he knew nothing about the Fleet, and that since they tried to avoid talking about such matters they did not know much about the Fleet. He said he didn't know whether all of the Fleet had gone, but that the Fleet present seemed small, and it seemed that the Fleet had left. The person in Japan then inquired whether that was so and what kind of flowers were in bloom in Hawaii. Mori stated that the flowers in bloom were the fewest out of the whole year, however that the hibiscus and the poinsettia were in bloom. He later stated that the Japanese chrysanthemums were in full bloom.

There is some reason to believe that the statements concerning flowers in the Mori telephone conversation were the use of code words indicating the absence or presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. In this connection, the Operation Order for the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 3) provided for the use of a radio broadcast code in which the statement "The cherry blossoms are in all their glory" would signify that there were "No warships in Pearl Harbor." This lends support to the theory advanced by representatives of the District Intelligence Office in their testimony to the effect that the primary purpose of the Mori telephone conversation over the trans-Pacific radio was to provide information to Japanese Fleet units which would be listening in on that frequency.

The espionage reports submitted by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu have been previously discussed. It will be recalled that in those coded messages considerable information was given of the movement of ships and location of ships in Pearl Harbor and of defense preparations at Oahu. Certain messages sent during the first week of December, 1941, indicated the likelihood of an attack by air on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu transmitted its messages via commercial companies using the various communications companies alternately. During the month of November, the McKay Radio Company handled the messages primarily, and during the month of December, 1941, RCA was transmitting the messages.

[90] Prior to December, 1941, efforts had been made by the District Intelligence Officer to get access to the files of the communications companies and thus to secure copies of the Japanese Consul General's messages. These efforts were without success, in view of the legal prohibitions against the disclosure of such messages. During a visit by Mr. Sarnoff, President of RCA, the District Intelligence Officer requested him to cooperate with the Navy by making such messages available, and pointed out the importance to the country of giving the Navy access to such messages.

On 5 December 1941, RCA Communications, at Honolulu, turned over to Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer, copies of some messages which had been sent by the Japanese Consul via RCA on the third and fourth of December. These messages, with the exception of a few unimportant plain language messages, were in code. Captain Mayfield turned them over to the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, headed by Lieutenant Commander Rochefort, for decryption and translation. That organization had not been working on Japanese diplomatic traffic. Efforts were immediately made to decrypt and to translate those messages. The messages so received by Captain Mayfield and turned over to the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence for decryption and translation were not identified in any record made at the time. Lieutenant Woodward, who did the decryption of them, has identified, to the best of his recollection, the messages received on December 5th as those set forth in Exhibit 58 and at pages 7–11 of Exhibit 58A of this investigation.

Various Japanese codes were used in the messages, including the "LA" code, which was the simplest and evidently the least important. The messages in that code, and the plain language messages, were decoded and read prior to the attack. The "LA" code messages so read are pages 1–5 of Exhibit 58. They contained no important military information. One, for example, reported the departure of a transport and another related to the cost of sending families home to Japan.
The testimony of Lieutenant Woodward, who decrypted the messages, of Colonel Lasswell and Captain Finnegan, who translated various of the messages, of Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the unit, and of Admiral Mayfield, who was District Intelligence Officer, indicate that no information of military importance was obtained prior to the attack from any of the Japanese Consulate's messages. It has been testified that various of the other messages received on 5 December 1941 were in a Japanese code known as the "PA" or "PA-K2" system and that efforts to decrypt these were not successful until after the attack. The messages, as identified by Lieutenant Woodward, will be found at pages 6-23 of Exhibit 56 (supplied by the Radio Intelligence Unit) and at pages 7-12 of Exhibit 56A (supplied by the District Intelligence Office). They were as follows:

(1) December 3rd to Tokyo—Advising that a freighter in military service departed on the second and that a named ship arrived on the third (p. 10, Exhibit 56A).

(2) December 3rd to Tokyo—Advising that the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders left port. The balance of the message was not recovered (p. 8, Exhibit 56A).

(3) December 3rd to Tokyo—In connection with the handling of expenses for steamer passage to Japan.

(4) December 3rd to Tokyo—Advising of a change in method of communicating by signals, so that each of the numbers one to eight had a certain meaning as to departures and dates of departure of ships, which numbers were to be communicated by lights in beach houses, by the use of a sailboat, by certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and by bonfires at certain points if the previous signals could not be made (p. 12, Exhibit 56).

(5) December 3rd to Tokyo and elsewhere—Regarding money taken in for sale of tickets (p. 16, Exhibit 56).

(6) December 3rd to Tokyo—Advising that the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders departed the third (p. 22, Exhibit 56).

(7) December 3rd to Tokyo and San Francisco—Advising that a transport had sailed for the Mainland and that a ship had arrived from San Francisco (p. 20, Exhibit 56).

A photostatic copy of the December, 1941, bill of RCA Communications at Honolulu, covering the Japanese Consul General's messages in November and December, 1941, was received from the District Intelligence Office at Honolulu (Exhibit 55). This indicates that there were four radiograms sent on November 2nd, two on November 13th, four on December 1st, and two on December 2nd. The testimony concerning these is to the effect that they were not received or read prior to the attack, that they were received later and were thought to be in more complex codes, probably machine codes, as there were no indicators by which they could be identified.

It further appears from Exhibit 55 that there were various other radiograms charged to the Japanese Consul General for December 4th and 5th, and three for December 6th. The testimony concerning these indicates that none was obtained prior to the attack.

The two messages listed on the RCA bill for December 4th, according to Lieutenant Woodward, were among a group of messages received on the night of December 7th (p. 4-5, Exhibit 56A). It was later learned that one advised Tokyo that an English gunboat arrived on the third and departed and that the sailors had come ashore and had received mail at the British Consulate; the other advised that a light cruiser had departed hastily on the fourth (Exhibit 57).

The five radiograms listed on the RCA bill for December 5th were received after the attack and were actually two messages to Tokyo, the second having been sent also to San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D. C. The first message reported the arrival on the morning of the 5th of three battleships, which had been at sea for eight days, also that the LEXINGTON and five cruisers had left the same day, and that eight battleships, three cruisers, and sixteen destroyers were in port. The second message has not been translated. It relates to funds of the consulate General (Exhibit 57).

[92] The three radiograms charged for December 6th were actually two messages in the "PA-K2" code (Exhibit 57). The first, which was translated after the attack, was sent to Tokyo and to Washington at 6:01 p. m. on 6 December 1941. It set forth the ships observed at anchor on the sixth and stated: * * * 9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).
"2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm."

The other message of December 6th, which was filed at 12:58 p. m. that day, was, after decryption, translated by Joseph Finnegam, now a Captain, U. S. N., who reported for duty in the radio intelligence unit on the 9th or 10th of December, 1941. He translated that message (Exhibit 57) as follows:

"From: KITA  
"To: F. M. TOKYO  
"Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123  
"1. The army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparation for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

"2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the nonuse of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further."

Captain Finnegam admitted in his testimony that the last sentence of the first paragraph of his translation was an incorrect translation. As appears from an Army translation of that message (Exhibit 57), that sentence, correctly translated, was as follows:

"I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places."

As previously noted, among the messages turned over to the District Intelligence Officer and to ComFOURTEEN-Communication Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation on 5 December 1941, was the [93] message from Honolulu to Tokyo dated 3 December 1941, which established a system of signals to be used from Oahu by means of lights at beach houses, the use of a sailboat, by want ads on a radio station, and bonfires. This message was in the possession of the Radio Communications Intelligence Unit from 5 December to 10 December 1941, at which time it was successfully decrypted and translated. The Japanese Consul General's signal message of December 3rd was not only in the possession of the Navy at Pearl Harbor prior to the attack, but was also in the possession of the Navy Department at Washington prior to the attack. A copy of that message as contained in the Op-20-G files at the Navy Department, indicates that it was translated on 11 December 1941, and that it had been intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Va. (Document 22, Exhibit 13). In fact, however, that message was decrypted and translated in rough form prior to 1 p. m. 6 December 1941, by Mrs. Edgers, a translator assigned to the Op-20-G Unit, Navy Department. She testified that she believed that it was shown that afternoon to Kramer and that he examined it in rough form. Kramer did not recall this but did recall going over the message thoroughly on December 8th. Evidently further work on this message was deferred on December 6th because of the pressure of work on the thirteen parts of the Japanese fourteen-part reply which were being decrypted that afternoon and evening.

It should be noted that a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated 2 December 1941, was intercepted by the Army radio intercept unit at Fort Shafter, Hawaii (Document 24, Exhibit 13). This message stated that in view of the present situation the presence of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers was of utmost importance, that there should be daily reports, that there should be reports whether or not there were observation balloons above Pearl Harbor, or an indication that they would be set up, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-mine nets. The message apparently was forwarded from Fort Shafter by mail to the Army. The Army translation of the message bears a note that the message was received on December 23rd and translated on 30 December 1941, by the Army. It has been testified by Brigadier General Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, that no decryption was done at Fort Shafter, but that all intercepted traffic was forwarded to Washington for decryption and translation.

Finally, it appears that the two highly significant messages sent by the Japanese Consul General during the afternoon of December 6th were both intercepted by the Army intercept station at San Francisco and forwarded to the Army in Washington by teletype (Docs. 14, 15, Exhibit 13). Both of these were in the Japanese
code known as the “PA-K2” code and are indicated to have been translated by the Army on Monday, December 8, 1941. According to Captain Safford, the longer message, stating that there was “considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack” against Pearl Harbor, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets, could have been decrypted in about an hour and a half; and the shorter message, which stated in part that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm, could have been decrypted in less than an hour.


In the latter half of November, 1941, the Japanese Government by messages to Washington and elsewhere established two codes to be used for communication between Tokyo and elsewhere. The first has been referred to as the “winds code.” In that code certain Japanese words were to be added in the middle and at the end of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcasts and could also be used in Morse code messages, which words would apparently be weather reports. Thus, the Japanese words “HIGASHI NO KAZEAME” which meant “East wind rain,” would actually mean that Japan-United States relations were in danger. Words were also supplied for Japan-Russian relations and for Japan-British relations. The existence of this code was brought to the attention of the Navy Department late in November through the interception and decryption of Japanese messages establishing the code, and also through information to the same effect received from other sources such as the United States Naval Attache at Batavia. It appeared that the use of the code words would indicate a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war between the countries designated.

The Japanese also established, late in November, 1941, a code system which has been referred to as the “hidden word code.” This code was not discussed in previous investigations. The establishment of the code was first learned through the interception and decryption in Washington, D. C. of several Japanese diplomatic communications which had been sent from Tokyo on and after 2 December 1941 (Documents 6, 8, 12, 17 and 20, Exhibit 13). This code was intended to be used, when telegraphic communications might be severed, as a means of informing Japanese diplomats of the situation concerning the country in which they were located. Thus the word “KODAMA” meant Japan, the word “KOYANATI” meant England, the word “MINAMI” meant United States, and the word “HAT-TORI” meant that relations between Japan and another country, to be identified by a code word, were not in accordance with expectations. It may be noted that the meaning of the last word, as set forth in the Navy translation of the “hidden word code,” differs from the meaning which the War Department cryptanalyst testified should have been given to the word. According to his testimony, the word should have been translated as meaning that relations were on the verge of crisis or that hostilities might commence.

Prior investigations conducted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry resulted in findings that prior to 7 December 1941 there had been a “winds code message” by the Japanese in which the code words relating to the United States were used, and that this message had been intercepted by the Navy Department prior to the attack and communicated to the Army, but that no copy of it could be found in the Army or Navy files. It appears that these findings were based primarily on the testimony of Captain Safford and of Captain Kramer of the Navy Department.

It should be noted that a Japanese message using the “winds code” words relating to the United States, if received on 3 or 4 December, or at any other time prior to 7 December 1941, would have conveyed no information of importance which the Navy and War Departments did not already possess. Such a message would have indicated either a break in diplomatic relations or possibly war with the United States. That both the Navy Department and the War Department, and Admiral Kimmel as well, were already aware that a break in diplomatic relations or war with the United States was imminent, is clearly established by the November 27th “war warning” to Admiral Kimmel, and by the repetition on November 28th by the Navy of the Army’s warning dispatch to General Short.

In view, however, of the findings by the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board that a “winds message” relating to the United States was received about 3 December 1941, and that no copy of it could be found, further investigation on this point was deemed necessary.
(1) Prior investigations.

(a) The Naval Court of Inquiry:

In the "Addendum" to its findings, the Naval Pearl Harbor-Court of Inquiry stated concerning the "Winds Code" as follows:

"From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, there was much diplomatic dispatch traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and which was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. A message dated 19 November, 1941, Tokyo to Washington, translated on 28 November 1941, and referred to as 'The Winds Code' was as follows:

"'Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

"'(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*

"'(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KOTANOKAZE KUMORI.**

"'(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***

"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

"'Forward as urgent intelligence.'

[96] "The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November, 1941, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations, information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commandant 16th Naval District; and Commandant 14th Naval District, substantially the same information as outlined above. On 5 December, 1941, the United States Naval Attaché, Batavia, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations substantially the same information. These messages stated that at some future date information would be sent by Japan indicating a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war between countries designated.

"All officers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in the Navy Department, considering the expected information most important, were on the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.

"It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.

"Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department."

(b) The Army Pearl Harbor Board:

The "Top Secret" and separate portion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board's report referred to the "Winds Message." The report stated that a winds execute message reading "War with the United States, war with Britain, including the Netherlands East Indies, except peace with Russia" had been received in the Navy Department on 3 December 1941; that the Navy admitted that that message was received prior to December 6th; that the War Department files contained no copy of the message. The report referred in this connection to testimony by Captain Safford, who stated that such a message had been received by Commander Kramer, who had been [97] notified by Brotherhood of its receipt, and that it had been seen by Safford at 8:00 a. m. on December 4th. Safford stated that no copy of the message could be found in the Navy Department files.

The Army report further stated that on December 5th, Admiral Noyes called Colonel Sadtler, at 9:30 a.m., saying: "Sadtler, the message is in." Apparently based on Sadtler's testimony, the report also stated that Sadtler did not know

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*East wind rain.
**North wind cloudy.
***West wind clear.
whether this meant war with the United States, but believed it meant war with either the United States, Russia or Great Britain; that he discussed it with his superiors and was instructed to confer with Admiral Noyes; and that he telephoned Admiral Noyes, who said that he was too busy and would have to confer with Sadtler later. Sadtler then saw various officers in the War Department, all of whom did not think that any further information should be sent to Hawaii.

It also appeared that the Army Board had received testimony on this matter from Colonel Bratton, who said that Sadtler, acting on behalf of Colonel Bratton, had arranged for the FCC to monitor Japanese broadcasts. Apparently Bratton testified that no information reached him before December 7th which indicating a break in relations with the United States and that he did not think that any such information had reached anyone else. He referred to an FCC intercept which contained the message for which they had been looking.

2. The basis of the previous findings that there was a Winds Execute message prior to the attack.

The basis for the Army Pearl Harbor Board finding that a “winds message” relating to the United States had been received appears, to the extent known by the Navy, in the above summary of the top secret portion of the Army Board’s report. That indicates that primarily the basis for the finding was the testimony of Captain Safford. In addition to Safford’s testimony, there was apparently testimony by Sadtler of a conversation with Admiral Noyes in which he referred to a “winds message” but not to the contents of that message.

Captain Safford testified before Admiral Hart and before the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry. His testimony was the primary basis for the Naval Court of Inquiry’s findings that a “winds message” relating to the United States had been received. In addition to his testimony, the Naval Court of Inquiry had testimony from Captain Kramer bearing on this subject which tended to support the finding.

In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford said:

“On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the ‘Winds Message’, and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my ... presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p.m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, ‘What do you think of the message?’ Admiral Noyes replied, ‘I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander in Chief.’ Admiral Wilkinson stated, ‘I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander in Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office.’ Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this message of warning had been sent, and did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that McCollum’s message had not been sent. In order to clarify the above statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the ‘Winds Message’. The ‘Winds Message’ was a name given by the Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence duties to identify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain (including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We received a tip-off from the British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immediately forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. We also received a tip-off from the Dutch in Java through the American Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip-off was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State Department, War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the ‘Winds Message’ when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corregedor, Hawaii, Bremer-ton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty
dollars per day for this material alone. The 'Winds Message' was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington Time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the 'Winds Message' was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I. units, not hearing the 'Winds Message' themselves and not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the 'Winds Message' had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to send out information that the 'Winds Message' had been sent by Tokyo. The 'Winds Message' was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified the message as the 'Winds Message' we had been looking for. The significant part of the 'Winds Message' read: 'HIGASHI NO KAZEAME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMURI'. The literal translation of these phrases is: 'EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY'. The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: 'War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with Russia.' I first saw the 'Winds Message' about 8:00 a. m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my office with a big smile on his face and piece of paper in his hand and said, 'Here it is!' as he handed me the 'Winds Message.' As I remember, it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant 'Winds' underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the War Department. As the direct result of the 'Winds Message,' I prepared a total of five messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result of the 'Winds Message,' McCollum drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the 'Winds Message' as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the 'Winds Message': Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following officers knew by hearsay that the 'Winds Message' had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves:

Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N.
Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R.
Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N.

Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve * * *

[100] "The 'Winds Message' was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my understanding at the time."

Before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Captain Safford repeated in substance his prior testimony and stated that Lieutenant Murray or possibly Kramer brought him the message; that he couldn't determine from what Navy intercept station the message had come; that he had a vague recollection of a second "Winds Message", but had been unable to find any trace of it until he testified before Admiral Hart; that since that time he learned that the FCC had intercepted a "Winds Message" at Portland, but that he did not recognize that message. He did not recall any of the FCC intercepts contained in Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of
Inquiry, none of which indicated a break with the United States. He stated further than despite repeated search since November, 1943, no copy of the “Winds Message” could be found in the files; that Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood had told him that he knew the disposition of them, but did not care to tell Safford. Also Safford said that he knew what had happened to the Army copies of that message through very “second hand and devious sources.” He also repeated his prior testimony to the effect that about the middle of the first week in December, 1944, Commander McCollum had drafted a long dispatch which included information about the “Winds Message,” and which dispatch had not been sent out.

Commander Kramer in his testimony before the Naval Court, said that on December 3rd or 4th he had been shown a “Winds Message” by the watch officer and took it immediately to Captain Safford, who took it to Admiral Noyes. This was a plain-language message and, as shown to him, contained the phrase translated as “East Wind Rain” which meant strained relations or a break with the United States. The message had been on teletype paper and indicated that it had come through an USN intercept station.

Among the witnesses before the Naval Court of Inquiry who testified that so far as they knew there had never been a “Winds Message” relating to the United States were Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and Admiral Noyes. Neither Admiral Wilkinson nor Commander McCollum, who were alleged by Safford to have had knowledge of the “Winds Message,” was a witness before the Naval Court of Inquiry, as both were at the time actively engaged in combat operations.

(3) Evidence Obtained in this Investigation Concerning “Winds Message.”

(a) Testimony of Captain Safford:

Captain Safford testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. He realized that he would be one of the important witnesses and that his memory was vague. Accordingly, he began looking around to get information in order to prepare a written statement which he could use in his testimony. He noticed that in the Roberts report there was no reference to the “Winds Message” or to the dispatch which McCollum had drafted. Safford then began talking to everyone who had been around at the time to see what they could remember, and to see if they could give him leads so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. He talked the thing over with various of the Army people.

Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that Brotherhood had written back saying that he didn’t care to tell Safford about the disposition of the copies of the “Winds Message,” but when Brotherhood returned to the United States, Safford asked him about it and found out that there had been a misunderstanding. Brotherhood had been referring to the false “Winds Message” (Document 2 of Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court), which apparently related to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast.

Safford stated that he had information “third hand” concerning the Army’s copies of the “Winds Message,” and that he thought it might be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadtler before the Army investigation. He stated that his information from the Army came through W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the War Department, and that the information was that the copies of the “Winds Message” had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Blissell on the direct orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that Colonel Bratton of the War Department had had some question about the message and had asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of the original of the “Winds Message,” but that Admiral Noyes refused to comply on the grounds that the Navy translation was correct. This, he said, should appear in Colonel Bratton’s testimony before the Army investigation. He also stated that a Captain Shukraft of the Army knew that the “Winds Message” had been received.

Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his testimony during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier impression, Kramer told him that the “Winds Message” and various other intercepts relating to Japan had not been turned over to the Roberts Commission, but about 9 December 1941 had been collected and shown to Under Secretary Forrestal, during the absence of Secretary Knox. He also said that Kramer told him that he did not recall the “Winds Message” specifically. Safford also stated that the reference in McCollum’s message to the “Winds Message” was very short and was the last item in McCollum’s draft dispatch.

Safford testified that it now appears more likely that the “Winds Message” was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than the night before, because the watch officers who were on duty recollected
only the false "Winds Message," and not the "true 'Winds Message.'" The vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted in the message being intercepted only on the East Coast of the United States, and that such conditions were not unusual. He pointed out that they had to call on Corregidor to cover the Tokyo-Berlin circuits because the combined efforts of intercept stations on the East Coast, [102] West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than about fifty percent coverage. Although he had no knowledge as to which Naval station allegedly intercepted the message, his first guess was the station at Cheltenham, Maryland, and his second guess was Winter Harbor, Maine. He stated that the logs of those stations and of the Navy Department had been destroyed during one of the numerous moves and no record had been kept.

Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood at 9:05 p.m. on December 4th (Exhibit 65, Naval Court), he said that this was the "false" message which appeared on the surface to use the "winds" code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast. This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and later Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket. He said that that message was received twelve hours or more after what he referred to as the "true winds message."

Safford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65, as a true "winds" message relating to England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Safford testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been monitoring for a "winds" execute message, but that prior to the attack they had intercepted no such message.

(b) Captain Kramer's testimony:

Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously concerning the "winds" message but wanted to go over that previous testimony in the light of thinking it over since that time. He said that he had had no recollection of a "winds" message at the time it was first mentioned to him, the spring of 1944, but after receiving from Safford some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, he did recall a message some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of the week, and did recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and walking with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned it over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that that message had been a "winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it might have been one using the code words referring to the United States, as he previously testified, but he was less positive of that now than he had been at the time of his previous testimony. The reason for this revision of his view was that on thinking it over, he had a rather sharp recollection that in the latter part of the week preceding the attack there was still no specific mention of the United States in any of the Japanese traffic. For that reason he was under the impression when he testified during this investigation that the message referred to England and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too. He just didn't recall.

Captain Kramer testified that on the morning of December 7th, a Japanese "hidden word" code message was received and was hurriedly translated by him as he was about to leave the Navy Department to deliver other messages. The message as translated by Kramer was, "Relations between Great Britain and Japan are not in accordance with expectations" (Exhibit 20). In his [103] haste, Kramer overlooked the word "MINAMIT" which was contained in the Japanese Message and which referred to the United States. He testified that after he returned to the Navy Department and shortly before 1 p.m. on December 7th, he discovered his mistake and made a penciled correction on the file copy of the translation. He testified further that he believed that he made several telephone calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of ONI and an officer of G-2 of the War Department. The copies of the translation in the Navy Department's files do not disclose any correction of the translation (Exhibit 20). Kramer testified concerning this that a number of copies of the translation were made at the time, and that undoubtedly his correction was made on another copy which has since been discarded.

Captain Kramer also stated that he had been under the impression until he testified before this investigation that the "hidden word message" of 7 December 1941 had been a "Winds Message," but now recognized it as a "hidden word message." He stated that he thought that the "hidden word message", which he identified as having been received on 7 December, was among the group of mes-
sages shown to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December 1941, when he hastily reviewed a
folder of that traffic for Mr. Forrestal. This was done, he said, because of the
fact that previously Mr. Forrestal had not seen such material.

(c) Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood's Testimony:
Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch officers who
were on watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week of December,
1941. He said that he had never received an intercept or message wherein the
"Winds Code" words relating to the United States were used. He said that about
December 4th, he received a telephone message from the FCC in which the words
apparently relating to Russia were used; that he called Admiral Noyes, who com-
mented that the wind was blowing from a "funny" direction, and that he, Brother-
hood, did not think at the time that it was an actual "Winds Message." Brother-
hood stated that shortly before he testified in this investigation, he had had a
conversation with Safford who stated that Brotherhood had called him about
December 4th or 5th and had told him that such a message had arrived. Brother-
hood said he did not recall the telephone conversation and that he believed,
therefore, that he had called Captain Safford at that time.

(d) Lieutenant Commander Linn's Testimony:
Linn testified that a 24-hour watch was maintained in Captain Safford's
section; that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the four officers
who stood watch during the first week in December, 1941. Any intercept
which had come into that section, he said, would have had to come through one
of the four watch officers. He was familiar with the "Winds Code" and he never
saw any intercept [104] prior to 7 December 1941 in which the "winds"
code words relating to the United States were used.

(e) Lieutenant Commander Perling's Testimony:
Perling testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing watch
during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's section. He knew
of the existence of the "winds" code and he never saw any intercept using the
code words relating to the United States.

(f) Lieutenant Commander Murray's Testimony:
Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing a twenty-
four hour watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week in December,
1941. He testified that no "winds" code execute relating to the United States
ever came to his attention during that week. He said that after the attack, Linn
had told him that a "winds" message had come in on 7 December 1941.

(g) Lieutenant Freeman's Testimony:
Freeman testified that he was in a section which disseminated to ONI intelli-
genience received from the field radio intelligence units; that his unit worked very
closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every effort was made to monitor
for a "winds" message. Freeman was one of the officers mentioned by Captain
Safford, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, as having personal knowledge of
the receipt of a "winds" message relating to the United States. He testified that
he never knew of any intercept of a "winds" message relating to the United States.

(h) Captain McCollum's Testimony:
Captain McCollum testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code;
that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted which contained the words
relating to the United States; that the message which contained the words ap-
parently relating to Russia had been received during the first week of December,
1941, but that in his opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said further
that during the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch summarizing
the situation which he wanted to have sent out; that he remembered no reference
to any "winds" message in that dispatch; and, that the dispatch was based on a
memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941 which did not refer to a "winds"
message (Exhibit 10). He did not know whether or not his draft dispatch had
been sent out. It had been submitted to Admiral Wilkinson.

(i) Admiral Wilkinson's Testimony:
Admiral Wilkinson testified that his only recollection of the "winds" code was
that some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander McCollum, had
mentioned to him that a message using a "winds" code had been received. Pos-
sibly, he said, it was the message received on the 7th using the words relating to
England. He did not recall anything about the long dispatch which McCollum
had drafted and which [105] Captain Safford had testified Admiral
Wilkinson had endeavored to have sent out.

(j) Captain Mason's and Commander Fabian's Testimony:
Captain Mason, who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and Com-
mander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor, both testi-
fied that intensive efforts had been made there to monitor for any Japanese broadcasts using the “winds” code, and that nothing was received wherein the words relating to the United States were used. In this connection, it should be noted that it was the view of the Navy Department that the unit at Corregidor, because of its geographical location, was in a much better position to intercept Japanese radio broadcasts than were the units at Pearl Harbor or Washington (see Exhibit 8).

They also testified that close liaison was maintained with British Intelligence services in the Philippines, that the British had been monitoring for a “winds” message also, and that had such a message been received by the British, they most certainly would have been advised of its receipt, but that they received no information from the British as to the receipt of a “winds” message prior to the attack.

(k) Captain Layton’s Testimony:

Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he had been familiar with the “winds” code, that efforts were made to monitor for the use of that code; and all available Japanese language officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan; that he checked up each day with Commander Rochefort and that no “winds” intercept was received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did they receive any dispatch from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard.

(1) Captain Safford recalled:

Captain Safford was recalled and testified that he never had a conversation with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a “winds” message. He stated that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he received a call from Brotherhood about December 4th in which Brotherhood advised of the receipt of a message apparently using the Russian “winds” code words. He had had a vague idea that there was another “winds” message, and, he said, the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill. He said further, that until 1944 he did not recall having seen, or knowing of the FCC intercept in which the words relating to Russia were used.

(m) Mr. Friedman’s Testimony:

Mr. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that prior to 7 December 1941 he had no information as to whether or not a “winds” message had been intercepted. He said that he had had several conversations with Captain Safford concerning the subject, the first one about a year and half ago, and none later than six months prior to his [106] testimony in this investigation. He said that Safford had indicated in the course of the early conversations that there had been a “winds” message, but that no copies could be found in the Navy’s files, and that his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy East Coast station. Mr. Friedman also testified that about a year and a half ago he had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a “winds” message had come in on the 4th or 5th of December; that he had been notified either directly or by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message was in; that there had been some question about the exact Japanese words which had been used, and that Sadler had not seen the message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that Colonel Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verification from Admiral Noyes but had not been successful, whereupon the G-2 authorities simply passed the matter over since there was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the message. Mr. Friedman said that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen a copy of that message, and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testified that he regarded this as highly inconceivable, but that in conversation with Captain Safford he probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started, and that he had no idea that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr. Friedman had no knowledge, directly or indirectly, concerning the existence of a “winds” message relating to the United States, apart from his conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler.

(n) Captain Rochefort’s Testimony:

Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, testified that they monitored for any “winds” code message, covering all known broadcasts from Tokyo on a twenty-four hour basis, and that results were nil. He testified further that he had made an exhaustive search into all available Navy records and could find no trace of any “winds” message prior to 7 December 1941.
E. Information Concerning the Organization of the Japanese Navy.

(1) ONI Report of 29 July 1941.

On July 29th, the Office of Naval Intelligence issued a revised report, which had been prepared by Commander McCollum, dealing with the organization of the Japanese Navy. This stated that, as a result of information which had been received, it was possible to give a much more complete picture of the organization of the Japanese Navy. It stated that the Japanese naval forces afloat were organized into two main commands—the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. The Combined Fleet included:

(a) First Fleet, or Battle Force.
(b) Second Fleet, or Scouting Force.
(c) Third Fleet, or Blockade and Shipping Control Force.
(d) Fourth Fleet, or Mandated Islands Defensive Force.
(e) Submarine Force (also called the Sixth Fleet).

The Combined Fleet and First Fleet, under the command of Admiral Yamamoto, consisted of various BatDivs, a CruDiv, three CarDivs and two destroyer squadrons. BatDiv 3 (KONGO, HIYEL, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) was included. The carrier divisions were CarDiv 3 (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU); CarDiv 5 (RYUJO, HOSHO); and CarDiv 7 (CHITOSE, CHIYODA, MIZUHO).

The Second Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Koga, included various cruiser divisions, two carrier divisions and two destroyer squadrons. (CarDiv 8 (CHIKUMA and TONE) was included. The carrier divisions were: CarDiv 1 (AKAGI and KAGA), and CarDiv 2 (SORUYU and HIRUYU).

The Third Fleet included CarDiv 6 (NOTOIO and KAMIKAWA MARU) and various minelayer and minesweeper divisions, a base force and sub-chaser squadrons.

The composition of the Fourth Fleet or Mandates Fleet, and of the Submarine Fleet and of the Japanese Naval Forces in China was also given. (Exhibit 81.)

(2) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 45-41.

On 27 November 1941 (when the “war warning” was received), the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, distributed Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 45-41 (Exhibit 21). This bulletin dealt with the organization of the Japanese Navy and with Japanese Forces and installations in the Mandated Islands. It was a revision of the ONI bulletin above summarized and replaced that bulletin on the subject of the Japanese Fleet. This stated:

“The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below:

### Major Fleet Commands

1. Combined Fleet
   1. First Fleet (Battle Force) 3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons
   2. Second Fleet (Scouting Force) 4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons, etc.
   3. Third Fleet (Blockade & Transport Force) Small Craft.
   4. Fourth Fleet (Mandate Defense Force) 1 Desron, 1 Subron and many small units.
   5. Fifth Fleet
   6. Sixth Fleet (Submarine Fleet) 6 Subrons
   7. Carrier Fleet (Aircraft Carriers) 5 Cardivs
   8. Combined Air Force (Seaplane tenders, etc.) 4 Airrons, & shore based planes.

II. Japanese Naval Forces in China

1. First China Exped. Fleet (Central China) Gunboats
2. Second China Exped. Fleet (South China) 1 CA, 1 CL and small craft.
3. Third China Exped. Fleet (North China) Torpedo Boats, etc.
4. Southern Exped. Fleet (Saigon) 1 CL, transports and mine craft.
The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing."

The Combined Fleet and First Fleet as listed in this bulletin included three 
BatDivs, among which was BatDiv 3 (HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA and 
HARUNA—as to the latter it was stated that it had been inactive during 1941, and was probably undergoing major repairs). Also included was a cruiser 
division and two destroyer squadrons. 
The Second Fleet included four CruDivs and two destroyer squadrons. One 
of the CruDivs was CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA). 
The composition of the Third, Fourth and Sixth (Submarine) Fleets was 
given in some detail in this bulletin. As to a Fifth Fleet, it stated "The com-
position of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The flagship has been reported 
at Maizuru."

[109] The composition of the Carrier Fleet, with the KAGA as flagship, 
and consisting of ten carriers and sixteen destroyers, was listed as follows:

CarDiv 1: AKAGI, KAGA (F) and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 2: SORYU (F) and HIKYU and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 3: RYUJO (F) and HOSHO and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 4: ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 5: KORYU and KASUGA (MARU).

As will appear subsequently, the forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 included six carriers, the KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1), the 
SORyu and HIRYU (CarDiv 2), and the ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU. The 
latter two carriers had been identified as CarDiv 4 in the Pacific Fleet 
Intelligence Bulletin, as CarDiv 3 (annexed to the First Fleet) in the earlier ONI 
bulletin, and as CarDiv 5, in Exhibit 3, which sets forth the composition of the 
attacking force.

Also included in the attacking force were the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two 
of the battleships of BatDiv 3) which had been listed in the intelligence bulletins 
as assigned to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, and the TONE and CHIKUMA 
(CruDiv 8) which had been listed in the intelligence bulletins as assigned to the 
Second Fleet.

[110] Information Concerning the Location and Movements of Japanese Naval 
Fleets.

The evidence indicates that there were no formal arrangements whereby the 
Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of 
Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelli-
gence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division 
of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to 
radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the 
situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the 
Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese 
movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

(1) Information available at the time of the "War Warning."

The procedure for handling radio intelligence information concerning Japanese 
movements was set forth in a dispatch of 24 November 1941 from OpNav to 
CincAF, information ComSIXTEEN, CincPac, ALUSNA Chungking, ASTALUSNA 
Shanghai, and ALUSNA Tokyo (Exhibit 8). This dispatch stated that Japanese 
naval movements as reported by the individual information addresses were often 
conflicting because of their necessarily fragmentary nature and that since Com-
SIXTEEN intercepts were considered most reliable, it was suggested that other 
reports be carefully evaluated and sent to ComSIXTEEN for action and to 
OpNav for information and, that after combining all incoming reports, Com-
SIXTEEN was to direct dispatches to OpNav, info CincPac, based on all informa-
tion received and indicating the ComSIXTEEN evaluation.

The Japanese naval situation as estimated by ComFOURTEEN on 26 November 
1941, was set forth in a dispatch of that date to OpNav, information CincPac, 
CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN. This dispatch stated that for the past month the 
Commander of the Second Fleet had been organizing a task force consisting of 
Second Fleet and other units and, after discussing various other units, stated:

"There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in
the Marshalls which comprise Airon 24, at least one carrier division unit, plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palau and Marshalls.

On the same day, ComSIXTEEN sent a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav, Com-FOURTEEN and CincAF, discussing in considerable detail the estimate of Com- SIXTEEN concerning the location and probable movements of Japanese Fleet units (Exhibit 8). This stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet was directing some units of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Fleets in a loose-knit task force organization that apparently would be divided into two sections. One section expected to operate in the South China area, was referred to in the dispatch as the “first section.” The “first section” was estimated to consist of CruDiv 7, AirRon 6, Defense Division 1, Desron 3, and Subron 6. The “second section” consisted of units expected to [III] operate in the Mandates. The “second section” was believed to include CruDiv 5, Cardiv 3, RYUJO and one MARU. It was indicated that BatDiv 3 might be included in the “second section,” but that this could not be clarified yet. The dispatch further stated: “Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in the Mandates X Our best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area.” The evaluation was considered to be reliable.

During this time, the Office of Naval Intelligence was issuing fortnightly summaries of current national situations. The summary for 1 December 1941 (Exhibit 9) was distributed by air mail. The statements therein as to the Japanese naval situation, which portion was prepared by the Far Eastern Section of ONI, were based upon information which had been received at least three or four days prior to the date of the document. This stated:

“Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

“The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.”

(2) Admiral Kimmel’s sources of information after the “rear warning.”

The ComFOURTEEN communication intelligence unit continued the practice, which had been followed for some time past, of preparing daily communications intelligence summaries for submission to Admiral Kimmel via Lt. Comdr. Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Photostatic copies of the communication intelligence summaries from 14 October to 14 December 1941 [III] constitute Exhibit 22 of this Investigation. Lieutenant Commander, Layton, who presented these summaries to Admiral Kimmel, also prepared daily intelligence reports which were distributed to various members of CincPac’s staff. The intelligence memoranda were not given to the Admiral or Chief of Staff because they saw the basic material upon which the reports were based. The intelligence reports by Layton for the period 1 October to 2 December, 1941, constitute Exhibit 26. None was prepared after December 2nd, according to Layton.

The daily communication intelligence summaries together with the dispatches received by Admiral Kimmel from other organizations during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, constituted the only sources of information which he had during that period concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces.

(3) Information received by Admiral Kimmel after the “rear warning.”

The critical period commenced on 27 November 1941, when the Japanese force, which was to attack Pearl Harbor, secretly left Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island and,
in radio silence, proceeded undetected toward Pearl Harbor. The Japanese force, which included three of Japan's Carrier Divisions, CarDiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA; CarDiv 2, HIRYU, SORYU; CarDiv 5, SHOKAKU, ZUikAKU; BatDiv 3, first section, HIIYEI, KIRISHIMA; CruDiv 8, CHIKUMA; and other lighter vessels, cruised for ten days to a point 200 miles north of Oahu, where the planes were launched for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

It will be recalled that the November 24th dispatch from CNO in part had stated that the diplomatic situation and statements of the Japanese Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility. The "war warning" of the 27th had stated that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days and that the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

The information which Admiral Kimmel subsequently received as to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was as follows:

**28 November 1941:**

The Naval Attache at Shanghai reported in his dispatch 270855 the sightings by the master of a foreign vessel, which had left Hong Kong en route to Shanghai, of many transports proceeding south singly or in small groups.

[113] The November 27th ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary delivered on November 28th, stated that in general traffic volume was a little below normal, due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the Tokyo-Takao circuit was unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama and Saigon were active as originators. The main Tokyo originator was the intelligence activity which sent five dispatches to the major commanders. The direction finder activity was very high. As to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there was still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address he had been fairly inactive as an originator. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander, it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandate, and also that there was no further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. The Commander Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the Chichijima area. Concerning air forces in general, it was indicated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU and that "Carriers are still located in home waters." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

It appears, therefore, that as of this time the ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, and Washington radio intelligence units were of the opinion that the major portion of the Japanese carriers were in "home waters:" that ComFOURTEEN was of the opinion that a carrier unit was in the Marshalls, and that ComSIXTEEN expected CarDiv 3 to operate in the Mandates. The evidence disclosed that the term "home waters" was understood differently by the Far Eastern Section of ONI, which prepared the 1 December 1941 ONI estimate, and by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet. Captain McCollum testified that the term meant the normal cruising grounds of the Japanese Fleet, roughly west of the 180 meridian of longitude and north of the southern end of Formosa, and included the Kurile Islands but not the Aleutians. Captain Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that "home waters" meant to him, and was understood by Admiral Kimmel to mean, the drill grounds of the Inland Sea and approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay Area in general the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, but not including northern Japan and the Kuriles, to a point about 60 miles east of Japan.

**29 November 1941:**

On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th (Exhibit 19, Naval Court). This repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:

[114] "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but
hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not alarm civil population or disclose intent. X Report measures taken X A separate message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States. X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. X Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further:

"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

On the 28th of November, ComFOURTEEN addressed to OpNav, information CincAF, and stated:

"Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source X Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on One December without ultimatum or declaration in order to get between Bangkok and Singapore. X Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. X Main landing to be made at Songkhola X (Singora)

ComSIXTEEN in a dispatch of the 28th addressed to CincAF, OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, stated that an unidentified ship believed to be a light cruiser had apparently relieved the KASHII as flagship, Southern Expeditionary Fleet; that this ship was now in the Camranh Bay-Saigon area.

OpNav, in dispatch 281693, addressed CincAF, info CincPac, ComSIXTEEN, ComFOURTEEN, and supplied information from State Department, from Saigon, dated November 26th, which stated that five days previously. Orange troops and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon, taking up all available quay space; that 20,000 troops had landed and that 10,000 had arrived from the north by rail during the same period; that the total troops in South Indo-China totaled 70,000. It observed that there was an estimate of some 128,000, but considered that too high. It reported that many trucks had landed and were moving troops and supplies to the interior. It observed that this movement is of large proportions and indicates hostilities against Thailand may begin soon. It also forwarded information from Hanoi, also from the State Department, dated November 26th, that said supplies and military equipment, particularly railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Haiphong even recently augmented and are being transshipped south. Among recently landed artillery are anti-tank guns; that the Japanese had recently purchased a considerable number of native boats along the coast of Tongking Province. It was reported they desired to purchase 500. These boats were being sent south. Further reports from Hanoi, dated November 25th, said that the American Consul had received reliable information that the Governor General had ascertained from an agent that around December, without either declaration of war or ultimatum, Nippon Navy will attack Kra Isthmus. Simultaneously the Army would advance on Thailand; that great increased troop landings and movements were noted south; that during last few days about 4,000 men have landed. On November 25th and 26th, 1,500 troops would go south by special train; that in Tongking there were approximately 25,000 Japanese troops and at Gillingham there were approximately ninety airplanes. Dated November 26th, Hanoi, was the report that on early November 25th the Haiphong mayor had advised all interested persons that the Japanese intended to sequester all freight en route to China, that the Japanese had demanded keys to all warehouses by noon November 25th.

The ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered the 29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communications to and from South China and between the Mandates and the Empire were very heavy. No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence net was very active and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed to the Tokyo direction finder command from various stations and this command also originated messages of high precedence to the major fleet commanders. It was said that
"This activity is interpreted to indicate that the radio intelligence net is operating at full strength upon U. S. naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS." As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any of its units. As to the Third Fleet, there was little activity from its units save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Fleet was said to be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleets. There was little indication of submarine activity. This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel.

[1/6] The ComSIXTEEN communication intelligence unit sent a dispatch on the 29th noting various recent developments from radio intelligence, such as various encrypted addresses noted in the preceding two days traffic, that various additional units now appeared to be associated with the "first section" (South China area), referred to in ComSIXTEEN's November 26th dispatch, that the Hiyei (which in fact was en route to Pearl Harbor) and Kongo appeared to be associated definitely with the "first section," but no movement from the Takao area had been noted, and, that the Cinc Combined Fleet was to leave the Kure zone that day, the Sasebo zone on December 1st, and enter the Bako zone on the 2nd.

30 November 1941:

On 30 November 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch to CincAF for action and to CincPac for information (Exhibit 76, Naval Court), which advised in part:

"Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra by overseas expedition X**X** Desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt of this dispatch X**X**"

A second similar dispatch was also sent on the same day (Exhibit 77, Naval Court) requesting a daily report from CincAF, even if there were no contacts and the information were all negative.

The communication intelligence summary of the 29th delivered this day stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the traffic to South China was still very high. A good share of the traffic was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to major commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the major commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo radio Yokosuka (near Tokyo) sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual AlNav, and the naval general staff addressed Commanders, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been addressed as the 103rd air group originated one dispatch whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he had no navy call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this had appeared before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was intentional in making positively known the existence of an air fleet. Its composition was unknown. The dispatches indicated that various units were under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, including Cardiv 3, and the Third Fleet.

Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships but their assignment was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held extensive communication with [1/7] the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako. The Cinc Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He was still in the Truk area. There was some traffic for Commander Submarine Force, who was at Chichiyama the previous day, and also some traffic from the Commander in Chief, China Fleet.

1 December 1941:

A copy of a dispatch by CNO to CincAF, 301709, was received by CincPac, referring to the previous dispatch which had directed an air search on the line Manila to Camranh Bay, directing that a report be made daily even if the information were all negative (Exhibit 77, Naval Court).

A dispatch from OpNav, dated 1 December 1941, was also received referring to a Thailand-Japanese intrigue aimed at forcing the British to attack Thai as a countermove to a Japanese landing in Kota Bharu, whereupon Thai would declare war and ask Japanese help.

A dispatch of 1 December from ComSIXTEEN advised of radio intelligence information indicating that various units under Cinc Third Fleet were in the
Takao area and that Cinc Second Fleet had shifted from Kure to Sasebo apparently en route to South China waters.

The communication intelligence summary for November 30th, delivered on December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the past few days, that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates. No reason could be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for the past few days had prevented the repetition of dispatches. The volume of dispatches originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUs. As to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of those Fleets were in Kure. In the same message, the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was not listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was at sea. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent one dispatch to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included the KONGO and HIYEL, which it was said placed them as members of his task force. (The HIYEL was actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As to the Third Fleet, it was said, "No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be still in the Truk area. It was said that the continued association of Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force, plus his known progress from the Empire to Chichijime to Saipan had made his destination obviously the Marshalls; also that since one of his large units arrived in the Marshalls some time ago, that unit could not agree with ComSIXTEEN that there was not a submarine concentration in that area. "Every evidence points to a concentration, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there, but also a good proportion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer.

[118] A dispatch was received from ComSIXTEEN, addressed to OpiNav, information CinCAPEF, CinPac, and ComFOURTEEN, to the effect that a reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had occurred at midnight.

2 December 1941:

On 2 December 1941, ComSIXTEEN reported that Cinc Second and Cinc Third Fleets were in the Takao area, and, that broadcasts to fleet units were being sent by Takao or Bako in addition to Tokyo. Also reported was the fact that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok had requested permission to destroy codes.

CinCAPEF also reported that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines on a southerly course in the South China Sea between Camranh Bay and the Philippines. Also that three submarines were sighted 670 from Saigon, 180 miles, heading south, and that twenty-one transports, with air patrol overhead, were at Camranh Bay.

A report from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised of the arrival of 14,000 troops sailing from there the week ending the 22nd.

The communication intelligence summary for the previous day stated generally that all service radio calls of forces aloft changed promptly at 0000 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000 1 December indicated that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromise. Either that, or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual were pending. It should be noted that the sentence in the above summary reading "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale" was underscored in red pencil commencing with the words "service calls." Captain Layton testified that to the best of his recollection this was underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time.

The summary further stated as to the First Fleet "nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to the Second Fleet,
it was stated “This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China;” Takao did not appear to play an important role in the traffic; consequently, the assumption was made that this fleet was passing up Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was "nothing to report except that the [111] same associations of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continued. As to Fourth Fleet, “No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.” As to Fifth Fleet, "Nothing to report.” As to submarines, it was stated a large number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijime and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force, it was stated "No change." As to carriers, it was said "No change." This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel.

In accordance with the request of Admiral Kimmel, Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, prepared a memorandum for the Admiral dealing with the location of the Japanese Fleet. This memorandum was prepared, according to Layton, on the evening of 1 December, and was submitted by him to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941. The original memorandum is Exhibit 23. The memorandum bears certain notations in red pencil which, Layton testified, were inserted by him on December 2nd prior to submission of the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, and which reflected the later information received after preparation of the memorandum on the night of December 1st–2nd. It also bears certain lead pencil notations which Layton identified as the handwriting of Admiral Kimmel. This memorandum, according to Layton, summarized his best estimate of the location of the Japanese Fleet, based on all information available to him and to Admiral Kimmel up to and including 1 December 1941.

Layton's estimate stated that from the best available information, units of the Orange (Japanese) were "thought" to be located as listed in the memorandum. In the Kure-Sasebo area he listed the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief, First Fleet, with six battleships, "(?)", and other units. He listed the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, at Nagara initially and then corrected it in red to indicate that it was at Takao. Also in the Kure-Sasebo area he located Cruiser Division 8.

In the Shanghai area, Layton's estimate located the Commander in Chief, China Fleet, the Shanghai base force, and an air group.

In the Bako-Takao area, Layton listed Third Fleet submarine squadrons and various destroyers and the Commander of the Combined Air Force with numerous air groups and the KASUGA MAIKU (thought to be a converted carrier with 36 planes). He estimated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, had been en route to Takao (this he corrected in red pencil to indicate that he was at Takao) with a cruiser division, destroyers, and with "Cardiv 4—two CV and four DD; Cardiv 3—two CV and 3 DD; Batdiv 3 less HAKUNA—3 BB (maybe 2 BB)" and, he added in red pencil, certain cruisers and Destroyer Division 2.

In the Hainon-Canton area, Layton located the Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet and various cruisers and destroyers and transports. In the French Indo-China area, he located the Commander in Chief of an Expeditionary Fleet with various ships including 21 transports and some base forces among others. In the Mandates area, he located at Palau an air group [120] and base force; at Truk, the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet with cruisers and destroyers, and a base force and an air group. At Saipan, he located the Commander in Chief of the Submarine Force with possibly submarines and various air groups and a base force. In the Marshalls area, he located various air groups and the carrier "KORYU? plus plane guards", and several submarine squadrons and base force.

Layton's memorandum did not make any reference to the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese Fleet (which in fact were en route to attack Pearl Harbor). According to Layton, on 2 December 1941, during his conference with Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noticed and commented on the absence of information concerning Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. In his testimony, he described the conversation on this point as follows:

"Mr. Sonnett: Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?

"Captain Layton: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I replied, "No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean
to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it? or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect."...

"Mr. Sonnett: Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?

"Captain Layton: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

"Mr. Sonnett: He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?

[121] "Captain Layton: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

3 December 1941:

It will be recalled that on December 3rd dispatches were sent by CNO to CincPac and others advising that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London, had been ordered to destroy the "purple" machine and most of the codes and ciphers.

Layton testified that at the time Admiral Kimmel asked him what the "purple machine" was; that he did not know and made inquiry; that he advised Admiral Kimmel that it was a diplomatic machine; that he did not then know whether or not the Japanese consul at Hawaii had such a machine; and, that he subsequently learned that the Japanese consul there did not have such a machine.

The communication intelligence summary delivered on the 3rd, covering the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic was the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. It was stated that ComSIXTEEN had reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not recovered at ComFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances, Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was said that "Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units, has left Empire waters, but is either not close enough to Takao for good communications or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao." It was further stated, "The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this office from making definite statement as of this date of the units now in the southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area." Also it was pointed out generally that "There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo." As to the First Fleet, it was stated that despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that "from inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal combined fleet staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates one combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets, and apparently in company, while another combined fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated "No units have stood out prominently in the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet, it said there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the association of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.
Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel.

4 December 1941:

On 4 December 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21, Naval Court) to NavStaGuam for action, and to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, and ComSIXTEEN for information stating:

"Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN and OpNav X. Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain. X Report crypto channels retained."

ComSIXTEEN advised, in a dispatch received on December 4th, that seven transports had been sighted off Saigon on 15 November 1941, and on the 20th a seaplane carrier northeast of Amoy.

The Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised, in a dispatch received 4 December, that several large liners had been carrying supplies and personnel to the Carolines, that 3,000 laborers had landed at Jaluit and that certain islands were being specially developed.

The Naval Attache, Tokyo, advised in a dispatch received this day that a transport loaded with aircraft and another with naval personnel had left Yokahama on 27 November 1941.

The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated under the heading "General," that traffic volume was normal with receiving conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slowed up identification of even these units. Very few units had been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the Commands in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third Fleets. Tokyo intelligence originated nine [223] dispatches to the same addresses. It was stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, in Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It was also stated that there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands but their identity was not known. It was stated also that there was "no information on submarines or carriers." This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel.

5 December 1941:

There were no dispatches of an intelligence nature received by CincPac. The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated that in general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao radio instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there were two fleet broadcasts now in operation. So far only a few messages had been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intelligence originated messages to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force, and same. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated "The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addresses. It is now believed that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CincSecond Fleet is still copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the Commander in Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check could be made on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls and that Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South China, it was stated that Bako continued as an active originator addressing many mes-
sages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China commanders, all units in that area were quiet. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

6 December 1941:

Several dispatches dated 6 December 1941 were found in the CincPac files, but it does not appear whether or not they were received prior to the attack. One was an OpNav dispatch authorizing CincPac to direct the destruction of secret and confidential documents at our outlying islands “in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands.” (Exhibit 22, Naval Court). Other dispatches dated the 6th, from the Naval Observer at Wellington, advised of Japanese destruction of codes; from the Assistant Naval Attaché, Shanghai, advised of the departure south of Japanese troops and increase of Japanese gendarmerie force in Shanghai; and, from CincAF, advised of a [124] 25-ship convoy, a 10-ship convoy, and 3 ships, off Saigon, French Indo-China, all of which appeared to be headed in a westerly direction, also 30 ships and a cruiser were sighted in Camranh Bay.

The radio intelligence summary for 5 December, which was delivered on the 6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the attack. It stated in general that traffic volume was heavy. All circuits were overloaded with Tokyo broadcasts going over full 24 hours. Tokyo Mandates circuit in duplex operations. These were several new intercept schedules heard. It was noted that some traffic being broadcast was several days old which indicated the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits. A plain language message was sent by the captain of the OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau saying, “In reference to the Far Eastern crisis what you said is considered important to this end, but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon.”

As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were still frequently addressed but were receiving their traffic over broadcasts. It was stated that “They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either.”

There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic to that fleet. There was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet addressed at Jaluit, strengthening the impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. As to South China, there was much traffic addressed to the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, by Sama. Bako continued as an active originator with many dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with the movement of air corps, several of which were moving probably to Indo-China.

[125] Findings.

29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its representatives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in Washington, D. C., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained on the Government's actual views concerning the diplomatic situation, of the Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and of the fact that hostilities were impending and imminent.

30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at Washington by Naval and military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.

31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully informed on this subject.

32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at Washington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese might intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the transmission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have overtaxed the Navy's communications facilities; and, that it was the duty of the
Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise CincPac of the important facts learned.

33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.

34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during November (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.

35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships to or from other ports.

36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after the November 27th "war warning," which made further evident the termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.

37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department at 1 p.m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p.m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.

38. This so-called "1 p.m. delivery message," which consisted of one sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army until after 0900.

39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information several hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.

40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.

41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941; which was received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum at 1 p.m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might have but that the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities were to be informed.

42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive movement by the Japanese is expected [127] within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."

43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.
44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and other countries. These were known as the “winds” code and the “hidden word” code. The “winds” code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the use in weather broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.

45. The interception of a “winds” message relating to the United States during the first week of December, 1941, would not have conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.

46. No message in the “winds” code relating to the United States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the effect that a “winds” code message was received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op-20-G, a communications security section at the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he stated, recalled having seen and read the “winds” message. Each of those officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the effect that a “winds” message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op-20-G, who said that he recalled that there was a message but could not recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this [28] Investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a “hidden word” message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a “winds” message.

47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted “hidden word” code message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of delivering other messages, including the “1 p. m. delivery message,” he overlooked a code word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only that “relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations.” He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.

48. Except for the omission of the United States, the “hidden word” code message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect previous diplomatic intercepts which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.

49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months prior to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District Intelligence Officer feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval significance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.

51. On 6 December 1941 the local representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Honolulu named “Mori” and a person in Japan. This was examined by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be further studied by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to
listen to the recording of the conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, references were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words signifying the presence or absence of ships, and a method of conveying information to the approaching Japanese ships, which presumably would have been listening in on the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the “Mori conversation” was also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941. 

[129] 52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications company, were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was the first time that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of particular significance.

53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

54. One of the Japanese Consul General’s messages, which was obtained by the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the “PA-K2.” It was decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat, certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would convey information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op–20–G of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received the message from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.

55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation, the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.

56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu sent two messages in the “PA-K2” code which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm. These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.
57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

58. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence bulletin was distributed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command. This bulletin set forth the available information concerning the organization of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and pointed out that the principal change was a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each having two carriers.

60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such information also was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C.

61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included summaries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces which had been received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippines.

62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, Information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that the Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units of various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts might operate from Polo and the Marshalls.

63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in the Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch of ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two sections. The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. The second section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included "Car Div 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This dispatch also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates, and that their best indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. It was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.

64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not report the movement of carriers.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initiated these summaries daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he initiated the summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received prior to the attack.

66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other things, that there was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that “carriers were still located in home waters.” The next day, he received the November 28th summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon U.S. Naval communications and “IS GETTING RESULTS.” There was no information set forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, among other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral Kimmel received the previous day’s summary which stated as to carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed.

67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received stated that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that “The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale.” It also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was “no change.”

68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained Layton’s estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which included four carriers, and the “KASYU MARU” (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier “KORYU (?)” plus plane guards” in the Marshalls area.

69. Layton’s written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.

70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following conversation:

“Captain Layton. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, ‘What! You don’t know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?’ and I replied, ‘No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.’ Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, ‘Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn’t know it?’ or words to that effect. My reply was that, ‘I hope they would be sighted before now,’ or words to that effect.” * * *

[132] “Captain Layton: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, ‘Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?’ and I said, ‘I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven’t heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,’ and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, saw, ‘Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?’ or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.”

“Captain Layton. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn’t so indicated their location.”
71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:

"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."

72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

[134] Confidential

IV

RECONNAISSANCE

A. The Responsibility for Long Distance Reconnaissance.

1. The Navy's obligation. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Exhibit 80), which was in effect prior to the attack, the Navy was responsible for long distance reconnaissance.

Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan made provision for joint air action by the Army and Navy for defense against hostile raids or air attacks to a declaration of war. Under this agreement, if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the Army aircraft were to be used by the Navy. This plan was implemented by the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, under which Admiral Bellinger would command the Navy and Army patrol planes. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan were not operative prior to the attack. An agreement between the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite to the operation of Annex VII, Section VI. No such agreement was made prior to the attack.

2. Control of the Pacific Fleet patrol planes. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were actually under the control and operating in accordance with the orders of Admiral Kimmel. Thus, on November 22nd he approved the schedules for the employment of those planes, which remained in effect up to the time of the attack. His responsibility for the operations of the patrol planes, which were under the command of Commander, Task Force Nine, of the Pacific Fleet, is further indicated by the fact that he directed search operations by those planes at Midway and Wake.

Admiral Bellinger, who commanded Task Force Nine, which consisted of Patrol Wings One and Two of the Fleet, was under the command of ComFOURTEEN only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was activated for the purpose of drills.

The responsibility for the employment of the fleet patrol planes was, as Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court, his responsibility and was accepted by him. He testified further that Admiral Bloch had asked for the dispatch of patrol planes for a search if he had felt that it was necessary. In this connection it should be noted that on October 17, 1941, Admiral Bloch had asked for certain Fleet utility planes to be used for inshore patrol and that they were not made available to him (Exhibit 46, Naval Court). It should be noted that ComFOURTEEN had no planes assigned to him.

Admiral Bellinger testified that he was responsible for the operation of the Fleet planes in accordance with the orders of Admiral [135] Kimmel. He said, however, that it was not his responsibility to decide whether or not long range reconnaissance should be conducted. Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, who was the Fleet Air Officer on CinCPac's staff in 1941, testified before Admiral Hart that his duties were primarily, if not almost entirely, concerned with technical training and logistic matters.

3. Conferences after 27 November 1941 concerning reconnaissance. There is no evidence that on or after 27 November 1941 the necessity or advisability of long distance reconnaissance was specifically discussed between Admiral Kimmel and any member of his Staff or Task Force Commanders. Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer, testified that he thought the subject was discussed, but that he could recall no specific conference dealing with this subject. Admiral Bellinger
tested that there was no such conference in which he participated. Admiral Kimmel's testimony before the Naval Court was to the effect that on November 27th he decided not to conduct long range reconnaissance. It is significant that Captain Layton, who was the Fleet Intelligence Officer, stated that he did not tell Admiral Kimmel prior to December 7th that aerial reconnaissance from Oahu would be advisable in view of the available intelligence because he knew that reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet patrol planes. He said that he was not familiar with the extent of the reconnaissance, but definitely believed that reconnaissance was being conducted. Neither the Chief of Staff nor the Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer could recall any discussion of the advisability or necessity for long range reconnaissance from Oahu between November 27th and December 7th.

B. Reconnaissance Conducted from Oahu.

Although the schedules for the Fleet patrol planes (Exhibit 37) did not provide for any reconnaissance from Oahu, the Fleet Security Letter (Exhibit 8 NC) directed that there be a patrol of the Fleet operating areas. The Fleet operating areas were thirty miles to the south of Oahu.

During the period 30 November to 7 December 1941, certain searches were flown from Wake and Midway. The extent of these searches appears in Exhibit 50A of this investigation. One squadron had been sent to Midway on the 30th of November and searched en route; another squadron had been sent from Midway to Wake on the 1st of December and returned to Pearl Harbor prior to the attack, searching en route (Exhibit 50, 50A).

Prior to 7 December 1941 the last daily long distance reconnaissance flown from Oahu was in the summer of 1941. According to Admiral Bloch's previous testimony some time during the summer of 1941, on the basis of some intelligence or information which he could not recall, he asked Admiral Kimmel to direct reconnaissance on a section towards Jaluit and this was done for several days, Admiral Kimmel recalled that such reconnaissance had been flown for a few days on the line from Jaluit to Pearl Harbor and stated that they had in mind that they might catch a submarine on the surface out there and perhaps any other vessel there. Despite thorough examination of the available records of Patwing Two, of the CinCPac operation files, of the CinCPac secret dispatches for 1941 and confidential and restricted dispatches for June, July, and August, 1941, no record of this reconnaissance could be found. None of the witnesses examined recalled the reconnaissance or the reasons for it.


In the Army report it was stated that on November 26th the Army directed General Short to send two B-24's to Jaluit on a reconnaissance mission to look for various things, including ships. However, the Army report does not state whether this reconnaissance actually took place.

Before the Roberts' Committee, General Gerow said that reports had been received of Japanese concentrations in the Mandated Islands and they assumed that every effort was being made to identify any Japanese movements in that direction. He stated that those two B-24's were sent out with an idea of trying to confirm information that had been received from other sources. If no reconnaissance at all were done after the Army's message to General Short which directed such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary, General Gerow said that would have been considered a failure to obey orders.

The status of this reconnaissance has been quite definitely confirmed by Captain Layton's testimony in this investigation. In the latter part of November, 1941, Captain Layton stated, either Admiral Kimmel directed him to establish contact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance or else his opposite number, Colonel Raley, came to him with the information of the pending reconnaissance and requested his assistance towards delineating the appropriate objectives and to furnish the pilots and crews with intelligence material for briefing. He was also requested to assist in the projected reconnaissance. The reconnaissance unfortunately never materialized, he stated, because only one plane arrived and there were delays due to uncompleted camera installations. He was never informed that one plane had arrived, but later learned that it was destroyed in the attack on Hickam Field. The Navy was extremely anxious that the reconnaissance be made at the earliest possible date, and Admiral Kimmel,
upon receipt of Captain Layton's memorandum concerning information he had obtained at the conference, asked him how soon the reconnaissance might be expected. Captain Layton relayed Colonel Kiley's answer to the Admiral to the effect that the delay was due to non-installation or non-completion of installation of cameras and the time was still not definitely fixed. A photostatic copy of a memorandum of November 28th from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel concerning this reconnaissance appears in the record as Exhibit 28. Furthermore, Captain Layton was questioned as to his knowledge of any discussion concerning the possibility of the use of Navy planes for this reconnaissance. Captain Layton replied that it was not discussed with him, but he thought that PBY "Catalinas" could not be used because their appearance over the Marshalls would have been an overt act while the Army planes, on the other hand, would have been flying ostensibly from Wake to Port Darwin en route to the Philippines. Captain Layton was particularly anxious that this reconnaissance be carried out to check on his information as to the presence or absence of air strength and carriers and submarines and naval concentrations in the Marshalls area, including Truk. This was an ideal opportunity to establish the reliability of existing intelligence on Japanese naval dispositions and developments in the Mandated Islands.

Admiral Bellinger recalled nothing concerning the proposed Army reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands.

[137] D. The Direction to Execute an Appropriate Defensive Deployment.

Among the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet by the Basic Navy War Plan was to protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. It will be recalled that the Pacific Fleet War Plan, which was designed to implement the Navy Basic War Plans, provided, among other things, that in the event of war with the Axis Powers, including or excluding Japan, the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet were to conduct the maximum reconnaissance possible of the approaches to Oahu. The Pacific Fleet Plan was not ordered to be executed prior to the attack. On the 27th of November, however, in the war warning, which advised that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations had directed Admiral Kimmel to "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

On the following day, the Chief of Naval Operations, in his dispatch which repeated the Army dispatch advising that hostilities were possible at any moment, had directed that Admiral Kimmel was to "Be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court that as the result of the "war warning," he continued the security measures already in effect (supra, page 64); carried out the planned movements of carriers to Wake and Midway, with reconnaissance on route; carried out reconnaissance at Midway and Wake; increased security measures in fleet operating areas southward of Oahu; and, on November 28th, issued an order directing extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas and depth bombing of all contacts, suspected to be hostile, in certain of the operating areas (page 5, Exhibit 70). There is no evidence of any other specific action taken by Admiral Kimmel after 27 November 1941, in order to carry out the direction contained in the war warning or the direction in the message of November 28th. It does appear that so far as the Fleet patrol planes at Oahu were concerned, their training continued along the same lines which had been followed prior to the "war warning."

The testimony by Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer, and others in this investigation, is to the effect that the establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "Appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

It is interesting to note that the memoranda prepared by the War Plans Officer on November 30th and 5 December 1941, setting forth the action to be taken if war developed with Japan in twenty-four or forty-eight hours, contained no provision for the establishment of reconnaissance from Oahu (Exhibit 69A and 69B, Naval Court). As Vise Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff, testified, what they were thinking about in the Pacific was not the defense of Pearl Harbor. They were thinking about the Fleet and the readiness of the Fleet.
E. The Reconnaissance that Could Have Been Flown.

A review of past reconnaissance during Admiral Kimmel’s tour of duty sheds no light on this problem because he testified that he had never attempted to cover any large sector by long range reconnaissance and that a patrol out to 300 miles was almost useless unless as a guard against an air raid, although any patrol has some value as far as surface ships are concerned. However, his predecessor, Admiral Richardson, had established a distant patrol, “in view of the fact that constant and repeated warnings were received of the possible outbreak of the war in the immediate future” (p. 1053, Naval Court). This patrol, he said, was designated to cover a given sector adequately and was rotated daily. The sector which was primarily covered more adequately and frequently than any other was from 170° to the westward to about 350°. That to the eastward was not covered.

Admiral Richardson also testified that this patrol would not have been adequate to positively detect an approaching combat force having as its intention the delivery of an attack early in the morning, but that it certainly would have made the attack more difficult. These patrols were discontinued when or shortly before Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.

Admiral Bellinger’s testimony on the reconnaissance that could have been flown during the critical period is obviously the most valuable on the subject. He stated that after October 28th, while there were 107 VP assigned to all units of Aircraft Scouting Force, only eighty-one were available. Of these, fifty-four had just arrived and were the PBY-5 type, with limited available spare parts. The number of plane crews did not quite equal the number of planes available. If one could consider eighty-one planes available, and assuming that there would have been none lost because of breakdowns requiring spare parts, it would have been practicable to use one-third, about twenty-seven planes, for daily patrol. Each plane could cover a sector of eight degrees with a radius of 700 miles, totalling approximately 216 degrees daily. This, however, would have been the absolute maximum because of the lack of sufficient crews and spare parts. 144 degrees could have been covered daily based on the use of eighteen planes daily of the fifty-four new PBY-5’s. Actually, on 7 December 1941 there were in all only sixty-one planes available at Oahu, one squadron of which had just returned from Midway and Wake and required overhaul. This left forty-nine planes actually available, one-third of which would have been able to cover 128 degrees.

Admiral Bellinger testified that if he had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, to conduct 360 degrees reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, it would have been possible to maintain such reconnaissance for not more than four or five days. His estimate of the duration of the daily 128-degree search was that it could have been flown until the failure of planes and the lack of spare parts reduced the planes to such an extent that further reconnaissance was impossible. It appears that such reconnaissance could have been carried on for an indefinite period and Admiral Bellinger’s “yague” estimate was that it could have been carried on for several weeks.

Admiral Davis testified before Admiral Hart that: “There were not enough planes and pilots to establish and maintain a long range, 360 degree search indefinitely, or even for more than a limited time. There were, however, enough to approximate this by using relatively short range planes in the least dangerous sectors, and by obtaining some assistance by available Army aircraft, so that I think it could have been undertaken, had it been considered essential, on the basis that reenforcements could have arrived before personnel and matériel fatigue set in. Unless reenforcements arrived, it could not have been maintained.”

F. The Sectors Which Would Have Been Covered.

Had partial reconnaissance been flown from Oahu during the first week of December, 1941, it appears that the northern sectors would have been covered. Admiral Bellinger testified that he considered the northern sectors as the most dangerous sectors primarily because of the prevailing winds which would facilitate carrier-based plane operations in that sector. He stated that had the normal plan been carried out after the attack, on December 7th patrol planes would have searched the northern sector, and that some few planes did search that sector. But there had been searches made to the south because of information received from CincPac to the effect that a radio bearing indicated that the attacking force was to the south.
73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the only practicable way by which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, could have obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.

74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation, through Com 14, to conduct distance reconnaissance, and under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations. As previously pointed out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between the Commanding General and Com 14 that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite and no such agreement had been made prior to the attack. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements for joint Army-Navy air action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.

75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.

76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.

77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.

78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning", as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.

79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Planes, and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which was used as a basis for the Joint Army-Navy agreements, was prophetic in its estimate that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-measure included daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degrees, to reduce the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that such patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel and material available at the time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that such patrols were not practicable unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by the responsible officers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which was always open was to fly a patrol of less than 300 degrees, with the available aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.

80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu was being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisions of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas.

81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissance flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer of 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.

82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by providing intelligence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were not ready prior to the attack.

83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet patrol planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required for overhaul and repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.
84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Admiral Kimmel "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which, among other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Navy dispatch directed that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and November, 1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reinforcements after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but at the expense of defenses in other areas. The Navy Department presumably knew that the number of planes available at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the Navy Department thought that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.

89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.

90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.

91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.

[143]

THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

A. Prelude: Japanese Submarines on 7 December 1941.

At 0342, 7 December 1941, the USS CONDOR, a minesweeper, sighted a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. This was in a defensive sea area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged. When sighted, the submarine was proceeding toward the entrance Buoys. It was about 100 feet from and on a collision course with the CONDOR, but turned sharply to port. The CONDOR simultaneously turned to starboard. The CONDOR reported the incident by bilarker to the USS WARD between 0350 and 0358. The WARD was a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol then engaged in patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor. The CONDOR then continued on its assigned mission. The message to the WARD read:

"Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course, speed 9 knots."

After receiving this visual signal, the WARD made a sonar search for about an hour and a half, without result. It then communicated by radio with the CONDOR, asking:

"What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that you sighted?"

At 0520 the CONDOR replied:

"The course was about what we were steering at the time 020 magnetic and about 1000 yards from the entrance apparently heading for the entrance."

In response to further inquiries made by the WARD between 0521 and 0536, the CONDOR advised again that the last time it had sighted the submarine was at about 0350 and that it was apparently headed for the entrance. On receiving the message giving the submarine's course as about 020 magnetic, the
The captain of the WARD realized that his search had been in the wrong direction. He then continued searching, but again without result.

The CONDOR made no report of the incident, except to the WARD. The captain considered that the identification at that time was not positive enough to make a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat. The Senior Officer Present Afloat, Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge, who commanded the WARD, made no report to higher authority. The captain of the WARD thought that the CONDOR might have been mistaken in concluding that it had seen a submarine.

The radio conversation between the WARD and CONDOR was overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, a radio station then under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol, 14th N. D. (Ex. 18). Since the conversation was solely between the ships and was not addressed to the Section Base and no request was made that it be relayed, the Bishop's Point Radio Station did not relay or report it to higher authority. The loudspeaker watch on the same frequency, which was maintained in the Communications Office, 14th N. D., did not overhear or intercept the WARD-CONDOR conversation.

At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate-vessel charged with opening and closing the net at the entrance. This anti-torpedo net was, according to Admiral Bloch's previous testimony, 45 feet in depth. The deepest part of the channel was 72 feet. A Japanese submarine subsequently recovered was about 20 feet from keel to conning tower.

The instructions of the Captain of the Yard were that the net should be kept closed from sunset to sunrise and opened only on orders from him, from the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or from the Yard Duty Officer who could be reached via the signal tower (Exhibit 43). The log of the gate-vessel indicates that the net was opened and closed a number of times during the night of December 6-7. At 0458 on the 7th, the gate was opened and the CROSSBILL and the CONDOR stood in. It was not until 0846 that the gate was closed. The Commanding Officer of the CONDOR testified that at 0532, when the CONDOR came in, conditions of visibility were very good and were "approaching daylight conditions."

The log of the signal tower for December 6-7, 1941 records the closing of the gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by an entry at 0600 that the ANTARES was reported off the harbor (Exhibit 46).

The USS ANTARES, with a 500-ton steel barge in tow, arrived off Pearl Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it exchanged calls with the WARD. At 0630 the ANTARES sighted a suspicious object, which appeared to be a small submarine, about 1500 yards on its starboard quarter. The ANTARES notified the WARD and asked it to investigate, and several minutes later, at about 0633, observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two smoke pots near the object. (Exhibit 73)

The WARD complied and at 0640 sighted an unidentified submarine one point off its starboard bow, apparently following the ANTARES in to Pearl Harbor. General Quarters were sounded and all engines ordered full ahead, increasing the WARD's speed from five to twenty-five knots. At 0645 she opened fire with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun. The attack lasted only one or two minutes. The first shot, at a range of approximately 100 yards, passed directly over the conning tower; the second, from No. 3 gun, at fifty yards or less, hit the submarine at the waterline junction of the hull and conning tower. At about this time, the ANTARES, observing the fire of the WARD, also noted the Navy patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the submarine. The submarine heeled over to starboard and started to sink. The WARD ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. A large amount of oil appeared on the surface. The submarine went down in 1,200 feet of water. (Exhibit 74).

At 0651 the WARD sent a radio message to the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit 18):

"We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area."

The captain of the WARD, after reflecting that this message might not be interpreted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653 sent the following supplementary message:

"We have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area."
This message was received by the Bishop's Point radio station, relayed to the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Inshore Patrol, and delivered by the Communications Watch Officer, FOURTEENTH Naval District, to the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The Duty Officer notified the ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff at 0712 and, at the latter's direction, the Duty Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715.

The ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff informed Admiral Bloch. Because of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the WARD had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the WARD and the relief ready duty destroyer MONAGHAN, which was dispatched, could take care of the situation, while the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to whom they had referred the information, had the power to take any other action which might be desired.

The CinC Pac Staff Duty Officer was given the report at about 0720 by the Assistant Duty Officer. After several attempted phone calls to ascertain whether Admiral Bloch knew of the report, the Staff Duty Officer received a phone message at 0740 from the duty officer of PatWing 2 that a patrol plane had reported that a submarine had been sunk in the defensive sea area; simultaneously, another phone call from FOURTEENTH Naval District advised the CinC Pac Staff Duty Officer that Admiral Bloch had been informed of the sinking and had ordered the ready duty destroyer out to assist the WARD and the standby destroyer to get up steam. The Staff Duty Officer then phoned Admiral Kimmel and gave him both messages and the information as to the action taken by Admiral Bloch. About this time, Captain Ramsey, of PatWing 2, phoned again and the Staff Duty Officer suggested he make his search planes available in case the Admiral wanted them.

Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court that between 0730 and 0740 he received a report that a submarine had been attacked off Pearl Harbor. He said that he was waiting for an amplification of this report when the air attack commenced. He also stated that the officer who reported the sinking of the submarine should have broadcast in plain language, but that he had reported in code, which caused a delay. Admiral Kimmel also testified that after 27 November 1941, there had been about a half-dozen of such reports, and hence amplification of the report was necessary.

The evidence indicates that the reports by the WARD were in plain language but that a request for verification by the WARD was later sent in code by the ComFOURTEEN Communication Officer at the direction of the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The WARD’s reply to that request was also in code and was deciphered at about the time the air attack commenced.

A Japanese midget submarine entered Pearl Harbor and, after the air attack had commenced, fired both of its torpedoes, one of which exploded on the beach of Ford Island, passing between the RALEIGH and the CURTISS, and the other buried itself, it was believed, in the mud near the berth of the UTAH. This submarine was sunk by the CURTISS and recovered from the harbor some weeks after the attack. It had been so thoroughly destroyed that nothing of intelligence value could be obtained from it. Whether or not this was the submarine which had been sighted by the CONDOR could not be determined. No other submarine was detected in the harbor.

Another Japanese midget submarine was beached off Bellows Field, Oahu, and captured on the next day, along with its commanding officer. Various documents were recovered from this submarine including a chart of Pearl Harbor, on which was laid out a course into the harbor, around Pearl Harbor, and out of the harbor (Exhibits 32A, 33A). On this chart (Ex. 33A) were indicated the positions of various ships in the harbor. The charted positions differed substantially from the actual berthing arrangements on December 7th. This fact led the Army Pearl Harbor Board to conclude that the submarine had been in the harbor for reconnaissance prior to December 7th.

The conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board that the Japanese midget submarines "must have been in the harbor a few days before the attack and evidently were moving into and out of the harbor at will" (Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, page 155) is based wholly on the legends appearing on the Japanese maps (Exhibits 32, 32A, 33, 33A) captured in the midget submarine that was sunk off Bellows Field, and on the testimony of Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge at Honolulu on 7 December 1941, which, in turn, is likewise based solely on the legends appearing on the same maps (Rep. APHB, page 155). At the present time, Mr. Shivers is Collector of the Port at Honolulu, and is in a precarious physical condition due to a serious heart ailment. Mr. Shivers was inter-
viewed in Honolulu during the first week of June, 1945, and he stated, as also appears in the Army Pearl Harbor Board report (page 155), that his conclusion that Japanese submarines had been in Pearl Harbor prior to the attack was based on an examination of the maps in question, and that he had no other information to sustain his conclusion. Mr. Shivers likewise had no further information to supply in respect of the intelligence situation or the intelligence information that was available in Honolulu prior to 7 December 1941, except to say that he was mystified that the ONI tap of the telephone line of the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu was lifted on 2 December 1941, pursuant to an order issued by Captain (now Rear Admiral) Mayfield, the DIO. Since Mr. Shivers' statements were no different from those given by him in his testimony of record before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and since the basis of his, and the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, are shown to be erroneous by a careful study of the legends on the maps in question, on which those conclusions were based, and since his health was so precarious, it was deemed not necessary to call him as a witness.

[147] For the following reasons, it appears that the Japanese midget submarine from which was obtained the chart of Pearl Harbor was not in the harbor on that day, and probably had not been there on any prior occasion:

(a) The following facts lead to the conclusion that the recovered chart was an attack plan rather than an actual track and log of events:

1. The characters marking certain points on the chart (Exhibit 33 and 33A) were in Chinese ideographs which give no indication of tense. For instance, the notation which has been variously translated as "Enemy ship sunk" and "Attack and sink enemy ships" could have been the future meaning. Similarly the notation translated as "Fixed position," could mean "Position to be fixed," a natural course of action before entering the channel.

2. The times marked on the chart were unquestionably Tokyo time (—9). This is confirmed by the computation, on the back of the chart, of the time of dawn and sunrise at Pearl Harbor on December 8 (Tokyo time).

3. Based on (2), times along the track were all in daylight, commencing at the channel entrance at dawn.

4. The northwesterly portion of the track, to the northward of Ford Island, passed through an area which was, and had been, occupied by a number of ships moored to buoys, and could not have been followed by a submarine.

5. The courses and notations were much more neat and meticulous than any that could have been made during the passage of narrow and crowded waters by the navigator of a two-man submarine.

6. The major Japanese operation plan for the Pearl Harbor attack, as reconstructed by a captured Japanese yeoman, and confirmed generally by captured documents, provided that the midget submarines were to enter the harbor and after the initiation of the air attack were to attack with torpedoes. The times on the chart were in conformity with this, since, converted into Honolulu time, there was a waiting period inside the harbor entrance from 0545 to 0840 and the turning point south of Ford Island was timed 0900.

(b) The submarine had its full allowance of two torpedoes when recovered.

(c) The submarine commander, on interrogation, stated that he had failed in his mission (Exhibit 68).

(d) The information on the chart was of a nature that could more readily be obtained by civilian observers from the area surrounding Pearl Harbor than by dangerous submarine reconnaissance. As has appeared earlier, the Japanese Consul General had been communicating just such intelligence to Tokyo.

(e) Notations on the chart indicate that the submarine commander received intelligence reports as late as December 5th.

[148] Intelligence information recently received indicates that the midget submarines were carried by and launched from mother submarines (Exhibit 69). They were carried on the main deck abaft the conning tower and secured to the pressure hull by means of heavy clamps. The midgets used in the Pearl Harbor attack were 41 feet in length, had a reported cruising range of 175 to 180 miles at their most economical speed of 4 to 6 knots, did not have a radio transmitter, and carried a crew of two men. They were armed with two torpedoes and apparently carried the same designation number as their mother subs. The exact number with the Japanese task force is not definitely known, but there is substantial proof that there were at least five.

The midget submarine beached off Bellows Field from which the chart was recovered bore the designation of "I-18," apparently that of its "mother." In the recovered chart, at various points along the sides of the entrance channel
from Hammer Point to Hospital Point, are notations in faint pencil. "I-16," "I-20," "I-22," "I-18," "I-24." From information received, it is now known that these are the designations of the submarines which carried the five midgets known to have been present. The times on the recovered chart indicate a waiting period in the narrow harbor entrance area from 0115 to 0410 (0445 to 0840, Hawaiian time). It therefore appears to be a logical assumption that the five midget submarines were to lie in wait in the narrow entrance channel, approximately in the positions indicated, with the object of torpedoing ships attempting to sortie, thus blocking the channel; and that after the initial air attack had been completed, they were to proceed around Ford Island and complete the destruction. The midget submarine which was sunk west of Ford Island apparently followed just such a plan. Confirmation of this assumption is found in a captured copy of the Japanese Plan for this operation, wherein the following initial task is assigned to the Sixth Fleet (Submarine Force): "Will observe and attack American Fleet in HAWAII area. Will make a surprise attack on the channel leading into PEARL HARBOR and attempt to close it. If the enemy moves out to fight he will be pursued and attack."

B. Suspicious Submarine Contacts Prior to 7 December 1941.

It was suspected in Washington for some time prior to December 7th that our Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was being kept under observation by Japanese submarines, there having been, over a period of six months, reports by our destroyers of such contacts. The Fleet also received reports that Japanese submarines were reconnoitering the approaches to Pearl Harbor. The number of such reports at Pearl Harbor prior to the attack was placed by one witness at from ten to fifteen, several of which occurred in the immediate vicinity of the entrance to Pearl Harbor. The contacts were on underwater sound contacts, which were not confirmed by sightings.

A search of the files of CincPac has resulted in locating dispatches that refer to three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding Pearl Harbor:

(1) On 3 November 1941, an oil slick area in latitude 20–10, longitude 157–41 was observed by a patrol plane, and crossed by Task Force One; an air search of a fifteen mile area by the patrol plane, a sound search of an unspecified area by the USS WORDEN and an investigation by [149] the USS DALE produced negative results (Exhibit 48; dispatches 031920, 032035, 032133, 032330, 040042).

(2) On 28 November 1941, after the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had issued an order requiring extreme vigilance against possible hostile submarines, restricting submerged submarine operations to certain areas, and providing that all submarine contacts in other areas suspected to be hostile were to be depth-bombed, the USS HELENA reported that a radar operator, without knowledge of the CincPac alert, was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area (Exhibit 48; dispatch 280837). A search by a task group with three destroyers, of the western border and the northern half of that area, pursued from 281050 to 281845, when abandoned by 290000, produced no contacts (Exhibit 48; dispatches 281050, 281133, 281704, 281845).

(3) During the night of 2 December 1941, the USS GAMBLE reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20–30, longitude 158–23, which was lost in a change of range, that was evaluated to have been too rapid to indicate the presence of a submarine (Exhibit 48; dispatch 022336). An investigation, ordered to be made by Desron 4 (Exhibit 48; dispatch 030040), apparently was negative.

C. Detection of Aircraft by the Army Radar System.

It appears from the prior investigations that about 0702 on the morning of 7 December 1941, two Army privates on duty at a mobile radar unit on the northern part of Oahu discovered an unusually large response on the radar in a northerly direction and from about 136 miles. This information they reported, at about 0715, to an Army officer on duty at the Army Information Center. The Army officer stated that he had some information to the effect that a flight of Army B-17's was due in that morning, and he thought that the planes detected by the radar were those Army planes. He did not suspect enemy planes and made no effort to report to his superior.

The evidence indicates that neither this information nor any other information as to the direction from which the planes approached or on which they departed was transmitted to the Naval authorities on the day of the attack.
D. The Air Attack.

The Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor, according to most observers, started at 0755. It began with dive bombing and strafing of the Naval Air Station at Ford Island, and at the Army's Hickam Field. This was followed at Pearl Harbor by attacks on major units of the Fleet, launched by torpedo planes and dive bombers, and was accompanied by strafing: Next there occurred two distinct horizontal bombing attacks from high altitudes, the last immediately preceding a final intensive dive bombing attack. Almost simultaneously with the raid on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attacked [160] the Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station and Ewa Field at Barber's Point was strafed. Approximately 150 planes took part in the attack on Pearl Harbor. The raid is reported variously to have ended at from 0940 to 1130 and some Japanese planes are known to have been over Oahu after 1200.

The CinC Pac Staff Duty Officer learned of the inception of the air raid during his second telephone conversation of the morning with Admiral Kimmel, when he was advising of a report by the WARD, after its submarine reports, that it had detained a sampan. He immediately told the Admiral of his receipt from the signal tower of this message:

"Japanese are attacking Pearl Harbor X This is no drill."

E. Location of Pacific Fleet Units.

At the time of the attack, the forces of the Pacific Fleet were, according to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 73), disposed partly in port and partly at sea as follows:

(1) In Pearl Harbor:
   (a) Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one battleship, one light cruiser and one destroyer) comprising five battleships, four light cruisers, seventeen destroyers, two light cruisers, and four mine layers.
   (b) Task Force Two (under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey, who was at sea with units thereof constituting a separate task force—Task Force Eight) comprising three battleships, eight destroyers, one light cruiser, and four mine layers.
   (c) Task Force Three (less detached units under command of Vice Admiral Brown at sea, and less a separate task force—Task Force Twelve—which was at sea under Rear Admiral Newton's command) comprising two heavy cruisers, and four mine layers which were under overhaul.
   (d) Five submarines and the submarine tender PELIAS of Task Force Seven.
   (e) The TANGIER, HULBERT, CURTIS, and THORNTON, and Patrol Squadrons VJ-11, 12, 14, 22, 23, and 24 (a total of about sixty planes) of Task Force Nine.
   (f) Marine Air Squadrons VMSB 232 and VMJ 252 (a total of twenty planes) at Ewa, Oahu.
   (g) Two destroyer tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, and planes of Base Force Aircraft Squadrons VJ-1, VJ-2, and VJ-3, as follows: 19 J2F, 9 JRS, 2 PBY-1, 1 J2V.

(2) At Sea:
   (a) Task Force Eight (Vice Admiral Halsey commanding) consisting of one aircraft carrier (ENTERPRISE), three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers, located 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward, was returning to Pearl Harbor after landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake Island.
   (b) Task Force Three (Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less units in port, consisting of one heavy cruiser and one mine laying squadron, less two of its divisions, was exercising with landing boats at Johnston Island.
   [152] (c) Task Force Twelve (Rear Admiral Newton commanding), ordinarily a component of Task Force Three, consisting of one aircraft carrier (LEXINGTON), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, located about 425 miles southeast of Midway, was proceeding on a westerly course to land a Marine Air Squadron on Midway Island.
   (d) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of Task Force Three, were engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest of Oahu.
   (e) Four submarines of Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en route to Pearl Harbor.

(3) At other places:
   (a) At Midway Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and Patrol Squadron VP-21 (consisting of twelve planes) of Task Force Twelve.
   (b) At Wake Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Air Squadron.
(c) At Johnston Island (in addition to Task Force Three, undergoing exercise), two Base Force PBY-1 planes.
(d) At Mare Island, five submarines of Task Force Seven.
(e) At San Diego, four submarines of Task Force Seven.
To sum up: At Pearl Harbor, there were eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, one old cruiser mine layer, eight destroyers, five submarines, twelve mine layers, two destroyer tenders, one submarine tender, four aircraft tenders, various auxiliary and repair ships, and 111 aircraft of various types, of which nine were under overhaul. At sea, there were two aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four submarines, and one mine layer squadron less one division. At other places, there were thirteen submarines, fourteen Navy Patrol planes and one Marine Air Squadron.
Except as to Task Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special missions to reinforce Wake and Midway Islands, the dispositions of Pacific Fleet Units as noted above were in accordance with a previously worked out fleet employment schedule.

[153] F. Condition of Readiness.

(1) The ships in port:
The testimony in previous investigations showed some confusion as to the condition of readiness which was in effect on ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. It appears, however, that whether or not Condition III, as prescribed in the Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the Fleet, was in effect, the condition aboard the battleships was in excess of that condition. Each of the battleships had two 5-inch anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned. While the Fleet letter on security fixed responsibility on the senior officer present in each air defense sector for fire control in his sector, no particular damage control organization was prescribed in that letter or functioning on the ships in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that the anti-aircraft batteries of the ships were quickly manned and, considering the circumstances, were effectively used against the Japanese attackers.

(2) The aircraft of the Pacific Fleet:
The condition of readiness in force as to the Fleet aircraft was Baker 5 (50 per cent of the assigned aircraft to be ready on four hours notice) with machine guns and ammunition in all planes not undergoing maintenance work. Three squadrons (one at Midway, one at Pearl Harbor, and one at Kaneohe) were in condition Afirm 5 (100 per cent assigned aircraft to be ready on four hours notice). This was augmented on December 7th by specific duty assignments which required six planes from Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN and from Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR (at Kaneohe) and from Patrol Squadron TWELVE (at Pearl Harbor) to be ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. On the morning of December 7th, three patrol planes of a squadron based at Kaneohe were in the air on morning security patrol armed with depth charges; three were ready for flight on 30 minutes notice, and four on four hours notice; and four planes of a squadron at Pearl Harbor were in the air conducting tactics with submarines and one plane was ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.

G. Reaction to the Attack:
The hostile character of the attacking planes was not recognized until the bombs fell, but there followed an immediate and general realization of that fact, and a prompt application of such defensive measures as were then capable of being carried out. General Quarters was sounded in all units ashore and afloat and, as has been pointed out above, anti-aircraft batteries were manned and, considering the damaged condition of the ships, employed to the fullest possible effect. There was, however, an unfortunate lapse of time before damage control measures on the ships in Pearl Harbor could be carried forward, resulting in the suffering of much damage that might otherwise have been prevented or minimized. The damages so quickly suffered included a partial breakdown of the communication system, preventing an accurate interchange of necessary information, including radio direction bearings of the attacking force. The futility of the attempted countermeasures in locating and attacking the Japanese striking force was due, in [154] large part, to a flood of wild and con-
ficting reports as to the location and strength, and probable intentions, of units of the Japanese force.

The evidence obtained in the previous investigation demonstrates clearly that the officers and men of the Pacific Fleet met the attack, individually and jointly, with great heroism.


The chief source of information concerning the Japanese force which attacked Pearl Harbor is a Japanese prisoner of war who was captured on Saipan during the Marianas Campaign. The POW was a chief yeoman in the Japanese Navy, attached to the staff of the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto. The reconstruction by the POW of the events preceding and leading up to Pearl Harbor has been substantiated and verified by other information, including that contained in a copy of Japanese Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1, recovered from the Japanese cruiser NACHI that was sunk in Manila Bay. The prisoner's reconstruction of the orders to the striking force is contained in Exhibit 3.

The movements of the striking force were provided for in the Japanese Secret Operation Order No. 1, dated 1 November 1941, which stated that war would be declared on the United States on X-Day, expected to be in the early or middle part of December, and that on or about X-16 Day the carrier task force would depart its base and proceed by way of Tankan Bay (Hotokappu Bay), Etorofu Island and the Kuriles for Pearl Harbor, where it would deliver a surprise attack. Japanese Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 3, dated 10 November 1941, fixed as X-Day 8 December 1941, E. L. T. (Exhibit 3).

The Japanese striking force actually left Suiki Anchorage near the Bongo Channel some time between November 20 and November 22, 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island. At the latter place it assembled and fueled, and departed on or about 28 November 1941, E. L. T., and headed eastward under heavy front. The force proceeded in an easterly direction heading on course about 085°, to a point in longitude about 170° W.; then turned southeast on course about 135 degrees, and proceeded to a point northwest to due north of, and approximately 200 miles from, the Island of Oahu, where it arrived early in the morning of 8 December 1941, E. L. T. From that position the Pearl Harbor attack was launched. Following the attack, the striking force retired initially to the northwest, on a heading of about 300°, to a point about longitude 170° E., thence to the southwest, irregularly on varying headings to a point near 140° E., and thence northwest to Kyushu (Exhibit 3, page 16).

The striking force consisted of three of Japan's five carrier divisions, the KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1); HIRYU and SORYU (CarDiv 2); SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU (sometimes referred to as CarDiv 3, sometimes as CarDiv 4 and sometimes as CarDiv 5); the HIYEL and KIRISHIMA (two of the battleships of BatDiv 3); the TONE and CHIKUMA (CarDiv 8), and of various destroyers and submarines.

Cooperating with the foregoing striking force was a large part of the Japanese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet. That fleet left the Japanese Inland Sea about 18 November 1941, E. L. T. At the time of the attack, many Japanese submarines were concentrated at the mouth of Pearl Harbor for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on any United States ships that attempted to escape from the air attack in the harbor. As previously pointed out, the evidence indicates that only one midget submarine succeeded in entering the harbor.

[156] I. The Casualties and Damage.

The facts as to the casualties and damage appear fully in the record of the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry:

(1) An examination of reports in the Bureau of Personnel showed that there were 3,963 casualties as a result of the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack, of which 896 were wounded and 3,067 were either killed, dead of wounds, or are missing and declared dead.

(2) The damage to fleet units in Pearl Harbor was extensive. The Battleships ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OKLAHOMA, and WEST VIRGINIA were sunk and the NEVADA beached to prevent its sinking. The auxiliary vessels UTAH and OGLALA were also sunk. All other battleships in the harbor, PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND, and TENNESSEE, the Cruisers HELENA, HONOLULU, and RALEIGH, the destroyers SHAW, CASSIN, and DOWNES, and the auxiliaries CURTIS and VESTAL, were seriously damaged.
(3) The damage to airplanes was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No. present Dec. 7</th>
<th>No. on hand after raid</th>
<th>No. usable after raid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scout bombers</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo bombers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleship and cruiser planes</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility and transport planes</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by ComFourteen, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.

93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the air attack.

94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.

95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army commanders.

96. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFourteen had no previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and damage.

97. The battleships each had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charges and 4 engaged in tactics with submarines); ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forty-four on four hours notice.

98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were all in port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.

99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Tunkan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.

100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions, among which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.

101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.

VI.

A. FINDINGS

1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or excluding Japan.

2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and raids
on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, including the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.

3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases, at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory of the Associated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the establishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding against surprise attack by Japan.

4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, which it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hostilities opened with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack.

6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of substantially peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans. The method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until and unless unity of command were invoked.

7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army’s task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the naval forces. The Navy’s task was to patrol the coastal zone (which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu), and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support the Army forces.

8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for distant reconnaissance.

9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.

10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.

11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided, among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations.

12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan also provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its aircraft warning service, and that prior to the completion of that service, the Navy, through the use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as might be practicable.

13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take steps to make available to the other the air forces at his disposal, in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the plan.

14. The Commanding General and ComFORT5EN did not effect any agreement prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI, in operation.

15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided, among other things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of the assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there might be a surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a combination of both forms of attack was possible.

16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which would
probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.

17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex "Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provision for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The plan was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by Joint Commanding Officer, for Navy units.

18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that a single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, including provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.

20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of 7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of threatening naval forces": that initial action would include "possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other outlying United States positions"; and that the initial Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and that submarines in the Hawaiian area. ** **" (Italics supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.

23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility. Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a serious probability.

24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial. However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operating setup which could insure the constant and timely exchange of information, decisions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the establishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.

25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the FOURTFENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for out-
lying islands was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in connection with a proposal for reinforcement of Wake and Midway by Army planes. General Short’s position was that if Army forces were involved, the command must be his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases must remain with the Navy. The islands were reinforced with Marine planes.

26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the frequent transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations.

27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indicated the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C., prior to the attack; that others which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were, with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be decrypted there before December 7th; and, that three messages intercepted by Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department for decryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had been able to obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage reports sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.

29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its representatives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in Washington, D. C., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained of the Japanese Government’s actual views concerning the diplomatic situation, of the Japanese Government’s intention to wage war, and of the fact that hostilities were impending and imminent.

30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.

31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully informed on this subject.

32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at Washington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese might intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy’s success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the transmission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have overtaken the Navy’s communications facilities; and, that it was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise CincPac of the important facts learned.

33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.

34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during November (particularly the “war warning” of the 27th) and early December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceased that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.

35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships to or from other ports.

36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after the Novem-
ber 27th "war warning," which made further evident the termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.

37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department at 1 p. m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.

38. This so-called "1 p. m. delivery message," which consisted of one sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army until after 0900.

39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information several hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.

40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.

41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might have but that the addresses were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities were to be informed.

42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive movement by the Japanese is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."

43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.

44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and other countries. These were known as the "winds" code and the "hidden word" code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the use in weather broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.

45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during the first week of December 1941, would not have conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.

46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was
intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op20-G, a communications security section at the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December 3d or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op-20-G, who said that he recalled that there was a message but that he could not recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message.

47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of delivering other messages, including the "1 p.m. delivery message," he overlooked a code word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes before 1 p.m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.

48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.

49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. [166] 50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months prior to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District Intelligence Officer feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval significance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.

51. On 6 December 1941 the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be further studied by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to listen to the recording of the conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, references were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words signifying the presence or absence of ships, and a method of conveying information to the approaching Japanese ships, which presumably would have been listening in on the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.

52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications company, were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was the first time that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of particular significance.
53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the "PA-K2." It was decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat, certain warehouses to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires at night. It conveyed information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op-20-G of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received the message from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the [167] attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.

55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation, the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by the Army indicates that the message was translated on 8 December 1941.

56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA-K2" code which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm. These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.

57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

58. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin was distributed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command. [168] This
bulletin set forth the available information concerning the composition of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and pointed out that the principal change was a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each having two carriers.

60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such information also was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C.

61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included summaries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces which had been received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines.

62. On November 26th, ConFORTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, information to CinC Pac, CinCAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that the Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units of various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts might operate from Palao and the Marshalls.

63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in the Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CinC Pac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch of ConFORTEEN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two sections. The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. The second section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included “CarDiv 3, RYUJO, and one MARU.” This dispatch also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates, and that their best indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. It was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.

64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not report the movement of carriers.

[169] 65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initialled these summaries daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he initialled the summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received prior to the attack.

66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other things, that there was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that “carriers were still located in home waters.” The next day, he received the November 28th summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval communications and “IS GETTING RESULTS.” There was no information set forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, among other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral
Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed.

67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received, stated that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale." It also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yososuka-Chichi-jima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."

68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which included four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU" (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "KORYU (?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.

69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.

70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following conversation:

[170] "CAPTAIN LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." * * *

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kuro area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location." * * *

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:

"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 2'o service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."

72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the only practicable way by which the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, could have obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.

[171] 74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation, through ComFOURTEEN, to conduct distant reconnaissance, and under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces
were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations. As previously pointed out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite and no such agreement had been made prior to the attack. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements for joint Army-Navy air action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.

75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.

76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.

77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.

78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.

79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Planes, and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which was used as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agreements, was prophetic in its estimate that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-measure included daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degrees, to reduce the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that such patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel and matériel available at the time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that such patrols were not practicable unless other intelligence indicated that surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by the responsible officers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which was always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the available aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.

80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu was being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisions of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas.

81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissance flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer of 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.

82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by providing intelligence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were not made ready prior to the attack.

83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet patrol planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required for overhaul and repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.

84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that Admiral Kimmel "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WP-46."

85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which, among other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Navy dispatch di-
rected that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and November, 1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reinforcements after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but at the expense of defenses in other areas. The Navy Department presumably knew that the number of planes available at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360° reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the Navy Department though that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.

89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128° to a distance of about 700 miles.

90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.

91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.

92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by ComFOURTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.

93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the air attack.

94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.

95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army commanders.

96. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and damage.

97. The battleships each had two 5" antiaircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charges and 4 engaged in tactics with submarines); ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forty-four on four hours notice.

98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were all in port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.

99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and
fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.

100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions among which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.

101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.

[175]

B. Conclusions.

1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.

2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.

3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange.

4. Current and detailed information which was obtained by the Japanese as to the location and movements of American naval forces and as to the preparations being made for defense against an attack on Pearl Harbor contributed to the success of their attack.

5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations, and its intention to wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages.

6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States.

[176] 8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.

9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the "1 p.m." message and its possible import, were unfortunate.
10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.

11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral W. D. (later Admiral) Bullinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages.

12. Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.

13. Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work.

14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.

[177] 15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft.

16. The principal basis for estimates of the location of Japanese naval forces was the intelligence obtained by the Navy from traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications.

17. A carrier attack could not, with certainty, have been prevented, for the following reasons:

(a) Certain prevention of such an attack requires interception and destruction of the carriers before attack planes can be launched.

(b) The forces necessary to insure such interception and destruction, anywhere in the vast area which would have had to be covered, were not available, and could not have been expected to be available.

(c) If the Japanese task force had been detected at nightfall, the probability of its successful interception and destruction prior to the following dawn would have been small.

18. Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as one half hour, would have served considerably to reduce the effectiveness of the attack, for the following reasons:

(a) Ships' antiaircraft batteries would have been fully manned and ready. It is to be noted that the antiaircraft fire was more effective against the subsequent attacks than the initial air attack.

(b) Enemy character of the approaching planes would have been immediately appreciated and they would have been engaged at once.

(c) The maximum condition of damage control readiness would have been set, thus facilitating the isolation of damage received.

(d) Many planes could have been in the air, in readiness.

(e) Ground dispersal of planes could have been improved.

19. The only adequate means of assuring detection of an approaching carrier attack was by 360° distant air search from Oahu. Sufficient planes were not available to carry out an all-round distant air reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

[178] 20. A thorough appreciation of the danger, the capabilities of the available planes, and the importance of the defense of Pearl Harbor might have justified the allotment by the Chief of Naval Operations of additional patrol planes
to the Pacific Fleet. Although the additional planes, if assigned, would not have been sufficient for a 360° daily search, they would have increased the area which could have been effectively covered and might have acted as an inducement to such employment. Admittedly, in making over-all plane assignments, it was necessary for the Chief of Naval Operations to weigh the prospective needs of the Pacific and the Atlantic, where hostilities with Axis submarines were already in progress.

21. Partial air reconnaissance, covering a sector of some 120 degrees, could have been maintained daily from Oahu for a considerable period of time with the Fleet patrol planes controlled by Admiral Kimmel and could have been designed to cover the most probable approach bearings from which an attack might have been expected. Such reconnaissance would have had a reasonable chance of success.

22. Neither the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor the key members of the latter's staff, seem to have given serious consideration after 27 November 1941 to the possibility or probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor or of its possible effect.

23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaya. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:

(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.
(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
(d) Installation of antitorpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.

24. Admiral Kimmel's estimate as to the probability of submarine attack in the Hawaiian area was justified by subsequent events.

25. Throughout his incumbency as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war. In considering the action which he could have taken, it should be noted that:

(a) Establishment of the maximum plane reconnaissance would have meant the stoppage of aircraft training which was of great importance to the naval expansion program, and might have resulted in wear and tear on planes and crews which would have reduced their later effectiveness.
(b) Higher conditions of readiness would have interfered with the rest and relaxation residable in port for the maintenance of personnel efficiency.
(c) Failure to install antitorpedo nets was influenced (i) by information from CNO which made it appear that effective drops of aircraft torpedoes with the depths of water and length of run available in Pearl Harbor were not probable; (ii) the interference such nets would have caused in harbor operations due to crowded conditions.
(d) The presence of two carrier task forces at sea at the time on necessary ferry trips did, in a way, provide striking forces and some reconnaissance.

(e) In view of the submarine menace and the concentration of antiaircraft batteries, it was questionable whether ships were safer in port or at sea. 26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyers. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced. 27. More effective action would have been taken both before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor had there been in existence in the Hawaiian area a suitable operating agency for the adequate exercise of joint command functions. This omission was the fault of no one person, but of the existing system.

28. War experience has shown that:

(a) The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be "unity of command."

(b) In planning and executing joint operations, responsible commanders of the different services, who are to act jointly, and the principal members of their staffs, must be in close physical touch, and not entirely dependent on telephonic, radio, or similar communications. In no other way can a full exchange of information and ideas be assured nor the possibility of misunderstanding be prevented.

(c) Command organizations which are to function effectively in an emergency must be in active operation prior to such emergency.

29. Based on the foregoing, military command of outlying stations, such as Hawaii, should, even in peacetime, be established under the principle of "Unity of Command." The commander exercising such joint command should be assisted by a joint staff, capable of advising him in the functions of both services concerned.

H. K. Hewitt.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY'S 3RD ENDORSEMENT (ON NAVAL COURT OF INQUIRY)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
WASHINGTON, 1 December 1944.

Third Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.

1. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General, and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I find that the evidence obtained to date indicates that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. I am not satisfied, however, that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence.

2. Further investigation into this matter will be conducted by an investigating officer, and, in addition to the subjects recommended for further investigation by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet in the Second Endorsement, will include the taking of the testimony of Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum, and such other investigation as may appear to be necessary in order to ascertain all of the relevant facts relating to the Japanese attack. Pending the completion of the necessary further investigation into this matter, I withhold decision as to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.

FORESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.
Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet 2nd Endorsement (On Naval Court of Inquiry)

Cominch File

[1] United States Fleet

Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

Navy Department,
Washington 25, D. C., 6 November, 1944.

Serial: 003224

Top Secret

Second Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.

From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.

1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advocate General in the First Endorsement and to the following remarks.

2. (a) As to Facts I and II (page 1156), the routine practice of rotating units of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two-thirds of its time at sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I discuss later on.

(b) In Fact III (page 1158) the Court points out that, because of constitutional requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap.

[2] (c) Fact IV (page 1159) sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures concerned with local defense.

(d) Fact V (page 1160) sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends; that they met frequently; that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect; that they frequently conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by either which had any bearing on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not cooperate with one another.

(e) Part VI (page 1160) sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance
of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of unpreparedness for war.

[3] (f) Fact VII (page 1165) sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions. My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage during the period of strained relations.

(g) Fact VIII (page 1167) stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base are necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment is that this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried to an illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principle, this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor should have been strong enough for self-defense. The [4] fact that it was not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for employing the Fleet in defensive measures.

(h) Fact IX (page 1169). This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that the basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that the naval participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer (because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces.

[5] (i) Facts X and XI (page 1171) set forth the states of readiness of the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive antisubmarine precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance, and the maintenance of "aug-
mented Condition 3' on board vessels in port. "Condition of readiness No. 3" provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and antiaircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in "Alert No. 1" which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect to this phase of the matter I offer the comment that "condition of readiness No. 3" is normally maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water, were not in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises; 50 percent were on 4 hours notice (page 669). This is further indication of the lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of large numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Findings, also, points out that there were no long range reconnaissance in effect on 7 December, a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI (page 1176) reads:

"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defense."

This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for reasons set forth later on.

(j) Fact XII (page 1176). The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established fact that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December 1941. The Court deduces, and states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.

[7] (k) Fact XIII (page 1178) discusses the difficulty of long range reconnaissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, therefore, unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the information that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance
by patrol planes, using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the arc between 170° and 350° to be of primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson (pages 683, 1053, 1055).

(1) Fact XIV (page 1182). This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing radar and other elements of the air warning system, but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition to function. The system was partially in use for training, and it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes when they were about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor—both Army and Navy. If there had been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the air attack struck.

(uu) Fact XV (page 1186) states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against break through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no antitorpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy Department (page 1187). Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated.

(uu) Fact XVI (page 1188). In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more important items are as follows:

[9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.

(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs would attack the United States.

(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and that indications were that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.

(o) Fact XVII (page 1183). In this section the Court sets forth certain information, which was known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel, which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is as follows:

(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days; [10] that there were indications of an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.

(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated; that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any time; and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.
(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information Addressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing him to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.

(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.

(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.

(p) Fact XVIII (1196). This section of the Findings deals with information that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November. It is set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming to an end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Department are set forth as follows:
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.

(1) A number of messages in Japanese codes received during and prior to this period were decoded in the Navy Department but were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. These messages are summarized in the Addendum to the Court's Finding of Facts at the back of Volume 5 of the record. The text of the messages is set forth at length in Volume 5, beginning at page 692. These messages indicate definite Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor, and mention, in some cases, a desire to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel these despatches, because to do so might jeopardize the secrecy which it was necessary to maintain as to the ability of the Navy Department to break the Japanese codes. This contention has some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the source of this information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information contained in these messages. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the despatches he did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions," the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate summary of the information at his disposal. I have to concur in this view.

(2) In addition to the foregoing the Court goes at length into the handling of the "14 part message", originated in Tokyo and addressed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The first 13 parts were received in the Navy Department on 6 December at 2100, on that date. They set forth the Japanese views as to certain United States proposals for resolving matters under dispute between the
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Countries, and leave no doubt that the United States proposals were unacceptable to Japan, but do not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At or about 0700, 7 December, the 14th part of the message was decoded. This part of the message said that the Japanese Government had finally lost hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. This part of the message was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 to the White House, and at 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Secretary Knox was conferring with Mr. Hull at the State Department.

At about 2030 on 7 December, the so-called "1:00 p.m. message" was decoded in the Navy Department. It directed the Japanese Ambassador to deliver the 14th part message to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. on that day. This message was of significance because 1:00 p.m. in Washington was dawn at Honolulu. This message was delivered at once to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and immediately thereafter to the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull the significance of the "1:00 p.m. time of delivery". In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (0500 Honolulu time) the Navy Department, or at least, some officers therein, appreciated that the information just received pointed to the possibility — even to the probability — of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states that this message came to his attention about 11:00 a.m., and that he immediately telephoned to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General Short that a break with Japan was imminent, and that an attack against Hawaii could be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the
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need for sending this message, but after brief consideration
asked General Marshall to include in his proposed despatch
directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. General
Marshall sent a despatch to the effect that the Japanese
were presenting “that amounts to an ultimatum at 1100 p.m.,
Washington time, on 7 December; that Japanese are under orders
to destroy their codes immediately; and that while the War
Department does not know the significance of the hour set for
delivering the note, you are to be on the alert accordingly
and to inform naval authorities of this communication.” He
sent this via commercial radio, which was then the usual means
of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The despatch
left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:17 a.m. Honolulu time,
and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 a.m. Honolu-
lulu time. This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By
the time the message had been decoded and delivered to General
Short, the attack was already underway. The Court states that
if the most expeditious means of delivery had been used (plain
language telephone) this information could have been received
in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court
remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor
means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped
the attack, or which could have had other than negligible
bearing upon its outcome, since there was already in effect
a condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances
attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor naval base,
and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go
along with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance
warning would have been of great value in alerting planes and
in augmenting the condition of readiness existing on board ship.

(4) On 3 December (the date is not specified in the
Findings; it is stated in Exhibit 20) Admiral Kimmel was
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informed that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says (his statement, page 28) that "the significance of this despatch was diluted substantially by publication of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and that he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to strike the United States.

(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch directing the destruction of secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant destruction in event of emergency (Exhibit 21). This was followed on 6 December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency". (Exhibit 22)

(q) Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts (Volume 5). In this section the Court sets forth matters which have already been discussed in the three preceding sub-paragraphs; and, in addition, touches on the matter of the so-called "Winds message". This Japanese message, originating in Tokyo on 19 November, was intercepted and translated in the Navy Department on 28 November. It set forth that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" certain code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short wave news broadcast, and directed that when these words were heard codes were to be destroyed. This message was received in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the expected "weather forecast". On 4 and 5 December, the Federal Communications Commission monitored the expected "weather forecast" which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December. The code words appearing in this implementing message meant that
Japanese relations with Russia were in danger. These two messages have been preserved in the files of the Federal Communications Commission. In addition to this indication that the Japanese were about to break relations with Russia, there is evidence (Volume 5, page 745) that Captain Safford, on duty in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications, saw on 4 December, a "yellow slip" on which was written a different version of the implementing code, which meant that relations with the United States and Great Britain were in danger. Captain Safford thinks that this message was intercepted by an East Coast station, but he was not sure. No written trace of the message referred to by Captain Safford could be found in the files of the War Department or the Navy Department. There is considerable testimony in the record as to what was done with the "Winds message". Various officers testified that the implementing despatches were transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval Communications, but Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them. It is an established fact that none of the despatches of the implementing messages were ever sent to Admiral Kimmel. However, as noted in paragraph 2(p)(4) above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London, to destroy certain codes.

(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII on page 1196) that on 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all important developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available."
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(a) Fact XIII (page 1200). The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court.

(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy. It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes that all essential information was obtained, despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; however, it appears to me that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.

3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion.

(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II (page 1201), the Court expresses the view that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion.

Had all of the information available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's dispositions on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on that occasion.
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(b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI (page 1202) the Court expresses the view that deficiencies in personnel and material which existed in 1941 had an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of men and material at the time and that available means were spread thin throughout the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not fully informed by the Navy Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the implications of that information which was given to him.

(c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII (page 1202), the Court holds that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. As I stated above, I think this is a narrow view of the question, and that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.

(d) The Court holds (page 1203) that Admiral Bloch performed his duties satisfactorily. I concur.

(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX, (page 1203), the Court states that naval defense plans were complete and sound in
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concept, but contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated, there could be no question that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes, except by lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own fault. This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.

(f) The Opinion, based on Fact I (page 1204), expresses the view that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and that the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.

(g) The Opinion, based on Finding II (page 1204), as to the effect that the measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The question at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening up of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.
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(h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII (page 1207), the Court holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I think that if all available information had been placed at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly, he would have found it necessary to do something about long range reconnaissance in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.

(i) In the Opinion, based on Facts XVII and XVIII (page 1207), the Court expresses the view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose that an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this possibility—a possibility that was strengthened by information received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.

(j) In the Opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX (page 1207), the Court expresses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had received regarding the Japanese situation, and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been

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UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic
relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area
might be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement that the
Judge Advocate General takes exception to this Opinion, on the
ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and his principal
advisers did not construe this message as indicating an attack in
the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the view of the Judge Advocate
General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon the
message in question, nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer
(attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department)
did take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy
to the fact that 1:00 p.m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu,
and midnight in East Asia (page 14 of Top Secret Addendum to the
Findings). It, therefore, seems evident, though Admiral Stark did
not have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this
message, nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least
some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view
that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel,
it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken.
I take no exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is
a fair conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of the
information available at the Department, he would have been in a
position to judge the situation better than he did.

4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation (page 1208) the Court
finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred
on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends
that no further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there
is not adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings,
but this does not bar administrative action, if such action is found
appropriate.

5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault
to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor
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Incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God", beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.

(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, particularly in the following respects:

(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.
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(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain intercepted Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.

(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Wina's Message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.

(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the "1:00 p.m. message" received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this message been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.

(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.

(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December.
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Concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:

(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.

(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.

(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been fully operational.

6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
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7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors.

8. In my serial O03191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views concerning how much of the record bears such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.
First Endorsement

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.

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1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.

2. The weighing of conflicting evidence and testimony is peculiarly the function of a Court of Inquiry or Board of Investigation, and not that of the reviewing authorities. Where the testimony is such as will reasonably support either of two or more different conclusions, it is not within the province of the Judge Advocate General to attempt to substitute his evaluation of the evidence for that of the Court. But where there is no creditable evidence in a record to support a finding or opinion, or where the weight of evidence is so preponderant on one side that it appears unreasonable to reach a contrary conclusion, the Judge Advocate General must hold, as a matter of law, that such a finding or opinion is not supported by the evidence adduced. See CMO 9 of 1928, P. 8; CMO 12 of 1937, P. 8; CMO 5 of 1936, P. 11.

3. Attention is invited to the following portion of Finding of Fact XVIII:

"In the early forenoon of 7 December, 1941, Washington time, the War and Navy Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, by inference and deduction, that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon."

4. This Finding, standing alone, may be misleading, in the sense that it may convey an impression that the Court concluded that responsible officials of the War and Navy Departments did in fact make the inference and deduction underscored above. The fact that the Court, in phrasing this Finding, used the past tense of the verb "appear", and used the expression "appeared to indicate", rather than "should have indicated" lends support to this construction. Such an [2] impression would not be supported by the record, as the great preponderance of the evidence before the Court refutes any such conclusion. It is quite clear from the evidence that the responsible officials of the Navy Department had evaluated the information available to them in Washington to means that a hostile move by the Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian area, except by submarines, but rather against Guam, the Phillippines, and British and Dutch possessions in the Far East.

5. Those witnesses who, on 7 December, 1941, held positions in the Navy Department which qualify them to speak authoritatively as to the prevailing opinion there just prior to the attack, are all in substantial accord that the Chief of Naval operations and his assistants had not deduced or inferred that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. On the contrary, the consensus in the Navy Department was that any attack would probably come in the Far East, and the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor was given a comparatively low probability rating. Those witnesses who stated that the information available to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference and deduction, that an attack on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers who were not on duty in the Navy Department at that time, or occupied subordinate positions. Their testimony is opinion evidence, undoubtedly unconsciously colored by hindsight, and arrived at by a process of selecting, from the great mass of intelligence reports available to the Chief of Naval Operations, those which in the light of subsequent events proved to be hints or indications of Japanese intentions.

6. Therefore, any finding, opinion or inference that the responsible officials of the Navy Department knew, prior to the actual attack, that an attack on Hawaii was impending, is not supported by the evidence. The Court recognizes this fact, as shown by its finding (last paragraph of Finding XVIII) that:

"These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere."
7. The foregoing remarks apply equally to the underscored portion of the Opinion expressed by the Court (P. 1207) that:

"Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation, and especially in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon."

As has been previously pointed out, the message herein referred to was not construed by the Chief of Naval Operations and his principal advisers as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area.

8. It is noted that the Court finds (Finding of Fact XVIII) that the time at which the War and Navy Departments had information indicating a break in diplomatic relations on 7 December 1941, and the possibility of hostile action by the Japanese on that date, was "in the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time." It is not considered amiss to comment in further detail on this finding, in view of a widespread misconception in some quarters that this information was known in Washington on 6 December 1941. The evidence before this Court establishes, beyond any doubt, that the information referred to was not available to any responsible official in Washington prior to approximately 10 a. m., the morning of 7 December 1941.

9. The Judge Advocate General feels constrained to comment on the apparent contradiction between the Opinion expressed by the Court that the Chief of Naval Operations failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in failing to transmit certain information to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the final Opinion that "no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person in the naval service." That this is only an apparent, and not a real, incongruity, is shown by the Opinion that "had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken." This statement, as well as the Finding of Facts and Opinions taken as a whole, indicate that it was the conclusion of the Court, although not clearly expressed, that the evidence adduced did not prove that Admiral Stark's failure to transmit the information in question to Admiral Kimmel was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Fleet on 7 December, 1941, and that any causal connection between this failure on Admiral Stark's part and the disaster would be entirely speculative. Such a conclusion is fully supported by the testimony in this record.

10. Subject to the foregoing remarks, the proceedings, findings, opinions and recommendations of the attached Court of Inquiry are, in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, legal.

T. L. Gatch  
T. L. GATCH.  
The Judge Advocate General.

Addendum to Court's Finding of Fact (Naval Court of Inquiry)

[1] In the Finding of Facts, No. XVIII, the Court has referred to "certain other important information" as being available in the War and Navy Departments. This information was obtained by intercepting Japanese messages and breaking their diplomatic codes. The Court has been informed that these codes are still in use and, if it became known to the Japanese Government that they had been broken by the United States, the codes would be changed and, as a consequence, the war effort would be adversely affected.

For this reason, the Court has refrained from analyzing or discussing the details of the information in its Finding of Facts but feels that its report would not be complete without a record of such details. The Court, therefore, submits the following record in this addendum and transmits it to the Secretary of the Navy for filing with other highly secret matter referred to as such in the record of the Court's proceedings.

Highly secret messages, hereinafter mentioned, were intercepted by the War and Navy Departments during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, 1941, and prior thereto. The method of handling these messages in the Navy Department was as follows:
The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Communications operated directly under the Chief of Naval Operations. They were responsible to see that all messages were transmitted to him in order that he might be kept conversant at all times with existing conditions.

Officers in Intelligence and Communications, Divisions of Naval Operations, remained on duty night and day. They made every effort to obtain all possible diplomatic and military information, in order that high officials of our government might be kept fully informed.

Messages were translated and placed in a folder immediately upon receipt or intercept. The important messages were marked with a clip and taken by a designated officer to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Directors of War Plans, Naval Intelligence, and Naval Communications, and to the Chief of the Far Eastern Division of Naval Intelligence. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Wilkinson, kept himself constantly informed regarding all messages. He checked as to whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations had seen the important ones and in many cases took them personally to the Chief of Naval Operations and discussed them with him.

Immediately after the receipt of the note of 26 November, 1941, from the Secretary of State, the Japanese representatives in Washington sent a message to Tokyo which was intercepted by the Navy Department. This is Document 17, Exhibit 63, which gave to Tokyo the following stipulations contained in the note:

(a) The recognition of Hull's "four principles".
(b) (1) Conclusion of mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Moscow, Washington, The Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
(3) Complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indochina.
(4) Japan and the United States both definitely to promise to support no regime but that of Chiang K'ai-shek.
(5) The abolition of extraterritoriality, the concessions in China, and other requirements bearing on reciprocal trade treaty, rescinding freezing orders, stabilization of yen, etc., and for Japan to amend her tripartite pact with Germany and Italy.

The Japanese representatives added in their report to Tokyo the following:
"Both dupe, humbugged, and stated to Hull we could not even cooperate to the extent of even reproving this to Tokyo."

No information regarding the delivery of this note or of its contents was transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders atf oat.

From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, there was much diplomatic dispatch traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and which was not transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific. A message dated 19 November, 1941, Tokyo to Washington, translated on 28 November, 1941, and referred to as "The Wind Code" was as follows:
"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME*.
"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**
"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***
"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
"Forward as urgent intelligence.

The Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November, 1941, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations, information to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commandant 16th Naval District; and Commandant 14th Naval District, sub-

*East wind rain.
**North wind cloudy.
***West wind clear."
stantially the same information as outlined above. On 5 December, 1941, the United States Naval Attache, Batavia, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations substantially the same information. These messages stated that at some future date information would be sent by Japan indicating a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war between countries designated.

All officers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in the Navy Department, considering the expected information most important, were on the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or [5] war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.

It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.

Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department.

It is a matter of general knowledge that Japan has had for many years a thorough system of espionage throughout the world and continuously sought and received information regarding the location and movements of United States naval vessels. There were certain messages received in the Navy Department which showed very clearly that Japan, at this critical period, was particularly desirous of obtaining exact information from two sources, namely, Manila and Honolulu. Messages between Tokyo, Manila, and Honolulu inquiring especially about planes, ships, their places of anchorage, etc., in the latter ports, were intercepted. Similar messages were sent to Japanese officials in Honolulu clearly indicating that Japan was most [6] desirous of obtaining exact information as to ships in Pearl Harbor.

The important messages having special reference to Pearl Harbor were as follows:

(a) On 15 November, 1941, Document 24, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department, 3 December, 1941, states: "As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular but at rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

(b) On 18 November, 1941, Document 37, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department on 5 December, 1941, states: "Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N" Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and areas adjacent thereto. Make your investigation with great secrecy." Note by Navy Department on this message, "Manila Bay" probably means "Manila Bay."

(c) On 18 November, 1941, Document 40, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Honolulu to Tokyo and translated in Navy Department 6 December, 1941, gives information as to ships moored in certain areas in Pearl Harbor and movement of ships in and out.

[7]

(d) On 20 November, 1941, Document 36, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Washington 5 December, 1941, states: "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements but in future will you also report even when there are no movements."

Admiral Kimmel was not aware of and had no information regarding these messages.

On 5 November, 1941, Document 7, Exhibit 63, Tokyo to Washington, was intercepted. This message stresses the necessity of signing an agreement between the United States and Japan by 25 November, 1941.

On 22 November, 1941, Document 11, Exhibit 63, intercept from Tokyo to Washington, stated that the signing of agreement set for 25 November, 1941, could be postponed until 29 November, and in explanation this message stated:

"* * * There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, * * * if the pertinent notes can be
exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. * * *"

No intimation of the receipt of this message was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat, nor was any information transmitted to them regarding contents of the messages mentioned in the following paragraphs.

[8] On 28 November, 1941, a dispatch, Document 18, Exhibit 63, was intercepted between Tokyo and Washington which in part reads as follows:

"* * * The United States has gone ahead and presented this humili-ating proposal"—referring to note of 26 November—"* * * the Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instruc-tions * * * etc.

The message indicates the position of Japan regarding the note of 26 November, and further indicates that within two or three days negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Further, it emphasizes the importance of delay. Neither the message nor any of its contents were transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat.

On 29 November, 1941, Document 19, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to Wash-ington and translated by the Navy Department 30 November, 1941, directs that Japanese representatives make one more attempt to have United States recon-sider and states:

"* * * please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations."

Again, on 30 November, 1941, Document 20, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Washington to Tokyo, indicated that negotiations were to be stretched out.

These two messages indicate that the Japanese were sparring for time.

[9] On 30 November, 1941, Document 22, Exhibit 63, translated by the Navy Department on 1 December, 1941, was intercepted, being a message from Tokyo to Japanese representatives in Berlin, reading as follows:

"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire’s existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotia-tions rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indochina), were completely in opposition to each other.

“Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has [10] become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a con-tinuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will no be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, The Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

On 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department intercepted a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin as follows:

"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is."

On 1 December, 1941, document 21, Exhibit 63, was intercepted, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which reads as follows:

"1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the [11] United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

On 2 December, 1941, Document 25, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to Tokyo, translated by the Navy Department 3 December, 1941, reports that conversations with the State Department continue; that the Japanese representatives stated to Welles, the Under Secretary of State, that it is virtually impossible for Japan to accept new American proposals as they now stand, and that the Japanese representatives feel that the United States is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation.

On 3 December, 1941, Document 29, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to Washington, translated by the Navy Department 4 December, 1941, requests their representatives to explain Japan's increased forces in Indochina.

On 3 December, 1941, Document 33, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to Tokyo, translated by Navy Department 5 December [12] 1941, states:

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."

On 6 December, 1941, Document 38, Exhibit 63, from Tokyo to Washington, was intercepted, giving notice to the Japanese representatives that a reply consisting of 14 parts to American proposal of 26 November is being sent to them, directing that secrecy should be maintained and stating that the time of presenting this reply would be sent in a separate message.

The first 13 parts of this reply were intercepted and received by the Navy Department at about 3 p.m., December 6, 1941, and were translated and made ready for distribution by 9 p.m., Washington time, of that date. These 13 parts contain a very strong and conclusive answer to the note of November 26 and state in part, "Japan cannot accept proposal as a basis of negotiations."

*JD-1: 6921.
**JD-1: 6710.
***Not available.
Commander Kramer, the officer whose duty it was to distribute this class of information, prior to 9 p. m., 6 December, 1941, phoned Captain Wilkinson that an important message had been received and was being translated. He also tried to communicate with Admiral Stark and Rear Admiral Turner at their homes but found them out.

At about 9 p. m., Washington time, Commander Kramer proceeded to the White House with the 13 parts of reply and delivered copy to a White House aide, with the request that it be delivered immediately to the President. Kramer then proceeded to the home of Secretary Knox where he personally delivered to the Secretary a copy of the Japanese reply. Secretary Knox read the reply, did not discuss it in detail with Kramer, but phoned the Secretary of War and Secretary of State.

Kramer then proceeded to the home of Captain Wilkinson and gave a copy to him. Kramer told Wilkinson that he had tried to get Stark and Turner. Wilkinson made several phone calls, presumably to Admiral Stark and others. This information regarding receipt of these 13 parts or their contents was not transmitted to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet or other Commanders Afloat.

Kramer then returned to his office in the Navy Department, arriving about 12:30 a. m., 7 December, and as no other important messages were at hand, went home and returned to the Navy Department about 7 a. m. Upon his arrival he found the 14th part of the Japanese reply had been received and decoded. He then delivered a copy of all 14 parts to the Flag Secretary in his office of the Chief of Naval Operations at about 9 a. m., where he found several officers gathering for a conference with Admiral Stark. Kramer then proceeded about 9:30 a. m., to the White House and made delivery of the 14 parts of the message. He proceeded then, at about 9:50 a. m., to the State Department and delivered same to the Secretary of the Navy, who was there in conference with the Secretary of State.

At about 10:30 a. m., Kramer returned to the Navy Department [14] where he found another message had been translated. This message, an intercept from Tokyo to Washington, was marked "Urgent, very important" and read as follows: "Will the ambassador please submit to the U. S. Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the U. S. at 1:00 p. m., on the 7th, your time." Kramer delivered a copy of this message (hereinafter referred to as the "one p. m. message") to the Flag Secretary of Admiral Stark, the latter at the time being in conference with several officers.

Kramer then returned to the White House and delivered the "1:00 p. m. message". From there he went to the State Department where the Secretary of the Navy was still in conference with the Secretary of State. On arrival he requested one of the State Department assistants to present the message to the Secretary of the Navy and to invite his attention to the fact that 1 p. m., Washington time, meant dawn at Honolulu and midnight in East Asia.

Admiral Stark had arrived in his office at the Navy Department at some time between 9 and 10:30 a. m., on the morning of 7 December. Although he testified that he had no information prior to this time relative to the Japanese reply to the note of November 26th, he was informed of the 14 parts and "the 1:00 p. m. message" not later than 10:30 a. m., of that date. He testified that General Marshall phoned him and suggested that the information regarding the delivery of the 14 parts at 1 p. m. was most important and significant and, in his opinion, should be transmitted to Commanders [15] in the Pacific. Admiral Stark at first demurred and hung up the receiver. Shortly thereafter he phoned General Marshall requesting that, in the event he sent the message to the Commanding Generals in the Pacific area, he instruct them to relay this message to naval opponents.

The message which General Marshall sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Exhibit 48) reads as follows: "Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

This message left the War Department at 11:52 a. m., Washington time, was sent out over R. C. A. at 12:17 p. m. (6:47 a. m. Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's R. C. A. office at 7:33 a. m. Honolulu time. There remained but 22 minutes before the attack for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action. Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the afternoon of 7 December, several hours after the attacking force had departed.
Had the telephone and plain language been used, this message could have been received in Hawaii before the attack began. Even in this event, however, there was no action open to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome. There was already in effect the condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the Fleet planes in their air bases in Oahu.

Orin G. Murfin
Orin G. Murfin,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.
Edward C. Kalbfus
Edward C. Kalbfus,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Adolphus Andrews
Adolphus Andrews,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
(A) Findings, Conclusions and Order.

On 13 August 1945 Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, in his fourth endorsement to the record of proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry made the official findings and conclusions of the Navy Department, and his order as Secretary assessing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The endorsement of 13 August 1945 that was signed by Secretary Forrestal has had deleted from it certain "TOP-SECRET" matter since, pursuant to the direction of the President, the findings and conclusions were to be made public. The endorsement with deletions therefrom was made public by the President on 29 August 1945.

The complete endorsement of Secretary Forrestal containing the findings, conclusions and action of the Navy in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster is as follows:

"1. Pursuant to Executive Order dated 19 December 1941, a commission headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that:

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"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform himself of and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to each other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department."
2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses having knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.

3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.

4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeyer, USN, as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.

5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET," and the balance "SECRET."
6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by me, was that the evidence secured by the Court did not warrant and would not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.

7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the evidence obtained indicated that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, but that the investigation had not gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would be conducted by an investigation officer and that pending the completion of the necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.

8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the prior investigations and that an appropriate summary of all information developed in the prior Naval investigations be prepared. Upon the completion of this review of prior investigations and after examination of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I appointed Admiral H. Hewitt, USN, as investigating officer, and John F. Sonnett as counsel to examine such witnesses and obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further investigation directed by my precept of 2 May 1945 was completed on 12 July 1945 and the report by Admiral Hewitt was forwarded to the Judge Advocate General and the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations for recommendation and comment.
9. In his Second Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report of further investigation, dated 10 August 1945, the Judge Advocate General advised, among other things, that he did not believe that there was sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to Naval Law; that the evidence indicated that the officers in question lacked superior judgment rather than being guilty of culpable inefficiency; and that "lack of superior judgment" is not an offense triable by general court martial. The Judge Advocate General further advised in his Second Endorsement that: "I am of the opinion that any such court-martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the Naval service."

Notwithstanding the difficulties pointed out by him, the Judge Advocate General was of the opinion, however, that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel tried by general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist. The Judge Advocate General recommended that Admiral Hewitt's investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and in prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to the public interests; and that if Admiral Kimmel insists, a general court martial should be convened to try him for any alleged offenses he may have committed on or before 7 December 1941.

10. In the Third Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report, dated 13 August 1945, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurred generally in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General and expressed the opinion that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial.
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of any person in the Naval service in that it would not sustain the charges
required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy; that with regard
to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet was still of the opinion that Admiral
Stark and Admiral Kimmel, although not culpable to a degree warranting
formal disciplinary action, nevertheless lacked the superior judgment
necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties, and that
appropriate action, consisting of the relegation of these officers to
positions in which lack of superior judgment might not result in future
errors, had been taken as to Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, and stated
that no further action was recommended. The Commander in Chief, U. S.
Fleet, also advised, in the Third Endorsement, that in any event he
considered it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark or Admiral Kimmel to
trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan because such pro-
ceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would
be detrimental to current military operations and to national security
measures. He concurred in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General that
the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to trial
before a general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist, but stated
that this action should not be taken until after the completion of hostilities
with Japan. He concurred in the further suggestions of the Judge Advocate
General that Admiral Hewitt's investigation be made available to Admiral
Kimmel and his counsel and that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free
to make public anything contained in this record and in prior records as
soon as that may be done without prejudice to national security.

11. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements to
the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record, and in their endorsements to the
report by Admiral Hewitt, are approved subject to the following remarks:

(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II (1156). This finding states, in substance, that the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.

The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the effect that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he anticipated an air attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, does not entirely "go along" with the opinion of the Court that the information available to Admiral Kimmel did not require any departure from his operation and maintenance schedules. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, states further in this connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding.

(b) Court of Inquiry Finding III (1156). This finding states that, "Constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . ." make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of avoiding overt acts.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, comments that this gives an unscrupulous enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional requirement preventing offensive action as a means of defense was a definite handicap. It does not appear that there was any proximate casual relationship between the Constitutional requirement and the instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition
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and the injunction as to overt acts did not preclude either long distance reconnaissance or a sortie by the Fleet. Further, it appears that prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional provision or his responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent the issuance of orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in operating areas.

(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV (1159). This states that Admiral Bloch was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently, Admiral Bloch had a responsibility for naval measures concerned with local defense.

It should be noted in this connection that Admiral Hewitt found:

"75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.

"76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941, in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu."

(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V (1160). The Court here finds that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly, cordial and cooperative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were received, and that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being taken by the other.

In this connection the following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt are approved:

"1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means,
various types of attack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.

"2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.

"3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange."

The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were informal arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and Navy at Hawaii, which included the transmission to the Army of some information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates, however, that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short was sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into effect by the other. It appears that after receipt of the "war warning" and prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on several occasions. They discussed the reinforcement of Midway and Wake. It does not appear that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect or to be placed in effect, or the question or advisability of placing in effect air reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel, he placed in effect Army Alert No. 1 (the anti-sabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what alert the Army had in effect, and that he made no specific inquiry of General Short in this connection.
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That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears from the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November 1941 relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to United States outlying islands to destroy classified material. He testified before the Naval Court that he did not direct that these be furnished to General Short, and that he did not know whether or not they were furnished to him. General Short testified that he had not seen these dispatches.

In view of these facts, I cannot agree with the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation, of joint command, was not working effectively - it failed. In this connection the following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt is approved:

"War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be "unity of command."

However, in respect of the above conclusion of Admiral Hewitt, it is important to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between the existence of two or more separate military or naval organizations as the functioning forces and an effective exercise of unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of the major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more distinct military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations, but all acting under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the several forces and their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually in the higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command post.

I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine contact had been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly
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prior to the air attack. The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt supports
the following conclusions by him, which is approved:

"26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported sub-
marine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have
been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in
sending out the ready destroyer. This information was of no imme-
diate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated imminency of
an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical.
In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack
had commenced."

(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI (1160). This states in
substance that unavoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had
a bearing on the effectiveness of the local defense of Pearl Harbor.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out, however, that
the pertinent question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available
to the best advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief
U. S. Fleet.

(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII (1165). The Court finds
that Japan had an initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's
numerical superiority, and the superiority of Japanese espionage.

The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined
to the general statement that factors such as those referred to by the
Court will always place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of
strained relations. This finding, of course, in general was correct.
Nevertheless, as applied to the specific issues here presented, it over-
looks the fact that:

(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well
known to Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into
account in the war plans;

(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a
disadvantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and
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War Departments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence advantages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.

(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII (1167). This states that it was the direct responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, is in agreement with "the fundamental concept of naval warfare" discussed by the Court, but takes a more realistic view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that in view of the weakness of local defense, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. It is to be noted, moreover, that under the defense plan the Navy was responsible for the maintenance of distant reconnaissance.

(h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX (1169). The Court finds that the air defense plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Fleet aircraft which could not be made permanently available for local defense.

The Second Endorsement states that the Court has overstressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes; that it was sound policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal; that it was his responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could; that the available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened; that it is doubtful whether with the available forces it would have been possible to destroy the carriers before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance; that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely due to his own fault; and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, with respect to this finding.
(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV (1159), VIII (1167), IX (1169). Based on these findings the conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed his duties.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is approved.

(ii) Court of Inquiry Finding X (1171). This holds adequate and effective Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.

(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI (1173). The substance of this finding is that Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called for by the information available to him, and that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense.

In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that condition which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the assumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the Fleet. Such was not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, further states that he does not agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense, and is of the view that the information available to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening up of the defense precautions as 7 December approached. With the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concur.
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(1) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV (1176). The Court here finds that there was no information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to predict that attack.

The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point: "There was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits."

It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral Hewitt’s investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel, particularly during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. This information, which consisted principally of daily radio intelligence summaries setting forth the results of monitoring Japanese naval communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, is set forth in some detail at pages 112-114, inclusive, of Admiral Hewitt’s report. It there appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese naval radio calls on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as indicating an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale; that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet Intelligence Officer as to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and that during that conference Admiral Kimmel noticed and commented on the absence of information in the Fleet Intelligence Officer’s written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned that these four carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high seas heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located by the Fleet Intelligence Officer in his written estimate, in Japanese home waters,
with the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In his testimony before Admiral Hawitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer described his conversation with Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as follows:

"Mr. SONTETT: Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now', or words to that effect."

"MR. SONTETT: Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this; Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardive 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardives 1 and 2', and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

"MR. SONTETT: He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in a way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

It is to be noted further that, as set forth in Admiral Hawitt's report, the daily communication intelligence summaries received by Admiral Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that: "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service
calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of
December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that
carrier traffic is at a low ebb. and that the daily summaries delivered
to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and prior to the attack, indicated that there
was no information as to Japanese carriers.

In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by
the Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the
view that the information as to the location and movements of the
Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the
week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which
he had received, including the "war warning" and other messages from the
Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating
that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an
attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.

(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII (1178). It is here stated
that Admiral Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long-range reconnais-
sance was sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and
that such use of the available planes was not justified.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval
Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to
make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors
to be considered. He states further, however, that after considering all
of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears that
Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at
long-range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and
more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attacks.
This comment adds that it is obvious that the means available did not
permit an all-round daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect
the approach of carriers before planes could be launched, but that there
were, however, certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have
been covered to some extent, and that such particular cover would have been
logical in the circumstances known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and
early December. Attention is called to the fact that Admiral Richardson had
maintained distant reconnaissance, using the few patrol planes at his
disposal, to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation, and that these
patrols were discontinued when or shortly before Admiral Kimmel relieved
Admiral Richardson.

In addition to these comments, with which I concur, it may be noted
that Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol in
the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by
Admiral Kloop at that time.

The following findings by Admiral Hewitt in connection with the
question of air reconnaissance are approved:

"77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of
Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be
no distant reconnaissance."

"78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between
Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt
of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of
long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer
thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could
recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet Patrol
planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning
messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion
with him."

"87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week
preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted
360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days."

"89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in
fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack
to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance
covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles."
"90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor."

"91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched."

"101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu."

(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV (1182). This states in substance that the Army radar detection system was ineffective.

The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding, which is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the radar detection system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic state, nevertheless, even in its then condition it could have and should have served to give at least an hour's warning of the attack. I concur in this comment and also approve the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt:

"15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft."

(o) Court of Inquiry Findings XIV (1186). This states that the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December 1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions of shoal water and limited approach, such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor, was not practicable, and that the Japanese attack was successful principally because of the employment of a specially designed torpedo, which was a secret weapon.

The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: "It is evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated." The principal point upon which the Court of Inquiry seems to rest its findings is the further finding th
it was not believed by American and British naval authorities at that time that torpedoes could be successfully launched from aircraft in waters as shallow as those at Pearl Harbor. As a basis for this view the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Operations early in 1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval Operations in June 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict with the Court's finding. This letter stated, among other things, that: "It cannot be assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised that torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13-15 fathoms of water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.

The records of the Navy Department indicated that in April, 1941, there was circulated in the Department an Intelligence report which described the demonstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this report that the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and that it required no greater depth of water for its successful launching than the depth at which it made its normal run.

It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the British reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water.

Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year prior to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of an airplane torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated.
SECRETARY Knox’s letter of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of the types of attack upon Pearl Harbor which he considered likely. His letter had been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received in February by Admiral Kimmel.

In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.

(p) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI (1188). The Court here finds that Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made after receiving the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the approval of the steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16 October which advised that hostilities were possible, and (b) the information then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November, 1941, which stated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.

The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underscores that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility...."

It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words, "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on those two places would be on foreign territory, but that the words also included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.

The Court refers in its finding to a part of a personal letter
sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark stated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably." However, the letter also continued: "Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend." To the letter was annexed a postscript stating in part: "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we made some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."

It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal with the question of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet, in the light of the highly important information which he received from the Chief of Naval Operations and otherwise during the critical period after the "war warning" of November 27th.

(q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII (1193). The Court here finds that there were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the Far East.

In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He notes further that all concerned recognized the possibility that such a
commencement of hostilities would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably strengthened by information available at Washington, all of which was not available to Admiral Kimmel.

It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation that the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November 27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly possible. The information received by Admiral Kimmel as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with these estimates. The following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt in this connection is approved:

"23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack . . . ."
and summarized in the addendum to the Court's findings of facts, constitutes a military error.

The comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington.

The endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, on the Naval Court of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Hear Admiral Wilkinson, former Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the conclusions of the Court based thereon, were concerned principally with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department, and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling this information. It was concluded that the failure to obtain this testimony was unfortunate.

With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concurred. It further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who, according to other testimony in the record, had important duties in connection with the handling of such intercepted enemy information, would be most helpful. Captain McCollum was also unavailable as a witness to the Court. I ascertained that at the time both Hear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy, and would be so engaged until some date in the future. From the nature of the duties which these officers were performing in their assignments, I determined that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort, their testimony in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.
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During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. The following conclusions of Admiral Hewitt in this connection are approved:

"5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages."

"6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to the intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready." . . .

"8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.

"9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the "1 p.m." message and its possible import, were unfortunate.

"10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.

"11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated
to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages."

12. The following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt concerning the intelligence secured by tapping the wires of the Japanese Consulate General at Hawaii and by intercepting cable messages of the Japanese Consulate General are approved.

Conclusion 12. "Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area."

Conclusion 13. "Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work."

13. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.

With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident, and that disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God" beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated in the Second Endorsement, that the Country...
as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy as a whole, although its ranking officers were fully informed of the most recent developments in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the true significance of those developments until their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial portion of the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of hostile action by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet and Air Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile action, these factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them to bring about that implementation of the plans that was necessary if the initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.

That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in several important respects.

(a) The destructive potentiality of air attack was not properly evaluated, although there was ample information available on this subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That this information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type of attack, but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial attack had been successful.

(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the fullest utilization of all of the available resources of
both the Army and the Navy; in practice, none of these measures came into being to any appreciable extent prior to the attack.

(c) Within the Navy itself, the organization was such as to submerge the Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to the procurement and material programs incidental to the rapid expansion of the Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans and operations the undivided and continuing attention which experience has shown they require, and tended to dull his perception of the critical significance of events.

In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage of hindsight, nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that any carrier strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost impossible to deflect. After giving due consideration, however, to all these factors, I am of the opinion that there were, nevertheless, areas in which sound military judgement dictated the taking of action which, though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack, would have tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective sphere, to take appropriate action.

14. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, as the responsible officers, might have taken to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow.
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(a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington, particularly in respect of:

1. The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese, which was regarded by the Japanese as an ultimatum;
2. The intercepted Japanese messages inquiring as to the disposition of ships within Pearl Harbor;
3. The implementation of the "winds" message;
4. In failing to appreciate the significance of the "one p.m. message" received on the morning of 7 December 1941, and in the failure to transmit it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available.
5. Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of intensification of critical relations between Japan and the United States.

I concur generally with these comments except as to (3) and (5). In connection with the failure of Admiral Stark to advise Admiral Kimmel of the implementation of the "winds" message, the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt is approved:

"7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States."

Although there may be some basis for the comment that prior to 27 November 1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communication sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that the message of November 27 was stronger than any message which Admiral Stark sent previously to Admiral Kimmel. That message read as follows:

"THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING X NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC HAVE CEASED AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS X THE NUM’R AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATE AN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER THE PHILIPPINES (printed in ink, "that") OR IRIA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO X EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL 46 X INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES X"
Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it might be added that Admiral Stark’s omission consisted not only in the failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available information, but also in the failure properly and speedily to evaluate that information, particularly on 7 December 1941.

The evidence shows that the State Department reply to the Japanese of 26 November 1941 was in fact regarded by them as an ultimatum; that it was known in the Navy Department before 1 December 1941 that the Japanese regarded the reply as unacceptable; that it was known, as early as 1 December 1941, that the Japanese proposed to strike without warning. It was further known that subsequent to their receipt of the State Department’s note the Japanese were directing their emissaries in the United States to do everything in their power to allay any suspicion of a hostile Japanese move. Against this background, there was received on 6 December 1941, in the Navy Department, an intercepted Japanese message to their emissaries here, which stated that a 14-part reply to the State Department’s note of 26 November 1941 was being transmitted, and further that a specific time for delivery of this reply would be transmitted from Tokyo by a separate message. This message, together with the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply were all available at the Navy Department by 2100 hours of 6 December 1941. The language of the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply then available indicated that the reply constituted a final breaking off of relations. All this pointed to the conclusion that a surprise attack was to be simultaneous with the delivery of the Japanese message. Thus, while it was not known on 6 December precisely when the attack was to be delivered, there was ample evidence to
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base the conclusion that a surprise move was due within narrow limits of time.

On the morning of December 7th, by 10:30, Admiral Stark had all fourteen parts of the Japanese reply, which in its entirety made explicit the breaking off of relations. He had as well the direction for the delivery of that reply at one p.m., Eastern Standard Time, and there was information available to him that this time corresponded to dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although, as found by Admiral Hewitt, no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring about some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.

(b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5(b) of the Second Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the "war warning" message on 27 November 1940, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December that the Japanese had ordered destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands.

In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his personal letters, which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well in the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the information
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received by Admiral Kimmel concerning the location and movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November 1941 should have been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as indicating the continued and increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially noted that while Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message of 27 November 1941, and again on 28 November when the Army message was relayed to him, to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him was carrying forward the arrangements for the reinforcing of and continuing the limited air patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging in unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued in effect the primary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition of readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in port. He neither ordered long-range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet air wing commander of the receipt of the war warning message. His failure to take other and more effective action is neither explainable nor excusable by an ambiguity in the meaning of or disagreement as to what would constitute an "appropriate defensive deployment." Admiral Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan of maintaining fleet security at bases and guarding against surprise attack by Japan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase "appropriate defensive deployment", he should have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for an explanation.

The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states that Admiral Kimmel could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action were open to him.
(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made the Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have resulted in the detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers; (2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, and thus made it more difficult for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port; (3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which Naval planes would have been fully manned, and damage control organizations fully operational.

Admiral Hewitt's report concludes in part:

"The absence of positive information as to the location of Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:

(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.

(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.

(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.

(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.

(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.

(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.

(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and aircraft warning installations."

I concur with these comments as to the various courses of action which Admiral Kimmel could have and should have taken. The evidence indicates clearly, however, that his most grievous failure was his failure to conduct long-range air reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack. That this is so is
manifest from the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt and from his
following conclusion, which is hereby approved.

Conclusion 14. "The only practicable sources from which Admiral
Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the
'war warning,' as to the approach of the attacking force, were
the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval
communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu."

During the critical period after November 27 the limitations
of the aircraft warning service and of radio intelligence were evident;
the only remaining practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was
entitled to rely for information as to the Japanese naval movements was
distant air reconnaissance which, covering the most probable approach
bearings, would as Admiral Hewitt concluded have had a reasonable chance
of success. The failure to detect the approach of the Japanese task force
contributed more to the success of the Japanese attack than did any other
single factor.

In addition to the courses of action referred to by the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and by Admiral Hewitt, it was, of course,
always open to Admiral Kimmel also to take steps to increase cooperation
between his organization and the Army command, and to attempt to achieve
effective joint command. That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing
such an objective is indicated by the evidence in the record and the finding
of the Court that the social relationship between him and General Short
was excellent. The need for Admiral Kimmel taking such measures existed
from the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in
urgency as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.

15. The Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
to the Naval Court record concludes that:

"6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and
Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of
commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the
superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.

"7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors."

16. In his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, states in part:

"I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:

"(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that the evidence will not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy.

"(b) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously expressed, that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency, due to the lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties.

"(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment may not result in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.

"(d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one of them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, nor are court martial or other proceedings (prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan) advisable because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to national security measures."

17. The Judge Advocate General in making his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report states in part:

1. "Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies..."
omissions in the earlier investigations. It is considered that this and former investigations, taken together, present as clear a picture of the pertinent facts as will ever be adduced. With this report, therefore, I believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack should be considered completed.

2. "Admiral Hewitt’s report brings out and confirms a distinction which impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a distinction which does much to clarify thinking on the question of placing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that there was no lack of appreciation on the part of any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming quickly, during the critical period immediately preceding 7 December 1941. The point on which those officers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment to be expected from officers occupying their positions, was their failure to appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of these officers, in estimating the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in that he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific.

3. "I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any great effect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that they each entertained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding would most likely merely have strengthened those views. Likewise, I submit that the importance of information from Japanese sources has been overemphasized; for had more basically sound principles been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have occurred. The security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our Pacific strategy, a fact which did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic concept of responsible officers.

4. "In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:

(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not believed that there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to naval law.

(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses which are worthy of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to define the duty of the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty to follow a course of action other than the one he did. In my opinion
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this would be impossible, as the acts of omission of these officers do not rise above the status of errors of judgment. No clearly defined duty can be established which was neglected or improperly performed. As stated by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on the findings of the Court of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the fact that the acts of the officers in question "indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency." "Lack of Superior Judgment" is not an offense triable by general court-martial.

*   *   *

(d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members of a general court martial will make it most difficult to constitute a court for the trial of the officers here concerned during war time or during a period of six months after the cessation of hostilities. Many of the officers of appropriate rank, both on the active and the retired lists, would be disqualified because of interest in the subject matter, the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue of having been connected with one of the investigations into the matter. If more than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an entirely new court would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried a former case arising out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to challenge. The Summoning of the necessary witnesses would result in temporarily removing from their duty stations many of the key officers in the naval organization. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the naval service."

*   *   *

18. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General thereto, and the Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, thereto; the record findings and conclusions of Admiral Hewitt, and the Second and Third Endorsements thereto; and on the basis of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:

    (a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.
(b) Then Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold R. Stark, particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, failed to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.

(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action should be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to active duty in the future for any position in which the exercise of superior judgment may be necessary.

(d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, should be made as soon as such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.

19. Accordingly, I direct:

(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.

(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.

(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, will be made as soon as such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.

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(B) Navy's Offer to Rear Admiral Kimmel of Court Martial.

On 7 September 1943 Rear Admiral Kimmel wrote to the Secretary of the Navy stating that he desired "to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date". On 28 August 1945 Secretary Forrestal offered a General Court Martial to Rear Admiral Kimmel if the same were still desired by the latter. The letter of Secretary Forrestal to Rear Admiral Kimmel read as follows:

"1. In your letter of September 7th, 1943, to the Secretary of the Navy, you stated "It is my personal desire to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date."

"2. In his letter to you the Secretary of the Navy gave you his assurance that a trial before General Court Martial would be had at the earliest practicable date that the public interest and safety would permit. In view of the present state of the war and in view of this assurance of the Secretary of the Navy I am disposed to order your trial by General Court Martial in open court in the event that you still desire to be so tried.

"3. It is requested that you advise me promptly whether or not you desire to be tried by General Court Martial."

On 8 September 1945 Rear Admiral Kimmel replied in writing to the Secretary's letter of 28 August 1945, stating that he desired to defer replying to the Secretary's inquiry whether he (Kimmel) still desired a Court Martial until after the pending Joint Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor was completed. This letter read as follows:
280 Bronxville Road, Bronxville 8, N. Y., 8 September 1945. From: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Retired). To: The Secretary of the Navy. Subject: General Court Martial in my case.

"1. In view of the agitation for a Congressional Investigation before Congress reconvened and the action of the Senate in ordering a Joint Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor, I wish to defer my reply to your letter of 28 August 1945 until that Investigation is completed."
November 2, 1944.

The memorandum at the bottom of this file, a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", indexed as 711.94/2512 FS/00, Confidential File, is a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation.

For purposes of the record there is now being superimposed a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, of date February 28, 1944, in which certain pertinent facts are stated and an analysis is made of the contents and true purport of the memorandum of November 27, 1941.
February 28, 1944.

On Sunday evening, February 20, Mr. Drew Pearson made in his radio broadcast certain statements regarding Mr. Stanley Hornbeck. Among these, as reported to Mr. Hornbeck on February 21 by the State Department’s recorder, was a statement that: “On November 22, 1941 Hornbeck drafted a memorandum stating Japan would not attack this country. Just fifteen days later she did attack Pearl Harbor”.

On February 27, Mr. Pearson made in his column of that day certain statements regarding Mr. Hornbeck. There, inter alia, he stated that: "...on November 22, 1941, just fifteen days before Pearl Harbor, he wrote an important memorandum to the Secretary of State advising that Japan never would attack the United States."

Such charges warrant attention. What are the facts?

Mr. Hornbeck did not write on November 22, 1941 any memorandum of estimate or prediction. He did on November 27 write a memorandum giving an estimate of "probabilities". Knowledge of the existence of such a memorandum was at some time before the end of August 1942 imparted by someone who had knowledge thereof to some member or members of the press. There appeared in a Washington newspaper in August 1942 under the dateline "By United Press" an article purporting to compare the record of prophecy of Mr. Drew with that of Mr. Hornbeck--unfavorably to the latter. In the course of that article there was given an account of "Hornbeck’s 5-1 odds", as follows:

"In contrast to that record [citations of occasions on which Mr. Drew had ‘advised the United States to guard against a possible surprise attack’] was the viewpoint of the State Department adviser on political relations, Stanley Kuhl Hornbeck. Hornbeck was of the opinion, even after the truculent statements of Japan’s two ambassadors, Kichisaburo Nomura and Sabusu Kurusu, that Japan was bluffing.

"Hornbeck’s idea was that Japan would not dare attack the United States, that it was bogged down in China and that the most that need be feared was an intensified campaign against the Burma Road.

"In mid-November, Hornbeck told consultants that if the situation was viewed as a gambling proposition the odds should be 5 to 1 that the United States and Japan would still be at peace a month later. He said it was even money that the United States and Japan would not be at war some months later."
The content of that story indicates that there was a "leak," apparently for prejudicial purpose, somewhere and at some time after the moment of the publication of the article under reference. It may be presumed that Mr. Pearson knew, and so did others of that article or has been told by some- one somewhere a story identical with or similar to the story on which the statements in that article were based.

Now what are the facts regarding a document which Mr. Hornbeck is alleged to have written to the Secretary of State on November 27.

Mr. Hornbeck did not write on November 27 a document of the type indicated. With regard to a memo- randum which Mr. Hornbeck did write (on November 27), see infra.

On November 27, Mr. Hornbeck had over the years frequently advanced the view that the United States and Japan were moving toward an armed collision and that, unless Japan changed her course or was defeated or brought to a standstill by an encounter with another country, such a collision was bound sooner or later to occur. Only the "exploratory conversations" of the year 1941, Mr. Hornbeck took the position that the only "peaceful settlement" which Japan was seeking was a settlement on her own terms, that she might have the support of the United States to her proposed conquest in the Far East. By August of 1941 the situation had become definitely threatening. Toward the end of that month, the British Government and the American government served on Japan a strong warning against further extension of her course of aggression. From then on it was generally recognized that Japan might embark on acts of force against Great Britain or the United States or both. Officers of the Department of State were in constant touch with officers of military intelligence and naval intelligence, exchanging actual data and discussing the possibilities of the situation.

On September 1, in the light of all information at that time available to him, Mr. Hornbeck expressed an opinion that Japan would not attack the United States within the next three months.

On November 24, Mr. Hornbeck advised that the last remaining United States landed armed forces in China be promptly withdrawn.
On November 20, Messrs. Nomura and Kurusu presented to the Secretary of State the last of various proposals advanced by the Japanese Government or agents thereof during 1941 for an agreement between Japan and the United States. Six days later, on November 26, the Secretary of State gave to Messrs. Nomura and Kurusu the last of the statements of counter-proposal made by the American Government during the course of the "exploratory conversations" which had been going on for several months.

On the next day, November 27, Mr. Hornbeck wrote an informal memorandum entitled "Problems of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of Situation and Certain Probabilities." That memorandum began with a statement, "The Japanese Government has made certain plans, some of which are absolute and some of which are conditional, for new military operations." He then stated that Mr. Kurusu's mission had had two principal objectives, and that Mr. Kurusu had achieved neither of those objectives. He then moved into the field of "forming conclusions as to what is probable". He stated that in his opinion, "the Japanese intent at this moment topersevere in and to intensify their operations toward 'brining China to her knees'; he expressed the opinion that, "The Japanese Government does not want or intend or expect to have forthwith armed conflict with the United States"; and he said that, "were it a matter of 'draining bats', he would give odds of 5 to 1 that the United States and Japan would not be at war on or before December 15, he would wager 3 to 1 that the United States and Japan would not be at war on or before the 15th of January, and he would wager even money that the United States and Japan would not be at war on or before March 1. "Stated briefly", he said, "the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate verge of 'war' in the Pacific." Continuing, he said: "The reasonable probability is that Japan's new military operations of the near future will be directed either toward Yunnan and the Burma Road or both." And, in conclusion, he said: "There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that the situation in the Pacific has been made worse, as regards the interests of the United States, by refusal on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms of 'concessions' by us in return for 'pledges' (qualified and hedge) around pledges) by Japan to keep the peace while continuing to make war and to prepare for more war. Japan has been at war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for several years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every one of her near neighbors and even on the United States. No price that we might have paid to Japan would buy or produce peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) in the Pacific. The question
question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington.

Examination of the whole content of the memorandum of November 27, 1941 shows that its author was offering not a long-range forecast but an estimate of situation in terms of short-range probabilities; that he nowhere suggested that Japan would not (or that she "could never") attack the United States; that, although he was of the opinion that the Japanese Government was not intending "to have armed conflict forthwith with the United States", he clearly perceived—and so indicated, as he had done many times before—that the situation was rapidly moving toward such conflict. In suggesting odds of 5-to-1 against "war" within the next three weeks, vs 1-to-1 against "war" within the next fourteen weeks; in affirming that within that period "there may be some armed encounters similar to those to which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic"; and in rephrasing from even a tentative prophesying beyond that period, he implied that he considered that the sands were fast running out. In stating, in conclusion: "The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington", he both asserted and affirmed that in the situation then prevailing in American-Japanese relations almost anything might before long happen.

All this is "out of the blue" from the support of the charge that "On November 22 (sic), 1941, just seven days before Pearl Harbor he [Hornbeck] wrote an important memorandum to the Secretary of State advising that Japan would never attack the United States."

Especially to be noted regarding this whole matter is the fact that M. Hornbeck's memorandum under reference was written not on November 22 (which was during the period while the question of repul to be sent to the Japanese proposals of November 20 was under consideration) but on November 27 (which was after the American Government had reached its conclusion and the Secretary of State had—on November 20—made this Government's reply).
November 27, 1941.

Problem of Far Eastern relations.

Estimate of situation and certain probabilities.

The Japanese Government has made certain plans, some of which are absolute and some of which are conditional, for new military operations.

Mr. Kurusu's mission has had two principal objectives: (1) to obtain, if possible, from the United States, terms of agreement favorable to Japan; (2) to ascertain, if possible, what action, positive or negative, the United States might, may or will take in the event of certain moves by Japan.

The American Government has now given clear indication that it has no intention of making "concessions" to Japan which would be inconsistent with the declared principles and the general objectives of American foreign policy and that it does not intend to condone or give countenance to policies and practice, past and present and future, of aggression on Japan's part.

Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the first objective of his mission.

The Japanese Government has given, during the course of the "exploratory conversations", clear evidence that it is not that Government's intention at the present time to
disassociate Japan from the Tripartite Alliance; or to
give up its objective of conquering China, conquering other
regions in the Far East, and establishing a "new order" and
a "co-prosperity sphere" in eastern Asia and the western
and southern Pacific. It has persevered in distribution
and disposal of its armed forces on a pattern clearly
designed for offensive rather than merely defensive opera-
tions. It has shown that it clearly intends to persevere
in pursuit of its general and its particular objectives by
the methods of threat of force or use of force—which means
continuance of contribution to instability rather than
stability of situation in the Pacific and eastern Asia.

The United States has not shown what action it will
take on the positive side in the event of Japan's taking
one or another of several possible steps. Mr. Kurusu may
have gained certain impressions, but he cannot be sure.
Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the second major objective of
his mission.

The business of prophesying involves a procedure of
examining facts and, as among various developments conceived
to be possible, forming conclusions as to what is probable.

The prophecy is an expression by an individual or a
group of individuals of an opinion as to what is going to
happen.

In
In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese intend at this moment to persevere in and to intensify their operations toward "bringing China to her knees". They have hoped that out of the conversations with the American Government they would extract something which would facilitate their effort toward that objective. Even now, they have not entirely abandoned hope of getting from us either positive or negative action helpful to them in pursuit of that objective.

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to have forthwith armed conflict with the United States. The Japanese Government, while launching new offensive operations at some point or points in the Far East, will endeavor to avoid attacking or being attacked by the United States. It therefore will not order or encourage action by its agents (except among which are its armed forces) which, if taken, would lead toward use by the United States of armed force by way of retaliation or resistance. So far as relations directly between the United States and Japan are concerned there is less reason today that there was a week ago for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make "war" on this country. Were it a matter of placing bets, the undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United States
States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before December 18 (the date by which General Marshall has affirmed that we would be "in the clear" as far as consumption of certain disposals of our forces is concerned); would wager three to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before the 1st of January (i.e., seven weeks from now); would wager even money that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before March 1 (a date more than 90 days from now, and after the period during which it has been estimated by our strategists that it would be to our advantage for us to have "time" for further preparation and dispositions). These ventures into the field of speculative prediction are based on an assumption that our definition of "war" must be the same in reference to activities and events in the Pacific as it is in regard to activities and events in the Atlantic: the indicated wagers are offered on an assumption that, although there may be some armed encounters similar to those to which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic, there will not be a recognized "state of war" such as to disrupt substantially or put an end to the present program of our Army and Navy for disposal within the periods mentioned of equipment and men for "defensive" and general purposes. Stated briefly, the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate
Launched a raid on the "T" in the Pacific.

Japan has had little success against China so far, and, of course, against Britain. It is true that Britain is much stronger than Japan, but a major operation involving very complicated movements might be a move for which Japan would be hard pressed. But, against Again, a move against China would involve very complicated movements, and there would be a move for which Japan would be hard for Japan to withdraw. A move by Japan against the Dutch East Indies would involve for Japan a great embroilment with Great Britain and possibly the United States; it would involve a risk of developing into a major operation.

A move by Japan now against Thailand would be a move which need not require great effort or involve great risk, if made, it would have a twofold objective, on the one hand an exploration of British and American reaction, and on the other hand a possible gaining of advantageous position in connection with and for operations against the Burmese road and therefore toward bringing closer to an end the "China incident". A move on Japan's part via Indochina into Yunnan and toward putting the Burma road out of commission (especially by continuous air attack) would involve little risk of embroilment with Great Britain or the United States, would not necessarily involve a major effort, and could be halted or be withdrawn from at any time should developments in
in the general situation render such action advisable in the opinion of Japan's military leaders.

The reasonable probability is that Japan's new military operations of the near future will be directed either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations against Yunnan and the Burma Road or both.

If, when and as Japan makes either or both of those moves, Japan will *in se facto* be further disclosing what are her political and military policies and will be further extending herself as regards military dispositions and effort and as regards burden and draft upon her national capacity (economic, social, political and military); she will be weakening her position in the event of there coming, later, armed conflict between herself and the United States; she will be exposing herself to naval and air attack on flank and from rear, if and when, by the United States, and she will be adding to the number of her enemies and the weight of public opinion adverse to her in the United States and the British Empire.

There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that the situation in the Pacific has been made worse, as regards the interests of the United States by refusal on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms of "concessions" by us in return for "pledges" (qualified and
and hedged around pledges) by Japan to keep the peace while continuing to make war and to prepare for more war. Japan has been at war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for several years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every one of her near neighbors and even on the United States. No price that we might have paid to Japan would buy or produce peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) in the Pacific.

The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington.
EXHIBIT NO. 109

(Exhibit No. 109 consists of a Guide to Symbols and of Maps submitted by Admiral R. K. Turner showing the location of ships December 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941 and will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

EXHIBIT NO. 110

SECRET

9 February 1940.

Dear Admiral: I was glad to get your letter of January 4 and I will follow your suggestion by sending this out by officer messenger.

You want to know, what is in the back of my mind—I will set out for a broad coverage for I am not sure just what you want—so here goes:

As far as what you would do in an emergency, there has been no change in the basic plans with which you are thoroughly familiar from your reading in the Department prior to taking over as CinC, Asiatic. I am told that you also read the CinCUS plans, which makes it unnecessary for me to go into them here except to say there has been no change.

I am in general agreement with the Asiatic Fleet Plan except possibly in the case of the destroyers. The destroyer logistic problems involved in the support of the long continued operations with the cruisers, as contemplated, might prove difficult and might hamper the cruiser operations. One recommendation which has been made to me is that the destroyers should remain at Manila with the submarines and patrol planes as long as practicable and then retire to the eastward. This is for the purpose of harassing enemy shipping in the near vicinity and for operations against enemy steamships which might act again our own and neutral shipping. Retiring destroyers would require such logistic support as might be necessary to permit them to join the Fleet to the eastward of Guam.

It may be that after further study you may desire to change the planned employment of the destroyers. You may want to divide them, using some of them on the operations now planned and the remainder on other tasks. You may even want to recommend a change in the major mission assigned to the Asiatic Fleet in the Basic Plan. Any such recommendations along these lines will of course be given great weight and study.

It is to be borne in mind in course of the present War Plans have been formulated as a result of studies continuing over an extended period by a number of officers. They follow Army-Navy joint plans. In the Navy Basic Plan the Asiatic Fleet Plan has been related and articulated to the U. S. Fleet Plan.

[2] The existing plan,—and for that matter any plan,—should, in my opinion, be changed by only one of two processes,—either after careful thought and investigation of the effect of the change in the Orange Plan as a whole, or, as a result, in time of war or emergency, of the factual aspects of the situation. The changes then made (in war or emergency) may be brought about by the
President, by the Navy Department, or by the responsible Operating Task Force Commander on the spot. It may be that the employment of the United States Fleet itself,—the Joint Asiatic Force—will be changed when the emergency arises. It may be that the employment of the forces of the Asiatic Fleet can not be carried out as planned because of the existing conditions.

I feel that the main problem confronting you as Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, does not lie with what to do when war has been definitely joined. At such a juncture, guided by plans, directives, conditions, and your own considered thought on the problem, I feel confident that you will be able to make decisions essentially correct, and better than they could be made elsewhere. The main problem lies rather, (and this was undeniably in your mind when you wrote), with what to do during a period of growing tension which may or may not culminate in war. In this connection it is to be noted that War Plans, as now conceived and prepared, follow the basic premise that war, (actual hostilities), has broken out. This is, of course, by no means always the case. As so frequently exemplified in recent years, armed forces may be employed in varying degrees, without being followed by an actual outbreak of war. Even when actual hostilities do break out they may or may not be accompanied by a formally declared war, and the extent of hostilities may be restricted or may be unlimited.

In view of the actual situation existing today, in the Far East and elsewhere, we might well say that we need “Tension Plans” as well as “War Plans”. But to prepare well considered “Tension Plans” we need a planning machinery that includes the State Department and possibly the Treasury Department as well as the War and Navy Departments. Of course, we have planning machinery for the Army and Navy which now provides for a better coordination of planning effort than has existed in the past. We do not, however, have regularly set up planning machinery that brings in the State Department. It is true that we have frequent consultation with the State Department, but things are not planned in advance, and often we do not receive advance information of State Department action which might well have effected our own activities.

It is also true, of course, that the State Department must in a country such as ours feel its way along to a large extent. This is unavoidable. In view of this the State Department is probably unable always to set up, in advance, concrete programs of their intentions.

[3] In the absence of the machinery for, or possibility of, planned coordinated action, I feel that naval commanders must continue—and they do continue to employ their forces in the support of the national purpose and the national policy in such manner and to such extent that they can make the support effectively with the forces available.

It seems to me to be the case, generally in life, that when a confusing and disturbing situation presents itself those who are confused and uncertain tend to orient their ideas and their actions and to rally around anyone capable of taking a decisive attitude and determined action, even though this one himself may be not too certain of what should be done. However, I know this is an unnecessary comment in your case. There is no substitute for good judgment.

A primary objective that continuously confronts naval commanders, particularly those in the “front line trench” as you express it, is the effective support of policy in a manner that does not result in war. The effective support prevents the adversary from being stimulated by the appearance of weakness, but the effective support must of course be tempered by the avoidance of provocative action. I feel that the people of the United States will support firm action as long as it does not go into a degree of jingoism that would serve to provoke the other fellow, and that if in the face of such firm but restrained attitude Japan should step on our toes, that our country will realize that Japan herself has provoked the action.

I realize very well the conflicting considerations with which you are faced. By continuing your forces, or a portion of your forces, at the point of conflict—the “Front Line Trenches” between the Japanese and the United States' interests,—you sustain United States' interests. If as the tension increases, you, or your forces stay on the spot you thereby continue to sustain these interests, may stay the hand of Japan, and may be the means of avoiding war instead of provoking it.

At the same time the longer these forces remain on the spot the greater their danger of being cut off and destroyed. If they leave too early, or leave precipitately, they may be saved but this action may not only fail to give maximum support to our interests but may even be the means of provoking war by a Japan which is apt to respond with aggressiveness to a show of weakness; and to
respond with a hesitating attitude to a show of strength and determination on our part.

On the other hand, if your forces stay on the spot too long in the face of threatening dispositions of Japanese force they may be unduly and inextricably jeopardized. It seems that some degree of exposure of a portion of the forces of the Asiatic Fleet is unavoidable. If we are not willing to expose them, not only will we face the surrender of interests and policies, but we accept a weakened position and loss of prestige, and may even bring on a war, (after we have weakened our position) that we have desired to avoid.

Aside from the forces that must be exposed, for a period at least, to this increasing threat and danger, I presume that the situation will guide you into keeping other forces of the Asiatic Fleet strategically deposed in a manner that will prevent their being contained by Japanese forces and will permit them to take counter measures against Japanese forces or interests. In this way, of course, they too support the forces exposed.

Undoubtedly the disposition of your forces could be better guided if you could be kept advised in advance of actions contemplated by the State Department. Whenever it is possible to do so, we will keep you so advised, and whenever State Department policies for either temporary or longer contemplated periods can be set forth, I will keep you informed of them.

Under conditions as they are, it seems to me, that you must continue to meet each situation with the adroit firmness that has characterized you attitude and that of your predecessors,—even though exposure of some of the forces of the Asiatic Fleet is necessarily involved. I feel that the Navy Department will continue to support such a firm position. It is the Department’s intention to maintain the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific and that fact may have an important moral effect in the support of your own tactful handling of any incident.

We keep the State Department advised of your letters, also the President. They are glad to get your letters. We are continually on the lookout with the State Department for anything of moment and of interest to you. To date nothing has been forthcoming other than what you know from despatches. I feel safe in saying that at present the State Department does not believe war probable in the near future, at least not in 1940; and that any pressure they put on they hope to apply in such a manner as not to precipitate a final crisis. Of course, they are in close touch with Senator Pittman who is the sponsor of an embargo bill. As framed, this would permit the President to prescribe as to if and when to apply it. In other words, it can be used advisedly along with other forms of pressure. We will make every effort to keep you in touch with the situation, which is now, with the abrogation of the treaty, getting into a stage which will be interesting to say the least.

With reference (in your letter of December 1) to the reversal of our attitude on your proposal relative to defense of Shanghai settlements. I will simply state now that when I sent you the despatch I did so after a conference, at which, I, at least personally understood the stand represented to be a Government stand and one which the State Department fully approved. Somebody reversed. Either I was wrong or the State was wrong in the understanding. However, that is water over the dam and I think it better to let it stay that way. I simply want to let you know that here in the Navy Department we felt we were on sound ground and acting in perfect good faith with the State Department. I had some uncomfortable moments and so did the State Department before the second telegram was sent to you. It is only fair to assume we were both acting in good faith.

You know Harry Yarnell thinks we should never precipitate anything in the Western Pacific unless the principally interested powers (United States-French-British-Dutch) act in concert. The possibility of getting such concerted action appears to me to be improbable during the present unpredictable state of affairs in Europe. We have been turning over in our heads whether you could use Hongkong, Singapore, North Borneo, or French or Dutch possessions, but there is no indication that any of them would be available. If we have to intern anything and have any option, naturally it would be desirable to select ports in countries which might be with us later, or at least friendly to us.

To return to some of the purely naval aspects of the situation, there have been added certain forces for which the plans now available in the Department do not provide. In regard to patrol planes I presume that they should be added to the local defense forces to work in conjunction with destroyers and submarines and with the Army. I assume that they would remain in Manila Bay for approximately the same time as the submarines, although it may be found
necessary to send away the tender early in the game. This of course can be determined only by the man on the spot with full recognition of existing conditions. If they have to look for shelter they probably would have more freedom of movement for internment in Singapore, for example, than any other port—and of course internment in Singapore might well turn out not to be internment in the end. It might be possible to have them work their way back home depending on the situation in Guam, Wake, and Midway.

The mining situation is receiving a great deal of thought in particular as a result of Smeallie's letter. We have authorization for the construction of mine stowage at Marivales, but it appears impracticable, and may be undesirable, to attempt to get money for that purpose at this time. For the present it would appear necessary to continue this stowage at Cavite.

Another problem arises, however, on the question of mine stowage. The six P-class submarines that we sent you are not now fitted to handle submarine torpedo tube-mines but I am advised that they can be so fitted by providing stowage and handling fittings for mines, both fore and aft. I believe that this work can be accomplished by the submarines being laid up for no longer a period than two or three weeks. It would be highly desirable in my opinion for these submarines to be fitted to lay mines and for mines to be available for this purpose at Manila. This would involve a minimum of 48 mines per submarine or a minimum for which stowage capacity would be required for about 300 of these mines. We would be glad to have your thought and recommendation on this point.

We have no mines at present suitable for laying by aircraft.

In regard to logistics, provision must be made of course for oil and rendezvous. We realize that and the War Plans provide for it. In addition to what provision we can make, I [6] assume you would exercise a perfectly free reign and would arrange to charter what you would consider to be necessary if suitable vessels can be found available.

I have not mentioned the Marines or the Army. I have talked to Holcomb. He does not know himself just what the plan is for the Marines, but states that that depends almost entirely on arrangements more or less under your control, as for example hooking up with the Chinese, removal, and, in the last analysis, possible capture.

I have taken up the question of reinforcements for the Philippines by the Army—both troops and planes. I think Marshall would be glad to send them if he had them. I suggested a minimum of 20,000 men and a considerable number of planes. Of course I realize that they would have to be sent out more or less unostentatiously, if we were ever able to send them, and frankly, of this I have very little hope—just at present NONE. Our army seems to be so dispersed, so small, so lacking in material and so few units available outside of the essentials in Hawaii and the Canal that the outlook for stationing any considerable detachment elsewhere looks hopeless just now.

The question of the relief of the AUGUSTA is in the mill at present. I am referring it to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, with the idea of getting the AUGUSTA back for a much needed overhaul and for an increase in her antiaircraft battery, including other important military alterations. The neger in the wood pile just now is that the only ship available is the HOUSTON which has been fixed up for more or less quick use by the President whenever he wants to cruise in the Pacific. We are hoping to be able to fix up another ship at no great cost. Whether it will be the HOUSTON, the INDIANAPOLIS or the CHICAGO we will inform you after the threshing it out here. I assume it makes no difference to you. Of course whatever you get will be one of the modified ships, with the increased antiaircraft battery of 8 guns.

I have had a copy made up of allotments which we have recently sent you although if I remember this has been previously covered.

Please excuse the length of this letter but as it will come by officer messenger I have tried to cover what I thought you had in mind about being kept in touch.

As an item of interest the question of whether to stay in the Philippines or get out of the Philippines has recently been debated in the Town Hall program—New York. One of the speakers was Mr. Paul McNutt. I am enclosing a record of that meeting.

My own personal feeling is that we cannot do other than get out unless the Filipinos of their own volition and in no uncertain voice request us to remain. There is a point of honor involved as I see it which must be followed.

[7] Of course I could indulge in some wishful thinking that consistent with the foregoing we could greatly improve Guam for possible future contingencies.

What is your opinion on this?
I trust that Carolyn has fully recovered by now and that you and all the little Harts are fine. Your prospective daughter-in-law was in the Department the other day and those who saw her said she was an exceptional, highly intelligent, fine looking girl. Am sorry to say I missed her.

Keep cheerful—all good wishes.

Sincerely,

Admiral T. C. Hart,
U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
USS AUGUSTA.

Since dictating the foregoing, I have your letter of 29 Jan.—I would work neither my planes nor my ships not one whit more than I felt the situation called for—in fact I would conserve them just as far as possible.

H. R. Stark.

22 October 1940.

Dear Tommy: You will have heard from J. O. Richardson via the HOUSTON before this reaches you and I really haven't much to add.

I was tickled to pieces over your going on to Manila as per your plans and scratched off a despatch with quick approval in which Colonel Knox thoroughly concurred.

I am delighted that you have practically all important units out of China but here again, we are leaving this entirely to your discretion.

The situation is not good and does not seem to be improving but just how critical it is no one ever knows.

I wish there was something I could give you from the State Department but there isn't. I think I may say safely, however, that there will be no backdown anywhere by the United States in the Far East, unless there is a right-about-face in present day policy.

JO's memorandum to you really gave all my thoughts and this note is just to let you know we are thinking about you and are glad you are on the job. I noted that in acknowledging my last letter you did not use the word "affirmative" which I asked you to send if you approved of the idea to send some heavy cruisers to you.

I am delighted over the prospect of getting our women and children out of the Far East and know what a relief it will be to you to give them the opportunity to come home, and also the knowledge that no more will be permitted to go out.

Every good wish as always.

Sincerely,

/s/ Betty.

Admiral T. C. Hart,
U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
USS AUGUSTA.

[1] Secret

12 November, 1940.

Dear Tommy,

We are pushing ahead as rapidly as possible on the preparation of material and personnel for any eventualities. While there is much still to be done (a condition that will continue to exist for years) I can not say that matters are unsatisfactory, so far as concerns things under my control. But we do not yet know the direction which affairs may take.

For the past three weeks I have been spending many hours, together with a group of officers particularly concerned, in developing a broad estimate of the material situation as it affects possible naval war operations. This estimate, or study, is now in the hands of the President. I do not expect any immediate decision, but do hope that it will serve to clarify matters so that, at least, those in authority will be fully aware of the implications of any particular policy that may be adopted with respect to the war.

Ghormley tells me the British expected us to be in the war within a few days after the reelection of the President—which is merely another evidence of their slack ways of thought, and of their non-realistic views of international political conditions, and of our own political system. They have been talking, in a large way, about the defense of the Malay Barrier, with an alliance between them-
selves, us, and the Dutch, without much thought as to what the effect would be in Europe. But we have no idea as to whether they would at once begin to fight were the Dutch alone, or were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese. Then again, the copy of the British Far Eastern War Plan which Thomas obtained at Singapore, shows much evidence of their usual wishful thinking. Furthermore, though I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will resist an attempt to capture their islands, I question whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only Singapore, were attacked.

The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we can make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely with you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore [2] the fields of:

Command arrangements,
General objectives,
General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and military deployment.

You are, of course, committed to assist the Army in the defense of Luzon. But with allied bases to fall back on, your direct support of the Army might well fall short, in degree, of the support you would afford were we alone to fight Japan.

I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so. In fact, I believe she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It is even doubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It seems more likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position in readiness, to consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a more or less gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Should we refrain from imposing additional economic sanctions, present conditions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract might be stabilized over a considerable period of the future. Our State Department, as you may know, had a hand in the execution of that contract.

But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance of British, Dutch and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to:

(a) Occupy Guam, and reenforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and some air;
(b) Establish naval control of Philippine waters by destroying our naval and air forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast detachment in Halmahera;
(c) Capture Luzon with troops now based in Formosa and Hainan;
(d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed from East to West.

I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power through economic starvation; the success of the blockade would surely depend upon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Your own action would, of course, be based upon your views as to the most effective method of contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.

One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we would support you, probably by sending a naval reenforcement to you at Soerabaja or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your views as to the size and composition of such a reenforcement; but in making your recommendation I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the Mid-Pacific, that we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, and that the collapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward the Atlantic.

You may well appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse).

The naval part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war is about completed, and will be on its way to you within a short time. We are hoping to send naval attachés to Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Balikpapan, and Ceylon; possibly one of these officers may bring this plan to you via air transportation.

We are all delighted to be able to put over the dependent thing for you. The State Department strongly supported us. I can appreciate the coals that must have been heaped upon you when it was learned that, while we were forcing our dependents home, the Army was sending dependents out.
You know how glad I always am for any opportunity to assist any or all of the Little Harts, as well as the Big Hart, in any way in which I can.

Keep cheerful,

Sincerely

/s/ Betty.

Admiral T. C. Hart,

P. S. Am sixty today. Here’s hoping! The first three score are the hardest!

Admiral Hart

18 November 1940.

P. S. Admiral Brownson’s name is being submitted to the President on the list going over to him for consideration in connection with the new destroyer. Here’s hoping.

Secret
Op-10-MD

August 28, 1941.

Dear Tommy: Since I last wrote you, much water has gone over the dam.

I will not burden you with my recent cruise in the Atlantic and the meeting with the British, except to tell you that is was extremely interesting. I hope and believe much good will result. If nothing else, the fact that we got to know each other very well is bound to be helpful.

This morning, I had a long talk with Mr. Julji Kasai, member of the Japanese Parliament. I was very frank with him, as I have been with Admiral Nomura, and I find that they both seem to feel very much the same way. I think I have written you how much Admiral Nomura has impressed us with his sincere desire that our countries solve their problems amicably. There is no doubt in my mind but that he has no stomach whatever for the Tri-partite Agreement, and the same applies to Mr. Kasai. I still have some hopes, or, to put it in another way, have not given up hope that peace in the Pacific may be maintained. However, I could wish that hope were not sustained by such a slender thread.

Whether or not the Japanese will go into Thailand, I do not know. There is no doubt but that if they do, the reaction in the United States will be bad. This has been made very plan to our Japanese friends here, and, therefore, to the home government.

I am continuing to urge strengthening of the Army forces in the Philippines, particularly in planes and mechanized equipment, and I hope some tangible results will take shape.

The Russian situation has complicated the entire picture. Ambassador Ouman- sky and some of their military men from Russia are coming in tomorrow, and I know that their demands will be very urgent.

[2] There is a good deal of a three-ring circus going on hereabouts. Shortages in raw materials become more acute daily. We have our own job of enormous expansion in every department. We are pressed from all over the world to sustain the forces actually fighting at the front and, of course, we recognize the importance of this. All in all, there is a never-ending problem of struggles for priority, and this is only one of the many problems involved—and it is a tough one.

You guessed quite right with regard to our feeling about ADB. We told the British in our recent meeting what we thought of it. They now have our official letters, so one of these days we may be expecting a reply. Incidentally, I was very frank with Admiral Pound with regard to the Command situation which you have pictured in the Far East. I hope the changes which have or will take place will be helpful.

I know about the very indiscreet radio and other leaks with regard to those recently sent to China. I have taken it up with those concerned, and here’s hoping for at least some semblance of secrecy on the next one. Anyway, we shall try.

Regarding the location of the fuel oil tanks:—I was ready to accept your recommendation without going back again because, as you know, we said we would leave the decision up to you. However, Ben Moreell felt a little better after I sent the wire and your confirmation of your previous decision.

Not much general news.
We have something over 262,000 men in the Navy, of whom about 40,000 are reserves. Reenlistments for the year have averaged a little over 70 per cent—and still are. We are aiming for a monthly quota of 12,000 recruits, and I hope will attain it this fall. We have, as you may know, put on a very extensive advertising campaign in the South and in the Middle West farm belt. I am more thankful every day that I have Nimitz as a side partner at this time. I hope you enjoyed the letter which the Bureau of Navigation is sending out in the interest of increasing our reenlistments. After all, that is the greatest recruiting ground we have if we can make it effective.

Of course, the heavy expansion puts a terrific burden on the forces afloat, but it seems inevitable that it happens that way. [3] As you know, I started in almost the minute I got here for great expansion in personnel, but, like everything else, it takes TIME.

There is much talk at present regarding possibility of Japanese interference with our sending material to Russia; that is, if it goes between the Japanese Islands and through the Sea of Japan to the Maritime Provinces. I rather doubt if they will take any immediate action, because it seems to me they are in one of those hesitation periods, but, of course, it is something that can not be discounted. Have you any line at all on the efficiency of the Russian submarines in the Pacific. Do you recommend any Staff talks with them? When the question you raised concerning closing the Sulu Sea came up here, I felt it inadvisable to make any proclamation, at least at that time for fear that later on, for some reason or other, the Japanese might use such an action by us as a precedent for...their closing the Sea of Japan. However, people don't seem to need much in the way of precedent in these days, that being more of a case of "Can one get away with it?"

We are directing Kimmel today to start his Southeast Force of two light cruisers, which you will recall WPL-51 envisaged. We have a Radar in the Galapagos Area—incidentally, another one just at present Southeast of Bermuda. We are starting considerable operations between North America and Ireland and the Good Lord knows if the Germans want an excuse for war, they have plenty. I have had just exactly 11 1/2 hours at this desk so far today, and I am afraid this letter will be terribly disjointed and loose, but I just felt like sitting down and talking to you for a while. I am going up to the Old Allies Inn for a bite and am coming back to finish up. There seems no end to it. Things move so slowly at times, but I suppose no matter how they move, we would still be impatient. Anyway, here's hoping, and every good wish to you in the wide world, as always.

Sincerely,

/s/ Betty.

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. N.
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
U. S. S. Houston, c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California.

[4] P. S. I hope to get up home over Sunday—Labor Day. I realise how much that would mean to you too. I often recall what someone once told me—"In this man's Navy, hard work gets you more hard work"—and no truer words were ever said.

I just had a happy thought and indulged myself in it and called up Carolyn and told her I was writing you. That fine girl had only cheerful things to say, and her voice just sounded glad. She said the best news she had—after being out all day—was to come home and find two letters from you. She also stated that the children are all fine and, in fact, everything was fine. Just what I would have expected from her, so I'll wind up here with good night.

Keep cheerful.

P. S. No. 2. I am taking up with Jerry Land and, in fact, already had before receiving your letter, the question of radio operators in his Merchant ships.

Regarding the docking of the four ships you mentioned—-I knew Jerry had had his troubles on this score, so many departments being involved and hands being tied.

[1] Op-10D-MD

November 1, 1941.

Dear Tommy: This will be in answer to yours of September 30 and October 7. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are in good fettle.
I am glad you wrote the official letter about the slowness with which official documents reach you. Of course, I am very sorry that conditions were such that the letter was required. I think the situation will be met alright; give us a jolt if it occurs again; it's the only way we can lick it.

I have run down what information I could on the status of the Radar equipment which was slated for the Sixteenth Naval District.

I find that two (2) units SCR-268 and one (1) unit 270-b had been shipped from San Francisco on September 8, 1941. I was later advised that the Department had been informed that the equipment arrived in Manila on September 29, 1941. By this time, I suppose installation is well under way. I am hoping that it will live up to expectations. If it does, it will be a great help.

Your reference to the Russians! I agree that it would be a fine idea to get as much information as possible about them. At the moment, there seems to be little chance of learning anything authoritative. An officer on duty in the Department (in the far Eastern section of O. N. I.) recently returned from temporary duty in London. During the course of his "inquiring around" in the Admiralty, a Britisher in the Intelligence branch remarked of the Russians that they were "Acquisitive, Acquisitive, and Secretive." That seems to about size them up. Our officer stated that the British just don't have anything of value on them. The British think, however, that the Russian Navy is probably better than we might ordinarily be inclined to think. The secretiveness of the Russians is hard to understand. I suppose, however, so many hands have been turned against them in the past that their current attitude is merely an outgrowth of the past. Even so, they do not permit the foreign attaches and correspondents to go to the front.

[2] Our Moscow Mission, as you no doubt know, has returned. Admiral Standley is enthusiastic about the Russians. He feels that they will hold on for a long time to come. I am informed that General Burns shares his views. I hope they are correct. One thing we do know is that they are in need of much material. How that is going to be gotten to them remains a problem which will give us many a headache before it is solved.

I am sorry that the PT situation was not better handled. I trust that the many problems in connection with them can be worked out. The tender situation is in hand, and I hope the fuel arrangements can be satisfactorily handled too.

The Bureau of Ships has informed me that spare parts ample to recondition engines on the station were shipped from Detroit on October 5, 1941. Further, seventy-five percent of the base tools are scheduled for delivery between now and February, 1942. Ships is sending a factory service engineer to Manila. Captain Kintner has just called to say that, depending on the vagaries of transportation, this engineer should arrive some time in November.

As noted above, I trust that the fuel situation works out satisfactorily. For the time being, and until you can get 100 octane gas, BuShips advises that you can use 87 octane at 4/5 load. This, I am informed, is the only type of gas that was available to these craft during their employment in the South last winter.

I hope that the PTs will be of real service to you. The British think they are fine. On the other hand, I quote about them from a recent letter from Kimmel:

"The 12 PTs which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use in this area. We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Oahu to Molokai. The reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were practically useless in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of them had to turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from being thrown about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use out here."

We are considering sending you six (6) more PTs and the NIAGARA as a tender. We are asking the Bureau of Ships to get the "FLORENCE D" for employment as you propose. That will let you have the GOLD STAR up your sleeve for velvet.

These boats have shown weakness when pounded into heavy seas. I might add that we know the weaknesses of these PTs. We gave them some grueling tests in fairly heavy weather from New London up around Block Island, down around Fire Island and back. They made a destroyer [3] "hump to stay with them, but all the boats which made the race suffered severe structural damage. We deliberately pounded them to see what they would stand and to develop their weaknesses. Profiting by what we learned, we hope to develop a much sturdier craft. Meanwhile, we sent out what we had, hoping they would be of some use.

I trust you will be glad to get the additional SS.
Sorry we cannot give you any more PBTs at the moment. They are just not to be had. The PBTs that we have gotten to date are not, as one might suppose, the result of our "big (May, 1940) money". New production of these will not come off the line until April, 1942. The planes that are now leaving the factories are those contracted for and paid for by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands. The VOS we are sending you is a good plane. The engines are excellent, and there are no "bugs" in them. Next to the PBY, they are decidedly the best type we have for your purpose. They can carry two 325-pound depth bombs, and that is pretty good. Two hundred forty (240) of these depth bombs are on their way out, and some seven hundred twenty (720) more are to follow shortly. I believe these planes will do good work for you as an inner anti-submarine patrol. It is true that the radio is not as high-powered as we wish it were—but even that might be to your advantage. These 24 planes and personnel will complete assembly by about January 1, 1942 at the Naval Air Station, San Pedro, and will be despatched from that point.

With reference to your problem of cooperation with the Army, I suggest that consideration be given to the agreement Kimmel and General Short are now using at Pearl Harbor. The name of the paper, a copy of which you now have is "Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base." Our file room tells me it went out along with Serial 059230 of June 20, 1941.

Your remarks about the ballast in the ST. LOUIS are noted. Mike Robinson states that the need for ballast in that ship came about as the result of endeavoring to introduce extensive improvement and changes in an existing design. The ship was laid down as a development of the BROOKLYN class, with engine and boiler arrangements modified to decrease damage from underwater explosion; the secondary battery was changed from open pedestal mounts to enclosed twin 5"-25 caliber mounts; and finally fire control was extensively rearranged to improve overhead view. Twin 5"38 caliber guns were subsequently developed, and this type was adopted instead of the 5"-25 caliber. This, together with director alterations, put a great deal of topside weight in the ship. The result of these changes was that, while the ST. LOUIS was entirely satisfactory from damage stability point of view under loaded conditions, she was not satisfactory in a light condition, and ballast accordingly had to be added to make her satisfactory to withstand heavy underwater [4] damage under any conditions of load. Subsequent alterations, recommended by the King Board, added more weight; this, of course, required that additional ballast be added. Mike Robinson remarked: "I feel very bad about the whole situation. I hardly think anyone can be blamed. If blame there be, it should be on our Naval Treaty Limitations. When one is given 10,000 tons around which to construct a ship, it follows that every effort is going to be made to get as much into the ship as possible. This the constructors did. When the new requirements for heavy anti-aircraft batteries came along, there just wasn't enough reserve stability left in the design to take care of the additional weights." Voila.

I took up the matter of Brooke-Popham's activities and the publicity given the meetings of the United States and British Commanders in the Far East with Admiral Sir Charles Little of the British Joint Staff Mission. A few days since, I had a note from him which said, "We have referred the matter to the Chiefs of Staff in London." It would seem that that reference should take care of the matter.

I referred the matter of your mines to the Bureau of Ordnance. Blandy has just brought in a letter which appears to cover the subject pretty thoroughly. I am enclosing a copy of it, which may be of assistance to you.

I am sorry about Remis. It was our impression that he would be a good one for that job. You have had tough luck with your commandants.

As for your recommendation about Glassford. I am not prepared to give you an answer at this moment. I appreciate the fact that he has been out there well over two (2) years, but these are unusual times. The Department of State has many reasons why a Flag Officer should be kept on the river. We practically have to go along with this on, and I can think of no one at the moment better qualified for the job than Glassford. I will discuss with Nimitz the many angles that your recommendation suggests to me and see if we can't work out something.

In your letter of August 19, you recommended that the Department select the officer it desired ultimately to relieve you and send him out forthwith. More recently (September 30) you asked what had become of Horne's and Greenslade's candidacy for your job. All I can say at the moment is that neither of
these officers is available and both are doing important duty in their present assignments.

Of course, I have been searching my mind for some time for someone who has all the many exacting qualifications for your relief. As you can well imagine—but, due to modesty, you would probably not admit—the job of finding someone to measure up to your standards has not been an easy one. Many officers no doubt are available, but, in the important job you now hold, the run-of-the-mine chap just will not do. We have to have the very best. To list just some of the necessary qualifications: he must be acceptable to the President and the Secretary; he must be mentally and physically vigorous; he must possess a fine strategical mind; he must be an inspiring leader; he must be possessed of great common sense and balance; he must be able to take care of us in conferences and guard us with the British while still viewing the problem as a whole; he must have a profound knowledge of the employment of the most important weapon he will have at his disposal—the submarine; and, finally, I must have complete confidence in him. Your station is the front line trench and one with no less qualifications than those listed can be considered.

I am considering Nimitz; it would be like losing one of my arms here; I have not even broached it to the Secretary. I am just telling you what is in my mind—if and when you tell me you feel you should be relieved.

I realize 3 years are a long time on the Asiatic—particularly when it stretches out indefinitely beyond a life of service and normal retiring age. It was not easy for me to ask you to continue in the Far East—in lots of ways I hated to do it—but I could think of no one else so well qualified to serve our country out there in time of stress. Moreover, I did it also because I know your rugged honesty—and that you will unhesitatingly tell me if you think, for any reason I should send out someone else. Please tell me exactly how you feel about it.

With all good wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ Betty.

Admiral T. C. Hart, U. S. Navy
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
% Postmaster, Asiatic Station,
San Francisco, California.

[1] Secret
(Re6b)
From: The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance
To: The Chief of Naval Operations
Subject: Effect of Sea Growth on Mines with Special Reference to a Mine Recovered in Manila Bay and Reported in a Personal letter from Admiral Hart to Admiral Stark

1. A dispatch has been prepared containing essentially the following:

"More detailed report on recovered mine including photographs is requested. It is suggested that this mine may have been the one reported lost in Sixteenth Naval District letter S76-1 Serial C-9001 dated 5 February 1941. Attention is called to the fact that tests as long as two years off Kitty Hawk and in Florida waters even when resulting in apparent encrustation did not prevent operation. It is suggested that condition of field in Manila Bay be tested by sweeping a few mines at the end. First so as to make contact with antennae and second so as to cut steel mooring with subsequent inspection under control of personnel trained in mine recovery."

2. More detailed comment has been submitted by Commander J. B. Glennon of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory as follows:

"The following comments are submitted relative to sea growth on mines at Cavite and elsewhere:

"In carrying out mine endurance tests off the coast of North Carolina, the Bureau has encountered the problem of sea growth on all assemblies not promptly recovered. Observation of tests units on return to the Naval Ordnance Laboratory practically always gives an impression similar to, but in lesser degree than that outlined by Admiral Hart. It generally appears that steel surfaces are encrusted and horns at times rendered inoperative by a rigid layer of marine growth. Investigation of this feature has shown that the condition of the marine growth changes very rapidly when removed from the sea water, and that growths which readily brush away when under water become rigid obstructions once
they start drying out. Thus this dry coating does not give a true picture of the service condition.

[2] "Underwater tests on heavily coated mines and floats down seven months at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, showed that mine horns and float horns readily functioned on impact. Mines tested for endurance over considerably longer periods in the same water frequently have been fired by contacting the antenna with a steel wire. In general, difficulty in firing on the test field due to fouled antenna has never been reported.

"There are four distinct ways in which sea growth might be pictured as interfering with the operation of the Cavite mines:

(a) Heavy coating on the lower antenna. This antenna serves as mine mooring cable and is held rigid under a 300 lb. tension. It is ½"" pure copper rope. Rubbing of this rigid wire by passing submarine should brush aside any wet growth that will cling to copper after a few months exposure.

(b) Heavy coating on upper antenna. The tension in this antenna is probably less than 30 lbs. There appears the possibility that brushing contact of a submarine might not clear a bright spot through even a wet coating on this antenna. However, irregularities on the submarine can exercise extra stress in passing. More important, this copper antenna is fitted with a horned float.

(c) Float horns. Each of these consists of a copper cup surrounding a star shaped steel disc. Any sea growth existing on the copper surface of the cup need only be punctured or brushed aside by a sharp steel point of the star shaped disc when the horn is bumped by a passing ship.

(d) Mine horns. These consist of a copper disc within a steel cup. The blunt edge of the copper disc must be driven through any wet sea growth between cup and disc. The available force for this blow between a ship and a mine, weighing more than 500 lbs. appears sufficient to brush aside reasonable quantities of wet sea growth as this open space is only 3/4" wide.

"So long as any one of these four means of firing remains open, the mine should be considered dangerous.

[3] "It appears desirable to know whether the mine recovered by fishermen at Cavite was inspected by Naval authorities before or after exposure to the air, if any immersed parts were tested for sea growth resistance what was the finding? Did sea growth on mine cling to copper surfaces? In addition, information is desired as to whether the mine was opened and inspected by Naval personnel, were the safety devices or other features tested for performance, was the mine positively identified as a live-loaded unit recently planted, has a report been submitted to the Bureau of Ordnance.

"Commandant Sixteenth District's letter S76-1 Serial C-9001 dated 5 February 1941 reported the laying of two experimental mines off Corregidor on 6 August 1940. One of these was recovered complete on 29 January 1941 and was reported upon in detail. As no mention of sea growth appears in the report, it would seem that this objectionable feature is not always present to an important degree. Photographs of these Cavite mines after six months submergence show no evidence of abnormal sea growth.

"Nothing in the above should be taken to indicate that the Naval Ordnance Laboratory desires to belittle the bad effect of sea growth upon mines, especially those in tropical waters. The Cavite mines will suffer both in firing efficiency and tidal efficiency. The field should be continually augmented with new mines. Present estimates are that the Cavite mines should be considered ineffective 'after one year'.”

3. In addition to measures which may be taken to repair deficiencies of the present fields by addition of Mark 6 mines, it is intended to supply new types of mines for use by the Asiatic Fleet in the defense of the same areas. The procurement of these mines has started and shipments will begin at an early date.

/s/ W. H. P. Blandy.

LWMcK/ELH

Op-100-MD

November 7, 1941.

Dear Tommy: Recently, the Fifth Sea Lord, Rear Admiral A. L. St. George Lyster, Royal Navy, visited the United States. He made a careful inspection of our manner of operation of aircraft and our aircraft facilities, both afloat and ashore. On the conclusion of his inspection, he submitted to us his frank observations in the form of the attached notes. I thought they would be of interest.
and am sending them along. Admiral Lyster impressed all of us as being an exceptional officer.

In addition, I am sending a copy of the notes made by Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten as the result of his observations in the fleet. He, too, impressed me as being a very capable officer. He is keen, alert, intelligent, and is remarkably articulate. In brief, he makes a very splendid impression. I am sure much good will result from the observations of both of these officers.

Events are moving rapidly toward a real showdown, both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. The Navy is already in the war of the Atlantic, but the country doesn’t seem to realize it. Apathy, to the point of open opposition, is evident in a considerable section of the press. Meanwhile, the Senate is dragging out the debate with reference to the arming of the merchantmen. Whether the country knows it or not, we are at war.

The sinking of the REUBEN JAMES, together with its large loss of life, will do much to bring closer home this fact. Incidentally, early reports indicate that she was struck on the port side just about the vicinity of the magazine. It is probable that the magazine exploded, since the forward part of the ship just disintegrated. There were only two survivors from the forward part of the ship—the boatswain’s mate of the watch and the helmsman.

The SALINAS did a good job of getting in—She took two torpedo hits with no loss of life. The submarine surfaced fairly close aboard sometime after the torpedoing and the Salinas thinks she got a shell into her. The submarine submerged and her position was given a good depth charging by a nearby destroyer. They think they got her!

You no doubt have noted in the press the conversations going on between the State Department and the Japanese Foreign Office. Mr. Kurusu’s trip to the United States has its dramatic appeal, but I am dubious of it having any real influence.

I hope this finds you in fine fettle. Keep cheerful! With all good wishes. Sincerely,

/s/ Betty.

Admiral T. C. Hart, U. S. N.
U. S. S. Houston,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

Enclosures—Mountbatten’s notes
Lyster’s notes

Secret
Op-10-MD

November 8, 1941.

Dear Tommy: We have at last gotten a decision regarding withdrawal of the Marines. I have immediately acquainted you with that fact by radio. The gun boats are still in the balance, and we have requested further word from you on this.

The Japanese situation looks almost like an impasse to me, and I wouldn’t be surprised at anything happening in the next month or two. I imagine your picture of that is just about as close as mine. The two points of view appear to me simply irreconcilable. But of this, more should be in the open before long.

I have been pressing Marshall to press the British for more air force in the Singapore area. I won’t go into the details, but I think we have very good grounds from every standpoint, both as to their present position at home, and as from their position in the Far East, and their airplane situation in general, to insist on their strengthening the Malay barrier. As you know, the British Navy is sending marked increases to the Eastern theater. I only wish we could have gotten all this started some time ago. It might have acted as a very great deterrent, but, in any case, I feel that the speeding up of these operations at present is vital.

Here’s hoping.
Every good wish.
Sincerely,

/s/ Betty.

Admiral T. C. Hart, U. S. N.
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, U. S. S. Augusta,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.